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Quotes of the Day:
“There are no uninteresting things, only uninterested people.”
– G.K. Chesterton
"If you hear a voice within you say 'you cannot paint,' then by all means paint and that voice will be silenced."
– Vincent Van Gogh
“The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self-restraint to keep from meddling with them while they do it.”
– Theodore Roosevelt
1. 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
2. Inside Pete Hegseth’s Rocky First Months at the Pentagon
3. Why RFE/RL Matters
4. ‘Amateur hour’: Washington aghast at Trump administration’s war plan group chat
5. Waltz’s future in doubt following accidental war plan leak
6. ‘Sloppy,’ ‘incompetent’ intelligence chiefs hammered for Signal chat
7. Counter-terrorism efforts reduced by Trump cuts
8. Noem says she plans to ‘eliminate FEMA’
9. Signal Chat Blunder Shows Pitfalls of Trump’s Ad Hoc Approach to Foreign Policy
10. Lessons From the Signal Chat on the Houthis
11. Report: Army Special Ops Issues 'Threat Advisory' Over Tesla Attacks
12. U.S. Agrees to Help Russia Boost Exports in Ukraine Talks
13. Trump’s Tariff War Forces Allies to Choose Resistance or Surrender
14. The U.S. Missile Launcher That Is Enraging China
15. Don’t Throw the (USAID) Baby Out With the Bathwater…Remodel the Bathroom
16. The Blame Game: The state of the US-Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations by Sir Lawrence Freedman
17. The South Pacific Is the New Frontline in the Rivalry with China
18. A Signal Screwup—and What It Means
1. 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
The 31 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf
I think this is a useful report. The most important part is on pages 29-30 Adversarial Cooperation. This is the first official report that I have seen that definitively identifies the cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea.
The question is will the classified version of this report be used to inform and formulate the new National Security Strategy?
That said there is one main weakness to this report (which illustrates my usual bias). While the north Korean section is a good assessment of the range of threats, the one threat that is not described is the threat of regime instability and collapse. It is light on north Korean cyber activities nor does it describe the regime's weapons proliferation and global illicit activities. It also does not describe any of north Korea's malign influence activities (though it describes those of China, Russia, and Iran). However the most important omission is that it does not describe the Kim family regime's ultimate strategic aim which is to dominate the Korean peninsula under its rule. I am sure the analysts assess that since this is unlikely to happen, they did not include it in the assessment. However, it is important to understand the nature of the regime and its objective and strategy to effectively address the entire threat.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 2
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................. 4
NONSTATE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS ....................................... 5
Foreign Illicit Drug Actors ..................................................................................................... 5
Transnational Islamic Extremists ............................................................................................ 6
Other Transnational Criminals ............................................................................................... 7
MAJOR STATE ACTORS .......................................................................................................... 9
China..................................................................................................................................... 9
Russia .................................................................................................................................. 16
Iran ..................................................................................................................................... 22
North Korea......................................................................................................................... 26
Adversarial Cooperation ....................................................................................................... 29
2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4058-2025-annual-threat-assessment
Published: 25 March 2025
This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community, which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America's interests anywhere in the world.
Download the report.
2. Inside Pete Hegseth’s Rocky First Months at the Pentagon
Inside Pete Hegseth’s Rocky First Months at the Pentagon
The disclosure of battle plans on a chat app created a new predicament for the defense secretary.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/25/us/politics/pete-hegseth-signal-chat-pentagon.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm
By Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt
Reporting from Washington
Even before he disclosed secret battle plans for Yemen in a group chat, information that could have endangered American fighter pilots, it had been a rocky two months for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
Mr. Hegseth, a former National Guard infantryman and Fox News weekend host, started his job at the Pentagon determined to out-Trump President Trump, Defense Department officials and aides said.
The president is skeptical about the value of NATO and European alliances, so the Pentagon under Mr. Hegseth considered plans in which the United States would give up its command role overseeing NATO troops. After Mr. Trump issued executive orders targeting transgender people, Mr. Hegseth ordered a ban on transgender troops.
Mr. Trump has embraced Elon Musk, the billionaire chief executive of SpaceX and Tesla. The Pentagon planned a sensitive briefing to give Mr. Musk a firsthand look at how the military would fight a war with China, a potentially valuable step for any businessman with interests there.
In all of those endeavors, Mr. Hegseth was pulled back, by congressional Republicans, the courts or even Mr. Trump.
The president made clear last Friday that he had been caught by surprise by a report in The New York Times on the Pentagon’s briefing for Mr. Musk, who oversees an effort to shrink the government, but also denied that the meeting had been planned.
“I don’t want to show that to anybody, but certainly you wouldn’t show it to a businessman who is helping us so much,” Mr. Trump said.
But Mr. Hegseth’s latest mistake could have led to catastrophic consequences.
On Monday, the editor in chief of The Atlantic magazine, Jeffrey Goldberg, wrote that he had been inadvertently included in an encrypted group chat in which Mr. Hegseth discussed plans for targeting the Houthi militia in Yemen two hours before U.S. troops launched attacks against the group.
The White House confirmed Mr. Goldberg’s account. But Mr. Hegseth later denied that he put war plans in the group chat, which apparently included other senior members of Mr. Trump’s national security team.
In disclosing the aircraft, targets and timing for hitting Houthi militia sites in Yemen on the commercial messaging app Signal, Mr. Hegseth risked the lives of American war fighters.
Across the military on Monday and Tuesday, current and retired troops and officers expressed dismay and anger in social media posts, secret chat groups and the hallways of the Pentagon.
“My father was killed in action flying night-trail interdiction over the Ho Chi Minh Trail” after a North Vietnamese strike, said the retired Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who served in the Iraq war. “And now, you have Hegseth. He has released information that could have directly led to the death of an American fighter pilot.”
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Mr. Hegseth disclosed the aircraft, targets and timing for hitting Houthi sites in Yemen on a Signal group chat that inadvertently included The Atlantic’s editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times
It was unclear on Tuesday whether anyone involved in the Signal group chat would lose their jobs. Republicans in Congress have been wary of running afoul of Mr. Trump. But Senator Roger Wicker, Republican of Mississippi and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, indicated on Monday that there would be some kind of investigation.
John R. Bolton, a national security adviser in the first Trump administration, said on social media that he doubted that “anyone will be held to account for events described by The Atlantic unless Donald Trump himself feels the heat.”
In his article, Mr. Goldberg said he was added to the chat by Michael Waltz, Mr. Trump’s current national security adviser.
On Tuesday, Mr. Trump defended Mr. Waltz. “Michael Waltz has learned a lesson, and he’s a good man,” Mr. Trump said in an interview on NBC.
Updated March 25, 2025, 7:24 p.m. ET2 hours ago
The president added that Mr. Goldberg’s presence in the group chat had “no impact at all” and that the Houthi attacks were “perfectly successful.”
To be sure, some of Mr. Hegseth’s stumbles have been part of the learning process of a high-profile job leading a department with an $850-billion-a-year budget.
“Secretary Hegseth is trying to figure out where the president’s headed, and to run there ahead of him,” said Kori Schake, a national security expert at the American Enterprise Institute. But, she added, “he’s doing performative activities. He’s not yet demonstrated that he’s running the department.”
Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University who has studied the military for decades, said the Signal chat disclosure “raises serious questions about how a new accountability standard might apply: How would he handle a situation like this if it involved one of his subordinates?”
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Mr. Hegseth has denied to reporters that he had divulged any war plans in the group chat and has criticized Mr. Goldberg as a “so-called journalist.”Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times
On Monday, Mr. Hegseth left for Asia, his first trip abroad since a foray to Europe last month in which he was roundly criticized for going further on Ukraine than his boss had at the time. He posted a video on social media of himself guarded by two female airmen in full combat gear as he boarded the plane at Joint Base Andrews. The show of security was remarkable. Not even the president is guarded that way as he boards Air Force One.
When he landed in Hawaii several hours later, Mr. Hegseth criticized Mr. Goldberg as a “so-called journalist” and asserted that “nobody was texting war plans, and that’s all I have to say about that.”
Mr. Hegseth’s stumbles started soon after he was sworn in to lead the Pentagon on Jan. 25.
In his debut on the world stage in mid-February, he told NATO and Ukrainian ministers that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders, before Russia’s first invasion, was “an unrealistic objective” and ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine. A few hours later, Mr. Trump backed him up while announcing a phone call with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to begin peace negotiations.
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Mr. Hegseth stumbled in his debut on the world stage when he told NATO and Ukrainian ministers in Brussels in mid-February that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was “an unrealistic objective” and ruled out NATO membership for Kyiv.Credit...Johanna Geron/Reuters
Facing blowback the next day from European allies and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, Mr. Hegseth denied that either he or Mr. Trump had sold out Ukraine. “There is no betrayal there,” Mr. Hegseth said.
That was not how even Republican supporters of Mr. Hegseth saw it. “He made a rookie mistake in Brussels,” Mr. Wicker said about the secretary’s comment on Ukraine’s borders.
“I don’t know who wrote the speech — it is the kind of thing Tucker Carlson could have written, and Carlson is a fool,” Mr. Wicker said, referring to the conservative media personality and former Fox News host.
Mr. Hegseth sought to recover later in the week, saying he had simply been trying to “introduce realism into the expectations of our NATO allies.” How much territory Ukraine may cede to Russia would be decided in talks between Mr. Trump and the presidents of the warring countries, he said.
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Mr. Hegseth and his wife, Jennifer Rauchet, attending a military ceremony in Warsaw. Mr. Hegseth tried to walk back his previous remarks on Ukraine later in that February trip.Credit...Omar Marques/Getty Images
Last week, Mr. Hegseth again got crosswise with Mr. Wicker over reports that the Trump administration was planning to withdraw from NATO’s military command and reduce the number of troops deployed overseas in addition to other changes to the military’s combatant commands.
Mr. Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Alabama and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a statement that they were concerned about reports that the Defense Department might be planning changes “absent coordination with the White House and Congress.”
Other signs point to a dysfunctional Pentagon on Mr. Hegseth’s watch.
Last week, the Defense Department removed an online article about the military background of Jackie Robinson, who became the first African American to play in Major League Baseball in 1947, after serving in the Army.
The article — which reappeared after a furor — was one in a series of government web pages on Black figures that have vanished under the Trump administration’s efforts to purge government websites of references to diversity and inclusion.
In response to questions about the article, John Ullyot, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement that “D.E.I. is dead at the Defense Department,” referring to diversity, equity and inclusion efforts. He added that he was pleased with the department’s “rapid compliance” with a directive ordering that diversity-related content be removed from all platforms.
Mr. Ullyot was removed from his position shortly afterward.
Sean Parnell, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said in a video that the screening of Defense Department content for “D.E.I. content” was “an incredibly important undertaking,” but he acknowledged mistakes were made.
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Mr. Hegseth ordered a ban on transgender troops serving in the military after Mr. Trump issued executive orders targeting transgender people.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times
The Pentagon leadership under Mr. Trump expressed its disdain for the military’s decades-long efforts to diversify its ranks. Last month, Mr. Hegseth said that the “single dumbest phrase in military history is ‘our diversity is our strength.’”
Mr. Hegseth also came under sharp critique from the federal judge handling a lawsuit against his efforts to ban transgender troops. “The military ban is soaked in animus and dripping with pretext,” Judge Ana C. Reyes of U.S. District Court in Washington wrote in a scathing ruling last week.
“Its language is unabashedly demeaning, its policy stigmatizes transgender persons as inherently unfit and its conclusions bear no relation to fact,” she wrote in her decision temporarily blocking the ban. “Seriously? These were not off-the-cuff remarks at a cocktail party.”
Greg Jaffe contributed reporting.
Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent. More about Helene Cooper
Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt
3. Why RFE/RL Matters
Most Americans do not grasp the importance of RFE/RL (and VOA and RFA).
This provides an exceptional view of the important work these organizations do and the contribution they manke to national security. We must never cede the narrative and the political warfare battle space to authoritarian regimes.
Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm going to talk about something a bit different: our work at RFE/RL.
Why RFE/RL Matters
https://mailchi.mp/dccad35f1b3d/could-the-eu-become-a-military-superpower-11408186?e=32a43f943e&utm
The Briefing: Radio Free Europe And Me
Readers of the Wider Europe newsletter have likely noticed the uncertain times facing Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) at the moment. On March 15, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order drastically reducing the size of RFE/RL's overseer, the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM). That was followed by a letter from Kari Lake, a senior adviser to the USAGM CEO, notifying that the Congress-approved grant that funds us has been terminated.
Despite this, we are still operating. The radio has sued both USAGM and Kari Lake over these moves, and there has been talk of possible fundingfrom the EU.
Given the circumstances, I’m going to break from the usual format and share a story I’ve never written down before -- about what RFE/RL means for me.
Behind The Iron Curtain
My father was born in Poznan, in western Poland, in 1939, just before the Nazi German invasion. With his father serving in the Polish army and later taken as a prisoner of war and his mother imprisoned for resisting the Nazi regime, my father spent most of the war in the care of his older brother and a Swedish Red Cross nurse -- a connection that proves significant later on.
After the war, my grandparents and their young son -- my father -- moved to the northern Polish port city of Gdansk in search of better job prospects. At this point in time, Sweden had one of Europe’s biggest merchant fleets and, against the grim backdrop of war-ravaged Poland, their gleaming ships in the harbor made quite an impression on my father.
Like many people stuck behind the Iron Curtain, my father listened to “the voices” -- that was what people called radio broadcasts from the BBC World Service, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe. People listened secretly, of course, holding a transistor radio up to their ears in bed at night. They were dark times, with censorship and crackdowns, but for my father those broadcasts were a godsend. They informed and they inspired, and, in my father’s case, convinced him to flee -- to the West, to Sweden.
Crossing The Icy Sea
His first attempt, when he was 17, was to try to walk from Poland across the ice-covered Baltic Sea to reach the Danish island of Bornholm. The plan was then to continue to Sweden. Winters were much harsher in those days and ice really did cover large parts of the Baltic, but it was still a foolhardy plan. Icebreaker ships made crossing on foot almost impossible and he was forced to return -- beaten but not discouraged.
The next year, he tried again, this time attempting to canoe across the sea with a friend. The teenage boys were caught by a Polish ship and turned over to the authorities. Instead of Scandinavia, they ended up in a prison cell back in Poland. Interrogated and beaten, they admitted to being CIA spies and got sentenced to 10 years.
Luckily, in the late 1950s, there were liberal reforms under way in Poland, and they were released after a year. With my father's dream of a life in the West now on hold, he got an education and met my mother. They married and both secured jobs in what were then the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk. Through all that time, he still listened to "the voices," the jazz, the rock 'n' roll that managed to escape the jammers.
Third Time Lucky
My parents' dreams of a new life abroad resurfaced, and, in 1971, they went to Yugoslavia, one of the few countries they could travel to at the time. On a beach in Pula, in today's Croatia, they saw a German couple that reminded them of themselves. The man was dark-haired like my father; the woman was blonde like my mother.
With nothing to lose, they walked up to them and asked if they were from West Germany, which they were. They then made a request so bold I still can’t quite believe how they had the audacity: they asked the German couple if they could take on their identities. And, astonishingly, the Germans said yes. (Apparently helping “easterners” in such a way was not uncommon during the Cold War.)
So, with the couple's IDs and also their car, they drove over the border to Italy. The German couple then went to the closest consulate saying that they had been mugged. After a year as political refugees in Italy, they were allowed to go to Sweden to seek residency and later citizenship.
Because of the war, my father grew up hating Germans -- so it was a sweet irony that the act of supreme generosity that gave him his freedom came from a German. They stayed in touch, sending the German couple a card every Christmas.
Closing The Circle
I was born in Sweden in the 1980s, in the peace and prosperity my parents could only dream of when they were young. Like many others from my generation, I studied abroad, spoke a few European languages, and traveled freely and widely across the continent, believing in the idea of a “common European space.” So it made a certain sense when I ended up in Brussels.
When I got an offer in early 2011 to try out as a freelance Brussels reporter for RFE/RL, I knew it was no ordinary job offer. After being brought up on tales of RFE/RL’s significance, I felt like I was closing a family circle.
When I started, in early 2011, the big news was the fraudulent presidential election in Belarus that had taken place in December the previous year and the subsequent crackdown of demonstrators taking to the streets. The EU was imposing sanctions on Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime, and I threw myself into reporting the story from Brussels. I've been reporting about the EU and NATO ever since.
Some things never change. Today (March 25), Lukashenko is being inaugurated for his seventh term and he is still facing EU sanctions. Under his repressive rule, there are an estimated 1,500 political prisoners in the country. One of them is my colleague, RFE/RL journalist Ihar Losik, who has been behind bars since 2020. Another colleague, Andrey Kuznechyk,was released earlier this year from a Belarusian prison.
When I think of Ihar and Andrey -- along with Vladyslav Yesypenko, an RFE/RL contributor who is jailed in Russia-occupied Crimea -- I can't help thinking of my father’s story and everything he did to live a free life.
We reach some 50 million people each week in places where media freedom doesn’t exist, is severely tested, or in environments flooded with disinformation. RFE/RL still matters, just as it did for my parents back in communist Poland. Just as it does for Andrey, Ihar, and Vladyslav -- and all the people they reached.
Feel free to reach out to me on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.
That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.
4. ‘Amateur hour’: Washington aghast at Trump administration’s war plan group chat
‘Amateur hour’: Washington aghast at Trump administration’s war plan group chat
Democratic lawmakers also called for investigations and hearings on the incident.
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/24/hegseth-national-security-group-chat-atlantic-reaction-00244983?utm
"Only one word for this: FUBAR," Rep. Pat Ryan (D-N.Y.), an Army veteran who sits on the Armed Services Committee, wrote on X. | Francis Chung/POLITICO
By Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer, Paul McLeary and Jack Detsch
03/24/2025 01:37 PM EDT
Updated: 03/24/2025 05:10 PM EDT
Members of Congress and national security staffers were stunned Monday by a bombshell report that top Trump administration officials — including the vice president and Defense secretary — discussed war plans in a Signal group chat.
Many raised concerns about the potential mishandling of classified information as well as sensitive details regarding U.S. war plans.
“Only one word for this: FUBAR,” Rep. Pat Ryan (D-N.Y.), an Army veteran who sits on the Armed Services Committee, wrote on X. “If House Republicans won’t hold a hearing on how this happened IMMEDIATELY, I’ll do it my damn self.”
“Get the fuck out,” said one Democratic congressional aide, capturing a general feeling on Capitol Hill that important security protocols had been broken. It’s an “operational security nightmare,” the person said. The aide, and others, were granted anonymity to be candid about a sensitive security issue involving the administration.
In the report in The Atlantic, the magazine’s editor revealed that he had accidentally been added to a group chat on the secure messaging app Signal where senior members of the Trump administration were discussing plans for airstrikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the hours before a recent wave of strikes on Yemen, an account attributed to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted detailed operational information about the targets, weapons and attack sequencing.
Inside the Pentagon, officials expressed shock that the officials used a Signal chat for such sensitive discussions.
“No, no they didn’t,” said one Defense official. “Just absolutely unbelievable.”
“DOD either doesn’t have a strong cybersecurity posture right now, or Hegseth is simply not engaging it,” said a second Defense official.
According to The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg received a request to connect on the encrypted messaging app Signal from a user named “Mike Waltz” on March 11 (presumably the Trump administration national security adviser). He was later added to a group chat called “Houthi PC small group” with several other members who appeared to be top administration officials, including Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe.
Brian Hughes, the spokesperson for the National Security Council, told the publication that the chat “appears to be an authentic message chain.” The NSC did not respond to a request for further comment from POLITICO.
President Donald Trump was asked about the report on Monday afternoon. “I don’t know anything about it,” he said. “I’m not a big fan of The Atlantic.”
Several highly sensitive, potentially classified pieces of information were included in the chat. For example, Ratcliffe listed the name of an active intelligence officer, whose identities are usually kept closely under wraps, as his point of contact for the discussion.
The government has classified communications systems in which officials can discuss sensitive information. National security experts questioned why senior Trump administration officials would resort to using Signal, a freely available app developed by a nonprofit, to discuss battle plans.
“Why in the world would you not use a high side, what we call the high side system, a secure classified system, to be discussing imminent war plans,” said Mark Zaid, a lawyer who has represented current and former national security officials and whistleblowers.
The revelation comes just days after the Defense Department promised to crack down on leaks, after multiple news outlets, including POLITICO, reported that the Pentagon was planning to give Elon Musk a military briefing on China.
“If you have a private that loses a sensitive item, that loses night vision goggles, that loses a weapon, you can bet that that private is going to be held accountable,” said Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell. “The same and equal standards must apply to senior military leaders.” The DOD has said it is launching an investigation into the leaks.
Republicans, including Waltz, have previously lambasted the mishandling of sensitive information by Democrats, most notably Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server while serving as secretary of State.
Top Democrats were quick to condemn the security lapse. Speaking on the floor of the Senate on Monday afternoon, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer called on Majority Leader John Thune to push for a “full investigation” into the lapse.
“Every single one of the government officials on this text chain have now committed a crime — even if accidentally — that would normally involve a jail sentence,” said Sen. Chris Coon of Delaware, the top Democrat on the panel that controls the Pentagon budget. “We can’t trust anyone in this dangerous administration to keep Americans safe.”
Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), the ranking member of the House intelligence committee, said he plans to use this week’s worldwide threats hearing to demand answers from top officials about the Signal texts.
Some used it as an opportunity to hit back at the Trump administration’s foreign policy.
“Amateur hour,” Sen. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), a Marine veteran, wrote in a post on X. “These are the geniuses that are also selling out Ukraine and destroying our alliances all around the world. No wonder Putin is embarrassing them at the negotiation table.
The consternation wasn’t limited to Democrats. Republican Rep. Don Bacon (Neb.), who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said that while it’s human to “accidentally send the wrong person a text,” the reports are concerning.
“The unconscionable action was sending this info over non-secure networks,” Bacon said. “None of this should have been sent on non-secure systems. Russia and China are surely monitoring his unclassified phone.”
Asked about the Atlantic story, Republican Sen. John Cornyn from Texas said, “It sounds like a huge screw-up. ... Is there any other way to describe it?”
Asked if he thought there should be an investigation, he said “I would hope that the interagency would look at that. That just sounds like somebody dropped the ball.”
That said, there were no immediate calls from Republican leadership for larger investigations or consequences.
The CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
It’s unclear how Goldberg came to be added to the group chat of senior Trump administration officials. Zaid, the national security lawyer, noted that it could have been worse.
“It proved to be a good thing I guess that it was Jeff and the Atlantic,” he said. “If it had gone to someone else, it may very well have been reported on immediately and required the scuttling of the entire operation.”
Eric Bazail-Eimil, Jordain Carney, Meredith Lee Hill and Connor O’Brien contributed to this report.
5. Waltz’s future in doubt following accidental war plan leak
I wonder who long he will last. It seems like the President's initial comments were supportive of him (e.g., "he learned an important lesson").
But that could change if the pressure intensifies.
Exclusive
Waltz’s future in doubt following accidental war plan leak
“You can’t have recklessness as the national security adviser,” one official said.
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/24/mike-waltz-signal-chat-resign-00246541?utm
White House national security adviser Mike Waltz gestures to Fox News host and President Donald Trump’s daughter-in-law, Lara Trump, after speaking with her at the White House on March 19. | Ben Curtis/AP
By Dasha Burns, Rachael Bade and Eli Stokols
03/24/2025 07:25 PM EDT
The stunning revelation that top administration officials accidentally included a reporter in a group chat discussing war plans triggered furious discussion inside the White House that national security adviser Mike Waltz may need to be forced out.
Nothing is decided yet, and White House officials cautioned that President Donald Trump would ultimately make the decision over the next day or two as he watches coverage of the embarrassing episode.
A senior administration official told POLITICO on Monday afternoon that they are involved in multiple text threads with other administration staffers on what to do with Waltz, following the bombshell report that the top aide inadvertently included Atlantic editor in chief Jeffrey Goldberg in a private chat discussing a military strike on Houthis.
“Half of them saying he’s never going to survive or shouldn’t survive,” said the official, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberation. And two high-level White House aides have floated the idea that Waltz should resign in order to prevent the president from being put in a “bad position.”
“It was reckless not to check who was on the thread. It was reckless to be having that conversation on Signal. You can’t have recklessness as the national security adviser,” the official said.
A person close to the White House was even more blunt: “Everyone in the White House can agree on one thing: Mike Waltz is a fucking idiot.”
Goldberg got a request to join Signal, an encrypted messaging app, from a “Mike Waltz” on March 11, according to the publication. He was then included in a group chat dubbed “Houthi PC small group” with what appeared to be other top administration officials including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and others.
A third person familiar with the fallout said Trump has spoken with Waltz about the matter — and the White House is, for now, standing by him.
“As President Trump said, the attacks on the Houthis have been highly successful and effective. President Trump continues to have the utmost confidence in his national security team, including national security adviser Mike Waltz,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a Monday statement. The press office declined to comment further.
A fourth White House official said they were aware of internal pressure for Waltz to own his mistake — which could mean a possible resignation. But that official said what happens to Waltz largely depends on how Trump personally feels about the matter, and noted the involvement of other administration officials in the Signal chat as well.
Two of the officials said that while Trump may lay blame at the feet of Waltz for potentially compromising U.S. national security, he could just as easily be frustrated with Vance for stepping out of line from the administration’s foreign policy in the chat, or target Hegseth as the one who allegedly shared sensitive details with the group.
“I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now. There’s a further risk that we see a moderate to severe spike in oil prices. I am willing to support the consensus of the team and keep these concerns to myself,” Vance said, according to the Atlantic’s report. “But there is a strong argument for delaying this a month, doing the messaging work on why this matters, seeing where the economy is, etc.”
It has also created an opening for longtime Waltz detractors suspicious of his neoconservative ties to push for his removal. Waltz once advised former Vice President Dick Cheney on counterterrorism but, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has in recent years shifted his foreign policy views to embrace a more “America First” approach.
Those concerns were amplified on social media Monday by a contingent of isolationist conservatives who questioned why Waltz had the Atlantic editor-in-chief’s cell phone number in the first place — suggesting it was evidence of Waltz’s continued neocon sympathies.
And while Congress has been reluctant to cross Trump in his first two months in office, some members on Monday voiced concerns about the incident. Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb.), who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said sending sensitive information over an unsecure network was “unconscionable,” while Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), chair of the Armed Services Committee, told the New York Times that it was a “concern” and that his committee would “definitely be looking into it.”
Defense hawks’ criticism of the incident is particularly noteworthy given their perception that Waltz is their guy in the administration, a sympathetic ear in a White House dominated by “America First” isolationists.
Still, the person close to the White House who dubbed Waltz a “fucking idiot,” didn’t expect any widespread repercussions from the incident.
“I don’t think there are any longterm political consequences for Trump or the Administration, outside of this potentially costing Waltz his job,” the person said.
But many Republicans on the Hill are hoping Waltz survives. Indeed, while GOP lawmakers privately said they believed some White House official would have to take the blame, House Republicans in particular have defended their former colleague Waltz.
Speaker Mike Johnson told POLITICO that Waltz should “absolutely not” resign.
“He’s exceptionally qualified for the job. He is trusted — trustworthy,” Johnson said. “He was made for that job, and I have full confidence in him.”
Megan Messerly, Meredith Lee Hill and Adam Wren contributed to this report.
6. ‘Sloppy,’ ‘incompetent’ intelligence chiefs hammered for Signal chat
Excerpts:
When Warner disputed Gabbard’s claim that the discussion contained no classified information, she said a sitting U.S. president can declassify information.
But one government counter-intelligence official who spoke to Defense One on background said that, if the Atlantic reporting is accurate, the chat’s participants likely broke one law that governs the sharing of information about military operations and another that governs the sharing of intelligence.
Whose phones?
Among lawmakers’ top concerns: Did the chat occur on personal devices or government-issued phones, and where were the participants at the time? Gabbard indicated that she had been traveling abroad during the discussion, but refused to say what kind of device she was using, citing the NSC review.
Another participant in the text discussion was Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, who was then in Moscow for meetings with Russian officials. Bennet asked Ratcliffe whether he was aware of that, and the CIA director answered that he was not.
Why does the location matter if the chat group was using an end-to-end encrypted messaging app? And Signal is widely considered among the best. It’s commonly used for communications in the civilian world and even between U.S. and partner militaries, especially in Ukraine. Ratcliffe testified today that Signal was allowed for use at the CIA, but only alongside more secure systems, not in their place. One person intimately familiar with Signal’s messaging and security features pointed out that the app’s encryption has never been broken, but it only secures messages in transit from one endpoint to another. A phone loaded with spyware—say, the Israeli-developed Pegasus, which is increasingly popular among autocratic regimes—could reveal those messages on command. “It’s as if you have a friend sitting next to you, watching you as you do everything on your phone,” said the individual.
The person added, “It doesn't matter whether you're using Signal or military-grade special [devices], if you add the wrong person to the chat, no one can help you.”
‘Sloppy,’ ‘incompetent’ intelligence chiefs hammered for Signal chat
At Senate hearing, Gabbard, Ratcliffe struggled to recall details of Yemen-strike chat shared with journalist.
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor
March 25, 2025 08:03 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
Tuesday's annual "worldwide threats" hearing—intended as a discussion of China, Russia, Iran, transnational criminal organizations, and other actors—devolved instead into something closer to a criminal deposition from Law and Order, with the heads of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence dodging senators’ questions about their use of a commercial chat app to discuss war plans and foreign affairs—all with a journalist on the line.
The fact that officials from the White House, intelligence community, and the Pentagon were using Signal to discuss highly sensitive military activities and relations with allies, possibly on their personal devices, while traveling abroad, including to Russia, and not checking who else might have been on the in the group chat exuded “sloppiness…incompetence, disrespect,” Sen. Michael Bennet, D-Colo., said during the hearing.
Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., the vice chair of the committee, described the entire chat episode as “sloppy,” but also dangerous.
“If the Houthis had this information they could have repositioned their defensive systems…American lives could have been lost.”
(The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg did not reveal operational details in his article, but merely alluded to them.) The Senate Democrats’ fiery tone stood in stark contrast to the silence of Republican lawmakers who made no effort to defend, explain, or justify the affair.
ODNI head Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe struggled to recall key details of the March 13-14 discussions, despite yesterday’s publication of a partial transcript, which was confirmed as authentic by a National Security Council spokesman. Gabbard initially refused to confirm that she was even included in the chats, citing a current National Security Council review. Minutes later, she acknowledged that she did remember certain details of the discussion—implicitly acknowledging her participation—but not other details. She also claimed that classified material had not been exposed, contrary to Goldberg’s reporting that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had posted “operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.”
Beside her, Ratcliffe confirmed that he was, indeed, the John Ratcliffe in the chat record. But he also failed to recall key details of the discussion. He claimed not to know whether classified information had been exposed. But he asserted that classified CIA data had not. (In his article, Goldberg reported that Ratcliffe sent a message that “contained information that might be interpreted as related to actual and current intelligence operations.”)
When Warner disputed Gabbard’s claim that the discussion contained no classified information, she said a sitting U.S. president can declassify information.
But one government counter-intelligence official who spoke to Defense One on background said that, if the Atlantic reporting is accurate, the chat’s participants likely broke one law that governs the sharing of information about military operations and another that governs the sharing of intelligence.
Whose phones?
Among lawmakers’ top concerns: Did the chat occur on personal devices or government-issued phones, and where were the participants at the time? Gabbard indicated that she had been traveling abroad during the discussion, but refused to say what kind of device she was using, citing the NSC review.
Another participant in the text discussion was Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, who was then in Moscow for meetings with Russian officials. Bennet asked Ratcliffe whether he was aware of that, and the CIA director answered that he was not.
Why does the location matter if the chat group was using an end-to-end encrypted messaging app? And Signal is widely considered among the best. It’s commonly used for communications in the civilian world and even between U.S. and partner militaries, especially in Ukraine. Ratcliffe testified today that Signal was allowed for use at the CIA, but only alongside more secure systems, not in their place. One person intimately familiar with Signal’s messaging and security features pointed out that the app’s encryption has never been broken, but it only secures messages in transit from one endpoint to another. A phone loaded with spyware—say, the Israeli-developed Pegasus, which is increasingly popular among autocratic regimes—could reveal those messages on command. “It’s as if you have a friend sitting next to you, watching you as you do everything on your phone,” said the individual.
The person added, “It doesn't matter whether you're using Signal or military-grade special [devices], if you add the wrong person to the chat, no one can help you.”
The use of government SIPRnet and JWICS networks, whose apps can be downloaded only to government phones, would have prevented the unintended inclusion of people without proper authorities to access such information. The use of Signal suggests that the participants were using personal devices.
If so, that would be a violation of the law, the counterintelligence official said.
“There is no official use of Signal. All government communications require use of government operated systems,” they said, citing the Electronic Records Act, which requires government communications to be retained. There is no exception for Defense Department or military use, they said.
Today’s hearing did not feature Hegseth or National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who reportedly invited Goldberg into the chat.
Waltz said today at the White House that he did not know and had never met Goldberg.
“President Trump took out the head missile leader, knocked out missiles, knocked out headquarters, knocked out the communication sites,” he said. “This journalist wants the world talking about more hoaxes…rather than the freedom that you're enabling.”
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
7. Counter-terrorism efforts reduced by Trump cuts
I think the pattern here is that these might be considered "soft power" programs.
Hard power is the priority; therefore, the only counterterrorism programs that will likely be funded will have to result in dead terrorists. (some sarcasm here).
Excerpts:
The throughline for this work is federal funding — a reliance on grants that are rapidly disappearing as the Trump administration guts billions in spending.
Tens of millions of dollars slated for violence prevention have been cut or are frozen pending review as President Donald Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency steamrolls the national security sector. Barring action from Congress or the courts, counterterrorism professionals say, the White House appears poised to end the government’s backing of prevention work on urgent threats.
“This is the government getting out of the terrorism business,” said one federal grant recipient who was ordered this week to cease work on projects including a database used by law enforcement agencies to assess threats.
This account is drawn from interviews with nearly two dozen current and former national security personnel, federally funded researchers and nonprofit grant recipients. Except in a few cases, they spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation from the Trump administration.
Dozens of academic and nonprofit programs that rely on grants from the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and other agencies are in crisis mode, mirroring the uncertainty of other parts of the government amid Trump’s seismic reorganization.
Counter-terrorism efforts reduced by Trump cuts
Tens of millions of dollars slated for violence prevention have been cut or are frozen as DOGE steamrolls the national-security sector.
By Hannah Allam
Staff Reporter, ProPublica
March 24, 2025
defenseone.com · by Hannah Allam
ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.
On a frigid winter morning in 2022, a stranger knocked on the door of a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, during Shabbat service.
Soon after he was invited in for tea, the visitor pulled out a pistol and demanded the release of an al-Qaida-linked detainee from a nearby federal prison, seizing as hostages a rabbi and three worshipers. The standoff lasted 10 hours until the rabbi, drawing on extensive security training, hurled a chair at the assailant. The hostages escaped.
“We are alive today because of that education,” Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walkersaid after the attack.
The averted tragedy at Congregation Beth Israel is cited as a success story for the largely unseen prevention work federal authorities have relied on for years in the fight to stop terrorist attacks and mass shootings. The government weaves together partnerships with academic researchers and community groups across the country as part of a strategy for addressing violent extremism as a public health concern.
A specialized intervention team at Boston Children’s Hospital treats young patients — some referred by the FBI — who show signs of disturbing, violent behavior. Eradicate Hate, a national prevention umbrella group, says one of its trainees helped thwart a school shooting in California last year by reporting a gun in a fellow student’s backpack. In other programs, counselors guide neo-Nazis out of the white-power movement or help families of Islamist extremists undo the effects of violent propaganda.
The throughline for this work is federal funding — a reliance on grants that are rapidly disappearing as the Trump administration guts billions in spending.
Tens of millions of dollars slated for violence prevention have been cut or are frozen pending review as President Donald Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency steamrolls the national security sector. Barring action from Congress or the courts, counterterrorism professionals say, the White House appears poised to end the government’s backing of prevention work on urgent threats.
“This is the government getting out of the terrorism business,” said one federal grant recipient who was ordered this week to cease work on projects including a database used by law enforcement agencies to assess threats.
This account is drawn from interviews with nearly two dozen current and former national security personnel, federally funded researchers and nonprofit grant recipients. Except in a few cases, they spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation from the Trump administration.
Dozens of academic and nonprofit programs that rely on grants from the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and other agencies are in crisis mode, mirroring the uncertainty of other parts of the government amid Trump’s seismic reorganization.
“We’re on a precipice,” said the leader of a large nonprofit that has received multiple federal grants and worked with Democratic and Republican administrations on prevention campaigns.
Program leaders describe a chilling new operating environment. Scholars of white supremacist violence — which the FBI for years has described as a main driver of domestic terrorism — wonder how they’ll be able to continue tracking the threat without running afoul of the administration’s ban on terms related to race and racism.
The training the rabbi credits with saving his Texas synagogue in 2022 came from a broader community initiative whose federal funding is in limbo. One imperiled effort, FEMA’s Nonprofit Security Grant Program, has helped Jewish institutions across the country install security cameras, train staff and add protective barriers, according to the nonprofit Secure Community Network, which gives security advice and monitors threats to Jewish communities nationwide.
In July 2023, access-control doors acquired through the grant program prevented a gunman from entering Margolin Hebrew Academy in Memphis. In 2021, when gunfire struck the Jewish Family Service offices in Denver, grant-funded protective window film stopped bullets from penetrating the building.
“These are not hypothetical scenarios, they are real examples of how NSGP funds prevent injuries and deaths,” Michael Masters, director of the Secure Community Network, wrote this month in an op-ed in The Jerusalem Post calling for continued funding of the program.
Now the security grants program has been shelved as authorities and Jewish groups warn of rising antisemitism. The generous reading, one Jewish program leader said, is that the funds were inadvertently swept up in DOGE cuts. Trump has been a vocal supporter of Jewish groups and, as one of his first acts in office, signed an executive order promising to tackle antisemitism.
Still, the freeze on grants for synagogue protections has revived talk of finding new, more independent funding streams.
Throughout Jewish history, the program director said, “we’ve learned you need a Plan B.”
The White House did not respond to requests for comment.
“Tsunami” of Cuts
For more than two decades, the federal government has invested tens of millions of dollars in prevention work and academic research with the goal of intervening in the crucial window known as “left of boom” — before an attack occurs.
The projects are diffuse, spread across several agencies, but the government’s central clearinghouse is at Homeland Security in the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, often called CP3. The office houses a grant program that since 2020 has awarded nearly $90 million to community groups and law enforcement agencies working at the local level to prevent terrorism and targeted violence such as mass shootings.
These days, CP3 is imploding. Nearly 20% of its workforce was cut through the dismissal of probationary employees March 3. CP3 Director Bill Braniff, an Army veteran who had fiercely defended the office’s achievements in LinkedIn posts in recent weeks, resigned the same night.
“It is a small act of quiet protest, and an act of immense respect I have for them and for our team,” Braniff wrote in a departing message to staff that was obtained by ProPublica. In the note, he called the employees “wrongfully terminated.”
Some of this year’s CP3 grant recipients say they have no idea whether their funding will continue. One awardee said the team is looking at nightmare scenarios of laying off staff and paring operations to the bone.
“Everybody’s trying to survive,” the grantee said. “It feels like this is a tsunami and you don’t know how it’s going to hit you.”
Current and former DHS officials say they don’t expect the prevention mission to continue in any meaningful way, signaling the end to an effort that had endured through early missteps and criticism from the left and right.
The prevention mission evolved from the post-9/11 growth of a field known as countering violent extremism, or CVE. In early CVE efforts, serious scholars of militant movements jostled for funding alongside pseudo-scientists claiming to have discovered predictors of radicalization. CVE results typically weren’t measurable, allowing for inflated promises of success — “snake oil,” as one researcher put it.
Worse, some CVE programs billed as community partnerships to prevent extremism backfired and led to mistrust that persists today. Muslim advocacy groups were incensed by the government’s targeting of their communities for deradicalization programs, blaming CVE for stigmatizing law-abiding families and contributing to anti-Muslim hostility. Among the most influential Muslim advocacy groups, it is still taboo to accept funding from Homeland Security.
Defenders of CP3, which launched in 2021 from an earlier incarnation, insist that the old tactics based on profiling are gone. They also say there are now more stringent metrics to gauge effectiveness. CP3’s 2024 report to Congress listed more than 1,000 interventions since 2020, cases where prevention workers stepped in with services to dissuade individuals from violence.
The probationary employees who were dismissed this month represented the future of CP3’s public health approach to curbing violence, say current and former DHS officials. They were terminated by email in boilerplate language about poor performance, a detail that infuriated colleagues who viewed them as accomplished social workers and public health professionals.
There were no consultations with administration officials or DOGE — just the ax, said one DHS source with knowledge of the CP3 cuts. Promised exemptions for national security personnel apparently didn’t apply as Trump’s Homeland Security agenda shrinks to a single issue.
“The vibe is: How to use DHS to go after migrants, immigrants. That is the vibe, that is the only vibe, there is no other vibe,” the source said. “It’s wild — it’s as if the rest of the department doesn’t exist.”
This week, with scant warning, Homeland Security cut around $20 million for more than two dozen programs from another wing of DHS, including efforts aimed at stopping terrorist attacks and school shooters.
A Homeland Security spokesperson confirmed “sweeping cuts and reforms” aimed at eliminating waste but did not address questions about specific programs. DHS “remains focused on supporting law enforcement and public safety through funding, training, increased public awareness, and partnerships,” the statement said.
One grant recipient said they were told by a Homeland Security liaison that targeted programs were located in places named on a Fox News list of “sanctuary states” that have resisted or refused cooperation with the government’s deportation campaign. The grantee’s project was given less than an hour to submit outstanding expenses before the shutdown.
The orders were so sudden that even some officials within the government had trouble coming up with language to justify the termination notices. They said they were given no explanation for how the targeted programs were in violation of the president’s executive orders.
“I just don’t believe this is in any way legal,” said one official with knowledge of the cuts.
Threat Research in Limbo
Cuts are reshaping government across the board, but perhaps nowhere more jarringly than in the counterterrorism apparatus. The administration started dismantling it when the president granted clemency to nearly 1,600 defendants charged in connection with the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.
The pardons overturned what the Justice Department had celebrated as a watershed victory in the fight against domestic terrorism.
Senior FBI officials with terrorism expertise have left or are being forced out in the purge of personnel involved in the Jan. 6 investigation. In other cases, agents working terrorism cases have been moved to Homeland Security to help with Trump’s mass deportation effort, a resource shift that runs counter to the government’s own threat assessments showing homegrown militants as the more urgent priority. The Justice Department did not respond to a request for comment.
Without research backing up the enforcement arm of counterterrorism, analysts and officials say, the government lacks the capacity to evaluate rapidly evolving homegrown threats.
Researchers are getting whiplash as grant dollars are frozen and unfrozen. Even if they win temporary relief, the prospect of getting new federal funding in the next four years is minimal. They described pressure to self-censor or tailor research narrowly to MAGA interests in far-left extremism and Islamist militants.
“What happens when you’re self-silencing? What happens if people just stop thinking they should propose something because it’s ‘too risky?’” said one extremism scholar who has advised senior officials and received federal funding. “A lot of ideas that could be used to prevent all kinds of social harms, including terrorism, could get tossed.”
Among the projects at risk is a national compilation of threats to public officials, including assassination attempts against Trump; research on the violent misogyny that floods social media platforms; a long-term study of far-right extremists who are attempting to disengage from hate movements. The studies are underway at research centers and university labs that, in some cases, are funded almost entirely by Homeland Security. A stop-work order could disrupt sensitive projects midstream or remove findings from public view.
“There are both national security and public safety implications for not continuing to study these very complicated problems,” said Pete Simi, a criminologist at Chapman University in California who has federally funded projects that could be cut.
One project never got off the ground before work was suspended.
Six months ago, the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Justice Department, announced the Domestic Radicalization and Violent Extremism Research Center of Excellence as a new hub for “understanding the phenomenon” of extremist violence.
Work was scheduled to start in January. The website has since disappeared and the future of the center is in limbo.
Other prevention initiatives in jeopardy at the Justice Department include grant programs related to hate crimes training, which has been in demand with recent unrest on college campuses. In the first weeks of the Trump administration, grant recipients heard a freeze was coming and rushed to withdraw remaining funds. Grant officers suggested work should cease, too, until directives come from the new leadership.
Anne Speckhard, a researcher who has interviewed dozens of militants and works closely with federal counterterrorism agencies, pushed back. She had around 200 people signed up for a training that was scheduled for days after the first funding freeze. Slides for the presentation had been approved, but Speckhard said she wasn’t getting clear answers from the grant office about how to proceed. She decided to go for it.
“I think the expected response was, ‘You’ll just stop working, and you’ll wait and see,’ and that’s not me,” said Speckhard, whose International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism receives U.S. funding along with backing from Qatar and private donations.
As the virtual training began, Speckhard and her team addressed the murkiness of the Justice Department’s support in a moment that drew laughter from the crowd of law enforcement officers and university administrators.
“We said, ‘We think this is a DOJ-sponsored training, and we want to thank them for their sponsorship,’” Speckhard said. “‘But we’re not sure.’”
This story was originally published by ProPublica.
defenseone.com · by Hannah Allam
8. Noem says she plans to ‘eliminate FEMA’
So I have to ask: If we eliminate FEMA, what is the US plan to support AMericans when they are faced with disasters?
Noem says she plans to ‘eliminate FEMA’
by Rachel Frazin - 03/25/25 1:25 PM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/5213057-noem-plans-eliminate-fema/
Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem said she planned to “eliminate” the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during a televised Cabinet meeting Monday.
While giving a status report on border security, Noem added, “and we’re going to eliminate FEMA.” She did not elaborate.
“That’s great. Great job,” President Trump said — appearing to respond to her broader status update.
Trump has been highly critical of the emergency management agency, having suggested in the past that he would consider cutting it.
“I’ll also be signing an executive order to begin the process of fundamentally reforming and overhauling FEMA, or maybe getting rid of FEMA. I think, frankly, FEMA’s not good,” Trump said in January.
However, a recent White House executive order stopped short of getting rid of the agency, instead calling for a review of disaster response policies.
That order calls on the Homeland Security secretary to propose changes and ensure “state and local governments and individuals have improved communications with Federal officials and a better understanding of the Federal role.”
FEMA coordinates disaster response in the immediate aftermath of storms and also helps with longer-term recovery.
Democrats pushed back on Noem’s comment, saying getting rid of FEMA would be abandoning communities in need.
“The Trump Administration’s grand plan for victims of natural disasters is to abandon them—and it’s a complete non-starter,” Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.) said in a written statement.
“This rash decision will harm ongoing disaster recovery efforts, and make it impossible to respond after the next natural disaster,” he added.
Tags Kristi Noem Peter Welch
9. Signal Chat Blunder Shows Pitfalls of Trump’s Ad Hoc Approach to Foreign Policy
Does anyone know if any strategic reviews are being conducted? Has DOD initiated a force posture review? What is the status of the development of a new National Security Strategy?
Signal Chat Blunder Shows Pitfalls of Trump’s Ad Hoc Approach to Foreign Policy
The administration has struggled to translate Trump’s promise of quick results into early wins
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-signal-chat-journalist-foreign-policy-e91cb838?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By Alexander Ward
Follow
March 25, 2025 7:20 pm ET
President Trump at an Oval Office meeting this month with Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and national security adviser Michael Waltz, among others. Photo: Yuri Gripas/press Pool
WASHINGTON—Texts by President Trump’s advisers about whether to attack Houthi militants in Yemen underscored the ad hoc nature of the administration’s national security deliberations, a mode that has sometimes left allies bewildered and his own aides at odds.
Other presidents have relied on the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council staff to develop and filter options in an orderly manner. The Trump team has operated in a far less orthodox fashion, one that stems from the president’s impatience with debate and skepticism of bureaucracy. Many of his top advisers, few of whom have held senior positions before, share that perspective.
That has proved a hindrance at times for Trump, who entered office this year promising a swift end to the war between Ukraine and Russia, peace in Gaza, a quick halt to Iran’s nuclear program, the acquisition of foreign territory, and an economic boom delivered by tariffs.
When national security adviser Mike Waltz created the “Houthi PC small group” on Signal earlier this month, it appeared meant for routine updates to Trump administration officials involved in deliberations on whether to strike Houthi militants.
It quickly evolved into something more serious—a chat group on a nongovernment app where over the next two days Waltz and other members of the national security team debated by text whether to launch the attack. The exchanges became public after Atlantic Editor in Chief Jeffrey Goldberg was inadvertently added to the group.
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President Trump defended national security adviser Mike Waltz for his role in the Signal group chat that inadvertently included a journalist while discussing strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen. Photo: Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images
Trump insists the Signal chats didn’t derail U.S. strikes on the Houthis. “The attack was totally successful,” he told reporters Tuesday, defending Waltz and his team for overseeing the military operation.
Yet the administration has achieved few early breakthroughs, partly because of a policy-formulation process that disregards international complexities in favor of threats and sweeping actions, undergirded by Trump’s insistence that his dealmaking skills will yield results where more cautious administrations have fallen short.
Trump’s shunning of conventional foreign policy thinking has included his notion to remove Gaza’s nearly two million Palestinians to develop the shattered enclave into “Riviera of the Middle East.” It is likewise behind his threat to take over the Panama Canal and his vows to acquire Canada and Greenland.
Instead of pushing back against his ideas, as senior officials often did in his first term, Trump’s current advisers have been much more compliant.
Trump’s ad hoc style has yielded successes. He has secured the release of hostages from Russia, Belarus and Afghanistan, relying on a hostage negotiator who hasn’t left his private-sector job. Trump has pressured Ukraine to be more open, at least publicly, to a peace deal with Russia, though it meant greater mistrust between Washington and Kyiv and growing alarm in Europe about the U.S.’s reliability as an ally.
It took an unheard-of public Oval Office shouting match with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in which Trump warned he was in a weak negotiating position and dismissed him from the White House to achieve even that limited result.
Distrustful of the so-called “deep state” of bureaucrats and career public servants, Trump’s team sidelined government agencies even before he returned to the White House. His campaign resisted informing the Federal Bureau of Investigation that it had been hacked separately by China and Iran. After winning the election, it stopped the bureau from performing background checks on incoming senior officials.
Once in office, Trump hired special envoys for Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, choosing diplomatic novices in some cases and sparking turf battles with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, among others, over who drives decision-making.
The lack of coordination has often manifested in contradictory policy messages—confusing allies and adversaries about where Washington stands. The Signal messages revealed by the Atlantic showed that Vice President JD Vance, fiercely loyal to Trump in public, disagreed with his boss on the wisdom of imminently striking the Houthis.
“I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now,” Vance wrote the group of 18 senior officials, saying European allies benefited more from trade in waterways threatened by the Houthis than the U.S. He would support whatever the team decided, he continued, “but there is a strong argument for delaying this a month.”
After a message from Waltz about how the U.S. might charge European allies for the strikes, Vance replied to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: “If you think we should do it let’s go. I just hate bailing Europe out again.”
The National Security Council and Vance’s office didn’t respond to questions about Trump and Vance’s disagreements, or about whether Trump had discussed the pros and cons of an attack in a formal meeting with his advisers.
Other signs that Trump’s aides are sometimes operating at cross-purposes abound.
On March 17, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters U.S.-brokered negotiations between Ukraine and Russia were on “the 10th yard line of peace.” But that same day, Rubio told Fox News Radio, “We’re not close to peace,” though he said progress toward a resolution had been made.
Trump’s advisers also seem at odds over Iran. In an interview published this weekend, Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff told Tucker Carlson that Trump wants “a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization” of Tehran’s nuclear material. In other words, Iran could continue its nuclear work but would need to halt any efforts toward constructing a bomb, an objective Iran has long denied pursuing.
But Waltz offered a different message during a Sunday interview on CBS News’s “Face the Nation” program. Asked whether Trump sought to keep tabs on Iran’s nuclear work or see it eradicated completely, Waltz replied: “full dismantlement.”
“That is enrichment, that is weaponization, and that is its strategic missile program,” he said. “This is the full program. Give it up, or there will be consequences.”
Trump has wavered on the shape of his April 2 “reciprocal tariffs” on other nations. Initially, he declared that the U.S. would match all duties charged by trading partners on that day, as well as tariffs on sectors like automobiles, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors he repeatedly said would be enacted. On Monday, Trump signaled he might soften his previous threats.
Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com
10. Lessons From the Signal Chat on the Houthis
OPSEC and security issues aside, the real revelation is the contempt for our allies among Administration officials. Our Asian allies are asking if these same remarks are being made about them in similar "Asia Security signal chats."
America can't win without allies.
But not to worry. We are almost through the 24 hour news cycle. This too shall pass.
Lessons From the Signal Chat on the Houthis
The leak furor will fade but not JD Vance’s contempt for allies.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/signal-leak-houthis-pete-hegseth-mike-waltz-tulsi-gabbard-john-ratcliffe-6195ab3b?mod=hp_opin_pos_1
By The Editorial Board
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March 25, 2025 5:53 pm ET
President Donald Trump speaks to the press in the Oval Office of the White House as Vice Presient JD Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz look on, Washington, March 13. Photo: mandel ngan/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Democrats had fun pounding away at the Trump Administration Tuesday over a security leak to a journalist on the Signal messaging app, and we trust the White House has learned a lesson. It’s amusing to hear journalists who dine out on leaks deplore this leak. But the lasting import won’t be the security breach as much as what Trump officials really think about our European allies.
The White House is insisting that no classified information appeared on the now infamous group chat about the Houthis, and Mr. Trump’s chief spooks Tulsi Gabbard and John Ratcliffe said as much at a Capitol Hill hearing on Tuesday. It was nonetheless notable to watch Ms. Gabbard, the supposed enemy of the intelligence deep state before she became director of national intelligence, obfuscate about the thread’s contents. What you admit apparently depends on where you sit.
President Trump reacted to the blunder better than anyone. He defended as “a good man” his national security adviser Mike Waltz, who may have been the one to add the Atlantic editor to the group chat. Democrats want heads to roll. Mr. Waltz appears to have been defending the President’s decision to protect freedom of navigation from the Houthis, and telling his colleagues they could find classified information on the usual secure channels.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s behavior looks less defensible a day later, as he may have been cavalier about the details of incoming military strikes. He also tried to shift the blame for the fiasco on the journalist who was put on the chat, which is silly given that the Atlantic editor did nothing but listen and says he declined to publish information he said might jeopardize U.S. troops.
A real security scandal is that the Signal chat apparently included Steve Witkoff, Mr. Trump’s envoy to wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. Press reports say Mr. Witkoff was receiving these messages on the commercial app while in Moscow. This is security malpractice. Russian intelligence services must be listening to Mr. Witkoff’s every eyebrow flutter. This adds to the building perception that Mr. Witkoff, the President’s friend from New York, is out of his depth in dealing with world crises.
The security breach will fade as a story, but we can’t say the same about what the chat said about the views that Trump officials hold about our allies in Europe. The President had decided to strike the Houthis in Yemen by the time of the leaked Signal chat.
That was a good decision by the Commander in Chief. The Houthis are terrorizing global shipping and taking shots at U.S. military ships and planes, which nobody should be allowed to do without paying a price. Mr. Trump understands that element of deterrence.
Yet Vice President JD Vance second-guessed the President’s strikes on the chat because he said only “3 percent of US trade runs through the suez” canal, while “40 percent of European trade does.” That understates the U.S. interest in freedom of navigation. Mr. Vance even suggested his boss didn’t understand that striking the Houthis was at odds with Mr. Trump’s “message on Europe right now.” He added that “I just hate bailing Europe out again.” So the Vice President is willing to let the Houthis shut down shipping to spite the Europeans?
The lesson Europeans—and many friends elsewhere—will take from this episode is that officials at the top of the Trump Administration think the U.S. relationship isn’t based on common interests or values. It’s closer to a protection racket (see nearby). It’s another reason many of America’s allies may conclude they can no longer trust the U.S. in a crisis.
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Free Expression: For all its bold talk, Europe could easily remain economically hidebound, politically divided and militarily weak even as tensions with the U.S. rise dramatically. Photo: Emil Nicolai Helms/Zuma Press/Yuri Gripas/Pool/Shutterstock
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the March 26, 2025, print edition as 'Lessons From the Signal Affair'.
11. Report: Army Special Ops Issues 'Threat Advisory' Over Tesla Attacks
Report: Army Special Ops Issues 'Threat Advisory' Over Tesla Attacks
The Federalist · by Shawn Fleetwood · March 21, 2025
Image CreditKTLA 5/YouTube
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The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) reportedly issued a “threat advisory” on Thursday warning of “possible threats” from radical left-wing activists against the command’s Tesla owners.
In screenshots of the alert obtained by Federalist contributor and retired Army ranger John A. Lucas, the USASOC informed service members of increased “concerns” regarding recent attacks against individuals who own Teslas and dealerships that carry the vehicle.
Within the past few months, extreme left-wing anarchists have been waging a rhetorical and physical war against the electric car company to protest its founder Elon Musk’s role in identifying waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the federal government. These acts of left-wing “resistance” have ranged from harassing Tesla owners to outright vandalizing and destroying Tesla vehicles and dealerships.
The Trump Justice Department and FBI have pledged to crack down on what Attorney General Pam Bondi has referred to as incidents of “domestic terrorism.” Three individuals were indicted by the DOJ on Thursday for allegedly destroying Tesla properties.
The USASOC advisory noted that while there are currently “[n]o credible threats directed at USASOC personnel or assets … there is potential as this is an emerging threat.” The notice specifically highlighted a new website called “Dogequest,” which “has allegedly published personal details of Tesla owners across the United States, sparking concerns over privacy and security.”
“Dogequest is an anonymous website that claims to ’empower creative expressions of protest’ by exposing Tesla owners’ personal data. According to 404 Media, the site includes a searchable database of Tesla drivers along with the locations of Tesla dealerships and charging stations,” the USASOC notice reads. “The site, which appears in the wake of anti-Elon Musk protests across the country, displays names, addresses, and phone numbers of Tesla owners on an interactive map and uses an image of a Molotov cocktail as its cursor.”
Equally notable, however, is the USASOC alert about an allegedly upcoming “Tesla Takedown” day of action.
The warning noted that “[p]rotesters worldwide are preparing for their largest demonstration yet, 500 coordinated actions at Tesla showrooms on March 29 aimed at CEO Elon Musk’s controversial policies.” The notice cited remarks from Alice Hu, named as executive director of the left-wing Planet Over Profit, who purportedly disclosed that such demonstrations will take place at the more than 275 Tesla showrooms across America and “hundreds more abroad.”
The threat advisory concluded by encouraging USASOC members to “remain on high alert while in public areas, especially in presence of Tesla branded items” and “[c]ontact the proper authorities for threat-related events once you are in a safe location.” It also advised “Tesla branded items owners [to] properly secure their property to prevent unwanted damage to their property” and all personnel to remain in a “safe location” on March 29.
Shawn Fleetwood is a staff writer for The Federalist and a graduate of the University of Mary Washington. He previously served as a state content writer for Convention of States Action and his work has been featured in numerous outlets, including RealClearPolitics, RealClearHealth, and Conservative Review. Follow him on Twitter @ShawnFleetwood
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The Federalist · by Shawn Fleetwood · March 21, 2025
12. U.S. Agrees to Help Russia Boost Exports in Ukraine Talks
I have been asked, since the US seems to be willing to make significant concessions to Russia, will it do so for north Korea too?
U.S. Agrees to Help Russia Boost Exports in Ukraine Talks
Moscow demanded the easing of Western sanctions in return for a cease-fire in the Black Sea
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-agrees-to-help-russia-boost-exports-in-black-sea-truce-7661b78f?mod=hp_lead_pos4
By Alexander Osipovich
Follow, Laurence Norman
Follow and Ian Lovett
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Updated March 25, 2025 5:11 pm ET
A member of Ukraine’s coast guard watches a cargo ship in the Black Sea. Photo: Thomas Peter/Reuters
The U.S. said it would help Russia boost agricultural exports and restore its access to payments systems, after the Kremlin demanded the easing of Western sanctions in return for a cease-fire in the Black Sea.
The announcement, which followed two days of talks involving the U.S., Russia and Ukraine, sets up a potential standoff between America and its allies in Europe, who imposed some of the sanctions at issue.
Russia said it would only comply with a Black Sea truce upon the lifting of some banking sanctions, which European nations have vowed to keep in place. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he was opposed to weakening sanctions on Russia as a part of a deal.
Moscow said major Russian banks involved in the food and fertilizer trade would need to be reconnected to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, payment network, singling out Rosselkhozbank, a state-owned bank that deals with Russian agribusiness, but suggesting that other banks should also have their access restored.
Western sanctions never targeted Russian grain or agricultural exports directly, because that is largely prohibited under international law, and out of concern that such sanctions would raise food prices and increase global hunger. But Russia says its agricultural exports were affected by the European port and banking sanctions.
The Kremlin has long sought the lifting of financial restrictions, which lie at the heart of the Western sanctions regime. The European Union has always said its banking sanctions allow exemptions for payments to Russia for permitted trade, such as in grain and fertilizers. Among the banks the EU didn’t sanction, for instance, is Gazprombank, one of Russia’s largest, and a key conduit for payments for Russian natural-gas sales.
A hotel in the port city of Odesa was damaged last week in a Russian drone attack. Photo: Oleksandr Gimanov/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Vladimir Putin has in the past complained that Russia was cheated by the West’s failure to remove impediments to Russian grain exports, including obstacles to insuring cargo ships and SWIFT’s blacklisting of Rosselkhozbank.
“Putin’s endgame is clear—he wants to coax Trump into lifting sanctions on Russian banks and energy companies to enable the Kremlin to pull in the hard currency it desperately needs,” said Edward Fishman, senior research scholar at Columbia University and a former senior U.S. sanctions official. “But there appears to be daylight between Moscow and Washington. The Russian statement goes much further on sanctions relief than the U.S. statement.”
The European Commission, which manages EU sanctions policy, declined to comment. A senior EU official said that Europeans remain determined to keep up the pressure on the Russian economy. EU countries would need to agree to reinstate Russian banks to SWIFT, which is headquartered in Belgium.
It wasn’t clear what benefits the deal confers on Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes with missiles and seadrones have long forced the Russian navy to withdraw from large parts of the Black Sea, facilitating an increase in Ukrainian grain exports. Kyiv’s defense minister said after the deal was reached Tuesday that Ukraine had the right to self-defense if Russian warships left the eastern Black Sea.
It couldn’t be established whether the agreement meant that Russia would curtail its missile and drone strikes on infrastructure in Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which officials in Kyiv had said they wanted to be part of any deal.
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Russia announced plans to develop a permanent naval base at a tiny port on the Black Sea. WSJ explains what it reveals about Moscow’s territorial and strategic ambitions for the region. Illustration: Daniil Levchenko
Zelensky said in a post on social media that the next few days would show whether the Kremlin was serious about reaching a peace deal.
“We need results from Russia. We don’t believe them,” Zelensky wrote. “They must prove that they are ready to end the war and are ready not to lie to the world, not to lie to Trump, not to lie to America.”
Ukrainian officials said they wanted to work toward a lasting peace—but also pushed Western countries to be ready to respond if Moscow didn’t abide by the agreement.
“Unfortunately, we can already see Russia attempting to manipulate and condition agreements on sanctions relief,” said Andriy Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister. “Moscow must face appropriate consequences for any manipulation or breach of agreements,” he wrote on X.
Last week, Russia launched one of its largest drone attacks of the war on the Black Sea port city of Odesa, injuring at least three people and demonstrating the damage it can do on the eve of cease-fire negotiations.
The White House also said Tuesday that it had agreed with both Russia and Ukraine to take steps to implement a previously agreed cease-fire on attacks on energy facilities in both countries. It also reiterated the U.S.’s commitment to seeking the return of Ukrainian children forcibly moved to Russia.
The U.S.-Russian agreement points to one of the many challenges a peace process will pose for both sides. While imposing sanctions on a rogue regime is relatively straightforward, Western countries have repeatedly found that reversing some restrictions often has little impact on the ground.
In the first year of the conflict, Russian food and fertilizer exports were indeed hampered by international sanctions. In December 2022, the EU adjusted its own sanctions regime under international pressure to make it clear to customs and port authorities in member states that they could receive fees from Russian vessels that were stuck in European ports carrying unsanctioned goods.
Ukrainian soldiers training in the Donetsk region. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
However in the past two years, Russian agricultural exports and its fertilizer sales have been robust. Even in Europe, Russian fertilizer exports have taken up an increasingly big share of the market, with the EU importing several billion euros of the product from Russia annually.
In 2023, Moscow pulled out of an agreement it had reached the previous year on Ukrainian grain exports, saying the West had failed to fulfill a separate part of the deal aimed at facilitating Russia’s food and fertilizer exports.
“We want the grain and fertilizer markets to be predictable, so no one tries to draw us away from them,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in an interview with Russian state television Tuesday.
Write to Alexander Osipovich at alexo@wsj.com, Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com and Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com
13. Trump’s Tariff War Forces Allies to Choose Resistance or Surrender
Why does it have to be this way?
Trump’s Tariff War Forces Allies to Choose Resistance or Surrender
Canada and the EU have fought back, the U.K. and Mexico haven’t, and nobody knows which strategy will ultimately work
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/tariff-war-retaliate-936dfd43?mod=latest_headlines
By Vipal Monga
Follow in Toronto, Kim Mackrael
Follow in Brussels and Santiago Pérez
Follow in Mexico City
March 25, 2025 9:00 pm ET
President Trump said Monday that the reciprocal tariffs planned for April 2 might be less severe than expected, adding to the confusion. Photo: jim lo scalzo/pool/Shutterstock
President Trump’s trade war is forcing America’s closest allies to choose between fighting back, or acquiescing. The trouble is, nobody has figured out which is the best way to get Trump to do what they want.
The European Union and Canada have led the charge against Trump’s tariffs, threatening their own duties on tens of billions of dollars of American goods after the U.S. leveled blanket tariffs on steel and aluminum, and on imports in North America. Officials in both regions have calculated there is value in showing strength.
“Of course, we have to retaliate,” said Anna Cavazzini, a member of the European Parliament from Germany. She said the European Commission wants a deal, but: “We also have to show our teeth because it’s the only language that this Trump administration is basically understanding.”
On the other side are the U.K. and Mexico, among others, which have decided to hold fire in hopes of striking a deal. Some countries are also loath to disrupt their security alliances with the U.S., which are viewed as increasingly fragile under Trump.
“Who is going to do better: the people that poke the bear in the eye, or those who wait for the people who are poking to be eaten first?” said Barry Appleton, an international trade lawyer and co-director of the New York Law School’s Center for International Law.
The decision is going to be even more tricky on April 2, when the Trump administration plans to move forward with a list of so-called reciprocal tariffs that aim to match the duties and nontariff trade barriers that other countries impose on American products, an act that would rewire global trade. Trump has called it “Liberation Day.”
A Levi’s store in Rome. The EU threatened tariffs on American goods in response to the Trump administration’s tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports. Photo: Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
So far, choosing between retaliation and compliance hasn’t mattered at all for Canada and Mexico, which have used different tactics—Canada being more aggressive with retaliation and Mexico taking a firm but cooperative approach. Both countries were still slapped with a 25% duty on many of their exports in March.
Trump suggested the tariff policies were evolving, adding to the confusion. “I may give a lot of countries breaks,” he said Monday. “We might be even nicer than that.”
The U.S. so far has put 25% duties on many products from Canada and Mexico, citing concerns about border security and upending the three countries’ free-trade agreement. On March 12, Trump levied 25% tariffs on global imports of steel and aluminum, citing a need to protect domestic industries. China already faced steep tariffs in the U.S., and Trump raised them even higher over the past two months.
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President Trump says reciprocal tariffs will kick in on April 2, when the U.S. will match the higher tariffs other countries impose on the U.S. Economists explain this ‘tit for tat’ strategy. Photo: Xingpei Shen
Among the governments that have pushed back, Canada, China and the EU feel they have enough leverage to hurt the U.S. economy.
Canada, the EU and China are among the top importers of U.S. goods—and Canada is a major supplier of energy to the U.S. The size of the EU’s market, which includes 27 member states, means that tariffs it imposes on U.S. products will have a noticeable impact for U.S. companies, said officials.
In Canada, there is the added element of Trump’s stated desire to make the country the 51st state, a proposition that Canadian leaders first saw as a joke but now view as a serious threat. Adding to the fervor to strike back: Canada is in the midst of a national election that revolves around which political party is best positioned to manage Trump.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called a national election, in which he will run against Pierre Poilievre of the Conservative Party, amid a trade war with President Trump. Photo: Frank Gunn/Associated Press
“I think you have to hit back. I don’t think Trump respects rolling over,” said David MacNaughton, a former Canadian ambassador to the U.S.
But when countries fight back, Trump has struck back much harder.
Earlier this month, Canada’s Doug Ford, leader of the province of Ontario, said he would punish the U.S. for tariffs by slapping a 25% export tax on electricity that goes to 1.5 million American homes. Two days later, the EU also threatened to hit the U.S. for its tariffs on steel and aluminum, unveiling duties of up to 50% on whiskey, motorcycles and motorboats, among other American products.
Ontario Premier Doug Ford said he would place a 25% export tax on electricity that goes to 1.5 million American homes in response to U.S. tariffs. Photo: Katherine KY Cheng/Getty Images
Then Trump threatened to double the 25% steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and slam the EU with a 200% duty on Champagne and other alcoholic products. Canada and the EU tapped the brakes, showing the limits of an aggressive retaliatory strategy.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney last week noted that Canada’s economy is much smaller than the U.S.’s and there is only so much it can do to punch back.
Trump 2.0
How Trump’s Trade War Is Playing Out At Breakneck Speed
“There is a limit to matching these tariffs dollar for dollar given that our economy is one-tenth the size of the United States,” he said.
The EU has also recently shown signs of softening. A first tranche of countertariffs was set to take effect on April 1, but the bloc said last week that it would delay them to mid-April to allow more time for internal consultations and negotiations with the U.S.
EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic met Tuesday with U.S. officials in Washington for what he said were substantive talks. “The EU’s priority is a fair, balanced deal instead of unjustified tariffs,” he wrote on X.
China’s retaliatory measures—new tariffs on U.S. agriculture and livestock, a World Trade Organization lawsuit, and probing U.S. firms for potentially “dumping” fiber-optic products—are seen as muted and symbolic. Analysts say it is likely looking for leverage to make a deal.
Others with less leverage have decided to swallow tariffs in the short term, gambling that it is safer to stay in Trump’s good graces.
Mexico, which sends almost 80% of its exports to the U.S., has sent a stream of officials to Washington for talks with U.S. counterparts. Meanwhile President Claudia Sheinbaum has tried to create a respectful, but forceful dynamic with Trump on their phone calls, said people familiar with the phone conversations.
U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer in the Oval Office last month with President Trump. Photo: Carl Court/Zuma Press
Hoping to address Trump’s concerns about drugs and migrants flowing over the border, Mexico in February transferred 29 imprisoned drug kingpins to the U.S. In a recent call, Sheinbaum shared a chart with Trump titled “Look at the Results!” that highlighted a sharp drop in drug seizures with statistics from U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Trump has expressed admiration for Sheinbaum but hasn’t given Mexico a break. If Trump proceeds with new tariffs on Mexican goods, the damage to bilateral cooperation will be significant, said one Mexican official.
“How do you maintain cooperation if this wrecks your economy?” the official asked. “Politically, it’s not sustainable to be close to an administration that hits you with a recession.”
In the U.K., Prime Minister Keir Starmer is looking to act as a bridge between the U.S. and Europe on issues such as defense and the peace in Ukraine. Not entering into a trade dispute with the U.S. administration is an important plank of that strategy.
Britain is also eager to sign a trade deal with the U.S., and has been on a charm offensive to woo Trump. During a White House visit last month, Starmer delivered to Trump a handwritten invitation from King Charles for a state visit.
“The prime minister and I have gotten off to an outstanding start,” Trump later said.
Write to Vipal Monga at vipal.monga@wsj.com, Kim Mackrael at kim.mackrael@wsj.com and Santiago Pérez at santiago.perez@wsj.com
14. The U.S. Missile Launcher That Is Enraging China
I guess this system is a bellwether for PRC-US relations (as well as US-Philippines and Philippines-PRC relations).
Please go to the link to view the map/graphics.
The U.S. Missile Launcher That Is Enraging China
Land-based Typhon Weapons System is capable of targeting major military-command and industrial centers in mainland China
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-us-typhon-weapons-system-missile-philippines-100fd852?st=m2WrHt&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Gabriele Steinhauser
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March 25, 2025 11:00 pm ET
A new U.S. missile system deployed in the Philippines puts key Chinese military and commercial hubs within striking distance and hands President Trump an early test of his commitment to deterring Chinese aggression against American allies in Asia.
Last year, the U.S. Army moved the Typhon Missile System, which can fire missiles as far as 1,200 miles, to a base on Luzon Island in the northern Philippines. It is the first time since the Cold War that the U.S. military has deployed a land-based launching system with such a long range outside its borders.
The Typhon, military experts say, is part of a broader strategic repositioning by the American military as it seeks to counter Beijing’s huge buildup of intermediate- and long-range missiles in the Pacific.
In the event of a conflict with China, land-based missile systems such as the Typhon could be central to defending key U.S. allies such as the Philippines, which has clashed with China over Beijing’s claims to nearly all of the South China Sea, and Taiwan, which Beijing has threatened to take, by force if necessary.
The Chinese government has responded to the Typhon’s deployment with alarm, rebuking the U.S. and the Philippines for fueling what it called an arms race.
Tomahawk and SM-6 ranges
JAPAN
Qingdao
Nanjing
Chengdu
Shanghai
Chongqing
Wuhan
Hangzhou
East China Sea
CHINA
Kunming
Fuzhou
Taipei
Guangzhou
TAIWAN
Shenzhen
VIET.
Philippine Sea
Hong Kong
LAOS
THAILAND
Luzon
Manila
Chinese-occupied
islands/reefs
CAMBODIA
PHILIPPINES
South China
Sea
Davao
MALAYSIA
Celebes Sea
Singapore
INDONESIA
*The SM-6’s range is estimated to be between 150-290 miles.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office (Tomahawk); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Congressional Budget Office (SM-6); Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Chinese-occupied islands)
Emma Brown/WSJ
Now, the Typhon, which was moved to the Philippines during the Biden administration, has emerged as an important litmus test amid concerns among American allies over the Trump administration’s willingness to come to their defense in a conflict with China. A visit to the Philippines and Japan by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth this week could provide more clarity on the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Typhon can fire two types of missiles. Tomahawk missiles bearing conventional warheads have a range of around 1,200 miles, putting into reach much of southeastern China along with the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, such missiles could target air-defense and radar systems on the Chinese coast as well as the Chinese military’s control-and-command centers in Guangzhou and Nanjing.
The shorter-range Standard Missile 6, or SM-6, could target Chinese or other enemy ships and aircraft, and intercept cruise missiles and ballistic missiles fired at U.S. interests. Army officials have said that it is the only missile in the U.S. arsenal capable of intercepting, at least in late flight, the hypersonic missiles that both China and Russia have been testing.
Flashpoint with China
The U.S. Army first moved two Typhon launchers, an operations center and support vehicles to Luzon Island for joint military exercises between the two countries a year ago. The Army, which first took delivery of the system in late 2022, said it wanted to test it in the hot and humid climate of the Indo-Pacific region.
The Army later agreed to extend the deployment indefinitely. Since then, Philippine commanders have said they would like to buy the Typhon for their own military and the country’s troops are now being trained on using the system.
Despite the limited immediate military value of the deployment—a full Typhon battery has four launchers and it didn’t come with any missiles—Beijing’s reaction was forceful.
An image provided by the U.S. Army shows a Typhon launcher firing an SM-6 missile in an exercise in New Mexico. Photo: U.S. Army
China’s Foreign Ministry demanded the Typhon’s removal and threatened retaliatory action. “China will not sit idly by when its security interests are harmed or threatened,” the ministry said in February.
Russia, a close ally of China, also denounced the move. Russian President Vladimir Putin likened the deployment to that of Pershing II missile launchers in West Germany in 1983, a step that Soviet leaders at the time interpreted as a preparation for a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet Union by the West.
The Pershing II deployment prompted large protests in Europe and the U.S. and eventually led to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union. That treaty banned the possession, production and flight testing of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 miles and 3,400 miles.
But the INF treaty didn’t include China, allowing Beijing to assemble an enormous arsenal of such missiles. In 2019, during Trump’s first term, the U.S. pulled out of the treaty and the Army began preparations for a new intermediate-range missile system.
Mounted in trailers on the back of trucks, the Typhon is relatively easy to move, including on military transport planes. Compared with ship-based missile launchers, land-based missile systems are harder to spot and take out early on in a conflict. In the future, the U.S. could deploy the Typhon in locations across the Indo-Pacific region or sell it to allies there. That would leave adversaries guessing from where they could be hit.
“The U.S. is shifting away from a reliance on big centralized bases, towards a more dispersed resilient force posture,” said Shawn Rostker, a research analyst with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Typhon Missile System
The mobile, ground-launched system enables attacks with SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. It is the first land-based missile system with such a far range the U.S. Army has deployed since the Cold War.
LAUNCHER
Can fire SM-6 or Tomahawk missiles. Full battery has four launchers installed in a trailer on the back of trucks.
Tomahawk
Max range:
1,200 miles
SM-6
Max range:
290 miles
Soldier
Battery Operations Center
Acts as the brain of the battery, helping staff analyze information on targets and threats, direct missile launches and monitor and adjust the missiles’ trajectory.
Note: Scale approximate
Source: Army Recognition
Jemal R. Brinson/WSJ
A potential bargaining chip
The Typhon’s deployment in the Philippines was a recognition of the increasingly strategic importance of the Philippines under the Biden administration. The country’s president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has expanded access to military bases for U.S. forces, and Philippine vessels and airplanes have pushed back against Chinese forces in the South China Sea, a thoroughfare for nearly one-third of global maritime trade.
Other American allies in Asia, including Japan, have so far balked at hosting U.S. missiles capable of striking China, but are developing their own comparable capabilities.
There have been some signs that the Trump administration also sees the Typhon as key to its strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
“We proved the MRC’s deterrent effect via a dynamic deployment in the Philippines and look forward to all future power projection opportunities!” Dan Driscoll, the new Army secretary, said in a post on X earlier this month, using the abbreviation for the army’s technical name for the Typhon, Mid-Range Capability.
Others, however, have warned that moving such powerful U.S. missile systems close to China risks a spiral of escalation and, perhaps by accident, a war between two nuclear superpowers.
An image provided by the U.S. Army shows American and Philippine soldiers working on Typhon equipment in Luzon Island in the northern Philippines. Photo: U.S. Army
“Just the presence of the system causes those escalation risks, and that’s before you even consider what happens if you use the system in a conflict,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a libertarian-leaning Washington-based think tank that backs a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.
Similar views have been espoused by some senior Trump appointees, including Andrew Byers, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, who has favored a less contentious relationship with Beijing. Before taking office, Byers suggested pulling U.S. assets out of the Philippines in return for China’s coast guard running fewer patrols in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
Marcos himself has said he would remove the Typhon system if China ceased its aggressions in the South China Sea.
But in the wake of Trump’s talks with Putin over Ukraine, there are also concerns in the Philippines that Typhon could become part of a deal between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Such a deal might sacrifice the interests of the smaller American ally, said Richard Heydarian, a lecturer in international studies at the University of the Philippines’s Asian Center.
“What the Philippines does with [the Typhon] and what the Trump administration will do about it,” he said, “determines how the game of deterrence will play out in the coming months and years.”
Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the March 26, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Missile Launcher Enrages Beijing'.
15. Don’t Throw the (USAID) Baby Out With the Bathwater…Remodel the Bathroom
Interesting proposal: the S-COG - Stability-Combined Operations Group
But the pattern that seems to be merging is that the Administration desires to forgo all use of "soft power." I am not sure this proposal would find traction in the current administration. Nor does it replace the breadth of work that USAID conducts.
Excerpts:
Working with trusted counterparts, the S-COG team will adopt mentorship interventions designed to empower and build the capability and capacity of the host nation local government and the trust of the population. As an example, if local public works personnel lack the skills to repair and maintain their existing heavy-equipment, a S-COG team mechanic would be dispatched to train and mentor the public works personnel. If parts are needed, then the request should go through government channels. If those channels are dysfunctional, then another capacity building opportunity emerges that may require mentoring from a team logistician. When the public works personnel can fix and maintain their own heavy-equipment, the institutional capacity of the public works department is increased. Within this construct, any monetary assistance, or money outside of the formal governmental budgeting process, is limited only to emergency situations. The intent of this policy is to get them to work through their systems, and if their systems don’t work, mentor system change.
The true measure of effectiveness of an effective S-COG is the creation of allied autonomous partner nations; in short, nations without the need for an S-COG.
The shuttering of USAID provides an opportunity to capitalize on this moment in history, revisit our recent failures, learn from our mistakes, create a trusted, transparent, and effective Stability-Combined Operations Group, and change the way we conduct international aid and stability operations. In other words, we’re at a point where the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—proactive stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure.”
Don’t Throw the (USAID) Baby Out With the Bathwater…Remodel the Bathroom
by Eric Hommel
|
03.26.2025 at 06:00am
The Department of Defense (DoD) directs the U.S. military to conduct stability operations with “proficiency equivalent to combat operations;” yet the military is fundamentally designed, trained, and equipped for conventional warfare. Stability operations are typically ad hoc, an afterthought where strategic reality forces the military to transform into (armed) humanitarians.
The much-maligned U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was an instrument of national power working within the stability operations realm. USAID’s mission emphasized “lead[ing] America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interest of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity,” to ensure “a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.” In other words, USAID purportedly worked to ensure global stability.
Now, the Trump administration has essentially closed USAID citing, “USAID has been unaccountable to taxpayers as it funnels massive sums of money to the ridiculous—and, in many cases, malicious—pet projects of entrenched bureaucrats, with next-to-no oversight.”
Regardless of whether you agree with the shuttering of USAID, we must acknowledge that since the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States has had a poor track record of fostering global stability. The United States lost the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—not on the battlefield, but in the stability operations space, which included the likes of USAID. In both countries, our military instruments of national power temporarily defeated the enemy but failed to secure the peace. As such, we are now at a crossroads in history where we can capitalize on recent lessons learned and change the way we do business and work to ensure global stability.
U.S. Army Stability doctrine states the aim of stability operations is “to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure … establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries” … and “establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.” Lessons learned from our stability methodology in Iraq and Afghanistan have now (supposedly) shifted our efforts towards integrating stability initiatives into all military operations. The prosecution of recent wars has led us to the (alleged) realization that, “military force alone cannot secure a sustainable peace.” We are no longer (purportedly) in the business of military-led nation building, we are now partnering with host nations and promoting long-term stability through capacity building.
To be proactive, our leaders must reconsider the way we currently do “stability” with a focus on efficiency of desired outcomes. Some would argue that we are already proactive, and stability operations strategy is already being implemented by U.S. Embassy country-teams, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel; but these entities are already stretched thin, with the majority of their stability operations efforts devoted to security cooperation. Any provincial-level governance, rule of law, and socio-economic development lines of effort are typically afterthoughts. Now, with the deletion of USAID from the U.S. Embassy country-team, we reduced the number of personnel who could be used to address broad-spectrum instability.
More work needs to be done.
In 2010, I argued for a new stability operations construct in a chapter I wrote for the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations. In the book, Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teams in War and Peace. I illustrated how my Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) changed the doctrinal way of conducting stability operations. We accomplished a full transition of security, reconstruction, and governance to our Afghan counterparts addressing all lines of effort in a transparent manner—without resorting to using “Money as a Weapon System.” Instead, we employed partnering and mentoring. By restricting funding and direct aid, provincial leadership eventually started building autonomous capacity rather than solely relying on the United States. The removal of U.S. funds was initially met with disdain, but Afghan provincial leadership eventually came around to acknowledge that we were, “the first PRT to actually make us work, and that’s good.”
In my chapter I outlined how a perverse incentive structure within the stability operations/international aid and development paradigm actually prolongs instability and works against success—as long as the money continues to flow. I witnessed firsthand how direct aid and money have a tendency to promote dependency and fuel corruption (the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction documented this corruption in a 2016 report to Congress). Instead of direct aid and money, I argued for a new steady state construct designed to bridge the chasm between conventional warfare (DoD), diplomacy (Department of State), and direct aid (USAID). I termed the construct a “Stability Operations Force.”
We’re at a point where the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—proactive stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure.”
This is not an argument to rebrand the PRTs as a Stability Operations Force; the PRTs were an ad hoc civ-mil conglomeration whose mission devolved into (primarily) reconstruction and contract management. Nor is this an argument to transform the entire U.S. military into stability operations experts. Rather, the argument is to adjust to current doctrine and create a permanent hybrid stability operations structure designed to fill the void left by USAID and address the inefficiencies of current military-centric stability operations. The argument is to build and employ a formalized a Stability Operations Force, working on the local-level, whose mission is to build partner nation capacity. The argument is for a formalized Stability Operations Force assembled into country-specific teams that combine select expertise from the government, local NGOs, and functional experts (public works, police, city planners, logisticians, construction workers, mechanics, medical professionals, budget professionals, etc.) chosen for their analytical and technical skills, and their ability to interact with partner nations honestly and effectively.
Demonstrating strategic patience, the S-COG team will first take the time to develop a deep understanding of their local-level area of operation; therefore, contextual learning is a top priority. The intent of contextual learning (or, common operating picture) is to establish a real-world understanding of local culture and each sector of government while simultaneously building trust and valued relationships with government figures and with the community. Building transparent and trusted relationships—not rooted in monetary reward—is the underpinning of every S-COG team.
To achieve effectiveness, the S-COG teams must be tailored to fit each of their deployed locations. The S-COG is designed and positioned to work from a “bottom-up” perspective, where they partner with provincial-level officials, and seek local partner-nation led solutions. The S-COG mission focuses on building provincial-level individual and institutional capacity through partnership and mentorship. Currently, most stability, aid, and development organizations work from a “top-down” perspective, where they work from a central government position. Within the S-COG construct, top-down stability efforts still reside within the Department of State.
Capacity development is “about transformations that empower individuals, leaders, organizations and societies,” and “generated, guided and sustained by those whom it is meant to benefit.” To achieve mission success, the S-COG team will work through the defined capacity building cycle by engaging with partners, building consensus, assessing capacity needs, designing capacity building strategies, implementing capacity building strategies, and then monitoring, mentoring, and adjusting strategies as the situation warrants.
Capacity building opportunities usually present themselves as problems during the initial contextual learning, relationship building, and analysis period. By taking the time to understand the intricacies of the systems, the culture, and the people, it should expose gaps, weaknesses, ineptness, and corruption within governance structures and with government officials. It should also lead to an understanding of the internal and external factors leading to organizational change and an understanding of the second and third order effects of any organizational change. With this knowledge, the S-COG team will tailor their approach to working with those partners who are also invested in the practice of good governance. The team will continue to conduct analysis throughout their tenure and adjust capacity building agendas as necessary.
Working with trusted counterparts, the S-COG team will adopt mentorship interventions designed to empower and build the capability and capacity of the host nation local government and the trust of the population. As an example, if local public works personnel lack the skills to repair and maintain their existing heavy-equipment, a S-COG team mechanic would be dispatched to train and mentor the public works personnel. If parts are needed, then the request should go through government channels. If those channels are dysfunctional, then another capacity building opportunity emerges that may require mentoring from a team logistician. When the public works personnel can fix and maintain their own heavy-equipment, the institutional capacity of the public works department is increased. Within this construct, any monetary assistance, or money outside of the formal governmental budgeting process, is limited only to emergency situations. The intent of this policy is to get them to work through their systems, and if their systems don’t work, mentor system change.
The true measure of effectiveness of an effective S-COG is the creation of allied autonomous partner nations; in short, nations without the need for an S-COG.
The shuttering of USAID provides an opportunity to capitalize on this moment in history, revisit our recent failures, learn from our mistakes, create a trusted, transparent, and effective Stability-Combined Operations Group, and change the way we conduct international aid and stability operations. In other words, we’re at a point where the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—proactive stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure.”
Tags: Stability Operations, USAID
About The Author
- Eric Hommel
- Eric W. Hommel is a prior-enlisted U.S. Navy Cold War submariner, and retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. He is a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (as a ground battle-space commander, and commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’s Panjshir province). In Iraq and Afghanistan, he worked under U.S. Army command. He spent ten years attached to the Pentagon, with three of those years working and traveling with Congressional Representatives as a military Legislative Liaison. Post-military, he is recognized as a stability operations expert, having trained government officials to work in areas of conflict for over a decade. He holds a MS in Peace Operations from George Mason University. Eric recently published, The Losing Game: How to Lose a War and Fail Veterans (Amazon Link - The Losing Game). The Losing Game is the only first-person account to take ownership of, and explore our failed mission in Afghanistan, where misguided leadership snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. You can find Eric currently giving personalized tours of Arlington National Cemetery.
16. The Blame Game: The state of the US-Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations by Sir Lawrence Freedman
Excerpts:
It is also important to note that the statements with both the Ukrainian and Russian delegations including the following admonition.
‘The United States reiterated President Donald J. Trump’s imperative that the killing on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict must stop, as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement. To that end, the United States will continue facilitating negotiations between both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution, in line with the agreements made in Riyadh.’
Thus the US demand for an early, full ceasefire remains.
Putin presumably assumes that Trump will prefer to keep a stuttering process going rather than acknowledge his unwillingness to make any substantive concessions. This war continues because Putin refuses to accept that he cannot achieve his political objectives by either military or diplomatic means.
Behind Putin’s stance is his confidence in future territorial advances that will increase the pressure on Ukraine. But this comes at a time when Ukrainians are increasingly confident that they can hold the line over the coming months. Russia’s territorial aim remains to get the four oblasts whose status as Russian has been enshrined in the constitution. Yet progress in Donetsk remains slow, while capturing all of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson is currently beyond Russian capabilities. Regardless, Putin’s reluctance to cut his losses on this war now assumes future gains.
If Trump really wants to end the fighting then his task is to convince Putin of the futility of his quest. This he can do by continuing with US support for Ukraine and adding to the economic pressure on Russia. There is no indication that he has yet realised this, or wants to realise it. But it is still the logical conclusion of his insistence that the killing must stop soon.
The Blame Game
The state of the US-Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations
https://samf.substack.com/p/the-blame-game?utm
Lawrence Freedman
Mar 26, 2025
∙ Paid
An oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai following an attack by Ukrainian drones.
Was progress towards at least a partial ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine made in Saudi Arabia on Monday? At first glance it seems so. As announced on Tuesday, there was an agreement to ‘ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes’ in the Black Sea. In addition discussions are to continue on ending attacks on energy infrastructure. Yet as soon as these were announced questions were raised about scope and schedule. Conditions began to be applied. It is not yet clear when and if they will ever come into force.
In my previous post, written after President Zelenskyy had agreed to a full ceasefire, including land forces, and the US had insisted that the ball was now in President Putin’s court, I expressed doubt about whether this was something the Russian leader could agreed to. Instead I suggested that he would:
‘string the discussions along to see if he can extract more from the Americans, perhaps some sanctions relief, and even if this effort fails he can at least claim he was doing his best to find a way forward.’
This is what he has been doing, so far successfully.
In this post I will examine how this has been done, and to what extent the Trump administration is complicit. I am aware of regular assertions that Trump is virtually Putin’s agent. Without denying the credulity and sympathy with which Trump and some of his aides have treated many of Putin’s claims, I think this is too simplistic. While clearly some close to Trump (Vance, Musk, Witkoff, Trump Jr.) are hostile to Ukraine, this is not true of other key players (Waltz, Rubio, Kellogg).
Moreover, Trump himself blows hot and cold. After the melt down in the Oval Office at the end of February, relations have been restored (as well as military supplies and intelligence). If we assume he wants at least a ceasefire that stops the fighting as soon as possible then he needs Ukraine on side. Because of this, he wants to believe that Putin shares this objective, although this is evidently not the case.
Will this impatient administration come to realise that the eminently reasonable Putin with which it claims to be dealing is a mythical figure? Will there come a point when the reality of Putin’s position becomes impossible to ignore, or will the administration stay satisfied with apparent concessions sufficient to keep the process going? Putin’s approach to negotiations is familiar from the Soviet days, pocketing any concessions while offering few of his own, and then only slowly, and with conditions.
While the current diplomatic effort is, in principle, about trying to find a way to end the war, in practice it is also about avoiding the blame for its likely failure. If the incentives to avoiding blame are high enough, so that the belligerents make more concessions than might otherwise have been the case, then this can work to the benefit of the peace process. Nonetheless, if both sides are working on the assumption that there will be no grand deal, and that the war will continue, they will use the process to get into the best position for the next round of fighting. The prize for Putin should Trump blame Zelenskyy is that Ukraine will be abandoned by the US: for Ukraine the vital objective is avoiding that fate while encouraging Trump to step up sanctions on Russia.
Steven Witkoff goes to Moscow
The early stages of this process are now well known. It began very well for Putin, with the first Trump-Putin phone call on 12 February 2025, which appeared to be a breakthrough for the Russian leader. He got prizes before any concessions: the immediate offer of normalisation of relations, the prospect of being able to deal directly with the US on a solution to the war to the exclusion of the Ukrainians and Europeans, and Ukraine being told how they must concede territory and end all hopes of joining NATO. And then Ukraine and its partners got bogged down on questions of security guarantees leading, after the Oval office clash, to Trump concluding that Zelenskyy was the obstacle to peace, determined to draw on US capabilities to keep the war going in the futile hope of being able to liberate lost territory.
Trump’s position was unfair and damaging. It did, however, have an electrifying effect on Ukrainian policy, leading to Zelenskyy doing everything he could to demonstrate his gratitude to Trump and to the US, along with his commitment to an early peace. The key strategic shift was to concentrate on first steps rather than worry about how to make a final settlement more palatable. It was best to manage the process by stages, starting, as proposed by the Trump administration, with an immediate ceasefire.
This was agreed when Ukrainian and US teams met in Saudi Arabia on 11 March. Politically this worked wonders: the military assistance was restored, and the ball was explicitly put back into Russia’s court. When the G7 met in Canada, instead of an argument about whether to call Russia an aggressor they could agree that Putin must accept the month-long truce, and that if he did not there were options for expanding sanctions and using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it with regard to the Russian position: ‘The question is, are we actually moving towards a ceasefire, or is this a delay tactic?’
To get Putin’s response Steven Witkoff, who has become Trump’s main intermediary on this issue (as well as the Middle East) was sent to Moscow. Russia has rejected Keith Kellogg, who had that role, as too sympathetic to Ukraine. This is not a problem they face with Witkoff. With little previous background in international diplomacy, he betrays no concerns about Putin’s trustworthiness or the validity of his claims. He appears to be more Putin’s envoy to Trump than the other way round. In an interview with another friend of Putin, Tucker Carlson, that should, but probably won’t, ensure that he plays no further role in process, he repeated Russia’s rationale for the war. In one of many egregious examples he stated:
‘First of all, I think the largest issue in that conflict are these so-called four regions, Donbas, Crimea. You know, the names, Luhansk, and there’s two others. They’re Russian-speaking. There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule. I think, that’s the key issue in the conflict. So that’s the first thing. When that gets settled - and we’re having very, very positive conversations…the question is, will the world acknowledge, that those are Russian territories. Will it end up, can Zelensky survive politically if he acknowledges this?’
The issue isn’t just that he was very muddled on the geography and the history, unaware that Russia does not hold all these territories, or the perfunctory nature of the so-called referendums that were not even systematic enough to need rigging. It is usually wise for someone who wishes to play an intermediary role to keep their cards close to their chest and avoid alienating either side. Ukraine now has no reason to talk to Witkoff, just as Russia does not want to talk to Kellogg.
Trump’s report of Witkoff’s meeting was positive, and references were made to land deals, power plants, and ‘dividing up certain assets,’ all of which was sufficient to make Kyiv nervous. But most curious was Trump’s mention of the Russian offensive in Kursk.
This offensive, to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory held by Ukraine since August, was important for Putin, especially if a ceasefire was to be based on the existing disposition of forces. The Russian move was largely successful, which was both disappointing and difficult for Ukraine. On 13 March Putin told a press conference, that Ukrainian troops in Kursk
‘have completely abandoned their equipment, as there will be a physical blockade of the region — they either die or surrender to leave the region.’
The next day, after Witkoff had spoken to Putin, a Trump post on Truth Social, talked up the conversation and also expressed concern about the fate of Ukrainian forces:
‘We had excellent and productive discussions with President Vladimir Putin of Russia yesterday, and there is a very good chance that this horrible, bloody war can finally come to an end — BUT, AT THIS VERY MOMENT, THOUSANDS OF UKRAINIAN TROOPS ARE COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY THE RUSSIAN MILITARY, AND IN A VERY BAD AND VULNERABLE POSITION.’
‘I have strongly requested to President Putin that their lives be spared. This would be a horrible massacre, one not seen since World War II. God bless them all!!!’
Yet while Ukraine acknowledged the retreat, it denied that its troops were in such a dire situation. This was confirmed by US intelligence. We have heard nothing more from Trump about this ‘horrible massacre’ since. Witkoff, and then Trump, appears to have been taken in by Putin’s determination to highlight Ukraine’s weakness.
Trump talks to Putin
The selective cognition when it comes to Putin was thrown into even sharper relief by the White House readout from Trump’s conversation with the Russian leader on 18 March. The demand for a full ceasefire had not been met so a partial ceasefire was presented as progress. Most importantly was the neglect of the negative character of the Russian position as spelt out by Putin.
Trump boasted at once on his Truth Social platform that the Russians were ready to move forward with speed to a final settlement:
‘My phone conversation today with President Putin of Russia was a very good and productive one. We agreed to an immediate ceasefire on all energy and infrastructure, with an understanding that we will be working quickly to have a complete ceasefire and, ultimately, an end to this very horrible war between Russia and Ukraine.’
Yet look at the Russian readout of the conversation:
Confirming his fundamental commitment to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the President of Russia expressed willingness to thoroughly work out possible solutions in cooperation with the American partners, aimed at reaching a settlement that would be comprehensive, reliable, and lasting, and, naturally, take into account the essential need to eliminate the root causes of the crisis, as well as Russia's legitimate security interests.
Concerning US President's proposal to declare a 30-day ceasefire, the Russian side outlined a number of significant points regarding ensuring effective control over a possible ceasefire along the entire frontline, as well as the need to stop the forced mobilisation in Ukraine and rearming the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was noted that some serious risks exist pertaining to the intractability of the Kiev regime which had repeatedly sabotaged and violated negotiated agreements. An emphasis was made on barbaric acts of terrorism committed by Ukrainian militants against civilians residing in the Kursk Region.
It was pointed out that a complete cessation of providing Kiev with foreign military aid and intelligence must become the key condition for preventing an escalation of the conflict and making progress towards its resolution through political and diplomatic means.
After mentioning the proposals on energy infrastructure and navigation in the Black Sea, the readout concluded:
The leaders confirmed their intention to continue efforts aimed at reaching a settlement in Ukraine bilaterally, with due regard in particular to the aforementioned proposals by the US President. For this purpose, a Russian and an American expert task forces are now being formed.
This was quite explicit – there was no suggestion that Ukraine, presented as the intractable party, had legitimate security interests. Putin wanted all support to Ukraine to stop, and that Ukraine must also cease defending itself. And this was just to get to a full ceasefire. Note also the stress on their ‘bilateral’ discussions with the US as the route to ending the war, and the need for a Russian and American task force to take this forward, without any role for the Ukrainians.
By contrast, the White House readout ignored all of these points, as if they were not worth mentioning:
Today, President Trump and President Putin spoke about the need for peace and a ceasefire in the Ukraine war. Both leaders agreed this conflict needs to end with a lasting peace. They also stressed the need for improved bilateral relations between the United States and Russia. The blood and treasure that both Ukraine and Russia have been spending in this war would be better spent on the needs of their people.
This conflict should never have started and should have been ended long ago with sincere and good faith peace efforts. The leaders agreed that the movement to peace will begin with an energy and infrastructure ceasefire, as well as technical negotiations on implementation of a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, full ceasefire and permanent peace. These negotiations will begin immediately in the Middle East.
…
The two leaders agreed that a future with an improved bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia has huge upside. This includes enormous economic deals and geopolitical stability when peace has been achieved.
Much of this was wishful thinking. Putin would not agree that the war was anything other than a strategic necessity for Russia and not an unfortunate and wasteful misunderstanding. A partial ceasefire covering energy infrastructure and the Black Sea was not that far away from Zelenskyy’s original proposal, which was not considered bold enough for the White House. Ukraine agreed to a full ceasefire to stop the killing. The Americans had said the ball was in Russia’s court, and Russia, as expected, procrastinated. The procrastination worked as Trump was unwilling to declare the Russian response inadequate.
Trump talks to Zelenskyy
The next day Trump spoke with Zelenskyy in another call that left the American president positive, which given the most recent encounter between the two was good news. This time the surprise element was a proposal for the US to take over control of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. As with the previous proposal for the US to be able to mine rare earth minerals, which is still being negotiated, it has the advantage of giving the US a stake in Ukraine’s future security, particularly so as one of the most important plants in Zaporizhzhia has been occupied, somewhat precariously, by the Russians. It has the disadvantage of probably being impractical.
The readout on the Trump-Zelensky call came from Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National security Advisor Mike Waltz. They gushed that Trump’s call with Zelenskyy was ‘fantastic,’ with lots of thanks for past support.
Zelenskyy had explained what had been going on in Kursk, leading to an agreement ‘to share information closely between their defense staffs as the battlefield situation evolved.’ He had also asked for more air defence systems, leading to a proposal to see what could be found in Europe (so nothing from US stocks). They agreed on the stages of the partial ceasefires on energy and the Black Sea as the first steps ‘toward the full end of the war and ensuring security.’ The issue of power plants, POW exchanges, and abducted children were mentioned. ‘They agreed all parties must continue the effort to make a ceasefire work,’ and ‘instructed their advisors and representatives to carry out this work as quickly as possible.’
After these two calls, the question remained unresolved: how long could the Russians keep this going while reserving their position on the conditionality of a ceasefire? The New York Times quoted administration officials privately acknowledging what seemed self-evident to most observers:
‘Mr. Putin appeared to be stalling, agreeing to just enough to appear to be engaged in peace talks, while pressing his advantage on the battlefield.’
Politico noted:
‘Trump has promised more sanctions against Moscow if Putin doesn’t commit to a peace deal but, for now at least, he’s allowing the Russian president to slip off the hook and set the tempo.’
According to one report Trump wants to achieve a full ceasefire by 20 April, in time for Easter, although this does not appear to be a firm deadline. Another report, this one from The Moscow Times, based on anonymous sources ‘familiar with the Kremlin’s thinking,’ suggests that there is not the same urgency on the Russian side. The Kremlin still believes that absent an agreement Russia can make more battlefield advances. The aim therefore was to keep the talks going while this happens. To do this they would argue about the technicalities. According to one of their sources: ‘These guys know the Ukraine talks inside and out. They’ve been tasked with nitpicking every comma.’ This was confirmed by Anton Troianovski, based on interviews with senior Russian foreign-policy figures at a security conference in New Delhi:
Mr. Putin continues to seek a far-reaching victory in Ukraine but is humoring Mr. Trump’s cease-fire push to seize the benefits of a thaw with Washington.
Little was expected from the peace process so the aim was to decouple that from the discussions on how to improve bilateral relations.
Back to Saudi Arabia
This helps explain what happened with the most recent round of talks which took place in Saudi Arabia from Sunday, 23 March to Tuesday, 25 March. These were proximity talks, so that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations were staying close together but did not meet. Nor was there much, if any, shuttling between the two by the US delegation.
Ukraine sent a high-powered team, incluidng Defence Minister Rustem Umerov and Pavlo Palisa, the deputy head of the President's Office. The US team did not include any of the most senior figures but had represenatives from the National Security Council staff, State Department and Kellogg’s team. The Russian delegation was led by the Head of the Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee, Grigory Karasin, and advisor to the Federal Security Service director, Sergei Beseda. Beseda’s past record as a senior figure in the FSB includes misinforming Putin about the likelihood of a quick victory. They do not seem to be figures likely to offer concessions beyond those approved by the Kremlin. Karasin described their intended role as ‘combative and constructive.’
At first it appeared that nothing had been agreed at all. Then came the separate announcements of a deal on the Black Sea and a possible one on prohibiting attacks on energy infrastructure. This is the one with Ukraine and this is the one with Russia. They both contain an agreement ‘to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,’ and ‘to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine.’ They both welcome ‘the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements,’ and promise to ‘continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace.’
The statement with Ukraine also included the following:
‘The United States and Ukraine agreed that the United States remains committed to helping achieve the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.’
Energy Infrastructure
The readiness of Putin to accept a ceasefire covering energy infrastructure could be taken as a testament to the success of Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes against Russian refineries and oil depots. On 14 March a new version of its Neptune cruise missile with a range of 1,000km blew up an oil refinery in Tuapse, about 480km from the front lines. An oil depot at Kavkazkaya was hit on 19 March and continued to burn for days afterwards.
With the winter almost over Russia might not see attacks on Ukraine’s energy systems as important to their overall campaign as before - another tribute to Ukraine’s resilience (and also an unusually warm winter). But while this may seem one-sided, an end to the attacks on the power grid that have caused regular blackouts and hardships in Ukraine would still be a source of relief.
There are also other targets inside Russia that are worth hitting with Ukraine’s new long-range systems, as was demonstrated on 20 March with an attack on military warehouses containing bombs and missiles at the Engels airbase. It was, therefore, not surprising that Zelenskyy quickly accepted this proposal.
The Kremlin readout from the Trump-Putin conversation had claimed that Putin had already given the order to cease attacks on 18 March. But this was followed by a Russian attack on an electricity system in Dnipropetrovsk, and then the Ukrainian attack on the oil depot the next day, leading to the Russians accusing the Ukrainians of non-compliance. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova played the blame game, observing: ‘How the American side will now deal with this deranged terrorist scum, excuse my language — that’s a big question.’
The Ukrainian delegation came to Saudi Arabia with a list of sites that required protection. These have not yet been agreed. Ukraine’s Umerov has observed that ‘additional technical consultations’ must be held as soon as possible for ‘the implementation, monitoring and control of the arrangements.’ In another statement Russia listed the targets to be spared (oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, including pumping stations; electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations, transformers, and distributors; nuclear power plants; and hydroelectric dams). Ukraine had wanted non-energy infrastructure to be included. Russia also still insisted that the agreement was already in force from 18 March, and so would expire 30 days after that (17 April).
Black Sea
This issue has some history. A deal was first brokered in the summer of 2022 which allowed Ukraine to ship grain through the sea. One reason for this, pushed by the UN, was that without this there was risk of countries dependent on Ukrainian grain going hungry. A year later Russia withdrew from the agreement. It argued that Western sanctions were preventing it exporting its own agricultural products. Yet although they threatened all commercial vessels heading to and from Ukrainian ports, Ukraine managed through an impressive campaign, to sink a number of Russian naval vessels and disable its headquarters in Crimea, so that they were able to establish a shipping corridor in the Black Sea sufficient so to push exports back to near-prewar levels. They were not, however, able to stop the Russians attacking ports along the Black Sea, notably Odesa. So for this to be a gain for Ukraine not only must they get confirmation that no Russian military vessels will move back into the western part of the Black Sea but also that there will be an end to attacks on port infrastructure. This would enable Kyiv to restart operations in other ports closer to the frontline.
Russia has, however, attached heavy conditions to the deal. According to the White House statement it would be ready to
‘help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.’
Unsurprisingly the Kremlin’s statement went further: the agreement would only be honoured after its state agriculture bank was reconnected to the international payment system and restrictions were lifted on ‘trade finance operations.’ They could therefore get relief on one important area of sanctions, setting a precedent for their further unwinding if there are more partial agreements, and then insist that Ukraine was violating the terms of the agreement and return to attacks on Ukrainian ports and shipping. They were also insisting on added that there need to be ‘appropriate control measures through inspection of such vessels,’ which would provide opportunities to check commercial vessels. Trump, thus far, has been non-committal: ‘We're thinking about all of them right now. We're looking at all of them.’
What Next?
Both agreements are flimsy, with headlines and insufficient detail. They need more definition and certainly more work on monitoring and compliance. It is still unclear how others will be involved. Turkey played a role in the original grain deal. Europeans are relevant to any sanctions relief. The Russian conditions on the Black Sea deal follow the same negotiating trick as before, in demanding major concessions before they give anything in return. It is perfectly possible that pinning down the details on both will lead to endless, notionally ‘technical’ discussions, which will frustrate Trump.
It is also important to note that the statements with both the Ukrainian and Russian delegations including the following admonition.
‘The United States reiterated President Donald J. Trump’s imperative that the killing on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict must stop, as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement. To that end, the United States will continue facilitating negotiations between both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution, in line with the agreements made in Riyadh.’
Thus the US demand for an early, full ceasefire remains.
Putin presumably assumes that Trump will prefer to keep a stuttering process going rather than acknowledge his unwillingness to make any substantive concessions. This war continues because Putin refuses to accept that he cannot achieve his political objectives by either military or diplomatic means.
Behind Putin’s stance is his confidence in future territorial advances that will increase the pressure on Ukraine. But this comes at a time when Ukrainians are increasingly confident that they can hold the line over the coming months. Russia’s territorial aim remains to get the four oblasts whose status as Russian has been enshrined in the constitution. Yet progress in Donetsk remains slow, while capturing all of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson is currently beyond Russian capabilities. Regardless, Putin’s reluctance to cut his losses on this war now assumes future gains.
If Trump really wants to end the fighting then his task is to convince Putin of the futility of his quest. This he can do by continuing with US support for Ukraine and adding to the economic pressure on Russia. There is no indication that he has yet realised this, or wants to realise it. But it is still the logical conclusion of his insistence that the killing must stop soon.
17. The South Pacific Is the New Frontline in the Rivalry with China
Excerpts:
What to Do?
For the past several years Beijing has been streamlining and improving the Belt and Road Initiative. This “Belt and Road 2.0” is dramatically less wasteful than the original. As China continues to build its influence in the region, Washington needs to determine how critical the South Pacific is to both American and also to Chinese national interests. For China the region is peripheral and does not come remotely close to the strategic significance of East or Southeast Asia. Chinese projects in the South Pacific may be large on a per-capita basis, but they are of limited strategic value to China. The Pacific island states have a combined population of 2.3 million people, or roughly half a million fewer people than the population of Yantai, a city in Shandong province (although Papua New Guinea has a population of 10.3 million people). For its part, Washington can continue its outreach in the region with close coordination with Australia and New Zealand. American critical interest in the Pacific is heavily centered on the same areas that China is concerned with, Northeast and Southeast Asia. Washington should consider the following policy recommendations if it seeks to not only maintain but also expand its influence in the region.
First, Washington can continue to work with its partners and allies in the region in deepening engagement and outreach to the South Pacific. This also calls for close consultation and coordination with Australia and New Zealand, who have much more invested in the region. The recent friction between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, over the latter’s signing of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Beijing, underscores the importance of the South Pacific to Wellington. This is an example where Washington does not have to invest significant resources but can rely on its allies to further American goals. Second, Washington can work with allies and partners in the region to persuade Pacific island states to not allow a potential Chinese military base on their soil. Finally, America can expand and reinforce the Shiprider Agreements with various regional states, which bring American and local maritime authorities together to work on maritime security. These agreements have immediate benefits for both the United States and the recipient country and this is an area in which China would have difficulty competing.
Overall, Washington needs to be cognizant that Pacific states have no interest in being pawns in the emerging great-power competition between the United States and China. They are very clear that they do not want to be forced to choose sides in the Sino-U.S. rivalry. Washington needs to realize that many regional states see Beijing as an opportunity and as a source of development. Ultimately, American attention to Pacific states will help blunt Beijing’s ambitions in the region.
The South Pacific Is the New Frontline in the Rivalry with China - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Christopher K. Colley · March 26, 2025
A few weeks ago, commercial flights over the Tasman Sea — located between Australia and New Zealand — were forced to divert after they were warned by the Chinese navy that its warships were about to conduct live-fire exercises in the area. This is the latest example of China looking to expand its position in the South Pacific. For at least the last six years, China has made a more focused effort to get many of the Pacific island states, especially ones that recently switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing (for example, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati), to take part in a new wide-ranging set of development and security deals. Critically, in May 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attempted to have Pacific states sign a regional development and security deal outside of the Pacific Islands Forum — an intergovernmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation and integration among countries in that region. This was a “red flag” for 10 out of 18 members of the forum, who declined to sign China’s deal. Beijing’s failure demonstrated that even the smallest of countries can “say no” to China. But this was not the end of the match.
For much of the last quarter of a century, the Sino-U.S. rivalry was largely confined to East Asia. Recently, however, there is an increasing amount of competition between Washington and Beijing in the South Pacific. However, I find that America and China are playing different games. China’s game is centered more on elite capture, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and various infrastructure projects. The United States has been focused on the development of human capital and working with these small island nations through Australia and New Zealand.
While American leaders look to “outcompete” China, they should be careful not to engage in a form of competition that directly seeks to play Beijing’s game, due to the frequent wasteful nature of China’s approach to building influence. Based on a deep analysis of open-source material in English and Chinese, as well as substantial on-the-ground research in five countries, I first assess what America and China are competing over and then evaluate Chinese activities and American responses. Next, I discuss the responses of the Pacific island states as well as focus on how well they are “playing the game.” Finally, I recommend that Washington continues to coordinate efforts with partners and allies to prevent Chinese gains in the region, such as the establishment of Chinese military bases in the South Pacific, as well expanding programs with regional states such as the Shiprider Agreements.
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What Are We Competing Over and How Are We Competing?
According to the Lowy Institute, from 2008 to 2022, China committed $10.6 billion in “total development finance” to the Pacific island states. Of this amount, only $4.5 billion has so far been spent. In contrast, over the same period, the United States committed $4.4 billion and spent $3.4 billion. It is important to note that while these figures may appear to be large, they are dwarfed by Australia, which committed $20.6 billion and spent $18.8 billion in the region. Beijing’s aspirations are large and, when coupled with its official assertion that the South Pacific is the part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, they appear to be part of a perceived Chinese “Long Game.”
In 2022, Washington announced intentions to open embassies in Tonga and Kiribati. This was in addition to previous announcement of new American embassies in other states, including the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, for a total of three new embassies in the region since 2023 (the planned embassy in Kiribati has yet to be opened). This is the clearest example of Washington’s response to China in the Pacific. This is coupled with an increase in American outreach to the Pacific and the holding of two Pacific Forums in Washington with former President Joe Biden. The U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit, held in Washington in September 2022, is the most visible major diplomatic push by the Americans to respond to China. During the summit, Washington announced more than $810 million in expanded programs designed to improve human development in the Pacific. While the money was welcome news in the Pacific, Chinese commentators have also been quick to point out that the money has not yet been released — currently, large amounts of American assistance are on hold and under review.
Developing countries around the world are full of Chinese stadiums and other high-profile construction projects. These are the nuts and bolts of physical infrastructure development. However, many Chinese projects are also vanity projects such as the sports stadium in Honiara in the Solomon Islands and are designed to bolster local leaders political support, especially before an election cycle.
Arguments that the United States cannot compete with China are based on the belief that China can mobilize massive amounts of resources, which the United States lacks. On the surface this appears true, but the state capacity of the United States is enormous. When Washington needs to mobilize its resources, it can do so in a way that China cannot. However, there is a clear difference between Beijing and Washington when it comes to development assistance and economic statecraft: Chinese leaders have few domestic constraints.
It can be argued that China is not even competing with the United States in the region, while Washington is engaged in a game of catch-up that it will not win. This American approach can appear to be “great-power competition on the cheap.” U.S. embassies in the region (especially recently opened ones) are thinly staffed. For example, the U.S. embassy in Tonga’s newly opened visa service is “staffed by the Consular Team from U.S. Embassy Suva on a quarterly visit basis.” The fact that visa officials are not permanently based in the country reflects low levels of staffing. This is in comparison to a massive Chinese embassy complex with an estimated 20 staff that is located close by. This situation is repeated in other Pacific states where it is not uncommon to find U.S. embassies with only two or three American employees and no visa services for locals. This lack of visa services is a constant source of irritation for local populations. Many Pacific islanders have to fly to either Fiji or New Zealand for a visa interview, and are not always successful in obtaining a U.S. visa.
Influence
Ultimately Washington is competing over influence. While some of Beijing’s actions may not be direct responses to America, China is competing. There is a perception that China is attempting to thwart American goals in the region, as well as the widespread belief that China is practicing a form of “elite capture” in its South Pacific diplomacy, thus greatly increasing its influence. How one measures influence and how to obtain it is a tricky task. Washington stresses the need to build local human capital and to reinforce and strengthen what are relatively weak institutions in the region. This form of influence building is not very visible and takes years if not decades to reach noticeable levels of success. Contrary to Chinese claims, it is also the key ingredient of successful and sustained economic development.
Pacific States and Agency
Frequently lost in discussions over the Sino-American rivalry are the actual states where this competition is unfolding. Small states have enormous leverage and agency that they can use to extract concessions from the great powers, but South Pacific states have yet to clearly articulate a realistic strategy to deal with China. A coherent strategy does not have to be uniform across states, but it would allow regional states to exercise greater agency and extract more concessions from Beijing. Although a few states have published some guidance on foreign policy, such documents are thin on details on how they can benefit from great power competition. For example, Fiji has a Foreign Policy White Paper that recognizes the competition between China and the United States, while the Cook Islands have published an Action Plan that describes various areas of cooperation with China. Reports have stated that Papua New Guinea is expected to put out a foreign policy white paper next month, which if correct, it would be the first one since 1981. Furthermore, Vanuatu’s National Foreign Policy paper does acknowledge that great power competition has “provided opportunities for leveraging our new-found strategic relevance into tangible development gains for our people.” While such publications are helpful, they do not shed light on any concrete strategies. In addition to the above, a common perception is that Washington partially left the region after the Cold War, and then “the gap was filled by others.” What is clear is that most regional states do not want to take sides in the rivalry and are trying to figure out how to take advantage of the friction between the two powers.
How states can play the powers off each other is another issue. Accepting large amounts of Chinese loans may help build infrastructure, but it also risks a state being indebted to China. Currently seven Oceania states are at high risk of debt distress: Tuvalu, Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Micronesia, Kiribati and Vanuatu. Pacific states have demonstrated the ability to say no to China. The above case of Wang not being able to get countries to sign on to his proposal in May 2022 is a clear example of their agency. Furthermore, Chinese attempts in countries like Fiji to send in a police force have been met with firm resistance.
One often hears grumbling by both locals and the foreign diplomatic communities about the high number of Chinese workers who dominate in areas like retail and construction. This is also an example of agency, or lack thereof, on the part of national governments. These states issue visas to Chinese nationals and can restrict access. However, the hurdle of obtaining a visa was recently removed between China and the Solomon Islands, which both waived visa requirements for each other in 2024. In addition, Chinese traders pay locals to lease their land and then set up shop. For example, Chinese nationals have purchased land in Palau in the form of 50- to 99-year leases. A final challenge for regional states is the lack of a cohesive China strategy. For example, even though the Chinese government has set up Confucious Classrooms at three branches of the University of the South Pacific, many governments in the region lack a fulltime fluent Mandarin speaker, even though there is a noticeable Chinese business presence in most countries. Even if a China strategy emerged, elite capture by Beijing is a threat to a well-coordinated policy on China.
Bases and Strategic Significance to China
The strategic value of the Pacific island states is debatable. Certainly, in areas like fishing it is enormous, as well as in the potential for logistics hubs. Concerns around China building a military base in Kiribati, however, may be overblown. Fears that such a base could be used to target Hawaii with Chinese missiles or obstruct an American response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are misplaced. If a conflict erupts with China, any Chinese outpost in the vicinity of Hawaii would be wiped out in the opening hours. Second, the South Pacific is not a critical strategic interest for China. Evidence of this can be found in the decreasing amount of money China is spending in the region. For example, in both 2015 and 2016, Beijing spent $405 million and $412 million respectively in the region. However, from 2019 to 2022, it averaged only $240 million per year. If Beijing views the region as increasing in strategic importance, we should have seen a sustained expansion of Chinese investment. In addition, the South Pacific is not the northern Indian Ocean, through which 95 percent of Chinese trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe transits.
Concerns of a Chinese base may become a reality in the Solomon Islands, but this has yet to be proven. There would be enormous diplomatic pushback from Washington and Canberra, not to mention from the Pacific island states, to a Chinese military base in their immediate neighborhood. Charlot Salwai, the former prime minister of Vanuatu, promised that there will be no Chinese military presence in his country and even denied that talks about one had taken place. Reports that Beijing was seeking to refurbish a port on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea were quashed when Port Moresby turned to Australia and the United States to redevelop the site, due to greater trust in their traditional partners.
What to Do?
For the past several years Beijing has been streamlining and improving the Belt and Road Initiative. This “Belt and Road 2.0” is dramatically less wasteful than the original. As China continues to build its influence in the region, Washington needs to determine how critical the South Pacific is to both American and also to Chinese national interests. For China the region is peripheral and does not come remotely close to the strategic significance of East or Southeast Asia. Chinese projects in the South Pacific may be large on a per-capita basis, but they are of limited strategic value to China. The Pacific island states have a combined population of 2.3 million people, or roughly half a million fewer people than the population of Yantai, a city in Shandong province (although Papua New Guinea has a population of 10.3 million people). For its part, Washington can continue its outreach in the region with close coordination with Australia and New Zealand. American critical interest in the Pacific is heavily centered on the same areas that China is concerned with, Northeast and Southeast Asia. Washington should consider the following policy recommendations if it seeks to not only maintain but also expand its influence in the region.
First, Washington can continue to work with its partners and allies in the region in deepening engagement and outreach to the South Pacific. This also calls for close consultation and coordination with Australia and New Zealand, who have much more invested in the region. The recent friction between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, over the latter’s signing of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Beijing, underscores the importance of the South Pacific to Wellington. This is an example where Washington does not have to invest significant resources but can rely on its allies to further American goals. Second, Washington can work with allies and partners in the region to persuade Pacific island states to not allow a potential Chinese military base on their soil. Finally, America can expand and reinforce the Shiprider Agreements with various regional states, which bring American and local maritime authorities together to work on maritime security. These agreements have immediate benefits for both the United States and the recipient country and this is an area in which China would have difficulty competing.
Overall, Washington needs to be cognizant that Pacific states have no interest in being pawns in the emerging great-power competition between the United States and China. They are very clear that they do not want to be forced to choose sides in the Sino-U.S. rivalry. Washington needs to realize that many regional states see Beijing as an opportunity and as a source of development. Ultimately, American attention to Pacific states will help blunt Beijing’s ambitions in the region.
Become a Member
Christopher K. Colley, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.
Image: U.S. Coast Guard via Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Christopher K. Colley · March 26, 2025
18. A Signal Screwup—and What It Means
Uh Oh.
This does not bode well for the National Security Advisor. The MAGA faction recognizes this was a screw-up and the knives are coming out.
Excerpts:
It’s true that Donald Trump said Tuesday that Waltz is a “good man” who “learned his lesson.” And in the Trump era, it can be perilous to be on the wrong side of the MAGA wing that is skeptical of foreign interventions.
For this crowd, Waltz was already on thin ice before the snafu. He was seen as a representative of the old Republican Party, tainted by past military interventions. In this view, the far greater sin was that an anti-Trump journalist was on his speed dial.
Sean Davis, CEO of the Trump-aligned publication The Federalist, said in a post on X he was “a lot less interested in how J.D. Vance is trying to keep the defense bureaucracy aligned with Trump’s foreign policy message and vision, and a lot more concerned about why Mike Waltz is regularly talking to Jeffrey Goldberg, a dead-end neocon war pimp who has been involved with every major foreign policy hoax of the last quarter century.”
Curt Mills, the executive director of The American Conservative, struck a similar tone when he said on X that Trump “has frankly never had as acute and relevant (the national security adviser oversees. . . national security) cause as he now has with NSA Waltz.”
Someone “close to the White House” certainly sounded like they were out to get Waltz when they told Politico that “Everyone in the White House can agree on one thing: Mike Waltz is a fucking idiot.”
“Can anyone seriously argue that Mike Waltz should not be fired?” asked Breaking Points co-host Saagar Enjeti in a post on X. “Both responsible for a massive security leak and accidentally reveals he’s in regular comms with one of the most prolific neocon journalists in D.C.”
A Signal Screwup—and What It Means
Who is being blamed for Signalgate? And why?
By Eli Lake
03.25.25 — U.S. Politics
https://www.thefp.com/p/a-signal-screwup-and-what-it-means
National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. (Kayla Bartkowski via Getty Images)
0:00
-7:
On Monday, Atlantic editor in chief Jeffrey Goldberg revealed that National Security Adviser Michael Waltz had included him in an encrypted group chat to discuss war plans for striking Houthi targets in Yemen. It didn’t take long for the blame games to begin.
There was plenty of blame to go around—while Waltz invited Goldberg into the chat, it was others, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who Goldberg claims shared classified material in the chat. For one wing of the MAGA coalition, it was Waltz who should go.
The stakes here are not just group chat etiquette. The real problem, for this faction, is that Mike Waltz represents a foreign policy that is insufficiently hostile to the old Beltway consensus about America’s enemies and allies. Hegseth has empowered America Firsters at the Pentagon. Waltz has Jeffrey Goldberg in his list of contacts.
It’s true that Donald Trump said Tuesday that Waltz is a “good man” who “learned his lesson.” And in the Trump era, it can be perilous to be on the wrong side of the MAGA wing that is skeptical of foreign interventions.
For this crowd, Waltz was already on thin ice before the snafu. He was seen as a representative of the old Republican Party, tainted by past military interventions. In this view, the far greater sin was that an anti-Trump journalist was on his speed dial.
Sean Davis, CEO of the Trump-aligned publication The Federalist, said in a post on X he was “a lot less interested in how J.D. Vance is trying to keep the defense bureaucracy aligned with Trump’s foreign policy message and vision, and a lot more concerned about why Mike Waltz is regularly talking to Jeffrey Goldberg, a dead-end neocon war pimp who has been involved with every major foreign policy hoax of the last quarter century.”
Curt Mills, the executive director of The American Conservative, struck a similar tone when he said on X that Trump “has frankly never had as acute and relevant (the national security adviser oversees. . . national security) cause as he now has with NSA Waltz.”
Someone “close to the White House” certainly sounded like they were out to get Waltz when they told Politico that “Everyone in the White House can agree on one thing: Mike Waltz is a fucking idiot.”
“Can anyone seriously argue that Mike Waltz should not be fired?” asked Breaking Points co-host Saagar Enjeti in a post on X. “Both responsible for a massive security leak and accidentally reveals he’s in regular comms with one of the most prolific neocon journalists in D.C.”
On Tuesday afternoon, Waltz himself said he’d “never met, don’t know, never communicated with” Goldberg. In his piece, Goldberg says he has met Waltz “in the past.” Nonetheless, one need only peruse Goldberg’s magazine since January to notice The Atlantic has not published any foreign policy scoops until Goldberg’s inadvertent one from Monday.
These figures, as well as Vice President J.D. Vance and many other lower-level officials brought in at the White House and Pentagon, are all part of the “restrainer” movement. This crowd believes the Beltway foreign policy consensus has overstretched America’s military and that European allies in particular should invest more in their own national defense instead of riding freely on America’s military.
In this sense, the ire directed at Waltz appears to be a convenient ideological cudgel. From just a national security perspective, the far more concerning breach was committed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth who, according to Goldberg, shared specifics about the strikes on Yemen. Here is how Goldberg described that information (which he chose not to include in his story). This was “operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.” Yikes.
Leaving aside Goldberg’s invitation to the group text, there is a risk in just sharing that information at all on a commercial encrypted app like Signal. “There is a vulnerability if you are using Signal,” Dan Meyer, the former director for whistleblowing and transparency to the Inspector General of the Defense Department, told The Free Press. “The president can decide it’s okay for all of his employees to use Signal. . . . But Signal is open to hacking by foreign intelligence services.”
So why has Hegseth largely avoided the wrath of wider MAGA Land? One reason is that he has all the right enemies. Unlike the confirmation process for Secretary of State Marco Rubio, which he sailed through with a 99 to 0 vote in the Senate, Hegseth’s nomination came down to the wire. Details from his divorce and an alleged tryst with a woman who was not his wife were dredged up during his nomination. His lack of experience was derided, and many Democrats in the Senate scoffed at the former soldier’s last job as a host on Fox News. Hegseth, like Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and FBI director Kash Patel, became a loyalty test for Republicans: Would they support the president even when the Washington establishment bristled?
For now, the White House is saying the entire matter is a nothingburger. Administration officials have pointed to guidance for government officials released during the Biden administration that allows for the use of messaging apps with end-to-end encryption like Signal. And as far as it goes, it’s true that senior national security officials in the Biden administration did use Signal to communicate with one another.
But one former senior national security official for a Democratic administration told The Free Press that while his colleagues did occasionally use Signal for routine communications, they never used it the way that Goldberg described in The Atlantic. “Some people had Signal on government phones,” this source said. “The primary focus was logistics and coordination when people were out of the office, or communicating with foreign counterparts who were not on our classified system. . . . We would never have a substantive policy discussion on Signal.”
So it raises some uncomfortable questions. What will mid-level officials think about the cumbersome rules of handling classified material when their bosses so casually discuss military plans on a Signal text chain? And what will Russian or Chinese officials conclude about the national security leaders of their most powerful rival? Finally, what does it say that the president’s reaction to the entire affair is to dismiss it as fake news and a tempest in a teapot?
While Signalgate has been grist for an ideological fight within Trump’s coalition, it speaks volumes that it seems the incompetence and carelessness displayed by Trump’s cabinet will, for now, go unpunished.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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