In Honor of Yu Gwan Sun and the March 1st 1919 Korean Independence Movement

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"But when fascism comes it will not be in the form of an anti-American movement or pro-Hitler bund, practicing disloyalty. Nor will it come in the form of a crusade against war. It will appear rather in the luminous robes of flaming patriotism; it will take some genuinely indigenous shape and color, and it will spread only because its leaders, who are not yet visible, will know how to locate the great springs of public opinion and desire and the streams of thought that flow from them and will know how to attract to their banners leaders who can command the support of the controlling minorities in American public life. The danger lies not so much in the would-be Fuhrers who may arise, but in the presence in our midst of certainly deeply running currents of hope and appetite and opinion. The war upon fascism must be begun there."

– John Thomas Flynn, As We Go Marching, 1945

"We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it - and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again - and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one anymore."

– Mark Twain

"Sometimes people don't want to hear the truth because they don't want their illusions destroyed."

Friedrich Nietzsche

1. Russia's foreign intelligence chief visits N. Korea this week

2. Massive Russian cargo plane linked to missile trade flies to North Korea

3. Launching the U.S.-ROK Enhanced Disruption Task Force

4. U.S., South Korea launch task force to thwart North Korean oil smuggling

5. An America at Risk

6. How Incheon Airport became a logistics hub for China’s e-commerce giants

7. Chinese part of Mt. Paekdu named UNESCO global geopark

8. S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch

9. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Coastal Launch Pad

10. S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch

11. New US sanctions target North Korean military finances

12. Construction at North Korea’s Kangson Facility: Probable Storage or Offices

13. Contemplating Possible Outcomes and Implications of the South Korean General Election

14. Why ASEAN is South Korea’s lifeline for mediation with the North

15. Why are North Koreans avoiding the upper floors of newly built apartments?

16. N. Korean overseas work candidates warned of consequences of not sharing earnings with government

17. Forging a New Era of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation

18. “A Time for Choosing”: Urgent Action or Continuing Folly (US Alliances)

19. S Korean trade, diplomacy trending away from China

20. The World’s Unpopular Leaders

1. Russia's foreign intelligence chief visits N. Korea this week

The regime is simultaneously reaching out and dealing with both China and Russia.

This is right out of the Kim family regime playbook.

Russia's foreign intelligence chief visits N. Korea this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 28, 2024

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- Russia's foreign intelligence chief visited North Korea earlier this week to discuss ways to bolster cooperation in responding to spying and plotting activities by hostile forces, Pyongyang's state media reported Thursday.

Sergei E. Naryshkin, director of the External Intelligence Bureau, visited Pyongyang between Monday and Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Naryshkin met with Ri Chang-dae, the North's state security minister, and working-level talks were also held between North Korean and Russian officials.

"At both talks, the two sides briefed each other about the views on the present international and regional situation regarding the Korean Peninsula and Russia, and widely and deeply discussed practical issues for further boosting cooperation to cope with the ever-growing spying and plotting moves by the hostile forces," the KCNA said.

The report did not elaborate on the details of the talks, but they are presumed to have exchanged intelligence on Russia's war with Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula.

A visit by a country's intelligence chief is usually not made public, but North Korean state media's rare revelation appears to be aimed at showing off deepening ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Following the summit between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year, the two nations have been strengthening cooperation in various fields amid suspicions that Pyongyang has provided weapons to Moscow for its use in Russia's war with Ukraine.

In May 2011, the North's state media reported a visit by then Russian foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov to Pyongyang and his meeting with then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

This computerized image depicts cooperation between North Korea and Russia. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 28, 2024

2. Massive Russian cargo plane linked to missile trade flies to North Korea

What kind of advanced technology might this plane be carrying?

Massive Russian cargo plane linked to missile trade flies to North Korea

Freighter and Russian government plane traveled to Pyongyang in dead of night last week, flight-tracking data shows

Colin ZwirkoMarch 27, 2024

https://www.nknews.org/pro/massive-russian-cargo-plane-linked-to-missile-trade-flies-to-north-korea/

Russian 224th Flight Unit Antonov An-124 (RA-82030) at Cayenne-Rochambeau Airport on Oct. 23, 2014 | Image: Spotting973, via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED)

Two Russian government aircraft appeared to travel to North Korea in the dark of night last week, including a cargo plane the U.S. previously accused of delivering DPRK ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine, according to NK Pro analysis of flight tracking data.

It is the latest in a steady stream of unpublicized Russian military flights to North Korea since last fall, amid questions about whether Moscow is acquiring short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from the DPRK by sea or by air.

Flightradar24 data shows a Russian 224th Flight Unit State Airlines Antonov An-124 cargo plane (tail number RA-82030) — one of the largest transport planes in the world — was traveling from the DPRK toward Vladivostok just east of the two countries’ shared coastal border at 6:47 a.m. KST on March 21.

It appeared to have been in North Korea, likely Pyongyang, for several hours. Tracking data shows it departed Vladivostok around 2:30 a.m. KST before quickly shutting off its location transponder.

Russian An-124 (RA-82030) heading back to Vladivostok from North Korea in the early morning of March 21, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian An-124 (RA-82030) departing Vladivostok before going to North Korea past 2 a.m. KST on March 21, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian Tu-154 (RA-85843) flying Pyongyang to Vladivostok after midnight on March 21, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian Tu-154 (RA-85843) flying Pyongyang to Vladivostok on the afternoon of March 22, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

It’s likely the plane went to Pyongyang given that another Russian government aircraft, a “Special Flight Squadron” Tupolev Tu-154 (tail number RA-85843), flew from Vladivostok to Pyongyang hours earlier.

That plane departed the Russian Far East city just before midnight on March 20 before landing in Pyongyang after 12:24 a.m. KST on March 21. It then left Pyongyang for Vladivostok less than two hours later, around the same time the cargo plane left Vladivostok.

The U.S. Department of Treasury singled out the 224th Flight Unit and the same cargo plane with tail number RA-82030 in new sanctions measures in January, saying it was “involved in the transfers of DPRK ballistic missiles and missile-related cargo transfers in late Nov. 2023,” without disclosing locations or the exact date.

The plane does not appear to have broadcast its location during the alleged November flight, raising questions over why it did so during part of last week’s flight.

An An-124 cargo plane picks up a Russian S-400 missile system | Image: Russian Defense Ministry (Nov. 27, 2015)Russian Special Flight Squadron Tu-154 (tail number RA-85843) | Image: Papas Dos (April 28, 2016) via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 2.0 DEED)

South Korea’s TV Chosun News reported on the cargo plane on Saturday, citing an anonymous “ROK-U.S. intelligence authority” source but without including details such as the model, tail number or timing.

The source reportedly said intelligence agencies caught the plane picking up cargo 50 feet (15 meters) in length “presumed to be SRBMs.”

The An-124 is capable of transporting large and heavy weapon systems like missiles and transporter erector launchers (TELs), space rocket stages and fighter jets.

The plane’s arrival in Pyongyang came just days after leader Kim Jong Un conducted the country’s first ballistic missile test in two months, launching six units of a 600mm long-range multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) at the same time.

This weapon has not yet shown up in Ukraine, though experts have identified other recently developed North Korean SRBMs from the Hwasong-11 series (KN-23) in use by Russia.

Planet Labs satellite imagery shows North Korea’s two operational Il-76 cargo planes were active on March 20 and 21 as well, though public trackers did not capture any flights.

One was moved away from its typical parking apron at Pyongyang International Airport to near the runway on the morning of March 20. The following morning, hours after the two Russian planes departed, the other was gone with a white material covering its parking spot in an unusual fashion, indicating it was either in a repair hangar or on a flight.

One North Korean Air Koryo Il-76 cargo plane appeared to be on the move at Pyongyang International Airport on the morning of March 20, 2024 | Image: Planet Labs, edited by NK Pro

The other North Korean Air Koryo Il-76 cargo plane appeared gone from Pyongyang International Airport on the morning of March 21, 2024 while unidentified white materials were in its place | Image: Planet Labs, edited by NK Pro

MORE RUSSIAN MILITARY FLIGHTS

The Tu-154 (RA-85843) that flew to Pyongyang just before the cargo plane last week made another trip to the DPRK capital after 12 p.m. the next day on March 22 and flew back to Vladivostok a couple of hours later, Flightradar24 data shows.

This was around the same time a Russian delegation led by Oleg Kozhemyako, governor of the Far East region of Primorsky Krai, reportedly left Pyongyang, though DPRK state TV showed him leaving on an Air Koryo Il-62 (tail number P-885).

The same Russian Tu-154 made undisclosed trips from Vladivostok to Pyongyang on the morning of March 2 and March 7 as well, according to Flightradar24.

A Russian cargo plane previously accused of transporting weapons also made an unusual detour flight on March 11 from Shanghai to Pyongyang before heading back to Moscow via Tianjin.

Russian Tu-154 (RA-85843) flying Pyongyang to Vladivostok on the morning of March 2, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian Tu-154 (RA-85843) flying Vladivostok to Pyongyang on the morning of March 7, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian Il-62 (RA-86559) travels from Vladivostok to Pyongyang on the morning of Jan. 6, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

Russian Il-62 (RA-86559) travels from Pyongyang to Vladivostok on the afternoon of Jan. 6, 2024 | Image: Flightradar24 screenshot

The timeline of Russian military flights in March 2024, showing their approximate time spent in Pyongyang | Image: NK Pro using data from Flightradar24

Russian military and government planes have made numerous undisclosed trips to North Korea since last fall amid evidence of active weapons trade between the two countries.

A Russian Air Force Il-62 (tail number RA-86559) VIP passenger plane made a previously unreported trip to Pyongyang on Jan. 6, Flightradar24 data shows.

NK News reported on the same plane making secret trips to the DPRK capital in August, September and November.

Russia and North Korea have appeared to try to hide alleged weapons transfers by ship that started last August, with vessels turning off their location transponders and discontinuing use of a naval port that helped tie the operation to the military.

It’s possible Russia has sent more planes to North Korea than have been detected in order to pick up weapons like SRBMs, while sending artillery shells via the maritime operation between the DPRK’s Rason Port and Russian ports up the coast.

The British think tank RUSI released a report on Tuesday detailing alleged frequent Russian oil shipments to North Korea, positing that they are related to payments for DPRK weapons.

Russia helped pass U.N. Security Council sanctions that prohibit transfers of all weapons and even vehicles to North Korea in 2017. But Moscow has since called for lifting the measures, while leader Vladimir Putin openly violated sanctions last month by sending Kim Jong Un a luxury armored vehicle.

Edited by Bryan Betts

3. Launching the U.S.-ROK Enhanced Disruption Task Force

Have to check the acronym pronunciation: EDTF (Ed- Tiff?)

Launching the U.S.-ROK Enhanced Disruption Task Force

https://www.state.gov/launching-the-u-s-rok-enhanced-disruption-task-force/

MEDIA NOTE

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

MARCH 26, 2024

On March 26, the United States hosted the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) bilateral Enhanced Disruption Task Force (EDTF), which is being established to counter illicit efforts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to circumvent sanctions concerning the procurement of refined petroleum. Led by U.S. Deputy Special Representative for the DPRK Lyn Debevoise and ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director-General for North Korean Nuclear Affairs Lee Jun-il, the two sides discussed how DPRK imports of refined petroleum in excess of the UN-mandated cap violate UN Security Council resolutions and support the DPRK’s unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. The United States and ROK underscored the need for close collaboration to disrupt the DPRK’s ability to illicitly procure excess petroleum, including petroleum from Russia, as this activity directly contributes to the DPRK’s military readiness and the development of its weapons programs.

Through EDTF, the United States and ROK are pursuing a wide range of joint actions to disrupt DPRK refined oil procurement networks, including by exposing DPRK sanctions evasion activities, reviewing options for autonomous sanctions designations, and engaging private sector and third-party actors throughout the region who facilitate – either knowingly or unwittingly – the DPRK’s oil procurement networks. The EDTF also discussed future areas of focus, including disrupting the DPRK’s illicit overseas coal sales.

For additional information, please see this sanctions announcement by the U.S. Department of the Treasury regarding DPRK illicit energy procurement, which outlines tactics used by the DPRK.

4. U.S., South Korea launch task force to thwart North Korean oil smuggling

Excerpts;

A U.N. Security Council resolution passed in 2017 limits the amount of refined petroleum that North Korea can import to 500,000 barrels per year.

However, Pyongyang has long used illicit means to skirt the restrictions. The Security Council's Panel of Experts estimated in its annual report released last week that North Korea imported more than 1.5 million barrels of refined oil from January to September last year.

North Korea, meanwhile, has shipped around 7,000 containers of munitions to Russia since July for use in Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said last week.

Shin estimated that Russia has sent more than 9,000 containers back to North Korea in return, carrying food, as well as raw materials used for producing munitions. He also suggested that Russia was providing North Korea with fuel, noting a significant uptick in military exercises since the start of the year.

....

The U.N.'s Panel of Experts, which monitors North Korean sanctions, is also facing an uncertain future due to resistance from Security Council members Russia and China. A vote to extend its mandate was scheduled to be held last Friday but had to be postponed due to "long, difficult, and contentious" negotiations instigated by Moscow and Beijing, who are pushing for sunset clauses in the sanctions regime, according to the independent think tank Security Council Report.

WORLD NEWS MARCH 27, 2024 / 5:57 AM

U.S., South Korea launch task force to thwart North Korean oil smuggling - UPI.com

By Thomas Maresca

upi.com

The United States and South Korea launched a task force this week to counter illicit oil shipments to North Korea, which have allegedly picked up in the wake of deepening ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia in September and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. File Photo by Kremlin Pool/UPI | License Photo

SEOUL, March 27 (UPI) -- The United States and South Korea launched a task force to counter North Korea's illicit oil smuggling operations, both governments said Wednesday, as Russia appears to be helping the isolated regime circumvent U.N. sanctions.

The new Enhanced Disruption Task Force held its inaugural meeting on Tuesday in Washington, the U.S. State Department said in a statement.

"The two sides discussed how DPRK imports of refined petroleum in excess of the U.N.-mandated cap violate U.N. Security Council resolutions and support the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs," the statement said.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

Of particular concern is the growing relationship between Russia and North Korea, which officials say has led to an exchange of weapons for oil.

The allies "underscored the need for close collaboration to disrupt the DPRK's ability to illicitly procure excess petroleum, including petroleum from Russia, as this activity directly contributes to the DPRK's military readiness and the development of its weapons programs," the State Department said.

The task force meeting included more than 30 officials from ministries and agencies covering diplomacy, intelligence, sanctions and maritime interdiction, South Korea's Foreign Ministry said in a separate statement.

"Oil is an essential resource for North Korea's nuclear and missile development and military posture," the ministry said.

A U.N. Security Council resolution passed in 2017 limits the amount of refined petroleum that North Korea can import to 500,000 barrels per year.

However, Pyongyang has long used illicit means to skirt the restrictions. The Security Council's Panel of Experts estimated in its annual report released last week that North Korea imported more than 1.5 million barrels of refined oil from January to September last year.

North Korea, meanwhile, has shipped around 7,000 containers of munitions to Russia since July for use in Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said last week.

Shin estimated that Russia has sent more than 9,000 containers back to North Korea in return, carrying food, as well as raw materials used for producing munitions. He also suggested that Russia was providing North Korea with fuel, noting a significant uptick in military exercises since the start of the year.

An analysis of satellite imagery released Tuesday by British think tank Royal United Services Institute and the Financial Times shows further evidence of a fuel exchange, with at least five North Korean tankers traveling to collect oil products from Vostochny Port in Russia's Far East in March.

The tankers could have moved up to 125,000 barrels of refined petroleum products -- a quarter of the U.N.'s annual oil cap -- in less than three weeks, the RUSI analysis said.

The U.N.'s Panel of Experts, which monitors North Korean sanctions, is also facing an uncertain future due to resistance from Security Council members Russia and China. A vote to extend its mandate was scheduled to be held last Friday but had to be postponed due to "long, difficult, and contentious" negotiations instigated by Moscow and Beijing, who are pushing for sunset clauses in the sanctions regime, according to the independent think tank Security Council Report.

5. An America at Risk

A good question: plans, policy, and strategy. Do either have these?

Excerpt:

We are in a cold war with four traditional nation-states—China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Simultaneously the world—which alas includes the U.S. mainland—is beset almost weekly by “challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states.”

Note that Korea always comes in last (just showing my bias).

An America at Risk

Biden and Trump know the details of the nation’s security threat. Does either have a plan to meet it?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-america-at-risk-biden-trump-do-either-have-plan-to-meet-threat-cc08a55f?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Daniel Henninger

March 27, 2024 5:26 pm ET

How Incheon Airport became a logistics hub for China’s e-commerce giants

Experts are concerned that China is exporting deflation to the rest of the world, and South Korea is facilitating this by serving as a logistics hub

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/03/28/5P3V7JEUS5GQPGX24F5G4XSAC4/

By Choi Yeon Jin,

Lee Jae-eun

Published 2024.03.28. 10:49

Updated 2024.03.28. 15:52

According to Incheon International Airport “sea-air intermodal cargo” - cargo that entered Korea by sea and was shipped to third countries through Incheon Airport - reached 98,560 tons last year, up 43.1% from the previous year. / News1

As Chinese e-commerce giants aggressively pursue global expansion, South Korea’s logistics sector is reaping the benefits. China, which is in the midst of a consumption slump caused by an economic downturn, is exporting deflation to the rest of the world by offloading surplus inventory at low prices. These products go through Incheon International Airport before heading to the United States and Europe.

Some experts are concerned that Korea is facilitating goods deflation via China by serving as a logistics hub for China’s outbound commerce.

Incheon International Airport reported on Mar. 28. that “sea-air intermodal cargo” - cargo that entered Korea by sea and was shipped to third countries through Incheon Airport - reached 98,560 tons last year, up 43.1% from the previous year. Notably, 99.6% of this cargo came from China. Experts believe that most of this surge is generated by goods from Chinese e-commerce giants.

Incheon Airport emerged as a pivotal logistics hub for China due to its geographical position. The principal departure city in China, Weihai(威海), is designated by the government as the overseas dropshipping logistics hub. A significant portion of China’s e-commerce cargo is collected at logistics centers in Weihai before being exported overseas.

“The Weihai area lacks airports capable of handling large cargo volumes, and it is faster to ship cargo from Weihai to Incheon by sea than by land to airports in China, so most of the cargo ends up in Incheon Airport,” said an industry insider.

Cargo from Weihai is brought into the country through west coast ports, including Incheon, Pyeongtaek, and Gunsan, then airlifted overseas from Incheon Airport. North America (47%) and Europe (31%) are the primary destinations for these shipments.

Last year, Incheon Airport sent about 700,000 tons of cargo from Korea to international destinations, with around 14% originating from China. “Incheon Airport has become a base for China’s goods deflation,” said an industry insider. “As Chinese e-commerce continues to expand its presence globally, China’s share in cargo volumes from Incheon to international markets is also expected to increase.”

Airlines are also reportedly scrambling to accommodate the growing volume of cargo from China. Incheon Airport is considering introducing more flights to China because handling Chinese cargo could improve the airport’s cargo revenue. “It’s surprising how the sales of Chinese e-commerce companies have come to affect Korea’s international air freight,” said an airport official.

7. Chinese part of Mt. Paekdu named UNESCO global geopark

Paektusan belongs to all Korean people. It is the birthplace of Korea in the lore and it should not be corrupted with the myth created by the Kim family regime or Chinese claims.

The mountain will remain in dispute with China.

Excerpt:

Mount Paekdu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula, lies on the border between North Korea and China, with around 55 percent of the crater lake in North Korean territory.

Chinese part of Mt. Paekdu named UNESCO global geopark | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 28, 2024

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- The Chinese part of Mount Paekdu has been listed as one of UNESCO's new global geoparks in the name of "Mount Changbaishan," the U.N. cultural agency's website showed Thursday.

UNESCO's Executive Board has endorsed the addition of 18 sites to the UNESCO Global Geoparks network, bringing the number of geoparks to 213 in 48 countries, according to the website.

"Located in the southeast Jilin Province, Mount Changbaishan UNESCO Global Geopark is like an open-air classroom for volcanism, with dramatic landforms and diverse rock types that document significant multiphase eruptions," it said.

During a regular press briefing, foreign ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk said South Korea will continue to keep a close eye on relevant efforts.

He stressed that Mount Paekdu holds "great significance" in the hearts of Koreans and voiced expectation for the rest of the mountain to be designated as a global geopark, citing comments by South Korean ambassador to UNESCO Bak Sang-mee.

In 2020, China applied for Changbai Mountain, considered to be Chinese territory in the Mount Paekdu region, to be listed as a UNESCO Global Geopark.

Mount Paekdu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula, lies on the border between North Korea and China, with around 55 percent of the crater lake in North Korean territory.

This image, captured from the website of UNESCO on March 28, 2024, shows a description of Mount Changbaishan. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 28, 2024

8. S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch

At the moment.

S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2024

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to be making preparations for its next launch of a spy satellite, although there are no signs of an imminent launch, South Korea's military said Thursday.

Last November, Pyongyang successfully placed its first military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts earlier that year. It has since vowed to launch three more spy satellites this year.

"While there are activities preparing for an additional military satellite launch by North Korea, there are no signs as of now of an imminent (launch)," Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters in a briefing.

Lee said South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are in close coordination to track North Korea's military activities, but did not provide further details.

Earlier this week, 38 North, a U.S.-based website monitoring North Korea, said an "expanse of blue material" -- possibly a covering -- was spotted on the launch pad of the North's satellite launching station, citing commercial satellite imagery.

38 North said the purpose of the material was unclear but noted the pad likely remains ready to use, raising speculation that a launch may be imminent.

Last week, South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said there was a high possibility the North could stage the satellite launch at the end of this month.

This captured image from North Korea's Korean Central TV on Nov. 22, 2023, shows the country firing a rocket carrying the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite from a launch station in North Pyongan Province. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2024

9. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Coastal Launch Pad

Imagery at the link below.

Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Coastal Launch Pad

https://www.38north.org/2024/03/sohae-satellite-launching-station-new-activity-at-the-coastal-launch-pad/

BY: MARTYN WILLIAMS, PETER MAKOWSKY AND ILIANA RAGNONE
MARCH 25, 2024

Commercial satellite imagery shows an expanse of blue material on North Korea’s coastal launch pad at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, the site used to conduct the last three satellite launch attempts.

The material currently forms a “Y” shape and covers a 125-meter stretch of tarmac from just outside the entrance of the launch pad to the retractable shelter. The haphazard way it is laid out and the way it overlaps suggests it is a covering, possibly tarpaulin, not paint. Each segment of the material appears to be 47 meters long.

Imagery from March 1 through March 12 reveals the same blue material placed along each side of the retractable shelter, also in 47-meter-long segments. These segments, however, have since been removed.

This similar blue material has been seen throughout the site—notably, covering materials at the southern seaport, wrapping tanks seen near the original Horizontal Assembly Building, and over the strongback launching mechanism housed under the coastal launch pad’s retractable shelter. However, this is the first time the material has been observed laying paths on the ground in this manner. The exact nature of the material or its purpose around the launch pad is unclear. Regardless, the pad likely remains ready to use when needed.

Figure 1. Blue materials laid in a “Y” shape on coastal launch pad observed on imagery from March 23, 2024. Satellite image © 2023 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 2. Blue material laid along either side of retractable shelter at coastal launch pad observed on imagery from March 12, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

In his address to the Korean Workers’ Party plenum in late December, Kim Jong Un outlined plans to launch three additional military surveillance satellites into orbit in 2024. State media has not disclosed any subsequent details, and no impact exclusion zones or launch windows have been announced yet, as North Korea has done ahead of previous launches.

10. S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch

At the moment.

S. Korean military says no signs of imminent N. Korean satellite launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2024

Last November, Pyongyang successfully placed its first military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts earlier that year. It has since vowed to launch three more spy satellites this year.

Lee said South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are in close coordination to track North Korea's military activities, but did not provide further details.

38 North said the purpose of the material was unclear but noted the pad likely remains ready to use, raising speculation that a launch may be imminent.

Last week, South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said there was a high possibility the North could stage the satellite launch at the end of this month.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2024

11. New US sanctions target North Korean military finances

Perhaps it is time for a strategic strangulation campaign that does not depend on China and Russia.

New US sanctions target North Korean military finances

By Reuters

March 27, 20247:37 PM EDTUpdated 12 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-north-korea-sanctions-target-individuals-russia-china-uae-based-firms-2024-03-27/?utm

A bronze seal for the Department of the Treasury is shown at the U.S. Treasury building in Washington, U.S., January 20, 2023. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

March 27 (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday announced sanctions on six individuals and two entities based in Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates, accusing them of channeling funds to North Korea's weapons programs.

South Korea, a U.S. ally, also imposed sanctions on four of the same six individuals and the two entities.

A U.S. Treasury Department statement, opens new tab

and South Korea's foreign ministry said the action was taken in coordination between the two countries.

It named the six individuals as Yu Pu Ung, Ri Tong Hyok, Han Chol Man, O In Chun, Jong Song Ho and Jon Yon Gun.

The entities to be hit with sanctions were Alis LLC, based in Vladivostok, Russia, and UAE-based Pioneer Bencont Star Real Estate.

The statement said both firms were subordinate to Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Co, an entity associated with North Korea's armed forces.

Seoul's foreign ministry said the sanctions target not only individuals directly involved but also those who aided North Korea's illegal financial activities, particularly those earning foreign currency in the information technology sector abroad.

Yu Pu Ung, who laundered money and supplied sensitive materials used to develop North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, was responsible for managing the funds, the ministry said in a statement.

The Treasury Department said Chinyong, which was placed under U.S. sanctions in May 2023, uses a network of companies and representatives to manage delegations of North Korean IT workers operating in Russia and Laos.

The announcement came after the United States and South Korea this week launched a new task force aimed at preventing North Korea from procuring illicit oil, as a deadlock at the United Nations Security Council casts doubts over the future of international sanctions on Pyongyang.

Years of U.S.-led international sanctions have failed to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs, and many North Korea watchers and sanctions experts consider the U.N. regime moribund, if not already dead.

12. Construction at North Korea’s Kangson Facility: Probable Storage or Offices

I am always thankful for the squints who can analyze imagery. It is always hard for me to make sense of it.

Construction at North Korea’s Kangson Facility: Probable Storage or Offices

https://www.38north.org/2024/03/construction-at-north-koreas-kangson-facility-probable-storage-or-offices/

BY: PETER MAKOWSKY, OLLI HEINONEN, JACK LIU AND JENNY TOWN
MARCH 27, 2024

Commercial satellite imagery over the past few weeks indicates construction is underway at North Korea’s Kangson facility. While a recent report by NK News has suggested that this “could increase floor space for centrifuges” at what is suspected to be a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, the design of floor plans observed suggests otherwise. Given how the extension has been partitioned, these new spaces are not suitable for a centrifuge hall, but rather provide small storage rooms, workshops or offices.

The pace of this construction has been rapid, perhaps reflecting an emphasis being placed on its completion and intended growth in the operations on-site. While the function of the Kangson facility remains unclear and contested in open sources, this new extension would not expand enrichment capabilities if this is an enrichment facility. However, if it is, instead, a manufacturing facility supporting uranium enrichment, these additional rooms could facilitate expansion of the enrichment program at Yongbyon and elsewhere.

Anatomy of the Extension

The main building at Kangson was a large three-story structure measuring 115 meters long by 48 meters wide and 12 meters high, flanked at each end by vehicle sheds. Prior to this new construction, vehicles could pass behind the building to reach two loading docks.

On imagery from March 1, 2024, foundations for the new construction had already been laid, and walls were being erected for 10, evenly sized rooms spaced across the entire length of the rear side of the building, each approximately 11 meters long and extending outward approximately nine meters.

Figure 1. Foundations for new construction and walls for ten evenly sized rooms observed on imagery from March 1, 2024. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

This extension now blocks vehicles from passing behind the building, but it appears that covered loading docks will be incorporated at either end of the new construction.

On imagery from March 4, eight center rooms had been filled with construction materials, and doorways between them were visible. Construction materials and trucks were present, one along the east side of the building and four more in front of the building, along with a truck-mounted crane.

Figure 2. On imagery from March 4, center rooms were filled with construction materials. Vehicles and a crane were observed at the site. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Imagery from March 14 showed work on the back wall of the new extension was ongoing, with more materials and vehicles around the site.

Figure 3. Additional vehicles and construction materials observed on imagery from March 14, 2024. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

By March 18, blue tarpaulins had been attached to a bracing bar affixed to the main building just below its roofline and extended outward, like an awning, covering most of the center section of the new addition.

Figure 4. By March 18, 2024, blue tarpaulins were added to cover the center section of construction. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

By March 27, additional tarpaulins had been added, covering the entire construction project. These were likely added to protect the workers and structure from the elements during construction, but they also deny further observation of the construction activities beneath. However, the placement of the tarpaulins in relation to the building suggests the new extension could be more than one story high, perhaps equal to the existing interior rooms located along the rear of the building. This would potentially increase the floor area for interior rooms by at least one-third.

Additionally, what appears to be gray canvas tarps are draped between the window columns. Their placement is likely needed for further protection of the existing interior spaces of the building as windows are removed and construction to join the spaces continues.

Figure 5.

Further developments will be seen in weeks to come, but the exact purpose and implications of this extension to the main building at the Kangson complex can only be established through on-site visits.

13. Contemplating Possible Outcomes and Implications of the South Korean General Election

Some useful analysis of various scenarios. Data and graphs at the link.

Contemplating Possible Outcomes and Implications of the South Korean General Election

https://www.38north.org/2024/03/contemplating-possible-outcomes-and-implications-of-the-south-korean-general-election/

BY: J. JAMES KIM
MARCH 27, 2024

With less than one month to go until the South Korean general election on April 10, all eyes are on the National Assembly. The outcome of this election looks to be a referendum on the Yoon Suk Yeol government and a setup for the next presidential election in 2027. The latest polling suggests that the election will be close, with neither major party appearing to give any ground. However, things can change quickly in the coming weeks: The South Korean political landscape looks as fluid as ever with the formation of new parties and new scandalous facts being reported about the leadership of both major parties. In this highly uncertain environment, better preparation and understanding are possible through a carefully weighted preponderance of different evidence and scenarios.

The Stakes

This election holds different meanings for different stakeholders. For President Yoon, it is about his legacy. Without a cooperative National Assembly, President Yoon will be a de facto lame duck for the remainder of his term. The National Assembly thus far has not been cooperative because the opposition controls nearly 60 percent of all parliamentary seats.

From a foreign policy standpoint, a cooperative National Assembly would be critical to institute the kinds of reforms and regulations consistent with the spirit of the US-ROK Joint Statements of 2022 and 2023, as well as South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Although the Yoon government has succeeded in working with the opposition to pass measures such as the Framework Act on Supply Chain Stabilization Support for Economic Security in late December 2023 and the Special Law on Aerospace Administration in January 2024, the National Assembly is still deliberating on issues related to standard setting on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI).[1] A more cooperative National Assembly means fewer resources wasted on defending policy pursuits and less watering down of the administration’s agenda.

For the major parties, this election is also a testing ground for the presidential election in 2027. Former Justice Minister and prosecutor Han Dong-hoon has finally emerged as the Chairman of the Emergency Committee of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) and its interim leader. He is currently ahead in the polls as one of two leading candidates for a presidential run in 2027, even though he has not declared any ambition to do so (Figure 1). Yet, he represents a generational change within the conservative mainstream and stands as an alternative voice to the 586 generation—South Koreans in their 50s who attended college in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s—who are so dominant within the Democratic Party (DP). [2] In some ways, he has already managed to capture the interests of younger South Korean voters who care more about individualism and personal preferences and less about collectivism, tradition and hierarchy.

Figure 1. Support for Future Presidential Hopefuls, June 2022 – March 2024. (Unit: Percent)[3]

This election will also be a reality check for the main opposition Democratic Party. Lee Jae-myung, who is facing multiple graft charges, will be watching to see if success in this election can provide the momentum needed to justify his renewed presidential bid in 2027. A significant loss of seats in this election will likely be taken as a rejection of Lee’s political aspirations, and the DP will have to regroup and rebuild after the election. However, he is still one of the two front-runners for the presidential bid—that is, if he is not squeezed out by others such as the former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, who is making a strong case for a possible run in 2027.

The Current Outlook

A good starting point for understanding the lay of the land is the current polling data. While this is hardly deterministic, it is a useful rearview mirror to the relative performance of each player as they position themselves in the final stretch of this election cycle.[4] One interesting trend that can be observed in the latest data is the change in public support for the major parties since the Lunar New Year in mid-February (Figures 2 and 3).

The support for the ruling PPP, for instance, increased significantly at the end of February. The DP is also contending, although the gap appears to be growing. This change coincided with a significant drop in independent voters from 34 percent in August 2023 to about 17 percent in the most recent polling. Perhaps discussions around the holiday dinner tables helped some undecided voters finally make up their minds.

Figure 2. Party Support May 10, 2022 – March 14, 2024. (Unit: Percent)[5]

Figure 3. Party Support January 9, 2024 – March 14, 2024. (Unit: Percent)[6]

The above trend also overlaps with the emergence of some newly formed parties that entered the fray late in the game. Although the relative support for these new parties may appear marginal at best, the difference between the two major parties is small enough that these third parties can influence the outcome in April. Take, for instance, Cho Kuk’s new progressive-leaning National Innovation Party (Figure 3). The announcement of its launch came only recently, yet it has already gained quite a following among both independent and progressive voters. Some observers speculate that this party may be able to win as many as 10 seats in the new National Assembly if the latest trend continues.

Of course, smaller parties like the National Innovation Party have an uphill battle in single-member districts (SMD), but they do have a chance at the semi-mixed proportional representation (PR) seats if they can garner more than three percent of the national PR votes. (Of the 300 seats in the National Assembly, 46 are set aside for semi-mixed PR.)[7]

Although the two largest parties have positioned themselves to absorb as many PR votes as possible through the so-called polls indicate that the newly formed third parties are performing relatively well.[8] If the minor parties can compete for some of these PR seats in a close election, they are likely to play a pivotal role in the passage or obstruction of important bills in the next National Assembly.[9]

These parties may have good reasons to be optimistic. The two major parties are facing criticisms for a lack of transparency in the candidate nomination process and political scandals surrounding their leadership. In fact, these two issues explain why many incumbents are leaving the two major parties to join the newly formed parties.

Moreover, the incumbent National Assembly members, who have been denied their respective party nominations, have argued that the internal party process only favors candidates whose preferences align with those of the leadership. Countless media reports seem to support this argument, with most PPP candidates being from the so-called pro-Yoon faction, while candidates for the DP are mainly from the pro-Lee Jae-myung camp. Without reforming the nomination process itself, the criticism against the nomination process is likely to persist.

Lessons and Patterns from Past Elections

While these factors may provide some explanation for the current trends in the polls, history suggests that they do not do a good job of forecasting how the election may play out. This was the case in 2012 and 2016 (Figure 4), when polling was very different from the election outcomes. Polls were more accurate in 2020, but the circumstances surrounding that election were quite unusual, occurring during a pandemic while the conservative opposition was still effectively decimated from President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017.

Instead, the history of past elections shows that the ruling party generally appears to have an edge over the opposition (Figure 5).

Figure 4. Pre-Election Polling on Party Support and Presidential Approval, 2012 – 2020.[10]

That said, the ruling party lost a sizable number of seats in 2016, and the ruling coalition failed to win the plurality of seats in 2000. The election in 2008 was also somewhat unusual,f with parliamentary elections occurring only a few months after a presidential election, enabling the conservative ruling party the benefit of riding the coattails of the conservative candidate’s presidential win. The circumstances surrounding this year’s election, however, are different from all of these rather unique cases.

Figure 5. South Korean General Election Results, 1988 – 2020. Unit: Number of seats)[11]

Some observers suggest that President Yoon’s low approval ratings (Figure 6) work against the ruling party. As the de facto leader of the party, the president is likely to influence support for the ruling party, but in this year’s election, Han appears to be an equally important factor in shaping the ruling party’s image.

Figure 6. Presidential Approval, October 2023 – March 2024. (Unit: Percent)[12]

History also suggests that presidential approval is not always a good predictor of election outcome. The polling data from 2012, for instance, shows that both the president and the ruling party suffered from low public approval just a couple of months before the election, yet the ruling party was able to defend almost all seats won in the landslide election of 2008 (Figures 4 and 5). In fact, the ruling party lost seats in 2016 when presidential approval was significantly higher than in 2012.

Possible Scenarios

In looking at this year’s election dynamics, there are at least four possible scenarios to consider.

The most likely scenario is one where the main opposition loses seats, but the results do not change the dynamics of the legislative process in the National Assembly. That is, the conservatives may gain seats or perhaps even control the majority, but the National Assembly will remain split, requiring bipartisan cooperation and compromise to move legislation forward. This is because the National Assembly requires 180 votes to break the filibuster.[13] In essence, the failure to secure 180 votes on a floor vote implies a greater likelihood for persistence of gridlock in the legislative process and difficulty for the president or ruling party to initiate unilateral changes.

The second possible scenario is one where a viable third party presents a strong alternative to the two major parties with the possibility of a larger coalition forming either on the progressive or conservative side. Currently, the National Innovation Party looks like a party that can attract undecided votes. There is also a strong possibility that the National Innovation Party will coalesce with the DP to obstruct President Yoon’s policy agenda. If the progressive opposition parties are unable to strike a grand bargain to form a united front, they may weaken their chances in the 2027 presidential election. The same logic applies to the PPP and the more conservative-leaning third parties, such as the New Reform Party, if they perform beyond expectation.

A third scenario is one where the DP retains its supermajority grip on the National Assembly and keeps the Yoon administration in check. The likelihood of this outcome is not high since special conditions like what existed in 2012 or 2020 do not currently exist. However, if this were to happen, the progressives would do everything in their power to obstruct President Yoon and the conservatives from pushing their agenda. President Yoon’s domestic agenda is likely to stall while his foreign policy will face growing legislative scrutiny and oversight.

The last scenario is one where the ruling conservative party outperforms all other parties, to everyone’s surprise, and takes control of the supermajority needed to advance bills through the floor votes. This would be interpreted as a vote of confidence on the Yoon administration and the conservatives to institute the kind of reforms President Yoon promised to change the status quo. However, this kind of outcome is not likely for the same reasons a dominant pro-progressive outcome is unlikely.

Conclusion

History suggests that the South Korean political climate can change quickly. However, the above discussion provides useful markers that would signal which of the four scenarios outlined is likely in the days ahead.

One key variable is how the third parties measure up against the major parties or whether some coordination or grand bargain forms between them. Other variables include what changes (if any) are there to the preferences of independent or undecided voters? How do the major parties manage the negative media reporting of their respective leadership? How does media reporting of these events change as the election approaches?

One recent bombshell issue working against the PPP is the Yoon administration’s handling of the special investigation of the former Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, who has been criticized for leaving the country early to assume his new position as the Ambassador to Australia. The issue has become a source of friction between the PPP and the president’s office, and there are signs that public opinion could be shifting against the president. Although Ambassador Lee has been called back to South Korea, it is unclear how the latest development might be perceived by voters in the days leading up to the election. The above list is hardly exhaustive, but it provides some useful guideposts to consider beyond just polling data as we look ahead to the election on April 10.

[1]
Robert C. O’Brien, “South Korea’s proposed tech regulations would be a gift to China,” The Hill, December 28, 2023, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4379108-south-koreas-proposed-tech-regulations-would-be-a-gift-to-china/; “사이버안보연구소, ‘국가사이버안보기본법’ 제정 위한 입법 지원 활동 주력,” 보안뉴스 , February 20, 2024, https://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=126840&kind=; “사이버안보법 다시 안갯속… 대통령 지적에 전면 재논의,” Digital Today, September 7, 2023, https://www.digitaltoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=487183; “국내 AI 법안만 13개 국회서 ‘낮잠’… ‘토종 AI 발전 막아선 안돼,” 파이낸셜뉴스, March 14, 2024, https://www.fnnews.com/news/202403141432311703; “‘AI 기본법’ 올해는 빛볼까… 과기정통부 ‘21대 국회 종료 전 통과 목표,’” Digital Today, January 2, 2024, https://www.digitaltoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=499842; and “‘챗GPT 시대’ 이미 열렸는데 ‘AI 기본법’ 국회서 수년째 낮잠,” Donga Ilbo, August 2, 2023, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20230802/120521367/1.
[2]
Kim Tae-Hyo and Bernard Rowan, “The Rise and Fall of South Korea’s 586 Generation: Implications for the US Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2022): 23-38, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090759.
[3]
The weighted sample ranges from n = 1,000-1,005 with an approximate margin of error ±3.1 percent point (using a 95 percent confidence interval). The question wording reads: “Who do you think would be a good political leader to lead our country as the future president?” Source: Gallup Korea.
[4]
Sunmin Kim and Taeku Lee, “Making Opinions Public: Polling and Democratic Responsiveness in South Korea,” Politics and Society, (2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231181766; Joshua Clinton, “Polling Problems and Why We Should Still Trust (Some) Polls,” Vanderbilt Project on Unity and American Democracy, January 11, 2021, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/unity/2021/01/11/polling-problems-and-why-we-should-still-trust-some-polls/; Courtney Kennedy, Andrew Mercer, Nick Hatley and Arnold Lau, “Does public opinion polling about issues still work?” Pew Research Center, September 21, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/09/21/does-public-opinion-polling-about-issues-still-work/; and E.J. Dionne and Thomas E. Mann, “Polling and Public Opinion: The good, the bad, and the ugly,” Brookings Commentary, June 1, 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/polling-public-opinion-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/.
[5]
The weighted sample ranges from n = 1,000–1,009 with an approximate margin of error ±3.1 percent point (using a 95 percent confidence interval). The question wording reads: “Which of the following political parties do you support?” The x-axis represents the week in a month of the year indicated. Source: Gallup Korea.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Although the number of semi-mixed PR seats was 47 in the last election, the redistricting agreement announced by the National Assembly in late February increased the number of SMD seats by one (each) in Incheon and Gyeonggi Province while reducing one SMD seat in Seoul and one PR seat, making the total PR seat for this year’s election 46; “National Assembly Passes Redistricting Bill ahead of April Elections,” KBS, February 29, 2024, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=183986.
[8]
Due to the unique method by which votes are translated into semi-mixed PR seats, the major parties have a significant disadvantage compared to smaller third parties from winning the PR seats in Korean general elections. Hence, instead of relying on the established party ticket for the PR votes, the major parties have resorted to the use of so-called “satellite parties” under a different name that will allow them to maximize the chance that their preferred candidates will win as many semi-mixed PR seats as possible.
[9]
Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
[10]
The percentages are taken from the last available polling data immediately before the election. The asterisk (*) indicates the party of the president. The weighted sample ranges from n = 1,000-1,003 with an approximate margin of error ±3.1 percent point (using a 95 percent confidence interval). Question wording on partisan support reads: “Which of the following political parties do you support?” On presidential approval, the question wording reads: “Do you think President OOO’s performance of his duties as president is well or poor these days? Well (approve) or not good (disapprove).” Source: Gallup Korea.
[11]
The asterisk (*) represents the party of the president. Bold type indicates the party or coalition that gained the plurality of seats in the corresponding National Assembly. Source: National Election Commission (http://info.nec.go.kr).
[12]
The weighted sample ranges from n = 1,000-1,009 with an approximate margin of error ±3.1 percent point (using a 95 percent confidence interval). Question wording reads: “Do you think President Yoon Suk-yeol’s performance of his duties as president is well or poor these days? Well (approve) or not good (disapprove).” Source: Gallup Korea.
[13]
Woojin Moon, “Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies, 22, (2022): 125-145.

14. Why ASEAN is South Korea’s lifeline for mediation with the North

Interesting assessment.

Excerpt:

Unlike his predecessor, Yoon is not prioritising resuming talks with North Korea or seeking a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. What he really aiming at is to prevent war. But relying solely on military deterrence is far from ideal. South Korea should reach out to other parties to help defuse tensions.

Why ASEAN is South Korea’s lifeline for mediation with the North | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · March 28, 2024

IN BRIEF

As South Korea faces increasing tensions with North Korea, ASEAN presents an opportunity for mediation. To defuse tensions, South Korea should foster discussions concerning regional peace and stability with key ASEAN players. Vietnam has emerged as a potential mediator due to its existing relations with North Korea and its role as a coordinator for ASEAN–South Korea relations in recent years.

Inter-Korean relations have been an extremely challenging issue for South Korea. But when all doors have closed, one remains open — Southeast Asia.

When South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May 2022, he was determined to break away from former president Moon Jae-in’s conciliatory approach towards a peace process with North Korea and to revitalise military deterrence against North Korea. Yoon also sought to avoid being tied down by inter-Korean relations in his broader foreign policy — within the Indo-Pacific Strategy, he has expressed his intention to go beyond the Korean peninsula and to transform South Korea into a ‘global pivotal state’. But after the US–Japan–ROK Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David in August 2023 and the North Korea–Russia Summit in September 2023, President Yoon seems no longer interested in the ‘global pivotal state’ concept.

Yoon has been forced to focus a great deal of his time on dealing with North Korea. The problem has worsened in 2024. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has slammed the door to peaceful reunification shut, formally removing it as a national goal from the country’s constitution.

President Yoon is seeking to deal with the looming threat of war from North Korea in a way that enables victory for his People Power Party in the upcoming April 2024 general election. The national assembly is currently dominated by the Democratic Party of Korea, which holds 164 out of 300 seats. Yoon is also facing low approval ratings, which reached under 30 per cent for the first time in nine months in February 2024. Yoon thus made the strategic move in December 2023 to reshuffle his cabinet and appoint six new ministers, enabling the replaced ministers to run in the legislative election.

Unlike his predecessor, Yoon is not prioritising resuming talks with North Korea or seeking a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. What he really aiming at is to prevent war. But relying solely on military deterrence is far from ideal. South Korea should reach out to other parties to help defuse tensions.

Northeast Asia is perhaps not a feasible option for South Korea. China has remained inactive beyond calling on all parties involved to use restraint and dialogue to avoid triggering closer trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea. South Korea also cannot turn to Russia for help, with Russian President Vladimir Putin seeking tighter cooperation with North Korea.

There is one card left on the table for South Korea — Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN have played important roles in regional peacebuilding and dialogue facilitation. From a divided region during the Cold War, ASEAN has now brought together all 11 Southeast Asian countries (Timor-Leste will ‘ideally’ become a full member in 2025). ASEAN countries hold more than 200 meetings every year while their Northeast Asian neighbours still struggle to sit down and talk to each other.

In Southeast Asia, there are four candidates that could assume a mediation role. The first is Indonesia, who shows a strong commitment to non-aligned foreign policy and has long been considered ASEAN’s de facto leader. For example, as the host of the 2022 G20 Summit, Indonesia invited Russia to attend despite pressure from the West. Another option is Thailand, who is intensifying its efforts to solve the Myanmar problem and has successfully organised a meeting between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in January 2024, during a time of fierce strategic competition.

Singapore and Vietnam are also strong candidates given their involvement in the denuclearisation process by hosting the US–North Korea summits in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Both countries have established diplomatic relations with North Korea, but Vietnam is the better option for South Korea given Singapore’s closer ties to the United States.

Vietnam and North Korea have maintained good relations over time. And Vietnam is South Korea’s most important market and investment destination in Southeast Asia and the coordinator for ASEAN–South Korea relations from 2021–24.

South Korea’s task is apparent — to turn to Southeast Asia. No matter what choice Seoul makes, it should foster discussions about maintaining regional peace and stability with key ASEAN players within ASEAN-led mechanisms to strengthen strategic trust between South Korea and ASEAN countries. Southeast Asia can be a trusted mediator, if both Koreas underline the importance of resuming dialogue.

Le Nhu Mai is Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1711663200

eastasiaforum.org · March 28, 2024

15. Why are North Koreans avoiding the upper floors of newly built apartments?

Do you want to haul your stuff up all those sairs? With intermittent electricity elevators are unreliable.

Why are North Koreans avoiding the upper floors of newly built apartments?

People living on upper floors have to carry everything they need to their homes, including water drawn from wells and firewood, a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un -

March 28, 2024

dailynk.com

Why are North Koreans avoiding the upper floors of newly built apartments? - Daily NK English

People in Chongjin and Hoeryong are avoiding the upper floors of newly built high-rise apartments due to various inconveniences, Daily NK has learned.

“The high-rise apartments in Chongjin and Hoeryong were completed this year after several years of construction. Some people have moved in and some are planning to move in,” said a source in North Hamgyong Province on Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity. “But no one wants to live there since living on the upper floors brings so many problems.”

According to the source, the province began building high-rise apartments in Chongjin five or six years ago on the orders of the central government. But because the apartments have no elevators, residents on the upper floors have a hard time getting up and down. They also lack reliable electricity and water, making them unpopular with locals.

“Apartments built in the past were usually four to five stories high. Because it was difficult to get up and down the fourth and fifth floors, they were in low demand and cheaper than the first and second floors,” the source said. “Now they are higher than 10 floors – nothing has improved. It’s not a surprise they’re so unpopular.”

Since it is already hard enough to make a living and upper-floor residents are forced to physically exert themselves going up and down stairs, there is little chance that demand for upper floor apartments will rise any time soon, he added.

In fact, a home in a high-rise apartment is cheaper than an ordinary one-story house. “A high-rise apartment in Chongjin costs RMB 15,000 to RMB 20,000, while a single-story apartment costs RMB 20,000 to RMB 25,000,” the source said. As of Mar. 28, RMB 1,000 is equal to around USD 138.

Government housing plans are “out-of-sync with reality”

In Hoeryong, local authorities have demolished single-story houses and built new high-rise apartments under government orders. However, as most of the new apartments have no elevators, locals who were allocated apartments in the new high-rises are suffering considerable inconveniences.

“Usually, people who invest in building the apartments are allotted the lower floors, while people who lived in demolished houses are allotted the upper floors,” the source said.

“Since the units on the upper floors suffer from unreliable running water, and going up and down the stairs is difficult because there are no elevators, they are unpopular. So they are mostly allocated to poor, powerless people.”

The source said people living on upper floors suffer considerable inconveniences because they have to carry everything they need to their homes, including water drawn from wells and firewood.

“High-rise apartments simply inconvenience and exhaust people,” the source said. “Some ask why the authorities are building apartments that are completely out of sync with reality. They say they want the government to improve their living conditions quickly, but that’s nothing more than a pipe dream right now.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Un

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

N. Korean overseas work candidates warned of consequences of not sharing earnings with government

The government appears intent on tightening control over overseas workers in order to maximize its foreign exchange earnings

By Jeong Tae Joo - March 28, 2024

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-overseas-work-candidates-warned-consequences-not-sharing-earnings-government/

North Korean workers wait for a flight to Pyongyang at the airport in Vladivostok, Russia, in December 2019. (Courtesy of Kang Dong Wan, professor at Dong-A University)

North Korean authorities recently told overseas job applicants that failure to give the government its share of their earnings would result in restrictions on future work opportunities.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source inside North Korea told Daily NK on Tuesday that the External Construction Guidance Bureau and other government agencies involved in sending North Korean workers overseas announced the measure last week.

The measure aims to emphasize to existing and future overseas workers that they will not be able to work abroad again if they fail to meet their earnings quotas.

Through the recent announcement, the External Construction Guidance Bureau and related agencies also made it clear to people in the selection or assignment process that failure to pay the government’s share on time would be considered serious misconduct that could prevent them from going home on vacation.

The source said that the bureau, as well as ministries and party organs that manage overseas workers, also use ideological indoctrination to convince workers awaiting selection or assignment of the importance of fulfilling government quotas.

North Koreans working overseas are required to pay a portion of their earnings to the government. In this sense, the government appears intent on tightening control over overseas workers in order to maximize its foreign exchange earnings.

The source noted, however, that “blocking workers from future overseas assignments could foster [negative] opinions about the government.”

Managers are concerned that latest measure could lead to more defections

A source in China told Daily NK that similar rules have been announced locally in China and Russia. The source said that not only returnees awaiting the results of the selection and assignment process, but also workers currently on overseas assignments have been told that they will lose their chance to return overseas if they fail to pay the money they owe the government.

“North Korean workers who want to continue their overseas assignments will have to work even harder to make their contribution to the government. This spells the end of any attempts to hide a little pocket money when they return home,” the source said.

“The latest move puts an undue burden on expatriate employees. Local managers are also concerned that fears about the future may push some workers to defect.”

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

17. Forging a New Era of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation

A new CNAS report. The 23 page report can be downloaded here: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/U.S.-Japan-KoreaTrilateralCooperation_Report2023_Final-1.pdf

Forging a New Era of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation

cnas.org · by By: Lisa Curtis, Evan Wright and Hannah Kelley

March 21, 2024

The Key to a Stable, Secure Indo-Pacific

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Executive Summary

In August 2023, the leaders of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States met for an unprecedented in-person summit at Camp David to expand and deepen trilateral relations. The meeting resulted in a comprehensive joint statement, “The Spirit of Camp David,” which commits the three nations to increasing the frequency of consultations between their leaders and senior diplomatic, economic, and security officials; raising the tempo and sophistication of their joint military exercises; taking new initiatives such as sharing sensitive missile warning data on North Korea in real time; collaborating on economic security measures and the protection of emerging technologies; and working together to stabilize global supply chains by launching a pilot early warning system. The Biden administration deserves credit for coordinating this watershed moment in trilateral relations, but South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida were responsible for the bilateral rapprochement that laid the foundation for renewed trilateral relations.

A major contributing factor to Japan and South Korea’s interest in improving defense ties with each other and trilaterally with the United States is the intensifying nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have laid out an ambitious defense cooperation agenda, including reviving trilateral maritime cooperation, initiating trilateral aerial cooperation for the first time, and bringing online a real-time trilateral data sharing system for tracking North Korean missile launches.

The three countries are poised to expand their cooperation across a range of issues and within other minilateral and multilateral settings. This includes the United Nations (UN), where, as of January 2024, both Japan and South Korea serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council—an overlap with the United States, a permanent member, which has not taken place in 27 years. Japan and South Korea are already coordinating their diplomatic activities in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict in the Middle East, demonstrating the potential for trilateral collaboration outside the Indo-Pacific region.

There is both opportunity and appetite to enhance trilateral cooperation across a range of critical technology areas, namely quantum, biotechnology, and cybersecurity.

Economic and technological competition with China also is driving the current push to cooperate trilaterally. Japan-ROK rapprochement has ended the trade dispute between Seoul and Tokyo, and the three partners are now deepening cooperation on economic security to secure supply chains for semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, and critical minerals. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida have encouraged industry cooperation, and all three capitals are now in discussions to further cooperation in novel technology areas.

There is both opportunity and appetite to enhance trilateral cooperation across a range of critical technology areas, namely quantum, biotechnology, and cybersecurity. The three nations already have largely complementary national quantum technology strategies, and there are opportunities to align resources to further quantum information science and technology (QIST) research and development and to harness the technology’s economic potential together. All three countries are interested in strengthening their respective biotechnology sectors as well as addressing cybersecurity challenges, especially related to North Korea and its funding for nuclear and missile programs.

Despite the immediate prospects for strengthening trilateral cooperation, there are several obstacles to sustaining meaningful collaboration over the long term. A change in national leadership in Tokyo, Seoul, or Washington could halt the partnership, as it is closely tied to the personal foreign policy agendas of all three leaders. Likewise, institutionalizing trilateral cooperation, regardless of leadership change, will be challenging in the long run. The Indo-Pacific security environment is increasingly severe, and varying perceptions among the three nations of threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea could lead to cracks in trilateral relations. Similarly, policymakers in all three capitals will need to carefully balance economic security with nationalist or protectionist trade policies to sustain support for trilateral economic and technology cooperation.

The large number of both opportunities and challenges facing the trilateral partnership means leaders in all three capitals have difficult decisions to make to sustain the momentum of the partnership. It is imperative for Japan, South Korea, and the United States to take the initiative and seize the low-hanging opportunities to further institutionalize and strengthen the ties with each other. In this context, U.S. policymakers should:

Continue to press for expanded trilateral cooperation within the UN. Both Japan and South Korea are non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) at the same time for the first time in 27 years. Using formal, multilateral forums such as the UNSC for trilateral cooperation can help reinforce progress made elsewhere and provides a dedicated means to align on issues the three parties have agreed to tackle together.
Create an interagency working group to identify opportunities and gaps in coordination among different minilateral groups, including the U.S.- Japan-ROK trilateral, the Quad, the “Chip 4,” and the U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue. In addition to improving diplomatic efficiency, encouraging greater coordination among the various minilaterals can provide opportunities for Japan and South Korea to deepen their security relationships with like-minded partners, contributing to the development of a networked security architecture aligned with U.S. priorities.
Encourage trilateral cooperation beyond the Indo-Pacific. Japan and South Korea have coordinated some diplomatic activities in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The United States should take advantage of this progress and encourage trilateral cooperation in other regional or functional areas of mutual interest, such as energy security in the Middle East or Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Increase trilateral intelligence sharing to enhance collective maritime domain awareness. The three countries should begin strengthening intelligence sharing beyond the North Korean missile threat by strengthening cooperation on maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Enhance trilateral contingency planning, especially evacuation of civilians. All three countries have an incentive to work together in evacuating civilians in the event of a regional contingency involving Taiwan. Modernizing alliance command and control structures can further enhance trilateral contingency planning and interoperability.
Plan trilateral defense exercises that expand beyond traditional domains to include cyber and space. China, Russia, and North Korea continue to invest in cyber and space capabilities. U.S. defense planners should consider trilateral exercises outside of traditional domains, such as joint space domain awareness or active cyber defense.
Encourage trilateral cooperation to further QIST research and development and harness the technology’s economic potential. The three states already have largely complementary national quantum technology strategies and capabilities, with the United States leading in quantum sensing, Japan excelling in quantum communications, and South Korea advancing in the field of quantum computing.
Launch a trilateral biotech industry working group and begin negotiations on a trilateral biotechnology cooperation agreement. The Biden administration should engage more robustly on emerging biotechnology with Japan and South Korea as a key area for strategic advancement.
Build consensus both at home and with trilateral counterparts to operationalize the trade pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. This is critical to demonstrate the body’s strength—and by extension the United States' strength as an organizing force—to a watchful China.

Introduction

The recent unprecedented trilateral cooperation between Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States under the administrations of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, President Yoon Suk Yeol, and President Joe Biden is laying a foundation for the three countries to collectively address increasingly critical economic, political, and security challenges in the region. Following a watershed summit at Camp David in August 2023, the trilateral partnership has expanded beyond addressing just the traditional, shared threat posed by North Korea to cover broader security issues in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. At the summit, the leaders jointly announced their commitment to deepen cooperation and align efforts to promote peace and stability and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.1 Following the summit, from mid-August to early December 2023, the three nations met roughly 30 times—averaging nearly one meeting every four days—to operationalize their pledges of closer cooperation.2 These developments show promise for a new era in trilateral relations that could help address nuclear and missile threats from North Korea and contribute to deterrence, stability, and economic prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific.

(L-R) South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida walk together to deliver a joint press conference following their historic Camp David summit on August 18, 2023. Among other things, the joint statement called for improved information sharing and increased defense, economic security, and technology cooperation. (Chris Somodevilla via Getty Images)

While the recent momentum in trilateral relations has the potential to fundamentally alter the economic and security landscape of the Indo-Pacific, questions about the political sustainability of the initiative have already emerged. A presidential election in the United States, a ruling party presidential election in Japan, and National Assembly elections in South Korea will occur in 2024, and there is concern that new leadership or shifts in political power dynamics in any of the three nations could lead to the deprioritizing of trilateral ties. Historical frictions in the Japan-ROK bilateral relationship also threaten to disrupt the initiative, especially in South Korea, where public support for improving relations with Japan lags behind Yoon’s personal commitment to moving them forward. The ambitious Camp David agenda will also take time and concerted effort to operationalize, and it could lose momentum and support if there are too many obstacles to its implementation. Finally, external security threats, such as Chinese economic coercion and maritime aggression or burgeoning Russia-North Korea defense and technology cooperation, could also reduce support for the initiative among the South Korean or Japanese public, causing either or both countries to back away from it.

This report examines recent developments driving trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and assesses the opportunities and challenges facing the future of trilateral cooperation. It then offers policy recommendations for how decisionmakers in Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington can leverage the current momentum of the partnership to further institutionalize trilateral relations, strengthen the durability of the relationship, and build on the Camp David agenda to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Download the Full Report.

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Endnotes

Authors

Lisa Curtis

Senior Fellow and Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program
Lisa Curtis is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is a foreign policy and national security expert with over 20 years of service in...

Evan Wright

Research Assistant, Indo-Pacific Security Program
Evan Wright is a Research Assistant for the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. He focuses on U.S.-Indo-Pacific relations, East Asian security, and science and technology p...

Hannah Kelley

Research Associate, Technology and National Security Program
Hannah Kelley is a Research Associate with the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS. Her work focuses on U.S. national technology strategy and international cooper...

18. “A Time for Choosing”: Urgent Action or Continuing Folly (US Alliances)

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Washington and many allies continue to behave as if they are still in the immediate post-Cold War springtime of great expectations. It may be too late to deter a reckoning that decades of indolence and wishful thinking have effectively invited. Recognizing and addressing the threats and structural problems that now beleaguer U.S. global alliances are urgent needs. That recognition and effort must begin in Washington. Ronald Reagan’s famous Cold War speech, “A Time for Choosing,” included a line that fully pertains to Washington and allies today: “We’re at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it’s been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening.”[33]

Keith B. Payne, “A Time for Choosing”: Urgent Action or Continuing Folly, No. 580, March 26, 2024

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“A Time for Choosing”: Urgent Action or Continuing Folly

https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-a-time-for-choosing-urgent-action-or-continuing-folly-no-580-march-26-2024/?mc_cid=3d5331ec49&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Dr. Keith B. Payne

Dr. Keith B. Payne is a co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, professor emeritus at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and former Senior Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Introduction

Washington’s global system of alliances is facing extremely tough internal and external problems. These problems are neither fleeting nor prosaic; they are now structural and will require significant efforts to ameliorate. That harsh reality would matter little if alliances were unimportant to Western security. But they are the West’s key advantage over an aggressive, authoritarian bloc, including a Sino-Russian entente, North Korea and Iran, that seeks to overturn the liberal world order created and sustained by U.S. and allied power. To maintain that advantage, Washington must recognize and respond to those threats, while resisting the usual anti-defense spending/anti-military themes of the “progressive” Left and the seeming neo-isolationism of some on the political Right.

U.S. defense budgets in decline when adjusted for inflation,[1] and a trend within parts of the Republican Party to oppose continuing military aid to Ukraine, are not lost on allies who fear for their security and are ultimately dependent on a seemingly reticent United States for their security. As threat conditions become increasingly severe and obvious, some allies, particularly those who are on the frontlines vis-à-vis Russia, China, and North Korea, understandably are increasingly alarmed.

Evidence of this alarm includes open allied discussions about acquiring independent nuclear capabilities—with the corresponding potential for a cascade of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps most surprising are open German and Japanese discussions of independent nuclear deterrence capabilities.[2] In Japan, the subject is tied directly to the continuing credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and has moved from being politically taboo to an open public discussion.[3] In February 2023, a Japanese defense study chaired by former military chief of staff Ryoichi Oriki reportedly suggested that “Japan ease its three nonnuclear principles that prohibit possessing, producing or allowing entry into Japan of nuclear weapons.”[4]

An alternative potential allied response to security threats is to move increasingly toward accommodating Moscow and/or Beijing. As contemporary power balances shift and fear among some allies grows, greater accommodation to China or Russia—and corresponding distance from the United States—may appear the most practicable option. Turkey appears to have been positioning itself between the West and Russia for years, while some allies appear to be serving Russia’s interests from within NATO.[5] In the Indo-Pacific, New Zealand deepens economic, trade, and cultural ties with Beijing.[6]

That some allies will hedge their geopolitical bets by seeking accommodations with Russia and/or China, and by distancing themselves from Washington, was demonstrated recently in statements by French President Macron and the European Commission’s leadership.[7] According to Macron, “strategic autonomy” must now be Europe’s organizing principle;[8] and the French ambassador reportedly has advised Canada to begin distancing itself from the United States, and stated that Ottawa must choose between the United States and Europe.[9] As two prominent European commentators have observed, “… based on global American strategic supremacy, the very idea of autonomous European defense has long been considered detrimental to the vital transatlantic link. However, with global strategic challenges growing fast, this principle is no longer tenable.”[10]

The manifest inconsistency in U.S. behavior important to allies has accelerated this problem. An Israeli analyst described the perception concisely: “The consensus in the region is that the US has abdicated its role as the Superpower vis-à-vis the [Middle East].”[11] As allies respond to the reality of rising threats, if a trend toward increasing allied interest in independent nuclear capabilities and/or distancing themselves from the United States expands, sustaining U.S. global alliances will be problematic, to the degradation of U.S. security.

America’s experience with North Korea over the past two decades is instructive. During the period of unquestioned U.S. military superiority over any potential foe, Washington solemnly and repeatedly declared a nuclear-armed North Korea to be “unacceptable.” Yet, five consecutive administrations, Republican and Democrat, have done nothing effective to prevent North Korea’s deployment of nuclear weapons that can now target much of the world, including the United States. As a result, North Korea is a nuclear power that now must be deterred.[12]

U.S. officials and commentators have repeatedly offered confident assertions that the risk is minimal because the United States can reliably deter North Korea[13]—assertions based on little more than convenience, hope, and shallow guesswork. Simultaneously, Washington has incessantly pleaded with China to help de-nuclearize North Korea—a problem that Beijing has shown no interest in resolving. Mounting South Korean popular interest in independent nuclear capabilities is a direct consequence of this American failure to deal with a threat that Washington has declared, for more than two decades, to be “unacceptable.”

Russia seeks to recover hegemony in much of Europe, starting with Ukraine, and China is on track to be able to take Taiwan by force within a few years.[14] Recent “leaked” Russian nuclear planning documents reveal a corresponding shockingly low Russian threshold for nuclear use,[15] and in 2022, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly concluded that there is a 50 percent or greater chance that Moscow will use nuclear weapons if facing defeat in Ukraine.[16] This is devastating commentary on the West’s contemporary deterrence position.

In this grim threat context, the fundamental alliance problem is the enduring U.S. preference to look away from stark security challenges and to prioritize non-defense goals. Western allies have unparalleled potential human and material advantages over virtually any combination of foes—Russia’s and China’s combined GDPs, for example, are a fraction of the combined GDPs of Western allies. The United States and allies have the potential to contain the Sino-Russian entente, North Korea and Iran. But they have continually punted in this regard and now confront multiple existential challenges.

Washington’s actions, and more often inaction over many years, are a primary reason that authoritarian states now pose serious military threats to the West’s future. The longer they go unanswered, the more likely it is that today’s threats will be the source of tomorrow’s crises and catastrophes. Whether the allied powers will act in unity and urgency, or ultimately move in different, disparate directions that undercut Western security, is an open question.

Who and What is to Blame?

The United States and allies may, in the foreseeable future, face a reckoning with harsh security realities. The immediate reason for this possible reckoning, of course, is the growing power and aggression of a hostile, authoritarian bloc that seeks to recast the world order, violently if necessary.

However, the United States and allies have facilitated the security challenges they now face. The antecedents to Moscow’s aggression in Europe and China’s belligerent expansionism have been blatantly obvious for well over a decade. These threats would be less significant had Washington taken needed steps over the past three decades. But many political leaders, Republican and Democrat, have made decisions based on convenient illusions, and the severe results of those decisions are increasingly obvious. That is, contemporary challenges, in principle, were largely manageable had Western leaders not been captured by unrealistic expectations regarding Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and a cooperative, post-Cold War “new world order.” Instead, Washington has facilitated foes’ hostile moves and magnified their significance by its failure to recognize and prepare proactively for obviously mounting dangers; as two serious experts have emphasized, Western “weakness is provocative.”[17]

The U.S. defense budget, defense industrial base and nuclear infrastructure, starved for decades, have not caught up with the great power military threats now confronting the United States and allies.[18] And, for more than a decade beyond any reasonable expectation of Russian or Chinese reciprocity, Washington has continued to pursue antiquated arms control thinking and practices that constrain needed U.S. military preparation and deterrence capabilities. Many in Washington still fail to recognize their culpability in this regard. They have extended the immediate post-Cold War “strategic holiday,” “peace dividend” and fixation on arms control solutions decades longer than prudent.

For example, in an unprecedented threat context, rather than responding urgently to an increasingly dangerous and hostile bloc of states, the Biden Administration’s “grand strategy” appears to prioritize pressing the United States and the world into the progressive political mold fashionable in Washington. As Professor Colin Dueck writes, “If the Biden administration’s grand strategy could be summed up in a single phrase, it would be –progressive transformation at home and abroad.”[19]

Professor Dueck’s apt and jarring assessment of Washington’s focus is confirmed in numerous ways. In response to looming military threats, including the prospect of nuclear war, Washington seems uninterested in correcting course significantly. America now pays more annually to service the national debt than is devoted to national defense. Despite a threat context that is more dangerous than that of the Cold War, the percentage of GDP devoted to defense is roughly half of what it was during the Cold War. And, as currently planned, U.S. defense spending will essentially be flat from 2023 through 2028,[20] and adjusted for inflation, the real buying power of the U.S. defense budget will actually decline.[21] The Commander of Indo-Pacific Command reportedly testified that the administration’s current budget request is $11 billion short of that needed to provide the means identified as necessary to deter conflict with China.[22] At the strategic nuclear force level, by the end of the decade, it appears that Washington will have to retire aging existing forces before their replacements can be deployed. These are not the behaviors of a sensible alliance leader prepared to, or preparing to, address unprecedented security dangers.

To be sure, a lack of serious focus on emerging security threats is not new. Washington’s dramatic drawdown of forces from Europe, for example, began immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and inexplicably occurred even with Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008 and its first assault on Ukraine in 2014.[23]

Russia and China combine unprecedented nuclear buildups and expansionist geopolitical goals, yet Washington remains mired in some of the most optimistic thinking of the immediate post-Cold War period. For example, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for “urgent” U.S. moves to advance long-standing arms control goals with no prospect for Russian or Chinese reciprocation. In the harsh contemporary threat context, the NPR asserts that “Mutual, verifiable arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and prevent their use.”[24] The comforting expectation that arms control now is the “most effective” way to prevent Chinese or Russian nuclear employment is otherworldly thinking given Moscow’s and Beijing’s words and deeds over many years—yet it continues in Washington.

In a most disturbing reflection of Washington’s misplaced priorities, John Kerry recently asserted that if Moscow would “make a greater effort to reduce emissions now,” it would “open the door for people to feel better about” Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. [25] In fact, a Russian commitment to “reducing emissions” would do nothing to ease Moscow’s crime of invading Ukraine or alter its commitment to violently changing borders in Europe. Similarly, while China and Russia see themselves as in a long-term war with the United States, Washington continues to label engagement with Russia and China as “great power competition,”[26]—a rhetorical obfuscation that prolongs the pretense of a relatively benign threat environment rather than confront stark threat realities.

In contrast to the Biden Administration’s NPR, the near-contemporaneous Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s 2023 report repeatedly calls for “urgent” U.S. movement to meet looming security threats. The need to call for urgency, and the fact that it has been criticized as being overwrought,[27] is testament to Washington’s decades-long preference for convenient illusions over recognition of rising threats.

In short, the immediate cause of the West’s unprecedented security challenge is a hostile bloc of revisionist, authoritarian states. A deeper cause is the decades-long failure of Washington and allies to recognize and rise to the threat—which could have been managed given their unparalleled combined power potential. Ultimately unrealistic, antiquated U.S. and allied thinking and behavior are responsible for the significance of contemporary security challenges.

Burden Sharing

Some U.S. leaders claim that overly dependent allies who refuse to contribute enough for Western defense are the problem. To be sure, many wealthy allies, such as Holland, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy, devote an essentially trivial fraction of their GDP to Western security—preferring to rely on the United States. Their defense efforts are wholly out of sync with the character of threats posed by a hostile Sino-Russian entente.

Washington, however, has been on its own “strategic holiday” for decades and generally has passively indulged allied free riding. U.S. leaders have called on allies for greater defense “burden sharing” for decades. But Washington’s simultaneous actions have, with few exceptions, consistently countenanced allies’ continued indolence.

Washington continually assures allies that the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence umbrella covering them is solid and reliable. The United States can hardly criticize allies for engaging in wishful thinking and indolent behavior when it continually offers “ironclad” assurances. Why expect allies to spend serious national treasure when Washington promises its unfailing protection? Why should allies want to change a security formula that demands so little from them—until, of course, that formula is manifestly unreliable.

U.S. and allied thinking are comparably naïve and self-serving: Washington for seemingly expecting—beyond any logic—that its extended nuclear deterrent promises will continue to be credible absent significant new effort, and allies for imprudently going along for the ride because it is most convenient and inexpensive. Allies may be castigated for their share of this folly, but doing so is not slightly hypocritical, and U.S. finger-wagging will ultimately prove unhelpful without real U.S. commitment and leadership.

A Structural Problem: Extended Nuclear Deterrence Credibility

A credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is critical to prevent regional war and is an essential glue that holds the alliance system together. Regarding Finland’s recent joining of NATO, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said that, “I would start from the premise that we in Finland must have a real nuclear deterrent…which comes from the United States.”[28] In the absence of a credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, key allies have indicated that they could be compelled to acquire independent nuclear capabilities—which would likely unravel the alliances, unleash a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and cause unpredictable, paranoid responses by Russia and China.

It is important to pull back the curtain on the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella: It is the U.S. and NATO threat to escalate a regional non-nuclear conflict, potentially to a thermonuclear war, in response to an attack on an ally. It includes the U.S. threat that Washington may resort to a level of warfare on behalf of an ally that could escalate to the destruction of both allies and the United States.

When the United States was reasonably well-protected from nuclear attack by wide oceans and defenses, Washington could, in relative safety, issue such strategic nuclear deterrence threats on behalf of allies. However, as the Soviet Union became increasingly capable of targeting the United States with its own strategic nuclear forces, U.S. extended deterrence nuclear threats became increasingly problematic. During the Kennedy Administration, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev asked U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk directly why Moscow should believe that Washington would risk self-destruction in a thermonuclear war on behalf of distant allies. Rusk’s answer was reduced to, “Mr. Chairman, you will have to take into account the possibility we Americans are just [expletive] fools.”[29] This answer did not even try to claim any logical credibility for the U.S. extended deterrent, but that Moscow should fear that Washington might foolishly be self-destructive.

The questions, of course, are: How credible is this ‘we may be fools’ basis for extended deterrence, against which enemies, and in what contexts? In 1979, Henry Kissinger addressed this question directly, telling allies publicly that they should not expect the United States to abide by suicidal U.S. strategic nuclear threats for their security: “Our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute, because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization.”[30]

During the Cold War, Washington undertook numerous steps to restore credibility to the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella. This included maintaining an enormous standing U.S. force in Europe, including over 300,000 troops throughout the 1980s, to help prevent an easy fait accompli that might tempt Soviet aggression, and brandishing approximately 7,000 locally-deployed or deployable, nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) to buttress the credibility of the U.S. extended strategic deterrence umbrella. The expectation was that conventional forces and NSNW would add credibility to the nuclear umbrella and manifest links to the U.S. strategic nuclear threat of intercontinental missiles and bombers. The United States also developed a deterrence doctrine that planned limited strategic nuclear options in support of extended deterrence, in the expectation that limited U.S. strategic nuclear threats on behalf of allies would be more credible than massive, potentially self-destructive U.S. threats.[31] These theater and strategic moves intentionally added multiple layers to the U.S. extended deterrent in the search for what Herman Kahn called a “not incredible” U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

Yet, the United States and allies have since minimized or eliminated the multiple theater deterrent layers that reinforced the credibility of the U.S. extended strategic deterrent during the Cold War—and, with few exceptions, have not advanced new and different measures to replace them. The 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews touted U.S. advanced conventional weapons as deterrence tools enabling Washington to reduce the number of, and reliance on, nuclear forces. But the United States has done very little in terms of actually deploying advanced conventional weapons; key allies have noticed. And, while Moscow disdains arms control, expands its nuclear arsenal, and increases its reliance on nuclear weapons,[32] Washington inexplicably continues to prioritize the goals of constraining its strategic and theater capabilities, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, as emphasized in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. This includes continuing to embrace unmitigated vulnerability to Chinese and Russian strategic missiles, rejecting new NSNW, abiding by arms control agreements that Russia has clearly abandoned, and harboring an enduring aspiration for a No-First-Use nuclear policy that would serve only to further degrade extended nuclear deterrence credibility, as multiple allies have warned for decades. These behaviors reflect a Washington that remains largely stuck in the post-Cold War “strategic holiday,” “peace dividend,” and demonstrably vapid hope that arms control can solve serious force posture problems.

This continuing fundamental lack of Western realism contributes to the declining credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent—a structural problem for the U.S. alliance system given the hostile bloc now confronting the West. The burden for extended nuclear deterrence is largely on the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, which may be insufficiently credible for this purpose without layers of supporting deterrence capabilities because, as Henry Kissinger emphasized in 1979, it connotes a threat Washington “cannot possibly mean” and “should not want to execute.”

Conclusion

Washington and many allies continue to behave as if they are still in the immediate post-Cold War springtime of great expectations. It may be too late to deter a reckoning that decades of indolence and wishful thinking have effectively invited. Recognizing and addressing the threats and structural problems that now beleaguer U.S. global alliances are urgent needs. That recognition and effort must begin in Washington. Ronald Reagan’s famous Cold War speech, “A Time for Choosing,” included a line that fully pertains to Washington and allies today: “We’re at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it’s been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening.”[33]

[1] Michael J. Boskin and Kiran Sridhar, “Biden’s Budget Neglects the Military,” The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2024, p. A17, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-budget-neglects-the-military-huge-gap-in-american-strength-and-readiness-142ccc30.

[2] See, for example, Eckhard Lübkemeier and Michael Rühle, “Nuklearmacht Europa: Braucht Europa gemeinsame Nukearwaffen? Ein Für and Wider,” Internationale Politick, No. 1 (Januar/Februar 2024), pp. 110-113.

[3] See, for example, Jesse Johnson, “Japan should consider hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, Abe says,” Japan Times, February 27, 2023, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/27/national/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-japan-nuclear-weapons-taiwan/.

[4] Hiroyuki Akita, “Why nuclear arms debate in South Korea cannot be underestimated: U.S. allies must think outside the box to counter new threats from North Korea,” Nikkei Asia Online (Japan), May 5, 2023, available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Why-nuclear-arms-debate-in-South-Korea-cannot-be-underestimated.

[5] Eric S. Edelman, David Manning, and Franklin C. Miller, “NATO’s Decision Process Has an Achilles’ Heel,” New Atlanticist, March 12, 2024, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/natos-decision-process-has-an-achilles-heel/.

[6] See, for example, Laura Zhou, “China and New Zealand are a ‘force for stability’ in a turbulent world, says Foreign Minister Wang Yi,” South China Morning Post, March 18, 2024, available at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3255852/china-and-new-zealand-are-force-stability-turbulent-world-says-foreign-minister-wang-yi.

[7] See for example, “Macron Says Europe Should Not Follow U.S. or Chinese Policy Over Taiwan,” Reuters, in, U.S. News and World Report, April 9, 2023, available at https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-04-09/macron-says-europe-should-not-follow-u-s-or-chinese-policy-over-taiwan. See also, “After Macron, EU Chief Seeks ‘Independent’ China Policy, Says Abandon US’ ‘Confrontational’ Approach,” Times Now (India), May 1, 2023, available at https://www.timesnownews.com/videos/news-plus/after-macron-eu-chief-seeks-independent-china-policy-says-abandon-us-confrontational-approach-video-99916110.

[8] See Vivienne Machi, Tom Kington, Andrew Chuter, “French visions for an autonomous Europe proves elusive,” Defensenews.com, May 9, 2023, available at https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/05/09/french-vision-for-an-autonomous-europe-proves-elusive/#:~:text=EUROPE%20and%20WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20After%20Russia,the%20continent%20standing%20alone%20militarily.

[9] Dylan Robertson, “Canada should link with Europe, surpass ‘weak’ military engagement, French envoy,” The Globe and Mail, April 5, 2023, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-should-link-with-europe-surpass-weak-military-engagement-french/.

[10] Maximilian Terhalle and Kees Klompenhouwer, “Facing Europe’s nuclear necessities, Deterrence can no longer be seen as just a bipolar equation — and it’s time NATO addresses this fact,” POLITICO Europe Online, April 22, 2023, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/facing-europe-nuclear-necessities-strategy-vulnerability-war-weapon/.

[11] Shmuel Bar, “Self-perceptions and Nuclear Weapons,” Information Series, No. 558 (July 2023), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/shmuel-bar-self-perceptions-and-nuclear-weapons-no-558-july-13-2023/.

[12] See for example, Timothy W. Martin, “Top U.S. General Sees Changing Nuclear Threat From North Korea,” The Wall Street Journal Online, March 11, 2024, available at https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/top-u-s-general-sees-changing-nuclear-threat-from-north-korea-4788270a.

[13] See, for example, Wolfgang Panofsky, “Nuclear Insecurity: Correcting Washington’s Dangerous Posture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (September/October 2007), pp. 113-114; David E. Sanger, “Don’t Shoot. We’re Not Ready,” The New York Times, June 25, 2006, p. 1; Mike Moore, “Missile Defenses, Relabeled,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 4 (July/August, 2002), p. 22; Joseph Cirincione, “A Much Less Explosive Trend,” The Washington Post, March 10, 2002, p. B-3; Carl Levin, Remarks of Senator Carl Levin on National Missile Defense, National Defense University Forum Breakfast on Ballistic Missile Defense, May 11, 2001, p. 4, available at www.senate.g0v/~levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=209421; Craig Eisendrath, “Missile Defense System Flawed Technically, Unwise Politically,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 23, 2001; and, Sen. Joseph Biden, “Why Democrats Oppose Billions More on Missiles” (Letter to the editor), The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2006, p. A11.

[14] The U.S. Commander in the Indo-Pacific reportedly testified before Congress that Beijing is on track to its goal of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027. See, Bill Gertz, “U.S. Indo-Pacific commander warns of growing danger of war over Taiwan: Aquilino tells lawmakers $11 billion in added funds needed to deter China,” Washington Times Online, Mar. 21, 2024, available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/mar/21/us-indo-pacific-commander-warns-of-growing-danger-/; Jesse Johnson, “China on track to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, U.S. commander says,” Japan Times Online (Japan), March 21, 2024, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/03/21/asia-pacific/politics/taiwan-china-invasion-2027/#:~:text=The%20top%20U.S.%20military%20commander,a%20single%20day%20this%20year.

[15] See Mark B. Schneider, “The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Information Series, No. 579 (March 18, 2024), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/mark-b-schneider-the-leaked-russian-nuclear-documents-and-russian-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-no-579-march-18-2024/.

[16] Ronny Reyes, “CIA estimated 50% chance that Russia would nuke Ukraine if it risked losing war: report,” New York Post, March 10, 2024, available at https://nypost.com/2024/03/10/world-news/cia-warned-50-chance-that-russia-would-nuke-ukraine-report/.

[17] Eric Edelman and Frank Miller, “Understanding that Weakness is Provocative is Deterrence 101,” The Dispatch, August 8, 2022, available at https://thedispatch.com/article/understanding-that-weakness-is-provocative/.

[18] For a discussion of frustrated efforts to align the defense budget with threat realities see, Bryant Harris, “A Nearly $1 Trillion Defense Budget Faces Headwinds at Home and Abroad,” Defense News Online, March 7, 2024, available at https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2024/03/07/a-nearly-1-trillion-defense-budget-faces-headwinds-at-home-and-abroad/.

[19] See Colin Dueck, “The Biden Doctrine,” The Caravan, Hoover Institution, March 5, 2024, available at, https://www.hoover.org/research/biden-doctrine. (Emphasis in original).

[20] Congressional Budget Office Report, Long-Term Implications of the 2024 Future Defense Program, October 25, 2023, available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59511#:~:text=The%20proposed%20budget%20for%20DoD,2024%20in%20the%20previous%20FYDP.

[21] Elaine McCusker, “Don’t Be Fooled by Biden’s Budget: He’s Cutting Military Spending as Our Needs Grow,” AEI Op-Ed, March 10, 2023, available at https://www.aei.org/op-eds/dont-be-fooled-by-bidens-budget-hes-cutting-military-spending-as-our-needs-grow/.

[22] As reported in, Gertz, “U.S. Indo-Pacific commander warns of growing danger of war over Taiwan,” op. cit.

[23] See, Michael Allen, Carla Martinez Machain, and Michael Flynn, “The US Military Presence in Europe Has Been Declining for 30 Years—the Current Crisis in Ukraine May Reverse That Trend,” The Conversation (January 5, 2022), available at https://theconversation.com/the-us-military-presence-in-europe-has-been-declining-for-30-years-the-current-crisis-in-ukraine-may-reverse-that-trend-175595.

[24] Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, October 2022, p. 16, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

[25] Quoted in, Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, “John Kerry says people would ‘feel better’ about the Ukraine war if Russia would reduce emissions,” Fox News, March 6, 2024, available at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/john-kerry-says-people-feel-better-about-ukraine-war-russia-reduce-emissions.

[26] 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., p. 5.

[27] For example, Harlan K. Ullman, “America’s strategic nuclear posture review is miles off the mark,” The Hill Online, October 30, 2023, available at https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4282404-americas-strategic-nuclear-posture-more-deterrence-and-more-weapons/.

[28] Anne Kauranen and Louise Breusch Rasmussen, “NATO’s nuclear deterrent must be real for Finland, says new president,” Reuters, March 1, 2024, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finland-inaugurates-alexander-stubb-president-nato-era-2024-0301/#:~:text=NATO’s%20nuclear%20deterrent%20must%20be%20real%20for%20Finland%2C%20says%20new%20president,By%20Anne%20Kauranen&text=HELSINKI%2C%20March%201%20(Reuters),fought%20election%20on%20Feb.%2011.

[29] Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), p. 228. See also, Arnold Beichman, “How Foolish Khrushchev Nearly Started World War III,” The Washington Times, October 3, 2004, p. B 8.

[30] Henry Kissinger, “The Future of NATO,” in, NATO, The Next Thirty Years, Kenneth Myers, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 8.

[31] See, Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), pp. 95-96.

[32] For discussions of increasing reliance see, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 6, 2023), p. 14, available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reportspublications/reports-publications-2023; and, The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 2022), p. 26, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

[33] Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing, October 27, 1964, available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/ronald-reagan/time-choosing-speech-october-27-1964.

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19. S Korean trade, diplomacy trending away from China

Excerpts:

It remains to be seen how China grapples with closer Japan-South Korea relations and whether China will achieve the normalization of a “win-win-win” relationship among the three countries “with a particular emphasis on Tokyo and Seoul demonstrating more strategic autonomy” – or whether the Camp David Summit will create additional impediments and constraints on China’s ability to project its sphere of influence in the region.

With Yoon in office until 2027, Seoul’s emphasis on closer trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, as well as on reducing dependency on China’s market, appears likely to continue. If Beijing does not adopt a more proactive approach to the ROK, its ties may have atrophied considerably Seoul by then, even if a friendlier president has assumed office.

S Korean trade, diplomacy trending away from China

Seoul drawing away from China’s geoeconomic orbit as South Korean investment in US reinforces Yoon administration’s geopolitical choices

By SCOTT SNYDER AND SEE-WON BYUN

MARCH 28, 2024

asiatimes.com · by Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun

South Korea is trending away from economic dependence on China and increasing its trilateral interactions with Washington and Tokyo. Thus far, Beijing appears unsure of how to respond, beyond calls for “cooperation” and encouragement for Seoul to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy.

A significant measure of the impact of South Korea’s evolution in geopolitical orientation is reflected in the shift in South Korea’s trade relations: The United States became South Korea’s number one export destination in December 2023, surpassing China for the first time since 2004.

South Korea also recorded an US$18 billion trade deficit with China, the first bilateral deficit with China in 31 years. South Korean exports to China in 2023 dropped 20% year-on-year, to $124.8 billion, while imports from China dipped 8% year-on-year, to $142.8 billion.

Strong investment flows to the United States by South Korea’s major conglomerates have resulted in a boost in South Korean car, automobile part and automotive battery exports. If such trends continue, South Korea in 2024 may have the distinction of being the only country adjacent to China for which China is not its number one trade partner.

Definitely affecting the bilateral relationship was the December 2023 announcement by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of its 3050 Strategy initiative designed to stabilize South Korea’s supply chains and reduce dependence on China to less than 50% by 2030.

The trade ministry’s effort to reduce dependence on China in its supply chains responds to a deeper realization in South Korea of that country’s vulnerability to possible Chinese economic retaliation.

The impact of deepening geostrategic rivalry is clearly contributing to a reconfiguring of political and economic relationships in Northeast Asia.

South Korea appears to be drawing away from China’s geoeconomic orbit as South Korean investment in the United States reinforces the geopolitical choices of the Yoon administration.

Meanwhile, Chinese diplomacy toward Seoul has sputtered forward, driven more by multilateral gatherings involving the two countries than any sense of strategic purpose.

Ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, but these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for substantive bilateral meetings.

Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko also failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry.

Mixed signals

Han and Xi meet. Photo: Chinese government

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s September 2023 visit to China was the first by a South Korean prime minister in over four years and generated expectations in South Korea that Chinese President Xi Jinping might make his first visit to Seoul since 2014.

Han requested China’s support for South Korea’s bid to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan and for the Yoon administration’s “audacious initiative” toward North Korea.

Xi emphasized the importance of “friendly cooperation” and expressed hope that South Korea “will work with China in the same direction, [and] take policies and actions that can reflect the importance it attaches to the development of China-ROK relations …”

However, Liaoning University Professor Lü Chao stated in the Global Times that political tensions generated by President Yoon’s pro-US approach and statements regarding Taiwan had “become a significant barrier to revive the three-way cooperation mechanism” between China, Japan, and South Korea.

Another development affecting the bilateral China-South Korea relationship was the announcement of a US-South Korea joint effort to counter disinformation.

The signing of the US-South Korea memorandum of understanding occurred on the occasion of US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Liz Allen’s visit to Seoul in December, reflecting South Korean concerns about false propaganda and global disinformation campaigns.

The signing of the MOU is even more salient in light of reports that the Chinese Ministry of State Security attempted to hack South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and infiltrated the computer network of the Presidential Office during the Moon Jae-in administration (2017-22).

Missed opportunities

Annual ASEAN and APEC meetings have long provided opportunities for national leaders to hold summit meetings, such as when Yoon met Xi at the November 2022 G20 Summit in Bali. But the November 2023 APEC meeting in San Francisco generated only an exchange of greetings between Xi and Yoon.

Likewise, despite Xi’s expression of willingness to visit Seoul in his meeting with Han, South Korea’s preparations to host the first leader-level trilateral meeting with China and Japan yielded no fruit in 2023.

President Yoon and Premier Li Qiang held two brief encounters in quick succession on the sidelines of the ASEAN and G20 summits in early September. Yoon expressed hope that the North Korean nuclear issue would not be an obstacle to improved China-South Korea relations. Premier Li emphasized the need to expand cooperation to “seek mutual benefit and win-win results.”

Chinese scholar Zhan Debin has laid out the obstacles to the realization of a trilateral summit in a Global Times column pointedly titled “South Needs to Prove Sincerity for China-Japan-SK Summit.” The article takes issue with the proposition that South Korea will be able to induce greater respect from China based on closer relations with the United States and Japan, asserting that South Korea has instead weakened its “autonomy.”

Second, Zhan points to Yoon’s disavowal of the Moon-era “three nos and one restriction” understanding regarding THAAD missile defense and its disregard for Chinese “red lines” on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang. Zhan concludes that “if South Korea is pushing for the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral talk because of US instructions, it would be better not to hold the meeting at all.”

Trying trilateral summitry

Amid such rhetoric, China participated in the trilateral senior officials’ meeting in Seoul in late September and meetings with ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin. Those meetings were accompanied by a more optimistic tone from the Global Times, emphasizing the unchanged framework of “gain from cooperation, lose from confrontation” stemming from economic interdependence, economic development, and close geographical and cultural ties.

However, Chinese commentators responded negatively to the virtual US-Japan-South Korea defense ministerial meeting in mid-November alongside the US-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul.

Liaoning University’s Lu Chao suggested that, following the Camp David Summit, enhanced United States-Japan-South Korea military cooperation contributed to a worsening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. And China Foreign Affairs University’s Li Haidong asserted that such ties would make the Korean security situation more volatile.

Park Jin met Wang Yi on the sidelines of the trilateral China-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting in Busan at the end of November. The South Korean readout from the bilateral meeting emphasized joint efforts to strengthen mutual understanding, strengthen strategic communication, and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity through economic cooperation, promotion of people-to-people exchanges, and restoring and normalizing cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea.

The Chinese readout reported Wang’s description of changes in the international and regional landscapes and their impact on China-South Korea relations in greater detail. Wang emphasized that “China and the ROK are neighbors … and this objective fact will never change,” arguing that cooperation is the only path through which to develop a mutually trusting and respectful relationship.

Chinese and South Korean readouts of the trilateral meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa emphasized efforts to institutionalize cooperation through a trilateral leader-level summit at the earliest possible time and deepen substantive trilateral cooperation.

In addition to the foreign ministerial meeting, the three countries successfully hosted the 16th trilateral health ministers’ meeting in early December, the first time the gathering had been held in four years.

Shifting regional orientation

It remains to be seen how China grapples with closer Japan-South Korea relations and whether China will achieve the normalization of a “win-win-win” relationship among the three countries “with a particular emphasis on Tokyo and Seoul demonstrating more strategic autonomy” – or whether the Camp David Summit will create additional impediments and constraints on China’s ability to project its sphere of influence in the region.

With Yoon in office until 2027, Seoul’s emphasis on closer trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, as well as on reducing dependency on China’s market, appears likely to continue. If Beijing does not adopt a more proactive approach to the ROK, its ties may have atrophied considerably Seoul by then, even if a friendlier president has assumed office.

Scott Snyder (ssnyder@keia.org) will assume the role of president of the Korea Economic Institute of America in Washington, DC, in April 2024 and is a senior advisor for Pacific Forum. See-Won Byun (sbyun@sfsu.edu) is an assistant professor of international relations at San Francisco State University.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. The article summarizes the authors’ chapter in the January 2024 issue of Comparative Connections, which can be read in its entirety here.

asiatimes.com · by Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun

20. The World’s Unpopular Leaders

Not good signs for many of the world's major democracies. Of course only democracies allow such criticism. while the axis of dictators/totalitarians do not allow such public political dissent.

Graphics at the link.

4 Common problems noted: Inflation, Immigration, Inequality, Incumbency

The World’s Unpopular Leaders

Why Biden isn’t alone with his low approval ratings.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/28/briefing/biden-approval-ratings-world-leaders.html

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President Biden with the French president, Emmanuel Macron.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By German Lopez

March 28, 2024, 6:27 a.m. ET

You’re reading The Morning newsletter. Make sense of the day’s news and ideas. David Leonhardt and Times journalists guide you through what’s happening — and why it matters. Get it sent to your inbox.

By many measures, President Biden is very unpopular. Since at least World War II, no president has had a worse disapproval rating at this point in his term.

Relative to his international peers, however, Biden looks much better. Many leaders of developed democracies have disapproval ratings even higher than Biden’s, as this chart by my colleague Ashley Wu shows:

Leaders’ disapproval ratings in developed democracies

A chart shows disapproval ratings for leaders in select developed democracies like the U.S., Germany, U.K. and Japan. Most leaders shown have a disapproval rating over 50 percent.

50%

100

73% disapprove

Olaf Scholz (Germany)

Emmanuel Macron (France)

Yoon Suk Yeol (S. Korea)

Fumio Kishida (Japan)

Rishi Sunak (U.K.)

Justin Trudeau (Canada)

Joe Biden (U.S.)

Alexander De Croo (Belgium)

Note: Data was collected from Feb. 26 to March 6, 2024.Source: Morning ConsultBy Ashley Wu

Many world leaders are also up for re-election. More than 60 countries — half of the world’s population — will vote or have voted this year. Most of the countries in the chart above will vote in national or European Union elections in the coming months.

Why are people so upset with their leaders? Some explanations are local, but four global issues have driven much of the public’s anger. Call them the four I’s: inflation, immigration, inequality and incumbency.

1. Inflation

The world has seen a sharp increase in prices over the past few years. As bad as inflation has been in the U.S., it has been worse in European countries more directly affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Rising prices anger voters. Your hard-earned money is worth less. “When prices rise, it feels like something is taken away from you,” my colleague Jeanna Smialek, who covers the U.S. economy, has said. And people direct much of that anger toward their leaders.

People also don’t like the solution to inflation. To slow price increases, central banks have raised interest rates. But higher interest rates also make loans, credit card payments and mortgages more expensive. This helps explain why people are so upset even as inflation has fallen.

2. Immigration

The U.S. and Europe have dealt with multiple migration and refugee crises in the past decade. Those crises have fueled anger against the more mainstream political parties that tend to be in charge in developed countries.

More immigration can have advantages, particularly for growing economies and reducing inflation. But for many people, other considerations win out. They worry that immigrants use government resources, take jobs, lower wages and change their country’s culture. Illegal immigration, in particular, upsets them by contributing to a broader sense of chaos and lawlessness.

And they blame their leaders for it. Sometimes, they will support once-fringe, far-right candidates — as happened in the Netherlands and Italy in the last couple years. These politicians often want to shut down most, if not all, immigration.

“There are a lot of people who are not right-wing themselves, but they really care about immigration,” said Sonnet Frisbie, deputy head of political intelligence at the polling firm Morning Consult. “They feel like centrist and center-left parties don’t represent their views.”

3. Inequality

Across the world, the rich have captured a growing share of income. Big companies keep getting bigger. A few individuals have amassed more wealth than entire countries. Many people now believe that the wealthiest have pulled ahead while everyone else has lagged behind (although some economists disagree).

The growing sentiment has contributed to greater distrust of elites, including national leaders. People feel that those in charge have taken advantage of their power to enrich themselves and their friends. That distrust now appears in approval ratings.

4. Incumbency

Incumbents typically have an electoral advantage over challengers. But that advantage can diminish over time. Voters tend to tire of national leaders the longer they’re in power — what political scientists call “the cost of ruling.” Consider that two-term presidents in the U.S. are rarely succeeded by a president of the same party. The cost of ruling “is a remarkably consistent pattern across countries,” said Lee Drutman, a political scientist at New America, a liberal think tank.

Image

Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister.Credit...Matthew Abbott for The New York Times

Many current world leaders, or at least their political parties, have been in power for a while. Japan’s top party has led the country for most of the last seven decades. Leaders or parties in France, Canada and Britain have ruled for seven to 14 years. In the U.S., Democrats have held the White House for 11 of the last 15 years.

The trend is not universal. India’s prime minister is popular after nearly a decade in office. Germany’s chancellor is unpopular despite coming to power a little more than two years ago. Still, the cost of ruling applies more often than not.

The bottom line

Over the past several years, the world has often felt chaotic and uncertain. Many people hoped that the end of the Covid pandemic would bring normalcy. Instead, inflation spiked. Longer-term problems, such as illegal immigration and inequality, persist. National leaders have struggled to address these issues, often despite many years in power. The result is widespread disapproval of the people running the world. And many of them are now at risk of losing their jobs this year.

Related: These maps show where Biden faces protest voters.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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