Quotes of the Day:
“If we really are fighting for freedom and in defense of democracy together, then we have a right to demand help in this difficult turning point. Tanks, aircraft, artillery systems. Freedom should be armed no worse than tyranny,”
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
"Wise men put their trust in ideas and not in circumstances."
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
"He uses statistics as a drunken man uses lamp-posts... for support rather than illumination."
- Andrew Lang (1844-1912).
1. Satellite imagery shows 'unusual' movement of N. Korean ballistic missile submarine: U.S. monitor
2. USFK reveals special ops training following N.K. ICBM launch
3. Belgian envoy voices concern about impact on N. Korea from Ukraine crisis
4. New book provides suggestions to incoming Yoon administration about its N. Korea policy
5. N. Korea calls on party officials to wipe out anti-socialist practices
6. Database formed on human rights abuse in N. Korea's penal facilities: British group
7. S. Korea, U.S. sign military document for war plan update
8. 1st workshop for N. Korean ruling party propaganda officials
9. North Korea not telling the whole truth about latest ICBM test, South Korean official says
10. Debris fell 'like rain' over Pyongyang, says lawmaker
11. Lessons from Reagan administration for Korea's new president
12. Tokyo fancies possible Japan-US-Korea alliance with change of leader in Seoul
13. As it happened: South Korea’s deadly omicron experiment
14. Testing times: why North Korea’s missile launches should worry the west
15. Former President Park Geun-hye, “The dreams that I haven’t achieved are now up to others”
1. Satellite imagery shows 'unusual' movement of N. Korean ballistic missile submarine: U.S. monitor
We should have no doubt the regime is trying to set the conditions for its blackmail diplomacy. It appears. tobe pulling out all the stops to put pressure on us to lift sanctions in return for stopping these provocations.
Satellite imagery shows 'unusual' movement of N. Korean ballistic missile submarine: U.S. monitor | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 30 (Yonhap) -- New satellite imagery of Sinpo South Shipyard has shown "unusual movement" of North Korea's experimental ballistic missile submarine that may indicate a possible submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in the future, a U.S. monitor said Wednesday.
"Satellite image collected on March 22 shows unusual movement of the 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero) experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) within the secure boat basin," Beyond Parallel, a project of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in a report released on its website.
The U.S. monitor said the submarine was seen moved out from the underneath a canopy that usually covers it.
"The exact purpose for moving the submarine is unknown, but it is likely related to ongoing modifications, continued repair work, preparations for an upcoming submarine-launched ballistic missile SLBM test, a component of a strategic deception plan, or a combination of these and other reasons," it said.
"The 8.24 Yongung plays a critical role in the under-way development of SLBMs, ballistic missile submarine technology, and operational procedures. It is also an indispensable tool for the hands-on training of new submariners," it added.
North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last week, marking its first ICBM launch in over four years since November 2017.
Pyongyang had maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since then, but said in January that it may restart all "temporarily suspended activities."
Earlier reports said the North may be repairing underground tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site that Pyongyang purportedly dismantled in 2018, possibly indicating an upcoming resumption of its nuclear tests.
To date, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, with the last one held in September 2017.
bdk@yna.co.kr
2. USFK reveals special ops training following N.K. ICBM launch
This also popped up on my Facebook and Twitter feed this week.
Intentional or not? Is this an example of the influence of what probably was a routine Facebook post. Good initiative by the SOCKOR PAO or just a routine post by the person who makes SOCKOR Facebook posts that gets interpreted by the media? Again, intentional or not? Just a rhetorical question and I do not expect an answer. Just another example of the importance and potential impact of social media.
USFK reveals special ops training following N.K. ICBM launch | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has revealed it conducted a special commando training earlier this month, in an apparent show of America's military might following North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch last week.
In a Facebook post Wednesday, the Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) showed a set of photos depicting commandos engaging in what it termed "special forces readiness training."
SOCKOR did not give the exact date, venue or purpose of the training.
The disclosure of the photos came as Seoul and Washington are seeking to beef up security cooperation in the wake of Pyongyang's ICBM launch last Thursday that ended its yearslong moratorium on nuclear and ICBM testing.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Belgian envoy voices concern about impact on N. Korea from Ukraine crisis
The ambassador is stating what many are thinking.
Excerpt:
Ambassador Francois Bontemps expressed concern that such "rogue states" as North Korea may miscalculate the regional situation and seek to "seize this opportunity to show more power."
(Yonhap Interview) Belgian envoy voices concern about impact on N. Korea from Ukraine crisis | Yonhap News Agency
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, March 30 (Yonhap) -- The top Belgian envoy in Seoul stressed the need for the international community to take stern actions against the Russian invasion, which is feared to send the wrong message to some nations, including North Korea, flexing their military muscles.
Ambassador Francois Bontemps expressed concern that such "rogue states" as North Korea may miscalculate the regional situation and seek to "seize this opportunity to show more power."
"That's why we have to stop that in Ukraine in order not to encourage others to acquire nuclear weapons and to show the force," he said during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at the Belgian Embassy in Seoul on Tuesday.
He accused Pyongyang of having crossed "the red line" with its recent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch amid news reports that the recalcitrant regime may be even preparing for what would be its seventh-known nuclear test.
The veteran diplomat called on China to do more to help stop the Russian aggression and use its influence over North Korea to deter it from taking additional provocative acts.
Having arrived here together with his Korean wife in September last year for his second stint as ambassador to Seoul, he is also placing a focus on public diplomacy to promote his country's image among Koreans and deepen understanding between the two sides.
At that time, he stated that, "With my wife, I am pleased to return, in a spirit of service, to Korea, a country we love, to broaden and deepen the partnership between our two countries."
His role and mission here this time is seen as more important, especially as many Koreans still remember shocking cases of violence involving his predecessor's wife. She came under police investigation into her alleged assaults on South Korean civilians, leading Belgium to recall Bontemps' predecessor.
Although the violent incidents made the Belgium community very "sad" and "upset" like Koreans, Bontemps believes the long friendship between the two nations remains intact. He vowed efforts to bolster their ties, especially in business, technology and academia.
The two nations signed their first Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in 1901, and Belgium sent troops to fight in the 1950-53 Korean War, alongside the U.N. coalition forces.
"We have a solid foundation, and it's also a long standing cooperation," he pointed out. "I think there is a lot to do between Belgium and Korea, still in the framework of the European Union, to foster cooperation in innovation."
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. New book provides suggestions to incoming Yoon administration about its N. Korea policy
I hope this book influences the incoming Yoon administration. I look forward to this being published in English.
In the book, Gwak argues that South Korea should “concentrate on showing Kim Jong Un that having nuclear weapons comes at a loss. [This process] will not only be slow at first, but could also provoke strong opposition from Kim. However, only by riding out the current storm in our entire nation can we open the pathway to liberal democratic unification and peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
...
Gwak points out in the book that the reason the last four years of denuclearization efforts have failed is because South Korean leaders have been unable to properly comprehend Kim Jong Un’s duplicitious tactics during the so-called “Spring of Peace” in 2018. South Korean leaders remain unable to pull themselves away from the delusions they have of that time and have simply focused on “recreating 2018.”
...
Not only does the book lucidly analyze the aims and intentions of the Kim Jong Un regime, but it also includes important suggestions on North Korea policy for the incoming Yoon administration. As such, the book is useful for North Korea-related policy makers, researchers, and students who want to better understand what direction South Korean policy toward North Korea should go.
New book provides suggestions to incoming Yoon administration about its N. Korea policy
The cover of the new book, courtesy of the author.
North Korea’s “nuclear clock” has been set back to 2017. North Korean authorities crossed the “red line” by launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile, claimed by North Korea to be the “Hwasong-17,” on Mar. 24.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been praising the hard work of the engineers and scientists in the country’s defense industry who contributed to the ICBM launch.
Kim recently remarked, as quoted by KCNA on Mar. 28, that, “We will continue to reach our national defense construction goals, and develop more powerful means of attack to better equip our military.”
This was essentially a declaration that North Korea would not only accelerate its development of nuclear weapons down the line, but also move forward with their deployment into the field as quickly as possible.
The CEO of One Korea, Kwak Gil-sub, who is also a former senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy’s Center for Research on the North Korean Regime, recently emphasized in his new book, “Beyond North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Division” (published by Book Wrap Publications on Mar. 31), that “Now we must deal with a Kim Jong Un who has begun to deploy nuclear weapons and missiles, rather than with a North Korea which had just been developing nuclear weapons.”
In other words, since North Korea is already a nuclear power, South Korea will need to establish a stronger national security stance in preparation for a nuclear war, place more importance on US-ROK cooperation, and strengthen its strategic diplomacy with countries such as the US, China, and Japan.
In the book, Gwak argues that South Korea should “concentrate on showing Kim Jong Un that having nuclear weapons comes at a loss. [This process] will not only be slow at first, but could also provoke strong opposition from Kim. However, only by riding out the current storm in our entire nation can we open the pathway to liberal democratic unification and peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
In fact, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula in 2022 seems almost a deja vu of 2017, when the now outgoing South Korean president, Moon Jae In, began his presidential term.
Gwak points out in the book that the reason the last four years of denuclearization efforts have failed is because South Korean leaders have been unable to properly comprehend Kim Jong Un’s duplicitious tactics during the so-called “Spring of Peace” in 2018. South Korean leaders remain unable to pull themselves away from the delusions they have of that time and have simply focused on “recreating 2018.”
Gwak’s book covers the entirety of North Korean affairs, including a desirable course forward for South Korea’s North Korea-related policies, the realities of Kim Jong Un and North Korean society, and North Korea’s strategies and tactics toward South Korea, including the nuclear issue.
Not only does the book lucidly analyze the aims and intentions of the Kim Jong Un regime, but it also includes important suggestions on North Korea policy for the incoming Yoon administration. As such, the book is useful for North Korea-related policy makers, researchers, and students who want to better understand what direction South Korean policy toward North Korea should go.
Translated by Jason Mallet
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
5. N. Korea calls on party officials to wipe out anti-socialist practices
Kim can't give the Korean people enough ideology. He thinks they need more.
N. Korea calls on party officials to wipe out anti-socialist practices | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea reiterated calls for the ruling party's propaganda officials to help weed out anti-socialist and non-socialist practices, as it wrapped up a three-day workshop, according to state media Thursday.
The workshop for officials in the information field of the ruling Workers' Party concluded the previous day with a study session on prioritizing ideological work as the "very core of the Party work," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
"The workshop called for regarding it as the general orientation and target of the Party ideological work to model the entire Party and the whole society on the respected Comrade Kim Jong-un's revolutionary idea," it added.
Officials were urged to "concentrate all rabble-rousing forces" on improving peoples' living standards and carry out a "fierce campaign" against anti-socialism and non-socialism.
During the workshop, the North also held a lecture warning officials to stay alert against the "imperialists' moves for ideological and cultural poisoning."
On the first day of the workshop Monday, the North's leader sent a letter to the party officials, urging them to wage a battle in rooting out "evil spirits" of anti-socialism and bring fundamental change to their ideological work.
The workshop appears to be part of the Kim regime's efforts to tighten social discipline and rally internal unity amid growing economic pressure from the fallout of international sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Database formed on human rights abuse in N. Korea's penal facilities: British group
The free world must take a human rights up front approach to north Korea.
Database formed on human rights abuse in N. Korea's penal facilities: British group | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 29 (Yonhap) -- A London-based nonprofit organization has launched a comprehensive database of human rights violations and atrocities involving the North Korean penal system, its website showed Tuesday.
"A vast system of penal facilities extends across North Korea," Korea Future said. "The construction of these facilities -- capable of detaining hundreds of thousands of people suspected or accused of crimes -- has enabled extensive and egregious violations of international law with catastrophic human consequences."
The group says it is committed to advancing accountability for widespread and grave violations of human rights in North Korea.
For the online archive, the North Korean Prison Database, Korea Future said it has conducted 259 detailed in-person interviews with survivors, perpetrators, and witnesses for nine months from March last year.
To date, it added, "We have identified 597 perpetrators linked to 5,181 human rights violations committed against 785 detainees in 148 penal facilities." The cases occurred between 1991 and 2019, according to the group, which is campaigning to accelerate justice and accountability.
It plans to update the database on a quarterly basis and provide international organizations with it if requested.
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. S. Korea, U.S. sign military document for war plan update
The military committee at work. Note that the ROK and the US jointly "co-own" the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. It is not a US command. Therefore the Military Committee is providing the strategic planning guidance to the CFC. Whether CFC is commanded by a US officer or a ROK officer the process (and co-ownership) remains the same. This is why I always write, OPCON transition is a myth. We are only changing commanders of the ROK/US CFC.
Excerpts:
Under the new directive, the allies are expected to incorporate various wartime scenarios into their battle plans, including the North's wartime use of both nuclear and conventional strikes and of its newest weapons systems.
Observers said that the SPD is likely to pave the way for a major change to the current OPLAN 5015 that lays out a series of procedures to handle an all-out war with the North.
OPLAN 5015 is known to focus largely on addressing conventional North Korean attacks -- a reason why calls have surfaced for the South and the U.S. to include the nuclear dimension of the North's threats into its contingency plans.
S. Korea, U.S. sign military document for war plan update | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- The top military officials of South Korea and the United States have signed a document directing the update of joint wartime contingency plans, Seoul officials said Thursday, following North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch last week.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and his U.S. counterpart, Gen. Mark Milley, inked the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) during their talks in Hawaii on Wednesday (local time), according to South Korea's JCS.
The SPD signing is bound to accelerate a previously agreed-upon process to rewrite the allies' wartime operation plans (OPLANs).
In December, Defense Minister Suh Wook and Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin approved the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), a ministerial-level step to determine the broad contours of what updated OPLANs should look like.
The allies' push for the update comes as the current OPLANs based on the 2010 strategic guidance do not reflect progress in the North's push for new weapons, such as ICBMs, refined nuclear arms, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a hypersonic missile.
Under the new directive, the allies are expected to incorporate various wartime scenarios into their battle plans, including the North's wartime use of both nuclear and conventional strikes and of its newest weapons systems.
Observers said that the SPD is likely to pave the way for a major change to the current OPLAN 5015 that lays out a series of procedures to handle an all-out war with the North.
OPLAN 5015 is known to focus largely on addressing conventional North Korean attacks -- a reason why calls have surfaced for the South and the U.S. to include the nuclear dimension of the North's threats into its contingency plans.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. 1st workshop for N. Korean ruling party propaganda officials
I guess this is why north Korea can win the information war. They have "mass."
This must be north Korea conducting their new course on information warfare - strategic influence and information advantage.
1st workshop for N. Korean ruling party propaganda officials | Yonhap News Agency
URL is copied.
1st workshop for N. Korean ruling party propaganda officials
This photo, dated March 30, 2022, and released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, shows officials in the information field of the Workers' Party of Korea taking part in the final day of the first workshop at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang after it opened March 28. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
(END)
North Korea 08:05 March 31, 2022
Copy URL
9. North Korea not telling the whole truth about latest ICBM test, South Korean official says
All warfare (politics and diplomacy or political warfare) is based on deception (Sun Tzu only said warfare).
As I have written perhap Kim is trying to make us fear the Hwasong 17 so he can "give it up" at negotiations when in fact it does not even exist. That would be in keeping with the regime's history of being able to get something for nothing. Another "long con."
Note also the report of the failed missile launch and debris falling over Pyongyang.
Video and photos at the link below.
North Korea not telling the whole truth about latest ICBM test, South Korean official says
Updated 3:52 AM ET, Thu March 31, 2022
Explained: How much damage can North Korea's weapons do? 02:28
The official, who spoke under the condition of anonymity, said South Korean and US analysis of the March 24 launch of what North Korea claimed was a new Hwasong-17 ICBM, was in actual fact the older and slightly smaller Hwasong-15 -- an ICBM last tested by Pyongyang in 2017.
Several missile experts have since reached a similar conclusion, but they caution the significance of last week's successful ICBM launch -- North Korea's first in more than four years -- should not be discounted, pointing out the test still demonstrated a weapon with the theoretical ability to hit all of the continental United States.
The ICBM fired by North Korea last Thursday flew to an altitude of 6,000 kilometers (3,728 miles) and to a distance of 1,080 kilometers (671 miles) with a flight time of 71 minutes before splashing down in waters off Japan's western coast last Thursday, according to Japan's Defense Ministry.
Here's how US missile defense could be fooled by an ICBM 03:44
Japan's Vice Defense Minister Makoto Oniki told reporters shortly afterward that the missile's altitude would suggest it is a "new type of ICBM."
Japanese officials were sticking to that assessment this week, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno saying on Monday that Tokyo judged the missile to be a new type based on flight altitude and other information.
Enter your email to subscribe to the CNN Five Things Newsletter.
You give us five minutes, we’ll give you five things you must know for the day.
Sign Me Up
By subscribing you agree to our
And CNN previously reported that the Pentagon is still assessing to what extent the missile is an improved version of previous launches.
But the South Korean official and missile experts said further close analysis of images in North Korean state media of last week's launch gave two potential clues relating to Pyongyang's alleged subterfuge.
The South Korean official said assessments by Seoul and Washington showed the ICBM launched last week only had two engine nozzles, like Hwasong-15, whereas Hwasong-17 has four.
This picture from North Korean state media, purportedly taken on March 24, shows leader Kim Jong Un walking with North Korean military personnel during the test launch operation of what state media reported was a new type intercontinental ballistic missile.
And video released last Friday by state-run Korean Central Television (KCTV) purporting to show Kim Jong Un guiding the launch reveal the North Korean leader's shadow appearing westward, meaning it was filmed in the morning, but the launch took place in the afternoon, the official said.
Also, it was cloudy in the launch area last Thursday, but the weather in the KCTV video appears to be sunny, the official said.
Analysts say US must still be wary
Several missile experts have also begun to cast doubt on North Korea's claim to have launched a Hwasong-17.
Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said the KCTV video appears to have been made during a failed launch on March 16, in which a North Korean missile exploded soon after liftoff around an altitude of 20 kilometers (12.5 miles).
"North Korea released a video after the March 24 test. We measured the shadows in it, however, and it is clear from the altitude and angle of the sun that the video is from the test on the morning of March 16," Lewis said.
"The video is of the (previous) test that failed. That strongly suggests the other test was something different that they don't want us to see."
Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Pyongyang may have altered the Hwasong-15 -- first tested nearly five years ago -- to make it look like a more powerful missile.
This picture released by North Korean state media on March 25 claims to show the launch of a new intercontinental ballistic missile. South Korea and missile experts dispute its authenticity.
"They claimed that it's the Hwasong-17, which is the new, very large ICBM they inaugurated at a parade in October 2020, but it looks like what they actually did was they put a very light or perhaps no payload on a Hwasong-15, which is the ICBM they first tested in November 2017. And they used that to stage a demonstration," Panda said.
Panda said Pyongyang's apparently inflated claim was aimed at a domestic audience rather than internationally.
"The only thing going well in North Korea right now is the missile program, so perhaps Kim Jong Un plans to use this demonstration to indicate to his own people that they are suffering, the food shortages, the economic difficulties, the lockdown over Covid, that all of this has been worth it, because their national defense capabilities are still advancing," he said.
On Tuesday, South Korean lawmaker Ha Tae-keung told reporters that, according to a military briefing, debris rained down over the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, following the failed March 16 test.
This picture by North Korea's official Korean Central News on March 25 purportedly shows leader Kim Jong Un walking near what state media reported was a new type intercontinental ballistic missile. Experts doubt the claims.
Ha's office confirmed the lawmaker's remarks to CNN on Thursday, adding North Korea may have been prompted to announce the March 24 Hwasong-15 launch as a Hwasong-17 to temper negative opinions in Pyongyang, where citizens witnessed the March 16 failure. North Korea has not acknowledged reports of a failed March 16 test.
Lewis, the nuclear weapons expert, said regardless of which missile was fired last Thursday, the test showed a powerful offensive capability that US defense officials have to be wary of.
"The missile fired on March 24 would have had a range of about 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles), which is certainly within the capability of a Hwasong-15, which can deliver a nuclear weapon anywhere in the United States," Lewis said.
And Matsuno, the Japanese official, said Monday that North Korea's missile program remains a serious threat to the security of Japan, the region and the world.
CNN's Yoonjung Seo and Junko Ogura contributed to this report.
10. Debris fell 'like rain' over Pyongyang, says lawmaker
The regime has no problem putting the Korean people in Pyongyang at risk for a missile test.
Wednesday
March 30, 2022
Debris fell 'like rain' over Pyongyang, says lawmaker
The failed North Korean missile test on March 16 led to a debris shower over the capital city of Pyongyang, according to a conservative lawmaker on Tuesday.
Lawmaker Ha Tae-keung of the conservative People Power Party, who sits on the National Assembly’s defense committee, said that the mid-air explosion of the missile, which was launched from Sunan Airfield near Pyongyang on March 16, sent wreckage “falling like rain” over the capital.
While it is not clear if there were any deaths resulted from the crashing debris, damage did occur, according to Ha.
The revelation by the lawmaker follows information released by U.S. and South Korean military authorities that the missile tested on March 16 was a new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but it only reached an altitude of approximately 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) before exploding.
Ha added that the missile’s low altitude at the time allowed the explosion to be seen from the ground.
The lawmaker added that the North likely tested a modified version of an older ICBM, the Hwasong-15, on March 24 and claimed it as a successful test of the newer and larger Hwasong-17 in order to save face over the failed test eight days earlier.
“Residents of Pyongyang were startled by the incident,” Ha said. “(The North Korean government) hastily fired a Hwasong-15 and claimed it was a Hwasong-17 in their propaganda to prevent adverse public opinion from morphing into regime instability.”
Ha’s assessment of the situation in the North Korean capital in the immediate aftermath of the March 16 test was partially contradicted by the defense committee’s chairman, liberal Democratic Party lawmaker Min Hong-chul, who characterized it as an exaggeration.
“If a missile explodes mid-air, of course debris will fall to the ground,” Min said. “The idea that it ‘fell like rain’ is merely (Ha’s) own personal opinion.”
Min however agreed with Ha’s opinion that the North’s most recent ICBM test was that of a Hwasong-15, not the newer Hwasong-17.
“The missile fired by North Korea on March 24 was a slightly more advanced Hwasong-15, launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL),” Min said. “While the North claimed it was a Hwasong-17, the joint opinion of the United States and South Korea is that it was a Hwasong-15. North Korea is being deceptive.”
Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry said Wednesday that both the United States and South Korea are at a “high-stage of readiness” for “the possibility of additional provocations, such as a seventh nuclear weapons test or another launch of the Hwasong-17 ICBM by North Korea.”
The ministry added it was also reviewing plans for joint allied exercises, which Pyongyang has denounced in the past as preparations for an invasion but Seoul and Washington said are necessary to maintain military readiness.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
11. Lessons from Reagan administration for Korea's new president
Interesting advice for the president-elect.
Perhaps not what you would expect from the headline.
Excerpts:
Finally, Yoon should take a lesson from the political scandal of the Reagan administration, that a "detached presidency" can be as detrimental as an "imperial presidency." The Iran-Contra affairs happened in large part because of the president's lax management and lack of oversight over the conduct of his NSC staff members.
The Yoon administration has promised to prevent presidential power abuse and delegate independence to administrative staff. Yet, presidential vigilance and engagement are also important in preventing abuse of administrative responsibilities.
Though praised as a "great communicator," Reagan failed to be also praised as a "great administrator." In contrast, though Yoon might not display similar communicative talents as Reagan, through striving to enhance administrative leadership, Yoon's presidency could avoid some of the mistakes of the Reagan administration.
One U.S. diplomat evaluated that at the end of the Cold War, Reagan and Gorbachev "didn't always get things right, but on the most critical issues, they finally did." As South Korea faces daunting foreign policy challenges in the new Cold War era, I also hope Korea's new president might not always get things right but will on the most critical issues.
Lessons from Reagan administration for Korea's new president
By Lee Jong-eun
A major political party was left in political disarray after the resignation of its scandal-ridden president. The succeeding president from a different party, who began his term promising accountability at home and moral diplomacy abroad, then faced criticism for a domestic economic recession and perceptions of weaknesses in foreign policy.
As a result, the previous ruling party achieved a political comeback four years later, electing a presidential candidate who advocated the restoration of military strength and pro-business economic growth.
This was a short description of the 1980 U.S. presidential election when Ronald Reagan was elected president. However, the description also applies to the South Korean presidential election held this year. In 2017, when South Korea's President Park Geun-hye was impeached after a political scandal, her conservative political party fractured and faced a serious threat of extinction.
The new president from the opposing party initially enjoyed high approval ratings with promises of political accountability and peaceful engagement with North Korea. Eventually, the Moon administration faced domestic dissatisfaction from soaring real estate prices, economic recession, and stalled progress in diplomacy with North Korea.
The previous ruling party, which renamed itself as the People Power Party, nominated Yoon Suk-yeol, a former prosecutor general, as its presidential candidate for the 2022 election. Yoon ran on a campaign advocating the rule of law, economic liberalization, and an assertive foreign policy toward North Korea and China.
Through his victory, Reagan achieved what U.S. political scientists evaluate as a significant political realignment. The traditional Democrat-leaning voters from the rural and working-class districts voted for the Republican candidate in historic proportion.
Reagan's victory marked the emergence of a new political right in the U.S., which advocated an aggressive anti-communist strategy over a peaceful coexistence ("detente") with the communist bloc.
Though Yoon's victory margin was narrower than Reagan's, Yoon also significantly increased conservative support among young Korean voters who have traditionally voted for more progressive parties.
As a result, Yoon's presidency also offers the possibility of a new brand of the political right in Korea, distinct from past associations with military rule and industrialization.
With such similarities in their political character, what foreign policy lessons could the upcoming Yoon administration learn from the past Reagan administration? There are four lessons.
First, despite his reputation as a Cold War warrior, Reagan was pragmatically selective in areas of foreign policy confrontation. While Reagan increased military pressures on the Soviet Union, he also ended the agricultural embargo and resumed trade with the latter.
Despite his private support for Taiwan, Reagan continued U.S. strategic alignment with communist China and maintained the One China policy of his predecessors. Though Yoon has promised a foreign policy based on strength and principle, the Yoon administration would also be prudent in picking areas of assertiveness and areas of restraint.
Even though the Yoon administration is likely to advocate a stance of "strategic clarity" toward China and North Korea, it should take a lesson from another conservative administration that "strategic clarity" should not equal "strategic rigidity."
Second, Reagan valued personal interactions in international negotiations. Facing difficult U.S.-Japan trade relations, Reagan cultivated a close partnership with Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, ensuring the stability of the bilateral alliance. Despite criticizing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," Reagan was proactive in building personal trust and partnership with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
Yoon should take Reagan's lesson in complementing state-to-state diplomacy with leader-to-leader diplomacy, building personal relations with other leaders within and outside Northeast Asia. While Reagan's hardline strategy might have pressured Soviet leadership to engage in negotiation, Reagan's personal interaction reassured Gorbachev to accept a nuclear agreement.
If the Yoon administration is committed to a strategy of "maximum pressure" against North Korea, Yoon should also prepare for the future when his personal credibility and reassurance would be crucial for the North Korean leadership to eventually accept an agreement.
Third, Reagan displayed an undaunted cheerful, even humorous persona in the face of policy setbacks, which earned him the nickname a "happy warrior." Such personal character was important in projecting an optimistic perception that "It's morning again in America" even during the difficult times of Reagan's presidency.
The Yoon administration will face multiple domestic and international challenges. Realistically, some of Yoon's policies will result in disappointing outcomes, and Korea could encounter challenges beyond the administration's control. In such times, Yoon should take Reagan's lesson that a leader who inspires public confidence is not necessarily one whose policies are always successful. Rather, it is a leader who can display optimism and even humor in times of adversity and inspire others to feel the same.
Finally, Yoon should take a lesson from the political scandal of the Reagan administration, that a "detached presidency" can be as detrimental as an "imperial presidency." The Iran-Contra affairs happened in large part because of the president's lax management and lack of oversight over the conduct of his NSC staff members.
The Yoon administration has promised to prevent presidential power abuse and delegate independence to administrative staff. Yet, presidential vigilance and engagement are also important in preventing abuse of administrative responsibilities.
Though praised as a "great communicator," Reagan failed to be also praised as a "great administrator." In contrast, though Yoon might not display similar communicative talents as Reagan, through striving to enhance administrative leadership, Yoon's presidency could avoid some of the mistakes of the Reagan administration.
One U.S. diplomat evaluated that at the end of the Cold War, Reagan and Gorbachev "didn't always get things right, but on the most critical issues, they finally did." As South Korea faces daunting foreign policy challenges in the new Cold War era, I also hope Korea's new president might not always get things right but will on the most critical issues.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, and East Asian regional security.
12. Tokyo fancies possible Japan-US-Korea alliance with change of leader in Seoul
Wishful thinking?
Tokyo fancies possible Japan-US-Korea alliance with change of leader in Seoul
By Hemant Adlakha
South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol shares three common things with Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida ― conservative leaning, hostility toward North Korea, and a hate-China outlook. This means a possible Fumio-Yoon-Biden security cooperation is already a cause of concern for Beijing.
Not surprisingly, media headlines in China have been calling Yoon South Korea's "Trump." We don't know if Trump will return to the White House in 2024 to haunt the Chinese.
What we do know is the political elite in Beijing is already fearful that the conservative new president-elect of South Korea may take a Trumpian "whole-of-government" anti-China hardline approach toward the "mighty" communist neighbor.
An even bigger concern in Beijing's strategic affairs community is Japan suddenly looking very hopeful of a "pro-Tokyo" government in Seoul under the new right-wing, conservative president. What threatens to upset Beijing's game-plan is if Tokyo and Seoul come together and join Washington to form a U.S.-Japan-South Korea security architecture in East Asia.
President Xi Jinping promptly congratulating Yoon, or Yin Xiyue, on becoming South Korea's new president was a usual diplomatic protocol the People's Republic of China adheres to. Though Xi was hours behind both U.S. President Joe Biden and Kishida in greeting Yoon.
In contrast, notwithstanding Biden's unscheduled phone call to Yoon within five hours of the latter being declared elected, what has raised eyebrows in Beijing is a "long" 15-minute telephone conversation the next day between Kishida and the new South Korean leader. According to a recent Chinese commentary, following the announcement of the March 9 South Korean election result, Japan's newly formed Kishida government has been quite conspicuous in not hiding a big sigh of relief.
"Japan's approach to the matter is to be cautiously 'happy.' 'Happy' because President Moon Jae-in, who is "anti-Japanese" in Japanese public opinion, has stepped down, and the candidate of his party has not been elected," the article stated.
Earlier on, what was observed as rather unusual for Beijing was several "unfriendly" media commentaries popping up within hours of Yoon's victory. Some of the headlines which "greeted" the 61-year old conservative Korean leader include "South Korea's new president may take a hardline stance on China."
"What does one make of the new South Korean leader? How will the situation evolve now in East Asia?" "South Korea elects pro-Washington president ― international capital's one more erroneous step," and "Campaign rhetoric may not hint South Korea's future China policy," etc.
Interestingly, weeks before the South Korean presidential election result was declared, China's Seoul watchers had started drawing up strategies for Beijing to deal with the conservative People Power Party (PPP) ― South Korea's largest opposition party ― and its populist leader, but new to the country's political arena.
Experts in China also broadly agreed on the following points: one, Yoon, the country's top graft buster who was appointed prosecutor-general in 2019 by none other than the outgoing president, is clearly a "pro-U.S., anti-China" leader; two, Yoon advocates an aggressive attitude in many China-related issues, for example, throughout his campaign he severely criticized Moon's promises of the three "No's," ― no additional THAAD deployments, no participation in U.S.-led global missile shields, and no creation of a trilateral military alliance involving Japan; and three, Yoon's rising popularity during the past two-three years has much to do with him exploiting the ruling Democratic Party of Korea's (DPK) "pro-China" stance and playing to the gallery.
Arguably, it is the cultural factor in particular which is instrumental in the rise in anti-China sentiment, especially among young people in South Korea. According to a recent report, the wrong interpretation of Korean history and condescending approach to their culture by China are what has annoyed them, especially the young Koreans.
As in last October, widely influential Stanford University Korea Studies Program director, professor Gi-Wook Shin, had observed that China's claim that Korean heritage such as traditional food (kimchi and samgyetang) and traditional Korean dress (hanbok) ― all have "their roots in China."
Also, in the words of Sejong University professor Lee Moon-ki, "Koreans believe our culture is unique and was never dependent on China, whereas China thinks Korea only has a culture thanks to China."
Furthermore, what is most irritating to most Koreans is the Chinese claim that the ancient Korean kingdom of Gogureyo was part of Chinese history. Apparently, it is this arrogance and patronizing attitude of China which is pushing people in South Korea to shift away from China toward the United States.
To return to what China's analysts and leaders think of Yoon, there are three broad noticeable trends in the official, semi-official, and leftist digital news platforms.
First, in the words of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher Dong Xiaorong, Yoon was voted into power by a large majority of Korean voters in their 20s. On Yoon's foreign policy, while the CASS scholar agreed with several others that Yoon "is pro-U.S.," she did emphasize the president-elect maintained a neutral stance when he said "[I] would never like to be forced to have to choose between China and the United States."
Second, China's well-known and reported to be relatively independent, liberal financial daily Caixin did warn about the newly elected presidents' tough approach toward Beijing.
Third, as was expected, a hardline nationalist, leftist digital news and current affairs platform was least charitable to president-elect Yoon, and said: "Yin Xiyue has just emerged from 'electoral heat,' as his first job, he is duty-bound to report to the White House."
However, referring to the congratulatory message to Yoon by China's foreign ministry which also mentioned "China and South Korea are neighbors who cannot be moved," the hardline leftist website in an almost veiled warning said: We hope Yin Xiyue takes a pragmatic view of China-South Korea relations. [But] if he chooses to restart the THAAD system "frozen" by his predecessor, then the consequences are going to be very serious."
Finally, most analysts and experts in China appear to be willing to give Yoon the benefit of the doubt and expect him not to disturb the Blue House's current status quo position on China.
The president-elect will assume office in May; in these two months, as some Chinese commentators reckon, the new president will do well to set clear his foreign policy priorities, which may include the following: South Korea will not undermine economic cooperation relations with China; Seoul will not restart the deployment of THAAD; South Korea will not touch China's red line on Taiwan; and last but not the least, South Korea will not join Quad+ or any anti-China military alliance in the region.
Let me conclude by citing what professor Lu Chao, director of the Institute of the U.S. and East Asian Studies, Liaoning University, wrote in his recent column just before the South Korean presidential election on March 9: "In the 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, no president has been able to undermine the overall foundation of bilateral relations once taking office. Even if the PPP is in power, it will not make major readjustments in the China-South Korea partnership."
Hemant Adlakha (haidemeng@gmail.com) is professor of Chinese at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He is also vice chairperson and an honorary fellow, the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), Delhi. The views expressed in the above article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.
13. As it happened: South Korea’s deadly omicron experiment
As it happened: South Korea’s deadly omicron experiment
Published : Mar 31, 2022 - 18:32 Updated : Mar 31, 2022 - 18:42
Emergency care team at Seoul Medical Center prepare for a patient’s arrival on March 27. (Yonhap)
South Korea retreated from its pandemic response strategy known as “test, trace, treat” on the premise that with omicron, COVID-19 had transformed into a more flu-like disease. Omicron’s emergence called for a new strategy “attuned to the changes in the characteristics of the virus” and a departure from the earlier ways of handling the pandemic, health officials have said.
The touted promise of a milder virus is fading by the day so far into Korea’s omicron journey. The pandemic situation here has turned grim, with the new variant killing and hospitalizing more people than any of its predecessors.
‘Omicron will set us free’
The omicron plan kicked off nationwide two days after the variant’s share of weekly analyzed cases crossed 50 percent on Jan. 24. With the plan, the country did away with most measures to control the outbreak and manage patients.
Contact tracing came to an end, and the isolation period for people with COVID-19 was cut to seven days after receiving the initial positive test. Eventually, quarantine requirements for close contacts were scrapped. Access to resources like polymerase chain reaction tests became restricted, reserved primarily for people 60 and older.
This policy shift at the dawn of the omicron age was guided by the notion that a surge led by the milder virus could help the country reach the endemic stage.
“This isn’t like delta,” Ministry of Health and Welfare spokesperson Son Young-rae explained during a press briefing on Jan. 26.
“While cases may increase for the time being, I believe that our response system will be able to minimize the damage overall,” he said, urging people to “trust the science that public health authorities provide, and don’t panic over the numbers.”
He said omicron was only one-fifth as deadly as the previously dominant delta variant -- an estimate that was later corrected as half or one-third -- and believed to cause less harm.
Among people younger than 60, omicron’s fatality rate was “nearly zero percent.” All in all, omicron was turning out to be about as fatal as the seasonal flu, he said, although for unvaccinated and older adults, it was a different story.
Still dangerous for some but mild and flu-like for most, omicron warranted “targeted protection of high-risk groups,” he said.
Two months after the plan was implemented, Korea is witnessing some of the highest new infection and death rates worldwide. Son told reporters on March 23 that this was “inevitable.” “It had to happen at one point or another,” he said. He said once the surge is past, however, the country would be rewarded with possible progression toward the goal of normal life.
Dr. Jung Jae-hun, COVID-19 advisor to the prime minister, said in a Facebook post on Jan. 20 that the omicron wave “may be in a way, the final big surge in this pandemic, and a period during which we make a fundamental transition in our society’s response to the pandemic.” In another post, on Feb. 4, he said, “After we can confirm the peak of the wave is past, we can begin to pursue an exit strategy.”
“We’re nearing the final chapter of our journey that has gone on for more than two years,” he said. “I hope together we can get through this crisis that is close to being the last.”
Great Barrington Declaration’s omicron revival
The rationale for the omicron plan is that the intensive social distancing of the delta days is “no longer viable nor cost-efficient,” according to the Health Ministry spokesperson on March 2. And as omicron is milder, doing so would pose little threat to the population.
Similarly, Jeong Eun-kyeong, commissioner of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, said at a March 21 briefing that “as there already has been substantial exposure in the community due to omicron’s high transmissibility, controlling the outbreak with social distancing alone will have significant limits.”
But the focus on social distancing eclipses what health officials should do without having to ask people to stay home and relive the intense isolation of the early pandemic days, according to public health professor Dr. Oh Ju-hwan of Seoul National University.
By using social distancing as a “blanket term” for pandemic control measures, health officials sold people on the idea that we no longer had to sacrifice freedoms to contain the virus, he said. “The narrative that social distancing is the only approach is misleading, and it’s been used as an excuse for authorities to do less of what they ought to be doing.”
With omicron’s rise, first to be abandoned were measures that exact the most administrative burdens, like extensive contact tracing and testing that Korea had prided itself on, he said. While quick to remove the no-cost testing-for-all policy and contact tracing, health officials kept social distancing restrictions, though eased, for the public. The cap on the size of personal gatherings and nighttime curfews for stores are still in effect, though they are anticipated to be removed soon.
(Our World in Data)
Google mobility trends shows movements have been on a decline in Korea after omicron took over as the dominant virus in late January. Visits to retail and recreation facilities especially have fallen considerably compared to when the delta variant was raging across the country in the fall of 2021.
“When cases soar and hospitals fill up, people exercise caution voluntarily,” Oh said. “The mobility trends data demonstrates that the surge we’re seeing now is not in fact attributable to the lack of social distancing, as some officials and experts suggest.”
Although health officials like to emphasize the pains of social distancing, and how they are no longer sustainable, what was glaringly absent were efforts to test and trace cases and grasp the true scale of the outbreak, he said.
Active tracing was also crucial to “monitor variants, as letting the virus run amok in the community gives it more opportunities to evolve,” he said.
Oh said the omicron response strategy of naturally infecting kids, and hybrid infecting adults while shielding only the vulnerable is deja vu of the Great Barrington Declaration from the first year of the pandemic. The declaration argued for focused protection of high-risk populations while letting those not considered to be as at-risk live near-normal lives.
Unlike when the declaration was penned, now there are vaccines and treatments. But evidence is still scarce that natural immunity attained through omicron infection will offer reliable protection against the next variant outbreaks, he said.
“If natural immunity is indeed superior, then contracting a mild disease would be considered a blessing, which it is not,” he said. “The ‘super immunity’ from a combination of vaccination and natural infection is at best an assumption.”
In fact, data pointing to the contrary is emerging. A study published March 17 in the journal Cell said omicron breakthrough infections are “less immunogenic than delta, thus providing reduced protection against reinfection or infection from future variants.” A preprint study posted March 23 said reinfection with the COVID-19 virus “occurs regularly, and can amount to a significant population level.” The absolute burden of reinfections “may become substantial for health systems,” it said.
“Korea is plowing through with the omicron plan at the cost of record deaths and hospitalizations on this assumption that at the end of the wave, protective levels of immunity will be established in the community that will allow us to return to normalcy,” Oh said.
“But if we’re wrong -- and there‘s a high chance we just might be -- then so many people would have died for nothing, they’re not even collateral damage.”
Koreans dying more than ever in omicron wave
Omicron’s impact on fatality trends is clear. Since omicron’s dominance, it took 54 days for the total confirmed COVID-19 deaths in Korea to double, from 6,712 total deaths on Jan. 28 to 13,432 total deaths on March 22.
The one-day high of 469 COVID-19 deaths reached on March 23 -- which translates to about 6 deaths occurring per 1 million people on a seven-day rolling average -- is higher than deaths seen in many other developed economies at the height of their respective omicron waves. The UK’s omicron wave peaked at 4 deaths per 1 million on Jan. 18, and Australia’s at 3 per 1 million on Jan. 29. The high death counts here have occurred as the worst of omicron is likely still to come.
While the official death toll is already staggering, it is important to remember the actual number of deaths can only grow larger, according to Dr. Lee Jong-koo, a former Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention chief.
Lee, who headed the national health protection agency through the H1N1 flu pandemic in 2009, said Korea was “in essence pursuing a natural immunity strategy,” which “has no basis on science and evidence.” “No one has explicitly admitted this, but that seems to be what we are doing, and this is backfiring with terrible consequences,” he said.
More than 350 people in Korea have died each day over the past week. The 8,172 deaths registered in March accounted for about half of the known 16,230 deaths accumulated since the beginning of the pandemic.
(Our World in Data)
“Never had so many people died from an infectious disease in one day,” Lee said.
As the omicron wave overwhelms hospitals, people who would have lived under normal circumstances have been dying from a lack of or delay in access to care, he said. “This is what we call ‘excess’ deaths.”
Statistics Korea noted in its March 14 report that since September last year, monthly deaths “have consistently surpassed” rates observed in the three preceding years.
The increase in extra deaths was particularly stark in older people. At the height of a post-reopening hospital bed crisis in last December, excess mortality rate rose by 18 percent in people ages 65-84 and by 21 percent in those older compared to the three-year average number of deaths from the same month in 2018-2020.
The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, formerly the Korea CDC, reports that more than 95 percent of omicron deaths were occurring in people 60 or older.
The rate at which omicron is killing older people could lead to a fall in the country’s average age by summer, according to infectious disease professor Dr. Kim Woo-joo of Korea University. “It’s like living through a senicidal nightmare,” he said.
Kim said the reduced severity of omicron was offset by its ability to spread and sicken so many people at once.
“Omicron wave’s absolute toll is not being considered in the policy decisions, with the fixture on its decreased virulence relative to delta,” he said. “But fathom this. Even if the possibility of dying from omicron is 10 times lower, if 10 times more people become infected, then ultimately the damages will cancel out whatever benefits of the milder severity.”
In the last decade the winter flu at its worst killed about 720 people a year, according to Statistics Korea data. Kim, who headed the national influenza centers from 1991 to 2001, said the true figure is probably closer to 2,000 to 3,000. Still, in just the two weeks from March 8-21, omicron managed to kill 3,661 people.
As deaths pile up, crematoriums and funeral homes across the country are struggling to keep pace. According to the Health Ministry, in the first two weeks of March an average of 1,100 bodies were cremated each day, which is about 391 higher than the three-year daily average of 719 in the same month in 2018-2020. The unprecedented rise in the deceased awaiting cremation led to the Health Ministry ordering public crematories on March 16 to extend their operating hours.
“From how I see it, nothing justifies 300 to 400 people dying every day with morgues running out of space for bodies. The worst part is we don’t know if this is going to be the last of the virus,” Kim said.
Chief infectious disease specialist Dr. Eom Joong-sik of Gachon University Medical Center, a state-designated COVID-19 hospital near Seoul, said his hospital recently ordered extra morgue refrigerators. “Omicron is by far the worst stage of the pandemic we’ve experienced. With flu comparisons we’re forgetting the rates we’re seeing now is a result of masking, populationwide vaccination, distancing -- something we don’t do with flu.”
Like waves at the beach
Dr. Jerome Kim, the director-general of the International Vaccine Institute, warned against thinking that the omicron wave is the endgame.
“We have to think of this in dynamic, not static -- like the flu -- annual terms. This is more like waves at a beach, one after another,” he said.
“Will the next one be more infectious and a tad more serious? Possibly. Or equally severe? Possibly. Not like the flu. Omicron and its ‘spawn’ BA.2, recombinants and more variants are able to reinfect those who were previously infected and put enough people in the hospital to use up 1,100 ICU beds. Also, not like the flu.”
From countries hit earlier by omicron it is evident that reinfection “within two months is possible, or not uncommon,” he said, which is also unlike the flu. “Europe is resurging after the omicron wave, also not like the flu. An emerging subvariant is taking over from the original omicron. Also not like the flu.”
He said even after the omicron wave recedes, Korea would still be left with a large enough susceptible population to be potentially hurt by another wave within a few months because of the quickly waning immunity and the virus’s tendency to reinfect easily.
“If 25 percent of the Korean population ends up being infected, that still leaves 75 percent to become infected if a variant or subvariant similar to omicron appears, or gets reintroduced from a country that has it three to four months from now,” he said.
“There are people who have been infected more than once, and vaccinated in between. So, while natural infection and vaccination may prevent bad outcomes like death, it may not prevent enough infections, and ICUs could fill up again.”
14. Testing times: why North Korea’s missile launches should worry the west
An equal? Really? Kim will interpret that as success for his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy.
I like Burce Bennett's description: "a non-compliant, unsafe, nuclear experimenter." It is not an equal.
Testing times: why North Korea’s missile launches should worry the west
The recent test of an ICBM is a show of strength by Kim Jong-un and a reminder that he will have to be treated as an equal by the US in future talks
When it comes to North Korean missile launches – and much else about the secretive country – all may not be as it seems. Days after the regime claimed it had successfully tested its biggest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), South Korea said it believed the launch had been faked.
The “monster missile”, the South’s military said, was in fact a Hwasong-15 – a smaller projectile previously tested in 2017, the last time Pyongyang fired missiles potentially capable of striking anywhere on the US mainland.
Even if last week’s launch, accompanied by a slick PR video showing the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, in a black leather jacket and aviator shades, was not of the more powerful Hwasong-17, there is agreement that the weapon flew further and higher than any other in the history of Pyongyang’s missile tests.
The timing is significant, coming as US president Joe Biden’s attention is on the war in Ukraine – a reminder that North Korea’s sanctions-busting development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons is continuing with alarming speed.
Kim Jong-un appears in Hollywood-style film of missile launch on North Korean TV – video
“Pyongyang might have thought it was safe to test more provocative weapons without drawing penalties while Washington and the world are preoccupied with Ukraine,” said Duyeon Kim, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.
“North Korea usually has multiple objectives for every action. It may be gearing up for a tougher US-South Korea alliance after Yoon Suk-yeol’s presidential election victory while pushing ahead with preexisting plans to make hi-tech nuclear weapons as ordered by Kim Jong-un. It might also be aiming to mask any internal weakness through shows of strength before the North Korean people even if it has to be deceptive about them.”
Despite reports that a Hwasong-17 had exploded in midair over Pyongyang in mid-March, reportedly in view of shocked residents of the capital, every significant missile launch is partly intended for Kim’s domestic audience.
Kim Jong-un before the test launch of what was called a ‘monster missile’ on 24 March. Photograph: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP/Getty Images
While the country battles food shortages and attempts to revive cross-border trade with China wrecked by two years of Covid-19 pandemic restrictions, Kim habitually uses weapons tests as an opportunity to demonise the US and reinforce the belief among the country’s 25 million people that their greatest existential threat comes not from economic mismanagement but from the “imperialists” other side of the Pacific.
Above all, the first launch of an ICBM since November 2017 was a reminder to the US that despite years of UN security council sanctions, North Korea is quickly becoming a legitimate nuclear-armed state that Washington will have to treat as an equal if there is to be a return to Trump-era summitry.
Although Biden has shown little interest in meeting Kim, North Korea can point to an increasingly impressive inventory of weapons, from a purported hypersonic missiles and smaller short-range solid-fuel missiles targeting South Korea, as an inducement to talk. In addition, analysts say the North could be planning another nuclear test – its seventh – to claim it has acquired the ability to produce a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on those missiles.
“The offensive arithmetic will be in their favour soon; they may be able to keep up with advances in American defences,” Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said after the recent ICBM test.
The North’s diplomatic calculation is the same now as it was when Kim signed up to a nebulously worded agreement to “denuclearise” the Korean peninsula at his first summit with Trump in June 2018, even though few analysts believed he had any intention of relinquishing his most effective deterrent and most powerful bargaining chip.
Pyongyang’s goal seems to be to strengthen its leverage so it can turn denuclearisation talks into nuclear-reduction talks in exchange for economic aid. “The message of the North Korean readout of [the recent] ICBM launch is clear: North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear arsenal,” said Rachel Minyoung Lee at the Washington-based 38 North programme, which monitors North Korea.
After a four-year hiatus, analysts say the ICBM test could be the opening gambit in a new phase of provocations reminiscent of the “fire and fury” days of 2017.
“A nuclear test is possible,” Hyun-Wook Kim, professor and director-general at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in Seoul, said, amid signs that work is under way to dig a shortcut to a tunnel at Punggye-ri, a nuclear test site the North “detonated” in 2018, weeks before Kim’s first summit with Trump.
“I think North Korea will use this opportunity to continue its military provocations as a way of getting something from both the US and China,” he added.
Duyeon Kim said it was “only a matter of time” before North Korea conducts a nuclear test, provided it stands to gain technologically or politically.
“North Korea has every reason to raise tensions on the peninsula to gain leverage ahead of any future negotiations with Washington and to be accepted by the world as a permanent nuclear power,” she said.
15. Former President Park Geun-hye, “The dreams that I haven’t achieved are now up to others”
Former President Park Geun-hye, “The dreams that I haven’t achieved are now up to others” - OKN
This article was originally posted on Jayu Press and translated by OKN Correspondent.
Former President Park Geun-hye arrived at her residence in Dalseong-gun, Daegu on the afternoon of March 24 and had prepared a statement to the public. President Park said, “I endured [my incarceration] thinking of the day when I would return to Dalseong, the place where I entered politics and the hometown of my heart,” and went on to express, “These past five years was a very unbearable time for me.”
After being discharged from the Samsung Medical Center in Irwon-dong, Seoul at around 8:32 a.m., Park visited the Seoul National Cemetery and visited the graves of the late former President Park Chung-hee and his wife (Park Geun-hye’s parents) and headed straight to her private residence.
Arriving at her residence at around 12:15 p.m., Park issued a statement to the public for about eight minutes. Former President Park said, in front of about 5,000 supporters who gathered in front of her home, “I am so grateful that so many people came out and welcomed me warmly even though I lacked [as the president] and disappointed you all.”
Regarding her decision to set up a private residence in Dalseong-gun, “After the pardon was granted, I was deeply moved by a news article saying that the people of Dalseong stated that they will take care of me to spend the rest of my days comfortably once I got to Dalseong,” and expressed, “I thought to myself how blessed I am.”
“24 years ago, when I came to Dalseong, an unfamiliar place in 1998, it was you who embraced me from the beginning,” Park recalled, “Thanks to your support and encouragement, I was elected to the National Assembly for the first time in the by-election and even became president after four-consecutive terms as your local lawmaker.”
She said, “I’ve been to every corner of Dalseong-gun,” adding, “I’m sure my footprints are imprinted all around in the soils here at Dalseong-gun.”
“I vowed to work hard for the nation and the people as president, but there were many dreams that I have not achieved,” she said. She then emphasized, “I think the dreams I could not achieve are now up to others.”
Shortly after President Park’s remarks, attorney Yoo Young-ha, a close aide to the former president, told reporters, “Dalseong is the place where she first entered politics,” adding a comment on why she chose to live in Dalseong, “(former President Park) always thought of this place like home, so that is why she chose here.”
Regarding if she would meet with President-elect Yoon Seok-youl, he said, “We were informed by the media on President-elect Yoon’s visit, but have not been directly told,” adding, “If we are contacted, it is not up to me to answer, but if (former President) Park decides, I will inform the media.”
While revealing that former President Park’s health condition can be treated as an outpatient, he said he could not answer the outpatient issue at Samsung Medical Center due to it being personal information.
On the same day, President-elect Yoon Seok-youl expressed his inclination to visit President Park at her private residence. He also said that he plans to invite Park to the inauguration ceremony on May 10.
President-elect Yoon was the head of the special prosecutor’s investigation team into Choi Soon-sil during the 2016 impeachment. He was then appointed as chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office that indicted former President Park on corruption charges.
There were also terroristic threats against former President Park this day. A citizen who appears to be a member of the People’s Revolutionary Party (alleged supporters of socialism) threw a soju bottle at the many supporters who gathered [in front of the residence]. The soju bottle fell on the road two meters away from President Park and debris from the bottle shattered a meter away but did not directly hit the former president. After addressing the public for eight minutes, President Park entered her private residence.
The Daegu Metropolitan Police Agency arrested Lee (48), who threw the soju bottle, on the charge of assault. The police plan to investigate the details of the crime.
To read the original article in Korean, please click here.
Author
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
