Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“No man has received from nature the right to give orders to others. Freedom is a gift from heaven, and every individual of the same species has the right to enjoy it as soon as he is in enjoyment of his reason.”

– Denis Diderot

“Either you think – or else others have to think for you and take power from you, pervert and discipline your natural taste, civilize and sterilize you.”

– F. Scott Fitzgerald.

“We all have inner demons to fight. We call these demons fear, hatred, and anger. If you don't conquer them, then a life of 100 years … Is a tragedy. If you do, a life of a single day can be triumphant.

– Yip Man, Dragon: The Bruce Lee Story

1. Mike Waltz Is Losing Support Inside the White House

2. Trump Team Weighs Broader, Higher Tariffs

3. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Concludes Visit to Japan

4. Pentagon chief says US will ensure 'deterrence' across Taiwan Strait

5. Trump says TikTok sale deal to come before Apr 5 deadline

6. Trump administration reveals its plans to Congress to 'abolish' USAID

7. Once an Economy Switches from Rules to Deals, It’s Hard to Go Back

8. A Peter Thiel Protégé Is Leading Trump’s AI Strategy Against China

9. AI Experts Say We’re on the Wrong Path to Achieving Human-Like AI

10. Contributor: The woes of 'attention capitalism' are new, but the cure is ancient

11. Israel’s Heven Drones says its hydrogen-fueled flying robots are a military game-changer

12. The Case for Tariffs

13. Zelensky, Trump and Putin may all have done U-turns on elections in Ukraine

14. Trump’s “Liberation Day” is set to whack America’s economy

15. Is Elon Musk remaking government or breaking it?

16. Hammer & Sickle, Star & Crescent: A Postcolonial Analysis of Salafi-Jihadist Terrorism in the Former Soviet States

17. NSA Warning—Change Your iPhone And Android Message Settings

18. How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage

19. Catastrophic Earthquakes Test Myanmar Junta’s Grip on Power

20. Trump aide says tariffs will raise $6 trillion as White House readies plan

21. Pentagon chief Hegseth says 'warrior' Japan indispensable to deter China

22. Asia Responds to Washington's 'Global War on Trade'

23. Army reconsidering prepositioned stock strategy, 'doubling down' on Indo-Pacific, general says

24. Signal For Secure Comms: Convenience Over Security Without The Record-Keeping

25. The Army wants simple, cheap unmanned tech—here are some options

26. Fighting for our Future: How—and Why—We Brought Wargames to an ROTC Program

27. Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

28. Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force

29. How to Save a Democracy

30. Obscurity by Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

31. The Fighter-Jock Doctrine That Explains Why Trump Is Winning

1. Mike Waltz Is Losing Support Inside the White House

Oh no. Where there are people of power and those who want power, there will always be power struggles. And those who do not feel they have enough power are those such as

"...ideological adversaries are pursuing an internal campaign to remind the president that Waltz wasn’t always aligned with him."

Excerpts:

Even before the most recent episode, Waltz had annoyed many of his colleagues by seeming imperious and expressing views that were out of line with Trump’s agenda, two administration officials said.

“Keeping Waltz is weak and betrays the base that elected President Trump,” Trump’s deputy communications director from his 2024 campaign, Caroline Sunshine, said.

...

But the Signal-chat debacle pierced Trump’s sense of flawless execution. Behind-the-scenes conversations were reminiscent of Trump’s first term, when power struggles within the White House spilled out into the press.

Trump’s anger at Waltz persists, even as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe also appeared to have posted classified information into the Signal thread.

Waltz’s ideological adversaries are pursuing an internal campaign to remind the president that Waltz wasn’t always aligned with him, by pointing out that Waltz opposed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and Syria, supported America’s defense of Ukraine, and worked on national security legislation with then-Rep. Liz Cheney, a House Republican from Wyoming who opposed Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election.

Some administration officials also began circulating clips on Friday of Waltz making particularly critical comments of Trump in the past. One was a 2016 video of Waltz criticizing Trump for not serving in the Vietnam War and urging voters to “stop Trump now.”

“All this has reminded everybody of those facts,” said a senior administration official, “and those were things that were best conveniently forgotten.”

Mike Waltz Is Losing Support Inside the White House

Although Trump decided not to fire his national security adviser over the Signal group chat, Waltz’s position is tenuous, officials say

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/mike-waltz-is-losing-support-inside-the-white-house-2b17459c?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Alexander Ward

, Josh Dawsey

and Meridith McGraw

March 30, 2025 7:41 pm ET

White House national security adviser Mike Waltz (left) has angered President Trump for having a journalist’s number in his phone, according to officials. Photo: Leah Millis/Associated Press

WASHINGTON—President Trump has decided for now not to fire his national security adviser over the revelation that he included a journalist on a group text chat to discuss and execute a military strike, but the damage to Mike Waltz’s reputation has put him on shaky ground in the White House, senior U.S. officials said.

Despite repeated messages of support by Trump, Waltz has lost sway with the president and the backing of senior aides within the White House, officials said, just as the administration struggles to broker peace deals and faces the threat of further war in the Middle East.

For Trump, the officials said, Waltz’s biggest sin wasn’t starting a Signal chat to coordinate strikes on the Houthis in Yemen, or even posting Israel-provided intelligence onto an unclassified network, it was having the Atlantic magazine’s editor in chief Jeffrey Goldberg’s number in his phone and inadvertently adding him to the conversation.

Trump’s anger spilled over into many private discussions last week, including multiple calls with allies in which he unloaded expletives and blamed Waltz for the administration’s first big national-security crisis. On Wednesday, Trump spoke to Vice President JD Vance, White House chief of staff Susie Wiles and personnel chief Sergio Gor about whether Waltz should be dismissed.

But on Thursday, Trump let Waltz know in a one-on-one meeting that the national security adviser would keep his job. Trump decided to give Waltz a reprieve during that discussion, two administration officials said. He didn’t want the media and Democrats to claim a scalp so early in his second administration, according to people close to Trump, as that would admit wrongdoing. One person said that if news of the Signal chat had first appeared in a conservative media outlet such as Breitbart, Waltz would be gone.

But the former George W. Bush administration official and U.S. lawmaker from Florida is still navigating a minefield. Two U.S. officials also said that Waltz has created and hosted multiple other sensitive national-security conversations on Signal with cabinet members, including separate threads on how to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine as well as military operations. They declined to address if any classified information was posted in those chats.

National security adviser Mike Waltz Photo: Pool/Getty Images

Even before the most recent episode, Waltz had annoyed many of his colleagues by seeming imperious and expressing views that were out of line with Trump’s agenda, two administration officials said.

“Keeping Waltz is weak and betrays the base that elected President Trump,” Trump’s deputy communications director from his 2024 campaign, Caroline Sunshine, said.

Trump was also shown polling that Republicans could possibly lose Waltz’s seat in Florida, although Republican officials have expressed confidence in the race.

In response to the criticism, National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said, “The chattering of unnamed sources should be treated with the skepticism of gossip from people lacking the integrity to attach their names.”

“Susie Wiles and the entire staff are firmly behind President Trump when he expressed his confidence in Mike Waltz and the entire national security team,” White House communications director Steven Cheung said.

TRUMP 2.0

An Annotated Analysis of Signal Group Chat With Top Trump Officials

In an interview that aired Sunday on NBC News’s “Meet the Press,” Trump said he didn’t “fire people because of fake news and because of witch hunts.” Early last week, Hughes confirmed that the Signal chats were authentic.

Even as Trump seriously weighed cutting Waltz loose, aides said he was haunted by his first term firing of Mike Flynn, the retired Army lieutenant general who served as his first national security adviser. Flynn had come under pressure from the media and his own team after lying to Vice President Mike Pence about his contacts with Russia, catalyzing a narrative that the novice president led a chaotic and undisciplined administration.

Trump came to regret that decision and has vowed never to repeat it. Two months into his new term, he has bragged about the relative professionalism and efficacy of his current team, enjoying in particular the absence of news stories about careless mistakes.

Rep. Jason Crow (D., Colo.) at a hearing in Washington pertaining to the Signal group chat discussing plans to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen. Photo: Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

But the Signal-chat debacle pierced Trump’s sense of flawless execution. Behind-the-scenes conversations were reminiscent of Trump’s first term, when power struggles within the White House spilled out into the press.

Trump’s anger at Waltz persists, even as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe also appeared to have posted classified information into the Signal thread.

Waltz’s ideological adversaries are pursuing an internal campaign to remind the president that Waltz wasn’t always aligned with him, by pointing out that Waltz opposed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and Syria, supported America’s defense of Ukraine, and worked on national security legislation with then-Rep. Liz Cheney, a House Republican from Wyoming who opposed Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election.

Some administration officials also began circulating clips on Friday of Waltz making particularly critical comments of Trump in the past. One was a 2016 video of Waltz criticizing Trump for not serving in the Vietnam War and urging voters to “stop Trump now.”

“All this has reminded everybody of those facts,” said a senior administration official, “and those were things that were best conveniently forgotten.”

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com, Josh Dawsey at Joshua.Dawsey@WSJ.com and Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com

2. Trump Team Weighs Broader, Higher Tariffs

The Trump tariff tool.

Tariffs are the number one national security, foreign policy, and economic tool for the administration, or so it seems.

Trump Team Weighs Broader, Higher Tariffs

Back on the table ahead of Wednesday’s deadline: an across-the-board hike of up to 20%

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-says-he-couldnt-care-less-if-car-prices-go-up-b9b4a211?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Gavin Bade

, Alex Leary

and Kristina Peterson

Updated March 30, 2025 5:23 pm ET

President Trump has pushed his team to be more aggressive in devising the tariff plan. Photo: Bonnie Cash/Bloomberg News

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is scrambling to determine the specifics of its new tariff agenda ahead of its self-imposed deadline of Wednesday, weighing options as the president has promised to remake the American economy with a swath of new levies.

One key point of debate is whether to impose individualized tariff rates for U.S. trading partners, as President Trump has previewed in recent weeks, or revert to his campaign pledge for an across-the-board tariff that would affect virtually every country doing business with the U.S., say people familiar with the conversations.

Trump spent most of last week playing down expectations for his so-called reciprocal tariff plan on April 2, saying repeatedly that he would be “nicer” than his previous pledges to equalize U.S. tariffs with those charged by other countries, and would consider exempting some countries from tariffs altogether.

But in recent days Trump has pushed his team to be more aggressive, people familiar with the conversations said, encouraging them to devise plans that would apply higher rates of tariffs on a broader set of countries.

Exactly how that will happen remains unclear. In recent days, advisers have considered imposing global tariffs of up to 20% that would hit virtually all U.S. trading partners. Trump and his team for months promoted such a plan on the campaign trail, before the president publicly ditched it in favor of a so-called reciprocal tariff plan that would mean “what they [other nations] charge us, we charge them,” as the president put it.

That reciprocal plan is also still on the table, an administration official said, adding that the president is inclined to tariff every country that the U.S. runs a trade deficit with, and that he wants a “clean number” for each country, though no final decisions have been made.

Whatever the final plan, the official added, the president wants the policy to be “big and simple.” That likely means the final action will be broader than earlier plans to prioritize levying tariffs on the U.S.’s biggest trading partners, about 15% of the world’s nations, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had labeled in media appearances as the “dirty 15.”

In addition to the debate over the reciprocal tariff plan, the president’s team is considering unveiling a slate of new industry-specific tariffs that could hit critical minerals and products that contain them, among other industries, people familiar with the discussions said. It is still unclear if those duties will be unveiled April 2, but they are expected to be included in a trade policy review document that the U.S. trade representative’s office is slated to deliver to Trump on Tuesday, the day before the announcement.

That reciprocal approach had been supported by National Economic Council chair Kevin Hassett as a way to rebalance U.S. trading relationships without dramatically increasing prices on U.S. consumers. But in recent days, the team has also debated the idea of virtually universal tariffs as a way to increase government revenue and offset tax cuts that Republicans are pushing through Congress.

Hassett said Sunday that the tariffs and a tax bill being crafted by congressional Republicans would buoy the U.S. economy.

“I think the naysayers will be proven wrong if they’re a little bit nervous about the blips from this week to next,” he said on Fox News’s “Sunday Morning Futures.”

Trump has publicly played down any concerns about higher prices, telling NBC News on Saturday that he didn’t care if foreign automakers raise their prices for U.S. consumers in response to new tariffs.

“I couldn’t care less, because if the prices on foreign cars go up, they’re going to buy American cars,” Trump said. “I hope they raise their prices, because if they do, people are going to buy American-made cars. We have plenty.”

Automakers can absorb some of the added costs but not all, and they are likely to pass some increases on to consumers. Photo: Brandon Bell/Getty Images

In the NBC interview, the president also disputed that he had instructed U.S. automaker CEOs on a call in early March to not raise prices, which executives have said is inevitable in the face of tariffs. The Wall Street Journal reported last week that Trump had warned executives that the White House would look unfavorably on such a move, leaving some of them rattled and worried that they would face punishment if they increased prices.

“I never said that,” Trump told NBC.

The president’s team is considering imposing reciprocal or universal tariffs using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, according to people with knowledge of the plans. That is the same law that Trump used to levy tariffs on Canada and Mexico over the fentanyl trade—the first time it was used to impose tariffs. Some White House lawyers have cautioned against using it for such broad tariffs as Trump is now considering, saying it could increase the legal risk that the tariffs could be overturned in court.

Democrats are likely to seize on any broader use of the so-called IEEPA tariffs as an abuse of executive authority. They are already planning to force a vote on a resolution, led by Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine, to challenge the president’s use of the law to impose tariffs on Canada. They plan to push for that resolution to come up for a vote on Tuesday, hoping to force Senate Republicans, many of whom are quietly concerned about Trump’s tariffs, to make a difficult decision.

“The IEEPA emergency [authority] is really designed to be used against enemies, bad actors, etc.,” Kaine said in an interview with the Journal. “Congress needs to take this power back. Trade powers are given to Congress in the Constitution.”

New sectoral tariffs, meanwhile, would likely be imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the president to levy tariffs on products deemed essential for national security. That is the provision Trump has used on recent tariffs targeting the automotive and steel sectors.

Americans’ frustration with the cost of living helped send Trump to the White House. Automakers and parts manufacturers can absorb some of the added costs but not all, and they are likely to pass some increases on to consumers. On average, vehicle prices could rise 11% to 12% to offset duties, Morgan Stanley analysts wrote in a recent note.

A representative from one foreign automaker said the industry hasn’t received instruction on how to pay the new tariffs and is still waiting for clarity on what their full impact will be. The representative said automakers have been whipsawed for weeks and that some are telling suppliers and dealers to stay cool, as there will likely be more ups and downs before the extent of the new tariffs is clear.

“We expected change with the new administration, but not this velocity and magnitude,” said Glenn Stevens Jr., executive director of MichAuto, a business group that represents Michigan’s auto sector.

Democrats argued that Trump’s trade policies aren’t helping Americans.

“Americans will pay more,” Sen. Mark Warner (D., Va.) said on “Fox News Sunday.” He added, “They hired this president to bring down costs and you’ve got the market crashing because they think the tariffs are stupid.”

Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com, Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com and Kristina Peterson at kristina.peterson@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 31, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Weighs Broader, Higher Tariffs'.

3. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Concludes Visit to Japan

Key development:

The Secretary also announced the commencement of Phase One of the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Force Headquarters, in line with the President and Prime Minister's joint statement from February 7 to upgrade the respective command and control frameworks of U.S. and Japanese forces. The upgrade of USFJ, matched with Japan's establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command (JJOC), will improve the ability of the U.S. and Japan to coordinate bilateral operations, increase our readiness to respond to a contingency or crisis, and reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. Both actions will allow for more seamless coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime or in crisis.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Concludes Visit to Japan

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4139267/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-concludes-visit-to-japan/

March 30, 2025 |

Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell provided the following statement:

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth traveled to Japan this week to meet with Japanese counterparts and U.S. military leadership in support of the Department's efforts to reestablish deterrence, strengthen our Alliance, and advance our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

On March 29, Secretary Hegseth participated in a ceremony commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima. In his remarks, the Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

On March 30, Secretary Hegseth met with Defense Minister Nakatani, where the two discussed concrete steps to deepen defense cooperation across a range of areas, including through enhancing bilateral training and exercises, strengthening Alliance force posture and presence, including in Japan's Southwest Islands, and promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation.

The Secretary also announced the commencement of Phase One of the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Force Headquarters, in line with the President and Prime Minister's joint statement from February 7 to upgrade the respective command and control frameworks of U.S. and Japanese forces. The upgrade of USFJ, matched with Japan's establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command (JJOC), will improve the ability of the U.S. and Japan to coordinate bilateral operations, increase our readiness to respond to a contingency or crisis, and reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. Both actions will allow for more seamless coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime or in crisis.

Secretary Hegseth also met with Prime Minister Ishiba to celebrate the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, demonstrated at the meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba on February 7, and to underscore the United States' commitment to the defense of Japan.

Before departing, the Secretary visited USFJ Headquarters to meet with the Commander of USFJ and our servicemembers stationed at Yokota Air Base.

4. Pentagon chief says US will ensure 'deterrence' across Taiwan Strait

Pentagon chief says US will ensure 'deterrence' across Taiwan Strait

30 Mar 2025 01:31PM

(Updated: 30 Mar 2025 01:41PM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/pentagon-chief-says-us-will-ensure-deterrence-across-taiwan-strait-5033246

During his visit to Japan, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the two countries stood firmly together in the face of "aggressive and coercive actions by the Communist Chinese."

Japan's Defence Minister Gen Nakatani (right) and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth shake hands before their meeting at the Ministry of Defence in Tokyo on Mar 30, 2025. (Photo: AFP/Kiyoshi Ota)

30 Mar 2025 01:31PM (Updated: 30 Mar 2025 01:41PM)

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TOKYO: The United States will ensure "robust, ready and credible deterrence" in the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said on Sunday (Mar 30), calling Chinese actions "aggressive and coercive".

"America is committed to sustaining robust, ready and credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait," Hegseth said in Japan after talks with counterpart Gen Nakatani.

"Japan would be on the front lines of any contingency we might face in the western Pacific and we stand together in support of each other.

"That's why today Minister Nakatani and I talked about the severe and urgent security environment around Japan, and we discussed what we are going to do about it," Hegseth told reporters.

Beijing has stepped up military pressure in recent years around Taiwan, including near-daily air incursions, and has not ruled out using force to bring the island under its control.

"Today's meetings have affirmed the extraordinary strength of America's alliance with Japan. After today's discussion, it is clear to me that our alliance is the cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo Pacific negotiation," Hegseth said.

"America and Japan stand firmly together in the face of aggressive and coercive actions by the Communist Chinese."

Source: AFP/ao

5. Trump says TikTok sale deal to come before Apr 5 deadline

Trump says TikTok sale deal to come before Apr 5 deadline

31 Mar 2025 07:59AM

(Updated: 31 Mar 2025 09:01AM)

channelnewsasia.com

FILE PHOTO: U.S. flag and TikTok logo are seen in this illustration taken January 8, 2025. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo

31 Mar 2025 07:59AM (Updated: 31 Mar 2025 09:01AM)

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE: US President Donald Trump on Sunday (Mar 30) said a deal with TikTok's Chinese parent ByteDance to sell the short video app used by 170 million Americans would be struck before a deadline on Apr 5.

Trump set the April 5 deadline in January for TikTok to find a non-Chinese buyer or face a US ban on national security grounds due to have taken effect that month under a 2024 law.

"We have a lot of potential buyers," Trump told reporters on Air Force One late on Sunday. "There's tremendous interest in Tiktok", adding, "I'd like to see Tiktok remain alive".

TikTok did not immediately comment.

Reuters reported on Friday private equity firm Blackstone is evaluating making a small minority investment in TikTok's US operations, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Blackstone is discussing joining ByteDance's existing non-Chinese shareholders, led by Susquehanna International Group and General Atlantic, in contributing fresh capital to bid for TikTok's US business. The group has emerged as front-runners.

Washington says TikTok's ownership by ByteDance makes it beholden to the Chinese government and Beijing could use the app to conduct influence operations against the United States and collect data on Americans.

Trump previously said he was willing to extend the April deadline if an agreement over the social media app was not reached.

Last week, he acknowledged the role China will play in getting any deal done, including giving its approval, saying "maybe I'll give them a little reduction in tariffs or something to get it done".

Vice President JD Vance has said he expects the general terms of an agreement resolving the ownership of the social media platform to be reached by Apr 5.

The future of the app used by nearly half of all Americans has been up in the air since a 2024 law, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, required ByteDance to divest TikTok by Jan 19.

The White House has been involved to an unprecedented level in the closely watched deal talks, effectively playing the role of investment bank.

Source: Reuters/rj

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6. Trump administration reveals its plans to Congress to 'abolish' USAID

Note the new organizations charts with State absorbing some of USAID functions at the link below:

https://www.devex.com/news/trump-administration-reveals-its-plans-to-congress-to-abolish-usaid-109753

Excerpts:

The plan involves restructuring some State Department bureaus and offices that would implement USAID programs, eliminating “substantially all” USAID employees, and conducting a new process at the State Department to hire relevant experts, which could mean rehiring some terminated USAID staff.

The State Department plans to keep humanitarian assistance programs, global health, strategic investment, and “limited national security programs” previously run by USAID. The Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and the Bureau for Global Health would be “realigned” to relevant State Department entities. The Trump administration has determined that other USAID programs duplicate the work of the State Department and will be eliminated.

Trump administration reveals its plans to Congress to 'abolish' USAID

USAID will be shut down, staff laid off, and parts of the agency — mostly humanitarian assistance, food security, and global health programs — will be run by the State Department.

By Adva Saldinger, Elissa Miolene // 28 March 2025

While various proposals suggesting how the U.S. Agency for International Development might merge with the State Department have circulated for weeks, the speculation is now over.

The Trump administration has outlined its plans to shutter USAID and merge some of its functions and programs into the State Department in a congressional notification that was obtained by Devex.

The administration plans to propose legislation to formally “abolish USAID as an independent establishment” as part of its budget request to Congress for fiscal year 2026, according to the congressional notification sent on Friday by Paul Guaglianone, a senior official in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs at USAID.

USAID was created by Congress, which would need to pass a new law to legally eliminate the agency — meaning the plan still would require congressional action to be done lawfully. It is unclear whether the Trump administration would wait for congressional authorization before moving forward.

The State Department and USAID “are notifying their intent to undertake a reorganization that would involve realigning certain USAID functions to the [State] Department by July 1, 2025, and discontinuing the remaining USAID functions that do not align with Administration priorities,” the message reads.

The plan involves restructuring some State Department bureaus and offices that would implement USAID programs, eliminating “substantially all” USAID employees, and conducting a new process at the State Department to hire relevant experts, which could mean rehiring some terminated USAID staff.

The State Department plans to keep humanitarian assistance programs, global health, strategic investment, and “limited national security programs” previously run by USAID. The Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and the Bureau for Global Health would be “realigned” to relevant State Department entities. The Trump administration has determined that other USAID programs duplicate the work of the State Department and will be eliminated.

Congress’ role

U.S. law requires that the administration consult with Congress on any agency reorganization plans, and this notification is part of that process.

Lawmakers can weigh in on congressional notifications and it is not uncommon for members of the relevant legislative committees to place a hold on plans if they disagree with them or want additional information. It has happened in previous USAID restructuring efforts, including during the Biden administration and the first Trump administration.

It remains to be seen how Congress might respond, but Rep. Brian Mast, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued a statement supporting the administration’s plans for USAID. “The State Department will never again be in a state of waste,” he said.

But on the other side of the aisle, Democratic lawmakers had a different take.

“These plans violate the law, which requires that USAID exist as a separate entity,” wrote Rep. Gregory Meeks, the top Democrat of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “Presidents are not kings, and if the administration wishes to change the law, the [Republican Party], which controls both the House and Senate, should pass one.”

Proposed USAID-State Department org chart.

The structure

The State Department will create a new office, the Office of Global Food Security, which will house food security and humanitarian programs, including those previously managed by USAID’s Bureau for Resilience, Environment and Food Security, and its Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs.

USAID’s remaining global health programs, including HIV/AIDS programs it oversees, will be managed by the State Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy.

All remaining USAID programs will be managed by an office of foreign assistance in each of the State Department’s regional bureaus, which would also absorb any relevant functions of USAID’s regional bureaus. For example, the work of USAID’s Africa bureau would now be overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, while Asia functions would be reassigned to the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

USAID procurement and program management functions would be integrated into the relevant State Department bureaus as well.

“Management of assistance programs by regional bureaus would ensure that aid programs are delivered based on regional and local priorities, and consistent with applicable U.S. foreign policy interest in those locations,” the notification says.

Proposed USAID-State Department org chart.

Not everyone believes spreading USAID’s work across regional bureaus is a good idea.

It would make aid and development work “more fragmented and it’s so submersed within the bureaucracy of the State Department that it’s hard to imagine it could be effective as a way of exercising soft power,” said Patrick Fine, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, at a recent Devex Pro briefing.

Administrative functions will also be transferred in the first phase of the transition, set to be completed by July 1. The State Department will begin managing USAID financial and administrative systems for remaining operations and ongoing programs, and will integrate USAID’s partner vetting systems and payment systems.

The people

The restructuring notification was sent the same day that Jeremy Lewin, newly minted deputy administrator of policy and programs, told USAID staff that they would be severed from the agency by one of two dates: July 1 or Sept. 2, 2025. By tomorrow, staff will have a choice: They can either go on “voluntary administrative leave” or “active duty,” the latter of which would require staff to help with the “drawdown of operations” at USAID.

The email — titled “USAID’s Final Mission” — sent waves across the agency, hitting both the few staff left at USAID and those who have already received notice that their job would be eliminated and were on administrative leave.

“There are new Declarations of Humanitarian Need set to be written *today*, like for the earthquake in Burma,” said one USAID staff member, who texted Devex after Lewin’s email went out on Friday. “Obviously a bunch of actual work is going to need to happen between now and the end of the fiscal year; there will be new disasters, grantees and contractors need oversight. What is happening with all of that?”

According to the congressional notification, that future will look something like this: USAID missions overseas will be closed, USAID staff abroad will return to the United States, and most locally employed staff will be “separated from U.S. government service in accordance with local law.” After all those firings, the State Department intends to rehire relevant civil service and foreign service staff to deliver USAID programs.

“The Department is not currently in a position to accurately project its needs or the exact numbers of USAID personnel to be hired in connection with the realignment of USAID’s programs and activities,” Guaglianone wrote.

Losing key USAID expertise is one of the changes that many have worried about for months.

Former State Department official Jim Richardson said the types of programs the State Department and USAID run are very different and require different expertise.

“If we're going to focus on monitoring, evaluation, impact outcomes, and we want to actually make sure that we have a good return on our investment for our resources, that's what USAID technical staff really bring to the equation,” he said at the recent Devex event. “Making sure that we are integrating those technical capacities into the new structures is super important."

The financials

The State Department intends to manage USAID’s operational accounts to ensure the agency is “closed out in a smooth and orderly transition.” That includes transferring some contracting and agreement officers to the State Department, despite the recent reduction-in-force notices that affected all of USAID’s staff.

The State Department will also soon control USAID’s operating expense and capital investment fund accounts, the notification states — buckets of money which, as of this week, contained $229.4 million and $133 million in obligated funds, respectively.

Funding associated with USAID’s Food for Peace program, which purchases surplus food commodities from American farmers and delivers it as foreign aid, is appropriated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture but managed by USAID.

The notification states that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as acting USAID administrator, will oversee the program “until appropriate legislation is enacted authorizing the [State] Department to assume this function.”

The notification also lists all the funds that have not yet been obligated by USAID — i.e. funds that have not been specifically allocated or contracted — ranging from global health to development assistance to economic support and beyond. Those funds total over $30 billion, according to the notification..

“USAID anticipates standing up a claims settlement process to ensure that any applicable claims of contractors, vendors, personnel or others are timely and adequately addressed by USAID,” the notification states. “USAID would continue to operate this process until appropriate legislation is enacted to facilitate the transfer to the Department.”

Despite not being obligated, those funds have still been appropriated by Congress, meaning it will require Congress’ approval to change how the money is spent.

About the authors

Adva Saldinger @AdvaSal

Adva Saldinger is a Senior Reporter at Devex where she covers development finance, as well as U.S. foreign aid policy. Adva explores the role the private sector and private capital play in development and authors the weekly Devex Invested newsletter bringing the latest news on the role of business and finance in addressing global challenges. A journalist with more than 10 years of experience, she has worked at several newspapers in the U.S. and lived in both Ghana and South Africa.

Elissa Miolene

Elissa Miolene reports on USAID and the U.S. government at Devex. She previously covered education at The San Jose Mercury News, and has written for outlets like The Wall Street Journal, San Francisco Chronicle, Washingtonian magazine, among others. Before shifting to journalism, Elissa led communications for humanitarian agencies in the United States, East Africa, and South Asia.

7. Once an Economy Switches from Rules to Deals, It’s Hard to Go Back

A cautionary note. Are we sure this is what we want?

Once an Economy Switches from Rules to Deals, It’s Hard to Go Back

Americans of all political affiliations will miss the checks and balances that Donald Trump is trying to dispense with.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-30/trump-won-t-rule-out-seeking-third-term-says-there-are-ways?srnd=homepage-americas&sref=hhjZtX76

Illustration: Valentin Tkach for Bloomberg

By Filipe Campante and Ray Fisman

March 28, 2025 at 9:21 AM EDT

What Happens to an Economy When Deals Replace Rules (Audio)

In 1976, Mao Zedong succumbed to Parkinson’s disease and passed the torch to Deng Xiaoping. After the Mao-led disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Deng took China in a very different direction. His reforms in the 1980s are credited with helping the country achieve decades of enormously rapid growth.

A shift of that magnitude — whatever its direction — is much more common in regimes ruled by a single leader, which political scientists call personalistic political systems. Because China had few constraints on the top leader, the shift from Mao to Deng mattered a lot. The country’s fate hinged on the whims of the guy in charge.

Citizens of democracies like to point out that personalistic political systems, like the one Mao built and handed to Deng, don’t deliver for their citizens as well as democracies do. In the long run, on average, there’s a good chance that’s true. But the full story is more subtle. History is filled with examples where personalistic systems seemed to work for a time. China under Deng, Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, South Korea under Park Chung-hee, Indonesia under Suharto: There are numerous instances of rapid economic growth under autocratic and personalistic leadership.

What the evidence does suggest is that personalistic political systems lead to greater variance in economic performance. In other words, the range of possible outcomes is much wider.

Illustration: Valentin Tkach for Bloomberg

In a 2005 study, economists Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken analyzed the impact of political leaders on economic performance by examining what happened in the wake of leaders’ unexpected deaths. There were no systematic post-death economic shifts following the demise of democratically elected leaders — like, say, when Lyndon B. Johnson took over for John F. Kennedy. But the death of autocrats led to marked shifts in economic outcomes: sometimes for the better, and sometimes for the worse.

When leaders operate without constraints, you have to rely on luck: Maybe you will get a “good” leader who manages things well. But maybe you will get a bad one. Without constraints, the range of possibilities widens and the risk of disaster increases. History suggests that good luck in leaders seldom lasts.

The Unconstrained Presidency

The first two months of Donald Trump’s presidency have proceeded at a blistering pace, including more than 90 executive orders. President Trump has fired independent officials, effectively shut down agencies like USAID, picked fights with judges and empowered Elon Musk to act as the government’s newly appointed Cost-Cutter in Chief. Designated as leader of the Department of Government Efficiency — a loosely defined entity of unclear legal status — the centibillionaire has been operating across a remarkably wide collection of agencies and departments, accessing their financial records and pushing for massive layoffs.

These disparate maneuvers have one thing in common: They are all part of a remarkable shift toward unilateral action by the president and the people he picks to work on his behalf.

While many US presidents have attempted to claim new powers for the executive branch, the Trump administration is unique in the extent to which they are pursuing maximalist claims of executive authority, as well as in their willingness to challenge the courts.

It’s also notable how little pushback Trump has received from the legislative branch. A Republican-controlled Congress has largely abdicated from any sort of institutional dissent with respect to the president’s initiatives. (The judicial branch has been active, in comparison, but with limited enforcement ability.)

The Trump administration’s agenda, paired with the lack of pushback, amounts to a bid to concentrate enormous power in the hands of the president and his hand-picked agents (like Musk). If successful, this would replace a system of rules-based policymaking across branches with decision-making by a few individuals.

Are Americans Feeling Lucky?

To understand the risks of personalistic systems, it’s worth considering the absolute best-case pro-Trump and pro-Musk scenario. Since Musk in particular has been empowered by Trump to act seemingly without constraint, let’s focus on him.

Suppose you believe that Musk’s success in the private sector translates perfectly to public administration — and that Musk is correct in his diagnosis of the current state of the public sector. Perhaps you therefore expect a big boost to US gross domestic product as a result of Musk’s untrammeled power.

Even if the bet on Musk were to pay off as handsomely as his most fervent acolytes hope, what happens after that? Should we expect that we will always be so lucky as to have the right person invested with those unchecked powers? In fact, if you really think Musk is uniquely qualified to manage government, you can only expect the next person to be much worse.

When leaders operate without constraints, you have to rely on luck.

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One response might be that if Musk’s successor proves to be ineffective or worse, electoral discipline can be relied upon to limit their overreach. That is, if a future president is a bad leader or empowers one, they can be then kicked out by voters. But this ignores another layer of uncertainty: Once you move to a personalistic system, democracy can no longer be taken for granted. You cannot simply remove checks and balances and hope that politics will still take place under the same rules as before.

From Rules to Deals

The US government is now veering toward the kind of governing-by-deal-making that Trump, who fancies himself as a master of the “Art of the Deal,” no doubt favors. This contrasts with the rule of law, whereby legislation is passed and regulations are put in place through a well-ordered policymaking process.

The first risk of a personalistic system, as we’ve described, is that too much hinges on who’s in charge. The second is that no single leader, no matter how smart, can make every decision. When rule of law is replaced by the whims of the executive, that process filters down into everyday decision-making.

This was documented by researchers Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Lant Pritchett in a study titled, “How Business is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus Rules.” While there’s politicking and uncertainty in every government, they describe why low-income countries are more likely to be dominated by deals.

Take a business trying to get a construction permit, one example from their paper. A rules-based approach would specify what’s required upfront. The process might be quick or slow, but it would be predictable. There is no negotiation and therefore less room for outright corruption.

But in many low-income countries, the authors observe, the rules are merely the starting point for a negotiation — deal-making, if you will — between business and government. Governance by deal-making creates the sort of uncertainty and restricted economic opportunities that are harmful to investment and growth; only the well-connected need apply.

This is an inevitable consequence of an unconstrained leader at the top. The lack of clear rules filters down, empowering thousands of dictatorial bureaucrats along the way. Where the rule of law languishes, corruption flourishes.

The Cost of the Deal

In an unpredictable, deal-making world, the way to succeed is to curry favor with whomever is in power. That may not sound so bad if deal-making replaces, say, stifling taxation — it could even be the grease that makes the wheel of business spin faster. But the evidence suggests this is not the case: A 2000 study by economist Shang-Jin Wei argued that corruption discourages investment far more than taxes, precisely because it is fickle and uncertain.

The political implications are even more concerning than the economics. By placing extraordinary powers in just a few individuals at the top of the deal-making hierarchy, they can become very difficult to dislodge. When success in business requires being in the good graces of those in power, leaders can wield that authority to build their own political resources — from campaign money to favorable media coverage.

Furthermore, unchecked authority raises the stakes of holding on to power. If whoever gets to be in charge can push whatever policies they like, and if it is hard to remove them once they get there, each side of the political aisle will see electoral losses as existential challenges. This, in turn, can add yet more political instability. And as the late, great economist Alberto Alesina documented with colleagues in the mid-1990s, political instability is associated with lower economic growth.

In short, the lesson from social science is that good economic policy depends as much on process as on substance. If the US takes steps down the road toward an unchecked, personalistic system of policymaking, it will carry very steep long-term costs. America has the most prosperous economy in world history, and it is no coincidence that it was built on a relatively impersonal, rules-based system. If it’s destroyed, it may prove near impossible to rebuild.

8. A Peter Thiel Protégé Is Leading Trump’s AI Strategy Against China

Excerpts:

Kratsios worked on a 2019 AI executive order that promoted research and development and directed the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop standards for measuring trustworthy AI systems.

Lawmakers worry the job and spending cuts promoted by DOGE will slow tech development. Kratsios said he would fight for priorities such as research and development and standard-setting.

Some friendly countries have raised concerns about proposed semiconductor controls that would limit their purchases, fueling worries that they might be pushed toward Chinese alternatives.

“These countries know this is nation building,” said Chris Lehane, chief global affairs officer at the ChatGPT maker, OpenAI. “They have to pick between one of the two.”

National-security hawks say the risk doesn’t justify weaker export controls that could boost the Chinese tech industry.

“I don’t think that they can do much innovation on their own, but they will if we keep sharing all this tech with them,” said Sen. Josh Hawley (R., Mo.).

A Peter Thiel Protégé Is Leading Trump’s AI Strategy Against China

Michael Kratsios will work to counter Beijing without disrupting U.S. businesses

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-ai-michael-kratsios-peter-thiel-protege-1457e276?mod=latest_headlines

By Amrith Ramkumar

March 30, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Michael Kratsios at his Senate Commerce Committee confirmation hearing in February. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Bloomberg

WASHINGTON—Many Trump administration officials work on national security or artificial intelligence. Michael Kratsios is thinking about how they collide.

Confirmed by the Senate on Tuesday to lead the Office of Science and Technology Policy, he is taking charge at a pivotal moment in the AI race with China. The Chinese startup DeepSeek rattled lawmakers in January when it released a powerful model trained at much lower costs than U.S. competitors.

That raised pressure on the Trump administration to limit China’s access to advanced U.S. chips without disrupting American businesses abroad. The Commerce Department on Tuesday added dozens of Chinese companies to a trade blacklist. U.S. companies need government approval to sell to those businesses in China.

Kratsios cut his teeth in the tech industry for several years as one of venture capitalist Peter Thiel’s top deputies. After Thiel was one of the few Silicon Valley executives to back Donald Trump in 2016, Kratsios got a top tech policy role in the first Trump administration and briefly oversaw research and engineering at the Defense Department.

Following a nearly four-year stint at the startup Scale AI, he has returned to government under a much brighter spotlight. “The stakes are a lot higher this time around,” Kratsios said in an interview.

Work at the Office of Science and Technology Policy includes everything from ultrapowerful quantum computing to modernizing the nation’s telecom systems and researching the world’s oceans. He expects to spend a lot of time coordinating among agencies.

“People will look to him as the person who’s really going to set things in motion,” said Chloe Autio, a tech policy consultant to companies and AI labs.

Kratsios, with an orange necktie, on Capitol Hill in 2023. Photo: J. Scott Applewhite/AP

One of Kratsios’s first tasks is sifting through thousands of suggestions companies submitted recently for the administration’s AI plan. President Trump directed his team to come up with the plan in a January executive order. He revoked President Joe Biden’s AI executive order asking companies to notify the government when developing powerful models.

Kratsios will be working with officials including the AI and crypto czar, David Sacks, and Sriram Krishnan, a senior policy adviser for AI. Sacks worked for the libertarian newspaper that Thiel founded at Stanford University, then helped launch the payments company PayPal alongside Thiel and Elon Musk, the Tesla chief executive now running the Department of Government Efficiency. Sacks and Krishnan both have venture-capital backgrounds.

A marathon runner from South Carolina, Kratsios graduated from Princeton University with a bachelor’s degree in politics. In college, he interned for Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.).

Kratsios got a firsthand view of the U.S.-China relationship in 2010, when he was a visiting scholar and instructor at China’s Tsinghua University, known for producing top engineering talent. Students were excited about the opportunity to work in the innovative U.S. tech industry, Kratsios said.

The same year, he started working for one of Thiel’s investment companies. In 2016, Kratsios returned to Tsinghua to help Thiel teach a two-week course after Thiel’s book on startups became a hit in China. By then, China had started investing billions of dollars in homegrown tech projects, helping tilt the relationship between the two countries.

One of Kratsios’s jobs in the first Trump administration was traveling around the world to persuade other countries not to install cheap telecom equipment from China’s Huawei because of security concerns. The U.S. didn’t have a domestic alternative to Huawei, so he suggested European options.

Michael Kratsios speaking at the Web Summit technology conference in 2019. Photo: Pedro Fiuza/ZUMA Press

“It’s always been a global competition to him,” said Tony Samp, head of AI policy at DLA Piper.

Kratsios worked on a 2019 AI executive order that promoted research and development and directed the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop standards for measuring trustworthy AI systems.

Lawmakers worry the job and spending cuts promoted by DOGE will slow tech development. Kratsios said he would fight for priorities such as research and development and standard-setting.

Some friendly countries have raised concerns about proposed semiconductor controls that would limit their purchases, fueling worries that they might be pushed toward Chinese alternatives.

“These countries know this is nation building,” said Chris Lehane, chief global affairs officer at the ChatGPT maker, OpenAI. “They have to pick between one of the two.”

National-security hawks say the risk doesn’t justify weaker export controls that could boost the Chinese tech industry.

“I don’t think that they can do much innovation on their own, but they will if we keep sharing all this tech with them,” said Sen. Josh Hawley (R., Mo.).

Write to Amrith Ramkumar at amrith.ramkumar@wsj.com

9. AI Experts Say We’re on the Wrong Path to Achieving Human-Like AI

The 88 page report can be downloaded here: https://aaai.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/AAAI-2025-PresPanel-Report-Digital-3.7.25.pdf

Just in the article below alone there are a number of new concepts and terms with which I am not familiar. The report will probably go way over my head.

AI Experts Say We’re on the Wrong Path to Achieving Human-Like AI

An extensive report on the future of AI research indicated that there's skepticism about current approaches to AGI.

https://gizmodo.com/ai-experts-say-were-on-the-wrong-path-to-achieving-human-like-ai-2000581717?utm

By Isaac Schultz Published March 30, 2025 | Comments (95)

𝕏

A server farm. © Shutterstock

According to a panel of hundreds of artificial intelligence researchers, the field is currently pursuing artificial general intelligence the wrong way.

This insight was revealed at the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)’s 2025 Presidential Panel on the Future of AI Research. The lengthy report was put together by 24 AI researchers whose expertise ranges from the state of AI infrastructure to the social aspects of artificial intelligence.

The report included a main takeaway for each section, as well as a community opinion section where respondents were asked their own thoughts about the section.

The section on “AI Perception vs. Reality”, chaired by MIT computer scientist Rodney Brooks, referenced the Gartner Hype Cycle characterization, a five-stage cycle common for technology hype. In November 2024, Gartner “estimated that hype for Generative AI had just passed its peak and was on the downswing,” the report noted. 79% of respondents in the community opinion section stated that current public perceptions of AI’s capabilities do not match the reality of AI research and development, with 90% saying that the mismatch is hindering AI research—74% of that number saying that “the directions of AI research are driven by the hype.”

“I included the Gartner Hype Cycle as it is something they have used for years and is a generalization of all the hype up followed by disappointment across so many different fields,” Brooks told Gizmodo in an email, “and therefore its existence and accuracy over so many fields tells us something about how we should use caution in accepting the current levels of hype about what is coming, any second now, with some caution.”

“I think large sections of public discourse about AI is too accepting of the hype level as accurate,” Brooks added.

Artificial general intelligence (AGI) refers to human-level intelligence: The hypothetical intelligence of a machine that interprets information and learns from it as a human being would. AGI is a holy grail of the field, with implications for automation and efficiency across countless fields and disciplines. Consider any menial task that you don’t want to spend much time doing, from planning a trip to filing your taxes. AGI could be deployed to ease the burden of rote tasks, but also catalyze progress in other fields, from transportation to education and technology.

The surprising majority—76% of 475 respondents—said that simply scaling up current approaches to AI will not be sufficient to yield AGI.

“Overall, the responses indicate a cautious yet forward-moving approach: AI researchers prioritize safety, ethical governance, benefit-sharing, and gradual innovation, advocating for collaborative and responsible development rather than a race toward AGI,” the report wrote.

Despite hype distorting the state of research—and current approaches to AI not putting researchers on the most optimal path towards AGI—the technology has made leaps and bounds.

“Five years ago, we could hardly have been having this conversation – AI was limited to applications where a high percentage of errors could be tolerated, such as product recommendation, or where the domain of knowledge was strictly circumscribed, such as classifying scientific images,” explained Henry Kautz, a computer scientist at the University of Virginia and chair of the report’s section on Factuality & Trustworthiness, in an email to Gizmodo. “Then, quite suddenly in historic terms, general AI started to work and come to public attention through chatbots such as ChatGPT.”

AI factuality is “far from solved”, the report read, and the best LLMs only answered about half of a set of questions correctly in a 2024 benchmark test. But new training methods can improve the robustness of those models, and new ways of organizing AI can further better their performance.

“I believe the next stage in improving trustworthiness will be the replacement of individual AI agents with cooperating teams of agents that continually fact-check either other and try to keep each other honest,” Kautz added. “Most of the general public as well as the scientific community—including the community of AI researchers—underestimates the quality of the best AI systems today; the perception of AI lags about a year or two behind the technology.”

AI is not going anywhere; after all, the Gartner Hype Cycle doesn’t end with “fade into oblivion,” but instead the “plateau of productivity.” Different arenas of AI use cases have different levels of hype, but with all the clamor about AI—from the private sector, from government officials, heck, from our own families—the report is a refreshing reminder that AI researchers are thinking very critically about the state of their field. From the way AI systems are built to the ways they are deployed in the world, there is room for innovation and improvement. Since we aren’t going back to a time without AI, the only direction is forward.

10. Contributor: The woes of 'attention capitalism' are new, but the cure is ancient

I am a great believer that the classics are still relevant and important. The question is how do we get the younger generations to become motivated to study them.

So we all need to exercise our attention "muscle."

And perhaps more colleges should adopt the Great Books curriculum.

Opinion

Contributor: The woes of 'attention capitalism' are new, but the cure is ancient

https://www.yahoo.com/news/contributor-woes-attention-capitalism-cure-100051954.html?guccounter=1&soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=fb&tsrc=fb&utm

J. Walter Sterling

Thu, March 27, 2025 at 6:00 AM EDT4 min read

Trinity College Library in Dublin. (Mairo Cinquetti / NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Attention, please!

We are losing the liberty of controlling our own minds. And education must be restructured to meet this challenge.

The corporations that define our economy are manipulating and harvesting our individual focus in unprecedented ways. This is “attention capitalism,” and authors Chris Hayes and Jonathan Haidt have each called out its dangers, demonstrating how much of our selves — our minds, our souls — are determined by our ability to pay attention and how, now, technology has hijacked that ability.

One approach to combat this is to change our attentional environment to help us resist the fracturing of our focus, such as by banning phones in classrooms. As essential as such recommendations are, attention is also an individual skill, a muscle that requires building. Indeed, this could be seen as the central task of education: the cultivation of the control of our own minds through the increased powers of attention.

If we were to take this as an organizing principle for all of education, what would that look like?

An essential first step would be to keep classes small, limiting distraction. Human connection would be a second key, because unmediated interaction with others is one of the most compelling, focusing experiences of our lives. To that end, face-to-face conversation must be central, incentivizing engaged speaking and active listening.

We would not seek to rescue or distract students from perplexity, silence and boredom, because the essence of attention is the ability to persevere through these discomforts. We would foreground deep prompts for attention — the richness of books and works of art, the complexity of natural phenomena and the intricacy of craftsmanship — as these things provide ever-deepening rewards for focused regard. We would consign to the margins digital technology, artificial intelligence and the thin, accelerated dopamine loop that drives almost all of our constant connectivity.

Of course, these tools for deepening attention are hardly new. This is the essence of liberal (“freeing”) education, as it has been practiced for centuries.

We know from mounting research that the practices core to this humanistic education — reading books and conversing with others, silent reflection and tuning out the technological stimuli — do detoxify us. We do recover. Just two weeks away from screens reduces psychological problems in children. People who are more socially connected have higher cognitive scores. Reading and discussing fiction, especially literary fiction, improves well-being, increases empathy and can decrease depressive symptoms for years. Deep reading literally reshapes the brain, as neuroscientist and reading expert Maryanne Wolf has shown, allowing us to “enter a cognitive space where we can connect the decoded information to all that we know and feel.”

At the small college I lead, St. John’s in Santa Fe, N.M., we see this in our students: Many of our freshmen arrive with diminished abilities, unprepared to study as rigorously as we do. But over four years in our sanctuary-like mountain setting studying a great books curriculum that ranges from Homer, Plato and Augustine to Einstein, Joyce and Arendt, they acquire the focus needed to write and then discuss their senior essays on, for example, the intricacies of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit.”

It is perhaps not surprising that the medicine to treat the new challenges of our time would be so ancient. As Hayes points out, attention capitalism is preying on vulnerabilities of human nature that have always been with us. He invokes the 17th-century philosopher Blaise Pascal: “When I have occasionally set myself to consider the different distractions of men, I have discovered that all the unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber.” Liberal education was designed from the beginning to remedy this.

But at just the time when we need such education the most, our educational institutions face unprecedented economic and political pressures — declining enrollments, reduced funding, rising costs, legislative interference that challenges academic freedom and curricular choices. The value of education itself is under scrutiny, and higher education has experienced an unprecedented loss of our collective confidence. During the confirmation hearing of now-Secretary of Education Linda McMahon, the only thing our two parties seemed to agree upon is that our system of education is disastrously failing our young people and that success is determined by how cost-effectively it prepares them for successful careers.

As educators, we should not retreat under this onslaught. We should instead find renewed purpose in doing what we’ve always known how to do well — deepen attention, cultivate free and self-possessed humans, and create the capacity to find fulfillment in whatever life presents to us.

In doing so, we can empower the next generation to navigate, perhaps even cure, the technological and political dystopia of an economy in which our own minds have become the commodity that attention capitalism markets and trades.

J. Walter Sterling is the president of St. John’s College in Santa Fe, N.M.

If it’s in the news right now, the L.A. Times’ Opinion section covers it. Sign up for our weekly opinion newsletter.

This story originally appeared in Los Angeles Times.

11. Israel’s Heven Drones says its hydrogen-fueled flying robots are a military game-changer

Excerpts:

“Drones are becoming a strategic asset,” said Levinson. “With the Russia-Ukraine war and following the October 7 onslaught, most countries understand that drones are the X-factor reshaping today’s modern warfare and are trying to get the best technology, but also to build their own capabilities of being able to produce them.”

Heven, headquartered in Miami with an R&D center in the Mevo Carmel Science and Industry Park near Yokne’am in the north of the country, was founded in 2019 to build affordable drones to be used by the military, homeland security, firefighters and aid organizations and for various civilian needs.

The most pressing issues for military or security forces are how much a drone can carry and how long it can stay in the air, Levinson said.

“In 2019, we started focusing on the heavy lifting aspect, so we started our operations in Israel and built a drone that could lift 70 pounds of payload, about 35 kilograms,” said Levinson. “As most traditional drones run on electric batteries and are limited to staying aloft about 40 minutes or at most an hour, we created drones that are powered by hydrogen fuel cells.”

Hydrogen power increases flight time fivefold over traditional batteries for the Heven drones, which are designed to carry larger payloads, the startup says.

Israel’s Heven Drones says its hydrogen-fueled flying robots are a military game-changer

Partnering with a US manufacturer to eliminate reliance on Chinese exports, the Israeli startup says its models set new standards for heavy lifting and prolonged airtime

By Sharon Wrobel Follow

30 March 2025, 9:53 am

timesofisrael.com

Heven Drones’ H100 heavy-lift drone has a payload capacity of up to about 30 kg and flight time of between 22 to 55 minutes. (Courtesy/Heven)

Israeli-American startup founder Bentzion Levinson is one of many entrepreneurs who returned from the battlefield with a sense of urgency after being on extended reserve duty during Israel’s 17-month military campaign against the Hamas terror group in the Gaza Strip. For Levinson, the war exposed the IDF’s vast challenge to defend against cheap and effective enemy drones that were causing casualties and damage.

“On October 7, 2023, Hamas used cheap Chinese drones bought on Alibaba to disable our cameras and monitoring systems,” Levinson, a reserve combat commander, told The Times of Israel. “Serving on the northern border for more than two months, I experienced how the [Iran-backed] Hezbollah group was taking down soldiers with drones.”

“I came back to work at the drone startup I founded a couple of years ago with the urgency and need to take action and provide the best tech for the most complex missions, as drones are reshaping modern global warfare and can get Israeli soldiers out of harm’s way,” Levinson said.

Born in New York, Levinson moved to Israel with his family at the age of 10, went through the Israeli education system and served as a combat commander in the IDF. In 2018, he joined a national hackathon project tasked with helping quash the scourge of balloons, kites and drones that Hamas launched from the Gaza Strip carrying airborne incendiary devices that started countless fires and burned large swaths of Israeli land.

Levinson recounted that initially, the idea was to equip drones with thermal cameras to identify the location of fires and provide firefighters with the GPS coordinates. That process wasn’t quick enough to stop the fires from spreading, so a larger drone prototype was developed that also sprayed a solution to extinguish the fires.

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The experience inspired Levinson to establish his own startup and develop an affordable and compact drone that can autonomously complete a variety of tasks, in contrast to the military’s large UAVs, which cost millions to build and maintain.

Heven Drones founder and CEO Bentzion Levinson. (Courtesy)

“Drones are becoming a strategic asset,” said Levinson. “With the Russia-Ukraine war and following the October 7 onslaught, most countries understand that drones are the X-factor reshaping today’s modern warfare and are trying to get the best technology, but also to build their own capabilities of being able to produce them.”

Heven, headquartered in Miami with an R&D center in the Mevo Carmel Science and Industry Park near Yokne’am in the north of the country, was founded in 2019 to build affordable drones to be used by the military, homeland security, firefighters and aid organizations and for various civilian needs.

The most pressing issues for military or security forces are how much a drone can carry and how long it can stay in the air, Levinson said.

“In 2019, we started focusing on the heavy lifting aspect, so we started our operations in Israel and built a drone that could lift 70 pounds of payload, about 35 kilograms,” said Levinson. “As most traditional drones run on electric batteries and are limited to staying aloft about 40 minutes or at most an hour, we created drones that are powered by hydrogen fuel cells.”

Hydrogen power increases flight time fivefold over traditional batteries for the Heven drones, which are designed to carry larger payloads, the startup says.

“The drones we develop can be used for heavy lifting logistics of sensors, robotic and intelligence-gathering functions, as well as for extreme missions and air launch missions, including launching missiles off drones,” said Levinson.

Heven has developed a series of three hydrogen-powered drones with GPS-independent navigation that it says are capable of flying between 100 minutes to more than 10 hours with a payload capacity of between 10 and 22 pounds. At its production facility in the north of the country, Heven, which has a workforce of 50 employees, can produce up to 100 drones a month.

“Fast forward to October 7: Customers’ minds opened up as there was a need and an urgency, and when you have these two things, especially in a government area, that totally opens the market,” said Levinson. “We are seeing that there are more and more specific drone units within battalions, as in today’s warfare, a battalion commander can use drones not only to detect threats but to eliminate threats.”

Heven’s H2D250 hydrogen-powered drone designed for payloads of up to 22 pounds and a maximum flight time of about 10 hours. (Courtesy)

Levinson said one of the biggest obstacles to the adoption of drone technologies is the lack of production facilities.

“If today you had to produce 1,000 drones a week, there is no production facility in Israel that can support that,” Levinson said. “A lot of companies have been working on defense stuff since October 7, but we had a facility that can produce 100 drones a month when the war broke out, which helped us become a supplier for the Israeli army.”

“We are currently the only sole-source supplier for hydrogen-powered drones to the IDF,” he said.

Levinson acknowledged that as with many government agencies, infiltrating the Israeli defense establishment and winning significant contracts as a startup is very challenging. Apart from its production capacity, what helped Heven clinch deals is that its president is former Israel Aerospace Industries CEO Yossi Weiss, who also leads the startup’s Israel office.

“Our customers, which include the Israeli army and US Department of Defense, urgently need thousands, and eventually tens of thousands, of drones to be deployed in-theater,” said Levinson. “The goal of the IDF is that at the end of 2025, every single battalion will have these capabilities, which means hundreds of tactical drones being deployed into the field.”

To meet the need and demand for advanced drone technology, Heven earlier this month partnered with Mach Industries, a US developer of defense tech for the US military, which is backed by venture capital firm Sequoia Capital. That’s as Western armies are seeking to reduce their dependence on drones manufactured in China, as well as Chinese materials and parts for drone development and deployment.

Heven’s tactical hydrogen-powered Raider drone can carry up to 50 pounds and fly for up to 12 hours. (Courtesy)

As part of the partnership, California-based Mach Industries will allocate part of its flagship factory in Forge Huntington to boost full-scale production of Heven’s hydrogen-powered drones and build a US-based defense supply chain.

“We launched this joint venture together to build facilities that can produce and support drones at significant scale,” Levinson said. “To start with, we hope to produce 1,000 drones a month.”

In addition, the two companies will jointly develop critical drone components, including avionics, radios, fuel sources and propulsion systems, for use by Heven and other companies.

“If you are a country like the US, Israel, the UAE, or the Philippines, you want to be able to control your own local supply chain, as there are many different types of drones which require flexible production lines, including the know-how, training and maintenance,” said Levinson.

Levinson said that the buildout of the drone manufacturing base in the US will serve as an ecosystem that Heven and Mach Industries plan to expand globally to build overseas factories and “guarantee sovereign production to US allies.”

“Eventually, the vision is to have a core heavy-lift drone platform that will be commoditized and will be available off-the-shelf, just like you can buy a Tesla online today,” said Levinson. “Similar to adding software to hardware kits, users will add appropriate kits depending on the purpose of the deployment of the drones such as farming, or delivery.”

timesofisrael.com

12. The Case for Tariffs

The Case for Tariffs

In the global trade revamp, American companies need certainty and protection to outdo their foreign rivals.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-case-for-tariffs-trade-deficit-business-investment-deindustrialization-40b8f867?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By John Michaelson

March 30, 2025 4:03 pm ET

Illustration: Martin Kozlowski

The global trading regime must change. Tariffs, which are front and center on President Trump’s agenda, can help achieve this—if used properly.

Tariffs have been enlisted since the days of Hawley and Smoot back in 1930. America thrived with a high-tariff regime in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The tariffs of 1930 were high but not exceptional, and they didn’t cause the Great Depression.

President Biden deployed tariffs against American trading partners just as his predecessors, including Mr. Trump, did.

Opening American markets to the world made sense after World War II. Europe and Japan were smoldering ruins and needed access to American markets to rebuild. We had large trade surpluses. For a generation, this trading system worked. Foreign prosperity and American hegemony went hand in hand.

Things began to go off the rails in the 1970s, followed by the Japanese auto invasion and the rise of Chinese manufacturing. We now have large trade deficits. The flood of imports has cost millions of American jobs and devastated the industrial heartland.

The principles that guided America’s industrial rise remain relevant even in today’s global trade environment. That means providing businesses with enough certainty and protection to justify long-term investments in domestic production capacity and workforce training in the face of ruthless mercantilist competitors.

The alternatives are far worse. That is true of both the top-down industrial strategy practiced by the Biden administration and the massive destruction in the value of the dollar practiced by the Federal Reserve for 50 years.

It is naive to believe that American goodwill or diplomatic overtures will convince other countries to give up the prosperity they obtain at our expense. Tariffs are only one weapon in the arsenal of adversarial trade. Not only China but allies such as Germany, Taiwan and South Korea use legal and cultural barriers—tax policies like value-added taxes and other tactics including intellectual property theft—to limit American exports while boosting their own.

Some economists would have you believe that if countries want to sell us good things at low prices, we ought to buy with both hands, even if their markets are closed to us. This supposedly makes all of us richer. In reality, it mainly benefits American elites.

But the wealth we’ve gained from one-sided trade has proved ephemeral as well as poorly distributed. It leads to imbalances that destabilize the financial system, while undermining our domestic politics.

Perhaps the worst part of America’s trade policies is their legacy of deindustrialization. Swaths of the country once proud of producing steel and aircraft are now better known for opioid abuse. The death of American industry has exacerbated inequality by eliminating millions of high-wage jobs across America that didn’t require high levels of education. Deindustrialization curtails American innovation, since production breeds know-how and invention. The end of American industry ultimately means the end of American power.

We’ve already exported most of the industrial capacity that won World War II. Today, we couldn’t possibly fight such a war against an industrial powerhouse such as China. We don’t even make semiconductors, the sinews of a modern military, any longer. Economists exercised about tariffs never seem to talk about national security, but it’s unlikely we can have the latter without the former. In many crucial industries, restoring American vitality will take decades of work.

The Trump administration’s approach has upended the status quo on free trade, creating an opportunity to rebuild American industry, reclaim our security and create manufacturing jobs here at home. The approach also represents an opportunity to reorient our economy away from finance and the hegemony of the coastal elites.

The use of tariffs as a negotiating tool certainly has a role. But bringing business investment and supply chains back to America involves long-term decisions, and what America also needs is a long-term approach.

Tariffs have many advantages in this project. They are simple and require little bureaucracy. They allow private actors to find the best solutions to clear new price signals. As with any tax, they imply a recognition that a person has to pay for some collective benefit. And as with any dangerous tool, tariffs should be used carefully.

Tariffs must be high, consistent, sustained and predictable so that businesses can plan. They must also be imposed across the board rather than selectively by country or type of import, with exceptions only for our few real friends such as the U.K. and Australia and for a few vital raw-material imports. Otherwise, we will continue to play whack-a-mole because our trade adversaries will game the system. A flood of imports from Vietnam or Nigeria is no better than a flood from China.

Through well-planned and consistently applied tariffs, we can address the full spectrum of neomercantilist practices employed against us by our trading partners. In doing so, we’ll create a more resilient and prosperous America.

Mr. Michaelson is chief investment officer of Michaelson Capital Partners.

Zelensky, Trump and Putin may all have done U-turns on elections in Ukraine

Preparations are under way for a presidential vote, though many doubt they can be done in wartime

https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/03/30/zelensky-trump-and-putin-may-all-have-done-u-turns-on-elections-in-ukraine?utm

Photograph: Eyevine

Mar 30th 2025|Kyiv

HE PREMIERE on February 28th of a new staging of “Macbeth” at the venerable Franko theatre in Kyiv was initially eclipsed by the diplomatic disaster unfolding the same day between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump in the White House. Since then the production has become the talk of the city’s elite. Ivan Urivsky, the director, says he decided to put on the tragedy after sensing a change in the country’s mood since Mr Trump’s election four months earlier. He had wanted to stage “Midsummer Night’s Dream”, a comedy, he says: “But you can’t do theatre without thinking about politics, war or the people watching.” His viewers are drawing parallels between Shakespeare’s characters and current events. For some, Macbeth resembles the bloodthirsty dictator in Moscow. For others the story of ambition, power and treachery feels closer to home.

In Kyiv, daggers are being sharpened around Mr Zelensky. For months the Ukrainian president has faced intense pressure from abroad: from Vladimir Putin, who questioned his legitimacy without a hint of irony, and from Mr Trump, who has repeated Mr Putin’s talking-points. Both appear to have been irritated by Mr Zelensky’s stubbornness. They pushed him to hold elections in the middle of the war, believing no doubt that Ukrainian voters would do them the favour of unseating him. Two months ago Mr Zelensky was believed to be dead set against holding a vote. But Mr Trump’s disgraceful treatment of him in the first week of March has bolstered his ratings, as captured in a poll commissioned by The Economist, and appears to have changed his calculus. Serious preparations are now under way for Mr Zelensky to go before the electorate for a second time, and quite soon.

Government sources say Mr Zelensky called a meeting last week to instruct his team to organise a vote after a full ceasefire, which the Americans believe they could impose by late April (Easter Sunday, April 20th, would have a certain resonance). The first confirmation of one may come in the run-up to or on May 5th, the deadline for a parliamentary vote to extend martial law, which expires on May 8th. Cancelling martial law is a necessary first stage to start an election process. The sources differ on the exact timeline, but most say Mr Zelensky is aiming for summer. The law requires at least 60 days for campaigning, so the earliest possibility would be early July. But some sources say the campaign would have to last three months: this is the time election authorities have reportedly told parliament that they require to reconstitute voter lists in the middle of war.

Petro Poroshenko, the leader of the largest opposition party and a sworn foe of Mr Zelensky, predicts elections could come “any time from August to October”. He claims the campaign started, in fact, with Mr Zelensky’s controversial decision to place him under sanctions in February. The move was reportedly linked to his long-running trial for alleged treason, but some believe that Mr Poroshenko’s trip to America in early February—where he met with some of Mr Trump’s people—lit the fuse. The former president says Mr Zelensky’s aides warned him not to go, but ascribed this to their “schizophrenia...and paranoia”. The sanctions were meant to do two things, he continues: rule out his candidacy, and warn off Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s former top general and the one man with a good chance of beating Mr Zelensky should he decide to run. A senior government source privately says Mr Poroshenko “both overestimates and underestimates his importance”. The former president does not represent any serious threat, but Mr Zelensky’s venomous dislike of Mr Poroshenko speeded up the sanctions decision.

That official thinks Mr Zelensky will try to catch rivals off guard with a July election, hoping that a short timetable would let him run unopposed. Such a turn would benefit not only the president, the source argues: “A long campaign would tear the country apart.” In fact, a rushed vote risks worsening the already bitter relations between the powerful, centralised presidential office and the rest of Ukraine’s political world.

Opposition leaders insist that a quick vote is impossible, pointing to a mass of logistical hurdles. Achieving a workable ceasefire in time for May 8th would be difficult enough, says Serhiy Vlasenko, a senior lawmaker with the Batkivshchyna party. Finding a way for millions of voters abroad, in the trenches, or in regions occupied by Russia to cast ballots would be “even harder”. One solution would be to use the government’s well-regarded Diia smartphone app. But that would raise questions of transparency. Any switch would mean changing the constitution, requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament. That would be difficult given that opposition parties are set against voting during wartime. The reasons are not only technical: they say a fair election first needs the dismantling of wartime propaganda and censorship.

The two long shadows cast over Ukrainian life, Messrs Putin and Trump, may not now want a quick election either. Both presumably demanded one believing it would lead to Mr Zelensky’s exit. Given that the calculation has flipped upside-down, they might not sit quiet while he fast-tracks his progress to a second term. Mr Putin holds many of the cards here. His drones and missiles could make cancelling martial law—let alone holding a vote—impossible. But many think elections could help Mr Putin destabilise Ukraine even if Mr Zelensky wins. An intelligence officer predicts internal instability will be a bigger risk to Ukraine in 2025 than battles on the front line. An election campaign would let the Russians turn up their influence campaign: “They will use opinion leaders, soldiers and the opposition to do their bidding.”

Things will not get any easier for Ukraine’s next president, whoever he may be and whenever he is elected. Mr Trump’s rushed diplomacy could lead to a bad peace agreement and resentment. In time, some Ukrainians may call for a tougher, more militaristic government. For all his flaws, Mr Zelensky depends too much on popular approval to ever become a true dictator. Whoever comes after him may be less circumspect. “Whether Caligula or Macbeth, abuse of power is a constant theme in history,” says Mr Urivsky. Theatre lets people “see ourselves in some of the terrible characters. And we hope, as Ukrainians, that we might avoid repeating their mistakes.”■

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14. Trump’s “Liberation Day” is set to whack America’s economy

What to believe? Are tariffs going to be good for us or bad? I just do not have the expertise to make an informed judgment.

I guess we will just have to wait and see.

Excerpts:

Mr Trump talks of tariffs as a rich vein of revenue for the government. Yet there is a paradox here: if tariffs do encourage firms to move factories to America, that will reduce the revenue the levies bring in. Still, it is true that tariffs are a tax and raise money. The Congressional Budget Office, a non-partisan scorekeeper, examined Mr Trump’s original proposal during the election campaign of a 60% tariff on China and 10% on the rest of the world. It concluded that these rates would decrease America’s fiscal deficit by about $2.7trn over the next decade, which would be nothing to sneeze at.

That is not the end of the story, however. Tariffs cause big economic distortions. Their benefits are captured by inefficient producers, who gain from higher prices at the expense of consumers. There is also a political concern. Firm in his belief that tariffs are a fount of revenue, Mr Trump wants to use them to help cover the cost of aggressive tax cuts later this year. These cuts will come at a time when America’s budget deficit is already worryingly high and rising. If America becomes fiscally dependent on tariff revenue, they will be harder to remove, despite their economic costs. Liberation Day may go down in the history books—not as the celebration that Mr Trump intends but as economic malpractice of the highest order.

Trump’s “Liberation Day” is set to whack America’s economy

A rush of new tariffs will hurt growth, raise prices and worsen inequality

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/03/30/trumps-liberation-day-is-set-to-whack-americas-economy

Photograph: Eyevine

Mar 30th 2025|Washington, DC

VEN HIS most ardent detractors would grant that Donald Trump is a masterful marketer. So it goes for the barrage of tariffs that he is set to unveil on April 2nd. The president has promised they will mark “Liberation Day” for America—a turning-point when the country starts to claw back the respect and money that, he thinks, it has lost over the decades.

In practice there will be nothing liberating about it. Over the two months since returning to the White House, Mr Trump will have brought America’s overall tariff level to its highest since the second world war, setting the country up for slower economic growth, higher inflation, more inequality and, quite possibly, fiscal trouble.

How bad will things get? Everyone, reportedly including Mr Trump’s closest advisers, is awaiting the final details. The president has swung between hinting at lenience and insisting his administration must take a hard line. Yet as he has done so, the outline of his approach has come into focus. On the campaign trail he regularly vowed to introduce a universal tariff of 10% or 20% on all imports. Soon after taking office, that idea was supplanted by a pledge for “fair and reciprocal” tariffs, with levies set to match the barriers that other countries supposedly erect against American goods.

The result will probably be a hodgepodge of different tariff levels, perhaps different tiers, applied to individual countries. Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, has said the White House will mainly go after the “dirty 15”, or the roughly 15% of countries that, in his view, have substantial tariffs against America. Possible targets came from the office of the American trade representative when it listed 21 economies that run large goods surpluses with Uncle Sam, including Britain, the European Union and Japan.

American officials have suggested they will base reciprocal tariffs on several measures, including other countries’ tariff rates, tax policies and currency management. But none is clear-cut. If they were to try to match tariffs, doing so would require American customs officers to enforce some 2.6m separate rates, depending on the product and the country. Once the other measures are brought into the equation, the scope for discretion is even greater. It all adds up to a vast amount of uncertainty. PwC, a consultancy, concluded that if the White House were to try to match countries’ tariffs and extraterritorial taxes strictly, India could soon find itself facing American levies of 28%, while Germany would encounter those of 20%.

Levying Chevies

In any event, a few things now seem abundantly clear. Most obvious, Mr Trump is a man on a mission, determined to jack up tariffs in order to remake America’s economic model; or, more accurately, to wind it back by a century. With multiple rounds of tariffs already implemented against China, Canada and Mexico—America’s three biggest trading partners—plus the 25% tariff on cars announced last week which is due to start on April 3rd, he has already lifted America’s effective tariff rate to about 8%, up from 2% last year. That is the highest it has been since the 1940s. Whatever he does on Liberation Day will take it higher.

Mr Trump seems to be giving scant regard to any blowback. A sputtering stockmarket, for example, does not worry him as it did in his first term. He believes he is doing what he must to rebuild American manufacturing. And Liberation Day is almost certainly not the end. Mr Trump has talked of more sectoral tariffs, covering everything from semiconductors to pharmaceuticals. If other countries retaliate, as they will, Mr Trump has vowed he will strike back. Some believe he ultimately wants to bring countries to the table, to reset economic relations. Chris Desmond of PwC predicts that: “The real goal, like with Mexico and Canada, is to negotiate trade deals.”

Whatever the details of Mr Trump’s grand strategy, America’s economic growth will slow. Although countries that rely on trade with America—notably Canada and Mexico—will suffer more, Uncle Sam is not immune to disrupted trade. Goldman Sachs at first thought the hit to America’s year-on-year growth rate from Mr Trump’s tariffs would peak at 0.3 percentage points. Yet with the president’s increasing aggression, the bank’s analysts now think it will peak at 0.8 percentage points, and could reach 1.3 percentage points if he continues to escalate.

Inflation will rise, too, especially in the short run. Deutsche Bank reckons that, if Mr Trump goes for maximal levies, he could add 1.2 percentage points to the inflation rate, pushing it above 3% in year-on-year terms. Surveys show that consumers think inflation may run as high as 5% in the next year. That is almost certainly over the top: tariffs are a one-off shock, lifting the price level but not producing continuously rising prices. Nevertheless, with the Federal Reserve still struggling to bring down inflation to its pre-pandemic norm, higher import costs will complicate matters, making policymakers wary of cutting interest rates despite slowing growth.

And then there are the distributional consequences. A bigger share of low-income workers’ paycheques goes on consumption, and more of their spending is on basic goods such as clothes and food that are vulnerable to tariffs. The Yale Budget Lab, a research group, estimates that households near the bottom of the income ladder will see disposable income fall by about 2.5% because of the first wave of tariffs on China, Mexico and Canada, compared with a 0.9% decline for the most well-off households. As Mr Trump piles on tariffs, the hit becomes still more severe.

False economy

Mr Trump talks of tariffs as a rich vein of revenue for the government. Yet there is a paradox here: if tariffs do encourage firms to move factories to America, that will reduce the revenue the levies bring in. Still, it is true that tariffs are a tax and raise money. The Congressional Budget Office, a non-partisan scorekeeper, examined Mr Trump’s original proposal during the election campaign of a 60% tariff on China and 10% on the rest of the world. It concluded that these rates would decrease America’s fiscal deficit by about $2.7trn over the next decade, which would be nothing to sneeze at.

That is not the end of the story, however. Tariffs cause big economic distortions. Their benefits are captured by inefficient producers, who gain from higher prices at the expense of consumers. There is also a political concern. Firm in his belief that tariffs are a fount of revenue, Mr Trump wants to use them to help cover the cost of aggressive tax cuts later this year. These cuts will come at a time when America’s budget deficit is already worryingly high and rising. If America becomes fiscally dependent on tariff revenue, they will be harder to remove, despite their economic costs. Liberation Day may go down in the history books—not as the celebration that Mr Trump intends but as economic malpractice of the highest order.■

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15. Is Elon Musk remaking government or breaking it?

I hope the great bureaucratic reset pays off for us, the American people. I am doing my best to keep an open mind. And we are not going to really know the effects for some time to come.

Excerpts:

Even this does not mean DOGE has failed—yet. There are three possible outcomes. First, that just as rivals laughed at Tesla and SpaceX in their early days, DOGE will come good in time. Second, that Mr Musk will break the government. The third, likeliest scenario is that DOGE becomes snarled up in court; many good civil servants are fired or quit; fewer talented people see government as an appealing career; and America is left with a stronger president and a weaker Congress.

This would be a huge missed opportunity. Imagine the Musk of the early 2010s, the genius-builder, in charge of procurement at the Pentagon or federal infrastructure projects. Instead, America has got late-era Musk, radicalised by his own social-media platform, flirting with authoritarian movements and stuck in the same mind-numbing partisan thinking as millions of less talented folk.

Leaders | Efficiency drive

Is Elon Musk remaking government or breaking it?

So far, there is more destruction than creation

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/03/27/is-elon-musk-remaking-government-or-breaking-it

Mar 27th 2025

Listen to this story

EXT TO SPACE travel, remaking the government sounds easy. Elon Musk conceives of himself as the saviour of humanity, who will put people on Mars as a prelude to making humankind a multiplanetary species. But of all the things President Donald Trump has done at home since his inauguration in January, putting DOGE (the Department of Government Efficiency) under Mr Musk has turned out to be the most polarising. The world’s richest man is exalted by some as an altruistic genius and hated by others as a self-dealing villain. Is he remaking the government, or breaking it?

This newspaper looked forward to what Mr Musk might do with some hope. He has transformed at least two industries. If he could reform the federal government—an organisation whose annual expenditure of $7trn is roughly equivalent to the revenues of America’s 20 biggest companies—that would be a boon for humanity. Across the West voters are frustrated because their governments are more adept at slowing things down than at making them go. Yet large democracies have for decades struggled to come up with a convincing fix.

So far, however, DOGE has stirred up animosity, as it has barged into one agency after another. It has broken laws with glee and callously destroyed careers. It has made false claims about waste and seized personal data protected by law. This week’s big scandal—the unintended inclusion of a journalist in a Signal group of senior officials discussing an imminent attack on Yemen—has nothing to do with DOGE. But it does not inspire confidence that Mr Trump’s inner circle can handle big tasks responsibly.

Some transgressions along the way might be worth it if DOGE brought about a true transformation. Proceeding with all due caution can be a recipe for stasis, after all. Who now remembers the recommendations of the Grace commission, which was tasked by President Ronald Reagan to find ways to cut waste in government?

Ordinarily, chances to start government afresh crop up only in times of war, plague or natural disaster. A sympathetic reading of DOGE is that Mr Musk is trying to bring creative destruction to bureaucracies by other means. His preferred method at Twitter (now X) was to break things and see what happened. Perhaps what America has seen so far is the destruction and the creation will come afterwards. Optimists note that Argentina’s President Javier Milei has achieved real progress with Musk-like tactics, and that the painful reforms carried out by Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s were hated by many at the time but proved beneficial.

Others retort that the government is not like the companies Mr Musk has transformed. If a firm goes bust, another will spring up to take its place; by contrast, government, in theory at least, provides critical services that the private sector does not or will not lay on in sufficient quantities. There may be some places where DOGE is doing good, like hiring Joe Gebbia, who is a co-founder of Airbnb, to streamline the retirement process for federal workers. Unfortunately, examples of DOGE making government less effective are much more numerous.

The inspectors general, whose job is to look for waste and fraud, have been fired. DOGE has sacked people at the FDA, the agency that approves drugs for medical use, which will slow innovation. It has driven lots of principled people to resign, including Louis DeJoy, who was appointed by Mr Trump to run the postal service. Employees of some agencies singled out by DOGE still have to send a weekly email listing five things they did last week. But the inbox is full and they bounce back.

DOGE’s scope to save money is smaller than advertised. It is targeting discretionary spending (the part of the budget not on autopilot) and defence is excluded, for now. That means Mr Musk’s attack surface is just 15% of the budget. Because much of the rest of government spending is redistribution, there are no huge efficiencies to be had there. If he were cutting administrative costs wisely, that would be welcome. But too many of DOGE’s planned cuts have turned out to be misprints, like the $8bn contract it cancelled that was actually worth only $8m. Nor has it identified lots of burdensome regulation to cut, as was the hope of Vivek Ramaswamy, briefly DOGE’s co-head.

Worst is that DOGE’s actions so far look as if they are designed not to make government work better, but to expand the president’s power and root out wrongthink. USAID and the Department of Education were created by Congress, and legally only Congress can get rid of them. Republicans have legislative majorities, but have not tried to pass the necessary laws. Instead, DOGE is trying to close these institutions by fiat, expanding executive power for its own sake. Facing lawsuits and some adverse rulings, Mr Musk and others have attacked judges, accusing them of staging a coup. Some of Mr Trump’s backers believe that in the 2010s America was gripped by a soft authoritarianism, whose instruments of power were universities, the media and partisan bureaucrats, and that a little authoritarian behaviour is now required to break it. Efficiency doesn’t have much to do with it.

DOGE goes rogue

Even this does not mean DOGE has failed—yet. There are three possible outcomes. First, that just as rivals laughed at Tesla and SpaceX in their early days, DOGE will come good in time. Second, that Mr Musk will break the government. The third, likeliest scenario is that DOGE becomes snarled up in court; many good civil servants are fired or quit; fewer talented people see government as an appealing career; and America is left with a stronger president and a weaker Congress.

This would be a huge missed opportunity. Imagine the Musk of the early 2010s, the genius-builder, in charge of procurement at the Pentagon or federal infrastructure projects. Instead, America has got late-era Musk, radicalised by his own social-media platform, flirting with authoritarian movements and stuck in the same mind-numbing partisan thinking as millions of less talented folk. ■

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16. Hammer & Sickle, Star & Crescent: A Postcolonial Analysis of Salafi-Jihadist Terrorism in the Former Soviet States

Conclusion:

A postcolonial perspective provides an in-depth analysis into the origins of Islamic terrorism within former Soviet states through consideration of factors frequently overlooked by its contemporaries which ignore the role of the state. With an emphasis on the historical contexts of colonial practices, it explains root causes of contemporary issues, especially the social dynamic between the oppressive and oppressed cultures. This method therefore concludes that terrorism within former Soviet states resulted from the oppressive cultural and religious policies it pursued. Laying the groundwork for the sustainment of extremist ideology and terrorism within the region, such policies have no doubt shaped the regional security picture, as well as influenced broader relationships between states and people groups. Terrorism in Russia and Central Asia is the inheritance of the former Soviet Union’s policies which disrupted traditional Islamic structures, suppressed religious identity and fostered deep-seated grievances that extremist movements continue to exploit.

Contemporary policymakers and strategists should consider the effects of counterterrorism efforts reminiscent of Soviet-era suppression tactics both within the region and more broadly. With former Soviet states remaining volatile, breaking such repressive cycles is key for long term success when such states seek to eliminate insurgencies that have persisted for decades. Postcolonial counterterrorism can therefore be characterized by reconciliation efforts, cultural and religious sensitivity, the reduction of foreign military intervention, and consideration of historical societal grievances. Promising shifts in Central-Asian counterterrorist policy can be identified through the Joint Plan Of Action strategy that aims to align regional efforts with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which heavily emphasizes preventative action. However, continued authoritarianism within the region, reminiscent of the past, is likely to limit any gains made as a result of this policy shift in the long term. Central-Asian states will therefore be required to enact wider governmental reform to address this challenge and lasting deradicalization and reconciliation efforts. Similarly, when examining contemporary developments such as the Syrian transition, policymakers should avoid sectarianism reminiscent of the Ba’athist regime, offer amnesty to former opposition members, and recognize the grievances of religious and ethnic minorities. However, recent atrocities against Alawite civilians suggest that, much like their Central-Asian counterparts, the cycle of repression will continue following an absence of political reform

Hammer & Sickle, Star & Crescent: A Postcolonial Analysis of Salafi-Jihadist Terrorism in the Former Soviet States

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/31/hammer-sickle-star-crescent/

by Christopher S. Kuzma

03.31.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

The collapse of the Soviet Union left behind a complex and volatile security landscape, where the rise of Salafi-Jihadi terrorism remains a persistent challenge. This essay examines the roots of Islamist extremism in the former Soviet states, arguing that Soviet-era policies such as forced secularization, ethnic fragmentation, and political repression created fertile conditions for religious radicalization. By suppressing the cultural and religious identity of minority groups, the Soviet Union provided the grievances and narratives necessary for extremist leaders to mobilize followers to conduct terrorist campaigns. This study explores key cases, such as Chechnya and Central Asia, to explain how jihadist movements gained traction in the aftermath of Soviet rule. It also analyses counterterrorism approaches in Russia and neighboring states and contextualizes terrorist threats within a historical framework. The findings underscore the need for policies that address the underlying causes of radicalization rather than relying solely on suppression.

Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War which had dominated international relations for nearly half a century. For the West, the unexpected and relatively peaceful end to the greatest security threat since the Second World War allowed for respite. Comparative peace reigned until the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Centre, which spurred a global war against terror that would replace the Cold War at the forefront of global politics. This reality, however, would arrive far sooner for the Russian Federation and newly created republics, whose Soviet legacy facilitated the emergence of widespread religious and ideological extremism. This essay adopts the postcolonialism perspective to explain how the origins of terrorism within former Soviet states arose as a direct result of Soviet domestic policy, and how these historical factors directly contribute to contemporary threats and counterterrorism responses in the region. This analysis, uses the Oxford definition of terrorism: “the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act”.

Postcolonialism Theory

Postcolonialism is a broad, multidisciplinary theory which analyses contemporary issues, through the lens of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. These terms are best defined as the extractive relationship between two states in which one exerts political hegemony over the other, which, although not exclusively, was facilitated via the establishment of colonies. While primarily conducted for economic and resource exploitation, colonialism and imperialism permitted forcing of European culture, religion, philosophy, and ideology upon subjugated indigenous populations. The narrative of colonial powers was that such native inhabitants were inferior or violent and thus necessitated and justified dominance over these subjects.

As the primary method of European power projection during the age of exploration from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth centuries, postcolonialism is Eurocentric by nature. Theorists present this legacy as explanation for the persisting influence that European ideology and values have on modern global politics and international relations. Within modern international relations, the theory assumes that the legacy of colonialism and imperialism shapes biased and inaccurate Western perceptions of former colonial subjects. Key postcolonial thinker Edward Said expands on this in his book Orientalism, where he describes how contemptuous Western views on the East are directly linked to imperialist legacies.

With former Soviet states remaining volatile, breaking such repressive cycles is key for long term success when such states seek to eliminate insurgencies that have persisted for decades.

Influences of Marxism on postcolonialism is also evident, particularly when examining the assumptions of social divisions. Both theories assume a division with the existence or former existence of an oppressor and oppressed as a key consideration in their explanation of contemporary issues. However, it is important to note that postcolonialism replaces class with race as the divisive factor. Postcolonialism also focuses on the affairs of de-colonized states, long after powers have abandoned them. It is not an emancipatory theory, and its Eurocentrism has been met with criticism by Marxists.

Postcolonialism, though deemed more complex than its critical counterparts such as social, cultural or religious theories, provides an intersection of empire, race, gender, and class to explain contemporary global politics and international relations. It therefore presents itself as an appropriate security analysis tool for the scope of this essay, which will use the former Soviet Union as the imperial power and examine the rival social and political relationships to explain the emergence of Islamic terrorism in the Central Asian states.

Explanatory Power of Postcolonialism Theory on Terrorism

Postcolonialism has been utilized as an explanation of terrorism following the rise in popularity of critical terrorism studies. Its explanation of considers several important factors which are otherwise ignored by traditional studies, which is believed to overemphasize state power, and present inherent biases. A postcolonial assessment of terrorism emphasizes the historical and colonial context in which terrorist groups form and operate. It holds the concept of human control and repression with importance and examines its societal impacts on factors such as religion, ethnicity, and culture. Postcolonial scholars, therefore, contend that the link between discourse, geography, identity, and subjectivity developed in postcolonial theory broadens the knowledge of terrorism and counter terrorism.

In sharp contrast to traditional studies, this criticality of the actions of state behavior has unsurprisingly led to postcolonial scholars criticizing many current policies. A postcolonial critique of the American-led global war on terror is that it is a continuation of past conflicts between the global north and global south. U.S. and allied policies being the modern manifestation of colonialism exercised by the old imperial powers. It adds that modern policies mimic the fundamentals of Said’s Orientalism, with the West maintaining the same views as the colonial powers on the global south: that the population and cultures are less advanced, barbaric, and violent. This perception not only shapes Western foreign policy but also informs domestic security practices in postcolonial states. Russian counterterrorism approaches—particularly in Chechnya and Central Asia—reflect the same historical pattern of repression, reinforcing grievances rather than addressing underlying drivers of radicalization.

Soviet Legacy & Terrorism

Examining the role of the Soviet legacy in understanding the persistence of terrorism in the region is essential. Utilizing the postcolonial perspective to identify the root causes of terrorism in former Soviet states necessitates scrutinizing of the Soviet Union’s historical policies. This can explain the context in which Islamic terrorism in its former territories thrives today. Basing the analysis on root postcolonial ideas such as the impact of human control, cultural repression, and the enforcement of ideologies deemed superior, the responsibility of the presence of religious extremism and separatism can be placed upon the legacy of such policies pursued by the Soviet Union over the course of its existence from 1921 to 1991.

It therefore comes as no surprise that these actions generated significant anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiment among the victims, passing through their descendants and poising contemporary populations in the region to remain hostile to culturally foreign authorities and ideologies.

The Soviet Union inherited the borders of the Russian Empire which had existed for approximately two centuries prior to the removal of the Tsarist regime in 1917. Russian Imperial expansion had over time incorporated several Islamic protectorate states and, within Russian borders, an estimated 20 million Muslims by 1916. Under Imperial rule, Muslim subjects exercised a significant degree of religious and spiritual autonomy, with the establishment of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in the 17th century whose main function involved the control and observance of clerical duties and Islamic education. However, persisting separatist desires among Muslim populations, coupled with tensions exacerbated by the First World War resulted in little support for the deposed Tsarist Regime in 1917. After ousting the provisional government which had permitted Muslim involvement in constituent assembly elections, Bolshevik revolutionaries outlawed this participation. This would be the beginning of Soviet oppression upon the Union’s Islamic population.

Within the first decade of Soviet rule, a significant number of protocols were enforced which rapidly altered the way in which religious activity was practiced, particularly in its Islamic regions. State atheism resulted in the closure of traditional Qur’anic courts, religious schools, and mosques, and the printing of the Qur’an and other religious material was replaced with anti-Islamic material. While this period of religious oppression was at its greatest following the immediate success of the Socialist revolution, it would persist for the remainder of the Soviet Union, with few concessions granted. This restriction of beliefs, according to postcolonialism, is a core activity employed by imperial powers in restructuring perceived primitive societies. In this instance, the Soviet Union perceived both Islam and religion writ large to be incompatible with their class-based, social ideology. While this religious oppression ultimately served to pacify potentially problematic groups within the boundaries of the colonial or imperial state, the Soviet Union inadvertently caused the import of dangerous religious ideology. The lack of traditional Islamic education in Soviet Muslim areas left adherents vulnerable to radical preachers from Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These ideas persist within former Soviet states today, where the postcolonial perspective reveals the historical Soviet religious oppression as a contributing factor to contemporary terrorism.

Prompting further repression was the issue of the national and cultural identity of Soviet citizens, which varied immensely within the Soviet Union. Nationalist sentiment, still lingering from the Tsarist era and long prior, was a primary concern of Soviet authorities, believed that nationalism served to mask ideology and hence were hostile to all forms of national self-expression. Rather, Soviet thinking asserted that the emancipatory message of socialism made no cultural or national distinctions within its message, instead focusing on social class. However, disparities persisted despite this policy, with Lenin stating that the Russian Communist Party had inherited the so-called great power prejudice of Tsarist Russia.

Soviet authorities relied heavily on Russian ‘cultural’ colonists within non-Russian regions of the Union while adopting a chauvinist attitude to local populations. This is further displayed when examining Russian cultural enforcement, such as the implementation of Russian language in the Soviet education system and replacement of Arabic script with Cyrillic within non-Russian regions. Additionally, in an attempt to further remove the perceived nationalist threat, Joseph Stalin reconstructed territorial borderlines to fragment ethnic groups in a practice dubbed ‘ethno-territorial proliferation’. Its intent was to create numerous new ‘nationalities’ that would dissuade conflict by forcing individuals to declare a single nationality. However, nationalist sentiment prevailed, with this failure likely contributing to the root causes of the separatist movements such as that of Ichkeria in Chechnya. It is from this historical and imperialist context where postcolonialism answers how terrorism prevails within these states. These oppressed, initially secular conflicts remain susceptible to the influence of religious extremists who in turn encourage terrorist attacks.

The Soviet Union perceived both Islam and religion writ large to be incompatible with their class-based, social ideology.

In addition to religious and cultural repression, the USSR inflicted more tangible and physical methods of oppression on their ‘undesirables’, ranging from deportation to outright genocide. It therefore comes as no surprise that these actions generated significant anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiment among the victims, passing through their descendants and poising contemporary populations in the region to remain hostile to culturally foreign authorities and ideologies. Particularly, Soviet authorities during the Second World War under the pretext of collaborating with occupying forces, engaged in the mass deportation of ethnic and religious groups considered threating to the Union. Factors suggest that many of these deportations were more closely related to geopolitical strategy and foreign policy rather than the punishment of accused populations. In the case of the Crimean Tartars, this was indeed the case, with Russian settlers colonizing Tartar regions following displacement, as well as renaming and repurposing culturally and religiously significant locations. These acts of colonization further alienated Muslims within Soviet territories who would further engage in stubborn resistance. This has created an unprecedented effect on the decedents of persecuted populations, who maintain a troubled relationship with Russian authority. This in turn may be a cause of terrorist activity within former Soviet states, where these individuals are at a higher risk of succumbing to extremist views and aligning themselves with like-minded groups. Examples can be found as recently as this year, with four Crimean Tartars facing jail time in Russia following their membership with Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Long-standing grievances continue to fuel the appeal of extremist ideology and terrorist movements which have outlasted Soviet rule and continue to shape regional dynamics.

Former Soviet States & Islamic Terrorism

While the threat of Salafi-Jihadi terrorism largely only surfaced in the majority of Western society following the September 11, 2001 attacks, former Soviet states had already been subject to such attacks for nearly a decade. This doctrine asserts the interference of non-Muslim states as the root of a perceived Islamic decline, calling for jihad to reverse injustices and restore prior prosperity. Despite secularist policies, the breakaway Muslim majority Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and its two wars for autonomy against the Russian Federation in the early nineties saw a large influx of foreign Islamic fighters such as Afghan-Arab veterans.

Jihadists with close ties to Al-Qaeda such as Saudi Emir Ibn al-Khattab would, according to Russian authorities, orchestrate attacks such as the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings, which would claim the lives of over 307 Russian civilians. In 2002, Chechen insurgents loyal to Shamil Basayev, a prominent Chechen general and an associate of Al-Khattab, organized the infamous Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis. In the following years, extremist sentiment would come to dominate separatist movements in the region, climaxing in 2007 with the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate. From its mountain fortresses within Chechnya, the Emirate would serve as an anchor point for jihad against Russia and other post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.

In this same year, the threat to Central Asian republics would also increase substantially following the conclusion of the Tajik Civil War which left the shattered region vulnerable to the further cultivation of extremist Islamist ideology. Indeed, despite officially opposing violence, radical Islamist organizations such as Hizb-Ut-Tahrir would find popularity following the Tajik peace agreement, and seek to liberate Muslims from the so-called Judeo-Christian nation state system with a borderless Islamic Caliphate. More traditional extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and their regional affiliate, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, would perpetrate acts of terrorism and share similar goals of establishing an Islamic State. These groups remain active, not only launching attacks within the Central Asian states, but also actively destabilizing regional security via participation in the illicit drug trade.

Despite the Caucasus Emirate and affiliated groups being crippled following large-scale defections to the Islamic State, the shared Salafist doctrine has ensured that Islamic terrorism remains a significant threat to the peace and stability of former Soviet states. These states have been the target of persistent Jihadist propaganda campaigns: Russian is the third most popular language utilized in ISIS propaganda behind Arabic and English. These efforts have evidently succeeded as a significant number of foreign fighters loyal to the Caliphate originate from the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with footage of ISIS training camps in Uzbekistan also surfacing. Additionally, Russia’s controversial involvement in Syria, where since 2015 it has supported the Assad regime against the Islamic State and opposition groups, has ushered further cries for jihadist attacks-for example, the downing of Metrojet flight 9268 and its 224 passengers that same year, exemplifying the Caliphate’s persisting ability to wreak havoc in the region.

Such acts of terror have been the driving factor for influencing regional security posture and counterterrorist policies. Within Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, an international organization comprised of former Soviet states, has sought to address this threat through assistance and shared intelligence via the formation of its Anti-Terrorism Centre in 2000. State policy when managing potentially dangerous Islamist ideas initially varied, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan opting for conciliatory, lenient approaches rather than the swift crackdown measures adopted by their Tajik and Uzbek partners. However, counterterrorism tendencies in Central Asia have begun to converge. Both Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities now perceive all forms of social and political activity within Islam as manifestations of extremism and terrorism, with detention rates of alleged Islamists rising steadily. These threats have additionally drawn the Central Asian republics closer to Russia and their sphere of influence, who they view as the only power in the region that can maintain the security and stability of Central Asia. Although China exists as a notable exception, leading the security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization with its neighbors, it is worth noting that this relationship, particularly between Russia and China, remains equivocal at times.

Basing the analysis on root postcolonial ideas such as the impact of human control, cultural repression, and the enforcement of ideologies deemed superior, the responsibility of the presence of religious extremism and separatism can be placed upon the legacy of such policies pursued by the Soviet Union.

Within Russia, counterterrorist policy emphasizes the heavy application of force with impunity. The Federal Security Service and Ministry of Internal affairs, who have seen a rapid expansion of their powers since the states’ 1991 federation, spearhead this approach. For instance, special task groups have been established whose sole responsibility is the elimination of terrorist threats, which is done without trial or standard legal procedures. Within Chechnya, accusations of kidnappings, summary executions, and torture are frequent, and media liberties can be legally suspended in zones of interest, as laid out in 2006 changes to federal counterterrorism law. Vladimir Putin has continued this hardline approach through both of his presidencies, leading to subsequent criticisms for its incompatibility with other counterterrorist agendas such as that of the United States or European Union. Russia has forbidden any joint operations in its domestic affairs such as its campaign against Islamic State in the North Caucasus, and, while targeting the Caliphate in Syria, closely supported the Assad Regime against the U.S and Turkish-backed rebel opposition.

Conclusion

A postcolonial perspective provides an in-depth analysis into the origins of Islamic terrorism within former Soviet states through consideration of factors frequently overlooked by its contemporaries which ignore the role of the state. With an emphasis on the historical contexts of colonial practices, it explains root causes of contemporary issues, especially the social dynamic between the oppressive and oppressed cultures. This method therefore concludes that terrorism within former Soviet states resulted from the oppressive cultural and religious policies it pursued. Laying the groundwork for the sustainment of extremist ideology and terrorism within the region, such policies have no doubt shaped the regional security picture, as well as influenced broader relationships between states and people groups. Terrorism in Russia and Central Asia is the inheritance of the former Soviet Union’s policies which disrupted traditional Islamic structures, suppressed religious identity and fostered deep-seated grievances that extremist movements continue to exploit.

Contemporary policymakers and strategists should consider the effects of counterterrorism efforts reminiscent of Soviet-era suppression tactics both within the region and more broadly. With former Soviet states remaining volatile, breaking such repressive cycles is key for long term success when such states seek to eliminate insurgencies that have persisted for decades. Postcolonial counterterrorism can therefore be characterized by reconciliation efforts, cultural and religious sensitivity, the reduction of foreign military intervention, and consideration of historical societal grievances. Promising shifts in Central-Asian counterterrorist policy can be identified through the Joint Plan Of Action strategy that aims to align regional efforts with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which heavily emphasizes preventative action. However, continued authoritarianism within the region, reminiscent of the past, is likely to limit any gains made as a result of this policy shift in the long term. Central-Asian states will therefore be required to enact wider governmental reform to address this challenge and lasting deradicalization and reconciliation efforts. Similarly, when examining contemporary developments such as the Syrian transition, policymakers should avoid sectarianism reminiscent of the Ba’athist regime, offer amnesty to former opposition members, and recognize the grievances of religious and ethnic minorities. However, recent atrocities against Alawite civilians suggest that, much like their Central-Asian counterparts, the cycle of repression will continue following an absence of political reform.

Tags: repression, Soviet, Soviet Union, terrorism

About The Author

Christopher S. Kuzma
Christopher S. Kuzma is a student of counterterrorism studies, studying a Bachelor of Social Science in Security and Counterterrorism. Having enlisted as a combat engineer, he has been deployed both domestically and internationally during his tenure with the Australian Army where he developed an understanding of real-world security challenges. He has additionally worked within the veteran support community. In his spare time, he studies Arabic linguistics and possesses a keen research interest in Middle-Eastern politics, irregular warfare, and modern history.

17. NSA Warning—Change Your iPhone And Android Message Settings

Please check your settings.

NSA Warning—Change Your iPhone And Android Message Settings

ByZak Doffman Contributor. Zak Doffman writes about security, surveillance and privacy.https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2025/03/31/nsa-warns-iphone-android-users-change-message-settings/?utm

Mar 31, 2025, 01:04am EDT

Do not make this dangerous messaging mistake

Corbis via Getty Images

Update: Republished on March 31 with a new report into the dangers of secure messaging in the workplace and a twist on WhatsApp versus Signal.

The secure messaging apps on your phone are dangerous. Not because their own security measures are vulnerable to attack — although that does happen, but because their security is only as good as your behavior. And millions of iPhone and Android users don’t realize that simple mistakes can open your phone to attack.

That was the crux of the NSA’s warning that has now been made public and which has been headlined as a Signal vulnerability in the wake of Trump officials inadvertently inviting a journalist onto a sensitive group chat. But it’s not. It’s a user vulnerability. The NSA notification is a warning to change messaging settings. Nothing more.

The NSA warning last month was prompted by Google’s Threat Intelligence Group discovering Russia’s GRU was tricking Ukrainian officials into opening access to their Signal accounts, allowing the Russians to listen in. This wasn’t a Signal flaw — the app was working as intended. And it wasn’t limited to Signal. Google warned “this threat also extends to other popular messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram.”

The two “vulnerabilities” relate to features in both Signal and WhatsApp that make them easier to use. Linked Devices and Group Links. The first enables you to sync and access your secure messaging apps on all your eligible devices. The second provides a simple way for you to invite new members into a group chat by sending them a link, rather than adding them one-by-one from within the group.

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The Group Link threat only extends to the group itself, and is easily mitigated. In Signal, disable the Group Link from within the group’s settings. In WhatsApp you don’t have that option, but do not use links for sensitive groups; you should also set sensitive groups in WhatsApp such that only Admins can add members.

The Linked Devices option is much more dangerous as it can establish a fully sync’d replica of your messaging app on someone else’s device. But again this risk is easily mitigated. In both apps there is a clear settings menu entitled “Linked Devices.” Go there now and unlink any device you don’t 100% recognize as belonging to you. If in doubt, remove. You can always add it back later if you make a mistake. On both apps, your primary phone is the base and all other devices can be linked and unlinked there.

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There is a twist to this. In the Russian attack, the Signal group invite link was hijacked to link a device instead, a vulnerability in the invite coding and mechanics, but not the app itself. But there is no way for someone to link a device without it showing in your settings per above. Regularly checking those links is key. It’s also worth periodically unlinking browser “web app” links (as opposed to apps) and relinking. The other advice is to not click group links unless they’re expected and you can vouch for the sender.

The NSA’s other messaging advice should be common sense. Set and regularly change your app PIN and enable the screen lock. Do not share contact or status info, certainly not outside your contacts. The DOD agency also recommends keeping phone and app contacts a separate, albeit that’s painful for everyday use.

The concept of secure messaging is widely misunderstood. End-to-end encryption is a transmission safeguard. Content is scrambled by your device and unscrambled when it reaches a recipient. Each end (phones in a chat) is vulnerable to a compromise of that device, a user saving content, or the wrong person invited into a group. None of these apps are bulletproof if your other security is flawed or you make a mistake.

NSA is not alone in calling out Signal as the headline act when it comes to secure commercial messaging platforms used by politicians and other officials. America’s cyber defense agency did the same in the wake of China’s Salt Typhoon hacks on U.S. networks. “Use only end-to-end encrypted communications,” CISA said. “Adopt a free messaging application for secure communications that guarantees end-to-end encryption, such as Signal or similar app.”

With interesting timing, WhatsApp — the most popular secure messenger worldwide, which uses the same Signal encryption protocol and Signals itself — has just made that easier. iPhone users can now select WhatsApp as their default texting and calling app. The platform update that delivers this new capability is rolling out this weekend. In Settings — Apps, select “Default Apps” and change “Messaging and “Calls” options.

But again, that doesn’t change the user/device vulnerability that will always leave secure messaging at risk. “The biggest risk of eavesdropping on a Signal conversation comes from the individual phones that the app is running on,” says Foreign Policy. “While it’s largely unclear whether the U.S. officials involved had downloaded the app onto personal or government-issued phones… smartphones are consumer devices, not at all suitable for classified U.S. government conversations.”

This is especially acute given that “an entire industry of spyware companies sells capabilities to remotely hack smartphones for any country willing to pay.” These are the forensic exploits that have plagued iPhones and Androids this year. And so just as it’s critical to apply the right messaging settings, it’s also critical to keep your phone updated, to avoid risky apps, and to stop clicking on links or unexpected attachments.

While Signal has taken the bulk of the headlines given the attack thread in the U.S., in reality it’s WhatsApp that’s the much bigger problem. “It’s a WhatsApp world at work now,” per the Financial Times, “and that’s not always a good thing.”

As the newspaper reports, gone are the days “you could leave [work] apps to ping away all weekend, knowing the pingers were unlikely to be asking anything more taxing than what time to meet for coffee or whether there was milk in the fridge. Those days are gone. Some time before Covid, office colleagues and work contacts began to send messages over apps once confined to social life.”

And WhatsApp is very much top of that list. Ironically, the only key market that has been a holdout against it has been the U.S., where iMessage has remained the dominant secure messaging platform. But even that is now changing, with Meta publicly celebrating WhatsApp passing 100 million U.S. users last summer.

“At some point,” the FT points out, “it no longer seemed wrong to WhatsApp one’s manager, and then add a thumbs up emoji. This seemed entirely sensible at this strange, disconnected time. A few years on though, it also feels as if a dividing line between work and social life has been breached.”

Ironically, Signalgate has prompted a gentle spat between WhatsApp and Signal as to which is the more secure app to trade and keep secrets. “There are big differences between Signal and WhatsApp,” Signal boss Meredith Whittaker posted, after WhatsApp boss Will Cathcart pointed out both use the same core encryption and could therefore be seen in the same bracket, notwithstanding Meta’s ownership.

“Signal is the gold standard in private comms,” Whittaker said. “WhatsApp licenses Signal’s cryptography to protect message contents for consumer WhatsApp,” albeit the same level of security doesn’t apply to business comms. “Don’t misunderstand — we love that WhatsApp uses our tech to raise the privacy bar of their app. Part of Signal’s mission is to set, and encourage the tech ecosystem to meet, this high privacy bar. But these are key differences when it comes to meaningful privacy and the public deserves to understand them, given the stakes. Not have them clouded in marketing.”

But it’s WhatsApp we need to turn to for the purest irony in this whole story. Just a few days before The Atlantic published its shocking revelations as to its inadvertent eavesdropping on a government “eyes only” Signal group chat, its rival platform posted on X: “As an admin, are you letting group members add other people to the chat?” Just that, nothing more. It’s almost as if the entire furor could have been foretold. Not that whoever really added reporter Jeffrey Goldberg was or wasn’t an admin, just that the risk of those group invites is out there and requires some attention.

The bottom line though is very simple. Whether WhatsApp or Signal, both are secure and recommended for use — if used properly. Set them up wrong — either of them, or neglect core phone updates, settings and secure usage, and both will fail. You can read the NSA’s full advisory here. Take heed and make sure you keep your work plans, your party plans and even your war plans secret.

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18. How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage

NATO conducting important operations.

Excerpts:

While patrolling for saboteurs, NATO ships maintain many normal routines. The Hinnoy crew regularly drills defensive measures to fend off assaults from small boats—like the suicide bombers who killed 17 U.S. sailors on the USS Cole in the Persian Gulf in 2000. Two of Johannessen’s sailors boarded a speedboat to pose as attackers zooming toward the ship. Other young men and women in the crew donned combat gear and fired off red plastic blanks from machine guns around the deck.

The Hinnoy, the Luymes and ships from Sweden, France and Belgium in Kockx’s task force also drill for coordination at sea to improve operational readiness. Officers say they are already seeing results, cutting their response time upon learning of suspicious activity to one hour, from 17 hours in October.

Still, daily operations are complicated because so many countries and offices are potentially involved.

“There’s a complicated mix of authorities that belong to ministries of the interior, coast guards, police, international organizations, commercial organizations…And, in each case, we work very carefully with the relevant authority,” said Cavoli, the NATO commander, on launching Baltic Sentry.

Officials hope that ship crews bent on damage who last year might have thought they could get away undetected or unpunished will now fear consequences and, at least, losing money by being detained.

“We can’t put a ship over each mile of infrastructure,” said Markussen. “It is deterrence we are working on.”

How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage

Baltic Sentry mission taps ships, planes and drones to police one of the world’s busiest waterways

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nato-russia-undersea-cable-pipeline-prevention-212d93ff?mod=latest_headlines

By Daniel Michaels

| Photographs by Marzena Skubatz for WSJ

March 30, 2025 11:00 pm ET

ABOARD THE HNLMS LUYMES—Belgian Navy Commander Erik Kockx was patrolling the Baltic Sea recently when he got word that a ship on NATO’s watchlist was acting in a suspicious manner. After leaving a Russian port, it had slowed down while passing near a pipeline on the sea bottom. The Luymes sailed toward the tanker to investigate.

Kockx leads a task force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s new mission to police the inland sea that its members share with Russia. NATO in January launched the operation, dubbed Baltic Sentry, after a string of undersea cables and pipelines were damaged by ships—many with links to Russia—that had dragged their anchors.

“We are functioning as security cameras at sea,” said Kockx, whose usual duty is clearing unexploded mines from the busy waterway.

No proof has been found that Moscow ordered or orchestrated the destruction, according to officials familiar with the investigations, though suspicion of it runs high in NATO countries.

Baltic Sentry taps at least 10 ships under NATO command at any given time and splits them into two task groups. It also uses many more ships from the navies, coast guards and police forces of the eight alliance countries bordering the Baltic. New undersea drones are keeping a watchful eye on pipes and cables. NATO surveillance planes from the U.S., France, Germany and occasionally the U.K. take turns scanning the seaway from high above. NATO has also strengthened its military presence on the Baltic, said U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, who serves as supreme allied commander for Europe and launched the mission.

Many of the units involved were already performing similar duties. Now they communicate and cooperate much more, orchestrated by the Centre for Critical Undersea Infrastructure that NATO’s Allied Military Command established last year, officials say.

The mine-hunter Hinnoy belongs to Norway’s navy. Belgian officer Erik Kockx, in blue, commands a task force of several ships within Baltic Sentry.

Baltic Sentry has largely relied on European forces, but late last month a U.S. Marine Corps detachment of around 40 Marines arrived in Finland for what NATO calls vigilance exercises, entailing drones and small craft. The unit, which is operating alongside Finnish forces, is practicing small-island skills that could prove useful in other regions, such as the Pacific, officials say.

NATO’s goal is to prevent more damage to subsea infrastructure and respond faster if something occurs. In a twist more familiar to police forces and intelligence agencies than militaries, success translates into a lack of action; cops and spies can be most effective when they prevent bad things from happening.

When Kockx’s ship recently approached the suspect tanker, which was part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” of illicit fuel transporters, it regained speed and sailed on.

“It’s quite difficult to prove that our presence helps. It’s hard to say that if we hadn’t been there, something would have occurred,” said Kockx as cargo ships floated by in the distance. But just as drivers become more attentive when they see a police car, “we’ve seen behavior get better,” he said of seamanship. “Ships know they’re being watched.”

In a sign of Baltic Sentry’s unusual nature, the ship Kockx used to inspect the suspect tanker wasn’t a combat vessel. It was a Royal Dutch Navy hydrographic survey ship normally used to inspect the sea bottom. The Baltic, a central theater in two world wars, is littered with wrecks and explosives that still pose danger. Surrounding NATO members are world leaders in finding and disposing of sea mines, officials say.

Today the Luymes’s advanced sonar, submersible probes and other gear are valuable for checking on cables and pipelines. As a precaution, the ship also carries two .50-caliber machine guns mounted on its deck.

The Luymes, a survey ship, carries scanning equipment that NATO uses to check on subsea cables and pipes.

Commercial traffic on the Baltic ranks among the world’s densest, with more than 1,500 ships plying its waves on any day, so policing it all is difficult. Further complicating NATO’s sentry duty initially was a lack of comprehensive information about all the critical infrastructure snaking across the sea’s muddy bottom. Details of pipes and cables have traditionally been kept by national governments or private companies. Nobody had a picture of everything.

“We had a very steep learning curve,” said Royal Danish Navy Capt. Niels Markussen, director of the NATO Shipping Centre at Allied Maritime Command outside London.

NATO’s new undersea infrastructure center last year assembled the first unified map of the Baltic’s floor. It tapped in-house software developers to create an application powered by artificial intelligence to analyze traffic patterns, both current and historic, dubbed Mainsail.

“If you know what the norm is, you can more easily identify what’s not normal,” said Royal Norwegian Navy Lt. Cmdr. Dani Johannessen, commanding officer of the speedy mine hunter HNoMS Hinnoy. NATO’s mix of AI and human vigilance aims to flag unusual behavior such as how ships navigate, the ports at which they call, and their reactions to radio calls from patrolling ships.

Catastrophic Earthquakes Test Myanmar Junta’s Grip on Power

Regime has been weakened by a yearslong civil war, now millions are counting on it to allow emergency aid

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/catastrophic-earthquakes-test-myanmar-juntas-grip-on-power-83ffb77b?mod=latest_headlines

By Feliz Solomon

Updated March 30, 2025 5:35 pm ET

Myanmar junta soldiers during a ceremony earlier this week. Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The wave of violent earthquakes that tore through central Myanmar has brought the biggest challenges yet to a military junta already strained by years of rebellion and economic isolation.

How the generals handle the emerging catastrophe could make or break their grip on power. The quakes struck Myanmar’s central heartlands near the city of Mandalay, a centuries-old center of Buddhist learning and home to some 1.2 million people. They crumbled temples, bridges and roads in the capital Naypyitaw and trapped countless people under the rubble.

The hardest-hit regions are important power centers for the junta, which, according to independent monitoring groups, controls less than half of Myanmar’s territory. Pro-democracy fighters and decades-old ethnic militias have waged a grinding rebellion against the military since a 2021 coup that plunged the Southeast Asian country into the latest in a series of humanitarian and political crises.

The junta said Sunday that at least 2,028 people had been confirmed dead and 3,408 injured. Early modeling from the U.S. Geological Survey suggested that the number of earthquake deaths in central Myanmar could rise to tens of thousands and that economic losses might surpass the value of the country’s gross domestic product. Aftershocks continued over the weekend, including a 5.1-magnitude tremor just north of Mandalay on Sunday.

An earthquake-damaged building in the Myanmar city of Mandalay on Saturday. Photo: sai aung main/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The quakes caused damage hundreds of miles away in neighboring Thailand. Photo: rungroj yongrit/Shutterstock

For some of Myanmar’s 55 million people, the quake’s destruction and loss of life awakened memories of an earlier natural disaster that struck in 2008 and ushered in an exceptional, if short-lived, chapter of political change.

That year, Cyclone Nargis descended on the nation’s coast and took the lives of at least 100,000 people as the regime played down the storm’s severity. Myanmar at the time was ruled by another reclusive and repressive military junta, which blocked international aid for weeks while it rushed through a referendum designed to cement its power.

Still, the severity of the crisis ultimately pushed the generals to engage with the United Nations, and is widely considered a watershed moment that helped lay the groundwork for Myanmar’s first democratic elections in a quarter-century in 2015.

“Many in Myanmar, steeped in superstition, may interpret natural disasters as cosmic retribution for failed leadership, an undercurrent that may erode the military’s standing further,” said Min Zaw Oo, executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, a policy think tank.

The official death toll of Cyclone Nargis stands around 85,000, although the U.N. has said more than 130,000 people died.

Trump aide says tariffs will raise $6 trillion as White House readies plan

As investors brace for sweeping new tariffs on Wednesday, administration officials say they are studying a historic increase in import duties.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/03/30/trump-tariffs-6-trillion-navarro/

UpdatedMarch 30, 2025 at 4:24 p.m. EDTyesterday at 4:24 p.m. EDT

4 min

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White House adviser Peter Navarro is among the most hawkish voices on trade in President Donald Trump's inner circle. (Matt McClain/The Washington Post)

By Jeff Stein

White House aide Peter Navarro claimed Sunday that President Donald Trump’s new tariffs would raise more than $6 trillion in federal revenue over the next decade, a figure that experts said would almost certainly represent the largest peacetime tax hike in modern U.S. history.

Appearing on Fox News, Navarro said the president’s tariffs on auto imports, set to take effect Wednesday, would raise $100 billion per year. Meanwhile, a regime of additional tariffs — details of which have yet to be released — would raise another $600 billion per year, or $6 trillion over the next decade, Navarro said.

Navarro’s remarks suggest Trump is preparing dramatic new measures for Wednesday, which the president has referred to as “Liberation Day.” Navarro is among the most hawkish voices on trade in the president’s inner circle, and it was not immediately clear whether he was previewing official administration policy or speaking for one side of an internal debate over the tariffs.

Also speaking on Fox News on Sunday, Kevin Hassett, director of the White House National Economic Council, declined to outline Trump’s tariff plans.

“I can’t give you any forward-looking guidance on what’s going to happen this week,” said Hassett, who is widely regarded as more skeptical of tariffs than Navarro. “The president has got a heck of a lot of analysis before him, and he’s going to make the right choice, I’m sure.”

Whatever the case, Navarro’s comments are sure to rattle markets amid intensifying fears about the global trade war Trump has touched off since taking office in January. Though investors had appeared to cheer Trump’s return to the White House, markets have since tumbled, with the benchmark S&P 500 on track to finish the first quarter down about 5 percent.

Tariffs are taxes imposed on foreign goods imported into the United States. A tariff regime that generated $600 billion per year would amount to the biggest increase in federal tax revenue since World War II, according to budget expert Jessica Riedl, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a center-right think tank.

“We’ve never seen a president propose such a drastic tax increase at a time where there is no national emergency requiring it” and the economy is already slowing, Riedl said. “You just do not hear numbers like $6 trillion over 10 years in legislation or executive orders.”

By way of comparison, the U.S. is set to spend nearly $900 billion on the Pentagon this year. Extending Trump’s 2017 tax cuts is projected to cost roughly $4 trillion over the next decade, adding roughly $400 billion a year to the national debt.

Generating $600 billion a year in fresh revenue theoretically would cover the cost of those tax cuts and then some. But economists say new taxes of that magnitude also could deepen instability on Wall Street and further increase the risk of a U.S. recession.

The Trump administration argues that steep tariffs are necessary to bring production and manufacturing jobs back to the United States. “The message is tariffs are tax cuts. Tariffs are jobs. Tariffs are national security,” Navarro said. “Tariffs will make America great again.”

Navarro offered no details to explain his enormous revenue projection. But Trump has in recent days revived the idea of imposing a single universal rate on all imports to the United States, regardless of the product or the country of origin. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump proposed setting this flat tariff rate as high as 20 percent.

Because the U.S. imports more than $3 trillion worth of goods per year, simple math suggests that a 20 percent import tax on all goods could raise close to $600 billion in annual revenue. However, economists argue that such a tax ultimately would raise far less because the costs would be passed on to American consumers in the form of higher prices, and consumers would therefore purchase fewer imported goods.

In an interview with NBC on Saturday, Trump nodded to this effect, saying he “couldn’t care less” if his auto tariffs raise prices, because higher prices on imports would encourage people to buy American-made cars instead.

Economists in both parties have heavily criticized a universal flat tariff, arguing that it would raise prices indiscriminately, striking even some goods — such as food and cheap consumer electronics — that either cannot be produced in America or make little sense to produce domestically.

This month, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent outlined a more moderate approach to “Liberation Day” that calls for the United States to determine a new tariff policy for its each of its key trading partners, leaving room for negotiations and dealmaking. But Trump has told advisers in recent days that he is wary of being insufficiently ambitious with his tariff policy, and it remains unclear precisely what Wednesday will bring.

Justin Jouvenal and Brianna Tucker contributed to this report.

What readers are saying

The comments overwhelmingly criticize the proposed universal flat tariff, suggesting it would act as a regressive tax on American consumers, disproportionately affecting the middle and lower classes while benefiting the wealthy. Many commenters argue that the tariffs would lead... Show more

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By Jeff Stein

Jeff Stein is the White House economics reporter for The Washington Post. He was a crime reporter for the Syracuse Post-Standard and, in 2014, founded the local news nonprofit the Ithaca Voice in Upstate New York. He was also a reporter for Vox.follow on X@jstein_wapo

21. Pentagon chief Hegseth says 'warrior' Japan indispensable to deter China

Pentagon chief Hegseth says 'warrior' Japan indispensable to deter China

channelnewsasia.com

30 Mar 2025 10:20AM

(Updated: 30 Mar 2025 02:40PM)

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who is in Asia on his first official visit, called Japan a "cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific".

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (centre left) and Gen Nakatani, Japan's defence minister, during a welcome ceremony at the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo, Japan, on Mar 30, 2025. (Photo: Reuters: Kiyoshi Ota)

TOKYO: US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said on Sunday (Mar 30) that Japan was indispensable in tackling Chinese aggression by helping Washington establish a "credible" deterrence in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait.

"We share a warrior ethos that defines our forces," Hegseth told Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani at a meeting in Tokyo.

Calling Japan a "cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific", the Pentagon indicated that President Donald Trump's government would, like past administrations, continue to work closely with its key Asian ally.

Japan hosts around 50,000 US military personnel, fighter squadrons and Washington's only forward deployed aircraft carrier strike group along a 3,000km archipelago that helps hem in Chinese military power.

Hegseth's praise of Japan contrasts with the criticism he levelled at European allies in February, telling them they should not assume the US presence there would last forever.

Hegseth, who is in Asia on his first official visit, travelled to Japan from the Philippines. On Saturday he attended a memorial service on Iwo Jima, the site 80 years ago of fierce fighting between US and Japanese forces during World War Two.

Source: Reuters/ao

22. Asia Responds to Washington's 'Global War on Trade'

An ominous subtitle below.

The new "GWOT."

Business/Economy

Asia Responds to Washington's 'Global War on Trade'

More damage likely than from Global War on Terror

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/asia-respond-washington-global-war-trade?utm_

Mar 31, 2025

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

In late March, the Foreign Ministers of Japan, South Korea, and China met in Tokyo to reinforce the importance of regional peace, agreeing that maintaining cooperation in the Korean peninsula was a shared responsibility. The United States, which has 28,500 US military personnel in South Korea and works closely with South Korean troops, did not attend.

Top trade officials from all three countries were to meet again this weekend in Seoul. South Korea’s Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun hosted the meeting with Japan’s Yoji Muto and China’s Wang Wentao on Sunday, the first such gathering among the three nations in five years. More importantly, these meetings are taking place against the larger backdrop of US tariffs.

Whereas Japan has been hit by several tariffs pertaining to the export of steel to the US, recently imposed tariffs on automobiles are going to hurt both Japan and South Korea. The ongoing ‘global war on trade’ (GWOT), an acronym bearing a remarkable similarity to the notorious ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT), is not merely a policy. For countries affected by it, including close US allies like Japan, it presents a geopolitical shift.

China is obviously a key target of US tariffs and perhaps the central player in the ongoing GWOT. But the ‘War on Trade’ may prove to be a lot more disruptive than the ‘War on Terror’ because Washington is waging it not primarily against non-state actors but against proper states, many of them its allies, and their economies. Some of these states not only have the capability to respond in the same manner but, more importantly, they can – and are already seeking to – recalibrate their ties with the US and with other states being affected by the trade war.

In other words, enemies and rivals are being rethought as friends. As Japan’s foreign minister said after he met with his counterparts from South Korea and China: “The international situation has become increasingly severe, and it is no exaggeration to say that we are at a turning point in history,” making it extremely “important than ever to make efforts to overcome division and confrontation.”

China’s Wang Yi noted this year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, saying “only by sincerely reflecting on history can we better build the future.” This is leading to many fresh starts. After the trilateral meeting, China and Japan also held their first so-called “high-level economic dialogue” in six years.

“The global economy is facing serious changes. Unilateralism and protectionism are spreading,” Wang told reporters, adding that “China and Japan, as major economies, should pursue development and cooperation together with innovative thinking and bring stability to a world full of uncertainty.”

The uncertainty is not simply rhetorical. For instance, due to fresh tariffs on the export of automobiles to the US, Japan’s car industry is predicting a critical impact, leading to major dips in the shares. The world's top-selling automaker, Toyota, closed down 2.0 percent, while Nissan shed 1.7 percent and Honda was off 2.5 percent. In South Korea, Hyundai shares dipped 4.0 percent. According to some estimates, Japan’s overall car production could see a more than 4 percent decline due to these tariffs. In 2024, Japan's automobile exports to the US totaled about US$40 billion, making up 28.3 percent of its exports to the country. In 2024, South Korea's exports of automobiles to the US stood at $34.7 billion, accounting for 49 percent of its total auto exports.

While these countries are in the middle of dealing with these tariffs and their impact, their biggest trouble probably lies in the White House, currently occupied by an extremely unpredictable political leadership relentlessly pushing economic nationalism at the expense of multilateralism. In some ways, multilateralism simply does not matter. Therefore, some form of ignorance about it within the Trump administration is also warranted. When Pete Hegseth appeared before the UC Congress for his confirmation hearing, he failed to name any single member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

What is even more ironic is that the association includes several states such as the Philippines with deep military ties with Washington. The total ignorance of the US defense minister, otherwise responsible for cultivating defence ties for the furtherance of US strategic interests, serves as a good context for ASEAN member countries to reorient themselves in ways that, for instance, reinforce a more regionally focused approach to issues pertaining to trade and territory than a more globally focused, Washington-backed approach to ‘contain’ China.

How well was Hegseth received in Japan during his maiden visit? Was he able to achieve anything meaningful? First of all, what he offered was the usual, worn and torn rhetoric of ‘countering China.’ Japan is itself doing that, not only by engaging with China but also by deciding to beef up its own military capability. Japanese officials are cognizant of US demands for spending more on joint defense. But Japan is keen to invest more in building its own national capacity.

With a focus on China, however, Hegseth’s message to Manila and Tokyo was to “reassure” these countries of continued US support. But these countries have questions about the reliability of US support in the wake of US attempts to damage their economies simultaneously. The fact that Hegeseth’s talks included no reference to the key source, i.e., tariffs, introducing nervousness and instability to the alliance, shows why the prospects of keeping things as usual are grim.

Reports show Japanese political elites divided on ties with the US. One Japanese official said Tokyo faces a difficult time because some of the country’s assumptions about the alliance in recent decades “suddenly look like they are not supported by the language coming out of the White House,” adding that there is a camp in Tokyo that believes real problems in the US will emerge in the future. The second camp believes that those problems are already here.

But no camp believes these problems can be effectively overcome. The same official said, “It is very hard to say that you can definitely rely on the US now, and as soon as you allow that thought to exist, you have to admit that Japan needs to do a lot more to defend itself.”

These thoughts are not limited to Japan. They may not be as pronounced in other traditional US allies, but they are there. Trump himself is reinforcing these ideas. When he recently said that the US would sell a toned-down version of the F-47, a new fighter jet being developed by Boeing, to allies because “someday maybe they’re not our allies,” he basically indicated that he doesn’t see any current US allies, including in Asia, as permanent US allies.

Given this, it makes a lot more sense for countries like Japan to not only review their ties with Washington but also to find alternatives. Importantly, because China is being equally – and perhaps even more – hurt by Washington’s trade war, regional countries are likely finding Beijing’s elites a lot more amenable than they otherwise would be.

23. Army reconsidering prepositioned stock strategy, 'doubling down' on Indo-Pacific, general says

Army reconsidering prepositioned stock strategy, 'doubling down' on Indo-Pacific, general says - Breaking Defense

Army Materiel Command Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan said the service could disband a floating, mobile cache of weapons and equipment and instead distribute them in friendly territory.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 28, 2025

After completion of Balikatan 2022, all military vehicles from the Army Prepositioned Stock 3, military vehicles assigned to the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade are successfully uploaded to the U.S. Navy Ship Red Cloud at Subic Bay, Philippines April 11, 2022. (Photo by Master Sgt. Shelia Fourman, 8th Theater Sustainment Command)

GLOBAL FORCE 2025 — The US Army is “having the conversation” about the future of its global prepositioned stocks strategy, and is weighing jettisoning its only floating, mobile cache in favor of putting those arms and equipment in friendly territory somewhere in the Indo-Pacific region, according to a three-star general.

“That’s predecisional still,” acting commanding general of Army Materiel Command, Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan, emphasized to Breaking Defense on Wednesday. “We are having the conversation about APS [Army Prepositioned Stocks] strategy… [and] we’re doubling down on INDOPACOM from a theater standpoint. Where do we have APS around the world and what lessons have we learned with the utilization APS in Ukraine?”

There are currently seven Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) aligned with different regions around the globe, including APS-4 for Northeast Asia and APS-5 for Southwest Asia. But it’s APS-3 afloat, which consists of seven ships chock full of equipment that currently could be called on for use in Europe, the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific, that could be on the chopping block.

The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training, or G-3, is currently leading that APS strategy overhaul with Mohan’s team also involved.

If Pentagon leaders ultimately sunset the floating APS, Mohan said the service is eyeing plans to distribute the equipment sets throughout the region. That means identifying the countries to place distributed sets, and then, potentially, inking agreements with those individual countries.

“[It’s] more challenging in INDOPACOM, because it’s bilateral versus having an alliance,” Mohan said. “It’s easy to say we’re going to put APS in Germany, and then we’re going to employ it in Lithuania, Poland, because they have the Schengen zone.”

In recent years Army leaders have tested logistics assumptions for the afloat APS in various exercises and events like Talisman Sabre 2023 in Australia.

For that exercise, the Army used five unit sets worth of equipment, which is basically about a third of one ship. But it’s not as easy as pulling the ship up to a pier offloading the weapons.

Australia’s strict agricultural inspection guidelines require the inspection of all military equipment entering the country for pests, meaning the service spent months preparing, according to Maj. Gen. Jered Helwig, who at the time of the exercise was leading the 8th Theater Sustainment Command. (Helwig now has a third star and is the deputy commander for US Transportation Command.)

Army Abrams tanks and other equipment from APS 3 that would be used in the exercise had to first go to Hawaii for a deep cleaning. The equipment was then loaded back onto the ship with an agricultural inspector onboard outfitted with pesticides standing guard until they arrived in Australia. It’s an ecological precaution for which there doesn’t seem to be an exception.

“If we went to war, would [Australia] really make us do it? And we [vehemently] think, ‘Yes.’ We’ve seen this in Europe,” Helwig added.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 28, 2025

24. Signal For Secure Comms: Convenience Over Security Without The Record-Keeping

Signal For Secure Comms: Convenience Over Security Without The Record-Keeping

We talked to experts about what secure communications options key decision makers have and why Signal is an attractive but highly problematic solution.

Howard Altman

Posted on Mar 28, 2025

twz.com · by Howard Altman

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News that discussions among the U.S. government’s top decisions makers about a looming attack on Houthi rebels in Yemen took place on the commercially available Signal messaging app raised a lot of concerns and burning questions. Among these were why was Signal used to talk about such a sensitive matter when there were other more secure, government-provided options available? What were these options and what reasons could possibly exist as to why they were not used? After the news broke, we set out to at least try to get the answer to these questions and more. Here’s what we found out.

Several experts we contacted, including a former acting defense secretary, a retired special operations forces officer and a government secrecy reform advocate, attempted to answer the question of why Signal became the go-to platform for a discussion that included operational details before the mission was launched. Their responses don’t condone the actions, nor do they paint a complete picture of what transpired, because this remains a developing story with a lot of unknowns. However, they offer insights into the technology available to America’s often on-the-go leadership and some perspective on features Signal provides that no government system can — by law.

The actions and the controversy

The mission against the Houthis, launched on March 15, turned out to be successful, according to the Pentagon and the White House. However, the use of Signal, brought to light by The Atlantic after its editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg was somehow added to the group chat called “Houthi PC small group,” sparked widespread concerns about how the Trump administration’s most senior leaders handle sensitive information. The messages included deliberations about whether to attack and when. Later in the text chain, they also featured a play-by-play summary of when the strikes would be launched and by what platforms, which was posted by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. They also mentioned at least one targeted individual.

Beyond these details, the chat, which was setup by National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, also contained several disparaging remarks about allies made by Hegseth and Vice President J.D. Vance. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and other top leaders were also included in the chat.

The Atlantic revelation spurred several investigations into the matter.

New — Here’s the Wicker-Reed letter asking the DoD IG to investigate the Signal chat

First (and likely only) bipartisan congressional inquiry on the matter pic.twitter.com/jx7bwGPfl2

— Andrew Desiderio (@AndrewDesiderio) March 27, 2025

After all, those officials could have used a government desktop terminal in a secure facility to share information over hardened networks like the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) and the Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR). Another option could have been a government-issued laptop, tablet or mobile phone designed to access portions of those systems while on the go, depending on the sensitivity of the information. Secure video conferencing is also available in facilities with the proper infrastructure. So why use a messaging app not meant for classified communications and one that the Defense Department (DoD), NSA and Google had issued security alerts about weeks ago, and in the case of the DoD, a day earlier? The NSA warned that even information not categorized as classified should not be shared on Signal, according to a memo obtained by CBS News advising users not to share “unclassified, nonpublic” information on the messaging platform.

#BREAKING @CBSNews obtained an internal NSA bulletin from Feb. 2025—a month before the Houthi chat—which warns NSA employees of using Signal, adding, that that the app should “NOT” be used for communicating CUI, unclassified, protected information. https://t.co/1pcMZFSa2C

— Jim LaPorta (@JimLaPorta) March 25, 2025

While offering relatively secure encrypted end-to-end communications, the Signal app is not approved for the transmission of classified or even sensitive information, nor does it meet the legally required standards for retention of such data.

During previously scheduled congressional hearings about the U.S. intelligence community, Ratcliffe and Gabbard argued that there was no discussion of classified information.

Signal “is a permissible use” application that has been approved by the White House for use by senior officials, Ratcliffe testified, adding that he was given a CIA laptop pre-loaded with the app. The group chat, he acknowledged, was a “mechanism for communicating between senior level officials but not a substitute for using high side or classified communications.” The Pentagon issued a statement on Hegseth’s behalf asserting that there was no exchange of classified information. He made the same argument in an interview, saying he was merely sharing an update.

One more time…

I see war plans every single day. No one is texting war plans. pic.twitter.com/ujU7IvHGmL

— Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (@SecDef) March 26, 2025

Several national security experts, however, suggested that by including the timetable, method, means and targets of the attack against the Houthis, Hegseth did inject clearly classified information into the Signal chat.

There is a debate about whether the operational details Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shared in the Signal Group Chat were "classified" or not. So I surveyed a range of current and former US defense officials who agreed "war plans" is not the right term but what was shared may…

— Jennifer Griffin (@JenGriffinFNC) March 26, 2025

The information Secretary of Defense Hegseth disclosed in the Signal chat was classified at the time he wrote it, especially because the operation had not even started yet, according to a US defense official and another source who was briefed on the operation.

“It is safe to say… https://t.co/y7gArrI6ca

— Natasha Bertrand (@NatashaBertrand) March 26, 2025

Even the ODNI’s guidelines seem to back up that contention.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence Classification Guide disagrees. https://t.co/YTaRgtwMYq pic.twitter.com/vjgwyVnjXz

— Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) March 26, 2025

President Donald Trump called the matter “a witch hunt” and said Hegseth “is doing a great job.”

Trump on Signal-Gate: Hegseth is doing a great job, he had nothing to do with this. Hegseth? How do you bring Hegseth into it? He had nothing to do with it. pic.twitter.com/pEe46PQI4T

— Acyn (@Acyn) March 26, 2025

Meanwhile, Democrats accused the administration of lying about the classified nature of information in the chat.

Trump’s Director of National Intelligence and CIA Director weren’t straight with us yesterday. The full Signal conversation proves it. pic.twitter.com/O9Sljkxhxu

— Senator Mark Kelly (@SenMarkKelly) March 26, 2025

The Atlantic changed its headline from “War Plans” to “Attack Plans” on the follow-up article in which Goldberg provided the full transcript of the chat after Tuesday’s brutal Senate hearing with Gabbard and Ratcliffe. After the additional details were released, it became clearer that the leak did not contain highly detailed war plans as originally insinuated, even though what was being discussed was still of an extremely sensitive nature.

Unclear Signal

The major concerns about Signal are security and records retention. Being end-to-end encrypted, its messages are relatively protected when sent over networks. That level of security is so high that the Swedish military last month urged troops to use it for non-classified messaging “to make it more difficult to intercept calls and messages sent via the telephone network.”

However, should the phone itself be compromised by being lost and unlocked or hit by a certain phishing attack or hack for instance, those messages would be available to unwanted individuals. Just being on Signal enabled Goldberg, a journalist, to inadvertently get access to the chat, one he would otherwise not have been part of on a government system. In addition, using Signal in a public location exposes chat content to anyone trying to sneak a peak if there is a clear line of sight to the device. Moreover, the fact that Signal messages can be set up to disappear forever after a prescribed amount of time makes it wholly unsuitable under federal data retention laws.

Convenience was likely a big factor in the choice to use Signal despite these security risks and prohibitions, several sources told us. It is far easier to whip out a cell phone wherever you are than to have to go into a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), a secure and electromagnetically hardened room or area used to store, process, and discuss highly classified information. Phones and electronic devices are not even allowed inside. Meanwhile, government-issued mobile devices, as former Biden administration Chief Information Officer Theresa Payton noted, “are difficult to navigate by design.”

Classified channels are difficult to navigate by design. Despite the fact that Signal use was approved and encouraged under the Biden administration and inherited by this administration, Signal is NOT one of the channels meant to be used for classified communications. pic.twitter.com/GabDjf4k1v

— Theresa Payton ✪ (@TrackerPayton) March 27, 2025

Cabinet secretaries should be provided “with integrated, compatible secure [communications systems],” former Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller, who served at the end of Trump’s first term, told us. “It’s ridiculous. Make the White House [communications office] responsible for issuing and managing. It’s like we are in the 1990s.”

An Army veteran and cybersecurity expert agreed that apps like Signal are faster and easier to use, especially for a chat involving 19 members from numerous agencies.

“The old days of carrying a PC with you everywhere you go, and having an encrypted tunnel and having hardware that protects all that are kind of largely behind us,” said Jared Shepard, who after leaving the Army helped the DoD create a secure network infrastructure in Iraq. He later founded Hypori, a company that provides secure mobile network solutions to several DoD entities. “Now, everybody operates from phones and tablets, and the technology is beginning to catch up.”

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Nathan Juarez, left, an Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) systems engineer, and Cpl. Kealey Dent, an aviation intelligence specialist, both with Marine Aircraft Group 12, set up camouflage netting in preparation of building a temporary sensitive compartmented information (SCIF) facility at Gwangju Air Base, Republic of Korea, during the Fiscal Year 2023 Korea Flying Training, April 19, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tyler Harmon)

“One of the challenges,” he added, “always is how do you successfully share sensitive information across multiple departments. And you know, in the government that is always a challenge.”

“The more secure you make it, the more complex you make it on the user,” Shepard noted. “And so you always have this natural human balance of it has to actually be easy to use, or relatively intuitive to use, if you want users to actually use it. And, from a technology standpoint, if you make it so secure that it’s just too hard to use, then users will find a way around it. It’s just, it’s a human nature thing.”

A government secrecy reform advocate concurred.

“In my experience, dealing with classified records is always a little bit more cumbersome,” explained Lauren Harper, Freedom of the Press Foundation’s first Daniel Ellsberg Chair on Government Secrecy. “I think those systems are probably a little bit less intuitive in terms of how many people were involved.”

Signal chat – 3/3 pic.twitter.com/DnKr8jjADv

— Intel Tower (@inteltower) March 26, 2025

A retired special operations forces (SOF) officer questioned the exchange of security for the convenience offered by an app like Signal.

“I went to a number of different countries in support of SOF-type training or for exercises or whatever, and I had a secret or a secure phone,” said the retired SOF officer. “I never had an issue communicating in a timely manner with my secure phone. Now, I wasn’t coordinating national-level strikes or anything, but I’m just saying I don’t know that it’s prudent to sacrifice operational security for maybe a little bit more speed.”

Perhaps a bigger concern than security is that those on the Signal chat may have been trying to avoid records retention.

“I wouldn’t buy the convenience argument as much as I think they were avoiding archiving laws,” Harper told us.

“One of Signal’s key features is that messages disappear,” she explained. “Would Signal be as popular if it didn’t have the disappearing messaging feature? There’s no way to tell.”

“There are also already policies across the government that allow officials to use third-party applications to communicate when they must, provided they forward those records to officials systems within 20 working days,” she added. “A big reason Signal is discouraged as a third-party method is because that’s impossible to guarantee that it is happening when messages can disappear.”

The government watchdog group American Oversight filed a civil lawsuit on Wednesday, alleging that those on the chat violated federal records laws by discussing Houthi attack plans on Signal. In response, a federal judge in Washington on Thursday ordered several Trump administration officials who participated in the Signal chat to preserve all of the messages they exchanged on the app from March 11 to March 15, The New York Times reported Thursday evening.

Breaking News: A federal judge ordered top Trump administration officials to preserve their Signal chat messages discussing plans for an attack in Yemen. https://t.co/WfkUztzvI5

— The New York Times (@nytimes) March 27, 2025

The government does issue mobile devices designed to handle secure information. In 2017, for example, the Pentagon’s Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) launched a pilot program expanding its Department of Defense Mobility Classified Capability-Secret (DMCC-S) program to 8-inch tablets, DefenseScoop reported at the time. The objective was to give senior military leaders greater flexibility and the improved user experience they typically would get in the office. The DMCC-S program offers Pentagon officials mobile access to the SIPRNet. Traditionally, the agency issued Samsung Galaxy smartphones to run the DMCC-S program.

Details about how the DMCC program operates. (DISA PowerPoint)

It remains unclear how widely distributed this option has been or whether Hegseth and others on the chat had access to it. DISA declined comment, deferring us to the Pentagon. Officials there have yet to respond to questions about this issue, including whether Hegseth used a government or personal device to access Signal.

We also reached out to the CIA, White House and National Security Council to find out what kinds of devices they issue for secure, mobile communications and which of the cabinet members involved in the chat used personal devices to do so. We will update this story with any pertinent information provided.

The Signal encrypted messaging application is seen on a mobile device with the Department of Defence logo in the background in this illustration photo taken in Warsaw, Poland on 25 March, 2025. (Photo by Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto) Jaap Arriens

Signaling Change

All this begs the question why isn’t there a government-issued app like Signal, especially if it’s being used by those handling sensitive information anyway?

“The government could develop a secure app or incorporate Signal and its use on secure mediums however, Signal is open source and independently audited,” the retired SOF officer posited. “This may raise suspicion about backdoors or surveillance of government employees raising concerns among stakeholders. Also, since Signal is a commercial app right now and commercial apps usually update frequently in order to better the user experience and incorporate security patches, the government tends to be slow and bureaucratic in incorporating these changes.”

Harper suggested that the question about why there is no government-issued app like Signal “is hard to directly answer because it also depends on agency rules around handling classified information.”

“You can’t separate the two issues of convenience and secrecy when trying to discuss whether or not the government should have applications like [Signal],” she suggested.

“It’s not just a question of what technical capabilities an agency may have,” she added, “but how it comports with classification guidelines that have to be improved by the Information Security Oversight Office and in compliance with the executive order on classified national security information, 13526,” issued in 2019 under then-President Barack Obama.

Then-President Barack Obama’s executive order on classified national security information. (White House)

Shepard, the Hypori CEO, said his company provides a secure mobile communications system being used by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Force and DISA.

“We meet the right guidance under the NSA,” he said. “We do have the ability to do classified communications in a mobile environment” on government-issued devices.

“Could the members of that Signal chat have had a classified version of Hypori instead and then done everything within the requirements to have a classified conversation?” he asked rhetorically. “The answer is yes, they could have done that.”

Even if the Signal controversy now consuming Washington blows over as newer issues come to the forefront, the underlying issues will remain. The need for highly secure, mobile and easy-to-use communications that retains its messages for those handling sensitive matters will only increase as the world moves faster with each passing day. And apparently, some in the highest reaches of power have moved ahead with the convenience an app like Signal provides, whether the government’s security apparatus likes it or not.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

twz.com · by Howard Altman

25. The Army wants simple, cheap unmanned tech—here are some options

The Army wants simple, cheap unmanned tech—here are some options

A 3D-printed kamikaze drone with a jet engine and a self-powered laser for downing incoming threats.

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

March 28, 2025

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought into stark relief that the U.S. Army needs not just powerful vehicles and artillery, but lots and lots of simpler unmanned and counter-unmanned systems for drone warfare.

“When America brings its best technology-wise, it's exquisite, and we should keep doing that,” Gen. Jim Rainey, the head of Army Futures Command, said Thursday at AUSA’s Global Force Symposium. “At the same time, we should buy cheap mass. [There’s a] lot of value in 30mm cheap rounds that can knock down UAVs, even if you have to shoot a burst of 30 at it.”

One company has a 3D-printed unmanned aerial vehicle on offer as part of the Army’s Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance, or LASSO, program, which is due to put out a request for proposals any day now.

Dubbed the Hellhound S3, the turbojet-powered drone doesn’t look like the quadcopter you probably picture when you think of an armed UAV. It looks like a fighter jet, and it can be loaded up with not only weapons but sensors or electronic warfare jammers.

“The LASSO program brings some really unique requirements – you want something that gives you loiter time, but also allows you to do precision strike at a target,” Sheila Cummings, CEO of Cummings Aerospace, told Defense One. “And so it's a combination of both missile—and, if you will—more traditional aircraft design.”

It topped out at 384 miles an hour during its most recent test in January, Cummings said, at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the latest Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment.

“The idea is one vehicle, multiple payloads, giving the soldier the maximum flexibility to support whatever the mission needs are in the battlefield,” she added.

The whole system weighs less than 25 pounds and allows soldiers to change out payloads in under five minutes, without tools. It’s also completely 3D-printed, so it can be manufactured in a few hours with inexpensive materials, and repaired on the battlefield.

“So imagine you have a shipping container with 3D printers in a forward operating base,” Cummings said. “The warfighter could ultimately replace parts that may get broken or damaged, really minimizing that logistics train by putting that capability in the forward operating base.”

In addition to sending up its own drones, the Army is in desperate need of something to counter drone swarms, a key tactic of Russia’s ground war in Ukraine.

While Rainey mentioned shooting bullets at a drone, Leonardo DRS is developing a counter-drone laser for mounting atop a Stryker vehicle.

“We cannot continue to shoot, you know, a $1,500 drone with a $100,000 missile, right? Or a million dollar missile,” Ed House, a senior director of business development, told Defense One. “And you know, you hear senior Army leaders say, ‘Hey, we've got to get to a lower price point per shot.’ That's what a laser brings to the game.”

The Blue Halo 26kW had a successful test in August and then went through two weeks of Army evaluation in December.

“We were able to demonstrate that you could shoot the laser at a drone while you're shooting a 7.62mm machine gun simultaneously against a ground target, and both were effective,” House said.

Their engineers estimate they could run the laser for two straight minutes at a time without burning it out, House added, and testing has shown it only takes a few seconds to shoot down a drone.

The system comes with a built-in generator so there’s no downtime for recharging. The laser sits alongside a larger counter-UAS Stryker system that also has a 30mm cannon, multi-mission radars and a Coyote missile launcher.

“Did we prove that you could operate a laser without batteries? Yes, we did. Could you fire the machine gun at the same time you fire the laser? Yes, we can,” House said.

Only the 30mm cannon seems to interfere with the laser, he added, so company engineers are working on a fix.

The system is next due to participate in a live-fire exercise trial in June at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

26. Fighting for our Future: How—and Why—We Brought Wargames to an ROTC Program

Conclusion:

US military leaders must develop an intuitive understanding of the battlespace to win at as low a human cost as possible on the complex, multidomain battlefields of the twenty-first century. Deep knowledge of friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures is the starting point for developing this understanding. As new technologies are making this battlespace increasingly fluid, leaders must also have insight into current and potential future threats. Like a chess grandmaster who must think ten moves ahead, military leaders must understand not just how the battlespace is now, but how it might change. This requires a level of experience and training that time- and budget-strapped organizations are unlikely to have. However, using commercial, off-the-shelf wargames, played during off-duty time, will help close this knowledge gap, resulting in battlefield success while minimizing casualties.

Fighting for our Future: How—and Why—We Brought Wargames to an ROTC Program - Modern War Institute

William Kuebler, Steven Lohr and James Sterrett | 03.28.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · by William Kuebler · March 28, 2025

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Why does the US military use wargames?

As Sanu Kainikara notes, “war games designed for generic training are extremely useful in promoting a deeper understanding of the profession of arms and the art of warfare within the officer cadre.” And arguably, wargames are even more relevant given the current global strategic landscape and US military priorities: incorporating them as part of combat leader training is an invaluable tool for accomplishing the secretary of defense’s goal of improving “lethality, readiness, and warfighting” in the Department of Defense.

European militaries have used wargaming for over two hundred years to train personnel in decision-making and to test plans. However, they have a unique utility when used to prepare junior leaders, as a tool for training military personnel in tactics and operational art, as former Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger has noted.

Wargaming can provide inexperienced personnel with a potentially lifesaving understanding of doctrine and both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. A DARPA study found that inexperienced troops suffered forty percent of combat losses in their first three months of a deployment. Two factors cited by the study for the increased casualty rates were lack of familiarity with the enemy tactics and general lack of experience. These factors can be mitigated through wargaming.

Commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) wargames, both manual and digital, provide a low-cost, engaging, and efficient way of providing service members additional training and practice in military planning and tactics under conditions of information uncertainty. Because these games are engaging, quick to play, and inexpensive, personnel can repeatedly play them off duty. Further, the engaging element of commercial games encourages players to strive for what psychologist Ellen Winner calls the “rage to master,” the drive to develop expertise in a subject. This engagement and the low barriers to repetition encourage players to repeatedly play multiple scenarios of various games, providing General Berger’s “reps and sets” and ultimately helping them to achieve greater insight into military problems. This increased understanding imparted by gaming acts as a force multiplier to improve the effectiveness of traditional military training and exercises. Further, COTS wargames provide additional training to service members during their off-duty hours at little to no cost to the government.

Wargames on Campus

Recently, the University of Iowa’s ROTC program and Army University’s Directorate of Simulations Education illustrated the cost-effective use of commercial wargaming for improving the training of cadets and their skill sets as future Army officers. These organizations partnered with the US chapter of Fight Club International to present a one-day wargaming event for the cadets. The main objective of this wargame event was to introduce fourth-year cadets to combined arms maneuver. A separate game was featured to introduce the cadets to unit management. The ROTC curriculum primarily focuses on maneuvering single light infantry platoons, agnostic of adjacent forces. Through wargaming, cadets were forced to develop synchronized plans that reinforced the importance of communication and decision-making. To achieve this objective, the game would do the following:

Introduce the cadets to the basic Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and apply it to a tactical problem.
Introduce the cadets to basic company-level infantry tactics and procedures and apply them to a tactical problem.
Introduce the cadets to management processes of non–combat arms units.

The team selected the commercial game , published by Matrix Games, to accomplish these goals. This game is set in the 1965–1991 time frame. It comes with various real-world 3D maps of Cold War–era West Germany and a database of over one thousand realistically modeled NATO and Soviet vehicles and squad-sized infantry units and weapons. This database, combined with the game’s strong editing features, allowed volunteers from USA Fight Club to create a company-level scenario that allowed the cadets to implement basic platoon-level infantry tactics as part of a larger company operation. Using a late–Cold War scenario, the cadets could practice the fundamentals of combined arms tactics without modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and standoff weapons capabilities. This also allowed the scenario to present a near-peer opponent while avoiding any discussions of classified systems capability and tactics.

Wargame Execution

Fight Club member Staff Sergeant Richard Firth, an infantryman assigned to the 198th Infantry Brigade, designed a scenario involving a reinforced infantry company attack in wooded terrain near Hof, West Germany. In preparation for the event, cadets were provided an operations order and annexes appropriate for their level of military education. To instruct the cadets on using combined arms, they were given a reinforced infantry company with attached armor, artillery, and infantry units. Opposing them was a Soviet infantry company with armor and artillery attachments. The scenario required the cadets to seize two small urban areas. It was also designed to present various tactical problems, including the coordination of armor and infantry in closed terrain, the coordination of artillery fires, and the clearing of obstacles under fire. Two weeks before running the wargame with the ROTC students, Fight Club volunteers did a dry run of the scenario online to ensure it was balanced and met the training objectives. To ensure the cadets were ready for the challenge, Hawkeye Battalion leaders modified the ROTC curriculum to include training on the first three steps of MDMP, emphasizing mission analysis and course of action development. Cadets utilized YouTube videos produced by the Combined Arms Center and the United States Military Academy to familiarize themselves with MDMP. The output was mission analysis and course of action briefs, enabling cadets to arrive with a plan.

The cadets had 210 minutes to play the scenario. Two iterations of the scenario were run, with eight cadets in each iteration. This allowed a cadet to control a platoon of scouts, armor, infantry, or engineers, ensuring that all cadets were equally involved. One of the cadets functioned as the company commander, guiding the platoon leaders and controlling the mortar sections and the off-map 155-millimeter fires. A volunteer from Fight Club who was familiar with Armored Brigade II functioned as the “puckster,” entering orders to the units in the game based on the cadet’s verbal orders. This was important because it mitigated cadets’ having to be familiar with game controls, thereby allowing them to concentrate on the battle problem. The remaining eight cadets who were not part of the current Armored Brigade II iteration went to a separate classroom to play a game about managing a field hospital (described later in this article). After the initial setup, the company commander could not look at the map but would have to rely on the players’ communications to understand how the battle was developing. To provide time stress, the game was run in continuous-clock mode for ninety seconds before it was paused to allow cadets a ten-second window to issue orders.

The cadets were largely allowed to formulate and execute their plans without any instructor correction. This highlights one of the significant advantages of using commercial games for professional development: because the cost, time, and personnel requirements are low, junior personnel can be given a chance to practice commanding forces while making and learning from their mistakes. While Staff Sergeant Firth was on hand to function as the company’s first sergeant and provide guidance to ensure training objectives were met, the cadets were largely unsupervised in executing their plans. This allowed them to make mistakes and learn from them. The cadets discovered that impatiently advancing unsupported armor through woods resulted in heavy losses; that allowing their Infantry to be channeled into kill boxes left them vulnerable to Soviet artillery; and that engineers have difficulty clearing obstacles until the area is secured. The cadets learned and internalized these lessons—which have life-and-death consequences in the real world—in only 210 minutes of training at no cost in life or limb.

The student evaluations were uniformly enthusiastic about the training. All the cadets found it to be helpful and engaging. In their evaluations, several cadets noted that the game either taught or reinforced the following lessons:

the importance of improving communications and coordination
the importance of proper planning
the Importance of leaders patiently executing a plan against an enemy

While these lessons are not earth-shattering to experienced officers, the fact that the cadets experientially learned them in less than four hours of training time demonstrates the power of such games.

Death Can Wait: Managing a Field Service Hospital

For the day’s second exercise, cadets paired up to play Death Can Wait, a game of managing a field service hospital. Designed by Lieutenant Colonel Caitlin Smith (then Major Caitlin Ebbets) as a master of military art and science Wargame Design track thesis, Death Can Wait has players prepare the hospital during the year before a deployment, after which they must deploy the hospital, operate it while deployed, and then redeploy the hospital while continuing to operate it in both locations. Players will better understand the challenges a field service hospital faces in each of these tasks and how each of its subordinate elements contributes to the success of the whole organization. The players’ objective is to minimize the number of deaths at the hospital. To drive home its lessons, the model is deliberately tuned to be lethal, and suffering fewer than 150 deaths in thirty days of deployed operations is considered success.

During the Prepare phase, turns are quarters of a year. Players must try to maximize the hospital’s manning, equipping, training, and morale. The game is structured to ensure that trade-offs must be made between these, but penalties will be exacted later for the shortfalls.

The game then shifts to one-day turns for the Deploy phase. Behind the scenes, the game assumes the hospital is in central Europe and is deploying to the Baltics. A field service hospital only has 25 percent of the transportation it needs to move all of its people and equipment, immediately creating the dilemma of what equipment and personnel to bring in the first wave and what will be left behind, dependent on outside support for its movement in subsequent days. Personnel and equipment are assumed to be operational on the second day after they begin movement.

As soon as the hospital has any capacity to accept patients, they begin to arrive. During the week allocated to deployment, the influx of patients is relatively small. Nonetheless, each day provides a random event, testing some aspect of the hospital’s available functions and their readiness, or enabling critical mass-casualty training.

On Day 8, major operations begin at the front. Casualty arrival rates spike, bed space gets short, fatigue grows, and mass-casualty events not only flood the hospital that gets the event but also spike the arrival rates at every other hospital.

Run out of beds? Patients sleeping on the ground die. Medical staff are too tired? They make mistakes and patients die. Don’t have all of your capabilities in place? Patients die. Death Can Wait relentlessly drives home its lessons on the interdependence of your preparation and of the hospital’s various functions. The cadets’ engagement was clear from their cheers on turns without a mass-casualty event and their groans when multiple such events threatened to overwhelm their hospitals.

Nearly half of the participating cadets will be entering branches in the Army Medical Department, so Death Can Wait provided them with a window into some of their future challenges. Nearly half are going into combat arms, and the game provided them with the rare opportunity to understand the challenges facing their support services. Commentary in our after-action reviews frequently noted the importance of ensuring that support services are themselves supported well enough to fulfill their support requirements.

Improving the Next Iteration

The primary deficiency in this exercise was insufficient time to conduct a thorough after-action review with the students immediately after the Armored Brigade II portion of the exercise. While the scenario selected only required three and a half hours of game time, the briefing and instructional activities took longer than anticipated. Based on this evolution, eight hours of training should be allotted for future iterations to allow sufficient time for both games. This would provide ample time for briefing, breaks, and, most importantly, for a thorough after-action review. This last piece piece is critical, as one of the purposes of using commercial wargames is to encourage students to do additional playthroughs on their own time. Knowing how to perform an after-action review to critique and learn from their gaming experience becomes a critical element in students performing the purposeful practice that will maximize learning from wargames.

Notwithstanding this failure, the cadets’ evaluations demonstrate that using commercial, off-the-shelf wargames is a training force multiplier and should be encouraged as part of formal and informal military training and professional development.

US military leaders must develop an intuitive understanding of the battlespace to win at as low a human cost as possible on the complex, multidomain battlefields of the twenty-first century. Deep knowledge of friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures is the starting point for developing this understanding. As new technologies are making this battlespace increasingly fluid, leaders must also have insight into current and potential future threats. Like a chess grandmaster who must think ten moves ahead, military leaders must understand not just how the battlespace is now, but how it might change. This requires a level of experience and training that time- and budget-strapped organizations are unlikely to have. However, using commercial, off-the-shelf wargames, played during off-duty time, will help close this knowledge gap, resulting in battlefield success while minimizing casualties.

Lieutenant Colonel William Kuebler is the professor of military science for the University of Iowa’s Mighty Hawkeye Battalion Army ROTC program. His goal is to enable his cadets to be better prepared second lieutenants than he was through fostering personal and professional growth.

Steven Lohr is a board member of USA Fight Club and Fight Club International. He served on active duty in the US Navy as a surface warfare and intelligence officer, retiring in 2010 as a commander. He is a graduate of the Naval War College and the Joint Military Intelligence College and has a JD from the University of Florida and a BS from the University of Iowa.

James Sterrett is the chief of the Simulation Education Division in the Directorate of Simulation Education of US Army University / Command and General Staff College. Since 2004, he has taught the use and design of simulations and wargames and has supported their use in education. He also earned a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London and has participated in beta test and design teams for many games, notably including Steel Beasts and Attack Vector: Tactical.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Staff Sgt. Jessica Avallone, US Air Force

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by William Kuebler · March 28, 2025

27. Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

Is there a void or is there a perceived void yet to come?

Excerpts:

Still, relying on Europe’s two nuclear powers to fill the void left by the United States is not an easy task. Neither country’s nuclear arsenal is currently positioned to assume the full array of functions that U.S. nuclear forces provide. In the event of nuclear war with Russia, France and the United Kingdom would be unable to minimize the damage to Europe. They can offer retaliation on a European country’s behalf, but not preemptive action that could head off a strike on European cities and populations. With limited arsenals, particularly when it comes to low-yield weapons that can be used to push Russia back rather than escalate, they also lack the flexibility to counter Russian threats that fall below the level of total annihilation. Both countries have relied on ambiguity in their nuclear strategies, avoiding rigid commitments on the exact conditions of nuclear weapons use to keep adversaries uncertain. This approach may have been effective when their arsenals were solely focused on homeland defense, but it is unlikely to reassure allies that would depend on these nuclear forces for their defense.

Making a strategy of European extended deterrence work will require significant updates to both nuclear hardware and doctrines. Amending their doctrines would be a comparatively quick process. British and French leaders could at any point publicly declare that they are prepared to prevent the conventional defeat of their eastern European allies, even if it requires being the first party to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict. But France and the United Kingdom would need to increase the scale and diversity of their nuclear arsenals, likely a multiyear undertaking even for France, which has preserved much of the necessary infrastructure. Leaders would also have to sell this strategy at home—which may prove difficult, especially in France. Marine Le Pen, leader of the opposition National Rally party, has already stated her opposition to a French nuclear umbrella and could reverse any changes if she came to power in the country’s 2027 presidential election.

If London and Paris can overcome these hurdles, offering effective extended deterrence to vulnerable eastern European countries may be feasible. The version of extended deterrence they could offer would still be riskier and more fragile than what the United States has offered since the early days of the Cold War. But ultimately, Europe has no way out of its strategic trilemma that does not involve painful tradeoffs. It is therefore no surprise that European leaders have thus far avoided making plans for the continent’s post-American defense. Yet with the future of the continent at stake, Europe is better off acting than not, even if that means accepting the costs associated with the least-bad option.

Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mark S. Bell · March 31, 2025

The Difficult and Dangerous Options for Post-American Deterrence

March 31, 2025

A French Air and Space Force aircraft at Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur Airbase, France, March 2025. Ludovic Marin / Reuters

MARK S. BELL is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

FABIAN R. HOFFMANN is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project at the University of Oslo.

More by Fabian R. Hoffmann

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Over the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency, it has become increasingly clear to European leaders that remaining reliant on the United States to underwrite the continent’s security would be a dangerous gamble. Trump’s overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vice President JD Vance’s public attacks on the domestic policies of European countries, the administration’s imposition of tariffs, and threats to the Danish territory of Greenland have pushed European leaders to begin to think seriously about a future in which the United States—and its nuclear weapons—are no longer the ultimate guarantor of European security.

Skepticism about the United States’ willingness to fight a nuclear war on Europe’s behalf long predates Trump. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle famously questioned whether the United States would “trade New York for Paris.” But the Trump administration’s hostility has given new urgency to Europe’s efforts to provide for its own defense.

Nonetheless, for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security is not simply a matter of generating more political will, higher defense budgets, or better coordinated procurement processes. Europe must navigate a strategic trilemma regarding its nuclear options. European leaders have three goals they would like to achieve: credible and effective deterrence against Russia; strategic stability, understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. Unfortunately, Europe cannot achieve them all. In fact, choosing any two makes the third impossible. If Europe chooses strategic stability and nonproliferation, it may not be able to deter Russia. But to fortify its nuclear posture enough for credible deterrence, Europe must either allow new states to acquire the weapons or sacrifice a degree of strategic stability. None of the available choices are ideal. But in the absence of protection from across the Atlantic, Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence. Accepting a level of strategic instability in Europe-Russian relations requires assuming genuine nuclear risks. The alternatives, however, would be even more dangerous.

PICK YOUR BATTLE

Europe’s first option in the absence of U.S. protection would be to choose a combination of nonproliferation and strategic stability. This would most closely resemble Europe’s current arrangement, albeit without the United States’ commitments. In this scenario, France and the United Kingdom would remain Europe’s only nuclear-armed powers, and no other countries would acquire nuclear weapons. Europe’s two nuclear powers would continue to maintain arsenals primarily dedicated to providing a reliable second-strike capability, rather than offering extensive first-use options.

But in this scenario, Europe’s defense posture against Russia would lack credibility. NATO frontline countries, particularly the Baltic states, are vulnerable to limited Russian incursions. Russia could then hold any territory it acquired by threatening nuclear action against Europe, a tactic known as “aggressive sanctuarization.” Any Russian threats in such a context would be credible, given Russia’s overwhelming advantage over France and the United Kingdom at the substrategic level—nuclear weapons with smaller yields and shorter reach, designed for battlefield use rather than to threaten total annihilation—in terms of both the scale and the diversity of its arsenal. Moscow could deploy such threats of limited nuclear use with the expectation that Europe’s nuclear powers, without the capacity to respond in kind and thus keep the conflict contained, would back down from trying to recover lost territory. In other words, without the U.S. nuclear backstop, picking nonproliferation and strategic stability would come at the expense of Europe’s deterrence credibility.

Moreover, this credibility gap is unlikely to be bridged by an increase in European conventional forces, at least not in the near future. Avoiding the dilemma of either yielding to Russian nuclear threats and allowing the loss of NATO territory or risking nuclear escalation in attempting to liberate NATO territory would require conventional defenses capable of halting a Russian incursion at the border. European NATO members, particularly those near Russia, have made significant investments in strengthening their local defenses, including through defense spending increases and plans for deploying troops to frontline countries. But these measures are likely still insufficient to immediately repel a determined Russian attack, especially in the Baltics. A defense force that could do more than simply delaying a Russian assault would involve a substantial increase in troops and a posture comparable in scope and ambition to U.S. forces stationed in West Germany during the Cold War. In principle, such an effort is not impossible, but it would take time and sustained investment, well beyond European countries’ latest short-term increases in defense budgets. Realistically, a credible forward defense posture would likely take seven to ten years—or longer—to establish. And even if leaders could marshal the political will, patience, and funding to scale up defense budgets, the continent’s limited production capacity for key military equipment, combined with manpower constraints in several countries, would pose significant obstacles to rapidly building up forces.

Seeking another way to defend itself, Europe could choose nonproliferation and credible deterrence. As in the first scenario, France and the United Kingdom would remain Europe’s only nuclear-armed powers. But to compensate for the gap in conventional capabilities and lower-yield nuclear weapons, Europe would have to rely on extended deterrence provided by its two nuclear states. To deter a Russian attack on frontline states in eastern Europe, however, France and the United Kingdom would need to expand their low-yield, tactical-level nuclear options, and indicate a willingness to use them, including by employing them first. Like the approach taken up by United States and NATO during the Cold War once the Soviet Union gained the ability to hit the United States with nuclear weapons, London and Paris would need to build up their limited nuclear options and develop doctrines that both outline their realistic use in battlefield missions and detail how to manage escalation.

Prioritizing nonproliferation and deterrence would thus require abandoning strategic stability. France and the United Kingdom would need to make the possibility of nuclear first use credible, which would necessarily be perceived as threatening by any potential target of such nuclear use. The chance that a crisis could escalate above the nuclear threshold would rise. Indeed, making crises more prone to nuclear escalation in order to deter Russia from initiating them would be the entire purpose of an updated British and French posture.

The final option for Europe in the absence of U.S. security guarantees would be to choose credible deterrence and strategic stability, sacrificing the continent’s commitment to nonproliferation. In this scenario, Europe’s nuclear powers would retain nuclear arsenals optimized for retaliation rather than first use, thus maintaining strategic stability. But if a nuclear posture geared toward retaliation is to offer credible deterrence against Russian conventional or limited nuclear threats, the weapons need to be under the control of states for which Russian military action would pose an existential threat, not just France and the United Kingdom, which, by virtue of their distance from Russia, do not face the same risk as those on the frontline. Because neither country’s existence would be in danger, their ability to credibly threaten a nuclear response would be limited. For the eastern European country targeted, however, a Russian conventional or nuclear attack would constitute an immediate and existential threat, and Moscow would have to fear that country would use its nuclear weapons, if it had them. In other words, maintaining both credible deterrence and strategic stability requires proliferation: eastern European countries would need to have their own nuclear arsenals to deter Russia from attacking.

FINDING UNSTABLE GROUND

Allowing proliferation in Europe by choosing strategic stability and credible deterrence would be highly costly, however, making it the least attractive of the three options. European states acquiring nuclear weapons could well deal a deathblow to the Nonproliferation Treaty, an international accord that took effect in 1970, and the global effort to stop the spread of these weapons. Moreover, proliferation is an arduous and dangerous process. It would be logistically difficult for countries such as Poland to acquire nuclear capabilities quickly because they lack suitable civilian nuclear infrastructure to divert to a nuclear weapons program. The proliferation process would therefore involve a long period of instability, as Russia would have an incentive to take preventive military action to stop frontline European states acquiring the weapons to deter it.

Forgoing credible deterrence against Russia by choosing strategic stability and nonproliferation might be the most politically expedient choice for European leaders, since it would not require major shifts in doctrine or investments in defense. If European leaders defer their decision on the future of the continent’s nuclear policy (or find themselves caught off-guard by an abrupt but now plausible U.S. departure from Europe), they might have no other choice but to accept this trade. But making the easiest decision would still be a dangerous gamble. Europe would have to hope that Russia would not call its bluff by seizing European territory with conventional forces and nuclear threats, either for the sake of Putin’s expansionist ambitions or to attempt to shatter the NATO alliance once and for all. Western European leaders would also be betting that their vulnerable eastern European counterparts would not seek their own nuclear weapons to protect themselves, which would trigger all the disadvantages and costs associated with proliferation.

The danger in sacrificing credible deterrence is that Europe would be left relying on Russian restraint, a potentially catastrophic choice given Moscow’s track record of invading its neighbors. As a result, some version of British or French extended nuclear deterrence may ultimately prove most attractive. It would provide a plausible path to deterrence without the political costs and security risks of proliferation, and could be put into place relatively quickly if Paris and London are willing to act decisively. The associated costs would be manageable, particularly when compared to the hundreds of billions currently allocated to Europe’s conventional rearmament. Although the risk of a nuclear first strike Europe would increase, it would remain containable, especially if France and Britain developed new doctrines that signaled their resolve below the threshold of nuclear use. Just as in the Cold War, when Washington decided to include its allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella rather than allow them all to nuclearize or leave them to fend for themselves, extended deterrence looks a better bet than the alternatives.

Europe has no way out of its strategic trilemma that does not involve painful tradeoffs.

Still, relying on Europe’s two nuclear powers to fill the void left by the United States is not an easy task. Neither country’s nuclear arsenal is currently positioned to assume the full array of functions that U.S. nuclear forces provide. In the event of nuclear war with Russia, France and the United Kingdom would be unable to minimize the damage to Europe. They can offer retaliation on a European country’s behalf, but not preemptive action that could head off a strike on European cities and populations. With limited arsenals, particularly when it comes to low-yield weapons that can be used to push Russia back rather than escalate, they also lack the flexibility to counter Russian threats that fall below the level of total annihilation. Both countries have relied on ambiguity in their nuclear strategies, avoiding rigid commitments on the exact conditions of nuclear weapons use to keep adversaries uncertain. This approach may have been effective when their arsenals were solely focused on homeland defense, but it is unlikely to reassure allies that would depend on these nuclear forces for their defense.

Making a strategy of European extended deterrence work will require significant updates to both nuclear hardware and doctrines. Amending their doctrines would be a comparatively quick process. British and French leaders could at any point publicly declare that they are prepared to prevent the conventional defeat of their eastern European allies, even if it requires being the first party to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict. But France and the United Kingdom would need to increase the scale and diversity of their nuclear arsenals, likely a multiyear undertaking even for France, which has preserved much of the necessary infrastructure. Leaders would also have to sell this strategy at home—which may prove difficult, especially in France. Marine Le Pen, leader of the opposition National Rally party, has already stated her opposition to a French nuclear umbrella and could reverse any changes if she came to power in the country’s 2027 presidential election.

If London and Paris can overcome these hurdles, offering effective extended deterrence to vulnerable eastern European countries may be feasible. The version of extended deterrence they could offer would still be riskier and more fragile than what the United States has offered since the early days of the Cold War. But ultimately, Europe has no way out of its strategic trilemma that does not involve painful tradeoffs. It is therefore no surprise that European leaders have thus far avoided making plans for the continent’s post-American defense. Yet with the future of the continent at stake, Europe is better off acting than not, even if that means accepting the costs associated with the least-bad option.

MARK S. BELL is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

FABIAN R. HOFFMANN is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project at the University of Oslo.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mark S. Bell · March 31, 2025

28. Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force

Conclusion:

The financial, military, diplomatic, and cultural challenges facing any Anglo-French deterrent would be formidable and require a “paradigm shift” in Europe’s approach to nuclear deterrence. However, the Trump administration’s public disregard for U.S. extended deterrence, the growing danger from Russia, and the rising risk of further nuclear proliferation, means that the settled paradigm of trans-Atlantic deterrence is already shifting in ways that will compel Europe to choose between these options. The development of an Anglo-French Eurodeterrent — ideally as part of a negotiated transfer of responsibility for European security from the United States to its NATO allies, could help Europe navigate a path from this old world to a more secure future.

Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by James Cameron · March 31, 2025

Recently published Signal discussions in which senior Trump administration officials admit they “hate bailing out” America’s “pathetic” European allies have cast fresh doubt on the U.S. commitment to defending Europe. Even before these revelations, what Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk described as “a profound change of [sic] American geopolitics” had already provoked reappraisals across Europe of the future of nuclear deterrence on the continent.

In this new reality, Washington’s European allies are faced with three options: continue to rely on what they consider a weakened security guarantee backed by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; pursue further nuclear proliferation; or develop an independent deterrent comprising the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom.

Each of these options are less desirable than U.S. extended deterrence before Jan. 20, 2025. The question, however, is how the European NATO members can best react to safeguard their collective defense, given the feasible alternatives today. Under current conditions, the transition to an Anglo-French “Eurodeterrent” is the best option for Europe.

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A Shaky U.S. Extended Deterrent

The fundamental nature of the crisis afflicting U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to NATO is one of credibility. The U.S. commitment rests on Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which requires each ally to respond to an armed attack against any one of them with “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” The deterrent credibility of this commitment requires U.S. willingness to risk and ultimately wage nuclear war on behalf of allies located thousands of miles away.

Deterrence theorist Thomas C. Schelling recognized that the U.S. commitment to defend the “homeland” was “inherently credible,” but the pledge to defend “allies” at “great cost and risk, requires more than military capability. It requires projecting intentions.” In addition to forward-deployed forces, Schelling emphasized the importance of America’s “political” commitment of its “honor, obligation, and diplomatic reputation” to the defense of its allies in making extended deterrence credible.

Since Jan. 20, the U.S. government has undermined this political commitment. President Donald Trump has said that the United States would not defend NATO members that fail to meet unspecified spending targets. Several administration officials have also expressed territorial ambitions toward NATO members Canada and Denmark. The United States suspended military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine to pressure Kyiv to make concessions in peace negotiations while doing nothing to force Russia into any reciprocal moves. Ukraine is not a NATO member and the United States is not treaty-bound to defend it. Nonetheless, these developments have spurred NATO allies’ reconsideration of their reliance on U.S.-made weapons systems.

Trump’s admiration for Vladimir Putin, Vice President JD Vance and Elon Musk’s support for the far-right Alternative for Germany, and administration actions that have undermined the domestic rule of law have also challenged Europeans’ belief that the United States still shares basic values and norms with them.

None of these moves constitute a formal removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from European NATO territory. Collectively, however, they have significantly undermined NATO allies’ confidence that the United States is committed to their defense against external attack. Anxieties over U.S. nuclear credibility are manifest in French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for a debate on European deterrence, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s suggestion that France and Britain could “share” nuclear weapons with Berlin, and Tusk’s discussion of Poland’s nuclear options.

The extent and heedlessness of this damage to the trans-Atlantic alliance constitutes a fundamental departure from past U.S. policy. Even if previous administrations doubted the solidity of extended deterrence, expressed frustration with their European allies in private, and publicly exhorted them to raise defense spending, U.S. officials never cast doubt on America’s will to defend its European allies in anything approaching the open manner of recent weeks.

Given the speed with which the Trump administration has moved in its first two months, Europe has no guarantee that Washington will not take even more significant steps over the next four years. This could include refusing to appoint a U.S. general officer as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or withdrawing or redeploying U.S. conventional or nuclear forces from European NATO territory. These steps could further damage the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This prospect lends urgency to European consideration of alternatives now.

Two former Biden administration officials have recognized the challenge that this “crisis of confidence” represents. They propose that Europe requests the United States to reaffirm its commitment to the continent’s security by reiterating previously stated policy, “backstopped by the full capabilities the U.S. military could bring to bear in a conflict.” Others have suggested that the current administration address European qualms over the strength of extended deterrence through changes to U.S. force posture, more coordination with allies, and consultative mechanisms.

However, any reiteration of previous declaratory policy would lack credibility: Trump and his lieutenants have already told Europe what they really think about America’s stake in its security, and they are likely to undermine any such recommitment through future statements or actions.

Nor are adjustments to the U.S. nuclear posture or consultative mechanisms likely to bridge the credibility gap. Forward-deployed nuclear forces, increasingly elaborate capabilities designed to limit damage to the United States and its allies in a nuclear war, and consultative mechanisms such as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group are the manifestation of the U.S. commitment to defend NATO territory with nuclear weapons, not a replacement for it. While the withdrawal of U.S. forces or abolition of nuclear consultation would spell the definitive end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, modifications in these areas would do little to repair the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence if the publicly stated commitment is not solid.

Simply waiting Trump out in the hope that a more orthodox U.S. administration takes office in 2029 is not a viable strategy either. Even if such an administration assumes power, there is no guarantee that the United States would not swing back to a more confrontational posture in 2033. Europe needs to come to terms with a future in which the U.S. commitment to its security will, at best, fluctuate.

Europe should therefore consider other options to secure itself.

The choice Europe faces is not between U.S. extended deterrence as it existed before Jan. 20, 2025, and other arrangements. Instead, the choice is between today’s compromised U.S. commitment — which may deteriorate rapidly and oscillate unpredictably in the future — and the alternatives.

The Destabilizing Prospect of Nuclear Proliferation in Europe

At present, the debate in Europe has turned to whether more countries should develop nuclear weapons. Analysts across the continent have argued that their governments should consider doing so. Tusk has hinted that Warsaw should consider acquiring its own nuclear deterrent. In Norway, commentators have debated a nuclear force for the Nordic region, though the Norwegian government has rejected the idea.

Nuclear proliferation is a superficially appealing course, given the existential security guarantee that a fully developed nuclear arsenal can provide. Any nuclear program, however, would encounter significant technological, legal, and military challenges that could undermine the security of a nascent nuclear power.

For starters, developing a nuclear arsenal is technologically demanding. While building a crude nuclear weapon is within the capabilities of a modern industrial state willing to bear the cost, it would take significant time and resources. No non-nuclear weapon state in Europe can dash to a bomb and acquiring the necessary industrial infrastructure would be very difficult.

Militarily, a crude aircraft-delivered fission gravity bomb would not be a sufficiently credible deterrent to external attack. Minimum deterrence requires that a state can reliably inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary. Guaranteed retaliation with unacceptable damage requires nuclear forces that can survive or preempt any enemy strike and penetrate defenses to deliver the weapons to target. As such, no nuclear weapons state currently relies on gravity bombs delivered by aircraft. Instead, nuclear powers at a minimum have developed ballistic missiles to deliver miniaturized nuclear warheads. Even then, stationary missiles are vulnerable to attack. Unless a state is willing to fire its missiles at the mere warning of an incoming strike, it needs to ensure survivability for its nuclear forces through mobile ground launchers, sophisticated aircraft, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Moreover, if a new European country were to acquire nuclear arms, or announce its intention to develop them, it would shatter the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All European countries are parties to the treaty and under its terms all non-nuclear states have agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, nuclear parties have agreed to share the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology and to pursue disarmament. The defection of a European country from the non-proliferation treaty would damage the nonproliferation norm and the effectiveness of the treaty. This, in turn, may increase the risk that countries such as Iran, South Korea, and Japan would acquire nuclear weapons. This would spell the end of the international nonproliferation regime.

The prospect of a new European nuclear power would likely provoke a significant reaction from any country that viewed it as a threat. This could include sanctions, but also military action to prevent the breakout state from acquiring nuclear weapons or destroying its emerging capability. As such, a new nuclear-weapons program would risk decreasing rather than increasing a European country’s security.

Any European country that obtained nuclear weapons would be incentivized to pursue a risky nuclear strategy. If the new nuclear state were small, with key cities near the Russian border, or had relatively weak conventional forces, then it would be highly motivated to launch a nuclear attack at the outset of a Russian invasion. Knowing that the country’s forces were on a hair trigger would incentivize Russia to launch a pre-emptive strike against that state, further increasing the pressure on the target state to pre-empt Russia by launching its nuclear weapons first. This escalatory spiral would dramatically raise the risk of nuclear war in Europe.

Despite these risks, if “front-line” European NATO allies conclude that they no longer have faith in U.S. extended deterrence, and absent any viable alternative, it is likely that some would seek their own nuclear arsenals.

A Third Way: An Anglo-French Eurodeterrent

Given the perceived damage that the Trump administration has done to the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and the dangers associated with further European nuclear proliferation, it is important to consider the potential of a replacement: nuclear deterrence based on the combined strength of France and the United Kingdom.

As several analysts have pointed out, an Anglo-French Eurodeterrent would be less militarily capable than U.S. nuclear forces. The United Kingdom and France currently have a combined stockpile of approximately 515 nuclear warheads. France can deliver these warheads by submarine-launched ballistic missile as well as air-launched cruise missiles carried by ground- and carrier-based Rafale aircraft. Meanwhile, Britain relies solely on a submarine-launched ballistic missile force. While operationally independent, the British force uses the U.S.-supplied Trident II missile. These missiles are maintained in the United States, and the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead and submarine programs are tightly integrated with America’s.

To be sure, an Anglo-French nuclear force could not replace the United States’ 3,700 deployed and operational reserve warheads in sheer numbers of weapons, or match Russia’s enormous 4,380-warhead operationally available stockpile. Nor could it replicate Washington’s potential ability to limit damage by pre-emptively striking Russia’s nuclear forces, or its range of options for sub-strategic nuclear use.

However, an Anglo-French force would not need to match U.S. capabilities. The size of Washington’s arsenal and the diversity of its weapons systems and nuclear options are products of its historical role as the provider of extended deterrence for a range of far-flung treaty allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This force, as stated U.S. policy attests, is designed not only to deter nuclear weapons use and “emerging non-nuclear threats,” but also to ensure that the United States will not be deterred from intervening conventionally on behalf of its allies worldwide. France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, could be able to focus their nuclear postures on deterring a narrower range of scenarios within Europe, where the two countries’ vital national security interests are manifest.

A European conventional military buildup of the type currently proposed would help narrow this range of scenarios significantly and alleviate the credibility problem that besets the U.S. deterrent. A large-scale forward-deployed European conventional force to defend NATO territory, including British and French units, would render any uncertainty regarding conventional intervention moot: The decision to fight at the conventional level would not rest solely with France or the United Kingdom in the same way it currently does with the United States. Yet French and British units would be involved at an early stage, thereby ensuring that Paris and London would be committed.

European forward-deployed conventional forces, for example in the Baltic states, Poland, and the Nordic region, capable of effective defense from the start of a Russian invasion, would mean that the United Kingdom and France would not have to credibly threaten nuclear first use in the same way as a bordering nuclear state would, or as today’s U.S.-reliant NATO might have to. The United Kingdom and France could instead focus on deterring Russian limited and large-scale nuclear attacks when Moscow was losing a conventional battle against a European coalition defending NATO territory. The development of such a European conventional force would not be easy or quick, but it would ease the credibility problem inherent in nuclear first use significantly.

With their ability to hold several key cities in European Russia at risk, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, even if Russia struck first, the submarine-launched missiles of the United Kingdom and France would provide a sufficiently credible force to deter large-scale Russian nuclear-weapons use against Europe. To maintain the long-term viability of this submarine force, the United Kingdom and France would have to develop joint contingency plans well beyond existing cooperation to cope with any cutoff of U.S. nuclear assistance to London.

Further development of an air-delivered missile capability would be necessary to provide a credible limited-use capability beyond the “final warning” of current French doctrine and the rumored low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead available to the United Kingdom. Such efforts would require an increase in warhead numbers, though not on par with U.S. or Russian stockpiles.

A new generation of conventional precision-strike systems should supplement the Anglo-French nuclear forces. Non-nuclear allies such as Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states could provide such systems, possibly through joint production. This role would draw non-nuclear states deeper into conventional-nuclear operations through exercises and planning that go beyond non-nuclear NATO members’ current involvement in Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations. Coordination of these nuclear and non-nuclear efforts should be institutionalized in a European equivalent of the existing NATO Nuclear Planning Group, in which France does not currently participate.

A new Anglo-French deterrence policy would need clear articulation by London and Paris, either in a single document, or in separate but coordinated statements, similar to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Neither country currently has such a detailed declaratory policy. Greater specificity would be necessary to bolster the credibility of an Anglo-French deterrent in the eyes of Moscow. Such a policy would also provide reassurance to non-nuclear European allies, who would need to be involved in its formulation in a similar way as with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.

The financial, military, diplomatic, and cultural challenges facing any Anglo-French deterrent would be formidable and require a “paradigm shift” in Europe’s approach to nuclear deterrence. However, the Trump administration’s public disregard for U.S. extended deterrence, the growing danger from Russia, and the rising risk of further nuclear proliferation, means that the settled paradigm of trans-Atlantic deterrence is already shifting in ways that will compel Europe to choose between these options. The development of an Anglo-French Eurodeterrent — ideally as part of a negotiated transfer of responsibility for European security from the United States to its NATO allies, could help Europe navigate a path from this old world to a more secure future.

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James Cameron is associate professor of Modern North American History at the University of Oslo. He is the author of The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation (Oxford University Press, 2018). Follow him on BlueSky at @jjjcameron@bsky.social.

Photo: SAC Rob Bourne/MOD

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by James Cameron · March 31, 2025

29. How to Save a Democracy

Quite an indictment on the state of American democracy. Is she correct?

(And I know I will receive messages saying America is not a democracy but a republic - but actually we are a federal democratic republic with checks and balances on both the chaos of direct democracy and authoritarian leanings - we are a democracy and a republic.)

Rather than asking can democracy be saved she might have asked, can the great American experiment be saved?

Conclusion:

Democracy in the United States faces a serious threat, but the case is not hopeless. Its defenders have a wide array of levers they can pull to oppose Trump’s and his allies’ attempts to consolidate power. If pro-democracy forces coordinate and act quickly to protect their resources and use them wisely, they can slow down the march toward autocracy and, ultimately, give American democracy a fighting chance.

How to Save a Democracy

Foreign Affairs · by More by Laura Gamboa · March 31, 2025

Americans Can Learn From Opponents of Authoritarianism Elsewhere

Laura Gamboa

March 31, 2025

A motorcade carrying U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., February 2025 Kent Nishimura / Reuters

LAURA GAMBOA is Assistant Professor of Democracy and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame and the author of Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies Against the Erosion of Democracy.

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The first few weeks of Donald Trump’s second presidency have accelerated a process of democratic erosion in the United States. In just two months, the president and his allies have issued executive orders of dubious constitutionality, violated the civil protections of federal workers, impinged on Congress’s powers over the budget, sidestepped and defied court rulings, used the Justice Department to punish opponents and protect loyalists, threatened to impeach judges who rule against the administration, weaponized U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and immigration law to imprison and deport documented immigrants without due process, and allowed unappointed individuals an unprecedented (and potentially illegal) level of access and power over key agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Treasury Department, and the Education Department.

Democratic erosion has not progressed as far in the United States as it has in many other countries, but that does not make the steps the Trump administration has taken any less concerning. At a minimum, democracies should afford citizens the opportunity to form and express their preferences and have them weighted equally in government. To do so, citizens must enjoy individual rights such as freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement. Checks and balances exist to guarantee those rights. They are meant to prevent abuses that—under the guise of majoritarian support—could limit citizens’ ability to participate in government on an equal footing. The Trump administration’s willingness to bypass the law, defy courts, and weaponize state institutions to punish opponents threatens that political participation and, in doing so, threatens democracy.

For democracy to survive, it must be protected. In the past few decades, in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Poland, opposition groups pushed back successfully against leaders with authoritarian tendencies early in the process of democratic backsliding, when they still had institutional levers to pull. But in other cases, such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Turkey, and Venezuela, oppositions either failed to act with sufficient urgency or used tactics that lost them their institutional levers, gradually hindering their ability to resist.

In the United States, the opposition’s response to the threat so far has been underwhelming. Reeling from electoral defeat and shocked by the blitz of the Trump administration’s power grabs, politicians and civil society groups are uncertain about the path forward and hesitant to take bold steps.

This delay is costly. If American democracy is to prevail, pro-democracy forces must follow the handbook that has enabled oppositions to stop would-be autocrats in other countries. They should coordinate to defend and expand their institutional powers while they have them, wield them to obstruct Trump’s authoritarian agenda, strengthen grassroots resistance efforts, and protect the activists, officeholders, and other individuals exposed to retribution from the administration. The alternative may be that democracy slips away while they wait.

DON’T THROW AWAY YOUR SHOT

Because the erosion of democracy happens gradually, the opposition has ample opportunities to fight back. In the United States, opposition groups are not without resources. The Democratic Party holds a nontrivial number of seats in Congress and state legislatures and controls many gubernatorial and mayoral offices. Politicians and other pro-democracy forces have access to independent courts and oversight agencies at the national, state, and municipal levels, as well as independent media outlets, economic resources, and well-organized grassroots organizations. All of this provides leverage to counter Trump’s antidemocratic policies.

Pro-democracy actors in the United States are not the first to hesitate to use their leverage. Wherever backsliding happens, its slow pace can make it difficult to detect. Unsure about the level of threat the administration’s moves pose, some members of the Democratic Party, media outlets, and other institutions believe they can afford to wait. They assume the political situation will change with new elections and are choosing to deal with this government as they have dealt with previous adversarial presidents. Instead of leveraging their resources to make a stand and hamper (even if marginally) the administration’s power grabs, they have opted to accommodate it by helping confirm controversial nominees, collaborating to pass a funding bill without safeguards protecting Congress’s power of the purse or limits on the dismantling of the bureaucracy, and acquiescing to demands to support the government’s agenda when faced with financial threats.

Others are more alarmed and have pushed for a more aggressive response. Some Democratic governors and members of Congress have demanded a blanket obstruction of the Trump administration’s agenda, and civil rights groups have mobilized to get the courts to halt the administration’s orders, shine a spotlight on abuses with protests and boycotts, and exert pressure on elected officers in town halls. Yet compared with the first Trump administration, when the threat to American democracy was not as stark, the resistance today is limited and uncoordinated.

For democracy to survive, it must be protected.

The problem with a delayed response is that the more power leaders with authoritarian tendencies accumulate, the harder it is to mount an effective resistance. The opposition is thus more likely to succeed if it acts early. Divided over the extent to which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has led Turkey since 2003, threatened democracy, the Turkish opposition continued with politics as usual during the early years of his government. Although the opposition successfully stopped some government policies, such as a reform to the penal code that would have criminalized extramarital sexual relations as adultery, it failed to prevent Erdogan and his party’s co-optation of the bureaucracy and obscured the extent of the threat to democracy. By the time opponents of Erdogan tried to block his ally from the presidency in 2007, they struggled to coordinate an effective resistance, enabling further power grabs.

Pro-democracy forces must also bear in mind that resisting the erosion of democracy is more of a marathon than a sprint. Although it is important to take the threat seriously and respond accordingly, opposition groups must also protect their resources and, if possible, expand them to prepare for fights down the road.

The Venezuelan opposition learned this lesson the hard way after President Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. At that time, Venezuela had the second-oldest democracy in Latin America, a powerful legislature that had impeached a sitting president six years earlier, two political parties that—although weakened—had controlled the political arena for 40 years and won a majority of congressional seats in 1998, and a well-established judiciary. The opposition also had access to courts and oversight agencies, influence over the armed forces, and control over the state-owned oil company, PDVSA. Yet it lost all those resources by resorting immediately to extreme measures, trying to oust the president before the end of his constitutional term. An attempted coup in 2002 and an oil strike starting the same year gave Chávez grounds to purge the armed forces and assume full control over PDVSA. In 2005, an electoral boycott by opposition groups handed him the National Assembly, which then helped him consolidate his hold over the courts and oversight agencies.

The opposition is more likely to succeed if it acts early.

Had the opposition refrained from using these tactics, it might have been able to stop the erosion of Venezuelan democracy. At the very least, opposition groups could have made it significantly harder and costlier for Chávez to push his agenda forward. Without the support of the armed forces or PDVSA’s resources, and facing opposition inside the legislature, it would have taken longer for the executive to co-opt state institutions, giving the opposition additional opportunities to stop the breakdown of democracy. In these circumstances, claiming more power would have required Chávez to abandon his democratic façade entirely, risking his domestic and international support.

Pro-democracy politicians and civil society groups in the United States need to play the long game better than their counterparts in Venezuela did. That means finding ways to preserve and, ideally, increase their presence in elected and non-elected bodies on the national, state, and local levels. This includes both supporting competitive candidates in Democratic-leaning districts and making headway in Republican-leaning areas, defending judges and courts that uphold democratic principles, and signaling approval and support for Independent and Republican politicians willing to stand up for democracy.

USE WHAT YOU’VE GOT

Oppositions need to not only protect the institutional resources they have but also use them to delay, obstruct, and if possible, stop the incumbent’s consolidation of power. Colombia’s opposition did so effectively to stop democratic erosion under President Alvaro Uribe, who served from 2002 to 2010. During his eight years in government, Uribe introduced legislation that sought to increase the powers of the executive, undermine the courts and congress, and co-opt oversight agencies. Despite holding only a minority of seats in congress, opposition parties were able to use procedural maneuvers to block and modify Uribe’s reforms. The president was still able to pass most of his legislation, but thanks to the opposition’s efforts, antidemocratic bills were either delayed, diluted, or saddled with procedural irregularities that made them easy targets for lawsuits alleging they violated the Colombian constitution.

Legislatures, courts, and other institutional spaces can prove useful to pro-democracy actors even after a country has turned more authoritarian. One case with strong parallels to what is happening in the United States today is the capture of Guatemala’s government after the 2016 elections by a coalition of politicians, economic elites, and members of the security apparatus who undermined state capacity for the sake of impunity and corruption. On the eve of the 2023 presidential election, this coalition used its hold over the courts and oversight agencies to bar any promising candidate who might challenge its continued rule.

Protesting in Guatemala City, January 2024 Cristina Chiquin / Reuters

Yet the election still became an opportunity for the opposition. A little-known former congressional deputy and diplomat, Bernardo Arévalo, managed to fly below the ruling coalition’s radar and stay in the race. Polls taken ten days before the election indicated that only three percent of Guatemalans intended to vote for him. But with a last-minute groundswell of support, Arévalo made it to the runoff and ultimately won the election. As his odds of victory grew exponentially, Arévalo’s success forced the government’s hand. The corrupt coalition had to make a decision: protect the façade of democracy by letting the elections run their course and risk losing or overtly tamper with the elections and prevent Arévalo from becoming president. It chose the latter option. From the first round of voting in June 2023 to the new president’s inauguration in January 2024, the government tried to disqualify Arévalo, steal electoral ballots, and prevent the transfer of power. The cost of these moves proved too high to bear: they splintered the governing coalition, drove Guatemalans to the streets, and invited substantial international pressure. Today, Arévalo is Guatemala’s president.

Like the Colombian and the Guatemalan oppositions, the Democratic Party in the United States can make the erosion of democracy visible to the public and costly to the perpetrators. It can obstruct legislation in Congress, compete in electoral districts where Republicans typically run uncontested, and coordinate to maintain a presence, even if only in protest, in as many institutional spaces as possible. Recent attempts to lead town halls in districts where Republicans refuse to hold them are great examples of this strategy.

GET OUT IN THE STREETS

Although these institutional tactics are important, they are not always enough to preserve democracy. Nonviolent struggle is another powerful tool. Well-organized social movements and civil society groups can shelter democratic institutions, mobilize voters, and increase the costs of antidemocratic behavior.

In Israel, for example, citizens mobilized against a bill that would have allowed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to reshape the judicial branch in ways that diminish the checks on the executive. During the first half of 2023, half a million Israelis took to the streets to protest the bill. Although ultimately insufficient to stop it from becoming law, the six months of sustained protests made its passage costly for Netanyahu’s administration. The demonstrations created ruptures in the government coalition, which delayed the judicial overhaul and increased international pressure on the prime minister.

In the United States, opposition groups are not without resources.

A well-organized nonviolent movement can be particularly effective at defeating an incumbent in an unfair election. In Serbia, the student movement Otpor was key to overthrowing the brutal ruler Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. Ahead of elections the month prior, Otpor worked with the Center for Free Elections and Democracy, a Serbian election monitoring organization, to register voters, distribute electoral information, and drive voter turnout with creative campaigns. When Milosevic lost the election but refused to concede, Otpor was ready. With thousands of members throughout Serbia, a nationwide organizational structure, connections with civil society groups, and a rigorous parallel vote count that confirmed the opposition candidate’s victory, Otpor was able to quickly call thousands of citizens to the streets and defend the election results.

In the 2023 presidential election in Guatemala, indigenous and peasant movements adopted a similar strategy. When the government attempted to overturn the vote, these groups led a massive mobilization to protect the results. Between July and December 2023, thousands of Guatemalans participated in marches, rallies, sit-ins, and road blockages to demand the resignation of senior officials. This sustained activity on the streets—and the international attention it drew—ultimately made it unbearably costly for the government to persist in its effort to steal the election.

Social mobilization does not always work. According to the political scientist Erica Chenoweth, just 40 percent of nonviolent movements between 1960 and 2010 achieved their aims, and since 2010, that figure has fallen to less than 34 percent. In Serbia and Guatemala, the opposition movements’ reliance on well-organized, flexible organizations with nationwide networks built on traditions of student and indigenous resistance was key to their success. This infrastructure enabled protesters to use creative tactics, stay active for long periods of time, and retain public support by eschewing violence even when they faced government repression. In the United States, investing in these kinds of grassroots movements now can pay off later, especially if the country confronts an unfair election in which the incumbent has engaged in gerrymandering, co-opted the electoral authorities, purged the voting rolls, or implemented laws that make it hard to vote. With the right infrastructure in place, the citizenry can be mobilized to boost turnout on Election Day—and, if necessary, demand that voters’ choices are respected afterward.

PROTECT YOUR OWN

Fighting against democratic backsliding is not easy. As the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way noted in Foreign Affairs earlier this year, would-be authoritarians often employ “soft” forms of repression, such as lawsuits, tax audits, or criminal investigations, to increase the cost of opposing the regime. These measures—or the threat of them—give those willing to stand against the government strong incentives to step aside. Well-organized civil society organizations can reduce some of the costs of opposition for activists, politicians, and citizens who may face government retaliation by providing legal or other professional services, economic assistance, or support to alleviate day-to-day tasks. Still, there will be many people who, whether under direct pressure or due to sheer exhaustion, have to give up the fight. Grassroots organizations can provide a replenishable pool of politicians and activists to take their place.

Serbia’s Otpor again offers a potential model to civil society in the United States. The group had a flat organizational structure that protected the movement from attacks on individual leaders. It also maintained a network of activists and lawyers it could notify and mobilize in defense of activists imprisoned by the Milosevic regime. The often life-threatening repression of the Serbian government is far more extreme than the methods the U.S. government is using or considering today, but there is still a role for social movements in the United States, particularly when it comes to funding and providing legal aid, offering training and tools related to digital security, and supporting the mental and emotional well-being of activists.

Democracy in the United States faces a serious threat, but the case is not hopeless. Its defenders have a wide array of levers they can pull to oppose Trump’s and his allies’ attempts to consolidate power. If pro-democracy forces coordinate and act quickly to protect their resources and use them wisely, they can slow down the march toward autocracy and, ultimately, give American democracy a fighting chance.

LAURA GAMBOA is Assistant Professor of Democracy and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame and the author of Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies Against the Erosion of Democracy .

Foreign Affairs · by More by Laura Gamboa · March 31, 2025

30. Obscurity by Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

A long read that provides some interesting insights that I had not considered.

Check out the grpahics at the link.

Conclusion:

These issues will not stay in the background when it comes time to gauge the military strength or economic resilience of the United States. They are important inputs into the Trumpist worldview. The friction these officials encounter in the bureaucracy, the success the administration has in expelling “wokeness” from American institutions, and Trump’s popularity with the broader public will all influence their perception of American strength. Those steeped in the technical intricacies of export controls and nuclear strategy may scoff at the idea that culture war battles will decide the course of world events. Nevertheless, they will. For Trump and his supporters, China is not just an adversary to outmaneuver, but a mirror and a standard. Competition with China cannot be severed from their larger quest to rechart the destiny of the American nation.

Obscurity by Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

By Tanner Greer

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/31/obscurity_by_design_competing_priorities_for_americas_china_policy_1100843.html?mc_cid=9cfc496744

Introduction

Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy.

That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be.

This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1]

If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2]

This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.

Analytical Approach

Since Trump’s 2020 defeat, Republicans have understood that the contours of their party’s China policy were not frozen in place. The GOP is a party in transition. It is led by a man who gathers blocs otherwise at odds into one large tent. Which ideas and interests should guide their joint enterprise are not (and likely will never be) settled. The best each side can do is lay out their case.

The last four years have seen many Trumpists lay out their cases. Via Twitter thread, essay, roundtable, conference panel, and podcast, their debates see-saw; at each turn, scholars, pundits, politicians, and former officials have unveiled their designs for American relations with China. This report draws on these public discussions to typologize the main positions in these debates and examine the assumptions underlying them. To supplement the public discussions more than thirty off-the-record interviews were conducted with congressional aides, think tankers, former Trump officials, Trump transition figures, and individuals nominated for positions in the second administration. The subjects of these interviews range from cabinet-level officials to the research assistants who are actually responsible for getting things done in Washington.

Drawing on both these private interviews and the public discussions of China policy, this report outlines the fundamental divides that have separated the various camps of argument. These camps are intellectual constructs. Though some arguments are strongly associated with this or that specific individual, the “schools of thought” outlined are not organized coalitions or factions. Many thinkers are located squarely at the intersection of different schools. Likewise, Republican politicians—including Trump himself—often flit between positions, lending rhetorical support to different stances as the situation demands. This is one reason why so many Trump supporters felt betrayed at least once during Trump’s first administration: no man’s vision of Trumpism is endorsed by Trump himself. Trump’s coalition is invariably larger and more varied than his supporters wish.

It is likely that each of the eight schools of thought identified here will have some influence on this administration; the strength of each’s influence will wax and wane as events roll forth. Individuals who champion each of the eight schools are already present in the new administration. Some of these schools have greater strength than others. But in Trumpworld, no win is permanent. Over the course of his first administration, Donald Trump barreled through six Secretaries or acting secretaries of defense, five White House communication directors, four national security advisors, and four White House chiefs of staff. With Donald Trump in power, present strength does not preclude future weakness. Those who lose today may win tomorrow.

This report thus lays out all of the Republican schools of thought on China policy, giving them approximately equal treatment. My purpose is not to take sides in their debates. Instead, it attempts to steelman each case and outline the deeper assumptions each is built upon. My hope is that unearthing these assumptions may prove useful both for the officials tasked with navigating these debates and for the pundits and journalists who will cover them.

Points of Consensus

Amid these debates, one finds several points of consensus. The disputing intellectuals, wonks, and politicians all agree that China is the most significant foreign policy problem the United States now faces. They describe China as a challenge that must be met in many dimensions: military, economic, and technological (some would add “ideological” to this list, but that is a point of debate, not consensus). Trumpists agree that the US armed forces are poorly structured and lack the resources needed to counter the military challenge posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They agree that America’s commercial and financial relationship with China underwrote the rise of a powerful rival while undermining America’s own industrial base. They believe that China has taken advantage of the traditional American commitment to globalization and free markets, and that doubling down on this commitment is foolish. To level the playing field, some mix of tariffs, export controls, capital controls, and industrial policy is necessary. They agree that the Biden administration’s China policy—while an improvement on that of the Obama administration—had nonetheless been feckless. They believe that the Biden administration articulated geopolitical goals that it had not resourced, cared too much about perceptions of amity and too little about perceptions of strength, and had not sold the American people on its foreign policy priorities.

As Alex Wong, principal deputy national security advisor for the new administration, observed last year:

I could present you with multiple articles that call for the United States to bolster military spending, increase allied defense cooperation, implement harder technological and investment strictures, build supply chain resiliency, neutralize Chinese influence operations, and cast a light on the depredations of the [Chinese Communist Party’s] authoritarian and genocidal rule. You would be hard pressed to identify which articles support what general vision for the US-China endgame.[3]

But if those responsible for shaping China policy agree on many of the tactical maneuvers and strategic expedients that the United States must adopt, there are often fundamental disagreements about the purpose of these actions. The official searching for a tool to reshape distorted trade balances might smile on tariffs—but so might the official aiming to protect a strategic industry, the official seeking to weaken the legitimacy of the Chinese government, or the official looking for additional leverage in otherwise unrelated negotiations. These aims cannot all be reconciled. Circumstances will force the administration to prioritize some over others. In that moment of decision, “general visions” will begin to matter.

The debates Trumpists have over the general vision of China policy can largely be sifted into two buckets: economics and geopolitics. In theory, one’s position on the CHIPS Act or currency devaluation might be tied to one’s position on military aid to Taiwan. In practice, this is not so. The economic and geopolitical debates occur on different planes. It was not unusual for individuals with an economic portfolio to say things like, “Obviously I care about the military balance, but I do not have the time to think in depth about it—I export all of my thinking on that to Bridge Colby.”[4] Those with a national security background, for their part, were just as likely to describe problems of currency, investment, and trade as problems beyond their paygrade.[5]

Elected politicians must work in both modes. It is common for two Republican politicians to be closely allied in the economic sphere but not in the geopolitical sphere—or vice versa. For example, as senators, Marco Rubio and JD Vance were close allies on the economic front. Both senators were deeply committed to reinvigorating American industrial policy. Their staffs worked together closely here. There are few meaningful distinctions between the economic strategy each office endorsed. In contrast, the two senators’ takes on the geopolitical problem posed by China are more difficult to reconcile. It is not easy to imagine JD Vance sponsoring either the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act or the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, bills that Rubio proudly presents as “the greatest turning point in US-China relations in decades.”[6]

The need to separate the economic and geopolitical angles of the China challenge will be revisited later in this report. For now, each will be discussed separately, looking at the two debates as their own participants do.

The Geopolitical Debate

One way to represent the core principles at play in the geopolitical debate is with a classic two-by-two matrix.

Optimism vs. Pessimism

On the x-axis is the single most important difference between the various geopolitical schools of thought found in Trumpworld: assessments of American power and state capacity. Where one falls in many of the most prominent debates—such as “Can the United States afford to support both Ukraine and Taiwan?” or “Should the ultimate goal of our China policy be victory over the Communist Party of China, or should it be détente?”—has less to do with one’s assessment of China and more to do with one’s assessment of the United States. What resources can be mustered for competition with China? Just how large are stores of money, talent, and political will?

Those on the right quadrants of my diagram provide pessimistic answers to these questions. They buttress their case with measurables: steel produced, ships at sea, interest paid on the federal deficit, or the percentage of an ally’s gross domestic product spent on defense. Against these numbers are fearsome statistics of Chinese industrial capacity and PLA power. Changes in technology, which favor shore-based precision munitions at the expense of more costly planes and ships, further erode the American position. This is a new and uncomfortable circumstance. The last time the United States waged war without overwhelming material superiority was in 1812.[7]

To these material realities, many skeptics of American power point to cultural or institutional obstacles that suggest the US military is less lethal than it once was. Tallied here are the failures of the US military in Afghanistan (and especially the botched 2021 withdrawal), the numerous fires and crashes that have marked the US Navy’s surface fleet, and the diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives defended by the general brass in the Biden era. As the incoming director of policy planning at the State Department puts it: “The brass is woke and incompetent, and senior officers and civilian leaders tolerate and even encourage wokeness and incompetence; or to say better, they excuse and deny incompetence in furtherance of wokeness.”[8]

To the Trumpists who see American power through this frame, there is only one logical response: the United States must limit its ambitions. This means either radically reprioritizing defense commitments to focus on China or retreating from conflict with China altogether. [9]

Trumpists in the left two quadrants see things differently. Where the pessimists see settled facts, the optimists see possibilities. The optimists recognize many of the same trends as the pessimists,[10] but view them as self-inflicted mistakes that can, and should, be reversed. An inadequate defense budget is not a law of the universe but a political choice. A failing industrial base, DEI defense programs, and reliance on aging weapons platforms are all choices. Trump has won. He will choose otherwise. Implicit in the optimist view is a longer time horizon—there is still time to turn things around.[11] But this window will not be open forever.[12] Optimists fear that pessimistic assessments erode the political will needed to make changes while change is still possible.[13]

The arguments between pessimists and optimists could be reframed as a matter of risk. [However] the pessimists are most worried about the downside risks of a crisis with China in the near future (2025–28).[14] The optimists balance that possibility against the longer-term risks America will face as it withdraws from other regions of the world or abandons defense capabilities that are not needed in the Pacific theater. Optimists believe this second class of risks is large and that the United States should not court them.[15] Even an America in desperate need of defense reform has some capacity to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” This issue is at the crux of their arguments on Ukraine: in material terms, aid to Ukraine is not coming at Taiwan’s expense. It is relatively cheap. What stops America from helping both beleaguered nations?

The pessimists do not view that question purely in material terms. In their debates, the pessimists are quick to highlight the few weapons systems being shipped across the Atlantic that might be used in the Pacific,[16] but their critique reaches higher than this. The costs of the war in Ukraine (and the Middle East) are measured not just in bullets, but in attention and effort: There are only so many minutes the National Security Council may meet. Washington can only have a few items on its agenda at any given time. The executive branch is stodgy, slow, and captive to bureaucratic interests; the legislative branch is rancorous, partisan, and captive to public opinion; the American public does not care about the world abroad. Accomplishing anything meaningful in the United States—much less the drastic defense reforms both sides of the debate agree are necessary—requires singular attention and will.

If this seems like a pessimistic take on the American system—well, it is one. It is common for Trumpists in the optimistic quadrants to argue that the People’s Republic of China is riddled with internal contradictions. In a long-term competition between the two systems, they are confident that these contradictions will eat China from the inside out, and that America’s free and democratic order will eventually emerge victorious. None of the pessimists interviewed made similar predictions. If they have anything to say about internal contradictions, it is American contradictions they focus on.[17]

Power-Based vs. Values-Based Perspectives

So much for the optimist-pessimist divide. What is the y-axis?

This can be thought of as a pole, with “power-based” perspectives on one hand and “values-based” perspectives on the other.

Trumpists in the top two quadrants ground their arguments in cold calculations of realpolitik. From this perspective, international politics is first and foremost a competition for power. States seek power. The prosperity, freedom, and happiness of any nation depend on how much power its government can wield on the world stage. While states might compete for power in many domains, military power is the most important. A state frustrated by a trade war might escalate to a real war, but a state locked in deadly combat has no outside recourse. The buck stops with the bullet.[18]

From the power-based perspective, then, the goal of American strategy must be the maximization of American power, with military force as the ultimate arbiter of that power. This force does not need to be realized in combat—ideally, its deterrent power will be strong enough that it is never actively used. The ideal means of American strategy is a military posture and alliance system strong enough to deter the Chinese from resorting to war.

The left and right quadrants of this perspective disagree on the best way to build that sort of power. The upper right quadrant—the “Prioritizers”—do not believe America will ever possess power sufficient to compel China into submission; a stable détente between the two countries is the best outcome that America can attain. Even this modest aim will only be possible if the United States prioritizes the threat posed by China above all others.[19]

Trumpists who argue from the upper left quadrant—the “Primacists”—also speak the language of realpolitik. They maintain, however, that the sacrifices the Prioritizers propose will weaken American power. They believe that the existing American alliance system contributes to America’s strength today and will contribute to America’s potential strength in the future. Instead of limiting American aims, the Primacists are more concerned with expanding American means. They are confident this can be done if the American people have the confidence to do so.

The lower two quadrants, whose arguments are labeled “values-based,” operate under a different frame. The people in these quadrants believe that American foreign policy should not be evaluated by a single variable. They see connections between what America does abroad and what America is like at home. They have strong values-based commitments to specific ways of life that are expressed in their vision for American strategy.

Those in the bottom left quadrant are labeled “Crusaders” because of their normative commitments to an American-led order. For this group, the character of the international order is a question not just of national security but moral right. American foreign policy always has been, and always will be, downstream of American ideas of right and wrong—the only question is whether one will admit or obfuscate this reality. This group finds little gain in obfuscation. They argue that America and its allies are knit together not only by shared security interests but also by a shared vision of the good. The values shared by the liberal bloc explain why these countries share security interests in the first place.[20] After all, China is an authoritarian power whose influence operations threaten the integrity of democracies across the world. Many Crusaders view this political-ideological threat as the most dangerous one that China poses.

For these reasons, those in this quadrant are especially skeptical of détente; they do not believe permanent compromise with China is possible. They attribute Chinese belligerence to the communist political system that governs the country.[21] For them, tensions in US-Chinese relations are less the expected clashes between a rising power and the ruling hegemon than a battle between two incompatible social systems. Pointing to the close cooperation that ties Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China together, the Crusaders argue (contra the Prioritizers) that the world is gripped in a general contest between democratic order and a resurgent authoritarianism whose different parts cannot be disentangled from each other. At stake are basic questions of moral right—not just abroad, but at home. An America stripped of its hegemony, humiliated abroad, and economically dependent on authoritarian powers will struggle to preserve freedom and virtue inside its own borders.

Those in the bottom right quadrant—the “Culture Warriors”—also think about foreign affairs through the lens of regime and right. For them, however, the hostile regime is their own. Culture Warriors link the liberal international order to the free trade agreements all Trumpists despise and the administrative “deep state” all Trumpists distrust. They see the liberal international order as an international extension of the progressive order they are trying to tear down at home. As one official tapped for service in the State Department rather pungently puts it: “There is an increasing disconnect between America’s stature on the geopolitical stage and superpower status and the well-being of actual Americans. What good does it do for America to remain globally dominant when all this translates to is preserving the spoils system for Jeffrey Epstein’s buddies?”[22]

There are echoes of the 1960s New Left in the Culture Warrior argument. Both the new left of yesterday and the new right of today are rebellions against “the establishment.” Both reject the pieties of their day; both see a bloated national security state as a symbol of the dehumanizing values they reject. Both groups correctly point out that there is no natural limit to the quest for primacy. Both argue that a totalizing foreign policy will lead to the bureaucratization of American life.[23]

Only the most radical Culture Warriors are ready for a twenty-first-century march on the Pentagon. Most aim for an easier target: a relatively modest foreign policy. Instead of defending an entire international order, it is enough to defend America. Instead of deterring authoritarianism, it is enough to deter China. China does not need to be defeated—it is enough to convince the Chinese to accept some sort of détente.[24]

This is somewhat similar to the ends sought by the Prioritizers. Little wonder so many of the Primacists and Crusaders interviewed believed the Prioritizers were Restrainers in disguise. Again and again this accusation was made: Prioritizer arguments are just an attempt to make isolationism sexy.[25] The Prioritizers do not actually believe in realpolitik—realpolitik is just a respectable way to attack the existing international order they despise.

There is an irony to this critique. Just as Primacists and Crusaders condemn the false face of the Prioritizers, so the Prioritizers and the Crusaders condemn the false face of the Primacists. Many of those interviewed insisted that their Primacist opponents made such-and-such argument not for the realpolitik reasons they professed, but because of their (hidden) commitment to liberal ideals. Ideals that cannot be defended on their own merits had to be prettied up with talk of hard power.[26]

All of these suspicions of subterfuge are overblown. Both Primacists and Prioritizers believe the arguments they make. Yet their suspicions are revealing. All sides clearly believe there is a political advantage in couching one’s arguments in realpolitik logic. That fact alone tells us something about the likely contours of a Trump presidency—and perhaps the beliefs of Trump himself.

The Economic Debate

As with the geopolitical debate, it is helpful to conceptualize the divisions over economic statecraft among Trump’s followers as taking place on a two-by-two chart. The x-axis of this chart describes the battleground on which economic competition with China must be fought: is this a contest to push forward the frontiers of technology and science, or does competition with China require a broader-based revitalization of American manufacturing capacity writ large? The y-axis, in turn, spans the gap between those who are confident that the administrative state can be used to strengthen the American economy and those skeptical of any bureaucratically administered industrial policy.

There are key tenets all quadrants share. Nearly all Trumpists claim that it is imperative for the United States to “win” economic competition with China. They regularly frame this as in terms of security and sovereignty. “If we want political independence,” one told me, then “we must first have economic independence. Lose that and you lose your country.”[27] Marco Rubio framed the matter in similar terms during his confirmation hearings: “If we stay on the road we’re on right now, in less than ten years virtually everything that matters to us in life will depend on whether China will allow us to have it or not. Everything from the blood pressure medicine we take to what movies we get to watch –and everything in between—will depend on China.”[28]

There is less agreement on what grounds independence must be secured. For some, “winning” the economic competition with China means maintaining American leadership on the bleeding edge of new technology. For others, victory means a renaissance in American manufacturing and industrial capacity.

Those in the right quadrants of the diagram are focused squarely on the promises of high technology. These Trumpists believe that economic dynamism and military power are primarily functions of technological innovation. Some industries matter more than others. To win the future, you must occupy the commanding heights of tomorrow’s economy—today. In its most extreme forms, this translates to a fixation on artificial intelligence (AI), the industry that promises the most total disruption to the existing global economy.[29] Most Trumpists in these quadrants are not this extreme. They seek victory in several battleground industries. The exact list differs from individual to individual, but they often include software, robotics, aerospace, drones and autonomous vehicles, semiconductors, batteries, new energy technologies, and biotech.[30]

These technologies all have obvious military applications. Many in the technology-oriented quadrants are former national security professionals who have only branched out into the world of economic security over the last decade. These Trumpists are laser-focused on the technologies that might provide the United States with a “third offset” advantage. One frankly admits that when evaluating the US-China competition as a whole, he does not care about the gross domestic product growth numbers of either power—what matters is who is furthest out on the technological edge and who controls the supply lines of critical technology sectors. Whether the Chinese are able to maintain high growth rates does not matter to his calculations.[31]

Other technology-oriented Trumpists come to their position via professional experience in the worlds of finance, venture capital, or engineering. A particularly large subset is associated with defense tech companies such as Palantir, Anduril, and the new band of start-ups operating out of El Segundo.[32] They share the concerns of their national security compatriots but add to them lessons drawn from the last three decades of American history. They describe the story of American economic growth over these decades as the story of Silicon Valley’s rise. Silicon Valley triumphed through disruptive technological change. By these means, upstarts like Facebook and Google—which at the turn of the millennium either did not exist or were not yet publicly traded—transformed into trillion-dollar behemoths. These technologists expect new firms will follow in their footsteps. The question is whether these new firms will be American or Chinese.

Republican technologists believe there are terrible stakes in this race. They often cite the total factor productivity gap that divides the United States from Europe as a warning sign: This is what will happen to America if another country’s tech sector “pulls ahead.”[33] China is the only country whose tech sector can credibly threaten to do so. If America unwisely invests limited resources in inefficient and outmoded industries, the Chinese will race ahead.

The Trumpists who draw on ideas from the left side of the axis find these arguments insufficient. They do not measure American competition with China in terms of blue-chip initial public offerings, patents filed, or new large language models. They point instead to broader measures of American industrial strength—measures like steel production, manufacturing share, and global trade balances. Their goal is not to lead the globe’s next technological revolution so much as to kickstart an industrial renaissance in the American heartland.

Three main arguments are given for this position.

The first is that winning blue-chip firms do not emerge out of a vacuum. Technological revolutions often require an entire “industrial commons” with crosslinked supply chains and shared talent pools.[34] As Oren Cass, the intellectual don of these quadrants, puts it: “Industrial expertise is not something bought off the shelf, it comes embedded deep within an ecosystem of relationships between educational institutions and firms; experienced workers and new hires; and researchers, engineers, and technicians. What a nation can make efficiently tomorrow depends heavily on what it makes today, which is one reason why saying it doesn’t matter what we make in America is so wrong-headed.”[35]

Many of these ideas are grounded in a close study of China’s economic model. It is common for Chinese firms to pivot from one industry to another. Phone companies become electric battery companies; car companies build semiconductor fabs; software companies start to manufacture drones. This is easy for these Chinese firms to do because each belongs to a group of interlocking industries that share skilled labor pools, domestic suppliers, and industrial know-how.[36] In other words, if China has an advantage in manufacturing solar panels and electric vehicles, it is because they first had an advantage in manufacturing liquid-crystal display screens and iPhones. Those who advocate for a manufacturing renaissance argue that what is true of China will also hold true in the United States.[37]

The second argument of the industrially inclined is more focused on national security. They fear that in times of war, leadership in semiconductors and software applications will not be sufficient for victory. The premise of this point is simple: any violent contest between China and the United States will be a terrible, bloody, protracted affair. If past wars pattern future ones, great power conflict means that both parties will stretch their industrial capacity to its limit. In that day of woe, outmoded industries will matter. Whether a country can smelt steel, refine rare earths, and build ships will decide death or survival. “It is foolish,” one Trump official tells me, “to imagine that the external sources of these goods will not be disrupted or interdicted in a time of global war.”[38] The time to prepare for that possibility is now.

The third argument of those in the left quadrants goes as thus: competition with China is not merely a matter of economic domination. It is also a contest to see which country can better secure the blessings of prosperity and safety for its people. Trump was elected on the promise that his administration would bring wealth to the backwaters—especially the Rust Belt. What does the technological frontier mean to Detroit or to Buffalo? Will American industrial policy restore “dignity” to the majority of American workers—or will it simply make richer those parts of America already rich?[39]

Where technologists see the history of Silicon Valley as a playbook for future success, industrial-minded Trumpists see in its history a cautionary tale.[40] The economic growth that America experienced over the last three decades was not evenly distributed. Its benefits went disproportionately to the class of creative urbanites that Trumpism is a revolt against. Any industrial or trade policy that entrenches the advantages of this class will result in a hollow “victory” over China.

The Trumpists who argue thus doubt that even a hollow victory might be attained. They predict that a hard line against China can only be maintained if their party keeps control of the country—something Republicans will fail to do if they cannot deliver on their basic election promises. But the problem they see is larger than partisanship. Many of those on the left-hand side of this axis describe the American social contract as “strained” or “brittle.” If the Trump administration cannot boost the prospects of working-class Americans or reverse the harms wreaked by globalization on the American people, class resentment and social upheaval. It will be difficult to compete with China, much less “win” any competition with it, if America’s own social order is cracking apart.[41]

Trust vs. Lack Thereof in the Administrative State

The x-axis of the diagram marks out differing visions of the battleground on which the Chinese must be beaten. The y-axis records disagreements on the type of economic weaponry America should bring to battle. Those in the upper quadrants are confident that state subsidies and regulation are the most powerful tools the new administration might draw on. Those in the bottom quadrants are distrustful of bureaucrats, worry about the consequences of creating an administrative leviathan that may not remain in Republican hands, and doubt that even Trump-aligned officials have the skills needed to intervene so directly in the American economy.[42] They prefer policy tools less reliant on congressional appropriation or extensive bureaucratic supervision.

Industrialists skeptical of industrial policy are drawn to tariffs. These “Trade Warriors” see several special advantages in a tariff regime. Like subsidies, tariffs can be used to right unbalanced trade relations and protect industries important to the “industrial commons” of the United States. Unlike industrial policy, tariffs can be implemented cleanly with no additional government outlay.[43] The Office of the US Trade Representative has fewer than 250 employees; no more would need to be hired to institute a far-reaching tariff regime. Tariffs are fully compatible with a nightwatchman state—indeed, tariffs were the primary economic tool of the nightwatchman state that presided over nineteenth-century America’s climb to power.

Trade Warriors tend to look at the American economy through an international lens. They describe American economic realities as a function not of state and market, but of states and market. Unlike subsidies and domestic investment, tariffs provide American leaders with a source of diplomatic leverage that might be used to change the policy of foreign states. At its most elaborate, as in the chair of Trump’s council of economic advisors’ proposal to “restructure the global trading system,” graduated tariffs are seen as a tool by which to restructure the monetary and industrial policies of the entire developed world in America’s favor.[44]

The bottom-right quadrant, labeled the “Dynamists”, share the Trade Warriors’ skepticism about the American administrative state. They accept the need—or at least the political necessity—of new tariffs, but do not see tariffs as central to their program. Many agree with Vivek Ramaswamy’s argument that tariffs should be “focused entirely on eliminating US dependence on China in those critical sectors for US security…[for] if we were really serious about decoupling from China in those critical sectors, that actually means more, not less, trade with allies like Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam.”[45]

These Dynamists are instead focused squarely on deregulating the American economy and reforming the American state. In their eyes, Chinese drone dominance is less a product of Chinese industrial policy than a result of the Federal Aviation Administration’s “war on technology;”[46] America’s failure to match the stunning new infrastructure of China is best blamed on the National Environmental Policy Act regime;[47] and cutting-edge developments in AI, crypto, and software engineering would have already transformed the American economy if not for the “regulatory capture, special interests, and perverse structural incentives” that have sheltered entrenched incumbents from real competition.[48]

Dynamists believe that many of these deficiencies stem from the outmoded structure and personnel of the US government itself. The DEI programs of the Biden administration are taken as a synecdoche of the structural problems of the federal workforce as a whole: too bureaucratic, too full of make-work, too protected from meaningful competition, and too hostile to meritocracy.[49] For America to become truly competitive with China, it must cut loose all deadweight. Many federal employees should be fired—but those who are not should be given far more freedom of action than is currently the case.

The “Industrialists” and “Techno-nationalists” who occupy the upper two quadrants of the diagram strenuously dispute this framing of America’s failures. Government intervention in the economy can work. Across the Pacific, it is working right now. China did not become such a menacing threat through a commitment to small government. The intellectual centers of this movement—magazines like American Affairs and think tanks like American Compass—regularly publish detailed reports seeking lessons from the Chinese experience.[50] If Beijing is unafraid to use industrial policy, subsidies, and direct intervention to dominate key sectors, Washington should not be afraid to do the same.

This approach assumes that knowledge is the key constraint on effective administrative power. There are wise and unwise ways to use the state. Judicious industrial policy promises a level of finesse that other tools do not. As one researcher well respected in Industrialist circles told me, tariffs and deregulation will never bring about the competitiveness America needs to pull ahead. Tariffs are “blunt instruments…What we need are more targeted tools.”[51] Industrialists see bipartisan efforts like the CHIPS Act as evidence that the American system is not just ready for industrial policy but capable of succeeding in it.[52]

This framework also appeals to the Techno-nationalists, who believe that America’s future rests on a specific set of high-end technologies in desperate need of boosted development. In practice, differences between the Techno-nationalists and the Industrialists are generally papered over; industrial policy’s place in the Republican Party is too tenuous for either side to afford much sniping at the other. But these differences exist. The Techno-nationalists are generally more sensitive than the Industrialists to the fiscal costs of American industrial policy. They realize that there is not money to fund everything, and they have strong preferences as to how the purse should be spent. More importantly, many worry that there is no time to bring about a full-bore manufacturing renaissance: the clock of conflict is ticking. The state of the American defense industrial base and developments in specific American technologies may decide whether China welcomes war or fears it. There may only be a few years to prepare the United States for that point of conflict.[53]

This is profoundly different from how the Industrialists think about the problem of China and the American economy. In a perceptive essay, Micah Meadowcroft describes the two schools of thought as such: on the one hand, there are “[Techno-nationalists who] want to decouple from China and invest here at home because they expect a shooting war” and fear that America has not done enough to deter it. On the other hand, Industrialists like “[JD] Vance, [who are] worried about the defense industrial base because the process of rebalancing trade with China and rebuilding America may heighten tensions to the point of open conflict.”[54]

For the Techno-nationalists with a national security background, China is the central problem—it is the adversary to be outcompeted, contained, and deterred. But often in the arguments emanating from the other three camps, China seems less like an enemy than a rhetorical device. Some will hail Chinese statecraft as an example to emulate. Others will summon a Chinese boogeyman that must be defeated. But in many of these cases, the real problem identified is not China per se, but the economic order that enabled its rise. The real target is a free-market consensus that prioritizes free trade and capital mobility over national resilience. Were the Chinese Communist Party to collapse tomorrow, the essential policies each group advocates would not change.

That China is such a powerful rhetorical weapon is revealing in its own way. Much like the geopolitical debate’s preoccupation with realpolitik, the economic debate’s insistence on foregrounding competition with China says something important about the anxieties of those in Trump’s orbit, as well as the arguments deemed most convincing to Trump himself.

Conclusions

There are several takeaways one might draw from this exercise.

First: Not every dispute has calcified along doctrinaire lines. This report has had little to say about Taiwan because positions on Taiwan policy do not match up neatly with any of the schools identified. There are Prioritizers, Primacists, and Crusaders who believe that extending a formal security guarantee to the Taiwanese is necessary; there are members of each camp who think any move of this sort profoundly unwise. Other disputes that seem to “cross party lines” include chip export controls, the true stakes of the AI race, the strength of the Chinese economy, the ideal US military force structure, and the role of peripheral regions like Africa or South America in the Sino-American rivalry. On issues like these, there may be room for an ambitious policy entrepreneur to have an outsized impact.

Second: The most pressing disputes over geopolitical and economic competition with China often have little to do with China itself. Serious debates about Chinese strengths or intentions are rare; instead, Republican discussions have largely focused on the scope of American power and the broader implications of this competition for both America’s global standing and its domestic economy. Similarly, in debates over economic policy, China is frequently invoked as either a pretext for action or a model to follow, but the underlying arguments stem from deeper ideological divides—disagreements over the nature of economic progress or the proper role of the market and state.

Notably absent from these discussions was serious consideration of how China might respond to American policy. Rarely did any of my interviewees frame their arguments in terms of “if we do X, then Beijing will do Y.” Rarer still were counterarguments voiced against other people’s faulty forecasts. This is not because Trumpists are unwilling to argue with each other—over the last two years, debates over China policy have been quite public. None of those interviewed were unwilling to rip into the perceived errors of rival camps.

The essential problem is that questions over how one should model Chinese perceptions or predict Chinese reactions are simply not central to these debates. Every person interviewed was capable of engaging with these questions when prompted. Some did so quite thoughtfully. But none raised these issues on their own accord.

Third: Policy can collapse under the weight of conflicting aims. This administration may struggle to adjudicate competing aspirations. On many issues—tariffs, revitalizing the defense industrial base, export controls, a rhetorically tough line on China, diplomatic engagement with India, and so forth—groups of officials who subscribe to different schools of thought may support the same policy. This does not mean policy will be able to accomplish everything dreamed of it. Often times one goal will have to win out at the expense of the other.

This will be particularly important when it comes to sequencing the administration’s actions. The administration will have to carefully consider which issues are worth raising tensions over, which are worth raising tensions over (but not now), and which are not worth raised tensions at all. There is no obvious framework for deciding these questions—especially if and when the winning arguments in the economic and geopolitical debates clash. With Republicans out of power, these two debates could proceed in parallel, neither one deeply impacting the other. This will not be true with Republicans in full control of the federal government.

Fourth: At the heart of these disputes lies a fundamental question: What is America capable of? Can it still do great things? For the last four years, Trumpists have answered “no.” They have cast the federal government as a bloated machine run by inept bureaucrats whose culture has been hijacked by “wokeism” and whose institutions have been weaponized against them. Trump has vowed to change all of that. Whether he succeeds will shape America’s approach to China.

These issues will not stay in the background when it comes time to gauge the military strength or economic resilience of the United States. They are important inputs into the Trumpist worldview. The friction these officials encounter in the bureaucracy, the success the administration has in expelling “wokeness” from American institutions, and Trump’s popularity with the broader public will all influence their perception of American strength. Those steeped in the technical intricacies of export controls and nuclear strategy may scoff at the idea that culture war battles will decide the course of world events. Nevertheless, they will. For Trump and his supporters, China is not just an adversary to outmaneuver, but a mirror and a standard. Competition with China cannot be severed from their larger quest to rechart the destiny of the American nation.

Tanner Greer is a Non-Resident Fellow with the FPRI Asia Program as well as the Deputy Director of the Open Source Observatory at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

Featured Image Credits: Adobe Stock, Flickr (US Department of State, Secretary of Defense, White House), Raytheon, US Strategic Command | Artwork: Leah Pedro | FPRI

Notes:

[1] James Taranto, “Weekend Interview: Trump Tangles with the Journal’s Editors,” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2024. Trump has expressed similar sentiments many times. For a review, see Daniel Drezner, “Does the Madman Theory Actually Work?” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2025.

[2] I have conducted more than thirty off-the-record interviews with congressional aides, think tankers, former Trump officials, Trump transition figures, and individuals nominated for positions in the second administration. Interview 12.

[3] Alex Wong, “Competition with China: Debating the Endgame,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, October 16, 2023.

[4] Interview 28.

[5] Interviews 2, 3.

[6] US Department of State, “Biography: Marco Rubio,” accessed February 2, 2025.

[7] Interview 5. See also Robert Greenway et al., “A Conservative Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2025,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 281 (April 2025).

[8] Michael Anton, “Why It’s Clearly Not in America’s Interest to Go to War Over Taiwan,” The Federalist, December 20, 2021.

[9] Interviews 4, 5. For representative public statements, see Alex Velez-Green and Robert Peters, “The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America’s Interests in a More Dangerous World,” Heritage Foundation Special Report no. 288 (August 2024); and Elbridge Colby’s comments in “The Most Dangerous Moment: A Debate on America’s Role in the Pacific,” Uncommon Knowledge, December 5, 2023.

[10] For two influential statements, see Mackenzie Eaglen, “10 Ways the US Is Falling Behind China in National Security,” American Enterprise Institute, August 9, 2023, and “Keeping Up with the Pacing Threat: Unveiling the True Size of Beijing’s Military Spending,” American Enterprise Institute, April 29, 2024; Jerry Hendrix, “The Age of American Naval Dominance Is Over,” The Atlantic, March 13, 2023.

[11] Interviews 10, 16.

[12] For one influential spokesman’s perception of the window, see Matt Pottinger, “The Stormy Seas of a Major Test,” in The Boiling Point: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan (Stanford University Press, 2024), 7–39, esp. 27–28. See also the introduction to Jonathan Ward, The Decisive Decade: American Grand Strategy for Triumph Over China (Diversion Books, 2023).

[13] Interview 21. For a representative statement, see Ivan Kapanathy’s concerns about public opinion in Taiwan and the United States posted in “Should the United States Change Its Policies Toward Taiwan?” Brookings Institution, convening April 16, 2024, and “The Collapse in One China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2022.

[14] Interview 4. For a representative public articulation, see Alex Velez-Green, “The Case for Urgency Against China,” The National Interest, September 13, 2023. Contrast this with David Sacks and Ivan Kapanathy’s argument that “a full-blown conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable. Although the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing and preparing for a conflict over Taiwan, it is not yet ready or willing to go to war with the United States. The PLA is still several years away from achieving the capability to take Taiwan by force (assuming US intervention), and Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have likely induced some short-term caution in Beijing.” Sacks and Kapanathy, “What It Will Take To Deter China in the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2023.

[15] Interview 1, 3, 8. For an extreme view, see Mitch McConnell, “The Price of American Retreat,” Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2024; for a version that concedes many of the Prioritizers’ arguments without reaching the same dismal conclusions, see Mike Gallagher, “America Needs a Strategy for China,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2024.

[16] See, for example, Alex Velez-Green, “Managing Trade-offs Between Military Aid for Taiwan and Ukraine,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief no. 5328, August 31, 2023. For prototypical Primacist and Internationalist responses, see Eric Sayers, tweet, November 23, 2024; Daniel Kochis, “Seven Things Pacific Prioritizers Get Wrong about Aid to Ukraine,” Hudson Institute policy memo, October 2024.

[17] Interviews 4, 25.

[18] For a thorough rendering of this idea, see Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021), 1–65. For a Primacist articulation of the same ideas, see “Tom Cotton Maiden Floor Speech,” C-Span, March 16, 2015.

[19] The argument has received its most coherent articulation by Niall Ferguson in “Kissinger and the True Meaning of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2024; see also Elbridge Colby’s endorsement of the piece in an April 6, 2024, Twitter Thread.

[20] Interview 1; for a version of this thesis permissible in Trump world, see Alex Wong’s comments on human rights and national security in Alex Wong, “Balance in the Indo-Pacific: Defining the US Approach,” Hudson Institute, May 30, 2023. See also Mike Walz’s opening statement in “Waltz Hosts Bipartisan Roundtable on CCP Human Rights Abuses and the Beijing,” Rep. Mike Waltz YouTube channel, April 15, 2021; and the points about Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz outlined in Amy Mackinnon, “Trump’s China Hawks Are Also Uyghur Advocates,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2024.

[21] The most influential statement of this was published by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff during the first Trump administration: Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, Elements of the China Challenge (November 2020). Miles Yu, who directed that effort, maintains the same position today; see Yu, “China’s Common Destiny Is America’s Uncommon Challenge,” Washington Times, January 5, 2025. For a similar vision of Chinese ambitions from an individual working in the second administration policy office, see Jonathan Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Atlas Publishing, 2019).

[22] Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews—Darren J. Beattie: If Only You Knew How Bad Things Really Are,” Fisted By Foucault, December 14, 2020. See also Beattie’s essay “Meet Norm Eisen: Legal Hatchet Man and Central Operative in the ‘Color Revolution’ Against President Trump,” Revolver News, September 9, 2020, for a more sustained argument that the foreign policy bureaucracy is an extension of the same forces arrayed against Donald Trump.

[23] Interviews 19, 25. The classic statement on the New Left is Carl Olgesby, “Vietnamese Crucible: An Essay on the Meanings of the Cold War,” in Containment and Change: Two Dissenting Views of American Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 1970), 3–176.

[24] For representative statements from two officials tapped to serve in the administration, cf. Andrew Byers and Randall Schweller, “A Cold Peace With China,” The American Conservative, September 14, 2024; Judy Woodruff, “Tulsi Gabbard on Why She Wants to Prioritize Foreign Policy,” PBS Newshour, May 17, 2019.

[25] Interviews 1, 3, 17. One consistent difference between Restrainers and Prioritizers that few Primacists or Crusaders acknowledge: the Culture Warriors genuinely fear the possibility of nuclear war. See, for example, Michael Anton, “Nuclear Autumn,” Claremont Review of Books (Fall 2022); “Tulsi Gabbard on Dick Cheney’s Lust for Nuclear War, and Why She’s on Biden’s ‘Terrorist Watchlist’,” The Tucker Carlson Show, September 7, 2024, and Tulsi Gabbard, “Statement by Tulsi Gabbard on Decision to Continue to Campaign for President and Declining to Seek Re-Election to the House of Representatives,” American Presidency Project, October 24, 2019. In contrast, most Prioritizers do not view nuclear conflict between China and the United States—or for that matter, Russia and the United States—as likely, and are more narrowly focused on deterring conventional conflict.

[26] Interviews 5, 21. This will be familiar to just about anyone logging onto Republican social media spaces, where both Primacists and Internationalists are derided with the smear “neocon.”

[27] Interview 12.

[28] Doug Palmer, “Rubio: US Must Break Its Dependence on China,” Politico, January 15, 2025.

[29] Interviews 19, 20. On this note see also Ivanka Trump, tweet, September 25, 2024.

[30] For a strong public example of this perspective, see Liza Tobin, “Commanding Heights: Ensuring US Leadership

in the Critical and Emerging Technologies of the 21 ^st Century,” Testimony for the US House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, July 26, 2023.

[31] Interview 27.

[32] Recently, the world views of this group have received a significant media coverage. See, for example, Margaux MacColl, “Rockets, God and Peter Thiel: 36 Hours in the Gundo, Tech’s Latest Startup Haven,” The Information, April 5, 2024; Zoe Bernard, “Inside California’s Freedom-Loving, Bible-Thumping Hub of Hard Tech,” Vanity Fair, July 22, 2024.

[33] Interviews 20, 24. The graph has gone viral in technologist spaces since its appearance in Valentina Romei, William Crofton, and Colby Smith, “Why America’s Economy is Soaring Ahead of its Rivals,” Financial Times, December 3, 2024.

[34] This phrasing comes from interview 23, who draws in turn from Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih, “Restoring American Competitiveness,” Harvard Business Review (July-August 2009).

[35] Oren Cass, “Chips Ahoy! Don’t Look Now, but Industrial Policy Is Doing Its Job,” Understanding America, August 9, 2024.

[36] For a succinct explainer, see Kyle Chan, “China’s Overlapping Tech-Industrial Ecosystems,” High Capacity, January 22, 2025.

[37] For a notable public articulation of these ideas, see “Julius Krein: The Blueprint for an American Manufacturing Renaissance,” The Realignment, episode 527, January 7, 2025.

[38] Interview 28. The same point is made by Robert Lighthizer in “Speech: The Naval War College Foundation Symposium,” America First Policy Institute, August 17, 2023.

[39] “Dignity” is a common byword among the Industrialists and Trade Warriors, often juxtaposed with economic efficiency. For a prominent example, see Robert Lighthizer, “How to Make Trade Work for Workers,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2020).

[40] Interview 30.

[41] This divide corresponds with, but does not map perfectly onto, other fault lines in the Republican coalition. The recent controversy over H1B1 visas—which pit technologists who believe that steady high-skilled immigration is necessary if America is to maintain its position as a global technological leader stay at the cutting edge against Republicans more sensitive to arguments about the effect H1B1 visa holders have on wages and opportunities for American citizens—echoes many of the same themes covered here.

[42] Interviews 14, 15.

[43] Interview 30.

[44] Stephen Miran, “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,” Hudson Bay Capital, November 2024.

[45] There are also people whom I would classify as closer to the techno-nationalist side of the equation who make similar arguments about the need to near-shore. See, for example, “Homeland Security and the China Challenge: A Conversation with Congressman Mark Green,” Hudson Institute, December 17, 2024.

[46] This phrasing comes from Marc Andreesen, “Marc Andreessen: It’s Morning Again in America,” Uncommon Knowledge, January 14, 2024.

[47] Mike Lee and David Schweikert, “Unshackling American Infrastructure,” City Journal, October 6, 2021; “How to Prevent Federal Judges from Killing New Energy Projects,” City Journal, January 27, 2025; Jon Askonas and

Jonathan Berry, “How to Free Elon Musk’s SpaceX from Federal Red Tape,” Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2024.

[48] Katherine Boyle, “Building American Dynamism,” a16z, January 14, 2022.

[49] This critique of DEI extends out to American struggles with industrial policy—see, for example, Matt Cole and Chris Nicolson, “DEI Killed the CHIPS Act,” The Hill, March 7, 2024.

[50] Almost every issue of American Affairs includes at least one essay mining the Chinese experience for American advantage. Some notable examples include Stephen Brent, “Disruptive Innovation in America and China,” American Affairs III, no. 4 (Winter 2019); David Adler, “Guiding Finance: China’s Strategy for Funding Advanced Manufacturing,” American Affairs VI, no. 2 (Summer 2022); Nathan Simington, “China is Winning. Now What?” American Affairs VIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2024); Melik C. Demirel and David Adler, “Threading the Innovation Chain: Scaling and Manufacturing Deep Tech in the United States,” American Affairs VIII, no. 4 (Winter 2024). The attitude at the American Compass is neatly summarized in the title of Marshall Auerback’s essay, “Contain China if Necessary, but Emulate Features of its Industrial Policy to Ensure Long Term Economic Prosperity,” American Compass, June 2020. However, compare Rob Atkinson, “No, Adopting an Industrial Policy Doesn’t Mean We’re Emulating China,” American Compass, April 2021.

[51] Interview 23. Similar comments were also made in interviews 20 and 24.

[52] Interview 10; see also note 35.

[53] For a characteristic example, see Ward, Decisive Decade.

[54] Micah Meadowcroft, “Making Sense of the China Problem,” American Compass, August 1, 2024. See also his interview with JD Vance in “The World That We Will Live and Die In,” The American Conservative, March 15, 2023, for a similar typology.

31. The Fighter-Jock Doctrine That Explains Why Trump Is Winning

Some interesting analysis I was not expecting.

The Fighter-Jock Doctrine That Explains Why Trump Is Winning

It's called the OODA loop, and it keeps him ahead of everyone.

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-fighter-jock-213761/

By JACK SHAFER March 23, 2016

Jack Shafer is Politico’s senior media writer.

Who was the first candidate for president to comment on the Brussels bombing Tuesday? Who issued the most assertive, saber-rattling denunciations on the morning shows, making the rest of the field look timid? Of course, Mr. First was Donald Trump, whose verbal fleetness and willingness to talk to almost any reporter at almost any time of the day about almost any topic have made him the pacesetter this election year.

According to MSNBC, Hillary Clinton declined interview requests yesterday “until she saw that Trump was calling in to morning news shows,” and then went on the air to criticize him, although not by name. By diving in so late, Clinton was reduced to replowing a field that Trump had already turned. Like the Republican candidates before her, Clinton was already caught inside Trump’s OODA loop.

OODA loop? What’s that? I had never heard of the OODA loop until Wednesday morning, when one of my editors, Blake Hounshell, introduced me to the concept. Originally formulated by fighter pilot and military theoretician Col. John R. Boyd to describe the mental cycles a successful dogfighting pilot navigates in bagging his prey, the thinking behind the OODA loop has since been applied to the world outside air combat by businessmen, athletes, diplomats and competitive types everywhere.

OODA stands for observation; orientation; decision; action—the four steps an individual goes through when reacting to an event. The key to military victory, Boyd preached, was to cycle through your OODA loop faster than your foe. In his June 2002 Fast Company feature about the OODA loop, Keith H. Hammonds explains that to win a dogfight, a pilot must find a way to operate “inside” his foe’s OODA loop, “acting quickly to outthink and outmaneuver rivals.”

“An effective pilot explodes his rival’s comfortable view of the universe,” Hammond writes, a statement that couldn’t be a better description of the way Trump has run his campaign. He’s rejected most of the etiquette that accompanies political campaigns, taunting and name-calling his opponents (“Lyin’ Ted Cruz,” for a fresh example) to instigate publicity-attracting feuds. But feuds are only a part of Trump’s OODA loop strategy. Upsetting opponents’ OODA loops with unexpected and rapid emanations from his own gives Trump the constant advantage of surprise. His ability to change mental course inside a media moment—from “perhaps there are two Donald Trumps” to “I don’t think there are two Donald Trumps”—would sound like a contradiction coming out of any other politician’s mouth. But Trump has been normalizing contradictions since the beginning of the campaign, with no loss of political support.

Who before Trump convinced TV hosts to accept lengthy phone-ins from a candidate? The practical advantage of doing phone-in interviews is it affords him maximum exposure with a minimum of physical effort. It also conditions TV bookers to call him when news or controversy breaks: He’ll be there to take the call. By making himself more available to the news media than almost any candidate, he’s got an edge in determining the terms of the debate, and his media ubiquity also makes him look like the leader and the other candidates like followers. While other candidates are composing expensive TV ads about their plans to solve the political crises of yesterday, Trump is on television screens across America, at no expense to his campaign, talking about how he will address today’s catastrophe. He’s already made his move. He’s inside their airspace.

Where did Trump come by these OODA loop skills? Although he owns a fleet of aircraft, including a Boeing 757-200, a Cessna Citation X corporate jet, two Sikorsky S-76B helicopters and, for a short time, owned Eastern Airlines’ shuttle service, he’s no fighter pilot. Maybe he learned the art of quick thinking at his developer father’s knee, or in military school dorm fights, or in New York real estate deal making, or while divorcing his first two wives. (I suspect all of the “wit” displayed on his TV show was scripted.)

There’s something Zen about one source of Trump’s power. He’s able to maneuver faster than the other candidates because, unlike them, he’s unencumbered by the polls and important advisers that slow the OODA loops governing other candidates. In this sense, his famously unplanned, unstructured campaign operation is a huge advantage. He’s a one-man fighter jet; his opponents are lumbering bombers, still painstakingly running through a weapons checklist while they’re viciously strafed from behind.

Unlike your average candidate, Trump doesn’t require facts to make an argument. He doesn’t even need an argument to make an argument: He possesses the confidence to shoot straight from the lip on any topic at any time, filling the air with chaff. For every critic who tut-tuts, “Trump doesn’t know what he’s talking about,” four or five people in TV land nod their head in agreement with him. By the time the fact-checkers arrive to assess the damage Trump has done to the truth, he has skipped on to several new subjects. He’s inside the fact-checkers’ OODA loops, too, moving too quickly for them to catch him.

It’s anybody’s guess which of Trump’s observations, acts of orientation, decision making and action are conscious and which are intuitive. Cartoonist Scott Adams of “Dilbert” fame writes of Trump’s great skill at simplifying the complex, which, when you think about it, is as sharp a time-saving tool as exists in any politician’s OODA-loopbag: Where other candidates devote whole speeches to how they’ll get things done, Trump merely states he’ll get the best people on it and they’ll finish on time and under budget. “Trump is talking directly to people’s subconscious. Everything else he says is just a carrier signal,” Adams writes.

Adams also calls Trump a master of the “linguistic kill shot,” citing the candidate’s ability to take out other candidates with a word or two that contains a resonance of truth. For Jeb Bush, the phrase was “low energy.” For Carly Fiorina, the word was “robotic.” For Ben Carson, “nice.” For Marco Rubio, “little.” (For Ted Cruz, the word is shaping up to be “Lyin’.”)

Did any of the vanquished candidates see Trump rocketing up from behind just before he shot them down?

******

Didn’t I recently promise not to write about Donald Trump again? Dang, I was hoping to sneak this piece inside your OODA loop. Send navigational directions via email to Shafer.Politico@gmail.com. My email alerts orient, my Twitter feed takes action, and my RSS feed is still broken.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Mike Waltz Is Losing Support Inside the White House

Although Trump decided not to fire his national security adviser over the Signal group chat, Waltz’s position is tenuous, officials say

Trump Team Weighs Broader, Higher Tariffs

Back on the table ahead of Wednesday’s deadline: an across-the-board hike of up to 20%

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Concludes Visit to Japan

Pentagon chief says US will ensure 'deterrence' across Taiwan Strait

Trump says TikTok sale deal to come before Apr 5 deadline

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Trump administration reveals its plans to Congress to 'abolish' USAID

Congress’ role

The structure

The people

The financials

About the authors

Adva Saldinger@AdvaSal

Elissa Miolene

Once an Economy Switches from Rules to Deals, It’s Hard to Go Back

What Happens to an Economy When Deals Replace Rules (Audio)

The Unconstrained Presidency

Are Americans Feeling Lucky?

From Rules to Deals

The Cost of the Deal

A Peter Thiel Protégé Is Leading Trump’s AI Strategy Against China

Michael Kratsios will work to counter Beijing without disrupting U.S. businesses

AI Experts Say We’re on the Wrong Path to Achieving Human-Like AI

Contributor: The woes of 'attention capitalism' are new, but the cure is ancient

Israel’s Heven Drones says its hydrogen-fueled flying robots are a military game-changer

Partnering with a US manufacturer to eliminate reliance on Chinese exports, the Israeli startup says its models set new standards for heavy lifting and prolonged airtime

The Case for Tariffs

In the global trade revamp, American companies need certainty and protection to outdo their foreign rivals.

Zelensky, Trump and Putin may all have done U-turns on elections in Ukraine

Preparations are under way for a presidential vote, though many doubt they can be done in wartime

Trump’s “Liberation Day” is set to whack America’s economy

A rush of new tariffs will hurt growth, raise prices and worsen inequality

Levying Chevies

False economy

Is Elon Musk remaking government or breaking it?

So far, there is more destruction than creation

DOGE goes rogue

Hammer & Sickle, Star & Crescent: A Postcolonial Analysis of Salafi-Jihadist Terrorism in the Former Soviet States

Abstract

Introduction

Postcolonialism Theory

Explanatory Power of Postcolonialism Theory on Terrorism

Soviet Legacy & Terrorism

Former Soviet States & Islamic Terrorism

Conclusion

About The Author

NSA Warning—Change Your iPhone And Android Message Settings

How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage

Baltic Sentry mission taps ships, planes and drones to police one of the world’s busiest waterways

Catastrophic Earthquakes Test Myanmar Junta’s Grip on Power

Regime has been weakened by a yearslong civil war, now millions are counting on it to allow emergency aid

Trump aide says tariffs will raise $6 trillion as White House readies plan

Pentagon chief Hegseth says 'warrior' Japan indispensable to deter China

Asia Responds to Washington's 'Global War on Trade'

More damage likely than from Global War on Terror

Army reconsidering prepositioned stock strategy, 'doubling down' on Indo-Pacific, general says - Breaking Defense

Army Materiel Command Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan said the service could disband a floating, mobile cache of weapons and equipment and instead distribute them in friendly territory.

Signal For Secure Comms: Convenience Over Security Without The Record-Keeping

The TWZ Newsletter

The actions and the controversy

Unclear Signal

Signaling Change

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

The Army wants simple, cheap unmanned tech—here are some options

Fighting for our Future: How—and Why—We Brought Wargames to an ROTC Program - Modern War Institute

Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

The Difficult and Dangerous Options for Post-American Deterrence

PICK YOUR BATTLE

FINDING UNSTABLE GROUND

Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force - War on the Rocks

How to Save a Democracy

Americans Can Learn From Opponents of Authoritarianism Elsewhere

Laura Gamboa

DON’T THROW AWAY YOUR SHOT

USE WHAT YOU’VE GOT

GET OUT IN THE STREETS

PROTECT YOUR OWN

Adva Saldinger @AdvaSal