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Apologies. yesterday was a travel day.
Quotes of the Day:
“So long as tyranny exists, in whatever form, man's deepest aspiration must resist it as inevitably as man must breathe.”
– Emma Goldman
“In keeping silent about evil, and burying it so deep within us, that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach, evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.”
– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
1. U.S. nuclear envoy says no indications of 'direct' N.K. military action, stresses 'sincerity' in dialogue
2. The US Is Raising Tensions With North Korea
3. N. Korea says it conducted 'cruise missile super-large warhead power test'
4. Kim Jong Un unveils nuclear ambitions
5. Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea
6. Trump win likely to pose enormous defense costs, diplomatic challenges to Korea
7. Russian deputy foreign minister visits Seoul amid war of words
8. How North Korean eyelashes make their way to West as 'made in China'
9. Navy chief visits U.S. naval base housing nuclear submarines
10. 121st anniversary of Korean immigration to US
11. Women, old men in military? Korea debates solutions for looming conscript shortfall
12. North Korea's rejection of unification emboldened by Russia ties
13. The death of 'Han'
14. Are North Korea’s Latest Threats Rhetorical Or Real? – OpEd
1. U.S. nuclear envoy says no indications of 'direct' N.K. military action, stresses 'sincerity' in dialogue
As I have written many times, we need to also observe for indications of instability at the same time we observe for indicators of attack. As Dr. Jung Park has asked many times at conferences before she assumed her position at State: WHo does Kim fear the most: the US military or the Korean people in the north? It is the Korean people in the north that provide the real existential threat to the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag state of north Korea. The real danger is the conditions of instability could elad Kim to assess he has no other option than to truly externalize his problems and execute his campaign plan as the only path to survival (in his calculus).
(Yonhap Interview) U.S. nuclear envoy says no indications of 'direct' N.K. military action, stresses 'sincerity' in dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 4, 2024
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Dong-hyun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- The United States has not detected indications of "direct" North Korean military action, its top nuclear envoy has said, pledging to make "relentless" efforts to deter and constrain evolving threats from the recalcitrant regime.
In an online interview with Yonhap News Agency on Friday, U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak made the remarks as the North's pugnacious rhetoric and its continued weapons tests have deepened worries about the possibility of major provocations by the North and even of an armed clash on the Korean Peninsula.
Despite an escalation of threats, the envoy expressed her hopes for Pyongyang to further reopen its border to pave the way for diplomacy, while stressing Washington's "sincerity" in its repeated yet unanswered dialogue overtures.
Highlighting her "100 percent" focus on North Korean issues, Pak also waved aside lingering speculation that America's policy toward the North could weaken following the departure of her predecessor and seasoned diplomat, Sung Kim, in December.
"We are not seeing indications of direct military action (by the North)," she said. "But we, of course, continue to monitor the situation and guard against the risks to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan." ROK is South Korea's official name.
This photo, taken on Jan. 18, 2024, shows U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak attending a trilateral meeting with her South Korea and Japanese counterparts at the foreign ministry in Seoul. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Touching on the shifting contours of security on the peninsula, the envoy pointed to military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, and "obstruction" from Beijing and Moscow at the U.N. Security Council of the efforts to address North Korean threats as two key differences from previous times.
"I think that has the potential to make him (North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) think that he's got two supporters. That's not a development that we want to see," she said. "We have been very clear that we continue to press Beijing to use its influence on Pyongyang to constrain North Korea's very inflammatory rhetoric and its really provocative actions."
Reiterating the U.S.' commitment to deterring "any kind of adventurism" from the North, Pak underlined Washington's eagerness to reengage with Pyongyang.
"We will continue to seek and press for dialogue and border reopening -- not just to Russia and China but to other embassies -- so that we can create conditions for diplomacy," she said.
Since its lifting of pandemic-induced border closures last year, Pyongyang has allowed the entry of diplomats from some non-Western countries, including China, Mongolia and Cuba, while uncertainty remains over the return of Western diplomats.
The U.S. does not have an embassy in the North, but relies on Sweden and other Western countries with diplomatic missions in Pyongyang, when a need arises for engagement with the reclusive state.
Pak's emphasis on diplomacy comes as questions have arisen over the veracity of Washington's dialogue mantra given that serious diplomatic engagement between the U.S. and the North has stalled for years since their no-deal Hanoi summit in 2019.
"Sincerity is in the eye of the beholder. We are sincere," she said. "It's really important for us to be talking to make sure that we understand each other's positions, but it's clear that the DPRK has decided for now that it doesn't want diplomacy, but we are going to keep trying."
She did not specify when the U.S. last offered dialogue to the North, but she said that Washington makes overtures "on a regular basis."
She rejected any suggestions that the U.S. is just waiting until Pyongyang pivots toward denuclearization in what critics say amounts to a policy of "strategic patience" -- a term used by some to refer to a policy approach by the former Barack Obama administration.
"I have never ever said in my life strategic patience," the official said. "There's a lot to be done and we've been doing a lot."
The official enumerated a range of achievements, including efforts with South Korea to curb the North's revenue generation from its overseas IT workers and cyber activities, and endeavors to improve the human rights situation in the North.
Pak voiced full confidence about her duties, underscoring that "the portfolio is in excellent hands."
"There's really no change except that Ambassador Sung Kim has retired. The work continues and the level of attention continues," she said. "I spend 100 percent of my time on DPRK issues and our team has remained the same and they continue to get better and better."
After Kim left office, Pak was given the title of the "senior official" rather than Kim's title as "special representative," spawning speculation that it might signal the Biden administration's dwindling attention to the North Korean quandary in the midst of Russia's war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East.
"I am not much for titles, but the senior official is more of a technical thing rather than an indicator of our commitment to high-level attention on this issue," she said.
Responding to a question about whether it is time for the U.S. to push aside the elusive goal of denuclearization for now and focus on risk reduction, the envoy said Washington is pursuing both.
"We are always trying to reduce risk. That is our job, but taking our eyes off denuclearization is not our goal," she said. "A world, where proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as okay or accepting DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, is not on the table."
Commenting on Pyongyang's continued launches of cruise missiles, Pak voiced concerns that those launches are undermining not only regional stability but also prosperity as they could imperil both navigation and overflight of civilian traffic on the high seas.
"This is one of the busiest thoroughfares for civil aviation and maritime vessels in the region," she said. "We will continue to call on DPRK to refrain from these potentially destabilizing activities and return to diplomacy."
Commenting on media reports on North Korean leader Kim's daughter, Ju-ae, being a possible successor to him, the official said it is premature to make a prediction on a potential leadership transition in the North.
"It is early yet, but it's clear that Kim wants to make sure that his daughter's front and center not just to make sure that she is present at these various events," she said. "I am not going to speculate on whether she is it because I think what we've seen over the past decade ... (is) that he has the potential to always surprise."
This photo, taken on Jan. 18, 2024, shows South Korea's top nuclear envoy, Kim Gunn (C) and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Jung Pak (R) and Hiroyuki Namazu, posing for a photo before their talks at the foreign ministry in Seoul. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 4, 2024
2. The US Is Raising Tensions With North Korea
And now for an alternate view. Blame the US.
It is Kim Jong Un who has the hostile policy toward the ROK. The ROK and the ROK/US alliance have. defensive policy toward north Korea. This is the fundamental problem with north Korean apologists and sympathizers. They do not accept or understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Do not accept the lame argument made in the excerpts below.
Kim has the power to end all of this. He simply needs to be willing to comet ot he negotiating table in good faith and reform. Unfortunately the nature of the regime and system prevents reform. The north needs to reform to survive. Yet to reform will undermine the legitimacy of the regime and cause it to collapse.
Excerpts:
To return to our starting point, consider the environment facing North Korea: It feels burned by a United States that did not accept the deal on offer at Hanoi. It sees a constant display of military power in its backyard by three countries that are deepening their cooperation. Where once trilateralism was a mere threat, now it functionally exists — thanks to US strategy against China and the election of a hawkish South Korean president. Russia, a friendly neighbor and a fellow target of sanctions, is in need of weapons and ammunition.
The DPRK is seizing the opportunity, knowing full well it will raise the ire of the United States. And why not? The American position since Hanoi has been perfectly — which is to say militarily — clear.
Some might object that this analysis focuses too intently on choices made by the United States; they might even say it erases North Korea’s “agency.” But while the autocratic Kim government does bear responsibility for the state of tensions, we cannot ignore the asymmetry between a poor, besieged state and a superpower capable of changing global security conditions on a whim.
The Kim government has assessed the security conditions, which are overwhelmingly set by the world hegemon, and placed its bets accordingly.
Countries make their own decisions, you might say, but they do not make them as they please. They do not make them under self-selected circumstances but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted by the superpowers’ actions of the past — including the very recent past. We may find North Korea’s choices to be appalling, even dangerous, but they are not irrational. The Kim government has assessed the security conditions, which are overwhelmingly set by the world hegemon, and placed its bets accordingly.
North Korea’s decision to turn further away from the United States and toward its adversaries probably does increase the risk of war. But that is not to say the situation has reached a point of no return. The problem is that pulling back will require more than just a dramatic change in the US-DPRK relationship, which was already unlikely. That relationship is now inextricably bound up with both competition against China and tensions with Russia that stem from US support for Ukraine. These are all interlocking challenges, in other words, and the situation with North Korea is only one example of how great power competition is exacerbating tensions in regions that were already powder kegs.
The stakes are high: behind all these interrelated crises lies the potential for nuclear war. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, still unrestrained, continues to advance. The last bilateral treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear weapons expires in 2026. The United States is spending $1.7 trillion to modernize its entire nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years. Russia recently deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. China is undergoing a major expansion of its once modest nuclear arsenal. We’ve got to kill great power competition before it kills us.
The US Is Raising Tensions With North Korea
jacobin.com · by John Carl Baker
In January, two veteran Korea watchers — Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker — published a provocative short piece that argues that, “like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.” Carlin and Hecker contend that in the wake of the Hanoi Summit’s failure in 2019, the Kim regime abandoned North Korea’s thirty-year goal of normalizing relations with the United States. Citing recent shifts in government rhetoric and policy, they warn that “the situation may have reached the point that we must seriously consider a worst case” — meaning North Korean military action backed up by nuclear weapons.
Alarmist claims about North Korea are common, but the piece raised eyebrows precisely because the two analysts are not known for them. Both are widely respected and eminently credentialed: Carlin is the former head of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, and Hecker is a former director of Los Alamos who has actually visited North Korean nuclear facilities.
Their argument was provocative enough that it even garnered coverage in the mainstream press, with NBC News asking in a headline: “Is Kim Jong Un preparing North Korea for war?” While the Korea-watcher community has been skeptical, the article does raise some questions: what would lead two dovish analysts to warn of a strategic shift by North Korea? Is it possible the Kim government really has decided to go to war?
The news from North Korea is bad and getting worse, but it does not add up to incontrovertible evidence of a pro-war strategic shift. That said, I think Carlin and Hecker are correct to draw attention to North Korea’s changing approach to the United States.
Something is happening. Where once better relations were held out as a distant possibility, the Kim government now seems to be foreclosing on that option — and replacing it with closer coordination with US adversaries. But to understand why the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be making that change, we have to move beyond analyzing its relationship with the United States per se and instead explore the ongoing militarization of the Pacific, the impact of right-wing governance in South Korea, the negative consequences of US sanctions, and the Biden administration’s commitment to what is euphemistically called “great power competition.”
One Country’s Exercise Is Another Country’s Provocation
The failed Hanoi Summit has certainly played a major role in North Korea’s shifting pose. Faced with an opportunity to limit the North Korean nuclear arsenal, the Trump administration instead demanded total disarmament — and walked away with nothing. US commentators praised Donald Trump for rejecting a bad deal, but as nuclear weapons expert Jeffrey Lewis wrote at the time, the deal was probably the best the United States could have gotten.
Kim Jong Un no doubt felt he had been taken for a ride, especially given the propaganda shifts necessary to undertake negotiations in 2018 and 2019. When the summit fell apart, North Korea responded by making 2019 a record year for missile tests. In 2022, it more than doubled that record.
But while Hanoi has been a key factor in North Korea’s increasingly antagonistic posture, subsequent events have been just as important. For one thing, the Biden administration simply has not made North Korea a diplomatic priority. The administration often stresses its willingness to talk “without preconditions,” but it has done little if anything to entice North Korea to the negotiating table.
The DPRK’s reluctance to talk is frustrating, but as a fellow analyst recently mentioned, conditions may be exactly what the Kim regime needs to hear from the US. If you want to avoid an embarrassing repeat of Hanoi, it makes sense to want to see concrete goals and ground rules for talks ahead of time.
Relations are stuck in a vicious cycle. The administration declares its willingness to talk but is unwilling to make concessions to incentivize the North Koreans to negotiate; North Korea views US messaging skeptically and refuses to talk. The US responds by beefing up “deterrence,” stressing that while it remains open to negotiations, an expanded military presence in the region is necessary to keep Kim Jong Un in check. (Perhaps more important, it also fits with the overriding US goal of countering China.) North Korea then sees these deployments as evidence of nefarious intentions and views the next US statement with even greater suspicion. The cycle continues.
Is it any surprise that a country surrounded by coordinating adversaries projecting military power may have given up on the prospect of détente?
The point is that military assets will always speak louder than words — and the Biden administration’s approach to the Korean peninsula relies heavily on military assets. In July, it broke forty years of precedent by sending a nuclear-armed submarine to make a port call in Busan, South Korea. President Yoon Suk-yeol boarded the sub and declared publicly that any “nuclear provocation” from the North would result in “the end of the regime.”
Biden has also pushed for near constant and often expanded military exercises to shore up deterrence. To cite examples from just the past year, the US–South Korean field exercises held in March 2023 were the largest in five years, and the live-fire drills that followed in May were said to be the biggest ever.
Large-scale annual drills were also held in August, but amid these regular exercises there have been innumerable other drills between the US and Japan, the US and South Korea, and even trilateral exercises between all three. Is it any surprise that a country surrounded by coordinating adversaries projecting military power may have given up on the prospect of détente?
Trilateralism and Empires Old and New
We know that North Korea already regards bilateral exercises as provocative, so one can imagine what the Kim regime thinks of growing trilateral security cooperation. In August, President Biden hosted the leaders of South Korea and Japan at a high-profile Camp David summit. In a joint statement, the three parties declared “a new era of trilateral partnership” and committed to “raise our shared ambition to a new horizon, across domains and across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
Among other things, this partnership will include “annual, named, multi-domain trilateral exercises on a regular basis to enhance our coordinated capabilities and cooperation.” Increased trilateralism has long been the dream of hawkish US analysts, who support a far more extensive military presence in Northeast Asia. Biden — in the name of deterrence and competition — has helped make this expansion a reality.
Trilateralism is sold to policymakers and the public as a mechanism to deter North Korea, and it is true that many of its facets are directed at the Kim regime. It is likely, though, that for the United States, trilateral cooperation has more to do with China than the fiery but more or less contained DPRK. Checking Chinese power is the overarching goal of US strategy and shoring up alliances in the Pacific is a logical step in establishing an anti-China bloc.
In that sense, trilateralism is similar to the AUKUS deal announced in 2021. That agreement was ostensibly about providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, but it only really makes sense as a way to expand the capabilities of US allies in the Pacific to counter the Chinese military.
We know that North Korea already regards bilateral exercises as provocative, so one can imagine what the Kim regime thinks of growing trilateral security cooperation.
A true anti-China bloc will not be built overnight. Indeed, many Asian countries retain an ambivalent stance on China, in part because of the country’s sheer economic power. Even the Biden administration is cagey about the topic, stressing that it seeks competition rather than outright conflict.
But from the administration’s standpoint, deterrence — the bedrock of “managed competition” — requires long-term planning, so it must act now if opportunities arise that could lead to closer coordination against China in the future. The election of Yoon Suk-yeol in South Korea was one such opportunity.
The joint statement includes a note of praise from President Biden, who commends Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean president Yoon “for their courageous leadership in transforming relations between Japan and the ROK [Republic of Korea Army].” The note parallels comparable statements from US-based analysts, who have treated Yoon as a visionary willing to buck domestic opinion to secure the region’s long-term security. Trilateralism is indeed controversial in South Korea, although analysts typically do not state the reasons — the living memory of Japanese occupation and continued imperial apologia in Japan.
Also unmentioned is the obvious reason Yoon had no problem making his “courageous” decision: South Korean conservatives have a very positive view of the Japanese right, an orientation that stretches back to collaboration during the 1910–1945 occupation. It continues today. In March, Yoon announced a settlement to the ongoing question of monetary compensation for Korean victims of wartime forced labor, about 1,800 of whom are still living. Opposing the rulings of South Korean courts (which have found Japanese companies liable) and the wishes of the victims themselves, Yoon’s proposal will instead use money from South Korean corporations to pay out compensation to claimants. Japan, the former colonial occupier, is not required to contribute.
President Biden praised the deal for inaugurating “a groundbreaking new chapter” in relations between the two countries. The growth of American power in the Pacific is being accomplished by sweeping the history of Japanese colonialism under the rug.
Our Man in Seoul
Conservative South Korean president Yoon’s narrow victory in 2022 enabled many of the policy changes mentioned above. Earlier in his presidency, Yoon made a not-so-subtle threat to explore the possibility of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. His comments garnered the attention of the Biden administration (probably on purpose), which created the Nuclear Consultative Group to bring South Korea into deterrence planning and tamp down talk of proliferation. Yoon’s comments were likely also what pushed the US to start sending nuclear-armed subs to the peninsula, as a show of its commitment to “extended deterrence.”
More broadly, conservatism in South Korea is defined by a hawkish stance toward the North, so Yoon’s foreign policy aligns with longstanding US preferences for pressure (sanctions), deterrence (military power), and denuclearization (up-front disarmament). He is a reliable partner for the Biden administration, in other words, because he already agrees with what it wants to do.
Domestically, Yoon’s militarist impulse has led his administration to restart nationwide civil defense drills and organize the first military parade in downtown Seoul in a decade. The last such parade was held during the reign of disgraced conservative president Park Geun-hye, who was later deposed in the Candlelight Revolution of 2016–17.
Coverage of Yoon in the United States is reminiscent of the fawning treatment given to former Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo, who was depicted as a gentle statesman despite being a right-wing nationalist. (Steve Bannon once called him “Trump before Trump.”) Yoon has spent much of his presidency in an extreme anti–communist mode, trying to tie the domestic opposition to the DPRK. In an August speech commemorating Korea’s liberation from the Japanese Empire, Yoon warned of “anti-state forces” working to harm South Korea from within. “The forces of communist totalitarianism,” Yoon declared, “have always disguised themselves as democracy activists, human rights advocates, or progressive activists while engaging in despicable and unethical tactics and false propaganda.”
President Yoon’s militarist impulse has led his administration to restart nationwide civil defense drills and organize the first military parade in downtown Seoul in a decade.
The statement is shocking in its own right, but it is particularly offensive in South Korea, where activists spent decades fighting for democracy while being tarred by conservatives as North Korean operatives. Some of those activists — like former president Moon Jae-in — are now senior members of the opposition party.
Yoon’s demagoguery matters because, while South Korean democracy is healthier than that of its alliance partner, it could hardly be described as stable. The situation is volatile enough that writer Tammy Kim warned of democratic erosion in a September piece for the New Yorker, citing Yoon’s threats to “protections for women, the right to associate and organize, and, most strikingly, freedom of the press.”
More ominous, in early January South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae-myung was stabbed in the neck during an appearance in Busan. Lee was rushed to surgery and luckily survived. The perpetrator, a sixty-seven-year-old realtor, told police that he stabbed Lee to prevent him from becoming president. The would-be assassin apparently believed that “pro-North Korean forces” in the judiciary were delaying attempts to hold Lee accountable, and that killing him would prevent a left-wing takeover. Yoon has of course denounced the stabbing, but one wonders whether his right-wing bully pulpit has played a role in stirring up anti-communist extremism.
The Emerging Pariah Bloc
In October, US officials revealed that North Korea shipped more than one thousand containers of equipment and munitions to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby, lately known as the administration’s chief defender of its Israel policy, stated at the time, “We condemn the DPRK for providing Russia with this military equipment, which will be used to attack Ukrainian cities, kill Ukrainian civilians, and further Russia’s illegitimate war.”
Kirby expressed concern that arms transfers could eventually go both ways, with Russia providing technology to North Korea that it could not normally receive under international sanctions. More details emerged in January when analysts found strong evidence that Russia had used the Hwasong-11, a North Korean ballistic missile, in at least two attacks against Ukraine.
The news caps a year in which Kim Jong Un used a number of public appearances to show off the North Korean arms industry. Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang in July, where he viewed two drone designs and an intercontinental ballistic missile. It was, perhaps significantly, the first state visit since North Korea closed its borders in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Shoigu later told journalists that the two countries were considering a joint military exercise. And of course Vladimir Putin hosted Kim Jong Un at a September summit, where the two toured a Russian factory that constructs fighter jets.
North Korean support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has been rightly met with shock and disgust, but it should not be surprising — least of all to the US government. The broad sanctions levied against Russia for its illegal invasion were bound to push it closer to other US adversaries, which share little in common except their status as economic pariahs. North Korea has been under extreme sanctions for years (especially since 2016 and 2017), and while smuggling and hacking soften the blow, they’re hardly a substitute for large-scale arms deals. In this case, the Kim government probably saw an opening — the Russian need for materiel to prosecute the war — and jumped on it. The benefits for North Korea are political as well as economic: not only do arms deals bring in much needed energy, fuel, and cash; they also throw a monkey wrench into the UN sanctions regime, which Russia until recently supported.
Tellingly, Kirby confirmed in January that Russia is looking to buy additional missiles from Iran, which is subject to “arguably the most extensive and comprehensive set of sanctions that the United States maintains on any country,” according to the Congressional Research Service. Sanctions may have economically isolated US adversaries from countries within its own orbit, but they have also drawn those adversaries closer together. With the headlong plunge into great power competition, backed up by the pursuit of military primacy, sanctioned countries’ convergence into a more solidified opposition seems likely to continue.
A Hostile Environment
To return to our starting point, consider the environment facing North Korea: It feels burned by a United States that did not accept the deal on offer at Hanoi. It sees a constant display of military power in its backyard by three countries that are deepening their cooperation. Where once trilateralism was a mere threat, now it functionally exists — thanks to US strategy against China and the election of a hawkish South Korean president. Russia, a friendly neighbor and a fellow target of sanctions, is in need of weapons and ammunition.
The DPRK is seizing the opportunity, knowing full well it will raise the ire of the United States. And why not? The American position since Hanoi has been perfectly — which is to say militarily — clear.
Some might object that this analysis focuses too intently on choices made by the United States; they might even say it erases North Korea’s “agency.” But while the autocratic Kim government does bear responsibility for the state of tensions, we cannot ignore the asymmetry between a poor, besieged state and a superpower capable of changing global security conditions on a whim.
The Kim government has assessed the security conditions, which are overwhelmingly set by the world hegemon, and placed its bets accordingly.
Countries make their own decisions, you might say, but they do not make them as they please. They do not make them under self-selected circumstances but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted by the superpowers’ actions of the past — including the very recent past. We may find North Korea’s choices to be appalling, even dangerous, but they are not irrational. The Kim government has assessed the security conditions, which are overwhelmingly set by the world hegemon, and placed its bets accordingly.
North Korea’s decision to turn further away from the United States and toward its adversaries probably does increase the risk of war. But that is not to say the situation has reached a point of no return. The problem is that pulling back will require more than just a dramatic change in the US-DPRK relationship, which was already unlikely. That relationship is now inextricably bound up with both competition against China and tensions with Russia that stem from US support for Ukraine. These are all interlocking challenges, in other words, and the situation with North Korea is only one example of how great power competition is exacerbating tensions in regions that were already powder kegs.
The stakes are high: behind all these interrelated crises lies the potential for nuclear war. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, still unrestrained, continues to advance. The last bilateral treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear weapons expires in 2026. The United States is spending $1.7 trillion to modernize its entire nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years. Russia recently deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. China is undergoing a major expansion of its once modest nuclear arsenal. We’ve got to kill great power competition before it kills us.
CONTRIBUTORS
John Carl Baker is a senior program officer at Ploughshares Fund. The views expressed here are his own. Baker's writing has appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the New Republic, Defense One, and elsewhere.
3. N. Korea says it conducted 'cruise missile super-large warhead power test'
"Super large."
(2nd LD) N. Korea says it conducted 'cruise missile super-large warhead power test' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · February 3, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 4, 6-10)
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Saturday it conducted what it calls a "cruise missile super-large warhead power test" and test-fired a new type of anti-aircraft missile the previous day.
The tests in the Yellow Sea were carried out for the "rapid development of the technologies in various aspects, such as function, performance and operation of new-type weapon systems" and were part of "normal activities," the North's Missile Administration said in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
It did not give further details, such as how many missiles were launched or how far they flew.
Photos released by the KCNA showed a cruise missile flying at a low altitude, striking a building and exploding.
North Korea conducts what it calls a "cruise missile super-large warhead power test" and test-fires a new anti-aircraft missile on Feb. 2, 2024, in these photos carried by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The South Korean military said Friday it detected the launch of several cruise missiles at around 11 a.m. from North Korea's west coast.
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the large warhead test may be intended to show that a nuclear warhead could be fitted on the missile.
Meanwhile, Lee Sang-kyu, an active-duty officer at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, said Pyongyang would have mentioned nuclear capabilities if the missile was designed to carry a nuclear warhead. He concluded the North likely tested a conventional cruise missile.
On the new anti-aircraft missile, Hong suggested the weapon could possibly be an improved version of the previously tested Pongae-5 and Pongae-6 missiles.
"Those are each copied from Russia's S-300 and S-400 missiles," Hong said. "Considering (the new anti-aircraft missile) was unveiled amid the recent cooperative mood between North Korea and Russia, we need to closely monitor it."
It marked the North's fourth round of cruise missile launches this year, and the first anti-aircraft missile test since September 2021.
On Jan. 24, North Korea test-fired a new strategic cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, named Pulhwasal-3-31, for the first time. The country also fired submarine-launched cruise missiles off the east coast Sunday, later saying that they were also Pulhwasal-3-31s.
On Tuesday, it fired what it later claimed to be the Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missile off its west coast but did not specify how many missiles it fired.
Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, fly low and are maneuverable, making them harder to detect and intercept.
Hwasal means an "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a "fire arrow."
North Korea conducts what it calls a "cruise missile super-large warhead power test" and test-fires a new anti-aircraft missile on Feb. 2, 2024, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · February 3, 2024
4. Kim Jong Un unveils nuclear ambitions
"Unveils?" I think "reinforces" is a better description. He is reinforcing what he and his family have long sought and what we have long known in general. Sure a nuclear armed submarine may be a fairly recent development but it fits with the long held "nuclear ambitions."
Kim Jong Un unveils nuclear ambitions
donga.com
Posted February. 03, 2024 07:24,
Updated February. 03, 2024 07:24
Kim Jong Un unveils nuclear ambitions. February. 03, 2024 07:24. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.
In a revelation last September, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un introduced the 'Kim Kun Ok Hero Submarine,' saying, “Once armed with nuclear weapons, it transforms into a nuclear submarine.' Despite Kim Jong Un's confidence, a submarine armed with nuclear weapons doesn't necessarily meet the criteria for a true nuclear submarine. The designation of a proper nuclear submarine should be reserved for those utilizing a 'nuclear propulsion system.'
The 'Kim Kun Ok Hero Submarine,' initially revealed its hull partially in 2019, took a substantial four years to fully materialize. Kim Jong Un likely sought to instill a sense of threat into this traditional (diesel) submarine. He insisted that this new vessel could carry up to ten tactical nuclear missiles, emphasizing that the act of 'arming with nuclear weapons' qualifies it as a nuclear submarine.
However, Kim Jong Un also unveiled his ambition for “an advanced power system,” expressing a desire to develop a nuclear-powered submarine. In North Korea, the declarations of the– Kim Jong Un, a.k.a. “supreme dignity,” carry the weight of the constitution. His public commitment to building a nuclear-powered submarine implies the mobilization of human and material resources by North Korean authorities. At that time, South Korean intelligence agencies speculated that Kim Jong Un would “present advanced plans for a nuclear-powered submarine within six months.” This meant that Kim would do so for the sake of responsibility, even if they were deemed bluster or exaggeration.
Surprisingly, less than six months later, on Sunday, Kim Jong Un declared an 'important conclusion' regarding the execution plan for constructing a nuclear-powered submarine. This was interpreted to confirm detailed plans and schedules for constructing such a submarine.
A nuclear-powered submarine draws power from a nuclear reactor, operating more ‘covertly’ than diesel-powered counterparts as it doesn't need to surface frequently. These submarines are also larger in size. Among U.S. nuclear-powered submarines, the Los Angeles class weighs 6,900 tons, and the largest Ohio class weighs 16,000 tons. Nuclear-powered submarines are renowned for their speed and the ability to carry various nuclear weapons, earning them the title of the pinnacle of nuclear weaponry.
The fortunate part of this situation is that Kim Jong Un's claimed 'important conclusion' is likely a bluff. South Korean key officials assert that “North Korea hasn't secured crucial technologies for the core of a nuclear-powered submarine,” emphasizing that it remains “Kim Jong Un's hopeful vision.” It would be a long way for North Korea to present itself as a country possessing nuclear-powered submarines on the world stage, considering that only six countries currently hold such technology.
However, the immediate concern lies in the high-risk variables at hand. Kim Jong Un, actively providing military support to Russia, a nation known for its nuclear submarines, may overtly request submarine blueprints. Some observations suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin may visit North Korea in the first half of the year. U.S. and South Korean authorities are closely monitoring the possibility of North Korea stealing nuclear submarine technology. North Korea targeted major South Korean shipbuilding companies with hacking attempts last year, indicating an interest in nuclear submarine technology.
If North Korea indeed possesses nuclear-powered submarine technology, it would dramatically alter the military landscape of the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un, emphasizing “the urgent need of the era for the navy to be armed with nuclear weapons,” would likely perceive the accomplishment of this task as imminent. In South Korea, there may be a growing domestic demand for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. The Korean Peninsula could become a focal point of a military arms race, with the keyword being nuclear submarines."
한국어
donga.com
5. Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea
Excerpts:
Yet most dismaying, though unsurprising, is the self-interested stance taken by China, which prioritises national interest over law and justice. Beijing has long played a double game in Myanmar, sometimes backing governments, sometimes siding with ethnic rebels. Its current, unambitious aims are to protect its huge belt and road initiative investments, curb cross-border crime and prevent any spillover of the fighting.
This approach is typical of President Xi Jinping, who often lectures the west about non-interference in other countries’ affairs. Yet China and its close ally, Russia – both big arms suppliers – have unmatched influence in Myanmar and do in fact regularly interfere there, for selfish commercial purposes. Such hypocritical behaviour plainly contradicts China’s responsibilities as the leading regional player and would-be global superpower.
A similar situation obtains in North Korea, another rogue state over which China exerts considerable influence. Beijing is the principal diplomatic and political ally of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, his main trade partner and biggest food supplier. Without China, his regime would probably implode.
Why then does Xi sit back and watch as Kim escalates his reckless campaign of nuclear weapons-related missile tests, the latest of which occurred last week? Western analysts suspect he enjoys the resulting discomfort of Japan and South Korea. The fact Kim’s antics distract US attention from Taiwan may be a factor, too.
But in the bigger, global picture China is setting a terrible example. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens all mankind. Kim’s threats to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles at the US mainland and bomb his neighbours are deeply destabilising and dangerous. And China itself is not immune. As a developing country that benefited immeasurably from the US-led global security order, China must now take its turn – and step up. With power comes responsibility.
Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea | Observer editorial
Instead of acting as a responsible superpower, China is putting millions of lives at risk in the region and beyond
The Guardian · by Observer editorial · February 4, 2024
Military coups and dictatorships rarely come to any good. But has any army takeover in recent times led to more utterly disastrous consequences than those suffered by the people of Myanmar since February 2021? For sheer, vicious stupidity and criminality, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief, and his bloodstained associates take some beating.
Yet a beating is what they are getting at the hands of Myanmar’s civilian resistance groups, known as people’s defence forces, and ethnic minority armed groups long opposed to discriminatory Buddhist-majority regimes. A big offensive begun in October has overrun swathes of the country, forcing the surrender and mass desertion of junta troops.
These setbacks have shaken the army’s confidence. Morale is reportedly low; there is open criticism of its leadership. But the generals are not giving up. Defying new western sanctions, they extended a state of emergency last week. Latest reports speak of an increase in indiscriminate air and artillery attacks on civilians, adding to a long list of documented war crimes.
The UN estimates that two thirds of Myanmar is experiencing conflict, with 2.6 million people internally displaced. Nearly 4,500 people have been killed. About 20,000 are imprisoned. One third of the population – about 18.6 million people – now requires humanitarian aid, a 19-fold increase since 2020. This is in addition to the 750,000 Rohingya Muslims who fled mass killings, rapes and village burnings in 2017 in what rights groups say was a genocide.
Myanmar’s unending agony represents a huge failure by the international community to uphold UN treaties and fundamental human rights. But while the US, Britain – the former colonial power – and other western democracies may be criticised for not doing enough, their leverage is limited. Shaming, too, is the inability (or refusal) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take effective action. Some member states actively connive with the regime.
Yet most dismaying, though unsurprising, is the self-interested stance taken by China, which prioritises national interest over law and justice. Beijing has long played a double game in Myanmar, sometimes backing governments, sometimes siding with ethnic rebels. Its current, unambitious aims are to protect its huge belt and road initiative investments, curb cross-border crime and prevent any spillover of the fighting.
This approach is typical of President Xi Jinping, who often lectures the west about non-interference in other countries’ affairs. Yet China and its close ally, Russia – both big arms suppliers – have unmatched influence in Myanmar and do in fact regularly interfere there, for selfish commercial purposes. Such hypocritical behaviour plainly contradicts China’s responsibilities as the leading regional player and would-be global superpower.
A similar situation obtains in North Korea, another rogue state over which China exerts considerable influence. Beijing is the principal diplomatic and political ally of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, his main trade partner and biggest food supplier. Without China, his regime would probably implode.
Why then does Xi sit back and watch as Kim escalates his reckless campaign of nuclear weapons-related missile tests, the latest of which occurred last week? Western analysts suspect he enjoys the resulting discomfort of Japan and South Korea. The fact Kim’s antics distract US attention from Taiwan may be a factor, too.
But in the bigger, global picture China is setting a terrible example. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens all mankind. Kim’s threats to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles at the US mainland and bomb his neighbours are deeply destabilising and dangerous. And China itself is not immune. As a developing country that benefited immeasurably from the US-led global security order, China must now take its turn – and step up. With power comes responsibility.
The Guardian · by Observer editorial · February 4, 2024
6. Trump win likely to pose enormous defense costs, diplomatic challenges to Korea
Excerpts:
The experts echoed that chances are very high for Trump to push ahead with whatever agenda he sets within the next four years, without considering any possible aftermath, because this would be his second term.
“Though we have been describing uncertainty under a second Trump administration, his roadmap for the next four years is quite visible — turning the situation advantageously for the U.S. through tougher trade measures, making U.S. allies shoulder more defense costs and controlling the diplomatic situation through his personal engagement with authoritarian leaders,” SNU’s Lee said.
“The question is how hard he will push ahead with those agenda items. The Yoon administration has to use this year to set up strategies based on how much Seoul is willing to accept regarding Trump's requests."
Senior fellow Lee also noted that many countries have already begun working on preparing scenarios for a second Trump presidency, and South Korea should engage with U.S. politicians and authorities who are likely to be relevant under a new Trump administration.
“U.S. relations and other diplomatic issues are expected to come as a tough challenge for the geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula this year,” he said. “South Korea has to buckle up its diplomatic capabilities to brace for impact.”
Trump win likely to pose enormous defense costs, diplomatic challenges to Korea
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
U.S. Republican presidential candidate and former President Donald Trump arrives to speak after meeting with members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters at their headquarters in Washington, Wednesday. AP-Yonhap
Experts call for Seoul to secure 'diplomatic buffer zone' ahead of possible scenarios this year
Editor’s note
This article is the last of a four-part series that provides an analysis of South Korea’s diplomatic situation with neighboring countries at the start of 2024. ― ED.
By Nam Hyun-woo
With Donald Trump cruising to a rematch with United States President Joe Biden in the presidential election in November, the world, including South Korea, is preparing for a possible second Trump presidency, which is anticipated to force many countries to recalibrate their diplomatic strategies.
Throughout last year, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration has concentrated on strengthening its alliance with the U.S. to an unprecedented level, aligning South Korea’s diplomatic stance with its traditional ally on most issues, including sensitive ones such as the war between Ukraine and Russia.
Experts said, however, that South Korea this year will have to focus on securing a "diplomatic buffer zone" to prepare for a possible second Trump presidency, which is expected to force Seoul to shoulder a greater amount of the cost of maintaining U.S. Forces Korea's (USFK) presence on the peninsula and make greater efforts for containing China. The speculation that Trump may condone North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is also a concern for Seoul, which has been striving to stymie Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions through U.S. extended deterrence.
“In terms of the relations with the U.S., the top agenda item that South Korea should focus on this year would be creating a diplomatic buffer zone for requests that Washington may make under a possible second Trump presidency in 2025,” said Lee Geun, professor of international politics at Seoul National University’s (SNU) Graduate School of International Studies.
According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released on Wednesday, Biden’s job approval ratings declined to 38 percent, down from 40 percent in December. In a separate Reuters-Ipsos poll, released on Jan. 25, showed Trump as having a 6 percentage-point lead over Biden, while a Bloomberg poll showed Thursday that Biden is losing ground to Trump in seven swing states.
Polls and new developments in U.S. politics are prompting countries to consider various scenarios in case of a second Trump presidency, and its impact on their respective national interests.
Jeong Eun-bo, right in the front row, then South Korea's top negotiator for defense-cost sharing talks, and Rob Rapson, left in the front row, then acting U.S. ambassador to Seoul, sign the Special Measures Agreement on Seoul's share of the cost for stationing the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea, at the foreign ministry in Seoul in this March 18, 2021 file photo. Joint Press Corps
For South Korea, one of the most urgent agenda items is the Trump administration’s possible demand for hikes in Seoul’s share of the upkeep of USFK.
The current 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) is set to expire at the end of 2025, but the two signatory parties reportedly reached an understanding to launch negotiations for the 12th SMA within this year, due to concerns that the negotiation could become a source of friction if Trump gets reelected.
In 2019, then-President Trump demanded a hefty rise in South Korea's contribution to the costs of USFK, calling for a five-fold increase to $5 billion. This created tensions between Seoul and Washington, but this was quickly addressed under the Biden presidency as the two countries agreed to increase South Korea’s contribution by a more modest 13.9 percent to 1.18 trillion won ($887 million) in 2021.
“I’m 100 percent sure that Trump will demand a significant hike in Seoul’s contribution in his second presidency, as he believes that many U.S. allies are enjoying a free ride on the U.S. military forces,” Lee said.
“Given that South Korean politicians these days are mentioning projects worth trillions of won during their election campaigns, the amount that the U.S. will demand will not likely be a conundrum. The problem will be South Korea’s public sentiment, given the nation has negative views on this issue.”
Lee Seong-hyon, a senior fellow at George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, also noted that the second Trump administration will likely demand a hike in South Korea’s contribution, and Seoul’s public sentiment will be the key point in this issue.
“With North Korea escalating tensions through its threatening rhetoric, missiles and nuclear weapons, could South Korea reject a demand from Trump?” he said.
“Let’s say Trump will again demand a five-fold increase. And if South Korea agrees, the question is how the Yoon administration will persuade the public … Simply put, there can be a question: ‘If we increase our contribution by five times, will the U.S. provide five-times-better protection ?’”
Senior fellow Lee also cast worries that “the business-like” approach to the alliance may also result in changing its nature from what both Seoul and Washington call “a value-based alliance for free democracy” to a purely financial transaction.
Then-U.S. President Donald Trump, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose for a photo ahead of their bilateral meeting during the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. Reuters-Yonhap
Push to contain China
The experts also believe that the U.S. already expects South Korea to play a greater role in containing China in economic and geopolitical realms. This expectation is likely to grow under a second Trump presidency.
On Jan. 28, Trump wrote on Truth Social regarding the automobile industry: “I want them to be made in the USA, every type of car, and would require China, and other countries, through TARIFFS, or otherwise, to build plants here, with our workers." He took a negative view of Biden endorsee Shawn Fain, the President of the United Auto Workers, calling him a "stiff" who is selling the automobile industry "right into the big, powerful hands of China.”
Trump is already laying the groundwork for setting more extreme trade barriers to block China, and this will naturally bring consequences to South Korea, as China is its largest trading partner.
“Given that the Biden administration somehow inherited Trump’s China policies, the U.S. pressure on China under a second Trump administration will likely be even greater than that of Biden,” SNU’s Lee said. “In terms of technologies and supply chain, the U.S. pressure on South Korea in terms of economic relations with China will likely grow.”
In a Jan. 30 report, the Korea International Trade Association thinks that a second Trump presidency will hasten the economic decoupling occurring between the U.S. and China, as Washington is poised to employ universal tariffs and other measures in a protectionist move.
The association expects that South Korea may be included in countries facing the universal tariff, because the Trump camp has pointed to cars and car components from South Korea, Japan, Mexico, Europe and Canada as reasons for the U.S. trade deficit.
“Coupled with the U.S.-China rivalry, concerns over regulations on Chinese plants owned by South Korean chipmakers, technology transfer, sales and other economic cost increases can be realized,” senior fellow Lee said.
“Trump will choose the direction and methods to contain China and use U.S. allies, including South Korea, for that. In that sense, it is quite obvious that the U.S. pressure on South Korean companies, regulative actions urging South Korea’s participation in halting China and other economic burdens will grow.”
Demonstrators gather near the parliament building to protest against the candidacy of Han Kuo-yu from Taiwan's largest opposition party the Kuomintang, in Taipei, Taiwan, Thursday. Reuters-Yonhap
Such a stance is anticipated in not only economic but also geopolitical issues, such as increasing tensions over Taiwan after its recent presidential election. Referring to the partnership between China and Russia, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, Wednesday: “Ukraine today. Taiwan could be tomorrow.”
Last year, South Korea made a bold diplomatic step by expressing its condemnation of Russia and support for Ukraine, breaking from its conventional tactics of keeping a cautious stance on international issues to which Korea is not directly related. It was seen as Seoul’s response to Washington’s indirect pressure to have its allies join its global campaigns.
“Like with the Ukraine war, the U.S. will ask more for South Korea to step up more on global geopolitical issues, including on the issue of Taiwan,” senior fellow Lee said.
“South Koreans usually think the South Korea-U.S. alliance is about protecting the Korean Peninsula, but the treaty states the two countries' commitment to security and defense cooperation in the Pacific. So the U.S. will increasingly ask what will be South Korea’s contribution to this … Against this backdrop, what’s wise for South Korea to do is to explain its range of actions related to Taiwan and its reasons to the U.S. in a preemptive manner.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and then-U.S. President Donald Trump move to shake hands at the border village of Panmunjeom in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas in this June 30, 2019, file photo. AP-Yonhap
Resetting NK policy, Washington Declaration in peril
As anticipation builds regarding Trump potentially securing a second term, reports and speculations on his North Korea policies are painting a worrisome four-year period ahead for South Korea.
One of those concerns can be understood courtesy of a Politico report in December, which explained how Trump was considering a plan where he might be interested in negotiating an arms control agreement with the North that would allow it to keep some of its nuclear weapons.
In that scenario, concerns would naturally grow rapidly in South Korea that Trump may use the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between the allies as a bargaining chip for the North to reduce its arms. The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration, which was adopted by Yoon and Biden in April last year to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence, and help South Korea to have greater visibility of U.S. strategic asset deployments around the Korean Peninsula.
“The worst case scenario is Trump making a deal with the North on allowing the regime to have nuclear, short- or medium-range missiles, while prohibiting long-range ones,” SNU’s Lee said. “Trump will not hesitate to meet Kim Jong-un. He wants to show that he can control Kim and he can prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons or missiles from threatening the U.S … In that case, the NCG and the U.S. extended deterrence can be very vulnerable during a four-year Trump presidency.”
President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden raise hands together at an official state dinner during Yoon's visit to the White House in Washington, April 26, 2023. Reuters-Yonhap
Senior fellow Lee also stressed that the Washington Declaration is a non-binding political declaration that can be scrapped anytime.
“It is unclear whether Trump will uphold Biden’s promise for the extended deterrence, but at least there will be no technical difficulties for the U.S. to abandon the declaration,” Lee said. “If the U.S. official who is in charge of this issue is a political appointee, not a career bureaucrat, Washington may find it easier to break the declaration.”
The senior fellow said that it is very difficult to predict Trump’s North Korea policies, but chances are slim for the former president to push for a grand bargain with Pyongyang — as he sought to do so in 2018 and 2019 — because he also has prior experience concerning Kim’s unpredictability. Rather, Trump may seek to engage with other superpower leaders, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin or Chinese President Xi Jinping, so that he can attain a tangible result and a boost in his domestic political approval ratings.
“In the past, Trump only starred in a show featuring North Korea,” Lee said. “Now, there are plenty of other channels with programs he can appear on. North Korea is not the only soap opera that Trump can appear in.”
A U.S. B-52H "Stratofortress" strategic bomber is parked at an air base in Cheongju, North Chungcheong Province, Oct. 19, 2023, intended as a show of force of the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. against North Korea's threats. Courtesy of Ministry of National Defense
The experts echoed that chances are very high for Trump to push ahead with whatever agenda he sets within the next four years, without considering any possible aftermath, because this would be his second term.
“Though we have been describing uncertainty under a second Trump administration, his roadmap for the next four years is quite visible — turning the situation advantageously for the U.S. through tougher trade measures, making U.S. allies shoulder more defense costs and controlling the diplomatic situation through his personal engagement with authoritarian leaders,” SNU’s Lee said.
“The question is how hard he will push ahead with those agenda items. The Yoon administration has to use this year to set up strategies based on how much Seoul is willing to accept regarding Trump's requests."
Senior fellow Lee also noted that many countries have already begun working on preparing scenarios for a second Trump presidency, and South Korea should engage with U.S. politicians and authorities who are likely to be relevant under a new Trump administration.
“U.S. relations and other diplomatic issues are expected to come as a tough challenge for the geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula this year,” he said. “South Korea has to buckle up its diplomatic capabilities to brace for impact.”
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
7. Russian deputy foreign minister visits Seoul amid war of words
The ROK has to deal with the axis of totalitarians as it really is and not as it would wish it to be.
Sunday
February 4, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 04 Feb. 2024, 18:48
Updated: 04 Feb. 2024, 18:59
Russian deputy foreign minister visits Seoul amid war of words
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-04/national/diplomacy/Russian-deputy-foreign-minister-visits-Seoul-amid-war-of-words/1974053?detailWord=
Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Rudenko during a meeting at the Reception House of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this file photo. [TASS/YONHAP]
South Korea expressed its disapproval of Moscow and Pyongyang's growing military cooperation as the Russian deputy foreign minister visited Seoul for talks on regional security.
Related Article
According to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Sunday, Deputy Foreign Minister Chung Byung-won met with Andrey Rudenko, the Russian deputy foreign minister overseeing the Asia-Pacific region, on Friday to address the war in Ukraine and international affairs.
During the meeting, Chung urged Moscow to behave responsibly and cooperate in preventing infringements on the rights of Korean citizens and businesses in Russia.
During the visit, Rudenko also met and talked with South Korea’s top nuclear envoy, Kim Gunn.
Kim asked Russia to strictly comply with its obligations to the United Nations Security Council resolutions, including immediately halting military cooperation with North Korea that threatens the security of the Korean Peninsula and Europe.
The Foreign Ministry added that the two nations agreed that continuous communications between Seoul and Moscow regarding the North Korean nuclear issue benefit both of them.
Rudenko’s visit to Seoul came after Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova referred to President Yoon Suk Yeol’s recent remarks on North Korea as “blatantly biased” and “designed to obscure aggressive plans as regards the DPRK.”
DPRK is the acronym of North Korea's full name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Zakharova was referring to Yoon’s statement made in a committee meeting at the Blue House on Jan. 31, in which he said the North Korean regime was the “only irrational group in the world that has legislated the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.”
The Foreign Ministry in Seoul said Zakharova’s comments were “rude, ignorant, biased and below the standard of remarks expected of the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a country.”
Amid the two nations' conflict over Yoon's comment, Seoul’s Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Chung Byung-won summoned Russian Ambassador to Korea Georgy Zinoviev on Saturday, saying, “It was very regrettable that Russia ignored the facts and unconditionally protected North Korea while criticizing the president’s remarks in extremely disrespectful language.”
BY CHO JUNG-WOO AND ESTHER CHUNG [cho.jungwoo1@joongang.co.kr]
8. How North Korean eyelashes make their way to West as 'made in China'
Who knew eyelashes could be a money maker. Now every time you see a woman with long eyelashes you will have to wonder if they are from north Korea. What if this changes the fashion to make short eyelashes the new look.? It could further cut off resources to the regime. (note an attempt at sarcasm).
How North Korean eyelashes make their way to West as 'made in China'
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-north-korean-eyelashes-make-their-way-west-made-china-2024-02-03/
By Ju-min Park and Eduardo Baptista
February 3, 20243:05 PM ESTUpdated 21 hours ago
SEOUL/PINGDU, China, Feb 03 (Reuters) - Millions of dollars in sales of North Korean false eyelashes - marketed in beauty stores around the world as "made in China" - helped drive a recovery in the secretive state's exports last year.
The processing and packaging of North Korean false eyelashes - openly conducted in neighbouring China, the country's largest trading partner - gives Kim Jong Un's regime a way to skirt international sanctions, providing a vital source of foreign currency.
Reuters spoke to 20 people - including 15 in the eyelash industry, as well as trade lawyers and experts on North Korea's economy - who described a system in which China-based firms import semi-finished products from North Korea, which are then completed and packaged as Chinese.
The finished eyelashes are then exported to markets including the West, Japan and South Korea, according to eight people who work for companies directly involved in the trade.
Some of the people spoke on condition that only their last names be used because they were not authorised to talk to the media.
North Korea has long been a major exporter of hair products like wigs and false lashes, which enable people to avoid the hassle of mascara and to achieve a dramatic look. But exports tumbled during the COVID-19 pandemic, when North Korea slammed its borders tightly shut.
Significant trade in North Korea-made lashes via China resumed in 2023, according to customs documents and four people in the industry.
Chinese customs data showed that North Korea's exports to China more than doubled in 2023, when borders reopened. China is the destination for nearly all of North Korea's declared exports.
Reuters Graphics Reuters Graphics
Wigs and eyelashes comprised almost 60% of declared North Korean exports to China last year. In total, North Korea exported 1,680 tonnes of false eyelashes, beards and wigs to China in 2023, worth around $167 million.
In 2019, when prices were lower, it exported 1,829 tonnes at a value of just $31.1 million.
The U.S. State Department and international experts estimate that North Korea seizes up to 90% of foreign income generated by its citizens, many of whom live in poverty. Reuters was unable to determine how much of the revenue from eyelash sales flowed back to Kim's government, or how it was used.
"We have to assume that ... millions of dollars every month that North Korea is making through this eyelash trade is being used for the Kim Jong Un regime," said Seoul-based sanctions lawyer Shin Tong-chan. His view was corroborated by two other international trade experts, though none provided specific evidence.
North Korea did not respond to requests for comment for this story sent to its U.N. missions in New York and Geneva, its embassy in Beijing and its consular office in the Chinese border city of Dandong.
A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Beijing and Pyongyang "are friendly neighbors" and that "normal cooperation between the two countries that is lawful and compliant should not be exaggerated."
U.N. AND U.S. SANCTIONS
Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council has sought to stall Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme through nearly a dozen sanctions resolutions that restrict its ability to trade products such as coal, textiles and oil. It also imposed strict restrictions on North Koreans working abroad.
Sanctions passed by the Security Council are supposed to be enforced by U.N. member states - all of whom are legally bound to implement them - using local legislation.
But there is no direct ban on hair products, so trading false eyelashes from North Korea does not necessarily violate international law, three sanctions experts told Reuters.
Reuters presented its findings to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which said it was "not aware of the circumstances" described but that any alleged violations of U.N. sanctions are "completely without foundation".
Japan's foreign ministry did not comment on Reuters' findings, but said Tokyo, which bans trade with Pyongyang, would continue to consider "the most effective approach" toward North Korea. The European Union's diplomatic service did not return requests for comment on North Korean-made eyelashes being sold in its jurisdiction.
The United States has since 2008 separately expanded its own measures against North Korea, which include sanctions on any company stocking or selling products whose sales fund the Kim regime: a restriction that also applies to non-American firms using the U.S. dollar.
But there are practical and political limitations on Washington's ability to enforce such sanctions unilaterally on entities such as foreign businesses that have minimal exposure to the U.S. financial system and don't sell primarily to American clients, according to two international sanctions lawyers.
A U.S. Treasury spokesperson said it "actively enforces the range of our broad North Korea sanctions authorities against both U.S. and foreign firms" and would "continue to aggressively target any revenue generation efforts" by Pyongyang.
The Treasury also referenced its nearly $1 million settlement with e.l.f. Cosmetics in 2019 over allegations that the U.S.-based firm inadvertently sold false eyelashes containing materials from North Korea.
e.l.f.'s parent company said in a 2019 filing that it discovered two suppliers had used North Korean materials during a "routine, self-administered audit" and that it quickly addressed the issue, which it determined was "not material."
The company, which has since stopped selling false eyelashes, reiterated its commitment to making products legally and responsibly in a statement to Reuters for this story.
Reuters was unable to establish whether any Western companies are currently involved in the North Korean eyelash trade.
CHINA'S 'EYELASH CAPITAL OF THE WORLD'
[1/5]Workers work on a production line manufacturing false eyelashes at a workshop of Monsheery, in Pingdu, Shandong province, China November 16, 2023. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab
The people involved in the industry said that Pingdu, an eastern Chinese town that bills itself the 'eyelash capital of the world', is a key node in the supply chain from North Korea.
Many Pingdu-based companies, such as Monsheery, package false eyelashes that are produced primarily by North Koreans, said Wang Tingting, whose family owns the firm, which exports products to the U.S., Brazil and Russia.
Wang said in an interview from her factory that North Korean goods had helped build Monsheery up from a small family workshop. The company was founded in 2015, corporate records show.
"The quality of the North Korean product is much better," said Wang, who said that she was not aware of any sanctions-related issues with using North Korean false eyelashes. She declined to name her international clients.
Others in Pingdu said they are conscious of the role sanctions play in the complicated distribution chain.
"If not for these sanctions, there would be no need for (North Koreans) to export through China," said Gao, who owns Yumuhui Eyelash.
Cui Huzhe, who represents a North Korean factory that works with a Chinese partner in a venture called the Korea-China Processing Joint Trading Company, said the North Korean firm sends semi-finished eyelashes to China, where they are sold to markets including the U.S., Europe, Japan and South Korea.
He declined to identify the two companies involved in the partnership or their clients. Subsequently, he couldn't be reached for comment on the sanctions implications.
INCOME FOR A CASH-STRAPPED STATE
Chinese manufacturers began working with North Korean eyelash plants in the early 2000s, according to three Chinese factory managers. They said they prize the country's labour force for its low cost and the high quality of the eyelashes.
About 80% of Pingdu's eyelash factories purchase or process false eyelash raw materials and semi-finished products from North Korea, according to a 2023 estimate published by Kali, a Chinese manufacturer of eyelash boxes, on its website.
Pingdu's government says the town of roughly 1.2 million accounts for 70% of global output of false eyelashes, which are often made of synthetic fibres but may also be created from mink fur or human hair.
Trading company Asia Pacific International Network Technology, based in the Chinese border city of Hunchun, advertises on its website the services of three North Korean eyelash processing factories with images of workers arranging hairs and pasting them on paper.
Reached by phone, a company employee, who would not give her name, declined to comment.
Seoul-based businessman Johny Lee imports products like chicken-feet shaped lashes used for extensions through Dandong into South Korea.
Those lashes are made by North Koreans, packaged in China, and then sold locally or exported to Asian countries like Japan, said Lee, who chairs a trade group in Seoul that includes eyelash extension technicians from the West and South Korea.
Asked about legal risks, Lee - who began sourcing eyelashes from China a decade ago - said he was not selling "sophisticated technology like semiconductors." North Korean workers "are trying to make a living there," he said.
South Korean law states that if two or more countries are involved in the production of imported goods, the place where the products gained "essential characteristics" will be deemed the country of origin.
Reuters described how eyelashes made by North Korean workers are packaged and completed in China to Shin Min-ho, a South Korea-certified customs attorney. He said North Korea would likely be considered their country of origin because it gave the raw materials "essential characteristics."
Seoul's Korea Customs Services said that "importing North Korean products disguised as Chinese can be punished," but that it was "difficult to determine" country of origin based solely on Reuters' description of the supply chain between North Korea and China and that it was not investigating the issue.
GOOD QUALITY, CHEAP SALARIES
Despite the quality of the eyelashes, North Korean labour is poorly paid. North Korean salaries can be a tenth of Chinese wages, four Chinese factory owners and managers said.
In addition, Wang, a manager for Pingdu-based manufacturer Co-Lash, which ceased North Korean operations during the pandemic, said the workers gave up most of their income to the state. He didn't supply proof.
Another Chinese manufacturer, PD Lush, pays workers at its factory in the North Korean border town of Rason - whose work is sold internationally - an average monthly salary of 300 yuan ($42), said Pingdu-based manager Wang.
The centrality of North Korea to the industry became clear when the country's borders closed during the pandemic.
Monsheery's Wang Tingting said that after North Korea closed its borders in 2020 due to the pandemic, ships carrying over the small amount of eyelashes exported during that time were often held up. "We have very high demand on our side," she said.
In the wake of the pandemic, supply was still not at full capacity and shipping delays were common, she added.
South Korean false eyelash brand Cinderella Amisolution typically procures supplies from Chinese traders of semi-finished North Korean products, which it then sells to customers. But when North Korea sealed its border, contractors sent samples that weren't made by North Koreans.
"I thought, 'this isn't going to work'," said chief executive Choi Jee-won. "They were completely different."
Additional reporting by Beijing newsroom and Sakura Murakami in Tokyo; Writing by Ju-min Park; Editing by Josh Smith and Katerina Ang
9. Navy chief visits U.S. naval base housing nuclear submarines
I am sure the ROKN longs for nuclear powered submarines.
Navy chief visits U.S. naval base housing nuclear submarines | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · February 4, 2024
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Feb. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top naval officer visited a key naval submarine base in the United States for the first time and stressed the need to strengthen ties against growing North Korean threats, the South's Navy said Sunday.
Adm. Yang Yong-mo, chief of naval operations, visited the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia, a southeastern coastal base home to key nuclear submarines, on Friday (local time), according to the Navy.
It marks the first time for a South Korean Navy chief to visit the base, which operates nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), a key U.S. strategic asset. SSBN is a sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad that also includes intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers.
Adm. Yang Yong-mo (R), chief of naval operations, poses for a photo with Rear Adm. Thomas Buchanan (L), the commander of Submarine Group 10, which oversees Ohio-class submarines at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia on Feb. 2, 2024, in this photo provided by the South's Navy on Feb. 4. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Yang took a tour aboard the docked Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alaska (SSBN-732) before meeting U.S. Navy officials to discuss the allies' combined exercises and ways to boost cooperation in deterring North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
The two sides reaffirmed the U.S.' firm commitment to provide extended deterrence to South Korea "utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear," the Navy said.
On Thursday, Yang also met with his U.S. counterpart, Adm. Lisa Franchetti, to discuss North Korea and maritime cooperation.
Franchetti underscored Washington's ironclad security commitment to the South and highlighted the need for both navies to improve interoperability and combined readiness in the face of an increasingly challenging security environment.
"Using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense and other advanced non-nuclear capabilities, the U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK," she said, referring to the South by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
Adm. Yang Yong-mo (C), chief of naval operations, salutes submarine crewmembers before stepping aboard the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alaska (SSBN-732) on Feb. 2, 2024, in this photo provided by the South's Navy on Feb. 4. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · February 4, 2024
10. 121st anniversary of Korean immigration to US
Remember our collective history.
121st anniversary of Korean immigration to US
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
By Choe Chong-dae
Choe Chong-dae
It has been about a century and a half since the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation was signed between the Joseon Kingdom of Korea and the United States on May 22, 1882. Accordingly, Korea dispatched its first ambassador, Park Jeong-yang, to the United States as part of the Korean Legation in Washington in 1887.
Subsequent to this, the inaugural wave of significant Korean immigration began on Jan. 13, 1903, with the arrival of a shipload of immigrants in Hawaii. These individuals, seeking opportunities, ventured to the United States to work on pineapple and sugar plantations, setting in motion a transformative journey that marked the genesis of a remarkable chapter within the history of Korean immigrants.
The courageous spirit of these Korean immigrants resonates through time, 121 years after this historic day. They embarked on a journey that harmoniously integrated their rich culture and vibrant heritage into the very fabric of the United States. Through their tenacious efforts, they have made lasting contributions that have remarkably influenced various aspects of American society.
Reflecting on this pivotal moment, it is essential to recognize the enduring legacy of those who took part in this historic immigration wave. Our ancestors’ tenacity and determination not only shaped their own destinies but also played a pivotal role in shaping the cultural landscape of the United States. Currently, the United States proudly stands as the home to one of the largest populations of Korean immigrants globally. The enduring devotion of these individuals to family, community and a collective purpose has played an instrumental role in advancing the U.S. toward a brighter and more inclusive future.
It is encouraging that Korean Americans have continued to contribute remarkably to diverse aspects of U.S. society, assuming a wide range of roles such as entrepreneurs, legal professionals, public servants, service members and politicians, among others. Their unwavering dedication to community and country exemplifies the best of the U.S. national character.
We honor the resilience of these Korean pioneers and celebrate the harmonious blending of cultures that has made the United States stronger and great. The integration of Korean culture into the American story stands as a testament to the shared pursuit of opportunities and the strength that arises from diversity.
In commemoration of the 19th celebration of Korean American Day, a significant milestone event, festivities unfolded on Jan. 13 at the Howard County Council within the George Howard Building in Ellicott City, Maryland, alongside various other locations. Notably, Howard County, home to one of the largest Korean emigrant populations, designates the entire week as Korean American Weekend.
Korean American Day, officially declared by the U.S. government in 2023, holds profound significance in recognizing the contributions and heritage of the Korean American community.
Thanks to the outstanding efforts of Park Sang-won, the first event of 2023 and the second event in 2024 were successfully held in Seoul.
The 2nd Republic of Korea (ROK) Korean American Day Celebration Convention convened on Jan. 24 at the Westin Josun Hotel in Seoul. Presided over by Park Sang-won, chairman of the World Korean Foundation and the Korean American Association of Brooklyn, New York, the convention featured representation from the Korea-America Association, led by Choi Joong-kyung. The event attracted numerous distinguished guests from the United States and Korea, including diplomats, government officials and officers from the U.S. Forces Korea, among them Major General Brian N. Wolford, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Korea, serving as the assistant chief of staff for the USFK.
I fervently hope that these courageous Korean immigrants in the U.S. persist in contributing to the rich composition of heritage that has been intricately crafted into American contemporary history for over a century.
Choe Chong-dae (choecd@naver.com) is a guest columnist of The Korea Times. He is president of Dae-kwang International Co., and director of the Korean-Swedish Association.
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
11. Women, old men in military? Korea debates solutions for looming conscript shortfall
Women, old men in military? Korea debates solutions for looming conscript shortfall
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · February 2, 2024
By Korea Herald
Published : Feb. 2, 2024 - 15:33
Able-bodied men in South Korea are required to serve in the military for 1 1/2 years or longer. (123rf)
Reforming military obligations for men in South Korea has always been a flashpoint for heated debate. But recently, fuel has been added to the fire with the emergence of two rather radical ideas.
One idea came from professor Choi Young-jin of Chung-Ang University in Seoul, who proposed in an op-ed for a local daily the formation of a "senior army" composed of men aged 55 to 75 to address an anticipated shortfall in military personnel.
In South Korea, which faces the nuclear-armed, belligerent North Korea to the north, all able-bodied men are required to serve in the military for one year and six months to one year and nine months, depending on the branch.
The professor’s suggestion was a counterresponse to a policy pledge made by Lee Jun-seok, the former leader of the ruling People Power Party who is now chief of the fledgling Reform Party, to require women to serve in the military by 2030 to qualify for police and firefighting positions, as a way to make up for the dwindling demographic of young, male conscripts.
“Drafting women into the Army is not wise for a country that should make its utmost effort to encourage births,” Choi said in his column for the vernacular Hankyoreh.
He went on to say that the country should instead tap into the pool of healthy, senior males.
“Currently, there are about 6.91 million men aged between 55 and 75, a significant number of whom are prepared to take up arms for the country once again."
South Korea maintains approximately 500,000 active-duty troops, but with the birth rate dropping to a minuscule 0.78, experts are warning of a significant decline in military resources. A birth rate to support a stable population is thought to be approximately 2.1 children born per woman in her lifetime.
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · February 2, 2024
12. North Korea's rejection of unification emboldened by Russia ties
Sigh...we have to understand the "rejection" of unification is part of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. And the regime has always sought domination over peaceful unification. For the Kim family regime to survive it believes it must bring the entire peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
North Korea's rejection of unification emboldened by Russia ties
Kim Jong Un touts military advances while discarding long-held diplomatic card
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-s-rejection-of-unification-emboldened-by-Russia-ties?utm_source=pocket_saves
JUNNOSUKE KOBARA, Nikkei staff writer
February 2, 2024 08:05 JST
SEOUL -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's declaration that he is abandoning unification with South Korea, after more than 50 years of alternating progress and stagnation, hints at greater confidence in Pyongyang's military capabilities -- with apparent aid from Russia.
South Korean media recently took note of a change in the North: Weather forecasts on Pyongyang's state-run Korean Central Television switched from a map that highlighted the entire Korean Peninsula to one that only marked the northern half.
This was around the same time that Kim declared in a January speech that North Korea should "completely eliminate such concepts as 'reunification,' 'reconciliation' and 'fellow countrymen' from the national history of our republic."
Pyongyang shut down three agencies related to unification, including the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, which was responsible for North-South dialogue. Kim dismissed "homogeneous relations" between the countries as "remnants of the past era," and proposed amending the constitution to clearly delineate North Korea's territory.
This signals an end to the special diplomatic position that Pyongyang afforded Seoul in light of their anticipated future unification. Kim called for the demolition of a railway linking the two countries, and ordered the destruction of a monument symbolizing reunification efforts.
The policy of reunification had been a tool in North Korea's national strategy for many years, starting in 1972, when then-leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean President Park Chung-hee sent secret envoys to each other, culminating in a joint communique that year. This opened the door for reuniting families split up during the Korean War.
Former South Korean Unification Minister Kang In-dok, who was involved in the talks as part of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, has written that Pyongyang's goal was to foster momentum in South Korea toward peaceful unification, and stoke public support for the withdrawal of American forces there.
This was also the year in which then-U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China and met with Mao Zedong. Pyongyang likely feared becoming isolated as Beijing, which had fought on its side in the Korean War, eyed rapprochement with Washington.
In 1972, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, right, meets with Lee Hu-rak, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. (Yonhap)
In the 2000s, then-North Korean leader Kim Jong Il took a conciliatory stance toward Seoul. Kim Jong Un, who took over leadership of the North's ruling Workers' Party in 2012, initially followed the same path as his father.
The younger Kim eventually parlayed North-South talks into a 2018 summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore. His foreign policy had revolved around repeatedly escalating and easing tensions with Seoul and Washington in pursuit of practical gains. But that now appears to be falling by the wayside.
Many analysts see this change as a way for Kim to shut out democratic ideas from South Korea and tighten his control over the country. Defections by North Korean elites are on the rise, according to South Korea's Unification Ministry, and Kim is seen to be painting Seoul as an enemy.
Others see Russia having a hand in the situation.
North Korea in November launched a satellite into orbit on its third attempt. The engine on the rocket had at least four nozzles, rather than the two seen during a failed launch in May, which many military analysts view as evidence of support from Moscow.
"North Korea acquired samples of advanced weaponry with Russia's cooperation," said Han Kwon-hee, planning director at the Korean Association of Defense Industry Studies. "That has made their development more efficient and strengthened confidence in the country's military."
Since cutting off negotiations with the U.S. in 2019, Pyongyang has focused on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. It sees the capacity to carry out a surprise nuclear strike on an American or South Korean military base strengthening its position against Washington and Seoul.
To actually pose a threat, however, the North needs sophisticated reconnaissance systems in addition to missiles.
Normally, military cooperation with North Korea would be of little benefit to Russia. But it is running short on weapons under economic sanctions imposed in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Kim met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian Far East in September, and is believed to have agreed to exchange military materiel for help with the satellite launch.
The additional self-assurance that Moscow's backing has given Kim came across in the January speech.
A war would "terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name.
"And it will inflict an unimaginably crushing defeat upon the U.S.," he added. "Our military capabilities, already in readiness to do so, are being rapidly updated."
Discarding the unification card makes it that much harder for the U.S., South Korea and Japan to draw North Korea to the negotiating table, narrowing their diplomatic options and heightening the importance of deterrence.
13. The death of 'Han'
The death of 'Han'
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
Courtesy of Soyoung Han
By David A. Tizzard
David A. Tizzard
This week I received a request from a friend and professor in the United States: “Can I please explain the concept of ‘han,’ particularly how it manifests in contemporary society and the benefits it provides to the community.” Korea clearly continues to fascinate many people around the world and a lot of them are looking for the secret code or key to understanding why Korean people are the way they are, why their K-dramas resonate the way they do, and why their favourite idol’s eyes linger on screen a little more than is comfortable. Could it be than this is all due to ‘han’? Certainly we are no strangers to articles and YouTube videos declaring “How Squid Game Reflects Korean People’s Unique Sense of Han” or “Bong Joon-ho’s Parasite Shows the Economic Han of Modern Korea.”
In the United States, where race and identity are incredibly important topics for many people, han seems to hold a particular attraction. Many Korean-Americans speak frequently of han as a way of connecting with their grandparents’ home. That while they might not really like kimchi that much and the language is still difficult, they nevertheless feel han. Deep in their bones, they are Korean because they understand that sense of connectedness through generations. They are part of a story of suffering, triumph, and resilience. They are, irrespective of a passport, Korean. They are characters in "Pachinko," they have cried in "H-Mart." They know what it is to have "Beef."
This article is not designed to disprove or reject any of those important experiences. It does not discount the identity or the values and character of any people around the world. What it does intend to do, however, is try and demonstrate how young people today in Korea see and understand the concept of han. To show that culture is real, lived, and, despite our wishes, always changing.
Culture is life
We often think of culture as something that other countries have. Particularly less developed regions or ones that have not modernized. Culture is the "other." It is something that deviates from the norm of contemporary life. In a sense it is also mystical. A sacred way of doing things that shows a deep and unbroken connection to a time before, when spirits moved us, dragons came and went, and the skies opened to the cries of deities. Culture is something to be preserved and respected.
And when we take this perspective, we do not think of ourselves as having culture. What is modern British culture? What is American culture? My students have openly asked each other, “Do Australian people have culture?” This often comes about because we are hesitant to see culture in modern life. But culture is that which is lived, performed, and carried out day-to-day. Culture is a solution to a problem and modern life gives us many challenges. We respond to these challenges (economic, social, political) by creating new cultures.
Korean culture is no longer a hanbok: it is a hoody, a pair of cons, and possibly a crop top as the weather gets warmer. Korean culture is no longer a hanok: it is an apartment with an elevator and a speaker inside that the security guard likes to talk over, particularly on the weekends very early in the morning when your kids are trying to sleep. Korean culture is that which is lived and experienced by the 50-odd million people here today. We might not see it as such right now, but in 100 years, people will look back at us and study our particular ways of being and find it fascinating because it will appear so different and weird to them. They will call it culture. We simply call it life.
Young people
And so I asked a young 19-year old Korean woman who regularly appears on my podcast, “What do you think of han, Yunseo? Do you have han?” She looked at me and with a characteristic Gen Z wry grin and said, “Ah! You mean that thing we have to study for our tests?” Han for her was something taught in school. It was like me growing up and learning about Maypole Dancing and how the Saxons made swords. I could kind of vaguely understand the concepts behind them, but it was nothing to do with me and my need to go to football, and play Tetris on my Gameboy.
She continued: “I think if I asked 100 of my friends, they would all say the same thing. Han is something we have to study for our university test. And, if you asked 100 people to define it, they would all give a different answer because it’s taught in such an abstract way. And, personally, I don’t think han is a Korean concept. If people from all over the world have the same hard times, they will have the same feelings.”
Though it was just the idea of one young individual, the last part was particularly revealing to me. Some Korean people today don’t want to be seen as a distinct or special identity. They instead want to be seen as part of the global community. They don’t want to be othered or viewed as different. They want to be accepted and seen. They don’t want to self-orientalize. They don’t come from a country where people have these special feelings no-one else can understand. They come from a place where they watch Netflix, go to the dentist, pay their taxes, fall in love, and worry about their next haircut. They are like everyone else. It’s just up to us to find the strange in the familiar and the familiar in the strange.
The death of han?
So are we witnessing the death of han? Has it become something akin to the hanbok and games featured in Squid Game? We speak about it on special occasions and marvel at how people used to do things? It amazes me how the west is moving more and more towards concepts such as intergenerational trauma as a reality, something that most university students will know and hear about, while, at the same time, Korean students are seemingly moving away from that idea of secondary trauma being passed down through generations. One group is embracing collective identity and shared experiences while the other is focusing on autonomy and hyper-individualism. The textbooks we have which tell us about Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions and the like are maybe getting things wrong now. It wouldn’t surprise me if in the next 20-30 years, some of the most hyper-individualized people in the world are from East Asia. Birthrates and mental health are probably connected to that as well. And this is not them becoming westernized. It is them becoming new Koreans.
Of course, there are challenges to the idea of the death of han. My Korean teacher and a few others I spoke to told me that han still definitely exists. They believe that Yunseo and her generation are still too young to understand han. Wait until they are in their forties. Then they will really know what han is and, by extension, what it means to be Korean. Another replied that if I wanted to see if han still exists, have a look at the crowd when Korea play Japan in the football. You’ll see it there.
So han means different things to different people. For some, it is part of their identity, their story and a way of making sense of this world. For others, it is a means to an end: a way to pass a test. I think, therefore, Yunseo was right when she said that 100 people would all have different definitions of han. As long as some people believe in it, han will still exist. And when they no longer tell each other those stories, it will fade away. Becoming but a fragment of a memory of a time no one really remembers.
Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social-cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the "Korea Deconstructed" podcast, which can be found online.
The Korea Times · February 4, 2024
14. Are North Korea’s Latest Threats Rhetorical Or Real? – OpEd
Unfortunately an "off ramp" for Mr. Feffer means a victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
Excerpts:
In the late 1940s, Stalin was skeptical about the advantages of North Korea attacking South Korea. Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, eventually convinced Stalin otherwise and won Soviet support for the attack on the south that took place on June 25, 1950. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has indicated that he will visit North Korea “at an early date,” his first trip there since 2000. Pundits and policymakers take note: Putin’s visit might tip the balance one way or the other in North Korea’s deliberations over war and peace.
In the meantime, it’s not too late for the United States and South Korea to offer Kim Jong Un an offramp from the conflict he has yet to initiate.
Are North Korea’s Latest Threats Rhetorical Or Real? – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · February 2, 2024
The Korean War ended more than 70 years ago, and a tense peace has reigned ever since on the Korean peninsula.
The two Koreas have exchanged artillery fire, battled in the economic and diplomatic arenas, and even covertly dispatched spies to each other’s territory. But the threats of a resumption of conflict, disproportionately coming from North Korea in recent years, have been rhetorical. The firepower of the South Korean military, backed by a U.S. defense pact, has deterred Pyongyang; the sheer number of soldiers in the North Korean army, backed by a small but operational nuclear arsenal, has deterred Seoul.
But borders don’t seem quite as inviolable as they once did. Russia has invaded Ukraine, Israel has sent forces into Gaza, and even Venezuela recently seemed to contemplate an incursion into Guyana. The United States, meanwhile, has recently attacked various targets abroad, from the Houthis in the Red Sea to Iranian commanders in Syria.
Against this geopolitical backdrop, are the latest threats emanating from Pyongyang still rhetorical?
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sounds more and more embattled and belligerent. In power since the death of his father at the end of 2011, he has been constrained by a hemorrhaging economy and uncompromising adversaries abroad. The growth rate of the North Korean economy wasn’t too bad at the beginning of his tenure. Since 2017, however, the arrow has simply gone downward, with a devastating 4.1 percent contraction in 2018, followed by a further 4.5 percent decline during the pandemic year of 2020. International sanctions have made North Korea dangerously dependent on China for trade, which explains in part Kim Jong Un’s current interest in covering his bets by improving relations with Russia.
Meanwhile, the two leaders that promised some form of engagement with Pyongyang—South Korea’s Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump—are no longer in office. South Korea’s current government is very cool toward engagement. Joe Biden, focused on a raft of other foreign policy challenges from Ukraine to Gaza, has not expressed much interest in expending political capital on a risky venture like negotiating with Pyongyang.
Washington’s failure to remain engaged with North Korea is the primary reason that longtime North Korea watchers Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker believe that Kim Jong Un has abandoned the default approach of more-or-less peaceful coexistence in favor of launching an attack against South Korea. In some ways, Kim is following the logic of Hamas, an illiberal force also in charge of a largely failed entity. Kim, too, perceives his adversaries as complacent, uninterested in any real negotiations, and vulnerable to a surprise attack. Presiding over an “open air prison” in Gaza, Hamas decided it had nothing left to lose. The North Korean leadership, in charge of an impoverished country with a horrific human rights record, may well have decided that it also has run out of options.
“The literature on surprise attacks should make us wary of the comfortable assumptions that resonate in Washington’s echo chamber but might not have purchase in Pyongyang,” Carlin and Hecker write in 38North. “This might seem like madness, but history suggests those who have convinced themselves that they have no good options left will take the view that even the most dangerous game is worth the candle.”
Carlin and Hecker don’t have what the Israeli intelligence community possessed a year before the October 7 attacks, namely a detailed description of preparations to launch a surprise attack. They are relying on official North Korean statements eschewing reunification of the peninsula and a constitutional change that now identifies South Korea as an adversary rather than as tanil minjok (“one people, one blood”).
This week, reports based on satellite images showed the destruction of Pyongyang’s iconic Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, also called the Arch of Reunification, which Kim earlier referred to as “an eyesore,” and called for its demolition.
North Korea has also recently conducted a rash of missile tests, including one with a hypersonic warhead, as well as military drills near the maritime border that seem designed to provoke a response from the South.
As sober analysts, Carlin and Hecker are not given to overstatement, so their warnings must be taken seriously.
At the same time, the usual North Korean approach has been to make wild threats to get the attention of an otherwise indifferent U.S. government in order to pave the way for a fresh round of negotiations. Missile launches, nuclear tests, and promises to turn South Korea into a “sea of fire” have all, in the past, signaled not an interest in war but, perversely, a determination to restart peace talks with newly attentive adversaries. Also, Kim might be eyeing elections in South Korea where the pro-engagement opposition party is hoping to increase its parliamentary majority in the April elections and in the United States where Donald Trump is now running even or better against Joe Biden in the polls. Trump has long boasted of the 27 “love letters” he exchanged with the North Korean leader. Perhaps, Kim strategizes, the love could continue if Trump is reelected.
Beware wishful thinking. Most analysts misinterpreted Vladimir Putin’s warlike rhetoric and military preparations at the end of 2021 as merely a bid for Western attention and a better bargaining position at the negotiations table. Conventional notions about the deterrence of superior force—Israel, NATO, South Korea—may not apply in a world of increasingly volatile leaders and increasingly violated borders.
Kim’s closer relationship with Putin may well prove pivotal in North Korean calculations. Beijing has traditionally attempted to rein in Pyongyang because an overly provocative neighbor is not good for the Chinese economy in addition to boosting U.S. military presence in the region. Moscow, on the other hand, might be sending different messages, given Putin’s more confrontational approach to the West. Just as the war in Gaza has proven a boon to the Kremlin, in that it has distracted attention and military hardware away from the European theater of operations, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be an even greater draw on U.S. and European resources.
In the late 1940s, Stalin was skeptical about the advantages of North Korea attacking South Korea. Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, eventually convinced Stalin otherwise and won Soviet support for the attack on the south that took place on June 25, 1950. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has indicated that he will visit North Korea “at an early date,” his first trip there since 2000. Pundits and policymakers take note: Putin’s visit might tip the balance one way or the other in North Korea’s deliberations over war and peace.
In the meantime, it’s not too late for the United States and South Korea to offer Kim Jong Un an offramp from the conflict he has yet to initiate.
This article was published at FPIF and originally published in Responsible Statecraft.
eurasiareview.com · February 2, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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