Apologies. Yesterday was a travel day.

Quotes of the Day:

“So long as tyranny exists, in whatever form, man's deepest aspiration must resist it as inevitably as man must breathe.”

– Emma Goldman

“In keeping silent about evil, and burying it so deep within us, that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach, evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.” 

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 

People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character." 

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 3, 2024

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 2, 2023

4. Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone - Irregular Warfare Initiative

5. U.S. Strikes Steer Clear of Iran’s Red Lines

6. New Anti-Ukraine Disinfo Campaign Aims To Bog Down Western Media

7. U.S., U.K. Launch Strikes Against Houthi Targets in Yemen to Protect Red Sea Shipping

8. Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea

9. Ukraine's terrifying new drones dealing death from above for Russians

10. The U.S. economy is booming. So why are tech companies laying off workers?

11. US plans 'Goldilocks' retaliation that will kill Iranians, but not in Iran

12. Is Washington Writing the Script for the Next Forever War?

13. More than a Century of Antisemitism: How Successive Occupants of the Kremlin Have Used Antisemitism

14. What’s the difference between Army Rangers and Green Berets?

15.  The relentless focus on White Christian nationalism is spreading a racist myth

16.  Joe Biden Is Arming Greece So Greece Can Arm Ukraine—And Pro-Russia Republicans Can’t Stop Him

17. Those Soldiers in Jordan Were Casualties of Bureaucracy

18. Misinformation spreads in China on ‘civil war’ in Texas

19. Red Menace, Black Ops, Green Light

20. Opinion | Relax, MAGA bros — Taylor Swift is not the enemy

21. Russia’s Buddhist Nations Want Ulan Bator To Adopt Compatriots Law To Make It Easier For Them To Move To Mongolia

22. Call For Urgent Action Against Myanmar Military Junta

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Iran as the US conducts strikes to preempt attacks by Iranian-back proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against American and other targets.
• The Kremlin censored a protest by wives of mobilized soldiers in Moscow on February 3 likely to suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of Russian soldiers and against the regime.
• Soviet leadership experienced first-hand the influence that social movements of relatives of Russian soldiers wielded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Kremlin likely aims to preemptively censor and discredit similar movements before they can garner similar influence.
• Putin may have learned from the Soviet Union’s prior failure to completely censor soldiers’ relatives and changed tactics, instead using limited censorship and discreditation to keep these movements from building momentum.
• Russian milbloggers continued to fixate on a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast and highlight divisions it caused within the Russian information space, which are indicative of wider issues with the Russian military’s ability to adapt in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian actors conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on February 3.
• Ukrainian strikes reportedly temporarily slowed Russia’s production of Lancet loitering munitions.
• Russian state media confirmed the appointment of two new officials to senior positions in military-adjacent civilian organizations.
• Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements along the frontline.
• Russian soldiers imprisoned for refusing to fight in Ukraine are reportedly dying in Russian detention.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth through the school system.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 3, 2024

Feb 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 3, 2024, 7:50pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on February 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Iran as the US conducts strikes to preempt attacks by Iranian-back proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against American and other targets. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed militia positions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen on February 3.[1] The US launched a series of retaliatory airstrikes against targets in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen on February 2 and 3 following a January 28 drone strike by an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[2] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned the strikes as a “blatant act of American-British aggression” and claimed that they demonstrate US policy’s “aggressive nature” and “complete disregard for international law.”[3] Zakharova claimed that the US airstrikes are “specifically designed” to further inflame the conflict in the Middle East.[4] Zakharova criticized the United Kingdom (UK) for participating in the strike and claimed that the UK “has yet to answer” for its “zeal” in supporting provocative US policy.[5] Russian state media reported extensively on the strike’s aftermath and amplified Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian state reporting and condemnations of the strike.[6] Russia requested a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting in connection with the US strikes, which is scheduled for February 5.[7] Russia frequently weaponizes its invocation of international law to undermine legitimate US activities in the Middle East.

The Kremlin censored a protest by wives of mobilized soldiers in Moscow on February 3 likely to suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of Russian soldiers and against the regime. Members of the Russian “Way Home” social movement laid flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow before holding a protest at the nearby Manezhnaya Square to commemorate the 500th day since Russian President Vladimir Putin began partial mobilization in September 2022.[8] Russian state media outlets largely did not cover the protest but did report that the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office warned against attending an unspecified protest in Moscow on February 3, very likely referring to the Way Home protest.[9] Russian opposition media outlets covered the protest in detail, however, estimating that roughly 200 people attended, and reported that Moscow police detained 27 individuals, most of whom were Russian and foreign journalists.[10] The opposition outlets reported that authorities later released the detained individuals without charges and that some of the Way Home members protested outside of the police station for the release of all detained individuals.[11] Russian police allowed Way Home protestors to later go to Putin’s campaign headquarters and handwrite appeals to Putin to bring mobilized personnel home, but the headquarters only allowed small groups of demonstrators inside and severely limited media access. Russian law enforcement likely deliberately detained journalists rather than protestors to limit reporting of the event while depriving the Way Home organization of a platform on which to martyr itself in the information space over the arrests of its members.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet leadership experienced first-hand the influence that social movements of relatives of Russian soldiers wielded, and the Kremlin likely aims to preemptively censor and discredit similar movements before they could garner similar influence. Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized the Way Home protests on February 3, accusing the wives of lacking the authority to advocate on behalf of frontline Russian soldiers because they are wives of soldiers, not mothers of soldiers, and asked to hear from the “husbands” instead.[12] (One of the main concerns of relatives is that mobilized Russian soldiers consistently lack the ability to communicate with relatives back home and go missing).[13] Solovyov asked whether the “husbands” authorized their wives to advocate on their behalf and asked whether this movement was “another Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers.”[14] The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (later renamed the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers) was founded in 1989 and advocated for better treatment of Soviet conscripts who were enduring poor living standards and violence — most notably suffering from dedovshchina, the ritual hazing of conscripts using physical and sexual violence — during peacetime in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[15] The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers also called for greater transparency within the Soviet military, particularly regarding deaths in the Afghanistan and Chechen wars as well as in peacetime, whereas the Soviet government desired to censor both the deaths and mothers’ movement.[16] The mothers’ movement leveraged public displays of grief and other tactics to pressure Soviet officials into disclosing the number of peacetime military deaths, which exceeded the number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan in the 1980s.[17] The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was so effective that it forced the Soviet military to make sweeping changes in the 1990s, including removing and prosecuting corrupt military commanders and officials in the military prosecutor’s office.[18] The legacy of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers represents the societal destabilization possible from a failed Soviet attempt at complete censorship, and Solovyov’s evocation of this specific organization indicates the depth of the Kremlin’s fear of similar movements only a few decades later.[19]

Putin may have learned from the Soviet Union’s prior failure to completely censor soldiers’ relatives and changed tactics, instead using limited censorship and discreditation to keep these movements from building momentum. The Kremlin has censored other relatives’ movements in support of Russian mobilized personnel since September 2022 and has more recently targeted the Way Home movement in December 2023 and January 2024.[20] Russian authorities compelled the Council of Wives and Mothers, founded in September 2022, to stop operating after designating it as a foreign agent in May 2023 after likely threatening criminal prosecution against its founder in December 2022.[21] Russian opposition outlets reported in late January 2024 that Russian authorities attempted to hack the social media accounts of Way Home members and that Russian law enforcement harassed members at prior demonstrations, both likely to discourage members from continuing their activism.[22] Other Russian sources, including ultranationalist milbloggers, have spread claims that Ukrainian special agents run the Way Home movement or that its leadership is otherwise corrupt.[23] While the degree of social influence that the Way Home movement or other similar Russian movements may hold is unclear, the extent and complexity of the Kremlin’s efforts to limit the rise of relatives’ movements in support of Russian soldiers underscores the Kremlin’s desperation to shut down these movements, particularly ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections and as it prepares for a long-term war effort.

Russian milbloggers continued to fixate on a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast and highlight divisions it caused within the Russian information space, which are indicative of wider issues with the Russian military’s ability to adapt in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 3 that “true patriots” responded to the January 30 footage of the unsuccessful assault with criticism and disappointment.[24] The milblogger criticized “traitors and sellouts,” including experts who frequent Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s TV show, who responded to the footage by falsely claiming that Russian forces have adequate supplies of electronic warfare (EW) systems and radios to repel Ukrainian first-person vision (FPV) drones.[25] The milblogger, citing personal conversations with frontline Russian personnel, claimed that such propagandists’ claims are not true and that Russian frontline commanders consider donated radio stations more valuable than state-provided tanks and infantry fighting vehicles due to radio equipment shortages.[26] Several milbloggers lamented that the Russian “high office” (likely the Russian high command) is unlikely to read milbloggers’ concerns about Ukrainian drone use and warned that many Russian personnel will die because of Ukrainian drone superiority on the frontline, calling the issue ”one of [Russia’s] biggest problems at the moment.”[27] Russian milbloggers’ willingness to continually fixate on this particular event is notable, as the milbloggers’ concern over Russian forces’ failure to adapt is apparently greater than their concern for their own personal safety given the arrests of several critical information space voices and milbloggers in 2023.[28]

Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev praised Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2 comment about drones being the Russian forces’ “Achilles’ heel” and claimed that Putin’s comment shows Putin’s awareness of what is happening on the front and that he has an understanding of modern warfare.[29] Medvedev claimed that Putin’s acknowledgment of Ukrainian drone superiority proves that Putin is not afraid to discuss Russia’s “problems” and “mistakes” and that Putin does not believe that constructive criticism of Russian operations in Ukraine is wrong or will prevent a Russian victory of Ukraine.[30] Several Russian milbloggers have seized on the discourse surrounding the January 30 footage of the unsuccessful Russian assault on Novomykhailivka to argue that Russian sources should not have to censor constructive criticism of the Russian military.[31] Putin’s February 2 statement appears supportive of the milbloggers’ argument against self-censorship. Putin has previously signaled his sensitivity to concern about Russian operations in Ukraine among Russian milbloggers, including during his “Direct Line” forum on December 14 when Putin singled out the tactical and operational situation in Krynky in the east bank of Kherson Oblast, an area of the front that Russian milbloggers have previously fixated on.[32] Putin’s statement suggests that there may be concern within the Russian military and political leadership about the Russian military’s ability to adapt and restore maneuver to the battlefield.

Ukrainian actors conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on February 3. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne and BBC Russia Service cited internal sources in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) who claimed that the SBU conducted the strike.[33] A source in Kyiv told Reuters that Ukraine used two attack drones to execute the strike.[34] A fire resulting from the strike apparently spread up to 300 square meters at the Lukoil refinery, which Russian emergency services extinguished.[35] Lukoil’s Volgograd refinery is one of the largest in Russia and the largest in the Russian Southern Federal District.[36] Russian officials obliquely reported on the strike, claiming that “falling debris” from a drone strike that Russian air defense repelled fell on the refinery and caused the fire.[37] A Russian milblogger criticized Russian authorities for not admitting that Ukrainian drones struck the refinery and called for massive retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to damage Ukraine’s battlefield prospects and dissuade Western investment in Ukrainian critical industries.[38]

Ukrainian strikes reportedly temporarily slowed Russia’s production of Lancet loitering munitions. Forbes, citing Ukraine-based OSINT group Molfar, reported on February 1 that a “well-targeted” Ukrainian strike may have hit the Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) near Moscow in August 2023.[39] Forbes noted that Russian state media denied that explosions at ZOMZ were the result of a drone strike, despite eyewitness reports to the contrary. Ukrainian military analyst Dmytro Snehyrev assessed that ZOMZ may have been producing camera lenses or optical devices for ZALA Aerospace’s Lancet loitering munitions.[40] Forbes stated that following the August 2023 incident at ZOMZ, Lancet production was “slashed,” which is noteworthy because Lancets use several imported components that should in theory be unaffected by explosions at ZOMZ. The Forbes investigation concluded that Ukraine may have conducted the strike against ZOMZ, impacting the factory's ability to produce unique domestic components for Lancets, thereby leading to a temporary decrease in Lancet production, which is now on the rise again as of January 2024.

Russian state media confirmed the appointment of two new officials to senior positions in military-adjacent civilian organizations. The Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) confirmed on February 2 that it unanimously elected Army General Alexander Dvornikov (former Southern Military District commander and failed Russian theater commander in Ukraine from April-May 2022) as DOSAAF’s new chairperson.[41] DOSAAF also noted that it determined its new strategic goals, defined as increasing the number of trained conscripts and developing a training system for drone operators and other specialists.[42] ISW previously reported rumors of Dvornikov’s appointment on January 30.[43] DOSAAF is a Soviet relic that funds and promotes military service for Russian youth through military-patriotic programming and military skills programs and sends representatives to military draft boards to allocate conscripts with specific skills into specific military roles.[44] Dvornikov’s selection to head DOSAAF suggests that the Russian military leadership may be setting conditions to reconstitute a conscript recruitment pipeline using DOSAAF’s educational and recruitment infrastructure. Kremlin newswire TASS also reported on February 3 that Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Russian Minister of Labor and Social Protection Anton Kotyakov with Russian Federal Financial Monitoring Service Head Yuriy Chikhanchin as head of the Kremlin-run “Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation.[45] The “Defenders of the Fatherland” foundation provides government support to Russian veterans and helps provide rehabilitation and social support to wounded veterans and their families.[46]

In accordance with its policy against speculating about future Ukrainian actions, ISW is not covering reported leaks concerning possible changes in the Ukrainian command structure. ISW will continue to report official statements by Ukrainian government officials and organizations as they are made.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Iran as the US conducts strikes to preempt attacks by Iranian-back proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against American and other targets.
• The Kremlin censored a protest by wives of mobilized soldiers in Moscow on February 3 likely to suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of Russian soldiers and against the regime.
• Soviet leadership experienced first-hand the influence that social movements of relatives of Russian soldiers wielded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Kremlin likely aims to preemptively censor and discredit similar movements before they can garner similar influence.
• Putin may have learned from the Soviet Union’s prior failure to completely censor soldiers’ relatives and changed tactics, instead using limited censorship and discreditation to keep these movements from building momentum.
• Russian milbloggers continued to fixate on a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast and highlight divisions it caused within the Russian information space, which are indicative of wider issues with the Russian military’s ability to adapt in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian actors conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on February 3.
• Ukrainian strikes reportedly temporarily slowed Russia’s production of Lancet loitering munitions.
• Russian state media confirmed the appointment of two new officials to senior positions in military-adjacent civilian organizations.
• Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements along the frontline.
• Russian soldiers imprisoned for refusing to fight in Ukraine are reportedly dying in Russian detention.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth through the school system.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line on February 3. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka, Krokhmalne, Tabaivka, and Novoselivske; northwest of Kreminna near Terny and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[47] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are conducting an increased number of air strikes in the Kupyansk direction and claimed that Russian forces dropped over 10 FAB-1500 glide bombs on Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka and Kyslivka on February 2.[48] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on February 2 that Russian forces have almost halved their daily rate of artillery fire in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions due to poor weather conditions and other unspecified issues.[49] Elements of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (10km south of Kreminna).[50]

Russian sources claimed on February 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a bakery in occupied Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on February 3 shows elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) striking Ukrainian forces operating in a forested area east of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut) that ISW previously assessed was under Russian control, suggesting that Ukrainian forces recently regained ground in this area.[52] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced along an unspecified road in the direction of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and captured new heights north and northwest of Klishchiivka, and that Ukrainian forces recaptured several positions north of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut).[53] ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm these claims. Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka and Klishchiivka, and in the Ivanivske direction.[54] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported that the Russian military command is transferring reserves to the Bakhmut direction in an effort to break through Ukrainian defensive lines west of Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar.[55] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian Cossack “Sibir” Brigade are operating near Soledar (northeast of Bakhmut).[56]

Russian sources claimed on February 2 and February 3 that Russian forces advanced north, south, and southwest of Avdiivka but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these purported gains. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers along the sand quarry on Avdiivka’s northern outskirts and one kilometer near Opytne (southwest of Avdiivka).[57] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced east of the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant (south of Avdiivka) and up to 600 meters near Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka).[58] Positional engagements continued near Stepove and in the gardening community north of Avdiivka; southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske; and on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts.[59] Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov observed that the Russian grouping of forces around Avdiivka consists of six Russian brigades, seven regiments, and three special purpose and Spetsnaz units.[60] Butusov specified that elements of the following Russian brigades are fighting near Avdiivka: 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic's [DNR] AC); 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]); 21st Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), 74th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD); 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC); and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet). Butusov identified that elements of two Spetsnaz brigades and the 80th “Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (1st DNR AC) are also operating in the Avdiivka area.

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 3, but there were no confirmed changes on the frontline. Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[61] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Southern Military District [SMD]) captured a Ukrainian position near Novomykhailivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this purported Russian gain.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Zolota Nyva (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made a marginal advance from Pryyutne towards Novodarivka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of such a Russian advance.[64] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Spetsnaz of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) are reportedly operating near Novodonetske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Limited positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 3. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Luhivske (northeast of Robotyne).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are intensively using first person view (FPV) drones along the Ocheretuvate-Polohy road that runs southeast of the Robotyne area and inhibits Russian movement along the route.[67] Several Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian forces in this area have insufficient electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to effectively counter Ukrainian drone use.[68] Elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 3.[70] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified statements made by a subscriber who is reportedly deployed near Krynky and claimed that Russian forces are struggling to conduct assaults in Krynky because Ukrainian forces fully control the airspace with drones.[71] The subscriber claimed that constant tactical redeployment and shifting of Russian units near Krynky is making inter-unit communication very difficult and claimed that Russian troops largely do not understand commanders' intent or their missions in the area.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136/131 drone strike against Ukraine on the night of February 2-3, mainly targeting energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[72] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 14 Shahed drones at Ukraine from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and Cape Chauda, occupied Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down nine Shaheds over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces also launched two Kh-59 missiles at Ukraine from Belgorod Oblast.[74]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian soldiers imprisoned for refusing to fight in Ukraine are reportedly dying in Russian detention. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on February 3 that at least one of three soldiers transferred to a military prison camp in occupied Rozsypne, Luhansk Oblast (on the Russian-Ukrainian international border) died while in Russian detention.[75] Astra noted that one of the soldiers (who may have since died) claimed overnight on December 24-25, 2023 that his group transferred to the Russian 25th Brigade (likely referring to the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th Combined Arms Army fighting in the Kupyansk direction) and that there were prior reported deaths at the Rozsypne prison camp.[76] Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that a Russian soldier detained in a basement prison for soldiers refusing to fight died of blunt force trauma in November 2023.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine’s international partners continue to provide Ukraine with weapons and military equipment through deals and assistance packages. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced in his February 2 evening address that an unspecified international partner delivered two unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine and described the systems as able to “bring everything down.”[78] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated on February 3 that an Estonian military assistance package including Javelins, machine guns, small arms ammunition, land and water vehicles, and driving equipment has also arrived in Ukraine.[79] Bulgarian Defense Minister Todor Tagarev announced that Bulgaria began transferring some of the 100 total armored personnel carriers (APCs) to Ukraine in accordance with a July 2023 agreement.[80]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth through the school system. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on February 3 of Russian military engineers teaching classes for high school students and members of the Yunarmia youth organization at a school in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[81] Russian military engineers with previous combat experience reportedly taught students about mines and other explosive devices and what students should do if they encounter such devices.[82] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor also reported on February 3 that Russian occupation authorities have begun offering several military cadet training classes in schools in occupied Dovzhansk, Luhansk Oblast, and are teaching Ukrainian youth military skills instead of providing them with the education needed to enter higher education institutions.[83] Ukrainian Regional Center for Human Rights (RCHR) lawyer Kateryna Rashevska noted that Russian officials are also militarizing and teaching deported Ukrainian youth to hate their homeland in higher education institutions in Russia.[84]

Russian-controlled youth engagement organizations continue to spread Russian influence in occupied Ukraine. Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation heads Vladimir Saldo and Yevgeny Balitsky announced on February 3 that the all-Russian “Movement of the First” youth organization is holding a grant competition to support “socially significant” projects in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[85] The “Movement of the First” is based on ”traditional Russian spiritual and moral goals” and seeks to indoctrinate Ukraine youth with pro-Russian sentiment and encourage participation in Russian civil society in occupied areas, as ISW has previously reported.[86]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue to hint at Russia’s interference in Western elections despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s previous denials. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on February 3 that the West funds Russian opposition politicians in Russia and that Russia should support isolationist and anti-US political parties and politicians during elections in the West.[87] Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin sarcastically admitted to his involvement in Russian election interference in November 2022, claiming, “We interfered, we interfere, and we will interfere.”[88] Putin has previously denied Western investigations that suggest that Russia meddled in the American 2016 presidential election.[89]

Russia appears to be struggling to mend its relationship with South Korea while attempting to rhetorically cater to North Korea. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev on February 3 following claims by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova that “the United States and its allies” are the main reason for growing tension on the Korean peninsula.[90] Zinoviev, in turn, criticized South Korean media’s reporting about Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.[91] Zinoviev stated on January 18 that Russia would ”welcome” South Korea into Russia’s circle of ”friendly countries.”[92] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui amid Ukrainian and Western reporting on Russia’s increased reliance on North Korea for ammunition.[93]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A milblogger who shares insider information about former Wagner Group personnel published footage on February 3 of Wagner instructors training Belarusian personnel.[94]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq and Syria: The February 2 US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeted Iranian-backed militia positions along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Iraq-Syria border, and south of Baghdad, Iraq.
• The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reported that the strikes hit al Qaim district, Anbar province, targeting the PMF Anbar Operations “mobile” headquarters, an element of the 13th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tufuf), and two 45th PMF Brigade (Kataib Hezbollah) positions.[14]
• The Iraqi prime minister formally commands the PMF, but “power and political realities” mean that large portions of the PMF, including Liwa al Tufuf and Kataib Hezbollah, answer to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
• A local Syrian source reported that the US strikes targeted Iranian-backed positions in Albu Kamal, a railway crossing west of Albu Kamal, the outskirts of Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor City, Ayyash (west of Deir ez Zor), and Tabani (west of Deir ez Zor).
• Iran, its partners in Iraq, and the Iraqi government falsely claimed that the strikes were violations of Iraqi sovereignty.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are continuing to infiltrate southwestern Gaza City. The militias, including Hamas, have conducted ten attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tel al Hawa since January 31.
• The Red Sea: US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down eight Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on February 2. CENTCOM also conducted preemptive strikes targeting four drones that the Houthis had prepared to launch towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on February 2.
• Iraq: IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted four drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on February 3. Three ”security sources” told Reuters that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 3, 2024

Feb 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 3, 2024

Brian Carter, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on February 3 and 4, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, February 5, 2024. 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

The February 2 US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeted Iranian-backed militia positions along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Iraq-Syria border, and south of Baghdad, Iraq. An anonymous US official told Politico that the United States struck all of its planned targets and several “dynamic targets that popped up as the mission unfolded,” including surface-to-air missile systems and drone launch sites.[1] Two unspecified US officials also told the New York Times that the United States conducted unspecified cyber attacks targeting Iran on February 2.[2]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reported that the strikes hit the al Qaim district, Anbar province, targeting the PMF Anbar Operations “mobile” headquarters, an element of the 13th PMF Brigade, and two 45th PMF Brigade positions.[3] The strikes also hit an artillery position, and multiple “armor” sites. The 13th Brigade is Liwa al Tufuf, an Iranian-backed militia controlled by Kataib Hezbollah.[4] Liwa al Tufuf has facilitated Iranian supply lines through al Qaim border crossing with Syria.[5] The 45th Brigade is one arm of Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy militia. Iranian-backed Badr Organization leader Hadi al Ameri added that the strikes targeted Jurf al Sakhr, a previously Sunni town south of Baghdad that Kataib Hezbollah occupied after committing acts of sectarian cleansing against the previous residents.[6]

The Iraqi prime minister formally commands the PMF, but “power and political realities“ mean that large portions of the PMF, including Liwa al Tufuf and Kataib Hezbollah, answer to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[7] The PMF’s leader, Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, has operated alongside IRGC Quds Force operatives to implement Iranian directives in Iraq.[8] The Popular Mobilization Commission is technically responsible for ensuring that the militias that make up the PMF answer to the Iraqi government.[9] Fayyadh’s installation as the chairman and his relationship with the IRGC safeguards the PMF from actual central government control.

A local Syrian source reported that the US strikes targeted Iranian-backed positions in Albu Kamal, a railway crossing west of Albu Kamal, the outskirts of Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor City, Ayyash (west of Deir ez Zor), and Tabani (west of Deir ez Zor).[10] Iranian-backed militias are active in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor City, and Mayadeen. The railway crossing west of Albu Kamal runs along the edge of Imam Ali military base, which is a key Iranian military base in Syria.[11]

Iran, its partners in Iraq, and the Iraqi government falsely claimed that the strikes were violations of Iraqi sovereignty.[12] Western media outlets reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah launched the attack from Rutba, Anbar province, western Iraq.[13] The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and American assets elsewhere in the region.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq and Syria: The February 2 US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeted Iranian-backed militia positions along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Iraq-Syria border, and south of Baghdad, Iraq.
• The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reported that the strikes hit al Qaim district, Anbar province, targeting the PMF Anbar Operations “mobile” headquarters, an element of the 13th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tufuf), and two 45th PMF Brigade (Kataib Hezbollah) positions.[14]
• The Iraqi prime minister formally commands the PMF, but “power and political realities” mean that large portions of the PMF, including Liwa al Tufuf and Kataib Hezbollah, answer to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
• A local Syrian source reported that the US strikes targeted Iranian-backed positions in Albu Kamal, a railway crossing west of Albu Kamal, the outskirts of Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor City, Ayyash (west of Deir ez Zor), and Tabani (west of Deir ez Zor).
• Iran, its partners in Iraq, and the Iraqi government falsely claimed that the strikes were violations of Iraqi sovereignty.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are continuing to infiltrate southwestern Gaza City. The militias, including Hamas, have conducted ten attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tel al Hawa since January 31.
• The Red Sea: US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down eight Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on February 2. CENTCOM also conducted preemptive strikes targeting four drones that the Houthis had prepared to launch towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on February 2.
• Iraq: IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted four drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on February 3. Three ”security sources” told Reuters that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on February 3.[15] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, fired small arms and mortars targeting Israeli forces in central and western Gaza City.[16] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, targeted Israeli forces in western Gaza City.[17] Hamas fighters mortared Israeli forces in the al Jamia area, in southwestern Gaza City.[18]

Palestinian militias are continuing to infiltrate southwestern Gaza City. The militias, including Hamas, have conducted ten attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tel al Hawa since January 31.[19]

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms fire and mortar rounds in Khan Younis City on February 3.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 3.[21] Israeli forces raided a building used by Palestinian fighters and captured weapons and tunnel shafts inside.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias seven times across the West Bank on February 3.[23] Israeli forces detained seven wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in the West Bank on February 3.[24]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 3.[25]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down eight Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on February 2. CENTCOM also conducted preemptive strikes targeting four drones that the Houthis had prepared to launch towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on February 2.[26] CENTCOM conducted the preemptive self-defense strikes after determining that the drones presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships.

IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted four drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on February 3.[27] IRGC-controlled media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces at al Harir Airbase, Erbil Province and Ain al Assad Airbase, Anbar Province, Iraq.[28] Three “security sources” told Reuters that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.[29] IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media also claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed at the al Tanf garrison, Homs Province, and Rumaylan Landing Zone, Hasakah Province, Syria.[30] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq did not claim either of the attacks in Iraq and Syria on its Telegram account.

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 2, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-2-2023

Key Takeaways

• Kuomintang legislator Han Kuo-yu was elected speaker of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan on February 1.
• PRC Ministry of Defense and state media criticized comments from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the threat that China poses to Europe and the prospects for a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
• The PRC Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing coordination with the US military about the next meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.
• The PRC and Russia held several high-level minister exchanges to enhance “strategic coordination,” which support the PRC’s effort to challenge the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
• The PRC Coast Guard claimed it had “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21.
• A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
• The PRC is engaging diplomatically with North Korea to undermine United States-South Korea security ties for the PRC’s benefit.
• The PRC contacted Iran to restrain the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. The outreach did not slow or stop the Houthi attack campaign.
• CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban Ambassador to China Bilal Karimi on January 30.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, FEBRUARY 2, 2023

Feb 2, 2024 - ISW Press

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 2, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Information Cutoff: February 1 at 9am ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• Kuomintang legislator Han Kuo-yu was elected speaker of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan on February 1.
• PRC Ministry of Defense and state media criticized comments from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the threat that China poses to Europe and the prospects for a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
• The PRC Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing coordination with the US military about the next meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.
• The PRC and Russia held several high-level minister exchanges to enhance “strategic coordination,” which support the PRC’s effort to challenge the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
• The PRC Coast Guard claimed it had “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21.
• A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
• The PRC is engaging diplomatically with North Korea to undermine United States-South Korea security ties for the PRC’s benefit.
• The PRC contacted Iran to restrain the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. The outreach did not slow or stop the Houthi attack campaign.
• CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban Ambassador to China Bilal Karimi on January 30.

Taiwan

The Legislative Yuan (LY) elected Kuomintang (KMT) legislature Han Kuo-yu speaker of the legislature on February 1. Han received all 52 KMT votes and 2 others from independent legislators in the second round of voting. No candidate secured a majority during the first round.[1] The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominated incumbent Legislative Yuan Speaker You Si-kun, who received 51 votes from DPP legislators. You had been the speaker of the Legislative Yuan since 2020. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) nominated one of its eight legislators, Vivian Huang, and voted unanimously for her.[2] The TPP abstained in the second round of voting. Huang was an unexpected addition to the race, as the TPP had indicated that it would support the DPP or KMT in exchange for political concessions. The potential to secure the TPP’s backing fueled competition between the two parties to appease the TPP until the party announced Huang’s candidacy on January 31.[3] The TPP’s last-minute participation in the LY speaker race caused controversy within the DPP, which viewed the move as an ultimatum to tear DPP support away from its candidate by those who advocated preventing Han’s victory at any cost.

Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics, notorious for his Beijing-friendly platform that contributed to popular dissatisfaction with his incumbency and subsequent removal from office as mayor of Kaohsiung in 2020.[4] Han held closed-door meetings with CCP officials during an unannounced trip to Shenzhen, PRC, and Hong Kong during his mayorship in 2019. Han met with then director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Liu Jieyi and CCP Chief for Shenzhen Wang Weizhong. Han also met the director of the PRC’s liaison office, which manages relations with Hong Kong.[5] Han’s meeting with CCP officials drew public criticism for endangering national security and breaking with official protocol for engaging with PRC officials.[6] Han’s meeting preceded a turbulent period in Hong Kong society that resulted in the PRC’s erosion of Hong Kong’s political autonomy and civil liberties by the PRC. Hong Kong’s plight earned widespread sympathy in Taiwan, intensifying criticism of Han.[7]

The KMT’s victory will strengthen its influence over policymaking during Lai Ching-te’s incoming administration. The speaker is responsible for guiding legislative processes, such as setting the agenda, voting on laws, and presiding over sessions. Control over legislative proceedings enables the speaker to prioritize or delay legislation based on political alignment and adjudicate debates on policies proposed by the executive branch. The DPP led a minority government under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which the KMT-led opposition persistently blocked DPP policies, including arms procurement from the United States.[8] KMT Vice Chairman Sean Lien promised strong LY oversight of the DPP government under Han’s leadership.[9] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi also warned that the KMT would strive to expose DPP corruption from the past eight years, portending an acrimonious relationship between the KMT and DPP during Lai’s presidency.[10]

The TPP’s eight seats in the LY position the party to be the crucial swing vote and could further complicate the passage of DPP policies. The KMT’s 52 seats plus two KMT-aligned independents and DPP’s 51 seats do not grant either a majority in the 113-member body. The TPP’s 8 seats will make its votes the deciding factor for some legislation.

Han’s position as the LY speaker also has ramifications for Taiwan’s international representation as the speaker represents Taiwan in a diplomatic capacity. Outgoing Speaker You Si-kun frequently met with foreign representatives during his tenure to advocate for Taiwan’s integration with the international community, deterrence of PRC aggression, and strengthening of democratic values. You’s diplomacy featured meetings with officials from key partners, including the United States, European Union, and Japan.[11] Han’s preference for warmer relations with Beijing and support for the 1992 Consensus suggests he will take a different diplomatic approach from You, who called attention to the PRC’s threat to cross-strait peace and highlighted Taiwan’s status as a sovereign polity. Han’s emphasis on the economy during his mayoral and presidential campaigns indicates he will use his platform to promote trade and investment opportunities, including with the PRC.[12] The Speaker of the LY also holds the chairmanship of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), a government-funded non-profit organization whose purpose is to promote democracy in Taiwan and abroad. DPP caucus whip Ker Chien-ming expressed his fear that PRC pressure on Han would constrain the LY’s diplomatic efforts, which he called the LY’s biggest responsibility.[13] Former Taiwanese diplomat Dale Jieh wen-chieh predicted that the DPP government would intentionally refrain from arranging for foreign guests to visit TFD under Han’s leadership to deprive him of a diplomatic platform.[14]

The PRC demonstrated its preference for Han as the LY speaker in a puff piece featured in the state media outlet CCTV on January 24. The program covered Han’s candidacy for speaker, emphasizing his support for the 1992 Consensus and his stance against being “pro-US and anti-China”.[15] The 1992 Consensus refers to a mutual understanding between the CCP and KMT of “One China”, though interpretations differ between them. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly stipulated acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as a precondition for cross-strait dialogue in 2017.[16]

The CCP may seek to leverage its rapport with Han to shape legislative outcomes in the LY, such as curbing DPP national defense-related proposals in the LY. The KMT’s historic inclination to reject DPP proposals in the LY aligns with the CCP’s desire to stymie the efficiency of Lai’s presidency and foment political disarray. Han’s conflicting policy agenda with the DPP indicates that he will wield his authority as speaker to this end, potentially causing problems for Lai’s administration.

The PRC unilaterally changed a domestic commercial flight path closer to the median line in the Taiwan Strait. The new route came into effect on February 1 and comes within 7.8 kilometers of the median line at its closest point.[17] The Taiwan Strait median line has acted as the unofficial border between the PRC and Taiwan since a “tacit agreement” between the two sides in 1958 to observe the line, although the PRC publicly denies its existence.[18] PRC aircraft began crossing the median line with increasing frequency in 1999, under Taiwan’s first democratically elected leader Lee Teng-hui.[19] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) accused the PRC of using civil aviation to “package” political and military issues to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.[20] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reiterated its claim that the purpose of shifting the route is to alleviate airspace congestion.[21] Chieh Chung, an analyst at the Taiwanese think tank National Policy Foundation, stated the move would significantly curtail Taiwan’s air defense early warning and reaction time.[22]

Taiwan’s Premier Chen Chien-jen labeled the PRC’s actions a ploy to undermine cross-strait stability and likened it to the PRC’s increasingly frequent flights of high-altitude balloons.[23] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) recorded 9 PRC balloons flying near Taiwan since January 25.[24] The PRC also flew a combined 55 military aircraft through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) from January 30 and February 1, 25 of which crossed the median line.[25] The ADIZ incursions over these two days represent a sharp increase from earlier that week and coincide with the election of the LY speaker.

Tuvalu is considering switching its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Tuvalu Ambassador to the Republic of China Bikenibeu Paeniu stated in a January 19 interview with The Australian that there were rumors Tuvalu would go down the same path as Nauru and switch recognition at some point after Tuvalu’s January 26 election.[26] Tuvalu’s Finance Minister Seve Paeniu also stated that Tuvalu expects to review diplomatic ties with Taiwan after the election as his country seeks additional financial support for development.[27] The Tuvalu government said Bikenibeu Paeniu’s comments did not represent its official stance and reaffirmed its ties to Taiwan.[28] Seve Paeniu is now one of the candidates in the race to become Tuvalu’s next Prime Minister as the newly elected lawmakers aim to form a cabinet in the coming week.[29] He is open to recognizing the PRC based on support for Tuvalu’s development priorities and aspirations.[30]

The CCP reportedly offered Tuvalu unspecified financial benefits in the period 2020 to 2023 in exchange for switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Then Tuvalu Minister for Justice, Communication & Foreign Affairs Simon Kofe refused the offer.[31] Tuvalu is the only country in the Asia-Pacific region that maintains relations with the ROC and does not have a Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreement with the United States.

China

PRC Ministry of Defense and state media criticized comments from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the threat that the PRC poses to Europe and the prospects for a PRC invasion of Taiwan. Stoltenberg said at the World Economic Forum summit on January 16 in Davos, Switzerland, that “China is coming close to us” through its activities in Africa and the Arctic and in trying to control critical infrastructure. He stressed that NATO is a transatlantic regional alliance and does not regard the PRC as an adversary, however.[32] Stoltenberg also commented during a visit to the United States that Western support for Ukraine is “closely watched in Beijing” and that a Russian victory in Ukraine could embolden the PRC to seize Taiwan.[33] The CCP-owned China Daily claimed on January 19 that NATO, not the CCP, was responsible for global instability. It said NATO had become expansionist and that its recent shift of focus to the Asia-Pacific posed a threat to the PRC and jeopardized regional peace and stability.[34] A January 23 China Daily article also described Stoltenberg as “the hawkish head of [an] aggressively expansionist transatlantic alliance” and accused him of “scaremongering” about PRC activities in Africa and the Arctic.[35] The state-owned Global Times wrote on January 30 that Stoltenberg’s “hyping” of the China and Russia threats will not alleviate Western “fatigue” over support for Ukraine.[36]

The CCP expressed concern about the NATO Steadfast Defender military exercises and inaccurately claimed that NATO is driving instability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. NATO began its Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises on January 24, its largest military exercise since 1988. The drills will feature around 90,000 troops from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden and will last until May 31.[37] PRC MoD spokesperson Wu Qian said at a January 25 press conference that the PRC was “highly concerned” about the exercise, as well as Stoltenberg’s comments about China, and accused NATO of approaching the Asia-Pacific and taking advantage of a “non-existent ‘China threat’” to threaten regional security. He called NATO a “walking ‘war machine’ that brings chaos wherever it goes.”[38] The state news agency Xinhua featured a news article on January 25 that argued that NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercises will only deepen hostilities between European countries and Russia.[39]

The PRC’s rhetoric about NATO aligns with Russian messaging about NATO since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. PRC government bodies and state media have portrayed NATO as an expansionist and aggressive military bloc controlled by the United States that threatens Russian security and regional stability. The CCP has also portrayed the war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict between the United States and Russia, in which Ukraine is a “pawn” of the United States.[40] PRC messaging also aligned with Russia in portraying the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises as “provocative.”[41]

The PRC Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed ongoing coordination with the US military about the next meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). MoD spokesperson Wu Qian did not announce the date of the meeting but said it was part of an ongoing effort to resume military dialogues with the United States.[42] US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed during their November 15 summit in San Francisco to resume high-level military talks, including the MMCA talks, US-China Defense Police Coordination (CDPC) talks, and telephone conversations between theater commanders.[43] The first CDPC consultation since the summit occurred on January 8-9.[44] The theater command-level talks have yet to be scheduled.

The United States views military-to-military talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The CCP views these talks, at least in part, as a bargaining chip that it can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit, however. A US action that the CCP deems unfavorable would be grounds to cut off military-to-military dialogue, in the party’s view. The party previously did this by cutting off high-level military dialogue in the aftermath of then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[45] This precedent indicates the possibility that the CCP will continue to use military-to-military dialogue opportunities to shape United States behavior in the lead-up to at least the May 20 ROC presidential inauguration.

The PRC and Russia held several high-level minister exchanges to enhance “strategic coordination,” which support the CCP’s effort to challenge the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. The talks took place from January 29-31 and included meetings between the two countries’ defense ministers and vice foreign ministers. The exchanges addressed a range of issues, such as BRICS cooperation, expanding military cooperation, the war in Ukraine, and developments in the Asia-Pacific, Korean peninsula, and Middle East.[46] The PRC’s defense minister readout on January 31 noted that “Russia will play a greater role in comprehensive strategic coordination and maintaining global security and stability.”[47] The meetings signify the continued growth of military and diplomatic ties between Russia and the PRC, including increased cooperation on shared strategic goals.

The Russian Pacific Fleet also conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea on January 29.[48] PRC state media did not publicize the event. The Russian frigate Marshall Saposhnikov of the Pacific Fleet previously conducted anti-submarine warfare drills in the South China Sea on January 29.[49] The Pacific Fleet exercise is likely aimed at demonstrating that Russia is a strong Pacific power that supports China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, as the Kremlin has routinely stressed in the past.[50] The dearth of CCP media coverage on the event reflects the party’s attempt to avoid drawing international attention to the South China Sea while the party is also engaging in military aggression toward the Philippine-controlled Second Thomas Shoal.

Second Thomas Shoal

The PRC Coast Guard claimed that it “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21. PRC Coast Guard Spokesperson Gan Yu said on the Chinese social media app WeChat that the Coast Guard had made “temporary special arrangements” to allow a small Philippine aircraft to airdrop supplies to troops stationed at the grounded warship that serves as the Philippine base on Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine National Security Council spokesperson Jonathan Malaya denied the PRC allegation that it had allowed the airdrop and said the Philippines did not need anyone’s permission to deliver supplies. He neither confirmed nor denied that the airdrop had occurred.[51]

The PRC inaccurately framed the airdrop as “provocative” amid the easing of tensions in the region. The Second Thomas Shoal is a disputed reef feature in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, which the Philippines controls but which the PRC and Taiwan claim. It was the site of confrontations between the Philippines and PRC in recent months. The Philippines and PRC held bilateral maritime consultations on January 17 to de-escalate tensions and the Philippines had not sent vessels to Second Thomas Shoal for over a month before the resupply mission.[52] PRC state-owned media outlet Global Times framed the airdrop as “provocative”, however. PRC Coast Guard Spokesperson Gan Yu reiterated the point in calling on the Philippines to stop its alleged “provocations” and “hyping” the dispute to mislead the international community.[53] He added that the Coast Guard will continue to defend the PRC’s sovereignty, rights, and interests on the Second Thomas Shoal and step up “law enforcement” activities around the shoal.

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[54] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[55] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[56] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[57] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[58] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[59] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[60] Funding the COFAs is a key part of the US Pacific Partnership Strategy to “fulfill our [United States] historical commitments and strengthen our enduring relationships with the full Pacific Islands region, including our special relationship with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.”[61] Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr expressed concern in a December 27 interview with ABC Australia over the lack of Congressional-approved funding for the COFA agreement, in part because the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement was not funded by the US Congress until 2018.[62]

These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 12 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[63]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would cause severe financial pressure in Palau because COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of the national government’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[64] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[65] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. stated that the CCP is intensely pressuring his country, including personally harassing him with angry phone calls to the point he changed his phone number, ahead of its November election to achieve this goal.[66]

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [67] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[68] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[69] In a December 27 interview with ABC Australia, Whipps tied this Palau Senate resolution to a narrative among unspecified portions of Palau that the United States actions were not in the best interests of Palau, as seen by the repeated delay in COFA funding.[70] The associated fiscal challenges that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[71] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[72] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[73] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps. The loss of COFA funding would also undermine the intent of annual humanitarian missions to Micronesia, such as that by the USNS Mercy in January 2024, to bolster US-Micronesia relations.[74]

The COFA funding also makes up $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands national government's annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[75] The loss of COFA funding would expose the country to similar severe fiscal challenges as Palau and Micronesia. The powerful waves that flooded portions of US Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll in late January 2024 highlight the Marshall Islands’ geographic vulnerabilities that the COFA funding would provide resources to address.[76]

COFA Funding as Share of Government Revenue in Freely Associated States[77]

Percentage of total government revenue, FY2023*

*This graphic does not include Micronesia as fiscal year 2023 data for the country was not found.

The CCP may use these revenue shortfalls to incentivize Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Australia evacuating refugees it paid Nauru to host led to a budget shortfall.[78] The CCP then reportedly offered Nauru USD 100 million per year in 2024 to successfully switch recognition from the PRC to the ROC, according to a Reuters report that cited an unspecified senior Taiwanese official.[79] This follows a regional trend of the PRC offering incentives such as a commercial aircraft to Kiribati or USD 8.5 million to the Solomon Islands, both in 2019, to successfully incentivize them to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[80]

North Korea

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong met with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho on January 26 to discuss bilateral relations and the “international and regional situation.”[81] The PRC did not comment on North Korea’s aggressive behavior in the region, which is consistent with PRC actions since mid-December. The CCP has not publicly criticized North Korea for launching ballistic missiles, testing alleged underwater nuclear drones, or labeling South Korea as its “primary foe.” The CCP has instead called for dialogue to portray the party as a responsible regional stakeholder while avoiding steps to stop North Korea's provocations. The PRC MFA has messaged since mid-December that “trying to solve the problem [on the Korean Peninsula] through military deterrence and pressure will not work…[and] dialogue and consultation” are how to resolve the issue.[82] The CCP has also emphasized the PRC’s close relations with North Korea and plans to deepen “mutually beneficial cooperation” this year, which will be the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[83]

The PRC is engaging diplomatically with North Korea to undermine United States-South Korea security ties for the PRC’s benefit. The PRC's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula is to push South Korea into a foreign policy that balances the interests of the United States and the PRC.[84] This is based on the view that a regional balance of power shift is underway that is unfavorable to the United States as the PRC engages in a military buildup and South Korea increases its military ability to independently defend against North Korea.[85] Implicit in this view is that the PRC military buildup will force South Korea to account for PRC strategic interests in the peninsula at the expense of the United States-South Korea security relationship.

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC contacted Iran to restrain the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. The outreach did not slow or stop the Houthi attack campaign. The Financial Times reported on January 24 that US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken asked the PRC to pressure Iran to stop Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The report also stated that unspecified US officials had seen little evidence of China acting upon these requests.[86] PRC officials asked Iran to have the Houthis show restraint regarding attacks in the Red Sea, according to a Reuters report citing unspecified Iranian officials. The unspecified Iranian officials stated that the PRC did not make specific threats toward Iran if Houthi attacks threatened PRC shipping interests.[87]

The PRC has not condemned Houthi aggression and has instead called for regional calm rather than take steps or support international efforts to stop the Houthi attacks on maritime shipping. PRC foreign affairs officials called on all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe on January 4 and expressed concern on January 12 about the alleged ”escalation of tensions in the Red Sea” after United States-led strikes on Houthi positions.”[88],[89] A joint PRC MFA and Arab League statement on January 16 reiterated these points in calling on “all parties to cool down the situation…and effectively maintain regional peace and stability.”[90] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin implied that US-led strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen are illegitimate because “the [United Nations] Security Council has never authorized the use of force by any country on Yemen.”[91] The only exception to in the PRC’s rhetoric about the Houthi attacks on maritime shipping occurred on January 10, when Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun “call[ed] on the Houthi armed forces to immediately stop harassing civilian ships and respect the freedom of navigation of all countries.”[92],[93]

The CCP continues to stress that US-led counter strikes on the Houthis and not the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping risk a wider regional escalation. PRC Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong stated in a late January interview with Bloomberg that the US-led strikes against the Houthis “can only escalate tension and it’ll not guarantee or maintain the safe passage of the commercial vessels.”[94] A regional escalation would further threaten PRC economic interests by increasing shipping costs and disrupting oil supplies from the region.

Afghanistan

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban Ambassador to China Bilal Karimi on January 30.[95] PRC MFA Spokesperson Wang Wenbin did not confirm nor deny whether the PRC recognizes the Taliban government in Afghanistan during a press conference on January 31.[96] The PRC appointed the new ambassador Zhao Sheng to the country in September 2023.[97] The PRC did not explicitly recognize the Taliban. No country officially recognizes the Taliban regime. The event demonstrates growing PRC-Taliban ties, however, as Xi accepted Karimi’s credentials at a ceremony in which he accepted credentials from diplomats from 38 other countries.

This is the latest indication of growing ties between the CCP and the Taliban regime and builds on agricultural and economic deals that the two signed last year. The PRC signed a 6.5 billion USD mining deal and oil deals worth hundreds of millions of US dollars in 2023.[98]

4. Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Excerpts:

The air power dimension is changing, and quickly. Violent non-state actors and transnational criminal organizations are creating their own, “guerrilla,” air forces that are upending what has been the asymmetric advantage typically held by nation-states. Traditional air forces are being confounded and overwhelmed by inexpensive air and space systems and unconventional employment of commercial technologies. The old rules for who gets to exploit the third dimension no longer apply.

Project Air Power intends to inspire discovery from airmen, aviators, and guardians, and also from industry, academia, internationals, and humanitarian service providers. In the face of daunting conventional and irregular challenges from our strategic competitors, the opportunities for creativity and innovation are boundless. Please join us in helping to shape, influence, and impact air and space power’s future.

Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Richard D. Newton · February 2, 2024

Introducing Project Air Power: Exploring the totality of air, aviation, and space opportunities for air-minded approaches to irregular, hybrid, and gray-zone threats to security and stability.

Introduction

Since the dawn of military aviation, air power has been, and continues to be, a predominant psychological weapon with the power to influence strategic decisions and shape tactical outcomes. As such, the opponent best able to wield the air power tool usually holds an asymmetric advantage in those conflicts dominated by the human dimension—irregular, unconventional, revolutionary, insurgent, low-intensity, etc., because as Billy Mitchell observed, “… air covers the whole world and there is no place that is immune from influence by aircraft [and now space capabilities].” From the great and middle powers’ perspectives, the evolving capabilities conferred by 21st-century technology—persistent high-resolution surveillance, precision targeting and attack, and rapid global mobility—makes possible what air power theorists dreamed about a century ago, i.e., a relatively low-cost means of controlling irregular adversaries without subjecting formations of soldiers to danger or causing the collateral damage as formations of troops pass through villages and farms. In 1920, Great Britain demonstrated that eight De Havilland DH-9A biplanes could substitute for the two divisions of soldiers the Army proposed as needed to find, attack, and defeat the Dervish guerrillas of Somaliland. Moreover, the Royal Air Force accomplished the mission for less than five percent of the Army’s funding request for the operation.

Nearly all analyses and reporting of irregular conflicts and gray-zone aggression have tended to limit their perspectives to a terrestrial focus, and thus neglected the possibilities and opportunities available via the third, vertical, dimension. For three quarters of a century, air, and more recently space, capabilities have offered military and civilian leaders creative options to address political, economic, humanitarian, and security challenges. The general missions conducted by air and space forces during irregular conflicts are much the same as during conventional conflicts. What is different, though, is the dominating role the human dimension plays in irregular conflict. While modern overhead systems have amazing, multispectral capabilities to “see,” they cannot sense emotions, judge attitudes, nor assess passion, all of which exert significant influence in the irregular warfare ecosystem.

Between the World Wars, the British tested their theories of air power’s psychological effects as a population control method in their colonies and mandates. The Royal Air Force (RAF) used the presence of surveillance aircraft and threat of air attack to influence behavior and force the locals to comply with political and economic decisions. The British embedded airmen among the tribes to communicate expectations, control the duration and tenacity of air-delivered effects, assess the impact of air operations, and then negotiate with the leaders to determine follow-on actions. Almost a century later, the fear of observation and attack from the air again shaped the actions of al-Qaeda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Between the World Wars, the British also demonstrated how air power might serve a humanitarian role, delivering vaccines, warnings of locusts, and pioneering medical evacuation techniques. More recently, Western air and space capabilities were powerful counters to anti-Western messaging during humanitarian relief operations in Pakistan and Türkiye.

On the other side of the coin, specifically the possibility for insurgents, terrorists, and criminals to add air and space capabilities to their malign actions has largely been ignored or rejected, until 7 October 2023. Shocked by Hamas’s combined arms invasion of Israel, the world watched on social media and in the mainstream news as Hamas terrorists demonstrated coordinated air operations, using paragliders, commercial drones, and homemade rockets that nation-states’ traditional hegemony over the air domain had ended. It does not matter if the West’s failure to anticipate Hamas’s air force was through arrogance or ignorance. The fact is that violent non-state actors, criminals, and insurgents have been finding creative ways to use air and space technologies for decades, and the West should not have been surprised by Hamas’ air operations on 7 October.

In 1998, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were the first insurgent group to field a guerrilla air force. Since then, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Hezbollah, al-Shabaab, and others have used relatively inexpensive aerial drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, propaganda, and air attacks. To no one’s surprise, transnational criminal organizations have taken note and have been using commercial-grade drones for scouting smuggling routes, harassing government officials, transporting illicit cargo, and intimidating innocent civilians and government officials. Of even more concern are reports of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel in Mexico hiring Middle Eastern terrorists as technical advisors and now fielding an elite drone unit, Operadores Droneros, trained to modify and fly commercial drones as attack aircraft. Around the world, malign actors—criminals, insurgents, terrorists, and madmen—have found innovative ways to cause harm, influence decision-making, and drive up the cost of defending innocent populations, aided and abetted by the commercial drone industry that offers inexpensive and ever-improving aircraft with capabilities such as secure communication, larger payloads, night vision, obstacle avoidance, and GPS-enabled autonomous flight. What Hamas achieved in October 2023 announced to the world that a new era for air and space operations had arrived and the world’s national armed forces could no longer ignore the air threat from violent non-state actors.

The Future of Irregular Air Operations – The Real Next Inflection Point

Over the past few years, Air Force leadership has talked about being at a new inflection point, where the service needs to adapt to a new reality. After two decades of near-continuous combat in theaters where the adversaries had minimal air defenses, the nation’s Air and Space forces must adapt once again, this time to address technologically advanced air and space threats from peer and near-peer adversaries.

In August 2023, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall noted that the Air and Space Forces were not as prepared as they should be to deal with the threats posed by China, and to a lesser extent Russia. To address the shortfalls, Secretary Kendall established seven operational imperatives that are overwhelmingly focused on the next generation of systems and platforms—space defense systems, the next-generation air dominance fighter, the B-21 next-generation bomber, and continued fielding and upgrades to the F-35—needed to deter our two primary competitors. Interestingly, though, the Secretary is also pushing for a change in mindset to focus on large unit training, exercises, and deployments. What is glaring by its omission is how the Air and Space Forces will address the most likely conflict scenarios between the three major powers—the limited “small wars,” often waged through proxies, that avoid triggering major conventional war. History suggests that future great power confrontations will most likely be waged through surrogates and proxies. Those conflicts will be fought in primitive, remote, and austere environments where the modern marvels of air power are ill-suited for operations. Moreover, those primitive locations present more risk and ambiguity than the Air Force’s leadership is likely to accept.

While we might agree that our Air and Space Forces are definitely at an inflection point, one can also argue that the problem is more than a blinkered focus on China. The dangers to international security and stability posed by China and Russia are formidable and the United States and its allies must develop systems, strategies, organizations, people, and doctrine to deter future conventional war—the war we pray will never happen. At the same time, however, the West needs systems, strategies, organizations, people, and doctrine appropriate to “uncomfortable wars,” far from where the services are planning, training, and equipping to fight—the limited wars the nation will likely have to fight.

In 2020, the Department of Defense wrote in the irregular warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy, that even with the shift to strategic competition between the major powers, “the requirement for mastery of irregular warfare persists” and that the department must not “repeat the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict.” That document was supplemented and affirmed in 2023 by the Joint Concept for Competing, but already, the Air Force has divested its only dedicated irregular warfare capability and is asking to reduce its Tactical Air Control Parties by 44 percent, claiming that these unique airmen‘s skills are no longer needed to deter war with China or Russia. But if, as the joint concept claims, the DoD’s goal is to subvert our opponents’ goals and objectives, create dilemmas for our enemies, and erode our adversaries’ power, influence, and will through irregular operations, an obsessive focus on next generation air combat seems like a foolhardy rush to irrelevance. Therefore, Project Air Power will explore the air and space power aspects of irregular conflict, offer thoughtful alternatives to potentially address the challenges of irregular conflict, contemplate the potential character of future irregular conflicts, and consider the applicability of air power case studies to contemporary strategic competition.

Project Air Power’s Mission

Project Air Power will offer military and civilian leaders, academics, and the private sector from across the international air and space communities an independent forum to explore, research, and debate the challenges of irregular conflict in the third dimension. In the process, those leaders, policymakers, futurists, and practitioners will discover opportunities to employ the totality of air, aviation, and space capabilities – joint, interagency, international, civilian, and humanitarian – to contribute to whole-of-society approaches that address the spectrum of irregular and hybrid challenges posed by the West’s strategic competitors.

The project focuses on an air-minded approach to the lower two-thirds of the competition-conflict spectrum, where human interaction, understanding, and connections are more important than technological marvels. It is also where the attributes that make air and space capabilities so powerful: reach, lethality, persistent stare, and power to influence are tempered by thinking airmen, aviators, and guardians who recognize the unique challenges of the irregular conflict environment, but who can also articulate the tremendous possibilities and advantages air and space power offers to shape decisions, influence people, and impact the future.

What’s Next?

The air power dimension is changing, and quickly. Violent non-state actors and transnational criminal organizations are creating their own, “guerrilla,” air forces that are upending what has been the asymmetric advantage typically held by nation-states. Traditional air forces are being confounded and overwhelmed by inexpensive air and space systems and unconventional employment of commercial technologies. The old rules for who gets to exploit the third dimension no longer apply.

Project Air Power intends to inspire discovery from airmen, aviators, and guardians, and also from industry, academia, internationals, and humanitarian service providers. In the face of daunting conventional and irregular challenges from our strategic competitors, the opportunities for creativity and innovation are boundless. Please join us in helping to shape, influence, and impact air and space power’s future.

If you would like to contribute to Project Air Power, contact us at rick.newton@irregularwarfare.org.

Richard Newton leads Project Air Power for the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He is a graduate of the USAF Academy and served as a combat rescue and special operations helicopter pilot, combat aviation advisor, strategic planner, and educator. He earned a Master of Military Art and Science from the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, holds a PhD in Defence Studies from King’s College London, is an adjunct professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, and is a Fellow at the Homeland Defense Institute, a partnership between the USAF Academy and US Northern Command.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Main image: A B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, two Royal Air Force F-35 Lightning IIs assigned to RAF Marham, England, and two F-15 Eagles assigned to the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath, England, fly in formation behind a KC-135 Stratotanker, assigned to RAF Mildenhall, England, during a training mission for Bomber Task Force Europe on September 16, 2019. Three B-2 bombers, Airmen and support equipment from Whiteman AFB deployed to RAF Fairford, England, as part of Bomber Task Force Europe. These multinational missions enhance our professional relationships and improves overall coordination with allies and partner militaries during times of crisis. (Senior Airman Thomas Barley via U.S. Air Force)

5. U.S. Strikes Steer Clear of Iran’s Red Lines

"Self deterrence" does not work and plays into enemy hands.

U.S. Strikes Steer Clear of Iran’s Red Lines

Washington warns of further retaliation for attack that killed U.S. soldiers, but has avoided Iranian casualties so far

By Benoit FauconFollow

 and Sune Engel RasmussenFollow

Feb. 4, 2024 6:10 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-steer-clear-of-irans-red-lines-7076408b?mod=hp_lead_pos1

U.S. strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen continued into Sunday morning as the Biden administration pressed on with its effort to defend shipping lanes in the Red Sea and pin back the growing influence of one of Iran’s most active allies.

But in a sign that Washington and Tehran are seeking to avoid a direct confrontation, American strikes haven’t killed any Iranian forces so far in a separate set of strikes against the Quds Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq. Those strikes began on Friday and are expected to continue in the coming days after a drone strike in Jordan on Jan. 28 that killed three U.S. troops and injured more than 40.

U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, said it had conducted a strike overnight in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen against an antiship cruise missile that the rebels had prepared to launch at vessels in the Red Sea. It said the strike, at around 4 a.m. Sunday local time, came after officials deemed the missile to be an imminent threat to the U.S. Navy and merchant shipping.

On Saturday, the U.S. and the U.K. said they struck at 36 targets in 13 locations in Yemen, targeting weapons-storage facilities, missile systems and launchers, air-defense systems and radars to degrade the Houthis’ capability to threaten global trade.

Houthis gathered Sunday near San’a, Yemen, after the latest U.S.-led strikes against the group. PHOTO: KHALED ABDULLAH/REUTERS

The strikes sent a message to the Houthis that they would “continue to bear further consequences if they do not end their illegal attacks,” U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said.

Tensions boiled over across the Middle East shortly after Israel invaded Gaza in the wake of Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks on Israel. Various Iranian-backed groups have targeted U.S. forces in the region and commercial ships transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, saying they wouldn’t stop until Israel ends the war in Gaza. In response, the U.S. has launched scores of strikes in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Despite the presence of advisers and fighters from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the targeted areas, the strikes so far haven’t killed any Iranian personnel.

TURKEY

Attacked U.S. bases as of Jan. 18

IRAN

Reported explosions

Mosul

SYRIA

Deir Ezzor City

A drone attack by an Iranian-backed militia killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan on Jan. 28.

Al-Baum

IRAQ

Al-Mayadeen

Al-Qaim

Akashat

Baghdad

100 miles

Note: Explosions on Feb. 2 , 4 p.m. ET. Attacks on U.S. bases as of Jan. 18 and since Oct. 18, 2023.

Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

Carl Churchill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“Unless [the strikes] continue, it is anything except deterrence. The last thing Biden wants is to be stuck in another quagmire in the Middle East,” said Saeid Golkar, an authority on Tehran’s security services at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. “Fighting with a more advanced technological enemy, the [Islamic Republic] uses a war of attrition, to frustrate the enemy, and when he steps back, fill out the power vacuum.”

The Iraqi government said 16 people were killed, including civilians, and 25 wounded in U.S. attacks on two towns in western Iraq near the border with Syria on Friday. Telegram channels close to Iran’s Guards published pictures of 10 Iraqi militiamen they said had died in the U.S. strikes.

Last week, Tehran warned the U.S. it would retaliate if its forces were hit—even outside Iran. “Should any party attack Iran’s territory or its interests and nationals beyond its borders, they will face a resolute and forceful response,” a spokesman for Iran’s delegation at the United Nations in New York told The Wall Street Journal.

Washington widely publicized its plans to attack Iranian allies in Syria and Iraq, giving Tehran ample opportunity to prepare and redeploy its personnel.

As long as U.S. strikes in Iraq and Syria avoid killing senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel, Tehran is unlikely to respond in kind. Even hard-line media outlets in Iran that are close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the security establishment have refrained from calling for retaliation against the American bombings.

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A U.S.-led coalition launched its third major series of strikes against Houthi rebel targets in Yemen on Saturday, one day after the U.S. attacked Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq. Photo: Stringer/Reuters

Some Revolutionary Guard commanders in eastern Syria’s countryside moved to safe houses in densely populated areas and to the south of the country where they could easily mix with Syrian and Russian military forces, said Syrian and U.S. government advisers.

In Yemen, about 50 advisers from Iran’s Guards and Lebanon’s Hezbollah left coastal areas where they had been assisting missile and drone attacks on ships to San’a, the Houthis’ de facto capital, according to people familiar with the redeployment.

Khamenei has said that an American attack on Iranian soil, which the U.S. has never conducted, would prompt a response. Short of that, American strikes on Iraq and Syria provide Iran a public-relations victory, said Foad Izadi, professor of American studies at the University of Tehran.

“If the U.S. is afraid of attacking Iran, then other countries will feel the same,” he said. U.S. strikes on Iraqi forces, some of which are part of Iraq’s security apparatus, also fray Washington’s relations with Baghdad, which is to Iran’s advantage.

“If you look at the propaganda value, Iran is winning. And who is responsible? The U.S. government is,” Izadi said. 

However, this careful dance around unspoken red lines is hazardous and carries with it a risk of miscalculation and mistakes that can tip a low-intensity conflict into something more destabilizing.

Israel’s bombardment of Gazan cities such as Rafah is motivating Iran-backed groups to keep attacking U.S. targets in the region, the groups say. PHOTO: MOHAMMED ABED/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Palestinians on Sunday collected the bodies of friends and relatives in Rafah. PHOTO: AHMAD HASABALLAH/GETTY IMAGES

The militia drone that killed three U.S. soldiers at a military outpost in Jordan appears to have hit the living quarters there only because American troops got confused as it approached them at the same time as one of their own drones returned to base, The Wall Street Journal has previously reported.

Following the attack, Iranian officials refrained from endorsing it, despite the death of American soldiers, and instead dispatched officials to Iraq to tell their militia allies that they had overstepped a line, the Journal also reported.

There are signs the U.S. strikes may lead only to a temporary slowdown in attacks from Iran-backed militias. Yemen’s Houthis and some of the pro-Tehran groups in Iraq have vowed to continue seeking out targets until Israel ends its war in Gaza.

While Iran can influence its allies by turning off funding and military assistance, it has only limited control over them, analysts say. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq operate within an overall framework dictated by Tehran but also follow their own agenda, and for years have pursued the eviction of American troops from the country as their top priority. The Houthis, meanwhile, see a confrontation with the U.S. as a way of legitimizing their claim to the rightful leadership of Yemen.

How these groups respond to the wave of U.S. strikes will likely determine whether the conflict can be contained.

Nancy Youssef, Saleh al-Batati, Suha Ma’ayeh and Costas Paris contributed to this article.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Sune Engel Rasmussen at sune.rasmussen@wsj.com

6. New Anti-Ukraine Disinfo Campaign Aims To Bog Down Western Media

Excerpts:

The same bots that took part in the "Doppleganger" campaign also shared anti-Ukrainian posts as part of the "Matryoshka" operation.

A December 2023 report by Insikt Group, the threat research division of US cybersecurity company Recorded Future, indicated that the "Doppleganger" campaign was still highly active on social media, using at least 800 bots dedicated to promoting fake news impersonating Ukrainian media.

According to German press last week, Germany has uncovered a vast "pro-Russian disinformation campaign" using thousands of fake X accounts to publish anti-Ukraine content alongside the visuals of German media.

"Ukraine continues to be the country most often targeted by information manipulation -- not by accident," European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said last week during a press conference about disinformation and foreign interference.

"We are engaging on a 'battle of narratives'," he added. "Security is no longer just a matter of weaponry... It is a matter of information.:

New Anti-Ukraine Disinfo Campaign Aims To Bog Down Western Media

By Théo MARIE-COURTOIS, Juliette MANSOUR

January 29, 2024

https://www.barrons.com/news/new-anti-ukraine-disinfo-campaign-aims-to-bog-down-western-media-00b57804?utm

This online disinformation campaign blamed on Russia involves not just the spreading of anti-Ukrainian fake news but also challenges Western media outlets to verify it

SEBASTIEN BOZON

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A message on X asked a major French channel to verify what seemed to be a Deutsche Welle report about a Ukrainian artist who "sawed down the Eiffel Tower."

"I see these kind of stories every day. Official media don't talk about them, what should I believe?" "Kathe" asked BFMTV on December 4.

But this was no innocent question, this was part of an online disinformation campaign blamed on Russia that involves not just the spreading of anti-Ukrainian false news, but also challenges Western media outlets to verify it.

It first appeared in September, and is a "vast enterprise of diversion" targeting journalists, experts say.

It is seemingly part of Russia's war on Ukraine, almost two years on since Moscow launched an invasion that has claimed tens of thousands of lives.

The "Antibot4Navalny" collective that tracks inauthentic Russian-language accounts on X, formerly Twitter, has christened this new disinformation campaign, operation "Matryoshka", after the Russian stacking dolls that are placed one inside another.

In the space of a few hours, "Kathe" had also contacted dozens of other major French media such as Paris Match, FranceInfo, Le Figaro and Le Parisien.

The X account then remained inactive for two weeks before publishing a picture of graffiti, purportedly from Los Angeles and depicting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky as a homeless person begging.

Subsequently, another X user asked various media to verify it.

The "Antibot4Navalny" collective trackers provided information that allowed AFP to identify scores of accounts that were also asking media to verify false stories.

The accounts AFP identified mostly appeared to have been dormant and then pirated.

These accounts posted frequently, sometimes as often as once per minute, in a tell-tale sign of false behaviour.

AFP analysis found that accounts requesting media to verify false news subsequently re-published them soon afterwards.

Posts that are part of this campaign always target Ukrainians and attempt to foster the idea that Europe and the United States are weary of Kyiv.

Examples include thefts from the Paris catacombs by a Ukrainian, military aid misappropriated by Ukraine, doctored or fake graffiti of Zelensky, false adverts on New York's Times Square.

Most of these images were first posted by Russian users, generally on the Telegram social media platform and news blogs, according to AFP research.

This campaign followed in the wake of another in recent months called "Doppelganger", which consisted of posting anti-Ukraine fake images that impersonated Western media.

French Intelligence services attributed that to Russia, experts told AFP.

David Chavalarias, director of the French scientific research centre CNRS, said this campaign is about "diversion for fact-checkers" in order to keep them "occupied on crude subjects (that are) difficult to verify".

This campaign can also give visibility to false information, said Chavalarias.

"The goal seems to be to capture the attention of fact-checkers in order to interfere with their work," said researcher Julien Nocetti, who specialises in cyber issues.

He added that the objective also seemed to be to generate more long-term effects on the narrative of the war by testing the ability of certain content to go viral.

The Russians are learning "and there is a type of agility in testing different methods," he added.

A French security source told AFP that Russia is "looking for visibility, they want us to talk about them, for better or for worse".

The same bots that took part in the "Doppleganger" campaign also shared anti-Ukrainian posts as part of the "Matryoshka" operation.

A December 2023 report by Insikt Group, the threat research division of US cybersecurity company Recorded Future, indicated that the "Doppleganger" campaign was still highly active on social media, using at least 800 bots dedicated to promoting fake news impersonating Ukrainian media.

According to German press last week, Germany has uncovered a vast "pro-Russian disinformation campaign" using thousands of fake X accounts to publish anti-Ukraine content alongside the visuals of German media.

"Ukraine continues to be the country most often targeted by information manipulation -- not by accident," European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said last week during a press conference about disinformation and foreign interference.

"We are engaging on a 'battle of narratives'," he added. "Security is no longer just a matter of weaponry... It is a matter of information.:

The Barron's news department was not involved in the creation of the content above. This article was produced by AFP. For more information go to AFP.com.

© Agence France-Presse

7. U.S., U.K. Launch Strikes Against Houthi Targets in Yemen to Protect Red Sea Shipping

U.S., U.K. Launch Strikes Against Houthi Targets in Yemen to Protect Red Sea Shipping

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

U.S. and British forces launched a series of proportionate strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in response to continuing attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Missile Launch

A Navy ship launches missiles in the Red Sea, Feb. 3, 2024.

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VIRIN: 240203-D-D0439-001

"These strikes are intended to further disrupt and degrade the capabilities of the Iranian-backed Houthi militia to conduct their reckless and destabilizing attacks against U.S. and international vessels lawfully transiting the Red Sea," Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement released by the Pentagon.

While U.S. and U.K. aircraft hit the targets, they were supported by an international coalition. Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and United States issued a joint statement announcing the strikes.

The international group struck 36 Houthi targets across 13 locations in Yemen in response to the Houthis' attacks against international and commercial shipping, as well as naval vessels transiting the Red Sea. "These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade and the lives of innocent mariners," the communique said.

The strikes targeted sites associated with the Houthis' deeply buried weapons storage facilities, missile systems and launchers, air defense systems and radars, officials said.

The Houthis have launched more than 30 attacks on commercial vessels and naval vessels since mid-November. These actions constitute an international challenge, and the coalition that is protecting the sea lines of communication through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden continues to grow.

"Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea, but let us reiterate our warning to Houthi leadership: We will not hesitate to continue to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats," the coalition members said in a statement.

F-18 Launch

An F-18 takes off from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower to strike Houthi targets in Yemen, Feb. 3, 2024.

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The Houthis continue to threaten vessels in the Red Sea. Officials at U.S. Central Command noted that aircraft conducted a strike in self-defense against a Houthi, anti-ship cruise missile that was prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.

"U.S. forces identified the cruise missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and determined it presented an imminent threat to U.S. Navy ships and merchant vessels in the region," the Centcom release said. "This action will protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy vessels and merchant vessels."

In addition, the destroyer USS Carney engaged and shot down one unmanned aerial vehicle over the Gulf of Aden on Friday, Centcom officials said. Later that day, U.S. Central Command forces struck four Houthi UAVs that were prepared to launch.

Later, the destroyer USS Laboon and F/A-18 Super Hornets from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group engaged and shot down seven UAVs over the Red Sea.

The Houthis receive equipment, training, intelligence and money from Iran.

All these strikes seek to degrade Houthi capabilities "used to continue their reckless and unlawful attacks on U.S. and U.K. ships, as well as international commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden," Centcom officials said.

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

8. Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea

Excerpts:

Yet most dismaying, though unsurprising, is the self-interested stance taken by China, which prioritises national interest over law and justice. Beijing has long played a double game in Myanmar, sometimes backing governments, sometimes siding with ethnic rebels. Its current, unambitious aims are to protect its huge belt and road initiative investments, curb cross-border crime and prevent any spillover of the fighting.

This approach is typical of President Xi Jinping, who often lectures the west about non-interference in other countries’ affairs. Yet China and its close ally, Russia – both big arms suppliers – have unmatched influence in Myanmar and do in fact regularly interfere there, for selfish commercial purposes. Such hypocritical behaviour plainly contradicts China’s responsibilities as the leading regional player and would-be global superpower.

A similar situation obtains in North Korea, another rogue state over which China exerts considerable influence. Beijing is the principal diplomatic and political ally of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, his main trade partner and biggest food supplier. Without China, his regime would probably implode.

Why then does Xi sit back and watch as Kim escalates his reckless campaign of nuclear weapons-related missile tests, the latest of which occurred last week? Western analysts suspect he enjoys the resulting discomfort of Japan and South Korea. The fact Kim’s antics distract US attention from Taiwan may be a factor, too.

But in the bigger, global picture China is setting a terrible example. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens all mankind. Kim’s threats to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles at the US mainland and bomb his neighbours are deeply destabilising and dangerous. And China itself is not immune. As a developing country that benefited immeasurably from the US-led global security order, China must now take its turn – and step up. With power comes responsibility.

Xi Jinping is playing deadly games with Myanmar and North Korea | Observer editorial

Instead of acting as a responsible superpower, China is putting millions of lives at risk in the region and beyond

The Guardian · by Observer editorial · February 4, 2024

Military coups and dictatorships rarely come to any good. But has any army takeover in recent times led to more utterly disastrous consequences than those suffered by the people of Myanmar since February 2021? For sheer, vicious stupidity and criminality, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief, and his bloodstained associates take some beating.

Yet a beating is what they are getting at the hands of Myanmar’s civilian resistance groups, known as people’s defence forces, and ethnic minority armed groups long opposed to discriminatory Buddhist-majority regimes. A big offensive begun in October has overrun swathes of the country, forcing the surrender and mass desertion of junta troops.

These setbacks have shaken the army’s confidence. Morale is reportedly low; there is open criticism of its leadership. But the generals are not giving up. Defying new western sanctions, they extended a state of emergency last week. Latest reports speak of an increase in indiscriminate air and artillery attacks on civilians, adding to a long list of documented war crimes.

The UN estimates that two thirds of Myanmar is experiencing conflict, with 2.6 million people internally displaced. Nearly 4,500 people have been killed. About 20,000 are imprisoned. One third of the population – about 18.6 million people – now requires humanitarian aid, a 19-fold increase since 2020. This is in addition to the 750,000 Rohingya Muslims who fled mass killings, rapes and village burnings in 2017 in what rights groups say was a genocide.

Myanmar’s unending agony represents a huge failure by the international community to uphold UN treaties and fundamental human rights. But while the US, Britain – the former colonial power – and other western democracies may be criticised for not doing enough, their leverage is limited. Shaming, too, is the inability (or refusal) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take effective action. Some member states actively connive with the regime.

Yet most dismaying, though unsurprising, is the self-interested stance taken by China, which prioritises national interest over law and justice. Beijing has long played a double game in Myanmar, sometimes backing governments, sometimes siding with ethnic rebels. Its current, unambitious aims are to protect its huge belt and road initiative investments, curb cross-border crime and prevent any spillover of the fighting.

This approach is typical of President Xi Jinping, who often lectures the west about non-interference in other countries’ affairs. Yet China and its close ally, Russia – both big arms suppliers – have unmatched influence in Myanmar and do in fact regularly interfere there, for selfish commercial purposes. Such hypocritical behaviour plainly contradicts China’s responsibilities as the leading regional player and would-be global superpower.

A similar situation obtains in North Korea, another rogue state over which China exerts considerable influence. Beijing is the principal diplomatic and political ally of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, his main trade partner and biggest food supplier. Without China, his regime would probably implode.

Why then does Xi sit back and watch as Kim escalates his reckless campaign of nuclear weapons-related missile tests, the latest of which occurred last week? Western analysts suspect he enjoys the resulting discomfort of Japan and South Korea. The fact Kim’s antics distract US attention from Taiwan may be a factor, too.

But in the bigger, global picture China is setting a terrible example. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens all mankind. Kim’s threats to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles at the US mainland and bomb his neighbours are deeply destabilising and dangerous. And China itself is not immune. As a developing country that benefited immeasurably from the US-led global security order, China must now take its turn – and step up. With power comes responsibility.

The Guardian · by Observer editorial · February 4, 2024

9. Ukraine's terrifying new drones dealing death from above for Russians

Graphics and photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12997173/Death-Ukraines-new-suicide-drones-start-terrifying-arms-race-British-military-chiefs-fear-create-weapon-mass-destruction.html

Excerpts:

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence told MailOnline: 'We currently have a number of highly effective systems, that are able to meet the threat posed by FPV drones.

'These include systems such as the High Velocity Missile System and the SMASH Smart Weapon Sight, which can track and lock on to drone targets

'We recognise the importance of the growing threat of FPV drones, and we are continually researching and developing new systems to counter the threats of the future.'

Meanwhile in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed to build a million drones this year as Kyiv sought to boost current production levels. 'We will do everything to make it so. I know that's how it will be,' Zelensky said.

Soon Ukrainians may be making kamikaze drones at home too, with digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov this month urging Ukrainians to do their bit for the suicide drone effort by creating their own for the military at home as part of a 'People's Drone' project.

Those joining the effort have been offered a free engineering course to teach themselves how to assemble a 7-inch FPV drone in their houses.

Despite their effect in Ukraine, Maj Gen Herbert said FPV drones were far from a major game-changer.

'Drones are not a game-changer or revolution in military affairs like the advent of gunpowder or the invention of the tank. But they're adding to the violence and psychological impact of war,' he added.

Ukraine's terrifying new drones dealing death from above for Russians

EXCLUSIVEDeath from above: Ukraine's new suicide drones are the start of a 'terrifying' arms race British military chiefs fear could create the next 'weapon of mass destruction'

• First-person view drones are the latest revolution on Ukraine's battlefield 
• The death bots are so accurate they can hit soldiers running for their lives 
• Military chiefs fear if AI is fitted into them it could create killer 'swarms' 

By TOM COTTERILL

PUBLISHED: 04:21 EST, 4 February 2024 | UPDATED: 09:30 EST, 4 February 2024

Daily Mail · by Tom Cotterill · February 4, 2024

On a scorched brown field pitted by blast craters, a lone Russian soldier cowers under the charred remains of his tank, sheltering from a terrifying new threat – one that already has him in its sights.

From the sky above comes the whining buzz that has become the nightmare of Putin's forces on the front line in Ukraine – that of a tiny suicide drone, no larger than a football but packed with enough explosives to level a house.

The noise sends the helpless soldier into a frenzied panic, as he desperately scrambles round his tank trying to escape, while the kamikaze death machine chases him in a deadly game of cat and mouse – one the Russian loses.

The aerial attacker hits Kremlin fighter with ruthless efficiency, detonating in a flash of orange flame and white smoke, leaving his bloodied body a lifeless wreck, smouldering on the muddy floor.

The brutal encounter - now common place at the front - was filmed by another UAV, with the kamikaze controlled from a bunker miles away by a Ukrainian soldier wearing special goggles that give him a first-person view (FPV) of the carnage.

In a hellish and war-torn Ukraine, a Russian soldier is spotted by a suicide down cowering under the main gun of a destroyed tank

From miles away, a Ukrainian operator wearing specialised goggles that give him a first-person view (FPV), chases the terrified Russian with the drone - which is packed with explosives

Unable to escape, the helpless Russian is hit by the drone, which explodes in a flash of orange

The Ukrainian troops have increasingly been using these 'FPV' drones to strike everything from tanks and personnel carriers, to trenches an lone troops

It's the ugly new dawn in the savage attritional plod of Ukraine's war, which sees FPV drones swarming the battlefield, pulverising troops on both sides, in a tactic that was almost unheard of a year ago. Now, hundreds of suicide drone missions are flown along the front every day.

The latest killing was carried out by Ukrainians from the 'Wild Division' of the 2nd Air Assault Brigade, which has become so lethal operators can fly FPVs into bunkers, through windows and can even hit lone Russians, who they disparagingly call 'Orcs'.

Grisly footage on social media shows the suicide bots slamming into packed troop transports, blowing them – and the soldiers within – to smithereens, flinging limbs across the battlefield. Others see drones dealing death from above, ambushing troops as they evacuate injured comrades on stretchers.

'Orc demonstrates great [football] skill... headbutts FPV drone,' gloats one account callously in a graphic clip on X (formerly Twitter) showing a Russian blown apart by a drone as it detonates on his face.

Both a dark omen to the future robotic warfare and an ingenious invention for the needs of the moment, the rise of the FPV kamikaze drone is reshaping the costs, speed and lethality of war in Ukraine.

It's allowed drone pilots from both sides to hunt and kill with a scale, accuracy and terrifying efficiency unseen since the start of Russia's invasion in February 2022.

And their effectiveness has left British military chiefs worried.

'This little thing we see on the battlefield in Ukraine is in the foothill of where this technology can go, which is a very worrying place... it could become a new weapon of mass destruction,' warned General Sir Richard Barrons, who once led the UK's Joint Forces Command.

Ukrainian soldiers have struck terror into the hearts of Russian troops, with their suicide drones which are strapped with explosives

A group of Russian troops were reportedly spotted by a Ukrainian drone team while they were resting by one of their vehicles. Using thermal imaging, the drone swoops in and drops a grenade into the group, with detonates with lethal effect

In another video, a group of three soldiers were seen scurrying between wrecked buildings

The first-person view of a suicide drone captures the final moments before it detonates next to them all

While in this footage, a drone is seen chasing a lone soldier in the icy war-torn wastes of eastern Ukraine

While Major General Charlie Herbert, a former British commander in Helmand, warned 'nowhere is safe on the battlefield'.

'How different might our campaign in Afghanistan have looked if the Taliban had had drones? They would have wrought havoc on us in our forward operating bases. We're lucky that they didn't,' the retired defence chief added.

'I have been under shell fire, rocket fire and mortar fire in my military career – they're all frightening and relatively indiscriminate. But when you have drones buzzing above your head it's more personal. You know you're going to be hunted down by one of these things. This adds an extra level to the psychological torture.

'It's completely terrifying. Warfare is always an incubator for technology not just military technology. Ukraine is proving an incubator for drone warfare technology. It's happening fast.

'This is really frightening where this goes.'

As the war continues to drag its heels, draining ammunition, equipment and manpower, both sides have started to turn to using the FPVs to hold it each other bay while they rearm.

Typically, the drones - which are about £300 a piece - will be used to target high-value assets like tanks and artillery system, worth millions of pounds each. But increasingly, they are being used to hound individual soldiers on the front.

Ukraine has been at the forefront of adopting the technology - with troops waging psychological warfare online, sharing graphic clips of the final moments of a suicide drone as they chase down motorbikes and quads; diving into a party of stretcher bearers; attacking soldiers smoking in trenches or hunting isolated troops as they run for their lives.

A Ukrainian operator straps an explosive warhead to a drone inside a bunker on the front line

Major General Charlie Herbert, the former Commander of British Forces in Helmand, warned 'nowhere is safe on the battlefield'

'We are all human beings, but for me, enemy soldiers are not just a legitimate target and professional target: they are targets that excite me,' a drone pilot from Ukraine's 54th Brigade told the Times. 'Destroying them does not involve moral doubt, it gives me moral satisfaction.'

Although Kyiv was the first to seize the initiative in using the cheap drones, military analysts say Russia now has the upper hand, having reportedly stocked up on large numbers of the flying bots and packing them with sophisticated kit.

The effectiveness of the attack robots has left industry scrambling for ideas on how to counter them. Everything from electronic jammers and disruption guns, to rifles that fire nets have been trialed by various militaries.

In America, Utah-based Fortem Technologies, an airspace security and defence firm, has gone a step further and developed a net-slinging drone interceptor called the DroneHunter F700, which is fully autonomous, radar-guided and powered by artificial intelligence.

But such systems are still few and far between on the battlefield.

And now there are fresh fears that an arms races to overwhelm these developing defences could see the introduction of drone swarms powered by artificial intelligence, which could act without the use of a human operator.

Potentially equipped with facial recognition software, the drones could act loiter above battlefield and kill independently. Tradition electronic warfare defences, which would disrupt communication between drones and human operators, rending them useless, would be ineffective in this case.

General Sir Richard now fears the development is only the start of a terrifying long road which he says could see drones becoming the new weapon of mass destruction - one that could easily be used by terrorists in the future.

British soldiers are already testing out their own drones. Pictured is a drone pilot from Army's Experimentation and Trials Group during an exercise in Swindon

The Army has also taken their drones overseas. Pictured is a recce soldier from 1 Royal Welsh during an exercise in Germany

And other soldiers have tested new anti-drone guns like this NightFighter which uses technology to target and disrupt unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rending them useless

'As the counter measures become more common and cheaper people will look to see how they overwhelm countermeasures by mass. You do this in drones by swarming. This isn't about sending ones and twos up. It's about sending hundreds,' he told MailOnline.

'Apply that to the battlefield where you deliver a huge swarm which are fitted with facial recognition technology and artificial intelligence and you're beginning to get to a place where you're building fleets of drones, connected to data, that allows them to seek out and defeat a target.

'That can then create a decisive technology which can kill hundreds or people. This could then create a new era of weapons of mass destruction - creating lethal, autonomous weapons systems that can kill humans in an unstoppable way.

'This little thing we see on the battlefield in Ukraine is in the foothill of where this technology can go, which is a very worrying place... it could become a new weapon of mass destruction.'

'Doing this is not science fiction – you can do it now,' he added.

The British Army is already experimenting with drone tech. In the past few years soldiers have been testing everything from tiny reconnaissance drones that can fit in the palm of a soldier's hand, to larger devices capable of shuttling ammunition of flying out wounded soldiers.

In September, the Army unveiled its latest prototype, a jet-powered drone armed with laser-guided Brimstone missiles.

Called the Hydra 400, British military chiefs say the heavy-lift piece of kit could fit in the back of a truck and would be ready to fly in just six minutes, packing enough punch to knock-out the best tanks in the world.

In September, the Army unveiled its latest prototype, the Hydra 400 - a jet-powered drone armed with laser-guided Brimstone missiles

The British military has ramped up its own research into drones following their widespread and effective use in Ukraine

Picture is the tablet screen showing the view from one of the British Army's test drones

The development is part of the Army's Warfighting Experiment, which has been running out of Portsmouth Naval Base, in Hampshire.

Among Britain's arsenal that can take down drones includes the high velocity missile system which uses state-of-the-art lightweight multi-role missile. Specialist gunners from the Royal Artillery and Royal Marines are among those trained to use the kit.

The Ministry of Defence is also rolling out the 'SMASH Smart Weapon Sight Fire Control System', a cutting-edge weapon sight, that gives soldiers assistance in wear to shoot to take down an aerial drone.

The 'SMASH' sight can recognise a target, track its movements, and maintain a lock on the target giving soldiers the ability to achieve a high probability of a hit against mini-UAVs.

In January, Britain unveiled it's new 'Dragon Fire' laser system, which can destroy everything from drones to hypersonic missiles.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence told MailOnline: 'We currently have a number of highly effective systems, that are able to meet the threat posed by FPV drones.

'These include systems such as the High Velocity Missile System and the SMASH Smart Weapon Sight, which can track and lock on to drone targets

'We recognise the importance of the growing threat of FPV drones, and we are continually researching and developing new systems to counter the threats of the future.'

Meanwhile in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed to build a million drones this year as Kyiv sought to boost current production levels. 'We will do everything to make it so. I know that's how it will be,' Zelensky said.

Soon Ukrainians may be making kamikaze drones at home too, with digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov this month urging Ukrainians to do their bit for the suicide drone effort by creating their own for the military at home as part of a 'People's Drone' project.

Those joining the effort have been offered a free engineering course to teach themselves how to assemble a 7-inch FPV drone in their houses.

Despite their effect in Ukraine, Maj Gen Herbert said FPV drones were far from a major game-changer.

'Drones are not a game-changer or revolution in military affairs like the advent of gunpowder or the invention of the tank. But they're adding to the violence and psychological impact of war,' he added.

Daily Mail · by Tom Cotterill · February 4, 2024

10. The U.S. economy is booming. So why are tech companies laying off workers?

The U.S. economy is booming. So why are tech companies laying off workers?

Google, Amazon, Microsoft and a raft of others fired thousands of workers in January, continuing a layoff wave that began in 2022.

By Gerrit De Vynck, Danielle Abril and Caroline O'Donovan

February 3, 2024 at 8:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Gerrit De Vynck · February 3, 2024

SAN FRANCISCO — The first time Julian Chavez got laid off from his job as a digital ad sales rep at web.com didn’t turn him off from the tech industry. Neither did the second time when he was laid off from ZipRecruiter. By the third time, though, Chavez had had enough.

“I really loved what I did,” said Phoenix-based Chavez in a text message. “But the layoffs got me jaded.” Now he’s pursuing a graduate degree in psychology.

Chavez is one of hundreds of thousands of tech workers who’ve been laid off in the past two years in what now seems like a never-ending wave of cuts that has upended the culture of Silicon Valley and the expectations of those who work at some of America’s richest and most powerful companies.

Last year, tech companies laid off more than 260,000 workers according to layoff tracker Layoffs.fyi, cuts that executives mostly blamed on “over-hiring” during the pandemic and high interest rates making it harder to invest in new business ventures. But as those layoffs have dragged into 2024 despite stabilizing interest rates and a booming job market in other industries, the tech workforce is feeling despondent and confused.

The U.S. economy added 353,000 jobs in January, a huge boost that was around twice what economists had expected. And yet, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Discord, Salesforce and eBay all made significant cuts in January, and the layoffs don’t seem to be abating. On Tuesday, PayPal said in a letter to workers it would cut another 2,500 employees or about 9 percent of its workforce.

The continued cuts come as companies are under pressure from investors to improve their bottom lines. Wall Street’s sell-off of tech stocks in 2022 pushed companies to win back investors by focusing on increasing profits, and firing some of the tens of thousands of workers hired to meet the pandemic boom in consumer tech spending. With many tech companies laying off workers, cutting employees no longer signaled weakness. Now, executives are looking for more places where they can squeeze more work out of fewer people.

“We’re going to continue to be careful on what we invest in, and we’re going to continue to invest in new things and new areas and things that resonate with customers. And where we can find efficiencies and do more with less, we’re going to do that as well,” Amazon Chief Financial Officer Brian Olsavsky said in response to a reporter’s question during a Thursday media earnings call.

“That is the way the American capitalist system works,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics. “It’s ruthless when it gets down to striving for profitability and creating wealth. It redirects resources very rapidly from one place to another.”

Economic concerns and inflation in 2022 and 2023 also cut into the amount of software and cloud services that businesses were buying, said Gil Luria, a tech analyst with D.A. Davidson Co.

“That rippled through the entire software ecosystem, and looking into 2024, it seems like the most recent data points are things are no longer getting worse but they’re not getting better yet,” Luria said. “Their customers haven’t loosened the purse strings.”

Unable to get back to the showstopping revenue growth of years past, tech executives are opting instead to put a positive spin on things for Wall Street by continuously cutting high-paid workers instead.

It seems to be working. In 2022, the Nasdaq Composite, a stock index dominated by tech companies, lost a full third of its value. In 2023, it grew by 43 percent. It rose another 3 percent in January.

Shine has come off the tech industry

As stocks have risen, spirits in the San Francisco Bay Area — the heart of the U.S. tech industry — have only fallen further. The power that tech workers felt they commanded to switch jobs and win higher salaries and meatier stock awards has partly evaporated.

For many tech workers, the shine has come off an industry that they had given their lives to in return for steady employment, flashy perks and the chance for lucrative stock options. Google and Meta in recent years have cut down on employee perks like free laundry, free massages, and food and fitness offerings. “Seems like tech has changed forever since mass layoffs,” an anonymous worker posted to the workplace gossip app Blind this week.

“It’s very new to feel job insecurity,” said Julia Grummel, a former senior product designer for a Bay Area software company. Since being laid off in February 2023, Grummel says she has received rejections from automated systems, been ghosted by employers after several rounds of interviews and gotten rejections without any feedback. And she’s facing competition from huge numbers of other laid-off workers like herself.

She has gotten interest from some companies that have already cut employees, but she’s wary of them, Grummel said. “I am not really interested in joining an organization that has demonstrated that they don’t value the people who are keeping the business running.”

Like Chavez, she says she’s beginning to think of looking for other kinds of work, focusing less on pay and more on jobs that may provide better work-life balance and more meaning and fulfillment, she said.

Even workers with years of experience or deep technical expertise are having trouble getting hired again.

Parker Lopez, a machine learning engineer and data scientist in Seattle, was laid off from his job at a health tech start-up in May 2023. The last time he was on the job market several years ago it only took him three months to find work. But this time he’s applied for more than 1,000 roles without any success.

“It feels very futile,” he said.

Even with several years of experience in software engineering, data science and manufacturing, including at Microsoft, laid-off Amazon contractor Jennifer Pearl said landing an interview has been tough. Pearl said previously they were able to land a job in a matter of days.

“I am worried,” they said. “I’ve been doing this stuff for 20 years … and right now I’m lucky to get a call back. ”

Some of the more recent layoffs are targeting middle-managers who ran the teams that were hit in previous waves of cuts. Some of them are trying to return to jobs where they write code rather than direct the work of others, calculating that those roles might be safer. Workers who tried to hop from company to company every three or four years to maximize the amount of stock options they could amass are now staying put.

Tech workers have also been exposed to a year of nonstop discussion of the artificial intelligence boom and its potential impact on the workforce. Many programmers use AI tools to help them write code faster, and executives and tech pundits frequently talk about how much more efficient workers will become in the near future.

Starry-eyed AI executives argue that as workers become more productive, companies will make more money, resulting in more growth and more jobs.

But tech workers themselves aren’t so sure. Neither are economists.

“The tech sector may be able to produce a lot and innovate a lot without as many people going forward,” Zandi, the Moody’s economist, said. “That is a lesson of AI.”

Once glitzy, high-paying and highly coveted, tech jobs have become less secure and less attractive to many in recent years. As a result, workers are more willing to take a lower-paying job, make a lateral move, or seek out alternative job opportunities.

For a former Meta user experience researcher in the Bay Area, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid hurting her future employment prospects, the job hunt has been tough since her layoff last April. Originally employed in academia, she joined the industry to expand her knowledge and ensure job security, good benefits and higher pay.

“It was the perception of stability,” she said about joining the tech industry. “Yet here we are.”

The Washington Post · by Gerrit De Vynck · February 3, 2024

11. US plans 'Goldilocks' retaliation that will kill Iranians, but not in Iran

US plans 'Goldilocks' retaliation that will kill Iranians, but not in Iran

US networks report plan for sustained campaign against Iranian oversea assets, citing White House officials 

inews.co.uk · by Kieron Monks · February 1, 2024

The US will seek a “Goldilocks” retaliation against Iran by striking its assets abroad in a campaign calibrated to restore deterrence while mitigating escalation risks, according to military sources and current and former officials.

Washington has approved plans for “multi-day strikes in Iraq and Syria against multiple targets, including Iranian personnel and facilities”, US network CBS news reported on Thursday, citing official sources.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, at his first public appearance since a lengthy hospitalisation, said on Thursday the response would be “multi-tiered”. “We have the ability to respond a number of times,” he added.

The White House also briefed that the drone that killed three US soldiers at the Tower 22 base in Jordan on Saturday, claimed by a coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militias, was manufactured in Iran.

President Joe Biden said earlier this week that a decision had been made how to respond to the attack. Adminstration officials have repeatedly stated that they are seeking to avoid a wider war, and the US has previously retaliated to Iran-allied militia attacks by targeting only the groups directly responsible.

But the President is under pressure to respond strongly to the first American combat deaths since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, with House and Senate Republicans demanding a direct attack on Iran. Iranian officials have warned that an attack inside its borders would draw a “decisive” retaliation.

The Biden Administration now appears most likely to thread the needle between a high-risk strike in Iran and a limited attack on allied militias by targeting Iran through its many assets across the Middle East.

US Army Reserve Sgt. William Jerome Rivers, Spc. Breonna Alexsondria Moffett, and Spc. Kennedy Ladon Sanders, who were killed in a drone attack on an outpost in northeast Jordan on 27 January (Photo: Reuters)

Dr Colin Clarke, a security analyst and director of research at The Soufan Group consultancy, said a “Goldilocks” option – one that is neither too hard nor too soft – was most realistic for the Biden Administration, which is facing fierce domestic pressure from the left over its support for Israel’s campaign in Gaza, and from the right for being perceived to have failed to deter Iran.

“What we are likely to see is targeting of Iran-backed militia infrastructure in Iraq and Syria, which could also end up with some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel being killed,” he told i. “There could be an offensive cyber operation launched against Iran’s defence industrial base too.

“In order to avoid escalating too far, I think the Biden Administration will avoid targeting Iran directly, at least from a kinetic standpoint.”

Dr Clarke added that the response could take the form of a campaign rather than one-off attacks.

Former Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, a military analyst at hawkish think-tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said strikes inside Iran were unlikely but called for attacks across the region.

“The campaign we will see… should at a minimum include sustained strikes on every Iranian proxy target we can locate in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, [and] include missiles and drone launch equipment, ammunition dumps, logistics sites and radars,” he wrote. “It must also include sustained strikes on hundreds of IRGC forces in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”

A former British Foreign office official based in the Middle East said that attacks on Iranian bases abroad are likely but the US could also strike through assassinations, as Trump did with General Qassem Solemani in 2020.

“My suspicion is that a low level tit-for-tat era awaits… and the rules of the game change to targeted killings,” the ex-official said. “The US won’t want to drain resources with a direct war with Iran. The only option would be a covert campaign of messaging and killing.”

The flag of the Kataib Hezbollah militia, which says it has suspended operations against US bases in Iraq (Photo: Reuters)

Iran has reportedly begun to withdraw assets from Syria that could have become targets, with Iranian sources citing Israeli attacks and assassinations. But Tehran has no intention of abandoning Syria, sources said, having built power in the war-torn nation in alliance with President Bashar al-Assad.

Khataib Hezbollah, a leading member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq coalition that claimed the Tower 22 attack, said on Tuesday that it had suspended attacks on US bases.

Thursday’s developments followed another round of US air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen overnight. US Central Command said that 10 drones were struck as they were preparing to launch, without disclosing the locations.

The UK was not involved despite previously taking part in air strikes against the militant group.

The Houthis have carried out dozens of attacks on shipping since the outbreak of war in Gaza that have caused losses of billions of pounds in insurance costs. Houthi leaders say they are acting in solidarity with Palestinians and the attacks on shipping will continue.

The group claimed to have struck a US merchant ship in the Red Sea on Thursday, although maritime security agencies said that the claim had not been verified.

inews.co.uk · by Kieron Monks · February 1, 2024

12.  Is Washington Writing the Script for the Next Forever War?

Is Washington Writing the Script for the Next Forever War?

New Republic · by Grace Segers · February 2, 2024

Grace Segers/

February 2, 2024/10:59 a.m. ET

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The Biden administration's open-ended escalations in the Middle East are starting to feel like the sequel to a bad movie.

Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

Sen. Tim Kaine speaks to reporters during a vote in the Senate Chambers of the U.S. Capitol Building on January 25, 2024 in Washington, DC.

INT. U.S. CAPITOL—OUTSIDE THE SENATE CHAMBER ON JANUARY 30, 2024

It’s been a few days since three U.S. service members were killed in a drone strike by an Iran-backed militia in Jordan. President JOE BIDEN has said that the U.S. “shall respond” but has not given details about what that response will be. Given the various ongoing conflicts in the Middle East—including Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza, and recent U.S. airstrikes against Houthis in response to their disrupting traffic in the Red Sea—reporter GRACE SEGERS wonders whether lawmakers are concerned that the U.S. might become embroiled in yet another “forever war” in the Middle East. She questions senators across the ideological spectrum about this possibility.

Enter Senator TIM KAINE, a Democrat from Virginia who has co-sponsored legislation to repeal the 1991 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force in Iraq.

KAINE: We shouldn’t be in another war in the Middle East, but particularly without a congressional debate and vote. So self-defense is one thing, but escalating regional conflict with the U.S. involved and our troops at risk is something that should not happen without a congressional debate and vote.

Camera pans to the Senate basement. Grace asks Senator MIKE ROUNDS, a Republican from South Dakota, if he’s worried about the U.S. getting entangled in a larger conflict in the United States.

ROUNDS: Sure, everybody should be. If we continue down this policy of not dealing with the problem children in the Middle East, yes. It started with a very, very poor policy with regard to Afghanistan, and now it’s continued on … where if you don’t deal with these individuals that are causing the problem up front, then they just continue to test the waters.

GRACE: Isn’t there the threat that if you go down that route of responding, that then it could end up in a tit-for-tat?

ROUNDS: We know what happens when you’re in a tit-for-tat, which is what we’re in right now. Where all we do is, just kind of push them a little bit, and then they go, “Oh, that wasn’t so bad.” So then they push back, and now they’re killing Americans. Bottom line is, they have to fear us, and they have to respect our military.

Back outside of the Senate chamber, we turn to Senator JOSH HAWLEY, a Republican from Missouri who has been skeptical of U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts.

HAWLEY: We’ve got to find a way to isolate Iran, to cut off any kind of support from the international community, to return to something like we had in the previous administration, where they really were truly isolated. Their revenues were way down. I mean, that’s got to be our goal while we continue our pivot toward the Pacific, where our biggest enemy is in China, where our biggest national security threats are.

GRACE: I think everyone wants to avoid another type of “forever war,” but do you feel as if there are steps that could be taken where the U.S. could go in that direction again?

HAWLEY: I’m leery of anything that would get us more involved in the Mideast in terms of central command—the central command area of authority—in terms of more manpower, more hardware. We have finite resources, and we have threats all over the world, but we have to prioritize.… Do I want to do nothing with Iran? No, I think we need to retaliate. We certainly need to isolate them. But I think we want to be careful that we don’t find ourselves embroiled, we don’t take actions that can embroil us in a major military conflict.

INT. U.S. CAPITOL—IN THE SENATE BASEMENT ON JANUARY 31, 2024 Enter Senator CHRIS COONS, Democrat from Delaware, a close ally of Biden.

GRACE: I’m wondering if you’re concerned at all—

COONS: “Wondering if you’re concerned.” Oh, my. That’s quite a way to frame it.

GRACE: Sure.

COONS: Let’s try again.

GRACE: How do you feel about the possibility that what’s happening in the Middle East could escalate into another type of “Forever War” that the U.S. could be embroiled in?

COONS: (Laughs, shakes head) Well, that’s about as negative a way as you could possibly characterize it. “Are you concerned about another Forever War?” I mean the answer to any formulation like that is going to be, “Of course I’m concerned.” Let’s put it differently: How confident am I that President Biden is clear eyed about the risks in the Middle East and is taking measured, responsible steps to both deter aggression and defend our troops and yet avoid a regional conflagration? Highly confident.

One of the great things about having a president with 50 years of experience in foreign policy is, he’s very, very aware of the difficulties, the tension, the competition in the region; the differences between the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas; the different militias in Syria and Iraq; and the overarching role that Iran is playing. But I’m confident that he is carefully balancing how to deter Iran, how to strike back in a way that shows a firmness and determination to protect American troops, with an eye towards avoiding broadening the conflict.

Camera pans to GRACE, who looks directly into the lens as she offers the following analysis.

GRACE: It’s still unclear to what extent the U.S. will become further engaged in conflicts in the Middle East in the coming weeks. While senators agree that Iranian-backed aggression should not go unheeded, the correct path for de-escalation is uncertain. While the prospects of another “forever war”—à la Afghanistan or Vietnam—are unappealing, time will tell whether the current conflict will evolve into a full-blown sequel.

13. More than a Century of Antisemitism: How Successive Occupants of the Kremlin Have Used Antisemitism

The 31 page report form the Global Engagement Center (GEC) from State can be downloaded here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GEC-Special-Report-More-than-a-Century-of-Antisemitism.pdf

More than a Century of Antisemitism: How Successive Occupants of the Kremlin Have Used Antisemitism - United States Department of State

state.gov

This report is also available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu.

Executive Summary

For over a century, Tsarist, Soviet and now Russian Federation authorities have used antisemitism to discredit, divide, and weaken their perceived adversaries at home and abroad. Today, Kremlin officials and Russia’s state-run or state-controlled media spread conspiracy theories, fueling antisemitism intended to deceive the world about its war against Ukraine. These tactics build on a long tradition of exploiting antisemitism to create division and discontent.

In this two-part report, the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) documents how successive occupants of the Kremlin have exploited antisemitism for disinformation and propaganda purposes. Part One details the contemporary Kremlin’s use of antisemitic disinformation in the context of its war against Ukraine and describes how Russia’s leaders and propagandists spread anti-Jewish conspiracy theories to shift blame and distort world events. Part Two provides a historical overview of how Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union used this insidious technique to further their ends.

In an attempt to defend its unjustifiable neo-imperial war against Ukraine to the international community and domestic audiences, today’s Russia often deploys antisemitism as its rhetoric of choice. The Kremlin falsely portrays Ukraine and its supporters as Nazis, antisemites and “Russophobes,” demonizes Ukraine’s Jewish president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, accuses Jews of being the worst Nazis, and manipulates the history of the Holocaust for political purposes. The Kremlin’s propagandists weaponize antisemitism, attempting to silence Jews in Russia who oppose the war. According to new U.S. government information, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has provided funding and direct tasking to push content online which has often been featured alongside antisemitic content. Even as it spreads disinformation about Russia fighting alleged Ukrainian and Western Nazis, the Kremlin cynically deploys openly antisemitic, neo-Nazi groups, such as Task Force Rusich, to wage its war against Ukraine.

The Kremlin also spreads antisemitic conspiracy theories, playing on centuries-old prejudices to mislead audiences about the world’s alleged hostile intentions towards Russia and to make Jewish people scapegoats for these attacks. This report details three examples of these lines of effort. First, Russia’s leaders consistently refer to the so-called “Golden Billion” conspiracy theory that stems from antisemitic tropes about alleged Jewish world control and evil intentions. Second, Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem targets prominent Jewish figures to portray as puppeteers behind secret cabals that seek to dominate the world’s politics and the economy. Third, Russia’s security services and prominent religious figures attempt to resurrect the ancient antisemitic “blood libel” conspiracy, accusing Jews of ritualistic murders.

Russian authorities’ exploitation of antisemitism as a tactic to spread disinformation and propaganda dates back over 100 years. One of the earliest examples of this malign influence activity was the Russian Empire’s Tsarist Security Service’s fabrication of the now infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the early 1900s. In the 1920s, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin used antisemitism to consolidate his power. In the late 1930s, he launched efforts to systematically eliminate Jewish influence in all spheres of Soviet society, cementing antisemitism as an official state policy. Until Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet security apparatus continued to deploy antisemitic disinformation campaigns—such as the witch hunt against “rootless cosmopolitans,” the targeting of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, and the notorious “Doctors’ Plot”— to portray Soviet Jews as traitors and Western spies. During the 1960s-1980s, the Committee for State Security (KGB) implemented several antisemitic active measures, a Soviet term for covert influence operations, to discredit its perceived adversaries — the Catholic Church, West Germany, the United States — as antisemitic. The KGB also targeted the Zionist movement and Soviet Jewish dissidents.

President Putin and the Kremlin use their disinformation and propaganda apparatus to exploit centuries-old anti-Jewish prejudice to serve their perceived state interests. The Tsarist and Soviet-era, and now the current, occupants of the Kremlin, have worked to discredit, divide, and weaken their perceived adversaries, falsely accusing them of Nazism, attempting to sow discord in their societies, and spreading anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. In the process, the Kremlin feeds the flames of antisemitism, which is rising globally. This report intends to expose the Kremlin’s dangerous antisemitic disinformation to the public in hope of minimizing the harmful impact of Russia’s information manipulation.

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state.gov

​14. What’s the difference between Army Rangers and Green Berets?

Sign.... Yes, Special Forces was established during the Korean War (10th SFG in 1952) but its legacy did not begin with the Korean . We really trace our modern legacy to the OSS in World War II. No Special Forces unit (1st through 10th SFGs) fought in the Korean War though some Special Forces soldiers did deploy and fight in Korea, some with many of the various partisan units (UN Partisan Infantry in Korea and the 8240th and others).

You might want to watch this ARSOF history video to learn about the Rangers and Special Forces (and Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations and Special Operations Aviation): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHQtj7B9UwY&t=12s

See the articles on Special Forces history here: https://arsof-history.org/history.html#check-sf

See the articles on Rangers here: https://arsof-history.org/history.html#check-sf

What’s the difference between Army Rangers and Green Berets?

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · February 2, 2024

The U.S. Army Special Forces, or Green Berets, and their tan beret-wearing brothers — Army Rangers — have proven their grit on the battlefield over decades of war. But their roles have been skewed so much during the War on Terror that many have a hard time understanding how they are different and what they have in common.

Today’s Rangers and Green Berets have a diverse portfolio of capabilities and the missions they take on can be similar in many ways, but with very different strategic outcomes in mind.

Joe Kent and Travis Denman served long careers in America’s special operations, spending time in both the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Forces. They both started as Rangers pre-9/11, but their careers in Special Forces that followed gave them a good look at how the two units are different and how much they’ve changed over time.

Modern Rangers trace their history back to World War II and Special Forces to the Korean War, though both claim lineage that goes back much further. The Rangers’ initial purpose was a direct action infantry role. Special Forces began with the mission of combating the North Korean covert guerilla attacks behind the front lines, often using similar tactics to defeat them.

Still today, each unit’s primary mission remains the same, though updates have been implemented.

“I think the mission of the Ranger Battalions is fairly simple. You’re the country’s premier light infantry,” Kent said. “No one does raids better than the Ranger Regiment, especially on the scale that they do them.”

Green Berets can carry out direct action raids but under much different scenarios.

Kent explained that a Green Beret must “immediately transition from a raid mindset, or even simultaneously, have cultural awareness and speak a foreign language, be deeply immersed in the cultures and traditions of whatever country you’re working with.”

Pre-9/11 vs Post 9/11

Kent and Denman agreed that Rangers and Special Forces were more distinguishable before 9/11. Denman was a Ranger fire team leader in 1995 when the U.S. planned to invade Haiti.

“I’m on the plane. I’m rigged up. I’m ready to jump into combat like my old man did in Grenada,” Denman said. “I got my dad’s fucking K-bar on my LCE, bro. I’m ready to get down, you know? And then the bird turned around and parked.”

The mission was scratched, leaving the Rangers disappointed. As they were breaking down gear to head back to their compound, they saw other — different — soldiers loading the plane.

“Who the fuck are those guys? Oh, that’s a bunch of 3rd Group dudes, and they’re going to Haiti,” Denman said. “Like, how are they going to go there when we didn’t even take the country? I don’t know. That’s SF dudes.”

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Like many Rangers of the era, Denman sought a career in Special Forces, thinking that was how he would get into the fight. But after 9/11, everything changed. Both Rangers and Green Berets deployed nearly non-stop throughout the War on Terror. With a focus on hunting high-value targets and direction raids, at times the only difference between a Ranger mission and a Special Forces mission was whether the guys had a beard or not.

Rangers were given additional responsibility and saw their standing in the world of special operations elevated, so “going SF” became less appealing — though it was not unheard of. Many Green Berets still worked by, through, and with partner forces to accomplish raids and build special operations units from the ground up in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both units were very busy.

Ranger and Green Beret missions

Comparing the two isn’t about who’s better or worse but how they are different.

“I think people look at a commando, whether he’s a tier one guy or an SF guy or a Ranger, and they think they’re the same,” Denman said. “But they have different jobs. They just don’t do the same things. So they’re not the same people.”

“If I pick the Super Bowl champions to play in the World Cup of Soccer, they would fucking lose. It’s not to say that the Cowboys are better or worse than Real Madrid. They’re just different,” Denman said. “It has nothing to do with what unit is better or worse.”

Kent said the structure of the Ranger Regiment and Special Forces was very different during his time at both. New Rangers were typically younger and lower ranking, where fire team leaders control your everyday tasks, and their squad leader tells them what to do, and so on. But when he arrived at Special Forces, it was a different atmosphere.

“Most of my team had been NCOs in the infantry before they came to SF,” Kent said. “They said this isn’t Ranger Regiment, like no one will tell you what you need to do every hour of the day. If you mess up, we’re just going to put your shit in the hallway.”

The Rangers have a rigid hierarchy, from the senior private on the fire team to the Command Sgt. Major of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Young Rangers are molded into leaders from day one and are tasked with leadership duties early on.

Kent said you have to be in Special Forces for a while before leading other Green Berets, whereas while deployed, a Green Beret will lead entire sections of partner nation militaries. The Special Forces atmosphere is a more mature, self-managing environment within the 12-man operational detachments they typically work in.

The culture in Special Forces is different from Rangers

It’s as simple as Rangers are typically young bachelors and live a barracks life while almost all Green Berets live off base and have families. Kent and Denman recalled the hardcore pace of training all day in the Ranger Regiment and then going hard with booze and shenanigans after work.

“I think Ranger battalions are like an armed frat because most guys still live in the barracks,” Denman said. “When you’re a private, you practically live in the squad room or whatever. So, you get off work, or you’re cleaning guns, and you grab a beer. The camaraderie and the party culture — really it’s Viking culture — at the forefront.”

Denman said some of the young, single Green Berets might go and party it up, but most NCOs would head home to be with their wife and kids when they weren’t working. A beer in the team room before heading home for the night was a tradition in Special Forces, but team gatherings outside work were often family-friendly barbecues.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · February 2, 2024

15. The relentless focus on White Christian nationalism is spreading a racist myth

A sensitive topic. But this is an interesting perspective in these excerpts:

Excerpts:

The constant linking of Whiteness with evangelical Christianity, though, obscures another major story. There are millions of Black, Latino, African and Asian evangelical Christians who are already profoundly changing America. They represent what one scholar calls the “de-Europeanization of American Christianity.”

And these non-White evangelicals will likely not only save the American church but transform the nation’s politics.

This future will belong to people like Pastor Peter Lim, founder of a growing congregation of Asian-Americans called “4Pointes Church of Atlanta.” Lim, a Korean American evangelical, says the media’s hyperfocus on White Christian nationalism often renders communities like his invisible.

He says he’s attended evangelical conferences where the only people who are featured onstage are White pastors or leaders. He wrote in an essay that Asian-American evangelicals often experience “perpetual invisibility” — akin to what Asian Americans encounter more broadly in this country.

“You just feel overlooked — your story or your experience is minimized,” he says. “It’s not done intentionally. But you don’t feel like you belong. It tells you that your stories don’t belong. It does hurt.”

Lim’s experience is the result of a passive form of racism. It’s not deliberate or malign; it’s a sin of omission rather than commission by many journalists, church leaders and commentators who rightly warn about the dangers posed by White Christian nationalism.

I’ve done it myself: In the past, when I thought about evangelicals, I only saw White Christians.

The relentless focus on White Christian nationalism is spreading a racist myth | CNN

CNN · by John Blake · February 3, 2024

Evangelicals explain differences between some White and non-White evangelicals

03:42 - Source: CNN

Story highlights

Evangelicals in the US are typically depicted as White men

But one in three American evangelicals is a person of color

Their politics are often more progressive than those of White evangelicals

CNN —

It’s been called an “imposter Christianity,” a heretical faith that “sanctifies lies,” and “the most serious threat” to democracy in America.

That’s how critics have described White Christian nationalism, a deviant strain of religion that has infected the political mainstream. White Christian nationalists believe the US was founded as a Christian nation, although the Constitution never mentions God and enshrines the separation of church and state. Its adherents twist biblical language to justify violence, sexism and hostility toward people of color.

But there is another cost to the spread of White Christian nationalism that no one mentions.

The relentless coverage of White Christian nationalism is spreading a racist myth: that Whiteness is the default setting for evangelical Christianity.

This is one of the unintended consequences of the media and public’s fascination with the subject. Feeding this perception is an avalanche of books, articles and now a Hollywood film on the beliefs of White evangelical Christians — the biggest followers of Christian nationalism. In a February 2023 survey, nearly two-thirds of White evangelical Protestants qualified as sympathizers or adherents to Christian nationalism.

The constant linking of Whiteness with evangelical Christianity, though, obscures another major story. There are millions of Black, Latino, African and Asian evangelical Christians who are already profoundly changing America. They represent what one scholar calls the “de-Europeanization of American Christianity.”

And these non-White evangelicals will likely not only save the American church but transform the nation’s politics.

This future will belong to people like Pastor Peter Lim, founder of a growing congregation of Asian-Americans called “4Pointes Church of Atlanta.” Lim, a Korean American evangelical, says the media’s hyperfocus on White Christian nationalism often renders communities like his invisible.

He says he’s attended evangelical conferences where the only people who are featured onstage are White pastors or leaders. He wrote in an essay that Asian-American evangelicals often experience “perpetual invisibility” — akin to what Asian Americans encounter more broadly in this country.

“You just feel overlooked — your story or your experience is minimized,” he says. “It’s not done intentionally. But you don’t feel like you belong. It tells you that your stories don’t belong. It does hurt.”

Lim’s experience is the result of a passive form of racism. It’s not deliberate or malign; it’s a sin of omission rather than commission by many journalists, church leaders and commentators who rightly warn about the dangers posed by White Christian nationalism.

I’ve done it myself: In the past, when I thought about evangelicals, I only saw White Christians.

Why evangelical Christianity may become less conservative

Carolyn Chen, co-director of the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion, says the growth of non-White evangelicals will change the American church and the nation’s politics.

Courtesy Ella Sophie Bessette

The true definition of “evangelical” has nothing to do with a color or a political party. Evangelicals are loosely defined as Christians who share a “born-again” dramatic personal conversion, who take the Bible seriously or literally and believe they’re supposed to spread their faith to others.

Today, however, the definition of an evangelical Christian has been reduced to one category: a White conservative Republican.

Click on any story about evangelicals and you’re liable to see a White person, usually a man, clutching a Bible.

But it may surprise some people to learn that in 2024, the face of evangelical Christianity in the US is more likely to be brown than White.

The numbers tell the story:

—According to a 2017 survey, one in three American evangelicals is a person of color.

—A higher number of Black Christians — 41% — identify as evangelicals than their White Christian counterparts.

—The fastest-growing segment of evangelicals in the US are Latino Americans.

—And at least 80% of the members of evangelical student groups at competitive universities like Princeton, Harvard and Stanford are Asian-American, according to one estimate.

As Carolyn Chen, a professor at UC Berkeley who is an authority on Asian American religion, said during a 2022 speech: “Today’s evangelical leaders are not just White men with degrees from Oral Roberts University.”

Two Asian Americans, for example, hold leadership positions at major evangelical organizations. Walter Kim, a Korean American, is the president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). And Tom Lin, a Taiwanese American, is the president of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, a nationwide campus Christian ministry.

The Rev. William Barber II, a Black pastor and activist who has been called the “closest person we have to MLK in contemporary America,” also identifies as an evangelical Christian.

This change of complexion often produces a change in political perspective. Scholars say non-White evangelicals tend to be conservative on issues like sexuality and abortion but more progressive in politics. A majority of Black evangelicals, for example, say that opposing racism is an essential part of their faith.

Chen predicts that “America will become more secular, and Christianity less conservative” as non-White evangelicals increase in number.

The spread of White Christian nationalism was on display during the January 6 insurrection, which featured many White Christians, like the one above, carrying Bibles and crosses as they rallied in support of former President Trump.

John Minchillo/AP

Chen says the browning of Christianity in the US owes much to the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. That law paved the way for millions of immigrants from Asian, Africa, and Latin American countries to come to the US.

“When we tell the story about American Christianity, we might start with the Puritans — it’s basically a European story,” says Chen, author of “Work Pray Code: When Work Becomes Religion in Silicon Valley.” “But what if we were to tell the story of American Christianity by what it’s starting to look like and how it’s changing today? That story begins in a place like Taiwan, Korea, or Mexico.”

How it feels to belong to a church that does not see you

The focus on White evangelicals presents their non-White counterparts with a challenge: How do you reconcile belonging to a church that often doesn’t see you?

That’s a problem Black evangelicals have faced for centuries, says the Rev. John C. Richards, Jr., a Black evangelical pastor at Saint Mark Baptist Church in Little Rock, Arkansas. He wrote in a 2017 essay that “White Christians have historically controlled the evangelical narrative.”

“Black Christians have always lived in the peripheral vision of White Evangelicalism — our stories remaining unearthed and untold,” he wrote.

But Black evangelicals have been in the US since the country’s birth. Richards says they have been the “moral compass of our nation,” clinging to their faith during slavery and Jim Crow. He cited the evangelical scholar Mark Noll, who once said:

“Black Christians are the ones who have experienced the cross most traumatically in American history yet have not been included in the stories of Evangelicalism.”

Richards deals with this challenge by asserting his evangelical identity in any forum he can. He uses social media, sermons and his “The Questions Worth Answering” podcast to highlight the faith and contributions of Black evangelicals.

And he continues to claim the term “evangelical,” despite its association with conservative White Americans.

“I’m not ready to abandon it just because someone co-opted it and just because people are misusing the word,” he says.

The Rev. John Onwuchekwa, a pastor and entrepreneur based in Georgia, has a different response.

President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Immigration Bill of 1965 on Liberty Island in New York Harbor with a view of the New York City skyline in the background. Next to the president on his right are First Lady Lady Bird Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. To the president's left are Senator Edward Kennedy (third from right) and Robert Kennedy (second from right).

Corbis Historical/Getty Images

The son of Nigerian immigrants, he says he grew exhausted trying to defend his perspective on race while he was a pastor with the Southern Baptist Convention, an ultra-conservative, predominately White evangelical denomination.

Onwuchekwa and the congregation he co-founded, the Cornerstone Church, eventually left the Southern Baptist Convention.

Onwuchekwa says he no longer uses the term “evangelical” to describe himself.

“It’s become an unhelpful label,” he says. “It’s almost become an exclusively political term. The point of a label is to reduce the time it takes to communicate. Whenever you use the term ‘evangelical’ in public discourse, it achieves the opposite because you have to say, ‘Oh, but wait, here’s what I mean.’ ’’

This pastor wants the ‘full intricacies’ of his humanity to be seen

Some non-White evangelicals are ignored in a more subtle way. Their perspective is only sought on issues related to race, like Christian nationalism.

Onwuchekwa says he was once participating in a panel discussion on theology at a large evangelical conference with another Black pastor. Both answered questions about race for 15 minutes. When the other panelists turned the conversation to other theological matters, no one had a question for either of them for the remaining 45 minutes.

Sometimes your race or ethnicity is ignored; at other times, that’s all White people see.

“It made me feel belittled, used and it made me feel like this isn’t the space for me,” says Onwuchekwa, author of “We Go On: Finding Purpose in All of Life’s Sorrows and Joys.”

Maria Antonetty, foreground right, joins other worshipers at a Spanish Easter service at the Primitive Christian Church in New York. The fastest growing segment of evangelicals in the US are Latino Americans.

Tina Fineberg/AP

“There need to be spaces where the full intricacies of my humanity are more fully appreciated,” says Onwuchekwa, who is also a co-founder of the Crete Collective, which opens churches in communities of color.

Some non-White evangelicals feel overlooked because church leaders don’t acknowledge their pain.

Lim, the Korean-American pastor, says several Asian-American families joined his church following a 2021 tragedy that rocked Atlanta’s Asian community. A man entered several Atlanta-area spas and shot and killed eight people, including six Asian women. The shooting underscored a recent surge in hate crimes against Asians in the US.

Some of the new members of Lim’s church had been congregants in large, White evangelical churches. They told him they left because of the spa shootings, he says.

“It wasn’t addressed at the churches; it wasn’t even talked about,” Lim says. “These Asian Americans, who were key members of the church, felt invisible. Their hurt was overlooked. That was the final straw for them.”

Non-White evangelicals may save the American church

It may soon be impossible to ignore the importance of non-White evangelicals because of one reason: demographics.

At first glance, the numbers don’t look good for Christians in America. Commentators have longed warned that Christianity in the US is dying.

Church membership in the US has been declining and in 2020 fell below 50% for the first time. Church leaders fret that the American church is poised to follow the path of West European churches: soaring Gothic cathedrals with empty pews and shuttered church sanctuaries converted into nightclubs.

The numbers look grim for White evangelicals as well. They are the oldest religious group in America, and their numbers are declining, Chen, the UC Berkeley professor, says.

But for evangelicals, the migration of non-White immigrants to the US from Latin America and Asia could represent a more earthbound form of salvation.

The US has more immigrants than any country. Many of them are evangelicals and they, along with their children, are bringing their religious fervor with them and planting churches.

The Rev. Dr. William J. Barber II , seen above speaking in Washington, DC, is an activist and civil rights leader who identifies as an evangelical Christian. However, he rejects the political beliefs associated with White Christian nationalism.

Oliver Contreras/For The Washington Post/Getty Images

“For so long we’ve talked about Christianity or evangelicalism as a White phenomenon,” says Chen, who is also the executive director of the Asian Pacific American Religions Research Initiative.

“We’re on the cusp of this demographic change and there’s evidence of it all over. But we don’t even see it because we’re so focused on this population that’s dying out.”

No one is saying there will be a “great replacement” of White evangelicals by hordes of brown or Black migrants elbowing them out of the pews. White evangelicals will remain a potent political force in American politics.

But there is a rich and vibrant world of non-White evangelicals in America whose stories remain “unearthed and untold.” Not every discussion of evangelicals should feature White faces.

It’s time to bury the myth that White Americans have a monopoly on evangelical Christianity.

John Blake is the author of “More Than I Imagined: What a Black Man Discovered About the White Mother He Never Knew.”

CNN · by John Blake · February 3, 2024

16. Joe Biden Is Arming Greece So Greece Can Arm Ukraine—And Pro-Russia Republicans Can’t Stop Him

Joe Biden Is Arming Greece So Greece Can Arm Ukraine—And Pro-Russia Republicans Can’t Stop Him

‘Excess defense articles’ is a powerful authority

Forbes · by David Axe · January 30, 2024

A Greek air force C-130.

Wikimedia Commons

As the Republican Party’s blockade of aid to Ukraine drags into its fourth month, the U.S. government under Pres. Joe Biden has found a clever new way to give Ukraine’s forces the weapons and ammunition they need to defend their country.

It is, in essence, an American version of Germany’s circular weapons trade—the so-called Ringtausch. The United States is gifting older surplus weapons to Greece with the understanding that Greece donates to Ukraine some of its own surplus weapons.

Greek media broke the news last week. According to the newspaper Kathimerini and other media, the Biden administration offered the Greek government three 87-foot Protector-class patrol boats, two Lockheed Martin C-130H airlifters, 10 Allison T56 turboprop engines for Lockheed P-3 patrol planes plus 60 M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles and a consignment of transport trucks.

All this hardware is U.S. military surplus—and is available to Greece, free of charge, under a U.S. legal authority called “excess defense articles.” Federal law allows an American president to declare military systems surplus to need, assign them a value—potentially zero dollars—and give them away on the condition that the recipient transport them.

The law caps annual EDA transfers at $500 million. The same law doesn’t dictate the value the president assigns to surplus weapons. In a letter to Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described the ships, planes, engines and vehicles as “free concessions.”

The EDA gifts to Greece sweeten a larger arms package that includes 40 Lockheed F-35 stealth fighters, which Greece is buying for $8.6 billion. The Biden administration previously approved, in 2022 and 2023, $60 million in financing for arms-purchases by Athens.

In exchange for this largess, the Americans want the Greeks to donate more weapons to the Ukrainians. “We continue to be interested in the defense capabilities that Greece could transfer or sell to Ukraine,” Blinken wrote.

The Americans even offered a reward once the donation is complete. “If these capabilities are of interest to Ukraine, and pending an assessment of their status and value by the U.S. government, we can explore opportunities for possible additional foreign armed forces financing of up to $200 million for Greece.”

The Greek military operates, or holds in storage, an array of Soviet- and U.S.-designed weaponry that would be of immediate value to the Ukrainian military—in particular, S-300 and Hawk long-range air-defense batteries, Tor and Osa short-range air-defense vehicles and ZU-23-2 air-defense guns. Also: ammunition for all these systems.

Some or all of those weapons could be heading to Ukraine. “Political and military leadership has already given the necessary directions so that obsolete systems and equipment that are no longer used by the Greek army are transferred to Ukraine,” Kathimerini reported.

The Greek ring-transfer was a delicate one, as tensions between Greece and Turkey mean the United States usually offers both countries new weapons at the same time—and in roughly the same quantity.

So it’s no accident that, simultaneous with the Greek arms deal, the U.S. State Department cleared Turkey to spend $23 billion on 40 new Lockheed F-16 fighters and 79 upgrade kits for older F-16s, plus munitions for the fighters. The deal also was a reward for Turkey finally consenting to Sweden joining NATO.

Germany’s Ringtausch program has speeded to Ukraine scores of tanks and other heavy weapons. America’s own ring trade could do the same—potentially on an even grander scale. Greece isn’t the only country with old weapons that it might give away, if the United States offers something in return.

That Biden and his secretary of state Blinken are backing an EDA-based ring-trade should come as no surprise to close observers of American politics. Last fall, pro-Russia Republicans in the U.S. Congress made it clear they probably never will approve direct military aid to Ukraine.

The Republicans are falling in line with disgraced ex-president Donald Trump’s personal hatred of Ukraine—and equally personal fondness for authoritarian Russia.

The Republicans’ allegiance to Trump—and therefore to dictators and military aggressors—wasn’t an issue for Ukraine until they narrowly gained control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2022 elections. When earlier funding for Ukraine ran out in late December, Rep. Mike Johnson—the extremist House speaker—refused to put additional aid to a vote.

So barring a legislative breakthrough, Biden can’t get the additional $61 billion in clean funding he wants for Ukraine. But that doesn’t mean he can’t honor the wishes of the majority of Americans and help Ukraine to defend itself.

Biden’s EDA authority is one of several legal mechanisms at his disposal that can free up older weapons for onward transfer to Ukraine. And while Biden could send excess defense articles directly to Ukraine, he initially is using EDA as leverage in ring trades.

Expect more of this as Republicans and Trump increasingly side with Russia in Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine. The Republicans might be eager to betray Ukraine; Biden however isn’t.

Forbes · by David Axe · January 30, 2024

17. Those Soldiers in Jordan Were Casualties of Bureaucracy

Excerpts:

Successive defense secretaries ordered the Army to develop these counter uncrewed-aircraft systems for the entire military with no success. In 2019 the Army tried to institutionalize drone defense by establishing the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, known as JCO, but that only worsened the Pentagon’s paralysis.

The JCO has devolved into an ineffective embarrassment that’s emblematic of the Defense Department’s overall procurement strategy. The office conducts an endless series of testing events that have yet to result in effective procurement of systems vital to our overseas forces. The JCO has required the defense industry to spend millions of the companies’ own dollars to participate in JCO-mandated testing to establish an approved list of suppliers.

Yet the office repeatedly has ignored its own recommendations. In supplying Ukraine, the JCO selected systems that weren’t approved in previous office field tests rather than those available from companies that poured money into getting JCO certified. The office has said it ignored its established criteria for systems procurement because they had to be acquired so rapidly, but JCO-certified companies could have supplied systems quickly. Moreover, the need now for counter uncrewed-aircraft systems is urgent, too. So why delay with bureaucracy?

Those Soldiers in Jordan Were Casualties of Bureaucracy

Why don’t U.S. forces have the best defense against drone attacks? Because of the Pentagon’s procurement system.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/those-soldiers-in-jordan-were-casualties-of-bureaucracy-pentagon-procurement-0364f0c4?st=ts28ow7o0ampsds&utm

By Christopher C. Miller

Feb. 2, 2024 6:39 pm ET

The Pentagon in Washington, May 10, 2023. PHOTO: DANIEL SLIM/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Sunday’s attack by Iranian proxies on U.S. forces serving in Jordan—the first time American soldiers have been killed by a conventional enemy air attack since the Korean War—serves as a stark reminder of the evolving threats that American forces face overseas. This event should highlight the importance of making sure our men and women in uniform have what they need to defend themselves. America will be burying more of its warriors if it doesn’t change the way the Pentagon does business.

This tragic loss of life didn’t need to happen. Our soldiers’ need for the materiel to defend against drone strikes has been obvious for months. Since October, U.S. forces have successfully defended against more than 160 attacks, many of them drone-based, from Iran-sponsored groups throughout the Middle East. Though our troops have performed admirably, the Defense Department has failed to provide them with the best available technology to defend against these attacks, even as its capabilities in the Middle East have diminished with its pivot to the Pacific. This, almost inevitably, led to the successful strike on our base in Jordan. Though the Pentagon knows what our forces need, it has let itself be too mired in bureaucracy to provide it.

This isn’t a partisan issue. I accept responsibility for failing to break the back of the hidebound bureaucracy when I served in the Army and ultimately led the Pentagon as acting secretary of defense. The Defense Department still adheres to its extant plodding and seemingly sacrosanct five-year budget-planning cycle, though it risks troops’ lives. If America’s military fails to change that, it risks defeat by the growing number of hostile powers intent on destroying the current international order.

Across my 37-year career, I’ve seen the U.S. military transform itself rapidly to face threats. It usually takes a crisis to drive urgency into the byzantine acquisition process. During the war on terror, America established rapid acquisition organizations to bypass the lethargic and impossibly complex contracting system to get our troops what they needed. Defense Secretary Robert Gates developed the playbook for quickly developing and procuring mine-resistant vehicles to protect U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon in 2006 created the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to defend against drones and improvised explosives while also using academia, laboratories, industry and private-sector investment to accelerate development of lifesaving solutions.

It’s time to demand a similar approach to counter other autonomous threats. It’s obvious what our troops need, but the bureaucracy is too slow to deliver. Specifically designed to detect, track and neutralize drones, counter-uncrewed aircraft systems would provide a critical layer of protection against aerial threats that can bypass traditional defenses. These systems have proved effective across various conflict zones, preventing harm to our troops and those of our allies—especially during the battle against ISIS in Mosul in 2017. But they haven’t been more broadly fielded to all units of the military that could use them, and our enemies are adapting as the Pentagon struggles to acquire more.

Successive defense secretaries ordered the Army to develop these counter uncrewed-aircraft systems for the entire military with no success. In 2019 the Army tried to institutionalize drone defense by establishing the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, known as JCO, but that only worsened the Pentagon’s paralysis.

The JCO has devolved into an ineffective embarrassment that’s emblematic of the Defense Department’s overall procurement strategy. The office conducts an endless series of testing events that have yet to result in effective procurement of systems vital to our overseas forces. The JCO has required the defense industry to spend millions of the companies’ own dollars to participate in JCO-mandated testing to establish an approved list of suppliers.

Yet the office repeatedly has ignored its own recommendations. In supplying Ukraine, the JCO selected systems that weren’t approved in previous office field tests rather than those available from companies that poured money into getting JCO certified. The office has said it ignored its established criteria for systems procurement because they had to be acquired so rapidly, but JCO-certified companies could have supplied systems quickly. Moreover, the need now for counter uncrewed-aircraft systems is urgent, too. So why delay with bureaucracy?

With its massive cost to companies and seemingly arbitrary use, the JCO’s testing system unfairly impacts nontraditional contractors, limits innovation and contributes to the erosion of our country’s defense industrial base.

How many more American warriors must die before our military and civilian leaders act? Congress, the Pentagon and American voters must honor the sacrifices of Sgt. William Rivers, Spc. Kennedy Sanders, Spc. Breonna Moffett and the loved ones they left behind.

By transforming the way the Pentagon does business, we can guarantee their sacrifices weren’t made in vain. We can create an effective military that deters aggression, and we can build a force capable of defeating our enemies while returning our troops home safely.

Mr. Miller served as acting defense secretary, 2020-21. He is author of “Soldier-Secretary: Warning for the Battlefield and the Pentagon About America’s Most Dangerous Enemies.”

18. Misinformation spreads in China on ‘civil war’ in Texas

​China has to hardly do any work when we provide it with such "rich" content.

Misinformation spreads in China on ‘civil war’ in Texas

BBC

By Kerry AllenBBC Monitoring

GLOBAL TIMES

Chinese media have stoked the idea Texas has reached a state of war

Amid the escalating border standoff between Texas and the White House over illegal immigration, misinformation has spread in China that the Lone Star state has officially declared war to secede from the US.

Popular Chinese outlets have been suggesting that events in Texas have led to deep divisions in the US widening to a point where unrest has become a stark reality.

More than 6.3m migrants have crossed into the US illegally since the beginning of 2021 - record highs that have intensified a standoff between President Joe Biden and Texas Governor Greg Abbott.

As part of his Operation Lone Star, Mr Abbott has sought to block or deter entry into his state, including by installing about 30 miles (48km) of razor wire barriers along the city of Eagle Pass.

The US Supreme Court ruled last month against Mr Abbott, but the Republican has vowed to add more razor wire to crack down on what he calls an "invasion".

Trending social media posts in China allege Mr Abbott was preparing to go to war with US federal authorities.

Posts with the hashtag #TexasDeclaresAStateOfWar have been viewed and shared thousands of times on the popular social network Sina Weibo. Some posts have been from a user with millions of followers.

A Voice of America journalist Wenhao, who specialises in Chinese online disinformation, posted on X that the "biggest US related news on China's internet for the past few days is Texas governor declaring war with the federal government, which did not happen in reality".

"Netizens are cheering for what they call America's self destruction," the post added.

Weibo does appear to have taken action to limit such content. A search of posts with the hashtag #TexasDeclaresAStateOfWar now shows a disclaimer, which says: "According to relevant laws, regulations and polices, content on this topic cannot be displayed."

However, many posts are still to be found on the popular platform, which has more than 600 million monthly active users.

Users are circulating pictures of the Texas Military Department flying a picture of a flag above its headquarters with the words "Come and Take It", which have led to domestic perceptions the state is stoking independence.

Old videos from Fox News are also circulating of vigilante groups dressed in camouflage to "defend the border". There are also multiple videos being circulated from Chile of military tanks that are being misattributed to Texas.

WEIBO

This video has been viewed more than 49,000 times after being posted by a user with more than three million followers

As censorship makes it difficult for Chinese users to do their own fact checks, this has given many Weibo users the impression that the state is at war.

Some have suggested that Texas could see a similar situation to Ukraine - which is at war with Russia - noting the two regions have a similar land mass.

Weibo

This image comparing Ukraine's and Texas's land mass has been widely shared in China

Media messaging has made the idea of civil war more believable, as Chinese state media have regularly suggested that political divisions in the US are now so polarised that the country has reached the brink of internal conflict.

The phrase "civil war" has been used repeatedly in Chinese newspapers since the January 2021 Capitol Hill riot.

While foreign media is largely blocked in China, content from foreign media is often cherry-picked to stoke suggestions of US internal divisions.

Social media users in China on Friday, for example, were able to read reports that Florida's Republican governor Ron DeSantis is sending up to 1,000 members of the National Guard to Texas.

China often publishes such reports as a response to Western governments issuing critical comments on China's handling of issues in Xinjiang, Hong Kong or Taiwan. It's a way of saying: focus on your own backyard, instead of telling us how to run our country.

This is not exclusive to the US. It is also common to see newspapers amplify suggestions that Scotland is increasingly pushing for self-rule, when UK politicians are critical of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese government maintains it does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. "This has always been a principle in our foreign policy and is recognised by the international community," it said in a recent statement.

BBC

19. Red Menace, Black Ops, Green Light

Little known history for most. Many of us have served with some of the icons who were on these teams.

Perhaps we should resurrect these teams and give them the mission of targeting each of Kim Jong Un's leadership villas in north Korea. Maybe that would get his attention. (note sarcasm)

Red Menace, Black Ops, Green Light

The Special Forces 'suicide' mission to insert behind enemy lines with backpack nuclear weapons

https://thehighside.substack.com/p/red-menace-black-ops-green-light?r=7i07&utm

JACK MURPHY AND SEAN D. NAYLOR

FEB 1, 2024

∙ PAID

17

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A Special Forces soldier jumps with the SADM trainer. Credit: Creative Commons

The men in black

On a warm, clear night in 1983, an Army two-and-a-half-ton truck pulled into a hangar on Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and dropped its tailgate. One by one, about a dozen Green Berets from 7^th Special Forces Group jumped down.

At the same time, an MC-130 Combat Talon, the special operations version of the venerable Hercules turboprop aircraft, taxied over to the hangar. The plane’s ramp lowered and two men in black flight suits with no patches or other insignia disembarked. They began to give the Green Berets a mission brief as other trucks pulled up loaded with freefall parachutes and other equipment, including live ammunition.

“This is a classified operation,” one of the briefers announced to the Special Forces A-team. “From this point forward, we have command and control.”

Neither of the men in black ever identified themselves or which branch of the U.S. government they worked for.

Then three vehicles filled with security personnel pulled up. One of the vehicles also contained a box. Inside was a device with which the Special Forces men were very familiar, as they had trained on an inert version of it for countless hours, with regular, rigorous inspections conducted to evaluate their competency and reliability in its use. The device that was unpacked and turned over to the team was a Special Atomic Demolition Munition or SADM (pronounced SAY-dum), a small nuclear weapon that contained a fissile core detonated with a dual-primed conventional explosive. The design of the device was not dissimilar to that of the original implosion atomic bomb developed at Los Alamos by J. Robert Oppenheimer and his team during World War II. The difference was this one was miniaturized to the point that it fit inside a rucksack.

Unlike the training device with which the team usually worked, this device had no “Inert” stickers or any other indication that it was anything but a live nuclear weapon. The mysterious men in the black flight suits told the Special Forces A-team, which in this case was known as a Green Light team because it specialized in infiltrating, emplacing, and detonating the SADM, to rig the device for an airborne insertion. But the team still hadn’t received a full operations order.

After preparing their parachutes, rucksacks and the SADM for a freefall jump behind enemy lines, the Green Light team loaded onto the MC-130 with the two men in black. Shortly afterward, they were airborne with no idea of where they were headed. Only when they were three hours into the flight did the men in operational control inform them of their target, according to one member of the team. It was a dam, a dam the team had analyzed and trained to strike many times. A dam in a hostile country.

They were about to jump into Cuba with a low-yield nuclear bomb.

Six hours later, the MC-130 dived to 500 feet above the ground, flying what aviators call “nap of the earth” to avoid detection by enemy radar. The Green Light team was soon given the directive to stand up, rig up, and prepare to jump from the back ramp of the aircraft, which was climbing steeply to an altitude of about 10,500 feet as it neared the drop zone.

When they were over the DZ, the Green Berets walked to the lip of the ramp and stepped off into the night sky.

“I'm the third person off the ramp,” said one member of the team, told The High Side. “We go out, we make a jump and land on an unmarked drop zone.”

After successfully landing, the team assembled, checked their bearings and began moving out toward the target with their CAR-15 carbines locked and loaded.

Suddenly, headlights flicked on nearby, illuminating the team. “Endex, endex, endex!” someone in the darkness shouted. “Endex” is an abbreviation that the U.S. military uses to denote the end of a training exercise. The Green Berets were in a state of shock, having been led to believe they were on a live operation.

People supervising the event appeared out of the darkness, asking the team members in American-accented English about their current emotional state and how they felt about the would-be mission. Technicians from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, also emerged. Now that the team members knew they were on a training mission, the lab techs wanted to accompany them to see how they armed and emplaced the SADM.

The Special Atomic Demolition Munition exhibit at the National Atomic Testing Museum in Nevada. (Kelly Michals, Creative Commons)

It turned out they were on a drop zone somewhere in New Mexico, more than a thousand miles from Cuba.

The Green Berets were still reeling, their adrenaline pumping. They had assumed they were deep behind enemy lines until moments previously. “It was absolutely real,” a team member said of how he felt right up until they heard the shouts of “Endex!”

He declined to name the target they thought they were attacking. But a former 7^th Group soldier native to Cuba said that the most likely dam target in Cuba for a SADM team would be the Hanabanilla Dam in Villa Clara province, the country’s largest hydroelectric dam.

The team quickly finished the training exercise before catching a ride in a military vehicle to a nearby airstrip, from which they were flown back to Pope Air Force Base (which was collocated with the team’s home post of Fort Bragg, now known as Fort Liberty).

The Green Light program was active from 1962 to 1986, a period during which Special Forces teams and other U.S. military units trained to clandestinely infiltrate small nuclear weapons behind enemy lines during World War III. Their targets were dams, bridges, ports and enemy troop formations.

“Beginning in the 1950s the Soviets had numerical superiority in Europe, so we went the route during the Eisenhower administration to make up for that with tactical nuclear weapons,” former Green Beret Mike Vickers, who underwent SADM training, told The Team House podcast. “That [SADM] was part of that family.”

But although the SADM is usually understood as a defense against a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, interviews by The High Side with more than a dozen former Green Light team members revealed plans to use the munitions across the globe, from Cuba to the Middle East to North Korea.

Many of the soldiers involved never saw an extraction plan – i.e., a plan to get them to safety once they’d accomplished their missions. As one Green Light team member said in a brief history of the program obtained by The High Side from U.S. Special Operations Command via the Freedom of Information Act, "You were under the impression that you were expendable."

At the dawn of the atomic age in the early 1950s, the U.S. military was equipped with and prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons in the event of war with the Soviet Union. During this period, the Army developed the M65 280mm atomic cannon, nuclear howitzer rounds and the Davy Crockett atomic recoilless rifle. Another specialized atomic weapon was the T-4 Atomic Demolition Munition, which was fielded in 1956 to destroy Soviet hard targets as well as to create obstacles that would delay the advance of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces across Western Europe.

By January 1958, U.S. Army Special Forces A-teams were working with the ADM, according to a certificate obtained by The High Side that was awarded to a Green Beret for successful completion of training on the T-4. These teams were called Green Light teams. (A full Special Forces A-team, or operational detachment alpha, consists of 12 Green Berets led by a captain.)

The Army assigned Special Forces the mission, “to safely and securely infiltrate a nuclear weapon into a target area, and detonate on orders of the National Command Authority,” according to the history of the Green Light program obtained from U.S. Special Operations Command. But the T-4 proved too bulky for a small team to easily infiltrate.

A doctrinal concept of the employment of the atomic demolition munitions in a tactical setting during wartime, from FM 5-106

In 1958, the Department of Defense requested a feasibility study from the Atomic Energy Commission for a man-portable Special Atomic Demolition Munition. The Pentagon wanted a device that weighed no more than 40 pounds and could be used at a firing site by “relatively non-technical field personnel,” according to a memo quoted in “The Swords of Armageddon,” a CD-ROM collection of documents about U.S. nuclear weapons collected by researcher Chuck Hansen.

The next year, Sandia National Laboratory proposed a SADM design based on the warhead used for the Davy Crockett. The SADM went into development in 1960, but the specifications were amended the following year to include a waterproof pressure case so that the device could be emplaced by frogmen. Going into production in June 1962, the SADM entered military service in April 1963 with the Army eventually stockpiling approximately 300 B54 SADMs by the mid-1960s, according to “The Swords of Armageddon.”

The SADM had two yields, .01 or .02 kilotons, and ended up weighing 59 pounds, according to Hansen. By comparison, the atomic bombs the United States dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of 15 kilotons and 21 kilotons respectively, according to the Department of Energy. (A 1-kiloton weapon has the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT.) The device itself measured 17 inches by 12 inches and had a mechanical combination lock, as well as a mechanical timer that used no digital components, out of concern that radioactivity would interfere with digital gear, according to former Green Light team members.

But with the SADM still in development, the Army had to ensure that it not only worked as a nuclear device but could succeed where the unwieldy T-4 ADM had failed, by being easier for a small team to carry behind enemy lines by parachute.

Making history without knowing

In 1960, Joe Garner was just a buck sergeant in Special Forces at Fort Bragg, but he had already racked up a lot of freefall jumps as a member of the Special Warfare Center's sport parachute club. It was this experience that prompted a more senior NCO who was also a club member to ask him if he would like to test parachute the “Green Light device.”

Garner, who died in 2013, knew almost nothing about the top secret “Green Light” program, other than that it involved some new type of demolition and that the Green Light A-teams trained in a one-story building on Bragg’s Smoke Bomb Hill that was ringed with barbed wire and had an armed guard at the gate.

Nonetheless, Garner eagerly accepted the invitation, later writing about the experience in his memoir “Code Name Copperhead.” The senior NCO told Garner to report to the parade field at Smoke Bomb Hill where they waited for an H-21 Shawnee twin-rotor helicopter to arrive.

“A Jeep came out of the Greenlight [sic] training area two blocks away,” Garner writes. “When it drove up, we could see that the four men inside were armed with .45 caliber pistols.”

One of the men got off the jeep lugging a hefty rucksack that he set at Garner's feet before producing a specialized harness to rig it for airborne operations. Garner had done lots of freefall jumps, but never with combat gear, and certainly never with a package this heavy. “Can I have a readout on previous jumps?” he asked, hoping to learn some best practices.

The SADM rigged up to jump. (Credit: arsof-history.org)

“We don't have any,” one of the guards told him. “We don't know of anybody that has ever jumped it.”

After Garner rigged up and boarded the H-21, the helicopter took off and the jumpmaster soon tossed a multicolored crepe paper streamer from the back ramp to check wind speed and direction over the intended drop zone, an old rifle range at the Macridge weapons training area, where VIPs had gathered to watch the demonstration. With the wind check complete, the jump master adjusted the release point to compensate for the wind drift, and the helicopter climbed to 8,000 feet.

Then the jumpmaster looked at Garner. “Let's do it!” he shouted. Garner pitched forward and jumped from the back of the helicopter, plummeting toward the earth.

“All of a sudden all that weight slammed the rucksack against the back of my knees, so I couldn't bend my legs and control my airfoil in flight,” Garner writes. “It wanted to pull me feet down, making it difficult to stay horizontal to the ground.” He continued to struggle to get stable in the air due to the heavy device strapped to the back of his legs until he pulled his rip cord at 1,800 feet and deployed his parachute.

Descending under canopy, he coasted above the VIP bleachers and briefly imagined jettisoning the device “like pigeon crap” upon them. “It's funny what goes through your mind, even during something serious,” he writes. Garner did drop the device on its lowering line when approximately fifty feet above the ground as intended, and then came down with a crash. But both he and the device survived. It had been a successful test.

An armed guard met him on the drop zone and took control of the device. As Garner was dusting himself off, he still had no idea what the Green Light program really was. It wasn't until many years later that he discovered the truth about it.

“That’s when the realization hit me,” he writes. “I was probably the first soldier to free-fall strapped to an atomic bomb.”

The (nuclear) dam busters

In 1974, 14 years after he became the first soldier to jump the SADM, Joe Garner found himself getting reacquainted with the munition as the team sergeant for a Green Light team in 7^th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg. As with many other Green Light teams, one type of target dominated their training mission profile: dams.

It was such a mission that the team was given for a full-scale training scenario that year. Locked down in the isolation facility at Camp Mackall, a training area close to Bragg, 7^th Group officials told the team that its target was a hydroelectric dam on the Pee Dee River that formed Lake Tillery near Mount Gilead in North Carolina.

“Our mission was to knock out the dam at Lake Tillery for forty-five days,” Garner writes in “Code Name: Copperhead.” “[W]e were shown a little square marking the area at the dam to be disabled, in our case the hydroelectric generators.” A platoon of Marines would play the enemy guard force for the dam.

During an early mission brief, Garner's demolition sergeant, Gerry Infanger, pointed to a rock near the dam as the ideal spot to emplace the SADM to take out all three hydroelectric generators. But the 7^th Group training coordinators told the team that they had to put the device inside the dam's control building, a request that the team found absurd.

“Hell, once we were in that foreign country, we would put it on the easier location to get to,” Garner writes. “We would be the only ones there, and who the hell would ever question us?” However, for the sake of the training event, Garner concedes, they “played the game.”

After their final mission brief, the team loaded up in a C-130 and jumped the SADM into the training exercise. As Garner was the actual custodian of the device, he also jumped with a loaded .45 caliber pistol so he could defend the device if an unauthorized party attempted to take it. (Even the inert but lifelike, highly detailed SADM training devices were considered so sensitive that the Green Light teams were authorized to use lethal force to protect them, several veterans told The High Side.)

Once they had landed, the team members took turns through the night rucking the SADM toward the dam. At 6 a.m., as he was monitoring the Marines from a distance, Garner’s team leader, Lt. Dan Schilling observed a pickup truck loaded with trash cans making garbage collection rounds at the dam. One of the garbage man's stops was the control building where the team needed to emplace the device.

Using local contacts, Schilling found where the garbage man lived and recruited him to their cause with ease. Wearing civilian clothes, Schilling and Infanger rode with the garbage man the next day on his rounds, with the SADM rolled up in a sleeping bag and hidden inside one of the trash cans. The Marines never suspected a thing.

At the control building, Infanger began arming the device while Schilling went to a break room and chatted with some of the Marines who were supposedly trying to catch him. Schilling left the dam with the garbage man, but Infanger had to remain behind with the device until the team received a “go” or “no-go” coded signal from a plane above.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dick Potter, seen here in 2016, commanded Green Light teams in 10th Special Forces Group. Credit: DVIDs, Staff Sgt. Doug Roles

It came at 3 a.m. The team's communications sergeant decoded it with a one-time pad. The detonation was a go. Garner crept closer to the dam and radioed the decision to Infanger.

With the timer ticking down, Infanger escaped with the garbage man during the latter’s rounds three hours later.

The device “detonated” on time. From the team’s perspective, the mission was a major success: the target had been destroyed with no friendly casualties.

But there was a frightening revelation when the team's company sergeant major caught up with them to go over the training. He was surprised that they didn't have the SADM with them, because the aircraft was supposed to have transmitted the “no-go” message. The team’s communications sergeant showed him his notes and the decrypted message. They had received a “go.” Apparently, someone in the air mixed up the “fire” and “don't fire” messages, a mistake that would have had devastating consequences had the scenario been for real.

Dams were also a primary target for Green Light teams focused on the European theater of operations.

As a 10^th Special Forces Group Green Light team sergeant at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in the mid-1970s, Tommy Shook never saw a targeting package, but because in training his team's target was so often a dam on a lake, he came to suspect that in a real-life mission, it would also be a dam. He was told in a briefing that if the Soviets invaded Western Europe, they were expected to make it to the English Channel in about six days. Shook assumed that the mission of his team, about half of whom spoke Russian, would be to parachute behind enemy lines and use the SADM to destroy dams and flood large areas to slow down the second echelon of Soviet forces.

“We could knock out five or six divisions with one bomb.”

“Dams were a big thing for us,” said Stephen Bush, whose 10^th Group Green Light team at Devens spent the mid-1980s training to attack targets in Europe.

Another 10^th Group Green Light NCO, Mike Taylor, confirmed that dams in Europe were among his team’s targets. “We knew what the targets were,” said Taylor, who got to 10^th Group at Devens in 1981. In addition to dams, they included military-industrial infrastructure, mountain passes and Soviet troop concentrations. “We could knock out five or six divisions with one bomb,” he said. However, the team’s primary mission was “a warm water port,” he said, declining to further identify the target. Other 10^th Group Green Light teams trained to hit train yards and heavy water plants, according to former team members.

The revamping of NATO’s war plans under U.S. Army Gen. Bernard Rogers, who served as supreme allied commander Europe from 1979 to 1987, enhanced the Green Light teams’ role in any conflict with the Warsaw Pact, according to retired Brig. Gen. Dick Potter, who, as a colonel, commanded 10^th Group from 1981 to 1984.

To reduce the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its satellites, Rogers introduced a concept he called “Follow-On Forces Attack” that prioritized the destruction of the second and third wave of Warsaw Pact forces before they reached NATO’s defensive lines. The targets for 10^th Group’s Green Light teams thus included the second echelon of Soviet forces, according to Potter. “He changed our whole mission set and target responsibilities for the general war plan and the SADM devices did play a significant role in that war plan,” he told The High Side.

Was Green Light a psyop?

While most of 10^th Group was located at Fort Devens, the group’s 1^st Battalion was stationed in Germany at Bad Tolz, about 20 miles south of Munich. It was there that Capt. Bill Flavin became a Green Light team leader in 1976.

When first assigned to the team, Flavin had no idea what Green Light was. When he learned that they trained with the SADM, it made sense to him, however, as he had taken nuclear targeting courses at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was certified as a nuclear employment officer.

But the more he learned about the Green Light program, the more Flavin became convinced that the Pentagon did not intend to send the teams into combat. “I always thought that this was a psychological tool that was used at much higher levels just to let the Russkies know that they had weird dudes and Green Berets running around with a nuke in their pocket,” he said.

“The SADM devices did play a significant role in that war plan.”

The logistics of the program never quite made sense to Flavin. He figured that the United States would not preemptively start World War III, which meant that the Green Light teams would be activated only after the war began (or, if NATO had forewarning, immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities).

Many SADM devices were kept secured in nuclear bunkers on military installations outside the United States, to be distributed to Green Light teams once war had begun. For Flavin, that meant that his team would have to be activated and then fly to RAF Sculthorpe, the airfield in the United Kingdom from which they would launch on their mission.

Once in the UK, the team would have to wait for officials to draw the SADM from a bunker and issue it to the team. Only then would the Green Light team be able to deploy for a combat mission and hit their targets. By that time, the war would be well under way and those targets might no longer be valid. From Flavin’s perspective, the overall scenario seemed extremely unlikely.

“That's where I concluded it was a psychological weapon,” he said.

In 1978 Flavin was promoted to major and became 1^st Battalion's executive officer, giving him access to all the battalion’s Green Light targeting packets. “They were,” he said, pausing briefly for emphasis, “interesting,” and gave the impression that whoever had put them together at higher headquarters had little idea of what a Special Forces team could, and could not, realistically accomplish. The experience furthered his belief that the entire Green Light program was designed to mess with the heads of Soviet military planners.

Conventional troops, unconventional weapons

While Special Forces teams had the mission of parachuting behind enemy lines and detonating the SADM in denied areas, conventional Army engineers in West Germany had their own SADM mission.

“The whole US strategy at the time was [when] the Soviets came across the border, there's no stopping them, all you can really do is slow them down,” said Richard Baker, who served as an atomic demolition munitions specialist with the 567^thEngineer Company (ADM), in Hanau, West Germany, during the 1980s. “That's where we came in.”

The 567^th had six platoons, each with its own missions in the event of war.

Spread around Germany were what the engineers called pre-chambers, located at road intersections, tunnels, rail yards, and ports, according to Baker, who received his SADM training at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. “[It] looks just like your regular manhole cover, except there's a lock on it and we had all the keys,” he said. The engineers would go out and check the chambers once a year and see if anything needed to be fixed or updated. Many of the pre-chambers were located close to the East German border.

If the Soviets invaded, and nuclear weapons were released to military commanders by the Pentagon, the Army engineers would be issued SADM devices that they would drive out to the pre-chambers and arm. The mechanical timers would be set, the devices locked inside the pre-chambers, “and then we hopefully get out of Dodge,” said Baker. The engineers, whose targeting packets were updated annually, had a rule that two soldiers had to maintain oversight of the bomb until detonation.

The company’s operations took place under a cloak of secrecy. “Nobody knew who we were,” Baker said. “Nobody knew what we were doing.” However, as secret as Baker’s operations were, he said he didn’t learn about the Special Forces Green Light teams until many years after he left the Army.

A mission to block the Panama Canal

One possible argument against Bill Flavin’s theory that the Green Light program was a psyop aimed at the Soviets was the number of Green Light targets located outside Europe.

Just as 10^th Group was focused on Europe, 7^th Group’s area of responsibility was Latin America. Its Green Light teams were thus extremely familiar with Cuba. A 7^th Group veteran said his team would regularly review slide decks and aerial photography of targets there. “I can tell you where every intersection on the Cuba highway, where every military base, where every naval port was, where every dam was,” he said.

UDT/SEALs training with the SADM. (Credit: Tommy Hawkins)

In his memoir, Joe Garner doesn't identify his team’s real-life targets, but he does indicate that at least some were in Cuba and describes how, having infiltrated into Cuba, his team might receive its orders. One possibility, he writes, would be to have a regularly scheduled commercial flight transmit a coded message from just outside Cuban airspace. “It might even be a ‘weather report,’” Garner writes.

The Green Light teams in 7^th Group were not exclusively focused on Cuban targets, however.

“We did look at the Bridge of the Americas in Panama, to drop that over the Panama Canal,” a 7^th Group veteran said. The bridge was targeted because downing it would close the canal temporarily – until the wreckage could be cleared – whereas destroying the canal’s locks would necessarily lead to a much longer stoppage of canal traffic. (However, the 7^th Group veteran said, the group also targeted the locks as a contingency.)

“If you thought about it, it scared the living daylights out of you.”

But although 7^th Group has traditionally had a Latin American focus, the 1974 inactivation of 1^st Special Forces Group, which was not reactivated until 1984, meant that other groups had to cover down on targets in East Asia, 1^st Special Forces Group’s traditional area of responsibility. According to veterans of 7^th Group’s Green Light teams, that meant some of their assigned missions were in North Korea.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon gave 5^th Special Forces Group’s Green Light teams targets in that group’s area of operations: the Middle East.

Ken Bowra's first exposure to the Green Light program came in 1972, when he was assigned as the team leader of ODA 572, a freefall team that was one of 5^th Group’s Green Light teams. 

“It was a total surprise for me,” Bowra told The High Side. “I [had] never heard about it, because everyone kept it close hold.” But Bowra, who retired as a major general, wasn’t complaining. “We got a real mission and that's all we focused on.”

He was reluctant to identify that exact mission, however. “[In] the war plan, we were in a specific country in the [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] with specific targets and that is what we always would rehearse when it came to our exercises,” Bowra said. (Central Command runs U.S. military operations in the Middle East.)

In the mid-1970s, a sergeant major “volunteered” Staff Sergeant Scott Wimberley for a meeting on Smoke Bomb Hill. Not knowing what the meeting was for, he arrived with about 60 other Green Berets from his company in 5^th Group. After an initial briefing about the “special weapons” program, the men went into isolation for mission planning, as per Special Forces doctrine.

The mission they were given corresponded to something that was occurring in the real world in “one of the Middle Eastern countries at the time,” Wimberley told The High Side. Green Light team members from the other groups would have recognized the type of target Wimberley and his colleagues were assigned. “There was a dam that we had to take out,” he said.

Citing the then-highly classified nature of the Green Light targets, 5^th Group veterans declined to go into detail about target locations. But they left no doubt about the seriousness of the mission. “If I were to tell you the country,” said Don Alexander, who spent a decade in an A-team in 5^th Group’s 2^nd Battalion, starting in 1984, “if you thought about it, it scared the living daylights out of you.”

‘You didn’t jump the bomb; it jumped you.’

Whichever country their target was in, the Green Light teams’ first challenge was infiltration: how to get themselves and the SADM to the target. In interviews with Green Light veterans, one method stood out above all others: freefall parachuting.

There were usually three freefall A-teams per Special Forces battalion, and three battalions per group. However, not all freefall teams had the Green Light mission. Those that did discovered quickly that jumping with the SADM was far more challenging than was implied by the oft-used phrase “backpack nuke.”

One reason for this was the increasing weight of the device. The Pentagon had asked for a device weighing no more than 40 pounds. In return it got a bomb that weighed 59 pounds, which by 1965 had grown to 70 pounds, according to a Sandia National Laboratories (the name had become plural since 1959) document titled “History of the Mk 54 Weapon” written in 1967.

That meant that a decade and a half after Joe Garner had struggled with the SADM when making the first-ever jump with the device, little had changed for the Green Berets charged with parachuting it into combat.

“Really experienced jumpers had a really hard time flying that bomb properly,” said Tommy Shook, the 10^th Group Green Light team sergeant in the mid-1970s. “You didn't jump the bomb; it jumped you.” He estimated that in about 90% of his team’s freefall jumps with the weapon he and his teammates missed the drop zone and ended up in the woods.

When infiltrating the SADM by parachute, one man jumped in with the bomb and another jumped in with the planewave generator that would detonate it. (The generator only weighed about a pound, but it was jumped in separately from the SADM as a security measure.) A third team member carried a conventional shaped explosive charge to destroy the SADM to prevent it from falling into enemy hands if the team were compromised.

A UDT/SEAL conducts a dreaded water jump with the SADM. (Credit: Tommy Hawkins)

Shook's team trained to jump three bombs, with the 12-man A-team divided into 4-man elements. However, Mike Taylor, who was a junior engineering sergeant on a 10^th Group Green Light team a few years later, said his team only jumped with one device, an indication of how tactics evolved over the years and differed between teams.

Often, the job of jumping with the bomb (or at least the inert training device) fell to Taylor. “Jumping it in from 30 or 40,000 feet with a nuclear bomb between my legs, I didn't think twice about that,” he told The High Side. What irked him, he added, was that the SADM filled his rucksack, so teammates had to carry his other gear, meaning he'd have to ask them for clean socks or whatever else he needed.

Like other Green Light veterans, Taylor recalled at least one episode when the team was spun up for what appeared to be a real-world mission. The episode that stuck in Taylor’s mind occurred during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, when his team got called in and put into an isolation facility to begin planning for a mission to Europe, parachuting in straight from a flight from the United States. They were not told what country they were going to. The entire team thought it was the real deal, but after four days the team was sent home with no explanation.

There were, of course, other methods of infiltration. One was simply to jump the bomb in using static-line parachuting (all Green Berets are airborne qualified using static-line jumping, the parachute method used by most paratroop units). Some teams, like Shook’s in 10^th Group, trained to deploy the bomb using both static line and freefall techniques.

But although freefall jumping is far trickier and riskier than static-line jumping, with or without a nuclear device, static-line missions could and did go awry.

In 1985, Mike Adams was a young sergeant on a six-man team put into isolation in Morocco to plan a complicated Green Light mission. From Morocco, the team flew north on an MC-130 toward the United Kingdom. Two, if not three, of the aircraft’s four engines failed en route, but the plane was still able to land as scheduled at a British military airfield, Adams recalled. 

“It was dark and there were MPs fucking everywhere,” Adams told The High Side. Some U.S. military officials issued the team with a SADM device. Adams had only joined the team in 1983, and this was his first confirmation that the Defense Department kept supplies of the weapon in Europe.

“It was dark and there were MPs fucking everywhere.”

The team inspected the SADM and then flew over mainland Europe (on a different aircraft) before static-line jumping it at low altitude into a “blind” or unmarked drop zone in Germany. From there, the team had to conduct a long foot march to the dam that was their target.

However, Adams’ young team leader had been fielded a new handheld navigation device that he refused to show to the rest of the team. “He insisted on doing all the navigation himself,” Adams said. But despite – or perhaps because of – his high-tech gadget, the officer lost his way. This resulted in half a dozen U.S. special operators scampering across a German autobahn in ones and twos at night, dodging high-speed traffic while carrying a replica nuclear weapon.

After finally reaching the dam and emplacing the device, they moved to their offset location to pull security while another U.S. unit recovered the SADM trainer. The team moved into an escape-and-evasion corridor for several days before being picked up by a Chinook helicopter. “That was the most complicated mission I ever did with the nuke, by far,” Adams said.

Pardonnez nous, s’il vous plait

At least Adams’ team landed in the right country.

Stephen Bush's 10^th Group Green Light team was not freefall qualified. Instead, they practiced infiltrating the SADM via static line, jumping so close together that they all landed within 20 feet of one another. That technique was only useful, however, if the team parachuted over the correct drop zone.

In 1985, the team was supposed to fly from the United States and jump the SADM training device straight into Germany as part of the annual Return of Forces to Germany exercise. But when they landed none of the terrain matched up with their maps. Confused, the Green Berets walked around until they found some road signs – in French.

They were 18 miles inside France. As far as the exercise was concerned, they had just jumped a nuclear weapon into the wrong country.

“That turned into a national security threat,” Bush said. The team’s role in the exercise was halted and the U.S. Army came and picked them up in trucks without letting anyone know that they were there. “That was a big one right there,” Bush said.

Bush’s team also trained to infiltrate the SADM by skiing, snowshoeing, kayaking and surface swimming. The first two methods were often an option in Europe, but no matter which technique was used, the SADM didn’t get any less unwieldy.

A close up of the inert SADM on display at the National Atomic Testing Museum. (Credit: Kelly Michals, Creative Commons)

“We skied with it,” said Bill Flavin, the 10^th Group Green Light officer. “Now there was an adventure.” The skier would never really be stable with the SADM on his back and even highly experienced skiers struggled with it, according to Flavin. Like jumping with a SADM, he said, “you didn't ski with the device, the device skied with you.”

The SADM was designed to be infiltrated either on or under water. But as with the other ways of deploying the device, there were challenges. Rigging the device to have zero buoyancy was always difficult, as it had to sink just beneath the water but also not drag the operator down like an anchor, according to Bush, who on one training exercise in the Northeastern United States swam the SADM out to a dam with a partner while an opposing force acted as guards.

Don Alexander’s 5^th Group Green Light team specialized in scuba and other diving operations. The team members swam with the device in lakes all over North Carolina during the 1980s, sometimes surface swimming and other times using closed circuit (rebreather) or open circuit (scuba) systems. The SADM was watertight to at least 10 meters of depth, which was pretty much as deep as the team would be going on rebreathers due to acute oxygen toxicity when venturing deeper.

“We were astounded … that we had a nuclear weapons capability.”

Alexander described one training exercise with the SADM in Key West, Florida, where they swam it underwater and had a tough time getting the device neutrally buoyant. Team members had to pack the rucksack's external pockets with dive weights. “It was a huge pain in the ass,” Alexander said.

A 7^th Group Green Light veteran also described very difficult water jumps, parachuting in with twin 80 scuba tanks in addition to the SADM. “It's a boat anchor,” he said of the device.

During the 1980s, retired warrant officer Jim West’s 7^th Group Green Light team’s targets were mainly bridges and ports, which meant he also conducted the dreaded para-scuba jumps with the SADM. In a water jump, after landing in the ocean or lake, the team would swim underwater on oxygen to their target while an opposing force on boats looked for them. (In some instances, according to West, the “enemy” even put seismic sensors in the ground to catch the Green Berets if they came ashore.) A 4-man element would then swim the device out to its firing location, where it would be weighted or tied down to keep it in place before the swimmers moved to a nominally safe distance, he said.

The Navy special warfare community also had a SADM mission, which began with the underwater demolition teams, the precursors to the SEALs.

As a young ensign, Tommy Hawkins went through UDT training in 1966 and was assigned to UDT Team 21 (the forerunner of SEAL Team 4). Soon afterward, he was sent to Naval Air Station Norfolk in Virginia to receive specialized training on atomic weapons. The one-week program was intended “to get all the young frog officers and enlisted attuned to the fact that we had a nuclear weapon and capability,” Hawkins told The High Side.

Like their Special Forces counterparts, the Navy personnel were taken aback by the briefings. “We were astounded…that we had a nuclear weapons capability,” Hawkins said.

The Navy did not assign Hawkins to a SADM team. However, in the late 1960s he helped set up a training scenario for just such a UDT unit. The exercise involved the team parachuting with a SADM device into the ocean near Fort Walton Beach, Florida, and conducting a daylight rendezvous with a SEAL delivery vehicle. The SDV then infiltrated the frogmen into a nearby port.

Hawkins stood on a pier as darkness set in, watching for signs of the SDV. Even though the frogmen were using open circuit scuba systems (rather than rebreathers, which don't produce bubbles), he was unable to spot the swimmers. That is, until one of them popped up at the ladder on the side of the pier with the SADM and announced, “here you are, you're dead.”

“That was very convincing in terms of actually recognizing that we had a very reliable SADM capability, probably for the first time in our history,” Hawkins said.

Arming the bomb

Having gone to the trouble and taken the risks to infiltrate the SADM, a team then had to arm and set the device to ensure that the bomb went off. For some operators, this was the most difficult part of the mission.

The standard operating procedure for all Green Light teams was that only two men would have the 16-digit combination required to unlock and arm the SADM. Even then, each man would only have eight of the numbers, so they had to be together to unlock and set the bomb. That 16-digit combination allowed access to the timing mechanism, which was set like any normal analog clock.

Over the years specialized patches made by Green Light teams have periodically shown up for sale on eBay. This one was made for ODA 745 according to a former team member. Credit: ODA 745

However, some Green Light teams deviated from doctrine and created their own SOPs. Many team members, including Tommy Shook, were Vietnam veterans with extensive combat experience who fully understood not only how quickly missions could go wrong, but the contingency planning necessary to adapt and overcome those problems in the field.

Shook made sure that every team member had the combination to unlock the SADM. In a combat operation, what would happen if the only two soldiers who knew the combination were killed by enemy action, he asked himself. What if they got hung up in trees during the infiltration parachute jump? There were thousands of “what ifs” and in Shook’s mind one of them was what would happen if only one man on the team survived to emplace the SADM. That man needed to be able to detonate the weapon.

(Each Green Light team also had to carry a 23-pound shaped charge to destroy the SADM before it could fall into enemy hands. Using the emergency destruction charge would spread uranium and plutonium across the environment, causing a far greater ecological disaster than a low-yield nuclear detonation. “It was so in-extremis, that their concern was more the destruction of the technology than the localized contamination that would happen,” Don Alexander said.)

The nuclear weapons storage facility on Chicken Road at Bragg was where 5^th Group’s Green Light teams would rehearse unlocking and arming the device and other SADM “tech ops,” according to then-Chief Warrant Officer 2 Ed Carter, who during the 1980s served in 2^nd Battalion’s A Company, which had the battalion’s Green Light teams: ODAs 542 (ruck team), 544 (freefall team), and 545 (dive team, originally named 543). (ODA 541 was a “special projects” team that worked on developing new equipment.)

At least three men would train on the SADM at a time, according to Carter. One Green Beret would read out the step-by-step process to arm the device from a large binder. A second SF soldier acted as a reader checker, making sure no steps were missed or miscommunicated. A third Green Beret actually handled the inert device, performing the tasks that the reader gave him.

“It was very precise,” Carter said. “The device itself had a combination plate on the on the top that opened it up and it was a 16-digit combination.”

As with other teams, although the doctrine said that only two men were to have the combination – each soldier with eight digits – the A Company teams ignored this rule and gave every team member the combination.

“When the lid came off, you were exposed to a timer,” Carter said. “The timer on the device had to be mechanical [because] the radiation could affect an electronic timer, so you had really basically an old-fashioned timer that you had to set.” The group commander directed how much time to put on the device.

It only got more complicated from there. “With the timer, you had to wire the thing in and they had a special tool and special wire you loop through the timer and when you set it it's exactly an inch long,” Carter said. The only margin of error allowed was “plus or minus an eighth of an inch,” he added. “And the ends had to turn out from that at a 45-degree angle and they were a quarter of an inch long. They were very specific about how you had to do it that way.”

The next step was to arm the planewave generator, turning it to the “on” position. At that point, the SADM was armed and the lid was locked back in place. The team repeatedly trained on these actions until they learned them by rote. If anyone on the team saw or heard something he thought was incorrect, he would say to stop and the team members would discuss the problem. Eventually, according to Carter, they also trained on this process under night vision goggles and on the back of a C-130 aircraft in flight.

Bush and Taylor both said that a lot of soldiers found operating the timer to be tricky because it was adjusted in 60-second intervals. The bomb would be armed at an off-site location, or mission support site, near the target before two men moved it to the final position where it would detonate. This meant that the timing had to be precise, because the SADM would already be ticking down while the Green Berets were moving it to the final position, they said.

‘A suicide mission’

Just like the conventional Army engineers, the Green Light teams were supposed to ensure that two men had eyes on the bomb right up to the moment of detonation, maintaining overwatch to ensure it was not moved or taken away. (Snipers were often employed in this role.)

That sounded like suicide to many Green Berets, including Bill Flavin, whose team decided to deviate from this rule. “We weren't going to be around,” he said. “The doctrine said we got to keep it under full surveillance or blah blah blah. Yeah, okay.”

If a team did follow the doctrine, the official distance that the observers were supposed to maintain as the device went off was 732 meters, according to Carter. Many were skeptical. “The safe distance when we armed the thing was not even close to safe,” Bowra said.

When Wimberley’s 5^th Group team took part in a simulated SADM attack on a dam at Fort Bragg in the mid-1970s, the 4-man team that delivered the device to the target had to stay nearby to keep eyes on. “It was considered a successful training exercise, I'm just glad we never had to do it for real,” said Wimberley, who swam the bomb into position and emplaced it on the dam. “It was going to be a suicide mission.”

Green Light team members approached the grim realities of their task with a mixture of determination and gallows humor.

“Nobody on the team was squeamish about accomplishing their mission,” Carter said.

Taylor, from 10^th Group, was one of several Green Light veterans to articulate a conspiracy theory that the SADM’s timer didn't work at all and the second the SADM was armed it would go off and kill the Special Forces team with it. The rationale for this theory was that the U.S. government would not want a handful of operators who could be captured running around behind enemy lines with knowledge about a nuclear bomb that was ticking down.

“We thought that, yeah, they want to evaporate the entire team,” Taylor said. To mitigate this, his team came up with its own SOPs, including only having one man move forward to arm the bomb.

Stephen Bush, another 10^th Group veteran, had heard the same theory, but took it in jest. “When you set the device, do you really have a delay or [does it go off] immediately?” he said. “That was the big joke we had and we just had to have faith that … things are working.”

In the middle of a very realistic alert for a mission that later turned out to be a false alarm, Don Alexander suddenly remembered Mike Adams’ favorite joke: that when a Green Light A-team unlocked the SADM to arm it for real, along with the bomb the soldiers would find 12 Medals of Honor and a bottle of Jack Daniels inside.

Adams himself was determined to follow doctrine and keep eyes on the SADM until detonation if ever called upon to conduct a live mission. “If you're going to pussy out at the last minute,” he said, “what good are you?”

The escape and evasion plan was a Swiss watch

For all the attention paid to infiltrating the SADM, there appears to have been suspiciously little effort devoted to planning how to get the teams back safely after the mission.

Like several other Green Light veterans interviewed for this article, Tommy Shook said that as far as he was aware, no matter how successful he and his teammates were in detonating the SADM, nobody was coming to get them. “There was never an extraction plan,” said the 10^th Group veteran. Instead, the team’s orders were to remain behind enemy lines, attempt to recruit Soviet military deserters, raise a guerrilla army and wage unconventional warfare.

“I literally never once saw an exfil plan for any of the missions we trained for,” said Jim West, who served in 7^th Group. Another 7^th Group Green Light veteran said he and his colleagues were issued Tudor Pelagos watches, ostensibly to be used as barter items during escape and evasion. (Tudor is a high-end Swiss brand and a sister company to Rolex.) “I was told you can walk onto an airfield anywhere in the world and trade a Rolex for a seat on a plane,” the other 7^th Group veteran told The High Side. The watches had to be turned in when soldiers left the team, he said.

Tommy Hawkins, the UDT frogman who went through an atomic weapons training course in the late 1960s, said the briefings left him and his colleagues “stuck with the reality” that if they ever had to conduct a SADM mission, “we aren’t coming back.”

Taylor, another 10^th Group veteran, was a rare exception. His team always had an extraction plan and developed their own escape-and-evasion routes, he said.

Adams said he saw extraction plans for 5^th Group missions targeting the Caucasus mountains, but he thought the plans were ambitious to the point of being fanciful. “The egress plan was we're supposed to walk back to Europe and hit caches that are allegedly along the way that 10^th Group put there,” he said, adding that he doubted the existence of some of the caches, because of their supposed locations behind the Iron Curtain. “The E&E plan was just crazy...it was literally hundreds of miles” to walk back to friendly lines, he added.

Dick Potter, who commanded 10^th Group during the early 1980s, and was presumably very familiar with the Green Light plans, adopted a matter-of-fact tone about the issue. “I’m sure we would not have gotten our people back,” he said. “It’s war.”

The secrets of ‘the little house on the prairie’

In the early 1970s, Tommy Shook was a Green Beret assigned to 5^th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg. On occasion, he'd be out at Pope Air Force Base and would see another SF team cordoned off on the opposite side of the airfield preparing for a jump. His colleagues told him in hushed tones that that was the “special weapons” team. The term meant nothing to Shook, who figured they meant submachine guns or something.

Shook had noticed that the building where the special weapons teams trained was always secured by armed guards. Nonetheless, he told The High Side, “I had no idea it was about atomic weapons.” It wasn't until a few years later, when he became a 10^th Group team sergeant at Fort Devens that he learned the true nature of the program, after his sergeant major told him to have his team standing by for special weapons training.

Another view of the SADM jump pack. Credit: USASOC

The training was held in an isolated concrete building in a field near the 10^th Group area at Devens. The structure had one door, no windows, and was known as “the little house on the prairie.” Once inside, instructors gave Shook's team a security brief and then showed them a film that introduced the Green Light program. The film bewildered Shook. “Why are they showing us this film of entire forests being destroyed by a bomb?” he thought.

Recalling the moment decades later, Shook told The High Side that his reaction at the time could be summed up in three words: “What. The. Eff.”

Shook’s astonishment was typical of those operators learning about the program for the first time. The secrecy surrounding the SADM device and the Green Light teams meant that even other Green Berets were completely unfamiliar with the program. It also meant that there were secrets to which even the Green Light operators, who were being asked to risk their lives, were themselves not privy.

“What. The. Eff.”

Secrecy suffused the Green Light program. The military took extraordinary measures not only to ensure the Green Berets kept secrets, but to keep secrets from them. Just as the 7^th Group team who thought they were on a wartime mission to jump into Cuba discovered, encounters with mysterious individuals who were less than forthcoming were the norm.

When Mike Adams was first assigned to a Green Light team in 1983, and then went through the SADM training course at Fort Belvoir in 1984 to learn about blast radiuses and how radiation moves with the wind, like others in the program, he had to be entered into the Pentagon’s personal reliability program for nuclear weapons. He later participated in a strange series of events when he and his team were called out to Pope Air Force Base to find the place heavily guarded by MPs.

Several men in suits were there. They identified themselves as being with the Defense Nuclear Agency (now the Defense Threat Reduction Agency) and gave the Green Berets a new type of planewave generator that none of them had seen before. “It looked different, and it was weird,” Adams said.

They used it to arm an inert SADM trainer and jumped it onto Bragg’s Sicily Drop Zone. As soon as they landed, “the suit guys came running out there, took the weapon back and took off,” he said.

During his time in a 10^th Group Green Light team in the 1980s, Stephen Bush was always told that he was using an inert SADM trainer, but there were times when he wondered what was really going on.

There were usually two guards around the Green Berets when they were training with the inert SADM, Bush said. But on some occasions, when the device seemed to weigh more, there would be four, with another small of group of about half a dozen nearby. In addition, on those occasions, the training assessors – “the people who wear the white armbands” – were not the usual Special Forces personnel. “They weren’t SF guys,” Bush told The High Side. “They were somebody else. I couldn’t say who they were, but I could tell there was different things that were going on, we got a lot more oversight.” Bush was never told what was going on that warranted the heightened security.

The tyranny of the inspectors

Along with the secrecy and the security came the scrutiny, embodied by the regular inspections of Green Light teams that could not only end an A-team’s role in the war plan, but also the careers of its entire chain of command.

“You lived in fear of the inspection,” Potter said. When the nuclear inspectors came to test the Green Light teams for two days, “you sweated bullets, really your whole career flashed before your eyes,” he said. “For a commander [the inspections] were a huge in pain in the ass. If you turned something a quarter of an inch too far with a wrench you failed.”

When his teams passed, Potter said, “I could kiss them all.” The feeling was mutual, according to Taylor. “We loved General Potter,” he said. “He was a great guy.”

The 10^th Group Green Light teams even took to calling themselves “PIG teams,” for Potter’s Imperial Guards. “Even to this day, I run into people [who tell me], ‘Sir, I was a PIG,’” Pottter said. (There were also “PIG teams” in 7^th Group, named after Col. Bill Palmer, the group’s commander in the early 1980s.)

Stephen Bush also found the inspections stressful, if only because he had a colonel, a major, and a few sergeants major breathing down his neck when he was tested. Immediately prior to one test he joked to them, “I'm holding all of your careers in my hands right now.” One of his superiors replied that if he failed, they were also holding his.

The perception that the inspections threatened the careers of every officer involved was not limited to 10^th Group. At 5^th Group officers believed that if a team failed an inspection the entire chain of command would be relieved. “It would have been the black Chinook coming in and taking everybody,” Bowra said.

The fenced-in nuclear facility (and SADM training area) off Bragg’s Chicken Road where 5^th and 7^th Groups’ Green Light inspections were held was nicknamed “the birdcage.” During the 1970s, the inspections were carried out by personnel from U.S. Army Forces Command, according to Joe Garner’s memoir.

“If you turned something a quarter of an inch too far with a wrench you failed.”

Every six months his entire A-team went through refresher training and once a year the inspectors came down to Bragg to put the team through their Technical Proficiency Inspection, Garner writes. (Another source said the inspectors came from the Defense Nuclear Agency. Bill Flavin said the inspectors who visited 1^st Battalion, 10^th Group’s Green Light teams in Bad Tolz came from U.S. European Command in Stuttgart.)

By the 1980s, little had changed, according to Carter. Nuclear inspectors came down to 5^th Group periodically to make sure its Green Light teams followed all of the exact procedures and to question each team member individually. The group usually had the teams preparing for inspections a month in advance at the birdcage. The team members did their physical training there and had food was delivered so that they could devote their full attention to the SADM work.

The conventional Army engineers who had SADM missions in Europe likewise faced the specter of inspections, being graded on everything from arming the device to the correct way to load it on a truck, according to Baker.

The Navy’s UDTs also went through rigorous nuclear inspections with “zero tolerance for mistakes,” said Hawkins. After undergoing the training, he was relieved to not be assigned to a SADM team because of the difficulty of the inspections, he added.

Potter would himself have to inspect the storage area for 20 SADMs in what he would only describe as “another NATO country.” The host country had a very cavalier attitude toward security, according to Potter. “A nuclear inspection and penetration team...had no trouble getting into the holding area,” he said. (Potter’s job was to inspect the facility and the SADM devices to ensure all 20 warheads were in place, but he wasn't responsible for the location’s security.)

The brief history of the Green Light program obtained via the Freedom of Information Act references a similar incident in 1980 in which Bernard Rogers, the supreme allied commander Europe, tasked a SADM team from 10^th Group’s 1^st Battalion in Bad Tolz with testing the security of a “proto-type nuclear weapons storage facility in Europe … to determine how well this new site could withstand a terrorist or commando raid.” The site’s security apparently needed improvements. “Lessons learned were immediately put in place,” the history states.

The end of the Green Light era

The Pentagon shut down the Green Light program in the late 1980s, following a recommendation to do so from 1^st Special Operations Command, the forerunner to Army Special Operations Command. That recommendation came after the command, based at Bragg, had reviewed the mission and the potential targets, according to the brief history of the program The High Side obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

“After considering the large amount of resources needed to maintain mission capability, a lack of credible potential targets – and the unlikelihood of ever using these weapons, a recommendation was made that the mission be terminated,” the history states.

Bowra, who took command of 5^th Group’s 2^nd Battalion in 1988, soon got the word. “I was notified as battalion commander by the group commander that the mission was ended,” he told The High Side. The news came as “a relief,” said Bowra, grateful that the teams would no longer have to go through periodic inspections. “I got my teams back and we could focus on real missions and training.”

The Pentagon had three main reasons for closing down Green Light. The first was the development of precision-guided munitions that could be delivered by a variety of means that did not require soldiers sneaking behind enemy lines. The second was the growing sense among strategists that nuclear weapons were most useful as a strategic insurance policy for nations to hold as a credible threat, rather than to secure tactical battlefield objectives.

Finally, at the time the Pentagon decided to shut the Green Light program down, the Cold War was in its final days. The Soviet economy was faltering. After their defeat at the hands of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Soviet armed forces no longer appeared as the threatening behemoth feared for so long by NATO’s military planners.

The ascension to power of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the positive relationship he developed with Ronald Reagan marked a turning point. In 1987 Reagan traveled to Berlin and demanded, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Two years later, the Berlin Wall indeed came toppling down – at the hands of East Berliners. The Soviet menace in Europe evaporated, and with it the need for Green Light teams to jump behind the Iron Curtain with nuclear weapons in their rucksacks.

The Green Light mission may have helped keep Special Forces alive through the 1970s, according to the brief history obtained from U.S. Special Operations Command. During this period, when the Pentagon wanted to forget its recent unpleasant experience with counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia and focus instead on winning a large-scale land war in Europe, Special Forces experienced cuts but was never disbanded, perhaps because of their high-priority nuclear mission.

“It was important,” Bowra said. “But it was overcome by events and technology.”

20. Opinion | Relax, MAGA bros — Taylor Swift is not the enemy

Sometimes you have to just shake your head and wonder.

Opinion | Relax, MAGA bros — Taylor Swift is not the enemy

The Washington Post · by Eugene Robinson · February 1, 2024

Trying to demonize two of the most beloved phenomena in American culture — Taylor Swift and the Super Bowl — is an insane political strategy. Which must mean that the MAGA-addled far right has lost its collective mind.

How else to explain the way some of Donald Trump’s most fervent supporters have reacted to Swift’s very public romance with Travis Kelce, the Kansas City Chiefs’ star tight end? When cameras showed the couple kissing Sunday after Kansas City’s victory in the AFC championship game, I could almost hear the pop-pop-pop of MAGA heads exploding like bubble wrap.

As one example, former GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, who has endorsed Trump, went so far as to embrace a tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory: that the fix is in to guarantee that Kansas City wins the Super Bowl, and that Swift and Kelce will then announce their support of President Biden.

“I wonder who’s going to win the Super Bowl next month. And I wonder if there’s a major presidential endorsement coming from an artificially culturally propped-up couple this fall,” Ramaswamy posted on X, formerly Twitter. And when some replies accused him of being paranoid, he stood his extremely shaky ground: “What the [mainstream media] calls a ‘conspiracy theory’ is often nothing more than an amalgam of incentives hiding in plain sight. Once you see that, the rest becomes pretty obvious.”

An “amalgam of incentives?” Whatever that’s supposed to mean, the only obvious fact is that something about Swift sparks irrational fear and anger among some of Trump’s highest-profile and most vocal acolytes. And it’s clear that her relationship with Kelce makes that reaction ever more intense.

In December, after Time magazine named Swift its person of the year, right-wing commentator Jack Posobiec posted a MAGA yawp on X. “The Taylor Swift girlboss psyop has been fully activated,” he wrote. “From her hand-selected vaccine shill boyfriend to her DINK lifestyle to her upcoming 2024 voter operation for Democrats on abortion rights.”

There’s a lot to unpack in those two sentences. Calling Swift a “girlboss” communicates misogynistic resentment of her success and popularity. Claiming that she is participating in a “psyop” conjures the existence of shadowy puppet masters who are somehow controlling her every move (which would seem to contradict the whole “girlboss” thing). The bit about the “vaccine shill boyfriend” refers to television and digital ads Kelce has done for Pfizer, urging viewers to get vaccinated against the coronavirus. “DINK” is short for “double income, no kids,” a nod to the far-right view that childlessness at Swift’s age — she and Kelce are both 34 — is somehow unacceptable.

It would be one thing if these delusions were being spewed only by click-seeking online blowhards. But Stephen Miller, the radically anti-immigration former Trump administration official — who would probably be one of Trump’s most influential advisers if he became president again — is onboard. “What’s happening with Taylor Swift is not organic,” he mused darkly.

But it’s totally organic. Swift is in the middle of the biggest and most lucrative worldwide concert tour in history; to make it to the Feb. 11 Super Bowl in Las Vegas, where the Chiefs will play the San Francisco 49ers, she will have to hustle from a scheduled show in Tokyo. She is a self-made billionaire because of her genius for writing pop songs with earworm melodies and stiletto-sharp lyrics that connect with legions of “Swifties” around the globe.

Kelce is the best tight end in the National Football League, one of the two brightest stars — along with Patrick Mahomes — on the best team of our era. He already has two Super Bowl rings and is a lock for the NFL Hall of Fame. Why wouldn’t anyone who is vaguely interested in celebrity couples be interested in this one?

I don’t know anything about Kelce’s politics. Swift has endorsed a couple of Democrats in the past and advocates for women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, but so far she hasn’t spoken out about this year’s election.

I think what’s driving folks on the right so crazy is that they want to claim football as their sport — macho, regimented, nationalistic, violent. They see Swift as the antithesis of those things. They see her as an interloper, an invader. Even a 10-second cutaway shot of the “girlboss” cheering at a Chiefs game is unbearable.

Chillax, dudes. Don’t be such snowflakes. Sit back and enjoy the game, and you can cover your eyes if there’s another kiss.

The Washington Post · by Eugene Robinson · February 1, 2024

21. Russia’s Buddhist Nations Want Ulan Bator To Adopt Compatriots Law To Make It Easier For Them To Move To Mongolia

Russia’s Buddhist Nations Want Ulan Bator To Adopt Compatriots Law To Make It Easier For Them To Move To Mongolia – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · February 4, 2024

Activists from the three largest Buddhist nations in the Russian Federation – Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvins – the first two of which speak languages closely related to Mongolians but the third of which speaks a Turkic language – are petitioning Ulan Bator to adopt a compatriots law and “Mongol card” to make it easier for them to move there.

The initiative, which was launched last fall by the United Mongols Development Foundation headed by Kalmyk Dzhangar Tyurbeyev, has collected several thousand signatures on two platforms (change.org/p/друзья-поддержите-внесение-законопроекта-монгол-үндэстthний-карт-в-великий-хурал-монголии and uih.mn/petition/view/161).

The petition calls on Ulan Bator to introduce a new law “which would allow representatives of Mongol-speaking and other related peoples from countries of the post-Soviet space to receive documents that officially declare them to be attached to the Mongol nation” (idelreal.org/a/karta-mongola-kalmyki-i-buryaty-zakon-o-repatriatsii/32789994.html).

The majority of several thousand citizens of the Russian Federation who have moved to Mongolia since Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine are Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans and unlike ethnic Russians there are interested in remaining there rather than moving on to other countries (borgenmagazine.com/migration-to-mongolia/).

According to Vlada Baranova, a socio-linguist at St. Petersburg’s Higher School of Economics research center, Moscow views the Buryats and Kalmyks as Mongol speakers but Ulan Bator views them as “part of a single Mongolian nation,” a position many of the two nations welcome.

The three Russian Buddhist nationalities also have welcomed the enthusiastic support Mongol leaders have given them in their opposition to Putin’s war and have offered them various supports to make moves there easier. But Ulan Bator has not adopted a Mongol card of the kind that these peoples want.

The reason for that are two-fold. On the one hand, if such an option were available, there would likely be a massive influx of Mongols from China’s Inner Mongolia, a migration so large that it might threaten the capacity of the Mongolian state to cope with and would certainly destabilize its relations with Beijing.

And on the other, Moscow almost certainly would see the adoption of such a law as Mongolian encouragement of secession among three nationalities that are already unhappy with the treatment they receive from the Russians and would lead to a deterioration of ties between Russia and Mongolia.

But the fact that Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans are pushing for this shows that they are interested in being part of the Mongol world far more than they are being included often against their expressed wishes in the Russian one as defined by Putin and Moscow.

eurasiareview.com · February 4, 2024

22. Singaporeans bemoan U.S. Senator's 'ignorant' grilling of TikTok CEO

It was a shameful questioning. It was painful to watch such agenda driven ignorance in action.

Singaporeans bemoan U.S. Senator's 'ignorant' grilling of TikTok CEO

AP · by ZEN SOO Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 2, 2024

SINGAPORE (AP) — After a U.S. senator grilled the Singaporean CEO of TikTok about his nationality and suggested he was affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, Singaporeans are complaining about ignorant — or even racist — views of their country.

TikTok CEO Shou Chew and executives of other technology firms such as Meta, X and Snap testified Wednesday before U.S. lawmakers on online harm to children from social media.

During the hearing, Chew was repeatedly questioned about his nationality and possible affiliations to the Chinese Communist Party by Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark.

TikTok, which is operated by the Chinese firm ByteDance, has over 150 million users in America. U.S. lawmakers have regarded TikTok with considerable suspicion over whether its data can be accessed by the Chinese government and whether the app can be used to expand China’s influence. Chinese companies are required to set up Communist Party cells.

“You said today, as you often say, that you live in Singapore. Of what nation are you a citizen?” Cotton asked.

Chew affirmed that he is Singaporean — which does not allow its citizens to hold dual citizenship — but Cotton pressed on, asking if Chew was a citizen of any other nation, and if he had ever applied for Chinese citizenship. China also does not permit dual nationality, and rarely accepts applications for citizenship.

When Chew responded no to both questions, Cotton asked if he had ever been a member of the Chinese Communist Party or have had any affiliation to it.

“No Senator, again, I’m Singaporean,” Chew responded, visibly perplexed. The party requires members to be Chinese citizens.

Cotton’s line of questioning was described as “McCarthy-esque” by The Washington Post. Clips of the exchange posted on social media platforms drew tens of thousands of views.

An Instagram reel of the exchange uploaded by Singapore flagship newspaper The Straits Times drew nearly 2,000 comments, most criticizing or mocking Cotton for his line of questioning.

“Senator, do you know where Singapore is?” one person asked. Another remarked that “just because he looks Chinese, doesn’t mean he’s Chinese.”

About 75% of Singapore’s approximately 5.9 million population is ethnically Chinese, a result of Chinese immigrants moving to Singapore in the 1800s and early 1900s. Many young Singaporeans today do not identify with China as a cultural motherland.

Wednesday’s hearing was Chew’s second time appearing before U.S. lawmakers. He first testified in front of lawmakers in March 2023. That grilling lasted six hours, with lawmakers asking questions about TikTok’s data security and harmful content on the platform.

Jojo Choo, an assistant marketing manager in her 30s, said she was happy to see a Singaporean appearing in Congress at first.

“Initially I felt pride because the CEO of such a huge company is actually someone from Singapore,” she said. “But I quickly realized how ignorant the senator’s questions were.”

Choo said the Cotton’s questions were tinged with racism and it was “narrow-minded” to assume that someone who’s ethnically Chinese would be affiliated with China.

Another Singaporean, Fian Fazlie, said he was “completely baffled yet amused” at the senator’s questioning.

“He’s just being ignorant and he’s still justifying (his words) in his latest Instagram post,” Fazlie, who works in the public transport sector, said about Cotton.

Cotton posted a clip of himself giving an interview on Fox News to Instagram, stating in the caption that Chew had “a lot of explaining to do.”

“Of course, you can be affiliated with or associated with the Chinese Communist Party anywhere in the world,” Cotton said on Fox News, adding that the Biden administration has many cases against U.S. citizens suspected of collaborating or working with the Chinese Communist Party.

“Singapore unfortunately is one of the places in the world that has the highest degree of infiltration and influence by the Chinese Communist Party,” said Cotton.

It’s unclear what Cotton’s claims about Singapore were based on.

The 41-year-old Chew is a native of Singapore, where he lives with his wife Vivian Kao and their three children. Prior to joining TikTok, Chew worked for five years at Xiaomi, a Chinese smartphone company. Before that, he was a partner at the venture capital firm DST Global and earlier worked at Goldman Sachs.

AP · by ZEN SOO Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 2, 2024

23. Call For Urgent Action Against Myanmar Military Junta

Call For Urgent Action Against Myanmar Military Junta – OpEd – Eurasia Review

eurasiareview.com

As Myanmar marked the third anniversary of the military coup a large number of global pro-democracy organisations urge the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to act in accordance with its mandate for peace and security and take concrete actions against the Myanmar military junta.

These actions must reflect the gravity of the mass atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar (also known as Burma or Brahmadesh) committed by the junta for which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the UNSC to refer the Myanmar crisis to the International Criminal Court, said an open letter addressing the members of the UNSC. 

“We find that the UNSC’s adoption of Resolution 2669, which passed its one-year mark in December 2023, not only came too little and far too late – after decades of atrocities by the Myanmar military – but also produced no concrete progress towards halting the military’s genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, which have only intensified since the adoption of the resolution,” asserted the letter, endorsed by 462 civil society organizations, adding that since its adoption, the military junta has launched at least 909 airstrikes, killing more than 364 civilians including scores of children, and torched nearly 80,000 houses. 

Over the last year, it is undeniable that the military junta’s violence has become more targeted against civilian populations with blatant attacks on villages, towns, internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, religious sites where the refugees were seeking space, schools, and hospitals. Since the coup attempt, the junta has killed at least 4,450 people and arrested more than 25,900 people, with more than 19,900 individuals still detained, including President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. 

“Today, dire humanitarian needs are alarmingly increasing across the southeast Asian country, with more than 2.6 million people having been displaced. Civil society has repeatedly called on international actors, including ASEAN, UN agencies, and international non-governmental organizations, to cease any attempts at partnership with the junta in the name of humanitarian aid. Partnering with the junta only exacerbates the crisis at hand, including by allowing the military rulers to continue to block aid from reaching the populations under its attacks,” added the letter.

Myanmar’s future can only be defined by the will of the people, not the misguided initiatives of the international community. The people of Myanmar have bravely and courageously proven their aspirations and determination to end the military’s decades-long violence and to achieve long-lasting peace in Myanmar where people of diverse backgrounds can co-exist with equal rights and dignity in a truly inclusive federal democracy. It is time for the international community, particularly the UNSC, to align itself with the will of the people of Myanmar through swift, meaningful action.

Meanwhile, the anti-junta outfits of Myanmar denounced the plan of military dictators to conduct the elections arguing that 27.5 million voters had already given their mandate in the November 2020 general elections to rule the country without the intervention of militaries. The pro-democracy groups pointed out that the current batch of military rulers are planning ‘to hold a sham election as one of its hallmark attempts to claim a democratic mandate, gain international legitimacy, and normalize its relations with foreign countries’.

“The military junta, which is plunging the country into a dire human rights, humanitarian, and economic catastrophe, lacks any legitimacy to conduct a national election,” said Progressive Voice, a participatory rights-based policy research and advocacy organization of Myanmar, adding that the last national polls showcased the unwavering commitment of its nationals for a democratic future without military control. But the military dictator Min Aung Hlaing led a coup on 1 February 2021 to oust the democratically elected government in Naypietaw.

“Since the military coup, the Myanmar people have united and coordinated a resistance movement against the military junta. They have collectively prevented the junta from seizing an effective control over the country. Today, because of the people’s resistance, the junta lacks the administrative control of major parts of Myanmar. Across the country, resistance groups have been building Myanmar’s federal future from the ground up with inclusive, people-centric governance,” said Khin Ohmar, chairperson of Progressive Voice, asserting that the illegal and murderous junta has no legitimacy to organize and conduct an election.

The international community must not fall prey to the junta’s desperate grasp at legitimacy that would only be weaponized to misrepresent the grave reality of Myanmar’s multi-faceted crisis and prolong the military junta’s decades-long oppression of the people, stated Ohmar, while talking to this writer from an undisclosed location of Myanmar. She also insisted that the international community ‘must denounce the military junta’s sham election plans, and instead actively support the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of genuine federal democracy and sustainable peace’.

Needless to mention, the junta’s election plans go hand in hand with its relentless violence against the unarmed civilians across Myanmar. Over the last three years, the junta has imposed illegal draconian laws to terrorise the opponents, disband many political parties (including the Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy) and also guarantee its success in the polls. The National Unity Government, an interim government formed by the elected lawmakers, who were not allowed to function, seemingly holds the public mandate to work with ethnic councils and various resistance organizations for establishing a genuine federal democracy in Myanmar.

• Sunday, February 4, 2024 

Eurasia Review

• A Journal of Analysis and News
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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com