Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

​Quotes of the Day:


“This is the true joy in life, being used for a purpose recognized by yourself as a mighty one. Being a force of nature instead of a feverish, selfish little clod of ailments and grievances, complaining that the world will not devote itself to making you happy. I am of the opinion that my life belongs to the whole community and as long as I live, it is my privilege to do for it what I can. I want to be thoroughly used up when I die, for the harder I work, the more I live. I rejoice in life for its own sake. Life is no brief candle to me. It is a sort of splendid torch which I have got hold of for the moment and I want to make it burn as brightly as possible before handing it on to future generations.”
― George Bernard Shaw

“The first step in liquidating a people is to erase his memory. Destroy its books, it's culture, it's history. Then have someone write new books, manufacture a new culture, invent a new history. Before long the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was.” 
– Milan Kundera

“The world breaks everyone, and afterward, many are strong at the broken places.” 
– Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms




​1. How a New Axis Called CRINK Is Working Against America

3. ‘Accidental Tyrant’ Review: The Unlikely Rise of Kim Il Sung

​3. Is Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy washed up?

4. N. Korean drones unveiled this week likely use AI to identify, strike S. Korean, U.S. equipment: lawmaker

5. Trump says he has not discussed Russia's purchase of weapons from N. Korea with Putin

6. Putin cites N. Korea among Russia's potential partners to settle Ukraine war: report

7. Prosecutors call in ex-President Moon for questioning over bribery allegations

8. Editorial: Conflicting rulings erode judicial integrity, deepen political divisions

9. Tens of thousands hold rallies in Seoul for, against Yoon's impeachment

10. Firefighters combat wildfires in southeast areas after overnight reignition; death toll rises to 30

11. Trump voices openness to making deals over reciprocal tariffs if U.S. can 'get something'

12. S. Korea says will work for prompt repatriation of 2 N. Koreans found adrift near border

13. Deployment of 3 North Korean Early Warning Aircraft Imminent

14. North Koreans Dislike People's Unit Leaders… 'Shift System' Appears

15. White House mentions Hyundai's investment plan as result of Trump's drive for 'American manufacturing dominance'





1. How a New Axis Called CRINK Is Working Against America


​Please go to the link to view the extensive charts and graphics. https://www.wsj.com/world/crink-axis-china-russia-iran-alliance-urkaine-war-3dab9921?st=Q2UGNs&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink


This complements the recent 2025 Threat Assessment from the ODNI. For the first time (at least that I can find) a national threat assessment recognizes this "adversarial cooperation."


ADVERSARIAL COOPERATION 
Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years, reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally. These primarily bilateral relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their activities. Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated these ties, but the trend is likely to continue regardless of the war’s outcome. This alignment increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another. China is critical to this alignment and its global significance, given the PRC’s particularly ambitious goals, and powerful capabilities and influence in the world. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf


We are going to need to develop a holistic strategy to deal with this fusion of foes.




  1. World

How a New Axis Called CRINK Is Working Against America

China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have united to defy Western sanctions and undermine U.S. interests

https://www.wsj.com/world/crink-axis-china-russia-iran-alliance-urkaine-war-3dab9921?st=Q2UGNs&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Timothy W. MartinFollow

Ming LiFollow

 and Roque RuizFollow

March 28, 2025 11:00 pm ET

An axis uniting China, Russia, Iran and North Korea—dubbed CRINK by some Western officials—has emerged from the war in Ukraine, a loose alliance united by a mutual disdain for the U.S.-led world order.

That coalition’s cooperation has steadily deepened as the four have exchanged food, oil, arms, diplomatic support and military assistance in a manner designed to remain beyond the reach of Western sanctions.

Now, President Trump’s determination to end the war creates a moment of truth for the entente. If he brokers a cease-fire, the bonds between the four could loosen. 

But a failure to do so—along with greater U.S. pressure on Iran and China—could unintentionally deepen this “common market of autocracies,” says John Park, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, who focuses on Indo-Pacific security and economic statecraft.


Cooperation between the four nations isn’t new. Russia and Iran allied to support the Assad regime in Syria, while China has long been North Korea’s main patron and Beijing and Moscow’s relationship has been deepening for years.

But the war multiplied those ties and helped knit the quartet together. The four are “promoting alternative systems to compete with the United States, primarily in trade, finance and security,” according to a recent assessment by U.S. spy agencies.

Russia’s need to fuel its war effort has put Moscow at the center of the entente. It has turned to Chinese firms for goods critical for making the arms it needs in Ukraine.

Chinese exported weapon components to Russia

$500 million

Essential weapon components

400

Strategic electronics

300

Sensitive electronics

Weaponry mechanical parts

200

Production and testing equipment

100

Numerical machine tools and components

0

2021

’22

’23

’24

’25

Source: Atlantic Council’s analysis of data from Chinese Customs

North Korea—itself long under international sanctions—has sent huge quantities of munitions as well as more than 12,000 soldiers to help Russia. Ukraine said last month that half of Russia’s ammunition now comes from North Korea. That support has helped Russia largely expel Ukrainian troops from its Kursk region. Lately, Pyongyang has engaged diplomatically with Moscow more than it has with Beijing.

North Korean military cargo shipments to Russia

1,000 containers

Oct. 2023

Dec.

South Korea estimates that 200 long-range artillery pieces had been sent.

Feb. 2024

June

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Delegations sent between North Korea and Russia or China, since 2021*

China

Russia

to North Korea

6

25

35

5

from North Korea

*as of March 27

Sources: staff reports (shipments); NK News (delegations)

Iran has provided Russia with drone expertise, giving it a critical boost in a conflict dominated by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Tehran has sent Shahed drones as well as blueprints and technical assistance for Russia to increase its own drone manufacturing. 

Military cooperation has gone hand-in-hand with economic ties. Shut out by the West, Russia has redirected much of its energy exports to China, while Beijing—which doesn’t support the U.S.-led sanctions against Moscow—has in turn stepped up exports of consumer goods that Russia no longer receives from the West.

Share of Russia–China trade in total trade for each country

China

Russia

35%

35%

30

30

25

25

20

20

15

15

10

10

5

5

0

0

2021

’22

’23

’24

2021

’22

’23

’24

Sources: Chinese customs via Wind; Russia's Federal Customs Service

As their economies draw closer, China and Russia have increasingly used their own currencies for their trade, shunning the U.S. dollar. Using dollars makes them more vulnerable to sanctions, while both nations also harbor ambitions to boost their currencies’ influence in world trade.

Russian trade by currency

Imports

Exports

100%

100%

Russian ruble

Russian ruble

80

80

60

60

U.S. dollar and euro

U.S. dollar and euro

40

40

Chinese yuan

Chinese yuan

20

20

Other

Other

0

0

2022

’23

’24

’25

2022

’23

’24

’25

Sources: Bank of Russia (to February 2024); Bank of Finland's analysis of Bank of Russia's data (after February 2024)

In return for military support, Russia has allowed in thousands of North Korean workers, who earn valuable hard currency that is sent back to the regime. Moscow has sent technicians to support Pyongyang’s spy-satellite program, South Korean officials said. Russia has also boosted illicit oil shipments to North Korea.

Russia’s oil exports by country

100%

90

China

80

70

60

50

Europe

40

India

30

U.S.

20

Others

10

Turkey

0

2017

’18

’19

’20

’21

’22

’23

’24

’25

North Koreans entering Russia

2023

1,117

13,221

2024

Sources: Kpler (oil exports); Russia’s Federal Security Service (entry)

As the world’s second-largest economy, China provides the economic ballast for the quartet, making it the indispensable partner for the entente. As a net importer of energy, China is a major market for Iranian and Russian energy. About 90% of Iranian oil goes to China.

Gross domestic product*

China’s oil imports by origin

China

100%

$17.79 trillion

Saudi Arabia

90

80

Iran

70

Russia

60

Iraq

50

40

Russia

30

$2.02 trillion

Others

20

Iran

$404.6

billion

10

0

May

July

Sept.

Nov.

March

North Korea

March 2024

Jan. 2025

$27.4 billion

*as of 2023

Sources: World Bank (GDP for countries other than North Korea); South Korea's Ministry of Economy and Finance (North Korea’s GDP); Kpler (oil exports)

China represents more than 98% of North Korea’s official trade with the outside world, giving it great leverage over Pyongyang. “Without China, the coalition is anemic,” said Christopher S. Chivvis, a former U.S. national intelligence officer for Europe.

An end to the war in Ukraine could drain the partnership of its staying power. Russia could try to mend relations with Europe, which would loosen its reliance on China. China—which is integrated in the global trading system in a way that the other three aren’t—may decide that supporting the axis isn’t worth jeopardizing its relations with the West.

If Moscow backs away from cease-fire talks, Trump has already threatened more sanctions and tariffs on Russia. Washington has also renewed its “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran, threatening military action if Iran doesn’t rein in its nuclear program. U.S.-China relations are also tense, with Trump recently raising tariffs on billions of dollars of China imports.

If left unchecked, the nexus between Russia and North Korea, which both already possess nuclear arms, and Iran, which is nearly able to produce an atomic bomb, could prove a serious threat to the West, said Chivvis, the former intelligence officer, who is now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“What we want to avoid is the deepening scenario, where they do actually build on the cooperation that we have seen over the last couple of years,” he said.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

What steps should the U.S. take to address growing cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea? Join the conversation below.

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com, Ming Li at ming.li@wsj.com and Roque Ruiz at roque.ruizgonzalez@wsj.com






2. ‘Accidental Tyrant’ Review: The Unlikely Rise of Kim Il Sung



I ordered this book (it comes out on April 1). Looks like a good read based on this review.


This explains the nature of the regime.


Conclusion:


Kim Il Sung was a man who told his people what to think, where to go, what to wear, what to eat, whom to marry, whom to shun, whom to worship and whom to anathematize (both at home and abroad). Mr. Tertitskiy has given us a chilling portrait of a man who seems almost too bad to be true.


‘Accidental Tyrant’ Review: The Unlikely Rise of Kim Il Sung

Selected by the Soviets to run what was supposed to be a minor puppet regime, Kim Il Sung created his own cult of personality in North Korea.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/accidental-tyrant-review-the-unlikely-rise-of-kim-il-sung-de005ba9?mod=Searchresults_pos11&page=1

By Tunku Varadarajan

March 28, 2025 11:49 am ET


North Korean Soldiers on parade in April 2007. Photo: KCNA/AFP/Getty Images

“There can be little doubt,” writes Fyodor Tertitskiy, that Kim Il Sung “is the darkest figure in all of Korea’s history.” If this Lord of Darkness has any competition at all, it comes from his son and grandson.

Grab a Copy

Accidental Tyrant: The Life of Kim Il-Sung

By Fyodor Tertitskiy

Oxford University Press

352 pages

We may earn a commission when you buy products through the links on our site.

Buy Book



Mr. Tertitskiy, a South Korea-based historian, has pulled off a rare and impressive biographical feat—his “Accidental Tyrant” is a book-length account of the life of Kim, the founder of North Korea, who ascended to power in 1945 at the end of World War II. Biographies abound of Hitler, Stalin and Mao, but those of Kim are hard to come by: “Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader,” by Suh Dae-sook, was the last good one, published in 1988, six years before Kim’s death. Mr. Tertitskiy’s book appears 37 years later. Yet for all the passage of time, Kim would surely give present-day North Korea his seal of approval, recognizing it to be the place of his own demonic conception. The Kimist regime—now led by his grandson Kim Jong Un—“remains unyielding in the face of all challenges,” Mr. Tertitskiy writes, “dominating the lives of over 20 million North Koreans, with no apparent end in sight.”

The country Kim created is, Mr. Tertitskiy tells us, “a nation so closed it defies comprehension.” How closed? He gives us examples: North Korean citizens are prohibited from reading books that haven’t been approved by the state; cannot access the internet without being “personally approved by the Supreme Leader”; cannot speak to foreigners on the telephone without risking harsh imprisonment; must display portraits of Kim Il Sung and his successors in every home; and can be put to death for defacing these portraits. Not being able to leave the country seems a trivial hardship by comparison. That so few attempt to do so is proof of the incarceration of an entire population.

Readers will find it startling, therefore, that Mr. Tertitskiy tells us “it would be wrong” to say that Kim “was a man of pure evil” or that he was “completely incapable of kindness, forgiveness and mercy.” After all, the book is a detailed portrayal of the man who “instigated the most destructive war Korea has ever seen,” one in which at least 2.5 million people died, and created one of the most suffocatingly coercive societies in human history. Mass famine was a constant feature of Kim’s rule, so much so that the multigenerational deprivation of food has led to the physical stunting of North Koreans, who are on average several inches shorter than their genetically identical brethren in South Korea. In truth, the only well-fed North Koreans we have seen (in the flesh or in photographs) have been the overweight members of the Kim dynasty.

13 Books We Read This Week


Kim Il Sung’s rise, a musical circus, allies of the American Revolution and more.

It’s likely that Mr. Tertitskiy stops short of declaring Kim Il Sung to be unadulteratedly evil because of the one example of genuine kindness the author highlights in the tyrant’s life. It involved Kim’s first wife, Han Song Hui, whom he loved but who was captured in 1940 by the Japanese when they were the imperial rulers of Korea. Husband and wife lost all contact with each other, and eventually Kim married a woman named Kim Jong Suk (the mother of his eventual successor, Jong Il). In the late 1940s, Kim, by then the ruler of North Korea, had the power and wherewithal to search for his first wife. He found her, and found also that she, too, had remarried—to a humble Korean farmer. When Kim “found his old love,” writes Mr. Tertitskiy, “he acted honorably,” remembering particularly “how she had woven him socks out of her own hair” when they were desperate rebels fighting against Japanese rule. And so the man who could have had her new husband killed with a snap of his fingers “respected her wishes” to remain with the latter. And the two—Kim and his first wife—stayed friends through the years to come.

This was, indeed, a touching act of humanity and uxoriousness, all the more remarkable for its performance by a man who would prove to be a monster. So total was his control over his subjects, says Mr. Tertitskiy, that the “enormous cost of his rule can never be wholly assessed.” Hundreds of thousands, sentenced or banished to work camps, never returned. There are places, we learn, “where people toiled in mines like the slaves of ancient Rome—until they died.” When it comes to a full picture of the suffering of the “tens of millions of innocents whose lives were twisted and brutalized by the will of this man,” there is almost no oral or written evidence “to tell the world of their stories.” Contrast this with the concentration camps of the Holocaust and Stalin’s Gulags, from both of which we have profusely documented accounts of the horrors perpetrated.

Was North Korea’s fate inevitable after 1945? Mr. Tertitskiy argues that it wasn’t: Kim’s accession to power wasn’t preordained but was, instead, the result of Soviet complacency and incompetence. North Korea was merely a trifling part of Stalin’s sphere of influence after World War II and—viewing its Korean fiefdom as a backwater—Moscow dispatched ambassadors of low caliber and intellect to oversee the new (ostensibly) puppet state. Kim ascended to power for want of any real competition among the leaders in North Korea. His promotion was intended to be temporary, the Soviets still believing in 1945 that it was possible to unify the Korean peninsula. Kim, who had been educated in Manchuria and had lived in Russia (where his son Jong Il was born), wasn’t entirely fluent in Korean at the time of his ascent. His mannerisms weren’t even Korean: After his first public speech as North Korea’s leader, one eyewitness later remembered that Kim “looked like a waiter in a Chinese restaurant.”

But Kim was, Mr. Tertitskiy says, “an extraordinarily talented dictator,” and the first signs of the Cult of Kim that was to swallow his entire nation was evident soon after he took charge. State publications began to refer to him as “Commander,” “True Patriot” and “Great Chief.” By the 1960s, his standard sobriquet became “Great Leader.” In time, the name Kim Il Sung was declared sacred, with no one else permitted to use it. In print it was required to appear in bold type. He was also addressed as “Great Marshal” and “Sun of the Nation.” The traditional Chinese Zodiac was proscribed in North Korea because the year 1912—when Kim was born—was the Year of the Rat, “unbefitting the Great Leader.”

Another title bestowed upon Kim was “Unsurpassed Genius,” and we ought, perhaps, to dwell on how this puffed-up moniker did have some perverse truth to it. Kim was brilliant—masterly, even—at playing the Soviets off against Mao and the Chinese, especially in the years when the two Communist behemoth-states were at loggerheads with each other. He persuaded Mao to enter the Korean War when the Soviets were reluctant to come to Kim’s aid—regarding him as a maverick who’d launched an unwinnable invasion of the south. In later years, he milked Moscow for aid and political support when Mao soured on him. All the while, he used his country’s threadbare resources to militarize and to consolidate his vise-like grip on the throat of his nation.

Kim Il Sung was a man who told his people what to think, where to go, what to wear, what to eat, whom to marry, whom to shun, whom to worship and whom to anathematize (both at home and abroad). Mr. Tertitskiy has given us a chilling portrait of a man who seems almost too bad to be true.

Mr. Varadarajan, a Journal contributor, is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and at NYU Law School’s Classical Liberal Institute. 

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the March 29, 2025, print edition as 'The Unlikely Rise of Kim Il Sung'.








3. Is Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy washed up?


​My knee jerk reaction is that China could never be successful in pulling Japan and South Korea into its orbit. Then I look at the active Chinese subversion of South Korea's political system and I get worried.


And of course alliance management is something that must be worked on everyday and cannot be neglected. And given the 2025 Threat Assessment and "adversarial cooperation" we cannot afford to allow China to pull Japan and South Korea into its orbit.


Excerpts:


The recent diplomatic overtures among regional powers signal a quiet yet consequential shift in the geopolitics of East Asia. While the US Indo-Pacific strategy may not be obsolete, it is undeniably under strain and facing a critical test of its relevance. In contrast, China’s diplomatic strategy – grounded in economic pragmatism, multilateral engagement, and non-interference rhetoric – is gradually reshaping the strategic choices of America’s closest allies.
Whether this shift results in a permanent realignment remains to be seen. However, one thing is increasingly clear: the era of unipolar US dominance in Asia is fast fading. In its place, a more complex, multipolar order is emerging – one where diplomacy, economic interdependence, and regional cooperation may carry more weight than traditional military alliances.
Navigating this new equation will require vision, flexibility, and a deep understanding of regional sensitivities. The strategic future of Asia will not be written by force alone, but by those who can build inclusive institutions, foster trust, and respond wisely to the changing tides of global power.




Is Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy washed up? - Asia Times

Is China succeeding in pulling South Korea and Japan into its orbit?

asiatimes.com · by Lakhvinder Singh · March 28, 2025

In the unfolding drama of 21st-century geopolitics, Northeast Asia is emerging as an increasingly pivotal arena. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy – once hailed as the cornerstone of regional security and economic architecture – is now facing fresh turbulence amid shifting global dynamics.

As new alignments begin to take shape, critical questions arise: Is the United States losing its grip on the region? And, more provocatively, is China succeeding in drawing traditional US allies such as South Korea and Japan into its orbit?

Recent developments, including the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo and the Expert Dialogue held at South Korea’s National Assembly, suggest that tectonic shifts are shifting – albeit slowly and cautiously. The language of these diplomatic engagements reveals a subtle but significant recalibration of strategic postures in the region, raising both opportunities and alarms for global stakeholders.

Winds of change: the trilateral meeting in Tokyo

On the 22nd of this month, in Tokyo, the foreign ministers of South Korea, China, and Japan convened for their first trilateral meeting in over 16 months. The meeting was significant not merely because it happened after a long hiatus but because of the changing geopolitical environment that necessitated it.

With South Korea and Japan both reacting to what many interpret as a deprioritization of the region by the United States under the Trump administration, the door is now ajar for a more multipolar diplomatic setting.

The meeting emphasized cooperation in sectors directly impacting citizens’ daily lives – such as healthcare, disaster relief, aging populations, trade and science and technology. Notably, the joint commitment to organizing a Korea-China-Japan summit soon speaks volumes about the momentum behind this trilateral initiative.

Yet, this was not merely a bureaucratic gathering. Beneath the technocratic tone lay a quiet but notable recalibration. South Korea and Japan, although still formally aligned with Washington, appear increasingly open to engaging Beijing in areas traditionally reserved for strategic partners. While this may not constitute a pivot, it certainly reflects a hedging strategy – acknowledging the rise of China, while subtly compensating for uncertainties in Washington’s commitment.

A subtle shift in strategic thinking

What is particularly revealing is the softening of political rhetoric around China by both Seoul and Tokyo. Although tensions remain – especially concerning historical grievances, territorial disputes, and North Korea’s behavior – the tone and content of the Tokyo meeting displayed a clear inclination toward stability and multilateralism, rather than confrontation.

Indeed, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul of South Korea explicitly stated, “We agreed to deepen substantive cooperation in areas closely linked to people’s daily lives.” This is no mere diplomatic platitude – it reflects a growing consensus that the region must build institutional frameworks independent of external powers.

The acknowledgement that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is a “shared responsibility” among the three countries further cements the notion of a Northeast Asian community taking charge of its destiny.

The US Indo-Pacific strategy: losing traction?

The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, introduced during the Trump administration and continued with modifications under Biden, sought to counterbalance China’s rising influence through strategic partnerships and military alliances. The core philosophy was to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific” by reinforcing ties with regional powers, most notably Japan, South Korea, India and Australia.

However, this framework has encountered several headwinds. First, the Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy undermined longstanding alliances by questioning defense commitments and demanding increased cost-sharing. This eroded trust in the reliability of US security guarantees, prompting allies to reconsider their strategic autonomy.

Second, the Biden administration, while rhetorically recommitting to the region, has been preoccupied with crises elsewhere – especially Ukraine and the Middle East – leading to concerns about strategic bandwidth. Simultaneously, America’s domestic polarization and economic challenges have made its foreign policy appear erratic and reactive, rather than coherent and enduring.

Against this backdrop, China’s patient and consistent diplomacy – emphasizing economic integration, people-to-people ties and regional institutions – offers an alternative and atractive vision for Asia. This vision, while not without its risks, appears increasingly appealing to countries tired of being caught in the crossfire of great power rivalry.

China’s quiet diplomacy: pulling without pushing

China’s strategy in Northeast Asia has been notably nuanced. Rather than aggressively confronting US allies, Beijing has focused on building bridges in areas of mutual interest – such as climate change, pandemic recovery and trade. The recently held Trilateral Expert Dialogue at South Korea’s National Assembly is a case in point.

Organized jointly by the Bipartisan Forum for Advanced Diplomacy and the Institute for Global Strategic Cooperation, the forum was attended by ambassadors from both Japan and China – underscoring a symbolic shift toward dialogue, even amidst differences. Sessions focused on regional resilience, economic frameworks, climate change and cooperative diplomacy. While security issues were not sidelined, the emphasis was clearly on pragmatic cooperation rather than ideological alignment.

Notably, policymakers and scholars called for institutionalizing trilateral mechanisms that could weather political transitions and global shocks. If such frameworks are developed and sustained, they may gradually evolve into an East Asian community with its own norms, priorities, and rules of engagement – potentially diminishing US leverage in the long run.

North Korea: a persistent divergence

Despite the convergence on many issues, North Korea remains a key area of divergence. Both South Korea and Japan voiced strong concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear provocations and its growing military cooperation with Russia. Minister Cho stressed the need to fully implement UN Security Council resolutions and prevent any strategic reward to North Korea, especially in the context of the Ukraine war.

Japan’s Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya also echoed concerns about cryptocurrency theft, nuclear threats and illicit arms deals. However, China’s position remained more measured, emphasizing dialogue and denuclearization without assigning explicit blame to North Korea or addressing its ties with Russia.

This divergence underscores a critical limit to trilateral cooperation. While South Korea and Japan still align with Washington on core security issues, their willingness to tolerate differing views on North Korea in a trilateral context reveals a growing diplomatic flexibility.

Strategic autonomy or subtle realignment?

The big question remains: is this trilateral engagement a step toward strategic autonomy or a sign of subtle realignment toward China?

For now, the answer lies somewhere in between. South Korea and Japan are not abandoning their alliances with the United States. Their military and intelligence cooperation with Washington remains robust. However, their growing engagement with China in economic, technological, and social domains suggests a recalibration toward greater autonomy.

This pragmatic balancing act reflects both geopolitical necessity and domestic pressure. With China as their largest trading partner and the US as their primary security ally, neither South Korea nor Japan can afford a zero-sum choice. Instead, they appear to be crafting a middle path – one that allows engagement with both superpowers while preserving national interests.

The road ahead: a multipolar Northeast Asia?

The proposed trilateral summit – pending resolution of South Korea’s domestic political instability – may serve as a litmus test for this evolving regional alignment. If successfully held, it could mark the beginning of a new era in which East Asian powers increasingly manage their own affairs, moving beyond the binary strategic choices imposed during the Cold War era.


Sign up for one of our free newsletters


From the perspective of US strategic planners, this shift represents both a challenge and an opportunity. Washington must understand that its allies in Asia may not necessarily be defecting from the US-led order, but are instead seeking greater flexibility and agency in navigating an increasingly complex global landscape. A more consultative, less transactional US approach – one that acknowledges and respects regional aspirations – could help revitalize America’s presence in the region rather than render it obsolete. The ball is now in Washington’s court.

The emergence of a multipolar Northeast Asia appears increasingly likely. If trilateral cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan continues to institutionalize, it could lay the foundation for a new regional architecture – one that may operate independently of, yet not necessarily in opposition to, existing security alliances. This could foster a more resilient and balanced regional order.

It is crucial for other regional players – particularly India – to take careful note of these undercurrents. The geopolitical environment in East Asia is shifting rapidly, and clinging to outdated narratives or rigid alliance structures could prove counterproductive. India must be agile, updating its strategic thinking and foreign policy posture to reflect the emerging dynamics of a multipolar Asia. Doing so will not only protect its interests but also position it as a more effective player in the evolving regional equation.

The recent diplomatic overtures among regional powers signal a quiet yet consequential shift in the geopolitics of East Asia. While the US Indo-Pacific strategy may not be obsolete, it is undeniably under strain and facing a critical test of its relevance. In contrast, China’s diplomatic strategy – grounded in economic pragmatism, multilateral engagement, and non-interference rhetoric – is gradually reshaping the strategic choices of America’s closest allies.

Whether this shift results in a permanent realignment remains to be seen. However, one thing is increasingly clear: the era of unipolar US dominance in Asia is fast fading. In its place, a more complex, multipolar order is emerging – one where diplomacy, economic interdependence, and regional cooperation may carry more weight than traditional military alliances.

Navigating this new equation will require vision, flexibility, and a deep understanding of regional sensitivities. The strategic future of Asia will not be written by force alone, but by those who can build inclusive institutions, foster trust, and respond wisely to the changing tides of global power.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

asiatimes.com · by Lakhvinder Singh · March 28, 2025



4. N. Korean drones unveiled this week likely use AI to identify, strike S. Korean, U.S. equipment: lawmaker


N. Korean drones unveiled this week likely use AI to identify, strike S. Korean, U.S. equipment: lawmaker | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2025

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korean drones unveiled this week likely incorporate artificial intelligence technology to identify and autonomously strike South Korean and U.S. military equipment, a South Korean lawmaker said Friday.

Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the ruling People Power Party made the analysis after the North's state media reported Thursday the country's leader Kim Jong-un oversaw tests of "suicide attack" drones equipped with new AI technology earlier this week.

State media photos showed the drones striking targets similar in appearance to South Korean and U.S. military equipment, including the South's mobile Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile system and the U.S. Stryker armored fighting vehicle stationed in South Korea.


This image, published by the Korean Central News Agency on March 27, 2025, shows a North Korean suicide drone striking a target similar in appearance to South Korea's mobile Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile system in a test overseen by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Yu said the suicide drone is likely capable of carrying out autonomous strikes by identifying South Korean and U.S. military equipment using trained data.

The drone's attack capabilities have also likely been improved, given that the North conducted a similar test last November of drones attacking a passenger car, not military vehicles.

This week's test also featured a quadcopter dropping a bomb onto a target for the first time, highlighting the North's efforts to develop a wide range of attack drones.

"North Korea is copying military technology from various countries, including China and Russia, and improving its weapons systems for modern warfare based on its experience from the Ukraine war apparently to completely transform itself," Yu said.

North Korean troops are believed to be gaining real combat experience from the war, having deployed thousands of troops in support of Russia.


This image, published by the Korean Central News Agency on March 27, 2025, shows a North Korean quadcopter dropping a bomb onto a target in a test overseen by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)


This image, published by the Korean Central News Agency on March 27, 2025, shows a North Korean suicide drone flying toward a target similar in appearance to the U.S. military's Stryker combat vehicle in a test overseen by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 28, 2025


5. Trump says he has not discussed Russia's purchase of weapons from N. Korea with Putin


Trump says he has not discussed Russia's purchase of weapons from N. Korea with Putin | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 29, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 28 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump said Friday that he has not discussed Moscow's purchase of weapons from North Korea during his recent phone talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, amid continuing concerns about a deepening military alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow.

"Not about specifically that. No," Trump said during a press availability at the White House.


President Donald Trump speaks before Alina Habba, his former defense lawyer, is sworn in as U.S. Attorney for New Jersey in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington on March 28, 2025 in this photo released by UPI. (Yonhap)

In the midst of the protracted war in Ukraine, North Korea has supported Russia through troop deployments and supplies of munitions and ballistic missiles, raising concerns that such military support could further prolong the war with security implications for both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Asked about what an important issue is regarding the war in Ukraine, Trump said he is making "all issues" important, pointing to a set of issues, including Ukrainian children held in Russia and human losses on the battleground.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 29, 2025


6. Putin cites N. Korea among Russia's potential partners to settle Ukraine war: report


​Fusion of foes.



Putin cites N. Korea among Russia's potential partners to settle Ukraine war: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 28, 2025

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday listed North Korea as one of the partner countries he is willing to work with to settle its war in Ukraine, according to a Russian report.

Speaking about efforts to settle the war during his visit to Murmansk, Russia, Putin said not just the United States, but also China, India, Brazil, South Africa, all BRICS countries, as well as North Korea, can be partners for cooperation, according to the Russian news agency Tass.

Putin also reportedly said he welcomes any efforts to resolve the situation.

BRICS is an interstate association of 10 countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Egypt.

The remarks came amid deepening military alignment between Russia and North Korea over the Ukraine war, with Pyongyang deploying thousands of troops on the Russian side.

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko was reported to have said the previous day that preparations were under way for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia this year.


This Tass image shows Russian President Vladimir Putin. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 28, 2025


7. Prosecutors call in ex-President Moon for questioning over bribery allegations


Prosecutors call in ex-President Moon for questioning over bribery allegations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · March 28, 2025

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors have called former President Moon Jae-in in for questioning regarding bribery allegations linked to the hiring of his ex-son-in-law, officials said Friday.

The Jeonju District Prosecutors Office in the southwestern city of Jeonju summoned Moon last month as a suspect, as he and his daughter, Da-hye, were accused of allegedly receiving bribes in the form of salary and other payments for Da-hye's ex-husband, surnamed Seo, by Thailand-based budget carrier Thai Eastar Jet.

Seo was appointed executive director at the airline in 2018 after the company's founder and former two-term lawmaker, Lee Sang-jik, was appointed head of the Korea SMEs and Startups Agency.

Prosecutors suspect that Lee's appointment was made in exchange for hiring Seo at the airline, particularly given Seo's lack of experience in the airline industry at the time.

Moon is alleged to have stopped providing financial support to his daughter's family after Seo's employment, and prosecutors consider the approximately 223 million won (US$151,959) in salary and other compensation paid by the airline to Seo and Da-hye as a bribe to the former president.

"We are coordinating schedules with Moon's legal team," a prosecution official said.


This file photo shows former President Moon Jae-in entering a convention hall in the southwestern county of Yeongam to attend a peace conference on Sept. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · March 28, 2025



8. Editorial: Conflicting rulings erode judicial integrity, deepen political divisions


Editorial: Conflicting rulings erode judicial integrity, deepen political divisions

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/03/28/D74HDX52GVA7BNKTCRXTGIWU2I/


By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.03.28. 09:06



The People Power Party (PPP) has criticized a court ruling that overturned the conviction of Democratic Party (DPK) leader Lee Jae-myung in an election law violation case. Calling the appellate court’s acquittal of Lee “unacceptable” after a lower court had sentenced him to prison, the PPP urged the Supreme Court to “rectify” the decision.

The DPK welcomed the ruling and shifted its focus to the Constitutional Court, demanding an immediate ruling on President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment case and calling for his removal from office “without delay.”

In the past, political parties typically expressed respect for judicial decisions regardless of the outcome. However, a growing number of conflicting rulings in high-profile cases have eroded public trust in the judiciary. When the same case yields opposing verdicts depending on the judge or court, public confidence in the legal system weakens.

The judiciary has also come under scrutiny in the investigation into Yoon’s insurrection case. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO), which lacks jurisdiction over such cases, obtained arrest and detention warrants from the Seoul Western District Court instead of the Central District Court, raising accusations of “warrant shopping.” Forty days after Yoon’s indictment, the court reversed its decision, citing concerns over detention duration and the CIO’s authority, warning that the case could be overturned on appeal.


A view of Seoul High Court./News1

In 2023, the Supreme Court ruled that appellate courts must have “clear and compelling” grounds to overturn lower court decisions in criminal cases. Yet, in Lee’s election law violation case, the second trial acquitted him despite no new evidence or testimony. In a separate perjury case, a key witness was convicted of lying under oath, but Lee was acquitted of subornation.

Similar inconsistencies have surfaced in other politically sensitive cases. In an election-meddling case under the Moon Jae-in administration, former Ulsan Mayor Song Chul-ho and lawmaker Hwang Un-ha were sentenced to three years in prison in the first trial, only to be acquitted in the second. Such rulings have fueled perceptions that judicial decisions are influenced by political considerations.

The Constitutional Court has also faced criticism. In the case of Lee Jin-sook, the Korea Communications Commission chairperson, the court rejected an impeachment motion in a 4-4 split decision. While opposition-appointed justices dissented, questions remain over the legal basis for impeaching an official just two days after taking office. Amid public opinion polls showing that four in ten South Koreans distrust the Constitutional Court, justices later unanimously dismissed an impeachment motion against the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection and rejected Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s impeachment by a 7-1 vote.

For South Korea’s judiciary to restore public confidence, court rulings must be consistent, regardless of the defendant, judge, or jurisdiction. If verdicts continue to shift unpredictably, legal proceedings risk becoming a gamble rather than a pursuit of justice. Meanwhile, political leaders who have tied their futures to these court battles face criticism for deepening distrust in the legal system.






9. Tens of thousands hold rallies in Seoul for, against Yoon's impeachment


​If the amount of protests for and against mattered....


Excerpts:


An estimated 15,000 protesters gathered near Gyeongbok Palace, holding up picket signs demanding Yoon's "immediate ouster" and chanting "End insurrection and embrace a new world."
...
On Yoon's side, an estimated 23,000 people gathered in central Seoul for what has become a regular weekend rally, denouncing his impeachment as "null and void," and demanding a Constitutional Court ruling in his favor.



Tens of thousands hold rallies in Seoul for, against Yoon's impeachment | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 29, 2025

SEOUL, March 29 (Yonhap) -- Tens of thousands of people staged rallies in central Seoul on Saturday, either demanding the ouster or reinstatement of President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was impeached over his short-lived martial law invocation in December.

Both sides called on the Constitutional Court for a prompt ruling on Yoon's impeachment trial, as the court has yet to announce its ruling date on the case.

An estimated 15,000 protesters gathered near Gyeongbok Palace, holding up picket signs demanding Yoon's "immediate ouster" and chanting "End insurrection and embrace a new world."

Police blocked traffic in nearby lanes.

"What the Constitutional Court must uphold is the safeguarding of democracy on this land and a ruling for an ouster," Kim Jae-ha, a leader of the civic group behind the rally, said.

"There are limits to public sentiment. The Constitutional Court will be kicked out of the public's heart if warnings against it accumulate," he said.

The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) and four other opposition parties also staged a separate rally in Gwanghwamun, central Seoul, where DP floor leader Park Chan-dae declared: "Where Yoon should be is in the prison. He will attempt martial law again if he is not ousted."


Protesters call for the ouster of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol during a rally in central Seoul on March 29, 2025. (Yonhap)

On Yoon's side, an estimated 23,000 people gathered in central Seoul for what has become a regular weekend rally, denouncing his impeachment as "null and void," and demanding a Constitutional Court ruling in his favor.

The protesters had planned to stage a mass march toward the Constitutional Court but canceled it due to safety concerns.

Save Korea, a Christian civic group, hosted a separate rally near the National Assembly in the western Seoul area of Yeouido, attended by about 3,000 participants, including several lawmakers from the ruling People Power Party.

Taking the podium, Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun accused the Constitutional Court of dereliction of its duties for failing to set a date for Yoon's impeachment ruling, demanding the court "not delay and deliver its ruling next week."


Protesters denounce the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol during a rally in central Seoul on March 29, 2025. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 29, 2025


​10. Firefighters combat wildfires in southeast areas after overnight reignition; death toll rises to 30


​The tragedy continues...




(4th LD) Firefighters combat wildfires in southeast areas after overnight reignition; death toll rises to 30 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 29, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest info in headline, throughout; ADDS photo)

ANDONG, South Korea, March 29 (Yonhap) -- Wildfires reignited in the southeastern part of the country overnight Saturday before firefighters brought them back under control, according to firefighting and regional authorities.

An official with Gyeongbuk Fire Service Headquarters said reports of smoke in Andong, some 190 kilometers southeast of Seoul in North Gyeongsang Province, had started coming in at around 10 p.m. Friday night. Forestry officials believe the fire reignited around 3 a.m. Saturday.


This image shows houses burned down in Andong, North Gyeongsang Province, on March 29, 2025, after massive wildfires. (Yonhap)


A firefighting helicopter tries to extinguish a wildfire in Andong, North Gyeongsang Province, on March 29, 2025. (Yonhap)

The Korea Expressway Corp. blocked off a section of a nearby highway at 5 a.m. and reopened it just before 9 a.m. With vehicles unable to reach the mountainous areas, 11 helicopters were called in to contain the fire.

Officials said fires had also restarted in other parts of the province, including Euiseong, just south of Andong.

Regional officials called in firefighting helicopters, along with firefighters and other personnel, to bring the main body of the fires under control.

As of the afternoon, 55 helicopters and 5,500 personnel had been on duty in the southeast region, including Euiseong, Andong and Cheongsong, putting out live embers and watching for any remaining torches.

"As of now, there are no reignited wildfires in the North Gyeongsang region," a regional official said, adding, however, that it would take several days to completely extinguish remaining embers.

Separately, firefighters launched overnight operations at nearby Mount Jiri, where steep slopes and a lack of paths made access difficult for fire trucks and personnel, and blazes were still sending up flames.

After sunset, all helicopters were pulled off, but nearly 1,000 firefighters and forestry officials, along with some 200 pieces of equipment, will work through the night to contain the fire, officials said.

The Korea Forest Service earlier announced wildfires in North Gyeongsang had been fully brought under control as of 5 p.m. Friday after killing or injuring dozens of people and forcing thousands of others to flee.

About 48,000 hectares of woodland, equivalent to some 80 percent of the size of Seoul, have been scorched in the worst wildfire disaster ever in South Korea, according to the forestry agency.

Of them, nearly 13,000 ha were in Euiseong, and nearly 10,000 were in Andong.

The fire also damaged 2,996 houses and more than 1,000 agricultural facilities, according to an official estimate.

According to the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters, the death toll from the fires hit 30 on Saturday, up two from the previous day, along with 45 injuries as of 8 p.m. It said 6,885 people from 4,193 households had yet to return home since evacuating.

It added that some 55.4 billion won (US$37.7 million) had been collected in donations through relief organizations.

Acting President Han Duck-soo said the government will provide "full administrative and financial support" for displaced people until they return to normalcy.

Presiding over a meeting in Seoul on the response to the wildfires, Han also urged firefighting authorities to keep a close eye on embers.

"It's more important than anything to ensure there won't be a recurrence of such tragedy," Han said. "We need to take a comprehensive review of the government's response system and see if we're prepared for major wildfires amid rapid climate change."

The interior ministry plans to offer 230 million won to back relief efforts in North Gyeongsang.


Smoke rises from a mountain in Andong, North Gyeongsang Province, on March 29, 2025. (Yonhap)


(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 29, 2025


11. Trump voices openness to making deals over reciprocal tariffs if U.S. can 'get something'


Trump voices openness to making deals over reciprocal tariffs if U.S. can 'get something' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 29, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 28 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday expressed his openness to making deals with countries over "reciprocal" tariffs after they are announced next week, if the United States can "get something" through negotiations.

Trump made the remarks as his administration plans to roll out reciprocal tariffs -- meant to match what other countries impose on U.S. exports -- on Wednesday. The country-by-country tariffs will be customized based on trading partners' tariff- and non-tariff barriers and other factors, including exchange rates.

"They want to make deals. It's possible if we can get something for the deal. But, you know, we've been taken advantage of for 40 years, maybe more, and it's just not going to happen anymore," he told reporters on Air Force One, according to a White House pool report.

"But yeah, I'm certainly open to that if we can do something where we get something for it," he added.


U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to members of the media aboard Air Force One before landing in West Palm Beach, Florida, on March 28, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

Asked if negotiated deals are possible before the announcement on the tariffs, Trump said, "No, probably later."

Trump also said that tariffs on pharmaceuticals will be announced "soon."

"But we have to bring pharmaceuticals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, back into our country," he said.

The president did not elaborate on the tariff rate he is considering but said that the government is looking for a "certain number" that will be "enough to get the drugs and the pharmaceutical companies bringing their product into our country."

"We never want to have to rely on other countries for that like we did in Covid," he said, referring to shortages that the U.S. suffered during the pandemic.

South Korea has been cranking up diplomatic efforts to avoid new U.S. levies amid concerns that its trade surplus, which reached US$55.7 billion last year, and Trump's seemingly negative view of Korea as a trading partner could put Asia's fourth-largest economy into his crosshairs.

During an address to Congress earlier this month, Trump claimed that South Korea's average tariff rate is four times higher than that of the U.S. -- a charge that Seoul countered by saying that it stands at less than 1 percent under a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S.

South Korea's average tariff on its most-favored nations (MFNs) stands at around 13.4 percent -- compared with the U.S.' 3.3 percent on its MFNs -- but that rate is not applicable to countries with FTAs with Korea.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 29, 2025


12. S. Korea says will work for prompt repatriation of 2 N. Koreans found adrift near border


S. Korea says will work for prompt repatriation of 2 N. Koreans found adrift near border | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 28, 2025

SEOUL, March 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will work toward the prompt and safe repatriation of two North Koreans who were found adrift in waters south of the inter-Korean maritime border earlier this month, the unification ministry said Friday.

"(The government) will have consultations with related bodies for the North Korean residents' prompt and safe return," Kim In-ae, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, said in a regular press briefing.

In March, the South Korean military found two North Koreans aboard a wooden boat drifting on the southern side of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, in what was believed to be an accidental border crossing.

They reportedly did not express a desire to remain in South Korea, prompting the South Korean government to arrange for their return home.

The government's reaction followed a news report that the United Nations Command had recently sent a notice via a hotline regarding the repatriation of the North Koreans at South Korea's request, but North Korea had shown no response.


Coast Guard vessels are seen in this undated file photo. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 28, 2025


13. Deployment of 3 North Korean Early Warning Aircraft Imminent



​This is a Google translation of an RFA report.




Deployment of 3 North Korean Early Warning Aircraft Imminent

WASHINGTON - Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org

2025.03.28

https://www.rfa.org/korean/listen/weapons-guide/2025/03/28/north-korea-airborne-early-warning-fighter/


North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un guided the defense science research work of the newly developed and produced Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Technology Association and the Detection and Electronic Warfare Research Group on the 25th and 26th, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 27th. The photo shows an aircraft that appears to be an airborne early warning and control aircraft that North Korea has unveiled for the first time. (Yonhap)


(Host) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace. This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting ' Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ' from Washington D.C., USA. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the Korea's 'Independent Defense Network.'


Kim Jong-un is said to have the 'early warning aircraft' he dreamed of, but...

(Host) North Korea, which has recently been showing signs of strengthening its conventional military power, has been caught almost completing the airborne early warning and control aircraft that it has been remodeling since two years ago. There is talk that it received technical support from Russia, and there is also analysis that it is made with Chinese technology. Just looking at the appearance of North Korea's early warning aircraft, what kind of performance can we estimate?


(Lee Il-woo) The first evidence that North Korea was building an early warning aircraft was revealed in mid-December 2023, when commercial satellite photos of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport showed an IL-76 transport aircraft being modified. This IL-76 transport aircraft is the same model as the large transport aircraft in the livery of Air Koryo that appeared during the airborne training of the Special Operations Forces Air Ground Forces in March 2024, when a parachute tangled and many people fell, revealing the true face of North Korea's special forces.


In the early 1990s, North Korea imported three IL-76TD cargo transport aircraft from Russia and operated them as Air Koryo. In fact, Air Koryo is an organization controlled by the North Korean military, so it was used to transport cargo to and from friendly countries such as China and Russia during normal times, and for airborne training when the North Korean military needed it.


There are more cases of early warning aircraft based on the transport aircraft called IL-76 than you might think. There is the Russian A-50 series, and China's KJ-2000. In the past, during the Hussein era, Iraq also made early warning aircraft in a rough manner under the names Baghdad-1 and Baghdad-2, and India made an early warning aircraft called A-50EI with Israeli technical support and is still using it. Looking at it this way, making an early warning aircraft based on the IL-76 platform may seem like a good choice.


North Korea's early warning aircraft may have used Russian technology, but it is also possible that it used a domestically developed phased array radar that applied the phased array radar technology used in the Lightning and Byeoljji series. The North Korean early warning aircraft has a similar shape to Russian or Chinese early warning aircraft based on the IL-76, but its radar is much larger than the Russian A-50 series, and there are triangles drawn on it that raise suspicions that it is a three-sided fixed phased array radar rather than a rotating radar. The fact that the radar is much larger than that of the A-50 and that it is positioned closer to the center of the fuselage is circumstantial evidence that increases the possibility that this radar is domestically developed by North Korea.


The problem is that as the radar has grown larger, its performance may not have improved as well. The detection range of a phased array radar is proportional to the power efficiency and number of T/R modules, and the amount of power supplied. Russia's A-50 and China's KJ-2000 are based on the same IL-76 transport aircraft, but they have the PS-90 turbofan engine, which is a newer model even among IL-76s, and have much more powerful output and power production than the North Korean IL-76TD model, which has the older Soloviev D-30 turbofan engine. In other words, it is very likely that the North Korean early warning aircraft has only a large radar due to insufficient output, lack of T/R module manufacturing technology, and lack of radar software technology, and its detection and tracking capabilities as an early warning aircraft are very poor.


Even this early warning aircraft does not appear to have any electronic warfare support equipment or an IDF antenna, as far as has been determined so far. This means that this early warning aircraft is literally just a radar base floating in the sky, and it is difficult to play the role of an early warning and control aircraft operated by advanced countries, that is, a command center in the sky that can fly and direct air operations.


North Korea Early Warning #1 Homework - ROK-US Cruise Missile Defense

(Host) An early warning aircraft is a weapon that North Korea has never had before. The most urgent task for the North Korean Air Force, which is seriously outdated, must have been to expand its modern air defense weapons, such as fighter jets. Why did North Korea suddenly decide to acquire an early warning aircraft?


(Lee Il-woo) As the saying goes, “The higher the bird flies, the farther the radar can see.” This is why radar for air defense operations is usually installed on mountaintops. Since there are many terrains and artificial structures on the ground that can potentially block radar waves, it is common sense to build in high places to avoid these obstacles as much as possible. However, no matter how high up on the ground you install it, the problem does not completely disappear. Since radar has a limited range of detection, that is, the angle of its radio waves, if you place it on top of a mountain on the ground, you can see far away, but it will be difficult to see targets flying at low altitudes at close range. It’s like putting the lamp under a dark lamp.


Early warning aircraft were introduced to solve this problem. By mounting radar on an aircraft at a very high altitude and then transmitting radio waves from above, the blind spot is greatly reduced, and the view is farther and wider. In particular, as introduced earlier, these early warning aircraft are very effective in detecting low-altitude aerial targets from a long distance.


Tomahawk missiles launched from US warships or submarines, or Hyunmoo-3 and tactical ship-to-ground missiles launched from South Korean land-based bases or surface ships, fly at very low altitudes to avoid North Korean air defense radars installed high on mountains or hills. These missiles are slower than ballistic missiles, but they are very precise, and can hit any building in Pyongyang, even on several floors and in several windows, like a pair of pincers.


These missiles are very difficult to detect with ground-based radar, and even if they are detected, they can only be detected at close range, leaving very little time to respond. This was a huge headache for North Korea, because in the event of an emergency, the US would use a tactic of pouring down a large number of Tomahawk missiles when starting a war, and the South Korean military would do the same, so if they could not stop this from a distance, there was a high possibility that the center of Pyongyang would be reduced to ashes by the South Korea-US joint force's pincer strike. In other words, North Korea's early warning aircraft is being built as a floating radar base to protect Pyongyang's leadership from the South Korea-US joint force's cruise missile threat.


North Korea conducted a strategic cruise missile launch drill in the West Sea on the morning of the 26th, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 28th. The agency reported that Chairman Kim Jong-un observed the drill.

North Korea conducted a strategic cruise missile launch drill in the West Sea on the morning of the 26th, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 28th. The agency reported that Chairman Kim Jong-un observed the drill. (Yonhap)

Related Articles


[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] Washington Aircraft Carrier 'God's Eye' Comes to the Korean Peninsula


[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] What will happen when 'Reagan' goes and 'Washington' comes equipped with F-35C


“Do you have a license?” North Korea, can it handle early warning aircraft?

(Host) The United States and other advanced Western countries have been using early warning aircraft for a long time, so the early warning aircraft themselves are technologically advanced and their operational tactics are also sophisticated. This is the first time North Korea is using this type of aircraft, so will they be able to operate it properly?


(Lee Il-woo) As previously introduced, major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China operate early warning aircraft. However, when comparing the actual cases of the United States and the actual cases of Russia, the method and results of operating early warning aircraft are very different. The United States, which introduced the concept of early warning aircraft at the end of World War II and has refined its technology and tactics for over 70 years, not only has the performance of early warning aircraft itself very excellent, but also has highly developed tactics and doctrines for commanding and controlling air operations of fighters and various support aircraft using them. American early warning aircraft use powerful radars that are incomparable to fighters to detect and track enemy aircraft from hundreds of kilometers away, and command friendly aircraft ranging from as few as three to four to as many as several dozen in a coordinated manner, sending friendly aircraft to advantageous locations and controlling them to launch unilateral attacks on the enemy.


However, Russia, which had regarded early warning aircraft as nothing more than radar bases floating in the sky, did not understand such tactics, and in this Ukrainian war, its role was limited to detecting incoming Ukrainian fighter jets and drones from a distance and transmitting interception orders to nearby Russian fighter jets. Because its radar performance was also lacking, it gradually came closer to the front lines, and then in the spring of last year, it was shot down by a Ukrainian long-range surface-to-air missile and was banned from flying for almost a year. Recently, it returned to its mission for use in Moscow air defense operations, but it is being criticized for failing to function properly as it failed to stop the Ukrainian drone air raid on Moscow in early March.


The same goes for North Korea. First of all, North Korea's early warning aircraft cannot guarantee radar performance, and even if it has a detection range of hundreds of kilometers, if it cannot share this in real time with other fighters or surface-to-air missiles in the form of a data link, its value as an early warning aircraft will drop sharply. Even if North Korea's early warning aircraft has such data sharing capabilities, almost all of North Korea's fighters and surface-to-air weapons are analog, not digital, so there is no way to receive the data transmitted by the early warning aircraft.


In other words, North Korea's early warning aircraft will only be able to warn of the approach of South Korea-U.S. combined forces' cruise missiles to new North Korean air defense frigates, new medium- and long-range surface-to-air missile batteries such as the Paengbo-5 or 6, and Byeoljji-1-2 deployed around Pyongyang. They will not be able to play the same role as the U.S. or South Korean early warning aircraft.


North Korean Fajr-27 gun replica and Star-1-2

North Korean Fajr-27 gun replica and Star-1-2 (Korean Central News Agency)

North Korea's 3 early warning aircraft, ready for combat in 30 minutes

(Host) Even if North Korea's early warning aircraft cannot play the same role as South Korea and the US's early warning aircraft, wouldn't it be a big problem if it could detect the cruise missiles of the South Korea-US allied forces from a distance and sound the alarm early? In particular, it seems like it would also hinder South Korea's retaliatory retaliatory strategy of precision strikes on the North Korean leadership.


(Lee Il-woo) The North Korean early warning aircraft was designed based on the old IL-76, and as explained earlier, it was manufactured without electronic warfare support. The most important mission of this one early warning aircraft is the Pyongyang air defense operation, so in the event of an emergency, this early warning aircraft will circle over Pyongyang. If North Korea wants to detect the ROK-US combined forces’ cruise missiles earlier and from afar, it can adjust the early warning aircraft’s flight area to the airspace over Sariwon and other areas in North Pyongan Province.


This early warning aircraft is so large that it can be detected from 200 to 300 km away by general fighter radars, and from 400 to 500 km away by South Korean early warning aircraft. South Korea will deploy KF-21 fighters equipped with Meteor long-range air-to-air missiles capable of attacking North Korean early warning aircraft from 300 km away to the Gangneung Air Base starting next year. A KF-21 taking off from Gangneung can shoot down a North Korean early warning aircraft over Pyongyang by firing a Meteor immediately after takeoff. This early warning aircraft does not have electronic warfare means, nor does it have the agility to avoid missiles, so it will be an easy prey.


Of course, the AIM-174B missiles used by the Super Hornets of the George Washington carrier strike group in the Pacific region can intercept North Korean early warning aircraft at a much longer range than the KF-21's Meteor attack range.


North Korea is converting its precious transport aircraft, of which there are only three, into early warning aircraft, but I can guarantee that these early warning aircraft will crash into a fireball within 30 minutes if war breaks out.


(Host) That was Lee Il-woo, the director of the Korea Independent Defense Network. Now, we're back with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington.


Editor Lee Jinseo


14. North Koreans Dislike People's Unit Leaders… 'Shift System' Appears


​Again, is there growing resistance potential?


This iia Google translation of an RFA report.



North Koreans Dislike People's Unit Leaders… 'Shift System' Appears

Seoul-Kim Ji-eun xallsl@rfa.org

2025.03.28

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-depth/2025/03/28/north-korea-resident-leader-shift-system/


A drama containing the story of a people's unit leader aired on Korean Central TV (KBS screen capture)


Anchor: In North Korea, there is news that since no one wants to be the people's unit leader, they decided to take turns taking the position. Reporter Kim Ji-eun reports from inside North Korea.


The People's Unit in North Korea is a grassroots organization of North Korean society, consisting of 20 to 30 households. Each People's Unit leader is responsible for delivering the party's instructions to the residents and mobilizing them, but it is known that friction with the residents often occurs during this process.


A source from Yanggang Province (who requested anonymity for safety reasons) told Radio Free Asia on the 25th, “These days, people’s units without people’s unit leaders are appearing in Hyesan,” adding, “This is because people’s unit leaders mobilize residents and receive tasks, which makes them the target of residents’ hatred and criticism.”


The People's Committee Leader, who has become the target of hatred and criticism, is an alternative that everyone avoids?

The source explained, “In the past, a neighborhood watch leader would be in charge of a neighborhood watch unit of about 30 households and would be responsible for everything from lodging inspections to social mobilization, relief supplies, and fundraising for loyalty.” He continued, “However, recently, there have been frequent instances of residents who are having a hard time making ends meet rebelling against neighborhood watch leaders.”


Also, “There was an incident in which residents protested against the neighborhood watch leader in Hyemyong-dong, Hyesan-si, who demanded supplies to set up a guard post,” he said. “The neighborhood watch leader relayed the party’s directive, but the residents protested, asking where they could get paint and cement.”


He added, “When some of the people’s unit members became aggressive, the people’s unit leader declared, ‘I will not be the unit leader from today onwards’ and ran out.” He continued, “The people’s unit residents who had gathered tried to elect a new unit leader, but the mood was that no one wanted to be the unit leader.”


He said, “When a people’s unit without a people’s unit leader was created, the head of the neighborhood office came to the scene and held several meetings to select a people’s unit leader,” and “When the meetings failed to reach a conclusion, the head of the neighborhood office took the measure of having each household take turns being the people’s unit leader.”


Related News


North Korea's Social Security Strengthens Control of Accommodation of Outsiders in Each People's Unit


“Have you left your money?” North Korean residents dissatisfied with ongoing challenges


Kim Jong-un takes commemorative photo with participants of the 3rd National People's Congress

General Secretary Kim Jong-un poses for a commemorative photo with participants in the 3rd National People's Congress on the 20th. (Yonhap)

In relation to this, another source from Yanggang Province (who requested anonymity for personal safety reasons) told Radio Free Asia on the same day, “These days, there are people’s units that take turns as people’s unit leaders,” adding, “This is because the people’s unit residents are rejecting the people’s unit leaders who collect money and supplies and cause friction with the residents.”


The source said, “Although the people’s unit leader receives a monthly activity fee of 30,000 won (US$1.50) from the neighborhood office, he has to mobilize residents and collect their tasks for the entire month in return for that money,” adding, “The party only gives continuous orders to residents who are having a hard time making a living, so even the unit leader can’t do that.”


He also said, “Residents who are forced to do unpaid labor under the pretext of social mobilization react angrily to the neighborhood watch leaders,” and “Residents who are tired of the continued tax burden and social mobilization often vent their anger at the neighborhood watch leaders.”


“In most neighborhood units, residents regard their neighborhood unit leaders as their enemies,” the source said. “Because neighborhood unit leaders are responsible for monitoring residents and reporting to the party, they are sometimes treated as watchdogs and whistleblowers.”


This is Ji-eun Kim of RFA's Radio Free Asia in Seoul.



15. White House mentions Hyundai's investment plan as result of Trump's drive for 'American manufacturing dominance'




​South Korean businesses are playing it smart. Things must be put in the context of a win for the President.


White House mentions Hyundai's investment plan as result of Trump's drive for 'American manufacturing dominance'

The Korea Times · March 29, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump arrives on Air Force One at Palm Beach International Airport, March 28, in West Palm Beach, Fla., U.S. AP-Yonhap

The White House cited Friday, South Korean conglomerate Hyundai Motor Group's recently unveiled plan to invest US$21 billion in the United States through 2028 as a result of U.S. President Donald Trump's push to achieve "American manufacturing dominance."

On Monday, the group's Executive Chair Euisun Chung announced a multipronged plan that includes an investment of $8.6 billion in the automotive sector, $6.1 billion in the steel, component parts and logistics industries, and $6.3 billion for future industrial sectors and energy.

The White House said that ten weeks into his second term, Trump is delivering "transformative" wins for the American people. (Yonhap)



The Korea Times · March 29, 2025





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Company Name | Website
Facebook  Twitter  Pinterest  
basicImage