Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

I will be traveling and working in a different time zone the next couple of days so my daily distro will be somewhat schedule.

Quotes of the Day:

“When a man is prey to his emotions, he is not his own master.”

- Baruch Spinoza

“From the errors of others, a wise man corrects his own.”

- Publilius Cyrus

“To listen well, you may have to restrain yourself from disagreeing or giving advice or talking about your own experience. Temporarily at least, listening is a one sided relationship.”

- Michael Nichols

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2023

2. Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China

3. Competition With China Drives FY 2024 Budget Request

4. Summit for Democracy: Democracy Cohort Outcomes - United States Department of State

5. Gendered Disinformation: Tactics, Themes, and Trends by Foreign Malign Actors - United States Department of State

6. Pentagon Woos Silicon Valley to Join Ranks of Arms Makers

7. Ukraine launches U.S. "small diameter" bomb with longer range than HIMARS

8. China seeks stalemate in Ukraine, US diversion from Taiwan

9. For shared human values: Forum on democracy opens in Beijing

10. Ukraine Offensive Takes Shape, With Big Unknowns

11. Americans hooked on Chinese apps

12. FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs Executive Order to Prohibit U.S. Government Use of Commercial Spyware that Poses Risks to National Security

13. Why is Biden doing another pointless Summit for Democracy?

14. China spent $240 billion bailing out 'Belt and Road' countries - study

15. The U.S. Should Get Over Its Short War Obsession

16. Why You Fell for the Fake Pope Coat

17. USAID, Internews, and Microsoft Announce Public-Private Partnership to Develop Media Viability Accelerator

18. Russian Nukes in Belarus: Just Another Gimmick by Putin

19. Here Is Everything Taiwan Needs to Stop a Chinese Invasion

20. Pick a True Believer to Run Your Military Campaigns

21. Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War

22. How to Protect American Democracy

23. Over-the-Horizon and Under the Threshold: Bringing Unconventional Warfare to Ukraine

24. Building R2-D2 - (AI)

25: Poll: Cut federal spending — but not big-ticket programs

26. He came to D.C. as a Brazilian student. The U.S. says he was a Russian spy.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2023

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group forces have likely taken the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and continue to make gains within the city.
Russian and Ukrainian sources speculated that Lieutenant General Sergei Kuzmenko will replace Colonel General Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander.
Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be using his influence in Russia’s mainstream media landscape to present himself as a potential contender in Russia’s 2024 presidential elections.
High-ranking Russian officials continue to set domestic conditions for a protracted war.
The cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely continuing to consume a substantial portion of the Russian Federal Budget.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree removing the upper age limit for Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen serving in occupied Ukraine until January 1, 2026.
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to expand Russia’s bureaucratic and administrative control of occupied areas of Ukraine.
The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on March 28 Belarus’ intent to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 28, 2023

Mar 28, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 28, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Wagner Group forces have likely taken the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and continue to make gains within the city. Russian milbloggers widely claimed on March 28 that Wagner fighters have captured the AZOM complex and are working to clear the area of remaining Ukrainian forces.[1] These claims are relatively consistent with available visual evidence of Russian presence in the AZOM complex. Geolocated footage posted on March 26 shows a military correspondent from Russian outlet RIA Novosti moving around the territory of the complex with apparent ease, indicating that Wagner likely controls enough of the plant to host media personalities in relative safety.[2] RIA Novosti correspondent Sergei Shilov additionally visited AZOM on March 28 and indicated that fighting has now moved to the industrial zone south of AZOM.[3] Several Russian milbloggers also claimed on March 28 that Wagner fighters have advanced closer to Bakhmut’s city center, taken control of the city market, and reached the Palace of Culture.[4] These claims are plausible considering geolocated visual evidence of Wagner’s advances towards the city center posted on March 28, as well as combat footage of Ukrainian infantry engaging in small arms exchanges with Russian forces near the Palace of Culture and central market area in Bakhmut city’s center.[5] Wagner is likely working to consolidate gains in northern and central Bakhmut to push towards the city center and expand its zone of control into western Bakhmut. ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced into an additional five percent of Bakhmut in the last seven days and that they currently occupy roughly 65 percent of the city.

Russian and Ukrainian sources speculated that Lieutenant General Sergei Kuzmenko will replace Colonel General Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander.[6] Kuzmenko previously served as the commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army from 2015 to 2019 and more recently as a department head at the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Academy.[7] Kuzmenko has never held a command position comparable to the role of a military district commander, and his appointment as EMD commander would be an unusual step. Russian military authorities reportedly dismissed Muradov due to battlefield failures and significant losses in western Donetsk Oblast, and Kuzmenko would likely inherit expectations to reverse the total lack of progress in the EMD’s zone of responsibility in Ukraine.[8] There is no indication that Kuzmenko would be better equipped to succeed in overseeing offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast with even further degraded forces than the more experienced Muradov. ISW has not observed any confirmation that Russian military officials have dismissed Muradov as EMD commander or that Kuzmenko has assumed the role.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be using his influence in Russia’s mainstream media landscape to present himself as a contender in Russia’s 2024 presidential elections. Prigozhin’s own Federal News Agency published an interview that Prigozhin conducted with Russian journalists from Russia Today, RIA Novosti and Federal News Agency on March 14.[9] This interview was noteworthy for its unique format--during the interview Prigozhin seemed to mimic the way that Russian President Vladimir Putin films his choreographed public meetings, either to mock Putin quietly or to suggest subtly that Prigozhin could become Russian president like Putin. The choreography and staging of Prigozhin’s interview places Prigozhin in the camera’s frame at Prigozhin’s desk across from his audience in the same way that Putin’s filmed meetings and photo ops usually do.[10] This film style is unusual for Prigozhin, as Prigozhin’s public video statements typically do not employ such a sterile format; Prigozhin has usually opted to film himself with wide shots on battlefields or in dynamic but staged videos that strive to appear candid and gritty.[11] Prigozhin also used this interview to reiterate his previous arguments about the need to instill hardline ideology in Russian fighters and insinuate that the Russian Ministry of Defense is deliberately depriving the Wagner Group of artillery ammunition.[12]

Prigozhin may seek to parody Putin’s cinematography style as part of a larger trolling campaign to attack the Kremlin or draw tacit parallels between Prigozhin and the office of the Russian presidency. Prigozhin has previously insinuated that he could replace Putin. Prigozhin made a sarcastic announcement on March 11 that he will run for the Ukrainian presidency in 2024 — a statement that a prominent Kremlin-linked Russian scholar argued implicitly promoted a narrative that Prigozhin would run in Russia’s presidential elections which are also scheduled for 2024.[13] Prigozhin directly attacked Putin’s presidential administration on January 18 and insinuated that some officials working there are traitors who want Russia to lose the war in Ukraine — one of Prigozhin’s boldest attacks against the Kremlin to date.[14] Prigozhin also denied the Kremlin’s claims that Russia is fighting NATO in Ukraine and questioned whether there are actually Nazis in Ukraine as the Kremlin — and specifically Putin — constantly claims.[15] Prigozhin’s recent behavior — regardless of its intent — is advancing a narrative among Russian society that Prigozhin has larger political aspirations in Russia. Former Russian officer and convicted war criminal Igor Girkin (one of Prigozhin’s critics) joked on March 26 that Prigozhin is like Julius Caesar, except that Julius Caesar first achieved military victories before agitating for his political advancement — likely referring to Prigozhin’s failure to deliver on his reported promise to capture Bakhmut by September 2022.[16]

High-ranking Russian officials continue a campaign begun in December 2022 to set domestic conditions for a protracted war both in private and in public. The Guardian, citing anonymous internal sources, reported on March 28 that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told a group of Russian political and cultural elite that “things will get much harder” and that the current situation (in reference to the war) “will take a very, very, long time” during a private dinner in December 2022.[17] Peskov’s reported warning supports ISW’s assessment that Russian authorities have been preparing multiple aspects of Russian society for a protracted war through careful setting of information conditions and engagement of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) since the end of 2022.[18] Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu relatedly visited artillery shell production facilities in Chelyabinsk and Kirov oblasts on March 28 and claimed that Russian ammunition production has increased significantly over the past year, promising that production will increase a further seven to eight times for certain unspecified artillery products by the end of the year.[19] Shoigu’s visit to artillery factories is the latest in a slew of choreographed visits to DIB facilities by various Russian officials and is part of a concerted effort to present the Russian DIB as effective in advance of a protracted war effort.[20]

The Russian budget continues to reflect the overall costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia has classified an unprecedented one-third of its entire budget expenditures and noted that classified spending as of March 24 is twice as high as it was during the same period in 2022.[21] Bloomberg also found that Russian defense and security spending is the second largest budget category after spending on social programs.[22] Bloomberg concluded that the classified share of the Russian budget will account for nearly a quarter of all expenditures for the whole of 2023 and will be due to an increase in expenses classed as “other expenses in the field of national defense.”[23] Russian outlet RBC relatedly reported on March 28 that the Russian Ministry of Finance plans to submit a proposal to reduce the number of federal state institutions subordinate to federal authorities in order to increase the efficiency of budget expenditure management.[24] Such expenditure manipulations suggest that Russia is trying to cut spending in a variety of spheres to support increased defense spending, further responding to costs associated with the war and setting conditions for a long war.

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group forces have likely taken the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and continue to make gains within the city.
Russian and Ukrainian sources speculated that Lieutenant General Sergei Kuzmenko will replace Colonel General Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander.
Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be using his influence in Russia’s mainstream media landscape to present himself as a potential contender in Russia’s 2024 presidential elections.
High-ranking Russian officials continue to set domestic conditions for a protracted war.
The cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely continuing to consume a substantial portion of the Russian Federal Budget.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree removing the upper age limit for Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen serving in occupied Ukraine until January 1, 2026.
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to expand Russia’s bureaucratic and administrative control of occupied areas of Ukraine.
The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on March 28 Belarus’ intent to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 28. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove), Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), Verkhnokamyanske (18km south of Kreminna), and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on March 28 that there were 13 combat clashes along this line in the last day and that while Russian forces have concentrated some of their best troops in this area, they are suffering widespread shortages in armored vehicles.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (Western Military District) disrupted the transfer of Ukrainian reserves northeast of Kupyansk near Hryanykivka (20km northeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (7km northeast of Kupyansk).[27] Geolocated footage posted on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces have made a limited advance in a forest area near Dibrova, about 6km west of Kreminna.[28] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces have recently made unspecified advances west of Kreminna in the Lyman direction.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on March 28 and have made advances within the city. Geolocated footage published on March 28 suggests that Russian forces likely advanced in southern Bakhmut and up to the Bakhmut City Market in Central Bakhmut.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces established sufficient river crossings across the Bakhmutka river and that fighting in Bakhmut is increasingly shifting to western parts of the city.[31] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations south and east of Ivanivske but have not managed to advance closer to the T0504 highway as of March 27.[32] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin claimed on March 28 that the Russian grouping of forces near Mayorsk (20km southwest of Bakhmut) does not currently have immediate orders for offensives.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations on Bakhmut itself, within 11km northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka, and within 16km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Ozarianivka.[34] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on March 28 that there were 19 combat clashes in the Bakhmut area with 14 directly in Bakhmut itself.[35]

Russian forces may be regrouping in the Bakhmut area. Cherevaty reported that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in and around Bakhmut has decreased over the past three days and that this may indicate that Russian forces are regrouping.[36] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be diverting Russian forces and resources away from the Bakhmut area to intensify offensives on Avdiivka, although Russian forces may choose to recommit personnel and resources to offensive operations on Bakhmut after a potential regrouping their forces.[37] Russian forces may need to regroup around Bakhmut because the Wagner Group has increasingly expended its pool of convict recruits, both during attritional assaults on the battlefield and as a large portion of convicts complete their six-month contracts and return to Russia.[38] Russian forces could conduct a regrouping in and around Bakhmut and add a larger proportion of conventional forces to what remains of the Wagner Group contingent in the area. Such a Russian regrouping would likely allow Russian forces to intensify offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and possibly secure gains at a more significant rate.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline on March 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka itself, Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka), and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Marinka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces are attempting to move further west of Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) aiming to encircle Avdiivka.[40] Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported on March 27 that Russian forces are considering the withdrawal of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) and the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) from the Avdiivka-Marinka area combat zone for replenishment.[41] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on March 28 that the 10th Tank Regiment (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) likely lost a large portion of its tanks in efforts to surround Avdiivka from the south in recent days.[42] Elements of the 3rd Army Corps likely suffered significant losses during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast in September of 2022, and the formations deployed to the outskirts of Donetsk City may be the remaining combat effective elements of the 3rd Army Corps or other already degraded formations.[43] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that elements of the DNR 1st Army Corps including the ”Sparta“ Battalion, the “Somali“ Battalion, and the 11th Regiment are conducting assault operations in various directions in the Avdiivka area but that Russian forces are not close to capturing Avdiivka.[44] A Russian milblogger amplified footage of the DNR 9thBrigade (formerly the 9th regiment of the DNR People’s Militia) operating near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[45] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied Ukrainian reports that Wagner Group fighters are planning to deploy to the Avdiivka area and stated that Wagner fighters have never fought in the area, although an obituary for a seasoned Wagner fighter claims that the fighter died in the Avdiivka area.[46]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on March 28. Pushilin claimed that there are positional battles near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) and that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in the area.[47] Dmytrashkivskyi reported that Russian forces recently introduced two unspecified tank units and a special unit of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division to replenish elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet in the last week.[48] The 155thNaval Infantry Brigade previously suffered significant losses in offensive operations in the Vuhledar area in early 2023, and Russian forces may be attempting to reconstitute the unit to resume offensive operations on Vuhledar. Russian forces have reportedly reconstituted the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade as many as eight times, and it is unlikely that another reconstitution would result in the combat effectiveness needed for resumed offensive operations.[49] The commitment of limited Airborne elements, on the other hand, might support resumed tactical offensives of limited scope and duration.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards unspecified Russian positions from Lukyanivske (about 32km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City).[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces sought to exploit poor weather in the area to advance on the frontline. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Russian forces are continuing to repel Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force attempts in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[51] Balitsky claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six HIMARS rockets at an educational facility in Melitopol on March 27, and Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration area in the city.[52] Fedorov also reported on March 28 that a power substation exploded in Fedorivka (about 17km northwest of Melitopol) under unspecified circumstances.[53]

Russian forces are continuing to fortify and reinforce their positions in southern Ukraine out of concerns for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Balitsky claimed that the Russian military command staffed Russian regiments at 15% of their usual strength in fall of 2022.[54] Balitsky noted that he could not assess how well-prepared Russian forces are for a claimed future Ukrainian counteroffensive and stated that combat will reveal the level of Russian preparations in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery also showed Russian forces digging new trenches along the roads leading into northern Crimea.[55]

Russian forces reportedly decreased the intensity of shelling in Kherson Oblast. Head of the United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces, Nataliya Humenyuk, stated on March 28 that Russian forces have not shelled the Dnipro-Bug Estuary from the Kinburn Spit over the past three days due to poor weather conditions.[56] Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition warehouses and artillery systems are undermining Russian logistics and forcing Russian forces to decrease their activities on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 27 removing the upper age limit from Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen serving in occupied Ukrainian territories until January 1, 2026.[57] The decree also notes that prospective Rosgvardia servicemen in occupied territories may undergo military medical examination in absentia to determine their eligibility for service. The decree notes that men interested in Rosgvardia service will not undergo psychological assessments and can provide alternative personal documents and testimonies to those previously specified in the 2011 law on service in Russian law enforcement organizations. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko noted that this decree allows the Kremlin to recruit residents of occupied territories without a Russian passport.[58] This decree likely seeks to expand recruitment into Rosgvardia alongside the Kremlin’s other recruitment campaigns.

The Kremlin continues to recruit contract servicemen in Russia and to conduct crypto-mobilization in occupied Ukraine. The Republic of Bashkortostan is forming two more volunteer battalions: the “Severnye Amury” and “Dayan Murzin” battalions.[59] The Tyumen Oblast military recruitment center opened 52 employment vacancies offering military contract service, and ISW previously observed similar recruitment advertisements on employment websites over the summer of 2022.[60] Russian officials are also continuing to financially incentivize men and their families to sign military contracts.[61] The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration reported on March 28 that the Russian occupation administration is refusing to demobilize students. The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration added that Russian officials mobilized 654 students of whom 300 are currently fighting in Ukraine.

Russian independent outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe described the current force composition of Russian irregular and volunteer armed formations operating in Ukraine. The outlet, citing an unnamed Russian expert, reported that there are 12 BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) battalions with 400 to 500 people each and eight BARS detachments of 150 to 250 people each fighting in Ukraine.[62] The expert noted that BARS is subordinated to the Union of Donbas Volunteers but legally operates under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). BARS reportedly trained at the Chechen SPETSNAZ University before arriving in Ukraine and has received ammunition from the Russian MoD. The expert noted that former Donbas commanders usually command BARS units, which can make them more effective than volunteer battalions directly subordinated to the Russian MoD. The expert also noted that Russian volunteer units are placed under Russian military commanders upon their arrival at a specific frontline. Russian volunteers arriving in Donbas would be placed into the central grouping of Russian forces, for example. These volunteers are treated as reinforcements, and it is likely that the Russian military command will continue to use incoming volunteers to patch up units on the frontlines.

Novaya Gazeta Europe also described the summer 2022 volunteer recruitment campaign. One expert told the outlet that the Russian military command decided to form the 3rd Army Corps likely without legal grounds and without following necessary regulations. The Russian military command ordered Russian federal subjects to recruit between 120 and 1,400 volunteers each, and Novaya Gazeta Europe estimates that 10,000 to 15,000 Russian volunteers deployed to Ukraine over summer 2022 prior to mobilization. Novaya Gazeta Europe noted that the Russian MoD and the presidential administration likely did not keep official track of volunteer formations. The expert observed that volunteer units received different treatment on the battlefield if regional heads endeavored to advocate for their armed formations to the Russian MoD. The expert also recalled instances when regional officials entered their own last names on volunteer lists and received veteran statuses without fighting in the war. Regional officials stopped releasing information about deceased volunteers and silenced families by threatening to remove social benefits relating the death of their relatives.

Russian ultranationalist publication Tsargrad criticized the Russian MoD and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu for the poor treatment and exclusion of Russian volunteer forces amidst the renewed Russian volunteer recruitment campaign. Tsargrad accused the Russian MoD of failing to recognize the participation of at least a third of all volunteers in the war, and claimed that Russian conventional forces abandoned volunteers on collapsing frontlines in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman in fall 2022. Chairman of the Union of Donbas Volunteers, State Duma Parliamentarian Alexander Boroday noted that the Russian MoD’s selection and limitations on volunteers “cuts off from volunteering a number of combat-ready people, veterans.” Another representative of the Union of Donbas Volunteers stated that the Russian MoD is continuing to adapt to “inappropriate peacetime norms.” Tsargrad’s numerous references to members of the Union of Donbas Volunteers, including Boroday, are peculiar, given that Boroday reportedly manages the BARS forces.[63] The criticism resembles that of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who had used attacks on the Russian MoD to promote recruitment into Wagner.

Russian security and bureaucratic measures in Rostov Oblast are likely slowing down the transfer of Russian supplies to the frontlines. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian customs detained cargoes with drones and other supply transfers due to bureaucratic processes.[64] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin also noted that Russia had not resolved issues with long lines at checkpoints between occupied Donetsk Oblast and Russia.[65]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a convoy of five Russian Z-STS armored vehicles belonging to the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 49th Combined Arms Army crashed due to speeding on the Kerch Strait Bridge.[66] The incident resulted in significant damage to four of five vehicles.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to expand Russia’s bureaucratic and administrative control of occupied areas of Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated during a live Rossiya-24 broadcast on March 27 that the occupation administration must rapidly develop infrastructure in Zaporizhia Oblast to accommodate the influx of teachers, civil servants, doctors, and law enforcement personnel arriving from Russia.[67] The apparent immigration of Russian citizens to staff administrative and law enforcement roles in occupied areas suggests that occupying officials are struggling to fill these positions using willing and loyal local collaborators and also may suggest that Russian officials are trying to repopulate areas of Ukraine with imported Russian citizens as part of a wider depopulation-repopulation campaign.[68] Balitsky also claimed that 40 percent of citizens of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast hold Russian passports and that the occupation administration is facing the issue of effective distributing of passports in a way that matches high demand.[69] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin similarly claimed that the passport distribution system in occupied Donetsk Oblast is overwhelmed with interest in Russian passports.[70]

Russian occupation officials continue to pursue increased connectivity between occupied areas of Ukraine and Russia. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated that Russian officials hope to open a railway between occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea before the start of the summer tourist season.[71] Balitsky similarly claimed that his administration has already allocated funds for the construction of a four-lane road along the Sea of Azov that will connect Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea, to Rostov Oblast through Berdyansk, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin similarly lauded efforts to create a ferry line between Mariupol, occupied Donetsk Oblast and areas in occupied Crimea and Sochi, Krasnodar Krai.[73]

Russian occupation officials are struggling to fully implement the use of rubles in occupied areas of Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration warned locals on March 28 that anyone who refuses to accept rubles or attempts to sabotage ruble use in occupied Kherson Oblast will face criminal prosecution.[74] The punitive approach to coercing ruble use indicates that occupation officials have largely failed to otherwise incentivize the rubleization process.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on March 28 Belarus’ intent to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25.[75] The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that a Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons would not violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and would not represent a departure from the norms of ”military cooperation between non-nuclear and nuclear powers.”[76] ISW continues to assess that a Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is irrelevant to Russia‘s nuclear strike capabilities; Russia has long fielded nuclear-capable systems able to strike any target that tactical nuclear weapons based in Belarus could hit.[77] A Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployment to Belarus would represent a milestone in the Kremlin’s longstanding campaign to establish more permanent Russian basing in Belarus, however.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. An unspecified airborne infantry element of the Vitebsk-based Belarusian 103rd Air Assault Brigade conducted tactical heliborne exercise in an unspecified location on March 28.[78]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287; https://t.me/smotri_z/12818; https://...

[2] https://ria dot ru/20230326/artemovsk-1860697725.html ; https://t.me/rian_ru/198008 ; https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/163...

[3] https://t.me/rybar/45151; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81608; https://t.m...

[4] https://t.me/smotri_z/12818; https://t.me/epoddubny/15302; https://t.m...

[5] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1640723997674426370?s=20 ; https:/... . https://twitter.com/umftteam/status/1640434381419425792?s=20 ; https:/... https://twitter.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1640621730145157121

[6] https://t.me/milinfolive/98547 ; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/87589 ; ... com/wall-212320493_59721?lang=en

[7] https://vagsh.mil dot ru/Struktura-akademii/Kafedra-voennogo-upravleniya/item/48203

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723

[9] https://riafan dot ru/23940551-prigozhin_rasskazal_v_chem_kroetsya_prichina_snaryadnogo_goloda

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[11] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11622303/Putins-chef-mercenary-... com/post/14182; https://twitter.com/Spriter99880/status/1640406738657591305; https://tw... https://twitter.com/GwarWorin/status/1638282617958158377

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://riafan dot ru/23940551-prigozhin_rasskazal_v_chem_kroetsya_prichina_snaryadnogo_goloda

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[16] https://t.me/strelkovii/4352 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-rosiya-mozhe-vesti-viynu-1679493967.html

[17] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/putin-prepares-russia-for-...

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623; https:/... https://isw.pub/UkrWar020923

[19] https://iz dot ru/1489736/2023-03-28/shoigu-proveril-proizvodstvo-snariadov-opk-cheliabinskoi-i-kirovskoi-oblastei; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81596

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011523; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031423

[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-28/war-and-secretive-spe...

[22] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-28/war-and-secretive-spe...

[23] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-28/war-and-secretive-spe...

[24] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/28/03/2023/64217afc9a7947666c28a70e

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuU5D7muYxbDogYv3iq...

[26] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/28/na-kupyansko-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-mayut-serjoznyj-deficzyt-suchasnoyi-bronetehniky-sergij-cherevatyj/

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/25162

[28] https://t.me/sashakots/39080; https://twitter.com/GertVHoecke/status/1640626529179664386

[29] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[30] https://twitter.com/umftteam/status/1640434381419425792?s=20 ; https:/...

[31] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46370 ;

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46370 ;

[33] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034AAANwWemXCqpSdYz1...

[35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/28/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-masovani-obstrily-bahmuta-u-poyednanni-z-shturmovymy-diyamy-sergij-cherevatyj/

[36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/28/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-masovani-obstrily-bahmuta-u-poyednanni-z-shturmovymy-diyamy-sergij-cherevatyj/

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523

[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034AAANwWemXCqpSdYz1...

[40] https://t.me/rybar/45123;

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/27/na-napryamku-avdiyivka-maryinka-dvi-brygady-rf-zaznaly-velykyh-vtrat/

[42] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1640591697858969606

[43] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept18 ; https://www.forbes.com/sites/david...

[44] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81566

[46] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/657

[47] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/55625

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/27/na-napryamku-avdiyivka-maryinka-dvi-brygady-rf-zaznaly-velykyh-vtrat/

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ua/2023/02/27/rosiyany-trymayut-trupy-svoyih-soldativ-na-skladah-aby-ne-vyplachuvaty-groshi-ridnym-spovid-okupanta/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VyogLhqX9E&ab_channel=Центрнаціональногоспротиву

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/25160

[51] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

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[53] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1587

[54] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

[55] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1640454897328877574?s=20

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/28/na-livomu-berezi-dnipra-j-na-kinburnskij-kosi-vorog-znyzyv-svoyu-aktyvnist-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[57] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202303270011; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1640592399654166528; https://www...

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[62] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2023/03/26/gubernatorskie-armii

[63] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2023/03/26/gubernatorskie-armii

[64] https://t.me/akashevarova/6251; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23700...

[65] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[66] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/piat-broneavtomobiliv-rosiiskykh-terorystiv-z-sts-akhmat-ne-doikhaly-do-zony-boiovykh-dii.html; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/33962; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love...

[67] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

[68] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

[69] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

[70] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[71] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8111

[72] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/913

[73] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3287

[74] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8123

[75] https://mfa.gov dot by/press/news_mfa/d73d30578e49412b.html

[76] https://mfa.gov dot by/press/news_mfa/d73d30578e49412b.html

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[78] https://t.me/modmilby/24885

Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China

https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-the-new-cold-war-plan-countering-china

March 28, 2023 Over an hour read Download Report

Authors:

James Carafano, Michael Pillsbury, Jeff Smith and Andrew Harding

SUMMARY

The Heritage Foundation’s “Winning the New Cold War” describes the ends, ways, and means to secure America’s future while confronting the greatest external threat the U.S. has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To be successful, this plan requires real and sustained U.S. economic growth, greater political will, stronger external partnerships, synchronized economic and security policies, resilient supply chains and borders, adequate military deterrence, and American energy independence. It also requires buy-in from the whole of American society. In order to implement a whole-of-nation strategy, the U.S. government must educate the American public and business community, from Main Street to Wall Street, about the scope of the threat from the CCP.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The People’s Republic of China is an adversary of the United States, and the two countries are embroiled in a New Cold War.

The U.S.’s decades-long engagement strategy toward China, an even more capable adversary than the USSR, has left the American people and economy vulnerable.

Protecting the U.S. homeland and prosperity and diminishing China’s ability to harm the U.S. will require a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

3. Competition With China Drives FY 2024 Budget Request

Videos at the link: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3343663/competition-with-china-drives-fy-2024-budget-request/

Competition With China Drives FY 2024 Budget Request

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

The $842 billion fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Defense Department is driven in large part by strategic competition with China, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said.

The budget also focuses, he said Tuesday, on furthering the department's three priorities: defending of the nation, taking care of service members and families and developing stronger relationships and cooperation with partners and allied nations.

1:20:27

VIDEO | 1:20:27 | Austin, Milley Testify on Defense Budget, Part 1

1:15:38

VIDEO | 1:15:38 | Austin, Milley Testify on Defense Budget, Part 2

31:42

VIDEO | 31:42 | Austin, Milley Testify on Defense Budget, Part 3

"This is a strategy-driven budget — and one driven by the seriousness of our strategic competition with the People's Republic of China," Austin said during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. "At $842 billion, it's a 3.2 percent increase over [the] fiscal year 2023 enacted ... and it is 13.4 percent higher than [the] fiscal year 22 enacted. This budget will help us continue to implement our National Defense Strategy and the president's National Security Strategy."

Spotlight: National Defense Strategy

With China as a pacing challenge, Austin said, investment in the Indo-Pacific region is a big part of the FY 2024 budget. In the Pacific, he said, the department is investing in a more resilient force posture and is also increasing the size and complexity of exercises with partner nations there.

Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

The FY 2024 budget request also includes a 40% increase for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. This year's $9.1 billion request for the PDI — the largest ever — funds a stronger force posture, better defenses for Hawaii and Guam, and deeper cooperation with allies and partners there, Austin said.

Also in the Pacific, Austin said, the department is forward-stationing and deploying more forces, while also investing in airfields, logistics, domain awareness and resilience in places like Japan, Australia, Guam and the sovereign states involved in the Compact of Free Association.

The FY 2024 budget request, Austin said, also marks the department's largest investment in research and development. This year, the request for R&D efforts stands at $145 billion.

The department is also requesting some $170 billion for procurement to maintain the nation's air, sea and land dominance. About $61 billion funds things like the newly revealed B-21 Raider, for instance, while $48 billion supports construction of nine battle force ships for the U.S. Navy, he said.

"We'll also continue to modernize all three legs of our nuclear triad ... and bolster our strategic deterrence," Austin told senators.

The FY 2024 request includes $37.7 billion to fund the nuclear triad, along with nuclear command, control, and communications.

Just six months ago, Austin signed a memorandum outlining plans to take better care of service member and their families. That memorandum discussed efforts to, among other things, make military moves easier, help military spouses find employment, and ease the burden associated with the cost of child care.

Spotlight: Taking Care of Our People

The most recent budget request continues that effort to take care of military personnel and their families, Austin said.

"We're going to remain the strongest military in the world," Austin said. "As we mark the 50th anniversary of our all-volunteer force, I'm enormously proud of the brave men and women who choose to wear the cloth of our nation. We owe it to them and to their families to take the best possible care of all of our people."

This year's budget request funds an increase in housing allowances, improvements to military housing, continued efforts to make child care more affordable, and the launch of universal prekindergarten at Department of Defense Education Activity schools.

The secretary also said the budget request supports the department's efforts to curb suicides and sexual assaults.

Spotlight: Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military

"We're also pushing hard to help eliminate suicide in our ranks ... including immediate steps to hire more mental health professionals and improve access to mental health care," Austin said. "Meanwhile, we're working toward a military that's free of sexual assault. We worked with Congress to improve the response of sexual assault and related crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. And those reforms will be fully implemented by the end of this year. And the department is also investing in a specialized workforce to combat sexual assault, harassment, suicide and more."

Spotlight: Suicide Prevention

The U.S. military doesn't fight alone, so relationships with allied and partner nations are also a focus of the FY 2024 budget request, Austin said, highlighting efforts in both Asia and Europe.

"In recent months, our friends in the Indo-Pacific have taken major steps forward," Austin said. "The Philippines has agreed to nearly double the number of sites where we cooperate together. Japan has committed to double its defense spending. And through the historic AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United States] partnership, we'll work with our Australian and British allies to build game-changing defense advantages that will deter aggression and boost our defense industrial capacity."

Spotlight: AUKUS: The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.

In Europe, as part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Austin has rallied support of some 50 nations to help Ukraine. Already, partners there have committed nearly $20 billion in support. The U.S. itself has committed more than $32.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. As a result of Russia's invasion or Ukraine, Austin said, the NATO alliance is stronger than ever.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

"Mr. Chairman, this is the budget that will meet this moment. And I'd respectfully ask for your support," Austin said. "The single most effective way that this committee can support the department and our outstanding troops is with an on-time, full-year appropriation. I look forward to working with you all so that we can continue to defend our democracy and support the forces of freedom in this hour of challenge."

FY 2024 Defense Budget FY 2024 Defense Budget: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/FY2024-Defense-Budget/

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

4. Summit for Democracy: Democracy Cohort Outcomes - United States Department of State

Excerpt:

What are Democracy Cohorts?

In dialogue with civil society, the United States launched the Democracy Cohorts concept to support and monitor commitments made during the first Summit and provide additional opportunities for continued dialogue and collaboration among governments and authorities, civil society representatives, private sector leaders, philanthropic partners, and academics. While each Cohort included at least one government and one civil society co-lead, their focus, objectives, actions, and deliverables were their own to determine and execute through inclusive, multi-stakeholder collaboration with co-leads and participants. Several governments and many civic groups enthusiastically volunteered to lead and participate in the Cohorts, lending their experience and expertise to foster democratic learning.

Summit for Democracy: Democracy Cohort Outcomes - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

Since 2021, the Summit for Democracy process has focused attention on how governments and non-governmental actors can work together to strengthening democratic institutions and processes, protect human rights, and advance the fight against corruption.

At the first Summit for Democracy in December 2021, representatives from governments around the world, civil society, and the private sector organized into 15 cooperative, multi-stakeholder “Democracy Cohorts:” platforms intended to undertake concerted action toward the implementation of Summit commitments in areas of common interest.

The 15 Democracy Cohorts focused on a range of topics, including technology, media freedom, youth engagement, financial transparency, rule of law, election integrity, and gender equality, among others. With 23 governments and 24 civil society and private sector actors co-leading these platforms, participants reflect democratic society’s shared stake in advancing key facets of transparent and accountable governance.

What are Democracy Cohorts?

In dialogue with civil society, the United States launched the Democracy Cohorts concept to support and monitor commitments made during the first Summit and provide additional opportunities for continued dialogue and collaboration among governments and authorities, civil society representatives, private sector leaders, philanthropic partners, and academics. While each Cohort included at least one government and one civil society co-lead, their focus, objectives, actions, and deliverables were their own to determine and execute through inclusive, multi-stakeholder collaboration with co-leads and participants. Several governments and many civic groups enthusiastically volunteered to lead and participate in the Cohorts, lending their experience and expertise to foster democratic learning.

Democracy Cohorts Launched During the Year of Action

Coming together for meaningful dialogue and collaboration, the Cohorts underscore the importance of strengthening democratic principles and participation, holding democratic governments accountable, and helping democracy deliver for its citizens. The Summit for Democracy organizers present the following summaries of each Cohort’s work and outcomes for the consideration of Summit participants, who may choose to utilize identified best practices, adopt recommended commitments, collaborate with Cohorts to advance ongoing efforts, and sign on to Calls to Action or Declarations. Like other Summit participants, the U.S. government will give due consideration to Cohort recommendations and deliverables.

Economic Growth, Shared Prosperity, and the Fight Against Corruption

Financial Transparency and Integrity

The Financial Transparency and Integrity cohort, co-led by the Government of the United States, the Brookings Institution, and the Open Government Partnership, focused on concerted, collaborative actions to advance financial transparency, accountability, and integrity.

Key outcomes include:

A Call to Action that outlines key steps that governments, civil society organizations, businesses and others engaged in the Summit should take to fight corruption; and
A Beneficial Ownership Outcome Document highlighting considerations for governments working alongside civil society on the implementation of beneficial ownership transparency and other reforms.

International Cooperation for Anti-Corruption

The International Cooperation for Anti-Corruption cohort, co-led by the Government of Moldova, the Basel Institute on Governance, and Transparency International, concentrated on international cooperation in anti-corruption awareness and enforcement, with a focus on asset recovery.

Key outcomes include:

A series of workshops convening more than 120 participants from 27 countries, alongside representatives of international organizations, such as the European Commission, United Nations, and World Bank to discuss the investigation of high-level corruption cases and asset recovery; and
Recommendations for emphasizing priority areas for potential reform and action going forward, including reinforcing international standards and structures; adapting national legal frameworks and practices, where appropriate; and strengthening operational cooperation.

Anti-Corruption Policies as a Guarantee for National Security, Stability, and Sovereign Policy

The Anti-Corruption Policies as a Guarantee for National Security, Stability, and Sovereign Policy cohort, co-led by the Government of Bulgaria, the Basel Institute on Governance, and the Center for the Study of Democracy, identified challenges and opportunities to promote anti-corruption policies and models for collective action.

Key outcomes include:

Recommendations for a high-level policy council focused on anti-corruption policies, and an anti-corruption agenda to strengthen anti-corruption cooperation and information sharing; and
A meeting to gather regional authorities and non-governmental organizations with international peers to review and determine cohort commitments.

Press Freedom and Information Integrity

Media Freedom

The Media Freedom cohort , co-led by the Government of Canada, the Government of the Netherlands, and Internews, reviewed progress and concrete action toward the first Summit’s commitments and encouraged new, innovative, and measurable commitments to advance media freedom around the world.

Key outcomes include:

A call to action to protect journalists, advance freedom of expression, and bolster independent and diverse media; and
A comprehensive findings report that highlights commitments by cohort members and recommends continued collaboration among government, the private sector, and civil society in promoting media freedom beyond the second Summit. This includes an annex of cohort commitments made by all cohort members, representing a diverse range of actions by governments, businesses, and civil society organizations.

Information Integrity

The Information Integrity cohort, co-led by the Government of Canada, the Government of Latvia, and the Alliance for Securing Democracy, highlighted and amplified best practices to strengthen a healthy information ecosystem.

Key outcomes include:

A global mapping project to track more than 500 organizations combating disinformation; a report on whole-of-society approaches to media literacy promotion; and a report based on a survey of government and civil society information integrity practitioners on resilience to disinformation; and
Recommendations for developing a white paper to inform policymakers and stakeholders about the risks to, and proposed protective measures for, political micro-targeting.

Justice for All

Rule of Law and People-Centered Justice

The Rule of Law and People-Centered Justice cohort, co-led by the Government of the Dominican Republic; the Government of Kosovo; the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative; Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies; Transparency International; and the World Justice Project, engaged interested stakeholders to participate in global rule of law and access to justice processes, such as facilitating cooperating with the Justice Action Coalition, as an opportunity to share achievements and challenges for rule of law and justice reforms.

Key outcomes include:

A call to action on the urgent need to strengthen the rule of law and people-centered justice within societies around the world, as a fundamental pillar of democracy and necessary precondition to peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.

Strong Institutions

Deliberative Democracy and Citizens’ Assemblies

The Deliberative Democracy and Citizens’ Assemblies cohort , co-led by the Government of Ireland, the European Commission, and the newDemocracy Foundation, focused on providing citizens with a meaningful role in public decision-making through citizens’ assemblies by bringing together community representatives.

Key outcomes include:

Recommendations for holding informational workshops for elected representatives; advocating for the adoption and distribution of the guidelines in the OECD ‘Deliberative Wave’ report; conducting a national-level citizens’ assembly; proposing a ‘Marshall Plan for Democracy’ to support countries with fragile democratic institutions; initiating a Global Citizens Assembly on Democracy; and establishing a global ‘What Works’ Center to support governments’ adoption of deliberative processes.

Election Integrity

The Election Integrity cohort, co-led by the Government of Greece, the Government of India, the Government of Mauritius, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, concentrated on opportunities for training and capacity building programs and technical consultancies in support of election management bodies (EMBs) and electoral authorities (EAs) globally.

Key outcomes include:

Recommendations that EMBs/EAs must be autonomous, professional, and impartial as a credible starting point for achieving election integrity; electoral and political processes should enable meaningful political participation of all people, particularly women, youth, and persons with disabilities, through targeted civic and voter education; and a set of voluntary guidelines for social media companies be developed to promote electoral integrity and combat the spread of mis/disinformation, especially via social media, that negatively influences the electoral environment.

Labor

The Labor cohort, co-led by the United States and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), helped to inform the commitments and reforms that governments may choose to make, and fostered diplomatic engagement around labor priorities that emerge from the Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment, and Rights (M-POWER) initiative, which the U.S. government announced at the first Summit for Democracy to advance workplace democracy and support trade union rights in the global economy.

Key outcomes include:

A document developed after consultations with government and labor stakeholders that captures best practices and principles to combat forced labor.

Protecting Civic Space and Countering Authoritarianism

Civic Space

The Civic Space cohort , co-led by the Government of the Czech Republic, the Government of Norway, and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, focused on supporting and protecting civil society actors and promoting civic space to ensure open and inclusive democracy.

Key outcomes include:

Calls to Action on the subjects of giving the public meaningful opportunities to provide input in draft legislation; promoting policies and public statements on human rights, democracy, the rule of law, peace, and sustainable development; applying and sharing experiences with the multilateral toolkit within the OECD DAC recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance; and committing to establish new, or join existing, groups of likeminded states to defend and improve language on civil society inclusion across the UN system.

Resisting Authoritarian Pressure

The Resisting Authoritarian Pressure cohort , co-led by the Government of Lithuania, Freedom House, and the Alliance of Democracies, focused on raising awareness and generating action on the cost of political imprisonment, aiding pro-democracy and human rights defenders from non-democracies, and building resilience to authoritarian coercion.

Key outcomes include:

A roundtable with 34 representatives from government, non-governmental organizations, and others on shared best practices to advocate for and secure the release of political prisoners worldwide;
A mural of Ales Bialiatski, a Belarusian human rights activist and Nobel laureate currently imprisoned by the Lukashenka regime, painted directly outside the Belarusian Embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania;
A risk assessment to help protect potential victims of transnational repression; and
A declaration that calls on all democracies to acknowledge and commit to a global framework to counter economic coercion, increasingly prevalent phenomenon of transnational repression, whereby states reach across borders to harm, intimidate, and silence journalists, activists, dissidents, and diaspora communities.

Advancing Technology for Democracy

Technology for Democracy

The Technology for Democracy cohort, co-led by the Government of Estonia, the Government of the United Kingdom, and Access Now, promoted the development, use, and governance of digital technologies to strengthen democracies and enhance the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It aimed to ensure that digital technologies are developed and deployed in a responsible, secure, and rights-respecting manner.

Key outcomes include:

Recommended specifications for an e-Democracy solution as a component to a full, free, and secure GovStack e-Governance solution ;
A forthcoming, public-facing portal providing key information on internet shutdowns aimed at promoting greater engagement for non-technical audiences; and
Supporting the development of a shared understanding of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) and shared guidelines and tools for responsible adoption and deployment of PETs.
The cohort will engage with the Freedom Online Coalition and GovStack to potentially integrate their work on internet shutdowns and e-Governance, respectively, in these fora to facilitate continued progress to shape global norms and technology standards to align with democratic values and human rights.

Inclusion and Equality

Gender Equality as a Prerequisite for Democracy

The Gender Equality as a Prerequisite for Democracy cohort , co-led by the Government of Romania, the Government of Sweden, Georgetown University’s Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, and International IDEA, highlighted the connection between gender equality and democracy and developed policy recommendations to bolster women’s participation in and contributions to democracy.

Key outcomes include:

A road map of actions that government, civil society, and other actors can implement to promote gender equality and strengthen democracy, including by consulting with representatives from government, civil society, and intergovernmental organizations to ensure that women’s experiences and perspectives inform policies and legislation on inclusion, legislative and policy frameworks, and conflict prevention, peace, and security; and
Support for global forums to spotlight gender equality as a prerequisite for democracy. Gender Equality as a Prerequisite for Democracy Cohort Outcomes

Inclusive Democracy

The Inclusive Democracy cohort, co-led by the Government of Spain, Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad, and Fundación Triángulo, concentrated on creating more inclusive democracies through the full participation of the most vulnerable groups.

Key outcomes include:

Recommendations for implementing public policies that help these groups exercise their rights and achieve their aspirations; encouraging the development of societies that are more welcoming, inclusive, and equitable; and supporting civil society groups that foster respect for the rights of all.

Youth Political and Civic Engagement

The Youth Political and Civic Engagement cohort , co-led by the Government of Ghana, the Government of Nepal, the European Commission, AfricTivistes, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), and the European Youth Democracy Network (EDYN), explored ways to implement Summit commitments on youth political and civic engagement.

Key outcomes include:

A handbook on youth participation;
Competitive micro-grants for local organizations focused on youth civic and political participation;
Recommended commitments that governments can adopt to prioritize youth civic and political engagement, for example action plans to promote and advocate for their inclusion; and
The creation of a Global Index on Youth Democratic Participation. Youth Political and Civic Engagement Cohort Outcomes.

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

5. Gendered Disinformation: Tactics, Themes, and Trends by Foreign Malign Actors - United States Department of State

Now I expect to hear from people calling this out as part of the woke agenda. Just know that those who want to make that accusation provide the desired effect that the malign actors are trying to achieve. Those who attack this report could be considered "useful idiots" by malign actors such as China and Russia. The malign actors are fanning the flames of the US culture wars to create divisions and have one sector of our society willing to attack the "other" while others want to execute the cancel culture concept as a way to ensure that "other" is always included. The irony is that cancel culture just creates another kind of "other." In my mind you either believe in equal rights for all regardless of whether someone has the characteristics of the "other" that does not conform to what makes you comfortable or if not you cannot say that you believe in the founding ideals of America.

I could not find a link to the report on the State web page. But this report at the Wilson Center is linked within the article. Perhaps this is the report it references: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/malign-creativity-how-gender-sex-and-lies-are-weaponized-against-women-online

Gendered Disinformation: Tactics, Themes, and Trends by Foreign Malign Actors - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

Home Global Engagement Center Remarks & Releases...Gendered Disinformation: Tactics, Themes, and Trends by Foreign Malign Actors

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Gendered Disinformation: Tactics, Themes, and Trends by Foreign Malign Actors

Report

March 27, 2023

Gendered disinformation is a subset of misogynistic abuse and violence against women that uses false or misleading gender and sex-based narratives, often with some degree of coordination, to deter women from participating in the public sphere. Both foreign state and non-state actors strategically use gendered disinformation to silence women, discourage online political discourse, and shape perceptions toward gender and the role of women in democracies. In a groundbreaking study, Canada, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Germany, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States jointly assessed the tactics used by these actors to sow gendered and other identity-based disinformation across the world. Key findings from this report are detailed below.

Perpetrators of gendered disinformation targeting women comprise both foreign state and non-state actors, including Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Foreign state actors utilize their media assets, control of the information environment, and sometimes state-backed troll farms to spread disinformation about women politicians, policy makers, journalists, and activists, and even policies targeted at women.
Disinformation is often targeted toward women with intersecting identities. Our research captured 13 unique themes of gendered disinformation that include the wide use of gendered stereotypes, hyper-sexualization, and political targeting of women to shame and discredit them. Perpetrators use a combination of identity-based and political themes, revealing that disinformation can target any vector of a person’s identity to discredit and shame either them and/or their communities.
Perpetrators most often disseminate gendered disinformation through coordinated social media activity that is either spontaneous or pre-mediated across multiple platforms. In many cases, abuse initiated by foreign state actors spurred further online gendered disinformation by social media users. Foreign state actors use false materials to spread disinformation (such as doctored or misleading images or videos) in addition to media articles, memes, bespoke hashtags, public statements by politicians or other influential people, and even manga cartoons.
Foreign state actors mobilize gendered disinformation to target a variety of individuals, groups, and legislation. When individual politicians, journalists, and activists are targeted, they may decide to leave their jobs or stop speaking out online as a result. When legislation is targeted, the underpinning public and political consensus can be reduced, sometimes leading to policy reversals. Beyond the harm caused by the abuse itself to the victims and survivors, which also include psychological distress, trauma, long-term mental health impacts, and physical and sexual violence, narratives also include threats of violence and rape, and physical calls to action outside the online sphere, whilst simultaneously posing a threat to democracy.
The ultimate goal of gendered and identity-based disinformation is to discourage the exercise of freedom of expression and undermine democracy. Both foreign state and non-state actors strategically target women and people with intersecting identities. One goal of this strategy is to dissuade individuals from practicing their freedom to express and uphold beliefs and ideals that contradict their adversaries’ beliefs. A second goal is to dissuade members of broader identity-based groups from exercising their rights. This strategy threatens democracy by undermining the ability to access impartial, fact-based information, and it negatively impacts the make-up of democratic representation.

Our research underscores the importance of using a gender and identity-based lens to analyze the tactics used by foreign state and non-state actors to spread gendered disinformation that deliberately polarizes attitudes, sows division, and undermines social cohesion. The spread of gendered disinformation harms not only the targeted individuals, but also democracy. The critical nature of the subject matter requires further investigation, particularly in understanding the use of gendered disinformation in Africa and Latin America; the evolving tactics of state actors; and Russia’s use of misogynistic narratives in Europe; in addition to furthering understanding of communications responses and interventions that can be used to counter gendered disinformation. To inform our collective responses most effectively, we must continue to not only study gendered disinformation tactics and their impacts on targeted communities, but also partner across countries invested in preserving democracy to share findings, deepen the evidence base, and inform policy to tackle this scourge.

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

6. Pentagon Woos Silicon Valley to Join Ranks of Arms Makers

Pentagon Woos Silicon Valley to Join Ranks of Arms Makers

To keep up with China, the Defense Department is trying to lure private capital

https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-woos-silicon-valley-to-join-ranks-of-arms-makers-38b1d4c0

By Sharon WeinbergerFollow

, Robert WallFollow

and Doug CameronFollow

March 26, 2023 8:00 am ET

The Pentagon is seeking to enlist Silicon Valley startups in its effort to fund and develop new weapons technology and more-nimble suppliers, as the U.S. races to keep pace with China’s military advances.

The push to tap private capital comes in the midst of concern that U.S. defense-industry consolidation has led to dependence on a few large companies that rely on government funding for research and is hampering innovation. Meanwhile, China has pulled ahead in some key technologies, ranging from small drones to hypersonic missiles, helped by Beijing’s use of external public-private guidance funds, according to current and former Pentagon officials.

Steve Blank, co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford University, said some estimates place Beijing’s capital infusion into the tech sector at more than $1 trillion.

“China is organized like Silicon Valley,” and the Pentagon is organized more like a Detroit auto maker, he said. “That’s not a fair fight.”

U.S. vs. China: How Nuclear Capabilities Stack Up Across Land, Sea and Air

Ukraine launches U.S. "small diameter" bomb with longer range than HIMARS

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · March 28, 2023

Russia said on Tuesday that its military intercepted a Ukrainian ground-launched small-diameter bomb provided by the United States, signaling that Ukraine's forces are now using the sought-after weapon.

The Russian Ministry of Defense in a daily operational update Tuesday wrote that troops shot down a GLSDB guided missile, as well as 18 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). Russia's report indicates that Ukraine has received and been trained on how to use the powerful bombs, which they long requested despite concerns that these weapons could cross Russian President Vladimir Putin's red line.

GLSDB are precision bombs that have been seen as a powerful development for Ukrainian troops, who have worked to prevent Russia from making gains in key areas in the eastern region of Donetsk, including Bakhmut. Notably, these bombs are capable of hitting targets as far as 150 kilometers (95 miles) away, thus expanding Ukraine's ability to strike behind Russia's lines. They are also capable of being fitted to rockets that have already been part of Ukraine's arsenal.

The range of these bombs is larger than that of the HIMARS previously provided to Ukraine by the U.S. government, which helped its military turn the tide of the war in its favor last year. The United States announced plans to provide Ukraine with the bombs in February.

Above, Ukrainian soldiers are seen firing a D-30 howitzer at Russian positions near Bakhmut, eastern Ukraine, on March 21, 2023, alongside an inset of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia said its forces shot down a U.S.-provided a GLSDB fired by Ukraine, the earliest indication that these powerful weapons are in Ukrainian hands. SERGEY SHESTAK/AFP via Getty Images; Contributor/Getty Images

Wes Rumbaugh, an associate fellow in the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Newsweek on Tuesday that the GLSDB is a cost-effective way for the United States "to provide a mass of stand-off capability to Ukraine."

"This extended range allows Ukrainian troops to target a wider range of Russian targets, including those farther behind the main lines of battle, giving them more options to disrupt Russian operations," he said.

Rumbaugh said it is not surprising that Russia was able to down one of these bombs and that Ukraine will "likely need to use mass to overcome Russian air defenses or suppress those defenses in some way to get the most out of GLSDB capabilities."

He noted that Ukraine had a "relatively quick turnaround" on using the GLSDB, as it would take some "investment and time" to prepare Ukrainian forces to properly use them. He said the interception signals that this is one of the earlier uses of the weapon in Ukraine.

Russia condemned U.S. providing Ukraine GLSDB

Early reporting that Russia could be considering providing these bombs to Ukraine drew condemnation from Russian authorities, who warned that doing so could lead to an escalation of the conflict. The Kremlin has long criticized the West for providing large amounts of weaponry to Ukraine, which has bolstered their defense efforts.

"Potentially, this is extremely dangerous, it will mean bringing the conflict to a whole new level, which, of course, will not bode well from the point of view of global and pan-European security," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in January.

GLSDB were developed by SAAB in partnership with Boeing. SAAB describes the bombs as "exceptionally flexible, highly effective and accurate over long distances."

Experts have previously noted the significance of these weapons in Ukraine.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges said in January that the bombs will "reduce sanctuary for Russians."

"Life is about to start getting very uncomfortable for the Russian navy, airforce and ammunition handlers on Crimea, along the 'land bridge'...and hopefully soon for repair crews on Kerch Bridge," he tweeted.

Newsweek reached out to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and weapons analysts via email for comment.

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · March 28, 2023

8. China seeks stalemate in Ukraine, US diversion from Taiwan

Excerpts:

Conversely, while the U.S. is the primary donor to Ukraine in sheer quantity of arms, several member countries have surpassed the U.S contribution on a qualitative basis. When Ukraine urgently requested fighter aircraft to impose the no-fly zone the Biden administration rejected for fear of precipitating a direct clash with Russia, Poland stepped up and offered the planes.

Washington blocked that critical enhancement of Ukraine’s defense capability that could have avoided much death and destruction. Now, as Ukraine prepares for a spring counter-offensive, Poland is again offering MIG-29s and this time the Biden administration is not opposing the transfer.

Similarly, the Czech Republic has supplied tanks while Germany and the U.S. are slow-walking delivery of the tanks they finally agreed to provide. The United Kingdom and Slovakia have also been more forward-leaning than the Biden administration in sending their most effective weapons to Ukraine.

The third American action that will address the Sino-Russian dual challenge is to formalize Biden’s personal promise to dispense with the policy of strategic ambiguity and clearly commit to defend Taiwan. Beijing will know for certain that an attack on Taiwan will mean war with America and it will not be the grinding, incremental Ukraine scenario with the aggressor nation afforded safe haven from effective counterattack.

China seeks stalemate in Ukraine, US diversion from Taiwan

BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 03/28/23 10:00 AM ET

The Hill · March 28, 2023

Xi Jinping’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week was their 40th personal encounter, but the first since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Putin launched that invasion just weeks after the two dictators met for the 39th time in Beijing for the Winter Olympics opening. They announced their “no-limits” strategic partnership, under which each pledged support for the other’s confrontation with the United States.

Some Westerners speculated on whether Xi knew of Putin’s plan and gave it a green light, though the Biden administration proudly proclaimed it knew all along the attack was coming.

Despite Russian — and American — expectations of a quick Russian conquest of Kyiv and the removal of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s democratically-elected government, the Ukrainians’ battlefield competence and valor has prevented Russian forces from achieving Putin’s objective.

Western observers then coalesced around a new assessment of Xi’s support for Putin’s aggression. They decided Beijing was having second thoughts about being associated with Russia’s war on Ukraine — a possible model for a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attack on Taiwan — not because it was morally wrong or violated international law, but because it had failed so ignominiously. But, again, they misjudged Xi’s intentions as he calculated the implications for his own planned expansionism in the Indo-Pacific.

Beyond Putin’s crime of starting a war of aggression, Russian forces have carried out a daily show of horrors of additional war crimes and crimes against humanity that have shocked the world’s conscience. But Xi’s conscience was not shocked, given China’s own crimes condemned by the United Nations and labeled as genocide by both the Trump and Biden administrations.

Instead, despite U.S. warnings against assisting Russia’s aggression and criminality, China has dramatically increased its purchases of Russian oil and gas, replacing the funds lost from Western sanctions. Beijing has supplied Russia with materiel and dual-use technology such as drone components to keep its military operating.

The Biden administration has now further diluted its fading “red line” and prohibits only loosely-defined “lethal” items — a ban also now being crossed with small arms, though Washington insists China is only “considering” more high-end weapons.

Xi’s visit with Putin was a major doubling down on China’s political and “moral” support for the outlaw Russian regime, significantly eroding its diplomatic isolation. Their joint statement was titled “Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the New Era.” But in the process of raising Putin’s international status, it further damaged Xi’s own reputation and reminded the world of the nature of China’s communist regime.

It also shed further light on Xi’s thinking about the China-Russia joint strategy on both Ukraine and Taiwan. The opening sentence of their statement rang with mockery of the most basic principle of the rules-based international order: “On the Ukraine issue, the two sides believe that the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter must be observed and international law must be respected.”

Putin praised Xi’s position on the Ukraine issue as “objective and impartial,” no doubt because Xi has never condemned Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine, its 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, or the 2008 invasion of Georgia — despite the autocratic partners’ professed reverence for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the U.N. Charter.

Xi’s strategic expectation for Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has evolved as the attempted Russian blitzkrieg foundered. Rather than the quick Russian victory, as with the earlier aggressions, Putin’s latest campaign is based on a series of almost-daily crimes against the civilian population and essential infrastructure, along with virtual trench warfare that costs massive losses of lives, with the Russians having far more to expend. Given his primitive brutality, Putin clearly hopes to wear down not only the will of the Ukrainian government and population but also the resolve of the Biden administration and the West.

Western governments are beginning to show signs of financial war-weariness as weapons, equipment, and ammunition stocks are being consumed at increasing rates, potentially impairing individual countries’ own security capabilities. This reportedly has occurred even with the United States — dubbed in World War II “the arsenal of democracy” — though America has provided more aid to Ukraine than the combined contributions of the other Western nations.

Beijing is particularly interested in the effects of the Ukraine war on the materiel capacity and psychological disposition of the United States to counter Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific, where its intentions toward Taiwan are every bit as hostile as Russia’s designs on Ukraine.

Xi seems intent on having Putin keep his war going no matter how many Russian and Ukrainian lives it costs, because it drains Western resources and will and effectively serves China’s interest in undermining U.S. “imperialism” in the Indo-Pacific. Putin probably did not need much convincing that, when Beijing decides to make its move against Taiwan, perhaps in the next year or two, the West’s dwindling capacities and attention will necessarily shift to that region, and the door of opportunity will open again for Putin in the European theater.

The push-and-pull strategy of Sino-Russian “Coordination for the New Era” will significantly stretch U.S. and Western resources and resolve. The autocratic allies hope to force territorial and sovereignty compromises in both regions — even without intervening actions by Iran and North Korea, the other proclaimed enemies of the West.

There are at least three ways Washington can address this dangerous dilemma. First, the Biden administration must build on its success in mobilizing NATO countries against the common danger.

Even without the formal Article 5 security guarantee they once dangled before Ukraine and Georgia but never delivered, NATO members need to raise their individual contributions proportional to their respective GDPs, so that together they match or exceed the dollar value of the U.S. contribution.

Conversely, while the U.S. is the primary donor to Ukraine in sheer quantity of arms, several member countries have surpassed the U.S contribution on a qualitative basis. When Ukraine urgently requested fighter aircraft to impose the no-fly zone the Biden administration rejected for fear of precipitating a direct clash with Russia, Poland stepped up and offered the planes.

Washington blocked that critical enhancement of Ukraine’s defense capability that could have avoided much death and destruction. Now, as Ukraine prepares for a spring counter-offensive, Poland is again offering MIG-29s and this time the Biden administration is not opposing the transfer.

What our past tells us about young people and guns How to foster US mineral trade with Africa

Similarly, the Czech Republic has supplied tanks while Germany and the U.S. are slow-walking delivery of the tanks they finally agreed to provide. The United Kingdom and Slovakia have also been more forward-leaning than the Biden administration in sending their most effective weapons to Ukraine.

The third American action that will address the Sino-Russian dual challenge is to formalize Biden’s personal promise to dispense with the policy of strategic ambiguity and clearly commit to defend Taiwan. Beijing will know for certain that an attack on Taiwan will mean war with America and it will not be the grinding, incremental Ukraine scenario with the aggressor nation afforded safe haven from effective counterattack.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

The Hill · · March 28, 2023

9. For shared human values: Forum on democracy opens in Beijing

I did not realize China held its own "democracy summit."

Excerpts:

The forum offers a platform for all countries to share their thoughts, experiences and practices related to democracy, rather than touting a one-size-fits-all model of democracy.

Li Shulei, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, said in his opening speech that democracy is a shared human value, a universal goal pursued by all countries that seek modernization and the bedrock on which building a global community of shared future is based.

To form such a community, all countries should uphold the principle of democracy, advocate democracy in international relations and promote the rule of law in international governance, he added.

Li also stressed that countries should seek common ground, shelve differences and respect every country's path to democracy, adding that whether a country is democratic or not should be acknowledged by the international community, not arbitrarily by a few self-appointed judges.

For shared human values: Forum on democracy opens in Beijing

news.cgtn.com · by CGTN,China Global Television Network

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For shared human values: Forum on democracy opens in Beijing

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The Second International Forum on Democracy: The Shared Human Values kicks off in Beijing, China, March 23, 2023. /CMG

Ahead of the U.S.'s "Summit for Democracy," the Second International Forum on Democracy: The Shared Human Values kicked off on Thursday in Beijing, where over 300 guests from more than 100 countries and regions engaged in extensive discussions on diverse forms of democracy, slamming monistic and hegemonic narratives on the subject.

Discussing the origin, forms and effectiveness of multiple democratic systems, keynote speakers at the opening ceremony shared consensus that true democracy is characterized by dialogue, mutual respect and mutual learning. They stressed the necessity of co-existence of different systems in a community committed to a shared future for mankind.

A dialogue on democracy

The forum offers a platform for all countries to share their thoughts, experiences and practices related to democracy, rather than touting a one-size-fits-all model of democracy.

Li Shulei, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, said in his opening speech that democracy is a shared human value, a universal goal pursued by all countries that seek modernization and the bedrock on which building a global community of shared future is based.

To form such a community, all countries should uphold the principle of democracy, advocate democracy in international relations and promote the rule of law in international governance, he added.

Li also stressed that countries should seek common ground, shelve differences and respect every country's path to democracy, adding that whether a country is democratic or not should be acknowledged by the international community, not arbitrarily by a few self-appointed judges.

"These acts – imposing one's model of democracy and 'democratic transformations' on others, or forming an 'alliance of values' in the name of 'democracy' vs 'autocracy' – create division and antagonism and trample on the democratic spirit, leaving a poisonous legacy despised by their targets," said Li.

Noting the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, Gao Xiang, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that in order to address the common challenges faced by mankind, all countries need to be open and engage in dialogue to ensure that distinctive models of democracy can drive global progress.

Fang Ning, director of the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that democracy shouldn't be dogmatized. In today's world, democracy is as diverse and multifaceted as countries themselves and their peoples have created different models of democracy and formed different democratic concepts based on their own experiences and practices, Fang said.

Imposing one's model of democracy on others can only impede the development of democracy, he added.

According to Du Zhanyuan, the head of China International Publishing Group, a recent survey conducted by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies shows that people in 23 countries on five continents generally agree with the idea that "each country should choose a model of democracy and modernization that suits its national conditions," with an approval rate of 94.3 percent.

Some in the U.S. style their country as the "beacon of democracy," while Xing Bo, vice president of China Media Group (CMG), said that incidents, such as the toxic train derailment in Ohio, child labor and police violence against African Americans, show that the U.S. is deviating from democracy.

Calling for breaking the hegemony of the Western discourse and providing more positive energy for global governance, Xing said CMG is open to mutual learning and walking hand in hand with friends from other countries to spread democracy as an important achievement of human political civilization.

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news.cgtn.com · by CGTN,China Global Television Network

10. Ukraine Offensive Takes Shape, With Big Unknowns

Ukraine Offensive Takes Shape, With Big Unknowns

Weapons and training from NATO allies will be pivotal, while targeting will seek Russian weak spots

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-offensive-takes-shape-with-big-unknowns-2f75f5ae

By Daniel MichaelsFollow

and Ian LovettFollow

March 26, 2023 10:00 am ET

After months of new weapons deliveries from the West, Ukraine is poised to punch back at Russia’s invasion forces in coming weeks—a high-risk campaign that will set the course of subsequent battles and potential peace negotiations.

Ukraine’s operational plans remain confidential, but some aspects of what is to come are discernible from a look at the equipment each side has—or doesn’t have—and their recent performance on the battlefield. Both are struggling to make gains and have been burning through munitions at rates not seen since the two world wars.

For Ukraine to succeed against Russia’s deeper resources and entrenched defenses it will need a combination of skill and luck, finding and quickly exploiting weak points, say strategists. While Kyiv’s forces are more motivated and, in some cases, better armed than Moscow’s troops, Russia has had months to prepare for a Ukrainian attack and shown greater willingness to expend lives and materiel.

Watch: Zelensky Visits Bakhmut After Russian Strikes Kill Seven in Kyiv

Americans hooked on Chinese apps

Axios · by Sara Fischer · March 27, 2023

Data: Apptopia; Chart: Axios Visuals

The standoff between the U.S. government and TikTok underscores a growing problem for policymakers: Chinese apps are booming in America, but most U.S. apps aren't able to operate in China.

Why it matters: Mobile apps are one of the most powerful vectors for expanding trade and exporting soft power, given how widely accessible they are, how much time is spent on them, and how little regulatory oversight there is online.

Chinese companies are able to "leverage China’s one billion internet users to test user preferences and optimize their AI models at home, then export the tech overseas," The Wall Street Journal notes. But given censorship demands in China, American tech firms can't reciprocate.

Driving the news: In the past 30 days, four of the top 10 most-downloaded apps in the U.S. across Apple's iOS store and the Google Play store are owned by Chinese companies.

Temu, an online retailer, has quickly become one of the fastest-growing apps in the U.S., giving marketplaces like Amazon and Walmart a run for their money. The company is based in Boston and owned by PDD Holdings, a multinational commerce company that's publicly traded on the Beijing stock exchange. PDD is also parent to Chinese social commerce company Pinduoduo.
TikTok continues to gain traction in the U.S., even amid calls for a possible ban. TikTok was by far the most-downloaded app in the U.S. and globally last year.
CapCut, a video editing app owned by TikTok parent ByteDance, is also gaining ground in the U.S. as a vehicle for young users to optimize their short-form video posts on TikTok, Instagram and YouTube.
SHEIN, a fast-fashion giant based in Singapore but founded in China, has long been one of the most-downloaded e-commerce apps in the U.S. The company was founded by Chinese entrepreneur Chris Xu, and most of its suppliers are in China.

Yes, but: While an increasing number of Chinese apps are becoming popular to download, these apps still struggle to provide American users with the same sense of daily utility as those made by U.S. companies.

Case-in-point: TikTok is the only app in the top 20 most-visited apps in the U.S. last month, per Comscore. Eight of the top 10 are owned by Google or Meta. The vast majority of the top 20 are owned by those two firms, Amazon or Apple.

Be smart: Last week's Congressional hearing showed how much bipartisan angst there is around TikTok's growing footprint.

TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew was grilled for hours by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, making for a contentious event that was broadcast live to millions of people globally online, on television, and of course, on TikTok.

In China, state media called the hearing an "embarrassment," per The Washington Post.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry argued that a ban, if TikTok is not sold to a U.S. firm, would constitute “unreasonable suppression” of the app.
Online in China, Chew is being described as a "punching bag" for American lawmakers and praised as a hero.

The big picture: The tension between China and Washington has come to a head over the national security risks that U.S. imports of foreign technology could pose.

To date, lawmakers have mostly taken aim at hardware and enterprise technology firms like Huawei and ZTE. TikTok is the first major consumer app that lawmakers are publicly threatening to ban.

Axios · by Sara Fischer · March 27, 2023

12. FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs Executive Order to Prohibit U.S. Government Use of Commercial Spyware that Poses Risks to National Security

Conclusion:

Taken together, these efforts aim to reduce the improper use of new technological tools to facilitate repression and human rights abuses, mitigate the counterintelligence threats these tools can pose to the U.S. Government, ensure that U.S. companies and former U.S. Government personnel are not facilitating authoritarian or repressive practices abroad, and provide tools to Americans and civil society to better protect themselves.

FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs Executive Order to Prohibit U.S. Government Use of Commercial Spyware that Poses Risks to National Security | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · March 27, 2023

Presidential Directive Will Serve as a Cornerstone Initiative During the Second Summit for Democracy

Today, President Biden signed an Executive Order that prohibits, for the first time, operational use by the United States Government of commercial spyware that poses risks to national security or has been misused by foreign actors to enable human rights abuses around the world.

Commercial spyware – sophisticated and invasive cyber surveillance tools sold by vendors to access electronic devices remotely, extract their content, and manipulate their components, all without the knowledge or consent of the devices’ users – has proliferated in recent years with few controls and high risk of abuse.

The proliferation of commercial spyware poses distinct and growing counterintelligence and security risks to the United States, including to the safety and security of U.S. Government personnel and their families. U.S. Government personnel overseas have been targeted by commercial spyware, and untrustworthy commercial vendors and tools can present significant risks to the security and integrity of U.S. Government information and information systems.

A growing number of foreign governments around the world, moreover, have deployed this technology to facilitate repression and enable human rights abuses, including to intimidate political opponents and curb dissent, limit freedom of expression, and monitor and target activists and journalists. Misuse of these powerful surveillance tools has not been limited to authoritarian regimes. Democratic governments also have confronted revelations that actors within their systems have used commercial spyware to target their citizens without proper legal authorization, safeguards, and oversight.

In response, the Biden-Harris Administration has mobilized a government-wide effort to counter the risks posed by commercial spyware. Today’s Executive Order builds on these initiatives, and complementary bipartisan congressional action, to establish robust protections against misuse of such tools.

This Executive Order will serve as a cornerstone U.S. initiative during the second Summit for Democracy on March 29-30, 2023, which President Biden will co-host with the leaders of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Zambia. In furtherance of President Biden’s National Security Strategy, this Executive Order demonstrates the United States’ leadership in, and commitment to, advancing technology for democracy, including by countering the misuse of commercial spyware and other surveillance technology. This Executive Order will also serve as a foundation to deepen international cooperation to promote responsible use of surveillance technology, counter the proliferation and misuse of such technology, and spur industry reform.

***

In particular, the Executive Order signed by President Biden today:

Applies to U.S. federal government departments and agencies, including those engaged in law enforcement, defense, or intelligence activities, and encompasses spyware tools furnished by foreign or domestic commercial entities.
Prohibits departments and agencies across the federal government from operationally using commercial spyware tools that pose significant counterintelligence or security risks to the U.S. Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, including to target Americans or enable human rights abuses.
Establishes key counterintelligence, security, and improper use factors that indicate such risks, including if:
a foreign government or foreign person has used or acquired the commercial spyware to gain or attempt to gain access to U.S. Government electronic devices, or those of U.S. Government personnel, without authorization from the U.S. Government;
the commercial spyware was or is furnished by an entity that (1) maintains, transfers, or uses data obtained from the commercial spyware without authorization from the licensed end-user or the U.S. Government; (2) has disclosed or intends to disclose non-public information about the U.S. Government or its activities without authorization from the U.S. Government; or (3) is under the direct or effective control of a foreign government or foreign person engaged in intelligence activities directed against the United States;
a foreign actor uses the commercial spyware against activists, dissidents, or other actors to intimidate; to curb dissent or political opposition; to otherwise limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly or association; or to enable other forms of human rights abuses or suppression of civil liberties;
a foreign actor uses the commercial spyware to monitor a United States person, without consent, in order to track or target them without proper legal authorization, safeguards, and oversight; and
the commercial spyware is furnished to governments for which there are credible reports that they engage in systematic acts of political repression, including arbitrary arrest or detention, torture, extrajudicial or politically motivated killing, or other gross violations of human rights. This ensures application of the Executive Order in situations when foreign actors may not yet have committed specific abuses through the use of commercial spyware, but have engaged in other serious abuses and violations of human rights.
Identifies concrete remedial steps that commercial spyware vendors can take to reduce identified risks, such as cancelling relevant licensing agreements or contracts that present such risks.
Directs important new reporting and information-sharing requirements within the Executive Branch to ensure departments and agencies can make informed and consistent determinations based on up-to-date all-source information, including a semi-annual comprehensive intelligence assessment.

The Executive Order, therefore, seeks to ensure that any U.S. Government use of commercial spyware aligns with the United States’ core national security and foreign policy interests in upholding and advancing democratic processes and institutions, and respect for human rights; does not contribute, directly or indirectly, to the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware; and helps protect U.S. Government personnel and U.S. Government information systems and intelligence and law enforcement activities against significant counterintelligence or security risks.

***

The Executive Order complements concrete actions the Biden-Harris Administration and Congress have taken to confront the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware:

Congress enacted new statutory authorities and requirements related to commercial spyware in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2022 and 2023, including new restrictions and reporting requirements for Intelligence Community (IC) employees’ post-service employment with foreign governments or companies, to include foreign commercial spyware entities. Last week, the Director of National Intelligence issued binding guidance to the U.S. Intelligence Community to implement these statutory requirements, which set an international standard that we hope will be followed by other countries.
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has placed foreign entities on the Entity List to address foreign policy concerns related to surveillance technologies. In November 2021, BIS added four commercial entities to the Entity List for engaging in the proliferation and misuse of cyber intrusion tools contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
The Department of Commerce has implemented technology-based controls to address digital surveillance tools. In October 2021, the Department implemented multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement export controls on certain cybersecurity items that could be used for surveillance, espionage or other actions that disrupt, deny, or degrade a network or devices on the network. The final rule has been in effect since May 2022.
In January 2022, the Department of State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s National Counterintelligence and Security Center issued an advisory for the broader public on how to protect oneself from commercial surveillance tools.
At the direction of Congress, the Department of State, in consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has submitted to appropriate oversight committees a classified report on contractors that have knowingly assisted or facilitated certain cyberattacks or conducted surveillance activities on behalf of relevant foreign governments against the United States or for the purposes of suppressing dissent or intimidating critics.
In June 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the Department of State, on behalf of the Biden-Harris Administration, will update the United States’ National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct. This builds on prior U.S. government guidance, including the U.S. Department of State guidance on implementing business and human rights principles for “Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities.”
In parallel, the Biden-Harris Administration continues to undertake a concerted effort to assess the extent to which commercial spyware has been directed against U.S. Government personnel serving overseas and mitigate the counterintelligence and security risks posed by these tools.

Taken together, these efforts aim to reduce the improper use of new technological tools to facilitate repression and human rights abuses, mitigate the counterintelligence threats these tools can pose to the U.S. Government, ensure that U.S. companies and former U.S. Government personnel are not facilitating authoritarian or repressive practices abroad, and provide tools to Americans and civil society to better protect themselves.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · March 27, 2023

13. Why is Biden doing another pointless Summit for Democracy?

From the Quincy Institute and its Responsible Statecraft. Do these people ever find anything positive about America? (I can accept criticism of our system and I believe we must recognize our faults but I also believe what makes our country great is our ability to correct our mistakes as we have done throughout our history). It pains me that the admisntration hires people from this organization.

About half of this article is criticism of India for "democratic backsliding."

Excerpts:

The U.S. would be better served if our leaders devoted their attention to shoring up and repairing our own dilapidated political system. Especially in foreign policy, we need a government that is more transparent and accountable to the people. Our leaders preach democracy to the rest of the world while neglecting or weakening it at home. The best thing that the U.S. could do to “bolster” the cause of democracy in the world is to improve our own practice of it here.

That brings us back to the question of what purpose this summit serves. If it is intended to “bolster” democratic norms and practices and stave off backsliding, it is not working very well. If it is just putting on a show to congratulate ourselves on the superiority of our own system, it is a waste of time and effort. If it is mostly an exercise in providing window dressing for some other policy agenda, we could dispense with the pretense that it has anything to do with democracy at all.

Given all these pitfalls, another democracy summit doesn’t seem to be worth the headaches that it will likely create for Washington.

Why is Biden doing another pointless Summit for Democracy? - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Daniel Larison · March 27, 2023

U.S. Foreign Policy

Why is Biden doing another pointless Summit for Democracy?

The event is more a show of dividing the world against Russia and China, creating numerous pitfalls that don’t seem worth it.

March 27, 2023

Written by

Daniel Larison

Why is Biden doing another pointless Summit for Democracy?

The United States is co-hosting the second Summit for Democracy later this week. In coordination with events in the capitals of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia, Washington will host a combination of in-person and virtual meetings to follow up on the original 2021 summit.

The summit seems unlikely to accomplish anything useful. The first Summit for Democracy was a largely pointless exercise in Biden’s first year in office, and it raises the question of why the administration thought it was worth holding a second one.

The same controversies that marred the first summit are sure to accompany this one. NATO allies Hungary and Turkey have once again been left off the list of invitees, while other governments that have been undermining democracy and the rule of law in their countries will still be represented. The snubbed governments may consider their exclusion to be a badge of honor, or they may take offense that they have been excluded again for what they will consider to be arbitrary reasons. Regardless, the U.S. and its co-hosts need to be able to explain why certain states don’t make the cut for events like this and others with similar records do.

One problem is that the hosts may end up paying a political price for excluding some states from what is little more than a glorified talking shop. If the hosts refuse to draw any lines about which states can participate, they open themselves up to criticism that the summit has no substance, but if they set the bar high enough, they will end up leaving out most of the world’s elected governments. When the U.S. and its partners make decisions to exclude some states for backsliding while ignoring the failings of others, it opens them up to charges of hypocrisy and favoritism.

Take India, for example. India has been steadily moving in the wrong direction under Prime Minister Narendra Modi for years. In the latest example of India’s backsliding, the leader of India’s opposition, Rahul Gandhi, has just been expelled from parliament after being found guilty of defamation because of his criticisms of the prime minister. Gandhi will now be barred from standing in elections for the next six years.

The decision has provoked protests from all of India’s opposition parties, and Gandhi’s expulsion has even been called the “direct murder of democracy.” The spokesman for Gandhi’s Congress Party said that it was part of a “systematic and repetitive emasculation of democratic institutions by the ruling party.” It remains to be seen what the administration’s official response to this development will be, but it would be genuinely surprising if the U.S. did more than express concern.

The U.S. has mostly ignored democratic backsliding in India in recent years out of a desire to cultivate their government as a partner against China. Earlier this year, the Indian government banned a BBC documentary critical of the prime minister, and the State Department played dumb. When the government then raided BBC offices last month, the State Department downplayed it. Washington has lots of practice of looking the other way when a partner government becomes more illiberal and authoritarian, but this becomes much harder to ignore when our government is frequently touting the importance of democracy in a grand struggle with “autocracy.”

It will be awkward at best to have the Indian government represented at a democracy summit while that government is openly undermining democracy and press freedom in India. Including India in this year’s summit makes it clear that there is no consistent or principled standard being applied against backsliding governments.

Letting India participate in an event like this right now helps Modi to distract from his government’s creeping authoritarianism and majoritarian abuses. Whatever goals the Biden administration hopes to achieve with these summits, providing cover for an illiberal nationalist while he squashes his political opposition is presumably not one of them.

The Biden administration’s “democracy vs. autocracy” rhetoric has never been a good fit for U.S. foreign policy or international political realities. Not only does the U.S. have many semi-authoritarian and authoritarian partners and clients that have absolutely no interest in defending democracy, but U.S. “leadership” has also put Washington at odds with democratic nations that do not want to be part of its global conflicts and rivalries.

Instead of rhetorically dividing the world into opposing camps, the U.S. should be open to cultivating better relations with as many states as possible regardless of regime type. As many observers have started to notice, the U.S. has become too inflexible in its foreign policy, and the “democracy vs. autocracy” framing risks reinforcing this rigidity when we can least afford it.

Other democratic governments will naturally have their own national interests, and they are not going to sacrifice those interests just because the U.S. and its European allies say that it is necessary for the sake of a larger ideological cause. The U.S. needs to understand that other democracies are not obligated to side with Washington on every major issue, and it needs to appreciate that sharing a form of government does not guarantee that other states will see the world as our government does.

In many cases, other states may remain neutral or even end up on the other side of a major issue because their governments are doing what their voters want. If the U.S. truly respects other democracies, it has to accept that they may adopt different and even opposing views about important international developments. Our leaders should not delude themselves into believing that they speak for all democratic states or that their preferences are the ones that all democracies must have.

The U.S. would be better served if our leaders devoted their attention to shoring up and repairing our own dilapidated political system. Especially in foreign policy, we need a government that is more transparent and accountable to the people. Our leaders preach democracy to the rest of the world while neglecting or weakening it at home. The best thing that the U.S. could do to “bolster” the cause of democracy in the world is to improve our own practice of it here.

That brings us back to the question of what purpose this summit serves. If it is intended to “bolster” democratic norms and practices and stave off backsliding, it is not working very well. If it is just putting on a show to congratulate ourselves on the superiority of our own system, it is a waste of time and effort. If it is mostly an exercise in providing window dressing for some other policy agenda, we could dispense with the pretense that it has anything to do with democracy at all.

Given all these pitfalls, another democracy summit doesn’t seem to be worth the headaches that it will likely create for Washington.

Written by

Daniel Larison

The Republican senator said Americans deserve to know the $113 billion appropriated for Kyiv is well-spent and accounted for.

Unlike the past, where Tehran was the co-dependent and Moscow maintained the upper hand, the roles are somewhat reversed.

After eight years of war, the ongoing humanitarian crisis worsens while the conflict hinges on a fragile truce that can end at any moment.

Robert Kagan claims US standing across the globe is just fine. The rest of the world wants “more America, not less.”

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Daniel Larison · March 27, 2023

14. China spent $240 billion bailing out 'Belt and Road' countries - study

Can we exploit this?

Graphic at the link: https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-spent-240-bln-bailing-out-belt-road-countries-study-2023-03-27/?_hsmi=252046907

China spent $240 billion bailing out 'Belt and Road' countries - study

Reuters · by Rachel Savage

JOHANNESBURG, March 28 (Reuters) - China spent $240 billion bailing out 22 developing countries between 2008 and 2021, with the amount soaring in recent years as more have struggled to repay loans spent building "Belt and Road" infrastructure, a study published on Tuesday showed.

Almost 80% of the lending was made between 2016 and 2021, mainly to middle-income countries including Argentina, Mongolia and Pakistan, according to the report by researchers from the World Bank, Harvard Kennedy School, AidData and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

China has lent hundreds of billions of dollars to build infrastructure in developing countries, but lending has tailed off since 2016 as many projects have failed to pay the expected financial dividends.

"Beijing is ultimately trying to rescue its own banks. That's why it has gotten into the risky business of international bailout lending," said Carmen Reinhart, a former World Bank chief economist and one of the study's authors.

Reuters Graphics

Chinese loans to countries in debt distress soared from less than 5% of its overseas lending portfolio in 2010 to 60% in 2022, the study found.

Argentina received the most, with $111.8 billion, followed by Pakistan with $48.5 billion and Egypt with $15.6 billion. Nine countries received less than $1 billion.

The People's Bank of China's (PBOC) swap lines accounted for $170 billion of the financing, including in Suriname, Sri Lanka and Egypt. Bridge loans or balance of payments support by Chinese state-owned banks and companies was $70 billion. Rollovers of both kinds of loans were $140 billion.

The study was critical of some central banks potentially using the PBOC swap lines to artifically pump up their foreign exchange reserve figures.

China's rescue lending is "opaque and uncoordinated," said Brad Parks, one of the report's authors, and director of AidData, a research lab at The College of William & Mary in the United States.

China's government hit back at the criticism, saying its overseas investments operated on "the principle of openness and transparency".

"China acts in accordance with market laws and international rules, respects the will of relevant countries, has never forced any party to borrow money, has never forced any country to pay, will not attach any political conditions to loan agreements, and does not seek any political self-interest," foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a news conference on Tuesday.

The bailout loans are mainly concentrated in the middle income countries that make up four-fifths of its lending, due to the risk they pose to Chinese banks' balance sheets, whereas low income countries are offered grace periods and maturity extensions, the report said.

China is negotiating debt restructurings with countries including Zambia, Ghana and Sri Lanka and has been criticised for holding up the processes. In response, it has called on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to also offer debt relief.

Reporting by Rachel Savage; Additional reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing; Editing by Richard Chang and Jacqueline Wong

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Rachel Savage

Thomson Reuters

Reports on markets, finance and economics across Sub-Saharan Africa and is based in Johannesburg. Previously she was LGBT+ Correspondent at the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Reuters’ sister organization, where she was awarded Journalist of the Year in 2021 by the NLGJA: The Association of LGBTQ Journalists, a U.S. organization. Before that Rachel worked for The Economist, covering west Africa from Lagos and east Africa from Nairobi. Her work has also appeared in the Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent and Euromoney.

Reuters · by Rachel Savage

15. The U.S. Should Get Over Its Short War Obsession

Excerpts:

Unlike the Russo-Ukrainian war, however, a Taiwan conflict could pit the world’s first and second largest economies directly against each other in open warfare. China’s military capability and industrial capacity already dwarf Russia’s. And if the United States is directly involved in the fighting, it will likely commit substantially more resources to the war than it has so far given to Ukraine. In short, the United States and China would be able to sustain a conventional conflict for a very long time, and neither side would reach the point of exhaustion quickly. And so, the United States would face a strategic choice between accepting defeat and fighting for the long haul.

Obviously, no one wants to fight long, grueling wars. They are bloody and expensive. If war can be avoided in the first place, all the better. But if the United States must fight—for instance, over Taiwan—it should take a clear-eyed look at its own history and prepare for what will, in all likelihood, be a protracted conflict. It must ensure that it has the industrial capacity and manpower to sustain a long fight and the strategic vision to guide its efforts for the long haul.

The United States’ adversaries—be it the Taliban yesterday, Russia today, or potentially China tomorrow—bank on Washington’s strategic impatience. They presume that if they hold on for long enough, Americans’ desire for short wars will sabotage their efforts in time. If the United States’ objective is to win, the only thing worse than fighting a long war may be thinking it’s possible to avoid one.

The U.S. Should Get Over Its Short War Obsession

No one wants long, grueling wars—but the consequences of impatience can be worse.

By Raphael S. Cohen, the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force, and Gian Gentile, the deputy director of the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division.

Foreign Policy · by Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile · March 28, 2023

Americans have long been fixated on the idea of the short, decisive war. At the start of the American Civil War, Washington gentry traveled to watch the First Battle of Bull Run—to partake of a spectacle they presumed would soon end. In 1898, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay expected the Spanish-American War to be a “splendid little war,” culminating in a quick victory for the newly emerging global power. As U.S. troops neared the Yalu River in November 1950 during the Korean War, Gen. Douglas MacArthur promised that his soldiers would “eat Christmas dinner at home.” In 2003, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld predicted that the Iraq war “certainly isn’t going to last any longer than [five months].” Multiple administrations underestimated the timeline of the war in Afghanistan.

A similar obsession with short wars colors the coverage of the Ukraine war today. In 2022, as it became clear Russia was about to invade Ukraine, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley, the U.S. intelligence community, and most outside experts predicted a Russian victory in a matter of days. As the Russian advance sagged, a handful of commentators then predicted a speedy Ukrainian victory. Many more have judged the war unwinnable and called for a quick end through negotiations. The media, for its part, has labeled the war a stalemate during just about every lull in fighting.

History has not been kind to any of these predictions. The Civil War lasted four years and remains one of the bloodiest conflicts in U.S. history. The Spanish-American War devolved into a yearslong insurgency in the Philippines. MacArthur’s push towards the Yalu triggered Chinese intervention, which prolonged the conflict by years, not months. The Iraq War lasted an order of magnitude longer than Rumsfeld predicted, and Afghanistan turned into Washington’s longest war. Today, the war in Ukraine has not resulted in a quick win for either side—but it is not a stalemate, either, as the battlefield continues to evolve.

The number of truly quick wars in U.S. history have been few and far between. Most of these have been small affairs against second-tier powers, like the Reagan administration’s attack on Grenada or the George H.W. Bush administration’s intervention in Panama. In some cases, a short war proved more illusion than fact. The First Gulf War in 1990 lasted only 100 hours, but it gave way to three decades of direct U.S. military involvement in and over Iraq that continues to this day.

Over the years, the United States has tried any number of approaches to shorten its wars. Depending on the conflict, it has experimented with diplomacy and encouraged off-ramps to entrenched conflicts. When those have not worked, it has tried “shock and awe” campaigns using overwhelming force to wow its adversaries into submission. Today, there are entire research programs at Washington think tanks focusing on “ending endless wars”—as if there were a lobby for engaging in such conflicts in the first place. In most cases, these efforts have failed: In recent decades, Washington’s wars have tended to last longer.

The United States has certainly paid a price for its short war fixation: U.S. forces were caught flat-footed in Korea, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The latter, multiple observers quipped, was fought as a series of 20 one-year wars, with units and their leadership replaced every year. In the process, the United States lost the continuity of effort and clarity of strategic vision that should have come with a 20-year commitment, as well as the opportunity to have a frank national conversation about the war’s likely benefits versus its true costs.

The United States’ adversaries—be it the Taliban yesterday, Russia today, or potentially China tomorrow—bank on Washington’s strategic impatience.No one can blame the near-universal desire to keep wars short. Still, as a matter of defense planning, the United States needs to assume that most of its wars will last a long time. Thankfully, wars are rare events. Most of the time, states only fight over what they perceive as irreconcilable issues of enough importance that they merit the investment of blood and treasure. If there were an easy solution, then most likely the war would have been avoided altogether. But precisely because states do not go to war on a whim also means they do not sue for peace on a whim, either.

Moreover, war, by its very nature, encourages intransigence. Behavioral economists often turn to the so-called sunk cost fallacy to explain why wars drag on. People are more likely to double down on policies rather than reverse course and risk losing their initial investment. In war, these sunk costs become especially acute when they are real blood and treasure. Political scientists similarly note that leaders are often willing to gamble for resurrection, escalating wars to avoid losing power. Cognitive scientists have argued that as wars go on, each side tends to dehumanize and vilify the other. Rather than becoming more open to negotiations and off-ramps, leaders become even more entrenched and less likely to see a way to peace. Many of these dynamics seem to underlie Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus in Ukraine as he continues to double down on a losing bet, but they applies to other leaders in other conflicts as well.

The advent of nuclear weapons has not prevented long wars either. While nuclear weapons may prevent both sides from seeking to destroy one another, if only to prevent mutual annihilation, they do not necessarily prevent protracted conventional conflicts in which they are directly involved, such as the Korean War, Vietnam War, or today’s Russo-Ukrainian War. Scholars sometimes refer to this dynamic as the stability-instability paradox: Precisely because states are confident that their nuclear arsenal protects them from full-on superpower war, they are likelier to engage in lower-level wars.

Today, the United States’ short-war fixation is a problem for its efforts to aid Ukraine. Such a fixation contributes to U.S. opinion-makers’ seemingly insatiable appetite for instantaneous gratification in the form of battlefield victories. Never mind the Ukrainian counteroffensives that have liberated large swaths of land around Kharkiv and Kherson. Never mind the fact that winter is not the most conducive season for offensive operations in Ukraine. Absent a continuous string of victories, some Americans—and many pundits and public commentators—begin to lose patience.

If Afghanistan was fought as multiple one-year wars strung together, then Ukraine is being fought one weapon at a time. Over the past year, the United States has agonized about whether to give individual systems to Ukrainian forces—from HIMARS rocket artillery and Patriot antiaircraft systems to, potentially, F-16 fighter jets, Reaper drones, and longer-range rockets. In theory, such added scrutiny is designed to control escalation and keep the war short and contained. In practice, this piecemeal approach comes at the cost of a more strategic one. Rather than thinking through what Ukraine needs to win and resourcing it accordingly, Washington slows down the weapons Kyiv needed yesterday.

The United States’ fascination with short wars may turn out to be a problem in the future, too. No one can say for sure how a potential war with China over Taiwan will play out, but wargames suggest it will be almost certainly bloody and probably not quick. Even if the United States and its allies stopped a Chinese invasion, would Chinese leadership simply call it quits, especially after having publicly committed to Taiwan’s capture as the central plank of the great “rejuvenation” of China? Conversely, if the United States loses, and China successfully occupies Taiwan, likely killing thousands of U.S. troops in the process, would a U.S. president say, “We gave it our best,” and go home? Probably not. More likely, he or she would be faced with the same sunk-cost problem that has trapped Putin today. And no amount of clever diplomacy would change that.

Unlike the Russo-Ukrainian war, however, a Taiwan conflict could pit the world’s first and second largest economies directly against each other in open warfare. China’s military capability and industrial capacity already dwarf Russia’s. And if the United States is directly involved in the fighting, it will likely commit substantially more resources to the war than it has so far given to Ukraine. In short, the United States and China would be able to sustain a conventional conflict for a very long time, and neither side would reach the point of exhaustion quickly. And so, the United States would face a strategic choice between accepting defeat and fighting for the long haul.

Obviously, no one wants to fight long, grueling wars. They are bloody and expensive. If war can be avoided in the first place, all the better. But if the United States must fight—for instance, over Taiwan—it should take a clear-eyed look at its own history and prepare for what will, in all likelihood, be a protracted conflict. It must ensure that it has the industrial capacity and manpower to sustain a long fight and the strategic vision to guide its efforts for the long haul.

The United States’ adversaries—be it the Taliban yesterday, Russia today, or potentially China tomorrow—bank on Washington’s strategic impatience. They presume that if they hold on for long enough, Americans’ desire for short wars will sabotage their efforts in time. If the United States’ objective is to win, the only thing worse than fighting a long war may be thinking it’s possible to avoid one.

Foreign Policy · by Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile · March 28, 2023

16. Why You Fell for the Fake Pope Coat

When I saw it on social media I thought "wow, the Pope is cool." I did not question it (like I should have). I just thought it was an interesting photo.

Why You Fell for the Fake Pope Coat

The pope didn’t actually wear that great jacket, but a lot of people were ready to believe he did.

By Charlie Warzel

The Atlantic · by Charlie Warzel · March 28, 2023

Being alive and on the internet in 2023 suddenly means seeing hyperrealistic images of famous people doing weird, funny, shocking, and possibly disturbing things that never actually happened. In just the past week, the AI art tool Midjourney rendered two separate convincing, photographlike images of celebrities that both went viral. Last week, it imagined Donald Trump’s arrest and eventual escape from jail. Over the weekend, Pope Francis got his turn in Midjourney’s maw when an AI-generated image of the pontiff wearing a stylish white puffy jacket blew up on Reddit and Twitter.

But the fake Trump arrest and the pope’s Balenciaga renderings have one meaningful difference: While most people were quick to disbelieve the images of Trump, the pope’s puffer duped even the most discerning internet dwellers. This distinction clarifies how synthetic media—already treated as a fake-news bogeyman by some—will and won’t shape our perceptions of reality.

Pope Francis’s rad parka fooled savvy viewers because it depicted what would have been a low-stakes news event—the type of tabloid-y non-news story that, were it real, would ultimately get aggregated by popular social-media accounts, then by gossipy news outlets, before maybe going viral. It’s a little nugget of internet ephemera, like those photos that used to circulate of Vladimir Putin shirtless.

As such, the image doesn’t demand strict scrutiny. When I saw the image in my feed, I didn’t look too hard at it; I assumed either that it was real and a funny example of a celebrity wearing something unexpected, or that it was fake and part of an online in-joke I wasn’t privy to. My instinct was certainly not to comb the photo for flaws typical of AI tools (I didn’t notice the pope’s glitchy hands, for example). I’ve talked with a number of people who had a similar response. They were momentarily duped by the image but described their experience of the fakery in a more ambient sense—they were scrolling; saw the image and thought, Oh, wow, look at the pope; and then moved along with their day. The Trump-arrest images, in contrast, depicted an anticipated news event that, had it actually happened, would have had serious political and cultural repercussions. One does not simply keep scrolling along after watching the former president get tackled to the ground.

So the two sets of images are a good illustration of the way that many people assess whether information is true or false. All of us use different heuristics to try to suss out truth. When we receive new information about something we have existing knowledge of, we simply draw on facts that we’ve previously learned. But when we’re unsure, we rely on less concrete heuristics like plausibility (would this happen?) or style (does something feel, look, or read authentically?). In the case of the Trump arrest, both the style and plausibility heuristics were off.

Read: People aren’t falling for AI Trump photos (yet)

“If Trump has been publicly arrested, I’m asking myself, Why am I seeing this image but Twitter’s trending topics, tweets, and the national newspapers and networks are not reflecting that?” Mike Caulfield, a researcher at the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public, told me. “But for the pope your only available heuristic is Would the pope wear a cool coat? Since almost all of us don’t have any expertise there, we fall back on the style heuristic, and the answer we come up with is: maybe.”

As I wrote last week, so-called hallucinated images depicting big events that never took place work differently than conspiracy theories, which are elaborate, sometimes vague, and frequently hard to disprove. Caulfield, who researches misinformation campaigns around elections, told me that the most effective attempts to mislead come from actors who take solid reporting from traditional news outlets and then misframe it.

Say you’re trying to gin up outrage around a local election. A good way to do this would be to take a reported news story about voter outreach and incorrectly infer malicious intent about a detail in the article. A throwaway sentence about a campaign sending election mailers to noncitizens can become a viral conspiracy theory if a propagandist suggests that those mailers were actually ballots. Alleging voter fraud, the conspiracists can then build out a whole universe of mistruths. They might look into the donation records and political contributions of the secretary of state and dream up imaginary links to George Soros or other political activists, creating intrigue and innuendo where there’s actually no evidence of wrongdoing. “All of this creates a feeling of a dense reality, and it’s all possible because there is some grain of reality at the center of it,” Caulfield said.

For synthetic media to deceive people in high-stakes news environments, the images or video in question will have to cast doubt on, or misframe, accurate reporting on real news events. Inventing scenarios out of whole cloth lightens the burden of proof to the point that even casual scrollers can very easily find the truth. But that doesn’t mean that AI-generated fakes are harmless. Caulfield described in a tweet how large language models, or LLMs—the technology behind Midjourney and similar programs—are masters at manipulating style, which people have a tendency to link to authority, authenticity, and expertise. “The internet really peeled apart facts and knowledge, LLMs might do similar with style,” he wrote.

Style, he argues, has never been the most important heuristic to help people evaluate information, but it’s still quite influential. We use writing and speaking styles to evaluate the trustworthiness of emails, articles, speeches, and lectures. We use visual style in evaluating authenticity as well—think about company logos or online images of products for sale. It’s not hard to imagine that flooding the internet with low-cost information mimicking an authentic style might scramble our brains, similar to how the internet’s democratization of publishing made the process of simple fact-finding more complex. As Caulfield notes, “The more mundane the thing, the greater the risk.”

Because we’re in the infancy of a generative-AI age, it’s too premature to suggest that we’re tumbling headfirst into the depths of a post-truth hellscape. But consider these tools through Caulfield’s lens: Successive technologies, from the early internet, to social media, to artificial intelligence, have each targeted different information-processing heuristics and cheapened them in succession. The cumulative effect conjures an eerie image of technologies like a roiling sea, slowly chipping away at the necessary tools we have for making sense of the world and remaining resilient. A slow erosion of some of what makes us human.

The Atlantic · by Charlie Warzel · March 28, 2023

17. USAID, Internews, and Microsoft Announce Public-Private Partnership to Develop Media Viability Accelerator

Not USAID's mission but something like this is needed for our own local media in the US.

USAID, Internews, and Microsoft Announce Public-Private Partnership to Develop Media Viability Accelerator | Press Release | U.S. Agency for International Development

usaid.gov

Data-Driven Digital Platform to Help Independent News Media Become Financially Self-Sufficient

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Internews, and Microsoft announced a new public-private partnership to develop a Media Viability Accelerator to help independent news outlets become more financially sustainable. The announcement, made in advance of the 2023 Summit for Democracy, illustrates a shared commitment among government, business, and civil society to shore up democracy’s fourth estate.

“Independent media is both a public good and a private enterprise, but it has faced significant financial headwinds of late,” said USAID Administrator Samantha Power. “The U.S. government will use every tool at our disposal to support independent media, including by drawing on the expertise of our partners in the private sector. The Media Viability Accelerator is a model public-private partnership that will help keep independent media outlets around the world financially sustainable so they can continue their vital work.”

“Media around the globe face a dual threat: repression and bankruptcy,” said Jeanne Bourgault, President and CEO of Internews, a nonprofit that supports independent media in 100 countries. “Thousands of media outlets have closed around the world in the past decade due to disruption of traditional media business models. In service of democracy, the Media Viability Accelerator will help reverse that trend by assisting media to survive and become more competitive.”

The Media Viability Accelerator is a web-based platform that will help news media become more financially sustainable by accessing solutions and market insights to inform effective business strategies. Participating media outlets will, free of charge, learn from a community of peers, access a multi-lingual tool that visualizes media performance data, and receive actionable daily alerts based on thousands of market and media sources.

"Independent journalism is essential to a healthy and vibrant democracy, but technology has unfortunately eroded traditional ad-based business models," said Brad Smith, Microsoft's vice chair and president. "Our hope is that this AI-powered data aggregation and visualization tool will offer media outlets the kind of market intelligence they need to be financially successful."

In a three-way memorandum of understanding that underlies the partnership:

USAID agreed to support the development and growth of the Media Viability Accelerator platform, and set and monitor high-level objectives for the project;
Microsoft will contribute expertise in data analysis, visualization dashboards, cloud services, and AI and agreed to provide in-kind technical support to develop and sustain the MVA platform; and
Internews, in concert with other media development organizations, agreed to register up to 500 media outlet users within 6 months, with a focus on media from low-resource countries and emerging democracies.

Other organizations supporting the effort include Free Press Unlimited, Global Forum for Media Development, IREX, SembraMedia, and the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Media outlets, businesses, governments and nonprofits interested in participating can sign up.

usaid.gov

18. Russian Nukes in Belarus: Just Another Gimmick by Putin

Excerpts:

The vague notion that Russia and the West might somehow slide into a nuclear war is just not credible. States do not make casual decisions about something as momentous as nuclear war. Putin may be desperate, because he cannot figure out how to win in Ukraine. But he is not stupid or suicidal.

Even the use of smaller or tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine is highly unlikely. There is no large, concentrated military target in Ukraine commensurate with such a massive strike. Using nuclear weapons on the battlefield would create irradiated spaces that would be hard for Russia to conquer or control. What Russia needs in Ukraine is a breakthrough — an armored punch through Ukraine’s lines that opens up terrain to Russian maneuver and conquest. This is what could push Ukraine to concede. It is hard to see how nuking Ukrainian positions would facilitate that, even if the external consequences from NATO and China could somehow be contained.

No matter how many times Putin waves his nukes around for the Western press, they do not meaningfully change the course of war in Ukraine. There is no obvious way to use them for victory, and a nuclear strike on NATO would be suicidal. It is just another gimmick from an aging, paranoid dictator frustrated by a war he cannot win.

Russian Nukes in Belarus: Just Another Gimmick by Putin

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · March 28, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Russia’s eastern neighbor. Belarus also borders Ukraine’s north, and Putin wants Minsk to participate more openly in his war against their shared neighbor. Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has acted warily with respect to Russia’s invasion, but he depends on Russian assistance to stay in power, especially after Putin helped him fight off mass protests in 2020. Lukashenko probably has little choice but to assent to the deployment of Russian nukes on his country’s territory.

Belarus also borders NATO countries. Putin’s emplacement of these weapons is likely meant as an oblique threat to the West. It fits Putin’s regular habit of talking up Russian nuclear weapons to unnerve Ukraine’s Western supporters. The tactic makes sense. Russian conventional power has embarrassed itself in Ukraine. Its army has struggled, and most of the world had expected a quick victory for Russian forces. Putin invokes Russia’s nukes to compensate. He has a long history of such bravado.

Putin’s Western sympathizers, who have talked up the possibility of World War III for over a year, will argue again that this deployment means we are sliding toward a global conflagration. But they are probably wrong. It remains unclear how invoking nukes will help Putin win a limited conventional war.

Belarus Nukes: Ukraine Is Not Spiraling Into World War III

Putin’s Belarus move would be far more unnerving if World War III seemed imminent or likely, but it doesn’t. There is no obvious utility for nuclear weapons in the current war, which is being fought with conventional weapons in a contained space limited to eastern and southern Ukraine. This is why the WWIII hype from Putin-sympathetic voices in the West is so suspicious. The policy deduction of their analysis is to push Ukraine into concessions to end the war and stop a slide toward a nuclear exchange. Yet many of these analysts also want Putin to win the war, so their reasoning feels strongly motivated. They are using Western nuclear anxieties to push a Ukraine aid cut-off in pursuit of their real goal — a Putin victory,

Critically, there is no evidence that a world war, or even a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine, is imminent. Empirically, Putin is not removing Russian weapons from safe storage, nor loading them onto strike platforms. China, Putin’s main ally in its effort to counter the growing sanctions on Russia’s economy, has said repeatedly that nuclear weapons must not be used in this conflict.

Analytically, it is hard to determine what Putin might strike with such powerful weapons. The risks involved in carrying out a nuclear strike are tremendous. A small nuclear strike in Ukraine would solidify Western support for Kyiv indefinitely. It would deeply alienate China and fire calls in much of the world for Putin to step down. A nuclear strike against NATO would be even riskier. NATO would declare war on Russia. There would be pressure to nuke Russia in return. World War III might well begin in this instance. Not because of the West, per Putin’s apologists, but because of Putin himself.

Russia Is Losing the War, But Putin Is Rational

Putin is highly unlikely to take such risks. Placing nuclear weapons in a country adjacent to NATO looks scary, and the media will play it up as such. But is not, in fact, a tipping point or escalatory step. Putin will not start a war with NATO that he cannot win conventionally and which might result in NATO nuclear strikes on Russia. Nor will NATO escalate against Russia in the nuclear realm. There is no strategic value to the West in doing that.

The vague notion that Russia and the West might somehow slide into a nuclear war is just not credible. States do not make casual decisions about something as momentous as nuclear war. Putin may be desperate, because he cannot figure out how to win in Ukraine. But he is not stupid or suicidal.

Even the use of smaller or tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine is highly unlikely. There is no large, concentrated military target in Ukraine commensurate with such a massive strike. Using nuclear weapons on the battlefield would create irradiated spaces that would be hard for Russia to conquer or control. What Russia needs in Ukraine is a breakthrough — an armored punch through Ukraine’s lines that opens up terrain to Russian maneuver and conquest. This is what could push Ukraine to concede. It is hard to see how nuking Ukrainian positions would facilitate that, even if the external consequences from NATO and China could somehow be contained.

No matter how many times Putin waves his nukes around for the Western press, they do not meaningfully change the course of war in Ukraine. There is no obvious way to use them for victory, and a nuclear strike on NATO would be suicidal. It is just another gimmick from an aging, paranoid dictator frustrated by a war he cannot win.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RobertEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

In this article:

Written By Robert Kelly

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is now a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · March 28, 2023

19. Here Is Everything Taiwan Needs to Stop a Chinese Invasion

Excerpts:

Obviously, some but not all of these necessities conflict with the need to maintain support for Ukraine. In particular, air defense systems and ammunition stocks are needed by both countries. At this point, there is no indication that China plans to attack Taiwan in the immediate future, and there is good reason to believe that Taipei and the United States will have significant warning before an attack begins. Still, we should not handwave away concerns about whether the U.S. commitment to Ukraine is detracting from Washington’s ability to support Taiwan.

For their part, the Taiwanese seem to have been sufficiently surprised by the Russian invasion of Ukraine to start seriously preparing for their own defense against China.

Here Is Everything Taiwan Needs to Stop a Chinese Invasion

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · March 27, 2023

What does Taiwan need in order to defend itself? Growing criticism of the Biden administration’s commitment to Ukraine has begun to coalesce around the idea that supporting the fight against Russia is hamstringing a potential future fight against China.

Does the argument hold much water?

Much of the answer depends on the specifics of the future fight. There are multiple plausible scenarios for the opening of a conflict between China and Taiwan, and so much depends on whether China attempts to blockade Taiwan, to seize offshore islands, or to undertake a full amphibious assault.

One of the best tools for analyzing Taiwan’s needs is through wargaming, and the wargaming community is indeterminate on the success of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

A recent panel at the International Studies Association discussed several models of cross-Straits conflict, concluding that attrition of both Chinese and American forces would be extremely high but also suggesting that the coalition (the Republic of China, the United States, and other ally nations such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Canada, or the Philippines that chooses to join the conflict) forces would stand a good chance of defeating a Chinese invasion.

Much (indeed nearly all) depends on the outcome of the air war over Taiwan. Although the panel did not focus on what the Taiwanese needed in order to maintain the fight, several acquisition priorities became clear:

Attrition of Chinese missiles launched against Taiwan will reduce the threat borne by Coalition bases across the region. China has a limited number of missiles to hit a great many targets (and keep those targets out of service), and local BMD will make things harder for Chinese planners.

Air defense weapons can reduce the threat of Chinese cruise missiles, drones, and manned aircraft over Formosa, although much care will need to be taken with target selection (avoiding cheap decoy drones) in order to maximize the effectiveness of the air defense network.

Even if the conflict between China and the Coalition devolves into a blockade, Taiwan will need anti-ship missiles in order to defeat or deter a landing on Formosa or on outlying islands. The availability of land-based anti-ship missiles would also extend the threat radius around the island, necessarily loosening the blockade.

-Material to harden targets on Formosa: The Taiwanese can handle the hardening of military bases mostly on their own, but the U.S. could contribute technologies that would ensure the connectivity of hardened bases to broader communications networks across the front.

-Material to disperse basing options across Formosa: The Taiwanese can also handle the responsibility of creating additional basing options across Formosa, but much like the hardening process, could likely use some assistance on maximizing the capabilities of small, dispersed bases.

-Stores of weapons and ammunition: As the Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated, modern conflict eats up an enormous amount of material. Ensuring that Taiwan has large stocks of ammunition and maintenance material (spare parts, lubricants) on hand at the beginning of a conflict helps to ensure that Taiwanese forces will remain in the fight over the long haul.

Beyond Formosa itself, several commentators on the ISA panel argued that dispersion and the fortification of airbases across the Western Pacific theater would have a significant impact on the ability of the Allied coalition to maintain an advantage in the air. This does not touch directly on U.S. commitments to Ukraine (even if the U.S. transfers aircraft to Ukraine eventually, they are likely to be older models) but nevertheless represents a way to hedge against masses of Chinese missiles. That said, even the most aggressive steps would leave the U.S. in a disastrous position, with massive attrition of the most advanced aircraft in the U.S. fleet, to say nothing of the destruction of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.

Preparation is the Best Defense

Obviously, some but not all of these necessities conflict with the need to maintain support for Ukraine. In particular, air defense systems and ammunition stocks are needed by both countries. At this point, there is no indication that China plans to attack Taiwan in the immediate future, and there is good reason to believe that Taipei and the United States will have significant warning before an attack begins. Still, we should not handwave away concerns about whether the U.S. commitment to Ukraine is detracting from Washington’s ability to support Taiwan.

For their part, the Taiwanese seem to have been sufficiently surprised by the Russian invasion of Ukraine to start seriously preparing for their own defense against China.

Expertise and Author Biography

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · March 27, 2023

20. Pick a True Believer to Run Your Military Campaigns

Excerpts:

The upshot is that it seems imperative to appoint a commander in tune with the politicians back home if he will wield ultimate power over the conduct of a campaign. In such cases the general is a direct, superempowered extension of politics as well as an operational overseer. His judgment should align with that of officialdom, letting him act as a proxy for his political masters. Ambivalence about the campaign’s direction bodes ill.

And in all four cases, you have to wonder whether qualms about a campaign’s goals or strategy took something off the ingenuity or zest a loyal but skeptical commander brought to the undertaking. If warding off disaster or modulating the campaign’s military punch becomes a supreme commander’s chief priority, chances are the effort will fall short of its operational, strategic, and political aims. Secondary concerns tend to give way.

As a rule military folk do the bidding of political grandees out of duty and honor, agree or not. But military history implies that statesmen are best advised to seek out an executor in full concord with the cause.

All hail true believers.

Pick a True Believer to Run Your Military Campaigns

As a rule military folk do the bidding of political grandees out of duty and honor, agree or not. But military history implies that statesmen are best advised to seek out an executor in full concord with the cause.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 26, 2023

It’s a recurring theme in military history, and perchance it’s been recurring in my extracurricular reading of late: sometimes a less-than-fervent general or admiral finds himself in charge of an expedition. That can create a quandary. The commander may be leery of the purposes impelling the enterprise, the methods he’s instructed to deploy to fulfill those purposes, or both. He might even sympathize with the foe. Commitment to the cause may suffer at the top of an expeditionary force.

What’s a soldier—or his political masters—to do?

Examples of civil-military dissent are legion. As Thucydides, the father of history, tells it, two-plus millennia ago the Athenian assembly assigned a troika of generals to head up a campaign to Sicily in hopes of securing the import-dependent city’s grain supply while flanking rival Sparta. The assembly recalled one commander to stand trial on spurious religious charges, another perished during the early going, and the last—Nicias, who had tried to dissuade Athenians from undertaking the expedition in the first place—ended up overseeing it.

One of history’s iconic martial catastrophes resulted.

Nor is this phenomenon unique to antiquity. As Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker note in their splendid new history of the Spanish Armada (1588), the fleet commander, the duke of Medina Sidonia, harbored grave doubts about the venture’s prospects for invading England and killing or capturing Queen Elizabeth I. And yet Medina Sidonia proceeded anyway despite his misgivings. The Armada met its doom through a toxic combination of ill fate, bad weather, and English seamanship and gunnery.

The result, as in classical Greece: disaster.

Or how about eighteenth-century North America? That’s when the British leadership selected General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe to enforce the crown’s interests in the wayward American colonies. But the brothers Howe were a liberal-minded sort, inclined to agree with the colonists that the king’s American subjects should be afforded the rights enjoyed by Englishmen in England. As a result the Howes seemed loath to strike the killing blow they could have struck against the Continental Army in 1776. George Washington’s army lived to fight another day, adapted its strategy, and, as Nathaniel Philbrick shows, prevailed in the end with hypergenerous help from France.

Another cataclysm at arms. For Britain, anyway.

And Shelby Foote documents how, during the American Civil War clash at Gettysburg (1863), the second-in-command of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, General James “Pete” Longstreet, dissented from supreme commander General Robert E. Lee’s concept for the campaign. Longstreet went into Pennsylvania believing the army would wage strategic offense through tactical defense. It would carry the fight across the Potomac River into Union territory, that is, but when fighting loomed it would attempt to seize advantageous ground and defy the Union Army of the Potomac to come and take it at extreme cost.

By contrast Lee’s vision was all offense, all the time. Longstreet was dismayed when the Blue army occupied the heights around Gettysburg, leaving the numerically inferior Gray host to dash itself against fortified positions. The climax came on the third day of battle, when Lee ordered Longstreet to assault the Union center across three-quarters of a mile of open ground, uphill, into the teeth of enemy cannon and rifle fire. Dubbed “Pickett’s Charge” for the division commander who led it, the Confederate death ride became a synonym for reckless futility on the battlefield.

Four debacles out of four cases. That’s a pattern.

Disloyalty isn’t the problem. In none of these instances did the commander deliberately sabotage the expedition entrusted to him. And yet. In three of the cases—the Peloponnesian War, the Spanish Armada, and the War of American Independence—statesmen bestowed almost limitless authority on the commander. They had to, or forego the endeavor. After all, it was impractical to supervise operations from afar given the rudimentary—at best—state of command-and-control technology and techniques of the age. And in each case the designee was a doubter.

Doubt and disagreement mattered.

The upshot is that it seems imperative to appoint a commander in tune with the politicians back home if he will wield ultimate power over the conduct of a campaign. In such cases the general is a direct, superempowered extension of politics as well as an operational overseer. His judgment should align with that of officialdom, letting him act as a proxy for his political masters. Ambivalence about the campaign’s direction bodes ill.

And in all four cases, you have to wonder whether qualms about a campaign’s goals or strategy took something off the ingenuity or zest a loyal but skeptical commander brought to the undertaking. If warding off disaster or modulating the campaign’s military punch becomes a supreme commander’s chief priority, chances are the effort will fall short of its operational, strategic, and political aims. Secondary concerns tend to give way.

All hail true believers.

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 26, 2023

21. Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War

Excerpts:

One thing that is clear a decade into Xi’s rule is that it is important to take him seriously—something that many U.S. analysts regrettably do not do. When Xi launched a series of aggressive campaigns against corruption, private enterprise, financial institutions, and the property and tech sectors, many analysts predicted that these campaigns would be short lived. But they endured. The same was true of Xi’s draconian Zero COVID policy for three years—until he was uncharacteristically forced to reverse course in late 2022.

Xi is now intensifying a decadelong campaign to break key economic and technological dependencies on the U.S.-led democratic world. He is doing so in anticipation of a new phase of ideological and geostrategic “struggle,” as he puts it. His messaging about war preparation and his equating of national rejuvenation with unification mark a new phase in his political warfare campaign to intimidate Taiwan. He is clearly willing to use force to take the island. What remains unclear is whether he thinks he can do so without risking uncontrolled escalation with the United States.

Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War

The World Should Take Him Seriously

By John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger

March 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger · March 29, 2023

Chinese leader Xi Jinping says he is preparing for war. At the annual meeting of China’s parliament and its top political advisory body in March, Xi wove the theme of war readiness through four separate speeches, in one instance telling his generals to “dare to fight.” His government also announced a 7.2 percent increase in China’s defense budget, which has doubled over the last decade, as well as plans to make the country less dependent on foreign grain imports. And in recent months, Beijing has unveiled new military readiness laws, new air-raid shelters in cities across the strait from Taiwan, and new “National Defense Mobilization” offices countrywide.

It is too early to say for certain what these developments mean. Conflict is not certain or imminent. But something has changed in Beijing that policymakers and business leaders worldwide cannot afford to ignore. If Xi says he is readying for war, it would be foolish not to take him at his word.

WEEPING GHOSTS, QUAKING ENEMIES

The first sign that this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—known as the “two-sessions” because both bodies meet simultaneously—might not be business as usual came on March 1, when the top theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published an essay titled “Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army, We Will Advance Victoriously.” The essay appeared under the name “Jun Zheng”—a homonym for “military government” that possibly refers to China’s top military body, the Central Military Commission—and argued that “the modernization of national defense and the military must be accelerated.” It also called for an intensification of Military-Civil Fusion, Xi’s policy requiring private companies and civilian institutions to serve China’s military modernization effort. And riffing off a speech that Xi made to Chinse military leaders in October 2022, it made lightly veiled jabs at the United States:

In the face of wars that may be imposed on us, we must speak to enemies in a language they understand and use victory to win peace and respect. In the new era, the People’s Army insists on using force to stop fighting. . . . Our army is famous for being good at fighting and having a strong fighting spirit. With millet and rifles, it defeated the Kuomintang army equipped with American equipment. It defeated the world’s number one enemy armed to the teeth on the Korean battlefield, and performed mighty and majestic battle dramas that shocked the world and caused ghosts and gods to weep.

Even before the essay’s publication, there were indications that Chinese leaders could be planning for a possible conflict. In December, Beijing promulgated a new law that would enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to more easily activate its reserve forces and institutionalize a system for replenishing combat troops in the event of war. Such measures, as the analysts Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter have noted, suggest that Xi may have drawn lessons about military mobilization from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s failures in Ukraine.

The law governing military reservists is not the only legal change that hints at Beijing’s preparations. In February, the top deliberative body of the National People’s Congress adopted the Decision on Adjusting the Application of Certain Provisions of the [Chinese] Criminal Procedure Law to the Military During Wartime, which, according to the state-run People’s Daily, gives the Central Military Commission the power to adjust legal provisions, including “jurisdiction, defense and representation, compulsory measures, case filings, investigation, prosecution, trial, and the implementation of sentences.” Although it is impossible to predict how the decision will be used, it could become a weapon to target individuals who oppose a takeover of Taiwan. The PLA might also use it to claim legal jurisdiction over a potentially occupied territory, such as Taiwan. Or Beijing could use it to compel Chinese citizens to support its decisions during wartime.

Since December, the Chinese government has also opened a slew of National Defense Mobilization offices—or recruitment centers—across the country, including in Beijing, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tibet, and Wuhan. At the same time, cities in Fujian Province, across the strait from Taiwan, have begun building or upgrading air-raid shelters and at least one “wartime emergency hospital,” according to Chinese state media. In March, Fujian and several cities in the province began preventing overseas IP addresses from accessing government websites, possibly to impede tracking of China’s preparations for war.

XI’S INNER VLAD

If these developments hint at a shift in Beijing’s thinking, the two-sessions meetings in early March all but confirmed one. Among the proposals discussed by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—the advisory body—was a plan to create a blacklist of pro-independence activists and political leaders in Taiwan. Tabled by the popular ultranationalist blogger Zhou Xiaoping, the plan would authorize the assassination of blacklisted individuals—including Taiwan’s vice president, William Lai Ching-te—if they did not reform their ways. Zhou later told the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao that his proposal had been accepted by the conference and “relayed to relevant authorities for evaluation and consideration.” Proposals like Zhou’s do not come by accident. In 2014, Xi praised Zhou for the “positive energy” of his jeremiads against Taiwan and the United States.

Also at the two-sessions meetings, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang announced a military budget of 1.55 trillion yuan (roughly $224.8 billion) for 2023, a 7.2 percent increase from last year. Li, too, called for heightened “preparations for war.” Western experts have long believed that China underreports its defense expenditures. In 2021, for instance, Beijing claimed it spent $209 billion on defense, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute put the true figure at $293.4 billion. Even the official Chinese figure exceeds the military spending of all the Pacific treaty allies of the United States combined (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), and it is a safe bet China is spending substantially more than it says.

But the most telling moments of the two-sessions meetings, perhaps unsurprisingly, involved Xi himself. The Chinese leader gave four speeches in all—one to delegates of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, two to the National People’s Congress, and one to military and paramilitary leaders. In them, he described a bleak geopolitical landscape, singled out the United States as China’s adversary, exhorted private businesses to serve China’s military and strategic aims, and reiterated that he sees uniting Taiwan and the mainland as vital to the success of his signature policy to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ethnos.”

In his first speech on March 6, Xi appeared to be girding China’s industrial base for struggle and conflict. “In the coming period, the risks and challenges we face will only increase and become more severe,” he warned. “Only when all the people think in one place, work hard in one place, help each other in the same boat, unite as one, dare to fight, and be good at fighting, can they continue to win new and greater victories.” To help the CCP achieve these “greater victories,” he vowed to “correctly guide” private businesses to invest in projects that the state has prioritized.

Xi may have drawn lessons about military mobilization from Russia’s failures in Ukraine.

Xi also blasted the United States directly in his speech, breaking his practice of not naming Washington as an adversary except in historical contexts. He described the United States and its allies as leading causes of China’s current problems. “Western countries headed by the United States have implemented containment from all directions, encirclement and suppression against us, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development,” he said. Whereas U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has emphasized “guardrails” and other means of slowing the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, Beijing is clearly preparing for a new, more confrontational era.

On March 5, Xi gave a second speech laying out a vision of Chinese self-sufficiency that went considerably further than any of his previous discussions of the topic, saying China’s march to modernization is contingent on breaking technological dependency on foreign economies—meaning the United States and other industrialized democracies. Xi also said that he wants China to end its reliance on imports of grain and manufactured goods. “In case we’re short of either, the international market will not protect us,” Xi declared. Li, the outgoing premier, emphasized the same point in his annual government “work report” on the same day, saying Beijing must “unremittingly keep the rice bowls of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people firmly in their own hands.” China currently depends on imports for more than a third of its net food consumption.

In his third speech, on March 8 to representatives from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police, Xi declared that China must focus its innovation efforts on bolstering national defense and establish a network of national reserve forces that could be tapped in wartime. Xi also called for a “National Defense Education” campaign to unite society behind the PLA, invoking as inspiration the Double Support Movement, a 1943 campaign by the Communists to militarize society in their base area of Yan’an.

In his fourth speech (and his first as a third-term president), on March 13, Xi announced that the “essence” of his great rejuvenation campaign was “the unification of the motherland.” Although he has hinted at the connection between absorbing Taiwan and his much-vaunted campaign to, essentially, make China great again, he has rarely if ever done so with such clarity.

TAKING XI SERIOUSLY

One thing that is clear a decade into Xi’s rule is that it is important to take him seriously—something that many U.S. analysts regrettably do not do. When Xi launched a series of aggressive campaigns against corruption, private enterprise, financial institutions, and the property and tech sectors, many analysts predicted that these campaigns would be short lived. But they endured. The same was true of Xi’s draconian Zero COVID policy for three years—until he was uncharacteristically forced to reverse course in late 2022.

Xi is now intensifying a decadelong campaign to break key economic and technological dependencies on the U.S.-led democratic world. He is doing so in anticipation of a new phase of ideological and geostrategic “struggle,” as he puts it. His messaging about war preparation and his equating of national rejuvenation with unification mark a new phase in his political warfare campaign to intimidate Taiwan. He is clearly willing to use force to take the island. What remains unclear is whether he thinks he can do so without risking uncontrolled escalation with the United States.

JOHN POMFRET, former Beijing Bureau Chief for The Washington Post, is the author of The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present.
MATT POTTINGER is Chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. From 2019 to 2021, he served as Deputy National Security Adviser.

Foreign Affairs · by John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger · March 29, 2023

22. How to Protect American Democracy

Excerpts:

Disinformation, the intimidation of election officials, and insider threats to voting systems are the among the most prevalent threats facing U.S. elections today, but that does not mean that worries over cyberattacks have disappeared. The U.S. election system today is far more resilient against cyberattacks than it was in 2016. Election officials have incorporated best practices for identifying and recovering from cyber glitches or hacks. Information sharing has greatly improved among local, state, and federal officials. And after years of no financial support, Congress provided some funding in 2018 and 2019 to help states upgrade outdated systems. These investments were a primary reason that the 2020 election was called the “most secure in American history.”

But in the face of evolving threats, failing to improve could mean falling behind. Twenty-four states use voting equipment that is more than a decade old, which is both more vulnerable and more likely to cause problems on Election Day. And with high staff turnover, election offices risk losing substantial institutional knowledge on how to mitigate vulnerabilities.

How to Protect American Democracy

U.S. Elections Are Still Vulnerable to Enemies Foreign and Domestic

By Lawrence Norden and Derek Tisler

March 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Lawrence Norden and Derek Tisler · March 29, 2023

The 2016 presidential election made clear that American democracy is vulnerable to interference by foreign adversaries. In response, officials at all levels of government moved quickly to strengthen protections for the vote. In 2020, the danger of domestic attacks came into greater focus, with the January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol in 2021 serving as a frightening wake-up call. The antidemocratic and violent forces unleashed that day have not faded away. Instead, the threat has metastasized. For the past two years, prominent voices have continued to spread lies about the electoral system and the results of the 2020 election. Election workers have experienced ongoing harassment and violence. There have also been instances of “insider threats,” where a small number of election workers have themselves propagated false election information and taken actions that directly threaten election integrity.

The good news is that the 2022 congressional midterms stalled the momentum of those denying the legitimacy of the 2020 election. Election deniers running to take over election administration in battleground states mostly lost their races, and across the country voting was remarkably peaceful.

Despite this outcome, it would be foolish to believe the danger has passed. Election deniers continue to work in some election offices around the country, and in 2022, they won more than 170 races for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and key statewide offices. Powerful figures, including former President Donald Trump and pundits with millions of followers and viewers, continue to undermine the public’s confidence in U.S. elections. Abroad, countries with massive resources have the motive and means to interfere in future contests. If anything, the heightened geopolitical stakes raised by the war in Ukraine and other global flashpoints will increase their interest in meddling in 2024. Elections have in many ways become a battlefield in a contest over global order.

With the next U.S. presidential election on the horizon, now is the time to further shore up the system’s defenses against threats foreign and domestic to help ensure that the democratic process is protected when Americans go to the polls in November 2024.

SPREADING LIES

A poll released in September 2022 showed that as many as one-third of American adults still do not trust the results of the 2020 election. The continued widespread dissemination and acceptance of lies about the election poses an existential threat to U.S. democracy. That such falsehoods continue to be embraced should worry all Americans.

Effectively pushing back against election falsehoods can seem like an impossible task, but Americans have learned a lot in recent years, and there are communications strategies and legislative measures that can help blunt the effects of disinformation. The first is to continuously “pre-bunk” disinformation and direct citizens to trusted sources, before false information has been spread and believed. Analyses of online election-related conversations by the Stanford Internet Observatory, the Brennan Center, and others have found that high-profile election deniers rely on the same core false narratives over and over. This repetition means that it is possible to predict a good deal of election disinformation. Therefore, election officials, public leaders, and civic organizations can anticipate false points likely to be raised, train voters to recognize false information, provide factual evidence to rebut—or “pre-bunk”—recurring rumors, and direct voters to trusted sources.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) “Rumor vs. Reality” resource, colloquially known as “rumor control,” is a good example. It provides factual information that dispels some of the most common election conspiracies. Since the 2020 election, election officials, voting system vendors, journalists, and many others made use of the authoritative source to push back against election falsehoods. Several states, including Connecticut, Kentucky, and Ohio, have since added to these efforts, setting up their own rumor control pages, hiring dedicated staff to get factual information to voters, and publishing easy-to-follow resources explaining the many steps that keep elections secure and accurate.

Elections have become a battlefield in a contest over global order.

Officials should continue to pursue pre-bunking at multiple levels: CISA should build on its existing rumor control efforts, updating its database as appropriate and ensuring that it has a wide reach; more states should launch their own efforts; and civil society groups should amplify accurate information.

Although the First Amendment prevents the government from imposing a sweeping ban on all misleading election information, legislatures can take steps to limit the spread of material falsehoods about the time, place, and manner of elections that interfere with an individual’s right to vote. In Kansas, Minnesota, and Virginia, for example, it is illegal to share inaccurate information—such as lying about the date of an election or the eligibility requirements for voting—with the intent to impede someone from voting. Similar bills are being considered in other states this year, including Michigan and New York.

Of course, this kind of legislation does not stop all disinformation. But it can mitigate the worst forms that have the direct potential to disenfranchise voters and decrease confidence in the process.

There should be little doubt that election falsehoods will play a prominent role in 2024. Indeed, the lesson for many candidates and other activists since 2020 is that such falsehoods can pay big financial dividends. At the same time, changes in the social media ecosystem, including at platforms like Twitter, may mean that efforts to restrict the spread of misinformation will be even more lax than in 2020. All the while, more sophisticated AI technology will make it easier to generate deepfake images, audio, and other misleading or outright false content. Public and civic leaders must be prepared to push back.

OFFICIALS UNDER ATTACK

The people who run U.S. elections have become targets for those seeking to undermine American democracy. In a 2022 Brennan Center survey of local election officials, one in six said that they had faced threats, and more than half were concerned about their colleagues’ safety. In November, an election official in Arizona was forced into hiding because of fear for his safety, and a losing candidate in New Mexico, who claimed that his election was rigged, was arrested in connection with shootings at the homes of elected officials.

These threats and harassment are among the factors contributing to a difficult environment for election officials, and many are choosing to leave the profession. Twenty percent of local election officials surveyed last year are very likely or somewhat likely to leave office before the 2024 election, and no doubt some of that is related to the increasingly hostile environment they face. If anything, the survey may understate the scope of the problem—in Nevada, at least ten of 17 counties will have a different election administrator in 2024 than they had in 2020. The loss of institutional knowledge that accompanies so many resignations can lead to more administrative mistakes, which only provides more fodder for conspiracy theories and further erodes confidence in the system.

This vicious cycle must be stopped. Although the United States avoided the worst-case scenarios in 2022, the 2024 election will bring more division, heightened tensions, and more potential for violence. The federal government and the states need to act now to protect election workers—and ultimately, confidence in the electoral process.

Most important, state and local election officials need additional funding to bolster physical security at their offices and, when necessary, at their homes. Congress should provide more funding, but existing federal grant programs such as the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program can also direct funds toward this effort. Although federal officials have encouraged states to use both grants for election security needs in past cycles, the absence of spending requirements for election security has left election officials without a seat at the table in their states, and very little of this money has actually made its way to election offices. The Department of Homeland Security partially corrected this issue by requiring three percent of HSGP funds to be used for election security in 2023, and by requiring states to consult with their chief state election official on how to spend these funds, though far more is needed to address the scope of the problem.

Election falsehoods will play a prominent role in 2024.

Election officials also need more legal protections to help keep their personal information private and to help them feel safer in their jobs. Legislative proposals that would have boosted security funding and taken other steps to expand protections for election officials did not advance in Congress last year. Now states must lead the way. Some already are: last year, for example, California, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington all passed laws that make it easier for election officials to keep their home address private. State legislators have introduced similar bills in Maryland and Virginia this year.

There also needs to be greater accountability for people who threaten violence against election officials, which in most cases is illegal under federal and state law. But it is conduct that is rarely prosecuted. The Justice Department’s Election Threats task force reviewed over 1,000 reports of threats against election workers over the past two years, but the department has charged only eight cases.

Building stronger relationships and trust between election officials and law enforcement may help address these shortcomings. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, which the Brennan Center and other nonpartisan organizations support, provides a hopeful model. It is a newly formed partnership between election officials and law enforcement to develop and promote policies and practices that keep election workers and voters safe. These solutions will not resolve all issues, but they are critical to stem the tide on this insidious threat.

INSIDER THREATS

Since 2020, there have been at least 17 incidents in which election workers granted unauthorized access to voting equipment to people seeking to cast doubt on the results of that year’s presidential election, or were pressured by them to do so. That is a small number relative to the tens of thousands of election workers around the country. But attacks from insiders can be particularly damaging to election integrity, especially in the event of a close election.

Here, too, CISA can help. The agency should expand its insider threat services by creating additional best-practices checklists, using them to develop self-assessment tools for officials, and training the agency’s physical security experts on these materials and practices so that they can offer insider threat guidance to election officials alongside other current assessments.

States also must lead on solutions. Colorado provides one model. Following an incident in 2021 in which a county clerk turned over voting equipment to a group connected to MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell and other prominent figures who have advocated for overturning the 2020 election, the state legislature passed a bill that prohibits tampering with voting equipment, requires 24/7 video surveillance and key card access to rooms where voting equipment is stored, and requires election officials to be certified by the state to ensure security training and compliance. A bill currently before the Nevada legislature would similarly require that election officials receive training on proper election procedures every two years.

In addition, states should act to prevent election officials from abusing their authority by improperly delaying the reporting of results or refusing to certify results. Michigan has provided a blueprint. After a county canvassing board initially refused to certify election results in 2020, voters there passed a constitutional amendment in 2022 limiting boards’ discretion and requiring the certification of results for the candidate who received the most votes.

In cases where officials refuse to certify, states should have a plan in place. In New Mexico in 2022, for example, the secretary of state immediately sued and obtained a court order against a county that refused to certify results, forcing the county to reverse course. All states must ensure that they are similarly prepared to act quickly, that laws governing an official’s duty to certify results are as clear as possible, and that efforts to overturn free and fair elections will not be tolerated.

HACKING THE VOTE

Disinformation, the intimidation of election officials, and insider threats to voting systems are the among the most prevalent threats facing U.S. elections today, but that does not mean that worries over cyberattacks have disappeared. The U.S. election system today is far more resilient against cyberattacks than it was in 2016. Election officials have incorporated best practices for identifying and recovering from cyber glitches or hacks. Information sharing has greatly improved among local, state, and federal officials. And after years of no financial support, Congress provided some funding in 2018 and 2019 to help states upgrade outdated systems. These investments were a primary reason that the 2020 election was called the “most secure in American history.”

But in the face of evolving threats, failing to improve could mean falling behind. Twenty-four states use voting equipment that is more than a decade old, which is both more vulnerable and more likely to cause problems on Election Day. And with high staff turnover, election offices risk losing substantial institutional knowledge on how to mitigate vulnerabilities.

It is safe to say that adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will continue to attempt to meddle in U.S. elections. The most critical federal agency in this fight is CISA, which provides state and local election officials with risk assessments, information sharing, and security guidance. As it did in 2020, CISA should release a strategic plan for the 2024 election, to guide internal planning, reassure election officials and the public that elections are a priority for the agency, and help other government agencies and civil society groups understand where gaps may exist that they can help fill.

CISA should release a strategic plan for the 2024 election.

CISA should also shift resources to build on earlier efforts, including by adding more frontline support for what CISA has deemed “target rich, resource poor” local election offices with little or no cybersecurity capacity. Existing executive branch grant programs could also help if directed appropriately. A good example is the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s new State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which will provide $1 billion over the next four years to address cybersecurity risks across the country.

States and municipalities must do more, too. Most states that still use paperless voting equipment, which security experts have long warned leave states more vulnerable to a cyberattack, have passed laws to phase it out and replace it with systems that create a paper record of each vote. But it is hard for local officials to transition to updated equipment without adequate funding from the state or federal government. Where there are already paper records of each vote, states must implement rigorous post-election audits to confirm the accuracy of results and demonstrate the trustworthiness of equipment. And states must continue to look for opportunities to add redundancy and resiliency to their systems so that a cyberattack cannot prevent voters from casting their ballots or stop vote totals from being accurately tallied.

Although there is substantial work to be done to protect the people, systems, and infrastructure necessary for elections, there is still time ahead of 2024. Past success in strengthening U.S. voting infrastructure against cyberattacks should give every voter the hope and expectation that the country’s leaders will be up to the challenge of defending American democracy.

LAWRENCE NORDEN is Senior Director of the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law.
DEREK TISLER serves as Counsel in the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law.

Foreign Affairs · by Lawrence Norden and Derek Tisler · March 29, 2023

23. Over-the-Horizon and Under the Threshold: Bringing Unconventional Warfare to Ukraine

A West Point Cadet majoring in civil engineering who will commission as an Army Aviator writing about unconventional warfare in Ukraine.. She is a true renaissance woman! I hope she goes through selection to join Special Forces.

Criticize the article all you want, I'm just happy we have these kinds of cadets who will lead in the future.

Excerpts:

Unconventional warfare is a unique way to respond to this aggression, subverting Russia’s actions while avoiding the conventional escalation dilemma. Doctrine defines unconventional warfare as “operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations,” with the intent of “exploit[ing] a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic objectives.” UW is foundational to special operations, rooted in World War II with the training and equipping of resistance forces throughout Europe by the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services. In Ukraine, a UW campaign could serve to combat Russia’s hegemonic intent without placing American soldiers into direct action.

Ukrainian resistance has shocked the international community with its defensive tenacity. The Ukrainian citizenry’s will to resist, a key component in UW doctrine, is laudable. The government in Kyiv, however, is very much aware that its military requires more robust support as fighting drags on. Advanced weaponry and other materiel provisions from allies are making a difference. Unconventional warfare would supplement this assistance, leveraging the Ukrainian resistance to develop greater guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion capabilities to augment the considerable skills of Ukrainian special operations forces. This increased resistance capacity could be particularly valuable in Crimea or places that have come under Russian occupation. Historically, these types of efforts have effectively degraded the morale of an invading force while disrupting its movements, communications, and control. Observers of this war are beginning to witness the psychological impact of covert attacks deep into Russia-held territory.

Over-the-Horizon and Under the Threshold: Bringing Unconventional Warfare to Ukraine - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Hannah Lamb · March 28, 2023

Hannah Lamb

This piece was selected as a winner in the undergraduate category of an essay contest co-sponsored by IWI and the Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition (OIWC). Due to the nature of the contest, this piece is published with only minimal inputs from our editorial team. The views expressed do not represent the position of IWI or the the US Government, including the Joint Staff J7 OIWC.

With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict now in its second year and devolving into a war of attrition, what direction should US policy in Ukraine take? While Congress seems, for now, united in a collective purpose and the Biden administration has been adamant in its support, US intervention has significant limitations. Escalation risk not only prevents the United States and its NATO partners from responding in a direct, conventional manner but also limits the types of external assistance the West is willing to provide. Russian nuclear capabilities are disconcerting, while policymakers seem fearful of overstepping an invisible line with an American public suffering from War on Terror syndrome. But the war is at a critical juncture, with Ukrainian forces suffering heavy casualties while strained logistics and dwindling munitions increasingly pressure Kyiv’s government. National Defense Strategy priority of limiting the expansion of adversarial spheres of influence, while simultaneously maintaining the Biden administration’s promise that it will not insert American soldiers into Ukraine. This approach would entail the training and equipping of irregular Ukrainian fighters outside Ukraine in order to subvert the occupying force and, potentially, create horizontal escalation opportunities in third states where Russia is vulnerable.

Unconventional Warfare’s Role in Great Power Conflict

Where there is strife between great powers, there is irregular war or proxy conflict in third states. Lingering Cold War tensions manifest in Syria and Iraq while China puppets African infrastructure policy to set roots of influence and bolsters its presence in the South China Sea. Great power rivalry lives in the “gray zone”: states operate below the threshold of war, but aggressively compete to expand influence and control. Conventional war often first manifests in low-intensity conflict, where states seek to undermine competitors’ interests without the costs of direct action. The United States and France have extensive special operations commitments in Africa. These efforts increasingly collide with expansive Chinese policies aimed at securing economic interests and Russian deployments of private military companies that usurp Western security relationships. Invading Ukraine, though foolhardy, was also a means for Russia to undermine the United States and NATO through actions in a non-allied state and to expand Russia’s strategic depth.

Unconventional warfare is a unique way to respond to this aggression, subverting Russia’s actions while avoiding the conventional escalation dilemma. Doctrine defines unconventional warfare as “operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations,” with the intent of “exploit[ing] a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic objectives.” UW is foundational to special operations, rooted in World War II with the training and equipping of resistance forces throughout Europe by the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services. In Ukraine, a UW campaign could serve to combat Russia’s hegemonic intent without placing American soldiers into direct action.

Ukrainian resistance has shocked the international community with its defensive tenacity. The Ukrainian citizenry’s will to resist, a key component in UW doctrine, is laudable. The government in Kyiv, however, is very much aware that its military requires more robust support as fighting drags on. Advanced weaponry and other materiel provisions from allies are making a difference. Unconventional warfare would supplement this assistance, leveraging the Ukrainian resistance to develop greater guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion capabilities to augment the considerable skills of Ukrainian special operations forces. This increased resistance capacity could be particularly valuable in Crimea or places that have come under Russian occupation. Historically, these types of efforts have effectively degraded the morale of an invading force while disrupting its movements, communications, and control. Observers of this war are beginning to witness the psychological impact of covert attacks deep into Russia-held territory.

Remote Unconventional Warfare: Over-the-Horizon and Under the Threshold

From the 2014 invasion of Crimea up to the recent Russian aggression, a cadre of 10th Special Forces Group Green Berets worked to train Ukrainian special operators in all facets of warfare. US Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs elements formed additional partnerships to modernize the nation’s practices from Soviet-era doctrine and tactics. These efforts had positive impacts on both the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces and the creation of pipelines for funneling weapons and supplies to Ukrainian formations. However, the physical threat of remaining in a Ukraine under siege resulted in a pullback of American involvement as Russia prepared its invasion. Today, reports vary on the existence of US operators and NATO units inside Ukraine. At one point, officials walked back the president’s comments on US involvement. Any training that is occurring in third countries seems largely oriented on conventional forces. A robust program to train Ukrainian irregulars in third states is a viable alternative not likely underway. Importantly, irregulars should develop not only defensive capabilities but also those enabling an increase in sensational attacks in the Russian rear. Additionally, though downside risks require careful consideration, horizontal escalation of irregular efforts in geographies outside of Ukraine could reveal Russia’s vulnerability, increase public scrutiny, and divert forces from the Ukraine fight.

The utilization of US special forces as trainers in neighboring states has potential to provide critical training in advanced weapon systems, resistance organization, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics. These training centers can be built in NATO nations like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, where governmental support is likely and Russia is unlikely to strike due to the Kremlin’s own fears of escalation. Existing US conventional units on rotation in Europe can provide logistical and intelligence support to the smaller special operations teams. US special operations forces (SOF) would be supplemented by allied organizations like the British Special Air Service and units from other NATO partners. Baltic special operations forces, for instance, could be particularly useful having spent a decade developing total defense, resistance-based UW concepts with US assistance. Ideally, regional teams could be formed and tied to existing social networks in different Ukrainian population centers.

There are some drawbacks to this potential approach. Training Ukrainian irregulars in neighboring countries will be logistically difficult and require successful coordination between the United States, Kyiv, and third states in volatile landscapes. For Ukraine, taking individuals away from the frontlines will come at a cost. Placing small operational detachments, like Jedburgh teams, forward in Ukraine would fix both problems but put American forces in harm’s way. While challenging, making efforts to remove fighters only from regions not actively under siege could build capacity without sacrificing defensive capability. Politically, it is possible that large-scale training of Ukrainian forces would be perceived as escalation by Russia. If deemed politically necessary, this mission could be performed under Title 50 approvals, maintaining a covert profile as American personnel provide discrete support to counter Russian aggression.

Total UW: Expanding Unconventional Warfare to a Whole-of-SOF Effort

War today is, of course, not won solely on the battlefield. The informational and civil spheres require more attention than previous conflicts: Ukraine is as much an arms race of influence as munitions. Utilizing the full capabilities of American SOF will greatly benefit the Ukrainian cause. In concert with the coordinated economic and political efforts of Western governments, SOF capabilities can contribute greatly in these spaces.f

In the modern era, the proliferation of strategic messaging through the internet is critical in shaping the narrative of conflict. Ukrainian government agencies actively push information campaigns to target disinformation and control international perception of the war. American psychological operations units frequently use messaging to degrade enemy combat power. Remote use of this capability to complement physical training efforts could be particularly impactful in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict: more than ever war is partially fought online. Stories of Ukrainian heroism rally a global audience, while Russia’s messaging dominates its population’s concept of the invasion. Weaponizing information is a tactic of great modern utility, one that US psychological operations support can supplement and further enable.

The war in Ukraine has left over five million refugees displaced in neighboring countries, while many more are internally displaced. Adjacent states have accepted refugees but struggle to accommodate the masses inside their borders. Civil affairs units are equipped to aid foreign humanitarian assistance, civil-military engagement, and populace control. These units can impact the broader unconventional warfare mission by assisting with the coordination and management of international efforts to address the refugee crisis, allowing Ukrainian manpower to maintain a singular focus on fighting the conflict. This consideration is increasingly important as the war becomes more resource intensive. Finally, efforts to stabilize the refugee diaspora could, in turn, bring more Ukrainians into an organized resistance.

External support to the Ukrainian resistance provides a chance to build critical partnerships in Eastern Europe, assert NATO unity after a period of fragmentation, and bruise Russia’s military on the global stage. Western intervention thus far has received rare, broad-based social and political support. The United States and NATO partners should go further to demonstrate commitment to preserving the sovereignty of a friendly nation at risk. Though Ukraine was not an official ally at this war’s onset, unwavering assistance will go a long way in shoring up member-nation confidence in the modern relevance of the alliance. It would also signal to other states that the West will not tolerate unwarranted breaches of sovereignty. States with territorial ambitions are taking notes on the US and NATO response to the Russo-Ukraine war. The implementation of a successful unconventional warfare campaign would increase the costs of this incursion to Russia and deter future malign actors. An investment now may well bear a compounding return for future global stability.

Hannah Lamb is a cadet at the United States Military Academy in the Class of 2023. She studies civil engineering with a minor in counterterrorism. She is currently researching how flawed infrastructure development policy in Iraq and Afghanistan fueled Islamist radicalization. She will commission as an Army aviation officer in May.

Photo: Ukrainian special forces training in Germany, September 13, 2020. US Army photo by Sgt Patrik Orcutt.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Hannah Lamb · March 28, 2023

24. Building R2-D2 - War on the Rocks

Conclusion:

Adding AI into aircraft is a logical extension of the automation trend that Sperry started over a century ago. Moving from pure automation to a human-machine team where one member of the team is an AI is a challenging endeavor that may soon be within reach. In order to develop an effective human-machine team, utilizing architectures and techniques that are already in place for human-human teams will simplify the introduction of AIs for their human team members and likely lead to earlier acceptance. Any struggle to communicate will complicate and delay the effective utilization of AI team members and could derail it entirely. But a fictional character in a classic space opera illustrates a potential way ahead for effective human-machine teaming and should serve as a model for the necessary performance and control interface. The R2 unit has been thoroughly illustrated — we need only build it.

Building R2-D2 - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Mike Pietrucha · March 29, 2023

When Star Wars debuted in 1977, it marked a major departure from the depiction of sci-fi robots. R2-D2 was a cylindrical, round-headed, three-legged “astromech” droid that communicated in whistles, although it understood human speech. As the trilogy progressed, several things became clear — the little droid was brutally mission-focused, unfailingly loyal, flat calm under pressure, and, if it can be said, more than a little sneaky. These are all traditionally human attributes. It was also versatile, competent and reliable, and not at all shy or deferential.

R2-D2 was no mere automaton — it was an artificial intelligence wrapped in an independently mobile shell with a variety of capabilities. Most importantly, R2-D2 was versatile enough to form both a machine-machine team and a human-machine team. Fiction notwithstanding, the depiction of an R2 unit offers a viable model for the creation of the AI crew member, and how an artificial intelligence “crew member,” somewhat like R2D2, could fit into a modern squadron.

Along with the emerging potential of AI comes the inevitable pursuit of it for aircraft applications. The discussion covers the full range of possibilities, from smart calculators or “decision aids” to fully autonomous aircraft “brains.” Indeed, automated systems to assist humans made their appearance in 1912, nine short years after the Wright Brothers’ first flight, with Luke Sperry’s introduction of the autopilot into a Curtiss C2 biplane. Analog, and later digital, technology allowed aviators to turn more tasks over to a computer, including navigation and the all-important terrain avoidance task. But the fully autonomous aircraft capable of executing complex tasks is elusive and likely to remain so.

But the history of aviation development in the last half-century has largely been one of incremental improvements, and some kind of AI might be desirable for F-15EX or future aircraft, introducing new capabilities into a human-machine team. In effect, engineers and technologists envision the addition of a third crew member to the F-15EX, building the real-world equivalent of Luke Skywalker’s venerated droid. But in order to do that, there must be some understanding that AI is not a magic application that can be seamlessly inserted into a combat aviation enterprise.

The March of Automation

Automation has made steady progress in aircraft development. The autopilot was so easily and universally accepted that it was often referred to as “George,” as if it were an aviator itself. Among the systems that were used to improve the capability of the aircrew was Terrain-Following Radar, introduced in the early 1960s, which paired the autopilot with a radar and allowed safer flight at low level. A number of fighters from the Century Series had a version of this kind of radar, as did the RF-4C and the F111. The F-111A’s AN/APQ-110 analog system allowed for automatic (hands-off) terrain following at low altitude and high speed — when upgraded to the digital AN/APQ-115 it allowed for flight at 200 feet at supersonic speeds. The B-1, MC-130, and F-15E are among aircraft that use this type of radar today. As autopilots became more advanced, fly-by-wire aircraft like the F-16 allowed for tighter coupling of the automatic system and the flight controls.

Accordingly, the F-16 was the first to get an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System, which is capable of taking control of an aircraft to recover it when the computer’s model indicates that terrain impact is imminent. This system has already saved several pilots. Today, even trainer aircraft like the T-6 have a Flight Management System that greatly simplifies tasks associated with basic and instrument navigation. The F-35 has an automatic system that allows the aircraft, like many airliners, to fly an instrument approach mostly by itself. The extensive use of automated systems in modern aviation follows a long period of use that has proven their safety and utility, potentially paving the way for the next step — the AI crew member.

An F-15E at low altitude on the North Carolina coast on Sept. 3, 2020. Terrain-Following Radar allows this profile (and lower) to be flown in complete darkness. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Kimberly Barrera)

A Smarter “George”

Terrain-Following Radar and the Auto Ground Collision Avoidance System, as advanced as they are, are merely forms of automation. Both are discrete-event controllers, programmed in advance to accomplish a very limited task set under specified parameters. Their function is fixed — any change in capabilities requires new software to be written by a programmer.

Enter the AI. Modern AI is not, alas, nearly as capable as George Lucas’ creations in 1977. The kinds of problems suited for AI applications are those that require math — lots and lots of math, done quickly. But there are tasks in aviation that could be greatly enhanced if a hyperthreaded, silicon-based math savant were present in the cockpit. Terrain-Following Radar can see what is in front of it but is limited by the profile of the next hill. In the future, AI might use a store of digital data to characterize the terrain over the next hill in order to plan an evasive path through it. The AI might act as a decision aid, draw fine details out of sensor data, manage defensive electronic warfare systems, or build and maintain an accurate picture of both friendly and adversary forces. Many of these things are today done by humans, but it may be that some of them can be done faster or better by a machine, which would free up the human crew to manage more of the mission and less of the mission overhead. The machine itself cannot do all of the tasks required for combat aviation, but the known capabilities of today’s AI could be leveraged to create a very powerful human-machine team if the team can be effectively formed.

Training R2-D2

In simple terms: when computer scientists talk about training an AI, they are describing a process that is only loosely correlated to training humans. For a human, training material is often experience, which has a similar effect in adjusting the human’s future performance. For an AI, the training material is data, which is used to adjust the algorithms that govern the AI’s function. Both of these methods are events focused on the training of the individual agent. Training a team is something else entirely.

Effective teams coalesce based on a number of factors, one of which is shared experience. A crewed aircraft is operated by individuals who have gone through a training pipeline that is standardized and shared. In my experience as an instructor, everybody gets to the same place by the same route, which gives some level of shared experience, even when the team members have vastly different experience levels. Once the team is formed, they train together to learn about individual capabilities. This shapes the team to maximize individual strengths while offsetting weaknesses. In order to incorporate a machine into the team (particularly one with a combat mission), the machine is going to have to follow the same process as a human might. Without such training, aviators will not trust the AI, and rightfully so. As with Terrain-Following Radar and the Auto Ground Collision Avoidance System, aviators may not risk their lives with unproven technology. The only way to prove the effectiveness of the team is to prove to the aviators that the technology works – and to do it on the aviator’s terms, not the computer scientist’s. Thus, the human-machine team will have to train as a team for the mission(s) they are preparing to execute. Critically, in order to be an effective team, the human and the machine are going to have to communicate effectively.

Voice Communication

In aviation, voice communication is king, both inside and outside the cockpit, and has been for more than 50 years. While the introduction of various forms of datalink, from NATO’s Link-16 to civil aviation’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), has reduced some requirements for voice communication, they have by no means eliminated it. That’s because a datalink shows a partial picture of the airspace around the aircraft, but does not communicate intentions or issue instructions. Even the picture is incomplete — a Link-16 picture shows cooperative, link-equipped friendly forces (adversary and neutral forces have to be detected and placed on the display), while Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast shows only other aircraft equipped with the same technology or air traffic relayed by Federal Aviation Administration radars through the Traffic Information Service. Neither datalink expresses intent or issues instructions. The manner in which an artificial crew member is integrated with future aircraft could lead to changes in how aircrew communicate, which will also be an incremental change based on operational experience.

In a fighter aircraft, Link-16 can show the crew the position and status of the flight. If the flight lead wants that flight to do something, then those instructions are issued through voice using a very specific language. Because radio communications are half-duplex (two-way communication where only one user can talk at a time), radio channels can become congested very quickly. Often, an entire strike package operates on a single radio frequency (or net, if anti-jam is used), and strike packages as large as 60 aircraft are not unheard of. Accordingly, NATO aviators use “brevity code” to cram the maximum amount of data into the fewest number of words. For example, an instruction by a flight lead (Panther 1) to his number 3 and number 4 aircraft (Panther 3’s element) to target a specified group of aircraft with AIM-120 missiles using launch and leave tactics is compressed into a call sign and four words: “Panther 3, target south group, skate.” A lot is left unsaid because Panther 3’s crew will no doubt recognizes the flight lead’s voice and knows who issued the task. Panther 3’s acknowledgment follows immediately afterward with one word, “three,” and now everybody on the frequency knows that the group of hostile aircraft is targeted and by whom. Panther 3’s intentions are assumed — that element is going to follow Panther 1’s command. All in seven words, total.

All of this means that a great deal of critical, real-time information is available on voice and a notional R2 unit is going to have to understand voice communications in order to share a common understanding with the human member of the team. In the absence of an understanding of what is occurring on the radios (or in the cockpit), the machine team member will lack the necessary level of situational awareness to tailor its actions to the tactical situation. One of the key constraints on the human-machine team is that the human cannot afford to spend time continuously updating a machine’s situational awareness. It is essential that the human-machine interface minimizes the human workload rather than increases it.

A machine that can keep track of the voice flows could prove invaluable in a number of situations. A machine might keep a running tally of targets successfully hit by other members of the package. In a close air support or combat rescue fight, the on-scene commander will often assemble a “stack” of friendly aircraft (so-called because the aircraft are assigned different altitude blocks to guarantee deconfliction). Each of these flights has a different ordnance loadout and endurance and keeping track of the mass of aircraft is currently a pencil-and-kneeboard exercise. But an AI that can listen to the check-in calls, keep track of the flights’ fuel and ordnance loads, and display the stack graphically would free up a lot of human cognitive capacity and reduce the amount of time that aircrew spend heads-down in the cockpit.

Voice is a logical way to interface with and direct an AI, in the same way it is used to interface and direct with human teammates. In World War II, when multiplane aircraft became common, even intercom calls were prefaced with positions (“Pilot to nav,” for example). Today, the intercoms are clear enough that who is talking to whom in a multiplane aircraft is often derived from context. In a similar vein, it would be best if the AI could determine from context whether a voice command is intended for internal or external action. This might be as simple as knowing whether the radio’s Push-To-Talk switch is actuated, although sometimes a single communication is both internal and external. Using the same scenario above: “Panther 1’s targeting the north group” lets both the wingman and the weapons systems officer in the back seat of the jet know the flight lead’s intentions. In the near term, it might be necessary to follow Apple’s voice command path for the iPhone’s Siri function (I suggest “R2” instead of “Siri”), but contextual extraction of voice commands should remain a goal.

It also goes without saying that as evocative as R2-D2’s whistles were, voice communication back from the AI would be somewhat superior to modulated tones. Voice warning has been used in aircraft for decades, although no voice warning system has an external prioritization sequence that tells it when it is appropriate to interrupt and when it isn’t. (“Pull up”, or “FIRE, FIRE” are clearly more time-critical than “fuel low”). As with the radios and intercom, the architecture is there for AI designers to capture.

Conclusion

Adding AI into aircraft is a logical extension of the automation trend that Sperry started over a century ago. Moving from pure automation to a human-machine team where one member of the team is an AI is a challenging endeavor that may soon be within reach. In order to develop an effective human-machine team, utilizing architectures and techniques that are already in place for human-human teams will simplify the introduction of AIs for their human team members and likely lead to earlier acceptance. Any struggle to communicate will complicate and delay the effective utilization of AI team members and could derail it entirely. But a fictional character in a classic space opera illustrates a potential way ahead for effective human-machine teaming and should serve as a model for the necessary performance and control interface. The R2 unit has been thoroughly illustrated — we need only build it.

Mike “Starbaby” Pietrucha (Col, USAF, Ret.) is an experienced fighter/attack aviator with over 1700 flight hours and 156 combat missions in the back of the F-15E and F-4G, granting some distant kinship to an R2 unit in an X-wing.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Mike Pietrucha · March 29, 2023

25. Poll: Cut federal spending — but not big-ticket programs

Video and graphics at the link: https://apnews.com/article/spending-budget-poll-biden-cd55f1c3859b62a861cdbdc0cd23bd79?user_email=06226fcc158b1f514791c81422207cd68e256e53c176b3708427fb43baccfcf3&utm_medium=Morning_Wire&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_campaign=MorningWire_March29_2023&utm_term=Morning%20Wire%20Subscribers

Poll: Cut federal spending — but not big-ticket programs

AP · by JOSH BOAK and HANNAH FINGERHUT · March 29, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — In the federal budget standoff, the majority of U.S. adults are asking lawmakers to pull off the impossible: Cut the overall size of government, but also devote more money to the most popular and expensive programs.

Six in 10 U.S. adults say the government spends too much money. But majorities also favor more funding for infrastructure, health care and Social Security — the kind of commitments that would make efforts to shrink the government unworkable and politically risky ahead of the 2024 elections.

These findings from a new poll by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research show just how messy the financial tug-of-war between President Joe Biden and House Republicans could be. At stake is the full faith and credit of the federal government, which could default on its obligations unless there is a deal this summer to raise or suspend the limit on the government’s borrowing authority.

Biden this month proposed a budget that would trim deficits by nearly $3 trillion over 10 years, but his plan contains a mix of tax increases on the wealthy and new spending that led GOP lawmakers to declare it dead on arrival. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., is insisting on budget talks with the White House but has not produced a plan of his own to cut deficits, which Biden has said is a prerequisite for negotiations.

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The new poll finds U.S. adults are closely divided over whether they want to see a bigger government offering more services or a smaller government offering fewer services. But a clear majority — 60% — say they think government is spending too much altogether. Just 16% say the government is spending too little, while 22% say spending levels are about right.

U.S. adults were previously less supportive of spending cuts, a possible sign of how the pandemic and a historic burst of aid to address it have reshaped politics. Compared with 60% now, 37% called for spending cuts in February 2020, as COVID-19 was beginning to spread throughout the U.S. By May, even fewer, 25%, wanted less spending, after the virus had forced major disruptions to public life, the economy and the health care system.

Retiree Peter Daniluk acknowledged the tensions over the federal budget by saying the government might be “a little too” large, but “you’ve got to spend money in order to make things better.” The 78-year-old from Dryden, New York, voted for Biden and believes there should be more funding for the environment and military, while also preserving Social Security and Medicare.

“The rich don’t pay enough of the taxes — that’s the problem,” he said. “They know how to get out of paying their proper share.”

Inflation jumped as the U.S. economy recovered from the pandemic. GOP lawmakers have blamed Biden’s $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief package for rising prices as they’ve pushed for spending cuts, while the president says inflation reflects global factors involving supply chains and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Federal expenditures are expected to be equal in size to roughly 24% of all U.S. economic activity for the next several years, a figure that will likely grow as an aging population leads to more spending on Social Security and Medicare. Government spending accounted for just 20.5% of U.S. gross domestic product a decade ago, according to the White House Office of Management and Budget.

Even if a majority of adults desire a tightened budget, the challenge for lawmakers trying to hash out an agreement is that the public also wants higher spending on a wide range of programs. While Biden rolled out a budget that would trim deficits largely through tax increases on the wealthy, GOP lawmakers have struggled so far to gel around a set of spending cuts — and even if they did, the White House is betting that their plan would upset voters.

Roughly 6 in 10 adults say the government is spending too little on education, health care, infrastructure and Social Security, as well as assistance to the poor and Medicare. About half say government is spending too little on border security, child care assistance, drug rehabilitation, the environment and law enforcement.

By comparison, a wide majority — 69% — say the U.S. is spending too much on assistance to other countries. But slashing foreign aid would have almost no impact on the overall size of the government, as it accounts for less than 1% of all federal spending, and major programs such as Social Security and Medicare are causing the government to grow in size over the next decade.

Glenn Cookinham, 43, of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, said inflation and health care expenses are major problems confronting the U.S. as a country right now. A Republican who views Biden as “OK,” Cookinham feels as though the U.S. could pull back on military funding to focus on its own internal challenges.

“I don’t think we should be the police for the rest of the world, really,” he said.

About a third of U.S. adults say spending on the military is too little and nearly as many say it’s too much; an additional third say it’s about right.

Bipartisan majorities back more spending on infrastructure and Social Security. But wide differences across party lines on other priorities could be a sticking point in budget talks.

Most Republicans say too much is spent on assistance to big cities (65% vs. just 19% of Democrats), and about half say too much is spent on the environment (51% vs. just 6% of Democrats). Republicans are more likely than Democrats to indicate that the military, law enforcement and border security are underfunded. By comparison, far more Democrats say too little is spent on aid for the poor (80% vs. 38% of Republicans), the environment (73% vs. 21% of Republicans), child care assistance (71% vs. 34% of Republicans), drug rehabilitation (67% vs. 36% of Republicans), and scientific research (54% vs. 24% of Republicans).

There is also a generational breakdown in terms of priorities. Young adults are more likely than older adults to say too little is spent on the environment and assistance to big cities, while more older adults say too little is spent on infrastructure, the military, law enforcement and border security. Young adults are especially likely to think too much is spent in those areas.

For those between the ages of 30-44, who are especially likely to have school-age children, there is a desire for the government to spend more on education.

___

The poll of 1,081 adults was conducted Mar. 16-20 using a sample drawn from NORC’s probability-based AmeriSpeak Panel, which is designed to be representative of the U.S. population. The margin of sampling error for all respondents is plus or minus 4.0 percentage points.

AP · by JOSH BOAK and HANNAH FINGERHUT · March 29, 2023

26. He came to D.C. as a Brazilian student. The U.S. says he was a Russian spy.

He came to D.C. as a Brazilian student. The U.S. says he was a Russian spy.

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · March 29, 2023

Europe

Johns Hopkins graduate Victor Ferreira was unmasked as GRU operative Sergey Cherkasov, according to a federal indictment and Western security officials

March 29, 2023 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

THE HAGUE — Like anyone who gets into his dream college, Victor Muller Ferreira was ecstatic when he was admitted to Johns Hopkins University’s graduate school in Washington in 2018.

“Today we made the future — we managed to get in one of the top schools in the world,” he wrote in an email to those who had helped him gain entry to the elite master’s program in international relations. “This is the victory that belongs to all of us man — to the entire team. Today we f---ing drink!!!”

The achievement was even sweeter for Ferreira because he was not the striving student from Brazil he had portrayed on his Johns Hopkins application, but a Russian intelligence operative originally from Kaliningrad, according to a series of international investigations as well as an indictment the Justice Department filed in federal court Friday.

His real name is Sergey Cherkasov and he had spent nearly a decade building the fictitious Ferreira persona, according to officials and court records. His “team” was a tight circle of Russian handlers suddenly poised to have a deep-cover spy in the U.S. capital, positioned to forge connections in every corner of the American security establishment, from the State Department to the CIA.

Using the access he gained during his two years in Washington, Cherkasov filed reports to his bosses in Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, on how senior officials in the Biden administration were responding to the Russian military buildup before the war in Ukraine, according to an FBI affidavit.

After he graduated, he came close to achieving a more consequential penetration when he was offered a position at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He was due to start a six-month internship there last year — just as the court began investigating Russian war crimes in Ukraine — only to be turned away by Dutch authorities acting on information relayed by the FBI, according to Western security officials. Officials in the Netherlands put him on a plane back to Brazil, where he was arrested upon landing and is now serving a 15-year prison sentence for document fraud related to his fake identity.

The details that have since emerged provide extraordinary visibility into highly cloaked aspects of Russian intelligence, including the Kremlin’s almost obsessive effort to infiltrate Western targets with “illegals” — spies who operate as lone agents with no discernible link to their home service — rather than diplomats with the legal protections that come with working out of an embassy.

The case has revealed lingering vulnerabilities in Western defenses more than a decade after the FBI arrested 10 Russian illegals in a sweep that made global headlines and spawned a popular television series, “The Americans.” U.S. officials acknowledge that the bureau discovered Cherkasov’s identity and GRU affiliation only after his arrival in Washington. The FBI declined to comment on the case.

The revelations have also exposed serious lapses in Russian tradecraft. Authorities have mined Cherkasov’s computer and other devices and found a trove of evidence, according to court records and security officials, including emails to his Russian handlers, details about “dead drops” where messages could be left, records of illicit money transfers, and an error-strewn personal history that he appears to have composed while trying to memorize details of his fictitious life.

His arrest last April came at the outset of an ongoing roll-up of Russian intelligence networks across Europe, a crackdown launched after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that officials say has inflicted greater damage on Kremlin spy agencies than any other effort since the end of the Cold War.

The FBI and CIA have played extensive behind-the-scenes roles in this wave of arrests and expulsions, according to Western officials. The charges filed Friday followed a multiyear investigation in which FBI agents gained access to devices seized by authorities in Brazil, according to the indictment, and were permitted to meet with the accused spy face-to-face in São Paulo.

This article is based on interviews with senior U.S., European and Brazilian security officials along with Brazilian court documents obtained by The Washington Post that have not been previously released, as well as the U.S. indictment.

Russia has denied that Cherkasov is a spy and requested his extradition from Brazil by presenting what U.S. officials regard as yet another fictional identity, claiming that he is neither student nor secret agent but a wanted heroin tracker who fled Russia to avoid prison.

Cherkasov’s accounts of his life have also shifted dramatically. After initially insisting that he was Ferreira and that Dutch authorities were mistaken, he admitted his Russian identity in hopes that doing so would help him secure a reduced sentence, said Paulo Ferreira, an attorney who represented Cherkasov and has the same last name as his client’s alter ego.

Even then, Cherkasov engaged in further deception, according to Brazilian court records. At one point, he delivered a tearful confession in which he said he had fled Russia out of fear of punishment for a petty crime. He later endorsed the story presented by the Russian government, even though it supposedly meant facing an even longer sentence in a Russian prison system notorious for its brutality.

Cherkasov’s attorney declined a request from The Post to speak with his client, saying he “doesn’t want to talk with any journalists.”

It is not clear whether the United States will also seek Cherkasov’s extradition, but U.S. officials said one of the considerations behind the indictment was that it might help preempt Russia’s attempt to secure the return of its spy. Cherkasov was charged with illegally operating as a foreign agent as well as multiple counts of bank, wire and visa fraud.

The Russian Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.

A convoluted ‘legend’

The creation of the Victor Ferreira character began in layers of fraudulent documents that functioned as a kind of chrysalis.

A replacement birth certificate bearing the Ferreira name was purportedly issued in 2009, a year before Cherkasov entered Brazil, according to Brazilian court files. A driver’s license followed with a photo of someone other than Cherkasov. The paper trail suggests that Cherkasov’s path was cleared in advance by Russian enablers and agents already in place.

The GRU appears to have exploited vulnerabilities in Brazil’s immigration and record-keeping system, while also relying on inside help. A notary who signed off on many of Cherkasov’s fraudulent submissions received gifts including a Swarovski necklace, according to Brazilian records and the U.S. indictment. The role of the notary is one focus of an ongoing Brazilian investigation into Cherkasov’s espionage activities in the country and the activities of the GRU, officials said.

Having gained a foothold, Cherkasov proceeded to collect additional residency documents under the Ferreira identity, including a taxpayer ID, a new driver’s license with a photo that actually matched his appearance, as well as a Brazilian passport.

During these early years in Brazil, he held jobs including one at a travel agency that the FBI suspects was run by a GRU operative, according to the affidavit. The travel agency — another echo of “The Americans” television show — has since closed down.

Cherkasov’s “legend” — the espionage term for a fabricated backstory — was convoluted and tragic. It depicted an almost Dickensian upbringing involving a series of surrogate caretakers and extended departures from the country after the death of his mother. To bolster this biography, the GRU cast Cherkasov as the son of Juraci Eliza Ferreira, a Brazilian woman who died in 1993.

In reality, she died childless, according to court records as well as her nephew, Juliano Arenhart. “As far as we know, she never had a child,” Arenhart said in an interview with The Post.

One of the more bizarre pieces of evidence to emerge in the case is a rambling four-page document found on Cherkasov’s computer that is written in Portuguese and reads like the notes of an actor trying to familiarize himself with a part.

“I am Victor Muller Ferreira,” it begins, before unspooling a contrived hard-luck story sprinkled with random details. He describes his aversion to the smell of fish near a bridge in Rio de Janeiro, and a pinup poster of Pamela Anderson in a mechanic’s shop where he supposedly worked.

Other passages seem to anticipate suspicion about his blond hair and puzzling accent, rehearsing ways to deflect such attention by claiming German ancestry and long stretches out of the country during which his Portuguese skills declined.

“My fellow pupils often used to joke about my looks and my accent,” it says about his days at schools he never truly attended. “They called me ‘gringo.’ That is why I did not have many friends.”

On its own, the clunky script reflects a lack of professional polish. The fact that he was still carrying it with him on a laptop a decade later, according to the FBI affidavit, is a startling breach of operational security.

In some ways, shoddy discipline has become a signature of Cherkasov’s alleged employer. In recent years, GRU operatives have seemed to make little effort to cover their tracks in brazen operations including the hacking of Democratic National Committee computers in 2015, the poisoning of Russian defector and former spy Sergei Skripal in England in 2018, and the attempted assassination of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny nearly three years ago.

Despite the tradecraft lapses, Cherkasov made remarkably swift progress toward his goal of infiltrating Western institutions.

After obtaining an undergraduate degree at Trinity College Dublin, he applied to two graduate programs in Washington, according to the FBI affidavit. The document does not name the universities, but professors and students at Johns Hopkins confirmed his attendance.

James Steinberg, the dean of the School of Advanced International Studies, declined to comment on any aspect of the case or its aftermath at Johns Hopkins.

The glee Cherkasov expressed about his admission was followed with similar elation weeks later when he obtained a student visa to enter the United States.

“Man, I got it! I f---ing got it!” he wrote in an email to his handlers, according to the affidavit. “We go there being welcomed! We won, bro. Now we are in the big-boys league.”

Cherkasov, who was 33 when he started at Johns Hopkins but was posing as a student in his late 20s, aroused only the vaguest of suspicions among his professors and classmates.

“I didn’t suspect any Russian in his behavior or accent,” said Eugene Finkel, a professor and native Russian speaker who had Cherkasov in two classes at Johns Hopkins, including one on genocide. In a posting on Twitter after the case became public, Finkel said Cherkasov had been “very smart and competent” and presented himself as Brazilian with Irish roots, so his “weird accent made sense.”

One classmate, however, described an awkward encounter. A former U.S. Navy officer also fluent in Russian said the two briefly bonded after class one day over their shared appreciation for motorcycles.

“I said we should ride together,” said the former officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing concern for his safety. As the two students talked, the former officer said, he detected a trace of Russian in Ferreira’s diction and thought it odd that a Brazilian would have such a Russian-sounding first name.

“I said, ‘I grew up speaking Russian — do you have any Russian ancestry,’” the former officer said. Ferreira recoiled and replied, “No, I have German,” the former officer said. After initially expressing enthusiasm about riding motorcycles together, Ferreira dropped the plan and kept his distance, said the former officer. “He really stepped back from answering questions at that point.”

During his final year at Johns Hopkins, Ferreira took part in a field trip to Israel with classmates, a trip he used to collect information on U.S. and Israeli officials as well as others the students met with, according to the affidavit. He then shared the list with a Russian handler he met secretly during a January 2020 trip to the Philippines.

Other mysteries about Ferreira appear to have gotten little scrutiny from the university, including how someone from such a supposedly impoverished background — who was offered no scholarships — could afford tuition and other charges that exceeded $119,000 over two years.

After his arrest in Brazil, Cherkasov claimed to authorities that he had covered his costly education with shrewd bets on bitcoin. The FBI affidavit alleges that he was receiving regular cash infusions from his Russian handlers, money he then routed through U.S. and Irish bank accounts.

As graduation approached in 2020, Cherkasov flooded the field with applications for internships and other positions. Among those he targeted, according to the affidavit, were the United Nations as well as “U.S. think tanks, U.S. financial institutions, a U.S. media outlet and a position in the U.S. government.”

Dead drops in the jungle

With the coronavirus pandemic causing a downturn in hiring, it’s not clear how many offers, if any, Cherkasov received. He left the United States in September 2020, according to the affidavit, just months before his student visa was set to expire.

Even from Brazil, Cherkasov continued to find ways to tap into his Washington network. In late November 2021, as Russia was amassing forces on the border of Ukraine, Cherkasov filed a series of reports to his handlers about how senior officials in Washington were interpreting Moscow’s moves.

The affidavit cites emails that Cherkasov sent describing information gleaned from advisers at think tanks, some supposedly in contact with senior Biden administration officials including Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Another report relayed that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had been cautioned “not to give any conceivable signal of the U.S. military involvement” to his counterpart in Ukraine.

“Meaning: the administration is definitely not in any position to help Ukrainians, if the fight breaks out,” Cherkasov wrote, according to the affidavit. “The administration does not want this conflict, because they don’t have any meaningful way of gaining something out of it.”

The information was attributed to one of Cherkasov’s former professors, who is not identified in the affidavit. The professor told the FBI that he could not recall any post-graduation interactions with Cherkasov, but that he had held online discussions about the threat of Russian invasion. The bureau concluded that Cherkasov was probably “participating in one of those online sessions.”

Cherkasov seemed convinced that Russia would face little backlash from the United States for a Ukraine invasion, saying in one message that there were “no signs indicating that the U.S. is going to provide any but political support to the Ukrainians in case of war.”

His sanguine reports tracked the deeply flawed assessments that Russian spy agencies rendered in the months before the invasion, as well as Putin’s own expectations that the war would end quickly with little interference from the West.

Cherkasov got his next big break soon thereafter, an internship offer from the International Criminal Court. Created two decades ago to enforce international laws against genocide, war crimes and other atrocities, the court has long been perceived by Moscow as hostile. Last month, prosecutors there issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of war crimes in Ukraine.

As an unpaid intern, Cherkasov would have been in position to roam the court’s glass-enclosed corridors and try to probe its firewalled computer system, according to Western security officials, who said Russia increasingly uses human spies to install software or devices that enable technical penetrations.

By March 2022, just a few weeks after Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, Cherkasov had “passed the security checks of the ICC and was accepted to the position of junior analyst,” according to the affidavit.

In Brazil, Cherkasov began tidying his affairs. He sought to “meet with a courier” to stockpile cash to sustain him in his unpaid position. He stashed computer drives and other devices in dead-drop locations along a jungle hiking trail near São Paulo, sending instructions to his Russian handlers on where to find them. He also discussed strategies for future meetings with his handlers, proposing return trips to Brazil that would be easy to explain to the ICC.

On March 31, as he boarded a flight to Amsterdam, neither Cherkasov nor his GRU handlers seemed aware of the net closing in on him. By then, the Dutch intelligence service had picked up its own signals that the Russian Embassy in The Hague was making preparations for the arrival of an important new illegal, according to a Western security official.

Authorities in the Netherlands then received a dossier from the FBI with so much detail about Cherkasov’s identity and GRU affiliation that they concluded the bureau and the CIA had been secretly monitoring Cherkasov for months if not years, according to a Western official familiar with the matter.

Dutch officials intercepted Cherkasov at the airport, questioned him for several hours, scoured his devices, and used facial recognition software to match the photo on his passport to online images of Cherkasov during his pre-GRU days in Kaliningrad. The Dutch then forced him to board a return flight to Brazil.

He was detained upon arrival in Brazil, where he denied that he was a Russian operative, insisting that the whole matter was a mix-up and that his Ferreira identity was real. Before landing back in Brazil, however, he had sent agitated messages to a woman in Russia he had been romantically involved with for years, according to the affidavit, seeking to enlist her to help in contacting one of his GRU superiors.

Two months after Cherkasov’s expulsion, Dutch authorities issued an extraordinary news release about his failed attempt to enter the country, posting the clumsy biography they said he had composed in about 2010. Dutch officials said the decision to go public was part of an effort to expose Russia’s conduct and call allied governments’ attention to the threat of illegals.

The news quickly rippled through the ranks of Cherkasov’s classmates and professors at Johns Hopkins.

No one was more dismayed than Finkel, the professor, who had written a letter of recommendation to support Cherkasov’s application to the ICC. “I had good reasons to hate Russian security services before. Now I am just exploding,” Finkel, a native of Ukraine who had denounced the Russian invasion and called for investigations of war crimes, wrote in anguished posts on Twitter. “I will never get over this fact. I hate everything about GRU, him, this story. I am so glad he was exposed.”

In Brazil, Cherkasov was confident the 15-year sentence would not stick.

“No f---ing way I’m staying here,” he said in a June 7 message to the Russian woman, whom he had sought permission from his GRU handlers to marry, according to the affidavit. “They ‘had’ to give me a big sentence to save their faces ok? Nobody is going to sit here serving f---ing 15 years for a fake passport!”

In a message sent in late August, he assured the same woman that his case would be finished in a matter of weeks and that by New Year’s the two would be strolling around the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. “All will be well,” he said, signing off as “Prisoner of War.”

The affidavit indicates that Cherkasov used messaging apps to send photos of handwritten messages to the woman, presumably on devices he was able to use while meeting with Russian diplomats during his detention.

Eight months later, Cherkasov remains in prison amid mixed signals about his eventual fate. The Brazilian Supreme Court recently granted tentative approval to Russia’s extradition request. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to visit Brazil in late April, raising the prospect that Moscow will find a way to secure his release.

Even so, Brazil’s high court has said that no extradition can occur until the country’s federal police conclude a second investigation that is focused on Cherkasov’s alleged espionage activities.

The Cherkasov case has been a source of embarrassment for Brazilian officials about their system’s susceptibility to fraud and the frequency with which it has been used by Russian intelligence services as a launchpad for illegals. Another alleged GRU operative relying on a false Brazilian identity was arrested in Norway last year.

Brazilian officials declined requests for on-the-record interviews but said the government is instituting new procedures including national identity checks to help curtail such fraud. Cherkasov’s long-term plan was to use his false Brazilian identity to apply for Portuguese citizenship, which would have enabled him to roam freely across Europe, according to officials and details in the affidavit.

The Cherkasov case has also raised difficult questions for Johns Hopkins, including whether it should do more to screen applicants, whether Cherkasov’s degree should be rescinded, and what the university should do with tuition payments it presumably received indirectly from the GRU.

Gabriela Sá Pessoa in São Paulo, Marina Dias in Brasília and Cate Brown in Washington contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · March 29, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

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Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 28, 2023

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He came to D.C. as a Brazilian student. The U.S. says he was a Russian spy.

Johns Hopkins graduate Victor Ferreira was unmasked as GRU operative Sergey Cherkasov, according to a federal indictment and Western security officials