Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Revolution is not a mwere struggle for power, it is a struggle for justice and freedom for all."

– Emma Goldman

"The greatest evils in the world will not be carried out by men with guns, but by men in suits sitting behind desks."

– C.S. Lewis

“Knowledge makes a man unfit to be a slave.”

– Frederick Douglas

1. What Do We Stand For? by Hy Rothstein

2. Failure Mechanisms in Democratic Regimes – an Army’s Role (The Angry Staff Officer)

3. Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Stop Offensive Cyberoperations Against Russia

4. Rubio Bypasses Congress to Send Israel $4 Billion in Arms

5. Zelensky’s Path Back to White House Would Confront Big Hurdles

6. Trump’s Old World Order

7. ‘Propaganda Girls’ Review: A Game of Subversion

8. NATO Is Dead: An Oval Office Meeting That Changed NATO Forever

9. Ukrainians Are Weary but Determined to End War on Just Terms

10. Volodymyr Zelensky Has Only Himself To Blame

11. Senior USAID official ousted after detailing problems providing life-saving aid

12. How to Protect NATO and Other Alliances From Trump

13. Is Civility Possible Again?

14. What Average Americans Think of Trump’s Showdown with Zelensky

15. How DeepSeek’s small team of liberal arts graduates transforms AI text generation in China

16. Europe’s Moment of Truth: The Transatlantic Alliance Is Under Grave Threat—but Not Yet Doomed

17. Willpower, Not Manpower, is Europe’s Main Limitation for a Force in Ukraine

18. Trump is reorienting America’s moral compass

1. What Do We Stand For? by Hy Rothstein

What Do We Stand For?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/03/what-do-we-stand-for/

by Hy Rothstein

03.03.2025 at 06:00am

The way the war in Ukraine ends matters. The seeds for future Russian aggression will be planted if Putin’s war results in advancing Russia’s conception of security. It is also important to remember that the war is not simply a war between Russia and Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accurately said that the West is engaged in a proxy war with his country. Though the US has not put boots on the ground, words and deeds have made the war in Ukraine America’s war too. The war is Russia against the West. Any settlement that rewards Russian aggression is a defeat for the West. The United States will not be spared another defeat by switching sides. Doing so will amplify the defeat.

Any settlement must consider that Putin has ruled out territorial concessions and demands that Kyiv abandon its NATO membership ambitions. The Russian president wants to limit the size and power of Kyiv’s military, ensure the country’s permanent neutrality and control the direction of its political future. Putin has also argued the people of the two countries share a common history and identity and Ukraine had been unjustly severed from Russia through the work of anti-Russian forces and must be reunified. For Putin, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is about correcting an event 30 years ago that he believes never should have taken place. A just outcome seems elusive.

The barbaric, genocidal, and illegal actions of Russian leaders and their troops should have convinced US leaders that Russian aggression cannot stand. Framing any war in moral terms is essential. Moral clarity must inform policy options. The United States did not clearly articulate the justice behind the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan when doing so should have been easy. Lost wars resulted. Perhaps losing wars has become routine, even acceptable to US leaders. Vladimir Putin seems to understand this.

In the narrowest sense, Ukraine is a democratic ally whose very existence is threatened by an authoritarian dictator in Russia. In a broader sense, the war in Ukraine is about the type of world we want to live in. It is about the post-World War II rules-based international order. Mr. Putin is dictating events and, so far, the U.S. is going along. What ultimately happens to Ukraine will influence future actions by Russia, China, and other adversaries.

But the scope of the conflict is even more onerous. In their expansive joint manifesto, Messrs. Putin and Xi Jinping outlined the world they intend to create; one where their countries would take their rightful places in it. NATO would be diminished. Military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, would no longer be deployed in ways that “threaten” Russia and China. Countries formerly part of, or allied with, the Soviet Union would not align with the West. Those already aligned will be re-absorbed by Russia by force, if necessary. Issues such as democracy and human rights would be redefined by Russia and China as their spheres of influence are expanded and the world is compelled to accept their imperial claims. In other words, the Putin-Xi Manifesto is a serious threat. This clash between tyranny and liberty is, arguably, the moral test of our time and is on display in Ukraine.

The nature of reality is also on the line. Putin tells lies for power. His control is based on the production of fiction, murdering political opponents, and outlawing language contrary to official state views. Denazification, NATO’s intention to deny Russia its rightful place in the international arena, Ukraine being on the cusp of joining NATO, Ukrainians killing their Russian speaking citizens, Ukraine not being a legitimate, independent state, the West starting the war, claiming to prevent genocide while committing it, and Putin’s warped interpretation of history are but a few examples of distorted reality. If Russia wins, the truth dies along with the hundreds of thousands of people who perished defending Ukraine.

Finally, a Russian victory would strengthen tyrants whose visions of geopolitics render any concept of a liberal democratic order obsolete. Russian actions in Ukraine make the case for what is at stake. In areas under Russian control, male Ukrainians have been murdered or forced to become cannon fodder and die at the front. Women have been raped. Millions of Ukrainians have been forcibly deported to Russia, many of them women with young children, to eliminate their Ukrainian heritage and force them to accept being Russian or face prison and torture. Russia has destroyed Ukrainian archives, libraries, universities, and publishing houses to erase Ukraine. The war is about the future of a democracy and the principle of self-rule, and the rule of law. A just settlement would confirm this. A settlement that rewards Russian aggression would destroy hope for countries working towards a democratic future and the rule of law.

President Zelensky and the Ukrainians chose to fight for democracy. Their resistance is saving the West perhaps more than the West is saving Ukraine. The courage of the Ukrainian people and their President, and the severity of the threat to all democracies, demand confronting the bear. If Ukraine loses, who will we be when this war is over? If the United States is a great power, it is time to act like one.

Tags: American Foreign Policy, Democracy, grand strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, US Foreign Policy, US Grand Strategy, US strategy

About The Author

Hy Rothstein
Hy Rothstein is retired from the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is a graduate of West Point and holds a Ph.D. from Tufts University in International Relations. He has written and edited numerous books on war as well as book chapters and journal articles on national security topics.

2. Failure Mechanisms in Democratic Regimes – an Army’s Role (The Angry Staff Officer)

It is disappointing to learn that the U.S. Army War College’s War Room blog declined to publish this.

A powerful statement here:

Fourth Army commanding general (and Medal of Honor recipient) Johnathan Wainright admonished soldiers demobilizing from the second World War:

You have seen, in the lands where you worked and fought and where many of your comrades died, what happens when the people of a nation lose interest in their government. You have seen what happens when they follow false leaders. You have seen what happens when a nation accepts hate and intolerance.

We are all determined that what happened in Europe and in Asia must not happen to our country…If you see intolerance and hate, speak out against them. Make your individual voices heard, not for selfish things, but for honor and decency among men, for the rights of all people.

The Angry Staff Officer

Of history, warfare, leadership, and alcohol

Failure Mechanisms in Democratic Regimes – an Army’s Role

angrystaffofficer.com · by arngcavguy · March 3, 2025

The United States was born of a desire to leave behind monarchial government and instead live under a republic. Although the structure of the United States was explicitly crafted to have both democratic and anti-democratic elements, the perils of democracy have been part of the American discussion from the beginning (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens”). The allure of democracy is simple: by allowing people to collectively express their collective will, a representative government should be entitled to rely on their support in carrying out its political agenda. This social contract between the governed and those who govern should, in most cases, be a recipe for broad acceptance of the program of government.

Nevertheless, in the 20th Century, as the memory of monarchies faded and the threats of fascism and communism blossomed, Americans have gradually come to believe that democracy embodied the American project. Despite America’s traditional suspicion of pure democracy (and James Madison’s plea for a government run by enlightened delegates), “democracy” came to stand for all that is good and holy in a world threatened by godless collectivism and/or authoritarianism. Beginning with President Wilson’s exhortation to “make the world safe for democracy” our Founders’ strong philosophical misgivings about mob rule appear to have been discarded as part of America’s search for common ground with allies against authoritarian alternatives. Unlike the Founders, 20th Century Americans weren’t trying to rise above the shortcomings of western European governments in such as those in France or Britain, but rather trying to find common cause with them.

Indeed, in the present moment we now call anything we favor “democratic” and anything we oppose “un-democratic.” We do this even when the problem we are concerned with is itself an inherently democratic one, only reluctantly acknowledging the very significant role played by the pervasive (and anti-democratic) “checks and balances” built into our own federal constitution. The fault lines inherent in democracies—so well known to the Founders—can be showcased by (mostly) contemporary examples. All have lessons for armies—as the premier land force at the disposal of national governments. As military professionals, it is incumbent on soldiers to consider at least a few of the pitfalls which may beset a democracy and ponder the involvement of armies therein.

The problem of having the “last” election – electing anti-democratic government.

The 2006 election of Hamas to govern the Gaza strip is instructive. Despite President Biden’s 2023 pronouncement that “Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people” in 2006 Hamas was elected to govern Gaza, at least by a plurality of votes (44%). Having won the largest block of legislative seats, it was to govern in coalition with other political parties. Hamas instead went to war with its coalition partner (Fatah, who remains in control of the West Bank) and took control of Gaza by a program of internal repression and political assassination. No elections have been held since.

There were insufficient state institutions (or committed outside forces) to ensure that the rules—rules which would have ensured Hamas’ legitimacy as the primary political force in Gaza, at least for that election cycle—were respected. An election was insufficient to seal any sort of social contract where the other institutions of the Palestinian proto-state (the rule of law, independent courts, political parties committed to democratic principles) were too weak to ensure the agreed-upon rules were followed. Even if capable and available military forces had been available to enforce the rules, the governing structures were too weak to support their employment.

2. Mob rule and orgies of violence.

Americans watched the French Revolution’s reign of terror in horror in late 1700s France. The storming of the Bastille and the violent daily uprisings in Paris foreshadowed what was to come. Soldiers from the King’s army took the side of the crowds. A citizen’s militia exploited the lack of political support for the King’s troops. Mob action eventually devoured both the crowd’s own leadership and France’s nascent democracy, leading to a coup by a young army general. Napoleon Bonaparte became Europe’s first modern dictator, raising a fearsome military machine based on mass conscription. The result was 23 years of war in Europe (eventually dragging the U.S. into war Britain).

Where support for the institutions of the state (Louis XVI) was crumbling, effective military support was not possible. The social contract between the people and their government had broken down to the point where the employment of state military force shared the same degree of illegitimacy as the government itself. Parallel, opposing forces spontaneously generated to oppose the forces of the state.

3. Dependence on extremist support for political survival.

Although the creeping re-assertion of heretofore unpalatable political parties has been a recurring feature of modern European politics, a recent example in Lithuania may be a useful single event to consider. A politician with a history of anti-Semitic beliefs created a new party to run in national parliamentary elections and won sufficient support to be a necessary political partner for one of the two main political parties to form a government. Of course, in multi-party parliamentary systems, coalition governments made up of several small political parties are the norm. However, the taboo against including extremist parties in such coalitions is dissolving.

With some exceptions, we have not seen the wholesale use of military force in respect to the “normal” operation of democratic political systems in post-WWII Europe. Given massive U.S. support for the Baltic states, however, it will be instructive to see how these trends implicate U.S. Army involvement in European defense initiatives and assistance. In Lithuania, we have seen recent use of military forces to reinforce border security (not always with happy results). As the political balance of their government changes, one might consider what proportion of the limited Lithuanian Land Forces (a division-sized element) may be re-allocated to internal security missions and away from US-led NATO priorities.

4. Pretextual assertion of emergency powers to extinguish civil liberties.

The best-known modern example is the Reichstag fire of 1933. The governing German national socialist party—a participant in democratic processes while being an enemy to the democratic system—used an act by an unknown arsonist to convince the president that emergency powers were required to forestall an uprising by communists. The civil and political rights thereby abolished were never restored and led to the dictatorship with which our grandparents were all familiar, igniting not only civil repression and a takeover of the apparatus of the state but also a militarily expansive Germany and the second World War.

This is simultaneously one of the most difficult and most straightforward examples of a democratic faultline, as it does not reflect a lack of (or disintegration of) state power leading to an ineffective use of military force, nor does it represent an incremental participation in government by elements previously considered outside the four corners of acceptable political discourse, but a wholesale co-opting of the state and its military forces, towards popular but unlawful and immoral ends. Although there was opposition to the regime from inside the German armed forces (and the level of enthusiasm within the military for anti-constitutional action matters), the overall popularity of the regime’s approach forced the matter to be settled by a contest with outside powers, at tremendous cost (German military casualties of 5.5 million were only surpassed by the Soviet Union’s).

5. Repression of minority groups.

Inherent in majority rule is that the majority makes the rules. Mechanisms to moderate this inherent feature of democracies have included Britain’s patchwork of fundamental laws and strong political norms (its “unwritten constitution”), written constitutions that occupy the apex of a national hierarchy of norms, as well as international agreements and customs (which, in the aftermath of the unipolar world and Pax Americana, are largely inspired by, and are consistent with, America’s own values).

That said, majority rule can involve the use of state power to oppress minority groups. America has easily recalled examples. More contemporary examples also often involve conflict between ethnic groups. Perhaps the most striking is the Rwandan genocide of 1994, where state power became concentrated in a historically-subordinated majority group, leading to a violent backlash against the previously-dominant minority. Five million deaths ensued. Here, the military forces of the Rwandan state were complicit in the violence, which was only ended when a militia aligned with the previously-dominant minority group returned to power, backed by the army of a neighboring state.

6. Redefining conduct to skirt mandatory prohibitions.

Here we can consider a modern, American example: post-9/11 detainee abuse. This was accomplished as the result of efforts by the executive branch to disingenuously re-define fundamental norms to allow mistreatment of detainees in US custody.

The military’s role, such as at the military prison in Abu Ghraib, was subsequently well documented. The military was involved because it was indispensable to executing the government’s plan. For large projects of national importance, even those strictly outside the military sphere, often there is no other arm of the government that possesses the necessary manpower, facilities, and equipment.

In this instance, the political leadership’s call to unlawful and illegitimate action was largely and steadfastly resisted by the military leadership (particularly the military legal community) based on the baked-in values inherent in Army doctrine. Ultimately, that resistance (as well as the statutory prohibition and related obligations in international law) were overcome by the determination of the political leadership of the day and the primacy of civilian control of the military.

What else?

Of course this is not a comprehensive list. Democracies can fail in numerous ways, although not all impact armies disproportionately. For example, while crony capitalism and the associated destruction of independent bureaucracies certainly can bring a democracy to its knees, armies are impacted by corruption of state institutions similarly to other government departments.

What is the lesson here?

The U.S. military has an extreme reluctance to involve itself in political questions. The intrigue and coups d’etat that have plagued other nations as a result of their military’s involvement in politics are foreign to our experience. The Army has been, however, occasionally compelled to appear as an actor on the American political scene and, of course, has been employed inside the continental United States.

That said, as a result of Army’s non-negotiable contract with the American people to “support and defend the Constitution, subordinate to civilian authority, and obey the laws of the Nation and the orders of those appointed over us [and] reject and report illegal or immoral orders or actions” America’s Army is always at risk of being drawn into the pitfalls to which the nation herself is subject. The Army is not only a national institution, but a moral construct based on shared, American values. As trustworthy, professional, competent, and committed experts in the service of our great national project, soldiers must constantly evaluate the role the Army is tasked to play in the American republic to ensure that the pitfalls inherent in democratic systems are avoided.

This is not only an institutional imperative, but an individual one, as Fourth Army commanding general (and Medal of Honor recipient) Johnathan Wainright admonished soldiers demobilizing from the second World War:

You have seen, in the lands where you worked and fought and where many of your comrades died, what happens when the people of a nation lose interest in their government. You have seen what happens when they follow false leaders. You have seen what happens when a nation accepts hate and intolerance.

We are all determined that what happened in Europe and in Asia must not happen to our country…If you see intolerance and hate, speak out against them. Make your individual voices heard, not for selfish things, but for honor and decency among men, for the rights of all people.

[Author’s note: An earlier version of this article was submitted to the U.S. Army War College’s War Room blog back in the fall of 2024, was put into their excellent editorial process, and benefitted greatly from their editor’s feedback. The piece was accepted and scheduled for publication in February. I found out on February 25, 2025 that USAWC had changed their mind and decided not to publish the piece, after having to pull another previously-published piece “due to sensitivities” of “unnamed critics that wield the power.” I’m grateful you can see it here, but I am sad that our Army’s institutions appear to have retreated so quickly from our shared values.- GBH]

About the author: Lieutenant Colonel Garri Benjamin Hendell has completed three overseas deployments to the Middle East, four overseas training missions to Europe, and in 2022-2023 served as the S3 of the brigade task force responsible for supporting the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency with land forces at the southern border. He is currently assigned as the Red Team Chief on the 28th Infantry Division staff. His civilian work includes stints as an attorney, an investigator, and as a branch chief at National Guard Bureau’s Army National Guard directorate. He has been published on a variety of topics relating to military planning, the utilization of land forces, and the internal organization of the Army.

The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army or Department of Defense.

Cover image: The US Army drill sergeant badge bearing the Army’s motto, “This we’ll defend,” which dates back to the American Revolution and the Board of War. Appearing as early as the 1750s, the phrase has its roots both in the Old Testament and Lenni Lenape traditions. Engraved on the breech of a Philadelphia militia cannon from that era used in the American Revolution was the phrase “Kawanio che keeteru,” translated as, “This is my right, I will defend it. ”

angrystaffofficer.com · by arngcavguy · March 3, 2025

3. Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Stop Offensive Cyberoperations Against Russia

What am I missing? Why would we do this? Do we believe it no longer has malicious intent toward the US? Is Russia no longer our enemy?

Do we believe that this will generate goodwill and cooperation from Putin and Russia?

Or will Russia's cyber services take this as an opportunity to further exploit US cyber vulnerabilities?

Excerpts:

Mr. Hegseth’s instructions, part of a larger re-evaluation of all operations against Russia, have not been publicly explained. But they were issued before President Trump’s public blowup in the Oval Office with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine on Friday.

The precise scope and duration of the Defense Department order is not clear, as the line between offensive and defensive cyberoperations is often a blurry one.

Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Stop Offensive Cyberoperations Against Russia

The defense secretary’s instructions, which were given before President Trump’s blowup with the Ukrainian president, are apparently part of an effort to draw Russia into talks on the war.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/02/us/politics/hegseth-cyber-russia-trump-putin.html?unlocked_article_code=1.004.npPn.9MXSxuZuLTG9&utm

The order from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is part of a larger re-evaluation at the Pentagon of all operations against Russia.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes David E. Sanger and Helene Cooper

Reporting from Washington

March 2, 2025Updated 5:21 p.m. ET

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered U.S. Cyber Command to halt offensive operations against Russia, according to a current official and two former officials briefed on the secret instructions. The move is apparently part of a broader effort to draw President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia into talks on Ukraine and a new relationship with the United States.

Mr. Hegseth’s instructions, part of a larger re-evaluation of all operations against Russia, have not been publicly explained. But they were issued before President Trump’s public blowup in the Oval Office with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine on Friday.

The precise scope and duration of the Defense Department order is not clear, as the line between offensive and defensive cyberoperations is often a blurry one.

Still, retaining access to major Russian networks for espionage purposes is critical to understanding Mr. Putin’s intentions as he enters negotiations, and to tracking the arguments within Russia about what conditions to insist upon and what could be given up.

Former officials said it was common for civilian leaders to order pauses in military operations during sensitive diplomatic negotiations, to avoid derailing them. Still, for President Trump and Mr. Hegseth, the retreat from offensive cyberoperations against Russian targets represents a huge gamble.

It essentially counts on Mr. Putin to reciprocate by letting up on what many call the “shadow war” underway against the United States and its traditional allies in Europe. The leading European powers continue to say their support of Ukraine is undiminished even as Mr. Trump, who has sought to portray himself as a neutral arbiter in seeking to end the war in Ukraine, has at times sided openly with Mr. Putin.

U.S. officials have said Russia has continued to try to penetrate U.S. networks, including in the first weeks of the Trump administration. But that is only part of a broader Russian campaign.

Over the past year, ransomware attacks on American hospitals, infrastructure and cities have ramped up, many emanating from Russia in what intelligence officials have said are largely criminal acts that have been sanctioned, or ignored, by Russian intelligence agencies.

Sabotage efforts in Europe — including suspected Russian attempts to cut communications cables, mysterious explosions and Russian-directed assassination plots, including against the chief executive of Germany’s largest arms maker — have accelerated in the past year. The United States has, until now, been central in helping European nations fight back, often in covert cyberoperations, but that cooperation could now be in jeopardy.

Many of those operations are run out of Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters — the storied intelligence agency that broke the Enigma codes in World War II — and to some extent by Canada. It is possible they will continue that work, while the United States focuses on China, its most sophisticated adversary in cyberspace.

Image

Many of the U.S. covert cyberoperations against Russia are run out of Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters.Credit...David Goddard/Getty Images

Russia also ran an aggressive influence campaign during the last presidential campaign, according to reports by U.S. intelligence agencies during the Biden administration. In recent election cycles, U.S. Cyber Command has conducted secret operations to hamper or curtail those influence efforts.

But the Trump administration has already begun to dismantle efforts by the F.B.I. and other agencies to warn about Russian propaganda, and the order by the Pentagon would halt, at least for now, any further Cyber Command efforts to interrupt future Russian influence campaigns.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday described the urgency of getting Russia to the negotiating table over Ukraine, even while acknowledging that it was unclear whether Mr. Putin was ready to make a deal.

“You’re not going to bring them to the table if you’re calling them names, if you’re being antagonistic,” Mr. Rubio said on ABC’s “This Week.” “That’s just the president’s instincts from years and years and years of putting together deals as someone who’s in business.”

Mr. Rubio was not asked about the decision to stop the offensive cyberoperations, but he grew defensive when pressed on why the United States was letting up on pressure on Moscow, to the point of removing language from a United Nations resolution that described Russia as the aggressor in the war in Ukraine. Almost all of the United States’ traditional allies voted against the resolution, leaving the Trump administration siding with Russia, North Korea, Iran and Belarus, and a handful of other authoritarian states.

“If this was a Democrat that was doing this, everyone would be saying, well, he’s on his way to the Nobel Peace Prize,” Mr. Rubio said. “This is absurd. We are trying to end a war. You cannot end a war unless both sides come to the table, starting with the Russians, and that is the point the president has made. And we have to do whatever we can to try to bring them to the table to see if it’s even possible.”

The order from Mr. Hegseth was first reported by The Record, a cybersecurity publication from Recorded Future, which tracks cyberoperations. The Pentagon and U.S. Cyber Command declined to comment on the record, but a senior defense official, declining to allow use of her name, said that Mr. Hegseth had “no greater priority” than the safety of military members, including in cyberoperations.

After the publication of this article, Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York and the minority leader, said in a statement that Mr. Trump appeared to be giving Mr. Putin “a free pass as Russia continues to launch cyberoperations and ransomware attacks against critical American infrastructure.” He called the administration’s move “a critical strategic mistake.”

As the Trump administration prepared to take office, departing Biden administration officials urged Mr. Trump’s appointees to keep the pressure on Russia, including by continuing to arm Ukraine and push back on the GRU and the SVR, two Russian intelligence agencies that have been behind some of the most aggressive Russian cyberattacks and espionage operations.

They specifically briefed the Trump officials on suspected Russian efforts to cut communications cables undersea, and the U.S. effort last year to get a message to Mr. Putin about the consequences if an effort to put explosives on cargo planes resulted in an air disaster. American intelligence agencies concluded that Russia’s ultimate goal was to send those packages to the United States.

During Mr. Trump’s first term, American cyberoperations against Russia were, if anything, ramped up. The National Security Agency created a “Russia Small Group” after the Russian interference in the 2017 election

Mr. Trump gave Cyber Command new authorities in his first term to conduct offensive cyberoperations without direct presidential approval in a classified document known as National Security Presidential Memorandum 13.

One of those operations was a stepped-up effort to probe Russia’s electric power grid, an effort first disclosed by The New York Times and one likely meant as a warning to Russia not to interfere with American critical infrastructure. Mr. Trump denounced that reporting as “a virtual act of Treason,” but his former aides later said he was concerned the revelation would affect his relationship with Mr. Putin.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges. More about David E. Sanger

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent. More about Helene Cooper

4. Rubio Bypasses Congress to Send Israel $4 Billion in Arms

Rubio Bypasses Congress to Send Israel $4 Billion in Arms

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s emergency declaration calls for sending 2,000-pound bombs and other weapons to Israel as the war in Gaza continues.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/02/us/politics/rubio-arms-israel.html

Officials from the State Department, led by Marco Rubio, told the House and Senate committees responsible for reviewing the weapons orders about the emergency authorization on Friday.Credit...Tierney L. Cross for The New York Times

By Edward Wong

Reporting from Washington

March 2, 2025Updated 5:49 p.m. ET

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has invoked “emergency authorities” to bypass Congress and send $4 billion in weapons to Israel, the second time in a month that the Trump administration has skirted the process of congressional approval for sending arms to the country.

Mr. Rubio did not explain in a statement announcing the decision on Saturday why he was using an emergency authority. He said only that the Trump administration would “continue to use all available tools to fulfill America’s longstanding commitment to Israel’s security, including means to counter security threats.”

State Department officials told the two congressional committees in the House and Senate that review foreign weapons sales about the emergency declaration on Friday. At least one congressional official privately expressed alarm at the bypassing of the review.

Several of the cases of munitions to be sent to Israel were undergoing review in Congress. But one large case worth about $2 billion had not been sent by the State Department to Congress for review, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to talk candidly about sensitive weapons deals.

The Pentagon announced details of that sale to Israel on Friday. The announcement lists several possible mixes of bombs that would be delivered, including more than 35,000 2,000-pound bombs.

Israel has been dropping 2,000-pound bombs in Gaza, a densely populated strip of 2 million people that is about the size of Las Vegas. U.S. military officers have said the bombs are unsuitable for urban combat.

President Joseph R. Biden Jr. sent several orders of the bombs to Israel, then withheld one shipment last summer as Israel prepared to attack Rafah, a shelter point for many displaced Palestinians. Israel destroyed much of Rafah anyway, and the Trump White House released the shipment days after President Trump took office in late January.

Israel announced on Sunday that it was halting all goods and humanitarian aid into Gaza in a pressure campaign to get Hamas to accept a temporary extension to a cease-fire that had just expired. Most of the aid is from groups and governments outside of Israel, and some legal experts said Israel’s halt violated international law.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said the proposal for a cease-fire extension had been the idea of Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East. Hamas had insisted that Israel seriously take part in talks for a permanent truce during the just-expired cease-fire, which Israel did not do.

Hamas still holds dozens of Israeli hostages who were abducted in October 2023, when about 1,200 Israelis were killed in a Hamas-led assault in southern Israel. The Israeli military then attacked Gaza, killing nearly 50,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza Health Ministry estimates. Most of the people killed on both sides have been civilians.

Besides the case of bombs worth $2 billion, the other military equipment to be sent to Israel under the emergency authorization includes bulldozers, more bombs and GPS-guidance kits to be fitted onto unguided or “dumb” bombs.

The two relevant congressional committees — the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — had been doing an informal review of the equipment. During that process, aides and lawmakers can ask the State Department questions about the orders before giving approval. The department usually expects the informal review process of arms for Israel to last no longer than 20 days.

In early February, the State Department bypassed the congressional informal review process to announce that it was sending $8 billion in arms to Israel that the Biden administration had approved.

The State Department under Mr. Biden, led by Antony J. Blinken, told the committees about that package in early January. Three of the four top Republican and Democratic officials on the committees approved the package during the normal 20-day informal review period. But one Democratic representative, Gregory W. Meeks of New York, wanted to continue the review, prompting the Trump administration to bypass full approval days after Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu met in the White House.

The Saturday statement from Mr. Rubio claimed that the Trump administration had approved the $8 billion in arms to Israel, when in fact the package had originated with the Biden administration.

The statement also falsely asserted that Mr. Rubio’s decision on the new $4 billion in weapons and equipment reversed a Biden administration “partial arms embargo” on Israel. In fact, Mr. Biden and Mr. Blinken approved almost all of Israel’s orders for weapons.

The State Department would not comment about either assertion.

Mr. Blinken did withhold issuing licenses for Israel to buy 24,000 U.S.-made assault rifles from American companies for fear of helping to escalate violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. This year, the department under Mr. Rubio submitted to Congress for review at least one request from Israel for a license to buy 5,000 rifles.

During Mr. Trump’s first term, the administration invoked an emergency declaration to bypass Congress to send arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department. More about Edward Wong

5. Zelensky’s Path Back to White House Would Confront Big Hurdles

Excerpts:

John Herbst, who served as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine under George W. Bush and is now a senior director at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., said that Zelensky clearly irritated Trump during the Oval Office meeting by repeatedly criticizing Putin and pressing Trump for U.S. security guarantees in front of the live television cameras.

Zelensky “could have handled himself better” by bringing those matters up in a private meeting after the Oval Office meeting, Herbst said. Ukraine has a genuine need for security guarantees, Herbst said, but the meeting Friday was, like other interactions between the leaders, overshadowed by their troubled past relations.

“History is relevant because Trump remembers stuff,” said Herbst. “He remembers slights. He also remembers favors.”

Trump has long harbored suspicions of Ukraine’s political establishment. He has promoted an unsubstantiated theory that the Democratic National Committee was hacked in 2016 not by Russia but by a server located in Ukraine, a theory also spread by Moscow.

Trump’s early dealings with Zelensky, meanwhile, only buttressed his belief the Ukrainian president was also aligned against him personally. After Zelensky was elected president of Ukraine in 2019, Trump began pressing the new Ukrainian leader to declare an investigation into his Democratic rivals there.

Zelensky’s Path Back to White House Would Confront Big Hurdles

President Trump’s strained affairs with the Ukrainian leader stretch back to a single phone call in 2019

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trumps-strained-affairs-with-zelensky-stretch-back-to-a-single-phone-call-25dab7ad?mod=latest_headlines

By Alan Cullison

Follow and Alex Leary

Updated March 2, 2025 6:12 pm ET

Trump’s Old World Order

Does he want deals with Russia and China to carve up the planet? He should tell Americans.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/propaganda-girls-review-a-game-of-subversion-6c794f5a?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

March 2, 2025 4:30 pm ET

‘Propaganda Girls’ Review: A Game of Subversion

Goebbels tried to recruit Marlene Dietrich to star in German films. Instead she worked with U.S. intelligence to undermine Hitler’s regime.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/propaganda-girls-review-a-game-of-subversion-6c794f5a?mod=latest_headlines

By Melanie Kirkpatrick

March 2, 2025 12:00 pm ET

When my mother was asked why she joined the Navy during World War II, she would reply: “We were at war. I had to do something.” Mother was one of 100,000 women who enlisted in the Waves—Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service—established for the purpose of replacing male workers, who were thereby freed to fight. Decades later, women who served their country in manifold ways during World War II would become the subjects of numerous novels and histories.

Grab a Copy

Propaganda Girls: The Secret War of the Women in the OSS

By Lisa Rogak

St. Martin's Press

240 pages

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Buy Book

Lisa Rogak’s “Propaganda Girls” chronicles the stories of four women who worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor of today’s CIA. Ms. Rogak is the author of many books, including biographies of Rachel Maddow, Jon Stewart and Stephen King.

One of the missions of the OSS was to create, produce and disseminate propaganda that would demoralize enemy soldiers and civilians. The women of “Propaganda Girls” worked in Morale Operations, the department that produced leaflets, posters, radio broadcasts and other media that “appeared to come from within the enemy country, either from a resistance movement or from disgruntled soldiers and civilians,” Ms. Rogak writes.

The objective was to make the enemy decide that Hitler and Hirohito weren’t worth fighting for anymore—to cause soldiers to surrender and civilians to despair or even resist. Verisimilitude required that a fake newspaper, say, be printed on paper from the targeted country and that radio scripts include local slang and references to local institutions or happenings. “If there were any doubts,” the author notes, “Allied soldiers could be at risk.”

William “Wild Bill” Donovan, who in 1942 founded the OSS, liked “quirky” people, the author reports, and the four operatives of “Propaganda Girls” had personal backgrounds that were unusual for women in the 1940s. Betty MacDonald was a Japanese-speaking society reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Barbara “Zuzka” Lauwers grew up in Czechoslovakia, spoke five languages and was a private in the U.S. Army. Jane Smith-Hutton, the wife of a naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, spoke Japanese and had delved deeply into Japanese culture. Marlene Dietrich, a German-American, was the big-name movie star known for her sultry persona.

The work the women produced for the OSS ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous. In the latter category was toilet paper featuring the image of Adolf Hitler, which OSS agents delivered surreptitiously to German latrines. The TP was the brainchild of Lauwers and her co-worker Saul Steinberg, who would later win fame for his New Yorker cartoons.

Smith-Hutton came up with the idea of creating a fake version of Japan’s pocket-size code of military conduct. While the real manual ordered soldiers to fight to the death, Smith-Hutton’s version informed them that surrender was an honorable act.

Drawing on a propaganda campaign that had been successful against German troops, MacDonald designed a program to plant worries in Japanese soldiers’ minds about whether their wives and girlfriends back home were being faithful to them. MacDonald produced radio scripts and newspaper articles describing a fictional program—supposedly introduced by the Japanese government—ordering women, single or married, to get pregnant “by any means possible” so as to honor the emperor by increasing the population.

Dietrich’s work for the OSS exploited her fame in her homeland, where she was so popular that Joseph Goebbels, the Nazis’ chief propagandist, had tried to recruit her to star in German films. Instead she signed up to entertain the Allied troops in the European theater. In 1944 Donovan enlisted her for the top-secret Project Muzak, which delivered broadcast news and entertainment to German soldiers and civilians.

Dietrich’s role was to sing, in German, popular songs whose lyrics had been changed—often by Dietrich herself—to discourage and dishearten German listeners. The new lyrics of the formerly upbeat “Taking a Chance on Love” told of lovers who “will never meet again” and referred to “a cross on a grave.” Another song, equally depressing, was sung from the point of view of a soldier who knows he will lose his girlfriend and his life.

Ms. Rogak’s prose is serviceable but far from sparkling. Her narrative sometimes reads like a series of bullet points that have been strung together. But not always. The first chapter, which recounts, from MacDonald’s perspective, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, makes that familiar story fresh again. The day had begun as “just another Sunday morning on Oahu,” Ms. Rogak writes, describing MacDonald’s incredulity that Honolulu was under attack. “Had she imagined the explosions? Maybe it was a drill after all.”

Also gripping is the author’s account of Smith-Hutton’s imprisonment, for 6½ months, in the American embassy in Tokyo. Reminiscent of Scarlett O’Hara in “Gone With the Wind,” Smith-Hutton repurposed the embassy curtains into winter clothing. She and the other internees would not be released until June 1942, when a Swiss diplomat arranged for their freedom in exchange for Japanese citizens held in the U.S.

Each of the four women in “Propaganda Girls” had her own reasons for joining the OSS. MacDonald was sick of writing for the women’s pages and longed for professional challenges. Lauwers craved adventure. Smith-Hutton hated the Japanese war machine that had held her captive and was defiling the culture she admired. Dietrich reviled the Nazis.

But they all shared a deep patriotism and a desire to serve their country. In words nearly identical to those of my mother, Dietrich said it well: “I couldn’t do much, but I had to do something.”

Ms. Kirkpatrick, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, is a former deputy editor of the Journal’s editorial page.

Appeared in the March 3, 2025, print edition as 'A Game Of Subversion'.

8. NATO Is Dead: An Oval Office Meeting That Changed NATO Forever

Is it really?

Or could these events somehow make it stronger if Europe spends more on defense and steps up to defend Ukraine and Europe from Putin?

Will NATO live on without US leadership?

NATO Is Dead

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · March 2, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s disastrous Oval Office meeting with President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance marks an inflection point for international security in the post-World War II era.

An Oval Office Meeting That Changed NATO Forever

Ukraine will continue to fight with or without support. After all, ideology and not grievance motivates Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader simply rejects Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation or culture. Ukrainians are not the sort of people who will willingly march to their own annihilation.

The reason for the meeting was so consequential is because of what it suggests about the future of NATO. Trump’s declaration of moral equivalency and his and JD Vance’s refusal to acknowledge the clear-cut aggression Ukraine weathered raise questions about whether they would rationalize and dismiss aggression against NATO members.

Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s foundational document, declared, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs.” But Article V is not as cut-and-dry as many NATO supporters believe for two reasons.

First, the Article only calls on the alliance to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” What is necessary for security is open to interpretation. Consider Trump’s logic: While Ukraine is not a NATO member, the president made his position clear to Zelensky and the assembled press. “You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people. You’re gambling with World War Three. You’re gambling with World War Three, and what you’re doing is very disrespectful to the country,” he shouted.

Trump also grounded his moral equivalency in practicalities. “If I didn’t align myself with both of them, you’d never have a deal…. You see, the hatred he’s [Zelensky] got for Putin, it’s very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. He’s got tremendous hatred, and I understand that, but I can tell you the other side is not exactly in love with him either… I want to see if we can get this thing done. You want me to be tough? I could be tougher than any human being you’ve ever seen. I’d be so tough, but you’re never going to get a deal that way. So that’s the way it goes.”

Put another way, if security means standing down to reach an agreement, so be it.

The second problem with Article V is the consensus that governs NATO. For 35 years, many within NATO saw its expansion as an inherent good. There was something to their logic: If countries became shareholders in a common alliance, they would have no ability to fight each other. The problem always has been the consensus at the heart NATO’s governance. It was tough enough to get full agreement when NATO had 12 members; with 32, it can be near impossible.

Now, if Montenegro or other window-dressing countries raise objections, other NATO countries might run roughshod over it. After all, a country of 620,000 like Montenegro simply does not compare to a country like the United States that has a population of 340 million.

If Washington blocks consensus, however, it’s a whole different ballgame.

RIP, NATO: What Happens Next?

What this means in practice is NATO is dead, even if it does not realize it yet. If Russian forces moved into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the United States would do exactly nothing. Germany might bluster but an emphasis on soft-power—even in combat zones like Afghanistan—long ago eroded its military prowess.

Germany’s military is today better at declarations than defense and memo rather than mortars. How to profit rather than rebuff invasion would motivate President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. Poland would fight, and perhaps France too, but neither would risk nuclear war, especially should Putin threaten Polish bases with tactical nuclear weapons.

Putin likely realizes the time is now for him to reclaim what he believes to be Russia’s inherent right to the former Soviet borders. Its Asian components can wait for the time being; opportunities like Trump provides do not come often. The Baltic states are his for picking.

The question now is whether Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose service to Trump’s agenda undermines everything for which he has hitherto stood will betray the Baltic and get scores of Americans killed when Russians forces enter, or whether he will order embassy evacuations now.

Donald Trump speaking at the 2015 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in National Harbor, Maryland.

Likewise, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has a choice: A non-combatant evacuation now, or a far more intractable problem with Americans stranded behind enemy lines later.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Dr. Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. He is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. The views expressed in this opinion piece are the author’s own.

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · March 2, 2025

9. Ukrainians Are Weary but Determined to End War on Just Terms

Excerpts:

A platoon commander called the shortage a crisis. “Heroes who defended our state have already died,” said the 35-year-old soldier who has been fighting since 2022. He added that morale is low. “Everyone is unmotivated and tired…All military men are human beings. Everyone has a limit.”

Though Ukraine managed to hold the Russians off with little Western help during the first harrowing weeks of the war, much has changed since then.

Russia has adjusted its tactics and is advancing in Ukraine’s east, albeit slowly. And the deluge of volunteers who rushed to join the military at the start of the invasion has long since dried up.

While Ukrainian internet channels have lit up with pledges to donate money to the military over the weekend, pledges to join the armed forces were far rarer.

Like so many Ukrainians, Denys Dykyi, a muscular 28-year-old IT worker in Kyiv, defended Zelensky’s performance in Washington, and was adamant that his country wouldn’t surrender.

“We are a nation fighting for our survival, and it’s disappointing to see some democratic leaders act as if power—not justice—determines who deserves support,” Dykyi said.

But he said he wasn’t ready to fight himself. He cited the lack of care for veterans, especially those who are injured, as one of the primary deterrents. He said he would continue to help in other ways, such as donating and paying taxes.

“Of course I’m afraid,” he said. “When you look at how little is given back to those who sacrifice, it’s hard not to feel conflicted.”

Ukrainians Are Weary but Determined to End War on Just Terms

An Oval Office clash has many wondering whether they will have to fight without their most powerful ally

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainians-are-weary-but-determined-to-end-war-on-just-terms-162ebf18?mod=latest_headlines

People mourning in Independence Square, Kyiv, on Sunday during the funeral ceremony for a Ukrainian dancer, choreographer and serviceman who was killed in action. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

By Ian Lovett

Follow and Nikita Nikolaienko

March 2, 2025 10:51 am ET

KYIV—Two years after losing her son in the war against Russia, Yevheniia Pavelko had allowed herself to hope that maybe, just maybe, the U.S. would offer Ukraine a security guarantee that could set the stage for a cease-fire.

But after the diplomatic meltdown during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the Oval Office on Friday, Pavelko is coming to terms with the cold reality: There is no end to the war in sight, and Ukraine will likely have to keep fighting without its most powerful ally.

“I want an end to this nightmare…but there must also be justice for us,” said Pavelko, a 51-year-old store clerk in Kyiv. “I know my son would never have accepted a peace agreement that was detrimental to Ukraine.”

Three years into the war, Ukrainians are weary and eager for an end to the conflict—but they see no alternative to continuing to fight against Moscow’s invasion, even if the West abandons them.

Civilians are tired of sweeping out broken glass and carrying their children to the basements during air raids. Many soldiers haven’t gotten a break from fighting since the invasion began. Their jobs, meanwhile, have become only more difficult: Though the Russian advance has slowed since the fall, Ukrainian soldiers on the eastern front say they are outnumbered at least 5-to-1.

Yet, the depth of the country’s sacrifice has also left most of the population unwilling to consider any cease-fire that resembles capitulation. Though polls show Ukrainians are more willing to cede territory to Moscow than earlier in the war, they say they must get some kind of security guarantees from the West in return.

Ukrainian soldiers training in Ukraine’s Donetsk region in November. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

The disastrous meeting between Zelensky and President Trump last week hasn’t changed that.

“Zelensky represented our interests there with dignity,” said a 28-year-old junior sergeant fighting in eastern Ukraine. “Trump has severely underestimated Ukrainians if he thinks we will just throw up our hands and surrender.”

Over the weekend, Ukrainians processed the news with characteristic black humor and a spirit of defiance. Bars in Kyiv on Saturday night brimmed with young people celebrating the start of spring. One group toasted to the tornadoes that must surely be coming soon—all other possible disasters had hit the country already.

Though Zelensky has taken some criticism for his combative response to Trump and Vice President JD Vance, the meeting in the Oval Office has again turned him into a cult hero, as he was at the start of the war.

Memes depicting Zelensky punching out Trump swept across Ukrainian social media channels. Another popular post showed two Ukrainian soldiers standing outside a destroyed building and holding a sign that read, “Thank you, JD Vance.”

Some here are holding out hope that the relationship with the U.S. can still be salvaged and aid from Washington will keep flowing.

Zelensky wrote Saturday on X that the two countries remain strategic partners “despite the tough dialogue.”

“It’s crucial for us to have President Trump’s support,” he wrote. “He wants to end the war, but no one wants peace more than we do. We are the ones living this war in Ukraine.”

However, hopes in Kyiv are generally shifting away from Washington, toward Europe. Leaders from across the continent have already begun a series of meetings about how they can keep Ukraine afloat militarily.

A damaged building in Pokrovsk after the front-line Ukrainian town had become the main target of the Russian assault. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

But Western officials and military analysts say there are certain capabilities—particularly missile defense and intelligence—that will be impossible to replace in the short term if the U.S. pulls aid from Ukraine. Within a few months, Kyiv could start running short of some of its essential, American-made weaponry.

It is possible that Trump will sell those weapons to European allies, who could provide them to Ukraine. But Friday’s clash has raised the specter that he could cut Ukraine off entirely, and even threaten allies who continue to provide aid.

Still, it isn’t clear what it would look like for Ukraine to keep fighting without Western aid. Already, the country is facing a major shortage of troops.

A platoon commander called the shortage a crisis. “Heroes who defended our state have already died,” said the 35-year-old soldier who has been fighting since 2022. He added that morale is low. “Everyone is unmotivated and tired…All military men are human beings. Everyone has a limit.”

Though Ukraine managed to hold the Russians off with little Western help during the first harrowing weeks of the war, much has changed since then.

Russia has adjusted its tactics and is advancing in Ukraine’s east, albeit slowly. And the deluge of volunteers who rushed to join the military at the start of the invasion has long since dried up.

While Ukrainian internet channels have lit up with pledges to donate money to the military over the weekend, pledges to join the armed forces were far rarer.

Like so many Ukrainians, Denys Dykyi, a muscular 28-year-old IT worker in Kyiv, defended Zelensky’s performance in Washington, and was adamant that his country wouldn’t surrender.

“We are a nation fighting for our survival, and it’s disappointing to see some democratic leaders act as if power—not justice—determines who deserves support,” Dykyi said.

But he said he wasn’t ready to fight himself. He cited the lack of care for veterans, especially those who are injured, as one of the primary deterrents. He said he would continue to help in other ways, such as donating and paying taxes.

“Of course I’m afraid,” he said. “When you look at how little is given back to those who sacrifice, it’s hard not to feel conflicted.”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hugs Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Sunday, the day of the European leaders’ summit in London to discuss European security and Ukraine. Photo: toby melville/Reuters

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

10. Volodymyr Zelensky Has Only Himself To Blame

Excerpts:

This episode will likely free Trump’s hand with European leaders. If he says that Zelensky is not a valid partner with whom he can make peace, Trump will walk away. Who in Europe will argue that Trump is wrong?

Even Kier Starmer of the UK and Manuel Macron of France tried to change Trump’s mind about supporting Ukraine during visits earlier this week. Yet, both were perfectly cordial and pleasant in front of the cameras in the Oval Office. They must have cringed as they watched Zelensky destroy any hope of moving Trump in Europe’s direction.

The chances are now high that Trump will more enthusiastically pursue what he sees as America’s best interests in this conflict: to see it come to a quick end and move on to more pressing matters between Washington and Moscow, irrespective of what it does for Ukraine.

Zelensky will now have to deal with the fallout and the likely diminished support from the U.S. and either face the reality that he will now have to negotiate an end to the war himself – or continue ignoring reality and fight on, pointlessly sacrificing potentially hundreds of thousands of more Ukrainian soldiers.

If he chooses the latter, the danger will rise, and he could face a riot from his own soldiers. This is a situation of Zelensky’s own making, and now he will face the consequences one way or another.

Volodymyr Zelensky Has Only Himself To Blame

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · March 1, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky came to the White House on Friday to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in search of more help in his war with Russia. Instead, he did the worst thing possible: he got into a public shouting match with the man who could help Ukraine the most, Donald Trump, and in about five minutes, he probably sealed his loss in the war against Russia.

The Oval Office Ukraine Erruption, Explained

In what was supposed to be a photo op of glad-handing and smiles in the Oval Office, Zelensky got irritated by Vice President J.D. Vance and tried to belittle him on live television.

Vance had allowed Zelensky to speak without interruption. Still, Vance’s patience ran out when Zelensky mocked the vice president’s position on the need for diplomacy – and called him by his first name – by saying “what kind of diplomacy, JD, you are speaking about?”

Vance fired back, saying “I’m talking about the kind of diplomacy that’s going to end the destruction of your country.” Zelensky attempted to counter, but the vice president cut him off and said, “Mr. President, Mr. President, with respect, I think its disrespectful of you to come into the Oval Office and try to litigate in front of the American media.”

It only got worse from there. Instead of reading the room and keeping the rest of his thoughts to himself, saving any difficult conversations for behind closed doors, he continued arguing with Vance and then escalated the verbal altercation with Trump as well.

It was a fatal miscalculation because Zelensky was in Washington to try to convince Trump to expand his support of Ukraine.

Just two days ago, Zelensky made a video explaining his objectives in coming to Washington, saying “For me and for all of us in the world, it is crucial that America’s assistance is not stopped.” And in front of cameras broadcasting live around the world, Zelensky chose to lecture the vice president and tell the president what he’s going to feel.

Ukraine’s Big Mistake

He just couldn’t keep his mouth shut and continued for more than five painful minutes. If there was any doubt about how much damage he inflicted on his cause, minutes after the session ended and the rest of the meeting cancelled, Trump posted on Truth Social that Zelensky “disrespected the United States of American in its cherished Oval Office. He can come back when he’s ready for peace.”

In all probability, Trump will now refuse to help Ukraine in any way and is likely to more readily agree to Putin’s terms on ending the conflict, no matter how draconian.

Zelensky’s Crucial Mistake

In truth, there was no real prospect that Zelensky could have come to the White House and convinced Trump to back him militarily.

The best he could have genuinely hoped for in his meeting was to get the U.S. president to push for the least offensive end-of-war terms from Putin.

However, this ugly display in the Oval Office exposed Zelensky’s refusal to acknowledge what was clear for a long time. There’s nothing new in his actions, as it turns out.

As I have been arguing in these pages since 2021, Zelensky should have taken the diplomatic path to prevent the war from starting (by refusing to implement the 2015 Minsk Accords or his unwillingness to suck down his pride and take the deal offered by Putin in December 2021), and should have sought a negotiated end weeks into the war, in Istanbul in April 2022.

But Zelensky has always refused to take the path that preserved the greatest amount of his territory or preserved the people over whom he leads. He has rejected every opportunity to end the war, and even now, he still appears unwilling to acknowledge the military reality that the war is unwinnable and seems unable to acknowledge that there is no peace deal to be had that advantages Kyiv. Instead, he has chosen to act out the role of a presumed modern-day Winston Churchill, rejecting every diplomatic overture offered by the Russians, choosing to fight.

That worked under the previous U.S. president because Joe Biden was perfectly willing to join with Zelensky in ignoring basic combat realities to keep the war going, so long as Russia was “weakened” in the process. Biden’s view, however, never had a fantasy that Russia would be militarily defeated because Biden realized that if Ukraine were to win, it would almost certainly push Russia into a nuclear escalation – something even Biden was keen to avoid.

Zelensky, however, was and remains unconcerned about such potentialities, going so far earlier this month on Piers Morgan to advocate to be given nuclear weapons with which to fight Russia.

If it wasn’t clear before, it should not be crystal clear: Zelensky cannot engage in diplomatic talks aimed at ending the war. He has proven he is incapable of making rational decisions.

What Happens Now?

This episode will likely free Trump’s hand with European leaders. If he says that Zelensky is not a valid partner with whom he can make peace, Trump will walk away. Who in Europe will argue that Trump is wrong?

Even Kier Starmer of the UK and Manuel Macron of France tried to change Trump’s mind about supporting Ukraine during visits earlier this week. Yet, both were perfectly cordial and pleasant in front of the cameras in the Oval Office. They must have cringed as they watched Zelensky destroy any hope of moving Trump in Europe’s direction.

The chances are now high that Trump will more enthusiastically pursue what he sees as America’s best interests in this conflict: to see it come to a quick end and move on to more pressing matters between Washington and Moscow, irrespective of what it does for Ukraine.

Zelensky will now have to deal with the fallout and the likely diminished support from the U.S. and either face the reality that he will now have to negotiate an end to the war himself – or continue ignoring reality and fight on, pointlessly sacrificing potentially hundreds of thousands of more Ukrainian soldiers.

If he chooses the latter, the danger will rise, and he could face a riot from his own soldiers. This is a situation of Zelensky’s own making, and now he will face the consequences one way or another.

About the Author: Daniel L. Davis

Daniel L. Davis retired from the U.S. Army as a Lt. Col. after 21 years of active service and is now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, writing a weekly column. He was deployed into combat zones four times in his career: Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq in 2009, and Afghanistan twice (2005, 2011). Davis was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for Valor at the Battle of 73 Easting in 1991 and awarded a Bronze Star Medal in Afghanistan in 2011. He is the author of The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America. Davis gained some national notoriety in 2012 when he returned from Afghanistan and published a report detailing how senior U.S. military and civilian leaders told the American public and Congress the war was going well while, in reality, it was headed to defeat. Events since confirmed his analysis was correct. Davis was also the recipient of the 2012 Ridenhour Prize for Truth-telling. Currently, you can find Lt Col. Daniel Davis on his YouTube channel, “Daniel Davis Deep Dive,” where he analyzes war, national security, politics, foreign policy, and breaking news with expert commentary.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · March 1, 2025

11. Senior USAID official ousted after detailing problems providing life-saving aid

Senior USAID official ousted after detailing problems providing life-saving aid

The memo, by the acting assistant administrator for global health, contradicts claims by Secretary of State Marco Rubio that he has put in place a functioning system for exempting life-saving assistance from the aid freeze.

March 2, 2025 at 6:41 p.m. EST50 minutes ago

A sign is seen last month at an entrance to the former USAID offices at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington. (Pete Kiehart/For The Washington Post)

By John Hudson

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/02/usaid-memo-official-leave/?utm

A senior career official at the U.S. Agency for International Development was placed on leave Sunday after he disseminated a detailed memo to staff describing the U.S. government’s “failure” to provide life-saving assistance around the world because of actions by President Donald Trump’s political appointees.

The memo, by Nicholas Enrich, the acting assistant administrator for global health, contradicts claims by Secretary of State Marco Rubio that he has put in place a functioning system for exempting life-saving assistance from the aid freeze imposed by Trump in his first week in office.

“USAID’s failure to implement lifesaving humanitarian assistance under the waiver is the result of political leadership,” says the memo obtained by The Washington Post.

“This will no doubt result in preventable death, destabilization, and threats to national security on a massive scale,” the memo says.

The broken system for providing waivers has been noted by aid groups for several weeks but never spelled out in such detail in an official government memo. The ouster of a senior official for acknowledging the problem also underscores the intolerance for dissent among senior USAID leadership.

The memo says the problem with providing exemptions is because of “the refusal to pay for assistance activities conducted or goods and services rendered, the blockage and restriction of access to USAID’s payment systems followed by the creation of new and ineffective processes for payments, the ever-changing guidance as to what qualifies as ‘lifesaving’ and whose approval is needed in making that decision, and most recently, the sweeping terminations of the most critical implementing mechanisms necessary for providing-lifesaving services.”

Enrich on Sunday sent a follow-up message to staff, obtained by The Post, thanking them for their service and saying he had been placed on “administrative leave, effective immediately.”

USAID did not immediately respond to a request for comment. A State Department spokesman also did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

By John Hudson

John Hudson is a reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and national security. He was part of the team that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service for coverage of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has reported from dozens of countries, including Ukraine, China, Afghanistan, India and Belarus.follow on X@John_Hudson

12. How to Protect NATO and Other Alliances From Trump

Conclusion:

Mr. Trump never appreciated Winston Churchill’s insight that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Accordingly, advancing U.S. national-security interests under Mr. Trump, and saving our admittedly imperfect alliances, requires enduring before prevailing. One answer is to outlast him, distract him and find him other targets. But the most important course is to tell the truth to the American people, starting now.

How to Protect NATO and Other Alliances From Trump

Responsible advisers and GOP lawmakers should redirect his focus to other targets, especially the EU.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-to-protect-nato-and-other-alliances-from-trump-nato-eu-german-france-war-russia-637c6db2?mod=latest_headlines

By John Bolton

March 2, 2025 11:52 am ET

Defense ministers meet at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s headquarters in Brussels, Feb. 13. Photo: olivier hoslet/Shutterstock

Last week’s Trump-Vance-Zelensky train wreck proved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is on increasingly shaky ground. Starting with Donald Trump’s Feb. 12 phone call with Vladimir Putin about the Ukraine war, things got worse when Mr. Trump called Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” and the war’s instigator. Vice President JD Vance’s neocon-like complaints that Western Europeans were insufficiently democratic, without comparable analysis of Russia, eased Mr. Putin away from diplomatic purdah. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan to consider massive cuts in defense spending foreshadows even worse consequences. The Oval Office grudge match finished the picture, and all now points to trashing history’s most successful politico-military alliance. Mr. Trump hasn’t formally withdrawn from NATO, but he is so gravely weakening it that leaving would simply be the final insult.

NATO isn’t America’s only alliance in jeopardy. In his first term, Mr. Trump’s assault on NATO arrived alongside his criticism of other allies, albeit not as publicly as today. The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, the Australia-U.K.-U.S. consortium to build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, and the export-control rules designed to keep rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction—are all at risk. Even bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea are in question. Taiwan should be very worried.

Israel may escape for now, but Israelis should recall Martin Niemöller’s poem, which concludes: “Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”

Two complementary political counterattacks are needed—to save Ukraine from Russia and to salvage NATO. Although the evidence is tenuous, there may still be enough alliance supporters among Mr. Trump’s advisers to change course. If so, they must advise the president on what he should be doing, not just responding “yes, sir” to his ill-informed statements.

I’ve been through this myself, as have others, and can attest it will be unpleasant for those showing loyalty to our country and its Constitution. But at some point, principles must rise above job security and ambition. Resignation becomes the only honorable course. Each adviser will have to make his own decision. But they need to start making them.

House and Senate Republicans must also stand up against dismantling our alliances and gutting the defense budget. Some lawmakers are asserting themselves on Ukraine and NATO, and more must follow. They will find allies among Democrats, and together they could constitute majorities in both chambers. Vocal congressional support for bolstering our alliances and substantially increasing defense spending is important in its own right—and for the reassurance it will give like-minded Trump administration officials. There is no argument more powerful to Mr. Trump than his own political well-being.

Alliance supporters should also persuade Mr. Trump to focus on his well-known disdain for the European Union, thereby easing the assault on NATO. Mr. Trump’s distaste for the EU reflects European weakness and inadequate defense spending, as well as his criticism of trade terms negotiated by previous U.S. administrations. Some of that dissatisfaction is justified but not enough to dismantle broader American security interests.

Here, Europeans must reject EU dogmatism, especially espoused by France, which insisted, even before the EU’s creation, on Europe’s separateness from America. Long reflected in calls for a “European pillar” within NATO, this groupthink has corroded the alliance’s cohesion. Ironically, and potentially fatally, if France’s EU ideology prevails and the EU tries to substitute itself for NATO, that would provide support for Mr. Trump’s view that America should withdraw. Not all of Europe suffers from this kind of thinking. Much of Donald Rumsfeld’s “new Europe” in the east and some “old Europeans,” like the U.K. and Nordic NATO members, have always emphasized Atlanticism. It is “old Europeans” such as France and Germany that are the main problem.

Europe’s first reaction to Mr. Trump’s fusillade, predictably led by French President Emmanuel Macron, was to assume Washington was irretrievably departing. Instead, to protect the West’s overall security and shared concerns about rising global threats, NATO advocates on both sides of the Atlantic must resist the misimpression that Mr. Trump’s position is enduring. Whether Europeans can stand alone against the China-Russia axis, the real overarching menace, is doubtful. Europeans should prize being part of the West more highly than being part of the EU, and act on that basis. Unfortunately, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz moved immediately in the wrong direction, saying he would seek “independence” from the U.S. Saying that “the free world needs a new leader,” as EU official Kaja Kallas did, also doesn’t help.

Mr. Trump never appreciated Winston Churchill’s insight that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Accordingly, advancing U.S. national-security interests under Mr. Trump, and saving our admittedly imperfect alliances, requires enduring before prevailing. One answer is to outlast him, distract him and find him other targets. But the most important course is to tell the truth to the American people, starting now.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the U.N., 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

13. Is Civility Possible Again?

Is Civility Possible Again?

The trick isn’t to fight fire with fire. Instead, you ought to fight clever with cleverer.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/is-civility-possible-again-political-discourse-the-view-donald-trump-godwins-law-social-media-1d89bef8?mod=latest_headlines

By Andy Kessler

March 2, 2025 11:55 am ET

President Donald Trump on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, Feb. 28. Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg News

The hits keep coming from Donald Trump: “Governor Justin Trudeau of the Great State of Canada.” To Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky: “I don’t think you’d be a tough guy without the United States.” “CLINKERS.” “Ratings Challenged NBC and MSDNC.”

On cue, there are calls from the media for civility. Now? We have a long history to overcome. Mark Twain, a 29-year-old San Francisco-based opinion columnist for a Nevada newspaper in 1865, was spewing venom, saying of the police, “Wax figures, besides being far more economical, would be about as useful.” Pianist and comedian Oscar Levant in 1940 said of his morning routine, “First I brush my teeth and then I sharpen my tongue.” Same.

Incivility became a favored tactic for activists. In 1971 Saul Alinsky wrote “Rules for Radicals,” which became the bible for the Obama and Biden administrations. Rule 5: “Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon.” Rule 13: “Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.” Rude, but effective.

I doubt Mr. Trump read the book, but he was self-taught on “The Apprentice” and has gotten sharper at it. It’s infectious. Comically, by the early 2000s, many Americans got their “news” from Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show” on, yes, Comedy Central.

I’m OK with divisions and disagreements. They’re healthy, and it’s where great ideas emerge from. But civility is often lacking. Why? NBC producer Don Ohlmeyer, when asked about the problems with sports, replied, “The answer to all your questions is money.” Now it seems, the answer to all your questions about the loss of civility (which we probably never had) is social media.

Not so fast. The crumbling mainstream media is no shining light on the hill, having lost a lot of credibility over the past five years. Think Russian collusion, Covid lockdowns and identity-politics cheerleading. Throw in loss of civility. Last month CNN’s Anderson Cooper told former New Hampshire Gov. Chris Sununu “Don’t be a d—.” Mr. Cooper later apologized.

In 2017 the Washington Post cited Godwin’s Law: “As an online discussion continues, the probability of a reference or comparison to Hitler or Nazis approaches 1.” In 2016 the Post’s website ran this headline: “Don’t compare Donald Trump to Adolf Hitler. It belittles Hitler.”

It’s getting worse. A case in point is ABC’s “The View,” which as far as I can tell is a gaggle of Greek mythology’s human-tormenting screeching harpies with a TV show—yes, that’s very uncivil of me to say. Last October, co-host Joy Behar said of Mr. Trump’s comments on immigrants, “It’s the same language that Hitler used.” On Mr. Trump, she followed up with, “If people still follow this fascist pig, then I don’t know what else to say.” If only.

Television is a shallow medium. The running joke is that TV is 75 inches wide and barely an inch deep. Many podcasts, if you have time to sit through hours of babbling, are much the same. I’m convinced that writers have a secret superpower over live formats: We have a backspace key. (You’ll never see the first draft of what I really think about “The View.”)

Like sports, opinions are increasingly a meritocracy and democratized across many platforms. X. Substack. TikTok. New voices emerge. Some ruder than others, but they are still being heard. Get used to it.

As for social networks, I’ve labeled X a cesspool of snark many times, which is why I enjoy it. It’s a meritocracy for clever folks with too much time on their hands. I’ve also been on the receiving end of hate—it comes with the territory, I suppose. A column against wealth taxes brought hundreds of guillotine tweets. When I write about the homeless, I often get physical threats. And I can’t even repeat the vile responses received when I wrote about diversity demands or anything involving identity politics. Neither side, it seems, can abide by civil discourse.

To push back against online bombast, don’t fight fire with fire, like complaining about tweeters in pajamas living in their parents’ basement. Instead fight clever with cleverer. If Mr. Trump says you’re “as dumb as a rock,” hit back with a “Breaking Bad” reference, “They’re minerals!” I think you’d gain his respect.

Is it over? Is society so depraved that life will never be civil again? In January, this paper quoted Jacob Mchangama, founder of Justitia, blaming cancel culture on “our species’ hard-wired tendencies toward tribalistic behavior and the self-righteous urge to punish outgroups who transgress taboos.”

Your taboo is my ballyhoo. Tribalism and self-righteousness are hard to combat, but not impossible. It has to start early and locally, in our education system and within our families and communities, to instill a sense of civility. Maybe someday.

Write to kessler@wsj.com.

How DeepSeek’s small team of liberal arts graduates transforms AI text generation in China

DeepSeek’s AI magic lies in its unique blend of literary expertise and advanced algorithms, former employees and industry experts say

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3300820/deepseeks-small-team-liberal-arts-graduates-transforms-ai-text-generation-china?utm

Ben Jiangin Beijing

Published: 6:00pm, 3 Mar 2025Updated: 6:13pm, 3 Mar 2025

The eloquence and human touch in text responses generated by Chinese start-up DeepSeek’s artificial intelligence (AI) models, which have quickly gained popularity, can be partly credited to a small team of liberal arts graduates who curated the training data, according to former employees and analysts.

DeepSeek has sent shock waves through Wall Street and Silicon Valley and sparked a frenzy of AI adoption in China. While the Hangzhou-based company is known for offering generous compensation packages to attract talent in algorithms and computing, it has also assembled a small team of “data omniscients”.

Employees holding the peculiarly named role are tasked with sourcing knowledge in history, culture, literature and science to build a vast virtual library.

Wang Zihan, a former DeepSeek employee, said in a live-streamed webinar last month that the role was tailored for individuals with backgrounds in literature and social sciences. They provide insights on various data sets for model training, infusing a human touch into the company’s low-cost but high-performance models. “They contribute to efficiency and nurture ideas across all teams,” Wang said.

According to a recent social media post by another former DeepSeek employee, Zheng Size, some of the roles are filled by Chinese language and literature graduates, who have significantly improved the quality of Chinese content generated by DeepSeek through their carefully curated training data.

The Chinese version of DeepSeek seen on a smartphone. Photo: Xinhua

The first text generated by DeepSeek that went viral on the Chinese internet was a well-crafted post attributed to its founder, Liang Wenfeng, addressing claims that DeepSeek had changed China’s national fate.

Using sophisticated and poetic Chinese language, the AI-generated post asserted that “DeepSeek would prefer to be a matchstick in the wilderness of code, and what truly ignites the AI fire is the unquenchable curiosity and persistence in your eyes”.

DeepSeek did not respond to a request for comment.

The quality of text generated by chatbots is becoming an increasingly important benchmark for assessing AI models’ utility and acceptance, alongside technical measures such as the number of parameters. At its launch of GPT-4.5, OpenAI highlighted the model’s improved general knowledge to enhance humanlike interactions.

DeepSeek has already integrated general knowledge into its model development, and while the results may be subtle, they have not gone unnoticed by users.

David Holz, founder of image-generating AI service Midjourney, said his tests revealed that DeepSeek’s models not only “crushes Western models” in its understanding of ancient Chinese literature and philosophy, but also showed a stronger command of English than his “first-hand Chinese sources”.

“It feels like [communicating] with literary, historical, and philosophical knowledge across generations that I have never accessed before,” he wrote on X in January. “It’s quite emotionally moving.”

One secret behind DeepSeek’s powerful models could be the quality of its training data, said Allen Zhu Xiaohu, managing director at GSR Ventures China.

DeepSeek’s models outperform others by generating elegantly crafted text and providing deeply insightful responses, particularly in philosophical areas. The success largely stemmed from the high quality of its training data, Zhu said in a recent podcast.

Wang Yonggang, founder of visual storytelling start-up Mootion AI, also said that in his team’s tests, DeepSeek’s models excelled in Chinese writing, especially in word choice, stylistic finesse and the incorporation of cultural knowledge. “DeepSeek’s Chinese writing capability is the best among all open-source and closed-source models,” Wang said in an interview with the Post.

Ben Jiang

Ben is a Beijing-based technology reporter for the Post focusing on emerging start-ups. He has previously covered Chinese tech for publications including KrAsia and TechNode.

16. Europe’s Moment of Truth: The Transatlantic Alliance Is Under Grave Threat—but Not Yet Doomed

"need for a new kind of European leadership."

Excerpts:

Above all is the urgent need for a new kind of European leadership. In order to defend their strategic security interests and rebuild the frayed alliance, European powers must show that they are able to shoulder a more substantial burden that enhances the collective power of the alliance. France, Germany, Poland, and other like-minded neighbors should launch a major defense initiative, shaped around a core group of powers that are prepared to speak with one voice on security issues. This European Defense Union—the EDU—would agree on majority decision-making and include as close participation from the United Kingdom as possible. Major objectives would include building a consolidated and unified defense market and supply chain; the joint development, procurement, and maintenance of military equipment; and the joint training of military staff. France and the United Kingdom, as nuclear powers, would be encouraged to examine options for an enhanced EDU contribution to extended deterrence.

The best and most elegant way for the Trump administration to include both Europe and Ukraine—as well as European partners such as Turkey—in the peace deal would be to reestablish the tested and proven contact group format, introduced in the 1990s to create a sense of unity and common purpose under U.S. leadership. We might remind Washington that it should be proud of that innovative and successful diplomatic format—a U.S. invention. In Ukraine, it could provide the crucial ingredients needed to ensure that the war really ends.

Thirty years ago, the diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs titled “America, a European Power”—without a question mark. Holbrooke foresaw that “in the 21st century, Europe will still need the active American involvement that has been a necessary component of the continental balance for half a century.” The essay ends with a prophetic assertion. “The task ahead is as daunting as its necessity is evident. To turn away from the challenge would only mean paying a higher price later.” Yes, Europe needs the United States to end the war in Ukraine permanently. But the United States will need Europe to successfully accomplish that task. Let’s hope that the Trump White House comes to recognize that reality.

Europe’s Moment of Truth

Foreign Affairs · by More by Wolfgang Ischinger · March 2, 2025

The Transatlantic Alliance Is Under Grave Threat—but Not Yet Doomed

Wolfgang Ischinger

March 2, 2025

Zelensky and Trump in the Oval Office, Washington, February 2025 Brian Snyder/Reuters

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER is President of the Munich Security Conference Foundation Council and former German Ambassador to the United States.

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The disastrous meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance at the White House on February 28 has led to a stark moment of truth for the Western alliance. In the fallout with Zelensky and the end of U.S. support for the war effort, the Trump administration has not only shaken Ukraine. It has also called into question some of the bedrock assumptions that have undergirded the transatlantic relationship since World War II.

In European capitals, panic has set in. Some policymakers and analysts are speaking of the end of NATO, or the end of the West. They are terrified about U.S. intentions: Does Washington intend to actively undermine the long-term survival of Ukraine as a sovereign and free country? Is Trump trying to execute a “reverse Kissinger,” by charming Russian President Vladimir Putin into abandoning his marriage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping and making an unholy alliance with the United States? A huge chasm has opened in transatlantic trust—one that is bad for Washington’s global power projection and for its image as a benign hegemon, and potentially catastrophic for transatlantic cohesion and the vitality of NATO.

The challenge facing the West is daunting. But the alliance has endured strong doubts before. And there are powerful arguments—on both sides of the Atlantic—that might yet rescue the alliance and support a continued strong U.S. presence and involvement in Europe. And there is much that Europe itself can do to demonstrate why the United States is so much stronger with it than without it.

THE MINSK MISTAKE

In the early 1990s, there were voices advocating for NATO’s gradual dissolution after the end of the Warsaw Pact. Yet since Russia embarked on its path of revisionism over the past two decades—especially since 2014, when it seized Crimea and invaded the Donbas—NATO has not only endured but also continued to grow. And it has become stronger in terms of cohesion, membership, and deterrent power.

The Trump administration has introduced a fundamental trust problem: for the first time, European leaders are uncertain whether the United States remains committed to NATO and to the American leadership role in it.

But the story is more complicated. It is crucial to remember that Trump has played a vital role in Ukraine’s defense. Ukraine was able to fend off and survive Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 because the United States had started to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons, such as Javelin antitank missiles, during Trump’s first term. Without the Javelins, Russian forces might have succeeded in taking Kyiv within days, as originally planned. It is therefore not far-fetched to argue that Ukraine owes its survival in the critical days of the early spring of 2022 in meaningful part to the support of the earlier Trump White House. Why would Washington now wish to abandon this remarkable success story, a story of combined U.S.-Ukrainian determination and resolve to uphold and defend the sovereign rights of a free country?

The United States also knows well the dangers of leaving Europe to deal with Russia. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, Washington decided to largely leave the confrontation with Moscow to the Europeans. The key vehicles for this were the so-called Minsk process—the talks aimed at a settlement for eastern Ukraine—and the so-called Normandy Four, the contact group of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine that met between 2014 and 2022. Unfortunately, the Minsk and Normandy process failed, and an American leadership vacuum only encouraged the Russian side to escalate further, culminating in the invasion of February 2022.

The United States knows well the dangers of leaving Europe to deal with Russia.

These events are fatally reminiscent of events of 30 years ago, when the bloody war in Bosnia led Europe to proclaim the “hour of Europe,” which went nowhere. It was only through the active political and military intervention of the United States that this war was finally terminated and that peace was achieved, via the 1995 Dayton accords.

Neither the first Trump administration nor the Biden administration repeated the mistake made by the Obama White House in 2014: they did not leave the resolution of the Ukraine war to the Europeans but decided to lead a remarkable international effort to support Ukraine. The new Trump administration has decided to play a leading role again, this time in order to bring the war to an end after 11 years of conflict and annexation, and three years of a brutal full-scale invasion.

It is in Europe’s interest to welcome, in principle, this strategic U.S. engagement, which actually stands in the way of a larger shift in Washington away from Europe and toward China. But to be successful the two sides of the Atlantic must swiftly close the yawning gap of trust. If this can be done, the crucial challenge is then finding a way to secure and implement a viable Ukraine deal. First of all, Ukraine must participate and will need to make sure the result is fair and not a sellout. Without active Ukrainian and European participation, the Trump administration’s peace effort might fizzle out before it has seriously started. This is why it will be in the U.S. interest to quickly mend fences with Zelensky and the Ukrainian leadership after the White House confrontation on February 28.

IS AMERICA STILL A EUROPEAN POWER?

Looming behind the tension between Washington and Kyiv is Europe’s role in the security equation. The U.S. military presence in Europe has been strengthened in recent years, but it is far from being equal to the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine and in Russia’s western military districts. And Washington has categorically ruled out U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. The Trump administration therefore needs its European partners and has openly said as much by requesting European forces to secure or enforce a possible Ukraine deal. In return, the Europeans should be resolute enough to confront Washington with their own requirement: adapting the American Revolutionary War slogan “No taxation without representation,” they must make clear that there will be no military deployment without participation in the peace talks. And Europe knows one thing: the deal, if it happens, is not simply about carving up Ukraine or securing a quick cease-fire. It is about a lasting and secure peace arrangement, about existential security issues for all of Europe.

An even bigger question is how to deal with Russia. So far, no meaningful signaling has come from Moscow regarding possible concessions. Predictably, the Kremlin has made maximalist demands and will prove very difficult to budge. It is an illusion to believe that a durable peace with Russia will break out simply by enshrining the line of contact in eastern Ukraine. Russia will come up with new, complex, and far-reaching demands, with strategic stability issues, regarding U.S. military installations in eastern Europe and will turn out to be an expensive and untrustworthy partner. Europe and the United States must steel themselves for a long and painful process.

Above all is the urgent need for a new kind of European leadership. In order to defend their strategic security interests and rebuild the frayed alliance, European powers must show that they are able to shoulder a more substantial burden that enhances the collective power of the alliance. France, Germany, Poland, and other like-minded neighbors should launch a major defense initiative, shaped around a core group of powers that are prepared to speak with one voice on security issues. This European Defense Union—the EDU—would agree on majority decision-making and include as close participation from the United Kingdom as possible. Major objectives would include building a consolidated and unified defense market and supply chain; the joint development, procurement, and maintenance of military equipment; and the joint training of military staff. France and the United Kingdom, as nuclear powers, would be encouraged to examine options for an enhanced EDU contribution to extended deterrence.

The best and most elegant way for the Trump administration to include both Europe and Ukraine—as well as European partners such as Turkey—in the peace deal would be to reestablish the tested and proven contact group format, introduced in the 1990s to create a sense of unity and common purpose under U.S. leadership. We might remind Washington that it should be proud of that innovative and successful diplomatic format—a U.S. invention. In Ukraine, it could provide the crucial ingredients needed to ensure that the war really ends.

Thirty years ago, the diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs titled “America, a European Power”—without a question mark. Holbrooke foresaw that “in the 21st century, Europe will still need the active American involvement that has been a necessary component of the continental balance for half a century.” The essay ends with a prophetic assertion. “The task ahead is as daunting as its necessity is evident. To turn away from the challenge would only mean paying a higher price later.” Yes, Europe needs the United States to end the war in Ukraine permanently. But the United States will need Europe to successfully accomplish that task. Let’s hope that the Trump White House comes to recognize that reality.

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER is President of the Munich Security Conference Foundation Council and former German Ambassador to the United States.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Wolfgang Ischinger · March 2, 2025

17. Willpower, Not Manpower, is Europe’s Main Limitation for a Force in Ukraine

Conclusion:

The policy set out above [below] would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.

Willpower, Not Manpower, is Europe’s Main Limitation for a Force in Ukraine - War on the Rocks

Jack Watling and Michael Kofman

warontherocks.com · by Jack Watling · March 3, 2025

Following a dramatic meeting in the White House, U.S. military support for Ukraine is perilously uncertain. Sustaining Ukraine in this war, and afterwards, is a responsibility that Europe will have to shoulder sooner rather than later. Washington may now cut support for Ukraine well before any agreement is reached and try to compel Ukraine to accept an unstable ceasefire. This will leave Ukraine in a perpetual state of insecurity, and Europe bracing for a possible renewal of the war. There is a significant risk that following a cessation in large-scale combat operations Russia continues its effort to destabilize Ukraine politically, pressure it economically, and set the conditions for a third war on far more favorable terms for Moscow. To prevent this, the Ukrainian military will need to be sustained in the field and reconstituted, while Russia is effectively deterred.

It is increasingly less likely that the United States will continue extending military or financial assistance, with Washington’s policy objective to shift the burden onto European capitals. Despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts, the United States has made it clear that it does not intend to offer Ukraine security guarantees or directly contribute to any forces supporting Ukraine after the imposition of a ceasefire. It therefore falls upon Europe to plan for such a force. This is a serious undertaking. Can European powers field such a force without hollowing out Europe’s ability to defend NATO’s borders, all while the United States potentially withdraws forces from the continent?

While the length of front and the size of Russian ground forces may give the impression that the task is infeasible, in our view it is practicable if European nations are willing to pay the cost. With the right force balance, investment, and political framework Europe could generate a credible commitment.

There is nothing fantastical about a European mission in Ukraine. France and the United Kingdom are considering such a proposal and, as recent reporting suggests, have discussed it during President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Washington. Turkey may be open to contributing to such a force as well. Indeed, while Zelensky’s meeting with Trump in Washington was a catastrophe, it may have increased European will to do much more than it might have otherwise. However, the conversation remains ill-informed in terms of requirements, either implying that a token force will be sufficient or inflating the necessary troop levels to a point that renders such a policy impossible. We seek to set a realistic marker for what would be required if Europe were to deploy forces in Ukraine.

Become a Member

Bounding the Mission

NATO is more secure with Russia facing an independent Ukraine with a credible military. Attacking NATO under these circumstances would leave Ukraine on Russia’s flank, while reducing the frontage over which Russia poses a threat. The first vital mission is therefore to partner with the armed forces of Ukraine to train and support their reconstitution, including the regeneration of a reserve and mobilization system in circumstances where many veterans have left the force.

The size of Ukraine, and the extensive front line, spanning over 750 miles (1200 kilometers) can lead one to presume that the requirements for a force are beyond the means of NATO’s European militaries. Yet what Ukraine needs is not a traditional peacekeeping or separation force which has to be stretched along the line of contact. As such, it’s not about the size of the front. Although European leaders may call it a “peacekeeping” force, this is not going to be a traditional U.N. peacekeeping mission. The force would serve two functions. First, assure Ukraine. With Western backing, Ukraine should be able to maintain a force sufficient to man, or patrol, key sectors of the front line. Second, enhance deterrence against future aggression from Russia through both the capability deployed and the inherent risk of directly engaging Western forces.

The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.

A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.

Deploying Forces

Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.

This effort should also envision moving the multinational INTERFLEX training mission for Ukrainian troops, currently running in the United Kingdom, into Ukraine. Britain’s 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, which is the unit at the core of that effort, should also be deployed. This would address Ukraine’s longtime request for greater in-country training of its forces, and adaptation of its basic training regimen. Keeping the force size manageable will be a challenge. Multinational formations tend to be larger than the mission requirements, because of duplication of functions between units, separate support elements for individual nation’s unique logistical requirements, and everyone wanting a seat at the table in the headquarters.

European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.

Sustaining this presence in Ukraine would mean that European nations would have to revisit existing commitments to rapid reaction forces, and those made under NATO regional defense plans. But Europe has the capacity to do this and given the recently made pledges to increase defense spending, could certainly increase it sufficiently to meet both a sustained deployment in Ukraine and other commitments over time.

The force as conceived would be a multinational division, operating under its own command. Units in the rear could help train Ukrainian forces, conduct joint exercises, and support other activities while learning from Ukrainian experience. Western forces could also be backed by their own airpower, based within the territory of bordering NATO members. This is a comparative advantage for countries like the United Kingdom and France, which have significant airpower available that’s largely uncommitted to other missions. This would provide a visible force multiplier, and additional air protection for units in-country. However, the mission would be under European, rather than Ukrainian command. Such a force would be additive given existing Ukrainian military capability. It would backstop Ukrainian forces manning the line of contact, rather than serving as the principal deterrent in the theatre.

The current British and French plan being discussed to deploy a force of up to 30,000 personnel suggest that while such a commitment is beyond the existing resource envelope of European NATO members, it is not beyond what is envisaged by European leaders. The question is whether they are prepared to underwrite the costs. So far European leaders have not been prepared to match their rhetorical commitments with resources. Notably, some nations with significant military capability, like Poland, appear to be reticent to be security providers. The majority contributors should not be frontline states, who have their own significant defense requirements. Therefore, Western Europe should take the leading role, ideally with Turkish participation.

There is a degree of fretting about the impact of such a deployment on NATO’s deterrence posture. However, frontline states should avoid engaging in beggar-thy-neighbor politics when it comes to European security. A European mission in Ukraine need not come at their expense. Furthermore, if European nations are incapable of collectively deploying one multinational division, then this should raise broader questions about European commitment to European security. The risk of inaction is much greater for Europe than the risk inherent in deploying a force into theatre that could be attacked, or otherwise challenged.

Managing Contingency

The question that will dominate discussions over whether to pursue such a policy is what happens if Russia attacks Ukraine. The deployed force would not be protected by NATO’s Article 5 and would not have the backing of the United States. First, in such a scenario, the mass of the force would be provided by the Ukrainian military. The goal of this proposal is not to shift the burden of deterrence and defense from the Ukrainian military onto Europe, but to enhance Ukraine’s existing capability. Whereas the Ukrainian military lacked an effective higher echelon of command, struggled to train its forces, or to coordinate fires beyond 30 kilometers during the current conflict, mentoring by European militaries could significantly strengthen aspects of operations, such that Russia would be dealing with a more capable and integrated force.

The second critical aspect of the force’s credibility would be the contribution of European air power. The Russo-Ukrainian War has demonstrated that it is possible to overcome Russian air defenses. The problem has been the scale at which such operations can be conducted and the limitations on Ukraine’s ability to exploit the gaps it creates. Europe has modern fleets of combat aircraft. Only a sliver of this capacity is used for current “air policing” missions, and out of area deployments. With appropriate training, and munitions, in a time of war these forces could suppress the Russian Aerospace Forces and offer decisive firepower to Ukrainian forces. Either way, it would add the risk to Russian considerations that European airpower might be involved in a future fight.

It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.

What of potential Russian opposition? Depending on the mandate of the force, and how this mission is framed, Moscow may accept it as part of an armistice. President Donald Trump said that he had raised the idea of peacekeepers with President Vladimir Putin as part of a deal and his impression was that “Yeah, he will accept it,” adding “I’ve asked him that question.” Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has said though that “we cannot consider any options” when it comes to European peacekeepers, ruling it out. Hence Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.

The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.

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Jack Watling is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute.

Michael Kofman is a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment.

Image: U.K. Ministry of Defense

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jack Watling · March 3, 2025

18. Trump is reorienting America’s moral compass

The question to ask Americans is whether they want America to be a force for good in the world anymore? Are we abandoning our fundamental values as Dr. Zakaria thinks?

I think everything we are seeing today in America can be found in and explained by the Federalist Papers and Democracy in America by de Tocqueville, whether the pundits and elites like it or not.

Conclusion:

Trump is not just changing American foreign policy. He is reorienting America’s moral compass, a compass that has been firmly set since the country’s founding almost 250 years ago.

Opinion

Fareed Zakaria

Trump is reorienting America’s moral compass

President Trump’s actions make one question whether America is still a force for good in the world.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/03/02/trump-zelensky-vance-freedom-policy/?utm

March 2, 2025 at 3:25 p.m. ESTYesterday at 3:25 p.m. EST

President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office on Friday. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

Over America’s long history, Americans have often hesitated to support foreign wars and international machinations. George Washington’s Farewell Address warning against entangling alliances cast a long shadow. But from the nation’s beginnings, Americans have usually known whom to root for — those who seek freedom — and whom to condemn — those who try to crush liberty.

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Across the United States, you will find statues honoring people such as the 18th-century Polish patriot Thaddeus Kosciuszko and the 19th-century Hungarian freedom fighter Lajos Kossuth, who sought liberation for their people from the Russian and Habsburg empires — and who found enthusiastic support in an America that was still a young and weak nation. When Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, even though it initially stayed out of the war, America organized what was then the largest food aid effort in history to help the victim of aggression. During the Cold War, though it could not help militarily, Washington refused to recognize the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic republics, which are now proud and independent nations. America as a superpower sometimes acted unwisely — in places such as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan — but even in those cases, it saw its involvement as the protection of freedom and democracy.

Not anymore. The strangest aspect of the past few weeks of American diplomacy — which culminated in the disaster at the White House on Friday — is that the president of the United States has seemed utterly unwilling to say plainly that he supports the victim of aggression against the aggressor who started the war. Or that he admires Ukrainian democracy more than Russian dictatorship. Instead, he and Vice President JD Vance spent Friday’s photo op at the White House publicly scolding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, telling him to say thank you (which he has repeatedly) and accusing him of being disrespectful. Zelensky’s fault was simply to point out that Ukraine had in fact signed a ceasefire deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2015 but that Putin had continually violated it. President Donald Trump used the occasion to remind all that he felt a special bond with Putin.

Zelensky did not handle himself well. He got emotional, responded too often and took the bait that Vance laid for him. He should have studied how French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer handled Trump: constant flattery and deference. Churchill said of his relationship with his American counterpart, “No lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.”

But Zelensky is leading a nation at war that has lost tens of thousands of people. He is fighting for his survival. And he and his nation are fighting for the values of freedom and democracy that America has supported since its founding — against a rapacious dictatorship that actively seeks to undermine the United States, its interests and its allies at every turn. It should not be hard to figure out where your sympathies lie.

Friday’s turn of events took place after weeks of diplomacy in which the Trump administration has bullied it neighbors, asked Canada to cease to exist as a country, pressured Denmark to sell Greenland and Panama to hand over the Panama Canal. It has threatened to impose higher tariffs on its allies than its foes. And it has shuttered almost all the food and medicine programs it promised to the poorest people in the world. Conservative former British cabinet minister Rory Stewart asks on X, “Was it for this that the US spent 80 years building power and alliances? Not to be a force for good. But instead to impoverish neighbours, threaten those it protected, rob minerals from war-torn countries, and break its promises to 100s of millions of the poorest in the world?”

Trump is not just changing American foreign policy. He is reorienting America’s moral compass, a compass that has been firmly set since the country’s founding almost 250 years ago.

What readers are saying

The comments overwhelmingly support the view that Zelensky handled the situation in the Oval Office with dignity and restraint, despite being ambushed by Trump and Vance. Many commenters criticize Trump and Vance for their bullying behavior and express admiration for Zelensky's... Show more

This summary is AI-generated. AI can make mistakes and this summary is not a replacement for reading the comments.

By Fareed Zakaria

Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS.follow on X@FareedZakaria

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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