Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Bottom line is - the right force in the right place at the right time to deliver the right effect. That's what we look at, and in many cases, those are SOF forces, especially with smaller nations they can go in."

– U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. John Aquilino at March 21 posture testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“It is also in the interests of the tyrant to make sure his subjects are poor…the people are so occupied with heir daily tasks that they have no time for plotting.”

– Aristotle

"Winning isn’t everything, but wanting to win is."

– Vince Lombardi

1. The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war, IG says

2. Giving ATACMS to Ukraine no longer as risky, says Joint Chiefs chairman

3. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

4. Opinion: Why I’m resigning from the State Department

5. Baltimore bridge collapse: Insurance loss could hit $3bn

6. Troops Still Aren't Getting Enough Sleep, and the Defense Department Isn't Taking Responsibility, Watchdog Says

7. Opinion | What’s happened in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal demands a reckoning

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2024

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 28, 2024

10. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

11. Army’s new vice chief seeks to drive strategic modernization

12. US leaders promise security for Gaza dock mission amid threat concerns

13. Recent Exercises Illustrate Taiwanese Military’s Emphasis on Decentralized Operations

14. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

15. Putin threatens striking Western air bases hosting Ukrainian F-16s

16. Evan Gershkovich’s Stolen Year in a Russian Jail

17. SOCOM calls for special ops veterans to report cancer screenings

18. Hamas Increasingly Seen as Main Cause of Gaza Humanitarian Crisis

19. Russia Doubled Imports of an Explosives Ingredient—With Western Help

20. Russia’s security services knew of ISIS threat before concert attack, new evidence from investigative body suggests

21. Is Biden listening to any of his military or intelligence advisers?

22. Cohesion, Performance, and Readiness: A Brigade-Level Experiment in the Art and Science of Organizational Culture

23. From Peril to Partnership: A Q&A with Author Paul Angelo

24. The New Autocratic Alliances

25. Overhaul UNRWA—Just Not Right Now

26. The West Needs a War Footing

1. The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war, IG says

So much to parse. Just after the so-called "divorce" I became the USASOC G3. I do not think this problem is a result of the divorce. It is simply a lack of understanding of and vision for the various roles for psychological operations combined with the root of the problem, a tremendous risk averseness with anything associated with influence. At the time of the divorce there was never a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and just as important there has long been both a lack of appreciation for and knowledge of PSYOP by commanders in the geographic combatant commands and services. And then there are the overly restrictive approvals processes that are due to the high level of risk averseness. The recent public display of risk averseness lies with the recruiting video made by soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group two years ago. Some officials were embarrassed by this video and demanded that it be removed. Yet it remains on YouTube (nothing can ever be removed from the internet but those without digital literacy will demand removal from the internet). it has had some 1.6 million views and the world has not collapsed because of it.

The most effective employment of PSYOP forces is with the US embassies around the world with soldiers conducting influence operations in support of the Chief of Mission as Military Information Support Teams (MIST). Ironically the long time use of MIST is what let to the name change of PSYOP to MISO.

BUt I have to call out this former Colonel for this ill-informed statement:

The other aspect is the “identity crisis” facing the special operations community which is trying to redefine itself post-Global War on Terror and now in the era of “Great Power Competition” with China and Russia where “there’s not as much of a role for the traditional Special Forces missions,” Curris said.

The good Colonel should stick to his lane as I do not think he understands the contribution SF can and must make in strategic competition. I think everyone has missed the important concept developed within the 1st Special Forces Command, that of cross functional teams with SF, PSYOP and CA elements (https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Documents/1sfc-vision-2021-beyond.pdf). That criticism aside, I think the Colonel wrote an instructive message in 2019 that is worth revisiting as it gets to some of the issues identified in the IG report. Read his message at the link and I have also pasted the text following this article. https://www.usapova.org/a-letter-from-the-regimental-commandant

The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war, IG says

Soldiers pointed to the "divorce" between active and reserve PSYOP units as a root cause of the issues.

BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED MAR 28, 2024 6:20 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · March 28, 2024

The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war with China and Russia, the Department of Defense’s Inspector General said in a report released Wednesday.

The IG report found the Army has not recruited, trained, or retained a big enough workforce to meet the growing demand for Military Information Support Operations (MISO), commonly referred to as “psychological operations, or PSYOP” which aim to influence the beliefs and actions of other countries’ populations.

Without enough active duty soldiers trained in PSYOP warfare, the service has relied on reservists to “fill the global, full-time requirements for conventional MISO.” In fiscal year 2023, the Army’s four active and reserve Psychological Operation Groups operated with only 60% of their authorized strength, according to the report.

“The resulting operational tempo required of this under-resourced force risks burnout of these specialized Soldiers, which only serves to worsen the underlying conditions,” the report said.

However, Aaron Schmidt, a current PSYOP reservist, said the “burnout” issue is not unique to PSYOP but to reservists in general.

“There are things that we need to better address whether that’s manning, training and equipping,” he said. “But from my perspective, I do not see it as a burnout issue.”

The “divorce”

Problems in the Army’s PSYOP community began around 2006 with the “divorce” where Army reserve component civil affairs and PSYOP units from the U.S. Special Operations Command was assigned to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, former and current PSYOP soldiers told Task & Purpose.

The change “enhanced PSYOP support of special operations forces, but diminished the employment of this capability for conventional forces,” according to an article by a former soldier and author of a book on the origins of U.S. Army Special Warfare.

After Sept. 11, as the requirements for active duty soldiers increased, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) decided they were going to support other Special Forces units only, instead of the Army writ large, said Robert Curris, former commandant of PSYOP at the Special Warfare Center.

“That got lost somewhere along the way and so that put a lot more pressure on the reserves to do things that they neither had the manpower or training to sustain for any period of time,” Curris said.

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Along with the reassignment, training became separate for the two groups which is different from other Army capabilities like armor or infantry where reservists and active duty soldiers train alongside one another.

“They don’t have language training. They’re not required to be jump-qualified. Their messaging processes are a little bit different and they are not tied into SOF activities and other additional SOF training that would be given to an active duty PSYOP soldier,” said former PSYOP Sgt. Maj. Kenneth Ramos, who also runs the Army W.T.F. social media pages.

PSYOP assessment and selection for active duty soldiers lasts 10 days and is designed to assess leadership qualities, critical thinking, and effective communication with populations around the world. After that, soldiers must endure roughly 41 weeks of physically and mentally demanding training with the PSYOP Qualification Course.

Curris said that Army PSYOP is losing its ability to “function at anything above the tactical level” partially because of sheer numbers and partially because of the command and control relationship and changes that were made under USSOCOM leadership.

The result, he said, has become a turf war over resources.

“It’s just blatant protectionism,” he said. “They don’t trust us and they don’t reinforce us. In fact, what they’ve said is that they would like to expand their information operations capability on the SF team without us. What that really means is, they don’t care if we go away, they would just build an internal capability which could then be Special Forces and they would control it.”

The other aspect is the “identity crisis” facing the special operations community which is trying to redefine itself post-Global War on Terror and now in the era of “Great Power Competition” with China and Russia where “there’s not as much of a role for the traditional Special Forces missions,” Curris said.

Impacts on national security

The former and current soldiers interviewed by Task & Purpose all expressed concerns over the outsized mission that PSYOP soldiers are tasked with.

“I think [Army] Information Operations as a whole is supposed to be a coordinating agency, but they try to take on a role of PSYOP because there is a lack of cyber around, which means that you get really bad PSYOP because they’re doing a job that they’re not trained for, but they’re trying to fill a need,” Curris said.

The IG report notes the 2022 National Defense Strategy which says that emerging technologies are making it easier for competitors (i.e. Russia and China) to “engage in operations below the threshold of armed conflict.”

The solution, according to the defense strategy, is that the U.S. military should use non-traditional tools like those in the information space. MISO is part of the military’s strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities and helps shape the operational environment and deterrence of large-scale combat operations, according to the DOD.

“We are diminished in our information warfare capabilities, as we speak, against China and Russia,” Ramos said. “We don’t have enough personnel and also, we don’t have enough outside eyes looking into the SOF organization to fix it.”

MISO or PSYOP are used by the military “to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, in a manner favorable to the originator’s objective” according to the IG report.

One PSYOP reservist told Task & Purpose that they’re doing a job that shouldn’t inherently be left up to the military, referring to the national power strategy of DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic.

“If the military is going to be conducting special operations with information support, what are those other state instruments that are going to be facilitating the other discussions for information support and that’s where that discussion around the I in dime comes in,” they said. “If we are going to say that the military is now responsible for something that it shouldn’t be responsible for, we are always gonna fail at it.”

Policy issues

The IG also called out an Army officer career management policy that limits who can become a PSYOP soldier. Instead of PSYOP units recruiting soldiers out of high school or college, the policy requires officers to reach the rank of captain and then seek a transfer into a psyop branch.

New officers who previously enlisted as 37F PSYOP specialists also “cannot directly re-enter the PSYOP branch as PSYOP officers.”

“The inability to assign newly commissioned officers into the PSYOP branch, combined with possibly taking years to fully train reserve PSYOP officers, contributes to 10 of 32 manned reserve PSYOP detachments not having PSYOP-qualified commanders,” according to the report.

As a result of policies like this, active special operations PSYOP soldiers have been forced to work more than the standard ratio of one month deployed to two months at home and the Army Reserve’s PSYOP groups operated with 25% of captains required to complete missions, according to the report.

“If new reserve officers were to commission directly into the PSYOP career field as recent college graduates, they might have more time and flexibility to spend longer lengths of time in training, compared with captains who might have more conflicting responsibilities related to civilian careers and families,” the report quoted from a PSYOP force modernization proponent.

When it comes to recruiting, Curris said there’s not enough education on what exactly PSYOP does. Most assume they handle marketing-like activities. However, with the contentious relationship with special operations forces, Curris fears that PSYOP won’t get the attention it needs.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · March 28, 2024

A Letter From The Regimental Commandant

https://www.usapova.org/a-letter-from-the-regimental-commandant

Regimental Commandant Robert A. B. Curris has prepared an excellent letter to the PSYOP Regiment and all Psywarriors past and present. It is an excellent overview of key issues being addressed by the Regiment for calendar year 2019.

Fellow PSYOPers past and present, Happy New Year!

As we start 2019 there is much going on with the Regiment, and I thought I would provide an update on few things happening within PSYOP, at least at the wave top level.

All things CYBER:

Frankly, I think there is as much trepidation as there is opportunity here. There has been an effort over the past couple of years to relook proponency for all information-related capabilities. As a result, there is a reorganization ongoing internal to TRADOC to move the Information Operations, MILDEC, OPSEC and a couple other smaller capability branches away from the Mission Command Center of Excellence to the CYBER Center of Excellence. This consolidation may clear the way to create an Information Warfare Proponent. However, the PSYOP proponent is currently remaining within USASOC.

As an extension of the proponency question there is the doctrinal question of what is Information Warfare? There have been PSYOP representatives from this office, 1st Special Forces Command and the USASOC G9 shop participating in an ARCYBER effort referred to as the Information Warfare Design Planning Team (IW-DPT). At the unclassed level, they are meant to define what actions and activities are part of information warfare, how are they conducted, how are they measured and how are they included in an operational concept. This will be roughly a six month effort and will culminate with back briefs to LTG Fogarty at ARCYBER. In my opinion, the importance of this effort cannot be understated because the operational concept that will ultimately come from this will help define how PSYOP works within and through CYBER.

Additionally, I think it is important to let you know that SOCOM and the PSYOP community are also expanding its WEB operations capability. This will be good for several reasons. It will be a great model for others to follow on how PSYOP can, and should, interact within the internet, and it will also allow us to grow a few senior level billets for both officers and NCOs.

Manning:

Speaking of billets, there has been a lot of staff work throughout 2018 that we should see payoff in 2019. The USACAPOC FDU that establishes growth and some development capability will go back to the Pentagon for decision this year, and we are hopeful that we have answered their questions and are ready to push forward.

Despite the loss of our staff positions within the Division Level HQs last year, we are hopeful that the PSYOP Cell recommended for each of the new Multi-Domain Task Forces will be codified this year. A version of this cell will be tried out in a major exercise later this summer, but there has been great support for this from the conventional force so far.

Changes in the force:

As some of you know we have had issues with our grade plate that has all but stopped promotion from E5 to E6. Partially because of the “no growth” policies we are at or over 100% at just about every NCO grade above E5. In an effort to remedy this we are working with 1st SFC and USASOC to submit a FDU Jr. which would recode our E5 billets to E6. This will also require a requisite grade plate change for E7s and above. To be clear, that doesn’t mean everyone is automatically promoted to E6. Graduates of the AC pipeline will still be an E5 and remain so until they meet all of the time-in-grade and time-in-service requirements to be an E6. However, this should allow for a backlog of very senior E5s to promote quickly. We should know the results of that this year.

There are also several DOTMLPF Change Requests (DCRs) out there which could change the force. The ones which request growth are on hold but may be allowed to get staffed in hopes of being approved for when future growth is approved. Most notably is the DCR within 1st SFC that could change our organization from two units of action (TPT and RPT) to a single unit of action simply referred to as PSYOP Teams and Detachments. This has been well socialized within the Active force but requires approval at the SOCOM level. I believe that you will see a few task-organized detachments as test cases for this concept this year.

Training:

USAJFKSWCS is going through multiple staff and organizational reorganizations at the moment. One of the efforts is to optimize all three branches into a four starts a year model that would allow for more cross functional training between the various specialties. This obviously includes looking at the PSYOP pipeline. The 5th PSYOP BN within 1st SWTG, along with the Training Group staff, have the lead and are working with the Commandant’s office and Operational commands to review certain portions of the curriculum. The intent is to roll out this pipeline in the next FY. While there will be additional ARSOF common Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities such as “Resistance” (UW and COIN) added to the course, we will NOT be abandoning the core PSYOP tasks and processes. We truly understand that we must be good PSYOPers first.

Tied to the previous CYBER conversation, we are also looking at how to leverage more social media analytics, protection and other baseline CYBER courses as an extension of the active duty pipeline. This is not to the exclusion of the RC force because these are P2 funded courses available to the Army. However, the RC forces would have to schedule these separately based on unit training time and dollars.

Conclusion:

Both AC and RC are facing recruiting and manning challenges at the junior level. Both forces are stretched with their current operational obligations and both are looking for ways to transform to be more relevant within what seems like CYBER-dominated world. I think both forces are frustrated with policy on how and when they conduct PSYOP on the internet; especially since our adversaries seem to be weapons free within all of political warfare. I would ask you to keep faith with the leadership who are doing things on your behalf to make sure we are included in discussions at the highest levels of DOD. I hope 2019 will be a banner year for our total force, because I think we will see some sweeping changes made and it will be up to all of us to make whatever happens into a positive for the Regiment. Thank you for your continued service and support.

Respectfully

COL Robert A.B. Curris

Commandant

2. Giving ATACMS to Ukraine no longer as risky, says Joint Chiefs chairman

With all due respect we should ask, was it ever risky? Or was it only risky in our own minds as we deterred ourselves? I hope we can learn from this. And answer the question: Are we going to give Ukraine what it needs to win? Every time we talk about fear of escalation we are ceeding the initiative to our enemies. We are telegraphing our Achilles' heel.

Giving ATACMS to Ukraine no longer as risky, says Joint Chiefs chairman

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Q. Brown, Jr., attends a Congressional Gold Medal ceremony on March 21, 2024. Tom Williams / CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images

The United States is becoming more comfortable giving Ukraine the long-sought weapons.

March 28, 2024 09:18 PM ET

By Patrick Tucker

Ukraine has been asking the United States for long-range ATACMS missiles since 2021, and the White House has consistently resisted, at least publicly. But the tide may be turning.

Thursday, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. C.Q. Brown, told reporters “the risk of escalation is not as high as maybe it was at the beginning.”

Russian statements in September 2022 indicated that providing such weapons to Ukraine would cross a “red line,” because their range would allow Ukraine to target Moscow. Gen. Mark Milley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Defense One at the time: “Folks in academia or think tanks or other forms of analysis, they call that ‘declaratory policy,’ when senior officials…issue out statements, predictive statements, of what they would or would not do, if certain actions were to take place.”

Top military officials, speaking on background, have pointed to Russian military doctrine specifically as it relates so-called existential risk, saying that giving Ukraine such weapons could compel a nuclear response from Russia, or spur it to attack a NATO partner.

Since the fall, reports have suggested the United States may have changed its calculation, and may be sending small numbers of the long-range missiles in secret—despite the fact that the White House has previously said it doesn’t have enough of them to send.

But the Biden administration has taken pains to avoid confirming or denying that reporting. As recently as March 20, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan declared, “I have nothing to announce here publicly today on that issue. When we do have something to share, we will be sure to share it.”

Brown didn’t officially confirm or deny the reporting either, but he did say that Russia’s muted response to a series of recent Ukrainian drone attacks well inside of Russian territory have allowed the Pentagon to adjust its analysis on the risk of sending ATACMS.

“Those are the things that we…pay attention to. You know, what is the likelihood of escalation based on…different capabilities and different actions,” he said.

Observers and even some Republican lawmakers have been pushing the United States to send the missiles, as they would allow Ukrainians to hold Russian positions in Ukraine in danger, including Crimea, far from the front line, including from well into western Ukraine. That would make it harder for Russia to advance as Ukraine could continue to strike even the most well-fortified Russian positions in the eastern portion of the country from virtually anywhere else in the country. That, in turn, would make it more difficult to reinforce troops even if Russia took more territory.

Ukraine has recently been losing territory, and some experts say that if Congress does not pass the $60 billion supplemental aid package for Ukraine, Russia may take more this spring.

Brown again encouraged swift passage of the supplemental, and said Ukraine will face continued artillery shelling for the foreseeable future. But he also said that fears of a massive spring Russian offensive may be overblown.

“I don't know if the Russians can generate a major offensive. I mean, if you look at…what's happened over the course of…the past year, the Russians have actually thrown a lot of capability and personnel and weapon systems and vehicles to gain what they have gained. And the way I would say, it's almost a meat grinder.”

3. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

By Nicholas DeMasters.

Will Deploying the U.S. Military Stop the Mexican Cartels Fentanyl Enterprise: Exploring Strategies and Evaluating Options

In recent polling, 25% of Americans report that either themselves or a family member have been addicted to opioids. Unfortunately, within the current US political landscape, there is less agreement on policy solutions that are urgently needed to address the widespread opioid crisis endangering so many Americans. A fundamental shift in policy paradigm is imperative to address the persistent failure of US policies in combating the escalation of fentanyl deaths and the ever-expanding drug enterprise of Mexican cartels.

The statistics illustrate these continued failures clearly. In 2023 alone, the Center for Disease Control tracked over 110,000 Americans died from Fentanyl overdoses and the Department of Homeland Security has estimated that between $19 and $29 billion was made by the Mexican cartels in illicit drug trade. This crisis requires a fundamental recalibration, and the US military may offer a plausible alternative.

Beyond being the world’s most lethal fighting force, the military embodies an assortment of capabilities, that strategically positioned, could offer ways to diminish the expansive drug network of the cartels. Through failed cooperative efforts with the Mexican government, particularly in addressing the fentanyl supply chain, the US military must leverage its capabilities and establish a multifaceted defense strategy aimed at disrupting cartel activities. Initially, by securing maritime shipping routes originating from mainland China, where precursor chemicals crucial for fentanyl production are trafficked, the military can impede the primary source of cartel resources. The next layer would be within the coastal waters of North America where Northern Command can deploy a variety of capabilities and technologies to further intercept these precursor shipments before they reach cartel-controlled ports of entry.

Furthermore, the military could be used in its most obvious form through direct action operations to dismantle key nodes in the cartel’s supply chain by employing special forces and precision targeting drones. This comprehensive strategy highlights the potential for the US military to significantly disrupt cartel activities and mitigate the fentanyl crisis.

The military arsenal surpasses the confines of mere lethality, resembling a versatile Swiss Army knife adept at navigating the intricate challenges of the cartels. Emphasizing the multifaceted nature of the American armed forces becomes crucial, underscoring their capacity to surpass a singular role and evolve into a formidable force multiplier to protecting the homeland. Alarming statistics necessitates the immediate demand for military action.

Recently, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) lead administrator stated that the leading cause of death for Americans age 18-45 is fentanyl overdose. The DEA also labeled both the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel in Mexico as primarily responsible for the vast majority of fentanyl trafficked in the United States. That coupled with the Mexican government’s deliberate acquiescence to the cartel’s illicit drug activity and Congress’s inability to generate any effective legislative measures make the use of military action more palatable against the malign impact coming from the Mexican cartels. These organizations represent a clear and present danger, threatening US national security and more importantly, safety of countless American lives. Although typically viewed as the hammer, the U.S. military has an inordinate amount of capabilities at its disposal that can help counter the cartel’s enterprise and further eliminate their manufacturing and distribution operations into the United States.

How Did We Get Here: Mexico’s Political Landscape

Since his 2018 landslide presidential victory and contrary to his predecessors, President Andres Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to as AMLO) has pledged a non-confrontational approach to the cartels, advocating “hugs not bullets” and vowing to withdraw the Mexican military from the streets. However, contrary to his assurances, the violence has exploded in Mexico, with over 30,000 deaths annually and more than 40,000 reported missing during his presidential tenure.

In contrast to the mass migration driven by the pursuit of employment in the US a decade earlier, Mexican immigrants are now fleeing to the United States to escape the escalating tyrannical violence perpetrated by cartels. Since taking office, AMLO has actively worked to dismantle the Merida Initiative, a $3 billion US-Mexico security cooperation framework established during the administrations of Mexican President Felipe Calderón and US President George W. Bush. In 2021, Mexico officially terminated the initiative, signaling an intentional shift away from security cooperation efforts to counter violent transnational organized crime in Mexico. Despite discussions led by the U.S. to renegotiate and reorient the Merida Initiative through joint security dialogs, collaboration against the Mexican cartels has shown minimal improvement.

Mexico’s reluctance to implement more effective counter-cartel policies is worsened by AMLO’s contradictory approach of militarizing public security while exploiting Mexico’s Armed Forces as low-cost labor for the MORENA party. Employing a political maneuver, AMLO successfully disbanded Mexico’s Federal Police under civilian leadership, and reincorporated more than 77% of its former members into a new National Guard overseen by an increasingly partisan defense ministry. Meanwhile, the Mexican military is progressively shifting away from security roles, involving itself in civilian infrastructure projects without adequate anticorruption measures or tender requirements. This includes taking charge of significant infrastructure endeavors such as Felipe Ángeles International Airport, expanding into tourism such as the Mayan Train project, and managing points of entry. According to El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, over 246 civilian institutions have been transferred to the Mexican Armed Forces since 2006, signaling a substantial departure from its traditional security role within the country.

These are all indications that AMLO is using the military for everything but countering cartel criminal efforts and the prospect for cooperations between the two countries on how to handle the cartels is bleak. To further compound that outlook, the upcoming 2024 Mexican presidential candidate and close ally to AMLO, Claudia Sheinbaum, is of the same mindset when it comes to working with and not against these violent criminal organizations. Sheinbaum is poised to win the upcoming 2024 presidential elections and is set to uphold AMLO’s legacy while advancing the political agenda of the MORENA party.

This should be a serious cause for concern for US policymakers, as her leadership is likely to worsen Mexico’s security posture, leading to heightened exposure of Mexicans to cartel violence and an inadvertent increase in fentanyl overdoses among Americans. The current trajectory suggests a reluctance by Mexico to adopt more effective counter-cartel domestic policies in the near future or even cooperative policies with AMLO as he intends to continue to role of acquiescence to these criminal enterprises. All evidence conclusively showing Mexico’s ongoing struggle to manage the escalating cartel violence domestically shows the urgency for the United States military to take action if there is any hope to stop the opioid casualties. Given the limited progress in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and Mexico’s hesitancy to adopt more effective counter-cartel policies, it becomes increasingly evident that the full spectrum of capabilities from the United States military is necessary and presents a critical policy alternative for effectively counteracting of the escalating cartel threat.

Who Holds the Key: Unlocking Solutions to Disrupt the Fentanyl Supply Chain

In 2019, China emerged as the primary manufacturer and distributor of illicit fentanyl bound for the US. However, by 2023, the Mexican cartels had overtaken China, seizing control of the illicit drug market and revolutionizing its sourcing model. They now dominate the production of illicit fentanyl consumed in America, utilizing chemical precursors from a various Chinese-affiliated companies. This shift has transformed the cartels roles from full-scale operations to sole supplier of the world’s largest consumer market. The geopolitical landscape has further complicated the fentanyl crisis, with deteriorating U.S.-China relations exacerbating the sourcing problem for the United States government. This was evident when China formally suspended cooperation with the United States in any counter drug effort in August 2022. Subsequently, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned over forty Chinese nationals linked to fentanyl trafficking, and the Department of Justice arrested two Chinese nationals involved in a fentanyl trafficking scheme. Despite these efforts, merely identifying and sanctioning criminal organizations is insufficient.

Additionally, reliance on the Mexican government to disrupt the fentanyl distribution has been futile. In 2022 the Mexican Congress finally mandated authorities to intercept fentanyl precursor chemicals at the various Mexican maritime ports, such as the port of Manzanillo where there are approximately 3.5 million shipping containers passing through annually. In 2023, the Mexican Navy disclosed that they work without technical assistance from the US to search the millions of shipping containers. This lack of cooperation is compounded by the challenges posed by the Mexican cartels, which perpetuate an environment of violence and intimidation. Exemplified in May 2023, when Sergio Emmanuel Martinez, newly appointed deputy customs director in Manzanillo, fell victim to an assassination weeks after assuming the role. ] This collaboration between Chinese chemical companies and Mexican cartels underpins the significant challenges of the maritime smuggling routes for these illicit fentanyl precursors. [

Early maritime interdiction can address the root of the supply problem. By disrupting the early part of the cartel supply chain, the U.S. military can prevent fentanyl precursors from reaching the maritime ports across North America, where the cartel clandestine labs and manufacturing hubs exist. Such military action requires high reliance on the US intelligence community, effective intergovernmental agency cooperation, and a command infrastructure capable of managing a large area of operations. To effectively execute maritime interdiction operations against these Chinese affiliated companies and their transports, the Department of Defense (DoD) must prioritize this mission effort under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

However, despite possessing the necessary command and control framework, the established task force for this purpose, Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West), has been significantly gutted, rendering it more of a rhetorical reference rather than an operationally capable unit. JIATF West, designated as the PACOM executive agent for DoD in counter-drug (CD) and drug-related missions, has encountered challenges since its establishment in 2003. Eventually, the Defense Wide Review, despite a directive for its deactivation in January 2020, was later reversed in 2021 with the approval to retain it as a smaller organization. It is imperative for the US military to revitalize and rejuvenate JIATF West as a primary PACOM function, with a renewed emphasis on its role as the first line of defense in countering the fentanyl crisis at America’s front door.

What are Other Military capabilities: A Layered Border Defense Structure

With PACOM responsible for monitoring and intercepting the outer most layer of illicit drug sourcing, the next line of defense falls to Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Within NORTHCOM, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) is designated as the lead DoD command to support interagency CD operations against the cartel threats to the homeland.

However, JTF-N has its own assorted challenges that could be compromising its mission readiness. JTF-N may not be sufficiently manned. Another concern is that it is composed of National Guard troops from many different units, which could impact on its ability to operate cohesively. There have been past news reports that the mission overseen by JTF-N, known as Task Force Phoenix, has been plagued by systemic issues such as alcohol and drug abuse among troops. These issues likely exacerbate management and operational challenges arising from an ad hoc organizational structure.

Despite Congressional oversight, neither NORTHCOM nor DoD have disclosed the recent findings of an internal administrative investigation initiated in response to these clear military readiness concerns, leaving critical questions unanswered about troop readiness, operational efficacy, command climate underpinning a lack of military effectiveness at countering the fentanyl distribution by the Mexican cartels.

Even with those setbacks working against JTF-N, NORTHCOM should request further surveillance capability from other overseas military units through DoD’s global force management system. Additional arial and maritime drone capability would provide JTF-N enhanced detection of fentanyl and fentanyl precursor shipments, as well as the ability to track suspicious activity by the Mexican cartels. NORTHCOM is also in the process to modernize the North Warning System, incorporating autonomous platforms equipped with domain awareness sensors that could provide continuous monitoring of potential threats. Additionally, NORTHCOM is enhancing over-the-horizon radar systems aimed to bolster threat awareness that could enhance coastal monitoring and increase effectiveness of interdiction operations. This lack of military cohesion and effectiveness overlayed with technological capability need highlights JTF-N unit overhaul and need for a comprehensive approach to effectively neutralize the cartel’s threat in the next layered defense.

Furthermore, JTF-N should prioritize efforts to seize weapons being trafficked to Mexican cartels by Americans, in coordination with Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The arming of these violent syndicates and influx of weapons has only strengthened the grip of the cartels over the Mexican police forces and military. While Bipartisan Safer Communities Act has been passed, boasting the seizure of approximately 2,000 firearms, it pales in comparison to the estimated 200,000 firearms smuggled into Mexico annually. Prioritizing interagency efforts by JTF-N underscores the urgent need for concerted military intelligence efforts to prevent cartels from acquiring sophisticated, military-grade weapons.

A Lethal Approach: Strategic Employment of Kinetic Strikes in Combating Fentanyl Distribution by Mexican Cartels

Finally, the US military can assume its primary role and utilize kinetic strikes in various ways to confront the Mexican cartel threat, aiming to isolate and eliminate fentanyl distribution in the final stages of the supply chain. The US military has a proven track record of success, exemplified by the effective use of Special Forces and precision strikes in previous operations, such as those against ISIS. While the operational and strategic context may differ, the military tactics have demonstrated their capability to minimize civilian casualties and maximize target neutralization. Moreover, the recognition of the decades of ineffective U.S. policy strategies involving the DEA and Mexican military emphasizes the need for a paradigm shift in military intervention. The DEA lacks the necessary funding and are not resourced for such operations due to its lack of manpower and necessary equipment for large-scale operations to combat the sophisticated and well-armed cartel networks that are insulated by either corrupt or apathetic institutions.

In contrast, the military has the operational reach, capabilities, and manpower needed to address these challenges utilizing weapon systems for intelligence gathering and precision strikes, as well as deploying Special Operations Forces for targeted strikes against cartel hubs and infrastructure. These proposed military operations draw parallels with counterterrorism tactics employed in the Middle East for decades, building upon the muscle memory of garnered experience and further showcasing military efficiency in combating complex threats.

The usage of kinetic military options to combat drug trafficking poses inherent risks that extend beyond the immediate tactical considerations. The militarization of drug enforcement efforts could lead to the proliferation of more potent and hazardous substances as cartels adapt to heightened US military enforcement measures. Moreover, such approaches entail significant geopolitical and economic implications. AMLO’s criticism of proposals for US military intervention emphasizes the potential for strained US-Mexico relations. In 2022 alone, trade between the two countries equaled more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars The lack of cooperation from Mexico, could further exacerbate diplomatic efforts and hinder effective collaboration on shared security concerns. Furthermore, US military operations may lead to the displacement of drug trafficking activities to neighboring Central American countries, highlighting the intricate and transnational nature of the Mexican cartel drug enterprise.

An innovative strategy to render the kinetic military option more palatable to the Mexican government and amplify its deterrent effect involves a selective approach in targeting the most volatile cartel syndicate, such as the Jalisco Cartel. According to the DEA, the Jalisco Cartel are primarily responsible for the vast majority of the fentanyl that is being trafficked to the United States. Not only that, the Jalisco Cartel are trafficking fentanyl combined with xylazine, a potent veterinary sedative that intensifies the risk of fatal drug poisoning, and more importantly is resistant to NARCAN to counteract xylazine’s effects.

By concentrating efforts on disrupting the operations of one particular syndicate, two enduring consequences can be anticipated. Firstly, the demonstration of military efficacy in dismantling a formidable cartel would serve to instill a sense of apprehension among other cartel factions, conveying a message that similar actions could be replicated against them if deemed necessary by the US military and government. Second, this display of force could serve as a potent deterrent, compelling other cartels to reconsider their involvement in the production and trafficking of opioids destined for the United States.

Such targeted interventions, therefore, have the potential to embody a significant shift in the calculus of cartel behavior and contribute to the broader objective of reducing US fentanyl-related deaths. Overall, leveraging US military lethality, including weapon systems and Special Forces, presents a promising strategy to disrupt the extensive cartel networks and safeguard American lives. This represents a departure from previous failed, non-existent policies and offers the potential for successful implementation of long-range, precision operations.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Military Action Against Mexican Cartel Drug Trafficking: A Critical Review

In confronting the dire opioid crisis fueled by the expanding reach of Mexican cartels, a paradigm shift and recalibration of US policy is imperative. While the US government develops a complex strategy to implement effective military involvement in the countering of Mexican Cartels and utilize the US military to strike the Mexican cartel leadership and networks directly as a means to address this pressing issue, such actions necessitate an examination of existing legal precedent and authorities. The suggestion arises that expanding these existing frameworks may hold greater relevance than designating the cartels as terrorist organizations. Despite the advantages offered by the official designation of terrorists, including streamlined prosecution for material support and asset freezes, it is important to recognize that drug trafficking is already a serious offense under US federal law and the DoD already have existing authorities and funding to counter transnational criminal organizations. Title 10 U.S.C. 284 grants the DoD the authority to provide specified support for counterdrug activities and to counter transnational organized crime.

Despite ongoing debates over the use of the military for law enforcement functions and concerns regarding force deployment along the southern border, Title 10 U.S.C. 284 has been consistently reauthorized by Congress. For example, in the DoD budget of 2019, a total of $881.5 million was allocated for US military counterdrug funding with domestic counterdrug support missions coordinated by NORTHCOM and more specifically, JTF-N. Despite President Trump’s memorandum directing DoD to support Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to secure the southern border, it was noted in congressional testimony that 10 U.S.C. 284 had not been utilized for this purpose. However, DOD expressed readiness to review and respond to any assistance requests from DHS under this authority.

Nevertheless, the United States maintains the legal framework designed to combat transnational criminal organizations and it remains uncertain whether affixing a designated terrorist label to the Mexican cartels would substantially enhance US legal authority for the US military intervention. Therefore, rather than altering their designation to foreign terrorist organizations, a more pragmatic approach would involve directly addressing specific Title 10 U.S.C 284 authority shortcomings through legislative means.

Amidst these legal considerations, the multifaceted capabilities of the US military emerge as a compelling option to confront the escalating threat posed by Mexican cartels and their fentanyl distribution networks. As the opioid epidemic continues to claim American lives at an alarming rate, the urgency for decisive action grows more pronounced. Given the clear and present danger that Mexican cartels pose to national security and public health, the military’s intervention becomes increasingly indispensable. However, with effective legislative measures restructured, leveraging the US military may indeed stand as the final line of defense against this formidable adversary to the homeland. Employing a defense in depth approach, the military’s extensive resources and strategic positioning offer a formidable deterrent solution against cartel operations and the influx of fentanyl overdoses plaguing the United States. Thus, recognizing the military’s potential as a force multiplier in protecting the homeland is not merely an alternative but a mandate in the fight against the opioid epidemic devastating American families.

*****

Author: Nicholas M. DeMasters is a US Naval Special Operations veteran with over 10 years of active duty time. Mr. DeMasters has deployed throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Mr. DeMasters has extensive military experience in interagency missions working with numerous foreign special operations units. Mr. DeMasters has his undergraduate degree from the US Naval Academy and was recently selected for a graduate fellowship at the Center of Public Leadership at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government where he is undergoing a Masters of Public Administration.

Image: Derived from a map of U.S. and Mexico border by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 30 April 2011.

Endnotes:

Owens. (2023, September 11). The politicization of the fentanyl crisis. Axios. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.axios.com/2023/09/11/fentanyl-politics-border-mexico

Ibid.

Mann, B. (2023, December 28). In 2023 fentanyl overdoses ravaged the U.S. and fueled a new culture war fight. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2023/12/28/1220881380/overdose-fentanyl-drugs-addiction#:~:text=In%202023%20the%20overdose%20death,for%20Disease%20Control%20and%20Prevention.

Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). The United States of America – Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study. US Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/cps-study.pdf

DEA Administrator on Record Fentanyl Overdose Deaths | Get Smart About Drugs. (n.d.). https://www.getsmartaboutdrugs.gov/media/dea-administrator-record-fentanyl-overdose-deaths

DEA Laboratory Testing Reveals that 6 out of 10 Fentanyl-Laced Fake Prescription Pills Now Contain a Potentially Lethal Dose of Fentanyl | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-laboratory-testing-reveals-6-out-10-fentanyl-laced-fake-prescription-pills-now-contain

Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels

Schiller, R. (2023, July 18). Opioid and Fentanyl Legislation Under Consideration in Congress - National League of Cities. National League of Cities. https://www.nlc.org/article/2023/07/14/opioid-and-fentanyl-legislation-under-consideration-in-congress/

Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels

Ibid.

Solomon. (2023, December 15). Insight: Rise in Mexican cartel violence drives record migration to the US. Reuters. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rise-mexican-cartel-violence-drives-record-migration-us-2023-12-15/#:~:text=Rivalries%20between%20organized%20crime%20groups,Mexican%20families%20in%20modern%20history.

US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/

Monroy, Jorge. 2021. Review of Documentan El Traslado a Militares de 246 Tareas Civiles. El Economista. October 21, 2021. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Documentan-el-traslado-a-militares-de-246-tareas-civiles-20211020-0155.html.

Madry. (2023, October 24). Mexico’s Sheinbaum handily leads 2024 presidential race, poll shows. Reuters. Retrieved January 28, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicos-sheinbaum-handily-leads-2024-presidential-race-poll-shows-2023-10-04/

McCormick. (2023, November 1). Drug cartels are paying attention to U.S. and Mexico politics. Dallas Morning News. Retrieved January 28, 2024, from https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/11/01/drug-cartels-are-paying-attention-to-us-and-mexico-politics/

US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/

Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890

F. (2023, July 25). Mexican port on the front line of US battle against fentanyl. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230725-mexican-port-on-the-front-line-of-us-battle-against-fentanyl

Davidson. (2021, March 9). STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE. Retrieved February 15, 2024, from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_03-09-21.pdf

JIATFW. (n.d.). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. https://www.pacom.mil/JIATFW.aspx

Joint Task Force North. (2017, March). NORTHCOM. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/Portals/16/documents/jtfn_trifold.pdf?ver=2017-08-04-112134-233#:~:text=JTF%2DN%20supports%20federal%20law,to%20protect%20the%20homeland%20and

Winkie, D. (2021, December 8). Death, drugs, and a disbanded unit: How the Guard’s Mexico border mission fell apart. Army Times. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/12/08/death-drugs-and-a-disbanded-unit-how-the-guards-mexico-border-mission-fell-apart/

Judson, J. (2023, May 12). A new design for homeland defense is in the works at NORTHCOM. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2023/05/10/a-new-design-for-homeland-defense-is-in-the-works-at-northcom/

New, B. (2023, October 7). The I-Team: Mexican drug cartels look to North Texas to smuggle military-grade guns. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/the-i-team-mexican-drug-cartels-look-to-north-texas-to-smuggle-military-grade-guns/

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

Carpenter. (2023, April 3). We Shouldn’t Use the Military to Fight Mexico’s Drug Cartels. CATO Institute. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://www.cato.org/commentary/we-shouldnt-use-military-fight-mexicos-drug-cartels

Jenkins, B. (2023, March 22). Should Mexico’s Drug Cartels Be Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations? RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/should-mexicos-drug-cartels-be-designated-foreign-terrorist.html

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

DEA Reports Widespread Threat of Fentanyl Mixed with Xylazine | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-reports-widespread-threat-fentanyl-mixed-xylazine

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. . https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

Rosen, W. (2019, February 20). The Defense Department and 10 U.S.C. 284: Legislative Origins and Funding Questions. CRS Insight. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IN11052.pdf

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

4. Opinion: Why I’m resigning from the State Department

Excerpts:

I am haunted by the final social media post of Aaron Bushnell, the 25-year-old US Air Force serviceman who self-immolated in front of the Israeli Embassy in Washington on February 25: “Many of us like to ask ourselves, ‘What would I do if I was alive during slavery? Or the Jim Crow South? Or apartheid? What would I do if my country was committing genocide?’ The answer is, you’re doing it. Right now.”

I can no longer continue what I was doing. I hope that my resignation can contribute to the many efforts to push the administration to withdraw support for Israel’s war, for the sake of the 2 million Palestinians whose lives are at risk and for the sake of America’s moral standing in the world.

Opinion: Why I’m resigning from the State Department | CNN

CNN · March 27, 2024

'Shocked and appalled': Why this State Department staffer resigned in protest over Gaza

11:44 - Source: CNN

Editor’s Note: Annelle Sheline, PhD, served for a year as a foreign affairs officer at the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The views expressed here are her own. Read more opinion on CNN.

CNN —

Since Hamas’ attack on October 7, Israel has used American bombs in its war in Gaza, which has killed more than 32,000 people — 13,000 of them children — with countless others buried under the rubble, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health. Israel is credibly accused of starving the 2 million people who remain, according to the UN special rapporteur on the right to food; a group of charity leaders warns that without adequate aid, hundreds of thousands more will soon likely join the dead.

Annelle Sheline

Courtesy Annelle Sheline

Yet Israel is still planning to invade Rafah, where the majority of people in Gaza have fled; UN officials have described the carnage that is expected to ensue as “beyond imagination.” In the West Bank, armed settlers and Israeli soldiers have killed Palestinians, including US citizens. These actions, which experts on genocide have testified meet the crime of genocide, are conducted with the diplomatic and military support of the US government.

For the past year, I worked for the office devoted to promoting human rights in the Middle East. I believe strongly in the mission and in the important work of that office. However, as a representative of a government that is directly enabling what the International Court of Justice has said could plausibly be a genocide in Gaza, such work has become almost impossible. Unable to serve an administration that enables such atrocities, I have decided to resign from my position at the Department of State.

Whatever credibility the United States had as an advocate for human rights has almost entirely vanished since the war began. Members of civil society have refused to respond to my efforts to contact them. Our office seeks to support journalists in the Middle East; yet when asked by NGOs if the US can help when Palestinian journalists are detained or killed in Gaza, I was disappointed that my government didn’t do more to protect them. Ninety Palestinian journalists in Gaza have been killed in the last five months, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. That is the most recorded in any single conflict since the CPJ started collecting data in 1992.

By resigning publicly, I am saddened by the knowledge that I likely foreclose a future at the State Department. I had not initially planned a public resignation. Because my time at State had been so short — I was hired on a two-year contract — I did not think I mattered enough to announce my resignation publicly. However, when I started to tell colleagues of my decision to resign, the response I heard repeatedly was, “Please speak for us.”

Members of the Al-Rabaya family break their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan outside their destroyed home by the Israeli airstrikes in Rafah, Gaza Strip, Monday, March 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Fatima Shbair)

Fatima Shbair/AP

Across the federal government, employees like me have tried for months to influence policy, both internally and, when that failed, publicly. My colleagues and I watched in horror as this administration delivered thousands of precision-guided munitions, bombs, small arms and other lethal aid to Israel and authorized thousands more, even bypassing Congress to do so. We are appalled by the administration’s flagrant disregard for American laws that prohibit the US from providing assistance to foreign militaries that engage in gross human rights violations or that restrict the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The Biden administration’s own policy states, “The legitimacy of and public support for arms transfers among the populations of both the United States and recipient nations depends on the protection of civilians from harm, and the United States distinguishes itself from other potential sources of arms transfers by elevating the importance of protecting civilians.” Yet this noble statement of policy has been directly in contradiction with the actions of the president who promulgated it.

President Joe Biden himself indirectly admits that Israel is not protecting Palestinian civilians from harm. Under pressure from some congressional Democrats, the administration issued a new policy to ensure that foreign military transfers don’t violate relevant domestic and international laws.

Yet just recently, the State Department ascertained that Israel is in compliance with international law in the conduct of the war and in providing humanitarian assistance. To say this when Israel is preventing the adequate entrance of humanitarian aid and the US is being forced to air drop food to starving Gazans, this finding makes a mockery of the administration’s claims to care about the law or about the fate of innocent Palestinians.

This picture shows smoke billowing following Israeli bombardments over east Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on February 13, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas militant group.

Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images

Some have argued that the US lacks influence over Israel. Yet Retired Israeli Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Brick noted in November that Israel’s missiles, bombs and airplanes all come from the US. “The minute they turn off the tap, you can’t keep fighting,” he said. “Everyone understands that we can’t fight this war without the United States. Period.”

Even now, Israel is considering invading Lebanon, which brings a heightened risk of regional conflict that would be catastrophic. The US has sought to prevent this outcome but shows no appetite for withholding offensive weapons from Israel in order to compel greater restraint there or in Gaza. Biden’s support for Israel’s far-right government thus risks sparking a wider conflagration in the region, which could well put US troops in harm’s way.

So many of my colleagues feel betrayed. I write for myself but speak for many others, including Feds United for Peace, a group mobilizing for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza that represents federal workers in their personal capacities across the country, and across 30 federal agencies and departments. After four years of then-President Donald Trump’s efforts to cripple the department, State employees embraced Biden’s pledge to rebuild American diplomacy. For some, US support for Ukraine against Russia’s illegal occupation and bombardment seemed to reestablish America’s moral leadership. Yet the administration continues to enable Israel’s illegal occupation and destruction of Gaza.

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I am haunted by the final social media post of Aaron Bushnell, the 25-year-old US Air Force serviceman who self-immolated in front of the Israeli Embassy in Washington on February 25: “Many of us like to ask ourselves, ‘What would I do if I was alive during slavery? Or the Jim Crow South? Or apartheid? What would I do if my country was committing genocide?’ The answer is, you’re doing it. Right now.”

I can no longer continue what I was doing. I hope that my resignation can contribute to the many efforts to push the administration to withdraw support for Israel’s war, for the sake of the 2 million Palestinians whose lives are at risk and for the sake of America’s moral standing in the world.

CNN · March 27, 2024

5. Baltimore bridge collapse: Insurance loss could hit $3bn

Why does the President say this?

President Joe Biden has said the federal government should cover the cost to rebuild the bridge.

Why can't Baltimore receive the insurance claim? Inst that what insurance is for? Why do we have to default to the US government footing the bill? Surely there is no political constituency that thinks the US paying all the repair costs is a good thing.

Baltimore bridge collapse: Insurance loss could hit $3bn

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68688856

14 hours agoBy Madeline Halpert,

BBC News, New York

Getty Images

The Port of Baltimore is the 14th largest in the US

The collapse of a bridge in the US city of Baltimore will result in the largest single marine insurance loss ever, a British insurance marketplace said.

Six people were presumed dead after a ship crashed into the bridge, and divers have recovered two bodies.

Experts say the damages could cost as much as $3bn (£2.3bn).

"I would say it's certainly going to be one of the largest marine losses in history," said John Neal, chief executive officer of Lloyd's of London.

"Of that there is little or no doubt," Mr Neal told the BBC. "But genuinely the good news is it's insured."

Mr Neal said the port and the ship that crashed into the bridge are also insured.

"So from a financial point of view, there is a process that will allow for financial compensation to be made and for the claim to be settled," he said.

The Maryland Department of Transportation has so far asked the Biden administration for $60m in emergency funds to help clear debris and clean up after the incident.

Addressing the bridge collapse is not the only expense, either. Until the shipping lane is reopened, experts say the incident could lead to losses of up to $15m (£11.8m) because of how vital the Baltimore port is to global commerce.

The amount of cargo handled by the port has grown steadily since 1998.

Mr Neal would not offer a number for how much insurance companies may be billed for the collision, but analysts at Barclays have said the claims could cost insurance companies as much as $3bn.

The analysts said damages to the bridge itself could amount to $1.2bn, while insurance companies may face fees between $350m and $700m for wrongful deaths.

Closure of one of the US' biggest ports while the bridge is repaired could also cost millions of dollars, Barclays' analysts said.

The Port of Baltimore is the 14th largest in the US. In 2023, 52.3 million tonnes of foreign cargo, worth $80.8bn, passed through Baltimore, according to data from the state of Maryland.

Cars, coal and gas... key cargo at Baltimore port

Experts have stressed that the closure of the part could have ripple effects on global supply chains.

President Joe Biden has said the federal government should cover the cost to rebuild the bridge.

Paul Wiedefeld, secretary of the Maryland Department of Transportation, and other officials noted that resolving the bridge collapse will not be a quick process.

But he promised at a press conference on Wednesday that officials were working to "come up with a design for the replacement of that bridge as quickly as possible to get the port back up and the community back up and running".

6. Troops Still Aren't Getting Enough Sleep, and the Defense Department Isn't Taking Responsibility, Watchdog Says

The GAO report is at this link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105917

Excerpts:

"There is universal recognition that it's an area of concern," Maurer said. "Everyone agrees that someone should do it, to take actions to address it, but it wasn't clear who that someone should be.

"So, if no one's in charge of addressing the problem and everyone else thinks someone else's taking care of it, you're not going to see major change," she said.

The report comes as the DoD has recently refused to say whether troops are getting adequate rest time at home between deployments, and as service members are spending more time away from home than ever.

Almost 500 deaths, serious injuries and property damage events were reported within the Department of the Navy between 2015 and 2019 -- all related to driving while fatigued, according to the GAO report.

"DoD recognizes that impairment from fatigue can be equivalent to the effects of alcohol intoxication and significantly increases the risk of physical injury," the report says.

Troops Still Aren't Getting Enough Sleep, and the Defense Department Isn't Taking Responsibility, Watchdog Says

military.com · by Military.com | By Kelsey Baker Published March 28, 2024 at 5:24pm ET · March 28, 2024

Service members still aren't getting enough sleep, in large part because there's no coherent Pentagon effort to remedy the problem, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office released this week.

The GAO found that fatigue among service members "appeared to be more the rule than the exception," with active-duty troops sleeping less than seven hours nightly twice as often as civilians. That lack of sleep has contributed to safety mishaps, near-misses and numerous deaths.

"There's recognition of this [problem] within the military," GAO report author and military readiness expert Diana Maurer told Military.com in a phone interview. "The problem is no one owns it."

Health experts recommend seven to nine hours of sleep for adults. It's not just quantity: Sleep quality is important too, making it hard for troops with uncomfortable mattresses or pilots dealing with noise and light to get meaningful shut-eye.

Pilots, missileers, aircraft maintainers and vehicle operators all noted in the report how fatigue has led to near-misses at work.

"Sometimes when I'm driving, I find myself falling asleep and I have to catch myself," one vehicle operator said in the report. "I could kill someone on accident because I'm not getting the right sleep."

Despite the military undertaking almost 130 fatigue-related research projects since 2017, most research findings are stovepiped, inhibiting information-sharing and sowing confusion over who within the Defense Department should oversee sleep and fatigue issues. Offices that manage training, readiness, safety and suicide prevention don't share information on fatigue-related events under their purviews either.

"There is universal recognition that it's an area of concern," Maurer said. "Everyone agrees that someone should do it, to take actions to address it, but it wasn't clear who that someone should be.

"So, if no one's in charge of addressing the problem and everyone else thinks someone else's taking care of it, you're not going to see major change," she said.

The report comes as the DoD has recently refused to say whether troops are getting adequate rest time at home between deployments, and as service members are spending more time away from home than ever.

Almost 500 deaths, serious injuries and property damage events were reported within the Department of the Navy between 2015 and 2019 -- all related to driving while fatigued, according to the GAO report.

"DoD recognizes that impairment from fatigue can be equivalent to the effects of alcohol intoxication and significantly increases the risk of physical injury," the report says.

In 2017, two disastrous Navy ship collisions led to the deaths of 17 sailors and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage. Fatigue was later identified as a contributing factor in both collisions.

It's not just safety that sleep affects. Chronic conditions such as obesity, depression and heart disease can all be spurred by sleeplessness.

The report also noted the links between lack of sleep and increased risk of death by suicide, a longtime struggle for the DoD. It's overlap like this that makes Dr. Vince Mysliwiec, a sleep researcher at University of Texas Health-San Antonio and former sleep medicine consultant to the Army's surgeon general, wish the DoD would create a stand-alone office to oversee better sleep and human performance practices.

"The implementation of these [best sleep] practices servicewide is what needs to happen," he told Military.com in a phone interview. "They've identified the problem too much."

Mysliwiec added that, while the study captured the need more a more focused effort, it didn't reference two other issues likely affecting some troops struggling with sleep -- alcohol and smartphones, both of which are notorious sleep disruptors.

But any actual implementation from new sleep efforts ultimately won't fall to the top brass, Mysliwiec said. It will be up to unit leaders.

"At the end of the day, when the mission is there, you have to recognize the ultimate responsibility for the military is to accomplish the mission," he said. "And then at times, sleep will be sacrificed. But it doesn't have to be sacrificed every day."

-- Kelsey Baker is a graduate student at Northwestern's Medill School of Journalism, and a former active-duty Marine. Reach her on X at @KelsBBaker or bakerkelsey@protonmail.com.

military.com · by Military.com | By Kelsey Baker Published March 28, 2024 at 5:24pm ET · March 28, 2024

7. Opinion | What’s happened in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal demands a reckoning

This is quite an argument. I think the author is being disingenuous by framing his argument only in terms of the Taliban and Al Qeada (if Al Qesa is not longer suing Afghanistan as a sanctuary perhaps you could argue the last 20 years was a "success.") Just because Afghanistan is unlikely to return to being a sanctuary for Al Qaeda does not mean there is no terrorist threat coming from Afghanistan. Why is there no mention of ISiS-K?

Opinion | What’s happened in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal demands a reckoning

A new threat assessment from the U.S. intelligence community debunks the chief rationale for the prolonged conflict.

msnbc.com · by Michael A. Cohen, MSNBC Columnist

Earlier this month, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its annual threat assessment, a compendium of “worldwide threats to the national security of the United States.” On the third to last page of the report, to little fanfare, the report makes a startling statement about the threat to America from “global terrorism”: “al-Qa‘ida has reached an operational nadir in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

Last September, Christy Abizaid, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said the same thing to similarly little notice. Al Qaeda’s “revival is unlikely,” she added, in part because of the loss of an “accommodating local environment.”

This should be a reason for celebration, but in reality, it demands a reckoning.

Warnings of potential terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan were a bipartisan exercise not only for presidents, but for legislators as well.

For 20 years after 9/11, the United States spent more than $2 trillion and lost nearly 2,500 soldiers fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. For 20 years, U.S. policymakers argued that the American troop presence in Afghanistan was vital to U.S. national security because it would prevent a Taliban victory and the inevitable return of an al Qaeda safe haven that would again imperil U.S. security. And for 20 years, U.S. officials rarely questioned those dubious assumptions as they sent more and more troops into harm’s way to fight an enemy that posed at best, a marginal threat to the American people.

As early as October 2001, the same month the initial military intervention in Afghanistan began, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld identified one of the key goals of the mission as ending “the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism.”

That goal was achieved two months later when the Taliban were routed from power and al Qaeda operatives, including their leader Osama bin Laden, either fled the country or were killed. Many of those who fled found shelter in Pakistan, where (at least initially) the U.S. military could do nothing to attack them.

Yet, the presence of an actual al Qaeda safe haven in Pakistan, from which the terrorist group did not successfully launch terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, failed to convince policymakers that their fears of a potential al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan were perhaps unfounded.

In fact, the “safe haven” argument became such a seductive explanation for U.S. military interventions that President George W. Bush began justifying the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq by arguing, “We’ll deny them the safe haven to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan.”

And as a Taliban insurgency began to ramp up in Afghanistan, the fears of an al Qaeda sanctuary there were used to justify not only maintaining the U.S.’ troop presence in Afghanistan — but expanding it. Soon after taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama increased troop levels and announced a new “comprehensive strategy” that aimed “to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al Qaeda safe haven that it was before 9/11.”

“If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged,” Obama argued, “that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”

The first rule of Washington’s foreign policy mandarins is never admit you were wrong — even if the consequences of your misjudgment are dead American soldiers.

Other officials echoed Obama’s words in even more forceful terms. Richard Holbrooke, Obama’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, declared that if the Taliban returned to rule, “without any shadow of a doubt, Al Qaeda would move back into Afghanistan, set up a larger presence, recruit more people and pursue its objectives against the United States even more aggressively.” That, he said, is “the only justification for what we’re doing.”

Warnings of potential terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan were a bipartisan exercise not only for presidents, but for legislators as well. They would be repeated by one military leader after another. To listen to these confident proclamations is to believe that once terrorists cross the border into Afghanistan, they are magically transformed from mere mortals into Jason Bourne-like figures, capable of unprecedented levels of death and destruction.

These talking points were picked up by President Donald Trump, who declared in 2017 that U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan were clear: “We must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America.”

Eventually, however, Trump signed an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw American troops from the country in return for a pledge that they would not allow “international terrorist groups” to operate inside Afghanistan’s borders.

U.S. soldiers stand guard as Afghans sit on a roadside near the military part of the airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Aug. 20, 2021.Wakil Kohsar / AFP - Getty Images file

Critics like Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2010-11, warned again that such a move endangered Americans. After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 2021, other U.S. officials, like former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director Leon Panetta, confidently declared that the group “will indeed continue to provide a safe haven for terrorists, and that spells trouble for the United States.”

If one is eagerly awaiting a mea culpa from Petraeus, Panetta, et al., don’t hold your breath. The first rule of Washington’s foreign policy mandarins is never admit you were wrong — even if the consequences of your misjudgment are dead American soldiers.

Opponents of the withdrawal might argue that while fears of a new refuge for al Qaeda proved incorrect, there were good reasons to believe that a Taliban return would lead to precisely that outcome. But in reality, the Taliban and al Qaeda had a fractured relationship. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s founder and Afghanistan’s supreme leader before the U.S.-led invasion, was not aware of the 9/11 plot in advance. Even before the attack, the relationship between Omar and bin Laden — and the movements they led — had become increasingly frayed. All of this was relatively well known — and regularly voiced by critics of the war — but largely ignored.

For hundreds of thousands of Americans who served in Afghanistan — and their millions of loved ones — the scars from that era are permanent.

Common sense might also have led U.S. officials to ask: After spending nearly 20 years as insurgents, why would the Taliban allow the same terrorists back in and invite yet another U.S.-led attack? And it wasn’t as if the U.S. was powerless to act if the Taliban inexplicably set out on the same course that had sent them into exile two decades earlier. In the years after 9/11, the U.S. went to great lengths to prevent a similar terrorist attack from happening again. Airport security was beefed up, and the U.S. government bolstered its ability to share information about potential terrorist plots. What was the point of those reforms if the U.S. continued to treat safe havens thousands of miles away as urgent threats requiring major military campaigns?

American officials could have also listened to the Taliban’s deputy leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani. “It is not in the interest of any Afghan to allow such groups to hijack our country and turn it into a battleground,” he wrote in a 2020 New York Times op-ed. “We have already suffered enough from foreign interventions.” As it turns out, he’s been true to his word.

For most Americans, al Qaeda and the war on terrorism will seem like ancient history: a dark period that has been overtaken by a newer and more pressing set of concerns. But for hundreds of thousands of Americans who served in Afghanistan — and their millions of loved ones — the scars from that era are permanent. Their memory deserves better than a sentence innocuously tucked away in an intelligence report that shows the fight they waged was based on a lazy and untested assumption that politicians of both parties, military commanders, pundits and journalists wrongly accepted and didn’t bother to question.

msnbc.com · by Michael A. Cohen, MSNBC Columnist

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine is currently preventing Russian forces from making significant tactical gains along the entire frontline, but continued delays in US security assistance will likely expand the threat of Russian operational success, including in non-linear and possibly exponential ways.
The continued degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella provides one of the most immediate avenues through which Russian forces could generate non-linear operational impacts.
Russia’s ability to conduct opportunistic but limited offensive actions along Ukraine’s international border with Russia offers Russia further opportunities to constrain Ukrainian manpower and materiel, but Western aid provisions and Ukrainian efforts to address manpower challenges would ease the impacts of such Russian efforts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to make sensationalized statements as part of Russia’s ongoing reflexive control campaign, which aims to deter further Western military aid provisions to Ukraine and deflect attention from the growing Russian force posturing against NATO.
Putin’s March 27 statements are neither new nor surprising, and best illustrate how the Kremlin routinely overwhelms the Western information space, often with irrelevant or decontextualized truths rather than with outright misinformation or disinformation, to shape global perceptions and advance its own long-term objectives.
The Russian Investigative Committee unsurprisingly claimed that it has evidence tying Ukraine to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack amid continued Kremlin efforts to link Ukraine and the West to the terrorist attack to generate more domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern for heightened ethnic tension in Russian society following the Crocus City Hall attacks and may be falsely blaming Ukraine and the West for the Crocus City Hall attack in order to divert domestic attention away from ethnic tensions.
Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries in Russia are reportedly forcing Russia to import gasoline from Belarus.
An independent investigation found that international information operation campaigns linked to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remained active, despite the Russian government shutting down media companies and organizations overtly linked to Prigozhin after his death.
Senior Russian officials are intensifying their victim-blaming of Armenian leadership as Armenia continues to distance itself from security relations with Russia after the Kremlin abandoned Armenia to its fate as it lost Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
Russia continues efforts to source ballistic missiles and other weapons from North Korea for use in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 28, 2024

Mar 28, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2024

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 28, 2024, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on March 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine is currently preventing Russian forces from making significant tactical gains along the entire frontline, but continued delays in US security assistance will likely expand the threat of Russian operational success, including in non-linear and possibly exponential ways. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CBS News published on March 28 that Ukrainian forces managed to hold off Russian advances through winter 2023–2024 and that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the operational situation.[1] Ukrainian forces slowed the rate of Russian advances west of Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of the settlement on February 17, and Russian forces have only made gradual, marginal tactical gains elsewhere in Ukraine.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are not prepared to defend against another major Russian offensive effort expected in May or June 2024, however.[3] Russian forces will likely continue to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations through spring 2024 regardless of difficult weather and terrain conditions in order to exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages before the arrival of expected limited Western security assistance.[4] Russian forces also likely aim to force Ukraine to expend materiel it could otherwise accumulate for defensive efforts this summer and possible counteroffensive operations later in 2024 or in 2025.[5] Pervasive shortages may be forcing Ukraine to prioritize limited resources to critical sectors of the front, increasing the risk of a Russian breakthrough in other less-well-provisioned sectors and making the frontline overall more fragile than it appears despite the current relatively slow rate of Russian advances.[6]

ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized 505 square kilometers of territory since launching offensive operations in October 2023, and Russian forces gained almost 100 more square kilometers of territory between January 1 and March 28, 2024, than in the last three months of 2023 (although this rate of advance may be due to a combination of Ukrainian materiel shortages and more conducive weather conditions in the winter than in the fall). This marginal increase in the rate of Russian advance is not reflective of the threat of Russian operational success amid continued delays in US security assistance, however. Materiel constraints limit how Ukrainian forces can conduct effective defensive operations while also offering Russian forces flexibility in how to conduct offensive operations, which can lead to compounding and non-linear opportunities for Russian forces to make operationally significant gains in the future.[7] The opportunities to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities will widen as materiel shortages persist and as Ukraine continues to grapple with how to address manpower challenges.[8] The arrival of sufficient and regular Western security assistance and the resolution of Ukrainian manpower challenges would narrow these opportunities for Russian forces and provide Ukrainian forces with the ability to stop Russian forces from making even marginal tactical gains, to degrade Russian offensive capabilities, and to prepare for future counteroffensive operations to liberate more Ukrainian territory.[9]

The continued degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella provides one of the most immediate avenues through which Russian forces could generate non-linear operational impacts. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that Russian forces launched 190 missiles of various types, 140 Shahed drones, and 700 glide bombs at targets in Ukraine between March 18 and 24.[10] Intensified Russian drone and missile strikes are likely once again placing pressures on Ukraine to prioritize the allocation of sparse air defense assets to defending population centers, critical infrastructure, and industrial facilities in the rear over positions along the frontline.[11] Kuleba stated that Russia’s widespread use of glide bombs along the frontline gives Russia a major battlefield advantage and that the only way to counter these tactics is for Ukrainian forces to shoot down the Russian aircraft conducting the strikes, which requires a sufficient number of air defense systems along the front.[12] Russian forces notably employed mass glide bomb strikes to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and have steadily increased their use of guided and unguided glide bomb strikes against rear and frontline Ukrainian positions in 2024.[13] Ukrainian and Western officials have increasingly warned of a critical shortage of air defense missiles in the coming months, and the further degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella would not only limit Ukraine’s ability to protect critical elements of its war effort in the rear but would also likely afford Russian aviation prolonged secure operation along the frontline.[14] This security would allow Russian forces to significantly increase glide bomb strikes at scale and possibly even allow Russian forces to conduct routine large-scale aviation operations against near rear Ukrainian logistics and cities to devastating effect.[15] Expanded aviation operations could allow Russian forces to heavily degrade Ukrainian combat capabilities and isolate sectors of the battlefield in support of efforts to make operationally significant gains.

US security assistance that could establish a wider and more stable Ukrainian air defense umbrella would deny Russian forces these opportunities. Zelensky stated on March 28 that five to seven additional Patriot air defense systems would allow Ukraine to protect population centers, industrial facilities, and the Ukrainian military.[16] Kuleba also noted that Patriot air defense systems are needed to defend Ukraine against intensified Russian ballistic missile strikes, as Ukraine’s Soviet-era air defense systems are unable to intercept these missiles.[17] Kuleba added that stronger Ukrainian air defense along the frontline would prevent Ukrainian forces from losing positions and enable Ukraine to force Russian forces to retreat from positions, likely in reference to the possible operational impacts of decreased Russian aviation operations.[18]

Russia’s ability to conduct opportunistic but limited offensive actions along Ukraine’s international border with Russia offers Russia further opportunities to constrain Ukrainian manpower and materiel, but Western aid provisions and Ukrainian efforts to address manpower challenges would ease the impacts of such Russian efforts. Zelensky told CBS that Ukrainian forces are constructing fortifications and defensive positions near Sumy City in response to a reported significant buildup of Russian forces in neighboring Bryansk Oblast and recent strikes on Ukrainian settlements in the area.[19] Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyuk recently warned that Russia is conducting an information operation threatening a possible Russian attack on Sumy Oblast but stated that Ukrainian authorities have not observed any Russian strike groups near the borders with Sumy Oblast.[20] ISW has not observed visual evidence that Russian forces are concentrating forces in Bryansk Oblast in preparation for any significant military undertaking. Russian forces will likely only be able to conduct a large-scale offensive operation in one direction in the coming months, and it is unlikely that Russian forces would suddenly prioritize a whole new front over the operational directions that they have been focusing on in the past year and a half in Ukraine.[21] Russian forces could theoretically choose to concentrate forces at any point along the over three-thousand-kilometer-long frontline along the Russia-Ukraine and Belarus-Ukraine borders in addition to the frontline in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to respond to Russian actions by re-allocating already scare resources from other, more active sectors of the front. Ukraine already appears to be prioritizing its limited manpower and materiel resources to critical sectors of the frontline, and even limited transfers of Ukrainian materiel and personnel from active frontline areas could prove destabilizing.[22] Future Russian offensive operations are not necessarily limited to the existing frontlines in eastern and southern Ukraine, and the Russian military command may only have to deploy a limited number of Russian personnel to any previously inactive sector of the frontline to force Ukraine to redeploy necessary manpower and equipment to that area, potentially creating vulnerabilities that Russian forces could exploit.

Ukraine could overcome these vulnerabilities if it received US military assistance in a timely fashion and addressed its ongoing manpower challenges. Ukrainian officials recently reported that the Ukrainian military is prioritizing rotations and rest for frontline units and other efforts to optimize Ukraine’s military organization structure.[23] The need for rotations is only part of the manpower challenge Ukraine faces, however. ISW continues to assess that consistent provision of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide rapidly at scale, will play a critical role in determining Russian prospects in 2024 and when Ukrainian forces can attempt to contest the theater-wide initiative.[24] The course of the war over the rest of 2024 depends heavily on the provision of US military assistance and continuing non-US military support as well as on Ukraine’s ability to address its manpower challenges. The forecast cone — the range of possible outcomes from most advantageous to most dangerous — is very wide and will remain so until it is clear whether the US will resume military support and Ukraine will address its manpower challenges. Both the US and Ukraine retain considerable agency in determining the course of the war this year and in coming years. This war’s immediate and long-term prospects remain highly contingent on decisions yet to be made in Washington, Kyiv, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and elsewhere and on the execution of those decisions in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to make sensationalized statements as part of Russia’s ongoing reflexive control campaign, which aims to deter further Western military aid provisions to Ukraine and deflect attention from the growing Russian force posturing against NATO. Putin, during a visit to the Russian 344th Center for Combat Employment and Retraining of Army Aviation Pilots on March 27, reiterated basic truisms and several boilerplate narratives aimed at distracting Western policymakers with irrelevant and tired Russian threats, likely seeking to delay and influence important decisions regarding additional Western military aid to Ukraine and countering the Russian threat against NATO. Putin claimed that Russia has “no aggressive intentions” towards NATO states and that Russia “would not be doing anything in Ukraine” if it were not for “the coup d’état in Ukraine and subsequent hostilities in Donbas.”[25] Putin is once again injecting into the international media bloodstream the false narrative that the West and NATO are responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin routinely falsely accuses Western countries of staging a coup in Ukraine in 2014 and Ukraine of violence against Russian-speaking residents of Donbas in an effort to deflect responsibility for the war in Ukraine and manipulate Western perceptions about Russia’s intent and capabilities.[26]

Putin dismissed claims that Russia wants to attack other countries, including Poland, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic as “complete nonsense,” while adding that Russia is defending the people living on Russia’s “historical territories” in Ukraine. Putin’s denials of Russia’s increasingly aggressive posturing against NATO’s eastern flank are reminiscent of the Kremlin’s claims that Russian forces would not invade Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022 (including right up to the eve of the full-scale invasion) — a line the Kremlin used to delay and deter any preparations to counter the Russian threat.[27] Putin’s denials of Russia’s imperialist aspirations are also incongruent with his own definition of the “Russian World” (“Russkiy Mir”) — an ideological and geographic conception that includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation.[28] The concept of the “Russian World” allows Putin to regard any territories that were once ruled by or claimed to be ruled by a Russian regime as Russia’s “historical territories,” which include Poland and the Baltic states. Putin may elect to “protect” people the Kremlin describes as Russian “compatriots” in these claimed “historic territories” at the time of his choosing by replicating similar narratives he used to invade Ukraine.

Putin also attempted to scare NATO states away from supplying Ukraine with F-16 fighter aircraft and attempted to deter Western audiences from further financial commitments to Ukraine’s and NATO’s security. Putin stated that Russia will destroy F-16 aircraft in Ukraine just like it destroyed other Western-provided military equipment and threatened that Russia would target Western airfields if Ukraine used these facilities to facilitate strikes against Russia. These statements, presented in sensationalized fashion, are, in fact, statements of the obvious — naturally Russian forces will seek to destroy Ukrainian military equipment of any sort, and naturally Russia would regard bases from which such forces conduct military operations against Russian forces as legitimate targets — such is war. Such declarations deserve no attention, yet Putin uses them to achieve important informational effects. Putin and Russian sources previously deliberately overwhelmed the Western information space with reports and footage of destroyed Western-provided military equipment and other Ukrainian tactical losses in summer 2023 to discourage timely Western military aid support and confidence in Ukrainian forces during the counteroffensive period.[29] Putin additionally attempted to involve himself in the US domestic political debate over defense spending by claiming that Russia spends nearly ten times less on its defense budget than the United States — an irrelevance considering Russia’s far smaller GDP and the fact that the US is not committing its own combat forces (paid for by the US defense budget) to this war.[30] Putin’s mention of US defense spending also likely attempted to create a false perception that Russia is more successful on the battlefield despite having a smaller defense budget, obscuring the reality that Russia has partially mobilized its economy and imposed hardship on its people to support the war effort while the US and the West are maintaining their economies on a peacetime footing.

Putin’s March 27 statements are neither new nor surprising and best illustrate how the Kremlin routinely overwhelms the Western information space, often with irrelevant or decontextualized truths rather than with outright misinformation or disinformation, to shape global perceptions and advance its own long-term objectives. These statements should be analyzed alongside endless instances of the Kremlin reusing the same narratives, rather than as standalone inflections. Overwhelming, confusing, and manipulating the Western information space and perceptions are part of the Russian strategy of “reflexive control” — or a way of transmitting bases for decision-making to an opponent so that they freely come to a pre-determined decision.[31] Putin’s statements target the US and Western perception of costs, priorities, risks, and alignment with values to achieve the desired outcome of delaying Western military aid provisions to Ukraine or prevent NATO from recognizing and responding to the potential Russian threat in a timely manner. Putin’s statements and other Kremlin information operations are part of Russia’s principal effort to force the US and the West to accept and reason from Russian premises to decisions that advance Russia’s interests, as ISW has recently assessed.[32]

The Russian Investigative Committee unsurprisingly claimed that it has evidence tying Ukraine to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack amid continued Kremlin efforts to link Ukraine and the West to the terrorist attack to generate more domestic support for the war in Ukraine. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed on March 28 that that the Investigative Committee’s investigation into the Crocus City Hall attackers confirmed that the attackers received “significant amounts of money and cryptocurrency” from Ukraine that they used to plan the attack.[33] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely intends to capitalize on domestic fear and anger and hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack will increase domestic support for the war in Ukraine.[34] The Kremlin will likely continue to conduct information operations targeting the Russian population and international audiences claiming to have evidence linking Ukraine and the West to the Crocus City Hall attack. ISW remains confident that the Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or aided the attack.[35]

Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern for heightened ethnic tension in Russian society following the Crocus City Hall attacks and may be falsely blaming Ukraine and the West for the Crocus City Hall attack in order to divert domestic attention away from ethnic tensions. Putin claimed on March 28 that he is concerned over statements that “Russia is only for [ethnic] Russians” from “jingo-patriots,” likely referencing March 24 footage of Russian ultranationalists harassing a woman from Sakha Republic in the Moscow metro and shouting that “Russia is only for [ethnic] Russians.”[36] Putin’s choice to quote these random and unknown Russian ultranationalists is likely a deliberate attempt to signal to Russian ultranationalists, including more well-known milbloggers and media and political personalities, that they should stop enflaming ethnic tension in the wake of the Crocus City Hall attack. Putin likely wants to avoid heightened animosity against ethnic minorities in Russia, whom Russia has disproportionally targeted in force-generation efforts, and to avoid continued calls for anti-migrant policies. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to introduce any restrictions that would reduce the number of migrants in Russia or restrict new migrants from entering Russia given that Russia continues to heavily rely on Central Asian migrants to offset domestic labor shortages and to target Central Asian migrants for crypto-mobilization efforts.[37] Putin intends to falsely direct blame for the Crocus City Hall attack onto Ukraine and the West to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine, but continued Russian ultranationalist attempts to blame migrants and radical Islamists for the attack highlight the reality that the attack was a notable Russian intelligence and law enforcement failure.[38]

Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries in Russia are reportedly forcing Russia to import gasoline from Belarus. Reuters reported on March 27 that Russia has significantly increased gasoline imports from Belarus in March due to unscheduled repairs at oil refineries following Ukrainian drone strikes.[39] Reuters reported that Russia has imported 3,000 metric tons of gasoline from Belarus in the first half of March as compared to 590 metric tons in February and no gasoline imports in January.[40] Russia banned gasoline exports at the beginning of March to stabilize domestic prices, and the significant increase in Belarusian imports suggests that operational Russian refineries may be unable to prevent domestic gasoline prices from rising.[41] Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries have significantly disrupted Russia’s refining capacity and will likely impact Russian exports of distillate petroleum products and the domestic prices of these goods.[42] Russian officials have noted that a reduction in primary oil refining in 2024 will likely lead to increases in Russian crude oil exports since Russia would not be able to refine as much as it usually does.[43]

An independent investigation found that international information operation campaigns linked to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remained active, despite the Russian government shutting down media companies and organizations overtly linked to Prigozhin after his death. US cybersecurity company Mandiant reported on March 28 that several Prigozhin-linked information operation campaigns remain active, namely Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens Campaign, Cyber Front Z, and Togo-based Panafrican Group for Commerce and Investment.[44] Mandiant reported that these campaigns continue to target the US, Ukraine, Russia, and countries in Europe and Africa — all regions that Prigozhin-linked information operations targeted prior to Prigozhin’s death. Mandiant did not assess the identity of actors managing these information operation campaigns since Prigozhin’s death. ISW has observed reports that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko oversees multiple information operations targeting Russia’s domestic information space, Ukraine, and the West.[45]

Kevin Mandia, the Chief Executive Officer of Mandiant, is an ISW board member.

Senior Russian officials are intensifying their victim-blaming of Armenian leadership as Armenia continues to distance itself from security relations with Russia after the Kremlin abandoned Armenia to its fate as it lost Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on March 28 that the Armenian leadership is consciously contributing to the deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations by making up far-fetched pretexts and distorting the last three and a half years of history.[46] Lavrov further blamed the Armenian leadership for defaming Russian border guards, Russian military personnel at Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia, and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “as a whole.” Lavrov also claimed that the European Union (EU) mission in Armenia is “turning into a NATO mission.”[47] Lavrov’s increasingly critical statements suggest that the Kremlin is likely preparing a harsher and more concerted response as Armenia continues to take measures to distance itself from Russia and signals interest in strengthening relations with the West.

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine is currently preventing Russian forces from making significant tactical gains along the entire frontline, but continued delays in US security assistance will likely expand the threat of Russian operational success, including in non-linear and possibly exponential ways.
The continued degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella provides one of the most immediate avenues through which Russian forces could generate non-linear operational impacts.
Russia’s ability to conduct opportunistic but limited offensive actions along Ukraine’s international border with Russia offers Russia further opportunities to constrain Ukrainian manpower and materiel, but Western aid provisions and Ukrainian efforts to address manpower challenges would ease the impacts of such Russian efforts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to make sensationalized statements as part of Russia’s ongoing reflexive control campaign, which aims to deter further Western military aid provisions to Ukraine and deflect attention from the growing Russian force posturing against NATO.
Putin’s March 27 statements are neither new nor surprising, and best illustrate how the Kremlin routinely overwhelms the Western information space, often with irrelevant or decontextualized truths rather than with outright misinformation or disinformation, to shape global perceptions and advance its own long-term objectives.
The Russian Investigative Committee unsurprisingly claimed that it has evidence tying Ukraine to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack amid continued Kremlin efforts to link Ukraine and the West to the terrorist attack to generate more domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern for heightened ethnic tension in Russian society following the Crocus City Hall attacks and may be falsely blaming Ukraine and the West for the Crocus City Hall attack in order to divert domestic attention away from ethnic tensions.
Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries in Russia are reportedly forcing Russia to import gasoline from Belarus.
An independent investigation found that international information operation campaigns linked to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remained active, despite the Russian government shutting down media companies and organizations overtly linked to Prigozhin after his death.
Senior Russian officials are intensifying their victim-blaming of Armenian leadership as Armenia continues to distance itself from security relations with Russia after the Kremlin abandoned Armenia to its fate as it lost Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
Russia continues efforts to source ballistic missiles and other weapons from North Korea for use in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 28. Positional fighting occurred northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 28, with neither side making any confirmed gains. Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in positional battles northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar, Novyi and Kanal districts (eastern part of Chasiv Yar), and Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[49] A Ukrainian crew commander of a drone detachment reported that there are seven to 10 Russian troops for every Ukrainian soldier in the Bakhmut direction and that Russian forces have increased their use of glide bombs in the area compared to 2023.[50] The commander added that the situation in the Bakhmut direction is difficult because of Russian glide bomb strikes and ongoing Ukrainian manpower shortages. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade noted that Ukrainian forces recently observed Russian motorcycle groups unsuccessfully attempting to advance in the Bakhmut area and that Russian forces are continuing to attack with in small groups with intensive drone, artillery, and aerial support.[51] A Russian milblogger similarly observed that Russian forces began using buggies and motorcycles to conduct attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Bakhmut direction.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) are continuing to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[53] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continued to operate near Spirne (southeast of Siversk and northeast of Bakhmut).[54]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to the O0542 (Avdiivka-Novobakhmutivka) highway within Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) on March 27, but ISW has not observed evidence confirming these claims.[55] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian assault brigade reported that Russian forces are trying to advance towards Semenivka and that Russian forces in the area can rotate personnel, commit new units to the battlefield, and replenish their brigades with more personnel.[56] The deputy commander added that Russian forces recently began using armored vehicles including tanks and observed that Russian forces lost several unspecified units when fighting for Orlivka (west of Avdiivka). Positional battles continued northwest of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[57] Elements of the Russian 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade (subordinate to the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Berdychi.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in and near Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City). Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novomykhailivka and in the fields north of the settlement, and Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Novomykahilivka.[59] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are not withdrawing from Novomykhailivka and are using first person vision (FPV) drones and cluster munitions in the area, which significantly complicate Russian efforts to advance.[60] Positional battles continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[61] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly continuing to operate near Novomykhailivka and elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Pobieda.[62]

Russian forces continued to attack near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 28, but did not advance.[63] Elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Main Command of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly continuing to conduct airstrikes near Staromayorske.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[65] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66] Elements of the Russian 38th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[67]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 28.[68] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces continue to conduct assaults in east bank Kherson Oblast with groups of 10 to 15 personnel without armored vehicle support and that Russian forces lose 30 to 40 personnel in the area each day.[69]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian naval drone near the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[70]

Russian sources claimed on March 28 that Russian forces shot down a Russian Su-27 or Su-35 aircraft in a friendly fire incident off the coast of occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[71] Russian sources also claimed that the pilot ejected, and that Russian authorities rescued him.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-22 cruise missiles and a Kh-31P anti-radar missile from the Black Sea, an S-300 missile at Donetsk Oblast, and 28 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 Shahed drones over Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts, and Ukrainian officials reported that the three Kh-22 cruise missiles and the Kh-31P cruise missile lost their combat capabilities over the Black Sea.[74] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian drone strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City.[75]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to source ballistic missiles and other weapons from North Korea for use in Ukraine. North Korea-focused outlet NK Pro reported on March 27 that two Russian aircraft, including a Russian cargo plane reportedly involved in delivering North Korean missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine, traveled between North Korea and Russia on the night of March 20 to 21.[76] NK Pro reported that the cargo plane likely flew from Vladivostok to Pyongyang and that an unspecific South Korea-US intelligence source stated that the plane picked up unspecified cargo 50 feet in length, presumably short-range ballistic missiles. NK Pro noted that the other aircraft, a Russian Tu-154 passenger aircraft likely transporting a Russian government delegation, has flown between Vladivostok and Pyongyang at least four times over the past month.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) 344th State Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel in Torzhok, Tver Oblast on March 27 and inspected samples of Russian flight equipment and aviation weapons.[77] Putin reportedly inspected Chrysanthemum missiles for the Mi-28NM attack helicopter and met with pilots and the widows of deceased Russian military personnel who served in Ukraine.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu presented a Gold Star medal to Russian Central Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev on March 28.[78] Russian officials previously praised the Central Grouping of Forces and Mordvichev for the seizure of Avdiivka.[79]

An unspecified Russian defense industrial base (DIB) source told Kremlin newswire TASS on March 27 that the Russian Sevmash enterprise will provide two Project 955AM “Borey-AM” nuclear submarine strategic missile cruisers for the Northern and Pacific Fleets in 2024.[80] The source stated that the Russian MoD contracted the construction of the cruisers in 2021 and that the Pacific and Northern Fleets will each have six of the cruisers by 2030.

A Russian insider source claimed on March 28 that Russian authorities instructed Russian law enforcement agencies to compile lists of and monitor “potentially dangerous” former convicts returning to Russia after completing military service contracts in Ukraine.[81] Russian authorities reportedly told local authorities and law enforcement to avoid classifying former convicts as “heroes of Russia” or allowing them to teach “lessons of courage” at Russian schools immediately after they return from Ukraine without additional checks and evaluations. Russian forces have previously widely recruited convicts from Russian penal colonies to serve six-month contracts in Storm-Z units.[82]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A source within the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) told Kremlin newswire TASS on MAR 28 that Russia is modifying Onyx supersonic anti-ship missiles with new active homing heads to strike Ukrainian ground targets with higher accuracy.[83] Another source told TASS that Russia is also working to protect Onyx missiles from Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.

Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade developed the new “Cheburashka” system that allows Russian forces to intercept a drone’s visual feed.[84] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that frontline Russian units are attempting to develop better methods of countering drones and that intercepting a drone’s visual feed allows Russian forces to locate the drone and momentarily activate the closest EW systems to down the drone, letting Russian forces avoid constantly operating EW systems. More isolated and temporary activation of EW systems helps Russian forces avoid situations when Russian EW systems interfere with Russian drone operations.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov warned on March 28 that Russian actors are conducting the “Perun” and “Maidan-3” information operations through Russian embassies and official events in unspecified “neutral” countries.[85] The GUR previously reported that the “Perun” information operation aims to destabilize Ukrainian and Western political environments, deflect Russia’s responsibility for its invasion of Ukraine, and deliberately misrepresent living conditions in occupied Ukraine in foreign media.[86] The “Maidan-3” information operation aims to sow panic and discontent in the Ukrainian population and drive a wedge between civilians and military and political leadership in Ukraine.[87] Budanov assessed that these information operations have certain successes, and ISW had previously assessed that Russia uses its diplomatic channels to influence international support for Ukraine.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iran in the Region: A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon.
The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.
This string of meetings comes after IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghaani visited Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah with Nasrallah.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 28. Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed senior Hamas commander Raad Thabet there on March 28.
West Bank: An armed Palestinian fired small arms targeting Israeli civilian vehicles near al Auja in the Jordan Valley on March 28, wounding three Israeli civilians.
Lebanon: The IDF concluded a week-long training exercise on March 27 aimed at increasing IDF Northern Command readiness in northern Israel.
Iraq: The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the recent Islamic State attack in Moscow shows that ISIS is “resurging and stronger than ever” on March 28. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s comments are notable given their contrast with the statements of Iranian-backed Iraqi officials, who have claimed that ISIS is no longer a threat to Iraq.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 28, 2024

Mar 28, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 28, 2024

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. Iran and the Axis of Resistance use periodic meetings between senior officials to coordinate responses to new developments in the region. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani spent much of October 2023 in Beirut for meetings with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to help coordinate “a possible broader confrontation with Israel,” for example.[1] The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.[2]

This string of meetings comes after IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghaani visited Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah with Nasrallah. One Iranian source told Reuters that during the meeting Nasrallah told Ghaani that Hezbollah did not want Iran to become involved in a Hezbollah-Israel war.[3] Iran could use the remainder of its proxy network—including actors based in Syria, Iraq, and in the West Bank—against Israel in a Hezbollah-Israel war to support Hezbollah and increase the threat to Israel. PIJ Secretary General Ziyad Nakhalah highlighted the importance of the West Bank in his meeting with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Tehran on March 28, noting that “the resistance is not only in Gaza, but [also] in the West Bank.”[4] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is seeking to promote major terror attacks by smuggling “high-quality” weapons into the West Bank.[5]

Key Takeaways:

Iran in the Region: A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon.
The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.
This string of meetings comes after IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghaani visited Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah with Nasrallah.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 28. Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed senior Hamas commander Raad Thabet there on March 28.
West Bank: An armed Palestinian fired small arms targeting Israeli civilian vehicles near al Auja in the Jordan Valley on March 28, wounding three Israeli civilians.
Lebanon: The IDF concluded a week-long training exercise on March 27 aimed at increasing IDF Northern Command readiness in northern Israel.
Iraq: The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the recent Islamic State attack in Moscow shows that ISIS is “resurging and stronger than ever” on March 28. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s comments are notable given their contrast with the statements of Iranian-backed Iraqi officials, who have claimed that ISIS is no longer a threat to Iraq.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 28. Israeli forces have killed about 200 Palestinian fighters around the hospital complex since the start of operations there on March 18.[6] Palestinian fighters continued to fire at Israeli forces from inside al Shifa hospital, including from the emergency room.[7]

Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed senior Hamas commander Raad Thabet at al Shifa Hospital on March 28.[8] Thabet was responsible for Hamas’ "supply and personnel unit,” according to the IDF. The IDF spokesperson said Israel considered Thabet among the top 10 senior-most Hamas military commanders in the Gaza Strip.[9] Israeli forces killed Thabet and two other Hamas fighters as they entered the hospital area.[10]

Most of the Palestinian militia attacks on March 28 targeted Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.[11] Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with mortar fire and rocket-propelled grenades.[12] Palestinian militias have conducted over 75 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. This high rate of attack indicates that Palestinian militia elements in the area remain combat effective, despite continued Israeli clearing efforts in Gaza City. At least six Palestinian militias have participated in the recent attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 28. Israeli aircraft conducted a strike targeting a cell of Palestinian fighters approaching the Nahal Brigade in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The IDF said that it destroyed a 2.5-kilometer-long tunnel used by Hamas to connect the northern and southern Gaza Strip on March 28.[14] Israeli forces used over 30 tons of explosives to destroy the tunnel.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis on March 28. The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal on March 24.[15] The IDF 98th Division has killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in al Amal during this operation.[16] The IDF Egoz SOF unit detained dozens of Palestinians in al Amal.[17] The Givati Brigade engaged two Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli forces in al Amal. Israeli forces seized hundreds of weapons in al Amal, including grenades, explosively-formed penetrators, small arms.[18]

Hamas engaged Israeli forces during IDF clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 28. Hamas fighters detonated explosives that Israeli forces had planted to destroy a building in Qarara. It is not clear how Hamas detonated the explosives. Hamas claimed that the house explosion killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF has not acknowledged casualties from the attack at the time of writing. This attack bears similarity to a Hamas attack in January 2024 that killed 21 Israeli soldiers after the soldiers rigged a building to detonate in the central Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters also separately targeted Israeli armor operating in Qarara with rocket-propelled grenades.[19]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry, said that 205 aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip on March 28.[20] COGAT said that 19 private sector “food” aid trucks reached the northern Gaza Strip without incident.

The US Defense Department is considering funding a private peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip, according to Politico.[21] The options under consideration will not include the deployment of US servicemembers to the Gaza Strip but could consist of a multinational force or a Palestinian peacekeeping team. Biden administration officials said these talks are part of planning for the "day after” in the Gaza Strip with Israeli officials and other partners. One of Israel’s stated war objectives is the destruction of Hamas’ governance apparatus in the Gaza Strip and the IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[23]

An armed Palestinian fired small arms targeting Israeli civilian vehicles near al Auja in the Jordan Valley on March 28, wounding three Israeli civilians.[24] Israeli media reported that the armed man was a security officer for the Palestinian Authority. The armed Palestinian is originally from Jenin.[25] Palestinian channels posted photos of the shooter and identified him as Mohammed Saadia.[26] IDF Central Command Commander Yehuda Fox and other IDF personnel held an ”assessment” of the attack. Fox reported that the IDF is still searching for the attacker at the time of writing.[27]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[28]

The IDF concluded a week-long training exercise on March 27 aimed at increasing IDF Northern Command readiness in northern Israel.[29] The IDF held briefings with Northern Command division, brigade, and battalion commanders to discuss ”operational and strategic plans” for a conflict in northern Israel.[30] IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin said that the IDF will continue to take an ”offensive approach” against Hezbollah and that the IDF is ”determined” to change the security situation in the north so that residents may return to the area.[31]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in Ras Naqoura in southern Lebanon on March 27, killing two Amal Movement fighters.[32]

The Amal Movement released statements mourning the fighters on the same day.[33]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel likely conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Iran-backed militia and Lebanese Hezbollah positions near Sayyida Zainab, Syria on March 28.[34] Syrian, Israeli, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported that the IDF air force struck several buildings near Sayyida Zainab, southeast of Damascus, Syria.[35] Syrian and Israeli media noted that Iran-backed militias and Lebanese Hezbollah were using the targeted buildings.[36] Israeli media reported that the strikes possibly killed an unspecified IRGC member.[37] Iranian-backed militia groups and the IRGC maintain a headquarters in Sayyida Zainab and use it to facilitate Iranian efforts throughout Syria.[38]

Israel has conducted at least six other strikes targeting Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated targets inside Syria in March 2024, a notable increase from an average of 1.6 strikes per month between December 2023 and February 2024.[39] The IDF said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah via Syria.[40]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the implementation of gas, electricity, and water supply agreements with senior Turkmen officials in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on March 28, possibly to preempt electricity and water shortages in the summer that could fuel internal unrest.[41] Abdollahian called for the implementation of these and other trade and transit agreements during separate meetings with the Turkmen president, foreign affairs minister, and the Turkmenistan People’s Council chairman. Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan previously signed a gas swap agreement in November 2021.[42] Senior Iranian officials called for the expeditious implementation of these agreements during their meetings with senior Turkmen officials in May and June 2023.[43] These agreements would allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heating to its northern provinces. Iranians previously protested power outages in Tehran, Fars, and Mazandaran Provinces in July 2021.[44] The Raisi administration has similarly expressed concern that water shortages could precipitate unrest inside Iran and sought to increase water cooperation with Turkmenistan to address these concerns in May 2023.[45]

The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the recent Islamic State attack in Moscow shows that ISIS is “resurging and stronger than ever” on March 28.[46] Iranian-backed Iraqi officials have claimed repeatedly that ISIS in Iraq is defeated to publicly justify their efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. The Iranian-backed head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) claimed on March 3, for example, that ISIS is no longer a threat due to the PMF’s capabilities.[47] Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al Sudani, who is supported by Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, claimed on February 7 and 25 that the international coalition is no longer necessary because ISIS has been defeated.[48] Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s comments are notable given their contrast with the statements of Iranian-backed Iraqi officials. Hussein is a Kurdish official and member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which Iranian-backed militias undermined during government formation in 2021 and 2022.[49]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months.[50] A resurgent ISIS could then threaten Iraq. Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[51]

Hussein separately questioned the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s claimed attacks on Israel on March 28 by stating that he did not know if the attacks were true or for internal propaganda purposes.[52] The IDF has not acknowledged any of the claimed Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacks targeting Israel. Hussein emphasized that only the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces—the Iraqi prime minister—could legitimately authorize the use of weapons inside Iraq. Hussein further said that the only entity with the legal power to declare war in Iraq is the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted four Houthi drones in the Red on March 27 that were “aimed at a US warship.”[53]

10. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

By Nicholas DeMasters.

Will Deploying the U.S. Military Stop the Mexican Cartels Fentanyl Enterprise: Exploring Strategies and Evaluating Options

How Did We Get Here: Mexico’s Political Landscape

Who Holds the Key: Unlocking Solutions to Disrupt the Fentanyl Supply Chain

What are Other Military capabilities: A Layered Border Defense Structure

A Lethal Approach: Strategic Employment of Kinetic Strikes in Combating Fentanyl Distribution by Mexican Cartels

Assessing the Effectiveness of Military Action Against Mexican Cartel Drug Trafficking: A Critical Review

*****

Image: Derived from a map of U.S. and Mexico border by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 30 April 2011.

Endnotes:

Owens. (2023, September 11). The politicization of the fentanyl crisis. Axios. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.axios.com/2023/09/11/fentanyl-politics-border-mexico

Ibid.

DEA Administrator on Record Fentanyl Overdose Deaths | Get Smart About Drugs. (n.d.). https://www.getsmartaboutdrugs.gov/media/dea-administrator-record-fentanyl-overdose-deaths

Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels

Ibid.

US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/

Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890

JIATFW. (n.d.). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. https://www.pacom.mil/JIATFW.aspx

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

DEA Reports Widespread Threat of Fentanyl Mixed with Xylazine | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-reports-widespread-threat-fentanyl-mixed-xylazine

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. . https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

11. Army’s new vice chief seeks to drive strategic modernization

This makes me think General MIngus is an example of an officer living the Abrams Charter. This is what makes the Rangers (and Special Operations Aviators as well as intelligence, logistics, and communications personnel) valuable to the Army. They serve for a period in special operations and then return to the regular Army and bring experiences and expertise and share knowledge with other units and organizations.

Excerpts:

“When I left the conventional Army in the late 1990s, early 2000s, there wasn’t a lot of information technology in our formations. There were a few things that had been digitized, but not to the scope and scale that we have today. And so, I left and kind of moved into the Ranger [Special Operations Forces] community for about a decade, where I was exposed to folks like [retired leaders of Joint Special Operations Command Army Gen. Stan McChrystal and Navy Adm. Bill McRaven] who really pushed the technology envelope. They could see where it was taking us as a military, and so there was a lot of investment in that technology, which allowed us to have a global network — getting after the fight that we did, from Fort Liberty — Fort Bragg — all the way to the Middle East and that network-of-networks,” Mingus told DefenseScoop in an exclusive interview.

“Then when I came back to the conventional Army in the 2010-2012 timeframe, I realized just how far behind the conventional Army was in the complexity that we had built into our networks and our IT systems,” he explained. “There was a recognition that we could do much better.”

Army’s new vice chief seeks to drive strategic modernization

DefenseScoop recently accompanied Gen. Mingus to Pennsylvania for a tour of the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant.

BRANDI VINCENT

MARCH 28, 2024

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · March 28, 2024

Early into his tenure as the Army’s new vice chief of staff, Gen. James Mingus is bullish about breaking “paradigms” to modernize how the service builds, buys and deploys technology.

That strategic intent is shaped by his experiences as a soldier and special operator — and commanding at every echelon, from company to division.

Mingus received his fourth star on Jan. 4, when he was sworn in as the Army’s No. 2 general officer and principal deputy to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George.

The proud Iowan started his military career in 1981, and since then he’s deployed a dozen times to Iraq and Afghanistan, commanded the 82nd Airborne Division, and, among many other roles, led the Mission Command Center of Excellence at the Army Combined Arms Center.

“It’s in charge of the Army’s network and is the force-mod proponent for the tactical network. And the other part, which was luck and timing, was that Gen. Mark Milley was our 39th Chief of Staff of the Army, and he decided that he wanted to fix the Army’s network. So, to his credit, we put a lot of energy behind it, and the network modernization strategy that we have today is what we’re kind of driving to fruition,” Mingus said.

Now, as he helps run the Army as vice chief, Mingus is keen to see the military accelerate its delivery and convergence of assets, data and technology platforms. This aim was on display March 20, when DefenseScoop accompanied Mingus on a day trip to Pennsylvania for a tour of the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant.

There, welders and other hands-on workers are ramping up the making of 155mm metal artillery parts — with a newly stated goal of increasing their production to 35,000 per month by Sept. 25.

As Ukraine and Israel increasingly tap into the U.S. arsenal, the Army is hustling to produce approximately 70,000 to 80,000 155mm rounds per month by the end of 2024, and 100,000 per month by late 2025.

“What I was most impressed with — and we talked a little bit about this when we were on the [factory] floor — is that they’re investing in new technology, but they’re also capitalizing on the stuff that they have. And so instead of completely divesting of it, that which they can still salvage, they’re renovating that and making use of their legacy platforms too,” Mingus told DefenseScoop.

Invested in the mission

The munitions plant in Scranton is one of 23 such facilities inside the Army’s organic industrial base.

“We have depots that rebuild equipment, we have others that produce small arms. I mean, it’s a whole host. And so what we saw was a very micro piece, but there’s a broader architecture out there that provides a ton of services for the Army and the other services that we are now realizing that we need to continue to invest in and modernize across the board,” Mingus said.

Owned by the federal government and operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, the Scranton plant has been in the spotlight recently for receiving millions in Pentagon funding to surge its production capacity of artillery shells.

“Everybody is very invested in the mission — they get it. When we do have senior leaders come here, they always engage the workforce,” a senior official from the contractor told DefenseScoop during the tour.

The ammunition plant has hosted multiple civilian and military leaders in recent months.

“Had [Gen. Mingus and his entourage] come last week, you would have seen something completely different. If he came next week, again, different. So yeah, I think what he saw versus people who have come to pass is a significant amount of progress,” the senior official said.

In order to drastically boost production, the contractor intends to expand and modernize its line production capabilities, hire more employees and build new facilities to accommodate that growth.

“[There won’t be] AI robots walking around the floor, but just automated material-handling solutions. So instead of a person picking up a shell out of a machine or putting it in, you would have some sort of automated solution,” the senior official told DefenseScoop.

Between the Marine Corps and the Army, according to Mingus, the U.S. military consumes on average roughly “18,000 rounds a month for our own use.”

“I’ve been dealing with the 155mm challenge for several years now. When the Russia-Ukraine conflict kicked off in Feb. 2012, we began to give them our 155 systems a couple of months later,” he said.

After Russia’s latest invasion, the U.S. in early 2022 shipped the first cache of M777 howitzers to Ukraine.

“And they used those to great effect and were able to utilize them in a very good way that greatly amplified their ability to be effective on the battlefield. But their consumption rates rose very quickly,” Mingus explained.

Initially, in this latest intensification of the conflict, Ukraine went through about 30,000 rounds per month. “Then, during the two big offensives, there were times where they were consuming in excess of 100,000 rounds a month,” Mingus noted.

Meanwhile, in the U.S., plants were only producing about 14,000 shells per month, given the previous surplus.

“We had some in the stockpile, but that very quickly was eroded — and so people woke up and realized we needed to ramp up production very quickly. So, our [Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA)ALT)) team, under the leadership of Army Assistant Secretary Doug Bush and Lt. Gen. Rob Collins] really went into full-gear, and we got some help from [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and our organic industrial base,” Mingus said.

In his view, progress observed in the sprawling Pennsylvania factory “was a result of that.”

“Between that plant and the others, we’re moving — where we were at 14,000 just two years ago, then 28,000 in this month, and in the next month we’ll press to get to [producing] 35,000 to 38,000 rounds a month. So it’s pretty amazing to see the money that we invested there is paying off,” the vice chief said.

Still, he emphasized that at this point more ammunition funding is needed to ensure that the U.S. can continue to support Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

That sentiment is also felt by other Defense Department and military leadership.

“We are already on a path to produce around 70,000 to 80,000 shells a month by the end of this calendar year or early next year. In addition, the department has a further goal of producing [approximately 100,000] rounds per month by late 2025. However — without further funding — we will be unable to achieve our [100,000] round per month objective,” a Pentagon spokesperson told DefenseScoop on Wednesday.

Notably, on top of generating standard 155mm high-explosive rounds, the plant is also set to supply a 155mm “boosted artillery round” known as the M1128.

While those standard 155mm munitions are “limited to about a 20 to 22 km range,” Mingus noted, the Army is now producing “the rocket-assisted or wrap-variant that puts a little rocket motor on it and it’ll shoot out to 30 to 32 km.”

The general said the simplified, cheaper variant would give the Army an additional 8 km — “just by how they are rifled and the technology associated with the round itself.”

“And so from conventional employment of artillery, which is our greatest and most effective weapon system on the battlefield — when you’re talking about mass artillery — that [additional] 8 km will make a big difference,” Mingus said.

“The battlefield that we grew up with, we kind of parse it out in the ‘deep fight,’ a ‘close fight,’ … and ‘rear area’ or ‘support area.’ And it’s going to allow us to extend that ‘close fight,’ because of the extended ranges of our conventional high explosive rounds, which gives us an advantage because the further out that you can take out your adversary, the better for your maneuver formations inside,” he added.

Those in-production M1128s were one of multiple topics of discussion during a working lunch that Mingus participated in with plant and General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems executives. In that conversation, he asked for feedback on a number of ideas, including whether there might be opportunities in this work for collaboration between the Australia, United Kingdom and United States (AUKUS) military alliance.

“I mean, those are all policy decisions that would need to be made between the three countries involved. But in the Pillar II portion of AUKUS, things that those three countries, all of us, can mutually benefit from — either from a technological standpoint or with co-production — those are all things that are interesting to the three countries to pursue together,” Mingus said.

Keep pace and transform

At each station on his tour across the spread-out manufacturing complex, Mingus made a point to stop and shake hands with workers on the ground and explicitly tell them that their efforts “are saving lives.”

“When you’re working in a plant like that, in the middle of America … you don’t always see the finished product, let alone see what it does on the other end when it gets to its destination. And so I just felt like it was important to share with them that what they’re doing is critically important for our nation and for the lives of folks that are in harm’s way,” the general told DefenseScoop.

He has plans to visit more of the Army’s 23 plants in the months to come.

But these oversight pursuits are just one small portion of his many responsibilities as vice chief — and Mingus is looking to push toward innovation and modernization beyond just the realm of weapons production.

“Everybody loves to talk about how the time is now — this sense of urgency. But when you look at the world events that are happening right now, I mean we really are at a point where doing things the old way — doing things the way we’ve always done them, the typical bureaucracy, the typical programmatic way in which we approach transformation, continuous transformation, transformation in contact — we’re going to have to break some of those paradigms to be able to keep pace and transform at a rate that is going to keep pace with our adversaries,” he explained.

Flexible funding mechanisms mark one tool he and other Army leaders are eyeing to help tackle those paradigms.

“So, using [uncrewed aerial systems and] counter-UAS — we have that program currently in a bunch of different portfolios. And then, in those portfolios, there’s multiple individual lines for individual systems, instead of broad categories of just UAS,” Mingus said.

“Say I want to buy 100 of this brand this year. But there’s a better brand that comes out next year and I want to buy 100 of them instead of being locked to that single line. Or, instead of having multiple individual radio lines, maybe you have one that allows you flexibility to move around and buy different things — because the technology is changing so rapidly that if you get stuck with a single program, then you’re not going to be able to always maximize the technology as it changes,” he further noted.

Recognizing the need “to build up trust with a lot of folks on how we would do that and how we would manage it” Mingus said he and Gen. George have decided to prioritize UAS, counter-UAS and electromagnetic warfare capabilities as prototypes to test out the first flexible funding initiative.

“So he’s going to start with those three, then we’ll expand as time permits,” Mingus said.

It’s clear he appreciates the technological progress the Army has made during his career so far, but the vice chief is still certain “there’s things out there today that we could do to improve.”

“It’s not [just about the] technology 10 years from now — there is stuff that exists today, that if we were just able to capitalize on it, we’d be much better off,” Mingus said.

When asked to provide a tangible example of such capabilities, he pointed to a recent visit he and his team paid to the 82nd Airborne Division.

“When I was there as the commander — and they still have it — they were one of the first to employ the integrated tactical network, which people would call the ITN and the secure but unclassified environment. And they’ve just taken that and continue to evolve and improve it,” Mingus explained.

Soldiers there have designed and are improving upon what the general said is “a mesh network out of the existing radios” that demonstrates the number of devices the Army might need in a formation could be far fewer than what’s used today.

“One of the things they were able to do, as an example, was take and build a mesh network. So with 13 to 16 radios over 15 km front, they were able to actually establish a true mesh network. [It shows that] we may be able to find a day where you’re just taking end-user devices [like smartphones] to the edge, and you’re using other higher-end transport mechanisms that move the data instead of everybody carrying individual radios,” Mingus told DefenseScoop.

Written by Brandi Vincent

Brandi Vincent is DefenseScoop's Pentagon correspondent. She reports on emerging and disruptive technologies, and associated policies, impacting the Defense Department and its personnel. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Brandi produced a long-form documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. She was named a 2021 Paul Miller Washington Fellow by the National Press Foundation and was awarded SIIA’s 2020 Jesse H. Neal Award for Best News Coverage. Brandi grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland.

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · March 28, 2024

12. US leaders promise security for Gaza dock mission amid threat concerns

December 1992. Somalia. A humanitarian only operation. What did Santayana say?

Then again if force protection is the top priority (more important than the mission?) then why should we conduct the mission at all? Why do we not frame this by saying the mission is so important ot US national security that we must be willing to risk the lives of our service members? Why not say we will do what is necessary to take appropriate force protection measures but we must accomplish this mission and accept the risk to our service members because it is our national security interests? If the President (and his advisors) cannot say that then we should question why we are conducting the mission in the first place. And the troops want know and need to be told that their mission is so important that they must risk their lives. We must be realistic and transparent. Frankly the path to every military failure has begun with the words "force protection is the priority." (yes that is an exaggeration but only to make the point).

US leaders promise security for Gaza dock mission amid threat concerns

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · March 28, 2024

Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. CQ Brown said he is confident that U.S. troops working to provide humanitarian aid to residents of Gaza will be protected from violence in the region. Brown’s comments come amid concerns from Senate Republicans that the mission could cost American military lives.

“Force protection is at the top of our list any time we put our forces in harm’s way,” Brown told reporters during a press event on Thursday. “There will be our own capabilities to protect our forces, the Israelis have also committed to help protect our forces in the area, and have other nations that are also part of this as well.

“So, as that capability is starting to move … that has given us time to work with allies and partners to start looking at not only the force protection piece but all the other parts that have to come together.”

Navy sending sailors and ships to help build Gaza aid pier

The plan requires the Navy and the Army to team up under the Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore program to construct a roll-on, roll-off discharge facility.

Following President Joe Biden’s call to increase humanitarian outreach to Palestinians amid weeks of Israeli military action in Gaza, Defense Department officials announced they will send three Navy cargo ships and five Army vessels to build a floating dock in an effort to ease delivery of aid to the region.

More than 1,000 American service members will be involved in the effort, working near active fighting between Israel Defense Forces and Hamas militants.

That reality drew concern from Republican members of the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this week. In a letter led by committee ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the lawmakers voiced “strong reservations” about the mission because it “entails a significant risk to U.S. personnel.”

“This decision appears to ignore force protection issues entirely against an enemy that tries to kill Americans every day,” the group wrote. “We are gravely concerned that the Department of Defense has given too little consideration to the likelihood that Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations operating in Gaza would attempt to attack the U.S. personnel that will be deployed to this mission.”

White House officials in recent weeks have said that American forces will not be on land for the work, and have emphasized that protecting U.S. troops and ships will be their primary focus while conducting the effort.

Brown echoed that sentiment on Thursday, noting that top U.S. Central Command officials have been in the region for the last week surveying the situation and making sure both troops and refugees will be able to safely access the floating dock once it is built.

The Joint Chiefs chairman also said he met with Israeli defense officials this week to hear about their plans to attack Hamas battalions that have fled to the southern city of Rafah, an area with more than one million Palestinian civilians.

Brown said U.S. officials are monitoring the situation closely, to understand the possible ramifications for additional violence in the region in coming weeks.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week called the situation in Gaza a “humanitarian catastrophe” and said outside countries need to dramatically increase the amount of assistance getting into the region.

Earlier this month, Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters that military leaders expect the pier will be operational in less than two months and help provide more than 2 million meals to refugees on a daily basis. American military personnel are already conducting food drops in Gaza to provide aid right away.

About Leo Shane III and Noah Robertson

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

13. Recent Exercises Illustrate Taiwanese Military’s Emphasis on Decentralized Operations

Conclusion:

The most important tenets of mission command are its emphasis on the lower level commander’s use of initiative and the commander’s intent when conducting and developing operations, as well as mission orders. The emphasis on decentralized C2 and increasing commanders’ decision-making capabilities will likely significantly enhance the survivability of the Taiwanese military during a potential conflict by allowing commanders to act even when communications are cut off or jammed.

Recent Exercises Illustrate Taiwanese Military’s Emphasis on Decentralized Operations

Sky Bow III Surface to Air Missile system test launch (Photo: Taiwan News)

By:

Joaquin Camarena

Date:

March 27, 2024

Modified: 1 day ago

https://theatlasnews.co/latest/2024/03/27/recent-exercises-illustrate-taiwanese-militarys-emphasis-on-decentralized-operations/?utm

theatlasnews.co

Joint Air Defense Exercise

On March 26th, the Taiwanese military conducted an early morning joint air defense exercise in the early morning hours. The Integrated Air Defense Operation Plan Exercise occurred from 5:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. local time and involved units from the Taiwanese Air Force, Army, and Navy. Specifically, various types of aircraft from the 1st to 6th Tactical Fighter Wings, units of Skybow and Patriot Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems, several air defense artillery systems, various army units, and several Taiwanese Navy vessels.

Lt. General Jiang Guanghua, Taiwanese Air Force (TAF) Political Warfare Department Director and spokesperson, released a statement about the exercise. Jiang pointed out that the exercise was “to verify the Command and Control (C2) and force deployment of joint air defense operations” involving the three branches and that “the situation was good.”

The Air Force Command said that the exercise is part of its efforts to increase training intensity due to the “frequent intrusions by Chinese Communist aircraft and ships into the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan.” The Command also said that Taiwan will conduct these exercises to increase its ability to respond to “potential threats, meet the needs of regional security and defense operations, defend the airspace, and protect the homeland.”

Other Exercises and Lectures

TAF Deputy Commanding General, Lt. General Sun Liansheng, presided over a tabletop war game on the “annual major exercise map.” Sun verified the team’s ability to move from peacetime to wartime footing and tasks of each unit involved, and the commander’s ability to make the best plans in real time. The exercise also required the exercise’s participants to “extend the exercise experience to all levels,” create plans that combined and used the “characteristics” of the units and training and testing tasks, and improve the unit’s combat readiness “to meet the actual needs” of the units.

Taiwanese Air Force Lt. General Sun Liansheng and other Taiwanese Air Force officers sitting in auditorium watching war games on March 27th (Photo: Youth Daily).

In the beginning stages of the exercise, Sun outlined the training objectives, key points, and task reminders. Each unit then conducted the various exercises on the map based on the “scenarios of the enemy’s possible invasion of Taiwan,” though using various computer command post drills and real-force drills. The drills simulated “actual battlefield conditions and limiting factors” to help verify the feasibility of the plan’s execution as well as the operational decision-making ability of the commander. Another of the drill’s aims was to “strengthen the personnel’s war awareness and combat readiness” to increase and prepare their combat effectiveness for wartime.

Sun urged that all units should focus on their responsibilities of enhancing the military’s C2’s effectiveness and ability to revise and verify plans due to “the CCP’s increasing gray zone harassment and military threats” and grasp the enemy’s situation. He also said that the military “must carefully plan response measures and strengthen actual combat effectiveness” to develop credible air defense capabilities and “defensive combat energy.”

Analysis

The air defense exercises occur against the backdrop of the recent increase of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels around Taiwan. However, the exercises are also part of the Taiwanese military’s effort to incorporate decentralized C2 capabilities among its individual branches, which began in 2017. Taiwan wants to increase emphasis on decentralized C2 capabilities for various reasons. The most significant reason for Taiwan to increase its decentralized C2 capabilities is to make the structures more resilient and survivable against both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. Another goal is to create C2 capabilities that are redundant, cross-domain, and survivable through the use of various long-range, survivable, mobile, and A.I.-enabled assets.

The exercises also included actual battlefield conditions and limiting factors to test commanders’ decision-making capabilities and their abilities to revise military plans ‘on the fly.’ The ability for commanders to decide when to quickly revise military plans is important in decentralized C2 structures because they will oftentimes have no higher commands to rely on for orders and have to decide what operations to conduct. Furthermore, the ability for commanders to act autonomously within the command structure is important because they would be relying on mission command.

The most important tenets of mission command are its emphasis on the lower level commander’s use of initiative and the commander’s intent when conducting and developing operations, as well as mission orders. The emphasis on decentralized C2 and increasing commanders’ decision-making capabilities will likely significantly enhance the survivability of the Taiwanese military during a potential conflict by allowing commanders to act even when communications are cut off or jammed.

theatlasnews.co

14. US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

Excerpt:

In confronting the dire opioid crisis fueled by the expanding reach of Mexican cartels, a paradigm shift and recalibration of US policy is imperative. While the US government develops a complex strategy to implement effective military involvement in the countering of Mexican Cartels and utilize the US military to strike the Mexican cartel leadership and networks directly as a means to address this pressing issue, such actions necessitate an examination of existing legal precedent and authorities. The suggestion arises that expanding these existing frameworks may hold greater relevance than designating the cartels as terrorist organizations. Despite the advantages offered by the official designation of terrorists, including streamlined prosecution for material support and asset freezes, it is important to recognize that drug trafficking is already a serious offense under US federal law and the DoD already have existing authorities and funding to counter transnational criminal organizations. Title 10 U.S.C. 284 grants the DoD the authority to provide specified support for counterdrug activities and to counter transnational organized crime.

US. Military and Countering the Fentanyl Epidemic | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

By Nicholas DeMasters.

Will Deploying the U.S. Military Stop the Mexican Cartels Fentanyl Enterprise: Exploring Strategies and Evaluating Options

How Did We Get Here: Mexico’s Political Landscape

Who Holds the Key: Unlocking Solutions to Disrupt the Fentanyl Supply Chain

What are Other Military capabilities: A Layered Border Defense Structure

A Lethal Approach: Strategic Employment of Kinetic Strikes in Combating Fentanyl Distribution by Mexican Cartels

Assessing the Effectiveness of Military Action Against Mexican Cartel Drug Trafficking: A Critical Review

*****

Image: Derived from a map of U.S. and Mexico border by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 30 April 2011.

Endnotes:

Owens. (2023, September 11). The politicization of the fentanyl crisis. Axios. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.axios.com/2023/09/11/fentanyl-politics-border-mexico

Ibid.

DEA Administrator on Record Fentanyl Overdose Deaths | Get Smart About Drugs. (n.d.). https://www.getsmartaboutdrugs.gov/media/dea-administrator-record-fentanyl-overdose-deaths

Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels

Ibid.

US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/

Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890

JIATFW. (n.d.). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. https://www.pacom.mil/JIATFW.aspx

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

DEA Reports Widespread Threat of Fentanyl Mixed with Xylazine | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-reports-widespread-threat-fentanyl-mixed-xylazine

Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/

The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. . https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr

sof.news · by Guest · March 28, 2024

15. Putin threatens striking Western air bases hosting Ukrainian F-16s

We must not be afraid of Putin's threats. But he is likely making these threats because of our past publicly stated fears of escalation.

Putin threatens striking Western air bases hosting Ukrainian F-16s

Defense News · by Illia Novikov and Barry Hatton, Associated Press · March 28, 2024

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin scoffed at the possibility of his country launching an attack on a NATO member, calling it “sheer nonsense,” but warned that any Western air base hosting U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets that are slated for deployment in Ukraine would be a “legitimate target” for the Kremlin’s forces.

“Their statements about our alleged intention to attack Europe after Ukraine is sheer nonsense,” Putin said late Wednesday, referring to warnings in the U.S. and Western Europe that Russia could turn its sights on other countries unless it is stopped.

He noted that the U.S. defense budget is more than 10 times higher than Russia’s. “In view of that, are we going to wage a war against NATO? It’s ravings,” he told military pilots during a visit to an air base.

Ukraine is awaiting the delivery of F-16s, which will increase military pressure on Russia, from its Western partners. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said last year that 42 F-16s had been promised. Ukrainian pilots have been training in the West for months on how to fly the warplanes.

The F-16s require a high standard of runways and reinforced hangars to protect them from bombing attacks when they are on the ground. It is not clear how many Ukrainian air bases can meet those requirements, and Russia would be certain to quickly target a few that could accommodate them once the jets arrive.

Putin warned Ukraine’s Western allies against providing air bases in their countries from where the F-16s could launch sorties against the Kremlin’s forces. Those bases would become a “legitimate target,” he said.

“F-16s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and we will also need to take that into account while organizing our combat operations,” Putin added.

Military analysts have said the arrival of F-16s won’t be a game-changer in view of Russia’s massive air force and sophisticated air defense systems, though Ukrainian officials have welcomed them as an opportunity to hit back at Russia’s air dominance.

Putin insisted the F-16s “won’t change the situation on the battlefield.”

“We will destroy their warplanes just as we destroy their tanks, armored vehicles and other equipment, including multiple rocket launchers,” he said.

F-16s can be used to bolster Ukraine’s capability to target Russian facilities with long-range missile strikes. Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year came up short in part because it took place without air cover, placing its troops at the mercy of Russian aviation and artillery.

Russia has maintained air dominance in the war with Ukraine, though the provision of sophisticated Western air defense systems has forced Russian warplanes to avoid Ukrainian skies and launch attacks while remaining over Russian-controlled territory.

The Kremlin currently has a battlefield edge in weapons and troops, yielding recent incremental gains at points on the around 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line, as Kyiv awaits more promised Western military support and mulls a broader mobilization.

Russia fired salvoes of drones and missiles overnight at southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, authorities said Thursday, injuring more than a dozen people as the Kremlin’s forces persevered with attritional attacks designed to wear down Ukrainian defenses.

Air defense systems intercepted 26 out of 28 Shahed drones, Ukraine’s air force said. Russian forces also launched five missiles overnight, it said.

The regular bombardment of Ukraine by the Kremlin’s forces during the war has recently gained momentum, with missile barrages of the capital Kyiv and strikes on energy facilities across the country. The attacks also aim to weaken Ukrainian morale and act as retribution for Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian soil.

One of Russia’s goals is to “deplete Ukraine’s inventory of ground-based air defense,” according to a recent military assessment published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

That would erode some of Ukraine’s combat ability as it waits on pledged but delayed military support from the West, including ammunition for its artillery and air defenses.

“Kyiv is confronted by the threat that an attritional war in the air domain will increasingly favor Russia without adequate support from the U.S. and its allies,” the IISS said. “Ukraine’s ability to continue to counter Russian air threats and impose costs on the Russian Aerospace Forces remains important to the outcome of the war.”

Authorities in the Mykolaiv region, near the Black Sea in southern Ukraine, said 12 people were injured and six residential buildings were damaged in a Russian strike on the city on Wednesday afternoon with a ballistic missile.

In an overnight attack on the southern Ukraine region of Zaporizhzhia, Shahed drones struck a residential area, lightly injuring two women aged 72 and 74, according to regional Gov. Ivan Fedorov. Rescue services said seven buildings were damaged.

The Black Sea city of Odesa repelled three missile and drone attacks, officials said.

Hatton reported from Lisbon, Portugal.

16. Evan Gershkovich’s Stolen Year in a Russian Jail

Journalism is not a crime. But because of the axis of dictators/totalitarians many journalists are in harm's way every day.

Evan Gershkovich’s Stolen Year in a Russian Jail

The Wall Street Journal correspondent has been deprived of 12 months of normal existence; a year of missed weddings, reporting trips and travels with friends

Evan Gershkovich appeared in court in Moscow in October.

EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA/REUTERS

By Eliot BrownFollow

Updated March 29, 2024 12:10 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/evan-gershkovichs-stolen-year-in-a-russian-jail-61234ec9

Evan Gershkovich was supposed to be with his friends in Berlin the first week of April 2023.

The Wall Street Journal Russia correspondent was set to stay in an Airbnb in the edgy Neukölln neighborhood, a base to explore the city’s cobble-lined streets with his tightknit crew of journalist pals exiled there from Moscow. He was going to drink coffee in hipster cafes and chat into the night over glasses of beer.

It was the start of his stolen year.

Russian authorities detained Evan in Yekaterinburg on March 29, 2023, and threw him into a jail cell in Moscow. He was a fully accredited journalist on a reporting trip and was detained on an allegation of espionage, which he, his employer and the U.S. government vociferously deny.

Glimpses of soccer

For 23 hours a day, Evan sits in his cell in Lefortovo prison in eastern Moscow.

He meets with his Russian lawyers weekly, and periodically goes to court where a judge extends his pretrial detention. Reporters circle around him taking photos as he stands in a courtroom cage in light wash jeans, occasionally flashing a smile.

Friends and family send letters with updates on the world and drama at work. He plays chess via mail with his dad and makes suggestions for his fantasy basketball league. He devours Russian-language classics and history books from the jail library.

Fans of Arsenal, Evan’s favorite soccer team, held a banner wishing him happy birthday in London in October. PHOTO: ALEX PANTLING/GETTY IMAGES

Near his bed, Russian television blares news and occasional recaps of Arsenal games.

“I experience the same highs and lows as if I got to watch the game live,” he said in a message relayed to us. A recent Arsenal win in the Champions League tournament left him glowing. “Spring came to Moscow and the lads gifted me the happiest Wednesday morning—another chance to get a small glimpse of them even from here,” he said.

London life

Up until his detention, Evan had always been a magnet for friends, scooping up groups of them wherever he lived. Now sprinkled around the globe, they describe a year in which their lives have moved along while thoughts of Evan’s suspended animation loom at every point.

Evan had just been settling into a new life in London. He’d relocated after leaving Moscow and moved into a flat on a narrow street across from a set of basketball courts.

It was to be the year of sports, he told his friend Pjotr Sauer, a reporter at the Guardian newspaper. He’d started exercising more and vowed to play more soccer with a team filled with fellow London-based journalists, who valued his presence on the field and over pints after games. (The squad’s name: Xmus Jaxon Flaxon-Waxon, a homage to a character in the sketch comedy TV series “Key & Peele”). He would watch more Arsenal soccer games in person at the nearby Emirates stadium. He had committed to a group of buddies to run a half marathon in Mallorca in May. He was out of shape, and said he needed friends to run with.

I was one of them.

Evan’s Xmus Jaxon Flaxon-Waxon teammates, with some help from other WSJ reporters, played a game in Evan’s honor in London in the fall. PHOTO: JUNHO KIM

The two of us bonded quickly when we both arrived in London just before the Ukraine war broke out. His contagious smile, constant stream of jokes and endless curiosity made him an easy mark for someone looking for friends. He moved in around the block from me and often we went for beers in pubs. We joked about our receding hairlines, gossiped about colleagues and traded reporting tales.

READ EVAN GERSHKOVICH’S WORK

On the Ground in Putin's Russia: Coverage of a Country at War

We were meant to go for a four-mile run when he was next back in London, though he didn’t seem to be loving the discomfort that accompanied his newfound fitness kick.

“I’m a broken person,” he wrote me in mid-March after slogging through a three-mile run.

Gatherings of his friends and family have gone on without him.

Berlin is a main node in Evan’s life. Numerous friends picked up their lives in Russia to move there after the war began. Among them is Masha Borzunova, a Russian journalist who met Evan at a New Year’s party in Moscow years earlier. She had just moved to the city and was eager to explore it with him in the early April 2023 trip.

“I sent him messages that it was already sunny in Berlin,” she said.

Over the summer, the Berlin friends went to Sauer’s family house on the beach in the Netherlands. In a past visit, they played spikeball and Evan barbecued. This time, they walked and biked on the coast in his absence.

Evan’s friends visited Pjotr Sauer’s family beach house in the Netherlands last summer. PHOTO: POLINA IVANOVA

Missed weddings

In the U.S., numerous friends got married without him. There was his close college friend and roommate Simon Brooks, whose ceremony was at a ranch near Santa Barbara. Friends line danced. Evan came up in almost all the speeches.

He had RSVP’d to attend the July wedding of Van Itallie, held at an old brick industrial building in Long Island City, Queens. The two played youth soccer when they were eight years old. They lived together in Brooklyn after college in a rowdy apartment where Evan was unable to charm a disgruntled downstairs neighbor.

Evan wasn't able to go to the wedding of his friends Mike Van Itallie and Hannah Grace VanCleave in Long Island City, Queens. His sister Danielle attended with her husband Anthony Huczek.

BOBBI PHELPS PHOTOGRAPHY

His college friend Jeremy Berke, a groomsman, walked down the aisle with a photo of Evan and sat it next to him. His sister, Danielle Gershkovich, attended in his absence.

“I was so moved at how much Evan was present there,” she said.

He was due to spend time with his parents, Danielle and her husband on the same trip. The prior summer, the family rented a small house by the Jersey Shore, which their father packed with groceries that Evan cooked into meals. He unplugged and wasn’t constantly chatting about reporting or Russian politics when he was with family, Danielle said.

“My brother and my dad played chess—we went on some walks in the woods,” she said. “We at this point would have been planning for another summer visit.”

Evan’s Olivier salad

A particular void was felt over the New Year. When Evan was based full-time in Russia, their group of friends rented a cottage outside Moscow where they made a fire in the snow and skated on a river.

Evan celebrated the turn of New Year from 2021 into 2022 with friends in Moscow. PHOTO: MASHA BORZUNOVA

The tradition repeated in exile in Berlin months before Evan’s detention. Evan made his family’s recipe of Olivier salad, a mayonnaise-filled dish with potatoes, ham and peas.

This time, when New Year approached, friends scattered.

“It would be the same friends, the same event, minus Evan,” said Polina Ivanova, a Financial Times reporter who had been based in Moscow.

“It would have been excruciatingly sad” to celebrate without him, she said. Instead, she worked over the holiday.

“Yes, Evan is missing birthdays and New Years and parties and all the trips we had planned together, “ she said. “But he’s also missing out on covering an insane story,” with an attempted coup, the assassination of the coup leader, the death of dissident Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Putin’s re-election and other transformative events.

“I know how much of a tragedy that is for him,” she said.

From left, Evan and friend Jeremy Berke at a Bowdoin College reunion in 2019; Evan, in green jacket, with college friends during a visit to New York; Evan in Brighton, U.K.

DEVIKA GURUNG (2), JAGO LECKIE

Outside life will march on in the year ahead.

His friend Berke is due to marry another college friend, Devika Gurung, in June.

Evan lived with Berke for two years in college. The duo hung out in Thailand after graduating, watched NBA games in Brooklyn and chatted about classmates and work until weeks before Evan’s arrest.

“We have an invitation with his name on it,” he said. “We’re still hopeful he’ll be there.”

Write to Eliot Brown at Eliot.Brown@wsj.com

17. SOCOM calls for special ops veterans to report cancer screenings

Excellent initiative. One of my very good friends has been tracking the cancer outbreaks among units (to include family members). I am not sure if the statistics indicate whether the rate is higher or lower than the general population but it hits especially close to home when we read the list of so many people with whom we have served who have succumbed to various forms of cancer.

The memo is at this link. https://taskandpurpose.com/uploads/2024/03/28/rob-newson_SOCOM-cancer-screening-memo_March5_2024.pdf

I am unclear what retirees should do. If the cancer screenings and treatments are in our medical records how will SOCOM access the information? Is there somewhere for retirees to report their screening and treatment?

SOCOM calls for special ops veterans to report cancer screenings

The memo announces a comprehensive study evaluating the cancer risk within the SOF community.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED MAR 28, 2024 5:33 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · March 28, 2024

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) sent a memo to all special operations forces (SOF) veterans, calling for retired and active duty service members alike to report any cancer diagnosis they have, or might receive, and to complete routine cancer screening tests.

The memo, signed by SOCOM’s commander, Gen. Bryan Fenton, and Command Sgt. Maj. Shane Shorter, was sent on March 5 and recently posted to social media channels. In cooperation with the Defense Health Agency, it announces a comprehensive study evaluating the cancer risk within the SOF community.

“One intent of this study is to determine if it would be beneficial to request support from the military health system to incorporate advanced screening technologies into routine care appointments,” said SOCOM Deputy Director of the Office of Communications James Gregory in a written statement.

rob-newson_SOCOM-cancer-screening-memo_March5_2024

Gregory said the current cancer mitigation and early warning surveillance efforts are based on “national guidelines and individual risk.” If a SOF member is diagnosed with cancer, they will provide all necessary resources through the military and their network of “benevolent organizations.”

SOCOM is encouraging men to complete routine prostate screenings and colonoscopies and women to complete colonoscopies, pap smears, breast exams, and mammograms. All of these exams and screenings are essential for early detection of cancer, which is vital for effectively treating any type of cancer.

Chelsey Simoni is the co-founder of the HunterSeven Foundation (H7F), a nonprofit that works to help veterans receive the medical help they need and provide early detection of cancer and other issues prevalent for veterans. Simoni said there’s a problem with the current cancer screening criteria.

“There are no clinical practice guidelines for cancer screening in post-911 service members on active duty or veterans. We see higher rates of cancers in end-stage, more deaths in veteran status, due to wait times, inadequate services, and demographics,” Simoni said. “If you’re not above the age of 50, you are not a priority for cancer screening. The healthy deployer effect: the visual appearance is young and otherwise healthy, so you’re not at risk.”

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According to HunterSeven’s research, there are high rates of brain tumors in U.S. Navy SEALs stationed on the East Coast, but no routine screening is available for that type of cancer. Most SEALs are much younger and fitter than the average person who meets cancer screening criteria, much like other service members under the SOF umbrella.

SOCOM said they are aware of advanced screening options outside of the military “provided by our benevolent organizations.” Simoni said Special Forces Charitable Trust, TF Dagger, and HunterSeven are examples of organizations that can help, but their ability to help veterans is limited.

“If we say, ‘Hey, come to HunterSeven and get screening,’ we have a waitlist of over 100 people for whom we don’t have the funding,” Simoni said.

Rob Newson is a cancer survivor and founding member of multiple U.S. Navy Special Warfare commands. He’s the current Military Special Operations Family Collaborative Cancer Task Force chair and a champion of advocating for solutions for cancer within the SOF community.

He was diagnosed with an aggressive form of cancer in 2017, but it was caught in the early stages of development. After an aggressive response with surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, and two years of hormone therapy, Newson said, “All is well. Knock on wood.”

However, it’s vital that current and former SOF personnel add their screenings, exams, and diagnoses to their Department of Defense or U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs medical records. By doing so, the study can fast forward through years of surveys and directly pull necessary information from federal medical records.

“The ship moves very slowly. Bureaucracies grind things into dust. […]. There’s this burbling problem where people are getting sick and dying, data lags, and the government response lags,” Newson said. “Then there’s some kind of legislation that is initial but not sufficient. Then at some point, there’s more comprehensive legislation, and so we saw that with Agent Orange.”

He pointed out other toxic exposure research and treatments that have been enacted, like Desert Storm Syndrome. But, to get legislation moving, the government needs empirical data to prove cancer is a problem that correlates to military service in special operations.

“Usually, just like the rest of the military, the cancer is aggressive, usually at an early age, often missed because guys and gals are fit, healthy, and don’t fit the normal screening criteria,” Newson said. “So, it’s often found at stage four and is terminal, and guys are fighting for their life and usually losing. The community has had just a tremendous amount of cancer.”

Newson explained there’s another aspect of the problem with early detection. The type of individuals that SOCOM attracts generally feel “bulletproof” and don’t notice the often obscure early symptoms. They also, generally speaking, do not want to be taken away from their unit’s mission to address medical symptoms they often explain away as wear and tear from serving in a high-caliber unit.

“Cancer is a scary thing. It’s a scary word, and your first thought when you hear you have cancer is, ‘I’m gonna die,’ because that’s what we associate it with. But my cancer was found very early. I had a great team down in Miami, and we were super aggressive,” Newson said. “We probably went further with chemotherapy than we needed to, but it was like, let’s destroy the enemy.”

Newson says there’s a reason SOCOM is spearheading the effort. They have better funding than the rest of the military, and Newson said it’s a “very small, responsive, and agile community.”

“I think SOF guys will answer the call a little bit quicker than other military posts with respect to, this is about your teammates, get your medical records to the VA and help the future guy who may be able to avoid cancer or find it much earlier than most of us did,” Newson said.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · March 28, 2024

18. Hamas Increasingly Seen as Main Cause of Gaza Humanitarian Crisis

A different perspective than the State Department officials who just resided over Hamas terrorism in Gaza and Israel.

Excerpts:

Yet, Israelis and their American supporters are increasingly poking holes in the near-universal finger-pointing at the Israel Defense Force, which is at war with a terrorist organization bent on erasing any Jewish presence in the Mideast. Arabs, Europeans, the United Nations, and a growing number of Americans are accusing Israel of deliberately starving civilians and denying medicine to Gazans.

Hamas Increasingly Seen as Main Cause of Gaza Humanitarian Crisis

Senator Graham labels the accusation that Israel is deliberately starving civilians and denying medicine to Gazans ‘a blood libel.’

nysun.com3 min

March 27, 2024

BENNY AVNI

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

15:54:57 pm

View Original

Even while President Biden, at least to a “point,” agrees with critics who accuse him of enabling an Israeli “genocide,” there are increasing signs that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is largely caused by Hamas.

“They have a point,” Mr. Biden said as three protesters interrupted his North Carolina campaign stop Tuesday, where he tried to talk about health care. “What about health care in Gaza?” the protesters demanded, accusing the president of abetting genocide there.

“Everybody deserves health care,” Mr. Biden retorted. As the screaming women were escorted out, he told his security detail to “be patient with them.” Then, to the crowd’s applause, he added, “We need to get a lot more care into Gaza.”

Yet, Israelis and their American supporters are increasingly poking holes in the near-universal finger-pointing at the Israel Defense Force, which is at war with a terrorist organization bent on erasing any Jewish presence in the Mideast. Arabs, Europeans, the United Nations, and a growing number of Americans are accusing Israel of deliberately starving civilians and denying medicine to Gazans.

Such accusations are “bulls–,” Senator Graham of South Carolina said Wednesday, following meetings at Tel Aviv with Prime Minister Netanyahu and a war cabinet member, Benny Gantz. “You’re talking about an accusation that is just a blood libel,” Mr. Graham said, arguing that the efforts the IDF is making to ease suffering in enemy territory are unprecedented in the history of warfare.

While the UN and other bodies highlight an acute lack of foodstuffs in Gaza, a report from the southern part of the Strip shows Israel may not be the biggest stumbling block to aid distribution: following a recent decision by the Hamas-controlled ministry of economy to give up oversight of one crossing into Gaza, at Rafah, prices of food there dropped significantly.

“Within 24 hours, prices fell by at least 50 percent on all types of food items,” a Gazan, Yosef Zakout, wrote on X. Another Gazan posted a short video on TikTok, claiming one can now buy chicken on the black market for $6, down from $25 only last week. Similar price drops, he said, are notable for those buying rice, sugar, flour, and cooking oil.

Europeans and the UN are accusing Israel of impeding the delivery of aid into Gaza. “Starvation is used as a weapon of war” and “Israel is provoking famine,” the European Union foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, said recently.

“Today I saw long lines of blocked relief trucks waiting to be let into Gaza,” Secretary-General Guterres of the UN said Sunday while visiting the Egyptian side of Rafah. Tacitly blaming Israel security checks of the trucks, he added, “It’s time to truly flood Gaza with life-saving aid.”

“Again, the UN is deceiving,” Israel’s Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories retorted on X. “These trucks are waiting for inspection in Egypt and haven’t reached Israeli crossings. The UN must scale up logistics and stop blaming Israel for its own failures.”

On Tuesday, “258 Humanitarian aid trucks were inspected and transferred to Gaza, 166 of these trucks carried over 7 million pounds of food,” Cogat reported. “The UN aid agencies distributed only 116 aid trucks within Gaza today, out of which only 36 trucks carried food.”

The UN acknowledges that delivering aid to the needy once it enters Gaza is difficult. “There are tremendous challenges for distribution inside,” Mr. Guterres’s spokesman, Stephane Dujarric, tells the Sun. While the UN mostly blames war-related chaos, Israel is posting endless video documentation of gunmen riding atop aid trucks. Hamas and price-gougers often confiscate the aid as soon as it enters the Strip.

According to the UN, the population of northern Gaza is on the verge of famine. Israel obliterated all organized Hamas battalions there and destroyed most of its tunnels early in the war. Yet, many Hamas and Islamic Jihad combatants have returned to the north since then, assuming Israel would soon be forced into a cease-fire.

Israeli troops were forced to re-enter Gaza City’s Shifa hospital, the largest healthcare compound in the Strip, where these operatives have been holed up. In a weeklong raid, special IDF units killed, arrested, and interrogated hundreds of top terrorists who have been using the hospital to stash arms, organize, and re-establish Hamas’s control over northern Gaza.

Among the Hamas bigwigs killed at Shifa was Brigadier General Faiq al-Mabhouh. The organization claims he was a security official charged with distributing aid in northern Gaza. Whether his demise would make aid less available, or, conversely, help in getting it to the hands of non-combatants could, perhaps, change Mr. Biden’s idea of what “point” his detractors have.

Benny Avni is the Foreign Editor of the Sun.

Benny Avni is a columnist who has published in the New York Post, WSJOpinion, The Daily Beast, Newsweek, Israel Radio, Ha’Aretz, and others. Once New York Sun, always New York Sun.

19. Russia Doubled Imports of an Explosives Ingredient—With Western Help

Pogo again. We have met the enemy and he is the companies of some like minded democracies.

Graphics at the link.

Russia Doubled Imports of an Explosives Ingredient—With Western Help

U.S., German and Taiwanese firms made nitrocellulose that was shipped to Russia, much of it through one Turkish company, despite sanctions

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-blocks-extension-of-north-korea-sanctions-monitoring-51ada1f3?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Ian Talley

Follow and Brett Forrest

Updated March 29, 2024 12:07 am ET

A worker holds nitrocellulose in its first stage of being processed at a U.S. Army ammunition plant in 2013. PHOTO: DOUGLAS GRAHAM/CQ ROLL CALL/GETTY IMAGES

WASHINGTON—Russia has boosted its imports of an explosive compound critical to the production of artillery ammunition, including from companies based in the U.S. and other Western countries and allies, despite international sanctions meant to choke Moscow’s wartime production, according to trade data.

Russian imports of nitrocellulose, a highly flammable cotton product central to gunpowder and rocket propellant manufacture, surged 70% in 2022, the first year of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and midway through 2023 had amounted to 3,039 tons of the product, nearly double the 2021 level.

Defense companies around the world have been grappling with ways to source nitrocellulose amid a shortage that has seen prices rise and created chokepoints for production. Only a few countries around the world produce nitrocellulose, since its primary use is in munitions and it is subject to international trade restrictions.

Russia produces little nitrocellulose, the main ingredient in smokeless gunpowder used in artillery, so Moscow’s ability to source it abroad has played a pivotal role in its war against Ukraine, according to U.S. officials and analysts.

“The nitrocellulose that goes into the propellant becomes an artillery shell,” said Bradley Martin, a 30-year U.S. Navy veteran who now heads Rand’s National Security Supply Chain Institute. “The majority of battlefield deaths and a lot of the civilian collateral damage is from artillery,” he said.

Nitrocellulose is also used for civilian purposes in inks, paints, varnishes and related products, but analysts believe that the surging imports are meant for arms, given that the Russian economy has been reoriented for wartime production.

Oleksandr Danylyuk, with the Center of Defense Reforms, a Kyiv-based security think tank that has studied Russian nitrocellulose imports, said Russia’s military is driving the imports.

“All of this demand is either for direct production of projectiles or substitution of nitrocellulose which was originally produced by Russian factories,” said Danylyuk, a former defense and intelligence adviser to the Ukrainian government.

China increased supplies of the compound to Russia in the wake of U.S. and European Union sanctions prohibiting exports of any kind for Moscow’s military. But companies from the U.S., Germany and Taiwan are also among those producing the nitrocellulose shipped to Russia in the past two years, according to trade data.

“China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations,” Liu Pengyu, spokesman for China’s embassy in Washington, said in a statement. “China-Russia economic and trade cooperation does not target any third party and shall be free from disruption or coercion by any third party.”

One small company in Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is responsible for nearly half of Russia’s imports of nitrocellulose since President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to the trade data.

One Russian importer, Analytical Marketing Chemical Group, received nearly $700,000 worth of nitrocellulose from Taiwan in the past two years, according to shipping data. According to the company’s website, the importer is a regular partner of Russia’s Kazan State Gunpowder Plant, which produces an array of weapons, according to company social-media accounts.

A director for Analytical Marketing Chemical Group said in a message to the Journal that the company hadn’t supplied cotton pulp to defense enterprises since 2019 and that it imports nitrocellulose for civilian purposes.

A rescuer works outside a residential building in Kharkiv, Ukraine, damaged by Russian strikes this week. PHOTO: SERGEY BOBOK/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Before the expansion of the Ukraine war in 2022, Turkey provided less than 1% of Russia’s nitrocellulose imports. By the middle of last year, however, a single Turkish company, Noy İç Ve Diş Ti̇caret, provided nearly half of Russia’s imports of the product, according to Russian customs records provided by trade database ImportGenius and viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Most sales by Noy, which is based in Istanbul, were to Russian companies that are registered contractors for the government in Moscow, according to corporate records.

The company didn’t respond to requests for comment. Turkey’s embassy in Washington didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Noy’s first nitrocellulose exports to Russia shipped within three months of Putin’s invasion, and it is through Noy that a significant portion of nitrocellulose manufactured by Western allies has made its way to Russia.

German subsidiaries of New York-based

International Flavors & Fragrances sold at least 80 tons of nitrocellulose to Noy, which then shipped the material to Russia last year. A spokesman for International Flavors & Fragrances said the company was surprised to learn that shipments to Russia of its nitrocellulose products, which it had suspended in April 2022, had continued through a third party.

“We were unaware of this and are reviewing the conditions of this sale and the relationship with this customer,” the spokesman said in a statement to the Journal.

The company said that its product doesn’t have sufficient nitrogen to make it military grade.

Russia’s top nitrocellulose imports by country

2022-23

2018-21

0 million lbs.

Turkey

Switzerland

China

Germany

India

Thailand

Germany

Brazil

Indonesia

Austria

Source: ImportGenius

Michelle Pantoya, a mechanical engineering professor at Texas Tech University who heads the school’s Combustion Lab research center, said the nitrogen content of civilian-use nitrocellulose can be increased to weapons grade. Regardless of its grade, “chemically and thermodynamically it’s an excellent ingredient for an ordnance system,” she said.

Taiwanese company TNC Industrial manufactured more than 500 tons of the compound that Noy shipped to Russia last year, according to trade data. Hagedorn-NC, which has produced nitrocellulose for more than a century in the western lowlands of Germany, produced a similar amount shipped by Noy to Russia over the past two years.

Hagedorn said it doesn’t produce nitrocellulose for military purposes, and that its product is used as a binder in civil printing inks and lacquer applications. “All exports are approved by the relevant authorities,” the company said in an email to the Journal.

In response to questions about nitrocellulose exports, Marie Güttler, a spokeswoman for Germany’s economic ministry, called the European Union’s sanctions against Russia “unprecedented and far-reaching.”

“Under these restrictions also the direct as well as the indirect export (via third states) of nitrocellulose is prohibited,” she wrote in a statement. “The same applies to cotton cellulose and other cotton products that can be used in the production of explosives.”

Those sanctions were tightened last year, she said, and “the German government and the competent investigative authorities rigorously follow up on indications of sanctions violations.”

TNC said that it didn’t know that its product was being shipped to Russia through Noy and that it manufactured nitrocellulose with a nitrogen content below the military-grade threshold. The company said Taiwanese authorities had earlier this month verified the firm’s security compliance.

“Our company will continue to export industrial grade nitrocellulose,” TNC said.

Taiwan’s International Trade Administration didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Top shipper companies to Russia, 2022-23

4.7

million lbs.

4.0

NOY IC

(Turkey)

OTHER

2.9

HENGSHUI

(China)

Top Russian buyer companies, 2022-23

7.0

million lbs.

COLOR

OTHER

2.8

1.8

STROYTEKHNOLOGIYA

Source: ImportGenius

The exports to Russia by Western companies also come amid a global shortage of nitrocellulose that is slowing down NATO countries’ production of artillery for Ukraine. Poland, for example, has invested in restarting its nitrocellulose production to meet growing demand for artillery.

“NATO countries are desperately looking for these raw materials,” Danylyuk said.

The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security is working to restrict Russia’s access to items such as nitrocellulose that can sustain its war effort, said Thea Rozman, assistant secretary with export-control oversight. Those efforts include “identifying entities—wherever located—that seek to provide support,” she said.

Last month, the Treasury Department levied a new round of sanctions meant to “continue to tighten the vise on willing third-country suppliers and networks providing Russia the inputs it desperately needs to ramp up and sustain its military-industrial base,” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said.

In December, the Commerce Department added nitrocellulose to its list of high-priority controlled items, which restricts their exports, and the Treasury Department said it would sanction banks or other institutions caught financing such trade.

Martin, the Rand analyst, said that for sanctions to be effective, they must also be applied to the companies supplying the nitrocellulose.

“The sanctions or the threat of sanctions have to go to that level,” he said.

Joyu Wang and Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to Ian Talley at Ian.Talley@wsj.com and Brett Forrest at brett.forrest@wsj.com

20. Russia’s security services knew of ISIS threat before concert attack, new evidence from investigative body suggests

At least it was not Al Qeada operating from the Taliban controlled sanctuary of Afghanistan. (note sarcasm).

Russia’s security services knew of ISIS threat before concert attack, new evidence from investigative body suggests

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/29/europe/kremlins-aware-of-isis-threat-before-concert-attack-intl-hnk/index.html

By Matthew Chance and Chris Lau, CNN

3 minute read

Published 5:31 AM EDT, Fri March 29, 2024

Several gunmen burst into the Crocus City Hall on the western edge of Moscow and fire automatic weapons at the crowd on March 22 in the deadliest attack on Russia in decades. Dmitry Serebryakov/AP

CNN —

The Kremlin’s security services were aware of an ISIS threat days before a deadly attack on a concert hall near Moscow, Russian intelligence documents obtained by a UK-based investigative organization suggest.

According to the London-based Dossier Center, the documents showed ethnic Tajiks radicalized by ISIS-K – the Central Asian offshoot of the terror group ISIS – could have been involved.

At least 143 people were killed last Friday in the deadliest attack on Russia in decades, when assailants stormed Crocus City Hall with guns and incendiary devices, just before a concert was to be held.

ISIS has claimed responsibility for the attack with statements, photos, and a propaganda video filmed by the attackers.

The Dossier Center is a Russian investigation group backed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an exiled former Russian oil tycoon turned Kremlin critic. It has previously unearthed details about Russian President Vladimir Putin and his regime, often using documents and leaks from inside the Russian government.

“A few days before the terrorist attack, members of the Security Council received a warning that Tajik citizens could be used in terrorist attacks on Russian territory,” said the group’s latest report, released on Sunday, referring to the Russian security agency.

“Even before the attack on Crocus City Hall, a source close to the intelligence services told the Dossier Center about this,” it added.

The Kremlin hasn’t responded to CNN’s request for a comment on the Dossier Center report.

Shocking footage of the attack showed how victims fled for their lives and ducked to safety in horror, with the venue transformed into an inferno.

Four suspects, who are from the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan but worked in Russia on temporary or expired visas, appeared in court earlier this week facing terror charges, showing visible signs of injury. Three pleaded guilty, according to Russian media.

Despite relations between Washington and Moscow being at historic lows, the United States warned Russia that ISIS militants were planning to stage an attack in the country.

Earlier in March, the US Embassy warned of an increased threat of terror attacks on Russia, with National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson saying the US had shared this information with Russian authorities under the “duty to warn” policy.

But in a speech just days before the attack, Putin had dismissed the American warnings as “provocative,” saying “these actions resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society.”

Putin, who recently won a stage-managed election to secure another term, has repeatedly suggested, without evidence, that Ukraine had helped orchestrate the attack. Ukraine has repeatedly denied having any links to the attack.

Former Russian lawmaker Ilya Ponomarev, an exiled Kremlin critic, said the latest evidence posed serious questions for the Russian leadership and its security forces.

“We see very clearly that Vladimir Putin could have reacted on numerous warnings,” he told CNN’s Erin Burnett Out Front.

ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022.

The following year, German police arrested several people from Tajikistan accused of plotting an attack on Cologne Cathedral, according to the Dossier Center. Suspected ISIS-K members were also arrested in Kyrgyzstan, accused of plotting an attack at an orthodox church.

According to the Dossier Center, Russian law enforcement was monitoring all these reports and “considered the risk” to Russia.

21. Is Biden listening to any of his military or intelligence advisers?

This requires examination.

As an aside, where is Bob Woodward these days? Why has there not been a book on the Biden presidency from Mr. Woodward.

Is Biden listening to any of his military or intelligence advisers?

BY JONATHAN SWEET AND MARK TOTH, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 03/28/24 7:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4559925-is-biden-listening-to-any-of-his-military-or-intelligence-advisors/?utm

There is a pattern to the series of bad decisions coming from President Joe Biden’s Oval Office. They are increasingly putting the nation’s security at heightened risk by naively playing into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Military setbacks in Ukraine, Chinese provocations in the Indo-Pacific and the placating of Iran with the release of frozen and sanctioned funds are all combining to put Americans and our allies in harm’s way. Given the totality of these unforced errors, it is difficult to believe that Biden is listening to the advice of his top military and intelligence advisers.

The Three Horsemen are coming for the U.S. and our allies. Yet Washington seems to be crassly predicating its national security moves based on election-year politics. That may work in a time of peace, but we are in global war right now against totalitarian regimes that reject our way of life and are intent on undermining, if not destroying, our democratic institutions. Hence Russia and China’s multipolar world concept and the formation of BRICS.

Biden is the chief executive now. He is no longer a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he once served as both ranking minority member and as chairman. Political calculus is no longer an option. Rather, the nation’s security must be his one and only guiding star if the U.S. is to thwart our enemies’ ambitions.

To the extent that Biden needs to factor in politics, he needs to do so by overcoming what Obama-era Secretary of Defense Robert Gates penned about him in 2014: “I think he [then-Vice President Biden] has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.”

Fast-forward to today, and Biden is arguably adding to that from a narrow national security perspective. He has created a permissive environment for our adversaries to operate in.

The most damaging of his mistakes have been a tolerance for open borders, surges in fentanyl overdoses and deaths due to Chinese drug trafficking, and the multi-faceted disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by Moscow-backed coup d’états in Sudan and Niger, and Hamas’s attack on Israel have put him squarely on his back foot.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions continue unabated. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed proxy militias are attacking U.S bases throughout the Middle East, and Iran-backed Houthi rebels are attacking commercial and naval shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

China continues to threaten Taiwan and is actively harassing Filipino commercial vessels in the South China Sea. North Korea persists with its gamesmanship and provocations against South Korea and Japan. Yesterday, after hinting at peace talks, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, ruled out any contact or negotiation with Tokyo.

Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are dictating the conditions; Biden’s Washington is constantly in reaction mode, and as a result, unacceptably failing, which makes the world a much more dangerous place. And election-year politics is making it more perilous still.

This may read as a political take. It is not. Rather, this is a call for Biden and Congress to take the politics out of national security. The letters D and R are secondary to “U.S.A.” Our messaging applies equally to Republicans and Democrats and as much to Biden as it does to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.).

Politics simply cannot dictate national security. Nor will politics deliver us from the peril our country currently faces.

As crafted, Biden’s National Security Strategy does not provide a solution either. Biden is absolutely correct in his opening statement: “How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come.”

It is past time to get on with responding. It is time Washington started setting conditions. As they say in the military, “move out and draw fire.”

As retired Army Lt. General Ben Hodges, the former U.S. Army Commander Europe, recently argued, “We spend too much time worrying about what the Russians might do. Instead, we should make them worry about what we’re capable of.” The same line of reasoning must also apply to the Chinese, Iranians and North Koreans.

NATO’s newest member has a plan. While focused on Putin and his war of aggression against Ukraine, its core principles are globally germane. Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström said in an interview with Euractiv, “We have to create more strategic difficulties for Russia.” Billström is right, as is French President Emmanuel Macron, with his stated willingness to place French troops in Ukraine, if needed, as a redline.

Biden needs to heed the advice and counsel of the career professionals, as his political appointees have clearly taken him down the wrong path. Ice cream cones and “root cause” discussions will solve nothing. Biden needs to leverage his combatant commanders, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the retired Army four-star general serving as his secretary of Defense, as well as retired generals sitting on the bench.

The restoration of America’s influence and image in the world begins with a plan, not with a strategy to win a political election. That means playing well with others — and for Biden, that means Republicans. For the Speaker, that means Democrats.

Ukraine does not have the luxury of waiting until November. Nor, quite frankly, do the border states, sanctuary cities and neighborhoods now under siege by criminal gangs. It is that bad, and past time to do something about it.

Col. (ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.

22. Cohesion, Performance, and Readiness: A Brigade-Level Experiment in the Art and Science of Organizational Culture

Graphics at the link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/cohesion-performance-and-readiness-a-brigade-level-experiment-in-the-art-and-science-of-organizational-culture/

Excerpts:

This unit campaign toward intentional culture development was designed to achieve what the brigade captured as the purpose in its definition of culture: to increase cohesion and performance. Cohesion and performance lead to a more ready formation. In the first quarter of this approach to developing culture, the brigade has developed a data-informed feedback loop with which to continually assess and strengthen it. As a result, soldiers better understand their units. They are clearer about who they are, what they do, and why they do it. Leaders share a common framework and language to remain on consistent messages that nest within those of higher echelons. Leaders can also more accurately monitor the pulse of their units through regular data collection.

While the Raider Brigade’s methodology toward culture development is still in its early phases, we have seen gains from leveraging an integration of the art and science of culture to drive action. Our survey results indicate that our people are more invested, our identity is clear, and our leaders are more responsive. We also have a better sense of the size and scope of our problems, which is helping us address them head-on. We will continue to assess costs and benefits of using culture as a line of effort to build a formation ready to accomplish its combat mission while developing the next generation of leaders. However, these early signals communicate that our brigade’s cultural development efforts are creating a more lethal, cohesive, and committed organization capable of responding to our nation’s call.

Cohesion, Performance, and Readiness: A Brigade-Level Experiment in the Art and Science of Organizational Culture - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Josh Bowen, Jon Bate · March 29, 2024

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“Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” This famous quote, most typically (and perhaps apocryphally) attributed to the late management author Peter Drucker, highlights the impact that organizational culture can have, for better or worse. Few other things in an organization so effectively shape its results and cohesion. A body of research demonstrates the robust link between organizational culture and performance.

For military organizations, where the difference between success and failure can be measured in lives, understanding that link is especially crucial. Yet, cultivating the type of culture that enables a unit to consistently achieve its assigned mission is far from easy. Leaders can say culture matters and that they want to build strong unit identities, but without dedicating time, attention, and resources, such statements are little more than aspirations. Or worse, without deliberate effort, unit culture can drift in a direction not aligned with the commander’s intent.

How do leaders invest in unit culture in a way that increases performance? The 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (“Raider Brigade”), 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado recently experimented with a three-step culture framework (art, science, and action). Our hypothesis is that integrating the art and science of culture allows us to drive decisions and action using data-centric feedback loops that increase readiness and strengthen the organization over the long term, ultimately increasing organizational alignment and commitment. While still in the early phases of our assessments, initial results suggest that the investment in unit culture has proven worthwhile.

Step 1: The Art—Clearly Defining Unit Culture

What is culture and what do we want ours to be? This was the overarching question for the Raider Brigade’s two-day off-site culture conference, which brought together 150 of the unit’s leaders (ranging from company/troop/battery to brigade command teams, along with noncommissioned officers and junior soldiers) to achieve consensus on what culture is based on existing research and doctrine. Through discussion and group exercises, we developed a common definition:

Culture is a community’s set of enduring values, beliefs, norms, and underlying assumptions expressed through symbols, traditions, and practices that are expected by all members, which leads to increased cohesion and performance.

Next, we applied this common definition to capture our desired unit culture at echelon from brigade to company/troop/battery level. The discussions focused first on defining the current reality, and then on describing a vision of the unit’s culture the leaders aspired to develop. During the off-site, the brigade’s leaders explored existing doctrine and research on culture, learned a common framework for culture using Edgar Schein’s three-level model with recommendations on how to operationalize the model, and learned the science of measuring culture through data collection and assessment. Leaders also engaged in small group activities to study historical cases (NASA and Alcoa) to practice assessing culture, define the division and brigade cultures, and begin designing subordinate formation cultures that are nested within the brigade’s.

The event accomplished four key outcomes. First, it defined the culture we aspire to create through culture statements identifying who we are, what we do, and why we do it. Second, it informed leaders and empowered them to thoughtfully cultivate culture moving forward. It also proposed an innovative method for measuring culture both quantitatively and qualitatively using a periodic cell phone–based survey. Lastly, the event generated buy-in for the resulting Raider Brigade’s organizational foundations document, pictured below, which clearly defines who we aim to be.

Raider Brigade Organizational Foundations Memorandum (click to expand)

Step 2: The Science—Systematically Measuring Unit Culture

With an initial framework in place, we next needed to determine a way to assess whether we were living up to our cultural expectations over time. Measuring culture directly is difficult—no common scale (such as 0–10, strong vs. weak, etc.) exists—but we attempted to indirectly measure it through soldier assessments of our culture measurables (or values, as defined in the memorandum above). To do this, we drafted a logic model (shown below) that proposes a theory for how leader inputs shape culture and then the mechanisms by which culture affects unit performance.

Raider Culture Logic Model

Relying on academic literature and leader experience, we proposed three mechanisms by which culture affects daily operations: cohesion, commitment, and communication. Since these concepts are difficult to measure directly, we identified distinct elements within each mechanism, such as information flow and trust in leader competence, which we could measure by surveying soldiers. These became our seven culture measurables, which serve as visible metrics for how culture affects day-to-day operations across the organization. These measurables are communicated as our organizational values as they aim to govern leader behavior, just as the Army values govern all soldiers’ behavior. To ensure that our culture metrics are nested, we mapped them to the brigade commander’s priorities, also published in the organizational foundations document.

Mapping Brigade Priorities to Culture Measurables

We operationalized these measurables by building a survey using Army-approved Novi Survey software and crafted the seven measurables into questions about soldier assessments of various aspects of their unit culture, using a 0–10 Likert scale. The short survey, easily administered over cell phone, also includes questions about respondent demographics (rank, battalion, company), assessment of unit morale, and two free-text questions (what soldiers like best about the unit and what frustrates them most), shown below.

Raider Culture Survey

Members of the Raider Brigade take the survey periodically (every one to three months) during division readiness days or payday activities. It takes as little as thirty seconds and can be taken while in a closeout formation after soldiers scan a QR code with their phones. Equipped with the survey data, leaders can both capture current snapshots and track trends by unit and rank, helping inform their decisions with objective data rather than subjective perceptions or isolated anecdotes.

Monthly Snapshot of Raider Culture Survey Results

The brigade staff takes survey results across the brigade and publishes individualized reports for each battalion/squadron, to allow command teams to visualize descriptive statistics (with boxplots to display dispersion of responses) using Microsoft’s Power BI software for each question down to the company/troop/battery level. The free-text comments provide valuable, anonymous context for the quantitative results. Units then follow up the quantitative survey with a qualitative survey by unit ministry teams. After viewing the quantitative survey results, chaplains develop follow-on surveys given face-to-face to validate the quantitative results and provide further context to drive appropriate action.

As an example of how surveys directly feed into culture development, during the pilot iterations of the survey, one battalion received relatively low scores for information flow and soldier inspiration. From this, the command team was able to prioritize those two areas through better communication and unit heritage events. The subsequent survey results suggested that the efforts were successful, as average scores in both areas increased by nearly 20 percent. Applying data analytics to this emerging culture dataset is promising, as we used linear regression to discover a link between a company’s “Development” score and its current retention results. It is likely that a larger dataset will provide insights into connections between unit culture and lethality or harmful behaviors.

Periodic culture surveys provide leaders a data-informed feedback loop with which to assess culture and make evidence-based decisions as to where to invest their time and resources. Completing the surveys and periodically reviewing their data keeps leaders engaged in what the brigade is striving to accomplish—and aligned with the commander’s priorities. It encourages continuous attention on and conversations about the unit culture. And the surveys enable the brigade’s organizational foundations framework and the impacts of the initial culture conference to remain salient throughout the formations.

Step 3: The Action—Continue to Cultivate Unit Culture

Organizational culture is intrinsically linked to change. When members’ enacted behaviors do not align with what the unit espouses, that signals a need for change. Critical to organizational change in John Kotter’s eight-step model is building a guiding coalition. Units can drive cultural change from the top down through the formal chain of command. However, this can be supplemented with a more robust approach by involving informal leaders in the process. This invites leaders, both formal and informal, at many echelons to use their spheres of influence to achieve a more complete change effort. Involving young soldiers, junior noncommissioned officers, and junior officers to help build a unit’s culture encourages them to take ownership of that culture and what the unit is striving to achieve.

A way the Raider Brigade continues to invest in its culture development and build guiding coalitions at all levels is through subordinate battalion culture events. One approach by a battalion leverages monthly culture days, which bring a small group of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers within the battalion (approximately thirty total people per session) together for a day to conduct their own off-site culture conference experience.

The day is built around the framework of celebrating the battalion’s past, crafting its present, and improving its future. The battalion’s culture day starts with a history-based physical training event where small groups move between stations, which are situated at meaningful locations across the installation that reflect important events in the unit’s history. At each station, members learn about a key event from the battalion’s history and then conduct physical exercises to celebrate it. The battalion’s past is further brought to life through soldier stories and citations of valor. Leaders then describe the battalion’s crest and the meaning of its design.

The battalion culture day transitions to the unit’s present with leaders providing the models that the brigade uses to define culture (Schein’s three-level model and the brigade’s organizational foundations). Soldiers then have the opportunity to use this knowledge and help craft the battalion’s existing cultural framework and ways to improve it through the addition, refinement, or removal of the unit’s cultural artifacts. Finally, the group looks to the battalion’s future by identifying some of its biggest problems or challenges, and then collaborating to develop solutions to address them. From these battalion-level culture days, participating leaders at numerous echelons within the unit return to their formations more informed about unit culture, better equipped to steward it, and inspired to accept ownership to help shape it. They become part of the coalition to help champion the change necessary to continue unit culture development.

Leaders are not victims of culture. We shape culture. We drive it. This was the clear call to action for leaders at the end of the first Raider Brigade culture conference. With their new shared knowledge on the science of culture, the unit’s approach to measuring it, and clarity on the culture that the brigade aspires to achieve, leaders departed the conference with a culminating question: Now what?

This unit campaign toward intentional culture development was designed to achieve what the brigade captured as the purpose in its definition of culture: to increase cohesion and performance. Cohesion and performance lead to a more ready formation. In the first quarter of this approach to developing culture, the brigade has developed a data-informed feedback loop with which to continually assess and strengthen it. As a result, soldiers better understand their units. They are clearer about who they are, what they do, and why they do it. Leaders share a common framework and language to remain on consistent messages that nest within those of higher echelons. Leaders can also more accurately monitor the pulse of their units through regular data collection.

While the Raider Brigade’s methodology toward culture development is still in its early phases, we have seen gains from leveraging an integration of the art and science of culture to drive action. Our survey results indicate that our people are more invested, our identity is clear, and our leaders are more responsive. We also have a better sense of the size and scope of our problems, which is helping us address them head-on. We will continue to assess costs and benefits of using culture as a line of effort to build a formation ready to accomplish its combat mission while developing the next generation of leaders. However, these early signals communicate that our brigade’s cultural development efforts are creating a more lethal, cohesive, and committed organization capable of responding to our nation’s call.

Major Josh Bowen is a US Army engineer officer currently serving as the operations officer for 299 BEB, 1/4 SBCT at Fort Carson, Colorado. With an MA in social and organizational psychology from Columbia University, he uses his education and previous experience as a USMA tactical officer to help cultivate intentional cultures and leader development strategies in the units he serves in.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Bate is a US Army infantry officer currently serving as commander of 2-23 IN, 1/4 SBCT at Fort Carson, Colorado. A Goodpaster Scholar in the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3), he holds an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School and PhD in Political Science from Stanford University.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Josh Bowen, Jon Bate · March 29, 2024

23. From Peril to Partnership: A Q&A with Author Paul Angelo

The opening question gets to why LTG Cleveland argues that there must be military - business partnerships in foreign internal defense and security force assistance. US businesses can make important contributions to security and stability through good business practices and can be an example of effective public-private partnerships in host nations.

From Peril to Partnership: A Q&A with Author Paul Angelo - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Ryan Kertis · March 28, 2024

United States security assistance is a critical foreign policy tool—irregular warfare in action at the intersection of diplomacy and defense. Paul J. Angelo’s recent work, From Peril to Partnership: US Security Assistance and the Bid to Stabilize Colombia and Mexico, provides a valuable look at US security assistance during Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative. Through complex case study analysis and sustained fieldwork, Paul emphasizes the importance of individualized approaches to delivering security assistance and undertaking security sector reform. I had the opportunity to sit down with Paul and discuss his book and applicable lessons that policymakers and practitioners may glean from his work and apply to future endeavors.

Ryan: In the book, you discuss the role of business elites as consequential determinants of success of any given security sector reform and underscore the importance of individualized approaches to security sector reform. With that in mind, how do you suggest policymakers and practitioners account for these variables prior to undertaking security sector reform with a partner nation?

Paul: Citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean view insecurity as one of their top concerns, and of course, rampant violence and crime adversely affect the region’s investment climate and the bottom line for business leaders. Given this confluence of interests, security is one area in which governments and national business communities should be able to work together. However, across the Americas, the private sector tends to look with suspicion on government policies, especially efforts to raise additional state revenue, instead of creating common cause with the political class to invest in a public good like security.

In countries where political and financial elites have historically operated in isolation, as is the case in Mexico, external actors such as the United States or multilateral lending organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank can be a good-faith guarantors, facilitating dialogue and helping foster the conditions for greater trust between government and the business community.

Examples from Mexican cities such as Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey illustrate the benefits of private-public partnerships in enhancing the provision of public security and underscore the importance of mechanisms that allow the private sector to exert oversight in the administration of government security strategies. To address multidimensional security threats, we must move beyond whole-of-government approaches and begin to embrace whole-of-society ones. For this, the private sector is an essential interlocutor.

Ryan: How does political polarization within party systems affect the sustainability and continuity of security strategies, as discussed in the book?

Paul: Political polarization within party systems – both in donor governments and in governments on the receiving end of security assistance – can hinder the sustainability of security strategies. Plan Colombia benefited from robust bipartisan support in the United States Congress, ensuring its continuity and long-term effectiveness. Similarly, in Colombia, security was a shared political concern for politicians from across the political spectrum, and Colombia’s legislature rallied around the transformation of Colombia’s military and police during successive presidential administrations.

Conversely, the Merida Initiative in Mexico faced challenges due to its secretive negotiation process between Washington and the Calderón administration. Political opposition in Mexico took advantage of a longstanding suspicion of the United States and a lack of cross-party political support for the Merida Initiative at its inception to contest elements of the security assistance package and eventually completely dismantle them when the presidency changed hands in 2012 and 2018. This scenario underscores the importance of bipartisan support in the United States and a transparent legislative process for sustaining and adequately resourcing the main elements of a security strategy in recipient countries to foster sustainable and favorable outcomes.

Ryan: How does the degree of centralization of security bureaucracy influence security sector reform efforts, and what are the implications for external supporters like the United States?

Paul: One of the bigger challenges with these undertakings is that the United States can’t pick and choose the institutional design of our partner security institutions. In Colombia, centralized decision-making facilitated the implementation of reforms, allowing for effective coordination and distribution of resources. Further, the various institutions in the United States were clearly able to identify their counterparts in Colombia, thus making our efforts at coordination across both bureaucracies much more efficient.

However, in Mexico, the decentralized structure with well over 1,800 police forces in the country posed challenges for the United States to cultivate relationships with relevant institutions in ways that improved security outcomes, especially among state and municipal police forces. President Lopez Obrador’s establishment of the National Guard aimed to address institutional fragmentation but has also raised legitimate concerns about permanent militarization.

Ultimately, to manage risk in more decentralized security environments, the United States should identify specific institutions or agencies within larger institutions for partnership that can have an outsized impact on security outcomes. Financial intelligence units, specialized investigative teams for violent crimes, and counterterrorism agencies all benefited from considerable US training in Colombia and Mexico and helped improve public perceptions of security when they were deployed appropriately. But again, the effectiveness of this approach depends on a deeper understanding of the specific security challenges and the institutional landscape of each partner nation. What works in one country will not necessarily work in the next.

Ryan: You explore the role of public opinion as it relates to effectiveness and accountability of security sectors in internal conflict vis-à-vis the nature of the threat faced by Colombia and Mexico. How do you characterize the differences in public opinion and the role of civil society as it relates to the government’s responses to the threat?

Paul: We must consider that Colombia and Mexico operate on vastly different scales, with Mexico being a much larger, more populous country, possessing considerably more economic prowess, and having a unique relationship with the United States due to its extensive border and a history of cross-border tensions. Notably, in Colombia, the nature of the security threat fostered a national sense of urgency. I think that points to another distinction that I make throughout the book: that the nature of the threat in Colombia fueled paranoia and a sense of concern amongst people from all walks of life and wherever they were in the country that Bogota was being brought to its knees – and at risk of succumbing to revolution. The fact that the FARC and ELN had politico-military objectives, not solely criminal ones, fueled a national perception of the need to pivot in a different direction, namely one that facilitated the strengthening of Colombia’s security forces.

Conversely, in Mexico, politicians tended to downplay the law enforcement concerns around organized crime as a manageable issue, something for the government to solve. Throughout the Merida Initiative, there were powerful political actors in Mexico who believed that a confrontational approach toward organized crime was the problem and instead quietly favored accommodation and negotiation with the cartels. Moreover, Mexico is a highly regionalist country, and the nation’s security challenges as a national problem did not necessarily resonate in cities and states where criminal violence was not a major concern.

Ryan: Throughout the book, you discuss the emphasis placed on democracy promotion as a component of Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative and how this position contrasted with US security assistance packages in combat theaters in other parts of the world. What impact did the relative level of democratic consolidation in Mexico have for addressing its security situation, and how will it influence the contours of security in the future?

Paul: In Mexico, the transition to democracy, which occurred throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, was accompanied by a simultaneous decentralization of political power. As the Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s grip on power collapsed, so too did the state’s monopoly of force, which was largely dependent on the hegemonic party, and state security institutions were slow to adjust to this new political reality. Democratization also took place as the criminal underworld was undergoing major shifts. Suddenly, there were more cartels and criminal groups who had ever more nodes of entry to corrupt the state, especially at the municipal and state levels. As democracy took hold, political competition intensified at all levels of government, prompting security institutions to succumb to electoral and sometimes even criminal pressures.

Subsequently, armed violence from cartels surged, prompting President Calderón to centralize the armed power of the state early in his tenure and initiate a war against drug cartels, first by deploying the military to address matters of public order and then by raising a new Federal Police force. However, successive presidential administrations have failed to capitalize on the promise of a federal civilian police force, leading to the military’s use in missions well beyond its democratic remit. All the while, criminal violence in Mexico is higher than at any point in the country’s recent history, and increasingly, Mexico’s democracy features political violence against candidates for office and activists, with more than 1,000 such incidents reported during the Lopez Obrador presidency.

Ryan: I want to flip the lens a bit, because your research dives deep into Colombian and Mexican security sectors and bureaucracy. But you did touch on the US’ red tape impacting implementation at some points. Is the US security apparatus designed to deliver the support needed for security sector assistance in the twenty-first century? What did your research into these two case studies reveal about the strengths and weaknesses of the US system?

Paul: US security assistance would benefit from some reconceptualization, especially in terms of how quickly we can surge resources to partners in need. Likewise, the US security assistance architecture at present does not facilitate multi-year programming, which was a major factor that underpinned success in Colombia. But more than anything, Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative taught us the importance of the interagency coordination process in the administration of US security assistance.

In Colombia, institutions on both sides of the bilateral relationship understood the strategic objectives of Plan Colombia, and partnership at the diplomatic level trickled down to the working level. As the US government sorted out its own interagency decision-making and resource allocation process, our Colombian partners replicated that same effort, especially with the advent of the Integrated Action program – an attempt to bring the institutions of the Colombian state to long abandoned regions. And so there was a real synergy that came out of a whole-of-government commitment in Washington and Bogota.

It is hard to identify that same synergy in the Merida Initiative. This is in part because there are more interests at play in the US-Mexico relationship than there were in the US-Colombia relationship by virtue of our long, shared border with Mexico. Moreover, Mexico is a federal system, and the United States was not dealing with a unitary actor. On both sides of the US-Mexico relationship—whether it was subnational police forces, Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration, you name it—there are whole agencies that must be brought into the conversation and whose voices and interests must be weighed in developing strategies. This feature of the relationship made it exceedingly difficult to enforce a unified strategic vision, especially in the absence of a clearly defined adversary and military objective, as was the case with Colombia’s insurgent and paramilitary groups.

Something that stands out to me in recent years is that the US Department of Defense has contributed more attention, and by extension, resources, to developing a cadre of people who are specialists in the administration of security assistance than other executive agencies and departments. This is apparent in recent efforts of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to expand and enhance our security cooperation workforce. The forward presence of these individuals and teams at our embassies is a multiplier for the administration of US security assistance, was critical to the success of Plan Colombia, and will be essential to future efforts to coordinate shared security strategies for countering crime in Mexico.

Ryan: Given that this is the Irregular Warfare Initiative, what are your thoughts on the growing role of global competitors and how that may affect delivering US security assistance? In terms of the case studies in your book, the United States had the advantage of being the partner of choice in defense relationships during those periods, but that may not necessarily be true in the future.

Paul: Strategic competition was never really a foundational part of the calculus for why we engaged in Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative. For the last 30 years in Latin America and the Caribbean, strategic competition with near-peer competitors has not been a significant driver of US engagement in the region. If you look at the arc of US-Latin American relations, this period was a remarkable exception to a long history of strategic denial. For decades after the Cold War, Russia had turned its back on even its closest allies in the Western Hemisphere, such as Cuba, and despite Beijing’s growing economic and diplomatic interest in the Americas, China developed more prominent security interests in other regions of the world.

US security assistance today, however, is occurring against a backdrop of competition with the United States’ near-peer competitors, as spelled out in the 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Today, as the United States partners with Latin American and Caribbean nations to curb common threats to insecurity, conversations with partners seldom happen without a very clear mention of US concerns over the growing influence of our adversaries, Russia and China, in the Western Hemisphere. And this brand of competition is the one area where we mostly see bipartisan agreement on Capitol Hill, making the temptation to use strategic competition as a justification for our regional engagement all the greater.

A prime example of this occurred recently in Ecuador. Although the United States is not exactly organizing around a Plan Ecuador as I advocated for in my War On The Rocks piece, the strategic competition chatter in the background influences the contours of the US-Ecuador relationship. We needn’t look much further than the decision by President Daniel Noboa to renege on the country’s commitment to send retired Soviet-era weapons to the United States for the purpose of triangulation of spare parts to Ukraine because of the economic coercion that Russia was exerting over banana exports from Guayaquil.

Ryan: Let’s talk about global application: have you experimented with applying your research to other parts of the world, just as a thought experiment or bouncing ideas from colleagues, and what the implications may be for Africa, Eastern Europe, or even the South Pacific?

Paul: The one thing that I would say about the region of the world in which I work, Latin America and the Caribbean, is that it stands out for the strength of its democratic tradition. In 2001, all the countries of the Americas (save Cuba) signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which subscribed governments and their peoples to a set of common values – ones that prized democratic deliberation and the rule of law as the basis of political decision-making. Furthermore, the Charter committed governments of this hemisphere to the multilateral defense of democracy in places where it was at risk of erosion or rapid backsliding.

I can’t think of another region of the world apart from the European Union where that consensus has been so formalized, committing Washington to deliver a foreign policy toward its neighbors that supports democratic processes, prioritizes human rights, and advocates for the peaceful resolution of conflict. To this end, US security assistance, as it was in Colombia and Mexico, will continue to be implemented in ways that foster dialogue and mutual respect and hold democracy promotion as a core feature, even as illiberal and autocratic governments make inroads in the Americas.

I would encourage policymakers to prioritize the delivery of security assistance to those partners, wherever they are in the world, who demonstrate the political will necessary to foster long-term political stability, improved governance, and human rights. We will not always have the luxury of deciding where we intervene in the name of stability because our national interests are so diverse and so complex. However, my book exposes both the promise and peril of US security assistance policy, and we met our objectives and then some when our interests and our values were aligned with those of our partners.

Ryan Kertis is a US Army foreign area officer with a regional concentration in Latin America. He holds a Master of Arts in Latin American Studies from Stanford University and a Master of Arts in Diplomacy from Norwich University. He has previously served at the United States Southern Command and various embassies throughout Latin America.

Main Image: Dr. Paul Angelo addresses a foreign delegation at National Defense University on October 19th, 2023. (William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies)

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Department of the Army, United States Southern Command, United States Northern Command, or United States Department of Defense.

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24. The New Autocratic Alliances

Excerpts:

Ties between Eurasian revisionists may not look like alliances as Americans typically understand them, but they have plenty of alliance-like effects. This isn’t an entirely bad thing for Washington: the closer U.S. antagonists get, the more one’s bad behavior tarnishes the others. Since 2022, for instance, China’s image in Europe has suffered because Beijing tied itself so closely to Putin’s war in Ukraine. The opportunity, then, is to use adversary alignment to accelerate Washington’s own coalition-building efforts, just as the United States used the blowback from Russia’s invasion to induce greater European realism about China. Doing so will be critical, because today’s revisionist pacts are increasing the freedom of action U.S. rivals enjoy and the capabilities they wield. The United States must get used to a world in which the links among its rivals magnify the challenges that, they individually and collectively pose.

This is an intellectual and analytical challenge as much as anything else. For example, the United States may need to revise assessments of how long its adversaries will take to reach key military milestones, given the help they are receiving—or could receive—from their friends. Washington must also rethink assumptions that it will face adversaries one-on-one in a crisis or conflict and account for the aid—covert or overt, kinetic or nonkinetic, enthusiastic or grudging—other revisionist powers could render as tensions escalate. The United States especially needs to wrestle with the risk that adversary relationships will promote a certain globalization of conflict—that the country could end up facing multiple, interlocking regional struggles against adversaries that cooperate in important, sometimes subtle ways.

Finally, U.S. officials should consider how these rivals’ partnerships could evolve in unexpected or nonlinear ways. Recent history is instructive. Although the Chinese-Russian strategic relationship has arisen over decades, that relationship—to say nothing of Moscow’s ties to Pyongyang and Tehran—has ripened considerably during the war in Ukraine. How might a future crisis over Taiwan, which triggers sharp U.S. sanctions on China, affect Beijing’s cost-benefit analysis regarding a still deeper alliance with Russia? Or how might a more thorough breakdown of order in one region tempt revisionist powers to intensify their campaigns in others?

Thinking through such scenarios is, unavoidably, an exercise in speculation. It is also an intellectual hedge against a future in which relationships—many of which have already exceeded U.S. expectations—continue to develop in disturbing ways. In the years ahead, the challenge of adversary alignment may well be inevitable. The degree to which it surprises is not.

The New Autocratic Alliances

They Don’t Look Like America’s—but They’re Still Dangerous

By Hal Brands

March 29, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Hal Brands · March 29, 2024

The U.S. alliance system: there’s never been anything quite like it. Ancient Athens helmed the Delian League. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck skillfully played Europe’s alliance game in the nineteenth century. The coalitions that won the world wars were nearly global in scope. But no peacetime alliance network has been so expansive, enduring, and effective as the one Washington has led since World War II. The U.S. alliance system has pacified what once were killing fields; it has forged a balance of power that favors the democracies.

Yet the existence—and achievements—of that system may actually make it harder for Americans to understand the challenge they now confront. Across the Eurasian landmass, Washington’s enemies are joining hands. China and Russia have a “no-limits” strategic partnership. Iran and Russia are enhancing a military relationship that U.S. officials deem a “profound threat” to the “whole world.” Illiberal friendships between Moscow and Pyongyang, and Beijing and Tehran, are flourishing. Americans may wonder if these interlocking relationships will someday add up to a formal alliance of U.S. enemies—the mirror image of the institutions Washington itself leads. Whatever the answer, it’s the wrong question to ask.

When Americans think of alliances, they usually think of their own alliances—formal, highly institutionalized relationships among countries that are linked by binding security guarantees as well as genuine friendship and trust. But alliances, as history reminds us, can serve many purposes and take many forms.

Some alliances are nothing more than nonaggression pacts that allow predators to devour their prey rather than devouring one another. Some alliances are military-technological partnerships in which countries build and share the capabilities they need to shatter the status quo. Some of the world’s most destructive alliances featured little coordination and even less affection: they were simply rough agreements to assail the existing order from all sides. Alliances can be secret or overt, formal or informal. They can be devoted to preserving the peace or abetting aggression. An alliance is merely a combination of states that seeks shared objectives. And relationships that seemed far less impressive than today’s U.S. alliances have caused geopolitical earthquakes in the past.

That’s the key to understanding the relationships among U.S. antagonists today. These relationships may be ambiguous and ambivalent. They may lack formal defense guarantees. But they still augment the military power revisionist states can muster and reduce the strategic isolation those countries might otherwise face. They intensify pressure on an imperiled international system by helping their members contest U.S. power on many fronts at once. And were U.S. antagonists to expand their cooperation in the future—by sharing more advanced defense technology or collaborating more extensively in crisis or conflict—they could upset the global equilibrium in even more disturbing ways. The United States may never face a single, full-fledged league of villains. But it wouldn’t take an illiberal, revisionist version of NATO to cause an overstretched superpower fits.

AMERICA’S EXCEPTIONAL ALLIANCES

Alliances are shaped by their circumstances, and U.S. alliances—namely, NATO and Washington’s Indo-Pacific alliances—are products of the early Cold War. Back then, the United States faced the dual dilemma of containing the Soviet Union and suppressing the tensions that had twice ripped the Western world apart. The contours of U.S. alliances have always reflected these founding facts.

For one thing, U.S. alliances are defensive pacts meant to prevent aggression, not perpetrate it. Washington originally structured its alliances so their members could not use them as vehicles for territorial revanchism; when American alliances have expanded, they have done so with the consent of new members. U.S. alliances are also nuclear alliances: since the only way a distant superpower could check the Red Army was to threaten nuclear escalation, issues of nuclear strategy have dominated alliance politics from the outset. For related reasons, U.S. alliances are asymmetric. Washington has long shouldered an unequal share of the military burden, especially on nuclear matters, to avoid a scenario in which countries such as Germany or Japan might destabilize their regions—and terrify their former victims—by building full-spectrum defense capabilities of their own.

This point notwithstanding, U.S. alliances are deeply institutionalized: they feature remarkable cooperation and interoperability developed through decades of training to fight as a team. U.S. alliances are also democratic; they have survived for so long because their foremost members have a shared, enduring stake in preserving a world safe for liberalism. Finally, U.S. alliances are sanctified in written treaties and public pledges of commitment. That’s natural, because democracies cannot easily make secret treaties. It’s also vital because the beating heart of every U.S. alliance is Washington’s promise to aid its friends if they are attacked.

These features have made U.S. alliances tremendously attractive, effective, and stabilizing—which is why Europe and East Asia have been so peaceful since World War II and why Washington has more trouble keeping prospective members out than luring them in. But they also influence Americans’ views of alliances in ways that aren’t always helpful in understanding the modern world. After all, there is no rule that alliances must look like Washington’s—and some of history’s most pernicious alliances have not.

THE PREDATORS’ PACTS

Today isn’t the first time the world’s most aggressive states have made common cause. During the mid-twentieth century, an array of revisionist powers forged malign combinations to aid their serial assaults on the status quo.

In 1922, a still democratic Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Rapallo Pact, which promoted cooperation between these two losers of World War I. Between 1936 and 1940, fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan inked agreements culminating in the Tripartite Pact, a loose alliance committed to achieving a totalitarian “new order of things” around the world. Along the way, Berlin and Moscow sealed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a nonaggression treaty that included protocols on trade and the division of Eastern Europe. And after a hot war gave way to the Cold War, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong negotiated a Sino-Soviet alliance that linked the two communist giants in their fight against the capitalist world.

These were some of history’s most dysfunctional, ill-fated partnerships. In several cases, they were temporary truces between deadly rivals. In no case was there anything like the deep cooperation and strategic sympathy that distinguish U.S. alliances today. This isn’t surprising: regimes as vicious and ambitious as Adolf Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, and Mao’s China shared little more than a desire to turn the world on its head. Yet this history is valuable because it shows how even the most transitory, tension-ridden partnerships can rupture the existing order, generating strong pressures in support of aggressive designs.

The Rapallo Pact was no full-fledged alliance: it was principally a détente in Eastern Europe, the region into which both Germany and the Soviet Union hoped to eventually expand. But the pact and the secret protocols that accompanied it turbocharged disruptive military innovation by international outcasts—Germany especially. At sites hidden within the Soviet interior, Germany began developing the tanks and planes the Treaty of Versailles had denied it, as well as operational concepts it would later use to great effect. This covert partnership collapsed when Hitler took power, but not before giving him a vital, deadly head start in Europe’s race to rearm in the 1930s.

Alliances, as history reminds us, can serve many purposes and take many forms.

Other revisionist pacts lowered the costs of aggression by reducing the isolation its perpetrators might otherwise have faced. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—the “new Rapallo” Hitler signed with Stalin on the eve of World War II—lasted less than two years. But during that period, it shielded Germany from the effects of the British blockade by giving it access to Soviet foodstuffs, minerals, and energy and by providing a conduit through which Hitler could access Japan’s growing empire in Asia. Molotov-Ribbentrop enabled Germany’s rampage through Europe by making much of Eurasia an economic hinterland for Berlin.

Molotov-Ribbentrop also enabled violent aggrandizement on one front by taming tensions on others; in this sense, it was a nonaggression treaty that encouraged world-shattering aggression. The pact set off World War II in Europe by assuring Hitler that he could fight Poland and the Western democracies without interference from the Soviet Union—and by setting off Soviet land grabs from Finland to Bessarabia by assuring Stalin that he could reorder his periphery without interference from Berlin. For two crucial years, Molotov-Ribbentrop made Europe a paradise for predators by freeing them from the threat of conflict with each other.

Revisionist pacts also backstopped aggressive behavior by creating solidarity in crises. The partnership between Nazi Germany and Italy was often uneasy. But during crises over Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, Hitler was emboldened, and France and the United Kingdom were hamstrung, by the knowledge that Italian leader Benito Mussolini—who had earlier opposed German expansion—now stood behind him. The Sino-Soviet alliance offers another example. After Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, the United States had to pull its punches—refraining from striking targets in China, for instance—for fear of starting a fight with Moscow.

Finally, revisionist alliances created multiplier effects by battering the status quo on several fronts at once. After signing the Sino-Soviet pact, Stalin and Mao sealed a division of revolutionary labor—Beijing pushed the communist cause with new energy in Asia, and Moscow focused on Europe—that forced agonizing debates over resources and priorities in Washington. Yet even absent formal coordination, advances by one revisionist made opportunities for others. During the late 1930s, the United Kingdom hesitated to draw a hard line against Germany in Europe because it faced danger from Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in Asia. The fascist powers helped one another simply by destabilizing a system suffering from too many threats.

THE NEW REVISIONIST PACTS

Cataloging the destruction caused by an earlier set of revisionist alliances provides insight into what really matters about the combinations taking shape today. These combinations are numerous and deepening. An ever-expanding Chinese-Russian partnership unites Eurasia’s two largest, most ambitious states. In Russia’s long-standing relationships with Pyongyang and Tehran, aid and influence now flow both ways. China is drawing closer to Iran, to complement its decades-old alliance with North Korea. For years, Pyongyang and Tehran have collaborated to make missiles and mischief. This isn’t a single revisionist coalition. It is a more complex web of ties among autocratic powers that aim to reorder their regions and, thereby, reorder the world.

These relationships profit from proximity. During World War II, vast distances across hostile oceans impeded cooperation between Germany and Japan. But Russia, China, and North Korea share land borders with one another. Iran can reach Russia via inland sea. This invulnerability to interdiction facilitates ties among Eurasia’s revisionists—just as the war in Ukraine pushes them closer together by making Russia more dependent on, and willing to cut deals with, its autocratic brethren.

These relationships have their limits. Of the Eurasian revisionists, only China and North Korea have a formal defense treaty. Military cooperation is expanding, but none of these partnerships remotely rival NATO in interoperability or institutionalized cooperation. That’s partly because historical tensions and mistrust are pervasive: as one example, China still occasionally claims territory Russia considers its own. But even so, revisionist collaborations are producing some familiar effects.

Take, for example, the way that Chinese-Russian collaboration is turbocharging disruptive military innovation. Although China has been under Western arms embargoes since 1989, its record-breaking military modernization has benefited from purchases of Russian aircraft, missiles, and air defenses. Today, China and Russia are pursuing the joint development of helicopters, conventional attack submarines, missiles, and missile-launch early warning systems. Their cooperation increasingly includes shadowy coproduction and technology-sharing initiatives rather than simply the transfer of finished capabilities. If the United States one day fights China, it will be fighting a foe whose capabilities have been materially enhanced by Moscow.

Today’s revisionist collaborations are producing some familiar effects.

Meanwhile, Russia’s defense technology relationships with other Eurasian autocracies are flourishing. Iran has sold Russia missiles and drones for use in Ukraine, even helping it build facilities that can produce the latter at the scale modern war demands. Russia, in exchange, has reportedly committed to delivering advanced air defenses, fighter aircraft, and other capabilities to Iran that could change the balance in the ever-contested Middle East. As in the Rapallo era, revisionist states are helping each other build up the military power they need to tear down the status quo.

Revisionist alliances are also—once again—making aggression less costly by mitigating the strategic isolation aggressors might otherwise face. Despite Western sanctions and horrific military losses, Russia has sustained its war in Ukraine thanks to the drones, shells, and missiles Tehran and Pyongyang have provided. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s economy has stayed afloat because China has absorbed Russian exports and provided Moscow with microchips and other dual-use goods. Just as Hitler once relied on Eurasian resources to thwart the British blockade, Putin now relies on China to blunt the economic harms of confrontation with the West. Expect more of this, as the revisionists cultivate networks—whether the International North-South Transport Corridor connecting Iran and Russia or the Eurasian commercial and financial bloc Beijing is constructing—to keep their commerce beyond Washington’s reach.

These relationships, additionally, are maximizing the risk of violent instability on some frontiers by minimizing it on others. The Chinese-Russian border was once the world’s most militarized. Today, however, a de facto nonaggression pact has freed Putin from the threat of conflict with China, allowing him to hurl nearly his entire army at Ukraine. China, too, can push harder against U.S. positions in maritime Asia because it has a friendly Russia to its rear. Beijing and Moscow don’t need to fight shoulder to shoulder, as Washington does with its allies, if they fight back to back against the liberal world.

The same friendships are delivering another disruptive benefit by increasing the prospect of autocratic solidarity in crises. For decades, North Korea’s alliance with China has constrained Washington from responding more firmly to its provocations. More recently, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s increasing belligerence may be fueled by an expectation (warranted or not) that Putin will have his back. Likewise, in a future showdown over Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran’s booming military partnership with Moscow could give it stronger diplomatic support—and better arms—with which to resist. China and Russia, for their part, are conducting military exercises in potential conflict zones from the Baltic to the western Pacific. These activities may be meant to signal that one revisionist power won’t simply sit on the sidelines as Washington deals with another.

Not least, the revisionists enjoy a perverse symbiosis by weakening the international order from several directions at once. Russia is brutalizing Ukraine and threatening eastern Europe, as Iran and its proxies sow violent disorder across the Middle East. China grows more menacing in the Pacific, as North Korea drives its missile and nuclear programs forward. All this creates a pervasive sense that global order is eroding. It also poses sharp dilemmas for Washington: witness U.S. debates over Ukraine versus Taiwan, today’s actual wars versus tomorrow’s prospective ones. As during the 1930s, Eurasia’s autocracies help one another by overtaxing their common foe.

TROUBLE TO COME

American analysts still sometimes refer to relationships among U.S. adversaries as “alliances of convenience,” the implication being that clever diplomacy can precipitate a divorce. That’s unlikely to happen any time soon. The Eurasian autocracies are united by illiberal governance and hostility to U.S. power. If anything, growing international tensions are giving them stronger reasons for mutual support. Indeed, a Russia that remains isolated from the West will have little choice but to lean into partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea. The United States may be able, periodically, to slow this process—as it did in 2022–23 by threatening China with harsh sanctions if it gave Russia lethal aid in Ukraine—but it probably can’t reverse the larger trend. And even if today’s revisionist ties never amount to a full-blown Eurasian alliance, they could plausibly evolve in ways that would strain U.S. power more severely.

More sensitive cooperation could make for more startling military breakthroughs. Russian technology will reportedly figure in China’s next-generation attack submarine, albeit through a process of “imitative innovation” rather than direct transfer. If Russia someday provides China—whose subs are still noisy and vulnerable—with state-of-the-art quieting technology, it could undercut U.S. advantages in one domain in which Washington still has outright supremacy over Beijing. Likewise, South Korean officials fear the payoff for North Korea’s arms shipments to Russia might be Russian aid to North Korea’s space, nuclear, and missile programs—which could help those programs advance faster than U.S. analysts expect. More broadly, as military cooperation morphs into coproduction or technology transfers, as opposed to the sale of finished weapons, it becomes harder to monitor—and increases the chances of capability jumps that catch outside observers off-guard.

Eurasia’s revisionists could create further dilemmas by cooperating more closely in crises. If Russia deployed naval forces in the East China Sea amid high U.S.-Chinese tensions—or if Moscow and Beijing sent vessels to the Persian Gulf during a crisis between Iran and the West—they could make the operational theater more complicated for U.S. forces, raising the risk that a fight with one might trigger unwanted escalation with others. The revisionist powers could even aid each one another in outright war.

In a U.S.-Chinese conflict, Russia could conduct cyber-operations against U.S. logistics and infrastructure to make it harder for Washington to mobilize and project power. One revisionist power could fill critical capability gaps, whether by resupplying a friend when key munitions run low or—as China has done in Ukraine—providing vital components that don’t quite qualify as “lethal” aid. Or it might posture forces in threatening ways. During a fight between the United States and China, Russia would only have to move forces menacingly toward eastern Europe to make Washington account for the likelihood of conflicts on two fronts.

The Eurasian autocracies surely don’t wish to die for one another. But they presumably understand that a crushing American victory over one would leave the remainder more vulnerable. So they might try to help themselves by helping one another—if they can do so without plunging directly and overtly into the fight.

THINKING AHEAD

Ties between Eurasian revisionists may not look like alliances as Americans typically understand them, but they have plenty of alliance-like effects. This isn’t an entirely bad thing for Washington: the closer U.S. antagonists get, the more one’s bad behavior tarnishes the others. Since 2022, for instance, China’s image in Europe has suffered because Beijing tied itself so closely to Putin’s war in Ukraine. The opportunity, then, is to use adversary alignment to accelerate Washington’s own coalition-building efforts, just as the United States used the blowback from Russia’s invasion to induce greater European realism about China. Doing so will be critical, because today’s revisionist pacts are increasing the freedom of action U.S. rivals enjoy and the capabilities they wield. The United States must get used to a world in which the links among its rivals magnify the challenges that, they individually and collectively pose.

This is an intellectual and analytical challenge as much as anything else. For example, the United States may need to revise assessments of how long its adversaries will take to reach key military milestones, given the help they are receiving—or could receive—from their friends. Washington must also rethink assumptions that it will face adversaries one-on-one in a crisis or conflict and account for the aid—covert or overt, kinetic or nonkinetic, enthusiastic or grudging—other revisionist powers could render as tensions escalate. The United States especially needs to wrestle with the risk that adversary relationships will promote a certain globalization of conflict—that the country could end up facing multiple, interlocking regional struggles against adversaries that cooperate in important, sometimes subtle ways.

Finally, U.S. officials should consider how these rivals’ partnerships could evolve in unexpected or nonlinear ways. Recent history is instructive. Although the Chinese-Russian strategic relationship has arisen over decades, that relationship—to say nothing of Moscow’s ties to Pyongyang and Tehran—has ripened considerably during the war in Ukraine. How might a future crisis over Taiwan, which triggers sharp U.S. sanctions on China, affect Beijing’s cost-benefit analysis regarding a still deeper alliance with Russia? Or how might a more thorough breakdown of order in one region tempt revisionist powers to intensify their campaigns in others?

Thinking through such scenarios is, unavoidably, an exercise in speculation. It is also an intellectual hedge against a future in which relationships—many of which have already exceeded U.S. expectations—continue to develop in disturbing ways. In the years ahead, the challenge of adversary alignment may well be inevitable. The degree to which it surprises is not.

HAL BRANDS is Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of the forthcoming book The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World.

Foreign Affairs · by Hal Brands · March 29, 2024

25. Overhaul UNRWA—Just Not Right Now

From an author who has had an inside view.

Excerpts:

But for most donors that support reform, the question is more about the wisdom of doing so right now, in the middle of an epic humanitarian crisis. This is why UN Secretary-General António Guterres is desperately trying to avoid UNRWA running out of funding or being dismantled. On February 5, he appointed Catherine Colonna, the former foreign minister of France, to lead “an independent Review Group to assess whether the Agency is doing everything within its power to ensure neutrality and to respond to allegations of serious breaches when they are made.” On March 20, the review group presented its interim findings: UNRWA has procedures in place to ensure its neutrality, but there are “critical areas that still need to be addressed.” The brief statement was the latest signal that the UN is trying to win back donors.

History has shown that withholding funding has not forced UNRWA to change or caused its demise. When the Trump administration cut off funding, European and other donors made up for the U.S. shortfall. Today, responding to the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Gaza, Canada, Sweden, and Australia have so far resumed their funding. Ending U.S. funding to UNRWA permanently could also remove or weaken U.S. leverage, something to consider as it seeks to influence a new post-conflict reality for the region.

The Colonna report is not likely to be as far-reaching as most might want it to be, but it could present an opportunity to force a long overdue and more realistic approach to UNRWA’s future. A managed approach, in the context of a postwar arrangement for Gaza, is a more responsible and appropriate option for the overhaul of UNRWA that is so clearly required. And as remote as it might seem right now, the best way to address this on a more permanent basis is in the context of a renewed peace process and a resolution to this historic and increasingly deadly conflict.

Overhaul UNRWA—Just Not Right Now

The Aid Agency Is Flawed, but It Is Also Saving Palestinian Lives

By Jonathan Lincoln

March 29, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Lincoln · March 29, 2024

There has hardly been a war, crisis, or peace process involving Israel and an adversary that has not involved a UN response of some kind. Despite the UN’s many shortcomings, the assumption that any situation would be far worse without its involvement has generally been an accepted principle. The war that began with Hamas’s brutal attack on October 7 has challenged this assumption like never before, particularly for Israel. Despite years of working with the main UN agency that provides aid and services to Palestinian refugees, known as UNRWA, Israel is now seeking to dismantle it.

In January, Israeli officials alleged that as many as 12 of UNRWA’s staff members in Gaza participated in the October 7 attack. They further suggested that more than 1,000 of UNRWA’s employees in Gaza (out of a total of 13,000) are affiliated with Hamas or Islamic Jihad, both of which are considered terrorist organizations by Israel, the United States, and the European Union. Although UNRWA responded to the charges by terminating the contracts of some of its staff and launching an internal probe, it was not enough to deter the United States and a handful of other donors from suspending financial support pending a more thorough investigation. According to figures from 2022, the United States provided close to $343 million of UNRWA’s $1.2 billion operations budget, making it the agency’s largest single donor. But on March 23, the U.S. Congress took an even more drastic step, passing a bill that bans U.S. funding for UNRWA for a year, effectively postponing a decision on whether to resume support until after the U.S. election in November. Although the United States has already disbursed $121 million for UNRWA this fiscal year, the new ban is set to deprive the aid agency of millions more.

At the same time, the war in Gaza is causing a calamity of historic proportions for the Palestinians who live there. More than 30,000 have been killed and famine is imminent, according to humanitarian officials. And although UNRWA’s existence is under threat, it remains a fundamental component of the international emergency relief effort in Gaza. It continues to provide emergency food and medical assistance. The UNRWA facilities that remain functional are serving as aid distribution points and shelters for a large portion of the more than 1.7 million displaced persons (75 percent of Gaza’s population). There are few, if any, other places for the population to turn. Although UNRWA is plagued with serious problems, many of which predate the current conflict, it is difficult to contemplate any alternative, and it would be even harder to put one in place, especially amid a war and ongoing humanitarian crisis.

ONE OF A KIND

UNRWA is in almost every respect an anomaly within the UN system. The UN General Assembly created it in 1949 to alleviate the dire conditions affecting Palestinian refugees from the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Today, it provides services for over 5.9 million Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Although part of the UN, it is a distinctly Palestinian entity. For the most part, it operates outside the UN frameworks established for the provision of humanitarian and development assistance worldwide, but its very existence also holds enormous symbolism and importance within the broader Palestinian political narrative. That is because UNRWA’s mandate is linked to the ongoing conflict, and the provision of its services, from the Palestinians’ perspective, represents an international guarantee of their rights, including the right to return to or be compensated for properties from which they fled or were forced to flee in 1948 and that are today in Israel. So, although UNRWA does not have a political mandate, its symbolism in the context of the conflict, and for Palestinians especially, cannot be overstated.

UNRWA has a relatively small cadre of international civil servants at its helm, but the bulk of its employees consists of around 30,000 Palestinians, including teachers, doctors, nurses, and engineers. In a place such as Gaza, where at least 70 percent of the 2.2 million population have refugee status, UNRWA looks and operates more like a state than a UN agency.

Indeed, even from a services perspective, to compare UNRWA to any other UN agency is almost impossible. For example, UNICEF, the UN Development Program, and the World Health Organization all typically have dozens of staff in a particular country office who provide technical and sometimes financial support for local nongovernmental organizations and state institutions to implement programs. They rarely engage in the direct implementation of services the way UNRWA does. Even the most comparable of the UN entities, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), bears little resemblance. For example, the UNHCR supports all other refugee populations across the globe with mostly emergency assistance and advocacy, and it has around 19,000 personnel in 137 countries supporting close to 90 million displaced people. Unlike UNRWA, the UNHCR works in accordance with the 1951 Convention on Refugees and therefore supports resettlement in third countries when possible, which, of course, UNRWA does not.

Through its operations, UNRWA has absolved the host countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) of taking responsibility for the Palestinian refugee populations living inside their borders. In a similar vein, UNRWA has relieved the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas in Gaza from a significant share of responsibility for service delivery. But each year, the list of beneficiaries continues to grow, and UNRWA’s ability to provide services depends on a constantly expanding budget funded by the United States and other international donors.

CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR

Israel has always been clear that it would like to see UNRWA’s mandate end, given the agency’s advocacy on behalf of Palestinians and especially its registration of refugees’ descendants. Israel views this as perpetuating the conflict and even threatening Israel’s existence, as it lends support to the idea that these Palestinian refugees have the right to one day return to Israel, something Israel rejects in principle.

Even so, UNRWA’s relations with Israel are far more complex than many of the agency’s detractors in Israel and the United States often suggest. From an operational perspective, Israel—like Hamas, the PA, and the refugee host countries—has benefited tremendously from UNRWA’s presence in Gaza and the West Bank because the agency provides services that would have otherwise been Israel’s responsibility since it took these territories in 1967. Far from seeking to alter UNRWA’s operational mandate, Israel has for the most part cooperated closely with it.

Although some politicians in Israel have consistently called for an end to UNRWA, the Israeli security establishment has long relied on UNRWA’s stabilizing role and its ability to deliver aid. As a result, relations with the Israel Defense Forces have generally been productive, especially in facilitating the delivery of aid into Gaza since Hamas took over the strip in 2007. October 7 changed this calculation.

The allegations about UNRWA staff participating in Hamas’s October 7 attack are just the tip of the iceberg for Israel. The Israeli government believes Hamas has completely infiltrated the agency.

That members of Hamas and other extremist groups have joined the ranks of UNRWA’s staff and used its facilities as cover for its attacks on Israel, especially since 2007, is not a new revelation. In fact, it is an issue that UNRWA has openly struggled to deal with for many years. Aside from undermining UNRWA’s neutrality, these associations also created serious concerns about the safety of UNRWA’s staff. UNRWA officials who have previously sought to expose this and remove employees with links to Hamas and other factions have faced threats or worse.

In Gaza, UNRWA looks and operates more like a state than a UN agency.

Today, Israel fears that Hamas could use UNRWA to reengage in civilian life. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza, which he presented to his security cabinet earlier this month, includes the dismantling of UNRWA. But the notion that there is any viable alternative to UNRWA, at least in the short to medium term, is something with which the UN, most donors, and Palestinians would strongly disagree. Aside from UNRWA’s contribution to the emergency relief effort, replacing an entity that provides statelike services to millions of people across the region is not something that is easily done.

Aside from the obvious risks concerning Gaza and the West Bank, there is also the much less discussed issue of how changes to UNRWA’s mandate would affect Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The addition of hundreds of thousands of individuals who would qualify for state services in countries that are already barely coping with other refugee crises and experiencing varying degrees of internal strife, would surely add considerable strain. There would also be a tremendous political fallout, including for a country such as Jordan, which not only has a large Palestinian population, but also a peace treaty with Israel.

Therefore, to contemplate what it might take to replace UNRWA requires facing significant political and logistical hurdles, not to mention risks. In Gaza alone, it would mean either curtailing or replacing the staff and administration at 22 health clinics. It would mean finding new staff for 183 schools that serve some 286,000 students. But across the region, it would affect more than 500,000 students and 140 health clinics that are directly serviced by UNRWA. No UN agency has ever carried out such a large-scale project on an urgent basis. Although possible in principle, in practice it would take enormous effort and time, and prove extremely costly. Even then, it would likely fall short unless additional support were brought in from local authorities and, in the case of Gaza, the PA and specifically its ministries of health, public works and housing, education, and social welfare.

But Netanyahu has also said he plans to exclude the PA from postwar Gaza, leaving only risky and haphazard alternatives for civil administration, such as clan leaders. In any case, a process to replace UNRWA could take years to properly put in place, and it would be fiercely resisted by the Palestinian leadership as well as the beneficiaries themselves who would view it as an attempt to alter the legal contours of the conflict and the rights of the refugees outside of negotiations.

When one factors in the resources and levels of political will required from Israelis, Palestinians, and refugee host countries, it becomes clear why policymakers in the United States, Israel, the UN, and elsewhere have long understood that an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be easier to achieve than effective reform of UNRWA.

LEAST BAD OPTION

That UNRWA in its current form is unsustainable has been well understood by Israel, its donors, and many others for a long time. The linkage of its services to the persistence of a conflict that has eluded resolution for more than 75 years raises ethical questions about the agency’s continuation. Instead of working itself out of a job, like most UN humanitarian and development agencies are trying to do, it has managed to adjust to changing political realities and consistently—and correctly—presented itself as a stabilizing element in an otherwise unstable region. UNRWA is “needed”—partly because of a reality that it helps to sustain. This also leaves donors responsible for a growing list of services that could have and probably should have been financed or taken on by others, including the PA and the countries hosting Palestinian refugees.

Historically, the UN has also not taken as much responsibility for the agency as it should have. The last UN secretary-general to really try and address these issues was Dag Hammarskjold in 1959. His main concern was over refugees not being integrated into the economies of the host countries, something he feared would perpetuate the conflict. The Arab states rebuffed this approach, and since then, a lack of general oversight set in, letting UNRWA resist UN reforms and restructuring over the years. This lack of accountability allowed for freedom of maneuver but also left oversight voids with regard to ensuring that programming and services matched the standards and values of the UN system. One glaring example of this failure has been UNRWA’s use of locally produced textbooks in its schools, including some with overt anti-Semitic references.

The United States has already disbursed $121 million for UNRWA this fiscal year.

But for most donors that support reform, the question is more about the wisdom of doing so right now, in the middle of an epic humanitarian crisis. This is why UN Secretary-General António Guterres is desperately trying to avoid UNRWA running out of funding or being dismantled. On February 5, he appointed Catherine Colonna, the former foreign minister of France, to lead “an independent Review Group to assess whether the Agency is doing everything within its power to ensure neutrality and to respond to allegations of serious breaches when they are made.” On March 20, the review group presented its interim findings: UNRWA has procedures in place to ensure its neutrality, but there are “critical areas that still need to be addressed.” The brief statement was the latest signal that the UN is trying to win back donors.

History has shown that withholding funding has not forced UNRWA to change or caused its demise. When the Trump administration cut off funding, European and other donors made up for the U.S. shortfall. Today, responding to the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Gaza, Canada, Sweden, and Australia have so far resumed their funding. Ending U.S. funding to UNRWA permanently could also remove or weaken U.S. leverage, something to consider as it seeks to influence a new post-conflict reality for the region.

The Colonna report is not likely to be as far-reaching as most might want it to be, but it could present an opportunity to force a long overdue and more realistic approach to UNRWA’s future. A managed approach, in the context of a postwar arrangement for Gaza, is a more responsible and appropriate option for the overhaul of UNRWA that is so clearly required. And as remote as it might seem right now, the best way to address this on a more permanent basis is in the context of a renewed peace process and a resolution to this historic and increasingly deadly conflict.

JONATHAN LINCOLN is Interim Director of the Center for Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. From 2017 to 2021, he served as Senior Coordination Officer at the office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, where he worked on aid in the West Bank and Gaza.

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Lincoln · March 29, 2024

26. The West Needs a War Footing

Mr. Rasmussen is talking about revitalization of the industrial base. He offers 5 ideas "to get the ball rolling."

The paradox is that America (and the West) is tired of the last 2 decades of war, yet that is not even close to the kind of war that could be fought in the near future. There was no significant commitment of the population to wars of the last two decades. But there must be for the kind of war we will fight in the future - if not to do the actual fighting but to develop societal resilience as the effects of future war will likely be felt severely at home. And to be successful in future war we will need a strong industrial base. We should keep in mind that the American way of war has not been the ability of the military outfight our enemies, but of our nation to out produce our them.

The West Needs a War Footing

FDR enlisted William S. Knudsen in 1940 to ramp weapons production up. As Russia continues pounding Ukraine, it’s time to do it again.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-needs-a-war-footing-world-war-ii-knudsen-ukraine-russia-2c0de22e

By Anders Fogh Rasmussen

March 28, 2024 5:13 pm ET

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, right, in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, March 21. PHOTO: VADIM SAVITSKY/RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY/SHUTTERSTOCK

Two years after Russia invaded, Ukrainian forces are outgunned. Russia has a 6-to-1 ammunition advantage along the front lines. If this persists, Vladimir Putin’s ambitions will become a reality.

The imbalance in weapons supplies is a major failure of Ukraine’s allies in the West. North Korea delivered as much artillery ammunition to Russia in one month as the European Union has been able to deliver to Ukraine in one year. Russia produces three million shells a year, while the U.S. and Europe combined are able to produce only 1.2 million for Kyiv. Despite the vast economic might of the democratic world, we are being outproduced by an arsenal of autocracy in Russia, Iran and North Korea.

If Western allies don’t immediately ramp up the supply of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, the future will be bleak. If Mr. Putin isn’t stopped in Ukraine, it will mean decades of instability and conflict in Europe. We need to wake up to that danger and put our economies on a war footing.

Turning the tide requires political decisions. Congress must approve the stalled $60 billion in aid for Ukraine—with haste. Yet such change also requires leadership from industry. If we are to defend freedom and democracy, CEOs must step up as they did during World War II.

In the late 1930s, Western democracies were dangerously unprepared for the threats posed by the rapidly arming autocracies of Germany and Japan. In May 1940, this complacency was brutally exposed. Nazi forces stormed into the Netherlands, Belgium and France, soon leaving Britain alone in the fight for democracy in Europe. In the White House, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that the U.S. urgently needed to ramp up military production and put the economy on a war footing. To do so, he knew the man to call: William S. Knudsen.

Knudsen was CEO of

General Motors, a man with vast experience in the automobile industry and one of the best-paid business leaders in the U.S. Roosevelt tasked him with transforming America’s industrial production, making it the arsenal of democracy. For his efforts, Knudsen would receive the token sum of $1 a year.Knudsen threw himself into the task. He made lists of the required weapons and ammunition: 50,000 planes, 13,000 mortar shells, 33 million artillery shells, 300,000 machine guns with ammunition, 1.3 million rifles with ammunition, 380 warships. He then traveled across the country to meet with industry leaders, visit factories and sign contracts.

Knudsen recognized that speed was crucial. In meetings with company and union leaders, he applied maximum pressure to ramp up production. His message was clear: “We are here to help you, and all we ask in return is that you give us speed and more speed. We need every machine running at full speed. . . . We must outproduce Hitler.” Within five months, Knudsen had signed 920 contracts with some 500 companies.

All of American society was mobilized to fight, and within a year the economy was on a war footing. Knudsen’s methods were controversial, and his direct style often led to confrontation with politicians and unions. But thanks to his network, his understanding of factory-floor conditions, and his ability to organize workers and machines, he got his way. He was pivotal in turning the tide against Germany and Japan.

If we could do it once, we can do it again. In the face of the renewed threat from a militarized autocracy, we must replicate Knudsen’s achievement and put our economies on a war footing. This will require action from politicians, industry and labor unions—as well as leaders who can cut through endless discussions, red tape and long delivery times.

Here are five ideas to get the ball rolling:

First, governments should enter into long-term contracts with the arms industry, to ensure that companies have the necessary capital to expand capacity swiftly.

Second, the contracting process should be simplified and shortened. A signed letter of intent should be enough to get production up and running quickly, leaving legal details to be sorted along the way.

Third, we should temporarily relax the rules on tendering defense contracts, so that production can begin with direct orders to companies that are able to deliver weapons or ammunition immediately.

Fourth, the defense industry should be allowed to depreciate investments in new production facilities faster than normal, to reflect the hopefully shorter horizon for war and conflict.

Fifth, sovereign wealth funds, as well as private pension and investment funds, should set up special pools for defense-industry investments. This will attract the private capital needed for rapid expansion of our defense industries.

We need to embrace a new mind-set. We need politicians who dare to tell the truth—including that defense and military-equipment investments are an essential element in the defense of freedom and peace. We need business and labor leaders prepared to take responsibility beyond the interests of their individual companies. Ultimately, we need a new William S. Knudsen.

Mr. Rasmussen served as secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009-14) and prime minister of Denmark (2001-09).

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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