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"Whatever you want in life, other people are going to want it too. Believe in yourself enough to accept the idea that you have an equal right to it." 

– Diane Sawyer

"The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him." 

–​ Niccolo Machiavelli

“No one is an unjust villain in his own mind. Even - perhaps even especially - those who are the worst of us. Some of the cruelest tyrants in history were motivated by noble ideals, or made choices that they would call 'hard but necessary steps' for the good of their nation. We're all the hero of our own story.”

–​ Jim Butcher, Turn Coat

1. Our dysfunctional relationship with information warfare starts with leadership

2. Top Marine general returns to work, 4 months after cardiac arrest

3. Military Times survey: ‘Alarming’ percentage accept conspiracies

4. Outgunned in the Drone Fight: The U.S. Military Is Failing to Adopt the Next Machine Gun

5. How the US Army Can Close its Dangerous—and Growing—Small Drone Gap

6. A Moment of Truth for the Army's Chief Laser Weapon

7. Air Force Employee Indicted for Unlawful Disclosure of Classified National Defense Information

8. Retired Army officer may have leaked secrets to honeypot spy

9. The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World

10. Pentagon's budget process needs 'fundamental restructuring,' panel says

11. Ukraine’s first lady declines Biden’s State of the Union invite

12. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 5, 2024

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2024

14. Why getting more female troops into Special Operations will take time

15. LTG (Ret) James M. Dubik Writing Fellows Program

16. Opinion | The U.S. can’t afford to wait to fully embrace the world’s most effective weapon

17. Nine Things Western Analysts Got Wrong About Russia and Its Invasion of Ukraine

18. Qatar Positions Itself as Special Operations Training Hub

19. America’s New Twilight Struggle With Russia

20. The Growing Limits to Formulating US Grand Strategy in an Ever More Complex World

21. TikTok Targeted In New National Security Bill On Adversary Owned Apps

22. The Houthis Are Very, Very Pleased

23. US Green Berets will permanently deploy to Taiwan

24. FOLLOW-UP: The UN won’t reform until its employees lose diplomatic immunity - Washington Examiner

25. On this day in history, March 5, 1966, patriotic song 'The Ballad of the Green Berets' hits No. 1

1. Our dysfunctional relationship with information warfare starts with leadership

So if I were king for a day (or the President of the United States), I would appoint Matt Armstrong to the new cabinet position of the Chief Information Officer for National Security Affairs. (CIO-NSA). It would be a cabinet level position and responsible directly to the President (and only to the President) for the direction, synchronization, orchestration, and coordination of all the instruments of informational national power across all the US government agencies to support US National security.

Our dysfunctional relationship with information warfare starts with leadership

Can we stop focusing only on the symptoms?

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/our-dysfunctional-relationship-with?utm=

MATT ARMSTRONG

MAR 5, 2024

As sure as the sun will rise tomorrow, you can expect an article or a conference speaker declaring the US is losing the information war against its adversaries. While painfully true, regardless of how you define information warfare, the blame and wistful nostalgia often accompanying the laments are likely to be untethered from reality. This poor framing tends to focus on symptoms rather than on the root causes. The common result is a misdiagnosis of the underlying problems followed by recommendations that are more likely to repeat and amplify defects than to correct them.

The most recent article in this genre that misses the forest from the trees, to switch metaphors, is “The US needs a better strategic narrative or it will cede influence to China” (FT.com, 18 February 2024) by Mike Studeman, “recently retired as a US Rear Admiral in naval information warfare and was the former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence.” I have some comments. I should make clear that Studeman’s piece is better than average because he expands the aperture to include too often ignored symptoms of the US’s defective view of information warfare.

If you don’t want to read further, the bottom line is we’re in this position by choice. Leadership from the White House on down, for about seven, not three decades, have made decision after decision to marginalize, deprioritize, limit, degrade, and segregate the informational element from the making and execution of policy. This segregation is so entrenched that information is viewed as something distinct from policy, with resulting calls like “putting the I back into DIME,” as if the so-called D(iplomacy), M(ilitary), and E(conomic) elements of power didn’t rely wholly on information.1 Segregating information amounts to shifting responsibility of the informational element of policy to another office, agency, or department, or complaining that it should be the responsibility of some non-existent organization, all of which is intended to conveniently absolve the original actor of responsibility.

Segregating information amounts to shifting the responsibility of the informational element of policy to another office, agency, or department, or complaining that it should be the responsibility of some non-existent organization, all of which is intended to conveniently absolve the original actor of responsibility.

Let me start with some background for new readers. I spent nearly the last twenty years in and around this topic as an academic, including earning a Master in Public Diplomacy, a blogger, a contracted expert to various Defense Department activities, and convening conferences on this topic (including this and this). I also worked with various State Department offices and supported Members and staff in Congress, including helping cause and write legislation related to this subject (including the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012) and helping cause and launch a Caucus on Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy in the House. I served as the executive director of a government commission dual-hatted to conduct oversight and advocacy with access across executive branch departments and agencies and Congress, and held a Senate-confirmed Presidential appointment leadership position (to which Senators approached and recruited me for as a subject matter expert) of a relevant federal agency. These roles allowed me to participate in high-side, low-side, and public conversations across the executive and legislative branches, and with domestic and foreign media, and governments in allied nations and less-than-allied nations at all levels, and in-person in places like Kabul, Doha, Vilnius, Brussels, Jakarta, Moscow, and Beijing. At present, I’m writing my PhD dissertation on how the US responded to Russian political warfare in the early cold war of 1945 to the early 1960s. That’s not to say I know more than the next person; it’s just that this is not new ground for me.

Definitions

Terms matter. Sometimes. Maybe not here. Studeman’s “strategic narrative,” besides also meaning tactical, focuses the mind on telling a story as if there is a magic combination of words and pictures. Studeman probably didn’t use the more common “information warfare” as it has a specific, and often tactical, meaning at his prior workplace. The term I prefer is political warfare, which focuses on the intent while leaving open the means. Begrudgingly, I’ll use information warfare for convenience as it is the more common term despite it focusing on a munition. We can argue this is a quibble over labels, but terms like “strategic narrative” reflect a deep dysfunction in conceptualizing and integrating the informational element of policy with policy.2

Symptoms

As I noted above, I like Studeman’s article because of his attention to symptoms that reveal leadership priorities over years and decades. Each bullet point below could easily be expanded into a chapter or dedicated research paper, of which I’m sure several exist for each.

• “We have placed less emphasis on training…”
• “[We are unable] to engage in information warfare at the speed and scale required…”
• “We have created barriers to releasing information…”
• “Our default mode for dissemination is more reactive than proactive.”
• “[T]he National Security Council exerts excessively tight discipline on…messaging”
• “[T]he White House fails to connect the dots for the American public…”

Each statement above is the result of decisions made and decisions avoided at all levels, from the President to Cabinet Secretaries to service chiefs (in the case of the Pentagon) to undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and continuing on down. The buck stops nowhere when it comes to information, except, that is, with the mythological USIA. Studeman opened his article by declaring, “Over the past 30 years, America’s information instrument has been neglected.” To be clear, this is a problem that extends back well over three decades. The symptoms he calls out are each an example of insecurity. Not doing something is the safer course. CYA is the basic operating principle because it’s allowed to be. An errant munition is easily explained if the boom is literal, but a figurative boom of an errant information munition causes people to preemptively run for cover. It’s explosion versus implosion.

CYA is the basic operating principle because it’s allowed to be. An errant munition is easily explained if the boom is literal, but a figurative boom of an errant information munition causes people to preemptively run for cover. It’s explosion versus implosion.

Studeman is right to decry the training aspect, but this could refer to either the training of individuals in the informational side or of educating leadership – and oversight – on the utility, role, value, means, risks, and necessary resources for integrating information into policy and operations. The two are not the same, though they are related. On the more traditional training side, as a Navyman, is Studeman considering the Military Information Support Operations or Psychological Operations units?3 These troops exist but they have traditionally been marginalized, similar to public diplomacy personnel at the State Department, and may be shrinking and becoming more marginalized as the Army increases its focus on “traditional” war. A recent headline seems relevant here: “US may cut info-warfare assets as China, Russia expand influence ops.” This is a decision by leadership.

A deeper conversation on this topic would include questioning the utility of separating the MISO/PSYOP troops between active and reserve components if the informational element is truly to be integrated at the strategic level and not merely constrained to tactical operations. And what of Civil Affairs, Foreign Area Officers, or the integrators under the Information Operations title? Such a deeper analysis would inquire into the comparative functional relationships between a combatant commander at different levels with their Public Affairs Officer, their JAG (the lawyer), and their PSYOPer. Each has a different primary interest, with (to generalize for the sake of the argument) one focusing on ways to achieve the commander’s objective, which may not necessitate obliterating a target, while the others consider acceptable parameters based on how the action will play at home or what is permissible under the law of armed conflict. We can see leadership training and accountability at work here.

It would also inquire into the status of broadly defined information warfare as commonly understood at the military’s “schoolhouses,” including the Army War College, Navy War College, National Defense University, and the Defense Information School, to name a few. This reminds me of a statement from 1965 that seems relevant and applicable today:

American defense plans during the past decade have carefully and expensively prepared to fight the only kind of war we are least likely to face. And we have not in any major sense prepared to fight the kind of war both Russia and China surely intend to press…

Regarding the Defense Information School, or DINFOS, is it less common now that a uniform PAO exits the room when a PSYOPer enters to avoid the taint by proximity? That had been going away a long time ago, but I heard it was returning. Is there still a culture of “I inform, I do not influence” within the military public affairs community?4 Studeman’s critique would certainly speak to that. This reminds me of an incident in Afghanistan a good number of years ago where a Taliban bomb killed women and children. As the ISAF PAO prepared the press release that it wasn’t NATO, the Taliban beat them to the punch and blamed NATO. The PAO, who I strongly suspect was an American (but I didn’t confirm this detail at the time), set aside their press statement without releasing it, saying the matter was now out of their hands because the PAO “doesn’t do counter-propaganda.”

On the civilian side, if senior leadership were seriously interested in the informational element, there would have been different hiring criteria for the Under Secretary of State of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the office would not have been left vacant for nearly half of the past quarter-century it existed as a functional replacement to the USIA Director, and there would have been a push to hire, train, equip, and empower the State Department’s information officers. But this Under Secretary office continues to be irrelevant and the department’s front-line professionals continue to be marginalized.

Interested readers might enjoy an excellent analysis from May 2021 by Uliana Artamonova, then a junior research fellow at Russia’s IMEMO: “Faceless Leadership of American Public Diplomacy: HR Crisis in the Post-Bipolar Era” (the linked PDF is stored on mountainrunner.us). Artamonova shared her article with me in March 2022. From her abstract:

Comparison demonstrates a considerable change of patterns: since 1999 persons in charge of American public diplomacy have been changing more often and the position itself stayed vacant longer then it did in 20th century. There have been many acting nominees during the past decade whereas in the time of USIA there has been none. In addition, [this] article studies [the] characteristics of directors of USIA and of Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Analysis of education, professional background, personal relationship with the president (or lack of thereof) demonstrated that standards for candidates for the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs are significantly lower than the ones that were applied to candidates for the directorship of the USIA.

I recommend Artamonova’s paper to anyone truly interested in this subject. The gaps in appointments, resulting in “acting nominees” as she calls them, reflect the discounting of this position by the President, his National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State, to name a few. Positioned to be the nation’s Chief International Information Officer and successor to the Director of USIA, seemingly everyone in and outside of government ignores this office when talking about the nation’s information warfare requirements as the result of years of leadership shortfalls.

Shifting to Studeman’s “connect the dots” at home, this may speak to the need for education and awareness, but I don’t think so. I have many experiences revealing the lack of knowledge, understanding, and awareness of what is needed and why among policymakers and legislators. This demands more education and awareness building. In effect, there needs to be an engagement campaign to discuss the need to resource and empower engagement campaigns. One example is the previously mentioned, and short-lived, House Caucus on Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy I helped cause and bring about. The knowledge deficit is great, however. As a Governor on the then-named Broadcasting Board of Governors, now the US Agency for Global Media, I was astounded by how many Members of Congress on our oversight committees expressed some level of surprise that we existed and an equal amount of ignorance as to what we did and why. This was as much a result of incurious (and sometimes arrogant) Members and staff as much as an agency bent on hiding under the radar thinking it was in their best interest.

Studeman wrote, “Our information teams tend to be small and scattered across government.” He may have meant this as evidence of dysfunction since he followed it up with some USIA mythology. Whether taken as a stand-alone statement or in conjunction with the reference to USIA, it reveals the wrong-headed view that information is someone else’s problem when it is everyone’s. There should be numerous teams scattered across the government who should be working together in concept and practice rather than like isolated islands without pressure to integrate and no accountability for failing to do so. USIA, however, despite its name, was not the integrator, director, or owner of such outposts as is often imagined.

(Ir)relevancy of History

Truth be told, it is fine to leave USIA out of these discussions. We can look at history for lessons, but that history has to be accurate. Studeman wrote,

We no longer have a central US Information Agency (USIA), as we did to counter Russian propaganda during the cold war. Its closest equivalents are the state department’s Global Engagement Center and the US Agency for Global Media, with only a fraction of the former USIA’s capacity.

Yes, USIA had “information” in its name, but countering Russian propaganda was not a key mission of the agency. It did, but not in the way people think it did and want today. It’s misleading to suggest USIA had the role demanded by arguments like Studeman’s or Robert Gates or most others complaining about the loss of USIA. For the quick proof, I usually mention the Active Measures Working Group established in 1981 as an interagency collective established to counter Russian disinformation because “attempts to counter Soviet disinformation had virtually disappeared” by the mid-1970s.

Further, USIA represents the fracturing of an integrated model, as Chris Paul and I wrote in our July 2022 article, “False myths about USIA blind us to our problems… and to possible solutions.” Studeman, like so many others tethered to a mythologized USIA, isn’t aware USIA had only a fraction of its predecessor’s capacity, authority, integration, and leadership responsibilities in the State Department, the National Security Council, and across other government agencies, including the Defense Department and foreign aid and redevelopment programs. There’s also confusion about the difference between an operational agency and a coordinating body, like a National Security Council-like entity, which, some imagine USIA was when it wasn’t.

The false mythology around USIA can be seen in describing GEC and USAGM as the “closest equivalents” of USIA. GEC is not a remnant of USIA. It is a modern creation to address departmental dysfunction and lack of function. The legislative authorization to replace the authorization by executive order was, in my view, an unconscious, half-effort to recreate USIA.

While the US Agency for Global Media is a remnant of USIA, it’s not clear to me that USAGM has “a fraction” of the capacity of when the broadcast operations were under USIA.5

The real remnants, which are ignored for reasons discussed earlier, is the now abolished (see a theme here?) Bureau of International Information Programs and the public affairs sections and libraries (“information resource centers”) at embassies and consulates abroad. IIP was broken up into parts to remake the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs into the aspirational Bureau of Global Public Affairs, the success of which is to be questioned, not the least of which by the mere existence of Studeman’s arguments.

As for the public affairs sections, they are the completely ignored yet very real legacy of USIA. The hard-working, under-resourced, under-staffed, often marginalized (especially within the department), and often improperly tasked public and cultural affairs staff, information resource center personnel, and others under the broad “public diplomacy” umbrella were USIA’s real strength and real value to US foreign policy. The modern narrative tends to focus on USIA’s ability to hurl electrons into foreign lands, to paraphrase Edward R. Murrow, but USIA getting its people into the “last three feet” to directly engage foreigners abroad was its real power. These offices, these people, these capabilities still exist. There is little respect for their potential, a fact reflected in the discounting of the value of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs discussed earlier.

Honestly, though, this past can be irrelevant to discussions like this. Studeman didn’t need to invoke USIA and I wonder if an early draft didn’t include USIA. In my experience, it’s possible, even likely, that a reviewer or the editor insisted on inserting USIA based on what they think they know.

Say-Do Gap

In

Daniel W. Drezner’s response to Studeman’s piece, he wrote he was old enough to “remember past efforts to improve U.S. public diplomacy” and that though “there was a lot of hair-pulling about whether the United States was doing a good job at information campaigns” it was “only in retrospect that commentators felt good about the U.S. performance.” I’m not sure what retrospective Drezner refers to, but it’s probably a mix of shifting the goalposts and focusing on the 1970s onward, a vastly different information and political environment than the present, which is more like the early cold war than the latter Cold War. On the public diplomacy side, I’m old enough to remember there was a lot of jabbering about the pixie dust of public diplomacy without any substance around leadership, resourcing, integration, or, really, anything else substantive. The “eroding appeal of the message itself,” as Drezner rightly pointed out, is about the failure to craft policies that match our words and values where the mutuality between policy and perceptions should have meant information programs complemented, clarified, and assisted but instead were used to put lipstick on a pig or change the subject.6The Propaganda of Propaganda

A discussion about the irony of misinformation surrounding our efforts to counter misinformation must include at least a mention of the propaganda of propaganda. Significant limits on US information activities conducted abroad stem from full-throated attacks on USIA, Voice of America, and the then-wholly separate Radio Free Europe in the 1960s. This culminated in a 1972 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act that set the course for the modern narrative it is a law designed to prevent the government from propagandizing Americans. Resulting misinformation led to falsified histories and unsupported statements the Act prevents Defense activities, and likely had a role in Studeman’s examples. This continues despite the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 explicitly stating this Title 22 law that calls out the State Department, USIA, BBG, and USAGM does not in some magical way apply to the Title 10 or Title 22 activities of the Defense Department. Such magical broader applications were selective at best, as is apparent in law review articles on this Act that employ absurdly broad strokes of language and demonstrate ignorance of the letter and construct of the law and US Code. (See my Fulbright’s “Knee-capping” of US Global Engagement, Part 2 for more on this.) The propaganda of propaganda hampers conceptualizing and discussing information warfare in Congress and throughout the executive branch.

Attempts to inform foreign or domestic audiences are quickly labeled as propaganda. Fear of the propaganda of propaganda is an easily identified failure of leadership. Through the delays, inaction, and rejected action that Studeman wrote about, leadership contorts themselves to pass the buck partly out of fear of the “five-dollar, five-syllable word” Eisenhower, as a candidate for president in 1952, said we need to stop fearing. To communicate is to influence and we need to communicate as part of our foreign policy and national security. I’m communicating here, by the definition of some, this note is propaganda, but is that a useful label?

A July 1945 State Department report explained the need for a postwar international information program this way: “Modern international relations lie between peoples, not merely governments… International information activities are integral to the conduct of foreign policy.” In 1947, the Secretary of State restated the need this way:

There was a time we could afford—or thought we could afford —to be unconcerned about what other people thought of us… That time is past… Our attitude and our actions—and rumors thereof—will be matters of concern everywhere.7

Maginot Line

Our insistence on focusing on the military means of dissuasion has long proven to be a Maginot Line that our adversaries are getting better at circumventing. Information warfare is written about today as something new because we’re ignorant. We weren’t better at it thirty or twenty-five years ago. It’s not new to our adversaries. For some of our adversaries, notably Russia, it is not just part of their Soviet history, but a part of the Tsarist history as well.8

Information warfare, or broader political warfare, is cheap and effective. Naturally, our adversaries pursue this asymmetric course of action to our detriment. They’d be dumb not to, especially since our ever-increasing reliance on military might to dissuade has an ever-rising threshold for employment. Our deterrence is based on fighting a war that we hope never comes and one that our adversaries aren’t waging directly against us. 

There are lessons to be learned, but the fake history in these writings are ignorant of past shortcomings and, as a result, ignorant of the lessons to be learned. If they understood the history, the role of the President’s will – to act, to provide resources, to integrate with the making and execution of policy, and to hold accountable the many agency actors, even if there is one notional central agency – is paramount. We are in the position we are today because of decisions and non-decisions by leaders across government for decades.

I’ll close with one of my two favorite quotes on this topic. This is Senator Thomas J. Dodd speaking in February 1961:

We have lost and lost and lost in the cold war for one primary reason: we have been amateurs fighting against professionals. So long as we remain amateurs in the critical field of political warfare, the billions of dollars we annually spend on defense and foreign aid will provide us with a diminishing measure of protection.

This remains, unfortunately, true.

1

The DIME metaphor is a prime example of the broken vision of information in the US national security discussions. The DIME components are neither co-equal nor are they actually “elements of power.” DIME is a model of bureaucracy, D = State, I = USIA, M = Defense, and E is a catch-all for trade, economic, and aid policies from the WH, Treasury, USAID, etc. In this model, the M is usually another flavor of D, except it is from Defense, just as the D requires rhetorical gymnastics to bring non-diplomatic activities. A good example of how broken the DIME is, and the discussions that flow around it, is the perversion of adding -FIL, for Finance, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement. The resulting DIMEFIL/MIDLIFE construct is simply another bureaucratic model of participation. I’m glad you asked if there is a better model because there is. A better framework is PPCE, for Political, Psychologic, Combat, and Economic. Here, we don’t have the actionless and neutral information as a munition, but intent and action with Psychologic (yes, without the -al). Instead of Military, which absent troops in contact, exercises psychological and political influence, hence Combat. Political provides a broader tent than the very narrow Diplomatic. The source of this framework is the US Army War College, one hundred and seven years ago. The Army’s Military Intelligence Branch organized around this concept. There are things to learn from the past.

2

I’m not using Public Diplomacy because it has no meaning. Adopted as an umbrella term for the activities of an agency in 1965, it carries that heritage of being detached from intent or means while being anchored to the actor, usually, but not always. It’s worth stating that PD can rightly be seen as PW by the receiver. For example, identical PD programs in France and China on how Americans register to vote will likely get a “meh” in Paris and an angry “Don’t tell us how to vote” in Beijing, the latter I can confirm from my meeting with the number 2 man of China’s domestic propaganda agency. He was right: from the perspective of China, PD is PW because it creates tension between Beijing’s disinformation and alternative options of governance, freedom, and the like. See my discussion on the term in my chapter “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy” in Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, 2020).

3

I don’t know if a disclaimer is necessary here, so I’ll say that I was inducted as an Honorary Member of the Psychological Operations Regiment at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in 2016. Before that, I had the honor of presiding over an induction ceremony at the Regiment, including drinking from the boot.

4

When faced with this, and it used to be frequent for me, I would posit the scenario of a PAO at a large military installation in the US informing the local community that the main gate would be closed for repairs. The PAO would coordinate with local stakeholders and the media to provide and publicize alternate routes of transit for both base traffic and nearby traffic, which would be impacted as well, and would, if they are doing their job, communicate this information to the community. This seems like a natural step to maintain good relations with the community. It is also influencing Americans and affecting their behavior.

5

Perhaps Studeman’s reference to “30 years” ago was intended to start with the establishment in 1994 of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the predecessor to the USAGM. BBG was under USIA until it became independent when USIA was abolished in 1999. For your bar trivia, legislatively, the amendment to abolish USIA first entered the record in June 1997.

6

See, for example, The Age of Amorality by Hal Brands in Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2024.

7

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, April 14, 1947, arguing for the need for the yet-to-be-reintroduced Mundt bill, known today as the Smith-Mundt Act.

8

See, for example, the Congressional testimony by Dr. Lev Dobriansky in 1964 I quoted here.

2. Top Marine general returns to work, 4 months after cardiac arrest

Top Marine general returns to work, 4 months after cardiac arrest

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · March 6, 2024

The top Marine general returned to full duty status Tuesday, a little more than four months after he experienced a cardiac arrest that scrambled the Marine Corps’ leadership.

Gen. Eric Smith, the Marine commandant, hadn’t been performing the Corps’ top job since he was hospitalized from a cardiac arrest on Oct. 29, 2023. But he repeatedly had signaled he intended to get back to work once he had recovered.

Three weeks after his hospitalization, Smith appeared in a brief video to reassure Marines, “I’ll bounce back from this.”

In January, he underwent a successful open-heart surgery to repair the congenital heart abnormality that the Corps said caused the cardiac arrest, and he reiterated he planned to return to full duty status once he could.

RELATED

Marine general taking steps to return to full duty as commandant

The top Marine's return could happen in the coming weeks.

In recent weeks, Smith has made visits to the Pentagon and listened in on meetings in preparation for his return to the job, the Associated Press reported.

“General Smith and his family appreciate the full support of Congress, the leadership at the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, the Joint Force, and all who extended them their well wishes during his recovery,” the Marine Corps said in a news release Tuesday announcing Smith’s return to full duty status.

This will be the first time since July 2023 that the Marine Corps’ top two positions have been filled by leaders on full duty status.

When Gen. David Berger retired as commandant that month, the Senate hadn’t confirmed Smith as his successor thanks to a hold on nominations by Alabama Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville, who refused to confirm senior military nominees through the usual unanimous consent process, in protest of a Pentagon policy facilitating troops’ travel for abortions.

Smith, then the assistant commandant, took over the role of commandant in an acting capacity. The Senate confirmed him as commandant by individual vote in September 2023.

Without a Senate-confirmed assistant commandant, Smith still was doing the equivalent of two jobs at once, he told reporters two days before his cardiac arrest.

Smith’s hospitalization briefly left Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the most senior general in Marine Corps headquarters, in charge of the service. Days later, the Senate rushed to confirm Gen. Christopher Mahoney as the assistant commandant, who would perform the duties of commandant.

Tuberville, who insisted the blame for the military’s leadership gaps lay with Senate Democrats and Pentagon leaders, relented on his hold on hundreds of military nominations in December 2023.

Since his confirmation, Mahoney had been in a situation similar to the one Smith previously faced: performing the top two jobs in the Marine Corps at once.

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

3. Military Times survey: ‘Alarming’ percentage accept conspiracies

This sounds like they have a healthy skepticism. But why do they seem so accepting of conspiracy theories? Why don't they have the same level of skepticism of those?

Excerpt:

“What the results are telling me is that they’re skeptical,” Parrott said. “They’re skeptical of news media, they’re skeptical of politicians and they’re skeptical of social media.”

However, a “disturbing” number of people still indicated support for the most extreme principles of QAnon and the “Great Replacement” theory — conspiracies that have prompted violence in recent years, researchers said.

​But there is a lot of interesting information in this article from the survey such as this:

The outlet with the most outright distrust was Fox News, with 57% of people saying they don’t trust it. About 30% said they do trust Fox News.

Military Times survey: ‘Alarming’ percentage accept conspiracies

militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · March 5, 2024

Most Military Times readers believe they’ve been targeted with disinformation from malicious groups, politicians and news media, and they think the responsibility to stop its spread falls to everyday people, a recent survey found.

Readers are dubious about information posted to social media and confident in their ability to spot disinformation — but they don’t have faith in their neighbors or in politicians to do the same, the results said. In a test designed to see whether readers could differentiate between real and false information online, about 90% succeeded.

While most respondents called out false claims about the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol being a “PsyOp,” or psychological operation carried out by the government, there were still hundreds who answered that the claim was credible, said Scott Parrott, a professor in the journalism department at the University of Alabama who helped put together the questionnaire.

“What the results are telling me is that they’re skeptical,” Parrott said. “They’re skeptical of news media, they’re skeptical of politicians and they’re skeptical of social media.”

However, a “disturbing” number of people still indicated support for the most extreme principles of QAnon and the “Great Replacement” theory — conspiracies that have prompted violence in recent years, researchers said.

Military Times and the University of Alabama conducted the survey with Military Veterans in Journalism to discern how readers perceived disinformation and extremist beliefs ahead of the November presidential election. More than 2,400 members of the military community participated, including veterans, service members, contractors and family members. Their political ideologies were split: one-fourth identified as Republicans, 14% as Democrats and 52% as Independents.

Most readers could spot disinformation

The World Economic Forum declared disinformation as the most severe risk over the next two years, writing in its annual report in January that the spread of false information could undermine the legitimacy of newly elected governments across the globe and result in violent protests, hate crimes and terrorism.

Researchers are already seeing instances of Russian interference in the U.S. this year, including a coordinated effort around the Texas-Mexico border crisis to amplify calls for a civil war, according to Kyle Walter, head of research at Logically, a British tech company that uses artificial intelligence to monitor disinformation around the world. Walter said Russia is likely to increase its spread of falsehoods in the run-up to the November election, likely focusing on immigration and the U.S. economy.

“The perception at times is that Russia is seeking to help one candidate win an election over another candidate,” Walter said. “What they’re really trying to do is create chaos and make people question the process and validity of the democratic process and the integrity of the election.”

Election deniers are specifically recruiting veterans and service members this year to exploit their social capital and bring legitimacy to the cause, argued Human Rights First, a nonprofit human rights organization. In a report, the nonprofit urged veterans to be wary of calls to “restore election integrity” or “catch the cheaters in real time” and instead leverage their credibility to counter conspiracies about the democratic process.

In the survey, 57% of Military Times readers said they had personally been targeted with disinformation, and another 23% were unsure. They believe disinformation is spread mostly by malicious groups seeking power, followed by the news media, politicians and independent actors.

“It’s a bad sign that so many people have been targeted, and a good sign that so many people recognize at least part of the time when they’ve been targeted,” said Rachel Goldwasser, a senior research analyst at the Southern Poverty Law Center.

When asked about who’s responsible for stopping disinformation, 87% of respondents said U.S. adults as individuals bear that burden. Of the respondents, 73% said members of the mainstream media also share responsibility, and about half think government and community leaders, academics and social media companies should help stop the spread of disinformation. Only 17% said foreign government agencies are responsible for stopping it.

Overwhelmingly, Military Times readers said they could identify disinformation — about 92% were confident they could spot it. They generally believe their friends and family members can identify disinformation, too. About 64% think their friends could identify it, and 61% think their families can.

Just over half of respondents said veterans as a population can identify disinformation, but they were less confident in politicians and people in the towns where they live. About 42% think politicians can discern real and false information, and 30% think their neighbors can tell the difference.

“It’s common for people to overestimate their ability to identify disinformation,” said Wendy Via, a co-founder of the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism.

Parrott described that as the “third-person effect,” referring to a theory coined in the 1980s that states individuals perceive others as being more influenced by mass-media messages than they are.

“It’s almost as if you think better of yourself, like ‘I’m not affected. I can figure it out. I can parse it,’” Parrott said. “But when it comes to family or friends, they say, ‘They can parse it, too, but not as well,’ and then it gets to townsfolk and they say, ‘No, they can’t.’”

Participants in a survey of Military Times readers were asked whether this post on X contained credible, fact-based information. About 10%, or 245 people, said it did. (University of Alabama)

The survey put readers to the test. It asked respondents to identify several posts on X, formerly Twitter, as being real or false information. Many of them were correct with their responses, but there was confusion among hundreds about what was real or false.

Via, who has conducted extensive research on disinformation and extremism, said voluntary surveys were a helpful way to understand people’s thinking, but it was important to take into account the demographics of who responded.

“For the folks who are willing to sit down and take a survey online, it’s usually because they have something to say,” Via said.

Of the respondents in this survey, 86% were men, 92% were white, 49% had earned master’s degrees and 68% had completed combat deployments. Participants were spread across the U.S., but the highest number of people, about 30%, were located in the Southeast. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and National Guard were represented in the pool of respondents, with the highest concentration — about 37% — serving in the Army. The average length of their military service was 19 years.

A concerning embrace of the Great Replacement

To determine whether disinformation had influenced readers, survey organizers asked for their beliefs about various extremist groups and prominent conspiracy theories. While most respondents reject key tenets of QAnon and the Great Replacement theory, those who do agree still amounted to a “disturbing” number, said Freddy Cruz, a researcher with the nonprofit Western States Center, a nonprofit that monitors political extremism in the U.S.

The Great Replacement theory is a baseless idea that lenient immigration policies are being designed to replace the power and culture of white people in the U.S. The survey asked respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with the notion that a group of people in the U.S. is trying to replace native-born Americans with immigrants and people of color who share their political views.

While 1,770 people completely or mostly disagree with that notion, 438 respondents, or 18%, said they mostly agree, and 223 people, or 9%, completely agree.

“There seems to be some embrace of the Great Replacement narrative, which has been linked to several violent incidents in the U.S.,” Cruz said. “That’s one of the things that stood out to me as one of the more disturbing aspects of the survey.”

The conspiracy theory went from fringe to mainstream in the past couple of years, as conservative media outlets and some elected officials have amplified the message, Cruz said. The theory fueled racist violence and motivated multiple mass shootings, including the 2022 killing of 10 people in Buffalo, New York, and a shooting in El Paso, Texas, that left 23 people dead in 2019.

A poll organized by the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 2022 found that one-third of Americans believe the Great Replacement theory. The findings from Military Times and the University of Alabama were on par with a similar poll conducted by the federally funded think tank RAND Corp. in 2023, which found that 29% of veterans believe it.

“The responses for ‘completely agree’ and ‘mostly agree’ with the Great Replacement theory were extremely high,” said Goldwasser, who has studied militia groups for nearly a decade. “This is a theory that was really created and used by white supremacists, so the idea that it’s moved into the mainstream to the point where Army veterans believe it is alarming.”

When asked about their thoughts on Nazis, 83% of survey respondents indicated they think the group is a threat to national security — a figure that surprised Cruz because of the embrace of the Great Replacement theory.

“In the survey, it looks like people overwhelmingly agree that white supremacy is bad, Nazism is bad, but then there’s a smaller group of people who seem to actually embrace Great Replacement, and it’s a weird discrepancy,” Cruz said. “I think it speaks to the GOP doing an excellent job of dissociating the theory from white supremacist beliefs.”

Phill Cady holds a sign during a "Take Our Border Back" rally on Feb. 3, 2024, in Quemado, Texas. Online actors tied to the Kremlin have begun pushing misleading and incendiary claims about US immigration in an apparent bid to target American voters ahead of the 2024 election. (Eric Gay/AP)

Another cause for concern was the acceptance of QAnon, Goldwasser said. QAnon is an umbrella term for several conspiracy theories that falsely allege a cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles run the world. Only 2% of respondents said they completely agree and 7% mostly agree with the theory, but Goldwasser argued those amounts were concerning based on how the question was posed.

Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the idea that the government, media and financial world in the U.S. were “controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex-trafficking operation.”

“The fact that people made it all the way to the end of that sentence and agreed with every single one of those statements is disturbing in the grand scheme of things,” Goldwasser said. “It really got to who the true believers were.”

Other surveys over the past few years have tried to ascertain how many U.S. adults overall believe in the QAnon theories. A poll by the Public Religion Research Institute in 2021 found that 15% believe it, and a poll by Yahoo in 2020 pegged acceptance of the theories at 7%.

Where readers get their information

Respondents turned to local news outlets most for accurate information. About 77% of people said they trust their local news either “a lot” or “some.” However, local news is facing a crisis. About one-fourth of local newspapers in the U.S. have shut down in the past 15 years, creating news deserts and driving more people to social media, where disinformation is rampant, according to research from the Center for Information, Technology and Public Life.

Among the Military Times readers surveyed, 59% trust national news outlets, and 29% of respondents trust the news they received through word of mouth. Social media garnered the least support, with only 14% of people trusting the information they received there. Nearly 50% said they didn’t trust information from social media at all.

The lack of trust in social media surprised Parrott, who expected more people to turn to sites like Facebook, X, YouTube and Instagram for their news. A study from Pew Research Center at the end of 2023 found that 19% of U.S. adults overall often get their news from social media, and 31% sometimes do.

“They were skeptical of news, especially on social media, which I think is really interesting,” Parrott said. “I expected more people to be getting their news there.”

Of the survey respondents who do get their news from social media, they most often turned to Facebook, followed by YouTube and X, the survey found. For people who do get their news on those platforms, Parrott suggested several questions they should try to answer to determine whether information is true, including: Does the person posting have a headshot and actual name? How long has the account been active? What other sources can you consult? Is the source objective or biased? Does the post share information that target a social or political group?

“Who’s the source? Where’d they get the information from? Are they real? Has it been confirmed? These are little things you can check,” Parrott said. “If it elicits strong emotions from you or others, if it’s enraging, that’s a sign you might want to check that out.”

Instead of social media, 53% of respondents said they get their information most often from news websites, followed by 37% who turn to television news the most.

Goldwasser warned that it’s unclear what respondents might’ve meant by “news websites.” Fake news sites have flooded the internet over the past several years and have increased in number since the advent of generative AI, which allows users to quickly create content to post online. NewsGuard, which tracks misinformation, found 725 AI-generated fake news sites in operation as of last month.

“This is something I have seen a number of times in a variety of circumstances, where people think it’s a news website, but actually, that might not be accurate,” Goldwasser said. “I think it evokes almost a sigh of relief, like, ‘OK, they get their news from news websites. That’s great.’ But actually, it might not be quite as great as it sounds.”

The survey asked about 14 news outlets specifically, including a few that skewed conservative or liberal, based on the media bias chart from the media watchdog Ad Fontes. Respondents could indicate either that they trusted the outlet, didn’t trust it or didn’t know how to feel about it.

The outlet with the most outright distrust was Fox News, with 57% of people saying they don’t trust it. About 30% said they do trust Fox News.

The Daily Caller garnered the fewest number of people who said they trusted it. Only 5% of respondents trust its news, while 48% don’t trust it and the rest don’t know how to feel about it.

Army Times, which distributed the survey through its morning newsletter, was predictably the most trusted, with 64% of people responding that they trust news found on the website. CBS followed with about 40% of respondents indicating they trust the outlet. About 27% trust USA Today, 31% trust CNN, 22% trust MSNBC and 37% trust The New York Times.

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

About Nikki Wentling

Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.

4. Outgunned in the Drone Fight: The U.S. Military Is Failing to Adopt the Next Machine Gun

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

Before World War I, a British military magazine wondered, “When will the professional military class realize machine guns had become a permanent presence in battle? What will they do about it?” Today, we ask the same about the U.S. military and small drones. Small drones are in high demand worldwide; a recent Royal United Services Institute report found that Ukraine was going through as many as 10,000 small drones per month. In 2024, Ukraine could use as many small drones on the battlefield as it does artillery shells. Effective small drones are not expensive or difficult to manufacture; in Ukraine, many are provided by volunteer groups. A single first-person drone is now below the price point of an automatic rifle, and they have been weaponized by groups ranging from Mexican cartels to Hamas, the Taliban, and ISIL. And drone proliferation is accelerating.

Currently, the U.S. military is being left out. Troops cannot afford to meet drones for the first time on the battlefield. Existing tactics and equipment struggle against the onslaught of small, cheap weapons, and troops must be exposed to drones in training to adapt. In January, the U.S. military lost its first soldiers to an enemy air attack since the Korean War in a drone attack in Jordan. Are we repeating the sins of the cancellation of the Guardian Angel program, where traditionalism killed an urgent requirement for ground forces? The U.S. military cannot let sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines fall further behind the curve. There is promising progress with the opening of counter-drone schools in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, but using small drones in the offense is still woefully behind. The military must change, or thousands of U.S. ground forces that remain exposed at the tactical edge could experience their version of the Somme in the next war.

Outgunned in the Drone Fight: The U.S. Military Is Failing to Adopt the Next Machine Gun - War on the Rocks

WALKER MILLS AND TREVOR PHILLIPS LEVINE

warontherocks.com · by Walker Mills · March 6, 2024

The British Army began World War I with only two machine guns per infantry battalion. One gun was a spare, meaning the effective ratio was one per 1,000 soldiers. Historian John Ellis summarized, “For the British commanders, on the eve of the First World War, the machine gun simply did not exist.” The inability to grasp the changing technological character of ground combat cost British forces dearly early in the war. In what remains the bloodiest day in the history of the British Army, tens of thousands of British soldiers were mown down by German machine gunners in the 1916 Battle of the Somme, despite automatic weapons having existed in a similar form since 1893.

The adoption of the machine gun is an apt analogy for the integration of small unmanned aerial systems in the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. military. As with the adoption of the machine gun, failure of vision, traditionalism, and bureaucratic resistance are leading to insufficient numbers and delayed force modernization. Despite observing small drones proliferate globally and their growing use on modern battlefields, the U.S. military has still not equipped its infantry with adequate numbers or pushed ownership of these systems low enough to have an impact.

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The U.S. military risks repeating history unless bureaucratic impediments are removed and the right organizations are empowered to make significant changes regarding the acquisition and distribution of small drones for infantry units — drones need to be proliferated, decentralized, and familiar to the units employing them. To do this, it must be made easier for infantry units to acquire and train with them. Failure to do so leaves the U.S. military unprepared for the modern battlefield.

Failure of Vision

In 1915, after World War I became a protracted stalemate, the number of machine guns allotted to a British infantry battalion doubled to four. By 1918, some battalions possessed as many as 80 machine guns, and the British Army created a machine gun corps with over 130,000 men to employ them. But much of this progress was owed to mavericks who recognized that the character of warfare had changed and defied their leadership to acquire and field the weapons required in sufficient quantities. Unfortunately, changing bureaucratic inertia was slow and cost thousands of lives.

A different tug-of-war is occurring today. In a time of constrained budgets, traditionalists question the disruptiveness or effectiveness of small drones on the battlefield and contend that resources are still best applied to traditional levers of military power and defense. They argue that small drones are solutions for weak states or the stateless that cannot field their own air force. The result is a U.S. military incrementally fielding small systems while pouring resources into grander projects like long-range weapons and air defense systems, yet falling victim to weapons it has not pursued. However, traditionalist bureaucratic impediments are mainly inadvertent due to the adherence to legacy constructs. Control and reporting requirements for small drones are typically modeled after manned aircraft, leading to incongruencies and friction in operations.

Utilizing legacy constructs designed for traditional aviation encourages centralized management and risk aversion. Marines who flew the RQ-21 Blackjack recall being overwhelmed by time-consuming mishap investigations, even in combat, for drone losses. Former Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe recalled, “In Iraq, as a battalion commander, I spent two days with guys out looking for a Raven that crashed in the Euphrates River. … [Drones have] got to be expendable, [so] if the link gets broken and it crashes, we don’t have to go look for it.” Failing to accept risk with unmanned systems disincentivizes the correct use of the reporting system and the drone. More problematically, it increases the appetite for higher echelons of command to centralize and sequester control of assets at higher levels, restricting the access, knowledge, and familiarity of the wider force.

A review of the most recent Marine Corps Aviation Plan displays lingering ignorance of the ongoing democratization of airpower, developed in concert with Naval Air Systems Command. Despite being the authority for all Marine Corps aviation, the plan makes no mention of small tactical drones. This raises important questions. Are small tactical drones the purview of the infantry that will wield them, or does authority lay with behemoth and gridlocked organizations like Naval Air Systems Command, the office for all naval aviation? Can traditional aviation be trusted to prioritize the needs of the ground force over other priorities? The history of ground support between the Army and the Air Force, and even the reason for the creation of Marine Corps aviation, makes such assumptions dubious. Yet, Naval Air Systems Command is where small drone oversight rests for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Simply, small drone experience and understanding are not widespread because drones are not accessible at lower levels of the force. Too few drones exist and are controlled at too high of a level. The result is a force where too few Marines and soldiers understand the threat or capabilities of small drones and cannot train with or against them. In this environment, advocacy in acquisition halls is constrained, if not silenced, and alarm at infantry unpreparedness is smothered with majority ignorance. The military needs many more small drones in its units so that Marines and soldiers can test, experiment, and train with them at speed and scale. This experimentation is especially critical because it leads to the development of drone variants, counter-drone defenses, and tactics. The problem: It is not happening.

Drones Today

The ongoing war in Ukraine showcases small drones as key tools for ground combat in the modern era. The technology behind them will continue to improve, as machine guns did, by becoming more reliable, portable, and tactically useful. Ukraine and Russia are desperate for better and more drones to equip their forces. This year, the Ukrainian government aims to produce one million small drones for military use, and its partners are focusing on supplying thousands more. As much as 50 percent of Russia’s modern T-90 tank combat losses are attributed to small first-person-view drones. Over 3,000 verified drone strikes occurred along the front line in January 2024. At the same time, Russian forces are building and using drones with equal zeal. In at least one case, a bakery was converted to 3D printing drones, and public schools are teaching classes on drone flying along with other martial topics. Small drones are becoming the defining technology of the conflict.

The parallels to World War I are uncanny. Last year, Ukraine’s then-commander-in-chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, described the conflict as a stalemate. Small drone operators stated that because of the proliferation of small drones, “nobody knows how to advance.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently highlighted the importance of drones, stating that “repelling ground assaults is primarily the task of drones.”

While a disproportionate amount of attention is paid to larger unmanned systems like the remotely piloted MQ-9A Reaper flown by the U.S. Marine Corps, smaller, less sophisticated drones are just as essential. Small drones alter the combat landscape by giving ground forces access to organic airpower with the ability to detect and attack targets that would otherwise be hidden or out of reach. Besides traditional reconnaissance, small drones can be used as displaced radio relays for signature management, remote sentries, electronic warfare platforms, decoys, artillery spotting, and strike aircraft. Some small drones are now equipped to shoot down other small drones as counterair defense, following a remarkably similar combat development path in early airplanes. Drones also showcase the vulnerabilities of well-trained forces and sophisticated weapons, like tanks, when proper countermeasures are not in place. These vulnerabilities are known and were war-gamed. Marines modeling infantry scenarios with swarming suicide drones (loitering munitions) absorbed greater than 30 percent casualty rates when the opposing side also possessed them.

Despite the obvious need for large numbers of small drones across the U.S. military, relatively few systems are in the hands of Marines and soldiers. As early as 2016, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert B. Neller, called for the Marine Corps to field small drones at the squad level, a ratio of one drone for every dozen Marines. Because of changes in Department of Defense policy about the commercial purchase of drones, Marine rifle squads are still waiting for their drones almost a decade later. The military must accelerate the acquisition and fielding of small drones across the services by attacking traditionalism and other bureaucratic impediments head-on, unifying efforts by eliminating stovepipes, and ensuring drone systems are managed at the lowest possible levels.

Stifled Experimentation and Innovation

Senior leaders often assert a common refrain that the military needs to move out on experimentation with small drones by putting new gear “in the hands of soldiers in the dirt,” or as the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently put it, the best experimentation is “where real Marines put hands on real equipment and tell us what does and doesn’t work.” This experimentation is critical because it gives leaders, acquisition professionals, and doctrine writers the necessary feedback. Unfortunately, in communities like the Marine Corps infantry, small drones are painfully out of reach in training, and only a small number of systems are available for deploying units and predeployment training. If small drones are available at all, they might be husbanded at a higher echelon.

Marines who need access to drones to refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures and integrate them across the force might not be able to get their hands on them. This lack of access contrasts with Marine leaders who imagine battalions armed with “thousands” of small drones and loitering munitions and who extol the ubiquity of drones “across the battlefield.” To its credit, the Marine Corps continues progressing with its organic precision fires program that will bring different sizes of loitering munitions to the fleet. However, it is unclear when these weapons will become operational across the force, with the latest official reporting from the service indicating that fielding will not be before 2027. Meanwhile, hundreds of similar systems are employed daily in eastern Ukraine, and all Marines units are forced to wait for a combat-proven capability.

Units that are disinclined to or cannot wait for years-long service-wide procurement programs face major bureaucratic hurdles to procure their own small drones, even for in-house experimentation and testing. The bottom-up refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures that can lead to major tactical innovations and force-wide familiarity is systematically stifled.

In 1898, a U.S. Army colonel chided his force for their unfamiliarity with machine guns. “Generally speaking, not one officer in a hundred has any special knowledge on the subject of machine guns, and very little is known of their construction, capabilities, or proper uses.” This unfamiliarity retarded institutional acceptance, blunted understanding, slowed integration, and set the United States decades behind its European peers. The same thing is happening with drones. In the joint terminal attack controller course, where students learn to call in airstrikes and artillery, few students and their instructors are familiar with small drone tactics, capabilities, or use cases despite small drones being used for artillery spotting and target designation for offboard weapons. The unfamiliarity with drones in the U.S. military extends to aircrews of conventional aircraft, many of whom were surprised to learn that small drones could be used to direct their weapons. In contrast, the Ukrainian military is training thousands of operators to fly specialized first-person-view drones and needs an estimated 10,000 operators for its military.

Counter-drone defense is a priority, but access and training heavily depend on the unit. Many systems being touted by the military are available only to deployed units and not for training. For example, military infrastructure like homeland airbases must possess counter-drone equipment and procedures. Upon learning that one author had access to drone systems in a passing conversation, airfield management requested he bring his drones out to test security measures. It was the first time the base’s counter-drone systems and personnel were tested, and the test was the result of happenstance. Without access to drones, small units cannot create a new cadre of weapons specialists, train to protect themselves, or develop new tactics and techniques to employ drones offensively.

Bureaucratic obstacles are holding the U.S. military back from adapting in the face of some of the largest changes in combat in a century. Department of Defense policies intended to prevent the acquisition of unsecured drones that might offer adversaries a back door are halting the procurement of commercial off-the-shelf drones, effectively any drone that is not a known program of record. Drones that cross the “valley of death” and make it into a program of record experience little competition. These drones are rapidly outmoded by changing combat environments, potentially rendering them combat-impotent if called upon. Moreover, program offices are sometimes at odds with the larger force, presenting acquisition obstacles. For example, the Skyraider R80D is available within the naval supply system; however, the program is owned by Special Operations Command and blocks acquisitions of the drone by conventional units within the Navy.

Pulling the Rug Out

Responding to concerns that Chinese-made drones or components could constitute a “vector for cyber security risk,” the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense released a memorandum barring their use in 2018. It was likely hoped the memorandum would spur domestic drone development and break China’s monopoly over the sector. A well-documented problem throughout the defense industry, finding drones or equipment completely free of Chinese components is difficult. DJI, a well-known Chinese drone manufacturer, enjoys a share of over 70 percent of the global drone market. DJI’s dominance likely led to the only U.S. competitor, Skydio, exiting its consumer segment entirely to focus on enterprise and government contracts in 2023.

Once the memorandum was released, many government entities’ small drones were indefinitely grounded — including the Marine Corps’ “Quads for Squads” initiative. Any drone not part of known programs of record could not be flown. The memo pulled the rug out from efforts to dramatically expand the number of small drones in the Marine Corps and Army infantry. Exceptions were allowed if drones underwent an assessment by the Defense Innovation Unit and were placed on the “Blue UAS” list. Acquiring drones that are not an existing program of record or on the Defense Innovation Unit’s list requires an Undersecretary of Defense waiver signed by the first flag rank in a unit’s chain of command. Moreover, procuring these systems typically requires deploying units to use their own limited operations and maintenance dollars instead of funded acquisition offices paying for them, as is standard practice for fielding all other equipment to U.S. military units.

Furthermore, drones that are National Defense Authorization Act–compliant must still wait for a Blue UAS certification or a program office taking an interest before placing their products in the hands of troops. Certifications for Blue UAS take time and focus on cyber aspects and sourcing compliance, not combat utility. Additionally, certifications might require drone companies to demonstrate support from a military sponsor that will attest they might pursue serial production. But this is a catch-22 as individual military units are unlikely to need the large numbers required to move the needle with the Defense Innovation Unit.

The result is that the Blue UAS list has only a small pool of products relative to the available market with unknown combat effectiveness. It should then come as no surprise that U.S. military drones performed dismally in Ukraine and are much more expensive. Interviews with industry insiders indicate that many U.S. drone companies that visited Ukraine with their equipment, some of which were on the Blue UAS list, fared poorly. Companies that want to market their drones to the Navy and Marine Corps entities are forced to look overseas for customers, opportunities for relevant operational testing, and user feedback because of bureaucratic obstacles to working with the U.S. military. The result is that the military, with much of the best equipment money can buy, is falling behind in acquiring and integrating technology that can be purchased at your local Target or made in a factory for a few hundred dollars.

Conclusion

Before World War I, a British military magazine wondered, “When will the professional military class realize machine guns had become a permanent presence in battle? What will they do about it?” Today, we ask the same about the U.S. military and small drones. Small drones are in high demand worldwide; a recent Royal United Services Institute report found that Ukraine was going through as many as 10,000 small drones per month. In 2024, Ukraine could use as many small drones on the battlefield as it does artillery shells. Effective small drones are not expensive or difficult to manufacture; in Ukraine, many are provided by volunteer groups. A single first-person drone is now below the price point of an automatic rifle, and they have been weaponized by groups ranging from Mexican cartels to Hamas, the Taliban, and ISIL. And drone proliferation is accelerating.

Currently, the U.S. military is being left out. Troops cannot afford to meet drones for the first time on the battlefield. Existing tactics and equipment struggle against the onslaught of small, cheap weapons, and troops must be exposed to drones in training to adapt. In January, the U.S. military lost its first soldiers to an enemy air attack since the Korean War in a drone attack in Jordan. Are we repeating the sins of the cancellation of the Guardian Angel program, where traditionalism killed an urgent requirement for ground forces? The U.S. military cannot let sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines fall further behind the curve. There is promising progress with the opening of counter-drone schools in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, but using small drones in the offense is still woefully behind. The military must change, or thousands of U.S. ground forces that remain exposed at the tactical edge could experience their version of the Somme in the next war.

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Walker D. Mills is a U.S. Marine Corps infantry officer and MQ-9A Reaper student pilot. He has also worked with unmanned systems as an exchange officer with the Colombian Navy and Marine Corps.

Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a U.S. naval aviator and a special operations joint terminal attack controller instructor. He currently serves as the Joint Close Air Support division officer at the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center and as an advisor for weaponized small drone development in a cooperative research and development agreement.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Walker Mills · March 6, 2024

5. How the US Army Can Close its Dangerous—and Growing—Small Drone Gap

Excerpts:

Ukrainian soldiers are right to highlight a serious gap in current US Army equipment, tactics, and training. When it comes to small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) for reconnaissance and strike at the squad to battalion level, the United States is behind the curve, partly due to self-imposed bureaucracy and institutional inertia. Meanwhile, US adversaries are gaining invaluable operational experience with these same technologies.

To fill this gap and begin the widespread experimentation that will be essential for driving the adaptation of combined arms tactics and future procurement programs, the US Army should introduce expendable off-the-shelf commercial drones to operational units as soon as possible. The Army should leverage the innovative and can-do spirit of its soldiers to close this dangerous small drone gap. To take advantage of this opportunity, it must specifically encourage experimentation and remove bureaucratic and cultural barriers that might prevent bottom-up innovation driven by junior leaders.

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The US Army fancies itself an innovative organization whose asymmetric advantage against China and Russia remains “its leaders and soldiers.” I have witnessed this to be true, but these same adversaries are surging ahead in the realm of sUAS while the United States moves at a relatively glacial pace. Other Army modernization priorities such as long-range precision fires or future vertical lift may necessitate more top-down technological innovation and contractor support, but sUAS does not. Instead of empowering its greatest asset—a specialist or lieutenant interested in drone racing or 3D printing—the Army impedes them with archaic procurement processes and risk-averse regulation. Critics of this approach will surely cite scores of reasons why the recommendations in this article are ill-advised or impossible to implement. They should consider that Russia has developed and fielded these technologies under one of the most restrictive sanction regimes in recent history. Surely, the US Army can muster its vast resources and talent to close this important innovation gap. Some units, such as the 82nd Airborne, are ahead of the curve and working to address this issue already. The Army should support these units and help spread their successes to other formations.

With experimentation, the Army may find that sUAS technologies do not impact American combined arms operations in the ways that many currently argue. This is an acceptable outcome, but this experimentation and determination must happen now, before soldiers’ lives hang in the balance. The Army cannot afford to slow roll innovation in the time before it goes to battle with an adversary who has been refining its sUAS capabilities for years.

How the US Army Can Close its Dangerous—and Growing—Small Drone Gap - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Tyler Hacker · March 6, 2024

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In July, Ukrainian soldiers took to social media to voice complaints about training they received from US Army personnel in Germany. Chief among their criticisms was the seeming ignorance of commercial drone use on the battlefield. One soldier wrote, “The Americans have not participated in a serious war for a while now. Their army does not even have an analogue of the Chinese Mavik 3, it was a shock for us.” He added, “The concept of Maviks and the use of civilian copters is simply not even in their plans. Of course, they study our war, but they are still surprised that we use it this way.”

Given that the Ukrainian military is locked in daily ground combat with one of the US Army’s most serious competitors, these criticisms should be particularly concerning to military leaders. Since then, additional complaints have trickled out in mainstream reports. A recent MWI article tells of Ukrainian soldiers describing the Army’s response to new threats and innovations as “lacking urgency due to a ‘business as usual’ attitude.”

Ukrainian soldiers are right to highlight a serious gap in current US Army equipment, tactics, and training. When it comes to small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) for reconnaissance and strike at the squad to battalion level, the United States is behind the curve, partly due to self-imposed bureaucracy and institutional inertia. Meanwhile, US adversaries are gaining invaluable operational experience with these same technologies.

To fill this gap and begin the widespread experimentation that will be essential for driving the adaptation of combined arms tactics and future procurement programs, the US Army should introduce expendable off-the-shelf commercial drones to operational units as soon as possible. The Army should leverage the innovative and can-do spirit of its soldiers to close this dangerous small drone gap. To take advantage of this opportunity, it must specifically encourage experimentation and remove bureaucratic and cultural barriers that might prevent bottom-up innovation driven by junior leaders.

Small Drones in Recent Combined Arms Operations

In the Army’s five-tier unmanned aircraft classification model, sUAS fall into Group 1 and Group 2. These platforms are actively changing the modern battlefield and shaping conflicts in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East. The distinction between reconnaissance drone and loitering munition is rapidly becoming moot. Ukrainian and Russian forces have used small drones to spot targets for artillery, kill tanks, attack fortified positions, provide reconnaissance for infantry assaults, and more. Although the best-suited role and full impact of these weapons is hotly debated among defense analysts, it is clear that sUAS and loitering munitions could fundamentally alter future combined arms operations. Ukrainian officers have argued this exact point when challenged on their lack of progress in successive counteroffensives.

Ukraine and Russia are now engaged in a drone arms race in which they are rapidly developing and mass producing new systems in the hope of gaining a technological edge along the stagnant battlelines of eastern Ukraine. Both sides have been forced to adapt their drone technologies and tactics in the wake of battlefield developments. To feed this race, they are buying and producing sUAS in immense numbers, consuming as many as ten thousand drones per month. Both Ukraine and Russia lean heavily on China for smaller drones, and the Chinese military has also been studying the impact of these systems on modern warfare.

Put simply, the Russian military (and, less problematically, the Ukrainian military) has a two-year jump on NATO and the US Army when it comes to buying, manufacturing, fielding, employing, and evolving sUAS for ground combat. One could identify myriad reasons for American and European sluggishness, but given the availability of drones on the commercial market, institutional inertia and military bureaucracy no doubt play a role.

If the Army is to remain prepared for tomorrow’s battlefield, wherever it may be, then it needs to be experimenting with fielding and employing expendable sUAS and loitering munitions today. Of course the Army should, as senior leaders promise, learn lessons from Ukraine and other cases in Gaza or Nagorno-Karabakh, but it cannot afford to just observe the use of these technologies while it waits years for its own procurement programs to mature. These nations’ military forces are set up differently than the US Army, and it is incumbent upon the Army to experiment with these technologies in its own formations as soon as possible. Conceptual and organizational innovation takes time, and a business-as-usual attitude will leave the Army behind its competitors.

To be clear, it remains to be seen if Ukraine, Russia, or others have found the best ways to utilize small drones in modern warfare, or how relevant lessons from positional warfare in Ukraine are to future combined arms operations. That said, large portions of Russian and Ukrainian combat formations have been experimenting with these technologies for over two years. The Army must be clear-eyed about the operational experience that these militaries are rapidly gaining with sUAS. The Army appears to be waking up to the urgent need for counter-sUAS technologies, but this is just one piece of the sUAS puzzle. It still lacks a widespread, expendable drone capability in most of its combat formations.

Army leadership will surely argue that the service is working to close the sUAS experimentation gap with efforts like the Short Range Reconnaissance program, which fielded the RQ-28A to the sUAS schoolhouse and some units in recent months. While the RQ-28A appears a very capable platform, the program took three years to deliver and costs over $20,000 per drone. Tranche 2 of the SRR program is expected to see the unit cost rise to over $120,000. At these prices, it is unlikely to be experimented with as a truly expendable platform across the Army’s numerous formations. The Pentagon is moving forward with its Replicator initiative to field large quantities of inexpensive autonomous systems in the next 18–24 months, but it remains unclear if (or how) this will impact Army maneuver units.

Filling the sUAS Experimentation Gap

How can the United States remain abreast of its competitors in the sUAS arms race? The Army should immediately put off-the-shelf drones in the hands of its junior leaders and empower them to rigorously test these capabilities. To do so requires three initial steps.

First, the Army should provide multiple combat units with large quantities of off-the-shelf commercial drones. This means skipping technology demonstrations, specially designed tests with contractor support, and major fielding events. Instead, it should purchase a variety of existing inexpensive sUAS with differing capabilities and put them in the hands of junior leaders. Rather than betting on top-down innovation from the sUAS program office and schoolhouse, let platoon and squad leaders determine how these systems can help them complete their training cycles. From reconnaissance platoons to infantry squads, mortar platoons, fire support teams, and artillery batteries, the Army should field these cheap drones to multiple elements of combined arms formations. Widespread distribution would allow units to use ongoing training events to determine what functions sUAS can best serve, what elements and echelons to integrate them with, and what tactics, techniques, and procedures work best. After a unit has experimented with these technologies in a cycle of live fires or a combat training center rotation, feedback from its soldiers could be formalized into standard operating procedures by the battalion or brigade staff and sent to schoolhouses to shape future training and doctrine.

These inexpensive drones need not do everything or satisfy traditional Army requirements—they only need to be something soldiers can experiment with today. Thermal cameras, hardened datalinks, and autopilot features are important in future sUAS programs, but soldiers need drones to test and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures now. Additional capabilities or payloads could be simulated in training exercises. This bottom-up approach has the added benefit of utilizing operational units to identify the right capability sets and requirements for future procurement programs, much like successful initiatives in US Special Operations Command. There are numerous drone vendors that the Department of Defense has vetted and cleared. For example, Skydio, who manufactures the RQ-28A, previously sold a commercial model starting at just over $1,000. At that price, the Army could purchase over forty thousand drones for the cost of a single Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon missile.

A low price point is essential to enabling the second step required to fill the Army’s sUAS experimentation gap: clearing regulation, bureaucracy, and risk avoidance, all of which inhibits rigorous experimentation by junior leaders. Removing barriers begins by ensuring these drones are considered truly expendable. They must not be classified as sensitive items or stored in arms rooms, and commanders and soldiers should not be held accountable for their loss or damage. Rather, it should be expected that these drones will be lost or destroyed during training. Soldiers should not hesitate to test them in all weather conditions, around indirect fire, and over impact zones. As commercial products, these drones would contain no sensitive technology to recover.

Of course, commanders will have to mitigate some risk, such as those presented by flying sUAS in the same airspace as helicopters. Other safety regulations should be altered or waived. Army leaders using local regulations as an excuse for prohibiting Ukrainian soldiers from flying drones while training at US bases in Germany is unacceptable. If the Army can fly AH-64s, fire artillery, and conduct close air support training at these bases, then surely senior leaders can make arrangements to fly quadcopters at low altitudes without forcing units to navigate a bureaucratic maze.

Finally, the Army should use ongoing experimentation to develop and field a modular drone assembled from commercially available parts to all active brigade combat teams within five years. Testing of off-the-shelf models should drive the requirements for these systems. Like the commercial variants adopted in the interim, these systems should be modular and must remain expendable. Drone technology is moving quickly, and the Army cannot afford to be stuck with sUAS that are not easily upgradeable, interchangeable, or expendable. In this regard, the Army appears to be on track with its Short Range Reconnaissance and Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance programs. As it purchases these systems, any kinetic platform should be accompanied by inert training variants to ensure that soldiers can continue to train with them without burdensome safety and property regulations.

To accompany drone experimentation, the Army should also bring 3D printing capability to the brigade level. Ukrainian forces have pioneered all types of harnesses to enable commercial drones to carry payloads. Given the opportunity and impetus, US soldiers may shock their commanders with creative solutions for problems that arise during sUAS testing and fielding. 3D printing equipment would also help units in other ways, such as fashioning small replacement parts for other equipment. The Army can support innovative soldiers by giving them printing capabilities and establishing a repository for designs and solutions to be shared between units.

The US Army fancies itself an innovative organization whose asymmetric advantage against China and Russia remains “its leaders and soldiers.” I have witnessed this to be true, but these same adversaries are surging ahead in the realm of sUAS while the United States moves at a relatively glacial pace. Other Army modernization priorities such as long-range precision fires or future vertical lift may necessitate more top-down technological innovation and contractor support, but sUAS does not. Instead of empowering its greatest asset—a specialist or lieutenant interested in drone racing or 3D printing—the Army impedes them with archaic procurement processes and risk-averse regulation. Critics of this approach will surely cite scores of reasons why the recommendations in this article are ill-advised or impossible to implement. They should consider that Russia has developed and fielded these technologies under one of the most restrictive sanction regimes in recent history. Surely, the US Army can muster its vast resources and talent to close this important innovation gap. Some units, such as the 82nd Airborne, are ahead of the curve and working to address this issue already. The Army should support these units and help spread their successes to other formations.

With experimentation, the Army may find that sUAS technologies do not impact American combined arms operations in the ways that many currently argue. This is an acceptable outcome, but this experimentation and determination must happen now, before soldiers’ lives hang in the balance. The Army cannot afford to slow roll innovation in the time before it goes to battle with an adversary who has been refining its sUAS capabilities for years.

Tyler Hacker is a research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where his work focuses on long-range strike, future operational concepts, and great power conflict. He previously served as a field artillery officer in the United States Army.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Marita Schwab, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Tyler Hacker · March 6, 2024

6. A Moment of Truth for the Army's Chief Laser Weapon

"Dust" as the enemy?

A Moment of Truth for the Army's Chief Laser Weapon

military.com · by Jared Keller · March 4, 2024

After nearly a decade in development, the Army's primary vehicle-mounted laser weapon is on a collision course with its most fearsome foe yet -- dust.

The service has deployed four Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense, or DE M-SHORAD, prototypes -- Stryker infantry carrier vehicles outfitted with 50-kilowatt laser weapons systems -- to the Middle East for "real world testing" in an overseas operational environment, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James Mingus recently told Breaking Defense.

The four prototypes reportedly arrived in the U.S. Central Command area of operations in early February, with the Army undertaking "initial testing activities" on the path to a future live-fire demonstration, according to Breaking Defense.

While the DE M-SHORAD system has already undergone testing at U.S. military facilities like the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Central Command offers the potential for testing amid real-world challenges like dust storms and other atmospheric phenomena that, according to the Congressional Research Service, could render any directed-energy weapon essentially ineffective.

"Substances in the atmosphere -- particularly water vapor, but also sand, dust, salt particles, smoke, and other air pollution -- absorb and scatter light, and atmospheric turbulence can defocus a laser beam," according to the 2023 CRS report on the Defense Department's directed-energy weapons program.

Shipborne lasers like the 60-kilowatt High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance, or HELIOS, weapon system tested aboard Navy destroyers in recent years can "markedly" reduce the impact of atmospheric water vapor on laser performance by emitting radiation only at "sweet spots" in the electromagnetic spectrum, per the CRS report.

But other phenomena such as dust storms don't have as convenient a solution, a problem captured in Mingus' comments to Breaking Defense.

"Our high-energy lasers are so susceptible to weather," Mingus said. "That's why I think this is going to be a great laboratory, because anytime there's a dust storm, anytime there's that kind of thing, it starts to alter the physics of the light particles that actually shoot that beam."

This is not the first time the Army has tested a laser weapon system in an unpredictable operational environment. In August, Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey, director of the service's Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, revealed that the Army had sent several 10-kilowatt laser systems to the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility for "operational assessments."

But the deployment of the 50-kilowatt DE M-SHORAD system represents a major testing milestone for a system that, in development since at least 2015, could offer a major leap forward for the Army's air defense systems at a time when the rising tide of adversary drones necessitates a surge in new capabilities.

Laser weapons have been a pillar of the DoD's revamped short-range air defense strategy since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the resulting pivot toward "great power competition" with conventional adversary states like Russia and China.

With near limitless magazines and superior precision to standard kinetic weapons, lasers offer a low-cost way to consistently defeat incoming rockets, artillery and mortar fire, drones and even rotary-wing aircraft. Overall, the DoD spends $1 billion annually developing directed-energy capabilities, according to a 2023 report from the Government Accountability Office.

The need for effective laser weapons has taken on new urgency amid both increased drone and missile attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria and the rise of Houthi missile attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. The latter has led to a call for increased fielding of shipboard laser weapons among Navy commanders whose warships are increasingly forced to fend off incoming airborne threats.

The technological descendent of the Army's Stryker-mounted 5-kilowatt Mobile Experimental High Energy Laser, or MEHEL, and 50-kilowatt Multi-Mission High Energy Laser, or MMHEL -- dubbed "Guardian" -- the DE M-SHORAD laser system became a program of record for the service in 2019. As part of its fiscal 2024 budget request, the Army proposed about $111 million in research and development funding for the laser system and vehicle package, according to service budget documents, down from $197 million the previous year largely due to the completion of a first set of four prototypes.

The Army's 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, at Fort Sill in Oklahoma, took delivery of the first platoon of four DE M-SHORAD prototypes in September 2023.

"The delivery of DE M-SHORAD prototypes to the 4-60th ADAR represents a transformational milestone in the Army's modernization campaign. It is an achievement that adds what was often thought of as a next-generation capability, now," Col. Steven Gutierrez, DR-MSHORAD program manager, said in a statement at the time. "These high-energy laser systems will be a game-changer on the contemporary battlefield, a critical component of an integrated, layered, and in-depth air missile defense for division and brigade maneuver formations."

The DE M-SHOARD isn't the only laser weapon in the Army's air defense arsenal: The service recently inked a contract with defense giant Lockheed Martin to furnish soldiers with the Valkyrie 300-kilowatt laser weapon which, loaded onto a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, will purportedly provide significant defense against the same family of missile and drone threats that its 50-kilowatt cousin is designed to defeat, as well as other hardened threats like incoming cruise missiles.

After such an investment of time and money in its development, the DE M-SHORAD's nascent laser platoon and the urgent need among commanders downrange are set to intersect during the upcoming operational tests in the Central Command area of responsibility, tests which will likely help define the limitations of the systems that prevent lasers from serving as an "all-weather solution" to incoming drones and missiles in regions such as the Middle East.

"It's a prototype, but we want to experiment in a live environment," Mingus told Breaking Defense. "Is it 100% ready? Is it going to work perfectly? Probably not, but we're going to learn from it."

military.com · by Jared Keller · March 4, 2024

7. Air Force Employee Indicted for Unlawful Disclosure of Classified National Defense Information

No this is not the 20 something Airman arrested last year. This is a 63 year old retired Army officer.

Air Force Employee Indicted for Unlawful Disclosure of Classified National Defense Information

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/air-force-employee-indicted-unlawful-disclosure-classified-national-defense-information?utm

Monday, March 4, 2024

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For Immediate Release

Office of Public Affairs

A civilian employee of the U.S. Air Force assigned to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), at Offutt Air Force Base, was arrested Saturday, March 2, for allegedly conspiring to transmit and transmitting classified information relating to the national defense (National Defense Information or NDI) on a foreign online dating platform beginning in or around February 2022 until in or around April 2022.

According to the indictment, David Franklin Slater, 63, of Nebraska, worked in a classified space at USSTRATCOM and held a Top Secret security clearance from in or around August 2021 until in or around April 2022, after retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Army. It is alleged that Slater willfully, improperly, and unlawfully transmitted NDI classified as “SECRET,” which he had reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, on a foreign online dating platform to a person not authorized to receive such information.

“As alleged, Mr. Slater, an Air Force civilian employee and retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, knowingly transmitted classified national defense information to another person in blatant disregard for the security of his country and his oath to safeguard its secrets,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Department of Justice will seek to hold accountable those who knowingly and willfully put their country at risk by disclosing classified information.”

“Certain responsibilities are incumbent to individuals with access to Top Secret information. The allegations against Mr. Slater challenge whether he betrayed those responsibilities,” said U.S. Attorney Susan Lehr for the District of Nebraska. “We look forward to continuing our work with the FBI and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations to ensure the safety of our country.”

“The FBI investigates those who choose to illegally use their access to classified information to put our national security at risk,” said Special Agent in Charge Eugene Kowel of the FBI Omaha Field Office. “When people violate the trust given to them to safeguard our nation's intelligence, they put our country at risk. We will continue working shoulder to shoulder with our partners to protect the American people and uphold the constitution by safeguarding our country's classified information.”

According to the charging documents, Slater attended USSTRATCOM briefings regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine that were classified up to TOP SECRET//SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (TS//SCI). Slater then transmitted classified NDI that he learned from those briefings via the foreign online dating website’s messaging platform to his co-conspirator, who claimed to be a female living in Ukraine on the foreign dating website. The co-conspirator regularly asked Slater to provide her with sensitive, non-public, closely held and classified NDI and called Slater in their messages her “secret informant love” and her “secret agent.” In response to these requests, Slater indeed provided classified NDI to her, including regarding military targets and Russian military capabilities relating to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Slater will make his initial court appearance tomorrow, March 5, in the District of Nebraska. If convicted, Slater faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000 for each count of conspiracy to transmit and the transmission of national defense information. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI Omaha Field Office and Air Force Office of Special Investigations are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Donald Kleine for the District of Nebraska and Trial Attorney Emma Dinan Ellenrieder of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Slater Indictment

Updated March 4, 2024

8. Retired Army officer may have leaked secrets to honeypot spy

What was this guy thinking?

Excerpt:

Between February and April 2022, the woman in Ukraine repeatedly asked Slater to give her classified national defense information, according to the indictment, which includes several of the woman’s messages to Slater such as:

• “Dear, what is shown on the screens in the special room?? It is very interesting.”
• “By the way, you were the first to tell me that NATO members are traveling by train and only now (already evening) this was announced on our news. You are my secret informant love! How were your meetings? Successfully?”
• “Beloved Dave, do NATO and Biden have a secret plan to help us?”
• “Dave, it’s great that you get information about [Specified Country 1] first. I hope you will tell me right away? You are my secret agent. With love.”
• “Sweet Dave, the supply of weapons is completely classified, which is great!”

Retired Army officer may have leaked secrets to honeypot spy

"You are my secret informant love! How were your meetings? Successfully?"

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED MAR 5, 2024 4:11 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 5, 2024

A retired Army officer passed secrets via a dating website to someone claiming to be a woman in Ukraine in online chats that mixed teasing sweet talk in broken English with specific requests for classified information, federal prosecutors claim.

“Beloved Dave, do NATO and Biden have a secret plan to help us?” read one note, according to court documents. “Dear, what is shown on the screens in the special room?? It is very interesting,” said another.

On the same day that Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira pleaded guilty to sharing classified information on Discord servers, the Justice Department announced they had arrested retired Army Lt. Col. David Franklin Slater, 63, for allegedly using a foreign dating website to provide national defense information to the person claiming to be a woman in Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors say Slater, then an Air Force civilian employee, provided the woman with classified information, including military targets in Russia’s war against Ukraine along with data about Russian military capabilities, according to an indictment against him, which the Justice Department has publicly released.

At the time of the alleged communications, Slater worked at U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, which has purview over the nation’s nuclear arsenal, the indictment says. Slater held a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance and had signed a non-disclosure act.

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From August 2021 to April 2022, Slater worked with classified information at STRATCOM and attended briefings about Russia’s war in Ukraine that were classified up to Top Secret/SCI, the indictment says.

Between February and April 2022, the woman in Ukraine repeatedly asked Slater to give her classified national defense information, according to the indictment, which includes several of the woman’s messages to Slater such as:

• “Dear, what is shown on the screens in the special room?? It is very interesting.”
• “By the way, you were the first to tell me that NATO members are traveling by train and only now (already evening) this was announced on our news. You are my secret informant love! How were your meetings? Successfully?”
• “Beloved Dave, do NATO and Biden have a secret plan to help us?”
• “Dave, it’s great that you get information about [Specified Country 1] first. I hope you will tell me right away? You are my secret agent. With love.”
• “Sweet Dave, the supply of weapons is completely classified, which is great!”

The indictment only identifies the person who claimed to be a woman living in Ukraine as “Co-Conspirator 1.” The dating website that Slater allegedly used to send messages to her is not named in the indictment.

Prosecutors accuse Slater of working with “other co-conspirators, known and unknown” to share national defense classified information about the war in Ukraine to people not entitled to receive it. The indictment does not include any specific information about who these other co-conspirators might be.

Slater has been charged with Conspiracy to Disclose National Defense Information, and two counts of Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information, the indictment says.

“If convicted, Slater faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000 for each count of conspiracy to transmit and the transmission of national defense information,” a Justice Department news release says. “A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.”

Task & Purpose was unable to reach Slater by phone or email on Tuesday. The indictment did not include any information indicating that he is represented by an attorney,

A STRATCOM spokesman told Task & Purpose that Slater had worked as an Air Force civilian employee in the command’s Logistics Directorate until 2022.

Slater is a prior enlisted soldier, served on active duty in the Army as a logistician from August 1981 to August 1984, and then again from July 2008 until December 2020, according to his service record, which was provided to Task & Purpose. Between December 1984 and July 2008, Slater served in the Army Reserve.

He deployed to Iraq from December 2003 to December 2004; and he made three deployments to Afghanistan from July 2010 to July 2011, from May 2014 to May 2015, and from March 2019 to February 2020. Slater also deployed to Qatar between February 2016 and February 2017.

This is the latest case of a service member or veteran being accused of wrongfully sharing classified information. Navy Chief Petty Officer Steven Pedicini is accused of providing an unnamed foreign government with sensitive information.

Separately, Navy Petty Officer Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, was sentenced in January to two years in prison for providing information and documents to a Chinese spy. Another sailor Jichao Wei – also known as Patrick Wei – was also arrested in 2023 for allegedly spying for China.

Navy veteran Jonathan Smay Toebbe was sentenced to 19 years in prison in 2022 after agreeing to make several “dead drops” with an FBI agent posing as a foreign intelligence officer. Law enforcement observed Toebbe leave SanDisks hidden in various items, including a peanut butter sandwich.

These incidents do not indicate that the U.S. military faces a problem of espionage within the ranks, Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters on Tuesday.

“But we also recognize the fact that insider threats are something that need to be taken seriously, which is why every single member of the Department of Defense – whether you are a basic trainee or a two-star general or above – is going to take training on the proper handling and safeguarding of sensitive information,” Ryder said at a Pentagon news briefing. “And if you violate those rules, you will be held accountable.”

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• Sailors at Norfolk will be locked out of their rooms if they fail inspection
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• Army will add 17 air defense units while cutting 24,000 active duty spots

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 5, 2024

9. The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World

Excerpts:

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World — Global Security Review

globalsecurityreview.com · by Aaron Holland · March 4, 2024

China’s nuclear breakout and Russia’s ongoing aggression leave many Western analysts uncertain as to what is in the mind of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Nuclear deterrence remains the most potent strategy at preventing great-power war and the escalation that would entail the death of many millions.

In nuclear deterrence, where the stakes are high and the consequences of failure are catastrophic, narratives play a crucial role in shaping strategy and influencing outcomes. Narratives surrounding nuclear weapons have profound effects on perceptions of credibility, intentions, and, ultimately, shaping the behavior of states. Understanding the role of narratives in nuclear deterrence is essential for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of nuclear politics.

Role of Narratives in Shaping Perceptions of Credibility

Narratives are important in nuclear deterrence strategy in shaping perceptions of credibility. The credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent is essential for its effectiveness in deterring potential adversaries. States that possess clear escalation dominance and nuclear superiority will hold an advantage in perceptions of resolve and strength. However, credibility is exclusively tied to a state’s willingness to use the bomb.

In the United States, the president is responsible for influencing the perceptions of his adversaries through crafting a compelling narrative that will properly induce fear into his enemy. Narratives that emphasize a state’s willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons can enhance its deterrence posture, dissuading others from taking aggressive actions. The only other way to enhance credibility beyond strategic narratives is to employ nuclear weapons in some capacity. Such acts are unpalatable for moral and ethical reasons, which leaves crafting convincing narratives as the preferred means of influencing an adversary.

Influencing Perceptions of Intentions

Narratives also influence perceptions of intentions. States often use narratives to signal their intentions and clarify their strategic objectives. For example, a state may adopt a narrative of minimum deterrence, emphasizing its nuclear arsenal’s defensive nature and its commitment to avoiding nuclear conflict. China is the prime example.

The inverse strategy to a narrative of minimum deterrence would be a narrative of maximum deterrence. In this approach, Russia, for example, emphasizes the offensive capabilities of its nuclear arsenal and its readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a wide range of scenarios. This narrative seeks to maximize the perceived threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Unlike the minimum deterrence narrative, which emphasizes restraint and a defensive posture, the maximum deterrence narrative emphasizes assertiveness and a willingness to escalate to achieve strategic objectives. Such narratives can help reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing clarity about a state’s nuclear policy.

Shaping Perceptions of Capabilities

Narratives also play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of capabilities. States often use narratives to convey information about their nuclear arsenal’s size, sophistication, and survivability. These narratives can influence how other states perceive the balance of power and make strategic calculations. For example, a state that portrays its nuclear arsenal as modern and reliable may be seen as more credible and capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Additionally, the concept of secure second strike is fundamental. This capability refers to a state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a devastating counterattack after absorbing a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory arsenals, which encompass a variety of delivery systems such as submarines, land-based missiles, and strategic bombers, are critical components.

Narratives surrounding second-strike retaliatory arsenals are designed to convey specific messages about a state’s nuclear capabilities. By highlighting the sophistication and survivability of their arsenals, states seek to deter potential adversaries by signaling that any attack would result in a devastating response.

Limitations of Narratives

Narratives in nuclear deterrence strategy are powerful tools, but they also have inherent limitations. One major limitation is the potential for misinterpretation or manipulation. Different states may interpret the same narrative in different ways, leading to misunderstandings and increased tensions. Moreover, narratives can be undermined by actions that contradict the message being conveyed. When China emphasizes its commitment to peaceful coexistence but then takes provocative actions, such as conducting aggressive military exercises near Taiwan, the credibility of its narrative is eroded. This is known as the credibility-action gap, where actions speak louder than words, undermining the narrative’s intended message.

When leaders openly talk about a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, expressing a moral revulsion to using them even in extreme circumstances, it can inadvertently weaken the state’s deterrent posture. Adversaries may perceive this as a lack of resolve, believing that the state would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons even if its survival was at stake.

Importance of Narrative Control

In the context of nuclear deterrence, narrative control is not just a strategic advantage but a fundamental necessity. It is through narrative control that states can shape perceptions, manage crisis situations, and ultimately enhance their deterrence posture. This is important for four reasons.

First, narrative control allows states to shape how their nuclear capabilities are perceived by others. By crafting a narrative that emphasizes their resolve, states can deter potential adversaries by conveying a clear and credible message. This perception can influence how other states make strategic calculations and may deter them from taking aggressive actions.

Second, during a crisis, narrative control can be crucial in de-escalating tensions and preventing misunderstandings. A carefully crafted narrative can provide clarity about a state’s intentions and actions, helping to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to escalation. By shaping the narrative surrounding a nuclear incident, states can help manage crisis situations and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

Third, narrative control is essential for enhancing the credibility of deterrent threats. A state that successfully controls the narrative can convey a clear and credible message about its willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. This can enhance the credibility of its deterrent threats, making them more effective in deterring aggression.

Fourth, narrative control can help reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. By shaping perceptions, managing crisis situations, and enhancing credibility, states can deter potential adversaries and maintain peace and stability in the nuclear age.

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

globalsecurityreview.com · by Aaron Holland · March 4, 2024

10. Pentagon's budget process needs 'fundamental restructuring,' panel says

I doubt we will find anyone who disagrees with this. The question is how to execute a better budget process?

Excerpts:

Among them are reforms that would allow the Defense Department to address long-held complaints about the current budget process, including giving it new authorities to move money amongst weapons programs or to start new programs even while under a continuing resolution. That’s currently forbidden, and a CR, like the one the military is currently under, keeps spending exactly as it was the previous year.

The commission also calls for the wholesale replacement of the PPBE system with a new “defense resourcing system” that aims to align the budget request more closely to strategy.

...

The commission makes several other recommendations aimed at improving the flexibility of the budgeting process, such as raising the amount of funding that the Pentagon can shift among programs without needing congressional approval — known as below threshold reprogramming — and addressing “color of money” issues that can complicate buying software or make it difficult to replace the procurement of obsolescent parts with more widely available options.

Another recommendation focuses on mitigating budgetary problems caused by a CR and would permit the Pentagon to begin a new start program or increase a production rate as laid out in a given budget request so long as the House and Senate appropriations defense subcommittees had approved a bill including the new program or higher rate.

The commission also calls for the creation of an analytic software platform that would crunch financial, contracting, logistics and readiness data “to allow decisionmakers to see the complete sight picture as never before, driving more meaningful decisions.”

Pentagon's budget process needs 'fundamental restructuring,' panel says - Breaking Defense

The almost 400-page PPBE report draws on two years of research and more than 400 interviews, and resulted in 28 recommendations, half of which are denoted as key changes.

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · March 6, 2024

F-22 fighter jets rest on a massive $100 bill in this graphic. (Breaking Defense)

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon requires a “fundamental restructuring” of its budget-making process and new authorities to make funding more flexible in order for the department to be able to quickly respond to new threats or adopt critically needed tech, according to a new report by congressionally-mandated bipartisan commission.

The almost 400-page report, published today, was written by the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE), draws on two years of research and more than 400 interviews, and resulted in 28 recommendations, half of which are denoted as key changes.

Among them are reforms that would allow the Defense Department to address long-held complaints about the current budget process, including giving it new authorities to move money amongst weapons programs or to start new programs even while under a continuing resolution. That’s currently forbidden, and a CR, like the one the military is currently under, keeps spending exactly as it was the previous year.

The commission also calls for the wholesale replacement of the PPBE system with a new “defense resourcing system” that aims to align the budget request more closely to strategy.

“One of the most consistent concerns the commission heard over the past two years is that the current PPBE process lacks agility, limiting the department’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to evolving threats, unanticipated events and emerging technological opportunities,” the commission stated in the report.

Critics have slammed the current budget-making process for being slow moving and cumbersome, with Pentagon beginning work on a budget about two years before funding is approved by Congress. That timeline can keep the Defense Department from being able to procure new tech like software and AI at the speed that they are made available in the commercial sector, the commission said.

At the same time, CRs and late budgets can also inhibit the department’s ability to start new programs or begin work on key initiatives.

The commission makes several other recommendations aimed at improving the flexibility of the budgeting process, such as raising the amount of funding that the Pentagon can shift among programs without needing congressional approval — known as below threshold reprogramming — and addressing “color of money” issues that can complicate buying software or make it difficult to replace the procurement of obsolescent parts with more widely available options.

Another recommendation focuses on mitigating budgetary problems caused by a CR and would permit the Pentagon to begin a new start program or increase a production rate as laid out in a given budget request so long as the House and Senate appropriations defense subcommittees had approved a bill including the new program or higher rate.

The commission also calls for the creation of an analytic software platform that would crunch financial, contracting, logistics and readiness data “to allow decisionmakers to see the complete sight picture as never before, driving more meaningful decisions.”

The commission, which was created by Congress through fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, released an interim report in August that called for 13 immediate reforms.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said then that the Pentagon would begin adopting “all actions that can be implemented now, as recommended by the Commission and within its purview.”

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · March 6, 2024

11. Ukraine’s first lady declines Biden’s State of the Union invite

Ukraine’s first lady declines Biden’s State of the Union invite

MARCH 6, 2024 11:27 AM CET

BY VERONIKA MELKOZEROVA

Politico · by Veronika Melkozerova · March 6, 2024

Olena Zelenska’s office cited a scheduling conflict. But U.S. media reported there was another reason: An invite to Yulia Navalnaya.

The Washington Post reported that there were other reasons behind Olena Zelenska turning down the invite | Andy Rain/EFE via EPA

March 6, 2024 11:27 am CET

By

KYIV ­— Olena Zelenska, the first lady of Ukraine, will not attend U.S. President Joe Biden’s State of the Union address to the U.S. Congress on Thursday despite being invited by the White House.

“Due to planned events in the schedule, including the visit of children from an orphanage to Kyiv, which was planned in advance, unfortunately, the first lady will not be able to participate in the event,” Zelenska’s office told POLITICO.

However, the Washington Post reported late Tuesday that there were other reasons behind Zelenska turning down the invite.

According to the Post’s sources, Zelenska was supposed to sit near U.S. first lady Jill Biden and Yulia Navalnaya, the widow of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who died in an Arctic prison in Russia last month.

But the Post said that caused discomfort for Ukraine’s top leadership, as many Ukrainians do not see Navalnaya and other Russian opposition figures as allies in the fight against President Vladimir Putin. That’s due to Navalny’s former remarks about Crimea “not being a sandwich to give back and forth,” which was viewed as backing Russia’s claim over the Ukrainian peninsula that it illegally annexed and occupied in 2014.

Navalny did later publicly support Ukraine’s restoration of its 1991 borders, while opposing the Russian attack on Ukraine.

In the end, Navalnaya also declined the White House’s invite to the State of the Union, citing fatigue.

The whole saga triggered some outrage in Kyiv.

“The world stubbornly wants to put Ukrainians and Russians side by side, implying, they say, that both are suffering from Putin’s authoritarianism. The victim and the aggressor are not equal,” Iryna Gerashchenko, a Ukrainian MP from the oppositional European Solidarity political party, said in a Facebook post.

“The tragedy of the Navalny family is not equal to the genocide of the Ukrainian people,” she added. “All Russians are responsible for this terrible war. They did not stop it.”

12. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 5, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Elections: Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament. Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.” Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.
• Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.” Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in attack claims.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. There are currently fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack.
• Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 5, 2024

Mar 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 5, 2024

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Rachel Friedman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament.[1] The majority of Tehran province’s 14 confirmed candidates were hardliners.[2] Incumbent hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected to parliament for Tehran province.[3] Parliamentarians will vote for the next parliament speaker after run-off elections conclude in late April or early May.[4] Forty-five candidates will compete in the run-off election.[5]

Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.[6] Approximately 25 million Iranians out of 61 million eligible voters voted for 290 candidates for Parliament and 88 candidates for the Assembly of Experts.[7] The Assembly of Experts is the body responsible for choosing the supreme leader’s successor. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi reported an official voter turnout of 41%.[8] This figure is likely inflated, given the Iranian regime’s historical tendency to exaggerate voter turnout.[9] Iran reported a 43% voter turnout in its 2020 parliamentary election.[10]

US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.”[11] Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan confirmed that Hamas negotiators gave Qatari and Egyptian officials a response to the Paris ceasefire proposal “over the past two days” but that the group is prepared to continue fighting.[12] Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Hamdan continued to blame the Israeli prime minister for the lack of a ceasefire. A Hamas Telegram channel posted on March 5 an undated quote from another senior Hamas leader that reiterated that the group would not discuss a hostage-for-prisoner exchange before a ceasefire, the total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, reconstruction of the Strip, and the return of displaced persons to their homes.[13] Israeli media reported on March 4 that Hamas recently asked for Israel to release more of its high-level prisoners as part of the ceasefire agreement.[14] Western and Israeli media previously reported during the week of January 31 that Hamas demanded the release of its elite Nukhba special forces and Palestinian political faction leaders.[15] The Nukhba forces took part in the October 7 attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.”[16] Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. Gallant issued a similar warning on February 7 that the Israeli government could invade Lebanon in response to continuing Hezbollah attacks.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Elections: Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament. Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.” Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.
• Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.” Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in attack claims.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. There are currently fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack.
• Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and three other Palestinian militias that have been active in the Gaza Strip did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces on March 5. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed a total of two attacks on Israeli forces south of Gaza City and zero attacks in Khan Younis.[18]

This drop in claims represents a sharp decrease in Palestinian militia activity across the Gaza Strip, but it does not indicate that Israeli action has destroyed or defeated Hamas. Palestinian militias claimed at least fifteen attacks on Israeli forces operating in the Gaza Strip on March 4.[19] Israeli forces continued operations throughout the Gaza Strip on March 5 and no negotiation parties announced a ceasefire deal.[20] CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in claims:

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. Israeli forces began the third phase of their military operation in the Gaza Strip in January, which consists of “targeted raids,” a decrease in the number of forces in the Strip, and the movement of many units to the buffer zone along the Israeli border.[21] Both Palestinian and Israeli sources reported in early January that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip moved to the Israeli-Gaza buffer zone.[22] These sources reported that Israeli units are no longer permanently present in the Gaza City, and now conduct multi-week “targeted raids” from the border buffer zone.[23] IDF concluded a two-week-long operation to reclear Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City of Hamas fighters on March 3 and has not announced a new clearing operation in the north.[24] This means that there are fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack. Palestinian militias appear to conduct a spirited defense when Israeli forces do present themselves as targets deep in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces 92 times in 11 days during the Israeli clearing operation in Zaytoun, for example.[25]
• Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties. CTP-ISW has previously hypothesized that communication problems can decrease the number of claims from a single militia group, but not five groups at once.[26] Israeli action in Khan Younis may be preventing militia forces there from rapidly reporting attacks to higher echelons that can distribute information about the attacks.

The IDF said that its engineering units finished destroying “the largest tunnel network discovered in the northern Gaza Strip” on March 5.[27] The IDF first disclosed the network’s existence in Beit Hanoun near the Erez Crossing in December 2023.[28] The IDF said the tunnel was dug toward Israel but did not extend out of the Gaza Strip. Israeli troops from the 98th Division conducted an airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia cell operating a drone near Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun on March 5.[29] The Palestinian fighters may have targeted the engineering units present in Beit Hanoun.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed over 20 Palestinian fighters using aerial, sniper, and tank fire in the central Gaza Strip on March 5.[30]

Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis on March 5. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade cleared militia infrastructure, including weapons caches, in Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis.[31] The IDF 7th Brigade evacuated civilians from Hamad and detained dozens of Hamas and PIJ fighters who tried to hide among evacuating civilians to escape the area.[32] The IDF began operating in Hamad on March 3.[33] The IDF LOTAR counterterrorism unit (attached to the 7th Brigade) cleared two weapons storage sites in civilian areas of Khan Younis.[34] The IDF said that one of the sites was adjacent to a school in Khan Younis formerly used as a shelter for displaced Gazans.[35]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 4.[36] The IDF reported that Israeli forces arrested 21 wanted persons across the West Bank, including the commander of an unspecified Palestinian militia’s Balata Battalion, Mohammed Tanji.[37] The IDF stated that Tanji was planning to conduct an “imminent attack”.[38]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 4.[39] Hezbollah launched at least three salvoes of “dozens of rockets” targeting Gesher HaZiv, Kiryat Shmona, and Kfar Blum, in northern Israel.[40] Israeli media reported that multiple civilians' homes were damaged in the rocket attacks targeting Israel.[41] Hezbollah claimed that the attacks were in response to IDF airstrikes that killed Hezbollah-affiliated paramedics in Adissa on March 4 and Lebanese civilians in Hula, southern Lebanon, on March 5.[42]

The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone over the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights that an unspecified actor launched from Syrian territory on March 5.[43]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi National Security Advisor and Badr Organization member Qasim al Araji stated on March 5 that Iraq is open to regional and international cooperation to combat drug trafficking in Iraq.[44] Araji claimed that drug trafficking is now the primary threat to Iraqi stability “[after] the defeat of [ISIS].” He clarified that Iraq should work with its partners to share intelligence to combat remaining ISIS fighters, however. The OIR quarterly report at the end of 2023 said that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) still faces deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, logistics, and planning that prevent it from defeating ISIS alone.[45]

The Houthis claimed that they targeted two US Navy vessels in the Red Sea using anti-ship missiles and one way attack drones on March 5.[46] Houthi military spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea said that the Houthis ”will not hesitate to expand their operations against all hostile targets” in support of Palestinians in Gaza.[47]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted strikes against unspecified targets in Ras Issa, Salif Province, and al Jabanah, Hudaydah province, in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[48]

The United Kingdom Defense Secretary Grant Shapps said on March 5 that he possesses unspecified information on Iran providing ballistic missiles to Russia.[49] The British magazine The House asked Shapps whether he had any information on Iran providing ballistic missiles to Russia and Shapps said that he did have information but declined to elaborate. Shapps added that “whether it's ballistic missiles or the Shahed drones that they supplied Russia with, we've seen that if there's struggle in the world,” Iran often exacerbates it. Shapps called Iran a ”bad influence” not only in the Middle East but also to Europe as well, citing Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia to support its war in Ukraine.

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[50] This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment in September 2023 that Iran and Russia would conclude a drone and missile sale agreement after UNSC Resolution 2231’s missile restrictions expired in October 2023.[51] UNSC Resolution 2231 suspended nuclear-related UN sanctions and established sunset dates for missile and other arms-related sanctions on Iran.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Hussein Ibrahim Taha on March 5 in Jeddah.[52] Abdollahian called on the OIC and other Islamic countries to pressure Israel into ending the Israel-Hamas war.

Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan separately discussed the Israel-Hamas war and strengthening bilateral trade on March 5 in Jeddah.[53] Abdollahian called on Muslim countries to take a more “coherent and strong” position in support of Palestine.[54] Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized diplomatic relations in March 2023 after severing ties in 2016.[55]

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine destroyed the Project 22160 Sergei Kotov large patrol ship of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) off the coast of the Kerch Strait on the night of March 4-5.
• Russian milbloggers responded to the sinking of the Sergei Kotov by decrying the Russian military command’s lack of response to the incident and mounting a wider critique against the bureaucratic inertia of the Russian military apparatus.
• Russian aircraft appear to be continuing to conduct a relatively high volume of glide bomb strikes in Ukraine despite Ukrainian officials’ reports that Ukrainian forces have downed several bomber aircraft in recent weeks.
• Russia and China are deepening their strategic space cooperation, including cooperation on satellite surveillance and space exploration.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two senior Russian commanders for their responsibility in perpetrating Russian war crimes – the first time the ICC has charged Russian military commanders.
• Russian forces are reportedly operating a “black market” to sell Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), including to Russian paramilitary groups that may be conducting their own POW exchanges with Ukraine.
• The director of the Moldovan Intelligence and Security Service, Alexandru Musteata, stated on March 5 that the Kremlin has begun to conduct multi-year hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its accession to the EU.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 5.
• Russian authorities are reportedly disbanding elements of the former Wagner Group that were supposed to join Rosgvardia or are currently in Belarus.
• Russian law enforcement is likely intensifying crackdowns against Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 5, 2024

Mar 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2024

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

March 5, 2024, 8:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on March 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. 

Please be advised: An expert analyst called our attention to the fact that we have not been using the doctrinal expression “Close Air Support” (CAS) in connection with Russian air operations around Avdiivka accurately. The analyst rightly pointed out that CAS requires close coordination with the maneuvering ground units, which ISW has not observed and does not assess has occurred. We used the expression (incorrectly) because the glide-bomb attacks were clearly meant to shape and support tactical actions, which is one of the purposes of CAS. But Russian air operations around Avdiivka were not properly CAS, and we were mistaken to use that expression. ISW apologizes for this mistake.

Ukraine destroyed the Project 22160 Sergei Kotov large patrol ship of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) off the coast of the Kerch Strait on the night of March 4-5.[1] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 5 that GUR special unit “Group 13” conducted the attack against the Sergei Kotov using Magura V5 naval drones, inflicting severe damage on the port and starboard sides of the ship, killing seven sailors, and wounding six.[2] GUR noted that Russian forces were likely able to evacuate 52 other crew members, but that the loss of the ship cost Russia a total of $65 million.[3] Ukrainian sources noted that the Sergei Kotov had either a Ka-29 or Ka-27 helicopter on board, which Ukrainian forces destroyed along with the ship.[4] A Russian insider source claimed that after the initial naval drone strike, BSF forces tried to tow the ship back to port, but that the damage was so severe that the ship sank five kilometers off the coast of Cape Takil, southeastern Crimea.[5] The Sergei Kotov was one of the BSF’s newest vessels and only entered service in January 2021.[6] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Ukrainian forces had disabled about 33 percent of the BSF’s warships as of early February 2024, including 24 ships and one submarine.[7]

Russian milbloggers responded to the sinking of the Sergei Kotov by decrying the Russian military command’s lack of response to the incident and mounting a wider critique against the bureaucratic inertia of the Russian military apparatus. Russian milbloggers alleged that this is the fourth Ukrainian attack on the Sergei Kotov since Russia’s full-scale invasion began and that the crew managed to repel similar Ukrainian attacks in July, August, and September of 2023.[8] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that the Sergei Kotov was inadequately equipped to defend itself against such an attack, and many milbloggers questioned why the ship did not have systems to defend against naval drones considering the crew had experienced similar attacks before.[9] One prominent milblogger stated in a post published on March 5 (which has been viewed 1.7 million times as of this writing) that the Russian military command has no response to the sinking of the Sergei Kotov because no one likes to tell the truth to the military command and that the military command refuses to learn important lessons from past experiences to improve the military.[10] Another milblogger emphasized that it would be very important for the Russian command to listen to the crew of the Sergei Kotov to improve and modernize naval vessels and defensive procedures in the future.[11] Another milblogger responded to this assessment and claimed that the Russian command is extraordinarily unlikely to do so because of an ”administrative guillotine” in the Russian military bureaucracy that prevents such learning and innovation, as well as the command’s larger cultural proclivity to cover up mistakes instead of addressing them.[12]

The ire expressed by Russian milbloggers towards the Russian military apparatus represents a longstanding source of discontent for pro-war military commentators. Miroslava Reginskaya, the wife of imprisoned ultra-nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, posted on March 5 an archival letter written by Girkin in 2018 wherein Girkin complained about the incompetence of Russian commanders causing the deaths of Russian soldiers and called for “Stalinist level repressions” against such commanders.[13] Girkin emphasized that all echelons of the Russian command are filled with such “scum” that contribute to “thousands of large and small disasters, based on incompetence, stupid immense greed, and disregard for people.” Girkin’s 2018 critique about the inability and lack of willingness of the Russian command to address its mistakes, internalize lessons learned, and disseminate them across the Russian military remains a central component of Russian information space critiques against the Russian military machine nearly six years later in 2024.

Russian aircraft appear to be continuing to conduct a relatively high volume of glide bomb strikes in Ukraine despite Ukrainian officials’ reports that Ukrainian forces have downed several bomber aircraft in recent weeks. Forbes reported on March 4 that Russian Su-34 aircraft, escorted by Su-35 aircraft, are conducting one hundred or more sorties per day to conduct glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions at a range of 25 miles (about 40 kilometers).[14] The New York Times reported on March 5 that Russian tactics are shifting to intensify operations in the air domain and that Russian forces’ “more aggressive” air support on the front lines has helped Russian forces to advance recently in eastern Ukraine.[15] These reports suggest that the Russian Air Force is maintaining a high tempo of fixed-wing air missions in Ukraine and is possibly willing to tolerate risks to fixed-wing aircraft, likely because the Russian command may have decided that the positive effects generated by such air operations outweigh the costs associated with flying such missions. Russian forces used glide bomb strikes to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and are likely attempting to replicate such effects to support ongoing offensive operations elsewhere on the front. ISW cannot independently verify Ukrainian reports of the shootdowns of several Su-34 aircraft in recent weeks.

Forbes also reported that Ukrainian forces are using French-provided AASM Hammer glide bombs after France started supplying Ukraine with 50 of these bombs per month in January 2024.[16] Forbes noted that Ukrainian forces previously conducted strikes with US-provided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) glide bombs, but the supply of these bombs has halted due to the recent lack of US aid provisions to Ukraine.

Russia and China are deepening their strategic space cooperation, including cooperation on satellite surveillance and space exploration. Russian space agency Roscosmos Head Yuri Borisov stated on March 5 that Russia and China are considering delivering and constructing a nuclear power plant on the moon in 2032-2035.[17] Though Borisov’s proposal to create a nuclear power plant on the moon is odd, Borisov’s statement is indicative of warming relations and Chinese willingness to foster a long-term strategic partnership with Russia to posture against and possibly threaten the West. The Russian government approved a Russian-Chinese cooperation agreement on space cooperation through 2027 in November 2023 that Roscosmos and the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) initially signed in November 2022.[18] The agreement outlines three phases to develop and build the International Scientific Lunar Station and jointly explore the moon’s surface. Roscosmos and CNSA also signed an agreement in September 2022 on the joint placement of Russian GLONASS and Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system stations in six Russian and Chinese cities.[19] Russia is reportedly developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon, and a strategic space partnership with China suggests that Russia would be unlikely to use this or similar technology against China and that both states would mutually benefit from Russia’s posturing against the West through space and satellite technology.[20]

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two senior Russian commanders for their responsibility in perpetrating Russian war crimes – the first time the ICC has charged Russian military commanders. The ICC issued arrest warrants on March 5 for Lieutenant General Sergei Kobylash, the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Long-Range Aviation, and Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), for their role in the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects and causing excessive or incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts under the Rome Statute between at least October 10, 2022, to at least March 9, 2023.[21] The ICC last issued arrest warrants for Russian officials’ involvement in war crimes in Ukraine in March 2022 against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[22]

Russian forces are reportedly operating a “black market” to sell Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), including to Russian paramilitary groups that may be conducting their own POW exchanges with Ukraine. British outlet The Times, citing Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs Petro Yatsenko and a Ukrainian POW, reported on March 4 that Chechen paramilitary groups are buying Ukrainian POWs from other Russian military units on a black market for trafficking POWs.[23] The Chechen units are reportedly then using the Ukrainian POWs in exchange for Chechen POWs held by Ukrainian forces. The Times stated that Chechen units are likely turning to the black market because Chechen units are currently largely acting in policing or logistics roles in rear areas of Ukraine where there are fewer opportunities to capture Ukrainian POWs and exchange them for Chechen POWs. The Times stated that although there are no articles in the Geneva Convention that explicitly prohibit the POW trades, this practice is likely in violation of the clause that “no special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war.” Reports of Chechen units apparently conducting their own POW exchanges with Ukraine suggest that some paramilitary units within the Russian military, like the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units, are likely not included in wider, higher-level Russian-Ukrainian POW exchanges. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly criticized Chechen forces for their incompetence and lack of involvement in Ukraine, and Chechen forces have been relegated to rear areas or less active sectors of the front after participating in major Russian offensive operations in 2022.[24]

The director of the Moldovan Intelligence and Security Service, Alexandru Musteata, stated on March 5 that the Kremlin has begun to conduct multi-year hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its accession to the European Union (EU). Musteata stated that the Kremlin is conducting an “unprecedented level” of hybrid operations aimed at preventing Moldova from joining the EU and keeping Moldova in Russia’s sphere of influence.[25] Musteata stated that the first stage of Russian hybrid operations began with attempts to compromise local elections in 2023 and that Russia intends to also interfere in Moldova’s upcoming presidential election in late 2024 and parliamentary elections in the summer of 2025. Musteata stated that pro-Kremlin Moldovan politicians with ties to the Kremlin, either directly or through Russian and Moldovan organized crime groups, will try to promote pro-Russia policies in the Moldovan Parliament. Musteata warned that Russia plans to provoke protests and incite inter-ethnic conflict and economic and social crises in Moldova, including in the pro-Russian autonomous region of Gagauzia and the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Transnistria. Musteata stated that Moldovan authorities have already observed an increase in the use of social media platforms to spread anti-EU sentiment. ISW previously warned that the Kremlin could intensify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova-EU accession negotiations and the 2024 presidential election or a suite of other courses of action against Moldova that are not mutually exclusive with hybrid actions.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine destroyed the Project 22160 Sergei Kotov large patrol ship of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) off the coast of the Kerch Strait on the night of March 4-5.
• Russian milbloggers responded to the sinking of the Sergei Kotov by decrying the Russian military command’s lack of response to the incident and mounting a wider critique against the bureaucratic inertia of the Russian military apparatus.
• Russian aircraft appear to be continuing to conduct a relatively high volume of glide bomb strikes in Ukraine despite Ukrainian officials’ reports that Ukrainian forces have downed several bomber aircraft in recent weeks.
• Russia and China are deepening their strategic space cooperation, including cooperation on satellite surveillance and space exploration.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two senior Russian commanders for their responsibility in perpetrating Russian war crimes – the first time the ICC has charged Russian military commanders.
• Russian forces are reportedly operating a “black market” to sell Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), including to Russian paramilitary groups that may be conducting their own POW exchanges with Ukraine.
• The director of the Moldovan Intelligence and Security Service, Alexandru Musteata, stated on March 5 that the Kremlin has begun to conduct multi-year hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its accession to the EU.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 5.
• Russian authorities are reportedly disbanding elements of the former Wagner Group that were supposed to join Rosgvardia or are currently in Belarus.
• Russian law enforcement is likely intensifying crackdowns against Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued near northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[27] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued northwest, west, and southwest of Bakhmut on March 5. Positional engagements occurred northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka, Klishchiivka, Bila Hora, Pivnichne, and Shumy.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to clear positions in eastern Ivanivske and attempted to drive Ukrainian forces out of their positions within the settlement.[30] The Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division claimed that the Russian Air Force is striking Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) with FAB-500 glide bombs and S-8 and S-13 unguided rockets.[31] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Guards VDV Brigade and Spetsnaz elements of the 3rd Army Corps are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[32]

Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions around Avdiivka but did not make any confirmed advances on March 5. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting northeast of Avdiivka near Novoselivka; northwest of Avdiivka near Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Berdychi, Orlivka, and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured most of Orlivka, half of Tonenke, and half of Pervomaiske, although ISW has not observed visual evidence proving these claims.[34] A Russian milblogger implied that Russian forces are attempting to rapidly capture Orlivka, Tonenke, and Berdychi while Ukrainian forces are trying to delay Russian advances and strengthen defensive positions between Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) and Tonenke.[35] The milblogger added that Russian forces conduct over 100 airstrikes against Ukrainian positions per day near Avdiivka. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated that Ukrainian field fortifications in the Donetsk direction (likely in reference to the Avdiivka area) do not consist of a single continuous wall or a single trench line and that Ukrainian forces are currently constructing fortifications leveraging natural terrain in the area, especially accounting for water features.[36] Lykhoviy stated that Ukrainian forces have prepared tank ditches, bunkers, and revetments. Elements of the Russian 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Berdychi area; and elements of the Russian 21st Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in the fields south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) were advancing from the east in Novomykhailivka, while elements of the 68th Army Corps (also of the Pacific Fleet) captured a dairy farm north of the settlement.[39] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Heorhiivka west of Donetsk City on March 5, but ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 420 meters in width by 320 meters in depth in Novomykhailivka.[41] Positional battles continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[42] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka; and a tank battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (8th CAA, SMD) is operating near Heorhiivka.[43]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 5 but did not result in frontline changes. Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine; and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Prechystivka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Malynivka and Hulyaipole.[44] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Zorya (about 35km south of Polohy) with HIMARS systems.[45] Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area; elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction; and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 5th CAA (EMD) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD) launched airstrikes on Ukrainian forces in Vremivka salient in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued in and around Robotyne, particularly on the eastern and western outskirts of the village.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have been able to deploy reserves to the Robotyne area and conduct counterattacks.[49] One milblogger complained that Russian forces are struggling with insufficient electronic warfare (EW), counterbattery, and drone capabilities in Robotyne.[50] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the South Ossetian “Alania” volunteer battalion are operating near Robotyne.[51]

Russian forces have now been in control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for over two years and continue to improperly and unsafely operate the plant.[52] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on March 5 that Russian forces have committed “more than 150 gross violations” of operating procedure at the plant over the two years of Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP.[53] Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom noted that there have been eight complete blackouts and one partial blackout at the ZNPP since Russia’s occupation—five in 2022 and three in 2023.[54] Energoatom Head Petro Kotin noted that the actions of Russian forces are leading to the degradation of equipment at the ZNPP, which is exacerbated by the fact that Russian forces have blocked access to the ZNPP for qualified Ukrainian specialists who have not signed contracts with the Russian occupation administration of the plant.[55]

Limited positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on March 5.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are striking small Ukrainian groupings in the dacha area near the Antonivsky roadway bridge and warned that Ukrainian forces may be strengthening their grouping on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[57] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a substation in Russian-occupied Kakhovka.[58] Geolocated footage posted on March 5 also shows the first confirmed Ukrainian use of French-provided AASM Hammer glide bombs against Russian positions in Kozachi Laheri, east bank Kherson Oblast.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 22 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Balaklava, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 of the drones over Odesa Oblast.[60] Ukrainian officials also stated that Ukrainian forces shot down a Kh-59 missile over Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[61] Russian sources claimed that the Russian strike targeted Odesa Oblast and that targets included port infrastructure.[62]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Unspecified Russian authorities are reportedly disbanding elements of the former Wagner Group that were supposed to join Rosgvardia or are currently in Belarus. A Russian insider source claimed that unspecified actors decided to disband the former Wagner base in Kazachi Lageri, Rostov Oblast, which Wagner retained control over when operating as part of the Rosgvardia Volunteer Corps.[63] The Russian insider source claimed that Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (call sign “Lotos”) could not reach an agreement on financing the Wagner Group and that unspecified actors forced Lotos to hand the base over to Rosgvardia. The insider source claimed that Wagner personnel began to disperse to different units after long periods of inactivity. Wagner personnel are reportedly criticizing Lotos for disbanding the Wagner base and voicing complaints about Lotos’ previous decisions, such as his handling of malaria outbreaks during Wagner combat missions in the Central African Republic (CAR) or the fact that Lotos did not want to fight at an unspecified frontline. The insider source also claimed that Wagner will also disband its forces training Belarusian forces in Belarus after the completion of this training.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continued to highlight that ongoing Russian military restructuring efforts are meant to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war with NATO. Shoigu stated on March 5 that the Russian military is strengthening its forces in the northwestern and western direction, including by creating the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Moscow Military District (MMD), in response to Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.[64] ISW continues to assess that Russia would likely use an increased military presence on NATO’s eastern flank to intensify threats against NATO to further Russia’s long-term goal of weakening and containing the alliance.[65]

Russia has reportedly nationalized 180 private companies, including within the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), in the past two years.[66] Russian exiled opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on March 5 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office filed 40 demands for the nationalization of 180 companies since February 2022, as compared to three claims per year in 2020-2021 and almost no claims in the 2010s. The total assets of the 180 nationalized companies in 2022-2024 reportedly amounts to about 1.04 trillion rubles (about $11.4 billion), which is about 0.6 percent of Russia’s GDP. Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that Russian authorities mostly targeted DIB and mechanical engineering companies, food and fishing industries, ports, and real estate. The Russian Prosecutor’s Office reportedly most often files its nationalization demands under claims that the company illegally possesses property or violated anti-corruption laws but refrains from publishing or declassifying all of the demands so some of the reasons are unknown. Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that only two of the demands did not result in nationalization or ended in a settlement agreement.

Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 5 that deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia submitted a bill to the State Duma to provide five-year deferments from military service to young workers at ammunition and chemical production enterprises within Russia’s defense DIB.[67] The Duma deputies explained that the new deferment policy is necessary as significant increases in the Russian state defense order for 2022-2025 have aggravated labor shortage problems in the Russian DIB.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russia is continuing efforts to revitalize its defense industrial base (DIB)to sustain its war efforts in the medium to long-term. Shoigu claimed on March 5 that the United Aircraft Corporation is developing designs for an Il-212 military transport aircraft with a PD-8 turbojet engine that will replace the An-26 and An-72 transport aircraft.[68] Shoigu claimed that the Il-212 will have an increased payload and range and would be able to operate on unpaved runways and in the Arctic. The United Aircraft Corporation plans to have a prototype by the end of 2026. Shoigu also claimed that the Ural Civil Aviation Factory is developing the serial production of D-18T aircraft engines, scheduled to begin in late 2027.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

Russian law enforcement is likely intensifying crackdowns against Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Presidential Representation in Crimea warned on March 4 that Russian law enforcement began conducting illegal searches on the homes of at least four Crimean Tatars in Staryi Krym and Zhuravky and that Russian law enforcement also searched the mosque in Staryi Krym.[69] Ukrainian Presidential Representative in Crimea added that Russian law enforcement has illegally detained 125 Crimean Tatars as of March 4. Crimea-based human rights organization Crimean Solidarity reported on March 5 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents conducted searches against the homes of Crimean Tatar activists and religious figures in Bakhchysaray and Dzhankoi.[70] Crimean Solidarity stated that FSB agents detained several of the activists and religious figures and that the FSB is detaining some of them on criminal charges in Simferopol. Ukraine’s Permanent Presidential Representative in Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, stated on March 5 that Russian occupation authorities in Crimea are persecuting religious minorities in Crimea and have already opened at least 100 cases against Crimea Tatars on religious grounds in 2024 alone.[71] Russian occupation authorities in Crimea frequently weaponize allegations of religious extremism to illegally persecute and detain Crimean Tatars and neutralize sources of opposition and community organization.[72]

Russian occupation administrations continue to prepare for Russian presidential elections in occupied areas of Ukraine. The Russian occupation officials in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts amplified footage and reports of the initial stages of early voting in the occupied parts of the four oblasts.[73] Ukrainian sources noted that Russian officials are engaged in multiple schemes to artificially inflate voter turnout numbers, such as conducting door-to-door polling, employing various electronic and remote voting options, allowing people to vote without Russian passports, using law enforcement agents to intimidate people into voting early, bribing residents into voting, and importing Russians to occupied areas to vote in the elections.[74] European Commission External Affairs Spokesperson Peter Stano emphasized on February 29 that Russian early voting in occupied Ukraine is a “clear violation of international law” and that the European Commission will never recognize the elections.[75] Russian occupation officials will continue efforts to portray widespread local participation in the upcoming presidential election to cast the occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of legitimacy, as is a common tactic in the Kremlin’s occupation playbook.[76]

Russia continues efforts to Russify Ukrainian children by co-opting the school system and encouraging various youth outreach programs. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo reported on March 1 that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration had sent 30 young men and women from Kherson Oblast to Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, to participate in the World Youth Festival, in which Saldo claimed that youth representatives from 180 countries will attend.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 4 that the World Youth Festival is essentially a Russian propaganda forum that Russian officials are using to create a new generation of pro-Russian collaborators amongst youth in occupied areas of Ukraine.[78] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militia Telegram channel also stated on March 4 that Russian occupation authorities are teaching “All-Russian” civics and history courses to children in occupied Stanytsia Luhanska, and Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that occupation officials are inspecting schools in occupied Luhansk Oblast to ensure that educators are complying with Russian curricula requirements.[79]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation seeking to weaponize religion and discredit Ukraine. Russian sources accused Ukraine of religious repression after the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy recommended adopting a bill that would ban religious institutions associated with the Kremlin from operating in Ukraine.[80] Verkhovna Rada Deputy Volodymyr Viatrovych stated that the bill explicitly bans the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and all its affiliated activities and structures.[81] The bill also simplifies Ukrainian churches’ transition to the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine.[82] The Russian claims are part of a longstanding information operation aimed at painting Ukraine as religiously intolerant to discourage further Western support of and security assistance to Ukraine and to informationally justify Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of Ukraine.[83] Russia has used Kremlin-controlled religious structures, including the ROC and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), to internally destabilize Ukraine and conduct a campaign of systematic religious persecution and cultural genocide in occupied Ukraine.[84]

Russian officials continue to exploit a leaked recording of German military officials discussing the possible provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine in order to deter further Western military aid provisions to Ukraine.[85] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova insulted German officials and forwarded a Russian information operation aimed at degrading domestic trust in the German government.[86]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger continued efforts to portray Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as weak and a threat to Armenian security in response to Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia and Russian-led institutions.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Union State and Belarusian officials are highlighting avenues for cultural integration between Russia and Belarus. Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev proposed on March 5 that the Union State create a list of shared Belarusian-Russian cultural heritage, using the analog of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[88] Mezentsev noted that the focus on Union State cultural heritage would emphasize the “scale and age-old depth of the culture of Belarus and Russia.” Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy also emphasized individual relations between Belarusian oblasts and Russia and highlighted Belarusian efforts to make Belarus an attractive tourist destination for Russians.[89]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

14. Why getting more female troops into Special Operations will take time

Excerpts:

Because confidence in the abilities of military team members is so critical, Manning emphasized the care special operations leaders needed to take not to lower qualifying standards or to be perceived as doing so.

But, she said, there were also steps the military might consider to lower risk to women attempting to make it in special operations.

Attempting to enter a training pipeline with a high attrition rate ― no woman has made it completely through training to become a Marine Raider or Navy SEAL, for example ― carries the risk of consuming valuable months in service that could be used for career advancement and missing out on opportunities to lead.

Manning didn’t offer a specific proposal about how to incentivize women to attempt special operations, but said it was something leaders should keep in mind.

“If [women] are thinking, maybe I want to do this as a career, it might not be their best choice,” Manning said.

Lisa Jaster, one of the first three women to graduate from Army Ranger School in 2015 and the first female Reserve soldier to do so, told Military Times the physicality needed to fill operator roles takes many women out of the running from the start.

A competitor in Brazilian jiu-jitsu who worked in offshore construction management prior to earning her Ranger tab, Jaster argues that girls and young women are disadvantaged by lower physical standards during physical training in their school years: such as hangs instead of pullups, and pushups from their knees instead of from their toes.

...

“I actually trained Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu with this young 17-year-old high school senior,” Jaster said. “She’s as hard as woodpecker lips; she’s as tough as can be. And nobody’s talking to her about the military.”

Jaster, who was 37 and a mother of two when she graduated Ranger School, said her advice to women considering the challenge of special operations is that they are not alone, or “weird” for their interest in the field.

“You might not find people like you at the corner store,” she said. “But when I went to Ranger School, there were 19 of us there that were all driven. We weren’t competitive; we were sisters in arms. And we would support each other to this day.”

Why getting more female troops into Special Operations will take time

militarytimes.com · by Hope Hodge Seck · March 5, 2024

As recently released data from the military services has shown, the participation of women in elite special operations roles ― and even entry into the training pipeline for such roles ― remains a rarity some eight years after these roles were first opened.

The military is starting to take notice: a wide-ranging Army special operations study released in 2023 highlighted barriers to service, from ill-fitting body armor to “benevolent sexism” keeping women on the sidelines.

In September 2023, the congressionally appointed Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services unanimously approved a recommendation, still pending, that the Secretary of Defense should establish a working group focused on women in the special operations community “to provide strategic oversight on and direction of current integration plans and challenges, metrics, lessons learned, and best practices.”

This, the committee wrote in its recommendation, “would enhance recruitment, integration, growth, and retention of women in SOF.”

RELATED

Women in Army SOF resorted to buying their own armor, study finds

Nearly half of the women in U.S. Army Special Operations Command reported problems with the way their gear fits and some have resorted to buying their own.

By Hope Hodge Seck

Some women who have served in elite and specialized military roles told Military Times they applauded these efforts. But they also pointed to a factor in the integration of women into special operations that was harder to manage: time.

Lory Manning, a retired Navy captain and co-chair of the board of directors at Service Women’s Action Network, said it was instructive to look at the integration of women into naval fighter aviation roles, a process that began in 1994.

While women still remain dramatically underrepresented in the fighter community, the presence of a female fighter pilot in a ready room isn’t as novel as it once was.

“I think a lot of it is a function of time and acclimation on the part of the men and the women,” Manning said of integrating women into new roles. “The women want to feel welcomed and supported. The men want to feel like, this isn’t somebody that’s slipping in here who really can’t cut the mustard.”

For naval aviation in particular, the process of cultural integration took some 15 years, Manning said.

The 1991 Tailhook scandal, in which dozens of women reported being sexually assaulted by fighter pilots at a professional symposium in Las Vegas, revealed an underlying culture of misogyny and disrespect for women.

Beyond that, though, Manning said she appreciated that developing trust in those entering new roles took time.

“You’ve got to understand it’s going to take time, and you’ve got to let them get whatever beefs they have off their chest,” Manning said of male service members skeptical that women could cut it in new roles. “And you’ve got to show them that not only can women do it, but it’s even better when you do have [them] around … because they bring an extra dimension.”

Because confidence in the abilities of military team members is so critical, Manning emphasized the care special operations leaders needed to take not to lower qualifying standards or to be perceived as doing so.

But, she said, there were also steps the military might consider to lower risk to women attempting to make it in special operations.

Attempting to enter a training pipeline with a high attrition rate ― no woman has made it completely through training to become a Marine Raider or Navy SEAL, for example ― carries the risk of consuming valuable months in service that could be used for career advancement and missing out on opportunities to lead.

Manning didn’t offer a specific proposal about how to incentivize women to attempt special operations, but said it was something leaders should keep in mind.

“If [women] are thinking, maybe I want to do this as a career, it might not be their best choice,” Manning said.

Lisa Jaster, one of the first three women to graduate from Army Ranger School in 2015 and the first female Reserve soldier to do so, told Military Times the physicality needed to fill operator roles takes many women out of the running from the start.

A competitor in Brazilian jiu-jitsu who worked in offshore construction management prior to earning her Ranger tab, Jaster argues that girls and young women are disadvantaged by lower physical standards during physical training in their school years: such as hangs instead of pullups, and pushups from their knees instead of from their toes.

“It’s, ‘Hey, if we’re being trained on one set of standards, and then we’re tested on another set of standards, I’m just not going to line up for the test,’” Jaster said. “Why would I?”

In addition to more equitable and challenging physical training prior to the military, Jaster said she would like to see more effective recruiting among the young women who do have the physical acumen to succeed.

While the military services have said they do recruit among female athletes and sports programs, lots of promising candidates are still slipping through the cracks, she said.

“I actually trained Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu with this young 17-year-old high school senior,” Jaster said. “She’s as hard as woodpecker lips; she’s as tough as can be. And nobody’s talking to her about the military.”

Jaster, who was 37 and a mother of two when she graduated Ranger School, said her advice to women considering the challenge of special operations is that they are not alone, or “weird” for their interest in the field.

“You might not find people like you at the corner store,” she said. “But when I went to Ranger School, there were 19 of us there that were all driven. We weren’t competitive; we were sisters in arms. And we would support each other to this day.”

About Hope Hodge Seck

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter covering the U.S. military and national defense. The former managing editor of Military.com, her work has also appeared in the Washington Post, Politico Magazine, USA Today and Popular Mechanics.

15. LTG (Ret) James M. Dubik Writing Fellows Program

​While I was at Georgetown, LTG Dubik and I had offices across from each other for a couple of years. I had some of the best discussions about the Army, strategy, and ethics with him.

Per the CSA to all Soldiers: write!

LTG (Ret) James M. Dubik Writing Fellows Program

armyupress.army.mil

Concept

In support of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) efforts to revitalize and reinvigorate professional writing in the military, Army University Press (AUP) establishes a voluntary, non-resident writing fellowship program to encourage military professional writing and discourse on topics that contribute to a community of military and national security professionals.

Namesake

The fellowship is named to honor the scholarship, writing, and professional contributions of LTG (Ret) James M. Dubik. General Dubik’s professional contributions to the military over the past several decades, on active duty, as well as in retirement, are exceptional and internationally recognized. He represents an ideal of a warrior-scholar that understands the importance of intellectual engagement in the community of military and national security professionals.

Purpose

The objective of the fellowship is to help achieve improved scholarship and writing by authors contributing quality content to AUP, Branch Journals, and other publishing platforms on important national security and defense topics.

Expectation

Fellows will be appointed for one academic year with the option of extension, based on the quality of an individual’s contributions. Fellows are expected to contribute a minimum of one article, one book review, and/or other equivalent product contribution to AUP, Branch Journals, and other military and professional platforms, as well as serve as peer reviewers for other Fellows.

Description

Fellows may be company and field-grade officers, NCOs, and civilians from across the services, allied/partner nations, the interagency, and academia. Senior Fellows may be senior field-grade or flag-level leaders, civilians, and nationally recognized scholars from academia. Senior advisors to the program will assist the Director, AUP, in the administration of the program.

Agreement

A detailed Volunteer Agreement will be signed before beginning the appointment. Generally, AUP will coordinate and provide recognition to Fellows at the conclusion of their appointments. Fellows are encouraged to state their affiliation with AUP on bylines and CVs.

Contact us for more details and to apply at mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.armyu-army-university-press@army.mil.

armyupress.army.mil

16. Opinion | The U.S. can’t afford to wait to fully embrace the world’s most effective weapon

​Excerpts:

The United States’ reserve force is more complicated than Israel’s, but the necessary authorities for such an initiative already exist within each military service. One is at the Marine Innovation Unit, launched in 2022, in which reservists with industry-trained skills in technology and management help bring commercially proven capabilities to the force. But we need more than an experimental unit here and there — the rapid proliferation of this type of reserve initiative is in order.

In this domain, the United States lags behind China and Russia, which have already incorporated industry talent in their militaries. However, whereas China has achieved this advantage through illiberal policies such as military-civil fusion and Russia has done so through conscription and brute force, the United States can accomplish it through the laissez-faire dynamism that makes America’s innovators and warfighters second to none.

While the combination of youth and experience in the IDF is a unique byproduct of the current war, the Defense Department already has a strong potential pool of mission-driven recruits in the commercial innovation sector. In recent years, technical talent has flocked to the U.S. defense tech ecosystem, which itself has become a top recipient of private venture capital. America’s experienced technologists are ready and eager to serve.

Opinion | The U.S. can’t afford to wait to fully embrace the world’s most effective weapon

By Shyam Sankar and Joab Rosenberg

March 4, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Shyam Sankar · March 4, 2024

Shyam Sankar is chief technology officer of Palantir Technologies. Joab Rosenberg is a retired colonel and reservist in Israel’s defense intelligence agency.

Israel’s defense and intelligence services are renowned for nurturing young technical talent. But their real advantage in the Gaza war is built on senior technical expertise found in the reserve units that have been called up for duty. The mix of young, raw talent combined with the wisdom and experience of an older reserve generation is an innovative model the United States can and should embrace.

Among the 360,000 reservists called up since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7 are some of Israel’s most seasoned software engineers, data scientists and data analysts. After decades of delivering hyper-scaled software solutions in the commercial sector — and learning from their failures — these senior reservists are spearheading explosive change in the Israeli military’s technical and analytical capabilities. Furthermore, they provide unique peer-to-peer collaboration with senior military leaders as well as mentoring for early-career technologists.

Though the United States’ reserve structure is very different from Israel’s, the Defense Department has much to learn from that model. To rapidly mature its technological capabilities, as well as expand its access to world-class technical talent, the department must create pathways for experienced commercial innovators to put on the uniform. In short, the United States should establish a new form of elite technical reserve duty.

The landscape of warfare has changed, and today’s commanders are as likely to work from a faraway desk as from a fortified battlefield post. Their most lethal weapon system is software. Providing explicit reserve opportunities for commercial technologists would boost the U.S. capability in at least three ways. First, it would infuse top engineering capability into the ranks, from the Pentagon to the front lines. Second, it would allow senior military leaders to work directly with some of the country’s sharpest technological minds, not as outside advisers but as true mission partners. Third, it would support a two-way knowledge transfer in which military technologists learn the private sector’s best practices, while industry leaders gain a sharper understanding of what U.S. warfighters need.

The impact of experience extends beyond software engineering. One of us has witnessed several examples in Israel since Oct. 7: When Hamas’s financial transactions had to be analyzed, a volunteer who works in the financial industry quickly connected the necessary dots. In another case, a senior data scientist — whose day job is in advertising — was able to immediately handle complex data sets from media and tech sources. And skilled academics used cutting-edge AI algorithms to sift through the enormous amount of GoPro, phone and multimedia content posted by the terrorists, enabling Israel to track them and their hostages.

Unlike Israel, the United States should not — and, in fact, cannot — wait for a war of necessity to realize these benefits. Israel’s smooth integration of senior technical talent should serve as inspiration to act now. The newly established technical reserve units would set aside maximum age limits and seek individuals with a certain number of years of experience in fields such as software engineering, data science, AI and machine learning modeling, and technical project management. Their work would pay off not only during times of activation after a crisis but also during every single day they perform their reserve duty.

The United States’ reserve force is more complicated than Israel’s, but the necessary authorities for such an initiative already exist within each military service. One is at the Marine Innovation Unit, launched in 2022, in which reservists with industry-trained skills in technology and management help bring commercially proven capabilities to the force. But we need more than an experimental unit here and there — the rapid proliferation of this type of reserve initiative is in order.

In this domain, the United States lags behind China and Russia, which have already incorporated industry talent in their militaries. However, whereas China has achieved this advantage through illiberal policies such as military-civil fusion and Russia has done so through conscription and brute force, the United States can accomplish it through the laissez-faire dynamism that makes America’s innovators and warfighters second to none.

While the combination of youth and experience in the IDF is a unique byproduct of the current war, the Defense Department already has a strong potential pool of mission-driven recruits in the commercial innovation sector. In recent years, technical talent has flocked to the U.S. defense tech ecosystem, which itself has become a top recipient of private venture capital. America’s experienced technologists are ready and eager to serve.

The Washington Post · by Shyam Sankar · March 4, 2024

17. Nine Things Western Analysts Got Wrong About Russia and Its Invasion of Ukraine

​Conclusion:

These misconceptions in the West about Russian imperialism and the war against Ukraine have caused a shallow understanding of what Ukraine needs to defeat the occupiers and why a complete Ukrainian victory is critical to ending Russia’s threats to its neighbors. Relying solely on a Western perspective of how Russia and Ukraine operate will only disadvantage the West in fighting against Russian imperialism.

Nine Things Western Analysts Got Wrong About Russia and Its Invasion of Ukraine

jamestown.org · by Taras Kuzio · March 4, 2024

Executive Summary:

• Many analysts in the West have misunderstood the conflict in Ukraine, leading to the mishandling of aid to Ukraine.
• Many Western analysts overlooked the historical myth-making that the Kremlin had been promoting for many years, which aimed to erase Ukrainian history and identity.
• The lack of military aid from the West following Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 allowed Russia to regroup and prepare for the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Two years ago, on February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what he termed a “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine. This was the first full-scale invasion of a European country since World War II, though the invasion truly began eight years earlier with the invasion of Donbas and the illegal annexation of Crimea. Many Western analysts, especially those with professed Russian expertise, misinterpreted several critical points, and Russian propaganda was quick to support these misconceptions.

1. Failed State: There was a long-standing depiction of Ukraine as weak, divided, and corrupt. This depiction is similar to Kremlin disinformation that portrayed Ukraine as a failed and artificial state (BBC, May 8, 2018; The Nation, February 15, 2022; Meduza, February 23, 2023). This view made it seem like protecting Ukraine was a lost cause for Western countries, deterring them from providing the aid Kyiv needed.
2. Pro-Russian: Russian speakers in Ukraine were portrayed as disloyal and pro-Russian, adding to the stereotype of a weak and divided Ukraine. This depiction is similar to that of Kremlin disinformation and Russian nationalist claims of all Russian speakers as “compatriots” who seek to become a unified part of a pan-Russian people (Gazeta.ru, April 5, 2021; RIA Novosti, May 26, 2021; TASS, July 12, 2021, Meduza, June 9, 2022). One of Putin’s justifications for the SVO was to halt the “genocide” of Russian speakers that he claimed had been carried out by Ukrainian “Nazis” since 2014 (Andrei Karaulov, Genocide of Russians in Ukraine: What the West is Silent About, May 15, 2018; RIA Novosti, February 18, 2022; Meduza, March 2, 2022). Since the 2014 “Russian Spring” and the 2022 invasion, most Russian speakers in Ukraine have shown themselves to be Ukrainian patriots. A poll conducted in July 2023 reported that 50 percent of eastern Ukrainians and 35 percent of Russian-speaking Ukrainians blamed the entire Russian population for the war, while 60 percent of respondents perceived the question of whether the Russian people or the Kremlin was to blame as irrelevant (RE:Russia, July 21, 2023).
3. Ukraine’s Quick Defeat: The Kremlin and Western analysts were unanimous in their view of a rapid Russian military victory and Ukrainian defeat, with Kyiv only lasting a few days before capitulating (Radio Free Europe, March 11, 2022; Lenta.ru, December 8, 2022). This influenced the West to only send light weapons, such as Javelins and NLAWS, to Ukraine for use in partisan warfare. Many in the West thought sending heavy weaponry was pointless, as Ukraine would be quickly defeated (US Department of Defense, April 7, 2022; CSIS, April 12, 2022; Foreign Policy, November 27, 2023). In October 2023, a year and a half into the war, 90 percent of Ukrainians believed that they would win the battle against Russia, demonstrating the resilience of Ukraine contrary to what many believed at the war’s beginning (Ukrainska Pravda, October 24, 2023).
4. Reformed Russian Army: Moscow and Western analysts were united in their view that a reformed Russian army had become the second best in the world (RG.ru, August 31, 2017; RBC Ukraine, February 22, 2023; Foreign Affairs, September 8, 2023; Kommersant, January 17). Western analysts ignored the disastrous impact of the mafia state, a term that had been used to describe the country as far back as 2010, on the Russian military and security forces (Vedomosti, December 2, 2010; BBC, December 2, 2010). By the end of the invasion’s first year, the Russian army was mocked as the second-best army in Ukraine (New Voice of Ukraine, June 2, 2023).
5. The Kremlin Is Not Ideological: Numerous Western scholars and analysts, although certainly not all, have been reluctant to depict Putin’s Russia as totalitarian, nationalistic, and fascist (Atlantic Council, April 23, 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 9, 2022; Courthouse News Service, August 3, 2022; Politico, December 9, 2022). Russia is a mafia state and, since constitutional changes in 2020 and increased domestic repression, a totalitarian political system that supports imperial nationalism and revanchism (Meduza, March 10, 2020; Republic.ru, September 5, 2022). Putin’s Russia seeks the genocidal destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainians and their replacement by a Little Russia and Little Russians. Crimea and New Russia (southeast Ukraine) are claimed as “historical Russian lands,” and central Ukraine would become a Little Russian puppet state akin to Lukashenka’s Belarus, while Putin has stated that many in Western Ukraine want the territory to be offered to Poland, Hungary, and Romania (RG.ru, July 22, 2023; TASS, December 19, 2023). Russia will rise from the ashes of a destroyed Ukraine as a great power (once again resembling the Soviet Union, where the US-led unipolar world is replaced by the multipolarism found in the Cold War). Russia’s rebirth in the ashes of Ukraine’s destruction is a quintessential definition of fascism.
6. Why Russia Invaded Ukraine: This question continues to puzzle some Western analysts and scholars because of their inability to comprehend the true nature of Putin’s regime. The roots of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lie in the Kremlin leader seeking to carve out a place in Russian history as the “gatherer of Russian lands” (alongside Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin). This notion is a return to the imperial-nationalist denial of Ukraine’s existence and the belief in a pan-Russian people composed of “great,” “little,” and “white” Russians (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, respectively) (TASS, July 12, 2021; RBC, June 9, 2022; see EDM, October 3, 2022). Many Kremlin leaders believed that “Little Russians” were deluded into thinking they were Ukrainians by the Austrians and Poles before 1914, by Vladimir Lenin when he gave them a Soviet republic, and by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since 1991 (Kremlin.ru, July 12, 2021; Pravda.ru, November 22, 2022).
7. No Military Support: Most Western analysts argued against sending military support to Ukraine after 2014 (Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2015). US President Barack Obama vetoed sending weapons to Ukraine despite the United States being one of the signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which provided security assurances to Ukraine in return for nuclear disarmament (House Armed Services Committee, October 4, 2015). One argument against the United States sending military aid was that Western weapons would not prevent Ukraine’s defeat (The Hill, December 7, 2021).
8. Escalation: A second argument from 2014–2021 was that sending Western weapons would merely lead to an escalation of the conflict Therefore, it was not in the interests of the United States and West to send lethal aid to Ukraine (Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2014; The Atlantic, April 2016). Since 2022, fear of escalation has continued to influence slow-moving US, German, and French military aid to Ukraine and the stipulation that prevented their use inside Russia until very recently. Fear of escalation continues to prevent the United States and Germany from sending more long-range munitions (Politico, October 12, 2023; NBCNews, February 19). The fear of Russian escalation was and has been exaggerated. Meanwhile, delays in military aid has caused the war to carry on longer as Russia was given time to build three lines of fortifications, lay tens of thousands of mines, and organize a mobilization of 300,000 soldiers (Interfax, November 1, 2022).
9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Enlargement: Some Western realists, analysts, and scholars blamed NATO in 2014 and since for provoking Russian military aggression (Reuters, July 11, 2023). Ukraine has yet to be granted full NATO membership. Russia did not necessarily oppose Ukraine joining NATO but instead worried about losing what the Kremlin considers “Little Russia” to Europe.

These misconceptions in the West about Russian imperialism and the war against Ukraine have caused a shallow understanding of what Ukraine needs to defeat the occupiers and why a complete Ukrainian victory is critical to ending Russia’s threats to its neighbors. Relying solely on a Western perspective of how Russia and Ukraine operate will only disadvantage the West in fighting against Russian imperialism.

jamestown.org · by Taras Kuzio · March 4, 2024

18. Qatar Positions Itself as Special Operations Training Hub

Qatar Positions Itself as Special Operations Training Hub

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

3/4/2024

By

Scale model of the 401 Project training facility

Stew Magnuson photo

DOHA, Qatar — The Qatari armed forces are setting up an international school that will train special operators and counterterrorism units from at home and abroad.

Dubbed Project 401, the special ops school is establishing some 400 scenarios for land, air and sea-based special operations, its director, Brig. Gen. Ali Harib Al-Harib, said March 3 in a press conference previewing the eighth edition of the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference, or DIMDEX.

The project was first announced at the 2022 edition of DIMDEX, and since then it has completed construction of one of four planned training centers at the Brouq Naval Training Camp for Special Forces, he said.

Project 401 will use cutting-edge technology such as augmented reality and virtual reality to enhance the training, he said. Live training will be held in a mock city, an inflatable boat course, a vehicle track and an Airbus 300 passenger jet hull to practice hostage rescue. Combat medical evacuation will also be taught there, he said.

The naval training facility already has an active system to teach underwater egress for helicopter crash scenarios, he said.

Other training will include a fast roping and repelling course and a maritime anti-terrorism course that will teach operators how to board and clear ships, as well as sea mine clearing. It will also offer courses on counter-improvised explosive device and K-9 detecting and training, a brochure said.

It will also teach non-kinetic skills such as hostage negotiations, dealing with the media, advanced interrogation techniques and how to work with civilian rescue teams, the brochure said.

Al-Harib said construction on all four facilities should be completed by the end of this year, but there will be a lot of work to be done complying with international security standards before the project becomes fully operational. He declined to say how long that may take.

Once finished, Project 401 will be looking to hire international special operations forces trainers, he said.

“It will be mostly local, but we are open to international experts to come do training if that is the requirement,” he said.

Abdulrahman Ali Al-Harib, the project’s technology development director, told National Defense March 4 that the project is seeking to do as much technology development as it can in house, but the four facilities will be looking to Middle East, European and U.S.-based military contractors to supply advanced augmented reality and virtual reality systems, as well as integrators who can help tie all the systems together.

It is already partnering with one U.S. company, InVeris Training Solutions — a Suwanee, Georgia-based specialist in live fire and virtual training systems, he said.

There is an acute need in the region to train forces how to counter unmanned systems, and Project 401 is setting up its urban training center and other facilities to teach armed forces — special operators or not — how to defend against them using soft-kill electronic warfare or kinetic means, he said.

“We’re at a level where we have developed the unmanned platforms, but of course when it comes to the sensor integration and it comes to building the core data center, we’re looking to collaborate ... with potential partners from around the world,” he said.

The center is looking to host students from the region, NATO and other “friendly forces,” he said.

Topics: International

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

19. America’s New Twilight Struggle With Russia

Excerpts:

A strategy of containment should prioritize defending Russia’s threatened neighbors, especially those that do not have a clear and immediate path to NATO membership. Apart from Ukraine, Russia’s most vulnerable neighbors include Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which remain outside the alliance. The United States should offer these countries training and weapons. It should also bolster these states’ resilience against Russian gray-zone threats, ranging from cyberattacks to election meddling. It should share intelligence with them and invest in critical infrastructure, such as power grids and data storage.

The war in Ukraine has severed Russia from the West to a significant degree, but there remain critical linkages that serve the Kremlin’s aims. Although sanctions have imposed real costs on the Russian economy, Moscow has adapted, transitioning to a war economy sustained by vast energy resources, particularly oil. The United States has been reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia’s oil sector for fear of exacerbating inflation at home. But Russia’s dependence on oil is a vulnerability on which the United States should capitalize. Western policymakers should take more proactive measures to push down the price of Russian oil, following in the footsteps of Ronald Reagan’s early 1980s policy, which contributed to the economic crises the Soviet Union experienced in the 1980s.

Any U.S. strategy toward Russia must recognize the peril of direct military confrontation. Washington must remain open to negotiating with Russia on arms control, cyberwarfare, and regional conflicts between each side’s allies. Without predicating these talks on large-scale political change in Russia, Washington must plainly demonstrate that the United States does not seek war with Russia and must even cooperate with Moscow on issues such as climate change and space exploration. Implementing a modern containment strategy will require bipartisan buy-in and a commitment to maintaining sufficient defense spending. In today’s polarized political and media environment, securing the kind of bipartisan consensus that sustained containment for much of the Cold War will demand political effort and creativity.

Kennan acknowledged that Washington had to commit to containment for as long as necessary—until Soviet power had “mellowed” and no longer threatened global stability. Containing Russia today will require a similar commitment of time and resources. It will be another twilight struggle, though it will unfold in a world vastly different from that of the late 1940s.

America’s New Twilight Struggle With Russia

To Prevail, Washington Must Revive Containment

By Max Bergmann, Michael Kimmage, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Maria Snegovaya

March 6, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability · March 6, 2024

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Washington to rethink its fundamental assumptions about Moscow. Every U.S. president from Bill Clinton to Joe Biden had sought some degree of engagement with Russia. As late as 2021, Biden expressed hope that Russia and the United States could arrive at “a stable, predictable relationship.” But Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine has radically altered that assessment. It is now clear that the two countries will remain antagonists for years to come. The Kremlin possesses immense disruptive global power and is willing to take great risks to advance its geopolitical agenda. Coping with Russia will demand a long-term strategy, one that echoes containment, which guided the United States through the Cold War, or what President John F. Kennedy called a “long, twilight struggle” against the Soviet Union.

More than 75 years have passed since the diplomat George Kennan first formulated that strategy in his famous Long Telegram from Moscow and then in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “X.” In his 1947 article, Kennan described containment as a political strategy reinforced by “the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.” The goal was to avoid direct conflict with the Soviet Union while halting the spread of Soviet power.

A new containment strategy must account for the novelty of the present moment. It must lean on U.S. allies more than its twentieth-century antecedent did. And it must be sustained for the long haul—a task that will be harder without the bipartisan consensus that marked the Cold War fight against communism. The geography of containment will also differ. Kennan’s vision of containment focused primarily on Europe. Today, post-Soviet Eurasia and the rest of the world will be more central.

A clearly articulated new containment strategy would presume that Russia will continue trying to dominate Ukraine. This strategy would signal to NATO allies and to Ukraine that the United States remains steadfastly committed to European security, while reassuring U.S. officials and American citizens worried about escalation. Ukraine’s defense is crucial for European stability and for preventing the spread of Russian power globally. Containing Russia in Ukraine means keeping the line of contact as close to the Russian border as possible, constraining Russia’s expansionist tendencies. But containment will remain necessary irrespective of how the war in Ukraine ends.As in Kennan’s day, a containment strategy enables Washington to check Moscow’s aggression without risking a direct conflict between two nuclear powers. But it is not enough to simply dust off Kennan’s prescriptions. New times call for new thinking.

CONTAINMENT’S NEW MAP

Cold War containment was never a single policy. Kennan emphasized political tools and the limited application of “counterforce.” Other Cold War strategists promoted a more militarized version. Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as director of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, called for “the rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” Nitze favored military intervention against Soviet-backed insurgencies in what was then called the Third World.

Old debates about containment still apply. Although the United States has marshaled military aid to Ukraine, checking Russian influence in Central Asia and Africa will require different tools, such as support for governance reform and trade. Containment will not look exactly as it did in the twentieth century. Geography marks the most important difference. Whereas the fault lines of the Cold War were in Germany, the flash points of today’s conflict with Russia are in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states on Russia’s western periphery. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are all likely to achieve varying levels of integration into Western institutions but will remain places of contestation. Some countries may hedge, working with both the United States and Russia.

Without the stark ideological divides of the Cold War, countries in other regions will remain on the sidelines. Important regional powers such as India and South Africa have bad memories of Western colonialism and see the West’s invocation of a moral struggle as self-serving and hypocritical. A still larger number do not want to imperil their own economies by imposing sanctions or otherwise partaking in a conflict they do not see as theirs. For this reason, the United States should contest Russian influence outside Europe primarily through development assistance, trade, and investment rather than through military intervention. In the Sahel, for instance, the United States can counter the brutality and corruption of Russian-backed juntas by supporting locally led initiatives to bolster civil society.

A BALANCE OF THREATS

In the twenty-first century, the United States will not be able to orient its foreign and security policy solely around the struggle with Moscow. Any strategy for containing Russia must account for resource commitments to the Indo-Pacific and for the impact of U.S. policy on the Chinese-Russian relationship. That complicated reality requires U.S. allies, especially in Europe, to take on a larger share of directing the containment of Russia.

Europe has shown its political and economic resilience in the face of Russian aggression. Yet militarily, the continent remains dependent on the United States. This dynamic must change, in part because the United States must commit more of its resources to Asia. The growth of European defense spending since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is an encouraging step. In 2023, 11 NATO members hit their spending target, allocating at least two percent of GDP to national defense, up from just 7 members in 2022. The rest need to follow suit.

Europe must also resolve the problem of coordination. Right now, the United States coordinates more than 25 militaries in Europe. While it must continue to do this in the short term, it must push individual European countries and the European Union to take over this role and to create a stronger European pillar in NATO. The goal should be for European states to provide at least 50 percent of funding, troops, and materiel for responding to a contingency under NATO’s Article 5.

Facing threats from revisionist neighbors, Japan and South Korea see the sovereignty of Ukraine as a matter of their national interest.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also connected Washington’s challenges in European and Asian theaters. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all made important contributions to Ukraine’s struggle. China, by contrast, remains one of the most important diplomatic backers of Russia’s war. Beijing echoes Moscow’s talking points about NATO expansion as the main driver of the conflict. It has also provided navigation equipment, fighter jet parts, and drones, even as it tries to present itself as a potential broker and has held back from providing substantial lethal military assistance.

Facing threats from revisionist neighbors, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian powers see the sovereignty of Ukraine as a matter of their national interest. Tokyo and Seoul have supplied humanitarian assistance and nonlethal military aid, such as helmets and bulletproof vests, and South Korea is emerging as a major arms supplier for European militaries.

The tradeoffs inherent in confronting both China and Russia will be acute. Even if Russia remains the principal threat to the international order, the United States will have to increase its focus on China in the coming decades. A strategy of containment can enable the United States to deter Russia in Europe while still dedicating more resources to deterring China in Asia.

A U.S. containment strategy toward Russia would pay additional dividends in Asia. Russia’s unprovoked war has been a quagmire. Washington’s continued support of Ukraine impedes Russia’s military ambitions and dilutes its potential to support Chinese aggression in the future. The war in Ukraine has made Moscow and Beijing more united than at any time since the days of Stalin and Mao. Biden and his immediate successors will not be able to peel Beijing away from Moscow the way that U.S. President Richard Nixon did following his 1972 visit to China; China and Russia are too tightly bound, and both see U.S. global leadership as a threat. The war has also deepened the relationship between Russia and North Korea, which has supplied Russian forces with weaponry and, with Moscow’s backing, may now feel emboldened to act on the Korean Peninsula with impunity.

Still, the United States and its allies have leverage with China. Whereas Chinese-Russian trade stood at $240 billion in 2023, China’s trade with the EU amounted to about $800 billion, and China’s trade with the United States was more than $660 billion. China has more at stake in its economic relationships with the United States and the EU than it does with Russia. The EU has leveraged its economic relationship, blacklisting Chinese firms suspected of providing materiel to Russia. Maintaining this leverage is one reason the United States and the EU should be wary of economic decoupling from China.

The war in Ukraine has made Moscow and Beijing more united than at any time since the days of Stalin and Mao.

For much of the Cold War, a hypermilitarized version of containment backfired in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The United States intervened militarily in civil wars and tolerated or abetted abuses by anticommunist partners such as the shah of Iran and President Suharto of Indonesia, which created long-standing resentments in these countries and elsewhere. Today’s Russia exploits those resentments to stoke anti-Americanism and obscure its own past as an imperial power.

A new containment strategy toward Russia must not repeat these mistakes. Many countries in the developing world will seek to hedge, by establishing productive relations with both Russia and the United States. Instead of pushing countries to take sides, Washington will have to avoid the “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” mentality that often colored Cold War strategy. To successfully counter the anti-American narratives that animate Russian diplomacy and disinformation, the United States must make support for democratic governance and civil society a centerpiece of its foreign policy.

Special care should be taken with respect to the Middle East, which is home to major energy resources and trade corridors vital to U.S. national interests. U.S. policymakers must not underestimate the lengths Moscow is prepared to go to secure its influence in the region: its brutal military intervention in support of President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in the Syrian civil war is a case in point. As Washington has pulled back from two decades of military intervention in the region, Russia stands to benefit from doubts about the durability of U.S. commitments to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and from anger about U.S. support for Israel. Containing Russia in the Middle East will require the United States to reinforce its commitments to its regional partners through expanded defense and security cooperation. Washington should also work with these states to push for a negotiated peace in Gaza. This is a feat that Russia, although it styles itself a regional mediator, cannot accomplish.

CONTAINMENT AND THE FATE OF UKRAINE

Europe’s security hinges on the fate of Ukraine. If Moscow realizes that its war is a dead end, it could be compelled to admit failure. But even if Ukraine does not achieve total victory on the battlefield, it could nevertheless be integrated militarily and politically with the West. In the worst-case scenario, a large-scale forward movement of Russian forces in Ukraine would bring the Russian threat to NATO’s door, making containment more urgent but also more difficult.

A new containment strategy does not depend on Ukrainian victory. Still, that strategy should retain Ukrainian victory as a long-term goal. Forcing Russia to abandon all or most of the territory it has occupied there will push the Russian threat farther from Europe’s borders, leaving the Kremlin to grapple with the consequences of a failed war of aggression—much as the Soviet Union did in the 1980s after its Afghanistan debacle. Ukrainian victory would embolden other countries to push back against Russian malign influence.

A Ukrainian military victory will require larger and more sustained Western military assistance, including weapons with long-range strike capabilities. The EU recently stepped up with a $50 billion military assistance package. The United States needs to follow suit and pass the $60 billion in supplemental funding stalled in Congress.

Two decades of war in the Middle East combined with domestic travails have sapped American public support for foreign engagements. Questions about U.S. staying power only embolden Russia (and other expansionist powers). It believes it can wait out the West in Ukraine, winning a victory that will mark the end of an era of U.S. preeminence.

This situation is like the one the United States faced in the aftermath of World War II, when Soviet power was on the march in Europe. Just as during the Cold War, the United States can neither risk a direct conflict with a nuclear-armed Kremlin nor simply allow its aggression to go unchecked. Between these extremes, containment offers a middle path.

Russia has transitioned to a war economy sustained by vast energy resources, particularly oil.

A strategy of containment should prioritize defending Russia’s threatened neighbors, especially those that do not have a clear and immediate path to NATO membership. Apart from Ukraine, Russia’s most vulnerable neighbors include Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which remain outside the alliance. The United States should offer these countries training and weapons. It should also bolster these states’ resilience against Russian gray-zone threats, ranging from cyberattacks to election meddling. It should share intelligence with them and invest in critical infrastructure, such as power grids and data storage.

The war in Ukraine has severed Russia from the West to a significant degree, but there remain critical linkages that serve the Kremlin’s aims. Although sanctions have imposed real costs on the Russian economy, Moscow has adapted, transitioning to a war economy sustained by vast energy resources, particularly oil. The United States has been reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia’s oil sector for fear of exacerbating inflation at home. But Russia’s dependence on oil is a vulnerability on which the United States should capitalize. Western policymakers should take more proactive measures to push down the price of Russian oil, following in the footsteps of Ronald Reagan’s early 1980s policy, which contributed to the economic crises the Soviet Union experienced in the 1980s.

Any U.S. strategy toward Russia must recognize the peril of direct military confrontation. Washington must remain open to negotiating with Russia on arms control, cyberwarfare, and regional conflicts between each side’s allies. Without predicating these talks on large-scale political change in Russia, Washington must plainly demonstrate that the United States does not seek war with Russia and must even cooperate with Moscow on issues such as climate change and space exploration. Implementing a modern containment strategy will require bipartisan buy-in and a commitment to maintaining sufficient defense spending. In today’s polarized political and media environment, securing the kind of bipartisan consensus that sustained containment for much of the Cold War will demand political effort and creativity.

Kennan acknowledged that Washington had to commit to containment for as long as necessary—until Soviet power had “mellowed” and no longer threatened global stability. Containing Russia today will require a similar commitment of time and resources. It will be another twilight struggle, though it will unfold in a world vastly different from that of the late 1940s.

• MAX BERGMANN is Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
• MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of the forthcoming book Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability.
• JEFFREY MANKOFF is a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security. The views expressed here are his own.
• MARIA SNEGOVAYA is a Senior Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a Postdoctoral Fellow with Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is the author of When Left Moves Right: The Decline of the Left and the Rise of the Populist Right in Postcommunist Europe.

Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability · March 6, 2024

20. The Growing Limits to Formulating US Grand Strategy in an Ever More Complex World

The Growing Limits to Formulating US Grand Strategy in an Ever More Complex World

We are living in a period of extraordinary and concurrent global security challenges: from the Indo-Pacific to Ukraine and the Middle East. These challenges, as often noted, extend well beyond the traditional domains of air, land, and sea, to cyber, space, supply chains and technology competition. 

Tuesday, March 5, 2024  4 min read

By: Kenneth Weinstein

Research Team: Middle East and the Islamic World Working Group

https://www.hoover.org/research/growing-limits-formulating-us-grand-strategy-ever-more-complex-world

We are living in a period of extraordinary and concurrent global security challenges: from the Indo-Pacific to Ukraine and the Middle East. These challenges, as often noted, extend well beyond the traditional domains of air, land, and sea, to cyber, space, supply chains and technology competition. At this pivotal moment, however, growing isolationist sentiment and significant divides in public opinion create a problematic environment in which to craft an appropriate grand strategy.  

During the Cold War, for all the debate in the U.S. and among our allies over objectives, we had relatively focused grand strategy goals of foiling communism and limiting Soviet global aspirations. We tailored our strategies, which varied from containment in the Truman era, to Kennedy’s flexible response, to Reagan’s competitive strategies aimed at victory over communism.  

In the U.S., we now recognize the China challenge but have yet to come to a common understanding of what a desired end-state with our principal strategic adversary might look like. Do we seek the defeat of the Communist Party as some have suggested, or a slightly more liberal China that more willingly complies with international norms? Or, as I would assert, a far weaker, less autocratic regime that might be more easily pressured not to harass its neighbors?  

To put in place a grand strategy to effectively deal with the PRC, we need to have a clear definition of what our strategic objectives might look like – and then a clear sense of the means to achieve and manage it.  

The competition with China is different from the Cold War, when our closest and most powerful allies in Europe were on the front line against the Soviet Union. Rather than a Soviet-style failing economy unable to meet basic consumer needs, China is a near-peer competitor willing to leverage broad international economic dependency, growing military prowess, increasing defense industrial base and cross-domain capabilities, while exerting greater control over internal information flows than the Soviet Union ever did. These challenges are compounded by the fact that the U.S. bears the overwhelming burden of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and the First Island Chain – more complicated by geographic distance. 

Our alliances in the Indo-Pacific are unlike those in the North Atlantic during the Cold War. Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan have made major security strides, especially in the past few years, as has Singapore. But potential support in the case of a Taiwan contingency from both the Philippines and the ROK, let alone Singapore, is more conditional because the fear of PRC economic retaliation weighs heavily. Other nations, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, are admittedly fence-sitters, who seem unwilling to meld their fate to that of Taiwan.   

These complex strategic questions and the characteristics of our alliances in Asia are just a part of the broader subset of structural challenges affecting the formulation of American grand strategy. These challenges are profound – and extend well beyond the situation on the ground in the Indo-Pacific.   

First, there are additional potential significant threats. While the PRC challenge is central to Taiwan and the First Island Chain, including Japan and the Philippines, we face an additional urgent security challenge posed by North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile programs.  

While Russia’s war against Ukraine is the principal challenge in Europe, a broader threat to the Eastern flank of NATO, from the Baltics to the Balkans, remains. These challenges have been somewhat mitigated by Ukraine’s destruction of significant Russian military capabilities but Russia’s deep sense of grievance over Ukraine could well spill over into aggressive action elsewhere.   

Simultaneously, Iran’s threat to America, Israel, and America’s Sunni allies -- exercised via proxy groups including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and through Iran’s expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programs -- has rarely been more serious.  

These multi-theatre challenges are compounded by a growing alignment of interests between China, Russia, Iran, and the DPRK. China’s disruptive and illiberal opportunism, paired with Russia and Iran, has global implications, especially as these nations draw others to their vision of a splintered world, in a coalition of the “have-nots,” notably in Africa and Latin America, rejecting Western narratives and norms.   

The grievances of the developing world have been firmly placed at the foot of the West by an anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-capitalist ideology that conveniently ignores Russian, Chinese, and Iranian imperialism or the growing role of China as the largest global carbon emitter, the largest lender to the developing world, often at exorbitant interest rates, and a nation with territorial disputes with almost all of the countries which border it.  

At the same time, the American electorate has rarely been more divided on fundamental issues as we are today, with deep implications for America’s global leadership. A significant number of Americans do not accept either American exceptionalism or the principles of the American Revolution – a result, in part, of the pernicious impact of culture relativism and anti-Western, post-colonial theories promoted, in part, by our strategic adversaries.   

Part of the blame for the current crisis at our southern border can be placed on these ideologies, with a firm refusal of many in the United States to accept the primacy of the rule of law (seen in the outright rejection of the term “illegal alien”) or the critical importance of national borders as essential to national security. This crisis -- and the potential exploitation of our Southern border through foreign penetration – distracts from our capability to make strategic decisions away from our homeland, as the chorus of “money for our southern border not Ukraine” shows.   

Lacking the confidence and unity needed to face complex strategic challenges and project power seems reinforced by the already existing American tendency towards isolationism. While our divisions and lack of strategic focus come to the fore, the major authoritarian nations have become more opportunistic and aligned, posing an ever more pervasive threat, and filling the vacuums we leave behind.  

Paradoxically, in the Indo-Pacific, where American rhetoric is arguably less isolationist than elsewhere, our rhetorical focus on Taiwan, including those who speak of Taiwanese independence, often exceeds our willingness to commit resources. This, in turn, tends to drive away our allies (even in Taiwan) and fence-sitting nations who fear that certain American politicians may be as guilty as the PRC in promoting instability in the Taiwan Strait. We need to figure out how to talk about Taiwan in a more constructive manner, one that adheres more closely to the maxim of “walk softly but carry a big stick.”  

Allies are critical to meeting the China challenge – especially in an era of American retrenchment -- and we need to recognize that we have much to learn from them. Japan, for instance, has unique credibility in the Indo-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia, where Japanese development assistance and economic engagement have been essential, and a counterpoint to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. South Korea as well has unique credibility that is critical as we build the connectivity and relationships of trust that one day may enhance and extend our network of allies.   

Simultaneously, our allies need to comprehend that while China’s aggression is most explicit in its near abroad, and focused on U.S. allies and partners who are the least well-suited to respond, the PRC’s ambitions are global, from its desire to assert greater control over international institutions to its attempt to gain control of major ports, its focus on controlling emerging technologies, especially in the green energy and EV markets, to its efforts at global information warfare and disinformation. China seeks to promote its autocratic vision of a splintered world in which it alone is strong enough to shape critical outcomes; it is willing to leverage all instruments of national power, from supply chains to cyber-threats, to public diplomacy, to achieve these ends.  

The character of the Chinese challenge requires a multifold approach: a serious focus on our industrial base, technology, research, and development combined with strict economic security regulations and export controls aimed at denying the PRC key technologies. Simultaneously, we need to work with allies to develop future warfighting concepts and innovative technologies designed to assure our qualitative advantage.   

We need to create an effective information campaign to explain to our public, our allies, and our enemies what we are seeking to achieve and why we need to dedicate precious resources to the PRC challenge. This public diplomacy challenge is especially difficult today, in part because the self-confidence and unity of the West has been undermined by the pernicious ideologies mentioned above.   

Lastly, we need to extend these efforts to where China has made the greatest inroads – the so-called Global South. (It is too comprehensive a term, including nations that often have little in common, from relatively wealthy and well-governed ones such as Mauritius or Namibia, and others that are failing states, such as South Sudan.) Speaking abstractly about the liberal international order as do American and European elites does little to assuage deeply held grievances of the developing world, blamed, for better or worse, on the Global North.    

Meeting this challenge requires an effort to build relations of trust with the developing world by promoting greater connectivity, whether through development assistance or private sector investment. Japan has already pointed the way to do this through its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy of engagement with Southeast Asia and Africa. On the public diplomacy side, we should look to our Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partner, India, which stakes a far greater claim to speak for the Global South than does China. Our interests and India’s are increasingly but not always aligned but we are far better off in a world in which the developing world follows India’s lead rather than China’s.   

Kenneth R. Weinstein is Japan Chair at Hudson Institute.   

(Dr. William Chou of Hudson Institute provided invaluable guidance on an early formulation of the discussion points that later became this paper.)  

21. TikTok Targeted In New National Security Bill On Adversary Owned Apps

Excerpt:

A TikTok ban in the U.S. is unlikely, despite threats under current and former presidential administrations and intense bipartisan scrutiny; more than 150 million Americans and scores of businesses here have used or relied on TikTok, making an outright ban on the app politically unpopular, particularly so in an election year. But the app has been used to surveil individual Americans, including a journalist at Forbes, leading to concerns that it could be used to monitor U.S. citizens on a larger scale with little oversight. Forbes investigations have revealed that ByteDance also maintains tools that can exert control over what users say and see on its platforms, heightening concerns that its suite of apps, including TikTok, could be used to sway discourse during high stakes, polarizing events like the looming presidential election.

Committee aides said that more than a dozen lawmakers have endorsed the bill but declined to share who, specifically, is supporting it. TikTok did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

TikTok Targeted In New National Security Bill On Adversary Owned Apps

House leaders worried about TikTok’s close ties with China are taking a fresh swing at ByteDance’s crown jewel, hoping to tackle “the TikToks of the future” too.

Alexandra S. Levine

Forbes Staff

I'm a senior writer covering social media and online culture.

Forbes · by Alexandra S. Levine · March 5, 2024

A TikTok ban is unlikely in the U.S., but Congress continues to introduce bills aimed at allaying national security concerns raised by the app.

AFP via Getty Images

The bipartisan leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party are introducing a national security bill targeting social media apps, including TikTok, that are owned by companies subject to the control of a foreign adversary. By focusing narrowly on corporate ownership, committee aides say the legislation allays free speech concerns that have slowed or drawn criticism of past proposals dealing with tech and national security.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act—from Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher and Democratic Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi—is aimed at addressing concerns about China, Russia, Iran and North Korea’s potential to influence, surveil or access sensitive data on Americans. It specifically namechecks TikTok, owned by Beijing-based parent ByteDance, but would also cover other ByteDance-owned apps in the U.S. as well as other sizable social media apps owned or controlled (over 20 percent) by an entity that is headquartered or primarily doing business in an adversary country.

The hope, one committee aide said, is that “the TikToks of the future can be addressed as well.”

The bill also outlines a process through which the president can designate adversary-owned apps of concern and offer incentives for their owners to divest the app—unraveling TikTok from ByteDance, for example. The goal, according to committee aides, is to allow the apps to stay up and running in the U.S. while tackling ownership issues that could pose privacy and national security risks. (Once a divestment is complete, the app would no longer be restricted.) But short of divesting, platforms determined to be of concern would be banned across U.S. app stores and web hosting providers.

Got a tip about TikTok or ByteDance? Reach out securely to Alexandra S. Levine on Signal/WhatsApp at (310) 526–1242 or email at alevine@forbes.com.

A TikTok ban in the U.S. is unlikely, despite threats under current and former presidential administrations and intense bipartisan scrutiny; more than 150 million Americans and scores of businesses here have used or relied on TikTok, making an outright ban on the app politically unpopular, particularly so in an election year. But the app has been used to surveil individual Americans, including a journalist at Forbes, leading to concerns that it could be used to monitor U.S. citizens on a larger scale with little oversight. Forbes investigations have revealed that ByteDance also maintains tools that can exert control over what users say and see on its platforms, heightening concerns that its suite of apps, including TikTok, could be used to sway discourse during high stakes, polarizing events like the looming presidential election.

Committee aides said that more than a dozen lawmakers have endorsed the bill but declined to share who, specifically, is supporting it. TikTok did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

MORE FROM FORBESThe Words TikTok Parent ByteDance May Be Watching You SayBy Alexandra S. LevineMORE FROM FORBESA Draft Of TikTok's Plan To Avoid A Ban Gives The U.S. Government Unprecedented Oversight PowerBy Emily Baker-WhiteMORE FROM FORBESHow A TikTok Ban Would Deal A Blow To Creators, Businesses And The American EconomyBy Alexandra S. LevineMORE FROM FORBESThe FBI And DOJ Are Investigating ByteDance's Use Of TikTok To Spy On JournalistsBy Emily Baker-White

Forbes · by Alexandra S. Levine · March 5, 2024

22. The Houthis Are Very, Very Pleased

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, every possible course is risky. Breaking the Houthis may be impossible, but they don’t bend easily, either. Perhaps, without a war to rally the faithful, the Houthis could be pressured toward compromise and consensus. Yemenis are famously unruly and independent-minded, and they have shown signs of discontent with Houthi rule. Some observers think that the Saudis could play a positive role by reviving the deep network of influence they had before Saleh was overthrown, as long as they wield it more wisely. Promising pockets of local governance in areas of Yemen outside of Houthi control could ultimately serve as models in the north.

For the outside world, there is a larger concern: Now that the Houthis have shown what they can do in the Red Sea, what is to stop them from finding new pretexts to do it again? Their arsenal includes unmanned, explosive-packed boats and submarines, with parts provided by Iran. If one of these were to strike an American naval vessel, it could kill a lot of sailors. This is exactly what happened 24 years ago, when suicide attackers in a boat struck the U.S.S. Cole off the southern Yemeni coast, in one of the opening acts of al-Qaeda’s long confrontation with what it called “the far enemy.”

The diplomats who wrote the road map now say it must be revised with these dangers in mind. “We can’t just let bygones be bygones and forget all this happened,” one American official told me. “The peace process will have to ensure that the Houthi threat is contained, and that the Houthis are not further emboldened and empowered.”

How do you contain a force as volatile and reckless as the Houthis? The road map will need to provide an answer, or it could lead to a very dark dead end.

The Houthis Are Very, Very Pleased

Since staking claim to the Palestinian cause, the Yemeni militants have come to seem unstoppable.

By Robert F. Worth

MARCH 5, 2024, 9:21 AM ET

The Atlantic · by Robert F. Worth · March 5, 2024

The Leader is a man of about 40, with a smooth, youthful face and a thin beard and mustache. In televised speeches, he wears a blazer with a shawl over his shoulders, his dark eyes menacing and humorless. Apart from that, so little is known about him that he might as well be a phantom. He has no birth certificate or passport and is said to have spent his formative years living in caves. No foreign diplomat has ever met him in person. He presides over a starving, brutalized people in northern Yemen and has sent an armada of child soldiers to their deaths. In January, one of his courts condemned nine men to be executed for homosexual behavior—seven by stoning, two by crucifixion.

Yet Abdulmalik al-Houthi may now be the most popular public figure in the Middle East. Ever since his soldiers began attacking and boarding commercial ships in the Red Sea in November—ostensibly in defense of Palestine—he has been treated like a latter-day Che Guevara, his portrait and speeches shared on social media across five continents. The Houthis’ bravado may not have done much for Gaza, but it has gouged a hole in the global economy, forcing maritime traffic away from the Suez Canal. It has also made the Houthis into heroes for young Arabs and Muslims who are embracing the Palestinian cause as their own. The Houthis have even made inroads among Western progressives, who helped make a TikTok star of “Tim-Houthi Chalamet,” a handsome young Yemeni who advertises his loyalty to the group.

The consequences of the Houthis’ Red Sea attacks are still hard to fathom. Almost overnight, a militant movement in the remote badlands of Yemen has found a terrifying new relevance: It has choked off the waterway that carries about 15 percent of the world’s trade. The U.S. Navy began firing back at Houthi launch sites in January—its most intense exchange of the 21st century to date—but even then, the Houthis did not back down.

One measure of the Houthis’ new power is that the proud Arab autocrats who hate them hardly dare to criticize them. They fear drawing more attention to the gap between their own tepid statements of support for Palestinians and the Houthis’ brazen defiance. Some are afraid that they, too, will become targets for Houthi missiles. The Arab leaders have long seen the Houthis as dangerous proxies for Iran, the group’s main military supplier, but some observers now say the truth may be even worse: that the Houthis are fanatics who answer to no one.

The Red Sea crisis has pushed the Arab world—and Saudi Arabia in particular—into a painful dilemma. Saudi diplomats have been working for years on an ambitious peace plan that would ease the Houthis’ political and economic isolation and reconcile them with their rivals in Yemen’s “legitimate” government in the south (which controls perhaps 30 percent of the population). But now, with dramatic new proof of the Houthis’ recklessness, the Saudis face the possibility that their efforts will only make Abdulmalik al-Houthi even more powerful, and more dangerous.

The Houthi spokesman was right on time for our meeting. I was a little surprised by his appearance; I had half expected to see a swaggering tribesman of the kind I used to meet in Yemen—mouth bulging with khat leaves, a shawl over his shoulders and a curved dagger in his belt. Instead, Abdelmalek al-Ejri was a neat-looking fellow in a blue-tartan blazer and a button-down shirt. He kept a physical distance as he greeted me, his manner polite but guarded, as if to register that we stood on opposite sides of a chasm.

We met in a spotless café in Muscat, the capital of the Sultanate of Oman. The city has for years been a kind of portal to the outside world for the Houthis, whose control of the Yemeni capital is not recognized by any country other than Iran. But it is an odd place to discuss Yemen because—despite their physical proximity and shared desert landscape—Oman is essentially the inverse of its neighbor. Where Yemen is lawless and violent, Oman is almost impossibly sedate and tidy, an Arab Switzerland. Omanis glide around in their elegant cloth head wraps and white dishdashas, looking serene; you can be arrested for rude public gestures or loud swearing, even for littering. Some of this, one imagines, is a deliberate effort to keep Yemen’s chaos at bay.

Read: Were the Saudis right about the Houthis after all?

I had been warned that al-Ejri, a diplomat of sorts, might downplay the aggressiveness and radicalism of the Houthis, who prefer to call their movement Ansar Allah, or “Partisans of God.” He did start off a little defensively, with a long speech about the unfairness of America’s blind support for Israel. But he also made clear that the Houthis are very, very pleased with their new global status, and they aim to wield it like a club. “We are more confident now, because we have huge public support,” he said. “This encourages us to speak on behalf of Yemen.” He meant all of Yemen, though the Houthis control less than half of Yemen’s territory.

He went on to boast that the Houthis have outpaced their longtime patron in the so-called Axis of Resistance. “Our stance on Gaza is more advanced than anyone, even Iran,” he said. “Iran was shocked that Ansar Allah had the guts to do what we did.” Although the relationship is clearly very close—Iranian Revolutionary Guard officials are said to be in Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, right now—the Houthis do appear to have considerable independence and are believed to have shrugged off Iranian advice several times in the past. (Unlike some other Iranian allies, the Houthis are not mainstream Shiites and are not bound by the Khomeinist doctrine of rule by clerics.)

I asked him whether the Houthis would be willing to share power with other Yemeni political groups and was amazed again by the brashness of his answer. Abdulmalik al-Houthi will remain the supreme political authority in Yemen under any future government, he said, because his power comes directly from the people and is therefore beyond question. He then volunteered a comparison with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah and another close ally of the Iranian regime. But al-Ejri added that al-Houthi will be “stronger and bigger” than his Lebanese counterpart, because the Houthis are and will be “the main player, the main stakeholder” in Yemen. In other words, al-Houthi will be a kind of counterpart to the supreme leader in Iran, who has the final word on all affairs of state.

The Houthis weren’t always this open about their political agenda. I first came across them in 2008, when I made frequent trips to Yemen as a Beirut-based correspondent for The New York Times. I was standing outside a Sanaa courthouse one morning when an armored vehicle charged up and screeched to a halt. It had barred windows, and as the guards got out, I could hear the prisoners inside chanting in unison: “God is Great! Death to America! Death to Israel! A curse on the Jews! Victory to Islam!”

The Yemeni reporters alongside me were as baffled as I was. We knew that the Houthis were an insurgent group in the country’s northern mountains who had been fighting an on-and-off war with the Yemeni state for years. We knew that they placed enormous, almost comical importance on their freedom to recite the words we had just heard, known to them as the sarkha, or “shout” (it had been banned by the government). But no one seemed to know what they wanted, why they were fighting, or how many they were. Al-Houthi, their leader, said in interviews at the time that they were simply defending themselves and wanted only to be left alone.

Even 10 years later, when they had conquered Yemen’s capital and were ruling most of its population, a penumbra of mystery surrounded them. I used to discuss the movement with Hassan Zaid, who knew its founders and was a well-respected scholar of Zaydi Islam, the sect to which the Houthis belong (like most people in the far north). During my last visit to Sanaa, in late 2018, I asked Zaid if the Houthis had a political vision. He replied promptly that they had none. He was serving as the group’s youth minister at the time, so I was a little taken aback. “The problem with the Houthis is that they are a reaction to other people’s behavior,” he said.

Zaid had doctrinal differences with the Houthis, whose ideology strays far from Zaydi orthodoxy. When he was gunned down by mysterious assailants in 2020, I was saddened—I had always liked him—but not surprised. Several other eminent Zaydi figures who had criticized the Houthis were murdered under similar circumstances. The Houthis, naturally, blamed the Saudis.

Abdulmalik al-Houthi speaks at a ceremony honoring the birth of the Prophet Muhammad in Saada province, Yemen, February 4, 2012. (Khaled Abdullah / Reuters)

Houthi boats escort the hijacked Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea in this undated photo, released on November 20, 2023. (Houthi Military Media / Reuters)

Being coy may have suited the Houthis in the early days, and their ambitions may have evolved over time. But a will to power is built into their origin story. The Houthi family belongs to a caste that stood at the top of the social hierarchy in northern Yemen for more than 1,000 years. As Sayyids—claiming lineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad—they were part of the same group as the religious monarchs known as Imams who ruled the area for most of that time. Their fortunes changed when a group of young officers ousted the last Imam in 1962 and formed a republic. Afterward, the northern Sayyids were scorned as relics of a benighted theocratic era, and many fell into poverty.

Things got even worse for the Houthis in the early 1980s, when the Saudis—shaken by the Iranian revolution—began promoting their own brand of hard-line religion in northern Yemen. Yemen had never had a serious sectarian problem. But as Saudi-funded preachers spread their intolerant Wahhabi faith, the Zaydi clerics decided that they had to fight back. They trained a new generation of revivalist Zaydis who were steeped in anger at the House of Saud and its American ally. Among the most zealous was a young man named Hussein al-Houthi.

Hussein’s ambitions went far beyond defending Zaydism. He traveled to Iran and to Sudan, which was an entrepôt for all sorts of Islamists in the 1990s. When he came home, he transformed his family’s experience (and his own) into a new ideological weapon: a combustible blend of historic entitlement and outraged victimhood. He grew even more radical after Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s longtime president, pledged his full support to George W. Bush in the War on Terror, which some Islamists saw as a war on Islam. It was then that the Houthi sarkha was first heard.

Hussein’s teachings, gathered in a 2,129-page online document called the Malazim (“installments”), are now revered by the movement almost as much as the Quran itself. Gun-toting Houthi soldiers can be found scrutinizing them with a special Android smartphone app.

The Malazim contains a kind of blueprint for religious dictatorship—an updated version of the Imamate. According to the Princeton-based scholar Bernard Haykel, who lived in Yemen for years, Hussein proclaimed the need for a supreme leader who embodies a “cosmic revolutionary ethos” and will act as a “guide for the community and the world.” Most mainstream Muslims (and even many Zaydis) would consider all of this hideously idolatrous.

Hussein’s status was further elevated by his martyrdom at the hands of Yemeni soldiers in 2004. His younger brother Abdulmalik then took the helm and led the intermittent wars against the Yemeni government until 2010. Much of northern Yemen was devastated during these years, but the movement came out stronger after each conflict, thanks to the Yemeni government’s corruption and perceived cruelty. The Houthis have always been lucky in their enemies.

One reason the Houthis have been so poorly understood is that their movement arose in the shadow of the Saudi monarchy. The arrogance and wealth of the Saudis, and the poisonous influence of their puritanical Wahhabi clerics, lent credence to the Houthis’ argument that they were just defending themselves. And the Saudis share some blame for creating this desert Frankenstein, having meddled recklessly in Yemen for many years.

Riyadh tried to play a more constructive role after 2012, when protests brought down Saleh. Saudi Arabia oversaw a shaky transition and pumped billions of dollars into Yemen. But in the political vacuum that followed, the Houthis—with an army hardened by years of war—seized much of the country while pretending to play along with a democratic process.

In early 2015, a few months after capturing the capital, the Houthis signed a deal with Iran, which had already been surreptitiously providing them with weapons and training. The Houthis began running 14 flights a week between Sanaa and Tehran, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guards sent officers and arms directly to their new allies in the Axis of Resistance. This was too much for Riyadh. The Saudis assembled a coalition and declared war. The Obama administration reluctantly supported them, worrying that it would be pulled into an unwinnable proxy war against Iran.

Read: The Houthis have backed Iran into a corner

The war backfired, as expected. Poorly trained Saudi pilots, fearing anti-aircraft fire, dropped their bombs from too high, and indiscriminate raids killed thousands of Yemeni civilians. With the Saudi coalition imposing a blockade, food became scarce and much of the population was pushed to the brink of starvation. The Yemeni forces fighting alongside the coalition were weakened by factional divisions and corruption. As the years passed, the Houthi counterattacks became more effective. By 2019 the Houthis were firing ballistic and cruise missiles at Saudi oil fields and airports, and although the Saudis were able to intercept most of the strikes, the struggle was becoming painfully asymmetrical. Patriot interceptors can cost more than $1 million apiece, while Houthi armed drones are worth a few hundred dollars.

In early 2022, a Houthi missile struck an oil-distribution station in Jeddah during Formula 1’s Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, one of the kingdom’s signature tourist events. A huge plume of black smoke was visible from the track. The Saudis had made efforts toward a peace deal for several years, but this time Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears to have decided that enough was enough. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire a week later. Saudi negotiators, together with a UN envoy, began talking to the Houthis about a longer-term peace agreement.

The accord, known in diplo-speak as “the road map,” goes well beyond ending the war. It aims to pave the way for a happier future in Yemen, with provisions for reconstruction, the departure of all foreign forces, and an “inclusive” political dialogue between the Houthis and their rivals in southern Yemen, whom they have fought intermittently for a decade.

The road map will also withdraw restrictions on the Houthis’ main ports and airports, which have been blockaded for years. That will open their doors to the world and bestow a legitimacy they have long craved while providing a huge boost to their income. On top of this, the agreement would commit the Saudis to paying salaries to state employees in every part of Yemen, including soldiers, for at least six months. This could amount to as much as $150 million a month, a vast sum in Yemen. Most of it would go to the Houthi-controlled part of the country, where the bulk of the population lives. In all likelihood, some percentage of those salaries will be funneled into the Houthi war machine, which has mastered various methods of extorting cash from an impoverished population.

Houthi recruits take part in a military parade in the port city of Hodeidah, September 1, 2022. (Getty)

In other words, the road map will transform the Houthis from a terrorist group into a state. Whether this will nudge them toward greater maturity or merely enable their worst instincts remains to be seen. It may, among other things, allow Iran to airlift weapons directly to the Houthis rather than shipping them surreptitiously in disguised boats, as it has been doing for about 15 years. The Saudis are taking these risks because MBS does not want any more disruptions to Vision 2030, his extravagant bid to transform Saudi Arabia’s economy and society.

The road map is also likely to equip the Houthis for a war of conquest against all the areas of Yemen they do not already control. They have tried to capture these areas in the past, and they have made no secret of their desire to dominate the entire country. Whether they would stop at the border is anyone’s guess. Houthi propaganda includes threats to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and capture Mecca, and (even more improbably) Jerusalem. The Saudis are so nervous about this that none of the officials I met with during a recent trip to Riyadh would agree to be quoted.

The road-map negotiations were long and difficult. Hearing about them made me pity the people whose job it was to sit across the table from the Houthis. Several I spoke with described a string of exhausting sessions with men who are masters at the art of upping the ante, which they did, time and again. One example: The salaries of Yemeni government workers were initially supposed to be covered partly by taxes on a Houthi-controlled port and partly by profits from Yemen’s own oil and gas. By the end, the Saudis had agreed to pay for it all.

Abdulmalik al-Houthi followed the negotiations closely and is clearly in charge: “The buck stops with him,” one diplomat who was involved told me. “He has a command of the details, not just the vision.” Only on rare occasions does he engage directly with foreigners, and the ritual is always the same. The visitors arrive in Sanaa, where they are driven by Houthi officials to a private house. They are shown into a room with a desk and computer monitor, and al-Houthi speaks to them by video link from his stronghold in the northwestern city of Saada, 110 miles away.

In the end, the Houthis got what they wanted, because the Saudis were desperate to close the deal. “Their attitude is, We won,” the diplomat told me. “Anyone who wants to share power must do so under their terms.”

The Saudis say that they only facilitated the discussions over the road map, which is billed as an agreement between the Houthis and their rivals in Yemen’s “internationally recognized” government, based in the south. This is a legal fiction. The southern government is an unelected puppet, entirely dependent on Saudi largesse to stay afloat. It is also a facade, beneath which is a congeries of mutually hostile southern factions. One thing they agree on is hatred of the road map, which they see—with some justification—as a capitulation to Houthi demands. But they cannot say so, because that would endanger the paychecks from Riyadh.

This was painfully apparent when I went to meet the president of Yemen, Rashad al-Alimi. Although his government is based in Yemen, he lives and holds his meetings in the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh—a palacelike building set apart from the rest of the city, with a marble ballroom where four prancing horses, cast in brass and copper, loom over the guests. The symbolism of the setting was impossible to ignore. Back in 2017, the Ritz-Carlton was transformed into the world’s most lavish prison when Mohammed bin Salman arrested dozens of Saudi Arabia’s richest and most powerful figures, accused them of corruption, and forced them to sign over much of their wealth.

From the April 2022 issue: Absolute power

Al-Alimi is not a prisoner, but he isn’t exactly free. A slim, bald 70-year-old with a tiny mustache, he greeted me with pained courtesy, like a doctor who is reluctant to deliver bad news. He talked at length about the cruelties the Houthis have inflicted on the Yemeni city of Taiz, his hometown. The Houthis, he said, “broke all the taboos of wartime,” using snipers to fire on civilians and condemning female political prisoners to death.

When I asked about the road map, al-Alimi couldn’t bring himself to praise it. “I believe peace is the top priority for Yemen,” he said, looking melancholy. Not long afterward he said, “The Houthis will come to peace only after they are defeated.” He left it to me to draw the obvious conclusion. He would sign the accord, but he considered it a mistake.

The contrast between al-Alimi’s dour mood and the glowing confidence of the Houthis was almost embarrassing. When I mentioned al-Alimi to Abdelmalek al-Ejri, the Houthi representative in Oman, his face broke into a sarcastic grin. “We refuse to let the Saudis deal with us in the way they deal with the so-called legitimate government,” he said. He dismissed al-Alimi as a figurehead with no real authority, whose one virtue is that he will sign the road map if the Saudis tell him to: “Anything the Saudis say, he will reply ‘yes.’”

Some southern-Yemeni leaders are more willing to say what they think. In January, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, who is al-Alimi’s deputy but also heads an armed faction that favors an independent state in southern Yemen, criticized the American-led air strikes, saying that they would not be enough to deter the Houthis. Zoubaidi has called for the West to provide arms, intelligence, and training to the factions in the south, so that they can at least contain the Houthis, if not push them back. His boldness is related to his pocketbook; his main patron has been the United Arab Emirates, not Saudi Arabia.

The southerners’ frustration is understandable. Although the Houthis have won a reputation as fierce warriors, they have suffered a few real setbacks at the hands of their Yemeni rivals. In 2018 the Houthis nearly lost their economic lifeline, the port of Hodeidah on the Red Sea coast. If the southern soldiers had pushed just another few miles to the port, they would have forced the Houthis to their knees. At a minimum, the Houthis would have had to make painful concessions, and in all likelihood, they would not be fighting a naval war in the Red Sea today.

Instead, the Saudi coalition withdrew from Hodeidah under pressure from the United States and aid groups who warned that the battle could lead to an even deeper humanitarian catastrophe. Some analysts and human-rights workers now believe that those concerns were exaggerated amid an atmosphere of widespread anger at the Saudis.

In fact, the Houthis may well have been rescued—not for the first time—by a bizarre twist of fate. In early October of that year, Saudi agents killed and dismembered the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. Gory details of the murder leaked to the press, and a wave of fury engulfed the Saudis, who were already being criticized for their indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. I shared that anger; I knew Khashoggi well and had many long talks with him in Riyadh. But his death became a political football whose uses were difficult to foresee at the time.

The Saudi government was forced into a defensive crouch, and international allies no longer had the patience to support its fight for an obscure port on the Red Sea. The UN organized a cease-fire that required both sides to withdraw, but the Houthis have since violated it and regained control of the port. In retrospect, it seems possible that the outrageous public murder of a single famous man became the shield for a movement that has since killed thousands of Yemenis.

Can the Houthis be dislodged? They can seem invincible, especially now that they have successfully branded themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. That posture appears to have entrenched their power at home as well, helping them recruit some 16,000 new soldiers in the first month of the Gaza war, according to one independent report. In the areas they control, they have made the schools into factories of propaganda and war-mongering. A recent university exam in the city of Ibb featured a question about geometry, using missiles fired into the Red Sea as an example. Women are now discouraged from driving, and gender segregation is more rigid. Fear and censorship are more pervasive. One of my longtime friends in Sanaa now erases his texts to me as soon as I have read them.

Even the Houthis’ weaknesses are dangerous, because they foster a dependence on war. Their government is incompetent and bankrupt. Food prices have shot up, and Yemen’s ability to export labor—its mainstay for decades—is crashing, thanks partly to a lack of job training. Remittances from abroad (mostly Yemeni laborers in Saudi Arabia) have dropped, and conditions are only getting worse. Acute malnutrition is rampant, leaving many young people with stunted limbs and brain damage. Inflows of food aid are way down even though roughly 80 percent of the population depends on them. The road map includes a formula for sharing revenues from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, which are located outside the Houthi zone of control, and have been largely offline for years. But skeptics say that mutual hatred will scuttle that. The Houthis have clashed with southern factions in recent weeks, and some observers worry the two-year cease-fire may be fraying.

Eliot A. Cohen: The Decatur option

If civil war breaks out again, Iran hawks in the United States may call for re-arming the southern factions as a military counterweight. Some Saudi leaders may even see a civil war as useful in weakening the Houthis, as long as Riyadh can stay out of the fighting. But such a war would pit a Shiite alliance in the north against Sunni forces in the south, inflaming sectarian rivalries and drawing in jihadists from other countries. New versions of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State would bloom in the desert. Does anyone really want to go down that road again?

A man stands in front of billboards that read “Allah is the greatest of all. Death to America. Death to Israel. A curse on the Jews. Victory to Islam.” Sanaa, September 16, 2012. (Mohamed al-Sayaghi / Reuters)

Unfortunately, every possible course is risky. Breaking the Houthis may be impossible, but they don’t bend easily, either. Perhaps, without a war to rally the faithful, the Houthis could be pressured toward compromise and consensus. Yemenis are famously unruly and independent-minded, and they have shown signs of discontent with Houthi rule. Some observers think that the Saudis could play a positive role by reviving the deep network of influence they had before Saleh was overthrown, as long as they wield it more wisely. Promising pockets of local governance in areas of Yemen outside of Houthi control could ultimately serve as models in the north.

For the outside world, there is a larger concern: Now that the Houthis have shown what they can do in the Red Sea, what is to stop them from finding new pretexts to do it again? Their arsenal includes unmanned, explosive-packed boats and submarines, with parts provided by Iran. If one of these were to strike an American naval vessel, it could kill a lot of sailors. This is exactly what happened 24 years ago, when suicide attackers in a boat struck the U.S.S. Cole off the southern Yemeni coast, in one of the opening acts of al-Qaeda’s long confrontation with what it called “the far enemy.”

The diplomats who wrote the road map now say it must be revised with these dangers in mind. “We can’t just let bygones be bygones and forget all this happened,” one American official told me. “The peace process will have to ensure that the Houthi threat is contained, and that the Houthis are not further emboldened and empowered.”

How do you contain a force as volatile and reckless as the Houthis? The road map will need to provide an answer, or it could lead to a very dark dead end.

The Atlantic · by Robert F. Worth · March 5, 2024

23. US Green Berets will permanently deploy to Taiwan

Circular reporting by "Straight Arrow News" based on the Taiwan News story earlier this week and following the stories that have periodically been published since 2021.

US Green Berets will permanently deploy to Taiwan

https://san.com/cc/us-green-berets-will-permanently-deploy-to-taiwan/

YESTERDAY

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By Ryan Robertson (Anchor, Reporter)

Six miles. A handful of U.S. Special Operations soldiers will be stationed on an island controlled by Taiwan, just six miles from mainland China.

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The United Daily News in Taiwan reported U.S. Army Green Berets will deploy in three-man teams to a couple of amphibious camps, acting as consultants to further train Taiwan’s own special forces. The self-governing, main island of Taiwan is about 100 miles from mainland China. It also controls Penghu, located about 30 miles to the west, and Kinmen, just six miles from China, and within range of various weapons like missiles and artillery.

Special operators from the U.S. military have been helping train Taiwan’s military for some time now.

The training is in anticipation of a potential invasion from China, which sees Taiwan as a break-off region to be reunited by force if necessary.

In 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen became the first Taiwanese leader in 40 years to publicly acknowledge the deployment of U.S. troops in Taiwan. But in those previous trainings, the U.S. forces were more or less visiting. 2023’s National Defense Authorization Act set aside funds, though, under the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element to station troops at Kinmen and Penghu permanently.

Since last year, a large portion of the training focused on teaching Taiwan’s special forces how to operate the Black Hornet nano drone, a micro-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle designed to help special forces gather intelligence.

The Black Hornets are highly advanced drones that can fit in the palm of one’s hand, but still maintain flight in relatively strong winds.

“The Green Berets are a defensive type of special forces, employed to counteract enemy infiltration, especially when integrated with Taiwan’s amphibious reconnaissance battalions,” said Su Tzu-yun, the director of defense strategy and resources at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan are declining comment on the deployment.

On the whole, U.S. forces are on track for a busy year in the Pacific.

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The United States and Thailand are continuing their 43-year tradition of co-sponsored military training events with Cobra Gold currently underway. It’s the largest joint exercise in mainland Asia, and the longest running international exercise in the world. Thirty partner nations including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan and South Korea have troops at this year’s Cobra Gold.

South Korea is also hosting U.S. troops for its Freedom Shield exercises. The 11-day event is designed to help prepare South Korean troops in the event North Korea launches a nuclear weapon. A lot of the drill involves the cyber domain, but some field exercises are also expected.

Meanwhile, U.S. Marines are getting plenty of field exercise in Okinawa. Marines and ground soldiers from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are practicing island defense and island recapture for this year’s Iron Fist exercise. The force-on-force simulation pits the allies against each other in various jungle combat scenarios; skills which will need to be sharp if China does indeed decide to try and take Taiwan by force.

TAGS: CHINA, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, TSAI ING-WEN, U.S. ARMY

24. FOLLOW-UP: The UN won’t reform until its employees lose diplomatic immunity - Washington Examiner

In response to the article below. I received this from an old friend who has nearly two decades of service in the UN. I think he provides some important useful clarification of the information in the article.

I’m writing to tell you they got it wrong in this article:  The UN won’t reform until its employees lose diplomatic immunity - Washington Examiner

Only member state diplomats have diplomatic immunity. UN staff do not have it. I can be arrested/detained anytime, anywhere in the world. This happens to UN staff. The member state ambassadors and their UN Mission [read embassy] staff have the same diplomatic immunity as their national ambassadors/staff in their foreign capital embassies. That’s it. Yes, we travel with UN Laissez Passe (LP) – the light blue UN “passports.” But we still must use our national passports. The UNLP only gets some staff through the diplomatic lines in airports under specific/special circumstances. The most agitating agenda item related to “diplomatic immunity” is the issue of UN member state delegations’ diplomatic licence plates and perhaps run-ins with local law enforcement (like in any capital city around the world). 

The main reason UN staff aren’t routinely arrested/detained is the problems that can arise geopolitically. But that doesn’t/hasn’t prevented it from happening. 

As with any organization, things are not as bad as they seem and things are not as good as they seem (based on one’s perspective). There are a lot of things that need to be changed, but it’s the member states who make the changes. The UN Secretariat and its Departments and the loose confederacy of Agencies, Funds and Programmes do not march in lockstep. With nearly 20 years in, it amazes me how much mis/disinformation is reported on the UN. I often watch mainstream and cable news from around the world (I speak a few languages) and no one gets it right. So far, the most accurate reporting on the UN comes from France 24, but they’re not without error. 

The UN bodies are vulnerable to member state influence, which is why it’s important to remain engaged and on top of things. Like it or not, the UN is the one place where you can take a global pulse check. I’ve briefed and have been part of UN Security Council consultations. Regardless how it has recently mirrored the League of Nations, it remains the only international body doing what it’s doing. I’ve rubbed shoulders with our friends, allies, competitors and opponents. 

There’s no other place where I can have a frank (albeit delicate) discussion on the Middle East with Arabs, Israelis, Iranians, Turks, EU members, Russians, Americans, Brits, etc. That’s something anyway.

The UN won’t reform until its employees lose diplomatic immunity - Washington Examiner

By 

Michael Rubin

March 4, 2024 10:22 am

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/2900820/un-wont-reform-until-employees-lose-diplomatic-immunity/

The rot surrounding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East keeps accumulating. Not only did the UNRWA allow Hamas command posts under local hospitals and the UNRWA’s own headquarters, but UNRWA employees hid weaponry in their homes and then reportedly participated in the Oct. 7 kidnappings in Israel. Some employees held Israeli civilians hostage in the aftermath of the mass kidnapping. Israel alleges that 10% of UNRWA employees are Hamas members, a figure that, if anything, seems low.

Nevertheless, the U.N. response has been to obfuscate, bluster, and deny evidence. It is impossible to ignore the implication of hundreds of miles of Hamas tunnels built with diverted supplies under the nose of UNRWA employees. Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres deflects. While the U.N. says it has fired some UNRWA employees about whom Israel provided evidence, the fact that the UNRWA has not handed over employees complicit in kidnapping to face justice in Israel shows it is more interested in covering up the scandal.

The UNRWA scandal reflects decades of corruption, mismanagement, and incompetent leadership at the helm of both the agency and the United Nations, but the likelihood that it will be the U.N.’s last scandal is nil. Recent history suggests the U.N. simply does not learn as scandals repeat.

There was a pro forma attempt to investigate the Oil-for-Food scandal, though then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan successfully diluted the inquiry into the multibillion-dollar kickback scheme because it touched too many in power, including Annan himself.

Peacekeeper scandals repeat. U.N. employees in several different peacekeeping missions across Africa coerced sex in exchange for food and aid, sometimes even victimizing children. The U.N. continues to ignore a UNRWA-like scandal in the Democratic Republic of Congo with members of the Pakistan contingent radicalizing and providing aid to the Allied Democratic Forces, the local Islamic State. In 2010, U.N. peacekeepers dumped sewage into a river in Haiti, sparking a cholera outbreak that killed nearly 10,000 in a country that, until then, was cholera-free. The U.N. stonewalled to avoid paying compensation to the victims.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is also prone to scandal. Twice, after riots at the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, the UNHCR cut off food assistance and water access to its population, including women and children, until residents of the camp rebuilt destroyed structures. Collective punishment is a crime by any interpretation of the law, but U.N. officials engaged in it with impunity.

As U.N. scandals accumulate, it is foolish to believe that Guterres has any more interest in policing his organization than any of his predecessors. In certain countries and territories, U.N. corruption claims more lives than its interventions save.

Back to Gaza: Western donors have responded to the participation of U.N. employees in the massacre of Jews by pausing some funding, even if only temporarily. Any shortfall of funding grabs the attention of U.N. agencies whose employees fly business class and who enjoy a lifestyle akin to 19th-century colonial officers. But suave public relations, effective lobbying to whitewash corruption, and crying wolf about humanitarian hardship often lead to the quick restoration of funding.

Perhaps a better approach, then, would be to strip U.N. officials of the immunities they enjoy in the countries where they serve. If Nepalese peacekeepers or the U.N. bureaucrats who supervised them had realized they could face negligent homicide charges for killing 10,000 Haitians, perhaps they would have thought twice about dumping sewage in a river Haitians relied on for drinking water in the first place.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

Likewise, U.N. officials in Kenya would think twice about collective punishment against Somali refugees if they faced charges in the Hague for gross violations of international law. Even Guterres might have acted proactively against UNRWA corruption had its supervisors risked charges of accessory to murder for their underlings moonlighting as Hamas combatants with U.N. property.

Conventions granted U.N. workers diplomatic immunity to prevent retaliation by rogue regimes. However, as U.N. workers go rogue, perhaps it is time to reconsider the diplomatic privileges they enjoy. If nongovernmental workers live without immunity, U.N. bureaucrats can as well.

Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

25. On this day in history, March 5, 1966, patriotic song 'The Ballad of the Green Berets' hits No. 1

Wow. I try to keep up with history about Green Berets. But I did not know the original ballad was 12 verses. I wonder if those 12 verses still exist. 

On this day in history, March 5, 1966, patriotic song 'The Ballad of the Green Berets' hits No. 1

Song was originally a 12-verse epic ballad before it was trimmed to a radio-friendly length

By Christine Rousselle Fox News

Published March 5, 2024 12:02am EST

foxnews.com · by Christine Rousselle Fox News

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The song "The Ballad of the Green Berets," sung by Staff Sgt. Barry Sadler, hit No. 1 on the U.S. music charts on this day in history, March 5, 1966.

Unlike many songs that would emerge from the Vietnam War era, "The Ballad of the Green Berets" painted the American military in a relatively positive light.

The song's title refers to the colloquial name of the United States Army Special Forces, who wear green berets as part of their uniform.

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The song's opening verse refers to the Green Berets as "fearless men who jump and die," and as "men who mean just what they say."

The song's chorus calls the group "America's best," and notes that "100 men will test today, but only three win the Green Beret."

The Green Berets are members of the United States Army Special Forces. (iStock)

The song continues, "Trained to live off nature's land, trained in combat hand-to-hand, men who fight by night and day, courage peak from the Green Berets."

The third verse departs starkly from the upbeat tone of the first two, stating, "Back at home a young wife waits, her Green Beret has met his fate."

The song goes on, "He has died for those oppressed, leaving her his last request."

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His last request, of course, is for his son to become a Green Beret himself.

"Make him one of America's best. He'll be a man they'll test one day, have him win the Green Beret," says the song.

Green Beret Col. Paris David, pictured here in the middle (with Ted Kennedy on the left), was awarded the Medal of Honor on Friday, March 3, 2023. (U.S. Army)

Sadler himself was a Green Beret, joining the U.S. Army in 1962 after a successful stint in the U.S. Air Force, notes Britannica.

Sadler volunteered for the Special Forces and served as a medic.

He finished his training in December 1963, said the encyclopedia.

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Less than two years after he finished his training, Sadler was injured by a punji stick — a booby-trapped stake — in Vietnam, forcing him to return home to the United States, says History.com.

"Within two weeks of its major-label release, ‘The Ballad of the Green Berets’ had sold more than one million copies, going on to become Billboard magazine’s #1 single for all of 1966."

During his hospitalization and recovery from his injury, Sadler wrote an "epic ballad" about the Green Berets and submitted it to music publishers, says Britannica.

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Robin Moore, author of the nonfiction book, "The Green Berets," assisted Sadler in trimming down the ballad significantly, notes the website.

"The Ballad of the Green Beret" praises the bravery and valor of the Green Berets and includes a tragic turn with a nod to the next generation. (iStock)

Moore is credited as a co-writer of "The Ballad of the Green Berets."

Initially, the song was distributed only among the military, says History.com, but was later picked up by recording company RCA Records.

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"Within two weeks of its major-label release, ‘The Ballad of the Green Berets’ had sold more than a million copies, going on to become Billboard magazine’s No. 1 single for all of 1966," the site also said.

"The Ballad of the Green Berets" was Billboard Magazine's No. 1 single for 1966, said History.com. (itock)

Sadler left the military in 1967, but was unable to replicate his musical success.

Instead, he became an author, writing 29 pulp fiction books, said Britannica.

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In the 1980s, Sadler would move to Guatemala City. It was there that his life would take a tragic turn.

In 1988, Sadler was shot while sitting in a car. The injuries from the gunshot would render Sadler quadriplegic and brain-damaged, said Britannica.

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Sadler died on Nov. 5, 1989, at the Alvin C. York Medical Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

He was just 49 years old, said an Associated Press article about his death.

For more Lifestyle articles, visit www.foxnews.com/lifestyle

Christine Rousselle is a lifestyle reporter with Fox News Digital.

foxnews.com · by Christine Rousselle Fox News

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com