Quotes of the Day:

"I have simply tried to do what seemed best each day, as each day came." 

–​ Abe Lincoln

"A man doesn't begin to attain wisdom until he recognizes that he is no longer indispensable." 

–Richard Byrd

"Read, observe, listen intensely. As if your life depended upon it." 

–​ Joyce Carol Oates

​1. US Green Berets reportedly permanently based in Taiwan for 1st time

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 2, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 2, 2024

4. The World Is in for Another China Shock

5. Russians Keep Turning Up Dead All Over the World

6​. Dropping aid from planes is expensive and inefficient. Why do it?

7.​ I barely survived the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka

8. Opinion | Food convoy carnage distills what’s gone terribly wrong in Gaza

9. Nazi rescue of Mussolini a US model for Zelensky

10. General Officer Assignment Announcement, dtd 29 February 2024 (US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School)

11. Lack of Plan for Governing Gaza Formed Backdrop to Deadly Convoy Chaos

12. Russia's 'grey zone' tactics in Finland’s snowy forests

13. Minister: Drone education program to be introduced in Ukrainian schools

14. US 2.0: Lincoln’s Dilemma

1. US Green Berets reportedly permanently based in Taiwan for 1st time

I doubt they are "permanently" assigned. Our personnel system is just not agile enough to create requirements and authorizations to PCS personnel permanently to Taiwan. I think what we probably have is a "permanent" or ongoing rotational presence. 

Also, the Taiwan resident Detachment consisted of 1st Special Forces Group personnel from 1959 or through 1973. This had Special Forces personnel permanently assigned. But we forget our history.

Taiwan News is not the first to report this. This has been observed for quite some time.

US Army Special Forces Train Taiwan Troops Near China's Coast

Newsweek here: https://www.newsweek.com/american-special-forces-train-taiwan-soldiers-penghu-kinmen-china-coast-1868009

Building a US Special Forces ‘Stealth Network’ on Taiwan

https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/building-a-us-special-forces-stealth-network-on-taiwan/

US Army special forces train to defend Taiwan during Chinese invasion

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4879221

Inside the Secretive Training US Green Berets Give Troops Who May Face Russia or China

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/01/19/inside-secretive-training-us-green-berets-give-troops-who-may-face-russia-or-china.html

US Green Berets who've trained Taiwanese troops explain how they could fight China and why the US keeps their mission secret

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-green-berets-explain-how-they-train-taiwan-troops-2021-10

US Green Berets reportedly permanently based in Taiwan for 1st time

American military advisors stationed in Army amphibious bases in Kinmen and Penghu

By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer

2024/03/02 18:37

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5106211

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The U.S. has reportedly stationed special forces in Taiwan to conduct continuous training missions in the country.

Following the implementation of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 in the U.S., American military advisors have begun being permanently stationed in Army amphibious bases in Kinmen and Penghu this year, reported UDN. They are conducting periodic training sessions with various Taiwanese special forces units.

Since last year, U.S. special forces have been assisting Taiwan special forces in learning to operate the Black Hornet Nano, a military micro unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and helping develop guidelines and instructional materials. The Aviation and Special Forces Command has submitted a proposal to purchase the drone from the U.S. through arms sales channels.

The NDAA includes plans for sending officials to Taiwan. Currently, there are no reported plans for civilian officials to be stationed in Taiwan. However, it is reported that the U.S. military's Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) is expanding its training program in Taiwan.

This involves sending three-person teams from the Army Green Berets, specifically from the 1st Special Forces Group, 2nd Battalion, Alpha Company, to be stationed at bases of Taiwan's 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion and Airborne Special Service Company for continuous joint training, serving as resident training observers. Contrary to the past, when the U.S. military frequently visited the Army Airborne Training Center (now located at a new site in Pingtung) and the Guguan Special Forces Training Center, there were no U.S. personnel previously stationed at these locations.

Since last year, the SOFLE was stationed at Taiwan's special operations command base in Taoyuan's Longtan District. All U.S. special operations personnel in Taiwan are under the guidance, support, and control of the SOFLE post in Taoyuan, and it manages high-value equipment or training materials temporarily stored in Taiwan, UDN said.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, was cited by TVBS as saying, "The Green Berets are a defensive type of special forces, employed to counteract enemy infiltration, especially when integrated with Taiwan's amphibious reconnaissance battalions. They include the 1st Reconnaissance Company in Kinmen, 2nd Reconnaissance Company in Matsu, and 3rd Reconnaissance Company in Penghu, as well as at the mouth of the Tamsui River."

In an interview with CNN in 2021, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) became the first Taiwanese president in 40 years to acknowledge that there are U.S. troops deployed in the country. This latest news about the Green Berets, marks the first report of the U.S. permanently stationing military personnel in Taiwan.

When asked by Taiwan News to comment on the report, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said the content of the NDAA is aimed at assisting Taiwan in developing comprehensive training and institutionalized capabilities. "Exchanges with foreign militaries will be carried out according to annual plans, and no comments will be made on the details of such activities," said the ministry.

The MND added that the military will "continue to make concerted efforts to train and prepare for war to ensure national security and regional stability." Meanwhile, the Pentagon has yet to respond to a request from Taiwan News for comment.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 2, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be willing to risk continued aviation losses in pursuit of tactical gains in eastern Ukraine, likely along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).
• Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO.
• The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Krynky on March 2.
• Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 2, 2024

Mar 2, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 2, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 2, 2024, 6:05pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on March 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces appear to be willing to risk continued aviation losses in pursuit of tactical gains in eastern Ukraine, likely along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Su-34 aircraft that was conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine on the morning of March 1.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk later stated that Ukrainian forces attempted to down two additional Russian Su-34 aircraft and one Su-35 and downed one of the Su-34 aircraft.[2] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces have shot down 15 Russian aircraft since February 17.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces have not deployed A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft over the Sea of Azov for the past six days following the destruction of an A-50 aircraft on February 23 and implied that the absence of A-50 aircraft forces Russian Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft to fly closer to their targets to conduct strikes.[4] Previous Russian aircraft losses have prompted Russian forces to temporarily decrease aviation activity throughout Ukraine, but the increased rate of Russian aviation losses in Ukraine in the past weeks has yet to prompt Russian forces to significantly decrease tactical aviation activity.[5] ISW assessed that Russian forces temporarily established limited and localized air superiority during the final days of the Russian seizure of Avdiivka.[6] Russian forces are likely attempting to reestablish this limited and localized air superiority in order to support tactical Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction and have decided that continued offensive operations with air support outweigh the risk of losing more aircraft. ISW continues to assess that the reported loss of 15 aircraft and possibly some highly trained pilots in about two weeks is not negligible for the Russian military given that Russia likely has about 300 various Sukhoi fighter aircraft.[7]

Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024. North Korea-focused outlet NK Pro reported on February 29, citing satellite imagery, that Russian ships involved in the maritime transport of North Korean ammunition and weaponry to Russia have not docked at North Korea’s Rajin Port since February 12.[8] NK Pro reported that Russian ships have made at least 32 trips between the Rajin Port and Russia’s Dunay and Vostochny ports, Primorsky Krai since August 2023. NK Pro reported that the Russian Lady R cargo ship transported an unspecified number of shipping containers, likely containing North Korean ammunition and weapons, between North Korea and Russia from January 30 to February 8 and that the Maia-1 cargo ship arrived at Russia’s Vostochny Port from North Korea on February 12. NK Pro reported that satellite imagery has not captured another large cargo ship traveling between the two piers or new deliveries to the Rajin Port since February 12 and suggested that the pause could be due to production issues in North Korea or other logistical issues. NK Pro noted that North Korea could also be transporting weapons to Russia via air or rail. ISW previously reported that Russia uses the Baikal-Amur Railway and the East Siberian Railway to facilitate cargo transfers from and to China and North Korea, both countries that Russia is increasingly relying on for economic and military support respectively to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[9] South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik stated on February 26 that North Korea has sent an estimated 6,700 shipping containers of ammunition to Russia in recent months.[10] Shin stated that these containers could carry over three million 152mm artillery shells or roughly 500,000 122mm shells.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.[11] Lavrov attended the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey on March 1 and responded to a question about Erdogan’s offer by stating that there are no current dialogue initiatives that consider Russian interests.[12] Lavrov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other Kremlin officials routinely feign openness to negotiations while promoting information operations that place the onus for negotiations on the West.[13] Lavrov’s demand for a dialogue initiative that accounts for Russian interests is part of a longstanding effort to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[14]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU). Lavrov answered a question at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey on March 1 about the recent Congress of Deputies held in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, which requested that Russia provide Transnistria “defense/protection.”[15] Lavrov claimed that the Moldovan government is ”moving in Kyiv’s footsteps,” reiterating his previous comparisons of Moldovan policies towards Transnistria to Ukraine before 2014.[16] Lavrov continued to claim that Moldova is discriminating against Russian speakers, applying ”economic pressure” to Transnistria, and blocking the 5+2 negotiating process for the Transnistria conflict — claims that Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently repeated.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will use the recent Transnistrian congress as a springboard to intensify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova-EU accession negotiations and the Moldovan presidential election later in 2024.[18]

Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “it is time for Armenia to decide on its status in the CSTO,” likely in response to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s February 22 statement that Armenia “essentially” froze its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO “failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security” to Armenia, particularly in 2021 and 2022.[19] Pashinyan stated on February 28 that Armenia has not had a permanent representative to the CSTO in the past year and that Armenian officials and forces have not participated in CSTO events and exercises in “a long time.”[20] ISW observed that Armenia effectively abstained from the CSTO by failing to send representatives to several consecutive CSTO events in mid-to-late-2023.[21] Pashinyan has increasingly publicly questioned Armenia’s security relations with Russia since mid-2023.[22] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously responded to Pashinyan’s statements about the CSTO by rejecting his claims and emphasizing Armenia’s continued membership in the CSTO.[23] Lavrov’s acknowledgment of Armenia’s continued objection to its participation in the CSTO indicates that the Kremlin may be preparing a more concerted response to its deteriorating relations with Armenia.

The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1. Russian opposition sources reported that up to 16,500 people attended Navalny’s funeral at the Borisovsky Cemetery in Moscow, and footage shows that crowds of people queueing for the funeral chanted anti-war slogans and calls for demobilization.[24] Russian civil rights group OVD-info reported that Russian authorities detained 15 people in Moscow and 89 other people in 18 other Russian cities in connection with Navalny’s funeral by the night of March 1 to 2.[25] Russians continued to lay flowers at Navalny’s grave in Moscow and at memorials elsewhere on March 2, although relatively large displays of anti-war sentiment did not continue on March 2.[26] The Moscow Times reported on March 1 that the Kremlin tasked Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officials with conducting an operation to ”protect the constitutional order from threats” during Navalny’s funeral.[27] The Kremlin likely did not order large crackdowns against displays of anti-war sentiment in order to avoid prompting wider outrage while also projecting confidence in public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his war effort in Ukraine ahead of presidential elections on March 17.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be willing to risk continued aviation losses in pursuit of tactical gains in eastern Ukraine, likely along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).
• Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO.
• The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Krynky on March 2.
• Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 2. Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna) and south of Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[28] Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Lake Lyman, and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW is restructuring its coverage of the Donetsk Oblast axis to include activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. During the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, ISW assessed that Ukrainian activity in the border area was a supporting and related effort to Ukrainian activity in the south. As Russian forces have seized the battlefield initiative following the end of the counteroffensive, Russian troops appear to be trying to drive southwest of Donetsk City while simultaneously driving northeast from the Velyka Novosilka area on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. This Russian effort appears to include settlements along the O0532 Marinka-Pobieda-Vuhledar route. ISW will further restructure the Donetsk Oblast axis if Russian operational objectives in this area appear to change in the future.

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[30] Positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne.[31]

Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central and eastern Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[32] Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces also advanced in Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tonenke, but other Russian milbloggers denied claims that Russian forces controlled the settlement.[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka), Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka), and Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[35] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, Semenivka, and Stepove; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske.[36] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces completely rotated elements of a brigade that had been fighting in the eastern direction for two years and transferred them to the rear for restoration.[37] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Nevelske; elements of the 1st ”Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Tonenke; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Tonenke and Orlivka.[38]

The Russian military command is reportedly committing additional elements to offensive operations west of Avdiivka, further suggesting that Russian forces intend to continue their efforts to advance as far as possible before Ukrainian forces establish harder-to-penetrate defenses.[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command committed elements of the 74th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) from reserve into battle in the Lastochkyne-Tonenke direction.[40] Mashovets stated that the Russian command will also likely commit elements of the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) to the Berdychi or Novobakhmutivka direction in the near future. Mashovets stated that elements of the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment recently concentrated near Horlivka (northeast of Avdiivka) after resting and reconstituting. ISW last observed reports of elements of the 90th Tank Division attacking near Avdiivka during the Russian seizure of the settlement in mid-February but has not observed reports of them attacking west or northwest of the settlement since then.[41]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novomykhailivka, Heorhiivka, and Krasnohorivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian minefields west of Donetsk City are complicating Russian offensive operations.[44] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[45]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Marfopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Hulyaipole, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole, and elements of the 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on March 2.[49] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there is a lull in activity near Robotyne, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported only one unsuccessful Russian attack in the area.[50] Elements of the 247th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[51]

Russian forces recently made marginal gains near Krynky amid continued positional fighting in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[52] Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains within Krynky.[53]

Russian forces in occupied Crimea are reportedly trying to disrupt and mislead Ukrainian reconnaissance out of apparent fear of continued Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 2 that elements of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division in occupied Crimea have started to widely employ false positions and are using false radio communications to mislead Ukrainian reconnaissance.[54]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/35 missiles from occupied Kherson and Donetsk oblasts and 17 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Balaklava, Crimea.[55] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 14 Shahed drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and two missiles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[56] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings in Odesa City with drones and Shevchenkove Hromada, Mykolaiv Oblast with a missile.[57]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian authorities are constructing new mooring infrastructure for Russia’s Caspian Flotilla and a large military hospital complex in Makhachkala, Dagestan.[58]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to portray Russia as an inclusive harmonious, multicultural state during a speech to the World Youth Festival on March 2.[59] ISW has extensively reported on growing anti-migrant sentiments and interreligious tensions in Russia and Russia’s efforts to persecute non-Russian Orthodox Christian religious communities in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[60]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Belarus disagreed with Russia on the price of components for Grad multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), resulting in Belarus providing lower quality Grad MLRS components to Russia.[61] The GUR reported that Belarusian defense company Volatavto agreed to supply 250 Grad MLRS components to Russian defense company Special Design Bureau at a 500 to 600 percent markup. The GUR stated that Belarus agreed to lower the price of the Grad MLRS components by producing them through subcontractors who do not have the necessary licenses to produce the parts. The GUR noted that Volatavto and Special Design Bureau are under international sanctions.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 2, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-2-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. Hamas targeted Israeli forces in Zaytoun with rocket-propelled grenades and explosively-formed penetrators.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
• Humanitarian Aid: The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 2, 2024

Mar 2, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 2, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 2 and 3, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, March 4, 2024. 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. Hamas targeted Israeli forces in Zaytoun with rocket-propelled grenades and explosively-formed penetrators.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
• Humanitarian Aid: The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting three Palestinian fighters in western Gaza City’s Rimal neighborhood.[1] Israeli forces concluded a clearing operation to reduce Hamas fighters and infrastructure in neighborhoods including Rimal on February 15.[2] The IDF joint special operations multidimensional unit and Nahal Brigade killed several fighters in the central Gaza Strip on March 2.[3] The Nahal Brigade has been operating in Zaytoun as part of the IDF’s clearing operation there, which began on February 20.

Hamas fighters in southeastern Zaytoun resumed contact with their headquarters and reported several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[4] The fighters detonated explosively-formed penetrators and fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor in the area.[5]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed to shoot down an IDF reconnaissance drone over Beit Lahia.[6]

The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.[7] Israeli forces found small arms during a raid targeting a building owned by Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF 7th Brigade directed a series of airstrikes that killed eight Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis, including one who was carrying a suspected IED.[8]

Hamas fighters detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting seven Israeli soldiers in northern Khan Younis on March 2.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted several attacks using mortars and RPGs in Khan Younis City.[10]

The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.[11] US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Jordanian Air Force delivered 38,000 meals along the coastline of the Gaza Strip. US President Joe Biden said on March 1 that the "aid flowing to Gaza is nowhere [near] enough.”[12] An unspecified US official told Axios that he expected more airdrops to take place in the coming days.[13]

A senior US official told reporters that there needs to be a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to allow for the large-scale delivery of aid.[14] Israel has reportedly agreed to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce.[15]

Palestinian militias have conducted at least two rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 1. PIJ fired rockets targeting Ashkelon and other unspecified towns in southern Israel on March 1.[16] The IDF Air Force targeted two areas in the northern Gaza Strip from which Palestinian fighters had previously fired rockets targeting Israel on March 1.[17] PIJ fired another rocket salvo targeting Hatzerim in southern Israel on March 2.[18]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[19]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[20]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.[21] Houthi fighters also launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea on March 1. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi attack did not damage any vessels.

4. The World Is in for Another China Shock

Excerpts:

But weak demand and overcapacity means Chinese producer prices have been falling for 16 months, led by consumer and durable goods, food products, metals and electrical machinery. 

That disinflationary impulse is showing up around the world. The price of U.S. imports from China fell 2.9% in January from a year earlier, while the price of imports from the European Union, Japan and Mexico all rose.

Unlike in the early 2000s, however, the Western world now sees China as its chief economic rival and geopolitical adversary. The EU is considering whether Chinese-made electric vehicles are unfairly subsidized and should be subject to tariffs or other import restrictions. Former President Donald Trump, who is seeking the Republican nomination for November’s presidential election, has floated the idea of hitting imports from China with tariffs of 60% or higher. 

Such protectionism might shift some of the deflationary impact to other parts of the world, as Chinese exporters look for new markets in poorer countries. Those economies could see their own fledgling industries shrivel in the teeth of Chinese competition, much as the U.S. did in an earlier era. Unlike Japan or South Korea, which abandoned low-cost manufacturing as they progressed to higher-value exports, China has maintained a commanding position in low-cost sectors even as it pushes into products typically dominated by advanced economies. China represents “a unique mercantilist challenge,” said Rory Green, chief China economist at GlobalData–TS Lombard. 

The World Is in for Another China Shock

China is flooding foreign markets with cheap goods again. This time it isn’t buying much in return.

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-world-is-in-for-another-china-shock-3d98b533

By Jason Douglas

Updated March 3, 2024 12:15 am ET

Vehicles awaiting export in Fuzhou, China. The country is making more cars than its domestic economy can absorb. PHOTO: CFOTO/ZUMA PRESS

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. and the global economy experienced a “China shock,” a boom in imports of cheap Chinese-made goods that helped keep inflation low but at the cost of local manufacturing jobs.  

A sequel might be in the making as Beijing doubles down on exports to revive the country’s growth. Its factories are churning out more cars, machinery and consumer electronics than its domestic economy can absorb. Propped up by cheap, state-directed loans, Chinese companies are glutting foreign markets with products they can’t sell at home.

Some economists see this China shock pushing inflation down even more than the first. China’s economy is now slowing, whereas, in the previous era, it was booming. As a result, the disinflationary effect of cheap Chinese-manufactured goods won’t be offset by Chinese demand for iron ore, coal and other commodities. 

China is also a much larger economy than it was, accounting for more of the world’s manufacturing. It had 31% of global manufacturing output in 2022, and 14% of all goods exports, according to World Bank data. Two decades earlier China’s share of manufacturing was less than 10% and of exports less than 5%. 

Everyone is investing in manufacturing

In the early 2000s, overproduction mainly came from China, while factories elsewhere shut down. Now, the U.S. and other countries are investing heavily in and protecting their own industries as geopolitical tensions rise. Chinese firms such as the battery maker 

Contemporary Amperex Technology are building plants overseas to soothe opposition to imports, though they already produce much of what the world needs at home.The result could be a world swimming in manufactured goods, and short of the spending power to buy them—a classic recipe for falling prices. 

Strollers at a factory in Handan, China. Chinese producer prices have been falling for 16 months. PHOTO: STR/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“The balance of China’s impact on global prices is tilting even more clearly in a disinflationary direction,” said Thomas Gatley, China strategist at Gavekal Dragonomics.  

There are some countervailing forces. The U.S., Europe and Japan don’t want a rerun of the early 2000s, when cheap Chinese goods put many of their factories out of business. So they have extended billions of dollars in support to industries deemed strategic, and imposed or threatened to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. Aging populations and persistent labor shortages in the developed world could further offset some disinflationary pressure China exerts this time. 

“It won’t be the same China shock,” said David Autor, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the authors of a 2016 paper that described the original China shock. 

A different sort of China shock

Even so, “the concerns are more fundamental” now, Autor said, because China is competing with advanced economies in cars, computer chips and complex machinery—higher-value industries that are viewed as more central to technological leadership.

The first China shock came after a series of liberalizing reforms in China in the 1990s and its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. For U.S. consumers, this brought considerable benefits. One 2019 paper found that consumer prices in the U.S. for goods fell 2% for every extra percentage point of market share grabbed by Chinese imports, with the biggest benefits felt by people on low and middle incomes. 

But the China shock also piled pressure on domestic manufacturers. In 2016, Autor and other economists estimated that the U.S. lost more than two million jobs between 1999 and 2011 as a result of Chinese imports, as makers of furniture, toys and clothes buckled under the competition and workers in hollowed-out communities struggled to find new roles. 

A sequel of sorts appears to be under way. 

China’s economy expanded 5.2% last year, a subdued rate by its standards, and is expected to slow further as a drawn-out real-estate crunch crushes investment and consumers rein in spending. Capital Economics, a consulting firm, thinks annual growth will slow to around 2% by 2030. Beijing is seeking to engineer an economic turnaround by plowing money into factories, especially for semiconductors, aerospace, cars and renewable-energy equipment, and selling the resulting surplus abroad. 

Deflation in China

But weak demand and overcapacity means Chinese producer prices have been falling for 16 months, led by consumer and durable goods, food products, metals and electrical machinery. 

That disinflationary impulse is showing up around the world. The price of U.S. imports from China fell 2.9% in January from a year earlier, while the price of imports from the European Union, Japan and Mexico all rose.

Unlike in the early 2000s, however, the Western world now sees China as its chief economic rival and geopolitical adversary. The EU is considering whether Chinese-made electric vehicles are unfairly subsidized and should be subject to tariffs or other import restrictions. Former President Donald Trump, who is seeking the Republican nomination for November’s presidential election, has floated the idea of hitting imports from China with tariffs of 60% or higher. 

Such protectionism might shift some of the deflationary impact to other parts of the world, as Chinese exporters look for new markets in poorer countries. Those economies could see their own fledgling industries shrivel in the teeth of Chinese competition, much as the U.S. did in an earlier era. Unlike Japan or South Korea, which abandoned low-cost manufacturing as they progressed to higher-value exports, China has maintained a commanding position in low-cost sectors even as it pushes into products typically dominated by advanced economies. China represents “a unique mercantilist challenge,” said Rory Green, chief China economist at GlobalData–TS Lombard. 

Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com

5. Russians Keep Turning Up Dead All Over the World

I guess there is no hiding from the long arm of the Russian intelligence and security services.

Russians Keep Turning Up Dead All Over the World

A helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine is the latest obvious assassination, but a range of businessmen, bureaucrats and political figures have also suffered suspicious deaths since the invasion

By Drew HinshawFollow

, Joe ParkinsonFollow

 and Matthew LuxmooreFollow

March 3, 2024 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russians-keep-turning-up-dead-all-over-the-world-6acc8990?mod=hp_lead_pos7

On a Tuesday afternoon last month, Maxim Kuzminov drove up to his new condo overlooking a palm-lined Spanish beach, unaware that an assassin was waiting for him by the parking garage. 

Local police stationed less than 500 feet away needed only minutes to respond, but witnesses said it was too late for the former Russian helicopter pilot. The killer had vanished, driving out over the 28-year-old victim’s bullet-ridden body. A medic who sliced through his shirt with bandage shears noted the accuracy of the five small-caliber shots, one directly piercing his heart.

Six months earlier, Kuzminov, a native of a town near Russia’s North Korean border, had defected to Ukraine, his Mi-8 attack helicopter taking small-arms fire as he flew barely 20 feet above the ground. After turning over the gunship, he collected a $500,000 reward and encouraged his countrymen to follow his example.

“When all this opens up before you, your views will fundamentally change,” he said in an interview filmed and posted on YouTube by Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. “You’ll simply discover a world of colors.”

Now Kuzminov—gunned down in Villajoyosa, a coastal resort that translates as “Joyful Town”—has become the latest name on a lengthening list of unsolved deaths of Russians who soured on Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Spain hasn’t identified a suspect, although investigators believe the murder was ordered by the Kremlin, an official involved in the investigation said. 

Moscow hasn’t denied killing the pilot. “This traitor and criminal became a moral corpse at the very moment when he planned his dirty and terrible crime,” Sergey Naryshkin, Russia’s foreign intelligence chief, told its state news agency TASS. 

Since the invasion of Ukraine, prominent Russians have died in unusual circumstances on three continents. Some were thought to harbor politically subversive ideas, while others may have been caught up in run-of-the-mill criminal warfare. Some may have actually died of natural causes. But there are enough of them that Wikipedia publishes a running list, at 51 names, entitled “Suspicious deaths of Russian business people (2022–2024).”

Maksim Kuzminov, who flew a Russian military Mi-8 helicopter into Ukrainian territory last year, met with journalists in September. PHOTO: MAXYM MARUSENKO/NURPHOTO/GETTY IMAGES

Businessmen have been found hanged in London and drowned in Puerto Rico. A ruling-party boss fell from the roof of an Indian hotel and a 46-year-old deputy science minister died of an unexplained illness on a return flight from Cuba. Spanish police are still investigating the 2022 deaths of Sergey Protosenya, the former deputy chairman at gas producer Novatek JSC, and his wife and daughter in their home near Barcelona.

Last month, Russian independent media reported that the 35-year old son of Igor Sechin, Putin’s confidant and chief executive of oil giant Rosneft, died at his Moscow luxury apartment complex, known as “Putin’s Friend’s House.”  

There are no obvious Kremlin fingerprints on these deaths. Not so for another cohort, murdered in spectacular operations planned like theater productions scripted for maximum public impact. Two months after launching an aborted mutiny, the rogue commander of the Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was blown up at 28,000 feet. His jet crashed into a patch of meadow about 40 miles from Putin’s lakeside residence. 

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny was poisoned with the easily detectable nerve agent Novichok in 2020, then died suddenly in an Arctic prison colony last month, just as a deal to free him was coming together. The Kremlin has said the cause of his death is one for medical authorities to establish. Few in the West buy that. “Make no mistake. Putin is responsible for Navalny’s death,” President Biden told reporters last month.

The mafia-style assassination of Kuzminov fits into another hidden undercurrent of the new spy war between Russia and the West. Since Putin’s invasion, Ukraine and its Western allies have ratcheted up attempts to hollow out the Russian state and military by attracting a stream of defectors they hope could become a torrent. The Kremlin, in turn, has tried to hunt down its turncoats, one after the next, to deter more losses through the morbid power of example.

In Ukraine, military intelligence set up a 24-hour “I Want to Live” hotline for Russian soldiers who wished to drop their arms and cross over. More than 260 have deserted ranks through it, while another 26,000 have dialed in, and daily calls briefly shot up some 70% after Kuzminov went public in September, according to Petro Yatsenko, a spokesman for Ukraine’s prisoners of war department. Those numbers couldn’t be independently verified.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen on an outdoor display delivering his annual address on Feb. 29. PHOTO: MAXIM SHIPENKOV/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has produced three videos encouraging Russians, especially security officers, to collaborate with Washington; the videos generally attract tens of thousands of views. The agency says it wouldn’t keep making them if they weren’t persuading Russians to step forward.

“I invite them to do what others have already done this past 18 months and join hands with us—our door is always open,” British spy chief Richard Moore told a Prague audience in a rare speech last year. “Their secrets will always be safe with us.”

France has welcomed Maria Dmitrieva, a doctor who worked for the Federal Security Services, or FSB. Gleb Karakulov, an engineer on Putin’s presidential guard, sneaked away to an undisclosed location via Turkey last year. In a video interview with the Dossier Centre, a London-based investigative group funded by Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky, he said he was responsible for securing the president’s private communications, and that he accompanied Putin on more than 180 trips.

Boris Bondarev was a diplomat serving at Russia’s permanent mission to the United Nations in Geneva before resigning in protest two months after the invasion and seeking refuge in Switzerland.

“My colleagues say, ‘What can we do? If something happens, it happens,’” he said on a video call in front of a plain background. “Russian political thinking is getting simpler and simpler: If there is a problem, let’s just eliminate him.”

The operation to lure Kuzminov was meant to be a proof of concept, hatched by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Defense Ministry, or HUR, as Ukraine’s counteroffensive struggled and the embattled country reached for new methods. Over months that followed, the ordinary pilot, from a depopulating town thousands of miles from Moscow, became a test case of whether a high-profile defector could stay alive in the comforts of Western Europe, surviving on the money and new identity Ukraine awarded him.

To reconstruct his defection and killing, The Wall Street Journal spoke to the pilot’s neighbors and acquaintances in Spain—including witnesses to his murder—as well as Spanish, European and U.S. police and intelligence officials; and Ukrainians involved in the operation to extract him and his gunship from Russia. Reporters also reviewed Kuzminov’s social-media feeds, now littered with angry posts castigating him for betrayal, and the public remarks he made in the heady days after he escaped to Ukraine.

The Kremlin didn’t return requests for comment. When the state news agency asked Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, about the murder, he replied: “To a dog, a dog’s death.”

‘Choke on silver’

While Ukraine and its Western backers were designing operations to recruit officers like Kuzminov, Russia’s FSB was bolstering the architecture to stop them. 

The agency’s Third Directorate for Military Counterintelligence, or DKVR—charged with preventing military defections—has swelled since the war to become the largest division in the FSB, according to security analysts. Its mission involves spying on one of the world’s largest militaries, down to the unit level, in a country of 11 time zones. Even before the recent expansion, the DVKR was vast: More than 20 of its agents watched over troops at a single small air base housing just six aircraft in the Kaluga region, according to leaked FSB documents from 2012 published on the Russian investigative website Agentura.

This network of domestic and foreign intelligence agencies has regained its confidence and influence after the chaos at the beginning of the Ukraine invasion, European security analysts say. Early on, Putin had reportedly placed top FSB leaders under house arrest for badly misjudging the Ukrainian resistance. European capitals ejected some 400 Russian diplomats, many of whom were believed to be spies. 

Putin later released the FSB bosses, opting not to purge the ranks. He kept Russia’s borders open, allowing hundreds of thousands of Russians to escape mobilization by fleeing to Europe, Central Asia and the Caucuses—while undercover intelligence operatives joined them, rebuilding ranks depleted by diplomatic expulsions, European officials say.

A woman lays flowers for late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny near the Moscow headquarters of the Federal Security Services, or FSB. PHOTO: NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The president, a former KGB colonel, has long said he would hunt down Russian defectors: “Whatever they got in return, those thirty pieces of silver, they will choke on them,” he once told a hushed press conference, after a reporter asked him if he’d ever signed an order to liquidate traitors living in exile.

Now, his spy services are becoming more brazen and creative in squashing dissent abroad, U.S. and European intelligence officials say. The boundaries between Russia’s three main intelligence agencies—the FSB, the GRU military intelligence and SVR foreign intelligence—are increasingly blurring, analysts say, making it more difficult to know which is responsible for an operation. 

“The services used to be very separate but now they are exchanging personnel and assets,” said Andrei Soldatov, who has been writing about Russia’s security services for more than 20 years. “It’s just like Stalin’s time,” he added, when the Soviet dictator created a new agency called SMERSH, or “Death to Spies.” 

They are also increasingly using foreign nationals in operations.

Last year, British law enforcement arrested five Bulgarians accused of spying for Moscow by, among other things, keeping tabs on Russian exiles in London. In April 2023, Artem Uss, a businessman and son of a close Putin ally, escaped from house arrest in Italy with the help of a Serbian criminal gang and avoided extradition to the U.S. He was being held on criminal charges for violating sanctions on military technology. Uss said the charges were politically motivated. 

Using foreign nationals is a return to the practices of the Stalinist era, when a Spanish assassin, Ramon Mercader, passed into Soviet spylore by burying an ice pick into the forehead of Leon Trotsky and sending a clear message to other enemies of the regime. 

To this day in Russia, “sending a Mercader” means dispatching a hit man. 

The rendezvous

Only one man in the helicopter knew where it was going, and it was Kuzminov, the pilot, struggling to reassure his two crewmates as he switched off the radio and lowered their aircraft so close to the ground that no radar would detect his next move. 

For weeks, the son of a Russian seamstress, and the grandson of a Ukrainian pilot in the Soviet Union had nursed doubts about an invasion he saw as illegal, led by a president he viewed as a war criminal. Ukrainian military-intelligence operatives had reached out to him and offered a massive sum for a new life beyond Russia, with two stipulations: He would fly his helicopter to them, then participate in a documentary encouraging others to follow him.

On Aug. 9, he switched off his helicopter radio and seized his chance—a routine mission to fly spare jet fighter parts and two airmen out from the border city of Pskov. As he buzzed it over the front lines, his two crewmates in the cabin realized his plan and began loudly protesting.

But there was nothing they could do: Only Kuzminov knew how to fly. 

He tried to reassure them, offering instructions he would later recall telling them, his Ukrainian handlers say: When we land, don’t run.

His landing target was an overgrown meadow in a forest clearing outside the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, about 20 miles from the border, and as soon as the helicopter touched down, his two comrades Nikita Kiryanov and Khushbakht Tursunov ran toward Russia. Ukraine says its troops ordered them to stop. When they didn’t, both were shot dead. 

Kuzminov hobbled forward, his left thigh wounded from a bullet that had struck him somewhere during the chaos, the pain revealing itself as the adrenaline faded.

Once ensconced in his new home, an apartment in a Kyiv safe house, he was filmed in a documentary, “Downed Russian pilots.” The documentary was broadcast nationwide on Sunday, Sept. 3. “The film reveals for the first time the details of perhaps the most successful special operations…in the entire history of our country,” said one social-media promotional post.

After it aired, Russian anger at the betrayal spilled onto prime-time news shows. “We’ll find him. I don’t think he’ll live long enough to face trial,” said one intelligence officer interviewed on Russia’s News of the Week show. 

Ukraine intelligence officers inspect the Russian helicopter which was handed over to Ukraine, in this screengrab obtained from social media video. PHOTO: DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OF UKRAINE/REUTERS

Two weeks later, Kuzminov arrived to meet his handler in their rendezvous point, a downtown Kyiv park, confiding a worry now clouding his thoughts: Would the Russians catch him?

In Ukraine, he would be safe, his handler assured him. If he wanted, he could even fly in the Ukrainian Air Force.

He could also leave.

“We can’t keep you chained here in Ukraine,” one official said he told Kuzminov. “But we also need you to be aware of the risks to your safety.”

He decided to try his luck in Spain. On his way out, Kyiv handed him a Ukrainian passport, with a dubious cover name, Ihor Shevchenko—a common first name matched to the surname of a founding father of Ukraine’s national identity, 19th century poet Taras Shevchenko. It would be the equivalent of the CIA handing a newly minted American a passport printed with the code name “John Washington.”

Kuzminov opted for the Mediterranean town of Villajoyosa, population 36,000, including more than 800 registered residents from Russia. His home in exile was the ninth floor of a four-tower condominium cluster overlooking the beach, most of its tenants foreigners, the building manager said. A placard by the entrance extended a measure of confidence: “Facilities monitored by video cameras and security personnel.” In smaller print below read doorbell-ringing instructions, written in Spanish, English and Russian.

Along the street, Russian expatriates prayed at the nearby Orthodox church and shopped for groceries at a store named Baltica. The coastline had a reputation for Russian organized crime. Three years earlier, Spanish police had arrested nearly two dozen mostly Russian businessmen in the area in what it called the bust of an East European mafia network laundering money into nightclubs and real estate on the Mediterranean coast.

The building’s newest resident started in quickly, renovating his unit, often dressed in construction attire as he escorted another worker in and out of the building. One day, he asked the condominium’s building manager where he could dump debris. His Spanish was decent, the manager thought. 

Soon after, that manager was sweeping the parking lot when he heard screams, followed by the screech of tires pulling off. He ran and found Kuzminov’s body, staring up from the driveway, his mouth open.

“When I called the emergency phone number,” the manager said, “I already knew that the man was dead.”

The entrance to the parking garage in Villajoyosa, Spain, where Russian helicopter pilot Maksim Kuzminov was shot dead. PHOTO: JOHANNES SIMON/GETTY IMAGES

Marcos Garcia Rey and Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com, Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

6. Dropping aid from planes is expensive and inefficient. Why do it?

I always recall a talk given to my US Army Command and General Staff College class in 1994-95 by COL John Warden on Air Power. He said that we could have executed the mission in Somalia in 1992-1993 without any boots on the ground and we could have dropped what he called "food bombs" to the people so they could be fed. by doing so we would not have needed to deploy soldiers to Somalia. I wonder if he is advising this administration.

Dropping aid from planes is expensive and inefficient. Why do it?

By Sarah Dadouch and Claire Parker

March 2, 2024 at 3:32 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Sarah Dadouch · March 2, 2024

The United States on Saturday became at least the fifth country to drop aid to Gaza since the start of the war in October.

Between 3 and 5 p.m. local time, U.S. Central Command said, Air Force C-130s, working with the Royal Jordanian Air Force, dropped containers packed with more than 38,000 halal meals onto the besieged enclave. The containers, equipped with parachutes, were dropped over enclave’s Mediterranean coastline to allow “civilian access to the critical aid,” Central Command said.

Aid professionals say dropping aid from planes is an expensive, inefficient way to deliver aid to a population, and that the missions now being flown are insufficient to meet the needs of the more than 2 million people trapped inside Gaza.

Here’s what to know:

How dire are conditions in Gaza?

Over the past week, when people in the enclave have spotted parachutes swaying in the skies above them, they have run to meet them. Since Sunday, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and France have dropped tons of prepared meals, diapers and other essential supplies.

After nearly five months of war, Gazans have resorted to eating grain ordinarily used to feed livestock or plants they scavenge. Famine, U.N. officials warned on Monday, is “almost inevitable.” Twenty-four of the enclave’s 36 hospitals have been destroyed by Israeli bombardment, the World Health Organization reported Tuesday; those that remain are functioning only partially. The Israeli military campaign against Hamas has killed more than 30,000 people in Gaza, the health ministry there says.

Hamas and allied fighters who streamed out of Gaza early on Oct. 7 killed around 1,200 people in Israel and took 253 more as hostages, Israeli officials say, triggering the current conflict. But the densely populated, impoverished territory relied on aid long before then. It’s been under strict blockade by Israel and Egypt since Hamas seized power in 2007.

After the Hamas attack, Israel tightened the blockade. Eventually, aid was allowed to trickle in, but it has amounted to a fraction of the number of trucks that entered before the war.

Jordan was the first to try airdrops. On Nov. 6, Jordanian forces delivered medical and emergency supplies to a Jordanian field hospital, the first of several such missions.

Over the past week, the country was joined by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and France in a new effort to drop aid directly to civilians. In the most recent indication of the Biden administration’s growing frustration with the civilian toll of the Israeli military campaign, President Biden on Friday announced authorization for U.S. airdrops to Gaza.

How do airdrops work?

Jordanian troops on Thursday loaded tightly wrapped crates containing prepared meals, medicine, diapers and feminine hygiene products onto C-130 Hercules cargo planes at the King Abdullah II Air Base outside Amman. With Washington Post journalists on board, the planes took off, flew west over Tel Aviv to the Mediterranean Sea and swiveled south toward Gaza.

Jordan coordinates the airdrops with Israel. Israel gives Jordan a window during which the missions may be flown safely and vets people aboard the planes, including visitors, before granting permission.

The drops on hospitals are coordinated with contacts on the ground, who know to expect the large, GPS-guided parcels containing medical equipment, medicine and food. A C-130 can hold four such bundles.

The airdrops to civilians arrive unannounced. The boxes are packed smaller to reach more civilians; a C-130 can hold 16. On the Jordanian mission this week, they were dropped from 10,000 feet at a rate of one every 30-60 seconds. They’re dropped along the cost, where sight lines unimpeded by buildings mean civilians are more likely to spot them.

When aid has landed in the sea, Gazans have launched skiffs to recover it.

What’s wrong with airdrops?

Airdrops are exorbitantly expensive. The Jordanian military declined to give details on cost, but Philippe Lazzarini, the head of UNRWA, the principal U.N. agency for Palestinian affairs, described them as “a last-resort, extraordinarily expensive way of providing assistance.”

Airdrops can make logistical sense in some cases — to meet the urgent needs of hospitals, for example — but aid professionals say they should not be the main avenue to feed Gaza’s more than 2 million people.

“I don’t think that the airdropping of food in the Gaza Strip should be the answer today,” Lazzarini said. “The real answer is: open the crossings and bring convoys and medical assistance into the Gaza Strip.”

Janti Soeripto, the head of Save the Children, called the Gaza airdrops “theater,” and warned that they fueled chaos on the ground.

“You can’t really guarantee who gets it and who doesn’t,” she told The Post. “You can’t really guarantee where it ends up. You might put people at risk.” She described children wading into the sea to try to retrieve the heavy parcels.

It’s difficult to track where airdropped aid ends up. Soeripto said some morphine intended for hospitals were found elsewhere.

“The best answer is open up more crossings, allow trucks in, do it in an orderly fashion, let the U.N. and other agencies do the distribution,” she said. “That is the safest and most effective way to do it.”

Why has the United States joined the effort?

The need for the safe delivery of more aid was made excruciatingly clear on Thursday, when Gaza suffered one of the deadliest episodes of the war: More than 100 people were killed when a crowd descended on an aid truck convoy.

Palestinian officials and witnesses blamed gunfire from Israeli forces tasked with providing to provide security for the convoy. Israeli officials said they fired above the crowd after people moved toward soldiers “in a threatening manner”; they blamed a stampede.

U.N. officials transporting medicine and fuel to al-Shifa hospital on Friday reported seeing “a large number of gunshot wounds” among the injured, according to Stéphane Dujarric, spokesman for U.N. Secretary General António Guterres.

The disaster drew sharp condemnation, including from Israeli allies. Britain, France, Italy and Germany called for an investigation. Biden said it would hinder ongoing negotiations over a pause in fighting.

Biden authorized U.S. military airdrops onto Gaza the next day. Washington, he said, is also “going to insist that Israel facilitate more trucks and more routes to get more and more people the help they need.”

“No excuses, because the truth is aid flowing to Gaza is nowhere nearly enough,” he said. “I won’t stand by, we won’t let up and we’re trying to pull out every stop we can to get more assistance in.”

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Friday the airdrops were intended to “supplement delivery on the ground,” not replace it.

“You can’t replicate the size and scale and scope of a convoy of 20 or 30 trucks,” he said. The administration, he said, was also considering sending aid on ships. That would require permission from Israel, which controls Gaza’s maritime border.

The Washington Post · by Sarah Dadouch · March 2, 2024

7. I barely survived the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka

I barely survived the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka

A soldier tells the inside story of the retreat from Avdiivka, a town in eastern Ukraine which has fallen after nearly a decade. We explore what this loss means, amid American dithering over aid.

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/i-barely-survived-the-ukrainian-withdrawal?utm

MYROSLAVA TANSKA-VIKULOVA, TIM MAK, AND MATT GALLAGHER

MAR 3, 2024

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Editor's note: The Kyiv Independent and The Counteroffensive are going to hold a joint event this month! KI's Toma Istomina and our own Tim Mak will be talking about how we're telling the human stories of the war to cut through so-called 'Ukraine fatigue!' 

Mark your calendars: it’s March 14th at 1pm Eastern Time. 

Email Oksana@counteroffensive.news to sign up!

This video was shot by the soldiers of the 110th Brigade during the withdrawal from Avdiivka in February 2024 (Via Facebook). 

Viktor Bilyak, a soldier of the 110th Brigade, was ready to die.

He was one of the Ukrainian troops who were fighting in Avdiivka, and at one point, he thought that he would be unlikely to get out of the city with his life. 

Under Russian shelling, Viktor and his comrades had nowhere to hide. They thought they were surrounded on all sides, and that they would be captured or executed, like hundreds of other soldiers in this bloody war.

But, fortunately, in a kind of miracle, Viktor made it.

A pin showing the location of Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine. 

On February 17, Ukrainian forces had to retreat from Avdiivka, near Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. The fighting in the city dates back to 2014, when the Russian aggression began.

The most forward-placed Ukrainian forces near Avdiivka were at the ‘Zenit position,’ a site that stuck out into Russian-controlled territory, and became famous around the country due to Ukrainians being able to hold it over years and years of fighting.

That is why the defense of the city was important for Ukraine: it had held out for so long. However, due to the almost-complete encirclement of Avdiivka, the military withdrew from the position two weeks ago.

Viktor at Zenit position, Avdiivka, February 2023

After Russia's full-scale invasion started, the Ukrainians successfully repelled Russian attempts to advance on Avdiivka for a long time. But in early October 2023, the Russian army began a renewed attack.

In four months of constant attacks, the Russians lost many thousands of soldiers and hundreds of armored vehicles as they tried to capture the Zenit position and the town of Avdiivka – according to the Ukrainian military,. 

In fact, the number of troops Moscow lost in the months-long campaign to capture Avdiivka exceeds its losses during the decade-long conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the NYT reports.

There are differing opinions on what the loss of Avdiivka means. Roman Svitan, a military expert and reserve colonel for the Ukrainian military, said that it is a significant strategic loss that prevents Ukraine from launching further offensives against key cities in the occupied Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. 

On the other hand, it would be much worse to lose a lot of our military, weapons, and equipment there, as Russia has done, argued Dmytro Snigeryov, another military analyst. 

For Viktor, even after this defeat, with all its personal repercussions, the war goes on, and the defeat doesn’t dramatically change the situation on the battlefield in Russia's favor.

Until February 24, 2022, Viktor, from Lviv, had nothing to do with the war, except for spending a year and a half in the army. He had been involved in cycling since childhood – professionally, and for a while as a coach. He planned to spend the rest of his life in this field.

Viktor before the full-scale invasion, August 2021.

But it was not to be. When the war began in earnest, he stayed in his apartment all the time and did not go outside. It was not depression, but rather confusion. He wanted to be useful.

"I was so lazy, I thought I wasn't going to volunteer or carry anything. But I saw people going to the front who had never held a gun, and I had. I realized that I had to go to the front," Viktor Bilyak told The Counteroffensive.

Viktor decided to go to war as a volunteer fighter 11 days after the start of full-scale war… on his 25th birthday. He was immediately sent to the Avdiivka region. He stayed at the Zenit position for almost two years.

Viktor at Zenit position, Avdiivka, November 2023.

Over the last four months, the Russians have used all its might against the Ukrainian military, trying hard to break the line of defense, to take Avdiivka through encirclement. 

"When you have a severe shortage of ammunition and nothing to respond with, over time enemy shelling destroys all your fortifications and wounds your personnel. You run out of shelter and human resources," Viktor said.

Several weeks ago, logistical lines were cut off by the Russians troops and water supplies were running low. They couldn't stay in their positions.

Viktor at Zenit position, Avdiivka, February 2024

In mid-February, Ukrainian reinforcements were sent to the Avdiivka area to help. The units initially defended the town, but were later forced to withdraw and cover the withdrawal of other Ukrainian forces.

Viktor did not believe he would be able to leave the city. He spent the last week saying goodbye to his entire family. 

"We knew we would have only one road [to evacuate on], and it would be heavily shelled. And staying there meant death or capture," Viktor told The Counteroffensive.

However, he was lucky. On February 16, Viktor’s cheek was cut by a shell fragment from a munition that exploded when he was helping his wounded comrade. 

Viktor after his injury, February 16, 2024.

Viktor did not wait for an evacuation vehicle. He got out of the Zenit position by foot , with just his rifle and armor, walking one kilometer by himself. After that, he and his comrades walked almost 3.5 kilometers to the Avdiivka town, where it was safer.

There were six severely wounded soldiers left at Zenit, four of whom could not move on their own because of injury. At first they thought that they would be evacuated. But later they communicated with the command by radio and were told that evacuation vehicles would not be able to reach them. 

Viktor said that this morally destroyed the soldiers who managed to escape. 

“When we all heard that the wounded soldier had contacted the commander by radio, it had a very depressing effect on us. There was strong dissatisfaction with the command,” Viktor said.

Those remaining Ukrainians were surrounded by Russian troops. A few days later, Russian soldiers published a video of these POWs. 

This could have been avoided, Viktor said with sadness in his voice: "If the retreat had been organized earlier, at least a few days earlier. If there had been other ways to leave without being surrounded." 

Some Western media outlets reported that hundreds of Ukrainian POWs were captured in Avdiivka. Viktor believes the numbers were far lower than that: "A thousand is too many. This is apparently the total number of soldiers who were in Avdiivka.” The high numbers have also been denied by the Ukrainian command.

Viktor tried to explain to me what leaving Avdiivka means in a very dry fashion, without unnecessary details. He was struck when the open source, public information maps that show the precise positions of the frontlines showed the Zenit position as red – meaning that Russians controlled it. 

He does not mention his exhaustion from the war, but I can feel it in his voice.

Viktor's passion for sport helped him during the war. During cycling training he had to carry a lot of equipment, and during combat even more. So it was easier for him to fight than for other unprepared soldiers.

Now Viktor is in the hospital, and his comrades are at the home base. This is not an official vacation, but it is an opportunity to take a break. After the loss of Avdiivka, Viktor says, his fellow soldiers are in a depressed mood. They are very tired and psychologically destroyed. Many of them have started drinking.

"It would be a good time to give the military a vacation. Everyone has been home for a maximum of 10 days [since the full-scale invasion started]," Viktor said sadly. 

What Viktor misses most about his life before the war is the simple things that peace brings. He is unable to go outside and take a walk. 

"You're underground all the time, and it depresses you," Viktor said. 

When he is released from the hospital, he will return to battle. "I have to," Viktor told me briefly. Despite the fact that the full-scale war has been going on for two years, this soldier has no plans to give up. He says he will fight as long as it takes. 

Behind the paywall: our first-ever fictional narrative, from author Matt Gallagher, who writes a short story about a U.S. military veteran on the road to Avdiivka. And in the news, everyone is talking about an audio leak of German generals discussing the Ukraine War.

NEWS OF THE DAY: 

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands. 

LEAK OF GERMAN GENERALS AUDIO: German authorities are now probing a recording of German military officers discussing the Ukraine War. 

A 38 minute tape, published by state-controlled Russia Today, was published earlier this week -- and in it, German officers discussed how Germany's long-range missiles might be used by Ukraine. The tape also includes the officials talking about how Ukraine could target the Kerch Bridge, which connects Russia and occupied Crimea. 

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has said publicly that he's concerned that if he gave Ukraine the long-range missiles, they might strike Moscow with them. 

RUSSIANS PULL BACK AVIATION ASSETS: The Ukrainian military is celebrating a series of shoot-downs of advanced Russian aircraft, noting that Russian aviation activity over Ukrainian territory has decreased over the past week. A Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said that Western "countermeasures... have proven effective." 

ALL POLISH-UKRAINE BORDER CROSSINGS BLOCKED: Ukraine's border service said that Polish farmers are blocking freight trying to cross the border into the European Union, leading to a build-up of 2,400 vehicles waiting to pass. Buses and non-commercial cars are not being blocked. 

REPORTER’S NOTEBOOK: 

Editor’s note: We have something special today, a guest post from author Matt Gallagher, the author of a new novel, Daybreak. The book is set two years back, when the full-scale invasion began, and follows U.S. military veterans: one of whom is going to join the international legion to fight, the other to track down a former love in the western city Lviv.

This fictional short story follows a minor character from Daybreak named Trent. In the novel, he claims to be a former special operator with combat experience fighting ISIS in Syria. Readers of the book never get told for certain if he’s telling the truth about that or not, which is intentional — like a lot of Western journalists who’ve spent time in Ukraine, Matt has encountered a good many Trents. Some prove legitimate, some do not.

“Hey, man! You hear me? One hour until Avdiivka!”

I look up from doomscrolling through my phone and nod at Yuri. Everything is bad here. Everything seems bad everywhere else, too. The Ukrainian grips the steering wheel of the van with the same loose-wire energy we left Dnipro with, and it can’t all just be due to the crushed Red Bull empties littering the console.

His baby brother’s part of the retreat, I know. Helping hold one of the flanks. That’s why he’s lost his chill. He deserves a little grace. Like he told me one of the first days we started working together, “Better to be a safe ass than a sorry asshole.”

Then I think: retrograde, not retreat. The enemy retreats but we retrograde and America withdraws. Language matters in war, even when it’s not your own.

Maybe especially then.

We’re on our way to help with the… retrograde. Every vehicle that can carry supplies, was the order. Even over here volunteers get volun-told. I ignore the impulse to disappear into my phone again and stare out at the passing stretch of barren hills. The sky is bleak and streaked in winter grays and in the distance I can just make out what’s left of a mangled railroad bridge. On its best days the Donbas finds something near postcard charm. Today is not one of those.

Which is right, I feel. This call must not have been easy. Such decisions should not be made when it’s bright and shiny outside.

“Anything new from your government?”

Yuri’s question, its directness, surprises me. We stopped talking politics months ago for good reason. I tread forward with care.

“Unfortunately, no. Things are…” What’s even the word to use here to describe the American government? “...Stuck.”

Yuri makes a neutral sound with his throat. I offer him some dip from my pocket. He recoils. Ukrainians crack me up with this. They’d crawl miles (well, kilometers) for the cheapest of dirt cigarettes. But prime, long-cut Grizzly, expressed straight from the heart of American might? Naw, I’m the vile one.

“Trent.” He waits to finish as he zooms our van around a large farm tractor. It’ll never cease to amaze me how life refuses to retreat, retrograde, or withdraw from this war. “Is it true what some say? America is willing to fight Russia to the last dead Ukrainian?” 

This is my friend. Someone I know has my back as I have his. He seeks clarity. What can I tell him, though? I’ve been home twice since the Big Show popped off: at my dad’s funeral, they all called me a hero, the liberal cucks and MAGA mouthbreathers alike. Nine months later, when I went back for my kid cousin’s graduation? Shit. I caused a screaming match just by standing there.

At our best we Americans are worthy of the hype. I’ve seen it. It can be real and it can be awesome. At our worst, we’re some soft star-spangled fucks more interested in watching our own belly buttons expand than anything happening around us.

We’re fickle. That’s what I want to tell Yuri. But we’re driving into the teeth of fucking everything and his brother’s there so the last thing this man needs is more uncertainty, or at the least the second-to-last-thing, next to another Red Bull. So instead I say something cheap and easy but still maybe true.

“There's an old wisdom about America doing the right thing after it's exhausted all the other options. I think we're in the midst of proving that again.”

Yuri nods. He’s either satisfied or disgusted, it’s hard to tell. Twenty minutes later come the first drums of artillery to the east.

***

Today’s Cat of Conflict is a cat we came across in a tiny village between Mykolaiv and Kherson, About ten days before Kherson was liberated, as I recall. 

The village had only recently been liberated itself, and as cats will do, it refused to be bothered by our arrival and maintained both its stoop and composure. Photo credit to Benjamin Busch. 

Stay safe out there. 

Best,

The Counteroffensive Team

8. Opinion | Food convoy carnage distills what’s gone terribly wrong in Gaza

Excerpts:

The Biden administration sees this incident as a distillation of what’s gone wrong in Gaza. ‘“Israel doesn’t have a plan” for maintaining order, a senior administration official told me. Israeli officials have been “dismissive” of American warnings about their muddled plans for “the day after.” But these latest events suggest that Israel’s stated plan for loose control of Gaza by clans and local leaders is hollow at its core.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued last week that future governance in Gaza should be “civil management by local groups” unaffiliated with Hamas. But as former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak wrote Friday in Foreign Affairs, “In practice, this would mean empowering a number of influential Gazan families, some of which are involved in organized crime.”

As at every point in this conflict, there was an immediate quarrel about who was to blame for the food-truck carnage. Palestinians claimed Israeli troops had massacred civilians, but those allegations apparently were false, as were Israel’s claims that its troops had no role. According to U.S. officials who spoke Friday with Israel Defense Forces commanders, Israeli troops at a checkpoint at the rear of the convoy opened fire and killed about 10 people.

...

The picture could change as details continue to emerge, but it appears that the cause of most of the deaths was raw panic, driven by months of hunger and suffering as Israel launched a response to the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack. Palestinian civilians have been bombed out of their homes, driven into refugee camps, deprived of food and sanitation, and now this: clawing at trucks in their struggle to survive — while Hamas hides underground, and Israel protects its own troops but not the civilian population.

Opinion | Food convoy carnage distills what’s gone terribly wrong in Gaza

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 2, 2024

The drone videos taken early Thursday over Gaza City brought a new level of horror to this conflict: They showed hundreds of people, so tiny in the images that their human forms had almost vanished, desperately swarming a convoy of food trucks to grab what they could.

And then, off camera, the worst happened: The crowd stampeded, trucks crushed people under their wheels and a few Israeli troops opened fire, according to U.S. officials. The pre-dawn mayhem had an appalling toll. Gaza health officials said more than 100 Palestinians died and 700 were wounded as the aid convoy moved toward Gaza City.

How to describe this tragedy? For me, it was like watching a real-life version of “Lord of the Flies,” illustrating the hell on Earth when order and security disappear, and life becomes a primitive battle to survive. Israel’s war aim is to destroy Hamas, but sadly, it is also destroying any vestige of orderly life in Gaza.

Here’s how President Biden put it Friday as he announced the United States would start airdropping assistance to Palestinians: “Innocent people got caught in a terrible war unable to feed their families, and you saw the response when they tried to get aid.” The U.S. airdrops will be the most dramatic American intervention yet in Gaza. Officials say the administration will try to “flood the zone” with assistance by air, land and sea.

The Biden administration sees this incident as a distillation of what’s gone wrong in Gaza. ‘“Israel doesn’t have a plan” for maintaining order, a senior administration official told me. Israeli officials have been “dismissive” of American warnings about their muddled plans for “the day after.” But these latest events suggest that Israel’s stated plan for loose control of Gaza by clans and local leaders is hollow at its core.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued last week that future governance in Gaza should be “civil management by local groups” unaffiliated with Hamas. But as former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak wrote Friday in Foreign Affairs, “In practice, this would mean empowering a number of influential Gazan families, some of which are involved in organized crime.”

As at every point in this conflict, there was an immediate quarrel about who was to blame for the food-truck carnage. Palestinians claimed Israeli troops had massacred civilians, but those allegations apparently were false, as were Israel’s claims that its troops had no role. According to U.S. officials who spoke Friday with Israel Defense Forces commanders, Israeli troops at a checkpoint at the rear of the convoy opened fire and killed about 10 people.

The picture could change as details continue to emerge, but it appears that the cause of most of the deaths was raw panic, driven by months of hunger and suffering as Israel launched a response to the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack. Palestinian civilians have been bombed out of their homes, driven into refugee camps, deprived of food and sanitation, and now this: clawing at trucks in their struggle to survive — while Hamas hides underground, and Israel protects its own troops but not the civilian population.

The background to Thursday’s tragedy is a case study in Israel’s badly flawed management of this war. After the savage first months of fighting, humanitarian assistance was finally beginning to flow smoothly early this year, with more than 200 trucks a day distributing aid, according to U.S. officials. But in late January, Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir told police to allow demonstrators to close the main border crossing at Kerem Shalom to protest Hamas’s refusal to release all hostages.

With the crossing blocked, panic began to spread, U.S. officials say. Food supplies in Gaza soon became scarce, triggering hoarding and looting. United Nations relief workers were attacked by armed gangs as they tried to bring trucks into Gaza. The trucks had been accompanied by Gazan police. But the police were affiliated with Hamas, and after Israel began targeting them with drones, the U.S. officials told me, the police backed away.

To combat the food-scarcity panic, U.S. officials, led by David Satterfield, the U.S. coordinator of humanitarian assistance, decided to pump enough aid into Gaza to deflate prices and undermine the thieves. That was the strategy behind this week’s convoys.

A first run convoy of 21 trucks, operated by Gazan businesses that have long dealt with Israel, entered northern Gaza early Wednesday morning. They successfully delivered a shipment of supplies from the Palestinian Red Crescent Society — some “self-distributed” as it was snatched off trucks.

A bigger convoy of 30 trucks was scheduled for Thursday. But the Gazan contractors posted notice of the planned delivery on Facebook, U.S. officials said. That’s why hundreds of Palestinians gathered before dawn Thursday to grab their share of what was coming. The line of 30 trucks stretched for a kilometer. As Palestinians raced alongside the trucks in the darkness, the horror began.

Watching the drone footage of the scramble for food, it’s hard not to conclude that Israel and Hamas have unintentionally combined to create an interim status of mob rule for Gaza. Israel now finds on its border a version of Mogadishu in Somalia.

When this war began on Oct. 7, Israelis rightly felt they were the victims. The United States and its allies should now help Israelis — force them, if necessary — to become the rescuers.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 2, 2024

9. Nazi rescue of Mussolini a US model for Zelensky

Interesting speculation. I did not expect to read this type of article. Is there any evidence for this: either the collapse of the government or a rescue plan for Zelensky?

Of course the Nazi/Mussolini comparison makes for sensational reporting and website clicks (guilty as charged)

Nazi rescue of Mussolini a US model for Zelensky - Asia Times

US Pentagon is no doubt gaming out rescue plans should Zelensky’s unravelling and unpopular government fully collapse

asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · March 3, 2024

On July 25, 1943, Benito Mussolini, after being voted out of power by his own Grand Council, was called to a conference with King Vittorio Emanuele in the Villa Ada park at the special bunker known as the Villa Ada Savoia.

The King told Mussolini that the new Italian prime minister would be General Pietro Badoglio. Tired, unshaven and shaken, Mussolini walked out of the meeting only to be arrested by Carabinieri troops.

He would be held at different hiding places until he was transferred to the Hotel Campo Imperatore, Emperor’s Field Hotel (Albergo di Campo Imperatore) in the Apennine mountains.

Under Hitler’s personal orders, a German team made up of Nazi paratroopers (Fallschirmjäger) and a team drawn from the Waffen SS assembled in 10 gliders at Rome’s Pratica di Mare Air Base where they were towed to within striking distance of the hotel.

On September 12, 1943, the gliders carried an Italian general whose role was to convince Mussolini’s jailers not to fire on the Nazi rescue force. Four days before, the Italian government signed an armistice with the Allies, an event closely tracked (via communications intercepts) by Nazi intelligence. Allied forces had already taken Sicily and were lodged in southern Italy.

Hitler ordered his army to not only free Mussolini but also to take Rome, which they dutifully did. As this happened, the new government headed by Badoglio and the King escaped Rome and joined the allies at Bari, on the Adriatic in the south of the country.

The Germans established a military line of defense called the Gustav Line. Mussolini was flown out of Italy, first on a Storch light aircraft, and then transferred to more long-range aircraft that first took him to Vienna and, after a refresh, on to Berlin. Hitler would receive him and put him in charge of a rump Italian government called the Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, or RSI).

Benito Mussolini is shown in front of a hotel in Gran Sasso Mountain area of Italy in September 1943 during World War II. Gathered around the overthrown Italian dictator are German paratroopers who rescued him from imprisonment.

In April 1945, as German defenses crumbled, Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci attempted to flee to Switzerland but they were captured by Italian communist partisans and summarily executed on April 28 near Lake Como. Their bodies were taken to a service station in Milan where both were hanged by their feet for public display.

This bit of World War II history could well be a model for US Pentagon plans to rescue Volodymyr Zelensky should his government in Kiev collapse.

The US has launched a number of trial balloons and encouraged French leader Emmanuel Macron to propose the idea of sending NATO troops to Ukraine to somehow save the Ukrainians from the Russians.

This sort of thing would not have been discussed in polite circles until the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the collapse of the defense of Avdiivka. Now it is obvious that Russia has increased the tempo of its operations and is taking gobs of territory held by Ukraine’s army.

It is also now clear that Ukraine has significant manpower problems and its attempt to use forceful means to corral potential recruits is causing unrest in the country, including in major cities such as Odesa, Kharkiv and Kiev.

The problem for Washington is the lack of political support for any NATO military operations in Ukraine. The revelations, especially in the European press, including a recording of German military officers discussing how they could blow up the massive Kerch Strait bridge with Taurus missiles and hide the operation, are undermining the German government’s already badly eroded credibility at home. A French “instant” poll, meanwhile, showed two-thirds opposed to sending troops to Ukraine.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who recently emerged from a serious prostate operation to testify on Capitol Hill, argues that if Russia “wins” in Ukraine, then pretty soon after the Russians will attack NATO territory, suggesting that the first attacks might be against the Baltic states.

Austin knows there is no evidence supporting his argument. The same sort of claims, also coming from European leaders, are based on assumptions and assertions without any facts. Speaking on the occasion of his State of the Nation address in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin said emphatically that Russia has no intention of attacking Europe.

Austin and the Pentagon are in a dilemma. Without a provocation of significant magnitude to justify a NATO intervention (another Gulf of Tonkin exercise of what was a manufactured casus belli), what can the US do to save Ukraine? How can it get away with an intervention that most wouldn’t object to in Europe or the United States?

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin listens during a Senate committee hearing on Capitol Hill earlier this year. Photo: Chad J McNeeley / Defense Department

The US cannot just send in troops to start fighting Russians. That would surely start a war in Europe. Putin has already put down a marker that if there was a war in Europe, Russia could use its “tactical” nuclear weapons.

While NATO has been playing chicken with the Russians for many months, urging Ukraine to use NATO-supplied weapons to attack Russian cities, for example, or attempting to take down the Kerch Strait bridge or other critical Russian infrastructure, the introduction of NATO frontline troops can’t be hidden behind a facade of non-intervention or plausible deniability.

On what basis could NATO troops get away with some sort of intervention without a Russian counterattack? The Nazi example of freeing Mussolini may be a model that, in a modern interpretation, might do the trick.

No one can say how long the Zelensky government can hold on in Kiev. With a steady Russian military advance, growing turmoil at home, the refusal to hold elections, the jailing of people opposed to Zelensky and a host of unpopular measures, Zelensky’s hold on power is entering the zone of desperation.

The Russians may see an opportunity for a power transition to leadership in Kiev inclined to make deals with Moscow. Zelensky probably can’t do that: he is too committed to expelling every last Russian from Ukrainian territory and demanding war crime trials, as he also insists that he will never deal with Putin in Russia. Zelensky’s security situation in Kiev could rapidly come under a terminal shadow.

In these circumstances, the Pentagon could rescue Zelensky and move him elsewhere, with Lviv (Lvov) being the most likely place, as it is far in the west and challenging for the Russians to reach if they wished to deal with Zelensky using military means. Rescued by NATO “forces”, the Russians might happily see Zelensky and his government go.

That would make the relocation possibly unobjectionable or at least not the worst outcome for the Russians. They could then deal with a more flexible replacement government.

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In effect, just as Italy was temporarily divided (more or less) in half, with the Gustav line the demarcation until allied forces finally took Monte Cassino in May 1944, Ukraine might also be divided, although exactly how would depend on what remained of Ukraine’s army supporting Zelensky.

Should someone of the quality of former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhny take over in Kiev, it could mean that Zelensky’s stay at Lviv would be brief and he would go into retirement elsewhere. From the perspective of NATO and the Pentagon, such a process would take some time, perhaps even a year, allowing President Joe Biden to hang on until the US elections in November.

General Valerii Zaluzhny might be more willing to do a deal with Russia. Photo: Twitter

There are not many good choices for NATO or Washington. Biden cannot afford another Afghanistan debacle but one is rapidly creeping in his direction thanks to Russian military victories and the crumbling of Ukraine’s defenses. Biden has the option of opening peace negotiations with Russia but Moscow may not be interested. There is a lot of water that has poured over the dam.

Of course, the military situation in Ukraine could stabilize and the Russians could decide to wait until after the US elections in November, but this seems unlikely now. The Russians are under their own domestic pressure to wrap up the “Special Military Operation” and there is no reason at present to believe that Putin and the Russian army will slow down or back off.

In this light, the Mussolini rescue at the Hotel Campo Imperiale model may be one of the few alternatives available.

Stephen Bryen served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article was first published on his Weapons and Strategy Substack and is republished with permission.

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asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · March 3, 2024

10. General Officer Assignment Announcement, dtd 29 February 2024 (US​ Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School)

We will have a CA officer command SWCS. This is historic.

Congratulations to Brigadier General Jason Slider who will command the USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School and to Brigadier General Jack Stumme who is now officially the Deputy Chief of Chaplains for the Army. Two great Americans with whom I have proudly served in the Philippines and in Okinawa. https://www.gomo.army.mil/public/announcement/usa-3339

https://www.gomo.army.mil/public/announcement/usa-3339

General Officer Assignment Announcement, dtd 29 February 2024

    Office of the Chief of Staff, Army        29 Feb 24

The Chief of Staff of the Army announces the following officer assignments:

Regular Army

General James J. Mingus to Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Michele H. Bredenkamp to Director's Advisor for Military Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC. She most recently served as Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Lieutenant General Robert M. Collins to Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Washington, DC. He most recently served as Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Sean A. Gainey to Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/United States Army Forces Strategic Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He most recently served as Director, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office/Director of Fires, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Karl H. Gingrich to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Anthony R. Hale to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Commanding General/ Commandant, United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Lieutenant General William J. Hartman to Deputy Commander, United States Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland. He most recently served as Commander, Cyber National Mission Force, United States Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland.

Lieutenant General David M. Hodne to Deputy Commanding General, Futures and Concepts, United States Army Futures Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia. He most recently served as Director, Chief of Staff of the Army Transition Team, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Heidi J. Hoyle to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC. She most recently served as Director of Operations, G-43/5/7, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General David T. Isaacson to Director, J-6, Joint Staff, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Director, J-1, Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Mary K. Izaquirre to The Surgeon General, United States Army/Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command, Washington, DC. She most recently served as Commanding General, Medical Readiness Command, East/Chief of the United States Army Medical Corps, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Lieutenant General Thomas L. James to Deputy Commander, United States Space Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. He most recently served as Deputy Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Space Operations, United States Space Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado.

Lieutenant General Laura A. Potter to Director of the Army Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC. She most recently served as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Andrew M. Rohling to Deputy Chairman, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee, Belgium. He most recently served as Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany.

Lieutenant General Mark T. Simerly to Director, Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He most recently served as Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Support Command/Sustainment Center of Excellence and Fort Gregg-Adams, Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia.

Lieutenant General Douglas A. Sims II to Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Major General (Promotable) John W. Brennan, Jr. to Deputy Commander, United States Africa Command, Germany. He most recently served as Director of Operations, J-3, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Major General (Promotable) Charles D. Costanza to Commanding General, V Corps, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He most recently served as Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division and Fort Stewart, Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Major General (Promotable) Stephen G. Smith to Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina. He most recently served as Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington.

Major General Andrew C. Gainey, Commanding General, 56th Artillery Command, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany to Commanding General, Southern European Task Force-Africa/Deputy Commanding General for Africa, United States Army Europe-Africa, Italy.

Major General Gavin J. Gardner, Director for Logistics, Engineering and Security Cooperation, J-4, United States Indo-Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii to Commanding General, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

Major General Patrick L. Gaydon, Vice Director for Joint Force Development, J-7, Joint Staff, Washington, DC to Commanding General, United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Chaplain (Major General) William Green, Jr. to Chief of Chaplains, United States Army, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Deputy Chief of Chaplains, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Major General Garrick M. Harmon, Deputy Commanding General, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, Germany to Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs, United States Africa Command, Germany.

Major General Joseph E. Hilbert, Director, Force Development, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division/Deputy Commander, United States Alaskan Command, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

Major General James P. Isenhower III, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division and Fort Bliss, Fort Bliss, Texas to Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Major General Ryan M. Janovic, Director of Operations, J-3, United States Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland to Commanding General, Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Eisenhower, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia.

Major General Paula C. Lodi, Commanding General, 18th Medical Command (Deployment Support)/Command Surgeon, United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii to Commanding General, United States Army Medical Research and Development Command and Fort Detrick, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Major General Charles T. Lombardo, Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division (Combined), Eighth Army, Republic of Korea.

Major General Douglas S. Lowrey, Commanding General, Mission and Installation Contracting Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas to Commanding General, Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Major General Jacqueline D. McPhail, Director of Architecture, Operations, Networks and Space, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, United States Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, United States Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Major General Scott M. Naumann, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army Forces Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina to Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and Fort Drum, Fort Drum, New York.

Major General Thomas W. O'Connor, Jr., Commanding General, United States Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama to Director, Force Development, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Major General John L. Rafferty, Jr., Chief of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, 56th Artillery Command, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany.

Major General Hope C. Rampy, Director, Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, United States Army Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Major General Jeth B. Rey, Director, Network Cross Functional Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland to Director of Architecture, Operations, Networks and Space, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Major General Lori L. Robinson, Commandant of Cadets, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York to Commanding General, United States Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Major General James M. Smith, Director of Operations, G-43/5/7, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC to Deputy Commanding General, Installation Management Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

Major General Curtis D. Taylor, Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, California to Commanding General, 1st Armored Division and Fort Bliss, Fort Bliss, Texas.

Major General Colin P. Tuley, Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Liberty, North Carolina to Commanding General, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and Fort Moore, Fort Moore, Georgia.

Brigadier General (Promotable) David W. Gardner, Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Johnson, Fort Johnson, Louisiana to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army Forces Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brigadier General (Promotable) Monte L. Rone, Commandant, United States Army Infantry School, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence/Director, Future Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team, Army Futures Command, Fort Moore, Georgia to Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Fort Riley, Kansas.

Brigadier General Brandon C. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General (Support), 2nd Infantry Division (Combined), Eighth Army, Republic of Korea to Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, California.

Brigadier General Amanda L. Azubuike, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Cadet Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky to Chief of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Maurice O. Barnett, Commanding General, 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Germany to Commanding General, United States Army Cadet Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brigadier General Christine A. Beeler, Commanding General, Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama to Program Executive Officer, Simulations, Training and Instrumentation, Orlando, Florida.

Brigadier General Beth A. Behn, Chief of Transportation and Commandant, United States Army Transportation School, United States Army Sustainment Center of Excellence, Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia to Director of Operations, G-43/5/7, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Matthew W. Braman, Deputy Commanding General (Support), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York to Director, Army Aviation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Matthew W. Brown, Deputy Commanding General, 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, United Kingdom to Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, Germany.

Brigadier General John P. Cogbill, Deputy Director Operations Fires and Effects, J-3, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brigadier General Eugene D. Cox, Commanding General, Medical Readiness Command, West/Director, Defense Health Network West, Defense Health Agency, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas to Commanding General, 18th Medical Command (Deployment Support)/Command Surgeon, United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

Brigadier General Jason A. Curl, Director, CJ3, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, Iraq to Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Johnson, Fort Johnson, Louisiana.

Brigadier General Sean P. Davis, Commanding General, 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, Fort Cavazos, Texas and Operation SPARTAN SHIELD, Kuwait to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army Forces Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brigadier General Sara E. Dudley, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Liberty, North Carolina to Deputy Commanding General for Operations, United States Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brigadier General Patrick J. Ellis, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany to Director, Network Cross Functional Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Brigadier General Joseph E. Escandon, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Experiments, G-3/5/7, United States Army Futures Command, Austin, Texas to Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York.

Brigadier General Alric L. Francis, Deputy Commander (Operations), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas to Commandant, United States Army Field Artillery School, United States Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Brigadier General Kirk E. Gibbs, Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Division, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Shafter, Hawaii to Commanding General, Northwestern Division, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, Oregon.

Brigadier General George C. Hackler, Commanding General, United States Army Operational Test Command/Deputy Commanding General for Operational Testing, United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, Fort Cavazos, Texas to Deputy Commanding General, Combat Capabilities Development Command/Senior Commander, Natick Soldier Systems Center, United States Army Futures Command, Natick, Massachusetts.

Brigadier General Peter G. Hart, Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to Deputy Director for Joint Strategic Planning, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Paul D. Howard, Commandant, United States Army Signal School, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia to Director, J-6, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Brigadier General Paige M. Jennings, Commanding General, United States Army Financial Management Command, Indianapolis, Indiana to Director, J-1, Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Gregory S. Johnson, The Adjutant General of the United States Army, United States Army Human Resources Command/Commanding General, United States Army Physical Disability Agency/Executive Director, Military Postal Service Agency, Fort Knox, Kentucky to Director, Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Curtis W. King, Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, United States Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma to Commanding General, 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Germany.

Brigadier General Niave F. Knell, Deputy Commanding General (Support),1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas to Deputy Commanding General, United States Army North, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

Brigadier General Kevin J. Lambert, Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, Germany to Commanding General, Security Force Assistance Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brigadier General Shannon M. Lucas, Deputy Provost Marshal General, Office of the Provost Marshal General, United States Army, Washington, DC to Commanding General, United States Army Operational Test Command/Deputy Commanding General for Operational Testing, United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, Fort Cavazos, Texas.

Brigadier General Mark D. Miles, Director of Command, Control, Communications and Cyber, J-6, United States Indo-Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii to Deputy Commanding General, Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Eisenhower, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia.

Brigadier General Constantin E. Nicolet, Director of Intelligence, J-2, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to Director, J-2, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Brigadier General David C. Phillips to Program Executive Officer, Program Executive Office - Aviation, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He most recently served as Project Manager, Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, Program Executive Office Aviation, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Brigadier General Philip J. Ryan, Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, Jordan to Commanding General, United States Army South, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

Brigadier General Andrew O. Saslav, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Liberty, North Carolina to Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany.

Brigadier General Jason C. Slider, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 3rd Division (France), France to Commanding General, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Chaplain (Brigadier General) Jack J. Stumme to Deputy Chief of Chaplains, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, United States Army, Washington, DC. He most recently served as Command Chaplain, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany.

Brigadier General James D. Turinetti IV, Director, J-6, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to Commanding General, United States Army Communications-Electronics Command and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Brigadier General Camilla A. White, Deputy Program Executive Office, Command, Control and Communication (Tactical), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland to Program Executive Officer, Combat Support/Combat Service Support, Warren, Michigan.

Brigadier General Jeremy S. Wilson, Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia to Deputy Commanding General-Training, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Brigadier General Scott C. Woodward, Deputy Commanding General-Training, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to Deputy Commanding General (Support), 2nd Infantry Division (Combined), Eighth Army, Republic of Korea.

Brigadier General Joseph W. Wortham II, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Liberty, North Carolina to Assistant Commander-Support, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brigadier General David J. Zinn, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii to Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC.

* Colonel Andrew L. Landers, Commander, 68th Medical Command (Deployment Support)/Command Surgeon, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army Medical Command, Falls Church, Virginia.

* Colonel Yolonda R. Summons, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army Medical Command, Falls Church, Virginia to Commander, Medical Readiness Command, West/Director, Defense Health Network West, Defense Health Agency, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

* Officer has been nominated for promotion to brigadier general. Assignment of this colonel should not be construed as the Senate's consent of this promotion nomination. There will be no action to frock or promote these officers until confirmed by the Senate.

Army Reserve

Major General Deborah L. Kotulich, Director (Inactive Ready Reserve), Army Recruiting and Retention Task Force, Washington, DC to Deputy Chief of Army Reserve (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Kent J. Lightner, Deputy Commander - Support (Troop Program Unit), 412th Engineer Command, Vicksburg, Mississippi to Deputy Commander - Support (Troop Program Unit), 81st Readiness Division, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Brigadier General Katherine A. Simonson, Deputy Commander (Troop Program Unit), 3rd Medical Command, Forest Park, Georgia to Deputy Commanding General (Inactive Ready Reserve), United States Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brigadier General Richard W. Corner II, Commander (Troop Program Unit), 85th United States Army Reserve Support Command, Arlington Heights, Illinois to Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC.

Brigadier General Brian T. Cashman, Deputy Commanding General (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), Southern European Task Force Africa, Italy to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, United States Africa Command, Djibouti.

​11. Lack of Plan for Governing Gaza Formed Backdrop to Deadly Convoy Chaos

The old "5P" adage, "Prior planning prevents..."

Or better is Eisenhower, "plans are nothing, planning is everything."

Lack of Plan for Governing Gaza Formed Backdrop to Deadly Convoy Chaos

Israel has no clear plan for governing Gaza. That is a particular problem in the north, where the fighting has ebbed, and where a deadly stampede occurred on Thursday around an aid convoy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/03/world/middleeast/israel-aid-gaza-convoy.html

In northern Gaza, lawlessness, Israeli restrictions on convoys and poor roads have made it difficult for food to reach those still stranded there.Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Patrick Kingsley

Reporting from Jerusalem

March 3, 2024

Updated 8:21 a.m. ET

Israel’s reluctance to fill the current leadership vacuum in northern Gaza formed the backdrop to the chaos that led to the deaths on Thursday of dozens of Palestinians on the Gazan coast, analysts and aid workers have said.

More than 100 were killed and 700 injured, Gazan health officials said, after thousands of hungry civilians rushed at a convoy of aid trucks, leading to a stampede and prompting Israeli soldiers to fire at the crowd.

The immediate causes of the chaos were extreme hunger and desperation: The United Nations has warned of a looming famine in northern Gaza, where the incident occurred. Civilian attempts to ambush aid trucks, Israeli restrictions on convoys and the poor condition of roads damaged in the war have made it extremely difficult for food to reach the roughly 300,000 civilians still stranded in that region, leading the United States and others to airdrop aid instead.

But analysts say this dynamic has been exacerbated by Israel’s failure to set in motion a plan for how the north will be governed.

While southern Gaza is still an active conflict zone, fighting has mostly ebbed in the north of the enclave. The Israeli military defeated the bulk of Hamas’s fighting forces there by early January, leading Israeli soldiers to withdraw from parts of the north.

Now, those areas lack a centralized body to coordinate the provision of services, enforce law and order, and protect aid trucks. To prevent Hamas from rebuilding itself, Israel has prevented police officers from the Hamas-led prewar government from escorting the trucks. But Israel has also delayed the creation of any alternative Palestinian law enforcement.

Aid groups have only a limited presence, with the United Nations still assessing how to increase its operations there. And Israel has said it will retain indefinite military control over the territory, without specifying exactly what that will mean on a day-to-day basis.

Image

Packages of aid delivered from U.S. planes were dropped into Gaza City on Saturday. Northern Gaza lacks a centralized body to coordinate the provision of services and enforce law and order.Credit...Kosay Al Nemer/Reuters

“This tragic event reflects how Israel has no long-term, realistic strategy,” said Michael Milstein, an analyst and a former Israeli intelligence official. “You can’t just take over Gaza City, leave, and then hope that something positive will grow there. Instead, there’s chaos.”

Since Israel invaded Gaza in October, following the Hamas-led attacks that devastated southern Israel earlier that month, Israeli politicians have debated and disagreed about how Gaza should be governed once the war winds down, a period that they describe as “the day after.”

Sign up for the Israel-Hamas War Briefing.  The latest news about the conflict. Get it sent to your inbox.

In northern Gaza, that moment has essentially already arrived.

When U.N. officials toured the area last week to assess the damage there, they did not coordinate their visit with Hamas because it no longer exerts widespread influence in the north, according to Scott Anderson, the deputy Gaza director for UNRWA, the main U.N. aid agency in Gaza.

Reports have emerged of some Hamas members trying to reassert order in certain neighborhoods. But aside from limited services at several hospitals, Mr. Anderson said he saw no sign of civil servants or municipal officials. Uncollected trash and sewage lined the streets, he said.

“The leadership in Gaza is underground, literally or figuratively, and there is no structure in place to fill that void,” Mr. Anderson said in a phone interview from Gaza. “That creates a prevailing aura of desperation and fear,” which makes events like the disaster on Thursday more likely, he said, adding, “It’s very frustrating and difficult to coordinate things when there’s nobody to coordinate with.”

Israel-Hamas War: Live Updates

Updated 

March 3, 2024, 9:07 a.m. ET58 minutes ago

58 minutes ago

• U.N. experts warn that Gaza is close to famine. What does that mean?
• A Hamas delegation arrives in Cairo for cease-fire talks.
• The Rubymar was carrying fertilizer that the U.S. says threatens the waterway.

Video has emerged of armed groups attacking convoys, and diplomats say criminal gangs are beginning to fill the void left by Hamas’s absence.

Without any plan, “the vacuum will either be filled by chaos and lawless gangs and criminals,” said Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, an American commentator on Gazan affairs who was brought up in Gaza, “or by Hamas, which will manage to re-emerge and attempt to reconstitute.”

Power vacuums are inevitable after most wars. But critics of the Israeli government say the vacuum in northern Gaza is worse than it could have been because Israeli leaders don’t agree about what should happen next.

The country’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, released a plan in late February that suggested that “the administration of civilian affairs and the enforcement of public order will be based on local stakeholders with managerial experience.” But beyond noting that these administrators could not be affiliated with “countries or entities that support terrorism,” Mr. Netanyahu gave no further details.

His plan was so vague that it was interpreted as an attempt to postpone a looming decision about whether to prioritize the goals of his domestic political base or those of Israel’s strongest foreign ally, the United States.

Vocal parts of Mr. Netanyahu’s right-wing base are pushing aggressively for the re-establishment of Jewish settlements in Gaza, nearly two decades after Israel removed them. Such a plan would necessitate long-term Israeli control over the territory, making it impossible to re-establish Palestinian governance there.

Conversely, the United States and other Western powers and Arab states are pushing for Palestinian leaders in the Israeli-occupied West Bank to be allowed to run Gaza, as part of a process toward creating a Palestinian state spread across both territories.

Pulled between those two contradictory paths, Mr. Netanyahu has opted for neither.

“He’s trying all kinds of maneuvers to keep his government calm,” said Mr. Milstein, the former intelligence official. “Because of all the tensions and all the problematic configurations in his government, he cannot take any real dramatic decision,” Mr. Milstein added.

The office of Mr. Netanyahu declined to comment for this article.

Nadav Shtrauchler, a former strategist for Mr. Netanyahu, dismissed concerns about Mr. Netanyahu’s strategy.

“If someone thinks he doesn’t have any plan in his head, they’re wrong: He has a plan,” Mr. Shtrauchler said. “I think he has two plans. But I’m not sure which one he will choose in the end, and I’m not sure he knows.”

For now, Mr. Netanyahu is using the ambiguity to postpone inevitable confrontations with both his right-wing coalition allies and the United States for as long as possible, Mr. Shtrauchler and other analysts said.

Israeli officials have spoken of empowering clans in different pockets of Gaza to keep the peace in their immediate neighborhoods and protect aid supplies. But the plan is unproven and enforced — and foreign diplomats are skeptical about its effectiveness.

Some Palestinians and foreign leaders say that several thousand former policemen from the Palestinian Authority, the body that ran Gaza until being pushed out by Hamas in 2007, could be retrained to fill the void. Others suggest that Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan could send a peacekeeping force to support the authority’s policemen.

In the meantime, “the Palestinians who stayed in the north of Gaza are starving to death,” said Mkhaimar Abusada, a political science professor from Gaza City. “And basically, they are trying to find food in any possible way.”

Image

People waiting in line for food in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza, last month.Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A correction was made on March 3, 2024: An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of a American commentator on Gazan affairs. He is Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, not Ahmed Fouad Khatib.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more

Patrick Kingsley is the Jerusalem bureau chief, covering Israel and the occupied territories. He has reported from more than 40 countries, written two books and previously covered migration and the Middle East for The Guardian. More about Patrick Kingsley

12. Russia's 'grey zone' tactics in Finland’s snowy forests

Excerpts:

The long border has shaped Finland's relations with Russia, said Laura Saarikoski in Helsingin Sanomat (Helsinki). It sees its neighbour as an "unstable giant" to be mollified when possible, but to be guarded against in readiness for those times when a "bout of delirium" overtakes the Kremlin. And until Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland relied on its own resources for its security, said Andrea Prada Bianchi in Foreign Policy (Washington). From the end of the Second World War up to last April it had kept militarily neutral, while developing the strongest artillery in western Europe and making military service mandatory for school leavers.

Fully 900,000 of its 5.5 million people have had military training, and it now boasts a wartime troop strength of 280,000. Nato membership ended that self-reliance, but not Finland's resolve to remain well-equipped: it recently bought a high-altitude air-defence system from Israel and 64 F-35 jets from the US. It also plans to open 300 new shooting ranges to help citizens develop their shooting skills, said IceNews (Reykjavik). And Finns are responding to the initiative: enrolment in voluntary defence courses has doubled since the Ukraine invasion, and there has been a huge increase in applications for gun licences.

The number of migrants arriving in Finland is tiny compared to those reaching southern Europe, but 80% of Finns still back the decision to close the border, said Julian Gomez on Euronews (Brussels). That support has emboldened the government, a coalition led by conservatives and the far-right, to look at even tougher ways of dealing with migrants, not least joining with other Nordic countries in chartering repatriation flights. Yet this is a problem that isn't going to go away, said Ilta-Sanomat (Helsinki). The border is due to reopen in mid-April, by which time snow will be melting and Finland's new president, the former prime minster Alexander Stubb, will have taken office. Don't be surprised if Vladimir Putin decides to "test his nerves".

Russia's 'grey zone' tactics in Finland’s snowy forests

The Week · by The Week UK · March 3, 2024

Finland closed its borders last November in response to a Russian effort to flood it with refugees

(Image credit: JUSSI NUKARI / LEHTIKUVA / Sipa US via Alamy Live News)

By

published 3 March 2024

Another crisis involving an influx of migrants is building up on Europe's border, said Christiane Kühl on Merkur.de (Munich). But this one isn't in the Mediterranean: it's occurring along the frozen stretches of the 832-mile frontier between Finland and Russia.

From August to December last year, more than 1,300 refugees from nations such as Yemen, Somalia and Syria crossed into Finland (before that it had been an average of just one a day); thousands more are expected when spring arrives. It's all part of Russia's plan to destabilise its neighbour. The tensions between the two countries have a long history, but in April last year they escalated dramatically when Finland joined Nato, and have risen ever since. Using migrants as a weapon is a classic case of Russia using "grey-zone tactics" against a Nato state – a ruse somewhere between political pressure and physical aggression.

T

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Finland's firm stance

In response, Finland closed all its border crossings in November, said Elisabeth Braw on Politico (Brussels). However, "like any responsible democratic government", it put a time limit of two weeks on the closure, hoping that would deter Moscow from doing the same again. Yet when it reopened two crossings in December, the migrants started pouring in again. So now, as well as shutting all of its crossing points, it's stepping up patrols using heat sensors and drones to stop them crossing through the woods. But it's not easy picking them up in freezing, inhospitable woodland in the depths of winter, so last year work started on a 124-mile, ten-foot-high barbed wire fence along a sensitive part of the border. This has badly hit the many Finns needing to travel to Russia, in particular ethnic Russians living in Finland, some of whom have held protests to "voice their anger" over Helsinki's handling of the dispute.

Finland's firm stance also risks undermining its image as a liberal nation that follows international asylum conventions, said Erika Solomon in The New York Times. But Helsinki had no choice. Finnish guards say the migrants are either forced across the border or given bicycles to encourage them to cross it.

Russia the 'unstable giant'

The long border has shaped Finland's relations with Russia, said Laura Saarikoski in Helsingin Sanomat (Helsinki). It sees its neighbour as an "unstable giant" to be mollified when possible, but to be guarded against in readiness for those times when a "bout of delirium" overtakes the Kremlin. And until Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland relied on its own resources for its security, said Andrea Prada Bianchi in Foreign Policy (Washington). From the end of the Second World War up to last April it had kept militarily neutral, while developing the strongest artillery in western Europe and making military service mandatory for school leavers.

Fully 900,000 of its 5.5 million people have had military training, and it now boasts a wartime troop strength of 280,000. Nato membership ended that self-reliance, but not Finland's resolve to remain well-equipped: it recently bought a high-altitude air-defence system from Israel and 64 F-35 jets from the US. It also plans to open 300 new shooting ranges to help citizens develop their shooting skills, said IceNews (Reykjavik). And Finns are responding to the initiative: enrolment in voluntary defence courses has doubled since the Ukraine invasion, and there has been a huge increase in applications for gun licences.

The number of migrants arriving in Finland is tiny compared to those reaching southern Europe, but 80% of Finns still back the decision to close the border, said Julian Gomez on Euronews (Brussels). That support has emboldened the government, a coalition led by conservatives and the far-right, to look at even tougher ways of dealing with migrants, not least joining with other Nordic countries in chartering repatriation flights. Yet this is a problem that isn't going to go away, said Ilta-Sanomat (Helsinki). The border is due to reopen in mid-April, by which time snow will be melting and Finland's new president, the former prime minster Alexander Stubb, will have taken office. Don't be surprised if Vladimir Putin decides to "test his nerves".

13. Minister: Drone education program to be introduced in Ukrainian schools

Minister: Drone education program to be introduced in Ukrainian schools

by Kateryna HodunovaMarch 1, 2024 4:07 PM2 min read

kyivindependent.com · by Kateryna Hodunova · March 1, 2024

Seven Ukrainian vocational schools will implement a commercial drone education program, Ukraine's Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov wrote on his Telegram channel on March 1.

The new educational project called "Commercial drone pilot" will be launched in Kyiv, Sumy, Lviv, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.

Drones have been a key tool in Ukraine's defense against Russia's war. President Volodymyr Zelensky said that surpassing Russia in drone operations is one of the top priorities in 2024.

Zelensky also signed a decree on Feb. 6 creating a separate branch of Ukraine's Armed Forces dedicated to drones. It will reportedly focus on creating special drone-specific units, increasing production, ramping up training, and pushing innovations.

"Learning how to operate a drone is vital nowadays in Ukraine," Fedorov said.

"These drones are used for sowing, rescue operations, demining," the minister added.

"They help assess the damage from the combat actions, and journalists use them to film the war."

The EU helped Ukraine purchase drones for educational purposes and prepare teachers for the program, according to Fedorov.

The plan is to extend the number of vocational schools participating in the program and approve an educational standard, creating an opportunity to prepare pupils for a future career in this area, Fedorov said.

The minister also said that more than 200 vocational schools have already requested renovation of their workshops to create "quality conditions" to prepare future specialists.

How has Crimea changed after 10 years of Russian occupation?

Editor’s Note: The names of Crimea’s former and current residents cited in this article were changed to protect their identity amid security concerns. When Ukrainians talk about Crimea, they often talk about memories. For many, this peninsula surrounded by the Black Sea was a place where they spent

The Kyiv IndependentDinara Khalilova

kyivindependent.com · by Kateryna Hodunova · March 1, 2024

14. US 2.0: Lincoln’s Dilemma

This is one of the best podcasts I have listened to lately. I strongly recommend it. It is about Steve Inskeep's biography on Lincoln. https://www.amazon.com/Differ-We-Must-Lincoln-Succeeded/dp/0593297865/1

If you have an hour, listen to the entire podcast. If you have less time start at the 37 minute mark and listen tot the discussion about the Emancipation Proclamation. And if you only have a few minutes begin at the 48 minute mark and listen to the relationship between Lincoln and Frederick Douglas. This last part is very much worth listening to and pondering.  We all need to learn to think and act like Lincoln and Douglas. They are powerful examples of how to think about and work with others who may criticize us.

https://hiddenbrain.org/podcast/us-2-0-lincolns-dilemma/

US 2.0: Lincoln’s Dilemma

Over the past few weeks, we’ve been exploring the psychology of partisanship, and how to effectively handle disagreements with those around us. This week, we conclude our US 2.0 series by turning to the past. We’ll explore how one of the most important leaders in American history — Abraham Lincoln — grappled with the pressing moral question of his time. When, if ever, is it worth compromising your own principles for the sake of greater progress?

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com