Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"In science, where alone something approximating to genuine knowledge is to be found, men’s attitude is tentative and full of doubt. In religion and politics on the contrary, though there is as yet nothing approaching scientific knowledge, everybody considers it de rigueur to have a dogmatic opinion, to be backed up by inflicting starvation, prison, and war, and to be carefully guarded from argumentative competition with any different opinion. None of our beliefs is quite true; all have at least a penumbra of vagueness and error."

- Bertrand Russell, Free Thought and Official Propaganda (1922)

“In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.”

- commonly attributed to George Orwell

“Nothing is so dull as logic, and nothing is so important.”

- Will Durant

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2023

2. Ukraine's new offensives against Russia will aim to retake territory, inspire hope and reignite Western attention on the war

3. Beijing’s Subversive Political Warfare in the Pacific—and the Need for Greater Engagement by the United States and Taiwan

4. The failure of US unconventional wars - Global Times

5. Fighting Beijing's long arm of repression

6. Torture and Turmoil at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant: An Insider’s Account

7. The Pentagon’s vaccine imbroglio: where to go from here?

8. IntelBrief: TikTok’s Testimony Troubles

9. US Indo-Pacific Command seeks extra $274 million for cyber

10. AUKUS Success Will Depend on Long-term Political Will, Says Regional Expert

11. US military needs 7th branch just for cyber, current and former leaders say

12. All Talk, No Action on China

13. Elite Army Rangers Train in Hawaii as Pacific Interest Grows

14. Is the Army’s $117 million rebrand dead after Jonathan Majors’ arrest?

15. Why it’s time for the US Army to divest Iron Dome

16. The Iraq War's Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood

17. At least 50 U.S. government personnel targeted with phone spyware overseas

18. Any perception that China doesn’t affect NATO is invalid

19. America Shrugs, and the World Makes Plans

20. Russia says it test-fired anti-ship missiles in Sea of Japan

21. Japan holds evacuation drills amid Taiwan invasion fear

22. How the US mission in Syria evolved into a proxy war with Iran

23. Agile Ukraine, Lumbering Russia

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2023

Key Takeaways

Rumors about the dismissal of Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov on March 27 generated a muted and cynical response in the Russian information space.
Russian milbloggers also had a muted response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 25 announcement to deploy tactical nukes to Belarus, underscoring that Putin’s messaging is aimed at Western rather than domestic Russian audiences.
Russian military leadership likely committed limited higher quality Wagner Group elements to the offensive on Avdiivka, potentially to reinforce recent limited tactical successes in the area.
Russian forces made marginal gains around Svatove and Russian forces continue ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and made gains within Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russia appears to be increasingly deploying elements of conventional formations in a piecemeal fashion along the entire frontline, including in southern Ukraine.
Russian authorities continue forming new volunteer battalions subordinate to irregular formations.
Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against an occupation law enforcement officer in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 27, 2023

Mar 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2023

Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 27, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Rumors about the dismissal of Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov on March 27 generated a muted and cynical response in the Russian information space. The milbloggers claimed that Russian military authorities dismissed Muradov from his position as Eastern Group of Forces commander, but ISW cannot currently verify these claims.[1] Muradov took command of the Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) on October 6, 2022, and has overseen a series of disastrous offensive operations led by EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast over the past five months.[2] One milblogger claimed that Muradov is on “vacation,” which the milblogger noted is tantamount to resignation. Others claimed that Muradov’s removal is a positive step but stated that Muradov’s replacement is more important than his removal.[3] Some milbloggers noted that Muradov was responsible for significant Russian military failures in western Donetsk Oblast, including the high casualties suffered in the assault against Pavlivka in October-November 2022 and the prolonged and failed effort to take Vuhledar.[4] Independent Russian investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories), citing sources close to the Russian General Staff, reported that the Russian General Staff accused Muradov of being inept due to battlefield failures and significant losses in western Donetsk Oblast, including the near obliteration of the Tatarstan ”Alga” volunteer battalion.[5] One prominent milblogger claimed that military authorities are also considering dismissing Western Military District Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, whose forces operate along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in eastern Ukraine.[6]

ISW cannot confirm the rumors of either Muradov’s or Nikiforov’s dismissals, but it is noteworthy that Russian milbloggers are discussing potential dismissals of commanders associated with areas of operation in which Russian forces have been largely unable to secure substantial gains or have suffered major losses. Russian milbloggers do not appear to be hypothesizing about the removal of either the Central Military District (CMD) Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev or Southern Military District Commander (SMD) Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev.[7] Neither the CMD nor the SMD are heavily committed in critical areas of the front, and Mordvichev and Kuzovlev have therefore likely avoided becoming targets of Russian command skepticism because they are not currently responsible for significant failures. The muted information space response to the reported firings is additionally indicative of broader disillusionment with Russian military command, which milbloggers have argued for months needs systemic overhauls. Many milbloggers have consistently praised former Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergey Surovikin despite the fall of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast under his command, however. One milblogger claimed on March 27 that Surovikin may be responsible for defending against a future Ukrainian counteroffensive and claimed that Surovikin’s military strategy is better than that of Russian Chief of the General Staff and current Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov.[8] Russian authorities and some milbloggers have fixated on identifying and punishing individual commanders for the failures of their troops, rather than interrogating and resolving endemic issues in Russian command and control, force structure, and deployment patterns.

Russian milbloggers also had a muted response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 25 announcement that Russia will deploy tactical nukes to Belarus, suggesting that Putin’s messaging is aimed at Western rather than domestic Russian audiences. Many milbloggers and news aggregators simply amplified various points from Putin’s March 25 interview that artificially inflate the capabilities of the Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) to sustain a prolonged war effort, as well as the nuclear weapons deployment announcement itself.[9] One milblogger correctly noted that deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus does not improve Russia’s military situation in Ukraine, claiming that Russian forces need to instead prepare for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive, and criticized continued Russian military command and organization issues.[10] Another milblogger recognized that Putin targeted his nuclear weapons deployment announcement at the West and praised the prospect of being the ”nightmare” of the US.[11]

Russian military leadership likely committed limited higher quality Wagner Group elements to the offensive on Avdiivka, potentially to reinforce recent limited tactical successes in the area. Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivyskyi stated on March 25 that Ukrainian intelligence forecasts that Wagner may appear in the Avdiivka direction.[12] A Russian VK user posted an obituary on March 26 announcing the death of Wagner Group fighter Yevgeny Malgotin in Avdiivka on March 20.[13] The obituary claims that Malgotin had prior military experience and fought with the 2nd Russian Volunteer Detachment of the Army of Republika Sprska (commonly referred to as the Bosnian Serb Army) in 1992.[14] Malgotin appears to have been a seasoned fighter, and likely represents the higher caliber of fighter that comprises Wagner’s special operations forces. While Wagner has heavily committed a majority convict-based force to operations near Bakhmut, there is likely a contingent of higher-quality operators at various locations in Ukraine. Russian military leadership may have decided to deploy certain Wagner elements to the Avdiivka area in recent weeks to support exhausted and lower-quality Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) elements in their efforts to take the settlement. If such Wagner fighters have been fighting near Avdiivka, their involvement may help explain the limited tactical gains made in the area over the past week.

Key Takeaways

Rumors about the dismissal of Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov on March 27 generated a muted and cynical response in the Russian information space.
Russian milbloggers also had a muted response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 25 announcement to deploy tactical nukes to Belarus, underscoring that Putin’s messaging is aimed at Western rather than domestic Russian audiences.
Russian military leadership likely committed limited higher quality Wagner Group elements to the offensive on Avdiivka, potentially to reinforce recent limited tactical successes in the area.
Russian forces made marginal gains around Svatove and Russian forces continue ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and made gains within Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russia appears to be increasingly deploying elements of conventional formations in a piecemeal fashion along the entire frontline, including in southern Ukraine.
Russian authorities continue forming new volunteer battalions subordinate to irregular formations.
Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against an occupation law enforcement officer in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 26 and 27 and have made marginal gains in the Svatove area as of March 27. Geolocated footage posted on March 27 indicates that Russian troops have advanced into Raihorodka, 12km west of Svatove.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka (10km northeast of Kupyansk), Kreminna, Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), Vyimka (25km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna) on March 26 and 27.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 26 that elements of the Western Grouping of Forces (Western Military District) destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Stelmakhivka, 12km northwest of Svatove.[17] Russian milbloggers reported that elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) and 76th Guards VDV Division are operating in forest areas near Kreminna.[18] A Russian military correspondent reportedly embedded with Russian troops near Kreminna claimed on March 26 that Russian paratroopers and unspecified naval infantry elements are advancing 500 meters per day near Kreminna and capturing Ukrainian fortified positions.[19] A Russian milblogger noted on March 27 that Russian forces are additionally continuing attempts to push west of Ploshchanka (15km north of Kreminna).[20] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty reported on March 26 that Russian forces are conducting the highest number of artillery strikes along the entire Kupyansk-Lyman line and that there were 10 combat clashes on this line over the past day.[21]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on March 26 and 27 and made gains within Bakhmut as of March 26. Geolocated footage posted on March 24 and 26 shows that Russian forces have likely advanced along Zelena Street and Oleksandry Kolpakovoi streets in northwestern Bakhmut.[22] Russian media outlet RIA Novosti additionally posted footage on March 26 confirming that Wagner Group fighters have advanced within the AZOM complex in northern Bakhmut.[23] Geolocated footage posted on March 27 shows Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin visiting School No.5 near central Bakhmut.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters reached the rail line in northern Bakhmut on March 26 and continued advancing within urban areas of northern and southwestern Bakhmut in an effort to reach Bakhmut’s city center on March 26 and 27.[25] A prominent milblogger noted on March 26 that Wagner is advancing in Bakhmut with support from unspecified conventional Russian elements, supporting ISW’s assessment that conventional formations are increasingly supporting Wagner’s offensive on Bakhmut.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Predtechyne (15km southwest) between March 26 and 27.[27] Ukrainian Eastern Group Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted on March 26 that the number of Russian attacks on Bakhmut is decreasing and suggested that Russian forces may be ”maneuvering with reserves” in the area.[28]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on March 26 and 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 and 27 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka itself; in the Avdiivka area near Novokalynove (10km north of Avdiivka), Severne (5km west of Avdiivka), Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), and Novobakhmutivka (11km northwest of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Krasnohorivka; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[29] Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaly Barbarash announced on March 27 that communal service workers are evacuating Avdiivka and that the military administration will turn off mobile communications in the city due to the presence of Russian informants in the city.[30] Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivyskyi stated on March 25 that elements of the Russian 10th Regiment (likely a Donetsk People’s Republic formation newly subordinated to Russian command) are fighting in the Avdiivka area.[31] Russian milbloggers continued to discuss Russian operations towards Avdiivka on both March 26 and March 27.[32] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novokalynove and are attacking towards Keramik.[33] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northern outskirts of Marinka on March 26 and continued fighting for the settlement on March 27.[34] Geolocated footage posted on March 26 additionally shows that Russian forces have advanced north of Novomykhailivka, about 10km south of Avdiivka.[35] Dmytrashkivskyi noted that elements of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) have recently engaged in Marinka.[36]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on March 26 or 27.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Russian forces resumed offensive operations in the dacha area south of Vuhledar.[38] Geolocated footage posted on March 27 shows minor Russian advances in the southern dacha area about 3km southeast of Vuhledar.[39]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russia appears to be increasingly deploying elements of conventional formations in a piecemeal fashion along the entire frontline, including in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed on March 27 that the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) is operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[40] Personnel of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade previously claimed they would deploy to the Vuhledar direction to relieve the exhausted 155th Naval Infantry Brigade which is committed to the area, but a Russian milblogger claimed on March 21 that unspecified elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade are instead operating in the Avdiivka direction.[41] The apparent simultaneous commitment of elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade to two disparate areas of the frontline is notably not a doctrinally sound pattern of deployment. Other Russian sources claimed that unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) personnel are operating near Hulyaipole, Zaporizhia Oblast.[42] Russia has deployed various VDV formations across the theater, further indicating that Russia has not concentrated its most elite forces for any concerted push in one discrete area of the front.

A Ukrainian official reported that Russian forces are shifting to the use of guided aerial bombs to strike areas in southern Ukraine.[43] Head of the United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces, Nataliya Humenyuk, stated on March 26 that Russian forces have been testing guided aerial bombs along the contact line in Kherson Oblast for the past few days, and conducted a strike against Beryslav with these bombs on March 24.[44] Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces have decreased their tempo of shelling in Kherson Oblast from 90-100 instances to 50-60 instances per day. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat announced on March 25 that Russian forces are converting FAB-500 unguided aerial bombs into guided missiles to use as replacement for expensive cruise missiles.[45] Ihnat stated that these new aerial bombs have a range of 50 or more kilometers.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a dormitory quartering Russian military and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) personnel in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] Russian sources claimed that the technical school next to the dormitory held classes at the time of the strike.[47] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian force concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[48]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue forming new volunteer battalions subordinate to irregular formations. Russian sources amplified recruitment advertisements for the “Uragan” volunteer battalion subordinate to the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade, which operates in the Avdiivka direction.[49]

The Russian federal government reportedly has delegated the establishment of a new contract force to Russian federal subjects, suggesting that the Russian government has not learned from the failures of partial mobilization. Independent Russian media outlet SOTA claimed on March 24 that Russian authorities tasked Moscow City authorities with recruiting 27,000 contract personnel and threatening a second formal wave of partial mobilization if such recruitment efforts fail.[50] Russian sources previously claimed that Russia aims to recruit 400,000 contract personnel, as ISW has previously reported.[51] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called for Russia to establish a large contract army of 1.5 million personnel, but a milblogger criticized this effort and called for Medvedev to fix endemic issues in the Russian contract system.[52] The milblogger claimed that true contract armies are highly trained, motivated, and experienced, whereas Russian contract forces are not.[53]

The impacts of the Wagner Group’s prior prison recruitment effort have generated discord in some areas in Russia, suggesting that Russian domestic efforts to stimulate support for the war are not as all-encompassing as Russian authorities may have hoped. Latvian-based Russian-language opposition outlet Meduza reported on three conflicts between residents of villages in Bashkortostan, Transbaikal, and Rostov Oblast in which the residents and settlement village authorities argued among themselves on whether to bury convicted murderers who died in Ukraine while fighting for Wagner with military honors.[54] Some residents praised the deceased convicts as heroes, while others noted that they had not forgotten the grief from the murders these men committed prior to fighting in Ukraine. Some Russians’ refusals to overlook the convicts’ past crimes for their service in Ukraine suggests that the war remains distant for significant swaths of Russian society, and additionally suggests that the reintegration of Wagner convicts into domestic society may be a source of considerable friction.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against an occupation law enforcement officer on March 27. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that local partisans wounded Russian occupation police chief Mykhailo Moskvin after blowing up his car in Mariupol on March 27.[55] Russian sources posted photos and video footage on March 27 showing the aftermath of the attack on Moskvin, who reportedly survived with a concussion.[56]

Russian officials and occupation authorities approved a draft law on March 26 on the creation of a free economic zone (FEZ) in occupied territories. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on March 27 that Russian occupation authorities plan to implement a FEZ in occupied Kherson Oblast, building on existing factories to produce single products such as tomato paste.[57] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin claimed on March 26 that the Russian government met to discuss a draft law on creating a FEZ in occupied territories and establishing a simplified procedure for urban planning and land use.[58] A Russian source claimed that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved the draft law on March 26.[59]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce preparations for the September referendum in occupied territories. United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak claimed on March 26 that preliminary voting is underway in occupied territories and that over 2,500 residents of occupied Kherson Oblast have already registered with the United Russia political party.[60] Turchak called for the creation of a People’s Program in the coming months for social support, which he claimed will allow political candidates to understand the most acute problems and propose specific budget allocations for their resolutions.[61]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to eliminate the circulation of the Ukrainian hryvnia in occupied territories. Nova Kakhovka municipal district occupation administration head Pavel Filipchuk claimed on March 27 that anyone using the Ukrainian hryvnia in the Nova Kakhovka municipal district may face criminal charges and a possible prison sentence.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Ukrainian Border Guard Spokesman Andriy Demchenko stated on March 27 that the number of Russian forces in Belarus has decreased to 4,000.[63] Demchenko also stated that Russian command has partially transferred units previously trained in Belarus to eastern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 27 that Belarusian forces are strengthening the security of their air borders.[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/41415; https://t.me/rybar/45071 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23651; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20230; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/2...

[2] https://tass dot .com/defense/1519217

[3] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20230; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23650

[4] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/41415; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20230; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/2... https://t.me/milinfolive/98494

[5] https://t.me/istories_media/2282

[6] https://t.me/rybar/45071 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23651

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723

[8] https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/47322; https://t.me/kommunist/16623

[9] https://t.me/rybar/45046; https://t.me/readovkanews/55493; https://t.me/readovkanews/55475; https://t.me/readovkanews/55476; https://t.me/readovkanews/55473; https://t.me/readovkanews/55472; https://t.me/readovkanews/55468; https://t.me/readovkanews/55469; https://t.me/readovkanews/55470; https://t.me/readovkanews/55471; https://t.me/readovkanews/55480; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81381; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81380; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46318

[10] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11125; https://t.me/rt_special/3337

[11] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7414

[12] https://suspilne dot media/425655-rosia-budue-aderne-shovise-u-bilorusi-minoboroni-ukraini-zaklikalo-do-informacijnoi-tisi-396-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://suspilne dot media/425853-aktivizuvalisa-v-napramku-avdiivki-rosijski-vijskovi-315-raziv-strilali-po-doneckomu-napramku-dmitraskivskij/

[13] https://twitter.com/Matrix0983/status/1640260433553571840?s=20

[14] https://twitter.com/Matrix0983/status/1640260433553571840/photo/2

[15] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1640343948026683394; https://twitt... https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1640315282890665985

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FnK5bXUHWMsuvWNC48...

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/25114

[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81405; https://t.me/rybar/45089

[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81448

[20] https://t.me/rybar/45080

[21] https://suspilne dot media/425655-rosia-budue-aderne-shovise-u-bilorusi-minoboroni-ukraini-zaklikalo-do-informacijnoi-tisi-396-den-vijni-onlajn/

[22] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1639881216542253062 ; https://...

[23] https://ria dot ru/20230326/artemovsk-1860697725.html ; https://t.me/rian_ru/198008 ; https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/163...

[24] https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1640321912751419396?s=20 ; https:...

[25] https://t.me/rybar/45055; https://t.me/milchronicles/1708; https://t.m...

[26] https://t.me/rybar/45055

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FnK5bXUHWMsuvWNC48...

[28] https://suspilne dot media/425655-rosia-budue-aderne-shovise-u-bilorusi-minoboroni-ukraini-zaklikalo-do-informacijnoi-tisi-396-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FnK5bXUHWMsuvWNC48...

[30] https://suspilne dot media/426144-z-avdiivki-evakuuut-komunalnu-sluzbu-u-misti-vimknut-mobilnij-zvazok-mva/

[31] https://suspilne dot media/425655-rosia-budue-aderne-shovise-u-bilorusi-minoboroni-ukraini-zaklikalo-do-informacijnoi-tisi-396-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://suspilne dot media/425853-aktivizuvalisa-v-napramku-avdiivki-rosijski-vijskovi-315-raziv-strilali-po-doneckomu-napramku-dmitraskivskij/

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/11610; https://t.me/basurin_e/378https://t.me/war...

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/11625

[34] https://t.me/rybar/45060; https://t.me/z_arhiv/19887; https://t.me/bas...

[35] https://t.me/military_u/14559; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/... https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1639984364032327681?s=20

[36] https://suspilne dot media/425655-rosia-budue-aderne-shovise-u-bilorusi-minoboroni-ukraini-zaklikalo-do-informacijnoi-tisi-396-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://suspilne dot media/425853-aktivizuvalisa-v-napramku-avdiivki-rosijski-vijskovi-315-raziv-strilali-po-doneckomu-napramku-dmitraskivskij/

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FnK5bXUHWMsuvWNC48...

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/11610

[39] https://twitter.com/JagdBandera/status/1640271413301968896; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/578

[40] https://t.me/russian_shock_volunteer_brigade/87; https://t.me/basurin_e/380

[41] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20127 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030923; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[42] https://t.me/akimapachev/4204; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23682

[43] https://suspilne dot media/426303-kilkist-obstriliv-pravobereznoi-castini-hersonsini-suttevo-zmensilas-gumenuk-pro-robotu-sil-oboroni-pivdna/

[44] https://suspilne dot media/425733-dvi-dobi-pospil-armia-rf-atakue-hersonsinu-samorobnimi-kerovanimi-bombami-ale-u-nas-e-dosvid-ih-zbitta-gumenuk/

[45] https://suspilne dot media/425031-mzs-sprostuvalo-zaavi-oon-sodo-zorstokogo-povodzenna-z-polonenimi-rf-boi-za-bahmut-trivaut-395-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/25/vorog-mozhe-skydaty-svoyi-planuyuchi-aviabomby-na-vidstani-50-i-bilshe-kilometriv-ne-dohodyachy-do-nashogo-kordonu-yurij-ignat/

[46] https://t.me/riamelitopol/8657; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1640254569446797312?s=20; https://t.me/riamelitopol/86616`

[47] https://t.me/vrogov/8369; https://t.me/vrogov/8370; https://t.me/vrogov/8371; https://t.me/vrogov/8374; https://t.me/vrogov/8376; https://t.me/vrogov/8377; https://t.me/vrogov/8378; https://t.me/vrogov/8381; https://t.me/vrogov/8382; https://t.me/readovkanews/55547; https://t.me/readovkanews/55551; http... https://t.me/readovkanews/55549; https://t.me/readovkanews/55552

[48] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02xpSLSUAWPh...

[49] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8645; https://t.me/interbrigady2022/1681

[50] https://t.me/sotaproject/55986;

[51] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[52] https://tass dpt ru/armiya-i-opk/17367219; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8651

[53] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8651

[54] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/03/27/etot-vash-geroy-szheg-rodnuyu-mat-i-sestru

[55] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/03/27/u-mariupoli-pidirvaly-avtivku-golovnogo-misczevogo-policzaya/

[56] https://t.me/milinfolive/98503; https://t.me/rybar/45094; https://t.me... io/news/2023/03/27/v-okkupirovannom-rf-mariupole-vzorvali-avtomobil-nachalnika-politsii; https://ria dot ru/20230327/mariupol-1860869273.html

[57] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0kddZqG4PFqgwxLcDXcHvC8...

[58] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8075; https://t.me/readovkanews/55497

[59] https://t.me/readovkanews/55497

[60] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8079

[61] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8079

[62] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8084; https://t.me/VGA_Kakhovka/6882

[63] https://suspilne dot media/426234-u-bilorusi-zalisilos-4-tisaci-rosijskih-vijskovih-dpsu/

[64] https://t.me/modmilby/24863

Ukraine's new offensives against Russia will aim to retake territory, inspire hope and reignite Western attention on the war

ABC.net.au · March 27, 2023

Over the past two months, Russian forces have undertaken a series of thrusts in eastern Ukraine to capture territory and weaken Ukraine's armed forces.

In regions around Kreminna, Bakhmut and Avdiivka they have made some gains, but at high cost in soldiers, equipment and munitions.

In other locations, such as Vuhledar, they have made almost no progress while suffering catastrophic defeats against well-prepared Ukrainian defensive positions.

Ukraine says Bakhmut counterstrike coming soon

Ukrainian troops will launch a long-awaited counter assault "very soon", Ukraine's top ground forces commander says.

Soon, it will be the Ukrainians' turn to resume offensive operations. It is important to explore the purpose of these offensives because those planning them will have to balance multiple political, strategic and military imperatives.

Purpose in these circumstances is vital. It provides the starting point for strategy, and operational planning. But it also ensures that those who will participate in these offensives understand why they do so.

Soldiers will always follow orders. But it is purpose that inspires them, provides the foundation for extra exertions and often is the reason why so many offer their "last full measure of devotion" on the battlefield.

What are the elements of purpose in Ukraine's forthcoming offensives?

Reseizing initiative, maintaining hope

First, Ukraine wants to re-seize the initiative in this war. Their Kharkiv and Kherson offensives grasped the initiative from the Russians and forced them onto the defensive over winter. However, for a variety of reasons — including slow arrival of Western support and the injection of Russian mobilised troops — Ukrainian momentum seeped away over the Christmas-New Year period.

Now, with the Russians generating momentum with their Easter attacks, the Ukrainians will be keen to reverse it and regain their battlefield advantage, demonstrating to Russians that nothing they do can destroy Ukrainian resolve.

In this battle of wills, destroying Russian morale will be an important objective.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy frequently refers to the goal of retaking Ukrainian territory in his speeches.(Reuters: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service)

Related to this is the desire to demonstrate to the Russians — from Putin to the bottom of their army — that they cannot win this war. Defeat always causes problems with morale and cohesion. The Ukrainian armed forces will be hoping to achieve surprise, generate shock and, in the process, destroy Russia.

Ukraine will want to spread the word to the entire Russian invasion and occupation force that their days in Ukraine are numbered. This psychological aspect of offensive operations is very important.

The Ukrainians also want to take back their territory. This is an obvious and important goal, and one Zelenskyy frequently refers to in his speeches.

Large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine remain under the oppressive fist of Russian occupation. It is hardly an enlightened Russian presence. Instead, it provides the foundation for the kidnapping of Ukrainian children, the subjugation of civilians and press-ganging of Ukrainians to fight against their fellow countrymen.

For those in Ukrainian areas still occupied by the Russians, the Ukrainian offensives will provide a ray of hope that their turn for liberation will come soon. Such hope is vital as they look forward to return of Ukrainian forces.

The fight for justice

Another obvious purpose of the offensives is to continue degrading the Russian Army. The Ukrainians will want to destroy as much of the Russian army as possible, although this will be subordinate to recapturing territory.

The Ukrainian offensives will also be a vital message to the West that the Ukrainian armed forces are able employers of the military assistance provided over the last few months. If they can show that they can absorb and use it quickly and competently, more aid will flow.

And, like the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, there will be some hope that the Ukrainian offensives will reignite Western attention on the war and ensure that both politicians and populations support continued aid.

Residents in cities that have been retaken by Ukrainian forces, like Izium in the Kharkiv region, are still suffering the legacy of Russian occupation.(AP: Vadim Ghirda)

Finally, the offensives matter a lot to the Ukrainian people at home and those who remain refugees abroad. Since 2014, Russia has occupied its territory and conducted a sustained information campaign against the notion of Ukrainian sovereignty.

Since February 2022, the people of Ukraine have endured rape, murder, the abduction of their children, destruction of their cities, the death of their sons and daughters in battle, and deliberate attempts by Russia to eradicate Ukrainian culture, symbols and nationhood.

Civilians 'at the limit of existence' in Bakhmut

Some 10,000 Ukrainian civilians, many elderly and with disabilities, are clinging on to existence in horrific circumstances in and around the besieged city of Bakhmut, the International Committee of the Red Cross says.

Every Ukrainian I have spoken to wants some measure of justice for the horrors visited upon them. The forthcoming Ukrainian offensives are another opportunity to free more of their citizens from Russian rule, and to again show the Russians that their form of vicious, authoritarian government is not welcome in Ukraine.

The offensives launched in the next few months will be heartbreakingly bloody, and may not be the final blow that destroys the Russian Army in Ukraine.

But if the West holds its nerve, and the Ukrainians steadfastly apply their fighting power against the Russians while taking back large swathes of land, the offensives may be the beginning of the end of this war.

Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.

ABC.net.au · March 27, 2023

3. Beijing’s Subversive Political Warfare in the Pacific—and the Need for Greater Engagement by the United States and Taiwan

The 15 page PDF is at this link: https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTB-8.6-PDF-Final.pdf

Excerpt:

The main point: The PRC is extensively employing political warfare to subvert island states and undermine American defense architecture in the Pacific. The United States and its allies should collaborate more closely with Taiwan to build responsible and effective partnerships with Pacific states, and present them with a better option than the corrosive engagement offered by Beijing.

Beijing’s Subversive Political Warfare in the Pacific—and the Need for Greater Engagement by the United States and Taiwan | Global Taiwan Institute

Cleo Paskal

Cleo Paskal is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Col. Grant Newsham (USMC, Ret.)

Col. Grant Newsham (USMC, Ret.) is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy & Japan Forum for Strategic Studies. His new book is When China Attacks: A Warning to America.

globaltaiwan.org · by Global Taiwan Institute · March 22, 2023

Honduras has said it intends to shift diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. We know this story: with the exception of 2007, when St. Lucia switched from Beijing to Taipei, the trend has run in this direction, with China peeling off country after country. The 13 remaining countries that recognize Taiwan are under a constant political warfare assault to switch. In countries like Palau, People’s Republic of China (PRC) representatives make it clear that the individuals who make it happen will be well-rewarded.

The Honduras story was widely reported, with a sense of almost inevitability. But, within the same two weeks, David Panuelo, the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, wrote a remarkable letter to leaders in his country calling for a move in the opposite direction, from China to Taiwan. The reason he did it, and the response, gets right to the heart of China’s goals in the Pacific Islands, and how democracies are responding to Beijing’s plans.

This isn’t Panuelo’s first letter related to concerns over China’s role in the region. In March 2022, as news of a potential Solomons Islands-China security agreement leaked out, Panuelo wrote to Solomons Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare expressing his concerns about the “far reaching and grave security implications” of signing such an agreement.

Sogavare signed anyway. He had switched the country’s diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019. Since then Solomons has postponed elections due to be held in 2023, arranged payouts to 39 out of the 50 members of Parliament from a Chinese slush fund, accepted Chinese police training and equipment (including truck-mounted water cannons), and agreed to a loan from China to fund the setting up of 161 Huawei communications towers.

President Panuelo’s second letter, this time to other Pacific Island leaders, was in response to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s (王毅) May/June 2022 visit to eight Pacific Island countries. Wang was touting China’s “China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision,” to be supported by the “China-Pacific Island Countries Five-Year Action Plan on Common Development (2022-2026).”

Elements of the “Vision” include: law enforcement cooperation, incorporating “immediate and high-level police training”; “cooperation on network governance and cyber security,” including a “shared future in cyberspace”; the “possibility of establishing [a] China-Pacific Island Countries Free Trade Area”; “enhanc[ing] cooperation in customs, inspections and quarantine”; “creat[ing] a more friendly policy environment for cooperation between enterprises”; setting up Confucius Institutes; training young diplomats; “establish[ing] [a] China-Pacific Island Countries Disaster Management Cooperation Mechanism,” including a prepositioned “China-Pacific Island Countries Reserve of Emergency Supplies”—and much more.

The “Action Plan” includes: “a Chinese Government Special Envoy for Pacific Island Countries Affairs” (which has since happened); a “China-Pacific Island Countries Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement Capacity and Police Cooperation” (also done); “assistance in laboratory construction used for fingerprints testing, forensic autopsy, drugs, electronic and digital forensics”; “encourag[ing] and support[ing] airlines to operate air routes and flights between China and Pacific Island Countries”; “send[ing] 200 medical personnel” in the next five years; sponsoring “2500 government scholarships” from 2022 to 2025, and much more.

Combined, the Vision and Action plan are a blueprint for influence—if not control—of key levers of national power. This is consistent with Beijing’s trajectory in the region. Over the last several decades China has managed to insert itself throughout the Pacific and build attendant political influence and potential military access in the not-so-distant future —and without firing a shot.

It all follows a predictable sequence. First, the PRC puts in a commercial presence with Chinese nationals. Where possible, there is a targeting of key industries—such as fishing, lumber, and mining, often “greased” by corruption. There are also highly publicized “infrastructure” projects and “gifts.” This in turn leads to political influence, while creating a constituency that serves as PRC proxies. Dependency can also be deepened by lending to local governments.

This is all done with an eye towards an eventual military presence. Beijing is patient but has a clear objective. The Solomon Islands’ deal with Sogavare shows how this plays out—and will continue to play out. In 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Both are strategically located—one isolates Australia, while the other has an old World War II US airbase that can be refurbished and is 1500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

China is managing to do what Imperial Japan couldn’t accomplish. It has “taken” Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands through political warfare, and is setting itself up to potentially push the United States back towards Hawaii. The reason for the focus is the same as in World War II. The Pacific Islands are key terrain, in the heart of US defenses. Establishing a presence there is leapfrogging the First Island Chain that hems in the PLA, and extends Beijing’s “island hopping” to the Latin American coast.

Panuelo knew what he was seeing. In the second letter, he wrote that Wang’s proposal was: “The single-most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our lifetimes.” He added that: “I am aware that the bulk of Chinese research vessel activity in the FSM has followed our Nation’s fiber optic cable infrastructure, just as I am aware that the proposed language in this agreement opens our countries up to having our phone calls and emails intercepted and overheard.”

The intention, as he wrote, was: “to shift those of us with diplomatic relations with China very close into Beijing’s orbit, intrinsically tying the whole of our economies and societies to them. The practical impact, however, of Chinese control over our security space, aside from impacts on our sovereignty, is that it increases the chances of China getting into conflict with Australia, Japan, the United States and New Zealand, on the day when Beijing decides to invade Taiwan […] To be clear, that’s China’s long-term goal: to take Taiwan. Peacefully, if possible; through war if necessary.”

Many in the Pacific Islands, including President Panuelo, not only acutely understand the risk to Taiwan, they are aware that their futures are directly tied to any conflict. They have lived through this before, in World War II. For example, the island of Angaur, in Palau (a country that recognizes Taiwan), was the site of brutal battles in World War II that still scar the island and its people. The United States is now building an Over-The-Horizon Radar installation on Angaur. It is widely thought on Angaur that, once the installation is up and running, in the event of a kinetic attack on Taiwan, they will likely be hit first.

Taiwan often thinks of itself as standing alone, but there are people in the Pacific Islands who know they could die on the same day, and likely just before, anyone in Taiwan.

This is why President Panuelo’s third letter is even more remarkable. In it, he describes in great detail the “Political Warfare and Grey Zone activity [that] occur within our borders.” He further says: “One of the reasons that China’s Political Warfare is successful in so many arenas is that we are bribed to be complicit, and bribed to be silent. That’s a heavy word, but it is an accurate description regardless. What else do you call it when an elected official is giving an envelope filled with money after a meal at the PRC Embassy or after an inauguration? What else do you call it when a senior official is discreetly given a smartphone after visiting Beijing? […] What else do you call it when an elected official receives a check for a public project that our National Treasury has no record of and no means of accounting for?”

The effect, he writes, is: “Senior officials and elected officials across the whole of our National and State Governments receive offers of gifts as a means to curry favor. The practical impact of this is that some senior officials and elected officials take actions that are contrary to the FSM’s national interest, but are consistent with the PRC’s national interests.”

He then described the outcomes of this corrosion of the body politic. “So, what does it really look like when so [many] of our Government’s senior officials and elected officials choose to advance their own personal interest in lieu of the national interest? After all, it is not a coincidence that the common thread behind the Chuuk State succession movement, the Pohnpei Political Status Commission and, to a lesser extent, Yap independence movement, include money from the PRC and whispers of PRC support. (That doesn’t mean that persons yearning for secession are beholden to China, of course—but, rather, that Chinese support has a habit of following those who would support such secession).”

The results, he writes, are: “At worst in the short-term, it means we sell our country and our sovereignty for temporary personal benefit. At worst in the long-term, it means we are, ourselves, active participants in allowing a possible war to occur in our region, and very likely our own islands and our neighbors on Guam and Hawaii, where we ourselves will be indirectly responsible for the Micronesian lives lost.”

This leads him, in the letter, to describe discussions that he has had, at his request, with the Foreign Minister of Taiwan, Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), about either recognizing Taiwan or initializing an agreement for a Taipei Economic & Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Micronesia. A core reason for that, he explains, is “greatly added layers of security and protection that comes with our country distancing itself from the PRC, which has demonstrated a keen capacity to undermine our sovereignty, reject our values, and use our elected and senior officials for their purposes.”

Given how important the region is to China strategically, he knows how dangerous this is to him personally and writes: “I am acutely aware that informing you all of this presents risks to my personal safety; the safety of my family; and the safety of the staff I rely on to support me in this work. I inform you regardless of these risks, because the sovereignty of our nation, the prosperity of our nation, and the peace and stability of our nation, are more important. Indeed, they are the solemn duty of literally each and every single one of us who took the oath of office to protect our Constitution and our country.”

In Taiwan, discussions about recognition and the Pacific Islands are often just focused on the financial aspects of the issue. If it was just about money, they all would have switched long ago. China has made it clear that it will offer significant inducements to abandon Taiwan. But, incredibly, four are still holding out (Palau, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu), and President Panuelo of Micronesia is looking to change the “inevitability” narrative shown by Honduras—something of potentially global importance, as it could show there is another option to eventual absorption by Beijing.

So, what to do about it—how can freedom be defended?

It requires a collaborative effort, but one tailored to each country. For example, in the case of Micronesia, the United States could work with Taiwan and Japan—and include Palau and Marshall Islands, Micronesia’s neighbours. This would add more heft to Taiwan’s efforts—which will always be outmatched by the PRC’s resources—and it also adds Taiwan’s unique contributions to what the US and Japan are doing.

Another approach would need to be developed to serve Solomons, Kiribati and elsewhere. There is no one-size-fits all solution. That means much more attention needs to be paid to the needs of the people and the uniqueness of each country. That’s what China does—but it focuses on identifying and exploiting weaknesses, while democracies should work on identifying and supporting strengths.

It also means treating locals like real partners, the way the Japanese do. That means fully staffed embassies, with engaged, courageous and innovative representatives.

And, if you are serious, help the locals go after and expose corruption. The PRC infects the body politic through corruption, but many Pacific nations are ill-equipped to fight it. The language barrier alone is an issue. Taiwan in particular can help locals identify and expose Chinese criminals that set up shop in their nations.

If anyone believes in a free and open Indo-Pacific, it is imperative to recognize and support the brave leaders in the Pacific who are risking all for the things Taiwan, the United States, Japan and many others say they stand for. In the battle of systems, the Pacific Islands are once again on the front lines.

President Panuelo has stuck his neck out. China is sharpening the axe. Democratic states, Washington included, must show that he is not alone, and follow his lead in showing that democracy truly is worth fighting for.

The main point: The PRC is extensively employing political warfare to subvert island states and undermine American defense architecture in the Pacific. The United States and its allies should collaborate more closely with Taiwan to build responsible and effective partnerships with Pacific states, and present them with a better option than the corrosive engagement offered by Beijing.

globaltaiwan.org · by Global Taiwan Institute · March 22, 2023

4. The failure of US unconventional wars - Global Times

From the mouthpiece of the CCP - the Global Times, but written by a Professor Emeritus from Presbyterian College in South Carolina.

The failure of US unconventional wars - Global Times

globaltimes.cn · by Charles McKelvey

Illustraion: Chen Xia/GT

For the last decade, the US has unleashed a new type of warfare, involving a hybrid methodology with economic, political, military, cultural, and ideological dimensions. Economic sanctions, support for proxy military forces, and ideological distortions are its calling cards. It is utilized against nations that refuse to subordinate their interests to those of the US.

The unconventional war is possibly the last stage of US imperialism. The unconventional war cannot reverse decades of US economic decline, rooted in insufficient attention to the productivity of its national economy. It therefore cannot attain its goal of sustaining US hegemony in the neocolonial world-system, itself in a sustained structural crisis that unconventional wars aggravate.

In addition, the unconventional war has a boomerang effect. It increases unity among anti-imperialist states, deepening their interest in constructing alternatives to US hegemony. And it deepens resolve within targeted nations. Today targeted nations like China, Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua continue on their sovereign road, applying creative measures to adapt to new imperialist strategies, deepening their relations with one another, and finding the support of other nations that have a long-term interest in structural alternatives to the neocolonial world-system.

In the earlier epoch of world transition from colonialism to neocolonialism, economic sanctions imposed on non-conforming nations by the world powers could be effective. During that time period, non-conforming nations were those that did not uphold the appearance of being democratic, as was expected in the post-colonial era of the neocolonial world order, which involved a certain level of deception and in which the international community consists of supposedly equal and sovereign nations, in which all citizens have civil and political (but not socioeconomic) rights.

Apartheid South Africa, sanctioned for its incompatibility with the post-1965 neocolonial world order, could not resist the impact of sanctions, inasmuch as its political culture lacked tenable moral principles necessary for sustained resistance.

The current economic sanctions imposed by decadent imperialism, however, are another matter. The present world-system is in the early stages of transition to a post-neocolonial, pluripolar world, in which true respect for the sovereignty of nations is envisioned. In this situation, nations are sanctioned by the Western neocolonial powers for attempting to practice what they envision for the future. Such defiant nations have a strong moral foundation for sustaining resistance to any attacks against them. When they are attacked, they recommit to the fundamental moral principles on which their defiance is based, such as the right of all nations to sovereignty, among others.

The imperialist tool of economic sanctions is a complex affair. Economic sanctions today involve a considerable number of financial and commercial measures, many of which are directed against individuals or economic enterprises in targeted countries as well as in third countries.

The effect of economic sanctions is difficult to predict, because of the capacity of targeted countries to adapt, particularly those with large economies and extensive international commercial and financial relations. For example, Russian imports dropped during the first few months following the imposition of sanctions related to the Russian military operation in Ukraine, but the level of imports recovered by the end of 2022, as Russia reoriented its trade to China, Turkey, and a few other economies. Similarly, China has responded with countermeasures to US sanctions against Chinese companies.

On the other hand, even though targeted countries invariably adapt, sanctions can damage the economies of targeted nations, especially over the long term, and especially those with smaller economies. However, economic sanctions, even when they have damaging effects, do not cause a change in economic policies or in foreign policy. Sanctions do not deter or dissuade nations from their sovereign road, as can be seen in the fact that the processes of regional integration seeking a pluripolar world order have intensified during the past year.

At the June 23, 2022, BRICS Summit, for example, which was hosted by China and included the presence of Russia and President Vladimir Putin, the commitment of the member states to increase mutually beneficial trade and cooperation was evident. Moreover, a previous proposal for the expansion of BRICS has been given new priority; several governments from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are interested in joining the BRICS group.

The President of the International Forum of BRICS, Purnima Anand, maintained that "with the crisis in Ukraine, new alliances are forming, and the people are looking toward the East."

In addition, Russia hosted the Tenth Moscow Conference on International Security in August 2022. More than seventy countries participated, including China.

For its part, China continues to play a leadership role in the construction of a multipolar world. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement which includes fifteen East Asian and Southeast Asian countries to enter into force in January 2022. And China was a key player in it. And in December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended inaugurations of the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The imposition of economic sanctions often damages economies and inflicts harm on the people. But it does not deter the quest for sovereignty.

The author is Professor Emeritus at Presbyterian College in Clinton, South Carolina, US. He is based in Cuba, and he is the author of a regular Substack column, "Knowledge, Ideology, and Real Socialism in Our Times," in which he defends the socialist constructions of Cuba and China as advanced political-economic systems and as inspiring examples for humanity. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

globaltimes.cn · by Charles McKelvey

5. Fighting Beijing's long arm of repression

Note the importance of but danger from social media.

Fighting Beijing's long arm of repression

Activists rely on social media to stay in touch, but this also makes them more vulnerable

By Mia Ping-chieh Chen for RFA Mandarin

2023.03.26

rfa.org

Young Chinese people in the United States are taking a stand against Beijing's growing willingness to extend enforcement of party censorship and police surveillance among Chinese nationals and their relatives overseas, including through unapproved "police service stations" in other countries.

Governments around the world have launched investigations into these "service stations" run on foreign soil by the provincial police department in the southeastern province of Fujian, while activists and dissidents have spoken out about threats and retaliation by the state security police or pro-China businessmen overseas.

There are growing signs that U.S. police are willing to arrest people suspected of being agents of the Chinese state, amid growing protests against what young activists are calling transnational repression by the Communist Party.

Ning Ning, who asked to be identified by a nickname for fear of reprisals, said state security police came looking for her parents because she was linked to a petition critical of Communist Party leader Xi Jinping on Change.org.

Having lived in the United States for 10 years, she has chosen to fight back from a place of greater freedom, she told Radio Free Asia.

"The Chinese Communist Party thinks it can shut people up by hauling them in to 'drink tea' and other methods," she said in a reference to being summoned for questioning by the feared state security police. "But the thing they don't really want to face up to is that while this may silence people temporarily, public dissatisfaction will deepen."

"And when that dissatisfaction is given the right opportunity, even stronger resistance will erupt," Ning Ning said.

Social media helps and hurts

Transnational activists rely heavily on social media to stay in touch with their home countries, and this makes them more vulnerable to being targeted by their home governments for monitoring, experts told an Orion Policy Institute seminar in October 2022.

Yet a Twitter survey focusing on transnational repression by Chinese agents found that only half of respondents who had been harassed or threatened overseas had reported the incident to U.S. law enforcement.

Washington-based non profit Freedom House called on governments in a February 2022 report to start systematically recording cases of transnational repression, based on an internationally agreed definition of the term, then ensure that law enforcement officials, personnel at key agencies, and those working with refugees and asylum seekers are trained to recognize the targeting of exiles and diasporas.

When state security police contacted Ning Ning and asked her to delete or edit the petition, she reported the incident to the FBI, in the hope of raising awareness of the issue in the United States.

"I hope that I can bring about change through my own actions," she said. "I wanted people in the United States to realize how serious transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party is."

"I also wanted to send a message to [Chinese] people here, that they don't have to suffer this in silence, just because it won't make headline news or be sensational enough," Ning Ning said. "We have to speak out about our experiences, to bring about a change in the whole of society."

Zhou Fengsuo, executive director of the New York-based NGO Human Rights in China said the group is already focusing its efforts on helping the victims of transnational repression.

‘Victims’

Zhou, Ning and a handful of other people staged a protest outside the Capitol on March 22, holding up a placard that read: "We are the victims of the CCP's transnational repression. We stand against the CCP's transnational repression."

"This is a pretty shocking thing, that victims are often afraid to speak out because they're worried about their families," Zhou told Radio Free Asia.

"People [like Ning Ning] who engage in active resistance are rare,” he said. "People from China, students from China are clearly under threat from the Chinese authorities, and the U.S. government must respond proactively to that threat."

Fellow protester A Gui, who declined to give his full name citing reasons of personal safety, said it was “like a tug of war, with everyone pulling for their own team," he said. "If we all pull together, then we can through our willpower pull justice a bit closer to our side."

Democratic Sen. Jeff Merkley, who was among the sponsors of the Transnational Repression Policy Act introduced on March 15, called for a comprehensive approach to the issue.

"The U.S. must take a stand and pursue a whole-of-government approach to address the rising tide of transnational repression whenever and wherever it occurs," Merkley said in comments emailed to Radio Free Asia.

The bill would aim to hold foreign governments and individuals accountable "when they stalk, intimidate, or assault people across borders, including in the United States," according to a news release on the Senate website.

The bill aims to make the issue a key foreign policy priority and prioritize diplomacy that addresses the issue, it said.

"It’s terrible when authoritarian regimes oppress their people at home, but it’s an unacceptable act of aggression to target dissidents in other countries," Merkley said. "Journalists, writers, activists, and everyday people who have spoken truth to power in their country are too often intimidated and blackmailed while living abroad."

Meanwhile, Ning Ning still hides her real name when talking to journalists, and disguises herself when protesting in public.

"Look at how I have to dress up, just to criticize the Chinese Communist Party, because I know how bad their transnational repression really is," she said. "Can you imagine a U.S. citizen wearing a mask and a hat just to criticize their government's policies?"

Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

6. Torture and Turmoil at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant: An Insider’s Account

Torture and Turmoil at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant: An Insider’s Account

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · March 28, 2023

The former director of Europe’s largest nuclear facility describes abuse of Ukrainian workers and careless practices by the Russians who took control of the plant.

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The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant as seen from across the Dnipro River from the Ukrainian town of Nikopol last summer.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Marc Santora has been reporting and writing about the turmoil at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant since Russian forces first took control over the facility at the start of the war in Ukraine.

March 28, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

KYIV, Ukraine — By the time Russian soldiers threw a potato sack over his head and forced him to record a false video statement about conditions at Europe’s largest nuclear facility, Ihor Murashov had already witnessed enough chaos at the plant to be deeply worried.

Mr. Murashov, the former director general of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, did not know how much more stress the workers there could endure as they raced from one crisis to another to avert a nuclear catastrophe.

He watched as staff members were dragged off to a place they called “the pit” at a nearby police station, returning beaten and bruised — if they returned at all. He was there when advancing Russian soldiers opened fire at the facility in the first days of the war and he fretted as the they mined the surrounding grounds. He witnessed Russians use nuclear reactor rooms to hide military equipment, risking an accident.

Mr. Murashov, 46, is gone from Zaporizhzhia now, having been expelled from Russian occupied territory in October. In the months since, the situation at the plant has only grown more precarious, according to Ukrainian officials and international observers.

On March 9, it was plunged into a blackout for the sixth time since the occupation, forcing nuclear engineers to rely on hulking diesel generators to keep critical cooling equipment running.

Ihor Murashov, the former director general of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, at a cafe in Kyiv this month.Credit...Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director general of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, has raised repeated alarms about the mounting dangers and plans to visit the facility this week. On Monday, he met with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to discuss the problem.

Only around 4,600 of the plant’s 11,000 employees are still working, Petro Kotin, the head of Energoatom, Ukraine’s state nuclear power company, said in an interview. Employees at the facility have been given a deadline of April 1 to sign contracts with Rosatom, a state-owned Russian nuclear conglomerate. About 2,600 have signed the contract and the rest are still refusing, Mr. Kotin said.

Rafael Mariano Grossi, in blue vest, the director general of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, speaking with Herman Halushchenko, in white T-shirt, Ukraine’s minister of energy, and Petro Kotin, the head of Ukraine’s nuclear energy company.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times

The current problems are not a surprise to Mr. Murashov, who recounted his experience over several hours of conversation recently, providing a harrowing account of how Europe’s largest nuclear power plant had descended into such turmoil.

His account could not be independently verified, but it aligns with testimony from other workers who have since fled and those still there who have been interviewed by The New York Times and other news organizations over the past year.

The State of the War

A New Nuclear Threat: President Vladimir Putin of Russia said he would be able to position nuclear weapons in Belarus by the summer, a claim that analysts said was likely bluster but which underscored his willingness to use the specter of nuclear conflict to pressure the West.
On the Ground: Despite the high cost in lives, Ukrainian and Russian leaders said that the battle for Bakhmut would rage on, even as they brace for a war that they expect to widen and intensify as the weather warms.
Heroes or Criminals?: As thousands of Russian ex-prisoners fight and die in Ukraine, honoring their memory is becoming a patriotic imperative back home. But some committed crimes their old neighbors cannot forget.

Mr. Murashov said the Russians set up special areas in the nearby satellite town where employees were interrogated, bullied and beaten.

“There were two places called ‘the pits,’” Mr. Murashov said. “One was the police department in the town. Another was inside the local military unit.”

Mr. Murashov added: “I saw one of the employees who went to the pit, and he was all yellow because of the bruises he had been given. So I knew what could happen.”

Workers were sometimes taken from their homes, he said, and other times stopped at checkpoints as they entered the plant and taken away. They were routinely checked for pro-Ukrainian content.

At first, he and other employees said, the Russians were searching for people who manned barricades trying to prevent Russian soldiers from entering the town. Later, he said, they seemed intent on getting employees to sign contracts with Rosatom.

Until about a month ago, the plant was under Russian military occupation but the engineers still reported to Kyiv for technical instructions. That has ended, Mr. Kotin said.

It also now virtually impossible for the workers who remain to escape, Ukrainian officials said, since the road to Ukrainian-controlled territory is closed. By the time Mr. Murashov left the plant this past fall, most of the workers’ families had fled.

Photographs of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant under Russian occupation, exhibited in the offices of Energoatom, Ukraine’s state nuclear power company.Credit...Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

Many of the employees who remained viewed it as their duty keep the plant running safely, while others have been more actively collaborating with the Russians, Ukrainian officials said. Mr. Kotin said a special panel has been set up to examine each case individually.

Ukrainian authorities now have limited visibility into what is happening at the plant aside from the daily technical updates provided by monitors from the I.A.E.A., who have been stationed there since Sept. 1. Mr. Grossi has not commented publicly on specific reports of abuse but has repeatedly expressed concern for the physical and mental health of the workers.

Mr. Murashov said he initially hoped the U.N. monitors would improve the situation. But he described the morning they arrived on Sept. 1 as one of the worst days he experienced during the occupation.

Mr. Murashov got an urgent call from the nuclear power plant at 4 a.m. The Russians, who for a month had been shelling key energy lines feeding the plant, were shelling again, he was told. Another call came at 5 a.m. The alarm in Reactor No. 5 was blaring. As he raced to the station, he said, Russians started shelling the town of Enerhodar, where the plant is. He could see Russian attack helicopters flying low as he drove.

“We had to assess quickly what happened around and in the station,” he said.

They also had to prepare for the mission from the I.A.E.A. Mr. Grossi and his team arrived around 1 p.m., and Ukrainian engineers were able to give a short briefing outside the presence of the Russians. But as they started going around the station, he said, Russians took over and told the inspectors the shelling had come from Ukrainian positions.

“With all that mess, we had almost no chance to voice what was happening at the station and what we knew for sure,” Mr. Murashov said.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant last year.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

The last of the facility’s six reactors was cycled down 12 days after that visit. The plant is no longer producing energy, but external power is still essential to run critical cooling and other safety systems.

Ukrainian officials believe that after the Russians failed to find a way to divert the power from the reactors for their own use, they were trying to simply ruin the facility.

“Their goal is to make the situation so difficult that when we get it back, it will be unusable,” Ukraine’s energy minister, Herman Halushchenko, said in an interview in early March.

Ukrainian officials say the number of Russian troops at the plant is growing because they know it is perhaps the safest location in southern Ukraine to avoid being bombed by Ukrainian forces.

Mr. Murashov was appointed the plant’s director on Feb. 16, 2022 — just days before Russia launched its full-scale invasion.

The night the Russians invaded, Mr. Murashov moved with hundreds of workers to bunkers under the facility. On March 3, the Russians blasted their way into the town and were approaching the station.

That night, the Russians opened fire at the plant, and Mr. Murashov directed the staff to stream the security camera footage on YouTube so the world could see what was happening.

“On the morning of March 4, I received a call from the mayor,” he said. The Russians wanted to talk.

He emerged from the bunker to find a scene of devastation. There was smoke in the air and pools of blood on the ground, he said. Alarms blared in the distance. The dead body of a Ukrainian National Guard soldier lay near the entrance of the plant.

When the plant director met the Russian general in command, the officer seemed more concerned about why his soldiers were not welcomed as liberators than anything happening at the nuclear plant, Mr. Murashov said.

As the months passed and Russian forces lost ground in other parts of the country, things got worse for the Ukrainians at the plant. Workers started disappearing, Russian snipers watched from the rooftops, and more heavy artillery was moved into the facility, increasing the risk of an accident.

When his workers needed to perform maintenance in certain areas, Mr. Murashov said, they alerted the Russians in advance so the Ukrainians would not get shot.

Mr. Kotin, the Energoatom executive, said at least 200 workers were detained and at least 30 remain missing.

Petro Kotin, the head of Energoatom, Ukraine’s state nuclear power company, in his office.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

On Aug. 5, the facility was shelled for the first time. On Aug. 25, it experienced its first blackout.

The Russians pressed Mr. Murashov to sign a contract with Rosatom but he refused. As he was driving to his home on Sept. 30, the Russians intercepted him.

“They checked my papers and then they put bags on my head and my driver’s head,” he said.

“I was afraid,” he said. “I did not know what was going on, I could not imagine what would happen next.”

Having grown up in Energodar, he knew the roads well and noted every turn. “I knew I was being brought to the local department of Security Service of Ukraine,” he said.

He said he was made to sit in a chair with the sack over his head in handcuffs for 24 hours.

Three days after he was detained, he was forced to record a video. It remains a source of shame.

“The worst thing that I voiced is that quite likely the station was shelled by Armed Forces of Ukraine,” he said. “They made me sign a paper saying that my statement could not be retracted.”

“Now I take it back,” he said.

After he made the video, the sack was placed back over his head and he was thrown into a car with Russian soldiers. He remembered the Cranberries antiwar ballad, “Zombie, “playing as they drove. He was let out near the crossing to Ukrainian controlled territory and, without explanation, he was set free.

Anna Lukinova contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · March 28, 2023

7. The Pentagon’s vaccine imbroglio: where to go from here?

You cannot find this kind of analysis anywhere else. Long, but helpful and enlightening read,

The Pentagon’s vaccine imbroglio: where to go from here?

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · March 26, 2023

What could Congress’ repeal of the military vaccine mandate mean for morale and discipline in the armed forces? Should those who were separated for failing to obey vaccine orders be reinstated? These and related matters were raised by reporters recently, so this post aims to give you a perspective as you decide what you think the answers should be.

Lawfire® readers might recall that the issue of COVID-19 vaccinations in the military was discussed in a number of previous posts (see e.g., here, here, and here), so longtime readers may see a few familiar passages.

“Number one priority”?

At the outset, let’s ask these questions: could the Pentagon have done a better job at handling the vaccine issue from the very beginning of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term? Was a chain of events set in motion that resulted in thousands of people making decisions that harmed, perhaps irrevocably, their otherwise honorable careers?

Consider that in his Secretary Austin said “keep[ing] this country safe” is “job one” – and the only threat to that safety he referenced was the pandemic. If there was any ambiguity about what he meant, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a press release citing Max Rose, Secretary Austin’s special advisor on COVID-19, for the proposition that Austin’s message “firmly established that combatting (sic) the pandemic is [Austin’s] number one priority.”

If “combatting the pandemic” really was Secretary Austin’s “number one priority,” what can explain his initial decision not to mandate the COVID-19 vaccine for those in uniform? Yes, at that time there was a process that may have (but not necessarily) required Presidential action, but there was a clear legal path for Secretary Austin to order vaccinations if he really wanted to do so. There was lots of precedent: dating back to the Revolution, there is a long history of routine vaccination requirements for military members.

Inexplicably, however, it wasn’t until August 2021 that Secretary Austin finally issued a memorandum announcing he “determined that mandatory vaccination against coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is necessary to protect the Force and defend the American people.” Exactly why that determination could not have been made on “Day One” so that the process to require the shots could have gotten underway immediately has never been persuasively explained.

The consequences of delaying the mandatory vaccination order

By delaying the order mandating vaccines, Secretary Austin allowed objections to the shots to fester and grow for months. During this period of voluntary vaccination, many troops found religious, health, and other rationales for refusing the shot, and most likely told their military superiors, as well as family and friends, about their opposition.

By the time the Pentagon reversed itself and made the vaccination mandatory, thousands of troops would then have to compromise the positions they announced during the voluntary period. Consequently, I am not especially surprised that so many who had been declining voluntary vaccinations for months refused the mandatory shots, and thus were eventually discharged.

The law of military orders – some Qs & As

Everyone discharged for refusing the vaccine was involuntarily separated administratively. Involuntary administrative discharges are not uncommon, and they do not depend upon–or result in—a criminal conviction.

Nevertheless, the law of military orders that would support the discharges has some relevance. Much would be beyond the scope of this essay, but here a a few aspects you may find of interest:

Can military members presume orders they are given are lawful? Typically, yes. The Manual of Courts-Martial explains the inference of lawfulness applicable to servicemembers:

An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. (Emphasis added).

There was nothing “patently illegal” about the vaccination mandate so as to defeat the inference of lawfulness accorded military orders.

The issue of “patently” illegal orders was discussed by the all-civilian Court of Military Appeals (CMA) in the 1973 case of Lt. William Calley. CMA cited with approval this quote from Colonel William Winthrop (1831-1899) who the Supreme Court calls the :

But for the inferior to assume to determine the question of the lawfulness of an order given him by a superior would of itself, as a general rule, amount to insubordination, and such an assumption carried into practice would subvert military discipline. Where the order is apparently regular and lawful on its face, he is not to go behind it to satisfy himself that his superior has proceeded with authority, but is to obey it according to its terms, the only exceptions recognized to the rule of obedience being cases of orders so manifestly beyond the legal power or discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their unlawfulness . . . (Emphasis added.).

Can a lawful order be refused if the servicemember sincerely fears it is dangerous to comply with it? No. As a military appellate court put it (in a case about a sailor who refused to do maintenance on a reactor out of fear of radiation):

Appellant’s contention that duress, amounting to a legal defense, can inhere in a lawful order requiring performance of military duty “in harm’s way” simply strains credulity. Regardless of the sincerity of his beliefs, the premise upon which he rests this defense has no basis in military law.

How long does a servicemember have to decide about obeying an order? Again, the Manual is helpful:

Time for compliance. When an order requires immediate compliance, an accused’s declared intent not to obey and the failure to make any move to comply constitutes disobedience. Immediate compliance is required for any order that does not explicitly or implicitly indicate that delayed compliance is authorized or directed. If an order requires performance in the future, an accused’s present statement of intention to disobey the order does not constitute disobedience of that order, although carrying out that intention may. (Emphasis added).

Can a sincere religious or philosophical belief be a legal basis to refuse a lawful order? Generally, no. The Manual unequivocally states that “the dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of any otherwise lawful order.”

The obvious rationale for this rule is that in a pluralistic country like the U.S., there are a multitude of religions and philosophies, and the armed forces could not efficiently or effectively function if it needed to cater to each belief before expecting obedience to a lawful order.

Consider a pro-life commander who sincerely believes––as the Pope does––that abortion is “murder.” That belief would not justify failing to follow the Secretary of Defense’s directive aimed at aiding military personnel wanting to obtain abortions. For example, because the use of appropriated funds for travel and transportation for a service member wanting to terminate a pregnancy has been the commander must authorize such expenditures irrespective of the commander’s personal beliefs.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) does impact the law of military orders. It holds that if a person’s exercise of religion is “substantially” burdened by a government action, the government must demonstrate (1) a “compelling governmental interest” and (2) that the proposed action is “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

As to the latter factor, the Supreme Court observed long prior to RFRA that it “is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”

In any event, the RFRA does not appear to be an insuperable barrier to a military vaccine mandate. In a March 2022 case (Austin v. U. S. Navy Seals 1–26) the Supreme Court by a 6-3 vote granted a partial stay of a lower court ruling that would have precluded the military “from considering respondents’ vaccination status in making deployment, assignment, and other operational decisions.”

In concurring with the decision, Justice Kavanaugh addressed RFRA. Though three dissenters disagreed with him, he said:

“RFRA does not justify judicial intrusion into military affairs in this case. That is because the Navy has an extraordinarily compelling interest in maintaining strategic and operational control over the assignment and deployment of all Special Warfare personnel—including control over decisions about military readiness. And no less restrictive means would satisfy that interest in this context.”

Moreover, contrary to what some people seem to think, the RFRA does not make a vaccine order illegal. Rather, it provides an exception only applicable to certain persons in particular situations.

When circumstances change, the applicability of the exception may end. For example, in one circumstance there may be available a less “restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest,” but that means might simply not exist in another situation. In a dangerous world, the military has to be able to deploy people at any time, and anywhere, to do whatever duty needs to be done. Options as to “less restrictive means” may be non-existent in many circumstances.

Consider as well an issue that specifically concerned some religious (and other) military members, that is, the reported use of cells from a fetus aborted in 1973 at some stage of the COVID-19 vaccine development. Notably, however, the Vatican conceded in 2020 that “[i]t is morally acceptable to receive Covid-19 vaccines that have used cell lines from aborted fetuses in their research and production process…”

Perhaps more importantly, DoD now offers Novavax, a vaccine in which, the maker confirms,

The Archbishop of Military Services’ statement

It is true that following the Secretary’s vaccine mandate order, the Archbishop of Military Services issued a statement about vaccinations that some followers might have found confusing. He admitted that, in accord with the Vatican, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops found “that it is morally permissible to receive the COVID-19 vaccinations currently available in the United States.”

The Archbishop, however, went beyond relating pastoral guidance and delved into providing, in effect, legal advice. Specifically, he cited the 1981 case of Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana, to suggest that “federal law” allows military members to refuse the vaccine if taking it violated their “conscience-based objections.” The problem? Thomas was not a military case; rather it involves a civilian unemployment compensation issue litigated under state law.

As validated in Supreme Court precedent, military members live in a significantly different legal environment than do civilians. In Parker vs. Levy, the Court noted that “[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian” and that “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.”

Accordingly, the Manual for Courts-Martial provision noted above, (precluding religious or philosophical grounds as a proper basis for disobeying a lawful order), aligns with constitutional principles as they are applied to members of the armed forces. (Keep in mind that, as explained above, RFRA only provides an exemption if there is a “less restrictive means” available.)

The litigation

When the vaccines were finally ordered, the mandate did spark various litigation efforts by those opposed to the shots. Despite some lower court victories, it is doubtful they would have been successful had the issue reached the Supreme Court on the merits.

Why? In the March 2022 Supreme Court ruling noted above (granting a partial stay of an injunction that would have barred the military from making operational decisions about vaccine refusers), Justice Kavanaugh noted in his concurrence the “bedrock constitutional principle” that “courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”

He also cited several precedents (including Gilligan v. Morgan discussed below) that essentially hold that such decisions are military judgements for which judges lack competence to overrule. Consequently, Justice Kavanaugh said he saw “no basis in this case for employing the judicial power in a manner that military commanders believe would impair the military of the United States as it defends the American people.”

I think the underlying sense of Kavanaugh’s opinion would have prevailed with the Court as a whole if the substantive issue had reached it, even if other justiciability theories were employed.

Congress inserts itself

Nevertheless, Congress decided to insert itself into the vaccine issue (as it can under its constitutional authority to for the military). Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Secretary to rescind his vaccine mandate. However, the NDAA provision did not address what to do about the 8,000 servicemembers who were discharged for refusing the shots, and who may now feel vindicated by Congress’ action.

I do not believe that the courts–the Supreme Court anyway–will require the reinstatement of vaccine-refusers who have been discharged. Among other things, the Senate specifically considered an amendment to the NDAA doing just that but it did not pass.

As a result, there is little likelihood that the Supreme Court would countenance judges who, if they mandated reinstatement, would in essence be second-guessing the elected branches of government as to the composition of military forces. In Gilligan v. Morgan the Court said

It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible — as the Judicial Branch is not — to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. (Emphasis added).

Impact of congressional intervention

Clearly, it is only Congress’ intervention that blocks the execution of an otherwise routine military order directly related to the readiness of the force. That said, Congress’ NDAA provision does not mean that the order was unlawful when given, or that discharge actions were improper when imposed.

Undoubtedly, Congress’ direct intervention in a military discipline matter impacts the credibility of the military chain of command for the still-serving force. The Washington Post quoted an unnamed officer who enunciates the problem:

“I look like a clown now,” the officer said, intimating that, by reversing the mandate, lawmakers had weakened the military’s ability to enforce and maintain good order and discipline. “What happens when the next [unpopular directive] comes along, whether for vaccines or something else? I’ve lost my credibility to say ‘Do this’ when they know they can probably wait me out.”

“I have been completely undercut in trying to uphold the standards dictated to me from on high,” the officer added. “My sailors will have a hard time trusting me in the future when I say that some controversial policy must be complied with.”

The Post also cited Katherine L. Kuzminski, a military policy expert at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. She pointed out that “disciplinary problems can arise when rank-and-file troops see the erosion of rules set clearly and forcefully by senior leaders.” Kuzminski warned that Congress’ action “opens the door for more pushback in the future.”

Ms. Kuzminski is right. This episode could invite military members to again seek out politicians to reverse a lawful order with which they disagreed. Does the military need that politicization at any time, but especially at this moment in history?

DoD’s response

Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Gilbert Cisneros was asked at a hearing on Capitol Hill why the Department of Defense was still reviewing cases of those who refused the vaccine even after the mandate was ended. He rightly pointed out that “[c]ompliance with lawful orders is not optional in the military, and leaders within the military service took appropriate, disciplinary action, including separation, when appropriate, to maintain good order and discipline.” Secretary Cisneros added:

It’s very important that our service members go and follow orders when they are lawful. And there were several, or thousands that did not. And so those services are going through a process to review those cases to make a determination what needs to be done.

Should vaccine refusers be reinstated?

Obviously, the Pentagon still has the policy question as whether to reinstate thousands of people who defied the vaccine order. Military leaders need to tread cautiously here, and think carefully about the potential impact on morale and discipline of welcoming back and embedding thousands of those who refused a lawful order.

Why? Unfortunately, it is simply impossible to predict what (if any) lawful orders those among a reinstated group might decide to disobey in the future, or in what ways the reinstatement may fuel others to disobey lawful orders both now, and into the future, then turning to politicians to support their actions.

It could in fact be a significant paradigm shift with respect to the fundamentals of military discipline. For its part, the Supreme Court has long appreciated the importance of obedience in the armed forces. In Parker v. Levy, the Court cited the 1890 case of In Re: Grimly for the proposition that:

“An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer or the duty of obedience in the soldier.” (Emphasis added.)

What Congress has done seems to be exactly what the Supreme Court warned against: It raises questions as to a servicemember’s “duty of obedience” to military command.

How important is this? In the 1983 case of Chappell v. Wallace the Supreme Court noted what is virtually an axiom in the armed forces:

The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex, with no time for debate or reflection. (Emphasis added.)

This is no small matter for military readiness–and effectiveness–especially today. We live in an age of what many are calling “hyperwar,” and consequently, experts insist that decisions must be made at “warp speed.” A corollary would seemingly be that obedience to lawful orders must likewise be as rapid.

Again, what would it mean for the future to embed the thousands who refused a lawful order?

Some might understandably contend that the vaccine mandate did not just offend some individuals’ “conscience, religion, or personal philosophy,” it was also unwise and unnecessary on other grounds. Accordingly, they might conclude that, irrespective of other factors, no one should be penalized for disobeying an unwise and/or unnecessary order, especially one that Congress has now blocked.

This seems to miss the point. The order was lawful when issued, and military members had an obligation to obey it. Specifically, the unlawful defiance was complete when they choose not to comply. Of course, an order may appear to the recipient or others to be imprudent, poorly handled or even unnecessary, but that does not necessarily mean it actually is, or that–in any event–it is unlawful.

No military—or society—can countenance unlawfulness based simply on speculation that the law might be changed in the future.

What should a military member do if confronted with an irreconcilable moral dilemma about a lawful order?

In a thoughtful 2018 article, Brigadier General Linell A. Letendre and Dr. Martin L. Cook recognized that for some individuals certain moral dilemmas cannot be reconciled with their military duties. They advised:

“[I]t is perfectly possible any individual member of the profession might think that he or she has a personal moral belief that is fundamentally at odds with those professional obligations. But when that occurs, if that individual strongly feels he or she cannot or will not subordinate those beliefs to his or her professional obligations, the proper conclusion should cause the individual to leave the profession.”

Concluding thoughts

As sympathetic as the cases of many vaccine-refusers may be, the Pentagon still needs to ask itself hard questions before reinstating anyone. It should start with this: can they rely upon those who refused the vaccination to now comply immediately with all lawful orders they might receive in the future?

Or would commanders have to expect those reinstated would still filter lawful orders through their personal belief system before deciding to comply?

Can a military really effectively operate that way?

The Pentagon also needs to ask itself what the effect will be on all the troops who did comply with the order to now have the refusers reinstated among them.

It is good to hear Secretary Cisneros say the military services are going through each case to evaluate what should be done, as a case-by-case approach is the only reasoned course of action. A general amnesty would be a mistake.

The reality is, as the Supreme Court tells us, the “essence of military service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service.” No one ever said that doing so would always be easy, particularly as the Court also advises that

This means they will need to obey all lawful orders, including those that may at times conflict with their personal choices or beliefs. Those who cannot make that commitment might still be able to serve this great country in important and valued ways, but not as uniformed members of the armed forces.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · March 26, 2023

8. IntelBrief: TikTok’s Testimony Troubles

The excerpts I saw of the testimony were pretty painful.

IntelBrief: TikTok’s Testimony Troubles - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · March 28, 2023

March 28, 2023

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IntelBrief: TikTok’s Testimony Troubles

AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana

Bottom Line up Front

TikTok’s CEO, Shou Zi Chew, answered some tough questions during a Congressional hearing last week, as U.S. lawmakers pounced on his company’s alleged links to the Chinese Communist Party and consequent risks to American users and security.
The social media company’s plans to move American user data to U.S.-based servers monitored by American personnel did not seem to satisfy the national security concerns of U.S. House representatives on either side of the political spectrum.
Leaks suggest employees of TikTok’s China-based parent company, ByteDance, wield more access to user data than the platform’s executives have admitted to in the past.
Already banned in various forms by numerous national governments, TikTok now faces the threat of a comprehensive, national ban in the United States, as well as an investigation into its parent company by the U.S. Department of Justice.

Shou Zi Chew, the CEO of TikTok, a social media platform for short-form video content, was grilled in a rare bipartisan showing of the lower house of the U.S. Congress last Thursday. During a contentious, five-hour meeting of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chew was interrogated over issues ranging from possible Chinese government influence, surveillance, and censorship of the social media platform; industry-wide concerns like misinformation, child safety, and mental health; and even the app’s role in facilitating illegal drug sales. U.S. lawmakers also went after Chew personally: U.S. Representative Diana Harshbarger of Tennessee called him “an agent of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]” during the hearing, while U.S. Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas took to Twitter later in the evening to call for the executive, a Singaporean national, to be deported from the United States.

A frequent topic of discussion during the proceedings was the security and transparency initiative launched by TikTok known as “Project Texas.” In response to criticism that non-public information belonging to TikTok’s U.S. users could be accessed by the Chinese government, TikTok had announced that moving forward, this data will be stored on servers located on U.S. soil, housed in a data center owned by a U.S. company (Oracle), and monitored by American personnel. In the near-term, however, TikTok still must contend with the presence of legacy data that has already been collected and stored on offshore servers. In his testimony, Chew conceded that this data would remain accessible to Chinese engineers until it is deleted and migrated to the U.S. servers, a process he anticipates being completed this year.

Links between TikTok, its Beijing-headquartered parent company ByteDance, and the Chinese government have bred fear among several U.S. government entities that the highly popular social media app could be used for surveillance, censorship, or influence campaigns. The heads of numerous U.S. national security agencies – including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) – told the U.S. Senate earlier this month that they believe the app poses a national security threat. The U.S. Department of Justice also recently announced an investigation into allegations that ByteDance employees had accessed TikTok data belonging to U.S. tech journalists to identify their sources, while the digital media site Buzzfeed reported last year that leaks from internal TikTok meetings revealed ByteDance employees regularly accessed non-public information about the app’s U.S. users. In 2021, TikTok paid $92 million to settle a class action lawsuit that brought together 21 separate suits in the United States alleging the company shared user data, obtained without user consent, with third parties in places including China. While a 2021 report by the academic research lab CitizenLab could not prove that TikTok engaged in “overt data transmission to the Chinese government,” the report’s authors also would not discount the possibility that the servers they observed as recipients of TikTok data could act as intermediaries facilitating delivery to mainland China.

While its ties to the Chinese government may be unique to TikTok, the social media company’s broader data harvesting practices are hardly unique within the industry. In a daily brief discussing the testimony, Human Right Watch (HRW) pointed out last Friday that weak U.S. regulations give most social media platforms, not just TikTok, wide latitude to make content moderation decisions and leave users in the dark as to how their data is used. TikTok’s chief operating officer described the hearing itself as xenophobic. CitizenLab says that TikTok collects comparable amounts of data to Facebook. Meanwhile, some concerns raised at last week’s hearing over issues like child safety, self-harm, and mis/disinformation regarding contentious issues like COVID and elections could have just as easily been transferred to Twitter or Facebook. While the platform can be used to host critical content, HRW still stressed that, at the end of the day, “TikTok is beholden to the Chinese government … and ultimately, the ruling Chinese Communist Party.”

Beyond data harvesting, critics also fear the incredibly popular app might be used to promote narratives that support CCP objectives, though CitizenLab has described evidence that TikTok engages in political censorship of user-generated content as “inconclusive.” Nonetheless, U.S. lawmakers took time during last week’s hearing to excoriate Chew over the app’s suspension of various users who they claim were victims of censorship, including an American teenager who had posted a video drawing attention to the plight of China’s Uighur population – an ethnic group primarily located in Xinjiang province that some human rights groups and states, including the U.S. government, argue are victims of genocide and/or crimes against humanity. TikTok has insisted the user’s suspension was carried out for her use of a photo of Osama Bin Laden in a video which she had featured satirically. Nonetheless, in multiple instances during the hearing, lawmakers attempted to force Chew to discuss China’s treatment of the Uighurs, a subject that Chew sidestepped during questioning.

During her opening statement for last week’s hearing, Committee chairwoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers of the state of Washington called for an outright national ban of the app, calling it a weapon of the CCP. Hours before the hearing, China’s commerce ministry announced its opposition to a sale of TikTok after the Biden administration last week threatened to ban the app in the United States if ByteDance did not sell off its shares in the social media company. After a previous attempt to ban the app by the Trump administration was blocked in court in 2020, White House officials now acknowledge they need Congressional support to ban the social media app throughout the United States. While several critics of the platform have voiced concerns about the implications of TikTok, its wholesale ban has also raised concerns about the potential for government overreach. Nonetheless, the United States successfully passed legislation to ban TikTok from federal devices earlier this year. Several other states, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan, and India, as well as the European Union, have also imposed bans of varying degrees over security concerns.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · March 28, 2023

9. US Indo-Pacific Command seeks extra $274 million for cyber

Why does INDOPACOM have any unfinanced requirements (UKR)?

US Indo-Pacific Command seeks extra $274 million for cyber

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · March 27, 2023

WASHINGTON — U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the oldest and the largest of the Pentagon’s unified combatant commands, asked Congress for an additional $274 million to fund offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, as officials seek to fend off hackers and gird for potential conflict with China.

“Offensive cyber access and effects” projects, at $184 million, and “cybersecurity and network defenses,” at $90 million, are included in the command’s hefty $3.5 billion unfunded priorities list, a copy of which Defense News reviewed.

The former supports “capabilities to access and effect cyberspace operations,” it said. The latter would fund INDOPACOM attempts to harden networks and quickly identify intruders.

Combatant commands and military leaders annually send unfunded priorities lists, also called “wish lists,” to lawmakers, each offering different levels of detail, as required by law. They allow defense officials to note for Congress items that did not make it into the latest budget request from the White House but that would be useful should money be available.

INDOPACOM’s ask comes as the U.S. looks to counter an increasingly influential and assertive China in both real and virtual worlds. The Biden administration’s cybersecurity strategy, published this month, identifies Beijing as the “broadest, most active and most persistent threat to both government and private sector networks” and China as the “only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do so.”

The command’s wish list, which also includes millions for missile warning and tracking, signals intelligence upgrades, foreign influence campaigns and more, highlights “exactly the kinds of capabilities that will make People’s Liberation Army planners and political leaders in Beijing think twice” about acting belligerently, according to Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank.

US sent ‘hunt-forward’ team to Albania in wake of Iranian cyberattacks

Iran targeted Albanian networks in July and September, forcing offline key government services including the Total Information Management System.

“When you just quickly look at the list: Guam defense system, cybersecurity, network defenses, missile warning and tracking, space sensors, undersea targeting, resilient warfighting architecture, joint fires networks, maritime strike capabilities, and the list goes on and on,” he told C4ISRNET. “These aren’t exactly new golf courses in Hawaii, right? This is not a bigger house for the general.”

Hackers backed by China siphon intellectual property to boost technological development and meddle in foreign affairs by peddling disinformation, among other digital misbehavior. Chinese-sponsored cyberattacks breached a Navy contractor’s computers, jeopardizing sensitive information tied to secret work on an anti-ship missile, Defense News reported in 2018.

The Defense Department’s desired cyber spending has steadily increased in recent years. The department this month requested $13.5 billion, a 20.5% increase compared to the Biden administration’s previous ask of $11.2 billion. That same pitch is up from $10.4 billion in FY22, $9.8 billion in FY21 and $9.6 billion in FY20.

Trustworthy networks underpin much of what the military does, making cybersecurity paramount. And as the U.S. prepares to fight larger-scale wars with tech-savvy opponents, the pipes through which information flow need to be thickly insulated, according to defense officials and analysts.

“The kill chain is essentially what? It’s detect, decide, deliver,” said Bowman, a former Black Hawk pilot. “The side that can go through that kill chain, detect, decide, deliver, the fastest is the side that’s going to win the engagement and maybe win the conflict. So what strings all that together? Well, that’s strung together by networks, command and control, artificial intelligence, with a cyber protection or cyber activity layered over all of it.”

Defense News reporter Bryant Harris contributed to this article.

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · March 27, 2023

WASHINGTON — U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the oldest and the largest of the Pentagon’s unified combatant commands, asked Congress for an additional $274 million to fund offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, as officials seek to fend off hackers and gird for potential conflict with China.

“Offensive cyber access and effects” projects, at $184 million, and “cybersecurity and network defenses,” at $90 million, are included in the command’s hefty $3.5 billion unfunded priorities list, a copy of which Defense News reviewed.

The former supports “capabilities to access and effect cyberspace operations,” it said. The latter would fund INDOPACOM attempts to harden networks and quickly identify intruders.

Combatant commands and military leaders annually send unfunded priorities lists, also called “wish lists,” to lawmakers, each offering different levels of detail, as required by law. They allow defense officials to note for Congress items that did not make it into the latest budget request from the White House but that would be useful should money be available.

INDOPACOM’s ask comes as the U.S. looks to counter an increasingly influential and assertive China in both real and virtual worlds. The Biden administration’s cybersecurity strategy, published this month, identifies Beijing as the “broadest, most active and most persistent threat to both government and private sector networks” and China as the “only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do so.”

The command’s wish list, which also includes millions for missile warning and tracking, signals intelligence upgrades, foreign influence campaigns and more, highlights “exactly the kinds of capabilities that will make People’s Liberation Army planners and political leaders in Beijing think twice” about acting belligerently, according to Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank.

US sent ‘hunt-forward’ team to Albania in wake of Iranian cyberattacks

Iran targeted Albanian networks in July and September, forcing offline key government services including the Total Information Management System.

“When you just quickly look at the list: Guam defense system, cybersecurity, network defenses, missile warning and tracking, space sensors, undersea targeting, resilient warfighting architecture, joint fires networks, maritime strike capabilities, and the list goes on and on,” he told C4ISRNET. “These aren’t exactly new golf courses in Hawaii, right? This is not a bigger house for the general.”

Hackers backed by China siphon intellectual property to boost technological development and meddle in foreign affairs by peddling disinformation, among other digital misbehavior. Chinese-sponsored cyberattacks breached a Navy contractor’s computers, jeopardizing sensitive information tied to secret work on an anti-ship missile, Defense News reported in 2018.

The Defense Department’s desired cyber spending has steadily increased in recent years. The department this month requested $13.5 billion, a 20.5% increase compared to the Biden administration’s previous ask of $11.2 billion. That same pitch is up from $10.4 billion in FY22, $9.8 billion in FY21 and $9.6 billion in FY20.

Trustworthy networks underpin much of what the military does, making cybersecurity paramount. And as the U.S. prepares to fight larger-scale wars with tech-savvy opponents, the pipes through which information flow need to be thickly insulated, according to defense officials and analysts.

“The kill chain is essentially what? It’s detect, decide, deliver,” said Bowman, a former Black Hawk pilot. “The side that can go through that kill chain, detect, decide, deliver, the fastest is the side that’s going to win the engagement and maybe win the conflict. So what strings all that together? Well, that’s strung together by networks, command and control, artificial intelligence, with a cyber protection or cyber activity layered over all of it.”

Defense News reporter Bryant Harris contributed to this article.

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

10. AUKUS Success Will Depend on Long-term Political Will, Says Regional Expert

Why just submarines and technology? It would seem AUKUS has potential for so much more.

Conclusion:

The SSN acquisition effort is pillar one of the AUKUS arrangement. Davis argues that the second pillar of AUKUS, relating to cooperation to develop advanced technology, is “as important, if not more important than pillar one” because it can deliver capabilities “much sooner”. He expects more information about pillar two to emerge in Australia’s new Defense Strategic Review, which is expected to get published in the coming months.

AUKUS Success Will Depend on Long-term Political Will, Says Regional Expert - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Tim Fish · March 27, 2023

President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Rishi Surnak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese speak at the AUKUS bilateral meeting in San Diego, Calif, March 13, 2023. DoD Photo

As new details emerge about the AUKUS technology-sharing agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, a regional expert says the deal’s success requires both flexibility and sustained political support in all three countries.

The long-term nature of the AUKUS agreement that would pursue a nuclear-powered submarine capability for the Royal Australian Navy would require consistent support from successive governments across all three partner nations through the 2060s.

For AUKUS to result in a nuclear submarine fleet for Australia, the effort will require political support for the next three to four decades, regardless of the parties elected in Canberra, London or Washington, D.C.

There is opposition from the left and right of the political spectrum in Australia, according to Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst in defense strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). There is “an awful lot of criticism” of the AUKUS project in Australia with a “big effort being coordinated to try and attack or undermine it, people saying that [Australia] is tied into U.S. war plans,” he told USNI News.

He explained that the government “can’t afford” to allow that sort of effort to succeed if its committed to nuclear attack boats for the Royal Australian Navy

“Because if it did then what you could see is after a future election with later governments, or in a situation where the minor parties have the balance of power, we suddenly find AUKUS being imperiled,” Davis explained.

But he said he’s less concerned about the commitment from the left wing in Australia than with the political situation in the United States. His main concern is that a future U.S. administration could be less interested in international cooperation.

“Hopefully that will ensure that the U.S. continues to feel willing to support Australia in terms of providing the Virginia-class SSNs,” Davis said.

For Australia, the decision to opt for up to five Virginia-class submarines makes it entirely dependent on the U.S. The follow-on SSN-AUKUS submarine production plan also makes Australia’s future submarine capability and in-country manufacturing plans dependent on the United Kingdom. For a military capability, this is a level of dependency that Australia has not experienced before and may take some time to get used to, he said.

However, Davis believes this is a good thing.

“It is an opportunity for us to develop our skills and work with these countries and contribute to their own needs in terms of burden sharing. It strengthens the alliance between Australia, the U.S. and U.K.,” he said. “And whilst it is undeniable that Australia is going to have to depend on the U.S. and U.K. to help us get the experience and expertise and establish facilities, ultimately the Virginia-class and SSN-AUKUS submarines will be under sovereign Australian control. This is crucial, these will be Australian submarines, not American or British ones.”

Although the U.K. will initiate the SSN-AUKUS construction program at its own facilities in Scotland to build SSNs for the U.K. Royal Navy, this work will eventually transition to Australia at the ASC Shipyard in Osborne, South Australia to provide SSNs for the RAN.

However, history suggests that timelines for newly-built submarines could get delayed, so Davis said that the RAN “should be open to the possibility of extending the Virginia buy if there is a significant delay in SSN-AUKUS, which I am sure there is going to be. We are talking about three to five now. But as we get into the program, might that be six or seven. If there is a delay to SSN-AUKUS, Australia can’t be left short, so we should have that flexibility built into the deal.”

The AUKUS project will invest up to $5.32 billion to upgrade the facilities at RAN Fleet Base West at HMAS Stirling so that it can host Royal Navy and U.S. Navy attack boats for when the Submarine Rotational Forces West (SRF-West) begins in 2027. This will be one of two major ports in Australia that will operate SSNs. The other will be located on Australia’s East Coast, likely south of the city of Wollongong in New South Wales.

Allowing the Australians to operate Virginia-class boats ahead of their own domestic attack boats does allay the RAN’s concerns about the need to operate its existing fleet of six Collins-class submarines well into the 2040s. The Collins-class boats are undergoing a Life Of Type Extension (LOTE) program to ensure there is no submarine capability gap until the new SSNs enter service.

“We are no longer having to keep the Collins in for as long. They may be retired earlier,” Davis said. “The pressure will be on the Virginias and getting those into service. There’s really no way that we can accelerate this timetable, unfortunately, and we are getting the SSNs about as fast as we can,” David said.

“This is a lot better than where Australia started out from with estimates of the late-2030s until we saw the first SSN.”

The SSN acquisition effort is pillar one of the AUKUS arrangement. Davis argues that the second pillar of AUKUS, relating to cooperation to develop advanced technology, is “as important, if not more important than pillar one” because it can deliver capabilities “much sooner”. He expects more information about pillar two to emerge in Australia’s new Defense Strategic Review, which is expected to get published in the coming months.

news.usni.org · by Tim Fish · March 27, 2023

11. US military needs 7th branch just for cyber, current and former leaders say

I guess everyone should have their own service. (Except SOF. SOF would never be allowed to be a service - Nunn-Cohen missed the opportunity in 1986-87).

US military needs 7th branch just for cyber, current and former leaders say

therecord.media

A national association of current and former military digital security leaders is calling on Congress to establish a separate cyber service, arguing that the lack of one creates an “unnecessary risk” to U.S. national security.

In a March 26 memorandum, the Military Cyber Professional Association urged lawmakers to establish a U.S. Cyber Force in this year’s annual defense policy bill.

“For over a decade, each service has taken their own approach to providing United States Cyber Command forces to employ and the predictable results remain inconsistent readiness and effectiveness,” according to the group, which boasts around 3,700 members.

“Only a service, with all its trappings, can provide the level of focus needed to achieve optimal results in their given domain,” the memo states. “Cyberspace, being highly contested and increasingly so, is the only domain of conflict without an aligned service. How much longer will our citizenry endure this unnecessary risk?”

The creation of a Cyber Force would follow the arrival of the Space Force in 2019. It was the first new branch of the U.S. military in 72 years, bringing the total to six.

The association’s missive is likely to spark fresh debate on Capitol Hill, where an increasing number of policymakers see a cyber-specific military service as an inevitability.

Digital threats posed by foreign adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran have only evolved and multiplied since Cyber Command, the military’s digital warfighting arm, was first established in 2010.

Meanwhile, concerns about the talent pipeline into the command — which is subject to the whims of the military services — has become a perennial issue on Capitol Hill, where some feel the country’s offensive cyber mission is being given short shrift, impacting Cyber Command’s overall readiness to combat digital threats.

Last year’s bipartisan defense policy bill contained two provisions to address those worries. The first required Cyber Command to submit a report detailing the support it is receiving from the military services, while the second asked for an examination of any readiness shortfalls within the Cyber Mission Force — a cadre of roughly 6,200 personnel culled from the military branches that is slated to grow from 133 to 147 teams over the next few years.

Cyber Command and NSA chief Gen. Paul Nakasone testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month that the two studies would be transmitted to lawmakers in the coming months, predicting they would show “there are areas that we can work with the services to improve.”

No rush?

Space Force owed its relatively fast and frictionless creation to a unique set of circumstances, including major buy-in from Congress. Former President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence also pushed the idea inside the White House and touted it at campaign rallies, even after the force was already established.

By contrast, there is currently no political will within the Biden administration to create a seventh military branch, and there has been no sustained push, as of yet, by senior lawmakers for one.

In its memo, the association says that while “steps should be taken to establish such a service, with urgency, pursuing it in a hasty manner would likely prove to be a source of great disruption and risk to our own forces and operations.”

Therefore, any legislative approval of a Cyber Force should be accompanied by a “thorough study to determine what this military service should look like, how it be implemented, and the applicable timeline,” according to the group.

Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, the former executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, said the memo was necessary because “we’ve reached the point where we’re operating inefficiently, with multiple services” providing training, maintenance and equipment to the country’s cyber operators.

“We can achieve efficiency,” Montgomery, who leads the association’s legislative affairs, told The Record. “We can, I think, raise readiness and provide Cyber Command with a much more flexible tool.”

Congress “has done a good job” giving Cyber Command, and Nakasone, “unique” attributes for things like acquisition, he noted.

“But basically we're utilizing a workaround, instead of the most efficient, effective practice, which is to create a separate and unique cyber force,” Montgomery said.

Martin Matishak

Martin Matishak is a senior cybersecurity reporter for The Record. He spent the last five years at Politico, where he covered Congress, the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community and was a driving force behind the publication's cybersecurity newsletter.

therecord.media

12. All Talk, No Action on China

Dr. Scissors is one of the smartest people I know on all things related to China's economy.

He offers criticism of all sides.

Excerpts:

Will the new House Select Committee on China mean more effective legislation? Doubtful. Members within the Select Committee are genuinely concerned with the economic and military risks China poses, and they have allies elsewhere in Congress. But the Select Committee has no official jurisdiction — it can only talk, not act. This is an ideal outcome for those who want to appear politically strong while having no obligation at all to back up their words.

The Financial Services Committee, possibly the most important House committee, held a China hearing in early February. According to its Republican chairman and Republican-called witnesses, the top China threat is the U.S. responding in any serious way to China. Their conclusion: The U.S. should face up to the PRC’s military buildup, its domestic and international repression, and its economic predation by continuing to invest freely in the PRC.

With this “pressure” from some Republicans, the Biden administration does not feel compelled to truly compete. An executive order to address the more than $1 trillion the U.S. has invested in the PRC is many months overdue. Even if issued, it may prove an almost entirely empty action.

Other consequences to inaction are looming. China continues to steal intellectual property (IP), subsidize production that uses the IP, and drive advanced American companies out of business. It will also spread repression and more intensely target Taiwan. Politicians who take this seriously must propose policies that involve some pain, because that is what’s required for the U.S. to win. Politicians who don’t take the PRC seriously are easy to spot. They’ll be pushing some domestic agenda unrelated to China, tilting at windmills, and, above all, talking.

All Talk, No Action on China

By Derek Scissors

March 27, 2023

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2023/03/27/all_talk_no_action_on_china_889856.html

It might be easy to embrace recent warnings against a bellicose bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding China. But the real peril is that the true China consensus — which includes Democrats and Republicans, the administration and Congress — is to do nothing but talk, especially if action comes at a price.

Last month gave us a perfect example. February was full of anti-China speeches: Republican-run congressional hearings, Democratic-run hearings, and Biden administration revelations. In the end though, nothing of substance happened, nor is it likely to happen.

There is no standing up to the People’s Republic of China without costs. It has the world’s second largest economy as well as its second most powerful military. It is led by a dictator-for-life who intentionally hearkens back to a man who caused mass starvation. Winning even a peaceful contest would require sacrifices. Deterring Xi Jinping by preparing for conflict requires more. As sacrifice is not appealing to most American politicians, they instead spout rhetoric while hoping for a contest of convenience.

The administration’s actions include the Department of Commerce calling for tens of billions of dollars to vastly boost domestic semiconductor production, prioritizing it as a vital national interest. Given the PRC’s intent to globally dominate low-end chips, Commerce appears correct. But challenging as this goal is, Commerce is diluting its plan by also asking for better day care as part of the package. This, of course, is a counter-incentive for companies willing to build in the U.S. It creates an opposite effect to what was originally intended.

The administration has treated supply chains similarly, stirring in political priorities such as promoting green energy output without specific plans to secure green energy supply chains. While it is no surprise that political actors would use China as cover for executing domestic policies, it means far less gets done. Export controls on semiconductors were announced to great fanfare last October, with promises of more to come. Yet five months later, we don’t even have the final regulations.

Concerning licensing permissions, Commerce has gone from terrible to mediocre under the Biden administration. Last year, it accepted 70% of applications to export controlled items to the PRC. Not exactly tight restrictions, but still a substantial improvement over the Trump Commerce Department’s performance, during a supposed “trade war,” where the number may have been over 90%.

Part of the blame is with Congress. Being placed on Commerce’s “Entity List,” which imposes license requirements on foreign individuals, entities, or governments, requires just a license application. Yet many members of Congress have pretended for years that this is a blacklist preventing designated foreign firms from receiving American technology. In fact, tens of billions of dollars’-worth in licenses have been granted to these firms, most of whom were also eligible for American investment. The Entity List has always been fraudulent, and Congress willingly plays along.

Will the new House Select Committee on China mean more effective legislation? Doubtful. Members within the Select Committee are genuinely concerned with the economic and military risks China poses, and they have allies elsewhere in Congress. But the Select Committee has no official jurisdiction — it can only talk, not act. This is an ideal outcome for those who want to appear politically strong while having no obligation at all to back up their words.

The Financial Services Committee, possibly the most important House committee, held a China hearing in early February. According to its Republican chairman and Republican-called witnesses, the top China threat is the U.S. responding in any serious way to China. Their conclusion: The U.S. should face up to the PRC’s military buildup, its domestic and international repression, and its economic predation by continuing to invest freely in the PRC.

With this “pressure” from some Republicans, the Biden administration does not feel compelled to truly compete. An executive order to address the more than $1 trillion the U.S. has invested in the PRC is many months overdue. Even if issued, it may prove an almost entirely empty action.

Other consequences to inaction are looming. China continues to steal intellectual property (IP), subsidize production that uses the IP, and drive advanced American companies out of business. It will also spread repression and more intensely target Taiwan. Politicians who take this seriously must propose policies that involve some pain, because that is what’s required for the U.S. to win. Politicians who don’t take the PRC seriously are easy to spot. They’ll be pushing some domestic agenda unrelated to China, tilting at windmills, and, above all, talking.

Derek Scissors is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also the chief economist of the China Beige Book. The views expressed are the author's own.

13. Elite Army Rangers Train in Hawaii as Pacific Interest Grows

I look back at all the years I have spent in the Asia Pacific when no one cared or when PACOM was called the "economy of force theater." Now everyone seems to be paying some attention.

Elite Army Rangers Train in Hawaii as Pacific Interest Grows

military.com · by 27 Mar 2023 The Honolulu Star-Advertiser | By Kevin Knodell · March 27, 2023

The soldiers were methodical as they went through their gear and prepared to venture into the jungle Tuesday. They had just arrived by helicopter at the Army's jungle warfare school in Wahiawa—known as the Lightning Academy—after conducting a beach landing by boat and launching a simulated raid at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows.

After they accounted for their equipment, they moved carefully into the thick jungle as rain began to fall and humidity gripped the air.

They're members of the Army's elite 75th Ranger Regiment who have been in Hawaii the past two weeks. In the past two decades, the unit was continually deployed, conducting dangerous raids in Iraq and Afghanistan as Rangers were thrust into some of the most intense battles of those conflicts.

Rangers are considered some of the Army's best-trained and most capable soldiers. But for members of the 2nd Ranger Battalion's Bravo Company out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, training in Hawaii proved to be a humbling experience. The Pentagon has been shifting its attention to the Pacific amid tensions with China, and soldiers are training for the potential of a very different sort of war.

As a special operations formation that conducts sensitive missions, members of the unit are normally not authorized to speak to news media, but an officer with Bravo Company spoke to the Honolulu Star-Advertiser on the condition that his name not be used.

"The intent of the trip was to get Bravo Company Rangers exposed to a jungle environment because we have relatively minimal exposure, " the officer said. "We've got a lot to learn, for sure. I think we've got to force ourselves to kind of fight some institutional knowledge and thinking that we've developed over time and probably the last two decades, and constantly find ways to force our Rangers to think differently than they have in the past."

The officer said operating in the water introduced challenges, noting that although Rangers train on boat operations while attending Ranger School, they really get only "intermittent touches " of training in the water and that landing a raid force at Bellows forced Rangers to operate "in a way that in recent history we're not super familiar with."

"The Marine Corps' facilities located at Bellows provide one of the premier training environments available to the Joint Force in Hawaii, " said Lt. Col. Rollin Steele, director of operations at Marine Corps Base Hawaii. "The fact that units travel from the mainland to utilize this training resource is a testament to the training area's dynamic nature and to the level of readiness a unit can obtain through training at ( Marine Corps Training Area Bellows)."

The Ranger Regiment outfits its soldiers with the Army's most advanced equipment to carry out their missions. But in the jungle they can't necessarily rely on gadgets that once gave them an advantage. For instance, the Ranger officer said that "the regiment has gotten quite used to operating at night and using night vision optics and devices, " but under the thick jungle canopy, "that's just not really gonna be something you can leverage."

The Lightning Academy is run by the Schofield Barracks-based 25th Infantry Division. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Ryan, who was himself a member of the regiment and once led Rangers in Afghanistan, said the facility is becoming an increasingly in-demand training ground. Recently, a battalion of paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division out of Fort Bragg, N.C., trained on Oahu.

" The 25th Infantry Division is the U.S. Army's Pacific division, " said Ryan. "For decades we've developed a unique set of jungle skills and capabilities that we believe are critical to operate in this region and to share with our allies and partners. ... We are seeing an increased demand from the Army and (Special Operations Forces ) for training in a multi-island environment and in tropical and jungle conditions. There is no better place to conduct tough, realistic training than at Lightning Academy."

Operating in the jungle can be dangerous. On Tuesday one Bravo Company Ranger was injured while training deep in the jungle, suffering a laceration to his leg. According to Army officials, the soldier was treated on-site by his platoon medic and was extracted from the field by Lightning Academy jungle instructors for more treatment.

"When a service member sustains an injury in the jungle, the skills and techniques taught at Lightning Academy are invaluable to ensuring that they receive expedient care, " said Brig. Gen. Jeffrey VanAntwerp, the 25th's deputy commanding general for ope rations. "In this case the injured Ranger was treated and fully returned to duty."

In Iraq and Afghanistan, special operations forces such as the Rangers often pursued their own missions largely separately from conventional forces. But the operations that the military is preparing for now are a far cry from the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations where U.S. forces took for granted that they controlled the skies and had a firepower advantage.

Fighting a large, heavily armed force could require elite special troops to work more closely with larger conventional units to get the job done. The Bravo Company officer told the Star-Advertiser said that this exercise has given his Rangers an opportunity to practice that as they came to depend on the 25th Infantry throughout.

"That's been an unforeseen but great thing about this trip, " said the Ranger. "The exposure that our Rangers got for the advanced mobility course in Lightning Academy was eye-opening and humbling. ... We don't have that institutional knowledge, and it's a fresh reminder that there are a lot of elements in the Army doing very different things, and there's a lot to learn from other organizations across the Army as a whole."

In the Pacific, tensions have mounted in the South China Sea, particularly between China and Taiwan. Beijing considers self-ruled Taiwan a rogue province, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to take control of Taiwan through military force if necessary.

Ryan said that "the more we can expose the Army and the Joint Force to the Indo-Pacific region, the better because the training we do out here highlights the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific."

The buildup of military forces in the region has fueled fears of a major Pacific conflict. U.S. military leaders say the Chinese military is no longer talking to them even as regional leaders call for diplomacy to cool tensions.

The bloody fighting in Ukraine that kicked off in 2022 when Russian forces tried unsuccessfully to seize Kyiv has offered a harrowing glimpse into what such a conflict could look like as both Russian and Ukrainian forces slug it out with tanks, artillery and aircraft. The war has unleashed destruction on Ukrainian towns and cities and killed thousands of people.

U.S. military commanders are considering the gravity of a scenario where casualties are much higher than they've ever seen and the ability to evacuate them from the battlefield could be heavily restricted. In 2022 during an exercise at the Pohakuloa Training Area, Ryan told the Star-Advertiser, "We talked about the golden hour in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, getting casualties back to a higher level of care, within an hour of point of injury. It's just not going to be realistic on a battlefield like this."

But although tensions are high in the Pacific, Gen. Charles Flynn, Oahu-based commander of U.S. Army Pacific, expressed cautious optimism in February that a war isn't imminent and could be avoided, saying at an event in Washington, D.C., that the Chinese military itself might not feel it's prepared to take Taiwan.

"The complexity of a joint island landing campaign is not a small matter, and you have to be an incredibly professional, well-trained, well-led force—and they're working on it—but I will tell you that from my perspective they're not 10 feet tall ; they have work to do, " Flynn said. "I think that now is the time for us to get into position, to be able to deter that event from happening."

The Bravo Company officer said he expects that the Rangers will likely be back in Hawaii as the Pentagon's focus on the Pacific grows.

"I think the relationship out here is gonna grow immensely, " he said. "I think people are gonna continue to try to come out here and train in this environment, probably on a yearly basis."

___

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Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

military.com · by 27 Mar 2023 The Honolulu Star-Advertiser | By Kevin Knodell · March 27, 2023

14. Is the Army’s $117 million rebrand dead after Jonathan Majors’ arrest?

Is the Army’s $117 million rebrand dead after Jonathan Majors’ arrest?

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · March 27, 2023

Questions swirled Monday about the future of the Army’s $117 million “Be all you can be” rebranding effort, and the service and its partners did little to answer them.

Mere weeks after an elaborate rollout ceremony at the National Museum of the U.S. Army, the service’s marketing office yanked its first two advertisements, the only ones released so far in the new campaign, from airwaves. Army Times first reported the move, which followed actor Jonathan Majors’ Saturday arrest in New York City on charges of assault, strangulation and harassment against a 30-year-old woman.

The actor’s attorney forcefully denied the allegations in a Sunday statement, claiming that the charges will be “dropped imminently” due to video footage and witness testimony — but his representatives did not respond to a renewed comment request Monday.

The Army’s marketing office declined an interview request and did not provide a response to questions sent for this story. DDB, the advertising conglomerate on a more than $4 billion contract to assist Army marketing, declined to answer questions and referred them to the Army.

It’s still not clear what the direct cost of pulling advertisements off the air and web will be. Television networks often require advertisers to pay up front for airtime, and cancellation policies vary by network or medium. Sometimes advertisers are able to obtain credits toward future buys.

The new “be all you can be” advertisements were ubiquitous throughout the early rounds of March Madness, the NCAA men’s basketball championship tournament, and the Army’s marketers will be on the ground for the Final Four fan festival in Texas to do in-person experiential marketing that goes beyond recruiters manning a table. Sports news website Sportico reported that pre-paid 30-second commercials for this year’s final game cost between $2.2 and $2.3 million, though it’s unclear how many spots the Army purchased.

But should the pause on the existing two spots become permanent, costs could quickly rise. An unknown but significant portion of the $117 million that Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said the new campaign required went to creative development and production on cinematic ads.

Complicating things further, the spots featured the Creed III and Ant-Man and the Wasp: Quantumania star as an on-screen narrator. Majors or his silhouette is visible on-screen for more than a minute of the 90-second version of one ad, “Overcoming Obstacles.” That means removing the actor would necessitate a costly reshoot or producing an entirely new round of creative content.

How embracing ‘Be all you can be’ resurrected Army marketing

The rebrand is the latest move in a series of service-wide efforts that may reduce recent years’ recruiting struggles.

But all isn’t lost, likely.

Some line items in the nine-figure rebrand, which marketing officials detailed to Army Times in a February visit to their Chicago office, won’t require a redo even if the service permanently cans the Majors videos. The Army won’t need to replicate one-time costs such as research groups to select the “be all you can be” tagline, developing brand assets like logos and fonts, and developing a new marketing officer career field.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.

15. Why it’s time for the US Army to divest Iron Dome

Why it’s time for the US Army to divest Iron Dome

The Air Defense Artillery needs to be all that it can be. It can ill afford to maintain a single, unintegrated system as an Army of one, writes Tom Karako of CSIS.

breakingdefense.com · by Tom Karako · March 27, 2023

The US Army owns two Iron Dome batteries. (US Army)

For several years the US Army has been experimenting with Israel’s Iron Dome system. In the following op-ed, Tom Karako of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that Iron Dome does not match the Army’s needs, and that it may be time to move on.

This week, senior US Army leaders are gathering in Huntsville, Alabama for the annual Global Force symposium, hosted by the Association of the US Army. They do so amid increased budget pressure on the service reflected in the fiscal 2024 budget request, challenges for their end strength outlook, and recruiting shortfalls.

One important topic of conversation should be whether Iron Dome still belongs in the Air Defense Artillery branch’s force structure, and if not, what to do with it. An objective review of the situation yields a straightforward conclusion: Iron Dome is a great capability, but not one that fits the US Army in this decisive decade. It is time to evaluate alternatives, including giving it to another country, transferring it within the US military, and sending it back to Israel.

The Iron Dome system is highly effective against the threats it was designed to contend with: rockets, artillery, mortars, and slower-flying cruise missiles. With over 2,000 claimed intercepts, it is among the most combat-proven air defenses in history. Its capability is greatest when operationally integrated as part of a layered defense, as it is deployed in Israel. As a defense acquisition program, Iron Dome is a remarkable case study in urgent material development, cost-effective interceptors, and multi-national development, financing, and production.

Defending against the threat of cruise missiles, at the higher end of Iron Dome’s capability, is of particular concern to the United States. As seen in Ukraine, cruise missiles have become what John Plumb, the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, calls “weapons of choice.” Their characteristics and proliferation present the joint force with a severe capacity and manning shortfall to defend forward bases, including airbases on Guam and elsewhere.

The Army has been trying to get new cruise missile defense capabilities since 1993, with numerous stops and starts. In 2018, fed up with the lack of progress, Congress required the Army to acquire some kind of interim solution. Those who had drafted the statutory provision might have supposed it would be used to get a system like NASAMS, which today defends Washington, DC and is being successfully employed in Ukraine against Russian cruise missiles. The next year, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley approved the purchase of two Iron Dome batteries, with an option for more.

In many quarters, the Army’s acquisition of Iron Dome, against the counsel of some senior air defense leadership at the time, came as something of a surprise. Even before they were delivered in 2020, it was clear that they were unlikely to fit in the future force, and that the future option would not be exercised. Soldiers were trained to operate the system, it was briefly tested on Guam, and it has since been sent to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, in Washington State.

While the Iron Domes were being acquired as the interim capability, the Army held a separate competition for an enduring solution to counter drones and cruise missiles. The program of record, called Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC), includes both kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities. The non-kinetic component includes lasers and high-powered microwaves. For the kinetic interceptor competition, the Army held a shoot-off between one launcher with AIM-9Xs and another launcher with a variant of the Tamir (the interceptor used by Iron Dome), called Skyhunter. Following the shoot-off, the Army selected the AIM-9X offering for what is known as Enduring Shield. While AIM-9X is the only interceptor currently programmed for the IFPC launcher, in the future it will support multiple types. In principle, a Tamir variant could be among them.

Further demand for cruise missile defenses will come with the defense of Guam, with last year’s designation of the Air Force as lead service for homeland cruise missile defense, and by the Army’s pursuit of a future supersonic cruise missile interceptor for IFPC. Given this demand, these much-awaited IFPC capabilities cannot arrive soon enough.

The Problem

If the Air Defense Artillery needs all the capacity it can get, why not keep Iron Dome?

The simple problem is that Iron Dome, designed as part of Israel’s layered air defense network, cannot currently be integrated into the US Army’s future air defense brain, the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). Unless or until granted access to the underlying source code, cybersecurity concerns preclude that from happening. For better or worse, a requirement to plug into IBCS applies to virtually all new and legacy systems, including Patriot, Sentinel and LTAMDS radars, and IFPC. The requirement imposes costs on both these forthcoming systems and, in time, on other allies, such as the sixteen or so other operators of Patriot who will continue to use its organic command and control system, rather than getting IBCS.

Cyber uncertainty is why Army leadership has consistently made clear that it cannot integrate Iron Dome into its future force. Unless Israel permits access to address these concerns, these two batteries will remain a standalone, niche capability. As such, the Army seems to not know what to do with them. Despite the attention given to air and missile defense for Guam, INDOPACOM appears to have no intention of stationing Iron Dome within a thousand miles of that island, at least not unless war breaks out.

These technical difficulties do not diminish the engineering marvels of Iron Dome and its several elements. Numerous nations, for instance, are pursuing or have acquired its radar. There is likewise nothing wrong with its capable and cost-effective Tamir, or for that matter Tamir-like, interceptors. Should an American-made Iron Dome-like system be acquired by the Army, many of these problems could go away. The potential for further US-Israel cooperation on air defense munition coproduction seems strong. These bright prospects for future programs are distinct from the original batteries, which will remain stovepiped.

In principle, the two batteries could be operated in a standalone manner. In practice, this guarantees considerable expense with marginal return. Retaining two batteries of a single system, as opposed to twenty, carries a daily tax of opportunity costs measured in sustainment, force structure, training, deployment flexibility, and other scarce resources that cannot be applied to the rest of the ADA.

Personnel is one especially scarce and important resource. To crew the Iron Dome batteries, soldiers had to be pulled from the forthcoming eighth THAAD battery. The Army has prudently begun to expand ADA force structure, especially for IFPC, and with an additional Patriot battalion. But the number of air defenders will still fall far short of need. The operational tempo of the ADA, especially Patriot units, has long been among the highest in the joint force. Other examples of the branch’s personnel needs are not hard to find.

With last year’s defense bill, Congress signaled the potential need for still further Patriot capacity. In 2012, the objective requirement for THAAD batteries was set at nine, but only seven are currently operational, meaning that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could soon have more THAAD firing units than the United States of America.

The utility of scale, integration, and layering applies to air defenders of all nationalities and air defense systems of all types. The ADA needs to maximize the return from every air defender and piece of equipment in the branch. It cannot afford to devote personnel to train, operate and maintain two systems that by all accounts do not fit into its force structure. Given the increasing threat, the unmet integration criterion, and the need to most effectively employ every air defender, a reasonable conclusion is that the time has come for the US Army to begin divesting Iron Dome from its operational force.

Possible Next Steps

What, then, should be done with the Army’s two batteries of Iron Dome? Besides storage, at least three courses of action are worth consideration.

One option is to give them to Ukraine as part of a drawdown of US capability. Iron Dome could be usefully employed against lower-tier Russian threats, like those supplied by Iran, which have been used extensively against civilian targets — much like the threat Iron Dome was created to combat. Such a step would boost Ukraine’s air defense capacity, add to a layered defense, and preserve other scarce and more costly interceptors, including NASAMS, HAWK, and Patriot.

Any third party transfer would require permission from the government of Israel, whose foreign policy towards Russia has thus far precluded military aid to Ukraine, to include air defenses and even other nations’ Spike anti-tank weapons made under licensed production. (Similar drama has been seen with Swiss and German reluctance to approve third party transfers to Ukraine.) Assuming Israeli approval for Ukraine remains foreclosed, approval could also be requested to send or sell them to one of the many other allies and partners considering Iron Dome, or perhaps offer them as an extended loan to some other European country who has lent their air defenses to Ukraine.

Again, standalone capability may be sufficient if tight integration is not required. Integrated fire control is not needed in situations where fire direction and interoperability are good enough. Nevertheless, the several Scandinavian and Baltic countries reportedly considering Iron Dome and David’s Sling could anticipate facing a quandary similar to that of the US Army if they were to propose adding those systems into the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS) architecture, as opposed to operating them organically as national assets. So might Germany, if it acquires Arrow-3.

A second category of alternatives, transfer within the US military, would include harvesting the Tamir interceptors and giving them to the US Marines. For their Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) program, the Marines finessed the integration problem by pairing the sturdy Tamir with their own command and control system, their own Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), and a modified, expeditionary launcher. A related alternative would be to designate one or both batteries as a joint Army-Marines asset at White Sands Missile Range for training or concept development. Still another option is to give the Iron Domes to a National Guard unit on Guam or elsewhere. This last path, circumventing the regular Army’s IBCS requirement, would help alleviate regular force structure within the ADA while accepting the limitations of fire direction.

A third course would be to give the Iron Dome batteries back to Israel as part of the annual missile defense aid package from the United States. The usual contribution to Israeli missile defense of $500 million per year rose to $1.5 billion in 2022, due to a $1 billion boost specifically for Iron Dome procurement. The long-running and productive US-Israel partnership on missile defense will continue to bear fruit for decades to come, including with higher-end development programs like the forthcoming Arrow-4.

To avoid divestment, it may be worth one final, formal request to Israel to permit source code access and whatever else is necessary to fully address the cybersecurity concerns and integrate the batteries. Barring this resolution, however, it seems necessary to conclude that the Army’s experiment with Iron Dome has served its purpose, and move on. It would be no indictment of Iron Dome to do so. The long list of terminated ADA programs is a respectable reminder that not every air defense experiment persists.

In line with the Army’s new branding, the Air Defense Artillery needs to be all that it can be. It can ill afford to maintain a single, unintegrated system as an Army of one.

Tom Karako is the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

breakingdefense.com · by Tom Karako · March 27, 2023

16. The Iraq War's Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood

Conclusion:

Questions about Iraq’s weapons and ties to terrorism have already become foundational issues in 21st century international history. Unfortunately, public debates about these questions have not kept pace with the rather significant advances made by scholars. Saddam Hussein did not try to trick outsiders into thinking that he had weapons of mass destruction as a form of deterrence. The U.S. government had a flawed strategy rooted in poor incentives and dubious analysis. Saddam Hussein had no ties to the 9/11 attacks, and he was not an Islamist. Yet, these facts did not prevent him from working with bin Laden and groups like al-Qaeda.

Failing to grapple with the tragedy of the Iraq War in all its complexity risks creating simplistic narratives that will leave American analysts and policymakers ripe for repeating the same mistakes in the future. Blaming Saddam Hussein’s trickery for faulty assessments about his weapons programs takes the onus off American intelligence agencies. They will not learn the right lessons if they fail to address how their strategies to uncover Iraqi weapons programs created the flawed incentive structures that ultimately led Iraq to cease cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors. Likewise, simplistic narratives that refuse to address Saddam Hussein’s very real support for people like Osama bin Laden will leave analysts and policymakers ill-equipped to handle the nuance that such a threat demands.

The Iraq War's Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Samuel Helfont · March 28, 2023

The United States Invaded Iraq 20 years ago under false pretenses. Historians and social scientists have spent two decades investigating what went wrong. George W. Bush and other senior officials in his administration claimed former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. They also claimed that the Iraqi government had ties to nefarious groups such as al-Qaeda. Together, these two things posed an unacceptable threat to American security. Yet, once the American-led coalition toppled the Iraqi regime in 2003, it quickly became evident that there were no weapons of mass destruction or active ties to Osama bin Laden.

The narrative around the war is also controversial. Did the Bush administration actually believe that Saddam Hussein was a threat that had to be eliminated with military force, or did prominent U.S. officials simply cite the intelligence as a public justification for a war because they were eager to use the anger from 9/11 to remake the Middle East?

Either way, historians are now tasked with finding out what happened. Their sometimes–provocative findings have often been buried in dense academic tomes or, in some cases, exiled from polite conversation due to the political toxicity of anything that might be seen as lending support for a disastrous and ill-conceived war. This has left popular discourse to partisans on all sides looking to score political points rather than investigate the past. As a result, much of the debate in the national security community remains rooted in long-dispelled narratives or even factual inaccuracies. Despite the conventional wisdom touted in recent retrospectives, Saddam Hussein did not pursue a strategy of ambiguity around his weapons of mass destruction programs to deter Iran. Neither did his Arab nationalist ideology prevent him from working with people like Osama bin Laden. Indeed, much of the current conventional wisdom suffers from the same sort of groupthink as the intelligence failures it criticizes; it coalesces around easily digestible but flawed analysis. The 20-year anniversary of the war provides the perfect occasion to take stock of what we now know about these most infamous of intelligence failures.

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Since the demise of Saddam Hussein’s rule, historians have been blessed with millions of pages of internal Iraqi records containing the former regime’s innermost secrets. In the wake of the American-led invasion, Iraqi dissidents and the U.S. military seized the records of the regime in Baghdad, including the archive of the ruling Baath Party’s secretariat. The way those records were removed from Iraq led to protests and accusations of colonial-style appropriation of historical artifacts from the Middle East. However, the archives have produced a steady stream of books and articles outlining how Saddam Hussein ruled and conducted his foreign policy. These files, along with other investigative projects and interviews with former Iraqi officials, provide stunning insights into American intelligence failures in 2003.

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

The basic history of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction has now been well-documented. He had them in the 1980s. He used them against the Iranians and even his own people. Following the Gulf War, he promised to hand them over, but attempted to hide some from United Nations weapons inspectors. Once the Iraqi government was caught lying, Saddam Hussein decided to destroy the remaining illicit weapons in secret and without any documentation. Then, the Iraqi government doubled down on the claim that it had no weapons of mass destruction and challenged the inspectors to prove it wrong. Over the course of the 1990s, cajoling by the international community and defections by senior Iraqi officials — including Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law in 1995 — led the Iraqi regime to come clean about some of its past programs and to give up whatever remained of them. By the end of the decade, Iraq had completely dismantled his illicit weapons programs.

Yet, the question remains: How did intelligence agencies in the United States, with all their resources, fail to understand what had happened? Access to internal Iraqi records immediately showed the origins of some tactical misperceptions in Washington. For example, the United States government had intercepted snippets of Iraqi communications in which senior Iraqis ordered a site to be cleansed prior to the arrival of U.N. inspectors. In a high-profile presentation to the United Nations in February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell cited these intercepts as evidence that the Iraqis were covering up existing weapons programs. In the full context provided by Iraqi records, it became clear that the government was worried about a false positive from the residue of a long-dead program.

These discoveries, however, could not explain the full scope of the American intelligence failure. Finding itself in a political quagmire, the Bush administration prioritized uncovering how their assessments had gone so wrong. When an FBI agent named George Piro interrogated Saddam Hussein after his capture, one of his primary missions was to answer that question. After weeks of prying, Saddam Hussein let slip that he feared an Iranian invasion. Piro had his answer: Saddam Hussein had dismantled his illicit weapons programs but wanted to leave a residue of doubt about them to deter the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, he could not come clean about completely dismantling his weapons program.

The claim that Saddam Hussein was intentionally ambiguous about his weapons programs received a boost when a U.S. government-commissioned study on Iraqi strategic thinking interviewed former Iraqi officials. “For many months after the 2003 war,” the report recounted, “a number of senior Iraqi officials continued to believe it possible (though they adamantly insisted they possessed no direct knowledge) that Iraq still possessed a weapons of mass destruction capability hidden away somewhere.” One Iraqi general claimed Saddam Hussein was pursuing a strategy of “deterrence by doubt.” If Saddam Hussein was not forthright with senior leaders in his own regime, he was obviously lying to the international community as well.

This narrative is still widely accepted, but it is too neat. It too easily lets the intelligence community off the hook. It suggests the United States had relied on sound strategies and competent analysis, but it was tricked by the regime in Baghdad. It also ignores the fact that while Saddam Hussein was certainly duplicitous, and his claims about weapons of mass destruction contradictory, his regime had been telling the world it did not possess weapons of mass destruction for a decade.

There is no solid evidence prior to 2003 of Iraqis claiming that they really did have weapons of mass destruction. Further, scholars have uncovered no evidence of a “deterrence by doubt” strategy in the millions of pages of internal Iraqi records, and the Iraqi general who coined that phrase later walked it back. He claimed to have been influenced by reports in Western media and clarified that Saddam Hussein “never signaled the existence of WMD; neither in a statement of any kind nor by hints.” Despite whatever some other Iraqi generals told the United States government in an effort to clear themselves of responsibility for their crimes under the previous regime, Iraqi archives made clear that Saddam Hussein consistently and repeatedly conveyed the truth to his underlings about Iraq’s lack of illicit weapons programs. As he told the regime leadership in one closed-door meeting during the late 1990s, “you might think we still have hidden chemical weapons, missiles and so forth. We have nothing; not even one screw.”

New Scholarship on Iraqi Weapons

Scholars working with Iraqi archives have posited other theories resting on firmer ground. An important academic article by Gregory Koblentz pointed to the role of secret Iraqi intelligence agencies in Saddam Hussein’s failure to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, and thus the misperceptions about his weapons programs. The most important agency was aptly named the Special Security Organization. Its primary role was to spy on other spies and on members of the Baath Party to coup-proof the regime. Saddam Hussein’s regime held members of the Special Security Organization to the highest standards and trusted them with its innermost secrets. When Iraq tried to hide some weapons of mass destruction from the international community in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein placed the deception program within his most trusted agency, the Special Security Organization. Once Iraq dismantled its remaining weapons programs later in the decade, U.N. inspectors demanded Iraq not only open its weapons facilities but also to come clean about previous deceptions. Only then would the inspectors and the U.S. government feel comfortable that they were not being lied to again. Yet, that demand necessitated Iraq open it Special Security Organization to international inspectors.

By the mid-1990s, the United States clearly wished to do away with Saddam Hussein one way or another. It had even attempted a coup. It was also clear that U.S. intelligence agencies worked with and had penetrated the U.N. weapons inspection program. So, to come clean on his government’s deception program, Saddam Hussein would have had to open his primary counter-coup organization to the international community. This risked exposing this organization to U.S. intelligence agencies, which were working to overthrow the Iraqi regime. As the CIA concluded in a 2006 retrospective, when Saddam Hussein refused, intelligence analysts in Washington assumed he had something to hide. Instead, he was simply hoping to avoid a coup.

More recently, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, a leading expert on weapons proliferation at the University of Oslo, produced perhaps the most in-depth and sophisticated study of Saddam Hussein’s incentives. As she states, “The Iraqi leadership did not, as is widely believed, try to create a deterrent effect through calculated ambiguity as to whether Iraq no longer possessed WMD.” Rather than elaborate schemes or hidden agendas, sometimes the problems in Iraq stemmed from the type of good old-fashioned incompetence one often finds in authoritarian regimes. Senior leaders like Saddam Hussein had difficulty communicating their policies to lower-ranking officials, leading to contradictory statements and actions throughout the regime. Just as importantly, Saddam Hussein’s initial attempt to deceive weapons inspectors left him in what Braut-Hegghammer, calls a “cheaters dilemma.”

Once Baghdad was caught concealing weapons and documentation, U.N. inspectors and U.S. intelligence analysts developed a healthy distrust of everything the Iraqis said. When Baghdad later owned up to some aspects of its illicit programs, Americans took Iraq’s revelations of its previous misdeeds as proof of the regime’s duplicitous nature. Thus, instead of encouraging the Iraqis to cooperate with weapons inspectors, American and U.N. officials turned the screws even tighter on Baghdad, hoping to squeeze out even more hidden details. The incentive structure was all wrong. Every time Saddam Hussein cooperated, he was punished, and therefore, he eventually stopped doing so. As he told his advisors, “We can have sanctions with inspectors or sanctions without inspectors; which do you want?”

Iraq’s Support of Terrorism

The basic facts about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are well-known. Iraq did not have them. Thus, most of the post-mortem analysis has been interpretive. On the other major intelligence failure, the basic facts are still not widely understood. Senior Bush administration officials and right-wing intellectuals made false and reckless claims about Iraqi connections to terrorists. Despite their allusions and assertions, Saddam Hussein had no active links to al-Qaeda in 2001 and no ties to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

Refuting such claims is important, but the backlash, as is often the case, overreached. For example, Paul Pillar was a CIA analyst who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East from 2000 to 2005. That made him the nation’s top authority for interpreting Saddam Hussein’s regime during the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. When no evidence was found linking Iraq to 9/11, he argued that because Saddam Hussein was the head of a “secular dictatorship,” the “lack of connection should not have been surprising.” This is a widely held view.

Yet, while Saddam Hussein had no ties to 9/11, records in Iraqi archives have confirmed that he had a long history of supporting terrorists, including the type of radical Islamists in al-Qaeda. In 1994, bin Laden was living in Sudan. The director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, along with Saddam Hussein’s son Uday, made contact with him through a Sudanese intermediary. The Iraqis met bin Laden with Saddam Hussein’s approval in 1995. Bin Laden requested that the Iraqis begin radio broadcasts of a dissident Salafi preacher, Salman al-Ouda, into Saudi Arabia, and “to perform joint operations against the foreign forces in the land of Hijaz.” The latter was a euphemism for attacking U.S. military forces. Saddam Hussein personally approved a plan for the broadcasts, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service was looking for ways “to develop the relationship and cooperation between the two sides” further when Bin Laden was deported from Sudan and took refuge in Afghanistan in 1996. The Iraqi government then claimed that “the relationship with him is ongoing through the Sudanese side. Currently, we are working to invigorate this relationship through a new channel in light of his present location.” However, it appears Baghdad lost contact with him.

The Baathist regime aided other Islamist terrorists around the Middle East as well. Saddam Hussein was quite open about support for Palestinian suicide bombers. Iraqi records also make clear that in the early 1990s, Baghdad supported Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which later became an affiliate of al-Qaeda., Further, as late as July 2001, the Iraqi Intelligence Service was working with a group called the Army of Muhammad in Bahrain, which the Iraqis thought was an off shoot of al-Qaeda. According to Iraqi records, the group’s “objectives” were “similar” to bin Laden’s but it used “different names” as “a way of camouflaging the organization.” Clearly, then, there was no ideological impediment to cooperation between the Iraqis and the type of people who carried out the 9/11 attack.

When some of this information became public, and especially after some former Baathists turned up in the Islamic State, a few analysts argued that not only had Saddam Hussein supported radical Islamists, but that in the final years of his rule, he had become one himself. He was a “born again Muslim” or a proponent of some sort of “Baathi-Salfism.” These claims often came from proponents of the Iraq War and were meant to refute people like Paul Pillar. In reality, they simply repeated the same fallacy: that a dictator like Saddam Hussein needed to be ideologically aligned with foreign groups to support them. In fact, internal Iraqi documents show unequivocally that Saddam Hussein made no such ideological conversion. He still hated Islamists and did everything he could to suppress them in Iraq. Yet that did not stop him from supporting them abroad when his interests aligned with theirs.

Conclusion

Questions about Iraq’s weapons and ties to terrorism have already become foundational issues in 21st century international history. Unfortunately, public debates about these questions have not kept pace with the rather significant advances made by scholars. Saddam Hussein did not try to trick outsiders into thinking that he had weapons of mass destruction as a form of deterrence. The U.S. government had a flawed strategy rooted in poor incentives and dubious analysis. Saddam Hussein had no ties to the 9/11 attacks, and he was not an Islamist. Yet, these facts did not prevent him from working with bin Laden and groups like al-Qaeda.

Failing to grapple with the tragedy of the Iraq War in all its complexity risks creating simplistic narratives that will leave American analysts and policymakers ripe for repeating the same mistakes in the future. Blaming Saddam Hussein’s trickery for faulty assessments about his weapons programs takes the onus off American intelligence agencies. They will not learn the right lessons if they fail to address how their strategies to uncover Iraqi weapons programs created the flawed incentive structures that ultimately led Iraq to cease cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors. Likewise, simplistic narratives that refuse to address Saddam Hussein’s very real support for people like Osama bin Laden will leave analysts and policymakers ill-equipped to handle the nuance that such a threat demands.

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Samuel Helfont is the author of Iraq against the World: Saddam, America, and the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford 2023) and is Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy in the Naval War College Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.

This article contains the personal views of the author. It does not represent the views of the Naval War College or any other part of the U.S. government.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Samuel Helfont · March 28, 2023

17. At least 50 U.S. government personnel targeted with phone spyware overseas

We all must be vigilant.

At least 50 U.S. government personnel targeted with phone spyware overseas

White House bans federal agencies from using spyware that poses national security and human rights risks in the U.S.

By Ellen Nakashima and Tim Starks

March 27, 2023 at 12:00 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · March 27, 2023

At least 50 U.S. government personnel in at least 10 countries overseas have had their mobile phones targeted with commercial spyware, a number that is expected to grow as the investigation continues, senior administration officials said this week.

The revelation comes as the White House announces a new executive order to ban the use of commercial spyware by the U.S. government that poses a risk to national security and human rights. The order, unveiled Monday, follows in the wake of a long-running controversy over the misuse of a powerful spyware, Pegasus, by foreign governments to hack journalists, rights activists and dissidents around the world. It also comes as the administration this week co-hosts the second global Summit for Democracy.

In late-2021, Apple alerted roughly a dozen U.S. Embassy employees in Uganda that their iPhones had been hacked using Pegasus, military-grade spyware developed by NSO Group, an Israel-based company with government clients in dozens of countries. The tool allows its users to steal digital files, eavesdrop on conversations and track the movements of targets — often activated through “zero-click” malware that doesn’t even require the target to click on a link.

But the latest figure — of at least 50 government employees — shocked the Biden administration.

“We were astounded by the number," said one senior administration official, revealing that dozens of government officials, some of them very senior, had devices that appeared or were confirmed to have been hacked by commercial spyware. The official would not specify which company’s software was used or who had deployed the malware. “We had a hunch early on, when we started this process that [such spyware] could pose counterintelligence and security risks. ... We realized increasingly that the counterintelligence and security risks were profound."

The effort to identify additional targeted personnel continues, the official said, “and we cannot rule out that there will be more instances.”

The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House, noted that measures were being taken to mitigate the risks posed by the tools.

The executive order comes more than a year after the Commerce Department placed NSO Group on a trade blacklist known as the Entity List, a significant move that barred export of any hardware or software from the United States to NSO, choking off a vital source of technology and sending a signal to would-be investors. The company has said its human rights policies “are based on the American values we deeply share" and has terminated contracts when misuse is found.

But NSO Group, which has been struggling financially, is just one of what experts say are dozens of companies that produce spyware — most of them not as large or well-known as NSO Group, and many that operate with impunity in a largely unregulated space, officials say. The order is a welcome move toward establishing guardrails internationally, said John Scott-Railton, a senior researcher at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity research group.

“It will chill global spyware proliferation by putting companies and investors on notice that time is running out for 'anything goes’ business practices," said Scott-Railton, who has worked on numerous investigations of Pegasus.

The order, which grew out of a White House review begun in late summer 2021, bars federal agencies from using commercial spyware if it has been used to hack or target U.S. government devices or personnel — or if it has been used to abuse human rights, such as by targeting dissidents. It applies to spyware built by foreign or American companies, a measure to avoid creating a “perverse incentive” for companies to relocate to the United States to bypass restrictions, the official said.

There’s an exception for spyware that might be needed for helping U.S. agencies develop defensive cyber measures or testing countermeasures to defeat hackers, the official said.

Last year the FBI drew scrutiny for press reports that it had explored using Pegasus. Grilled by lawmakers at a House Intelligence Committee hearing last March, Director Christopher A. Wray said the bureau only purchased a license for Pegasus spyware to evaluate it, and never used it. “The FBI has not and did not use the NSO products operationally in any investigation," he said.

Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee, called the order a “really good step forward.” The United States has not been a big market for commercial spyware, Himes said, so he was initially dubious of the impact a ban might have. But, he said, the White House polled intelligence agencies and found that “various technology companies are actually very keen to sell to the U.S., which would suggest that they’re going to be very careful about the nature of their product, what it’s used for and who uses it.”

The order is “an important first step as we engage our partners around the world,” the senior administration official said. “It is also intended to make sure that we are not contributing directly or indirectly to the proliferation and misuse of these tools.” Countering the misuse of technology and growing “digital authoritarianism” is a key theme the United States will push at this week’s democracy summit, a second official said.

The Commerce Department’s entity listing of NSO Group and three other companies, as well as probes of Pegasus undertaken by European governments, followed a July 2021 investigation by The Washington Post and 16 other news organizations into the activities of NSO Group.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · March 27, 2023

18. Any perception that China doesn’t affect NATO is invalid

Any perception that China doesn’t affect NATO is invalid

Defense News · by 1st Lt. Adrian Pickett · March 27, 2023

The United States’ most significant challenge in the 21st century is the strategic rivalry with the Peoples’ Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region. With the PRC’s “One China” policy stating that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, a clash over the island could become the culminating issue leading to world conflict, if not addressed in an appropriate manner.

China’s globalization, border expansion and aggressive actions are responsible for hundreds of billions of dollars in defense spending among Indo-Pacific nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization alliance. China’s power has grown to the point where it challenges the borders of other countries’ sovereignty, while restricting them socioeconomically with the accumulation of money and natural resources. This is due to the weakening of Indo-Pacific alliances, which allows China to develop a system that exploits divisions among non-SEATO countries in the region.

China’s general assembly session has made the industrialization of defense spending and armed forces one of the 14th five-year plan’s main goals, emphasizing that economic prosperity should go hand in hand with bolstering the military.

“By the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027, the centennial goal of military development should be achieved, and by 2035 the country should achieve modernization of the national defense and armed forces,” according to Global Security report citing a Chinese plenary session.

The U.S. as well as its allies and partners must make a significant effort to counter China’s global rise, military expansion and infringement on regional sovereignty. NATO, of which the United States is a member, and SEATO are the only entities with the potential and legal capacity to limit China’s influence. One of many deterrence solutions is to increase defense spending, enable diplomatic channels, and encourage allies and non-allies to do the same rather than turning to China for assistance.

So why NATO?

The alliance is durable, and as a democratic organization, the bedrock of NATO’s security framework is essential and can strengthen regional stability while bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Working with allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, is part of the solution to a more dangerous and uncertain world.

Global security is intertwined, and Europe can no longer ignore what occurs in the east. Look no further than the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which bolstered the list of democratic allies and illustrated how security is interconnected.

What occurs in Europe impacts East Asia, and what happens in East Asia influences the European Union. In the 21st century, the perception that China no longer affects NATO is invalid.

For its part, the U.S. National Defense Strategy recognizes the immediate threat of China, and calls for prolonged deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through the military. As part of that, the U.S. should continue to support a Japanese no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons.

By that same token, the U.S. must help strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, which could lessen Tokyo’s dependence on Washington for security.

U.S., NATO and SEATO leadership must collaborate on reinforcing deterrence in Northeast Asia. They can also gain a better understanding of how interoperability, military exercises and the management of nuclear arsenals provide safeguards in the Indo-Pacific.

Lastly, the U.S. must combine its separate deterrence conversations with Japan, Australia, the Philippines and South Korea. That multinational discussion should address topics like nuclear preparation if deterrence fails.

Undeniably, China will continue to bend the rules to gain control of the Indo-Pacific, and it has not been shy about trying to uproot democratic institutions and ideals throughout the world.

But to get the U.S. to represent several nations in a democratic way, Washington must understand the political landscape of other countries and comprehend the governing bodies’ situations. The aim is to avoid a future conflict with China in the 21st century, and democratic nations must communicate effectively to push for concrete agreements.

First Lt. Adrian Pickett is a troop commander for the 2nd Joint Communications Squadron out of MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. This commentary does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department.

19. America Shrugs, and the World Makes Plans

This is probably a preview of the remarks Professor Mead will likely present at Arizona State University at its Forum for Innovating for Competitive Starcraft later this week.

America Shrugs, and the World Makes Plans

U.S. allies step up, but a too-aloof Washington could lead them into the arms of enemies.

By Walter Russell MeadFollow

March 27, 2023 6:22 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-shrugs-and-the-world-makes-plans-middle-east-security-defense-energy-russia-china-plan-b-ad57f4b6?page=1

War in Europe, tensions rising in the Indo-Pacific, Russia and China deepening ties with Iran: The international political situation continues to darken. Yet there are strong positive signs as well. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s commitment to Ukraine remains steadfast as Kyiv looks toward a spring offensive. American allies continue to rally in Asia. Japan and South Korea are repairing frayed ties. India and Australia committed to negotiating a comprehensive economic agreement even as Sydney, Washington and London agreed on the next steps in the Aukus defense partnership. Alienated by ham-handed Chinese diplomacy, the Philippine government is offering new base facilities to the U.S.

WSJ OPINION LIVE Q&A: THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

The threats to global stability and the US homeland are growing. How will the war in Ukraine end? Can China and the US develop a less combative relationship? Join historian and Journal columnist Walter Russell Mead and editorial page editor Paul Gigot for an interactive conversation on the threats to US security.

Hiroyuki Akita, one of Japan’s most respected foreign-affairs commentators, offered a framework for making sense of these developments when he stopped by my Hudson Institute office on a recent visit to Washington. As Mr. Akita sees it, America’s unquestioned supremacy after the Cold War established a global economic and security system that worked very well for key American allies like Germany and Japan. For these countries, their preferred foreign policy, which he calls Plan A, would be to carry on as usual, free-riding on American power and basking in the resulting peace and prosperity.

The trouble is that as challengers like China, Russia and Iran undermine the stability of the American order—and as the Americans themselves seem less reliable and predictable—Plan A is no longer enough. For most American allies, the response is to go to what Mr. Akita calls Plan A Plus. These countries want the American order to survive but realize that they must work harder to make up for perceived American weakness.

Countries that choose Plan A Plus are tightening their relations with the U.S., increasing defense spending, and intensifying efforts to strengthen the network of alliances that underpin the world order.

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From an American standpoint, getting our allies to Plan A Plus is good. It’s what we’ve tried and failed to do for decades in Europe, and the embrace of such thinking in the Indo-Pacific, from India to Japan and Korea, has created a web of relationships that help counter China. In an A Plus world, our enemies would be deterred, our friends empowered—and the U.S. would maintain a world system that benefits many people besides ourselves at a more reasonable cost.

But other countries can’t help but worry. What if American political polarization and economic mismanagement continue to undermine American power so that the U.S.-based order continues to decay despite greater allied support? If countries lose confidence in the ability of the U.S. order to survive, even with stepped up support from allies, they will inevitably begin to plan for their security in a post-American world.

That kind of planning is what Mr. Akita calls Plan B.

It isn’t primarily the state of the American military that drives people to contemplate Plan B—at least not yet. It is questions about our will, competence and political and social coherence that keep our allies up at night. For Europeans, the fear that Donald Trump might return to the White House most worries them. Many Asian and Middle Eastern countries had fewer problems with Mr. Trump, but they also worry about his, and America’s, unpredictability.

Russia says it test-fired anti-ship missiles in Sea of Japan

AP · March 28, 2023

MOSCOW (AP) — Moscow test-fired anti-ship missiles in the Sea of Japan, Russia’s Defense Ministry said Tuesday, with two boats launching a simulated missile attack on a mock enemy warship about 100 kilometers (60 miles) away.

The ministry said the target was successfully hit by two Moskit cruise missiles.

The Moskit, whose NATO reporting name is the SS-N-22 Sunburn, is a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile that has conventional and nuclear warhead capacity. The Soviet-built cruise missile is capable of flying at a speed three times the speed of sound and has a range of up to 250 kilometers (155 miles).

The ministry said the exercise, which included other warships and naval aircraft, took place in the Peter the Great Gulf in the Sea of Japan but did not give more precise coordinates. The gulf borders the Russian Pacific Fleet headquarters at Fokino and is about 700 kilometers (430 miles) from Japan’s northern Hokkaido island.

The Russian military has conducted regular drills across the country and Russian warships have continued maneuvers as the fighting in Ukraine has entered a second year — exercises that were intended to train the troops and showcase the country’s military capability.

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The U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Japan reacted calmly to the missile exercise, which was conducted near Vladivostok, rather than directly into the waters between the two countries.

Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihiko Isozaki told a news conference later Tuesday that Tokyo will continue to monitor Russia’s military operations, as it has been stepping up activity in the region.

Tokyo does not plan to lodge a protest to Russia over the missile exercise, said Tasuku Matsuki, Japanese Foreign Ministry official in charge of Russia, noting that its location — Peter the Great Bay — is considered Russian coast, though it is facing the water between the two countries.

“On the whole, Japan is concerned about Russia’s increasing military activities around the Japanese coasts and watching them with great interest,” Matsuki said.

He added that Russia has conducted missile drills in that area in the past and issued maritime advisories ahead of time.

Russian nuclear-capable Tu-95 bombers flew over the Sea of Japan for several hours last week.

In September, Japan protested multinational military exercises on the Russian-held Kuril Islands — some of which are claimed by Japan — and expressed concern about Russian and Chinese warships conducting shooting drills in the Sea of Japan.

Russia also tested submarine-launched missiles in the Sea of Japan last year.

___

AP writer Mari Yamaguchi contributed from Tokyo.

AP · March 28, 2023

21. Japan holds evacuation drills amid Taiwan invasion fear

Excerpts:

Eleanor Hughes, a defense analyst at the Asia Group in the United States, told DW that the preparations are partly aimed at "bolstering synergies on crisis management" between authorities at different levels across Japan.

"One of the byproducts of these visible preparations is that it's more difficult for Japanese citizens to rule out the possibility that Japan can completely shield itself from feeling the reverberating effects of a contingency [of war], should one occur," she said.

But some experts express doubt about the effectiveness of these evacuation drills. They also note that Japan's warning system, the J-Alert system, malfunctioned when North Korea fired ballistic missiles over Japan last October. Japan's chief cabinet secretary was forced to apologize to the public over the incident.

"If the government's alert system seems to be dysfunctional, Japanese people may think: why should they be too troubled by the potential contingency?" said Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan (TUJ).

Japan holds evacuation drills amid Taiwan invasion fear – DW – 03/28/2023

Citing the threat from China's aggressive military expansion, Japan has dramatically transformed its defense posture since last year, beefing up its defense budget, strengthening defense capabilities and deepening cooperation with key allies like the US and the Philippines.

Some of Japan's remote islands in the south are also enhancing their preparation for a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. On March 18, Japan's Okinawa prefecture carried out its first simulated exercise that aims at evacuating around 100,000 residents from remote islands close to Taiwan. Officials are concerned about southern Japan being affected by a potential Chinese invasion of the self-ruled island, which China sees as part of its own territory. Both local and national authorities in Japan took part in the exercise which was staged in several cities on the Sakishima Islands, about 360 kilometers (224 miles) away from Taiwan.

According to Japanese media outlets, the drill simulated residents on smaller islands in the Okinawa prefecture first being taken to bigger islands like Ishigaki and Miyako, and then transferred to Okinawa's main island Kyushu. Apart from the 120,000 local residents and tourists being evacuated based on the exercise, around 1.4 million people living on or around the prefecture's main island were asked to hide indoors.

The authorities plan to extract people on civilian aircraft and vessels, and the local government in Okinawa would cooperate with airline and ferry companies or other transportation providers to complete the task. Local authorities estimated that the entire evacuation effort could take six days.

Japan's military upgrade

US bases in Japan could become targets

While officials in Okinawa try to downplay the correlation between the evacuation drills and the potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, some experts say the proximity of Okinawa to both Taiwan and China, as well as the fact that it hosts US military bases, make the prefecture "an obvious target of a Chinese attack."

"If China invades Taiwan, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) may also attack US military bases in Okinawa, which means Japan would be automatically dragged into a war with China," said Kyoko Hatakeyama, a professor at the University of Niigata Prefecture in Japan.

"Japan needs to avoid civilian deaths and casualties in Okinawa, and that's why evacuation drills are becoming more important," she told DW.

Last December, Japan's westernmost Yonaguni Island also held an evacuation drill over potential ballistic missile strikes. Yonaguni is only 110 kilometers away from Taiwan.

Yonaguni, Japan's westernmost island, has a population of around 1,700Image: Kota Kiriyama/AP/picture alliance

Government apologizes over J-Alert malfunction

Eleanor Hughes, a defense analyst at the Asia Group in the United States, told DW that the preparations are partly aimed at "bolstering synergies on crisis management" between authorities at different levels across Japan.

"One of the byproducts of these visible preparations is that it's more difficult for Japanese citizens to rule out the possibility that Japan can completely shield itself from feeling the reverberating effects of a contingency [of war], should one occur," she said.

But some experts express doubt about the effectiveness of these evacuation drills. They also note that Japan's warning system, the J-Alert system, malfunctioned when North Korea fired ballistic missiles over Japan last October. Japan's chief cabinet secretary was forced to apologize to the public over the incident.

"If the government's alert system seems to be dysfunctional, Japanese people may think: why should they be too troubled by the potential contingency?" said Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan (TUJ).

"Local governments in Japan have a long way to go to ensure people living on the remote islands have adequate support if any emergencies were to happen," he told DW.

According to Kingston, it is still unclear how much support local authorities would provide. Also, communication and transport links remain limited in Okinawa, which would in turn limit the effectiveness of any evacuation plans.

North Korea fires missile over Japan

Ukraine war provides insights for Japan's civilian protection

Other analysts add that it is very difficult to actually evacuate tens of thousands of people from remote islands once a military conflict breaks out. They argue that the only way to ensure the safe evacuation of civilians under these circumstances is if the warring parties reach some tacit agreement.

"From Ukraine's experience, we know evacuating civilians is very hard to do [during a war] and mass evacuation is even harder to execute," said Koichi Nakano, a political scientist at Sophia University in Japan.

Both Kingston and Nakano point to Okinawa's brutal history during World War II. The island was the site of a battle between the US army and the Japanese forces in 1945, which killed more than 200,000 people. With that in mind, many local residents view the ongoing efforts and evacuation drills with skepticism and concern.

"Many people feel like there is once again preparation to use Okinawa as a buffer in a possible military confrontation," Nakano told DW.

"The government has no choice but to acknowledge that to a certain degree, Okinawa is less safe than it used to be, and that's why they have to conduct evacuation drills. But I don't think that can really reassure the local people," he added.

Sympathy for Taiwan in Japan

Tensions in the region were running especially high last summer, when senior US lawmaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. China saw the visit as implicit support to Taiwan's independence and responded by staging massive military drills, with several Chinese missiles reportedly landing in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone.

China launches biggest drills in decades

Residents of the Yonaguni Island, where evacuation drills were held in December, told Japan's daily Yomiuri Shimbun that this incident made them realize the rising military threat from across the Taiwan Strait.

Also in December, Japan revealed its biggest defense budget increase since WWII, aiming to raise the defense spending to 2% of GDP and strengthen its counterstrike capabilities. In its newly-released national security strategy, Tokyo characterized China as "the greatest strategic challenge ever to securing the peace and stability of Japan." It also highlighted the fact that Beijing hasn't ruled out the possibility of using force against Taiwan.

Kingston from Temple University Japan adds that issues related to Taiwan's security have been baked into Japan's foreign policy and there is longstanding sympathy and support for Taiwan in general. According to the expert, Tokyo's commitment to Taiwan will continue, regardless of who is in power.

Edited by: Darko Janjevic

22. How the US mission in Syria evolved into a proxy war with Iran

How the US mission in Syria evolved into a proxy war with Iran

Iran sees Syria as vital to its mission of driving the United States out of the Middle East.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED MAR 27, 2023 2:47 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 27, 2023

The United States has roughly 900 troops in Syria to fight the Islamic State group, but they also currently face a familiar adversary: Iran.

Most recently, the U.S. government has blamed Iranian-backed groups for several attacks against American service members deployed to Syria, including a March 23 suicide drone attack on a coalition base in Hasakah that killed an American contractor and wounded five U.S. service members.

U.S. intelligence officials quickly determined that the drone was “of Iranian origin,” the Defense Department announced that day.

In response to the attack, the U.S. military launched airstrikes on March 23 against facilities in eastern Syria that were used by “groups affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement.

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The following day, U.S. forces at two bases in northeast Syria came under rocket attacks, and one U.S. service member was injured, said Army Col. Joe Buccinio, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command.

“Our current assessment is that these rocket attacks were conducted by IRGC-affiliated groups, that this rocket attack was done in an effort to retaliate from last night’s attacks,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters on March 24.

So far, U.S. officials have not publicly identified which group that may be responsible for the recent attacks against U.S. troops. Information about the Iranian-backed group believed responsible for the March 23 drone attack is classified, according to U.S. Central Command.

The first U.S. service members arrived in Syria in October 2015 to help the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces destroy ISIS’s caliphate. Although ISIS lost its last remaining territory in 2019, U.S. troops continue to battle an ISIS insurgency in Syria and Iraq. As recently as this February, four U.S. service members and a military working dog were injured during a raid near Deir ez-Zor Syria that resulted in the death of a senior ISIS leader.

Separately, Iran has sent fighters from across the Middle East to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad amid the country’s ongoing civil war. Iran has not only sought to defend a friendly regime, but it has also used the Syrian civil war to vastly increase its influence in the country long after the war’s eventual end.

Syria plays an integral part of Iran’s strategy to become the biggest power in the Middle East, expel all U.S. forces from the region, and destroy Israel, said Nichols Carl, the Middle East Portfolio Manager at the American Enterprise Institute think tank in Washington, D.C.

“Iran is deeply committed to trying to entrench itself – economically, politically, militarily socioculturaly – as deep into Syria as it possibly can, because it wants to stay there in the long run,” Carl told Task & Purpose.

For years, Iran has sent Shia militia groups from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and possibly Yemen to fight for the Syrian regime and preserve Iranian interests, he said. It’s not clear exactly how many Iranian-backed fighters are currently in Syria.

Iran is also “laser-focused” on driving all U.S. troops from both Syria and Iraq, Carl said. The Pentagon reported in 2019 that Iranian-backed militants killed 603 U.S. troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.

The recent drone and rocket attacks and the U.S. airstrikes represent the heaviest reported fighting between U.S troops and Iranian proxy forces in Syria since this past August when an unspecified number of AC-130 gunships and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters struck Iranian-backed groups after an attack on the Green Village.

Despite the recent attacks, the U.S.-led coalition will continue its mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, said Army Maj. Matthew McFarlane, the commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

“The Coalition is focused on our D-ISIS [defeat ISIS] mission, but we monitor threats across Iraq and Syria very closely,” McFarlane said in a statement to Task & Purpose. “We stand prepared to address any of these threats that prevent us from pursuing our D-ISIS mission.”

President Joe Biden has also warned Iran that the United States would respond to any further attacks against American troops.

“The United States does not – does not, I emphasize – seek conflict with Iran, but be prepared for us to act forcefully to protect our people,” Biden said during a March 24 news conference in Canada.

When a reporter asked if the United States would inflict a higher cost on Iran if attacks against U.S. troops continued, Biden replied, “We are not going to stop.”

UPDATE: 03/27/2023; this story was updated on March 27 after Army Col. Joe Buccino, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command, said that one service member was injured by a March 24 rocket attack in Syria.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 27, 2023

23. Agile Ukraine, Lumbering Russia

Conclusion:

For over a year now, Kyiv’s extraordinary capacity for adaptation has kept its military in the fight. Equally important, the country has inspired confidence among its Western allies that its forces can continue using new weapons and technologies to take advantage of Russia’s mistakes, regain territory, and maintain high levels of motivation and capability. Moscow’s military performance, meanwhile, has inspired no one. Confronted with major losses of both equipment and troops, the Russian military has been under enormous pressure to retain whatever combat effectiveness it can and has had little spare capacity for experimenting with new technologies. But how significant are these contrasting performances to the ultimate direction of the conflict itself?

The dynamics of the war in the coming months will likely hinge on Russia’s unfolding spring offensive. Experts will debate whether the Russian leadership is aiming for a large-scale assault to take new territory or a more modest attempt to consolidate gains, and there will doubtless be continued scrutiny of the low morale and poor quality of the Russian forces. At this point, however, with both sides increasingly dug in along fairly stable frontlines, larger shifts in the war are unlikely to play out in a 24-hour news cycle. Moreover, the Russian military can continue fighting poorly for a long time—in fact, it has a long history of doing just that. Further still, the Kremlin, for some months now, has focused on reorienting the Russian economy and society toward a long war and preparing to outlast Western financial and material support for Ukraine. And although Western analysts and observers may be tempted to conclude that Ukrainian forces’ knack for adaptation will give them an edge in the long term, it is important to recognize that they are facing a far larger army led by a regime that has demonstrated a continued willingness to sustain enormous losses.

The Ukrainian military’s skill at integrating advanced weapons and new technologies has continually surprised not only its adversary, but also Ukraine’s own partners and allies in the West. Yet new technology and weapons, no matter how sophisticated, are unlikely to prove decisive. In fact, it is difficult to say whether there can be a decisive end to a war like this—a prospect that seems unlikely for the near future.

Agile Ukraine, Lumbering Russia

The Promise and Limits of Military Adaptation

By Margarita Konaev and Owen J. Daniels

March 28, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Margarita Konaev and Owen J. Daniels · March 28, 2023

During more than 13 months of war against one of the world’s largest armies, Ukraine’s military has continually stood out for one quality in particular: its ability to adapt. Over and over, Ukraine has nimbly responded to changing battlefield dynamics and exploited emerging technologies to capitalize on Russia’s mistakes. Despite their limited experience with advanced weapons technology, Ukrainian soldiers quickly graduated from point-and-shoot Javelin and Stinger missile systems to the more sophisticated High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which they have used to pummel Russian command centers, logistical assets, and ammunition depots. They have deployed military and commercial drones in increasingly creative ways. And although this is not the first war to play out on social media, the Ukrainians have been giving the world a master class in effective information operations in the digital age. Such is their record of technical and tactical versatility that Ukrainian forces continue to enjoy a sense of momentum, despite the fact that the frontlines have been largely frozen for months.

By contrast, Russian forces have shown limited openness to new tactics or new technologies. Hobbled by bad leadership and terrible morale, the Russian military was slow to recover from its disastrous attempt to seize Kyiv in February 2022 and has struggled to adjust its strategy or learn from its mistakes. This is despite having demonstrated considerable dexterity in its deployments in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and in Syria starting in 2015. In the current war, although Russian military leaders have made some adjustments to alleviate logistical problems and improve coordination on the ground, the Kremlin’s core strategy continues to rely largely on throwing more manpower and firepower at the enemy—a lumbering, high-cost approach that has hardly inspired confidence. Observing this performance, some Western experts have raised the possibility of exceedingly dire scenarios, including a doomed Russian spring offensive, a large-scale mutiny of troops, or even the collapse of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.

In short, the extent to which each side has been able to adapt has become a key factor shaping the course of the war. For Western analysts, Ukraine’s nimble tactics offer crucial insights into the conflict, including how they may spur future shifts in the war. But as the frontlines have become increasingly hardened, it is also important to take into account the limits of adaptation. For Ukraine’s allies, it will be crucial to understand the particular ways that this process has contributed to Ukraine’s remarkable success but also to temper expectations about what it can achieve in the months to come.

KYIV’S QUICK-CHANGE ARTISTS

Ukraine’s capacity for adaptation has been especially impressive in light of its recent history. Underfunded, poorly trained, and crippled by corruption, the Ukrainian military failed to repel the Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas in 2014 and could not regain lost ground. Since then, however, the Ukrainian military has undergone major, albeit incomplete, reforms to professionalize its forces and modernize its military equipment. Those efforts paid off in 2022. Although Ukraine’s leadership was initially skeptical of intelligence from the United States and other international partners indicating that Russia was planning an assault on Kyiv, the Ukrainian military put contingency plans into place in the months leading up to the invasion, and despite being caught off guard by the scale of the offensive, Ukrainian forces quickly recovered from Russia’s attempted “shock and awe” campaign. Then, in April 2022, when Russia shifted the war to the Donbas, where the open terrain and shorter resupply lines seemed more favorable to Moscow, Ukrainian forces were able to evolve, shifting away from the asymmetric, insurgency-style tactics that helped them defend Kyiv and toward those suited for fighting a large-scale conventional war. By late summer, Ukraine was rapidly regaining lost territory.

Ukraine’s rapid ability to integrate new technology into its operations has also been striking. As dozens of countries began sending high-tech Western weapons and equipment to Ukraine, some reports from the frontlines indicated that Ukrainian fighters lacked the training and experience to use them and that the Ukrainian military in general was struggling with the logistics and maintenance demands of so many different systems. Yet despite these challenges, Ukrainian soldiers have quickly adapted to sophisticated foreign weapons, ammunition, and materiel. In late August and throughout September, Ukraine’s effective use of HIMARS—the advanced mobile rocket launchers that Washington began delivering in June 2022—helped push the Russians out of Kharkiv and parts of Kherson. Ukrainian forces have also become adept at using deception to protect HIMARS from Russian artillery and air force attacks—for example, building wooden replicas of the system as decoys and keeping HIMARS operators’ roles and locations highly secretive. U.S. military trainers have acknowledged how quickly Ukrainian soldiers learned to operate advanced Western systems, including the Patriot missile systems that the United States has announced it will deploy to Ukraine.

Ukraine has used AI to help capture Russian communications.

Ukrainian forces have also showcased their innovative and experimental thinking in their use of drones. As the war has increasingly been dominated by artillery and missile exchanges in recent months, Ukrainian units have integrated drone operating teams with their artillery to improve the accuracy of nonprecision strikes as well as to help with targeting in real time and collecting targets for future attacks. Ukrainian forces have equipped large Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones with laser-guided missiles to supplement their reconnaissance capabilities. They have also deployed small reconnaissance drones, such as the Chinese-made Mavics, and even jury-rigged some of them to be able to drop small antipersonnel grenades.

Although Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has relentlessly appealed to Western governments to provide military aid, the Ukrainian leadership has also recognized the value of direct assistance from international manufacturers of advanced technology. Immediately after the Russian invasion, through a direct appeal to Elon Musk on Twitter, the Ukrainian government was able to secure access to SpaceX’s Starlink satellite Internet system and terminals, which have kept the military’s communications networks intact even as Russia has repeatedly targeted the country’s communications infrastructure. Many other companies, including Microsoft, Palantir, Planet, Capella Space, and Maxar Technologies, have also worked through Western intermediaries or directly with Kyiv to provide data, equipment, and various technological resources for the war effort. In April 2022, Wired reported that Primer, a U.S. company specializing in providing artificial intelligence (AI) to intelligence analysts, had shared machine-learning technology with Ukraine. According to the company, its AI algorithms were being used by Ukrainian forces to automatically capture, transcribe, translate, and analyze Russian military communications that were transmitted on unsecure channels and intercepted.

Of course, official Ukrainian reports describing the country’s use of new technologies must be scrutinized carefully. Kyiv has a clear incentive to emphasize the effect of advanced Western systems on its war effort in order to encourage the United States and its European partners to continue such support. From open-source reporting, it can also be difficult to assess whether Ukraine has deployed these innovative technologies widely or only on a few occasions. Nonetheless, it is clear that, unlike its enemy, Ukraine has been able to learn from and respond to unexpected and shifting battlefield conditions.

MOSCOW’S LOST INNOVATIONS

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year was not the first time that Moscow has vastly underestimated the capabilities and resolve of an adversary. In both its first war in Chechnya in the 1990s and its war with Georgia in 2008, Russia was plagued by significant structural and organizational failures, including in preparation, planning, and information sharing. Over the past decade, however, the Russian government has pursued an extensive and expensive military modernization effort. And during more recent deployments to Syria and eastern Ukraine the Russian military appeared far more adept at integrating emerging technologies and new concepts into its operations.

Indeed, Russia’s brutal intervention to support the Assad regime in Syria has been described as a “proving ground” for Russia’s military reforms. According to Russian government sources, Russia tested some 600 new weapons and other kinds of military equipment during its intervention in Syria, including 200 that officials have described as “next generation.” For instance, although Russia had a relatively limited fleet of reconnaissance drones at the beginning of its Syrian campaign, it ramped up production and deployment after 2015, and by 2018, it was able to deploy some 60–70 drones a day in a variety of battlefield situations. Some of the drones were used to create a theater-wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network that could relay targeting information and direct air strikes.

Russia’s intervention in Syria also allowed its military to experiment with integrating human and machine warfare, including the use of robots and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) alongside regular forces. Russia tested a variety of such technologies, such as the small Scarab UGV, which can be used for clearing mines and gaining access into underground facilities, and the Uran-6, a larger remote-controlled vehicle that also has mine-clearing capabilities. These experiments did not always go smoothly: in its first test in an urban combat mission, a larger UGV, the Uran-9, had serious problems with communications, navigation, and hitting moving targets. But these forays provided valuable real-world insight into how autonomous and AI-enabled systems could assist soldiers on the battlefield, and they have often been cited by Russian military analysts as showing the promise of AI.

Russia experimented with unmanned robots in the Syrian War.

In both Syria and eastern Ukraine, the Russian military was also able to use its modernized electronic warfare capabilities to disrupt enemy communications. So frequent was Russian interference with cellular, radio communications, drone, and GPS signals in Syria that the head of U.S. Special Operations Command described the war as “the most aggressive electronic warfare environment on the planet.” And during the war in the Donbas in 2015, General Ben Hodges, then the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, described how Russian electronic warfare “completely shut down” Ukrainian communications and effectively grounded their drones. U.S. military analysts have also noted that in at least one incident during the fighting in the Donbas, Russian forces were able to use intercepted cell phone signals to target Ukrainian soldiers with artillery strikes.

Yet very little of this innovation has been apparent in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Over the past year, Moscow has largely given up on the battlefield experimentation and learning that defined its campaigns in Syria and eastern Ukraine. Despite having a broad range of robotic and autonomous technologies in different stages of development, the Russian military has seemed unwilling or unable to field such systems in the current war. On occasion, open-source analysts have identified new high-tech weapons being deployed by Russia, including the KUB-BLA loitering munition, which is designed to use AI to identify targets. But there is little evidence of their use, and some observers have expressed doubts about such reports. Russian forces have also shown little success with electronic warfare and cyber-operations, areas in which they were believed to hold an advantage.

As the war has unfolded, Russia has made some adjustments. Early on, it shifted its resources to eastern Ukraine after being rebuffed at Kyiv and focused on the more limited objective of “liberating” the Donbas. Having taken a beating from Ukraine’s HIMARS for months, Russian forces finally began dispersing their command-and-control nodes and moving logistics and weapons depots out of the weapons’ 80-mile range. Faced with severe shortages of manpower and ammunition, Russia has also looked to foreign partners for assistance—buying Iranian and Chinese drones and, according to U.S. intelligence reports, even preparing to buy rockets and artillery shells from North Korea. Overall, however, Russian forces appear to have entirely lost the insights they gained in Syria about the value of flexibility.

MARGINS OF RETURN

For over a year now, Kyiv’s extraordinary capacity for adaptation has kept its military in the fight. Equally important, the country has inspired confidence among its Western allies that its forces can continue using new weapons and technologies to take advantage of Russia’s mistakes, regain territory, and maintain high levels of motivation and capability. Moscow’s military performance, meanwhile, has inspired no one. Confronted with major losses of both equipment and troops, the Russian military has been under enormous pressure to retain whatever combat effectiveness it can and has had little spare capacity for experimenting with new technologies. But how significant are these contrasting performances to the ultimate direction of the conflict itself?

The dynamics of the war in the coming months will likely hinge on Russia’s unfolding spring offensive. Experts will debate whether the Russian leadership is aiming for a large-scale assault to take new territory or a more modest attempt to consolidate gains, and there will doubtless be continued scrutiny of the low morale and poor quality of the Russian forces. At this point, however, with both sides increasingly dug in along fairly stable frontlines, larger shifts in the war are unlikely to play out in a 24-hour news cycle. Moreover, the Russian military can continue fighting poorly for a long time—in fact, it has a long history of doing just that. Further still, the Kremlin, for some months now, has focused on reorienting the Russian economy and society toward a long war and preparing to outlast Western financial and material support for Ukraine. And although Western analysts and observers may be tempted to conclude that Ukrainian forces’ knack for adaptation will give them an edge in the long term, it is important to recognize that they are facing a far larger army led by a regime that has demonstrated a continued willingness to sustain enormous losses.

The Ukrainian military’s skill at integrating advanced weapons and new technologies has continually surprised not only its adversary, but also Ukraine’s own partners and allies in the West. Yet new technology and weapons, no matter how sophisticated, are unlikely to prove decisive. In fact, it is difficult to say whether there can be a decisive end to a war like this—a prospect that seems unlikely for the near future.

MARGARITA KONAEV is Deputy Director of Analysis at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
OWEN J. DANIELS is Andrew W. Marshall Fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
MORE BY MARGARITA KONAEV MORE BY OWEN J. DANIELS

Foreign Affairs · by Margarita Konaev and Owen J. Daniels · March 28, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

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