Quotes of the Day:

"The thing I hate about an argument is that it always interrupts a discussion." 

– G.K. Chesterton

"It's not enough that we do our best; sometimes we have to do what's required." 

– Winston Churchill

"A proclivity for science is embedded deeply within us, in all times, places, and cultures. It has been the means for our survival. It is our birthright. When, through indifference, inattention, incompetence, or fear of skepticism, we discourage children from science, we are disenfranchising them, taking from them the tools needed to manage their future." 

– Carl Sagan

1. Preparing for a China war, the Marines are retooling how they’ll fight

2. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 28, 2024

4. Establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy

5. Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community Book Review

6. These Eight U.S. Bridges Are Vulnerable to a Repeat of the Baltimore Crash

7. Opinion | Zelensky: ‘We are trying to find some way not to retreat’

8. Authoritarians Threaten Journalists Around the Globe

9. The Origins of the Green Berets

10. US-funded Radio Free Asia closes Hong Kong bureau over safety concerns under new security law

11. Chinese migrant suddenly found on California military base

12. China's Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact

13. Is The American Empire Now In Its Ultimate Crisis? – OpEd

14.  Five decades after his graduation, a legendary general returns to Northeastern as an inductee into the ROTC Hall of Fame

15. Inside Mnuchin’s far-fetched plan to rebuild TikTok from scratch

16.  Why the U.S. Economy Is Surging, as China's Stumbles

17. Stabilizing Haiti: A Guide for Policymakers

1. Preparing for a China war, the Marines are retooling how they’ll fight

Perhaps we should look at island hopping in WWII. There were two lines of operation, one commanded by Nimitz and one commanded by MacArthur. Neither could fight the Pacific War alone. Are there lessons to be learned from a command and control perspective? (Of course there are. This was a major study in operational art when I was at CGSC in the 1990s). The parallel I am concerned with is a fight defending both Taiwan and Korea simultaneously or near simultaneously. There is going to have to be a sharing of resources. The question is how will we manage the division of resources and labor? Is INDOPACOM capable of doing that especially when it deems Taiwan defense as the main effort and Korea a secondary consideration (which goes to the question of which is more important to long term US interests Taiwan or Korea)? Or do we need two real commandant commanders in the region (one for the INDOPACIFIC and one for Northeast Asia)? Of course even then someone is going to have to make decisions on division of resources and that will likely have to be the Pentagon which will be adjudicating the decisions and deciding the priorities within the current command arrangements anyway.

Photos at the link. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/03/29/us-china-taiwan-marines/

Preparing for a China war, the Marines are retooling how they’ll fight

U.S. troops are preparing for conflict on an island-hopping battlefield across Asia, against an enemy force that has home-field advantage

By Ellen Nakashima

March 29, 2024 at 11:55 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · March 29, 2024

POHAKULOA TRAINING RANGE, Hawaii — The Marine gunner knelt on the rocky red soil of a 6,000-foot-high volcanic plain. He positioned the rocket launcher on his shoulder, focused the sights on his target, a rusted armored vehicle 400 yards away, and fired.

Two seconds later a BANG.

“Perfect hit,” said his platoon commander.

The gunner, 23-year-old Lance Cpl. Caden Ehrhardt, is a member of the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, a new formation that reflects the military’s latest concept for fighting adversaries like China from remote, strategic islands in the western Pacific. These units are designed to be smaller, lighter, more mobile — and, their leaders argue, more lethal. Coming out of 20 years of land combat in the Middle East, the Marines are striving to adapt to a maritime fight that could play out across thousands of miles of islands and coastline in Asia.

Instead of launching traditional amphibious assaults, these nimbler groups are intended as an enabler for a larger joint force. Their role is to gather intelligence and target data and share it quickly — as well as occasionally sink ships with medium-range missiles — to help the Pacific Fleet and Air Force repel aggression against the United States and allies and partners like Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines.

These new regiments are envisioned as one piece of a broader strategy to synchronize the operations of U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen, and in turn with the militaries of allies and partners in the Pacific. Their focus is a crucial stretch of territory sweeping from Japan to Indonesia and known as the First Island Chain. China sees this region, which encompasses an area about half the size of the contiguous United States, as within its sphere of influence.

The overall strategy holds promise, analysts say. But it faces significant hurdles, especially if war were to break out: logistical challenges in a vast maritime region, timely delivery of equipment and new technologies complicated by budget battles in Congress, an overstressed defense industry, and uncertainty over whether regional partners like Japan would allow U.S. forces to fight from their islands. That last piece is key. Beijing sees the U.S. strategy of deepening security alliances in the Pacific as escalatory — which unnerves some officials in partner nations, who fear that they could get drawn into a conflict between the two powers.

The stakes have never been higher.

Beijing’s aggressive military modernization and investment over the past two decades have challenged U.S. ability to control the seas and skies in any conflict in the western Pacific. China has vastly expanded its reach in the Pacific, building artificial islands for military outposts in the South China Sea and seeking to expand bases in the Indian and Pacific Oceans — including a naval facility in Cambodia that U.S. intelligence says is for exclusive use by the People’s Liberation Army.

China not only has the region’s largest army, navy and air force, but also home-field advantage. It has about 1 million troops, more than 3,000 aircraft, and upward of 300 vessels in proximity to any potential battle. Meanwhile, U.S. ships and planes must travel thousands of miles, or rely on the goodwill of allies to station troops and weapons. The PLA also has orders of magnitude more ground-based, long-range missiles than the U.S. military.

Taiwan, a close U.S. partner, is most directly in the crosshairs. President Xi Jinping has promised to reunite, by force if necessary, the self-governing island with mainland China. A successful invasion would not only result in widespread death and destruction in Taiwan, but also have catastrophic economic consequences due to disruption of the world’s most advanced semiconductor industry and of maritime traffic in some of the world’s busiest sea lanes — the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. That would create enormous uncertainty for businesses and consumers around the world.

“We’ve spent most of the last 20 years looking at a terrorist adversary that wasn’t exquisitely armed, that didn’t have access to the full breadth of national power,” said Col. John Lehane, the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment’s commander. “And now we’ve got to reorient our formations onto someone that might have that capability.”

The vision and the challenge

The U.S. Marine Corps has a blueprint to fight back: a vision called Force Design that stresses the forward deployment of Marines — placing units on the front line — while making them as invisible as possible to radar and other electronic detection. The idea is to use these “stand-in” forces, up to thousands in theater at any one time, to enable the larger joint force to deploy its collective might against a major foe.

The aspiration is for the new formation to be first on the ground in a conflict, where it can gather information to send coordinates to an Air Force B-1 bomber so it can fire a missile at a Chinese frigate hundreds of miles away or send target data to a Philippine counterpart that can aim a cruise missile at a destroyer in the contested South China Sea.

The reality of the mission is daunting, experts say.

Even if you get Marines into these remote locations, “resupplying them over time is something that needs to be rehearsed and practiced repeatedly in simulated combat conditions,” said Colin Smith, a RAND researcher formerly with I Marine Expeditionary Force, whose area of responsibility includes the Pacific. “Just because you can move it in peacetime doesn’t mean you’ll be able to in warfare — especially over long periods of time.”

Though the Marines are no longer weighed down by tanks, the new unit’s Littoral Combat Team, an infantry battalion, will be operating advanced weapons that can fire missiles at enemy ships up to 100 nautical miles away to help deny an enemy access to key maritime chokepoints, such as the Taiwan and Luzon straits. By October, each Marine Littoral Regiment will have 18 Rogue NMESIS unmanned truck-based launchers capable of firing two naval strike missiles at a time.

But a single naval strike missile weighs 2,200 pounds, and resupplying these weapons in austere islands without runways requires watercraft, which move slowly, or helicopters, which can carry only a limited quantity at a time.

“You’re not very lethal with just two missiles, so you’ve got to have a whole bunch at the ready and that’s a lot more stuff to hide, which means your ability to move unpredictably goes down,’’ said Ivan Kanapathy, a Marine veteran with three deployments in the western Pacific. “There’s a trade-off between lethality and mobility — mobility being a huge part of survivability in this environment.”

Though NMESIS vehicles radiate heat, and radar emits signals that can be detected, the Marines try to lower their profile by spacing out the vehicles, camouflaging them and moving them frequently, as well as communicating only intermittently. Similar tactics are being tested by Ukrainian troops on the battlefield, where despite the number of Russian sensors and drones, “if you disperse and conceal yourself, it’s possible to survive,” said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security.

But on smaller islands, there are fewer areas to hide, fewer road networks to move around on, “so it’s easier for China to search and eventually find what they’re looking for,” she said.

Lehane, the unit’s commander, says that the unit’s most valuable role isn’t conducting lethal strikes; it is the ability to “see things in the battlespace, get targeting data, make sense out of what is going on when maybe other people can’t.” That’s because the Pentagon expects, in a potential war with China, that U.S. satellites will be jammed or destroyed and ships’ computer networks disrupted.

China now has many more sensors — radar, sonar, satellites, electronic signals collection — in the South China Sea than the United States. That gives Beijing a formidable targeting advantage, said Gregory Poling, an expert on Southeast Asia security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The United States would have to expend an unacceptable amount of ordnance to degrade those capabilities to blind China,” he said.

The unit has been practicing techniques to communicate quietly. In a bare room of a cinder block building at its home base in Kaneohe, Hawaii, Marines in the regiment’s command operations center tapped on laptops on portable tables, plastic sheets taped over the windows. In the field, the gear could be set up in a tent, packed up and moved at a moment’s notice. Intelligence analysts, some of whom speak Mandarin, were feeding information to commanders on the range at Pohakuloa, practicing connections between the command on Oahu and the infantry battalion on the Big Island.

But exercises are not real life. Indo-Pacific Command is striving to build a Joint Fires Network that will reliably connect sensors, shooters and decision-makers in the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force. But chronic budget shortfalls, and long-standing friction between the combatant commands and the services — each of which decides independently of the commands what hardware and software to buy — have slowed development.

Even when it is fully fielded, Pettyjohn said, “the question is, is this network going to be survivable in a contested electromagnetic space? You’re going to have a lot of jamming going on.”

Shoulder-to-shoulder in the Philippines

Last April, the Marines and the rest of the Joint Force tested the new warfighting concept with their Philippine partner in a sprawling, weeks-long exercise — Balikatan — which in Tagalog means “shoulder-to-shoulder.”

With a command post on the northwestern Philippine island of Luzon, the regiment’s infantry battalion and Philippine Marine Corps’ Coastal Defense Regiment rehearsed air assaults and airfield seizures to gain island footholds, which would then be used as bases from which to gather intelligence and call in strikes.

During one live-fire exercise, the 3rd MLR helped the larger U.S. 3rd Marine Division glean location data on a target vessel — a decommissioned World War II-era Philippine ship — which U.S. and Philippine joint forces promptly sunk. Soon, the Philippine Coastal Defense Regiment expects to be able to fire its own missiles, said Col. Gieram Aragones, the regiment’s commander, in an interview from his headquarters in Manila.

“Our U.S. Marine brothers have been very helpful to us,” Aragones said. “They’ve guided us during our crawl phase. We’re trying to walk now.”

The training goes both ways. The Philippine Marines taught their American counterparts survival skills, like finding and purifying water from bamboo, and cooking pigs and goats in the jungle.

China in recent years has intensified its harassment of Philippine fishing and Coast Guard vessels. As recently as Saturday, Chinese Coast Guard ships fired water cannons at a Philippine boat conducting a lawful resupply mission to a Philippine military outpost at a contested shoal in the South China Sea. Amid such provocations, Manila has stepped up its defense partnership with the United States. A year ago, Manila announced it was granting its longtime ally access to four new military bases.

Although the two countries are treaty allies, bound to come to each other’s defense in an armed attack in the Pacific, how far Manila will go to support U.S. operations in a Taiwan conflict is an open question, said CSIS’s Poling. “Part of the reason for all the military training, the tabletop exercises, and all these new dialogues taking place is feeling out the answer,” he said.

Aragones said it’s important for the United States and the Philippines to jointly strengthen deterrence. “This is not only an issue for the Philippines,” he said. “It’s an issue for all countries whose vessels pass through this body of water [the Chinese are] trying to claim.”

Evolution in Okinawa

Some 800 miles to the north, the Marines’ newest unit, the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, was created in November. It was formed by repurposing the 12th Marine Regiment based in Okinawa, already home to a large concentration of U.S. military personnel in Japan — a source of tension with local communities dating back decades.

This unit is intended to operate out of the islands southwest of Okinawa, the closest of which are less than 100 miles from Taiwan. Over the years, Tokyo has shifted its military focus away from northern Japan, where the Cold War threat was a Soviet land invasion, to its southwest islands.

Recent events have vindicated that shift in Tokyo’s eyes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s bellicose response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 — in which the PLA fired five ballistic missiles into waters near Okinawa — rattled Japan. The number of days that Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed near the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China, reached a record high last year.

As a result, in the last year and a half, Tokyo has announced a dramatic hike in defense spending and deepened its security partnership with the United States, Philippines and Australia. Washington hailed Japan’s endorsement of the new U.S. Marine unit’s positioning in the Southwest Islands last year as a significant advance in allied force posture.

But resentment toward U.S. troops lingers in Okinawa, rooted primarily in the disproportionate burden of hosting a major U.S. military presence. The prefecture is home to half of U.S. military personnel in Japan, while making up less than 1 percent of Japan’s land mass.

“We are concerned about rising tensions with China and the concentration of U.S. military” on Okinawa and the Japanese military buildup in the area, said Kazuyuki Nakazato, director of the Okinawa Prefecture Office in Washington. “Many Okinawan people fear that if a conflict happens, Okinawa will easily become a target.”

He argued the best way to defuse the tension is for Tokyo to deepen diplomacy and dialogue with China, not military deterrence alone.

Other local officials are more receptive to a U.S. presence, arguing that Japan alone cannot deter China. “We have no choice but to strengthen our alliance with the U.S. military,” said Itokazu Kenichi, mayor of Yonaguni town on the island of the same name, the westernmost inhabited Japanese island — just 68 miles from Taiwan.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces has begun to establish a presence on the islands, including a surveillance station on Yonaguni, where they conducted joint exercises with other U.S. Marines last month — an interaction that has begun to accustom residents to the Marines, Kenichi said.

Ultimately, how much latitude to allow the Marines will be a political decision by the prime minister and the Diet, Japan’s parliament.

On the range at Pohakuloa, Hawaii, the littoral combat team trained for a month. They flew Skydio surveillance drones over a distant hill. They practiced machine gun and sniper skills.

As the wind howled on a lava rock bluff one morning, Lt. Col. Mark Lenzi surveyed his gunners firing wire-guided missiles at targets 1,200 yards away. Lenzi, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, said what’s different in the Pacific is that Marines won’t be fighting insurgents directly, but will be assigned to enable others to beat back the enemy.

“It takes the whole joint force” to deter in the Pacific, he said. “We train joint. We fight joint.”

These new forces will be at the heart of the “kill web,” he said, referring to the mix of air, sea, land, space and cyber capabilities whose efficient syncing is crucial if it comes to a battle over Taiwan.

“This one unit alone is not going to save the world,” said Col. Carrie Batson, chief of strategic communications for the Pacific Marines. “But it’s going to be vital in this fight, if it ever comes.”

Regine Cabato in Manila and Julia Mio Inuma in Tokyo contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · March 29, 2024

2. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

The 21 page PDF can be downloaded here: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/MaritimeSecurity_2024_032924.pdf

The EXSUM and Introduction are below.

Highlights:

Moving forward, the United States should:

Deepen commitment to its relationship with the Philippines and enhance partnerships with other Southeast Asian nations, both diplomatically and militarily.

Be prepared to take additional steps to protect Philippine vessels, including those involved in fortifying the Philippines’ presence at Second Thomas Shoal.

Encourage Southeast Asian nations to employ creative and peaceful steps to protect their own sovereignty and to highlight Chinese encroachments when they occur.

Leverage AUKUS capabilities.

Enlist Quad members.

Partner with India.

Work with other key partners, such as France.

Maintain tempo of multilateral naval exercises and joint patrols and sails to signal solidarity among U.S. allies and partners.

Rely on multilateral mechanisms to push back against China’s maritime aggression.

Invest in regional architecture and norms.

Continue to raise the issue of China’s aggressive behavior in the SCS in the newly resumed U.S.-China military-to-military talks.

Countering Coercion

Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-coercion?utm

By: Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake

Executive Summary

The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment.

China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2

PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3

Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4

PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives.

Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond. Moving forward, the United States should:

Deepen commitment to its relationship with the Philippines and enhance partnerships with other Southeast Asian nations, both diplomatically and militarily.

The United States should focus on building capacity not only of the Philippines but also of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian nations. The United States should also facilitate efforts to increase transparency about what is happening in the maritime commons and build international support for pushing back against China’s maritime bullying.

Be prepared to take additional steps to protect Philippine vessels, including those involved in fortifying the Philippines’ presence at Second Thomas Shoal.

Some analysts are calling for the establishment of a combined U.S.-Philippines outpost at Second Thomas Shoal.6 However, there are steps short of this escalatory move that send a similar signal to Beijing and help the Philippines maintain control of the reef. These include providing regular U.S. naval escorts for Philippine vessels, whether they are resupplying troops on the Sierra Madre or involved in efforts to construct more permanent structures on the reef, and increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to the area around Second Thomas Shoal.

Encourage Southeast Asian nations to employ creative and peaceful steps to protect their own sovereignty and to highlight Chinese encroachments when they occur.

The Southeast Asian nations must be willing to levy costs on China for its aggression, or it will only escalate. These steps should focus mainly on the information space and avoid employing military capabilities that would be more likely to raise tensions to a dangerous level.

Leverage AUKUS capabilities.

The United States and Australia are time-tested allies and are increasingly partnering on issues stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans.7 In addition to their bilateral partnership, they participate in multilateral groupings such as Five Eyes. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership increasingly presents opportunities to counter gray zone activity through technological developments, intelligence sharing, and operations. For example, in December 2023, the AUKUS defense ministers discussed plans for deploying shared artificial intelligence algorithms to advance antisubmarine warfare capabilities.8 The establishment of Submarine Rotational Force-West in Australia should include the objective of monitoring gray zone activity from its Indian Ocean vantage point.

Enlist Quad members.

While the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) has been reluctant to operate along explicitly military lines, its work to expand maritime domain awareness such as through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness initiative helps raise capability in the Indian Ocean and fortifies partner states against gray zone threats.9 The Quad members should also informally discuss South China Sea contingencies to generate ideas and considerations for deterring and, if needed, responding to such a crisis. Additionally, the Quad partners should collaborate to increase investments in sustainable port development in South and Southeast Asia. The recent U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announcement of $553 million in financing for a deep-water shipping container terminal that an Indian company is developing at the Port of Colombo is a notable initiative that can help balance increased Chinese involvement in port development in Sri Lanka. Finally, the Quad should continue to enhance humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean regions.

Partner with India.

India should take the leading role in countering China’s gray zone threats in the Indian Ocean, but the United States and its allies such as Australia should support and bolster Indian efforts. For example, the Indian Navy and naval strategists are studying different approaches and technologies that can counter China’s gray zone operations.10 Their insights present opportunities for greater collaboration by New Delhi, Washington, and Canberra.

Work with other key partners, such as France.

Beyond the Quad, the United States and Australia should work more closely with other key allies and partners. For example, France is also a key partner in the Indo-Pacific, with territory and nationals to defend.11 While the AUKUS announcement in 2021 resulted in a public controversy between Australia and France, both countries appear to have moved past this episode. As the United States’ oldest ally and an early mover in developing an Indo-Pacific strategy, France is a key partner for both the United States and Australia to embrace in countering gray zone activity.

Maintain tempo of multilateral naval exercises and joint patrols and sails to signal solidarity among U.S. allies and partners.

The frequency of U.S.-led multilateral naval activity in the form of exercises and joint sails has been impressive and should continue apace. The involvement of a variety of like-minded nations means that the burden can be shared and that the United States does not always need to participate. For example, India conducted its first naval exercise with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members in the South China Sea in May 2023.

Rely on multilateral mechanisms to push back against China’s maritime aggression.

The 2016 international arbitral ruling has become an indispensable tool for rejecting China’s sweeping maritime claims. There is a need for more such international efforts that call out China’s illegal behavior that undermines countries’ sovereignty. The United States and its allies and partners should support nations that bring new cases with similarly strong evidence to the tribunal against Chinese maritime claims.

Invest in regional architecture and norms.

The United States, Australia, and other key partners should continually invest in maintaining Indian Ocean stability. Dispatching senior officials to participate in regional architecture, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which Sri Lanka is chairing for the next two years, is one meaningful way to do this. Investing more resources in maritime capacity building such as legal training is another way. Both the United States and Australia currently conduct capacity building with smaller Indian Ocean partners.12

Continue to raise the issue of China’s aggressive behavior in the SCS in the newly resumed U.S.-China military-to-military talks.

The U.S. Department of Defense statement on recently held defense talks between Washington and Beijing indicated that the U.S. side highlighted PRC harassment of Philippine vessels operating in the SCS as a particular area of concern.13 U.S. officials should continue to highlight to their Chinese counterparts that Washington will stand by its allies and partners when there are threats to their territorial or maritime sovereignty. It is critical for the United States to send clear and repeated messaging in this regard.

Introduction

China’s gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the past year, is becoming an increasing global concern.14 China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea (SCS) has already led to confrontation between the United States (a defense ally of the Philippines since 1951) and China, and could even cause a lethal conflict between the two major powers. The Pentagon’s 2023 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China details “multiple coercive actions” in the South China Sea in what “appear to have been . . . a centralized, concerted campaign . . . to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational activity, and that of U.S. allies and partners.”15 Part of the problem lies in the fundamentally different views between Washington and Beijing about sovereignty claims, international law, and acceptable maritime operations.

While the United States’ strategic priority is deterring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from making military advances against Taiwan, Washington must also closely monitor PRC activities in the South China Sea and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. Some observers argue that it is not worth risking the South China Sea becoming another flashpoint between Washington and Beijing, and thus Washington should leave the maritime disputes to the claimants themselves. However, turning a blind eye to increasing PRC aggression in the South China Sea would discourage Southeast Asian nations and force them to accept PRC hegemony in the region, which would play into China’s strategy of circumscribing the role of the United States and undermining its influence in the broader Indo-Pacific. While Washington cannot halt all aggressive behavior, the stakes are higher where it has established a U.S. presence, made alliance commitments (i.e., with the Philippines), or declared U.S. intentions to preserve the status quo. Washington must not make the mistake it made over a decade ago when it failed to challenge China’s militarization of its artificial islands in the region.

PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting its economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power—not on asserting maritime claims.16 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives.

This paper examines China’s maritime goals and activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean regions, giving particular attention to brewing tensions between China and the Philippines over a small outpost that the Philippines has controlled for the past 25 years. The paper examines responses within the region to China’s growing maritime presence and its gray zone activity and discusses the future implications for the United States and its closest allies and partners. Finally, the paper puts forth a series of policy recommendations for the United States to improve maritime security in these two vital regions and shape the strategic environment to deter Chinese maritime actions that seek to disrupt the rules- based order in the Indo-Pacific.

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-28-2024?utm

Key Takeaways

• Taiwanese media reported that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping during a “private” visit to the PRC in April. The CCP may use the meeting to advance its preferred vision of cross-strait relations and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan.
• The Chinese Coast Guard has normalized patrols around Kinmen since February 14. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.
• ROC President Tsai Ing-wen declined to visit Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba in the South China Sea before her term ends. The Tsai administration has cited regional and personal security concerns in explaining Tsai’s decision to not visit Itu Aba.
• The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions.
• The Chinese Coast Guard is driving heightened tensions in the South China Sea while the PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the crises.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MARCH 28, 2024

Mar 28, 2024 - ISW Press

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 28, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 26 at 5 pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• Taiwanese media reported that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping during a “private” visit to the PRC in April. The CCP may use the meeting to advance its preferred vision of cross-strait relations and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan.
• The Chinese Coast Guard has normalized patrols around Kinmen since February 14. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.
• ROC President Tsai Ing-wen declined to visit Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba in the South China Sea before her term ends. The Tsai administration has cited regional and personal security concerns in explaining Tsai’s decision to not visit Itu Aba.
• The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions.
• The Chinese Coast Guard is driving heightened tensions in the South China Sea while the PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the crises.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwanese media reported that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping during a planned “private” visit to the PRC in April. CEO of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation and former Ma aide Hsiao Hsu-tsen announced on March 25 that Ma will lead a delegation of students to the PRC on April 1-11 to visit sites in Guangdong, Shaanxi, and Beijing. When asked if Ma would meet with Xi, Hsiao did not confirm the meeting but hinted that Ma was hopeful to meet “an old friend” if PRC arrangements permit it.[1] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Spokesperson Chen Binhua said that the PRC welcomed Ma to participate in cultural activities but did not mention any meetings with Xi or other CCP officials.[2] Taiwan’s Storm Media reported on March 26 that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on April 8 during his visit, however.[3]

Ma last met Xi in Singapore in 2015, when Ma was ROC president. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the PRC and Taiwan. In March 2023, Ma became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the PRC, in a visit that overlapped with sitting president Tsai Ing-wen’s trip to the United States. Ma did not meet Xi on that visit, however.

Ma is a member of the Kuomintang (KMT) political party and is known for his PRC-friendly views and controversial statements on Taiwan-PRC and Taiwan-US relations, especially after leaving office. Ma said in a January interview that Deutsche Welle posted several days before the ROC’s 2024 presidential election that Taiwan must trust Xi Jinping when it comes to cross-strait relations.[4] The comment drew condemnation from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and prompted KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih to politically distance himself from Ma, saying his views were “somewhat different.”[5] In a speech at New York University in October 2023, Ma said that the United States and other Taiwan-friendly Western countries should encourage Taiwanese leaders to engage in dialogue with the PRC rather than encouraging them “to move toward Taiwanese independence or even transforming Taiwan into a second Ukraine.”[6] Ma’s allegation that the United States is pushing Taiwan toward independence and risking war with the PRC aligns with CCP rhetoric on the US-Taiwan relationship.

The CCP may use a Xi-Ma meeting to advance its preferred vision of cross-strait relations and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast to the DPP. TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said on March 14 that Taiwan would be able to alleviate tensions and “sleep soundly” if it could relive the “peaceful development period across the Taiwan Strait from 2008-2016.” Chen’s statement refers to the years of Ma’s presidency.[7] A meeting between Xi and Ma would also be consistent with the CCP’s effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner while not directly interacting with Taiwan's DPP-led government. The PRC cut off official exchanges with Taiwan after Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP became president of Taiwan in 2016. CCP officials have repeatedly met with KMT officials during this time. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the KMT recognize but Tsai and the DPP do not. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China. Although Ma no longer holds an official position in the KMT, KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia said the KMT would be glad if Ma meets Xi and hopes his trip can help stabilize cross-strait relations.[8]

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has normalized patrols around Kinmen since February 14. A PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Kinmen capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit on February 14. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. The CCG pledged on February 18 to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The CCG has maintained a consistent presence around Kinmen and repeatedly violated Taiwan’s maritime boundaries since then. The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship on February 19, marking the first time a CCG ship conducted inspections in Taiwanese waters.[9] Five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen on February 26, including one that crossed into territorial waters.[10] The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen reached 11 on February 27, including two that entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16.[11] One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed.[12] The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.[13]

Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future. It provides the precedent for the PRC to justify future CCG around other offshore ROC islands, such as Matsu. The patrols near the offshore islands create domestic political pressure on the ROC government to negotiate with the PRC from a position of weakness to mitigate the frequency of patrols and defend ROC sovereignty.

The CCP has normalized the patrols around Kinmen while keeping the Kinmen incident and subsequent CCG incursions from escalating into a crisis. The use of the CCG rather than the PLA Navy is one way the CCP employs force to change the status quo without eliciting a foreign response because the former is not a military vessel. This activity is part of a trend of coercive actions that change the status quo in the PRC’s favor and do not reach the threshold of a ROC or third-party military response. The lower levels of PLA Air Force violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2024 compared to 2023 demonstrate that the party has avoided pursuing opportunities to escalate tensions to the point of inciting a military response. Every month from January to November 2023 averaged over 100 ADIZ violations. No month in 2024 has yet reached 100 ADIZ violations.[14] This aligns with two unspecified Taiwanese security officials’ comments to Bloomberg on March 18 that the PLA activity around Taiwan has not increased in intensity since the January presidential election.[15]

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) delayed the release of a Taiwanese fisherman that it rescued near Kinmen for over a week on suspicion that he is a ROC soldier. The CCG rescued two Taiwanese fishermen early in the morning of March 18 after their boat ran out of fuel and drifted out of Taiwanese waters around Kinmen. It held the fishermen in Quanzhou, a PRC coastal city a short distance from Kinmen. The PRC planned to hand the fishermen over to Taiwanese authorities on March 19 but delayed the handover after claiming one of the fishermen tried to hide that he was an active member of the Taiwan military.[16] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on March 23 that the fisherman is part of the Kinmen garrison brigade.[17] The CCG finally released one of the fishermen and his boat on March 23 but continues to hold the soldier in custody.[18] The ROC Coast Guard, Kinmen County government, and KMT legislator Jessica Chen of Kinmen maintained communication with PRC authorities to secure the release of the fishermen and allow their families to visit them. Chen denied that the PRC was engaging in “hostage diplomacy.”[19]

Taiwan

ROC President Tsai Ing-wen declined to visit Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba in the South China Sea before her term ends. Itu Aba is the largest island in the Spratly archipelago and the only one that Taiwan controls. The PRC, the Philippines, and Vietnam also claim Itu Aba as their territory. The KMT has called on Tsai to visit Itu Aba, known in Chinese as Taiping Island, in the South China Sea to assert Taiwan’s sovereignty there before the end of her presidency on May 20.[20] Tsai’s predecessors Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and Chen Shui-bian of the DPP both visited the island before leaving office.[21] KMT politicians criticized Tsai for not attending the inauguration ceremony for a newly renovated pier on Taiping Island on March 26.[22]

The Tsai administration has cited regional and personal security concerns in explaining Tsai’s decision to not visit Itu Aba. Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and National Security Bureau (NSB) director Tsai Ming-yen advised President Tsai not to travel to Itu Aba due to high regional tensions and militarization of the South China Sea. Wu said the PRC has built “enormous” military bases on three islands surrounding Itu Aba – Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef – and has 20 warships patrolling the South China Sea daily. He also noted escalating tensions in the region between the Philippines and the PRC and said Taiwan should consider “peaceful means” to avoid aggravating the situation.[23] NSB Director Tsai said there were security risks to President Tsai’s flight if she visits the island. He said PRC forces have harassed aircraft and ships replenishing Taiwan’s base on Itu Aba.[24]

The KMT criticized Tsai for not visiting Itu Aba and organized a legislative delegation to visit the island on May 16 to assert Taiwan’s sovereignty. Ma Wen-chun, who is the co-chair of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee in the Legislative Yuan, said that her delegation would go to the island regardless of whether President Tsai went.[25] Ten KMT legislators including Ma, three TPP legislators, and one DPP legislator also have signed up for the trip. These include LY Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang Chi-chen of the KMT, who is a member of the committee. LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, who is also on the committee, said he would not go due to political considerations, however.[26]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu dismissed the Tsai administration’s concerns about Tsai visiting Itu Aba as an “excuse,” noting that Taiwan has its own coast guard and military personnel on the island to protect the president’s flight and that past presidents visited despite similar concerns.[27] Former president Ma urged Tsai to visit the island to “safeguard national interests.”[28] Some KMT legislators alleged that the true reason for Tsai Ing-wen’s unwillingness to visit Itu Aba is related to her unwillingness to upset the United States.[29] This framing from the KMT implicitly criticizes US influence over Taiwan and frames Tsai as subordinate to US interests at the expense of Taiwanese sovereignty. The American Institute for Taiwan, the de-facto US embassy in Taiwan, said it was “disappointed” when Ma Ying-jeou announced plans to visit the island in 2016 because the trip could exacerbate tensions.[30]

China

The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Justice (DOJ) charged seven PRC nationals with cybercrimes on March 25. The cybercrimes were espionage and transnational repression in a far-reaching campaign that the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) directed.[31] The indictment accused the MSS-backed group, referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT 31), of malicious cyber activities focused on infiltrating government networks globally to collect sensitive data from public officials who criticized the PRC. The indictment alleges that APT31 embedded malware in over 10,000 emails that collected data on target recipients, including political candidates and campaign personnel. APT31 used the data to enable direct hacking operations against targets, including infiltrating home routers. The US indictment corresponds to earlier reports from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that revealed PRC cyber actor attempts to interfere with federal election infrastructure networks in 2020 and 2022.[32]

APT31’s hacking campaign has been going on for the past 14 years.[33] APT31 and its members have perpetrated numerous other malicious cyber campaigns in recent years, including spear-phishing operations targeting the United States Naval Academy, the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, and Hong Kong legislators and democracy advocates.[34]

The US charges coincide with similar accusations against the PRC from the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assessed with high confidence on March 25 that APT31 conducted extensive cyber espionage on UK parliamentarians in 2021.[35] NCSC also officially attributed the compromise of Electoral Commission networks in 2021 to the PRC, which exfiltrated the data of over 40 million people from electoral registers.[36] The head of New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) Judith Collins declared her country’s support for the UK’s condemnation of the PRC’s cyber operations. Collins announced on March 26 that GCSB also traced malicious cyber activity targeting parliamentary entities to PRC state-sponsored cyber group APT40.[37]

The US and UK jointly imposed sanctions on March 25 against two defendants and an entity they allege is an MSS front company that enables cyber operations.[38] The UK Foreign Office summoned the PRC chargé d’affaires on March 26 to express “unequivocal condemnation” of the PRC’s hacking activities.[39] UK political figures such as former Tory leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith and former immigration minister Robert Jenrick are urging the government to take harsh punitive action against the PRC.[40]

The latest revelations about the PRC’s hacking activities highlight the PRC’s large-scale data theft and espionage against its adversaries. The MSS conducted a large-scale hacking operation from 2014 to 2015 against the Office of Personnel Management, the United States government’s chief human resources agency that manages federal employees’ records for security clearances. The MSS exfiltrated the background investigation data of over 22 million federal employees and contractors.[41] A PRC state-backed cyber actor related to APT40, known in open source as Hafnium, exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft email servers in 2021 to extract sensitive data from organizations around the globe, compromising 30,000 companies and entities in the US alone.[42] NCSC called the espionage-focused incident the largest cyber intrusion against the UK and its allies to date.[43] The alleged APT31 operation also targeted companies of “national economic importance,” including defense contractors who supply the US military and a “leading provider” of 5G network equipment.[44]

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian denied the allegations on March 26 and pointed to recent PRC reports of US government cyber operations against the PRC. Lin accused the United States of recruiting Five Eyes allies to spread disinformation and villainize the PRC.[45] The PRC’s counter accusations are consistent with its past reactions to reverse the narrative, portraying itself as a responsible actor in cyberspace and a victim of US transgressions.

Northeast Asia

North Korea

Top CCP officials met with a North Korean delegation led by Minister of the International Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Kim Sung-nam in Beijing to discuss bilateral relations.[46] Kim met separately with Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Chairman Wang Huning and Director of the CCP International Liaison Department Liu Jianchao on March 21.[47] Wang Huning stressed unwavering ties despite changes in the international situation, according to Pyeongyang’s official media.[48] Kim met with Secretary of the CCP Secretariat Cai Qi on March 22.[49] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Kim met on March 23, during which Wang expressed the PRC’s will to maintain and develop its friendship with North Korea.[50] Kim declared North Korea’s support for the PRC in all Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang-related issues. This is Kim’s first overseas trip since assuming his position as the head of International Department of the WPK.[51]

PRC readouts of the meetings repeated expressions of goodwill between the two countries and pledges to strengthen bilateral cooperation. The PRC did not comment on North Korea’s aggressive behavior in the region, which is consistent with PRC actions since mid-December. The CCP has not publicly criticized North Korea for launching ballistic missiles, testing alleged underwater nuclear drones, or labeling South Korea as its “primary foe.” The CCP has instead called for dialogue to portray the party as a responsible regional stakeholder while avoiding steps to stop North Korea's provocations. The PRC MFA has messaged since mid-December that “trying to solve the problem [on the Korean Peninsula] through military deterrence and pressure will not work…[and] dialogue and consultation” are how to resolve the issue.[52] The CCP has also emphasized the PRC’s close relations with North Korea and plans to deepen “mutually beneficial cooperation” this year, which will be the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[53]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is driving heightened tensions in the South China Sea while the PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the crises. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated that Filipino marine scientists conducted research at Sandy Cay on March 21, two nautical miles from the Philippine-controlled Thitu Island, while the CCG and maritime militia harassed the researchers, including by helicopter.[54] Over 15 CCG vessels remained in the area between Sandy Cay and Thitu Island on March 22.[55] The CCG blamed the Philippines for “infringing on China’s territorial sovereignty,” since the PRC claims both Sandy Cay and Thitu Island as its own.[56]

The CCG also fired water cannons at a Philippine supply ship heading to the Second Thomas Shoal on March 23. The water cannons rendered the ship immobile and caused unspecified injuries to the Filipino crew. Two PCG ships towed the supply ship away while a motorboat successfully transported new soldiers and supplies to the Second Thomas Shoal.[57] The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. Filipino Undersecretary for Bilaterial Relations and ASEAN Affairs Theresa Lazaro protested the CCG and maritime militia actions to PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong via phone call on March 25.[58]

The CCG actions since March 21 are part of a coercive trend targeting the Philippines. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[59] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.[60]

The CCG actions In the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine dash line claims are unlawful.[61] The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its control over critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

The PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the regional tension. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. gave an interview to Bloomberg on March 19 where he stated the Philippines is trying to keep relations with the PRC “on an even keel” but “since the threat [from the PRC] has grown, we must do more to defend our territory.”[62] The PRC MFA responded on March 20 that the Philippines is driving the crisis by alleged “maritime infringements” on South China Sea islands the PRC claims as its own.[63]

The PRC MFA is framing the planned United States-Japan-Philippines summit on April 11 as provocative toward the PRC.[64] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin claimed on March 14 that the United States “traveled thousands of miles to China’s doorstep to … provoke trouble” as part of its “hegemonic activity.”[65] He then framed the revisionist PRC territorial aggression in the South China Sea as a protection of his country’s “territorial sovereignty.”[66] Wang’s rhetoric is consistent with previous PRC messaging about the US role in the region. The PRC MOD framed the United States as “creating bloc confrontations that escalate regional tension” after the June 2023 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[67] Wang’s comments exemplify the view of CCP leadership that the United States-led security architecture in East Asia is inherently aggressive rather than defensive in nature.

4. Establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy

RELEASE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy

March 29, 2024 |   

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3724742/establishment-of-the-office-of-the-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-cyber-pol/

As directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Department of Defense established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (ASD(CP)) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (OASD(CP)) on March 20, 2024.

The ASD(CP) will be the senior official responsible for overall supervision of DoD policy for cyber operations. The ASD(CP) will be under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). In addition, ASD(CP) serves concurrently as the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) and, in that role, acts as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on military cyber forces and activities. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (DASD(CP)) and Deputy Principal Cyber Advisor (DPCA) report through the ASD(CP).

"In standing up this office, the Department is giving cyber the focus and attention that Congress intended," said Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker.

The Secretary of Defense has designated Ms. Ashley Manning, a career member of the Senior Executive Service, as the official performing the duties of the ASD(CP) until such time as an individual is nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and appointed to the position. The President has nominated Michael Sulmeyer, who is currently serving as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of the Army, to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. 

The ASD(CP) is responsible to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) for all matters related to cyber-related activities that support or enable DoD missions in, through, and from cyberspace, including but not limited to:

• Developing, coordinating, assessing, and overseeing the implementation of DoD cyberspace policy and strategy, and ensuring these efforts are aligned with overarching national security objectives.
• Overseeing and certifying the department's Cyberspace Operations Budget, Additionally, providing fiscal and budgetary oversight to USCYBERCOMs $3B annual execution with their 'Enhanced Budget Control' (Budget Authority, as recently approved by the FY24 DoD Appropriations Act)
• Monitoring programs and activities associated with implementation of cyberspace workforce development, recruitment, and retention. 
• Overseeing integration of cyberspace operations and capabilities into operations and contingency plans.
• Developing DoD cyberspace policy guidance on private sector outreach, engagement, and agreements.
• Leading the DoD implementation of national-level cyberspace policies.
• Leading the development, implementation, and oversight of cyberspace-related activities for security cooperation.
• Exercising authority, direction, and control over the official designated as Deputy PCA with respect to that official's Deputy PCA duties. 

5. Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community Book Review

From two friends and colleagues, both the author and the reviewer.

Terrorism has not and will never go away. We need to continue to study it.

Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community Book Review - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

dkiapcss.edu

Book review by Dr. Lumpy Lumbaca

In his deeply unsettling yet meticulously researched book, Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna peels back the layers of horror that unfolded on Easter Sunday, 2019, in Sri Lanka. Published by Penguin Books, this isn’t just a recounting of the attacks; it’s a chilling exploration of the radicalization process, a stark warning for the international community, and a poignant reflection on the resilience of the Sri Lankan people.

Gunaratna, a recognized expert on counterterrorism, leverages his extensive experience to provide unparalleled access to the attackers’ mindset. Through interviews with detainees, investigators, and intelligence specialists, he builds a compelling case that the Easter Sunday bombings were not an isolated incident, but the culmination of a long-festering ideology of hate.

The book meticulously traces the roots of the bombings back to the ideology of Salafi-Wahhabism, a puritanical strain of Islam that preaches violence against non-believers. Gunaratna dissects the insidious ways this ideology infiltrated Sri Lanka’s Muslim community, exploiting existing social and religious divides. He avoids generalizations, instead focusing on the specific individuals involved, their motivations, and the recruitment tactics employed.

This personalized approach allows the reader to understand the complex cocktail of factors that led to the radicalization of these young men and women. Gunaratna doesn’t shy away from critiquing intelligence failures and political roadblocks; his analysis exposes missed opportunities and a lack of interagency cooperation within Sri Lanka’s government.

However, Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre isn’t just a chronicle of darkness. It also shines a light on the remarkable resilience of the Sri Lankan people. Gunaratna dedicates space to the outpouring of national unity and the unwavering determination to rebuild. He highlights stories of ordinary citizens who risked their lives to help others, exemplifying the power of compassion in the face of tragedy.

The book’s final chapters serve as a clarion call for international cooperation in combatting terrorism. Gunaratna provides specific recommendations for dismantling online recruitment networks, fostering interfaith dialogue, and strengthening regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms. His insights, grounded in the Sri Lankan experience, offer valuable lessons that transcend geographical boundaries.

Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre isn’t an easy read. It’s a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of religious extremism. However, it’s a necessary read. Gunaratna’s masterful blend of scholarship and personal narrative exposes the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorism and offers a roadmap for preventing such tragedies in the future. This book belongs on the shelf of anyone concerned with global security, religious extremism, and the enduring power of the human spirit.

Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD, is a retired US Army Green Beret and current Department of Defense civilian professor of irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and special operations at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He can be found on X/Twitter @LumpyAsia.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of DKI APCSS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these sites.

March 2024

dkiapcss.edu

6. These Eight U.S. Bridges Are Vulnerable to a Repeat of the Baltimore Crash

Graphics and photos at the link. It seems clear that this was an accident based on preliminary analysis. 

But if I were an unrestricted warfare practitioner I would conduct a CARVER analysis on the target list outlined below and then consider the timing for potential attacks to cause the most disruption to achieve strategic effects. And then there are the psychological and political effects to be considered.

In the case of this accident in Baltimore it is going to have a significant economic impact (with some military impact as well based on reports of certain military ships being unable to deploy). Other bridges may affect other instruments of national power at key times. Perhaps we need to be doing some red team analysis on these bridges.

These Eight U.S. Bridges Are Vulnerable to a Repeat of the Baltimore Crash

Modern spans must have safeguards but even robust structures might not withstand a direct blow from giant ships

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/these-eight-u-s-bridges-are-vulnerable-to-a-repeat-of-the-baltimore-crash-f2a2a057?mod=hp_lead_pos7

Jo Craven McGintyFollow

 and Paul OverbergFollow

March 29, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Fewer than 10 bridges in the U.S. have the clearance of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, the 1,200-foot span that collapsed after a supersize containership slammed into one of its vertical supports. All of them have a vulnerability where the failure of even a single steel component in tension along the span could cause a collapse. 

The National Transportation Safety Board flagged this condition in the Key Bridge after it fell early Tuesday morning—but the hit that destroyed the Key wasn’t a blow to one of those crucial steel components. Rather, it was the devastating strike taking out one of the bridge’s concrete vertical supports, known as a pier, that caused the massive structure to cascade into the water below. 

Any span of that size suffering a comparable loss could tumble, according to engineers, making bridges that can accommodate giant ships particularly at risk.

U.S. bridges with similar characteristics to Baltimore's Francis Scott Key Bridge

1

2

6

3

7

8

4

5

Francis

Scott Key

Bridge

Tacoma Narrows Bridge, Wash.

Lewis and Clark Bridge, Ore.-Wash.

St. Johns Bridge, Ore.

San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, Calif.

Golden Gate Bridge, Calif.

George Washington Bridge, N.J.-N.Y.*

Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge, N.Y.

Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Md.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

*Supports stand on or next to land.

Source: Staff reports

The fact that a vessel the size of the Dali—a 984-foot containership weighing 95,000 tons when empty—brought down a mighty bridge with satisfactory inspection records highlights a vulnerability in U.S. commerce. Ships of all kinds, including cruise and containerships, have grown bigger and bigger, especially after 2016 when the Panama Canal was widened, allowing them to enter East Coast ports from Asia. 

Today, federal guidelines require bridges over a navigable waterway to be protected from a potential vessel strike. Among the safeguards are “dolphins,” or independent barriers, meant to deflect a straying ship away from a bridge’s piers, and “fenders” that attach to piers to absorb a vessel’s impact. 

The Key Bridge predates these guidelines, though it was built with a set of concrete and wood barriers around its vertical supports that absorbed a containership strike in 1980.

The Key, which opened in 1977, was designed with a vertical clearance of more than 180 feet to allow the passage of large containerships into the port of Baltimore. The bridge spanned the Patapsco River at a point where it was wide enough to allow ships a channel of 1,100 feet between its piers.   

Few bridges allow so much room, and even fewer may see large containerships transiting, depending on channel depth and port capacity. Other bridges might accommodate large ships but with less room. 

The Dali container vessel after striking the Francis Scott Key Bridge and causing it to collapse. PHOTO: AL DRAGO/BLOOMBERG NEWS

At least seven bridges, some of them twin spans, have clearance similar to the Key according to the National Bridge Inventory, a collection of the inspection records done on the nation’s thousands of highway bridges, based on last year’s version of the data released by the Federal Highway Administration. An eighth has piers that stand on or next to land. The eight are part of important transportation systems in California, Maryland, Oregon, New York and Washington. 

All but one are older than the Key, and all contain what is known as “fracture critical members,” meaning the failure of even a single steel component in tension could cause a collapse. 

In a news conference Tuesday, Jennifer Homendy, chair of the NTSB, the agency investigating the accident, flagged that the Key Bridge is one of more than 17,000 “fracture critical” structures. Data show that many of those are smaller bridges or in the interior of the U.S., not bridges the size of the Key.

A bridge that is fracture-critical isn’t unsafe, according to engineers, but it lacks redundancy in its load-bearing design. Bridge owners are required to note this special condition in bridge inspection records and conduct and document special inspections of those parts of the bridge, sometimes as often as yearly. 

Defenses

The Sunshine Skyway Bridge, which suffered a similar incident as the Francis Scott Key Bridge in 1980, was rebuilt in 1987 featuring protective features designed to withstand the direct impact of an 87,000-ton ship traveling at a speed of 10 knots.

Francis Scott Key Bridge

Sunshine Skyway Bridge

Concrete and timber ‘fender’

‘Dolphin’ barriers and islands

Baltimore, Md.

Tampa, Fla.

Fenders

Islands are designed to

protect bridge supports

by running ships aground.

Dolphin

Groups of pilings

that form a barrier

in water.

Concrete box

Absorbs the impact

from incoming ships.

Timber posts

Island

Made of rocks and rise

about eight feet above

the water line.

Note: Not to scale.

Sources: American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (Baltimore bridge specifications); Florida Department of Transportation and Adam T. Sayers, 2007, ‘Critical Analysis of Sunshine Skyway Bridge,’ University of Bath (Tampa bridge specifications); Shutterstock (Baltimore photo); Tampa Bay Times/Zuma Press (Tampa photo)

Adrienne Tong and Kara Dapena/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

This didn’t play a role in the Key Bridge collapse, according to engineers, who said the loss of the vertical support was responsible.

“A bridge with fracture critical members or a bridge without fracture critical members would likely suffer the same fate,” said Frank Russo, an engineer and founder of Russo Structural Services.

Some of the largest bridges are iconic structures like the Key Bridge, including the twin spans of the nearby Chesapeake Bay Bridge, San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge and the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge in New York. 

Many are designed as some form of a suspension bridge, a design long favored by engineers for large crossings. The oldest, the Lewis and Clark Bridge between Rainier, Ore., and Longview, Wash., is a cantilever bridge that opened in 1930. The newest, the second span of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington, opened in 2007. All are rated in fair or better condition. Inconsistencies in the inspection data mean that a few other bridges might qualify for such a list.

By comparison, the Key Bridge was a truss made of connected triangles that worked together as a single unit in a design known as a continuous structure, Russo said. The truss included a main span and adjacent back spans. A truss bridge relies on the strength of the entire unit to carry its load—in this case, around 30,767 vehicles a day. 

A car is halted at the edge of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge across Tampa Bay, Fla., after a freighter struck the bridge in May 1980. PHOTO: JACKIE GREEN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Because of this design, once the main span of the Key Bridge was compromised, the entire structure was at risk.

“People were surprised that the far side of the bridge fell,” said Charles J. Carter, an engineer and president of the American Institute of Steel Construction. “Because they all worked together, that was, unfortunately, inevitable.”

Federal guidelines to protect bridges from vessel strikes were drafted following the 1980 collapse of the Tampa Bay Sunshine Skyway Bridge after a freighter rammed into one of its supports. Bridges built before the guidelines were released in 1991 weren’t compelled to comply—but some areas have opted to retrofit their bridges for safety. The Sunshine bridge has since been rebuilt but wasn’t among the eight that met the width and height criteria used in the Journal’s analysis.

The upgrades are expensive.

Last year, Delaware announced that it would spend $22.3 million to improve the Delaware Memorial Bridge pier protection system. (The Memorial bridge also isn’t one of the eight in the Journal’s analysis.) The new “ship collision protection system” will include eight barriers measuring 80-feet in diameter. 

Speaking at the White House on Wednesday, Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg said his agency will be ready to apply the findings of the NTSB investigation of the Key Bridge collapse to considerations about the “regulation, inspection, design or funding of bridges in the future.”

“What we do know is a bridge like this one, completed in the 1970s, was simply not made to withstand a direct impact on a critical support pier from a vessel that weighs about 200 million pounds—orders of magnitude bigger than cargo ships that were in service in that region at the time that the bridge was first built,” he said.

A cargo ship passes under California’s San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in 2015. PHOTO: JANE TYSKA/OAKLAND TRIBUNE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

—C. Ryan Barber contributed this article.

Write to Jo Craven McGinty at jo.mcginty@wsj.com and Paul Overberg at paul.overberg@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the March 30, 2024, print edition as 'U.S. Bridge Vulnerabilities Gauged'.

7. Opinion | Zelensky: ‘We are trying to find some way not to retreat’

Opinion | Zelensky: ‘We are trying to find some way not to retreat’

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 29, 2024

KYIV — President Volodymyr Zelensky delivered a stark message to Congress in an interview on Thursday as Russian missiles were pounding southern Ukraine: Give us the weapons to stop the Russian attacks, or Ukraine will escalate its counterattacks on Russia’s airfields, energy facilities and other strategic targets.

Zelensky spoke in a sandbagged, heavily guarded presidential compound that seemed nearly empty of its old civilian workforce after more than two years of war. The security was so tight, I had to surrender my plastic felt-tip pens. But Zelensky appeared as animated and pugnacious as when he made his defiant stand in the courtyard when the war began.

Zelensky, the actor who became a wartime president, now totally inhabits this role. He wore his habitual dress of a Ukrainian military sweatshirt and combat pants. He looked less haggard here on his home ground than he had about a month ago at a security conference in Munich. He seems to relish being the symbol of a nation at war.

The congressional delay in approving a $60 billion military aid package has been costly for Ukraine, Zelensky said. The military has been unable to plan future operations while legislators squabbled for nearly six months. He warned that hard-pressed Ukrainian forces might have to retreat to secure their front lines and conserve ammunition.

“If there is no U.S. support, it means that we have no air defense, no Patriot missiles, no jammers for electronic warfare, no 155-milimeter artillery rounds,” he said. “It means we will go back, retreat, step by step, in small steps.”

To describe the military situation, Zelensky took a sheet of paper and drew a simple diagram of the combat zone. “If you need 8,000 rounds a day to defend the front line, but you only have, for example, 2,000 rounds, you have to do less,” he explained. “How? Of course, to go back. Make the front line shorter. If it breaks, the Russians could go to the big cities.”

“We are trying to find some way not to retreat,” Zelensky continued. After the Russian capture of Avdiivka in February, he said, “we have stabilized the situation because of smart steps by our military.” If the front remains stable, he said Ukraine can arm and train new brigades in the rear to conduct a new counteroffensive later this year.

Zelensky summed up the zero-sum reality of this conflict: “If you are not taking steps forward to prepare another counteroffensive, Russia will take them. That’s what we learned in this war: If you don’t do it, Russia will do it.”

When I asked whether Ukraine was running short of interceptors and other air-defense weapons to protect its cities and infrastructure, he responded: “That’s true. I don’t want Russia to know what number of air-defense missiles we have, but basically, you’re right. Without the support of Congress, we will have a big deficit of missiles. This is the problem. We are increasing our own air-defense systems, but it is not enough.”

As Russian drones, missiles and precision bombs break through Ukrainian defenses to attack energy facilities and other essential infrastructure, Zelensky feels he has no choice but to punch back across the border — in the hope of establishing deterrence. An example is Ukraine’s drone strikes against Russian refineries over the past month. I asked Zelensky if U.S. officials had warned against such attacks on energy facilities inside Russia, as has been rumored in Washington.

“The reaction of the U.S. was not positive on this,” he confirmed, but Washington couldn’t limit Ukraine’s deployment of its own home-built weapons. “We used our drones. Nobody can say to us you can’t.”

Zelensky argued that he could check Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid only by making Russia pay a similar price. “If there is no air defense to protect our energy system, and Russians attack it, my question is: Why can’t we answer them? Their society has to learn to live without petrol, without diesel, without electricity. … It’s fair.”

“When Russia will stop these steps, we will stop,” he said.

What Zelensky wants urgently are long-range ATACM-300 missiles, which he said could strike targets in Russian-occupied Crimea, especially the airfields from which Russia launches planes with precision-guided missiles that are doing heavy damage. These missiles recently hit Odessa and several other targets.

“When Russia has missiles and we don’t, they attack by missiles: Everything — gas, energy, schools, factories, civilian buildings,” Zelensky said.

“ATACM-300s, that is the answer,” he continued. He said he wanted to use the longer-range missiles not to attack Russian territory but those airfields in Crimea. “When Russia knows we can destroy these jets, they will not attack from Crimea. It’s like with the sea fleet. We pushed them from our territorial waters. Now we will push them from the airports in Crimea.”

Zelensky recalled that in Munich in February, he took out a map of the targets the ATACMS could hit. “I showed them military platforms like airports, air-defense systems and other sites,” he said. When I asked if the ATACMS are on the way, as is rumored in Washington, he laughed and said: “I can’t share with you this information. Sorry.” He said that the missiles “are not in Ukraine” now.

Zelensky touted his program for a domestically produced “army of drones, including some that can reach 1,000 kilometers or more into Russia.” But he cautioned that “drones are not enough for winning the war. … We could use naval drones to push their fleet out of our territorial waters and the entire western part of the Black Sea, yes. But it’s not enough to win. These are drones, not missiles.”

I asked Zelensky whether he thought President Biden was too cautious in supplying weapons, as hawkish critics sometimes charge. “I think he’s cautious about nuclear attack from Russia,” Zelensky answered. His own view is that Vladimir Putin wouldn’t risk a nuclear exchange, but he conceded that the Russian leader is unpredictable: “He’s crazy. There is nobody in the world who can tell you 100 percent what he will do. That’s why Biden is cautious.”

The lesson of war for Zelensky, after two years of brutal fighting that has killed many of the best officers and soldiers in the Ukrainian army, is that Putin should have been stopped sooner.

President Barack Obama “was not strong against him” when Putin seized Crimea in 2014, Zelensky said. “Europe wanted to have security on the border and big trade with Russia. That opened the way to war with Ukraine.”

“He captured Crimea, and there was no reaction at all. Nobody pushed him back. Nobody stopped him.” When I asked if he would have allowed Biden to send U.S. troops into Ukraine to deter the February 2022 invasion, he said simply: “Yes.” In hindsight, that show of force might have been the only way this terrible conflict could have been averted.

Zelensky offered a chilling characterization of his adversary. “Putin is cunning, but he’s not smart,” he said. “When you fight with a smart person, it’s a fight with rules. But when you fight with a cunning person, it’s always dangerous.”

Looking ahead, Zelensky said Ukraine’s options depend on what Congress decides. Until Ukraine knows it has continuing U.S. support, “we will stay where we are now in the East.” He said Ukraine might conduct limited offensive operations, but “to push them out, we need more weapons.”

“We lost half a year” while Congress bickered, he said. “We can’t waste time anymore. Ukraine can’t be a political issue between the parties.” He said critics of aid for Ukraine didn’t understand the stakes in the war. “If Ukraine falls, Putin will divide the world” into Russia’s friends and enemies, he said.

Zelensky has been the X-factor in this war, mobilizing his country and much of the world to resist Russian aggression. I wish members of Congress who balk at aiding Ukraine could have listened to the Ukrainian leader talk about the price that Ukraine has paid for its defiance — and the risks ahead for the United States if it doesn’t stand with its friends.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 29, 2024

8. Authoritarians Threaten Journalists Around the Globe

Journalism is not a crime.

But authoritarians threaten journalists because freedom of the press is a threat to authoritarians (yes a blinding flash of the obvious).  

It is not only a free press issue (which is a value we must cherish and protect) anyone who considers information and influence operations knows that journalists and the media are key to helping transmit information. Without them we are pretty much mute.

Authoritarians Threaten Journalists Around the Globe

More than 520 reporters are locked up around the world, reflecting rising pressure on independent media

https://www.wsj.com/world/authoritarians-threaten-journalists-around-the-globe-38cda1d7?mod=hp_lista_pos3

By Matthew DaltonFollow

 and Jack GillumFollow

Updated March 29, 2024 5:59 pm ET

From Vladimir Putin in Russia to the theocrats in Iran, authoritarian leaders are increasingly shutting down independent media and locking up reporters, with hundreds of journalists now in jail around the globe. 

The surge in government crackdowns on the press, which accelerated after Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, has left more than 520 journalists imprisoned worldwide, including a few dozen under house arrest, according to the Paris-based advocacy group Reporters Without Borders. The figure is among the highest the group has ever recorded. 

The crackdowns reverse an expansion of media freedom that began after the end of the Cold War, as many governments turn toward autocracy. Even places that were once bastions of the free press, such as Hong Kong, are tightening restrictions on journalists. And countries such as Russia that once tolerated some dissent are imposing near-totalitarian limits on independent journalism, leaving state media and government propaganda to fill the void.

Many other journalists have been forced into exile under threat of imprisonment or worse, while authorities have banned numerous independent news outlets, forcing them to close or operate from abroad. New censorship laws restrict how journalists can cover topics deemed off-limits, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that an agreement to release Evan Gershkovich is a possibility. PHOTO: REUTERS

“It is difficult to work knowing that at any moment the newspaper can be closed and journalists arrested without hope of a trial,” said Oleg Roldugin, editor in chief of Sobesednik, one of Russia’s last remaining independent newspapers.

Russia is now one of the most dangerous places to practice journalism, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data collected by Reporters Without Borders. Nearly three dozen journalists are in Russian prisons, among the most of any country. That puts Russia ahead of Saudi Arabia and Syria and behind only China, Myanmar, Belarus, Israel and Vietnam, according to the data. Globally, around 600 journalists have spent time in prison or under house arrest so far this year.

The figures show Israel arrested the most journalists in 2023, and is now holding 35, after it detained dozens of reporters in the Palestinian territories following the deadly Hamas attack on Oct. 7. Reporters Without Borders doesn’t list the reasons for their arrest. Israel doesn’t say why these people were arrested. 

'It’s Still Painful.' Evan Gershkovich’s Parents on His Year in Prison

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE

'It’s Still Painful.' Evan Gershkovich’s Parents on His Year in Prison

Play video: 'It’s Still Painful.' Evan Gershkovich’s Parents on His Year in Prison

One year after WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich was detained during a reporting trip in Russia, his parents share details about his time in a Moscow prison cell and react to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent comments regarding their son. Photo illustration: JJ Lin

Reporters Without Borders said Israeli forces have killed 21 journalists covering the ground offensive in the Gaza Strip, making the Palestinian territory the world’s most deadly place for reporters this year and last. The advocacy group says its investigations suggest seven of the journalists were explicitly targeted by Israeli forces or killed while identifiable as journalists. It has filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court over their deaths. At least 83 other journalists have been killed in the Gaza Strip during the war; the advocacy group is investigating whether their deaths were linked to their reporting.

Israel’s military, known as the Israel Defense Forces, said it “takes all operationally feasible measures to mitigate harm to civilians including journalists. The IDF has never, and will never, deliberately target journalists.”

Al Jazeera journalist Wael Al-Dahdouh, center, lost his son Hamza, who also worked for Al Jazeera. PHOTO: HATEM ALI/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A protest against violence toward members of the press in Mexico, where four journalists were killed in 2023. PHOTO: CLAUDIO CRUZ/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Mexico is the second-deadliest country for journalists, with four killed last year and 11 in 2022. Reporters in Mexico often face violent reprisals from drug cartels, gangs and even local officials. The Mexican government didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“The number of countries witnessing a decline in media freedom has more than tripled during the last decade,” said Marina Nord, research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, a Swedish academic group that monitors treatment of journalists, censorship laws and other indicators to track broad shifts in democratic values. “This is a worrying trend, because attacks on media freedom are a strong indication that other democratic freedoms are in danger

Countries with the most journalists in jail

China

Myanmar

Belarus

Vietnam

150

111

100

50

0

'22

'22

'22

'22

2018

'20

'24

2018

'20

'24

2018

'20

'24

2018

'20

'24

Israel

Russia

Syria

Saudi Arabia

34

50

0

2018

'20

'22

'24

2018

'20

'22

'24

'22

2018

'20

'24

'22

2018

'20

'24

Note: A person held for multiple years is counted in each year of detention.

Source: Reporters Without Borders

Stephanie Stamm and Adrienne Tong/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The imprisoned journalists stand accused of a range of crimes—including espionage, incitement, spreading misinformation and terrorism—that press-freedom advocates say are designed to silence dissent or punish reporters who have exposed official wrongdoing.

Some have been detained for what appear to be geopolitical reasons. Putin has said that Wall Street Journal Reporter Evan Gershkovich, a U.S. citizen who has been held in a Moscow jail for a year, could be part of a prisoner exchange, “but we have to come to an agreement.” 

Gershkovich is being held on an allegation of espionage that he, the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny.

The 32-year-old reporter was accredited by Russia’s Foreign Ministry when he was taken by officers from Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, during a reporting trip in Yekaterinburg on March 29 last year. 

The U.S. has said Gershkovich isn’t a spy and has never worked for the government. The Biden administration has classed him as wrongfully detained, a designation that commits the U.S. government to work for his release.

WSJ correspondent Evan Gershkovich stands in an enclosure during a hearing in Russia. PHOTO: MAXIM SHIPENKOV/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

President Biden on Friday said his administration was working every day to secure Gershkovich’s release. “We will continue to denounce and impose costs for Russia’s appalling attempts to use Americans as bargaining chips. And we will continue to stand strong against all those who seek to attack the press or target journalists—the pillars of free society,” he said in a statement.

“I admire the hell out of him,” Biden later told reporters at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. “We’re not gonna give up.”

Congressional leaders issued a statement Friday calling for the release of Gershkovich and others wrongfully detained in Russia. “Journalism is not a crime, and reporters are not bargaining chips. The Kremlin’s attempts to silence Evan and intimidate other Western reporters will not impede the pursuit of truth,” said House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.), Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.), and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D., N.Y.).

The journalist Alsu Kurmasheva, a dual U.S.-Russian citizen who works for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, is also detained in Russia. The U.S. hasn’t reached a decision on whether she has been wrongfully detained. Kurmasheva was taken into custody in October and charged with failing to register as a foreign agent. She also faces charges related to a book she edited that is critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Through her husband and legal team, Kurmasheva has denied the charges. The State Department says Russia has brought baseless charges against her.

Most of the world’s imprisoned reporters are local journalists who don’t have a foreign government working on their behalf. Many are freelance reporters or independent bloggers.

The Kremlin has passed a suite of laws that attempt to quash opposition to its war in Ukraine. Many of the 34 journalists in Russian prisons are there because of their reporting on the conflict, according to Reporters Without Borders. Russia has outlawed the use of the words “war” or “invasion” to describe what the Kremlin calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine.

This month, Roman Ivanov, a reporter for the independent news website RusNews, was sentenced to seven years in a penal colony for several posts on social media and his Telegram channel that described alleged human-rights violations and war crimes by Russian forces in Ukraine. One post summarizes a United Nations report that found the Russian army committed war crimes, including executions, rape and torture, during the first months of the invasion. A court near Moscow convicted Ivanov of spreading “fake news” about the Russian army.

Russia sentenced Roman Ivanov—seen here in a T-shirt that says ’No to war’ in Russian—to a penal colony because of his social-media posts. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

His sentencing was guarded by special-forces soldiers and a battalion of police “so dense that the batons were knocking against each other,” according to a report by Sobesednik, the independent Russian newspaper.

When the judge asked Ivanov if he understood the verdict, Ivanov replied, according to Sobesednik: “This is a verdict on you!”

The Kremlin’s censorship laws forced much of the staff of Novaya Gazeta, Russia’s most celebrated independent newspaper, into exile in Latvia in April 2022. The newspaper set up a separate entity there called Novaya Gazeta Europe, which Russia has since declared “undesirable.” Russians working for it face fines or imprisonment.

Still, the original Russian entity continues to publish, its reporting muzzled by the new laws and its print license revoked by the government, meaning it can’t publish more than 999 copies of each edition.

Sobesednik put Alexei Navalny on its front page after the prominent Kremlin critic died in a Russian prison in the Arctic last month. Authorities confiscated all copies of the paper around Moscow and have repeatedly blocked the newspaper’s websites, said Roldugin, the paper’s editor in chief. 

“I think they want us to get scared and shut ourselves down. I will not say that we are completely calm, but we do not intend to close ourselves yet,” Roldugin said. 

The Russian newspaper Sobesednik shows a photo of the late Alexei Navalny on the front page. PHOTO: MAXIM SHEMETOV/REUTERS

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed the suggestion that Russia is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.

“There are many truly dangerous countries in the world for journalists,” he said in an email to the Journal.

Peskov said that in connection with Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, “we now have very strict legislation regarding the sphere of information, but these laws are clear and precise. Those who violate them are punished.”

Moscow’s censorship policies are echoed and even amplified in other post-Soviet states. In neighboring Belarus, Russia’s closest ally, there are now 41 journalists locked up on a range of charges, such as defamation of President Alexander Lukashenko or membership in an “extremist” group—usually a foreign media outlet that has been banned by the government. In Kyrgyzstan, authorities this year arrested 11 journalists from the investigative outlet Temirov Live. Kyrgyzstan has also opened a probe into the investigative website 24.kg, after Russia’s media regulator sent a letter to the outlet in 2022 telling it to delete articles about the war in Ukraine and then blocked access to the site from Russia.

“The situation is getting worse and worse in central Asia, and we see that there is Russian pressure behind it,” said Jeanne Cavelier, head of the Eastern Europe & Central Asia desk at Reporters Without Borders.

The governments of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Iran releases two

Protest movements in the Muslim world have led to sharp crackdowns in recent years. Iran has arrested more than 70 journalists since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police, which detained her for allegedly not wearing the Muslim headscarf. The 22-year-old’s death in 2022 sparked widespread protests and violent reprisals by the Iranian authorities.

Niloofar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi, two journalists who were among the first to report on Amini’s death, were arrested in 2022 and charged with collaborating with the U.S. Both have denied the charges and were released on bail in January after spending 17 months in prison. Twenty journalists are currently imprisoned in Iran, according to Reporters Without Borders. 

Iran’s ambassador to the U.N. didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Iranian reporters Niloofar Hamedi, with glasses, and Elaheh Mohammadi spent more than a year in prison. PHOTO: CHRISTINA ASSI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGE

Activists demand the release of Algerian journalist Ihsane El Kadi. PHOTO: CHRISTOPHE ENA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Algerian government has closed independent news outlets and jailed several high-profile journalists in the wake of a protest movement that arose in 2019 to demand more political freedom. Ihsane El Kadi, the founder and editor in chief of two of Algeria’s leading privately owned media outlets, was arrested in December 2022 and charged with receiving foreign financing to undermine national security.

El Kadi denied the charges, saying he received money from his daughter in London to help keep his media outlets operating. El Kadi was a critic of Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who called him an “informer” on national television after his arrest. He was sentenced last year to seven years in prison.

“He covered subjects that could potentially destabilize the powers that be, and they made him pay dearly,” said Pierre Brunisso, a Paris-based lawyer who represents El Kadi.

The Algerian government didn’t respond to a request for a comment.

China holds the most

In Asia, Vietnam and Myanmar have become among the world’s most prolific jailers of journalists. Myanmar has imprisoned dozens of reporters since a military junta took control of the country in 2021. There are 35 journalists currently imprisoned by authorities in Vietnam. 

9. The Origins of the Green Berets

Although this is a pretty basic overview of the origins of Special Forces (not the hat) it caused me to think about a couple of points. 

We have lost the views of Special Forces as an economy of force capability as well as a force multiplier when working through, by, and with indigenous forces or the forces of our friends, partners, and willies. It would seem that those are very important contributions in strategic competition and large scale combat operations. But I guess they are considered anachronistic and do not fit in with all the fancy new terms people like to create to show modern relevance.

The second point is on psychological operations and how it is an integral component of Special Forces operations.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are also a key component of the Green Berets' skill set. This involves the use of propaganda, information warfare, and other non-traditional methods to influence the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of both enemy forces and civilian populations. By shaping the narrative and psychological landscape of a conflict, Green Berets can help achieve strategic objectives with minimal reliance on conventional military force.

It caused me to take another look (which I have done many times) at COL Frnacis Kelly's book (and report he wrote for the Center of Military History's Vietnam Series), U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. (which can be downloaded here:https://history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-23-1/CMH_Pub_90-23-1.pdf).

COL Kelly's work remains very instructive and with an open mind, and some creative thinking ,and perhaps some squinting when looking at the pages, the reader can see a lot of relevance to strategic competition and large scale combat operations. What I particularly focused on was psychological operations and how it was integrated into the various organizations (PSYOP Detachment with every C Team and even an E5 Chief of research and development operator assigned to A Teams - a euphemism for psychological operations - which it seems that we have a long history of blurring the terms of PSYOP). I know it was the USASOC intent in reorganizing the 1st Special Forces Command to not only develop a irregular warfare campaign headquarters but to re-establish the synergy among Special Forces, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs (During Vietnam A Teams also had civic action operators).  

Anyway, COL Kelly's report is a rich study that is too often overlooked because it is associated with the failure in Vietnam (and sadly just as everything associated with Afghanistan and Iraq will be overlooked, discounted, and forgotten). I would love to see someone write a study of US Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq using COL Kelly's work as a model.

Another point concerns this historical footnote:

On April 9, 1987, the Special Forces branch was officially established as a basic branch of the United States Army through Department of the Army General Order No. 35. This recognition solidified the Special Forces' status within the military hierarchy, highlighting their unique skills, capabilities, and contributions to national security objectives.

Although a heretical question for some: Should SF have become a separate branch? On the one hand as noted it did solidify SF as a branch (and for me personally it allowed me to volunteer for SF training because my request volunteering for SF training was denied by the infantry branch three times prior to 1987 because it was "not in the best interest of the officer's career"). The counterfactual question is if SF had remained a functional area and not become a separate branch would it have the stature that Rangers and Special Operations Aviators have within the Army today because of their regular rotation between regular and special operations units? Or would the problem of SF being treated as a rogue Army element have continued to this day?  

 It appears th​e article below is the beginning of a series so I will keep an eye on what the authors write.

The Origins of the Green Berets

The US Army needed an economy of force solution to go in and work with guerrillas in countries that had become occupied to fight against oppression.

March 29, 2024

https://www.ghostsofthebattlefield.org/articles/the-origins-of-the-green-berets?utm

The Origin of US Army Special Forces

by: A series with Former Green Beret Richard Killblane and Jeremy Jones

The U.S. Army Special Forces, commonly referred to as the "Green Berets," were established in 1952, they have a storied history of operating in some of the most challenging and sensitive environments around the world. Their signature headgear, the green beret, is a symbol of their distinction and expertise.

One of the defining characteristics of the Green Berets is their emphasis on unconventional warfare. Unlike conventional military units, which often operate in large formations, Green Berets typically work in small teams, allowing them to conduct missions with a high degree of flexibility and agility. This enables them to adapt to a wide range of situations, from direct action raids to training and advising foreign forces.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are also a key component of the Green Berets' skill set. This involves the use of propaganda, information warfare, and other non-traditional methods to influence the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of both enemy forces and civilian populations. By shaping the narrative and psychological landscape of a conflict, Green Berets can help achieve strategic objectives with minimal reliance on conventional military force.

In addition to their expertise in unconventional warfare and psychological operations, Green Berets are trained in a variety of other specialized skills, including foreign language proficiency, cultural awareness, and combat medicine. This broad skill set allows them to operate effectively in diverse environments and collaborate with local partners around the world.

Origins:

The Cold War began when the Soviet Union detonated their first atomic bomb and erected a

barrier of Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe in 1949. Shortly after that, the Communist

North Koreans invaded South Korea and the United States and its UN allies coming to its aid.

The US Army recognized it needed an economy of force solution to go in and work with guerrillas behind the lines in these countries to fight against oppression. In 1951, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare tapped into several WWII experts in irregular warfare to develop Army doctrine and an Army capability to operate behind the Iron Curtain.

Of the men the report selected, Colonels Russel Volkmann and Wendell Fertig had both commanded division-sized guerrilla forces in the Philippines fighting the Japanese. Aaron Bank had led Jedburgh teams behind German lines.

 At this point Volkmann had actually written two Army field manuals on the subject and served on Eighth Army staff planning the employment of guerrillas behind enemy lines during the Korean War. Colonel Aaron Bank created the table of organization for the modern Special Forces and commanded the first Army Special Forces unit, the 10 th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in 1952, but gave much credit to Volkmann for doing much of the ground work that led to the creation of Army Special Forces.

The formation of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in June 1952 marked the beginning of what would become a storied history for the United States Army Special Forces. Under the leadership of Colonel Aaron Bank, the 10th Special Forces Group was established shortly after the creation of the Psychological Warfare School, which later evolved into the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

In September 1953, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed to Bad Tölz, Germany, while another cadre remained at Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty), forming the 77th Special Forces Group. The 77th Special Forces Group underwent reorganization in May 1960 and was designated as the 7th Special Forces Group, a designation it holds to this day.

Since their inception, Special Forces soldiers have been deployed to numerous regions and countries around the world, operating in diverse and often challenging environments. These deployments have included conflicts and missions in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the 1st Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen, Niger, and East Africa in a Foreign Internal Defense (FID) role.

On April 9, 1987, the Special Forces branch was officially established as a basic branch of the United States Army through Department of the Army General Order No. 35. This recognition solidified the Special Forces' status within the military hierarchy, highlighting their unique skills, capabilities, and contributions to national security objectives.

In this series we will examine the history of the Green Berets from their foundation in 1952 to the mountains of Afghanistan.

Special Forces soldiers prepare for a combat diving training operation on a US Navy ship in 1956, wearing their green berets

10. US-funded Radio Free Asia closes Hong Kong bureau over safety concerns under new security law

US-funded Radio Free Asia closes Hong Kong bureau over safety concerns under new security law

Stars and Stripes · by KANIS LEUNG · March 29, 2024

Surveillance cameras are seen as a visitor looks at Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong on March 11, 2024. (Louise Delmotte/AP)

HONG KONG — The president of U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia said Friday that its Hong Kong bureau has been closed because of safety concerns under a new national security law, deepening concerns about the city’s media freedoms.

Bay Fang, the president of RFA, said in a statement that it will no longer have full-time staff in Hong Kong, although it would retain its official media registration.

“Actions by Hong Kong authorities, including referring to RFA as a ‘foreign force,’ raise serious questions about our ability to operate in safety with the enactment of Article 23,” Fang said.

RFA’s move is widely seen as a reflection of the city’s narrowing space for a free press following the enactment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, locally also known as Article 23 legislation.

Rep. Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed concern over RFA’s shutdown and said the new law “not only represents a significant escalation in efforts by Hong Kong and Beijing authorities to suppress free speech and expression,” but “also undermines media freedom and the public’s ability to obtain fact-based information.”

Cédric Alviani, the Asia-Pacific bureau director for Reporters Without Borders, called the broadcaster’s withdrawal “a consequence of the chilling effect applied on media outlets” by the new security law.

“We urge democracies to build up pressure on Chinese authorities so that press freedom is fully restored in the territory,” Alviani said.

The U.S. State Department on Friday announced it was taking steps to impose new visa restrictions on a number of unspecified Hong Kong officials “responsible for the intensifying crackdowns on rights and freedoms” in the territory, following its annual assessment under the Hong Kong Policy Act.

The State Department said the new security law could be used to suppress dissent inside Hong Kong and further Beijing’s campaign to intimidate activists abroad.

Hong Kong, once seen as a bastion of media freedom in Asia, has already changed drastically since Beijing imposed a similar security law in 2020, following anti-government protests in 2019.

Since the introduction of the 2020 law, two local news outlets known for critical coverage of the government, Apple Daily and Stand News, were forced to shut down after the arrest of their senior management, including Apple Daily publisher Jimmy Lai.

Hong Kong ranked 140th out of 180 countries and territories in Reporters Without Borders’ latest World Press Freedom Index.

The new home-grown security law, which was enacted through an expedited legislative process last week, has expanded the government’s power to stamp out challenges to its rule.

It targets engaging in espionage, disclosing state secrets and “colluding with external forces” to commit illegal acts, among others. Some offenses, such as treason and insurrection, carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The legislation has sparked worries among many journalists over a further decline in media freedom. They fear the broadly framed law could criminalize their day-to-day work.

RFA, funded by the U.S. Congress through the U.S. Agency for Global Media, has recently been under the Hong Kong government’s attack. In January, police issued a letter to RFA and condemned it for quoting “false statements” by wanted activist Ted Hui that they said smeared the police force.

Hui, a former pro-democracy lawmaker, is one of the overseas-based activists for whom police have offered awards of 1 million Hong Kong dollars ($128,000) for information leading to their arrest. He is accused of requesting foreign countries to impose sanctions on Hong Kong and China.

In February, Hong Kong’s security minister, Chris Tang, said some comments quoted in reports by RFA about the new legislation were “fake” and “false.”

He did not specify the comments or reports, but said they suggested that some provisions of the law were targeting the media. He insisted there were protections for the media in the legislation.

When asked whether the work of RFA is considered “external interference” or “espionage,” Tang said any violation of the law should be judged on a case-by-case basis. If someone deliberately used false information to defame the government’s legislative work, he said he had to let Hong Kongers see clearly the intention of these “external forces” and those who have fled and want to endanger Hong Kong’s security.

The Hong Kong government on Friday refused to comment on operational decisions of individual organizations. But it condemned “all scaremongering and smearing remarks” against the new law in an email response.

It said many other countries also have security laws. “To single out Hong Kong and suggest that journalists would only experience concerns when operating here but not in other countries would be grossly biased, if not outrageous,” it said.

The government insisted the new law only targets an extremely small minority of people who endanger national security and that most journalists will not unwittingly violate it.

Fang said RFA’s Hong Kong bureau has operated as a private news organization since its launch in 1996 and that its editorial independence was safeguarded by a firewall endorsed by the U.S. Congress.

“This restructuring means that RFA will shift to using a different journalistic model reserved for closed media environments,” she said.

But she assured RFA’s audience in Hong Kong and mainland China that its content would “continue without disruption.”

Hong Kong authorities have not announced any arrests under the new law. But the government on Wednesday condemned the BBC for what it called an “extremely misleading report” about an activist who was blocked from a remission of sentence, or early release, under the law. Tang also wrote a letter to condemn an opinion piece by The New York Times.

Over the past months, articles by other international media outlets, including the Washington Post and The Times, also have been criticized by officials.

Associated Press writer Didi Tang in Washington contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by KANIS LEUNG · March 29, 2024

11. Chinese migrant suddenly found on California military base

Perhaps we need to build better walls around military installations. (note sarcasm).

Chinese migrant suddenly found on California military base

Newsweek · by Nick Mordowanec · March 29, 2024

The arrest of a Chinese national at a Marine Corps base in California is spurring many questions.

The presence of Chinese nationals on American soil has been on lawmakers' radar for months, given the recent influx of migrants at the southern and northern borders and exacerbated tensions with the Chinese Communist Party.

Republican Senators Joni Ernst and Marco Rubio are among nearly three dozen members of Congress who have requested visa changes through the Department of Homeland Security. They told Newsweek earlier this week that Chinese nationals' ability to enter U.S. territories like Guam through the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without proper B-1 (business) or B-2 (tourism) visas should be immediately addressed with reform.

Mounted Border Patrol officers are seen before Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen inaugurates the first completed section of the border wall in California's El Centro Sector on October 26, 2018. On Friday, a Chinese national... Mounted Border Patrol officers are seen before Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen inaugurates the first completed section of the border wall in California's El Centro Sector on October 26, 2018. On Friday, a Chinese national who was in the U.S. illegally was discovered at a Marine Corps base in the sector. MARK RALSTON/AFP via Getty Images

On Friday, Border Patrol chief agent Gregory Bovino wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that agents responded to a call from a Marine base about a Chinese national in the El Centro Sector "who entered the base without authorization, ignoring orders to leave."

"Subject was confirmed to be in the country illegally," Bovino wrote, along with an image of the suspect. "His purpose & intent behind his actions are still being investigated."

BP agents responded to a call from the Marine Corp Base about a #Chinese national who entered the base w/o authorization, ignoring orders to leave. Subject was confirmed to be in the country illegally.

His purpose & intent behind his actions are still being investigated. pic.twitter.com/vaKmWSkLm9

— USBP Chief Patrol Agent Gregory K. Bovino (@USBPChiefELC) March 29, 2024

Newsweek reached out to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials via email for comment.

Jon Feere, director of investigations at the Center for Immigration Studies and a former senior adviser to the director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, questioned how the migrant ended up in the U.S. in the first place.

"Illegally here because he overstayed/violated a visa? Or Illegally here because he crossed the border without inspection?" Feere wrote on X.

Gordon Chang, a journalist who has covered China for decades, wrote: "We have to assume this #Chinese national is a soldier or operative of some sort. Send him to #Guantanamo."

The El Centro Sector, located in Southern California's Imperial Valley, has existed for nearly 100 years and covers 410 square miles and 70 miles of international border. It is home to four Border Patrol stations in the cities of El Centro, Calexico, Indio and Riverside.

California has experienced an increase in Chinese migrants in recent years. There were approximately 15,700 Chinese migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in roughly the first three months of the current fiscal year, which began October 1. Those numbers already surpass the approximately 14,600 encounters in the entire 2023 fiscal year, according to CBP data.

Earlier this week, the Department of Justice indicted seven Chinese nationals suspected of hacking on China's behalf for over 14 years.

Newsweek · by Nick Mordowanec · March 29, 2024

12. China's Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact

China's Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone · March 30, 2024

A China Coast Guard cutter blasts the resupply vessel Unaizah Mae 4 on March 23, 2024. Armed Force of the Philippines Image

Six days after China Coast Guard cutters blasted out the windows of a Philippine resupply ship with a water cannon, Manila is weighing whether a 70-year-old mutual defense pact could compel the U.S. military to defend Filipino forces in the South China Sea as a result.

On March 23, the Philippine Navy-operated, civilian-contracted resupply ship Unaizah Mae 4 was attempting to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre outpost on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal when two Chinese cutters fired water cannons on the ship. According to footage released by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the high-pressure blasts blew out windows on the bridge of Unaizah Mae 4 and injured sailors aboard.

The attack, the ninth and most aggressive since Chinese cutters restarted a campaign blocking the monthly resupply runs to the World War II-era Sierra Madre, is prompting politicians, analysts and lawyers across the Pacific to weigh the U.S. obligation to come to Manila’s aid under a 1951 mutual defense pact.

Both the U.S. State and Defense departments issued statements this week pledging commitment to the treaty.

“The United States reaffirms that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea,” reads the statement from Foggy Bottom.

While the worst-case scenario under the defense treaty could lead to open war with China, the agreement has options for the U.S. to support Manila diplomatically short of armed conflict. However, the 1951 treaty’s application in the 21st century raises questions about whether the Chinese use of water cannons constitutes an armed attack or if the resupply missions are categorized as civilian or military, opening up several legal interpretations.

Rust Bucket Resupply

USNI News Photo Illustration of Second Thomas Shoal Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies used with permission

The rusting hulk of the Sierra Madre – originally the U.S. World War II tank landing ship USS Harnett County – has been beached on Second Thomas Shoal since 1999, when the Philippines deliberately grounded the vessel to stake its claim to the sandbank. Second Thomas Shoal is about 120 miles east of the Philippine island of Palawan – well inside the country’s exclusive economic zone – and just inside China’s expansive nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. Just 20 miles west, Beijing created a Chinese military outpost on Mischief Reef from a similar low-tide feature.

Since Sierra Madre’s grounding, Filipino Marines have maintained a presence on the shoal as a hedge against Chinese encroachment toward Palawan. They receive supplies every few weeks. A Philippine Coast Guard vessel typically escorts smaller civilian-chartered vessels that have Filipino Navy sailors aboard. Those smaller civilian vessels, like Unaizah Mae 4 , carry and transfer the supplies.

But the ambiguous civilian status of those ships raises some questions, like whether firing water cannons on the Unaizah Mae while it had Filipino sailors aboard constituted an armed attack against a vessel or service members.

“That’s the question … that needs clarification,” Julio Amador, an analyst based in Manila, told USNI News. “It’s getting more dangerous [to resupply the Sierra Madre] given the news that we see, that navy sailors are actually getting hurt by all of this bombardment by the [People’s Republic of China Coast Guard].”

“It’s very clear that it’s Navy personnel inside those resupply vessels, so I don’t think the Chinese are remiss, or don’t think that [the Chinese] can claim ignorance about who is inside,” he added.

The decision to use civilian vessels dates back to the administration of former Philippine President Benigno Aquino, according to Jay Batongbacal, a law professor at the University of the Philippines. The idea was to make the missions look less “provocative” while still resupplying the garrison, he said.

“They thought that by using these civilian vessels, it would be a safer way of conducting this activity,” Batongbacal told USNI News. “Obviously that situation has completely changed.”

Back in Washington

Adm. John Aquilino, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, testifies before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington D.C. March 20, 2024. DoD Photo

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last week, outgoing U.S Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. John Aquilino described the Philippines as a “really critical hotspot” that he is worried about because of the China Coast Guard’s increasing aggression toward the Sierra Madre resupply missions.

“I’m concerned where it could go,” Aquilino told lawmakers.

In 2016, an international tribunal ruled against Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea and said China had no legal claim to the Second Thomas Shoal or its surrounding waters.

But China ignored the Hague’s ruling. China Coast Guard cutters, maritime militia and People’s Liberation Army Navy warships continue to restrict access around the features in the Spratly Islands.

In his testimony, Aquilino noted the escalation and other countries’ rebuke of the Chinese attacks.

“I would hope that the international community condemnation of those actions is enough to get the Chinese to back off,” Aquilino told the committee. “But if it doesn’t, it could go in bad places. The Philippines, if a sailor or soldier or one of their members were killed, could invoke Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty. And that would put our policy decision makers in a place that would require really tough choices. It would be my requirement and responsibility to provide the secretary with options if that were to happen.”

Tatlong opisyal ng Philippine Navy ang nagtamo ng injury sa kanilang mata at ulo matapos atakihin ng China Coast Guard vessels ang Philippine supply vessel malapit sa Ayungin Shoal nitong Sabado, March 23. #News5 | via @_GioRobles pic.twitter.com/L8DBw4XO0Q

— News5 (@News5PH) March 25, 2024

Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines states that “an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”

In statements this week, Chinese defense and foreign affairs officials warned Manila against seeking international aid.

“The Chinese side will not allow the Philippines to act willfully and that’s why China has responded with legitimate resolute and restrained actions,” Chinese military spokesman Senior Col. Wu Qian said in a statement Thursday. “The Philippine side should realize that provocations will only do themselves more harm than good, and soliciting foreign support will lead nowhere.”

Under the treaty Manila and Washington have alternative options to armed conflict, Batongbacal told USNI News. Diplomatic solutions are covered under the first three articles, including providing mutual aid and participating in conversations between foreign ministers. There are also levels of proportionality within any invocation of Article V.

“Many think that when you say you invoke the MDT, you’re going to get the ally to engage in armed conflict for you,” Batongbacal said. “That’s the common misunderstanding of the MDT. And I think that for the [Philippine] Armed Forces, that has also been rather prevalent because [of] the simple fact that there has never been a need to invoke the MDT for anything for quite a long time.”

USS Dewey (DDG-105), bottom, steams in formation with the Philippine Navy offshore patrol vessel BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PS 15) while conducting a bilateral sail in the South China Sea, Oct. 21, 2023. US Navy Photo

In one potential scenario, the U.S. could come to the aid of a Philippine vessel attacked by the Chinese. If the Chinese Coast Guard continued its attacks and turned those actions toward the U.S. vessel, the American ship could reasonably respond in self-defense under the rules of engagement, Batongbacal said.

Though the treaty is flexible, Batongbacal argued the U.S. and the Philippines need to show China that they are willing to invoke the MDT. Otherwise, he said, the treaty’s deterrent effect will be diminished.

“Right now China is very confident that the Philippines will surrender because it has no appetite to invoke the MDT and the U.S. will not have any appetite either to apply the MDT,” he said. “So it’s calculating that it can get away with just about anything as long as it does not give any reason for outright war.”

While an armed attack is not defined within the treaty, lawyers at INDOPACOM say the U.S. historically views “self-defense against an armed attack” as pertaining to “any illegal use of force.”

According to the guidance, which was last updated March 10, “an illegal use of force is not limited by law to a kinetic armed attack (e.g. the use of munitions), but could also include non-kinetic attacks that result in death, injury, damage, or destruction of persons or objects.”

China’s Coast Guard stopped using water cannons in 2021, but resumed in August 2023 and has fired on four resupply missions since November.

“I think that this interpretation of INDOPACOM actually now means that INDOPACOM considers even these non-kinetic means, particularly means that do not involve munitions – it specifies that – it now considers these acts valid basis for invoking the MDT,” Batongbacal said.

View from Manila

WATCH | China Coast Guard started blasting water canon directed at Unaizah May 4 around 7:59AM deliberately targeting and hitting the supply boat.#OneAFPOnePHILIPPINES#StrongAFPStrongPHILIPPINES#AFPyoucanTRUST pic.twitter.com/Y0xZdVMshd

— Armed Forces of the Philippines (@TeamAFP) March 23, 2024

Since the attack on the resupply mission last week, officials in Manila have promised to respond. In a March 28 statement on X, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said he has conversed with domestic leaders and international allies about China’s ongoing aggression.

“Over the succeeding weeks there shall be, implemented by the relevant national government agencies and instrumentalities, a response and countermeasure package that is proportionate, deliberate, and reasonable in the face of the open, unabating, and illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks by agents of the China Coast Guard and the Chinese Maritime Militia,” Marcos said.

On Wednesday, Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro consulted with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, according to a Pentagon readout.

“[Austin] emphasized U.S. support for the Philippines in defending its sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and reiterated that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to both countries’ armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft — including those of its Coast Guard — anywhere in the Pacific, to include the South China Sea,” reads the statement. “They highlighted that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Ruling is final and binding on the Parties and called on [China] to abide by its obligations under international law.”

Following comments from China on Thursday urging Manila to back down, the Philippine Department of National Defense issued a statement with the heading, “Filipinos do not yield.”

“[China’s] repertoire consists of only patronizing, and failing that, intimidating smaller countries,” reads the statement. “We will never seek a fight or trouble. Neither will we be cowed into silence, submission or subservience. We do not yield. We are Filipinos.”

Related

news.usni.org · by Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone · March 30, 2024

13. Is The American Empire Now In Its Ultimate Crisis? – OpEd

So pray tell, Mr McCoy, what comes next? What does fading global hegemony entail and what is there when there is only a distant memory of the US? What will the world look like then?

Excerpts:

Washington now finds itself facing three complex global crises, each demanding its undivided attention. Any one of them would challenge the skills of even the most seasoned diplomat. Their simultaneity places the US in the unenviable position of potential reverses in all three at once, even as its politics at home threaten to head into an era of chaos. Playing upon American domestic divisions, the protagonists in Beijing, Moscow, and Tel Aviv are all holding a long hand (or at least a potentially longer one than Washington’s) and hoping to win by default when the US tires of the game. As the incumbent, President Biden must bear the burden of any reversal, with the consequent political damage this November.

Meanwhile, waiting in the wings, Donald Trump may try to escape such foreign entanglements and their political cost by reverting to the Republican Party’s historic isolationism, even as he ensures that the former lone superpower of Planet Earth could come apart at the seams in the wake of election 2024. If so, in such a distinctly quagmire world, American global hegemony would fade with surprising speed, soon becoming little more than a distant memory.

Is The American Empire Now In Its Ultimate Crisis? – OpEd

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29032024-is-the-american-empire-now-in-its-ultimate-crisis-oped/

 March 29, 2024  0 Comments

By Fair Observer

By Alfred W. McCoy

Empires don’t just fall like toppled trees. Instead, they weaken slowly as a succession of crises drain their strength and confidence until they suddenly begin to disintegrate. So it was with the British, French and Soviet empires; so it now is with imperial America.

Great Britain confronted serious colonial crises in India, Iran and Palestine before plunging headlong into the Suez Canal and imperial collapse in 1956. In the later years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union faced its own challenges in Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Ethiopia before crashing into a brick wall in its war in Afghanistan.

America’s post-Cold War victory lap suffered its own crisis early in this century with disastrous invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, looming just over history’s horizon are three more imperial crises in Gaza, Taiwan and Ukraine that could cumulatively turn a slow imperial recessional into an all-too-rapid decline, if not collapse.

As a start, let’s put the very idea of an imperial crisis in perspective. The history of every empire, ancient or modern, has always involved a succession of crises — usually mastered in the empire’s earlier years, only to be ever more disastrously mishandled in its era of decline. Right after World War II, when the United States became history’s most powerful empire, Washington’s leaders skillfully handled just such crises in Greece, Berlin, Italy and France, and somewhat less skillfully but not disastrously in a Korean War that never quite officially ended.

Even after the dual disasters of a bungled covert invasion of Cuba in 1961 and a conventional war in Vietnam that went all too disastrously awry in the 1960s and early 1970s, Washington proved capable of recalibrating effectively enough to outlast the Soviet Union, “win” the Cold War and become the “lone superpower” on this planet.

In both success and failure, crisis management usually entails a delicate balance between domestic politics and global geopolitics. President John F. Kennedy’s White House, manipulated by the CIA into the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, managed to recover its political balance sufficiently to check the Pentagon and achieve a diplomatic resolution of the dangerous 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union.

America’s current plight, however, can be traced at least in part to a growing imbalance between a domestic politics that appears to be coming apart at the seams and a series of challenging global upheavals. Whether in Gaza, Ukraine or even Taiwan, the Washington of President Joe Biden is clearly failing to align domestic political constituencies with the empire’s international interests. And in each case, crisis mismanagement has only been compounded by errors that have accumulated in the decades since the Cold War’s end, turning each crisis into a conundrum without an easy resolution or perhaps any resolution at all. Both individually and collectively, then, the mishandling of these crises is likely to prove a significant marker of America’s ultimate decline as a global power, both at home and abroad.

Creeping disaster in Ukraine

Since the closing months of the Cold War, mismanaging relations with Ukraine has been a curiously bipartisan project. As the Soviet Union began breaking up in 1991, Washington focused on ensuring that Moscow’s arsenal of possibly 45,000 nuclear warheads was secure, particularly the 5,000 atomic weapons then stored in Ukraine, which also had the largest Soviet nuclear weapons plant at Dnipropetrovsk.

During an August 1991 visit, President George H.W. Bush told Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kravchuk that he could not support Ukraine’s future independence and gave what became known as his “chicken Kiev” speech, saying: “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.” He would, however, soon recognize Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as independent states since they didn’t have nuclear weapons.

When the Soviet Union finally imploded in December 1991, Ukraine instantly became the world’s third-largest nuclear power, though it had no way to actually deliver most of those atomic weapons. To persuade Ukraine to transfer its nuclear warheads to Moscow, Washington launched three years of multilateral negotiations, while giving Kyiv “assurances” (but not “guarantees”) of its future security — the diplomatic equivalent of a personal check drawn on a bank account with a zero balance.

Under the Budapest Memorandum on Security in December 1994, three former Soviet republics — Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine — signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and started transferring their atomic weapons to Russia. Simultaneously, Russia, the US and Great Britain agreed to respect the sovereignty of the three signatories and refrain from using such weaponry against them. Everyone present, however, seemed to understand that the agreement was, at best, tenuous. (One Ukrainian diplomat told the Americans that he had “no illusions that the Russians would live up to the agreements they signed.”)

Meanwhile — and this should sound familiar today — Russian President Boris Yeltsin raged against Washington’s plans to expand NATO further, accusing President Bill Clinton of moving from a Cold War to a “cold peace.” Right after that conference, Defense Secretary William Perry warned Clinton, point blank, that “a wounded Moscow would lash out in response to NATO expansion.”

Nonetheless, once those former Soviet republics were safely disarmed of their nuclear weapons, Clinton agreed to begin admitting new members to NATO, launching a relentless eastward march toward Russia that continued under his successor George W. Bush. It came to include three former Soviet satellites: the Czech Republic Hungary, and Poland (1999); three former Soviet Republics: Estonia Latvia, and Lithuania (2004); and then three more former satellites: Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004). At the Bucharest summit in 2008, moreover, the alliance’s 26 members unanimously agreed that, at some unspecified point, Ukraine and Georgia, too, would “become members of NATO.” In other words, having pushed NATO right up to the Ukrainian border, Washington seemed oblivious to the possibility that Russia might feel in any way threatened and react by annexing that nation to create its own security corridor.

In those years, Washington also came to believe that it could transform Russia into a functioning democracy to be fully integrated into a still-developing American world order. Yet for more than 200 years, Russia’s governance had been autocratic, and every ruler from Catherine the Great to Leonid Brezhnev achieved domestic stability through incessant foreign expansion. So, it should hardly have been surprising when the seemingly endless expansion of NATO led Russia’s latest autocrat, Vladimir Putin, to invade the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, only weeks after hosting the Winter Olympics.

In an interview soon after Moscow annexed that area of Ukraine, US President Barack Obama recognized the geopolitical reality that could yet consign all of that land to Russia’s orbit, saying: “The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do.”

Then, in February 2022, after years of low-intensity fighting in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, Putin sent 200,000 mechanized troops to capture the country’s capital, Kyiv, and establish that very “military domination.” At first, as the Ukrainians surprisingly fought off the Russians, Washington and the West reacted with a striking resolve — cutting Europe’s energy imports from Russia, imposing serious sanctions on Moscow, expanding NATO to all of Scandinavia and dispatching an impressive arsenal of armaments to Ukraine.

After two years of never-ending war, however, cracks have appeared in the anti-Russian coalition, indicating that Washington’s global clout has declined markedly since its Cold War glory days. After 30 years of free-market growth, Russia’s resilient economy has weathered sanctions, its oil exports have found new markets, and its gross domestic product is projected to grow a healthy 2.6% this year. In last spring and summer’s fighting season, a Ukrainian “counteroffensive” failed and the war is, in the view of both Russian and Ukrainian commanders, at least “stalemated,” if not now beginning to turn in Russia’s favor.

Most critically, US support for Ukraine is faltering. After successfully rallying the NATO alliance to stand with Ukraine, the Biden White House opened the American arsenal to provide Kyiv with a stunning array of weaponry, totaling $46 billion, that gave its smaller army a technological edge on the battlefield. But now, in a move with historic implications, part of the Republican (or rather Trumpublican) Party has broken with the bipartisan foreign policy that sustained American global power since the Cold War began. For weeks, the Republican-led House has even repeatedly refused to consider President Biden’s latest $60 billion aid package for Ukraine, contributing to Kyiv’s recent reverses on the battlefield.

The Republican Party’s rupture starts with its leader. In the view of former White House adviser Fiona Hill, Donald Trump was so painfully deferential to Vladimir Putin during “the now legendarily disastrous press conference” at Helsinki in 2018 that critics were convinced “the Kremlin held sway over the American president.” But the problem goes so much deeper. As The New York Times columnist David Brooks noted recently, the Republican Party’s historic “isolationism is still on the march.” Indeed, between March 2022 and December 2023, the Pew Research Center found that the percentage of Republicans who think the US gives “too much support” to Ukraine climbed from just 9% to a whopping 48%. Asked to explain the trend, Brooks feels that “Trumpian populism does represent some very legitimate values: the fear of imperial overreach… [and] the need to protect working-class wages from the pressures of globalization.”

Since Trump represents this deeper trend, his hostility toward NATO has taken on an added significance. His recent remarks that he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO ally that didn’t pay its fair share sent shockwaves across Europe, forcing key allies to consider what such an alliance would be like without the United States (even as Russian President Vladimir Putin, undoubtedly sensing a weakening of US resolve, threatened Europe with nuclear war). All of this is certainly signaling to the world that Washington’s global leadership is now anything but a certainty.

Crisis in Gaza

Just as in Ukraine, decades of diffident American leadership, compounded by increasingly chaotic domestic politics, let the Gaza crisis spin out of control. At the close of the Cold War, when the Middle East was momentarily disentangled from great-power politics, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the 1993 Oslo Accord. In it, they agreed to create the Palestinian Authority as the first step toward a two-state solution. For the next two decades, however, Washington’s ineffectual initiatives failed to break the deadlock between that Authority and successive Israeli governments that prevented any progress toward such a solution.

In 2005, Israel’s hawkish Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to withdraw his defense forces and 25 Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip with the aim of improving “Israel’s security and international status.” Within two years, however, Hamas militants had seized power in Gaza, ousting the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. In 2009, the controversial Benjamin Netanyahu started his nearly continuous 15-year stretch as Israel’s prime minister and soon discovered the utility of supporting Hamas as a political foil to block the two-state solution he so abhorred.

Not surprisingly then, the day after last year’s tragic October 7 Hamas attack, theTimes of Israel published this headline: “For Years Netanyahu Propped Up Hamas. Now It’s Blown Up in Our Faces.” In her lead piece, senior political correspondent Tal Schneider reported: “For years, the various governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu took an approach that divided power between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank — bringing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to his knees while making moves that propped up the Hamas terror group.”

On October 18, with the Israeli bombing of Gaza already inflicting severe casualties on Palestinian civilians, President Biden flew to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Netanyahu that would prove eerily reminiscent of Trump’s Helsinki press conference with Putin. After Netanyahu praised the president for drawing “a clear line between the forces of civilization and the forces of barbarism,” Biden endorsed that Manichean view by condemning Hamas for “evils and atrocities that make ISIS look somewhat more rational” and promised to provide the weaponry Israel needed “as they respond to these attacks.” Biden said nothing about Netanyahu’s previous arm’s length alliance with Hamas or the two-state solution. Instead, the Biden White House began vetoing ceasefire proposals at the U.N. while air-freighting, among other weaponry, 15,000 bombs to Israel, including the behemoth 2,000-pound “bunker busters” that were soon flattening Gaza’s high-rise buildings with increasingly heavy civilian casualties.

After five months of arms shipments to Israel, three U.N. ceasefire vetoes, and nothing to stop Netanyahu’s plan for an endless occupation of Gaza instead of a two-state solution, Biden has damaged American diplomatic leadership in the Middle East and much of the world. In November and again in February, massive crowds calling for peace in Gaza marched in Berlin, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Istanbul, and Dakar, among other places.

Moreover, the relentless rise in civilian deaths well past 30,000 in Gaza, striking numbers of them children, has already weakenedBiden’s domestic support in constituencies that were critical for his win in 2020 — including Arab-Americans in the key swing state of Michigan, African-Americans nationwide, and younger voters more generally. To heal the breach, Biden is now becoming desperate for a negotiated cease-fire. In an inept intertwining of international and domestic politics, the president has given Netanyahu, a natural ally of Donald Trump, the opportunity for an October surprise of more devastation in Gaza that could rip the Democratic coalition apart and thereby increase the chances of a Trump win in November — with fatal consequences for US global power.

Trouble in the Taiwan Strait

While Washington is preoccupied with Gaza and Ukraine, it may also be at the threshold of a serious crisis in the Taiwan Straits. Beijing’s relentless pressure on the island of Taiwan continues unabated. Following the incremental strategy that it’s used since 2014 to secure a half-dozen military bases in the South China Sea, Beijing is moving to slowly strangle Taiwan’s sovereignty. Its breaches of the island’s airspace have increased from 400 in 2020 to 1,700 in 2023. Similarly, Chinese warships have crossed the median line in the Taiwan Straits 300 times since August 2022, effectively erasing it. As commentator Ben Lewis warned, “There soon may be no lines left for China to cross.”

After recognizing Beijing as “the sole legal Government of China” in 1979, Washington agreed to “acknowledge” that Taiwan was part of China. At the same time, however, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, requiring “that the United States maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force… that would jeopardize the security… of the people on Taiwan.”

Such all-American ambiguity seemed manageable until October 2022 when Chinese President Xi Jinping told the 20th Communist Party Congress that “reunification must be realized” and refused “to renounce the use of force” against Taiwan. In a fateful counterpoint, President Biden stated, as recently as September 2022, that the US would defend Taiwan “if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.”

But Beijing could cripple Taiwan several steps short of that “unprecedented attack” by turning those air and sea transgressions into a customs quarantine that would peacefully divert all Taiwan-bound cargo to mainland China. With the island’s major ports at Taipei and Kaohsiung facing the Taiwan Straits, any American warships trying to break that embargo would face a lethal swarm of nuclear submarines, jet aircraft, and ship-killing missiles.

Given the near-certain loss of two or three aircraft carriers, the US Navy would likely back off and Taiwan would be forced to negotiate the terms of its reunification with Beijing. Such a humiliating reversal would send a clear signal that, after 80 years, American dominion over the Pacific had finally ended, inflicting another major blow to US global hegemony.

Washington now finds itself facing three complex global crises, each demanding its undivided attention. Any one of them would challenge the skills of even the most seasoned diplomat. Their simultaneity places the US in the unenviable position of potential reverses in all three at once, even as its politics at home threaten to head into an era of chaos. Playing upon American domestic divisions, the protagonists in Beijing, Moscow, and Tel Aviv are all holding a long hand (or at least a potentially longer one than Washington’s) and hoping to win by default when the US tires of the game. As the incumbent, President Biden must bear the burden of any reversal, with the consequent political damage this November.

Meanwhile, waiting in the wings, Donald Trump may try to escape such foreign entanglements and their political cost by reverting to the Republican Party’s historic isolationism, even as he ensures that the former lone superpower of Planet Earth could come apart at the seams in the wake of election 2024. If so, in such a distinctly quagmire world, American global hegemony would fade with surprising speed, soon becoming little more than a distant memory.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

• About the author: Alfred W. McCoy is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power. His newest book is To Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change (Dispatch Books).
• Source: This article was published by Fair Observer

14. Five decades after his graduation, a legendary general returns to Northeastern as an inductee into the ROTC Hall of Fame

Five decades after his graduation, a legendary general returns to Northeastern as an inductee into the ROTC Hall of Fame

news.northeastern.edu · by Ian Thomsen · March 28, 2024

Published on

March 28, 2024

Major Gen. Salvatore Cambria, who led U.S. Army Special Forces operations around the world, retired in 2012 after a highly decorated career of 36 years.

by

As a U.S. Army Major General, Salvatore Cambria became the first Special Forces officer to lead two regional commands. Photo by Matthew Modoono/Northeastern University

Salvatore Cambria, a retired U.S. Army major general, had not visited Northeastern University since he graduated with a biology degree in 1976.

On Friday, he made his return while receiving an unprecedented honor. Maj. Gen. Cambria was inducted into the United States Army Cadet Command Hall of Fame — the first Northeastern graduate to be so recognized.

Cambria retired in 2012 after a highly decorated career of 36 years.

After serving in the U.S. Army Infantry for five years, Cambria completed the Special Forces Qualification Course as an honor graduate. He spent his last 31 years in uniform as a Special Forces officer at different levels of command.

As the first Special Forces officer to lead two regional commands, Cambria served as commanding general, Special Operations Command South (overseeing South America and Central America) as well as commanding general, Special Operations Command Pacific (covering Asia and the Pacific theaters).

“Special Operations Forces are involved in various types of missions ranging from peacetime to combat, including unconventional warfare, short-duration strikes, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism operations, hostage rescue, civil affairs and foreign humanitarian assistance,” says Cambria, who was responsible for deploying and employing Special Forces (also known as Green Berets) and Special Operations units made up of Navy SEALs, airmen and Marines. “We have highly specialized civil affairs units that work with local governments and civilian aid organizations to rebuild infrastructure — schools, wells, medical clinics and orphanages — and restore stability in areas stricken by war or natural disasters.”

The Special Forces under Cambria’s command were known as Green Berets; SEALs and others under Cambria’s command were known as Special Operations units.

“Whether it’s training a counterterrorism force in a country or getting bad guys or conducting those civil affairs programs — I think these are all tremendous achievements.”

And yet Cambria did not envision a career in the military when he enrolled at Northeastern in 1971 amid the Vietnam War and the nationwide protests it prompted.

“I wanted to be a doctor,” he says.

In his own words, here is Salvatore Cambria’s story.

The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) enabled Cambria to graduate from Northeastern.

“I’m first-generation American. My mom and dad came over on a boat from Sicily right after World War II. I grew up in Roslindale, Massachusetts.

“My dad was a barber. He used to cut hair for a number of players from the Celtics, the Boston Red Sox and the Bruins hockey team. My dad died when I was in high school.

“Pretty close to the end of my first year at Northeastern, my mom said, ‘I’m out of money. I can’t pay for your school. I just don’t have it.’

“What was I going to do? I was talking to a good friend — he was not in ROTC but he knew about it — and he said, ‘Sal, go talk to the ROTC department. They give out scholarships.’

“Do you know what I said? I said, “What is ROTC?” Because I didn’t know. I didn’t grow up in a military family. So I went over to the ROTC department and I ended up getting a scholarship for the last four years.”

Today Northeastern heads Liberty Battalion, an 11-school Army ROTC consortium of 95 cadets, mxost of whom are on scholarship. While ROTC programs were exiled from many college campuses during the Vietnam era, ROTC maintained a presence at Northeastern. “A lot of the alumni are really proud of that,” says Col. Brian Slotnick, who heads Liberty Battalion.

“I remember there were protests. There were a couple of times we were told not to wear uniforms on campus. That went on for a few months at a time. I think there were only 30 to 35 cadets in my graduating class.”

Cambria transitioned from medicine to the military at Northeastern.

“I wanted to be a surgeon because it fascinated me to be able to put your hands inside a human body and to see the immediate results of your actions where eventually that person walks away and is healthy. I thought of that as an amazing challenge that was almost unreal.

“For me, being a member of the U.S. Army Special Forces fascinated me as both an intellectual and a physical challenge. Special Operations is where courage meets precision. These elite Special Forces units operate in the shadows, executing missions with unmatched skill, resilience and dedication.

“There were two to three cadre members at Northeastern who were Green Berets when I was a cadet. Throughout the year they would take us for a weekend of training with a Special Forces unit that was stationed at Fort Devens (in Massachusetts). I had the opportunity to learn a lot about the U.S. Army Special Forces and it became what I wanted to do following my commission to second lieutenant. Their standards are a lot higher than the regular Army because Special Forces is a volunteer organization — you have to apply and volunteer to go to training. And if you do not meet the standards, you will be transferred back to the regular Army.”

He graduated from Northeastern as a distinguished military graduate/distinguished military student and was commissioned on Sept. 16, 1976, in the infantry as a second lieutenant.

“I applied for Special Forces and kept getting turned down. I finally got accepted in my fifth year of service and stayed with Special Forces for the rest of my career.

“One of the biggest things I learned in the military as I was going through the ranks was to take care of your troops and always set the example in everything you do. Because the more rank you get, the more people are looking at you. But as a lieutenant, very few people are looking at you. I know, there are a lot of jokes about lieutenants, but everybody has to start somewhere, right?”

His command helped Colombia develop an enduring security network against an insurgent group known as FARC, the terrorist organization that dominated the nation’s drug trade.

“In Special Operations, virtually everything we do is high risk,” says Cambria, who retired in 2012. “We accept that.” Photo by Matthew Modoono/Northeastern University

“As a colonel, I was selected to command the 7th Special Forces Group, which mainly operated in Latin America, including Central America and the Caribbean.

“We were the first U.S. military unit to deploy to and help the Colombian government under Plan Colombia, a U.S. foreign aid, military aid and diplomatic initiative aimed at combating Colombian drug cartels and left-wing insurgent groups in Colombia. The plan was conceived by the administrations of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and U.S. President Bill Clinton, and signed into U.S. law in 2000.

“The FARC would go to a farm and say, ‘If you grow cocaine for us instead of coffee, we’ll take good care of you … and if you don’t, we’re just going to kill you and your family.’ We went into one village where they wiped out a whole family — women, children — because they refused to grow cocaine.

“This operation continued for many years and Plan Colombia is a success story. Since Plan Colombia began, homicides in Colombia have been cut in half, while kidnappings and terrorist attacks have declined by 90%. As of February 2024, the vast majority of former FARC members have honored the 2016 peace agreement.”

Just before Cambria retired, he was directly involved in the mission to rescue Jessica Buchanan, an American aid worker, and Poul Hagen Thisted, a Danish aid worker, who had been held hostage by Somali pirates for 93 days.

“The pirates were demanding a $45 million ransom for their release. Precise intelligence as to their exact location along with concerns about Buchanan’s rapidly declining health were major factors in moving forward with the rescue mission. Under the cover of darkness, a Special Operations unit parachuted 19 kilometers from where they were being held and moved cross-country to conduct the rescue. Nine pirates were killed during the operation, and Buchanan and Thisted were successfully rescued, unharmed.”

He learned to deal with high-risk missions.

“In Special Operations, virtually everything we do is high risk. We accept that. But we mitigate the effects by developing and implementing numerous controls — actions taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce risk. Approval of Special Operations missions is often dependent on the presence of these controls. Without them, missions may be delayed or canceled altogether.

“I never really thought about the dangerous side of it because I always felt confident with our risk-mitigation procedures. You have to have confidence in your tactics, techniques, equipment and in the leadership. That is the bottom line.”

How did the mentality change after 9/11?

“That is a great question because up until 9/11 we were focused on one thing: the Russians coming across the Fulda Gap. The Fulda Gap offered one of two obvious routes for a hypothetical Soviet tank attack on West Germany from Eastern Europe, especially from East Germany; the other route crossed the North German Plain.

“The concept of a major tank battle along the Fulda Gap became a predominant element of NATO war planning during the Cold War.”

After 5 years in military intelligence and 2 years at a monastery, he’ll graduate from Northeastern as an engineer

“It was all we were focused on. There was little to no focus on counterterrorism. There was no focus on nation-building and getting the militaries of other countries up to a level where they could handle their own problems of terrorism and have effective counterterrorist units.

“But 9/11 changed our myopic focus on the Russians. Everything changed to the better — the tactics, techniques, procedures, training and the organization of units. The mentality of the U.S. military completely changed as we focused on the Global Military Campaign referred to as the Global War on Terrorism.”

Cambria’s goal was to retire after 40 years.

“They called from the Pentagon and said, ‘You’ve done a great job. We don’t have any more jobs for you.’

“I said, ‘Can you send me to Afghanistan for my last year?’

“They said, ‘No, you’ve done enough in 36 years. Time to go home.’

“You’re probably thinking about asking me if I have any regrets. I really don’t have any regrets. I do wish I was still in most of the time because of what’s going on in the world today. Once you’re part of the team and you’ve played in the big games, it’s very hard to sit back and watch the games. You still want to be actively involved.”

Cambria, who had been inducted in 2022 into the Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment Hall of Fame, brought family members, an ROTC classmate and a former aide de camp to the induction ceremony at Northeastern. His 10-person guest list included his wife, Jana, who retired as a senior non-commissioned officer after 35 years in the Army. They have three children.

“You read about people being inducted into a hall of fame, whether it’s sports or military or whatever it may be, and you sit back and say, man, that must be pretty cool. And all of a sudden it hits me. Wow. I’m being inducted into a hall of fame.

“I never expected that. So it’s truly an honor, an unexpected honor. It’s a recognition by an organization that takes the time to say, “You trained with us from day one, you had a great career and now we want to close that chapter of your life by honoring and thanking you for a job well done.” That’s how I look at it.”

Ian Thomsen is a Northeastern Global News reporter. Email him at i.thomsen@northeastern.edu. Follow him on X/Twitter @IanatNU.

news.northeastern.edu · by Ian Thomsen · March 28, 2024

15. Inside Mnuchin’s far-fetched plan to rebuild TikTok from scratch

Seems like he would be buying the name or brand only and then creating a new platform. Perhaps Facebook should buy the name and change its Reels to TikTok.

Or perhaps he and his team can develop a better algorithm and by buying TikTok he will be eliminating the competition. 

Inside Mnuchin’s far-fetched plan to rebuild TikTok from scratch

His proposal to buy the app without its algorithm from its Chinese owner has drawn skeptical reactions, including from those he’s pitched

By Elizabeth Dwoskin and Drew Harwell

March 30, 2024 at 8:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Elizabeth Dwoskin · March 30, 2024

Former treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin is telling rich investors he has a plan to take over TikTok: rebuild the wildly popular video app from scratch.

The investment banker who served under President Trump has told potential backers that he aims to maneuver around two giant obstacles facing those vying for the platform: its estimated price tag of more than $100 billion — far beyond what most suitors, including Mnuchin, could afford — and the Chinese government’s ban of the export of recommendation algorithms, TikTok’s secret sauce.

Mnuchin has indicated that he could overcome those hurdles by offering to buy the app without the export-blocked code, essentially forcing his consortium to remake a service built on billions of lines of code before it could be usable again.

He has told prospective investors that the provision might even let them get TikTok at a discount, according to two people familiar with the pitch who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss it.

Observers, and at least one person familiar with the pitch, have said the idea is so far-fetched that it suggests a lack of familiarity with how tech companies work. TikTok users flocked to the app because of its surprising suggestions for videos they might like to watch, and there’s no guarantee any Mnuchin-driven version could duplicate that success — or beat rivals like Meta and Google, which have worked for years to mirror the experience within their own respective apps, Instagram and YouTube.

“Everyone wants to build a TikTok-level algorithm. That’s a key element of competition in the tech sector right now,” said Matt Perault, a University of North Carolina professor and former Facebook director who studies technology policy.

“All the biggest companies have thrown a lot of money and engineering talent at that issue and have struggled to do it,” Perault said. “If Steve Mnuchin thinks he can do that and succeed where a lot of successful companies have struggled, good luck.”

Mnuchin, a former hedge fund manager and Hollywood producer with no social media experience, has informed potential partners that omitting TikTok’s algorithms would be the key to unlocking control of one of the world’s most popular apps.

But the challenges that Mnuchin would face are massive, beginning with the fact that TikTok is not for sale: Though the House passed a bill calling for the app’s China-based parent company, ByteDance, to divest it or face a nationwide ban, the effort has stalled in the Senate and faces likely resistance in the courts.

As a digital platform, TikTok is reliant on a vast and interlocking network of code, and it’s unclear how Mnuchin would mimic the complex infrastructure that the app uses to reach more than 170 million U.S. accounts.

The divestiture deadline of six months — which would result in a nationwide ban if missed — would force Mnuchin’s team to replicate what TikTok’s research, development and engineering teams have created and refined since the app’s international launch in 2017.

Beyond the algorithm, TikTok offers billions of videos, users, comments and interactions; in-app utilities, like a video editor and live-streaming tool; libraries for background music and visual effects; and systems for advertising, online shopping and flagging rule-breaking content.

“This is like rebuilding Facebook — that’s the task here,” one of the people knowledgeable of Mnuchin’s pitch said. “It can’t be done in 180 days — or even years.”

Mnuchin declined to comment through a spokesman. But on CNBC this month, he offered a general outline of the proposal when he said that TikTok needed to be “rebuilt in the U.S.” and that “there’s a lot that can be done in six months.”

“Hopefully, we can find a solution where China will allow it to be sold,” Mnuchin said. “The Chinese will agree to do that as long as there’s not a transfer of their critical technology, which I don’t think we need in the U.S.”

TikTok and ByteDance declined to comment.

Mnuchin said he has discussed his pitch with an assortment of billionaires and big businesses, including the tech giant Oracle and the former head of the Activision Blizzard video game empire Bobby Kotick, the two people said.

The Wall Street Journal reported this month that Kotick had floated the idea of buying TikTok over dinner with his fellow guests at an elite business conference. Kotick did not respond to requests for comment.

TikTok executives have said ByteDance is 60 percent owned by large international investors, three of whom — Susquehanna International Group, General Atlantic and Coatue Management — are based in the United States and have directors on the company’s five-person board. (The other 40 percent is split between company founder Zhang Yiming and ByteDance’s employees, thousands of whom live in the United States.)

In 2020, Mnuchin led the Trump administration’s attempt to force TikTok’s sale to a revolving group of companies, first to Microsoft, and then to Oracle and Walmart. At the time, Trump was calling for the Mnuchin-led Treasury to be given a cut of any sale’s proceeds.

And as chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a federal group that has negotiated with the company over ways it could address national-security concerns, Mnuchin was afforded access to private and classified information about its inner workings — a fact that has drawn criticism given his renewed interest in a government-assisted takeover attempt.

After leaving the Trump administration in January 2021, Mnuchin formed his private equity firm, Liberty Strategic Capital, with money from sovereign wealth funds in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. If Mnuchin were to bring together a group to purchase TikTok, his own foreign ties could be subject to scrutiny.

Dan Wang, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center who studies Chinese tech and policy, said Mnuchin’s proposal would probably hit a dead end in China, which has shown no interest in consenting to a forced sale and could use its “highly discretionary” political system to block the deal.

China’s export-control list — which the country updated to prohibit the transfer of personalized-recommendation software during the Trump standoff over TikTok in 2020 — relies on the same style of trade regulation that the United States now employs to block sales of computer chips to China. But the Chinese government could also assert that any forced TikTok sale would break its regulations around data control or enact something entirely new, Wang said, adding that “if Beijing wants to do something, it almost always has the discretion to do so.”

Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that the Chinese government would “continue to firmly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises” and that the United States was using “robbers’ logic” to “snatch from others all the good things that they have.”

The Chinese government, Wang said, does not view ByteDance as one of its “proudest creations”: It is not a state-owned enterprise, and its products aren’t cutting-edge reflections of technological growth. “If ByteDance loses a chunk of revenue and hurts its private-market investors, who are mostly American, there's not going to be too much grief in Beijing,” he said.

An American ban of TikTok, he added, would probably be celebrated as a propaganda victory in China, which has argued that Washington is hypocritical in its professions of free speech and enterprise. Mnuchin’s involvement could further that argument.

Imagine “if the highest-ranking minister in China ordered Apple or Tesla to sell the entirety of their operations to a Chinese consortium, and then eventually this minister ended up leading the consortium in the sale,” Wang said. “That would look bad not just in Beijing’s eyes, but in anyone’s eyes.”

Tony Romm contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Elizabeth Dwoskin · March 30, 2024

16. Why the U.S. Economy Is Surging, as China's Stumbles

But as I understand it most Americans do not think the US economy doing well.

Why the U.S. Economy Is Surging, as China's Stumbles

IDEAS

BY JOHN AUSTINMARCH 29, 2024 5:00 AM EDT

John Austin directs the Michigan Economic Center and is a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings Institution.

TIME

“Every so often, a grand thesis captures the world’s imagination,” began an article in the The New Yorker in 2008. “The latest ... is that America’s time of global dominance is finished, and that new powers, such as China, India, and Russia, are poised to take over.” There has been no shortage of optimism about China since, like a 2011 Foreign Affairs headlined the “The Inevitable Superpower” and a 2018 piece from The Economist that “The Chinese century is well under way.” What a difference the past few years have made.

Conventional wisdom that China’s economy would eclipse the U.S. in a decade—maybe even sooner—is looking uncertain. The view that China was the emerging geopolitical power, with developing nations tucked under its wings, is looking similarly shaky. It is now unclear whether China’s GDP will ever surpass the U.S. and nations around the world are rethinking their ties to Beijing and the debt trap that is the Belt and Road Initiative.

Meanwhile, China’s population growth is done. Chinese entrepreneurs are leaving the country. Optimism is dimming among Chinese youth. The Chinese stock market is tanking. Foreign direct investment is in freefall, as global business seeks alternatives to the “world’s factory” that don’t come with the same geopolitical risk, and Big State political meddling. The economic indicators are so bad that Beijing is pulling many of them from public view.

As for the U.S., it is chugging along as the world’s fastest-growing and most dynamic economy. Inflation is down while jobs, real wages, and productivity are going up.

What happened? China is showing the inevitable limits of a state directed economy and society, when political diktats begin to trump open-market economic self-interest. One can’t grow the economy forever under state-controlled enterprise and subsidized infrastructure, EVs, and real estate, particularly while tightening political control over both the masses and your leading entrepreneurs. Just listen to the warning from Chinese businessman Chen Tianyong as to why he was packing up: “China’s economy is like a giant ship heading to the precipice. Without fundamental changes, it’s inevitable that the ship will be wrecked and the passengers will die.”

The genius of China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping was to move the country, beginning almost 50 years ago, from a state-directed economy toward global capitalism. This economic opening allowed China to unleash the talents of hundreds of millions of entrepreneurial people. The results have been staggering: In just a handful of decades China has moved from a relatively poor, rural society to home of the world’s largest middle-class.

Unfortunately, China’s current leader Xi Jinping—heady with the geopolitical influence that economic strength brings—is too focused on concentrating his power. Economic dynamism flourishes with freedom—freedom to think, create, speak, travel, do business with whomever you want—all bound within the rule of law that ensures a fair and open business playing field.

It’s no accident that most of the major technological breakthroughs—from the silicon chip, computers, and smartphones to the internet and AI—come from the U.S. and its democratic allies. The more educated and free a society is to express itself, the more likely it will be a font of the technologies and ideas that transform economies and cultures, as well as likely to keep attracting the best and brightest from around the world to join the innovation party.

That is not to say the U.S. is short of challenges. The Biden Administration must accelerate the push to reinvest in our heartland economies and our people, in order to combat economic inequities that are the root cause of anti-democratic movements here and abroad. These investments at home must be combined with a robust ally-shoring regime that expands our economic integration and production with countries that share our values, in turn strengthening our collective economic and political hand in a global competition against authoritarianism.

Yet the U.S. is not seizing the moment. President Biden is preoccupied with securing his reelection; the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House poses grave risks. What with his overt embrace of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and his de facto one of China’s global leadership role by defaulting on America’s own. Trump is already putting the future of a democratic Ukraine (and possibly other NATO allies) at risk by instructing House Republicans, where an aid package has stalled, they can’t help Ukraine.

Read More: China’s Economic Slump Is Here to Stay

The world’s other rich and democratic nations now face the daunting prospect of having to either “Trumpproof” a Western alliance or pray Biden gets re-elected in November. A prudent course of action for the U.S. President would be to affirm the set of collective economic and political alliances, supply and trade regimes that consolidate and strengthen the U.S. rules-based order.

Taking advantage of Chinese economic missteps, democratic allies also need to supercharge their efforts at rewiring and “recoupling” of critical supply chains out of China and into countries invested and committed to that order.

If done right, ally-shoring can offer all countries a more attractive trade, investment, and development “offer” than that of a diminished China. It will also send a clear message to China that the U.S. and its allies will end dependencies that can be used for political and economic blackmail, as China had hoped.

TIME

17. Stabilizing Haiti: A Guide for Policymakers

A long read with a lot of lessons and advice.

But I will highlight this excerpt (Yes I am showing my bias)

U.S. Special Forces units operating in central Haiti, though, proved the exception.47 As this type of mission is a traditional Special Forces mission, they had few problems quickly integrating with the local population to build local security, often despite the presence of Haitian Armed Forces personnel. In Port-au-Prince, U.S. leaders went to great pains to avoid the perception of choosing sides between groups in conflict. U.S. Special Forces had no such qualms, supporting groups that aligned with the mission objectives and countering those that did not. Despite their success relative to those of their compound-bound colleagues in Port-au-Prince, these units received very little support from higher commanders, and a few team leaders were threatened with relief of duty and court martial for exceeding their authorities and failure to wear the directed protective equipment. The opportunity to build security institutions with public support that did not view extortion of the local population as an inherent right passed, leaving a power vacuum in its wake.

There are some parallels. LTG Fridovich led a battalion in Haiti. As the commander of 1st Special Forces Group and later SOCPAC he was able to do in the Philippines what he was not allowed to do in Haiti.

Vol 7, Iss 2 Spring 2024

https://tnsr.org/2024/03/stabilizing-haiti-a-guide-for-policymakers/

Weak States Caribbean

https://tnsr.org/2024/03/stabilizing-haiti-a-guide-for-policymakers/

- 

Stabilizing Haiti: A Guide for Policymakers

Ian Murray, Chris Bernotavicius

Proposals for a security-focused intervention in Haiti are logical given the rampant instability and endless escalation of gang violence. Many argue that Haiti’s foundational problems of economic underdevelopment, violence, and weak institutions cannot be addressed without improvements in basic security. Previous interventions — always on scales far larger than the currently proposed U.N.-approved mission — have not served Haitian civil society. Instead they have shored up corrupt regimes, and it is far from clear that they have contributed to any stability in Haiti. The country’s challenges are fatalistically ascribed to violence, and the narrative that nothing can be done to improve Haiti’s economic and social conditions until security improves both belies the origin of Haiti’s economic challenges and precludes discussion of economic engagement. Haiti is in chaos, and events are moving quickly. This heightens the need to consider both immediate and longer-term policy responses rather than another security intervention that will repeat the mistakes of the past.

Facebook ShareLinkedin ShareGoogle Plus ShareTwitter ShareMail Share

On Oct. 7, 2022, Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 senior government officials requested the help of international troops to address the ongoing violence and a potential “major humanitarian crisis,” a request Henry made repeatedly afterwards.1 Seven months later, on May 9, 2023, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk repeated a call for a military intervention in Haiti. Specifically, he called for “a time-bound, specialized and human rights-compliant support force, with a comprehensive action plan to assist Haiti’s institutions.2” Since then, U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has called for an intervention numerous times, and the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 2699 to authorize a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti.3 Today, gangs directly control over 80 percent of Haiti’s capital, having completely displaced portions of the police force,4 and may soon control major airports and seaports — complicating any future efforts to deliver aid.

Henry’s resignation on March 12, 2024, in favor of a Presidential Transitional Council — supported by the Caribbean Community (also known as CARICOM) — further complicated a possible deployment when the Kenyan government announced that it would not deploy if Haiti had no functioning government.5 It also had no impact on the gang-led violence, as the planned council rejected the inclusion of any of the gang leaders or former rebel leader Guy Philippe.6

Henry’s repeated calls for an intervention are understandable. With control of the capital lost, the Haitian military have had to assist the police in repelling an attack on the international airport, and gangs have prevented Henry from returning from meetings abroad. The violence has also caused significant economic strife, bringing the country to the brink of collapse. What an intervention will not do is fundamentally change the economic and social prospects of the Haitian people, which will require a very different sort of international engagement.

From a humanitarian perspective, Turk’s and Guterres’ pleas are likewise understandable. However, the type of intervention that the U.N. Security Council has approved for Haiti will not resolve the current security situation or create a path to success for Haiti. There is the challenge of scale — in sharp contrast with the potential deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police officers and up to 4,000 additional unconfirmed forces, previous interventions often involved forces orders of magnitude larger. In 1994, Operation Restore Democracy involved more than 20,000 U.S. troops.7 The 2010 response to the Haitian earthquake involved more than 22,000 personnel.8 While the U.N. mission is often associated with the post-2010 earthquake response, it was established in 2004 in response to political violence, some of which manifested as gang violence, and comprised around 6,700 soldiers as part of a multinational coalition. Notwithstanding the nuance and complexity of the U.N. decision to intervene, it is worth examining the size of the force required as a litmus test for the feasibility of contemporary interventions. Even as recently as 2015, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti was comprised of more than 5,000 military and police personnel.9 It hardly stands to reason, given the continued escalation in gang violence and the aggravating context of political instability, that a small force of police with limited knowledge of the environment and the language would achieve anything other than being swallowed up in the morass of Port-au-Prince’s violent chaos.

To give Haiti a chance at success, the proposed U.N mission and the policymakers behind it need to address the underlying causes of the spike in gang activity in Haiti. Any solution with a reasonable opportunity of success ought to address long-term macro-economic and social conditions on an equal footing with security. However, as long as the United States and the United Nations continue to accept the corrupt and ineffective Haitian government and economic elite by creating a security environment not linked to legitimacy and stability, developing human capital and strong institutions will remain goals prioritized well below those of personal enrichment and power consolidation.

As of March 2024, the United States had committed $300 million to support Kenya’s proposal to lead a police-focused intervention without any commitment of U.S. forces or assets.10 But neither history nor the current facts of the situation give any indication that an intervention is the right path forward. While some see improving the security situation11 as a prerequisite to restoring democracy, improving economic viability, and stemming a migrant crisis, this perspective is backwards. It neglects the economic history of Haiti and sets a course for repeating many past mistakes at the expense of true engagement with Haitian civil society. No intervention will improve the security situation until there is a viable economic future for Haiti. Haiti does not need just another military intervention. It needs an economic and civil-society intervention, only part of which involves security.

The Gangs of Haiti

Imagine the scene. Only blocks from security forces and in the middle of a main street, gang members set ablaze the body of a political opponent of the former president.12 Weeks later, members of the same gang stormed parliament to prevent a vote that would open investigations into politically motivated murders carried out by the gang. Near Cité Soleil — the dense commune in Port-au-Prince that is the epicenter of gangs and violence — a gang member named “Killer” showed off an abdominal wound sustained during a clash with security forces. He stated13 that he planned to fight against the current Haitian leadership. Outside of Jéremie, government-supporting gang members with the support of security forces murdered 27 people, wiping out four families,14 including the torture of children. In Port-au-Prince, large groups of locals tracked down and burned to death dozens of government-aligned gang members responsible for inflicting violence on the community. None of these events took place since the death of President Jovenel Moïse. In fact, some of the incidents date back to the 1960s.

Gangs and criminal groups have played a major role in grassroots politics in Haiti since at least the late 1950s, as both challengers and supporters of government.15 President François Duvalier and President Jean-Claude Duvalier used the Tontons Macoutes — a paramilitary force answering only to the Haitian president — as a counterbalance to the army and to target political dissidents. Over the next three decades, the Macoutes systematically assaulted, tortured, and murdered upwards of 60,00016 people with the tacit approval of the Duvaliers. Similarly, in support of his return to power in 2001 and after, Jean-Bertrand Aristide supported armed groups known as the Chimeres to serve as enforcers to intimidate or eliminate political opponents and to exert control over Cité Soleil17 and other poor neighborhoods. The politically inspired gang violence continued through the removal of Aristide and presidential elections in 2006. However, the U.N. Stabilization Mission’s operations targeting gang leadership resulted in the degradation of the gangs’ abilities to carry out organized activities. This meant that the gangs could only conduct limited turf expansion operations and did not have sufficient numbers to control the local populace.18 Following the 2010 earthquake that damaged the Port-au-Prince prison and allowed thousands of prisoners to escape, the gangs returned to their previous prominence as an enforcement arm of the political class.

The days of supporting a party to secure favor, money, and weapons faded, and the gangs began to use the weapons and resources provided by their benefactors to gain their own power and wealth.

Kidnappings for ransom dramatically increased immediately following the 2010 earthquake and then returned to normal levels. However, the gangs began to transition from machete-toting groups with relatively few firearms to well-armed groups able to confront security forces19. The face of the Haitian gang had begun its transition to its current form. During the 2010–2011 elections, gangs associated with politicians Jude Celestin and Mirlande Manigat clashed in the streets, and gangs aligned with Michel Martelly set up burning tire barricades throughout Port-au-Prince after allegations of government-led voter fraud in favor of Celestin. Over the next 10 years, political leaders increasingly leveraged relationships with criminal organizations for both security and support, but the gangs viewed the relationship with politicians as transactional rather than as a political alignment.20 The days of supporting a party to secure favor, money, and weapons faded, and the gangs began to use the weapons and resources provided by their benefactors to gain their own power and wealth. After the assassination of Moïse21 in 2021, the most powerful gangs exerted their independence, disregarding their former masters.22

Since July 2021, though, gangs in the greater Port-au-Prince region have evolved from small groups exerting control over sections of neighborhoods into large organizations with the ability to directly challenge the state’s supposed monopoly of violence. The G9 gang federation paralyzed fuel imports at the Varreux Terminal23 for nearly two months, and the 400 Mawozo gang effectively seized24 the suburb of Croix-des-Bouquets. Gangs that had previously avoided confrontation with police began ambushing and killing them,25 and gangs engaged in open combat on the Port-au-Prince streets with each other and the police. While gang-related crime had always been a problem, gang activity began to more closely resemble a combat zone.26 The situation went from bad to catastrophic in Port-au-Prince. By March 2024, gangs had gained control of the areas surrounding the main port, the airport, and all routes in and out of Port-au-Prince. Neither the Haitian police nor private security companies can guarantee secure movements through the gang-controlled areas, and the gangs have at least parity with, if not dominance over, the state in terms of the use of violence. G9 leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier’s ability to control gang activity has made him the face of the criminal power and ultimately led to Henry’s resignation. That power used to solely reside with the Haitian elite. The gangs, once the muscle of the political and economic upper class, may have become a praetorian guard.

Previous Security Interventions

The United States is just one of a number of states and international organizations with a long history of intervening in Haiti to attempt to restore security and stability. Previous international interventions succeeded in curbing the gangs’ abilities to dominate the use of force in the capital, but the success was short-lived.

French Revenge for Independence

The first intervention — perhaps better referred to as a punitive action — took place in 1825 when French King Charles X sent 14 warships to Haiti demanding reimbursement for the loss of money and trade that resulted from Haiti’s independence. During the first two decades of its independence, Christophe Henry and Alexandre Petion ruled a divided Haiti. Christophe proclaimed himself king in the north, and Petion presided over the south. Following the overthrow of Napoleon in 1814, King Louis XVIII allowed his emissaries to engage in negotiations regarding a payment to France in exchange for recognition of Haitian independence.27 An indignant Christophe rebuffed such negotiations, but Petion offered $15 million, equal to the price that the United States paid for the Louisiana territory, which the French king rejected.28 In 1825, newly crowned French King Charles X offered to recognize Haiti’s independence for 150 million francs.29 The offer came via Baron de Mackau, who entered Port-au-Prince harbor with a 500-cannon fleet,30 implying that a rejection of the offer would result in war. Jean-Pierre Boyer, the Haitian president at the time, signed the document, agreeing to pay off the sum in five equal payments, even though it was 10 times the annual revenue of the country.31 Unable to make the required payments, the government of Haiti had little choice but to borrow from French banks, the only institutions that would lend to Haiti. The initial 150 million francs debt quickly ballooned, as the banks charged exorbitant fees, and the French government threatened Haitian maritime trade shipments.32 Debt payments accounted for nearly 80 percent of government spending for more than a century following the agreement. To meet those payment requirements, Haiti had no choice but to focus economic development on cash-producing agricultural products and forego attempts at industrialization. The ensuing wealth disparity continued to grow, leaving a much greater percentage of the Haitian population in poverty than other French colonies populated predominantly by former slaves from Africa.33 That first intervention had nothing to do with security or stability. It was purely an extortion play that has had a lasting, devastating economic impact on Haiti and set the stage for the societal and economic conditions that gave rise to security-related instability.

Protecting the U.S. Sphere of Influence

Ninety years later, the United States launched its first intervention in Haiti after four years of turbulence from 1911 to 1915 that saw seven Haitian presidents killed or removed from office. In December of 1914, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the Marine Corps to seize $500,000 from the Haitian National Bank for “safe-keeping” in New York, effectively taking control of the institution.34 Seven months later, following another presidential assassination in Haiti, Wilson ordered the Marine Corps to Haiti, purportedly to prevent a descent into anarchy but really to prevent a potential German invasion.35 Within months, the United States gathered a group of political elites and held an election for a new president. Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave won the vote, but U.S. military leaders in Haiti maintained authority over most decisions.36 The Marine Corps faced significant challenges from locals, termed Cacos, and quickly realized that the 2,200-plus contingent was insufficient in the face of approximately 15,000 Cacos. Out of necessity, the United States created the Haitian Gendarmerie37 as a means to counter local discontent with local authority. The gendarmerie was a force comprised of U.S. and Haitian citizens under the control of the Marine expeditionary force and was later used to censor the press and conscript civilian labor as well as put down Haitian rebellions against the U.S. occupation.38

For the next 50 years, stability in Haiti became synonymous with a state security apparatus that did not allow room for dissent, and the Haitian military that evolved from the Gendarmerie leveraged that foundation in the name of forced stability.

During the 19-year occupation, U.S. forces defeated two Caco uprisings, but it only had two lasting accomplishments:39 the construction of the road from Port-au-Prince to Cap Haitien and improvement of the local hospital in the capital. The limited development that did take place favored U.S. companies40 present on the island at the expense of the average Haitian. The use of forced labor coupled with changes made to the Haitian constitution that benefitted foreign companies at the expense of locals detracted from any possible security gains that could have come from the intervention and the creation of the Haitian Gendarmerie.

The departure of U.S. forces in 1934 left President Stenio Vincent to rule a country that had not resolved its earlier divisions. Vincent, like many Haitian leaders since, turned to authoritarian tendencies41 to maintain control, holding onto power until 1941. For the next 50 years, stability in Haiti became synonymous with a state security apparatus that did not allow room for dissent, and the Haitian military that evolved from the Gendarmerie leveraged that foundation in the name of forced stability.

Operation Uphold Democracy and Its Aftermath

In September 1994, the United States led another military intervention as part of Operation Uphold Democracy with the intent of returning deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Sanctions, a four-year economic embargo, and threats failed to get the military junta led by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras to step down, which led the United States to launch a mission to remove the government by force. Only a last-minute agreement brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter prevented direct conflict. Two days later, U.S. forces and the parallel U.N. peacekeeping effort arrived in Haiti and remained until 1996.42 In exchange for U.S. support, Aristide was forced to sign an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank43 that bound Haiti to structural adjustment policies. The forced opening of domestic markets to foreign trade coupled with the impacts of the previous four years of total embargo turned Haiti into a country completely dependent on foreign food imports and international organizations for its budget. Aristide’s second tenure would be short-lived, as well.

During the U.S. intervention in the mid-1990s, the Haitian military held most of the weapons in the country, and the gangs had little ability or will to directly confront the U.S. forces. Most of the gangs supported the return44 of Aristide, and the intervention allowed that to happen, creating little need for the gangs to engage. In fact, the most resistance came from Haitian military leaders who viewed the intervention as illegitimate. Because the U.S. military met little to no resistance from the populace during the first month, their efforts focused on seizing weapons caches, not on reducing gangs’ influence in neighborhoods.

Additionally, U.S. forces held preconceptions about the dangers of interacting with the local population, including unfounded fears regarding Voodoo and the prevalence of HIV in the population.45 This led forces to remain on their compounds unless directed to conduct an operation. When they did venture out, the soldiers were required to wear a significant amount of protective gear, including helmets and flak jackets, and leaders often appeared to be more focused on the wearing of proper uniform and equipment than on conducting effective missions.46 Without the routine interaction with locals, the occupying forces never gained an understanding of the local environment and left the Haitians to sort out their own problems. When the U.S. forces did act on information regarding weapons caches, they often found that the information came from an individual with a vendetta against the target, using the U.S. military as a tool of competition.

U.S. Special Forces units operating in central Haiti, though, proved the exception.47 As this type of mission is a traditional Special Forces mission, they had few problems quickly integrating with the local population to build local security, often despite the presence of Haitian Armed Forces personnel. In Port-au-Prince, U.S. leaders went to great pains to avoid the perception of choosing sides between groups in conflict. U.S. Special Forces had no such qualms, supporting groups that aligned with the mission objectives and countering those that did not. Despite their success relative to those of their compound-bound colleagues in Port-au-Prince, these units received very little support from higher commanders, and a few team leaders were threatened with relief of duty and court martial for exceeding their authorities and failure to wear the directed protective equipment. The opportunity to build security institutions with public support that did not view extortion of the local population as an inherent right passed, leaving a power vacuum in its wake.

Apart from the U.S. forces’ unwillingness to engage, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Shelton and the first commander of the U.S. mission in Haiti had concerns that failing to support the Haitian military and the local police or confronting them when committing acts of violence against the local population would lead to a collapse of the state security apparatus.48 This fear was confirmed after an interaction in Cap Haitien between a U.S. platoon and a Haitian police commissariat during a protest. Local Haitians were protesting against police abuses, and U.S. forces put themselves between the police station and the protesters. When the Haitian military forces supporting the police appeared and threatened the protesters, U.S. forces opened fire, killing the ten Haitian soldiers present.49 The remaining Haitian Armed Forces and police in Cap Haitien abandoned their duty stations and fled the city that day. U.S. leaders were concerned that such a thing could happen in Port-au-Prince, so they made the decision to not intervene when Haitian soldiers or police violated50 the rights of the population. This crucial decision engendered further disdain for the security institutions and created pockets of armed resistance in Port-au-Prince, initially as a means to protect the neighborhoods from predatory police and military personnel.

By focusing solely on structural economic changes while not addressing the underlying institutional and political problems, the U.S. intervention resulted only in a temporary reduction in violence and no long-term stability.

When the United States withdrew its forces from Haiti in 1995, it transferred command of international forces in Haiti to a small U.N. force of about 6,000 soldiers and police officers to work with the Haitian police and support elections. Political leaders called the mission a rousing success. As planned, Aristide returned to power, assuming his position as the elected president. However, the Clinton administration did not understand the level of failure of the mission, as it did not address the root causes of the instability in Haiti.51 The military junta that deposed Aristide did so with the political backing of many of Haiti’s elites, as they opposed many of the reform policies that Aristide planned to introduce.52 Even after Aristide returned with U.S. support, the opposition quickly set out to undermine any future success. While the intervention did restore a democratically elected leader to power, neither U.S. nor U.N. efforts did anything to address the underlying problems that led to his removal in the first place.

After regaining power, Aristide utilized the Chimere gangs to rally53 and often force support in the Port-au-Prince neighborhoods of Cité Soleil, Bel Air, and Martissant. Initially, this gave Fanmi Lavalas, Aristide’s political party, an advantage in the capital. As opposition to Aristide within the economic and political elite grew, rival gangs received support in the form of weapons and money to encourage or obligate parts of the population to protest against the policies.54 Likewise, the inability of the U.S. intervention to counter the institutional weaknesses in the Haitian military, which Aristide disbanded in 1995, and Haitian police meant that leaders could take advantage of the lack of accountability to sell or provide weapons to interested parties. This allowed for the rise of Philippe and his supporters,55 who eventually deposed Aristide for a second time, as they were able to acquire sufficient quantities of arms to challenge the security forces loyal to the regime. By focusing solely on structural economic changes while not addressing the underlying institutional and political problems, the U.S. intervention resulted only in a temporary reduction in violence and no long-term stability.

The U.N. Stabilization Mission

Aristide’s second departure followed two years of violence among politically active gangs and between the gangs and security forces. In June of 2004, 8,000 peacekeepers deployed to Haiti as part of the U.N. Stabilization Mission. Over the next six years, it grew to a size of 13,000 by 2010 and then tapered off before the mission ended in 2017.

Despite the presence of Brazilian, Chilean, and Sri Lankan military units, among others, the gangs never disappeared. Their activity levels varied based on support from their benefactors, but the gangs generally avoided direct conflict with U.N. military forces after the first few years of the mission.56 Further, though the U.N. military intervention did have a positive impact on security in relation to gang activity, the Haitian government did little to consolidate those gains. During the first three years of the U.N. Stabilization Mission, which lasted from 2004 to 2017, gangs actively engaged with military peacekeepers and exerted their authority over their territories, as the military component did not conduct large-scale unilateral missions. The December 2006 request of the Haitian government to disarm the gangs and detain their leaders in the Cité Soleil neighborhood of Port-au-Prince singaled a major shift in the fight against insecurity.57 By late 2007, U.N. military personnel had increased operations and suppressed gang activity,58 keeping it contained within their respective territories. During the latter years of the mission, the gangs opted to avoid conflict with the military forces due to the overwhelming firepower and armored vehicles of the U.N. forces.

Even with the advantage of military support and thousands of international police officers, though, the U.N. Stabilization Mission was unable to effectively disrupt the gangs because of their ties to politicians and the weak state institutions. Following the 2010 earthquake until its departure, U.N. anti-gang operations focused on the detention of key gang figures59 or the seizure of weapons caches rather than truly dismantling the gangs, because no mechanism to do so existed. U.N. military forces could arrest suspected gang members when operating in support of the Haitian police, but the Haitian justice system had no means to incorporate evidence produced by the U.N. mission. Politically connected gang members quickly returned to their neighborhoods, and the others languished in prison awaiting due process in a broken system. U.N. plans to clear and hold60 some of the worst neighborhoods while the Haitian government — with U.N. and non-governmental organization support — would provide infrastructure and services failed miserably. The Haitian government struggled to follow through on even the most basic promises of security, clean water, and shelter, and the U.N. forces did not have the will or ability to conduct long-term deployments into the impoverished neighborhoods. The gangs quickly learned to leave the area ahead of the operations and wait out the occupiers. Once the Stabilization Mission forces departed, the gangs were free to resume their activities unmolested. The cycle repeated through the departure of the military forces in 2017. The follow-on U.N. mission in Haiti did include roughly 1,300 police officers, the majority of whom comprised the seven Formed Police Units. However, they had limited ability to assist the Haitian National Police with operations, including the July 2018 riots following an increase in oil prices, due to insufficient transportation and support capabilities. Additionally, the dispersion of the small force made it largely ineffective in terms of providing any scale of response to unrest besides securing U.N. locations in their area of responsibility.61

Gang-related violence typically did not affect the upper echelons of society, as the U.N. forces were able to contain the criminal organizations. Additionally, the political and economic elite focused their efforts on using the gangs to manipulate the poorer population to incite protests when it served their political interests. By using the gangs to mobilize or disrupt votes, the Haitian elites took advantage of a broken election system that the United Nations and major international donors went to great pains to support.

As in previous interventions, the focus was to contain the violence, ostensibly to provide the indigenous security forces the time to develop into a force capable of maintaining security on its own. However, the two missions were not linked in a manner that would ensure that success in one area determined success in the other — or that failures in one necessitated a change in the other. Thus, Haitian and international policymakers cited the reduction in violence that resulted from U.N. military successes as proof that the Haitian police was ready to assume security responsibilities. Despite failures to meet personnel minimums, little to no improvement in the justice system regarding processing criminal cases, and continued protests that delayed Moïse from assuming the presidency on time, Haiti was declared self-sufficient. Within two years of the departure of the military forces from the Stabilization Mission, gang violence had surged once again,62 increasing 60 percent in each of the next two years before exponentially growing in 2021.

Lessons from the Past

The long history of interventions in Haiti paints a bleak picture overall, but the lessons from contemporary interventions send the clearest signal. Haiti has seen an almost unbroken chain of interventions since 1994 — ranging from a few thousand deployed U.N. forces to full U.S.-led stabilization missions of more than 20,000. The Haitian government and international aid community have never been able to consolidate any gains due to weak institutions, lack of economic growth, governments that actively employed gangs and criminal elements in power struggles, and — more than anything — a failure to engage with Haitian civil society.

Haitian National Police Development … or Lack Thereof

Following the departure of the U.N. military mission in 2017, the Haitian National Police became the sole guarantor of security in the country. With approximately 10,000 officers — 3,300 fewer than in October 201963 — the force has a ratio of police to 1,000 citizens of less than half of the minimum prescribed by the United Nations (1.06 vice 2.2).64 The proposed Multinational Security Support Mission would, in theory, greatly increase the quantity of security forces on the ground, but it would still be far fewer than needed. Furthermore, contributing nations have not yet made clear their caveats regarding how their forces could be used, which would have a significant impact on the mission’s effectiveness. Calls for a military intervention tend to portray a scenario of quick wins65 against the gangs that will provide the Haitian police space to increase in size and capability in a short period of time. The previous “successes” often cited by the proponents of this strategy, however, show that they fail to look beyond the short-term effects. While violence may have temporarily subsided, the underlying situation that allowed the gangs to gain strength never changed, and the Haitian police had no greater ability to confront the criminal threat.

As international donors poured more resources and money into police force development, the government’s efforts at undermining such development continued, making the constant influx of support more of a problem than a solution.

Following Aristide’s disbanding of the Haitian Armed Forces in 1995, the police served as the sole security force in Haiti, and Aristide understandably did not trust a robust, well-resourced security force. Thus, in 2006, the Haitian police had fewer than 7,000 officers. U.N. Police Development plans called for a goal of reaching 14,000 officers by 2011 and a potential end strength of 20,000. By 2012, the Haitian National Police still remained below the target goal, with approximately 10,000 officers and the goal of 15,000 by 2016.66 Despite over $300 million67 in direct support from the United States and $150 million68 from Canada,69 plus contributions from France, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, among others, the Haitian National Police has not been able to meet basic end-strength and capability goals in nearly 20 years, including during the 13 years of support from the U.N. Stabilization Mission. Despite an increase of nearly 100 percent of GDP since 2010, the police budget remains a paltry $204.6 million70 (1 percent of GDP), with the United Nations71 and the United States accounting for about one-third of the funding.72 As international donors poured more resources and money into police force development, the government’s efforts at undermining such development continued, making the constant influx of support more of a problem than a solution.73

The evidence of the police force’s inability to rapidly develop and grow, despite support and significant resources from donors, shows that an intervention with the goal of creating space for the institution is doomed to failure. The Haitian police will remain a lackluster performer if officers do not have adequate pay or health insurance to cover injuries sustained74 in the line of duty. Low pay, endemic corruption, and political interference hamper recruiting and retention efforts, and no intervention force will have the ability to change that in a short period of time.

Re-establishing the Social Contract

Compounding the Haitian police’s failure to stop the gang violence, a military intervention would likely create second-order effects that would hamper future government credibility and allow the Haitian government to avoid fulfilling its governance duties. Notwithstanding his March 12 announcement that he would step down from office, Henry has held power since the assassination of Moïse, although much of the population viewed75 his administration as illegitimate. By not immediately holding elections, Henry allowed the security situation to deteriorate to a point where elections were not a viable option. Without new mandates or provisions, the terms of both chambers of the Haitian parliament expired, leaving him to rule by decree. An intervention, which Henry repeatedly demanded, would have cemented his position of power despite his lack of constitutional or electoral legitimacy. His willingness to step down, under significant duress, does not eliminate the severe the risk of continued democratic backsliding76 that is the direct result of the dissolution of all of Haiti’s elected government.

An intervention would almost certainly provide an opportunity for the Haitian government to divert resources away from police force development to other, personally beneficial projects, much as Martelly and Moïse are accused of doing with PetroCaribe funds. Despite the notable increases in the Haitian police budget since 2010, force size only increased by 30 percent at its peak, and its capabilities remain limited. Much like in the education and health77 sectors, the security sector is one in which the government would likely shift responsibility to foreign donors.

To respond effectively to the situation in Haiti, the policymakers in the United States and the United Nations should identify the core economic and social problems and condition political support and aid on the Haitian government and elites providing viable pathways to enduring solutions. The north star to any Haiti policy should be a respect for democratic processes and the ability for Haitian civil society to possess true agency in political decision-making — not the expediency of an ostensibly “stable” regime.

The Haitian economy continues to flounder, going into its fourth consecutive year of contraction.78 One could argue that the economic woes stem from the problems with crime. The reality is that two key linkages tell a very different story. Chronic unemployment and underemployment mean that there are almost no routes to escape poverty. The vast majority of Haitian workers rely on informal employment with little opportunity for financial improvement.79 Consider that 80 percent of the population remains in poverty and youth unemployment has remained at 30 percent or higher since 2004. Interviews with current and former gang members highlight their dependence on gangs or kidnapping rings in order to simply survive, corroborating that unemployment and lack of economic opportunity directly contribute to the security problems.80 This should be no surprise, as unskilled and uneducated youth have historically been prime targets for recruitment by criminal and extremist organizations, and Haiti is no different. The second key linkage is that much of the GDP growth in the past decade can be attributed to the increase in remittances (up to 24 percent of GDP),81 which shows a stagnated economy. Likewise, the failing Haitian educational system undermines the ability of Haitians to change their socio-economic status, as education remains inaccessible to those without significant resources. With the cost of education consuming between 15 and 25 percent of household income,82 fewer than half of Haitian children complete basic primary education,83 which simply continues the vicious cycle — none of which will be ameliorated without significant economic advances.

Above all, Haiti lacks accountability. In 2022, the United States sanctioned Haitian politicians84 associated with the gangs, many of whom, such as Senators Youri Latortue and Josef Lambert, were already suspected of illicit activity. Canada followed suit with a more robust sanction announcement85 that included Martelly, former Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, and Martelly’s brother-in-law Charles “Kiko” Saint-Remy. However, none of the Haitian politicians, family members, or wealthy businesspeople have faced prosecution in Haiti, the United States, or Canada despite the mounting evidence of their theft of state funds.86 Holding political and economic elites accountable, confiscating funds and property, and canceling visa and resident status for crimes committed in Haiti would prevent them from waiting out political turbulence in the United States or Canada in luxury homes.87

The Convergence of Security and Economics

Many arguments regarding88 Haiti rest on the idea that establishing security is the prerequisite to any sort of economic or social development. Yes, insecurity directly shapes every facet of life for the vast majority of Haitians, and the recent events have had an impact on the economic and political elite at unprecedented levels. Extreme levels of insecurity clearly undermine any possible economic and social development opportunities. This serves as a perennial multi-tool for rebutting any variety of arguments89 that challenge the utility of a security-focused intervention or security sector-focused aid. However strong or convincing these arguments might be, so the logic goes, it is simply unavoidable that a vast improvement in the security situation remains the primary precondition for development. But there is ample reason to suggest that Haiti’s economy would not thrive even with greatly improved security conditions. Many structural factors — such as trade imbalances, the high cost of servicing sovereign debt, the collapse of many export sectors following the 1991 trade embargo — provide greater impediments to economic growth. They are all also potential focus points for a foreign policy strategy that does not hinge on an intervention and or neglect the participation and equities of Haitian civil society.90

With continued degradation of the security environment, some type of support to security forces would need to be part of the plan — however, it should be in the context of implementing economic and political reforms as the primary effort.

Fatalism often91 seems to pervade a discussion of economic growth in Haiti, seeing it as an immutable condition of a small Caribbean island prone to natural disasters. This neglects the history of the Haitian economy and the fact that the other small Caribbean economies, even ones deemed at more risk of natural disasters, have shown promising growth. Fatalism encourages a fixation on security aid or intervention rather than engagement on issues that restrain foreign direct investment and economic growth. But these economic and policy issues represent an alternative approach that could encompass diversifying Haiti’s export industries, attracting greater foreign direct investment, and reforming Haiti’s regulatory structure to promote international business. With continued degradation of the security environment, some type of support to security forces would need to be part of the plan — however, it should be in the context of implementing economic and political reforms as the primary effort.

A Sabotaged Economy

Much focus is rightly given to the long-term impacts to the Haitian economy that derive from the appalling indemnity92 that Haiti was forced to pay France to secure its independence. Haiti continued to pay the debt, the equivalent of $21 billion dollars93 in today’s terms, for over 122 years, crippling its ability to prosper. This is not the only structural obstacle that other state actors have levied on Haiti throughout the years. Following the U.S. occupation of Haiti in 1934, Washington continued to control Haitian finances for another 13 years, servicing U.S. and French debt that accounted for 40 percent of Haitian national income.94 And, of course, former President Bill Clinton apologized in 201095 for tariff policies that benefited American farmers but also destroyed Haitian rice cultivation as subsidized American rice flooded the Haitian market.96 Perhaps just as impactful in the contemporary consideration of the Haitian economy are the less-often discussed impacts of the 1993 embargoes that the United Nations imposed following the coup d’état that ousted Aristide. Often viewed as a transitory action necessary to restore democracy, the real result was the collapse of many Haitian export sectors, something that defines the discussion of Haiti’s economy today.

Haiti once made97 90 percent of all baseballs used worldwide — today, it exports none. Likewise, coffee once constituted a $46 million98 export to the United States for Haiti but is nearly nonexistent as an export commodity now. The reason is straightforward and was examined in a recent U.S. International Trade Commission report99 on the Haitian economy. Following the removal of Aristide from the presidency on Sept. 29, 1991, the United States initiated a series of trade embargoes that escalated by 1993 to include a near total oil embargo. The result was to crush most Haitian export industries. As the report notes, “Notably, none of the most-exported manufactured goods from before the embargo (other than apparel) appears in the top tier of the NRCA list”. The NRCA refers to normalized revealed comparative advantage and measures relative comparative advantage. Today Haiti’s only significant exports are linked to the apparel sector. The vast majority of inputs into the Haitian economy derive from remittances and foreign aid.

There are, of course, other challenges to expanding Haiti’s export sectors. The same report from the Trade Commission indicates that executives responding to a survey believe that Haitian tax policy does not encourage investment, that a small number of firms dominate most of the economy, and that the poor infrastructure is an impediment to any expansion. Infrastructure is a clear challenge, given that in 2018 the World Bank ranked Haiti 153rd of 160100 countries with respect to a logistics performance index. At the same time, the stark contrast between the pre-embargo Haitian economy and the post-embargo Haitian economy might light a path towards fruitful policy objectives — such as developing infrastructure, reforming Haitian tax and business policies, and expanding export sectors — that are more productive than temporary attempts to quell security threats. The role of security in improving Haiti’s attractiveness to investment and business opportunities cannot be overstated, but it is also insufficient, in and of itself, to generating true economic advances.

The country’s unequal economic policies further undermine efforts to provide aid and even the value of remittances. Though Haiti’s economy is largely dollarized in a de facto sense — international transactions are mostly denominated in dollars — most of the population lacks banking access and therefore is constrained to using Haiti’s national currency, the gourde.101 Aid might be sent to the government in dollars, but employees are often paid in gourde. Likewise, remittances sent in dollars to family members are most often paid out by an intermediary service and in gourde.102 The Haitian government has even taken action to minimize payments in dollars, as it runs low on dollar reserves in light of the continued devaluation of the gourde against the dollar.103 The end result is simple: Foreign aid and remittances might seek to improve daily life, but the majority of Haitians use a currency that has devalued against the dollar and significantly reduced purchasing power.

An Economy in All Our Dreams

The pessimism that pervades discussions of Haiti often leads to generalizations and an inability to see promise.104 Nonetheless, inclusion of Haiti as a priority in the U.S. Global Fragility Act105 provides an avenue for a more holistic approach and, at the same time, trade preference programs such as the HOPE and HELP acts106 have demonstrated the ability of U.S. trade preferences to lead to surges in foreign direct investment.107 Expanding trade preferences, and making them permanent to ensure investor confidence, could represent a path to demonstrate U.S. commitment to a growing economy and a growing trade partner.

Given global competition with China, alongside the global fragility demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is no surprise that American talk of near-shoring companies’ production — with emphasis on Mexico and Central America108 — abounds. It is surprising then to find that the United States is not a significant source of foreign direct investment for Haiti.109 At the same time, the promise exists. For example, CODEVI, one of Haiti’s largest free trade zones,110 is operated by the Dominican “Grupo-M” and serves as one of Haiti’s largest formal employers.111 Haiti’s economy need not be condemned by its poor security situation. Instead, the United States should look to expand trade preference programs, improve tax and business regulation, and apply the philosophy of near-shoring to build a lasting trade partner and mitigate the enormous trade imbalances that serve as a brake on Haiti’s social development.

A Path Forward

The potential intervention approved by the United Nations ignores the most significant lesson learned from the past century of interventions in Haiti: the lesson of scale. In less violent times, the U.N. mission managed with troop levels as low as 6,000, but any attempt to intervene in the context of significant violence has historically required a significantly larger troop footprint — as large as 20,000 or more soldiers, police, and peacekeepers. Even then, troops were often constrained to limited security patrols and fortified garrisons. Nor does a larger intervention provide a real path to success absent a deeper understanding of Haitian politics. The Achilles’ heel of contemporary interventions has been that interventions have habitually failed to connect with civil society and have instead propped up regimes willing to use gangs and extortion to focus on self-enrichment at the expense of long-term security and development.

Haiti needs to take a more ambitious approach to economic development and restoring a participatory democracy, and to begin this approach international actors like the United States and the United Nations need to join it. Long-term improvements in the Haitian economy will not be accomplished simply by restoring security or via a few small reforms. Economic growth based on the export of commodities and low value-added items is always a challenging path and certainly one made more challenging by both the security situation and the history of extraction-based engagement between Haiti and the global economy. Attributing Haiti’s economic challenges to either the 2010 earthquake or the current security situation miscasts history. It ignores Haiti’s colonial experience, the deleterious effects of trade imbalances and debt, and the devastating impact of trade embargoes in the wake of the 1991 coup.

Interventions that perpetuate the current structure of Haitian political leadership will only continue to promote democratic backsliding and preserve self-enriching regimes that do not fundamentally work to improve the long-term prospects for the Haitian people.

A full-spectrum approach to economic aid to Haiti should focus on an approach that leverages the limited successes that exist and make concerted efforts to reduce abject poverty. At the international level, that means continuing efforts to restructure debt and promote free trade. At the bilateral, U.S.-Haitian level, it means conditioning aid on business sector reform and transparency to eliminate unneeded barriers to market entry while making permanent and expanding trade agreements like the HOPE and HELP acts. Efforts like micro-financing and other related small-scale credit initiatives have proven useful in developing countries, but the current de facto dollarization of the Haitian economy and the disparate treatment it engenders for those without banking access is an impediment that should be corrected. No amount of export-driven economics will help when businesses that export products for dollars pay their employees in ever further devalued gourde. International aid donors to the Haitian government — governmental and non-governmental — have a role to play in ensuring that the transfer of aid dollars translates to true wealth and purchasing power for the Haitian people.

Military and security-focused interventions riddle the long and troubled history of one of the poorest and most unstable countries in the world. They have produced no significant improvement for the people of Haiti in more than two centuries. If anything, the history of recent interventions should provide the most somber and realistic perspective; much larger interventions — in much better economic and security conditions — failed to achieve lasting results. Similarly, an intervention that sprints towards establishing elections will be insufficient — holding democratic elections is not an end state in and of itself. Elections will be neither free nor fair when voter turnout is a small fraction of the population and when candidates’ policy positions are neither communicated nor fully developed. The former requires improved security conditions and an engaged civil society. The latter requires serious candidates with both concrete policy proposals and teams prepared to carry them out. Interventions that perpetuate the current structure of Haitian political leadership will only continue to promote democratic backsliding and preserve self-enriching regimes that do not fundamentally work to improve the long-term prospects for the Haitian people.

Powerful gangs are not the root cause of Haiti’s challenges but rather the outcome of problems that preceded today’s security conditions. If anything, current global economic conditions are exacerbating the dire situation in Haiti as the purchasing power of the Haitian gourde continues to fall.112 Given that the Multinational Security Support Mission still has no planned date to arrive in Haiti, change cannot wait for the security situation to stabilize. Even with the support of a security intervention, though, the underlying causes of Haiti’s economic situation necessitate action while a multinational force works with the Haitian National Police to restore security. Security alone will not fix the problem and could reinforce the failed system.

Without significant reforms — of which many will run counter to the interests of the elites who depend on weak institutions to retain power and wealth — a military intervention will produce no sustainable results, adding another chapter to the long book of failed attempts at stabilizing Haiti. The “right” intervention in Haiti will instead involve economic engagement — particularly expansion of free trade regimes, inclusion in near-shoring initiatives, and debt forgiveness — alongside determined initiatives to better link Haitian civil society to institutions and regimes that have structured accountability to the Haitian people.

Ian Murray is an active-duty colonel in the U.S. Army and a regional specialist focusing on Latin America. His writings have appeared in the Foreign Area Officer Journal, and he currently serves as the director of the Americas Studies Program at the U.S. Army War College.

Chris Bernotavicius is an active-duty commander in the U.S. Navy and a regional specialist focusing on Latin America. His writing has appeared in War on the Rocks, West Point’s Modern War Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’s Defense360 site, and other forums.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, or Department of Defense.

Image: Marcello Casal Jr/ABr (CC BY 2.5 DEED) (cropped)

Endnotes

1

Danica Coto, “Haiti’s Leader Requests Foreign Armed Forces to Quell Chaos,” Associated Press, October 10, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-united-nations-port-au-prince-haiti-antony-blinken-057bf6462ca2b00fe667e93b5289d319.

2

“Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief warns against ‘never-ending cycle of violence’,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 9, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/haiti-un-human-rights-chief-warns-against-never-ending-cycle-violence.

3

United Nations, “Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti for Initial Period of One Year, by Vote of 13 in Favour with 2 Abstentions,” SC/15432, October 2, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15432.doc.htm.

4

Evens Sanon and Pierre-Richard Luxama, “Gangs in Haiti try to seize control of main airport in newest attack on key government sites," Associated Press, March 4, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/haiti-violence-prison-break-curfew-105ca137aa337b9e6681cf87add9a5c1.

5

“Kenya Pauses Police Deployment to Haiti after PM’s Resignation," Reuters, March 12, 2024,  https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-pauses-police-deployment-haiti-after-pms-resignation-2024-03-12/.

6

“Haïti - FLASH : 6 entités sur 7 ont remis le nom de leur représentants au Conseil Présidentiel de Transition,” Haiti Libre, March 15, 2024, https://www.haitilibre.com/article-41888-haiti-flash-6-entites-sur-7-ont-remis-le-nom-de-leur-representants-au-conseil-presidentiel-de-transition.html.

7

Danica Coto, “Haiti’s leader requests foreign armed forces to quell chaos,”Associated Press, October 7, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-united-nations-port-au-prince-haiti-antony-blinken-057bf6462ca2b00fe667e93b5289d319.

8

Gary Cecchine, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael A. Wermuth,Timothy Jackson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Matthew Stafford, “The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders,” RAND Arroyo Center, 2013, 41.

9

U.N. Security Council, “Adopting Resolution 2180 (2014), Security Council Approves One-Year Renewal for United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” SC/11599, October 14, 2014, https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11599.doc.htm.

10

“Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47394#:~:text=The%20Administration%20pledged%20%24100%20million,ministers%2C%20and%20several%20gang%20leaders.

11

Rafael Bernal, “Human rights coalition to Biden: No military intervention in Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022, https://thehill.com/latino/3713762-human-rights-coalition-to-biden-no-military-intervention-in-haiti/.

12

Jane Regan, “Haiti: In Bondage to History?”, North American Congress on Latin America, September 25, 2007, https://nacla.org/article/haiti-bondage-history.

13

Peter Beaumont, “Gang violence increases as angry Haitians see quake aid benefiting the wealthy elite,” The Guardian, April 17, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/18/haiti-tension-gang-violence-preval.

14

Jean-Philippe Belleau, “Massacres Perpetrated in the 20th Century in Haiti,” Mass Violence and Resistance, April 2, 2008, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/massacres-perpetrated-20th-century-haiti.html.

15

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Haiti: Evolution of gangs, armed groups and political violence,” October 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti-Timeline.pdf.

16

Onz Chery, “In Haiti, “gangs” reside where caring for community and corruption collide,” The Haitian Times, September 12, 2022, https://haitiantimes.com/2022/09/12/in-haiti-gangs-reside-where-caring-for-community-and-corruption-collide/.

17

Chery, “In Haiti.”

18

Louis-Alexandre Berg, “Crime, Politics and Violence in Post-Earthquake Haiti,” United States Institute for Peace, September 28, 2010, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%2058%20-%20Crime%20Politics%20and%20Violence%20in%20Post-Earthquake%20Haiti.pdf.

19

Chery, “In Haiti.”

20

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an escalating crisis,” October 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti.pdf.

21

Sabrina Tavernise, host, “Why Was Haiti’s President Assassinated?”, The New York Times, The Daily podcast, produced by Daniel Guillemette, Austin Mitchell, Rob Szypko, and Chelsea Daniel, December 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/14/podcasts/the-daily/jovenel-moise-haiti-president-assassination.html?showTranscript=1.

22

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Haiti in 2023: Political abyss and vicious gangs,” Brookings Institution, February 3, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/haiti-in-2023-political-abyss-and-vicious-gangs/.

23

Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Gang blockade cripples Haiti fuel supplies, hospitals prepare to close,” Reuters, September 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/gang-blockade-cripples-haiti-fuel-supplies-hospitals-prepare-close-2022-09-27/.

24

Sergio Saffon, “How a Haiti Suburb Fuelled the Rise of a Formidable Street Gang,” InSight Crime, March 23, 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/how-a-haiti-suburb-fuelled-the-rise-of-a-formidable-street-gang/.

25

“Haiti gang ambushes, kills 3 policemen as violence soars,” Associated Press, April 9, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/haiti-police-killed-gangs-8c6dbbee7a995b37241eb2d564433e0e.

26

Laura Gozzi, “Haiti police riot after crime gangs kill 14 officers,” BBC News, January 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64421308.

27

Marlene Daut, “When France extorted Haiti – the greatest heist in history,” The Conversation, June 30, 2020, https://theconversation.com/when-france-extorted-haiti-the-greatest-heist-in-history-137949.

28

Baron de Vastey, Essai sur les Causes de la Revolution et des Guerres Civile d’Hayti, (De l’Imprimerie Royale, 1819, 234-235, https://books.google.com/books?id=2w8WAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=marrons&f=false.

29

Marlene Daut, “When France extorted Haiti — the greatest heist in history,” The Conversation, June 30, 2020, https://theconversation.com/when-france-extorted-haiti-the-greatest-heist-in-history-137949.

30

Christophe de Chabrol de Crouzol, “Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Hayti by the French Government,” The American Monitor, London, 1825, 2, no. 5, 277. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044094174828&view=1up&seq=284.

31

Anthony Phillips, “Haiti, France and the Independence Debt of 1825,” University of San Francisco, 2008, 4, https://canada-haiti.ca/sites/default/files/Haiti,%20France%20and%20the%20Independence%20Debt%20of%201825_0.pdf.

32

Phillips, “Independence Debt.”

33

Henri Martin, “La consummation des ménages dans la France d’outre-mer: quelles disparités avec la métropole?” Études caribéennes (August-December 2017): 37-38, https://doi.org/10.4000/etudescaribeennes.11323.

34

Office of the Historian, Department of State, “U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34,” accessed March 15, 2024, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti#:~:text=the%20full%20notice.-,U.S.%20Invasion%20and%20Occupation%20of%20Haiti%2C%201915–34,This%20occupation%20continued%20until%201934.

35

Office of the Historian, “Invasion.”

36

James Weldon Johnson, “Self-Determining Haiti.” The Nation, August 28, 1920, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/self-determining-haiti/.

37

Office of the Historian, “Invasion.”

38

Christopher Davis, “History as an Enemy and an Instructor: Lessons Learned from Haiti, 1915–34,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11, no. 1 (Spring 2020), https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_11_1_History%20as%20an%20Enemy%20and%20an%20Instructor_Christopher%20Davis.pdf.

39

Weldon Johnson, “Self-Determining Haiti.”

40

Jeffrey W. Sommers, “The US Power Elite and the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation: Investment, Race, and World Order,” The Journal of Haitian Studies, 21, no. 2 (2015): 46-67, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43741121.

41

Patti M. Marxsen, “Dictatorship and Dissent: Jacque Roumain’s ‘La Tragedie haitienne,’” Journal of Haitian Studies, 23, no. 2 (2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/26431820.

42

United Nations, “Haiti Background,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmihbackgr2.html.

43

Rachael Bunyan, “25 Years After ‘Operation Uphold Democracy,’ Experts Say the Oft-Forgotten U.S. Military Intervention Still Shapes Life in Haiti,” Time, September 20, 2019, https://time.com/5682135/haiti-military-anniversary/.

44

Diego Da Rin, “New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists,” International Crisis Group, July 27, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists.

45

Philippe R. Girard, “Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 24, no. 1, Summer 2004, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/290.

46

Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’: A Concise Histoy of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA528265.pdf.

47

Kretchik, Bauman, and Fishel, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’.”

48

Kretchik, Bauman, and Fishel, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’.”

49

Kretchik, Bauman, and Fishel, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’.”

50

Girard, “Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti.”

51

Girard, “Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti.”

52

Judson Jeffries, “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention,” Caribbean Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2001): 71–94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40654238.

53

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Haiti: Evolution of gangs, armed groups and political violence.”

54

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Haiti: Evolution of gangs, armed groups and political violence.”

55

Kim Ives, “Calling for “Radical Change,” Former Coup Leader Guy Philippe Triumphantly Returns to Haiti,” Haiti Liberte, December 6, 2023, https://haitiliberte.com/calling-for-radical-change-former-coup-leader-guy-philippe-triumphantly-returns-to-haiti/.

56

Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, “Haiti Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince,” September 2008, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr208.pdf.

57

Jan Olaf Hausotter, “The Uses of Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 32, no. 1, Winter 2008, 152.

58

Dziedzic and Perito, “Gangs of Port-au-Prince.”

59

“Haiti — Security: Gang of La Saline dismantled, details of operations,” Haiti Libre, July 16, 2015, https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-14538-haiti-security-gang-of-la-saline-dismantled-details-of-operations.html.

60

Thomas Napoleao and Mariana Kalil, “Stabilization as the securitization of Peacebuilding? The experience of Brazil and MINUSTAH in Haiti,” Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian Studies, 3, no. 2 (March 2015).

61

Namie Di Razza, “Mission in Transition: Planning for the End of UN Peacekeeping in Haiti,” International Peace Institute, December 1, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19644.1.

62

UNICEF, “Rising gang violence in Haiti is now targeting children, UNICEF warns,” April 15, 2021, https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/rising-gang-violence-haiti-now-is-targeting-children-unicef-warns.

63

Antonio Guterres, “Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2022/747, Oct. 10, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2022_747.pdf.

64

Guterres, “Letter.”

65

Rick Barton, “Break Haiti’s death spiral by empowering its police,” The Hill, January 24, 2023, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3827989-break-haitis-death-spiral-by-empowering-its-police/.

66

Michel Forst, Human Rights Council, U.N. General Assembly, “Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst,” A/HRC/22/65, February 7, 2013, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-65_EN.pdf.

67

The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Haiti,” July 13, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/13/fact-sheet-u-s-assistance-to-haiti/.

68

Jacqueline Charles, “As violence in Haiti worsens, Canada bets on assistance to police,” Miami Herald, May 3, 2023.

69

Peter Zimonjic, “Liberal government announces $100M in aid to shore up police forces in Haiti,” Canadian Broadcast Corporation, March 24, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-haiti-funding-gang-violence-1.6789606.

70

U.N. Security Council, “United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti — Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2024/62, January 15, 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s202462-enarruzh.

71

U.N. Development Programme, “Fact Sheet: Haitian National Police Support Programme,” February 2023, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-05/UNDP-HT-FACTSHEET-Police-ENG-032023.pdf.

72

U.N. Development Programme, “Fact Sheet.”

73

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Haiti: The Haitian National Police (Police nationale d'Haïti, PNH), including its effectiveness, reform, and the reliability of reports issued by the police and justices of the peace; whether there is an authority that handles complaints about the police (2010-May 2013),” June 13, 2013, https://www.refworld.org/docid/51dd1d894.html.

74

Murdith Joseph and Juhakenson Blaise, “Haitian police say they’re victims too, demand better support to squash violence,” June 10, 2022, https://haitiantimes.com/2022/06/10/haitian-police-say-theyre-victims-too-demand-better-support-to-squash-violence/.

75

Luke Taylor, “Haiti left with no elected government officials as it spirals towards anarchy, The Guardian, January 10, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/10/haiti-no-elected-officials-anarchy-failed-state.

76

Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2022: Haiti,” accessed March 15, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2022.

77

Maria Abi-Habib, “Why Haiti Still Despairs After $13 Billion in Foreign Aid,” The New York Times, August 16, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/world/haiti-foreign-aid.html.

78

Trading Economics, “Haiti GDP Annual Growth Rate,” accessed October 2023, https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/gdp-growth-annual.

79

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on Haiti’s Economy and Workers,” publication no. 5397, December 2022, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5397.pdf.

80

Jess DiPierro Obert, “Can Haiti’s gangs help build a better future for the country?” The New Humanitarian, February 14, 2022, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/2/14/can-Haiti-gangs-help-build-better-future-country.

81

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Youth Unemployment Rate for Haiti,” accessed October 2023, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSHTI.

82

International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, “Dropping out of school: An unwelcomed trend in Haiti.” October 26, 2020, https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/dropping-out-school-unwelcomed-trend-haiti-13528.

83

theGlobalEconomy.com, “Haiti: Primary school completion rate,” 1997, accessed October 2023 https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Haiti/Primary_school_completion_rate/.

84

U.S. Mission Haiti, Department of State, “StateDept announcement of U.S. sanctions against those involved in the operation of Haitian street gangs and other criminal organizations,” October 14, 2022, https://ht.usembassy.gov/statedept-announcement-of-u-s-sanctions-against-those-involved-in-the-operation-of-haitian-street-gangs-and-other-criminal-organizations/.

85

“Canada sanctions two Haitians over alleged support for armed gangs,” Reuters, January 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-sanctions-two-haitians-over-alleged-corruption-2023-01-13/.

86

U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to Address Corruption,” November 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-C-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.

87

Dan Bilefsky and Catherine Porter, “Who Paid for That Mansion? A Senator or the Haitian People?” The New York Times, July 11, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/10/world/canada/Haiti-Canada-Celestin-corruption.html.

88

Charles T. Call, “Haiti needs a new, improved UN mission,” Brookings Institution, December 2 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/haiti-needs-a-new-improved-un-mission/.

89

Pooja Bhatia, “US-backed foreign intervention has led to the disaster in Haiti,” The Guardian, October 19, 2022, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/oct/19/us-backed-foreign-intervention-disaster-haiti-un.

90

Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 18, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/haiti-betting-montana-accord.

91

Ishaan Tharoor, “Haiti’s fate is intertwined with the U.S.,” The Washington Post, July 8, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/08/haiti-fate-america/.

92

Greg Rosalsky, “’The Greatest Heist In History’”: How Haiti Was Forced To Pay Reparations For Freedom,” NPR, October 5, 2021, https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/10/05/1042518732/-the-greatest-heist-in-history-how-haiti-was-forced-to-pay-reparations-for-freed.

93

Dan Sperling, “In 1825, Haiti Paid France $21 Billion To Preserve Its Independence — Time For France To Pay It Back,” Forbes, December 6, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/12/06/in-1825-haiti-gained-independence-from-france-for-21-billion-its-time-for-france-to-pay-it-back/?sh=66c1e384312b.

94

Rosalsky, “The Greatest Heist.”

95

Tharoor, “Haiti’s fate.”

96

Maura R. O’Connor, Maura R., “Subsidizing Starvation,” Foreign Policy, January 11, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/11/subsidizing-starvation/.

97

Kevin Blackistone, “Baseball has a debt to Haiti, and it’s time the sport repaid it,” The Washington Post, September 22, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/09/22/baseballs-haiti-mlb/.

98

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

99

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

100

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

101

Malick W. Ghachem, “The Real Intervention Haiti Needs,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/haiti-crisis-intervention-gangs-colonialism-france-us-history-monetary-policy/.

102

Timothy Schwartz, “History of Haitian gourde (HTG) to the US dollar (USD), 1912 to 2020,” Schwartz Research Group, August 10, 2020, https://timothyschwartzhaiti.com/history-of-haitian-gourde-htg-to-the-us-dollar-usd-1912-to-2020/.

103

Onz Chery and Samuel Lois, “Haitian gourde rises as regulation of local money exchanges, banks increases,” Haitian Times, October 29, 2020, https://haitiantimes.com/2020/10/29/haitian-gourde-rises-as-regulation-of-local-money-exchanges-banks-increases/.

104

M. R. O'Connor, “One of the most repeated facts about Haiti is a lie,” Vice, October 13, 2016, https://www.vice.com/en/article/43qy9n/one-of-the-most-repeated-facts-about-deforestation-in-haiti-is-a-lie.

105

Susan D. Page, “A Smarter U.S. Assistance Strategy for Haiti,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/report/smarter-us-assistance-strategy-haiti.

106

Karla I. Rios and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47394.

107

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

108

Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer, “Advancing U.S. Nearshoring Priorities in Central America with Special Economic Zones,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 15, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/advancing-us-nearshoring-priorities-central-america-special-economic-zones.

109

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

110

U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S.-Haiti Trade.”

111

Lounelsi Mateo, “Cómo Codevi ha ayudado a reducir la emigración haitiana hacia RD,” Acento, September 14, 2022, https://acento.com.do/economia/como-codevi-ha-ayudado-a-reducir-la-emigracion-haitiana-hacia-rd-9106266.html.

112

Ghachem, “The Real Intervention.”

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com