Quotes of the Day:
"How lovely to think that no one need wait a moment, we can start now, start slowly changing the world!"
- Anne Frank
"With the new day comes new strength and new thoughts."
-Eleanor Roosevelt
"Optimism is the faith that leads to achievement. Nothing can be done without hope and confidence."
- Helen Keller
Spirit of America, Ukraine SITREP
Spirit of America is a "not neutral" NGO.
Spirit of America is very active in providing support into Ukraine. We are working primarily with US embassy personnel (mil and State) relocated from Kyiv to Poland. Our focus is on non-lethal assistance to Ukrainian armed forces and civilian volunteers, including medical supplies, comms gear, body armor and helmets. We placed our first order - for $4mm - on Friday. It will arrive in Rzeszow by Thursday and be in Ukraine the next day. We have the pieces in place - procurement, logistics, shipping, "last mile" - to significantly scale our assistance. This is the moment - the fight to defend freedom - that Spirit of America was built for.
This is the time to "take a side" which is what being "not neutral" means. Spirit of America always takes the side of America and its allies.
You can help: The SOA online donation page is: https://spiritofamerica.org/project/defend-ukraine-freedom
(Note: I am a member of the SOA Board of Advisors).
1. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 7, 2022 | SOF News
2. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 16
3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 6
4. Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, but Now Faces a Potential Quagmire
5. Arming Ukraine: 17,000 Anti-Tank Weapons in 6 Days and a Clandestine Cybercorps
6. House working on bill to ban Russian oil imports
7. Putin’s plan is failing in ways he could not have imagined
8. Why the War in Ukraine Seems Destined to Get Far Worse
9. Making the Most of Foreign Volunteers in Ukraine
10. 20,000 foreigners volunteer to fight for Ukraine, foreign minister Kuleba says
11. If Russia Hacks a US Satellite, Is It an Act of War?
12. Truth Is the Best Way to Defeat Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine
13. Options to Mitigate Cognitive Threats
14. Why Putin will regret launching this war (Interview with MG Mike Repass)
15. Putin’s War Is Xi’s Worst Nightmare
16. FDD | Biden’s Coming Iran Deal Will Be Even Worse than Obama’s
17. Biden's bold gamble might just save Ukraine | Opinion
18. Putin Is Making a Mockery of the United Nations
19. Russia Recruiting Syrians for Urban Combat in Ukraine, U.S. Officials Say
20. Decoding the 'Z' — the mysterious Russian military symbol that's been co-opted by Russia's nationalist movement
21. WATCH: Russian POW Tells Truth About Ukraine War, Putin Throws Russia Back To the U.S.S.R.
22. The world after the war in Ukraine: Who or what will stop Putin?
23. The stakes couldn't be higher in Ukraine. Here's why and what to do next | John Nagl
24. Top Republican says no-fly zone over Ukraine could lead to ‘beginning of World War III’
25. The battle for Kyiv will be on a scale the world hasn’t witnessed for 75 years
26. Ukraine needs clandestine help from the West | Column
1. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 7, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine Conflict Update - March 7, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Russian Campaign Update. Troops, armor, fuel, food, and other supplies are making their way to many of the areas of Ukraine where the Russians are massing their forces to continue the offensive. Kyiv remains the number one target. There are several other secondary objectives that are mentioned below. The Russian war machine will slowly grind away – as it has through history. Over 600 missiles have been fired into Ukraine as of Monday (Mar 7). Around 95% of the pre-invasion troops that were massed along the Ukrainian border have now entered Ukraine. Russian advances in the last two days have not been significant.
Using the numerical advantage that Russia has in personnel and equipment – it will slowly attrite the Ukrainian armed forces at the same time that reinforcements and more supplies arrive from the Russian hinterland. The Russian logistics system providing the necessary supplies to its forces in Ukraine has thus far failed. Russian casualties have been in the thousands – Ukrainian officials say over 11,000 Russian troops have been killed in the war. Russia lost 15,000 troops during its ten year occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
The humanitarian corridors negotiated by the Russians and Ukrainians have thus far not produced the results needed. Russian shelling on the humanitarian corridors has halted the movement of evacuees. Russia has proposed new humanitarian corridors out of Ukraine . . . leading into the Russian Federation, not to other Ukrainian cities. The third round of negotiations are scheduled to take place on Monday at 16.00 Kyiv time. Protests are taking place in some of the Russian-occupied cities and villages. In some instances, the protesters have been fired on by Russian troops. Some deaths among protesters have been reported in the news and on social media. Russia has published a list of ‘unfriendly countries’, among the 43 listed are almost all countries of the European Union.
Fight for the Skies. The Russian air force still has not achieved command of the skies. Ukrainian jet fighters continue to harass the Russian formations and convoys. The Ukrainian air defense has not been neutralized; although it certainly has sustained some losses. Drones – sophisticated ones for armed attack, inexpensive hobby drones for reconnaissance – have given the Ukrainians an added boost. Russia is attacking some of Ukraine’s airfields – the airfield at Vinnystia sustained heavy damage.
Maritime Activities. The naval infantry on board the amphibious landing craft in the Black Sea . . . are still on board their respective ships. They will likely be in a supporting attack role once the Russians in the region north of Crimea strike out along the coastline towards Odessa. In the meantime, the amphibious force is tying down Ukrainian forces in the defense around Odessa. Covert Shores has published a map depicting possible beach landing sites around the Odessa region. Read more about a possible strike towards Odessa in a USNI News article (5 Mar). There are some early reports that a Russian patrol ship (Vasily Bykov) was struck and on fire in a GRAD shelling in the Black Sea on Monday (Mar 7).
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. There are social media reports that say ground attacks by the Russians will begin in earnest against Kyiv on Monday (Mar 7). The city is encircled in the west, north, and east. Access by vehicle and train is south and southwest. Air raid sirens are common through the night with aircraft, artillery, and rocket attacks. One of the Russian units in the western sector is the 76th Airborne Division. Russian troops east of Kyiv may strike south to capture the Boryspil Airport. Many point to Kyiv as the key battle of the war.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. The Ukrainians have mounted several counterattacks with some success. It has not been completely cut off by Russian forces. It is unknown if the Russians will attempt to take the city in the next few days. A large force of Russians is west of the city – but Russian intentions are unknown. It may be directed to assault Kharkiv, or move south to link up with Russian forces in the Dnipro region, or move west to take part in the assault on Kyiv.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. It is reported that heavy shelling by the Russians took place on Monday (Mar 7). The humanitarian corridor out of the city has been mined by the Russians.
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea. Over the past few days it has been subjected to Russian shelling along the city’s outskirts with several residential areas hit. It is reported that Smerch MRLS are being used to shell the city.
Map of Russian Controlled Areas. The Institute for the Study of War has a map that they update daily with the disposition of Russian forces. You can view the 6 March (Sun) edition online at this link. You can read a detailed account of Russian troop movements and actions on the ground in the ISW daily update – the 6 March (Sun) edition is here. The Ukraine War Map (Twitter @War_Mapper) has posted its latest situation map on Monday (Mar 7).
Ukraine’s Shoulder-Fired Missiles. Ukraine is using the stocks of MANPADS and anti-tank missiles to great effect. And they got more coming through its western border from nations around the world. Thousands of man-portable anti-aircraft and anti-armor weapons have already been delivered to Ukraine and thousands more are on the way. Joseph Trevithick provides an extensive review of these types of weapons being used by the Ukrainian armed forces. “These Are All the Types of Shoulder-Fired Missiles That Are Pouring Into Ukraine”, The Warzone, March 5, 2022.
General Information
Evacuation Corridors – Not So Much. The routes of departure negotiated between the Russians and Ukrainians for civilians trapped in some cities have not provided relief. Civilians attempting to leave via these humanitarian evacuation corridors have come under fire by the Russians resulting in injuries and death to many civilians. Russia has announced another ceasefire in selected regions to allow for civilians to flee contested areas. The humanitarian corridors lead to Belarus and Russia. “Russia sets cease-fire for evacuation but battles continue”, AP News, March 7, 2022.
Rescuing Zelenskyy? If Ukraine falls completely, meaning the Russians get all the way to the western border of Ukraine, then the fate of a government in exile may rest on the now very popular president. However, keeping President Zelenskyy safe could be problematic. Apparently there are some contingency plans afoot – some UK and US special operations folks have gathered in Lithuania and are in a readiness status to pluck Zelenskyy from danger. Reported in The Sun on Saturday (Mar 5).
Russian Diplomats – Flying Home. With airspace closed to Russian aircraft, Moscow sent a diplomatic jet to Dulles to grab officials kicked out of the United States. The aircraft picked up 13 expelled Russian diplomats. There are reports that additional Russian staff members at their D.C. embassy were on the plane as well. The Ilyushin Il-96 plane picked up twelve ‘intelligence operatives’ and a staffer at the United Nations. “Russian plane lands in D.C. to pick up expelled ‘spies'”, Politico, March 5, 2022.
Wargaming the Invasion. In the two weeks prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Marine Corps University ran a four-day wargame to simulate the first several days of a Russian invasion. The current Russian campaign is playing out very closely to the USMC wargame. Read a detailed essay describing the wargame with comparisons to what has happened on the ground in Ukraine – complete with maps. A good read! “The Wargame Before the War: Russia Attacks Ukraine”, War on the Rocks, March 2, 2022.
The Coming Resistance
Government in Exile? Although Ukraine has mounted a very stiff defense of its territory it is likely that Russia will reverse the setbacks experienced in the first two weeks of the war. Eventually Russia will win advance farther into Ukraine – possibly to the western border but at least with the capture of the capital. At that point one would expect the formation of a government in exile and the establishment of an insurgency – one that could last many years. “U.S. and allies quietly prepare for a Ukrainian government-in-exile and a long insurgency”, The Washington Post, March 5, 2022.
A Russian Victory, Followed by a Ukraine Resistance. Andrew Milburn examines the possibility of a future resistance movement by the Ukrainian people once Russia completes its occupation of part or all of Ukraine. Milburn is familiar with insurgencies (and counterinsurgencies as well) – having seen a few during his career as a special operations Marine officer. “How the US can beat Russia in Ukraine without firing a shot”, Task & Purpose, March 5, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Truth and Lies. President Putin has shut down two of the last remaining independent broadcasters in Russia. While the Ukraine conflict is a military battle, it is also an ‘infowar’. And on the information operations battleground, “Vlodymry is kicking Vladimir’s butt.” So says Howard Kurtz, the host of Fox News Media Buzz. Zelensky is doing this in his army style T-shirt, from the streets, and calling in reporters from CNN, NBC, and other media outlets for interviews. Putin sits at one end of a long table with his advisors or reporters at the other end of the table – and seems disconnected with the reality of what is actually happening in Ukraine. Listen to Howard in “Putin crushes the truth while Zelenskyy bravely does interviews”, Fox News, March 4, 2022.
The Twitter War. Tech expertise is being used to undermine the Russians. The “IT Army of Ukraine” is being used to launch cyber attacks against Russia. And a Ukrainian cabinet minister is reaching out to the tech companies for support – these include Google, Meta, Twitter, Apple, YouTube, and more. “Twitter is part of our war effort – Ukraine minister”, BBC News, March 6, 2022.
Putin’s Messaging – Failing. The president of Russia has squandered his information operations organizations with a war that is indefensible in the world of public opinion. His ‘de-Nazification’ narrative is one example of how his IO campaign is off track. His attempts at ‘false flag’ operations was pre-empted by prompt responses from the U.S., UK, and other nations around the world. The prevalence of open-source intelligence websites and Twitter feeds has also contributed to the defeat of Russian propaganda. Social media feeds and instant messaging platforms may spread disinformation but they also spread the truth. Read more in an article by Eleanor Lopatto entitled “The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda”, The Russia File, Wilson Center, March 4, 2022.
Cyber Warfare. The U.S. Senate passed some major cyber security legislation this past week. The use of Telegram has increased as a result of the Ukraine conflict. People from all over the world are using Telegram to organize themselves and resources to support either Russia or Ukraine. Telegram has also become a digital battleground for cyber attacks and fraud with cyber criminals and hacktivists leveraging the messaging app for conflict-related activities.
World Response
Rush to the Border. According to multiple sources over 1.5 million Ukrainians have fled west to neighboring countries. The countries of Europe have opened their arms to the refugees. It is the largest movement of people from a conflict in Europe since World War II. “Crisis Ready” has plotted some of the border checkpoints and refugee receptions centers on a map. Border crossing points are plotted on this map by the Humanitarian Data Exchange.
Financial Actions Against Russia. American Express has suspended operations in Russia and Belarus. AE cards will no longer work at merchants or ATMs. Mastercard and Visa have also ceased transactions in Russia.
Baltic States Support Ukraine. The three small nations sitting on the northern border of Russia have reason to be concerned. They could be Putin’s next conquest. And a conventional attack would likely be over very quickly. Of course, being NATO members, a conventional attack across the border by Russian forces could invoke article 5. However, there are many ways to wage war – and Russian hybrid warfare is a weapon in Putin’s arsenal. Read more in “What Baltic leaders think about a war they’ve long warned was coming”, The Washington Post, March 3, 2022.
Commentary
Putin and the Rewriting of History. The Russian president has been busy distorting the meaning of words and conducting a cleansing of the past history of the Soviet Union over the past several years. Recently he has misrepresented the unjust invasion of Ukraine as a humanitarian intervention. This is a noble action to many Russians who see the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a tragedy and who feel that Russian minorities in other countries deserve Russia’s protection. “Putin’s Memory Laws Set the Stage for his War in Ukraine”, Lawfare Blog, February 28, 2022.
Upcoming Events
Online Event – Humanitarian Support for Ukraine and its People, USAID. “In addition to military aid, the U.S. is rapidly expanding our humanitarian support initiatives to Ukraine and its people. Together with USAID, the State Department recently announced the provision of an additional $54 million in humanitarian relief to Ukraine. This call will provide an overview of this humanitarian support and answer any of your questions about how the Ukrainian diaspora can assist. Please submit your questions through this survey. You can register for the event via the link below:”
Online Event – The Future of Russia: The Oligarchs. Join The Washington Post when it hosts Pavel Khodorkoskiy, the son of a Russian oligarch-turned-dissident who was jailed for a decade after posing a political threat to President Putin. Event takes place on Wednesday, March 9.
Online Event – German Ambassador on Ukraine. Emily Haber will discuss the Ukraine conflict with David Ignatius, a columnist with The Washington Post. The event will take place on Thursday, March 10.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map. This map is a crowdsourced effort by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) and the wider open source community to provide reliable information for policymakers, journalists, and justice organizations about the evolving situations both on the ground and online.
UK Ministry of Defence. Check out the map posted by @DefenceHQ on Twitter.
Ukraine Graphics by Reuters. “Russia Invades Ukraine”
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
**********
Image: “Fight for Ukraine”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Twitter, March 5, 2022.
2. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 16
UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 16
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with the Critical Threats Project, AEI
March 6, 2022
This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Key Takeaways March 5-6
- Russian forces spent the past 24 hours largely regrouping and preparing to renew offensive operations around Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolayiv.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reports the presence of a large concentration of Russian forces west of Kharkiv that it assesses will launch a wide offensive southwest toward the Dnipro River, although no such offensive has begun as of this publication.
- Russia violated two Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire agreements, collapsing efforts to establish a humanitarian corridor to help evacuate civilians from Mariupol and Volnovakha on March 5 and 6.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin has not demonstrated any willingness to de-escalate with Ukraine or the international community, nor has he provided reasonable demands that would lay the groundwork for de-escalation or negotiations.
- The Kremlin is likely laying the domestic information groundwork for a declaration of martial law in Russia should Russian President Vladimir Putin decide that mass mobilization and conscription are necessary to achieve his objectives.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin allowed for the confiscation of assets belonging to “corrupt” Russian officials on March 6, likely to acquire new revenue streams at the expense of alienating some supporters.
- The Kremlin is attempting to deter US or European bans on Russian oil exports by claiming that a ban would devastate world oil markets.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin compared Western sanctions to a “declaration of war” on March 5 as the Kremlin began to retaliate against foreign businesses.
Key Events March 4, 4:00 pm EST – March 6, 4:00 pm EST
Military Events:
The military situation on the ground has not changed significantly in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continue to mass for renewed offensive operations east and west of Kyiv, west of Kharkiv, and toward Mykolayiv-Odesa but have not yet initiated new large-scale ground attacks. Russia has increased aerial and artillery/rocket attacks on civilian positions and infrastructure, including known evacuation corridors. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their second counterattack in two days, this time near Mariupol. The Ukrainian air force and air defense forces continue to operate, inflicting damage on Russian ground forces and disrupting Russian air and missile operations.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
1) Main effort—Kyiv: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east. Russian forces near Kyiv have continued to concentrate in preparation for resuming offensive operations both east and west of the city. They have conducted limited movements to advance the western envelopment but have not gained much ground.
2) Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv; The Ukrainian General Staff assessed on March 5 that as many as 23 BTGs are concentrated likely west and northwest of Kharkiv and are preparing to resume offensive operations toward Lubny, Poltava, and Kharkiv itself.
3) Supporting effort 2—Mariupol: The Russian encirclement of Mariupol continues and Russian forces continued to shell the city on March 5.
4) Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward: The Ukrainian General Staff reports that three Russian BTGs of the 7th Airborne Division attacked toward Mykolayiv on March 5 but were repulsed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed on March 6 that Russia was preparing to bomb Odesa, although he offered no evidence for that claim and ISW has found no independent confirmation of it. Zelensky is almost certainly right that Russia will begin bombing Odesa in advance of ground or amphibious operations against the city, but the timing of such operations remains unclear.
Russia violated two Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire agreements, collapsing efforts to establish a humanitarian corridor to help evacuate civilians from Mariupol and Volnovakha on March 5 and 6.[1] Russia and Ukraine agreed to a March 5 ceasefire to create a humanitarian corridor for evacuating civilians and the wounded from Mariupol and nearby Volnovakha. Russia likely continued to target Ukrainian forces on March 5 in violation of the ceasefire. Russia and Ukraine agreed upon a subsequent ceasefire on March 6 starting at 10:00 am local time.[2] The International Committee of the Red Cross (IRCR) reported that evacuation attempts in Mariupol and Volnovakha again failed and Ukrainian officials claimed Russia again violated the ceasefire.[3] Russia denied that its forces violated the ceasefire and blamed the Ukrainian government for the failure of the humanitarian corridor.
- Ukraine’s Framing: Multiple Ukrainian officials claimed Russian attacks in Mariupol on March 5 and 6 closed the humanitarian corridor.[4] Mariupol Mayor Vadym Boichenko and Mariupol Deputy Mayor Serhiy Orlov said Russian forces were “still bombing Mariupol“ on March 5 and called off evacuation efforts.[5] The head of Ukraine’s Donetsk Region administration, Pavlo Kirilenko, said in a Facebook post on March 6 that the second attempt to evacuate Mariupol residents failed.[6] Kirilenko claimed “the Russians began to regroup their forces and resumed heavy shelling of the city.”[7] Ukrainian Interior Ministry advisor Anton Gerashchenko and Ukrainian Minister for Reintegration Iryna Vereshchuk blamed Russian shooting along parts of the corridor between Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia for the failure to safely establish humanitarian corridors.[8]
- Russia’s Framing: Russian officials and Kremlin-supported media outlets claimed the Ukrainian government is disinterested in helping its citizens and said Ukraine blocked its citizens from evacuating Mariupol on March 5 and 6. Russia’s Ministry of Defense claimed Russian forces followed the ceasefire order and accused “Ukrainian forces and national battalions of taking advantage of the declared [ceasefire] to regroup on defensive positions.”[9] Head of the National Center for Defense Control of the Russian Federation Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev stated on March 5 that “a catastrophic humanitarian situation had developed” in most of Ukraine and falsely claimed “the Nazis blocked thousands of Ukrainians and foreigners” from evacuating. Russian Defense Ministry Representative Major General Igor Konashenkov said on March 5 the Russian military went ahead with its offensive operations at 6:00 am Moscow time “due to Ukraine's’ unwillingness to influence nationalists or extend [the ceasefire].”[10]
Other Russian Activity:
The Russian Federal Customs Service detained a US citizen on drug charges on March 5, likely to improve Russian leverage over the United States.[11] The Russian Federal Customs Service detained NBA Basketball player Brittney Griner for possession of hash oil at Sheremetyevo airport on March 5.[12]
An alleged FSB whistleblower leaked their analysis on the Russian-Ukrainian war, highlighting major logistical and planning issues. [13] The leaked letter accused Russian leaders of poor planning and concealing the nature of the war from the Russian people, including planners for the invasion. The letter-writer claimed that Russian intelligence analysts did not provide accurate assessments of the impact of Ukrainian resistance or Western sanctions because Russian leadership told analysts that their assessments were hypothetical thought exercises for which the assessment of a positive outcome for Russia would be politically beneficial. The letter-writer also claimed that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is searching intensely for evidence that Ukraine is building nuclear weapons. The letter-writer also alleged that Russia has an internal deadline of June for the end of the war due to economic pressures.
The Kremlin continued restricting news and social media outlets that refused to comply with its new disinformation law as other media outlets restricted or closed their Russian operations on March 5-6. The Kremlin is leveraging its accusations of Western disinformation against Russia to justify its acceleration of social control measures that eliminate Russian freedom of speech, right to protest, and access to trusted information. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov justified increasing crackdowns on freedom of speech as a national security measure. [14] Peskov said that Russian citizens must express their positions on the Russian military operation in Ukraine “within the framework of the law” but did not specify the parameters of the law.[15] The Kremlin likely seeks to promote self-censorship among Russian citizens. Russian Internal Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Irina Volk admitted on March 6 that Russian authorities arrested 3,500 protesters in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other unspecified regions, likely to deter additional protests.[16]
Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok temporarily suspended live broadcasting and new content in Russia on March 6 to comply with the new censorship law.[17] Russian-owned media application Telegram briefly experienced service interruptions on March 5, possibly to ensure compliance with the new disinformation law.[18] Russian users frequently use TikTok, Telegram, and other social media applications to share Russian force movements in Russia and spread footage of kinetic action in Ukraine. Russian state media regulator Rozkomnadzor also blocked access to communications application Zello on March 6 over its refusal to comply with the censorship law.[19]
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty closed their Russian operations on March 6 due to mounting fines over their refusal to accept their designations as “foreign agents.”[20] Independent Russian news outlet COLTA temporarily suspended publications on March 5 and said that it must “make changes” to and remove recently published materials on Russia’s war in Ukraine to comply with the law.[21]
Belarusian Activity:
N/A
Ukrainian Activity:
N/A
Military Support to Ukraine:
N/A
Sanctions and Economic Activity:
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing for the confiscation of assets belonging to “corrupt” Russian officials on March 6, likely to raise state revenue at the expense of alienating some supporters.[22] The decree allows the Kremlin to withdraw money from an official’s account if its assets exceed three years' worth of income. The Kremlin will confiscate the assets if the official does not provide legal documentation of the origin of his or her land ownership, real estate, vehicles, and other assets. The Kremlin is unlikely to conduct fair audits and may rely on seizing the assets of disobedient officials to fund Russia’s declining economy. Such seizures would likely damage Putin’s relations with regional governments. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine has already soured relations with formerly pro-Russian Ukrainian businessmen like Rinat Akhmetov, who denounced Russia as an aggressive country and Putin as a “war criminal” on March 5.[23] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine likely destroyed Akhmetov’s Ukraine-based industries. Akhmetov was previously a strong supporter of the pro- Putin Yanukovych regime.
The Kremlin is attempting to deter US or European bans on Russian oil exports by claiming that a ban would devastate world oil markets. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on March 5 that US limitations on Russian oil imports "could have rather serious consequences” on Russian oil that would disrupt the world energy market.[24] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on March 6 that the United States and the European Union are looking into banning Russian oil imports “while making sure that there is still an appropriate supply of oil in world markets.”[25]
Russian President Vladimir Putin compared Western sanctions to a “declaration of war” on March 5 as the Kremlin began to retaliate against foreign businesses.[26] Putin’s “declaration of war” rhetoric is likely intended to prepare the Russian population for additional hardship.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to prevent further Western sanctions against Russian officials by masking available information on their assets and incomes. The State Duma introduced a bill under the guise of anti-corruption efforts to remove public information about income and assets of sanctioned public officials on March 5 to prevent “unfriendly states from exerting pressure and influencing Russian officials” and their families.[27]
The Kremlin is beginning to retaliate against and replace Western companies for their governments’ sanctions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Western governments acted like bandits, coerced private companies to leave Russian markets, and infringed on the property rights of sanctioned Russian businessmen by confiscating their properties abroad.[28] Peskov claimed that Russian companies might resort to using “non-standard and bold” measures such as using unlicensed software, encouraging pirating of Western programs.[29] Putin ordered the Kremlin to create a list of “unfriendly” states, legal entities, and actors on March 6.[30] Putin also signed a decree allowing Russian companies to repay debts to “unfriendly” foreign creditors in Russian rubles instead of dollars or euros.[31] Russian State Duma Committee on Economic Policy member Sergey Altukhov warned that Western companies will have a challenging time returning to the Russian market as Russian and Asian businesses will replace them.[32] Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and PayPal suspended their operations in Russia on March 5-6, limiting Russians’ abilities to conduct domestic transactions.[33] Russian banks reportedly plan to issue “Mir” co-badged cards and introduce the Chinese “UnionPay” system in retaliation.[34] Russia’s Central Bank also unofficially ordered Russian banks to limit the amount of funds Russians can transfer to families abroad to $5,000 a month to prevent currency from leaving the country on March 5.[35]
The Kremlin is also leveraging its own and Western sanctions to advance its foreign policy and national interests. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov threatened to derail the Iran nuclear deal talks if the United States does not guarantee that Western sanctions against Russia will not be imposed on Russian trade and investment with Iran on March 6.[36] Russian agriculture and veterinary regulators likely lifted restrictions from 15 Georgian dairy producers on March 6 to reward the Georgian government for its reluctance to officially support Ukraine.[37]
Humanitarian Concerns:
N/A
Other International Activity:
N/A
[10] https://iz dot ru/1301377/2022-03-05/vs-rf-vozobnovili-nastuplenie-iz-za-nezhelaniia-kieva-prodlevat-rezhim-tishiny
[18] https://iz dot ru/1301062/2022-03-05/sboi-proizoshel-v-rabote-telegram
[21] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/05/redaktsiya-colta-ru-reshila-na-vremya-zamolchat-iz-za-zakona-pro-feyki-o-deystviyah-rossiyskoy-armii
[23] https://apostrophe dot ua/news/sport/2022-03-05/putin---voennyiy-prestupnik-ahmetov-jestko-osudil-napadenie-rossii-na-ukrainu/261523
[24] https://iz dot ru/1301122/2022-03-05/v-kremle-predupredili-o-posledstviiakh-pri-zaprete-rossiiskoi-nefti-v-ssha
[28] https://iz dot ru/1301143/2022-03-05/peskov-schel-ekonomicheskii-banditizm-prichinoi-ukhoda-riada-kompanii-iz-rf
[30] https://nv dot ua/world/geopolitics/vladimir-putin-sostavlyaet-spisok-stran-vragov-novosti-ukrainy-50222631.html
[31] https://iz dot ru/1301551/2022-03-06/putin-podpisal-ukaz-razreshaiushchii-kompaniiam-platit-dolgi-zarubezhnym-kreditoram-v-rubliakh
[32] https://iz dot ru/1301251/2022-03-05/v-gd-predupredili-inostrannye-kompanii-o-trudnostiakh-pri-popytke-vernutsia-v-rf
[35] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/05/kommersant-tsentrobank-zapretil-perevodit-rodstvennikam-za-rubezh-bolee-5-tysyach-dollarov-v-mesyats
3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 6
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 6
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 6, 2:00 PM EST
The military situation on the ground has not changed significantly in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continue to mass for renewed offensive operations east and west of Kyiv, west of Kharkiv, and toward Mykolayiv-Odesa but have not yet initiated new large-scale ground attacks. Russia has increased aerial and artillery/rocket attacks on civilian positions and infrastructure, including known evacuation corridors. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a second counter-attack in two days, this time near Mariupol. The Ukrainian air force and air defense forces continue to operate, inflicting damage on Russian ground forces and disrupting Russian air and missile operations.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces spent the past 24 hours largely regrouping and preparing for renewing offensive operations around Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolayiv.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reports the presence of a large concentration of Russian forces west of Kharkiv that it assesses will launch a wide offensive southwest toward the Dnipro River, although no such offensive has begun as of this publication.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.
Russian forces near Kyiv have continued to concentrate in preparation for resuming offensive operations both east and west of the city. They have conducted limited movements to advance the western envelopment but have not gained much ground.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces remain deployed in the positions north and west of Kyiv that they have occupied for several days and have not initiated major combat operations in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that up to 18 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are currently operating along Kyiv’s western approaches (up from the 15 BTGs the General Staff reported in its previous update).[1] The General Staff claimed that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne Division are seeking to advance toward Belhorodka, roughly 20 kilometers west of central Kyiv.[2] Such an operation, if confirmed, would likely indicate that Russian forces seek to move closer to the capital from the positions they currently occupy further to the west, enabling a shorter route to complete the encirclement of Kyiv on the western side. It is unclear if Russian troops have the combat power to complete this operation successfully.
The Russians diverted their efforts to encircle Kyiv to attack the civilian evacuation corridor running west from the capital via Irpin. They reportedly shelled a bridge and bombed a rail line being used to evacuate civilians on March 5 and 6.[3]
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv axis
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 that Russian forces were concentrating for a renewed attack on Chernihiv, including bringing forward thermobaric MLRS launchers.[4] The Russians have not reportedly launched a new attack on Chernihiv as of this publication, however, and the Ukrainian General Staff reports that Ukrainian forces still hold Chernihiv itself.[5]
Subordinate supporting effort — Sumy axis
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops on the eastern bank of the Dnipro near Kyiv are regrouping near Brovary, likely in preparation for a renewed advance south via Peremoha toward the Boryspil Airport.[6] Such an advance would likely be intended to complete the encirclement of Kyiv from the east as Russian forces attempt to encircle it from the west. It is unclear if Russian forces have the combat power necessary to complete this effort, which has not begun as of this publication. The Ukrainian General Staff also claimed that Ukrainian forces had defeated a Russian mechanized force of unknown size in Sumy Oblast on March 5.[7]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
The Ukrainian General Staff assessed on March 5 that as many as 23 BTGs are concentrated likely west and northwest of Kharkiv and are preparing to resume offensive operations toward Lubny, Poltava, and Kharkiv itself.[8] Poltava is approximately 130 kilometers north of Dnipro City; Lubny is roughly 185 kilometers east of Kyiv. Lubny and Poltava are roughly 120 kilometers apart. A Russian offensive operation on this scale would be a significant undertaking that could be intended to isolate Kyiv from eastern Ukraine, seize Dnipro, reinforce Russian attacks on Kyiv itself, or achieve some combination of all these objectives. The Ukrainian General Staff asserts that the Russians intend to seize the Kaniv Hydroelectric Powerplant on the Dnipro near Cherkasy, which an offensive toward Lubny and Poltava could support.[9] Russian forces have thus far shown limited ability to conduct attacks to this breadth and depth successfully in general, although the terrain in this region is more favorable to mechanized offensive operations than is the terrain around Kyiv itself. No large-scale attack on this axis had begun as of this publication. Ukrainian forces report defeating several Russian elements of unknown size in the Kharkiv region on March 5 and 6.[10]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that two Russian BTGs were continuing their efforts to advance southeast near the Northern Donets River on March 5 but making no significant progress.[11]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
The Russian encirclement of Mariupol continues and Russian forces continued to shell the city on March 5.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counter-attack near Mariupol, destroying a small number of Russian vehicles but not likely materially altering the lines of control.[13]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that three Russian BTGs of the 7th Airborne Division attacked toward Mykolayiv on March 5 but were repulsed.[14] Social media reports of damaged and destroyed Russian vehicles in this area may confirm these reports.[15] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed on March 6 that Russia was preparing to bomb Odesa, although he offered no evidence for that claim and ISW has found no independent confirmation of it.[16] Zelensky is almost certainly right that Russia will begin bombing Odesa in advance of ground or amphibious operations against the city, but the timing of such operations remains unclear. ISW has observed no additional indicators of Russian preparations for an amphibious assault on Odesa, but we likely would not see such indicators after the ships had completed loading and before they actually landed troops. We expect Russian commanders would wait until Russian ground forces had secure a crossing over the Southern Bug, at or north of Mykolayiv, before committing to an amphibious assault on Odesa, but we have no specific evidence or indicators that they will do so.
The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces illegally present in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria are on high alert, although it also claimed that their morale is poor and they do not want to fight in Ukraine.[17] ISW has no independent verification of either claim. Russia has maintained three battalions in Transnistria for decades despite the opposition of the Moldovan government. Those battalions have historically had low readiness levels and are unlikely to be able to conduct effective mechanized maneuver operations on their own. The Ukrainian General Staff may be reporting on them because of indicators they are seeing that the Russians intend to use them in conjunction with an attack on Odesa. ISW has no independent indicators to support such an assessment, although it would be logical.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian operations northwest of Kyiv may resume attacks on the city and/or attempts to encircle it to the west in the next 24-48 hours;
- Russian forces east of Kyiv may resume their drive likely intended to envelop Kyiv from the east;
- Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug in the next 24-48 hours.
[16] https://www.unn dot com dot ua/uk/news/1966763-tse-bude-istorichniy-zlochin-zelenskiy-zayaviv-scho-rosiya-gotuyetsya-bombiti-odesu; https://lb dot ua/society/2022/03/06/508248_zelenskiy_zayaviv_shcho_vorog.html
4. Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, but Now Faces a Potential Quagmire
A lesson for every general and military planner: there are almost never quick wins, never count on them, and never promise them.
We are in love with this quote but we never take it to heart:
"There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare." - Sun Tzu.
Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, but Now Faces a Potential Quagmire
The close Putin ally modernized Russia’s forces, but those troops have run into ferocious Ukrainian resistance
Victories in Crimea and Syria helped propel Mr. Shoigu and the military to the center of Mr. Putin’s Kremlin power structure, with an upper hand over the feared intelligence services that had previously been the main supporters of the Russian president, who is himself a former spy.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in December.
Photo: Mikhail Tereshchenko/Zuma Press
Russian troops’ failure to quickly seize Ukraine, however, has shown Mr. Shoigu’s changes, while real, didn’t create the fearsome fighting force he touted. Poor logistics, flawed strategy and ill-prepared troops mean any victory will be immensely costly, and an occupation hard to sustain.
Experts on the Russian military place some of the blame on Mr. Shoigu’s willingness to back Mr. Putin’s plans, even if they are unrealistic. That has meant agreeing with assumptions the Ukrainian military would quickly fold in the face of a superior force and that Russian troops would be greeted as liberators.
“Beyond Putin, this is very damning for one person in particular, and that is Sergei Shoigu,” said Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization located in Arlington, Va. “By agreeing to these assumptions and this type of operation, he has essentially thrown the Russian military into a disaster.”
It is hard to predict how this plays out for Mr. Shoigu. His acquiescence to the invasion demonstrated loyalty to Mr. Putin’s political objectives in Europe. But if the operation fails, the Kremlin leader would likely look for a scapegoat. “It all depends on how this all ends for Putin,” said Mr. Kofman.
Russian Forces Pound Ukrainian Cities as Civilian Death Toll Rises
Moscow shifts approach after failing to execute quick invasion of Ukraine
Debris on the streets of Kharkiv after Russia shelled Ukraine’s second-largest city.
Lyaxander/TASS/Zuma Press
1 of 10
•••••
1 of 10
Show Caption
Debris on the streets of Kharkiv after Russia shelled Ukraine’s second-largest city.
Lyaxander/TASS/Zuma Press
Whether or not Russia prevails in Ukraine, Mr. Shoigu’s initial strategy to quickly topple the Ukrainian government with minimal losses has failed. After 11 days of fighting, Russian troops have failed to take any major city and have suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties. Ukraine has gotten global support and Western sanctions are on track to cripple the Russian economy. To make up for its military setbacks, Russia has increasingly resorted to indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas.
The 66-year-old Mr. Shoigu is one of the most popular top officials in Russia. Trained as a civil engineer, he started as head of the country’s emergency management agency just before the fall of the Soviet Union. He dashed around the country tackling the multitude of crises in those years. He built a massive ministry whose efforts were packaged and promoted to the Russian people. His success led to his appointment as head of the military.
There he took a dispirited and weak military and turned it into a more modern fighting force. Heavy marketing boosted the military’s reputation and drew in young men to be professional soldiers. Every spring, he paraded the military’s new weapons and technology through central Moscow.
Mr. Shoigu’s first success came in Crimea, when he planned a nighttime intervention by special forces to seize the peninsula. They took over government buildings in an operation that ultimately led to the annexation of the Ukrainian territory in 2014. The invasion was seen as retribution for the ouster of a pro-Russian president in Kyiv a month earlier and to protect Russia’s Black Sea fleet, which had its headquarters in Crimea.
The military’s power in helping Moscow achieve its aims in Syria was clear when it started its air campaign in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2015. “The military and the ministry of defense had gained the upper hand over the foreign ministry,” said Hanna Notte, senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. She added, “You could talk to diplomats, but it wouldn’t matter much.”
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus last month.
Photo: russian Defense Ministry press s/Shutterstock
The resurgence has made the military the primary tool of Mr. Putin’s foreign policy and made Mr. Shoigu a key member of his inner circle. Mr. Shoigu was sanctioned by the U.S. and the European Union last month, along with Mr. Putin and other close associates.
“He’s long been seen as the most likely successor to Putin should the latter drop dead,” said Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Rather than being a political threat, Mr. Shoigu helped boost Mr. Putin’s image and his ideology, which is centered on confrontation with the West, Russian nationalism and religion. Mr. Shoigu changed the design of military uniforms to look like those introduced by Joseph Stalin to celebrate the U.S.S.R.’s victory in World War II. He attended the consecration of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, whose floors were made from the melted metal of Nazi German tanks captured by the Soviets.
“He understands which way political winds can be blowing and is good at echoing the values Putin obviously finds important,” said Dmitry Adamsky, a professor and an expert on the Russian military at Reichman University in Israel.
The military became known for sleek, well-produced videos, using drone footage and snappy editing to show Russian victories in Syria. The Defense Ministry’s official television channel, Red Star, visited Russian troops on operations in the Middle East and the Arctic, presenting them as heroes standing up for Russia’s interests around the globe.
One of Mr. Shoigu’s deputies made sure the defense minister received good press and would harangue journalists who criticized him. The Russian Defense Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
The military was also used to punish opponents of Mr. Putin, who were sent to harsh locations to do their military service. “It’s seen as a kind of punishment for people who don’t know how to keep their mouths shut,” said a person with ties to the Defense Ministry.
As Mr. Putin elevated the military, the armed forces have cooperated with other, darker aspects of the Kremlin leader’s rule. Mr. Shoigu has entered into numerous contracts with Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Kremlin-connected businessman, who has bankrolled Russia’s private military company, known as Wagner.
Wagner has provided support on the ground in places like Syria, and the Defense Ministry has rewarded Mr. Prigozhin with military contracts for food services. Mr. Prigozhin didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Pictures of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Army of Russia store in Moscow last month.
Photo: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg News
If the Ukraine invasion continues to go poorly, it could unravel years of image-building for the military and Mr. Shoigu, and show that earlier victories were less impressive than they seemed.
Crimea is less than one-twentieth the size of Ukraine and even under Ukrainian rule, it was a stronghold of pro-Russian sentiment. And the Syrian effort was mostly aerial bombing.
Mr. Shoigu has been one of the most visible proponents of the Russian version of events before and after the invasion of Ukraine. When the U.S. warned of an imminent Russian invasion, he said that Moscow’s intelligence showed the U.S. was helping Ukraine develop nuclear weapons and that Washington was preparing for a chemical weapons attack on the Russian-backed militants in Ukraine’s east.
Last week, when it was clear the invasion wasn’t going as planned, he blankly read from his prepared comments in a widely televised meeting. “The most important thing for us is to protect the Russian Federation from the military threat created by the West, which is trying to use the Ukrainian people in the fight against our country,” he said to a group of officers.
“The grouping of the armed forces of the Russian Federation will continue to carry out the special military operation until the mission put forth has been completed,” he said.
5. Arming Ukraine: 17,000 Anti-Tank Weapons in 6 Days and a Clandestine Cybercorps
There must be a lot of people saying I told you so or what if? What if we had armed Ukraine better and sooner?
And of course the cyberwar bears watching This conflict may shape the future of cyberwar.
Excerpts:
One of the odd features of the conflict so far is that it runs the gamut of old and modern warfare. The trenches dug by Ukrainian soldiers in the south and east look like scenes from 1914. The Russian tanks rolling through the cities evoke Prague in 1956. But the battle of the present day that most strategists expected to mark the opening days of the war — over computer networks and the power grids and communications systems they control — has barely begun.
American officials say that is partly because of extensive work done to harden Ukraine’s networks after Russian attacks on its electric grid in 2015 and 2016. But experts say that cannot explain it all. Perhaps the Russians did not try very hard at the outset, or are holding their assets in reserve. Perhaps an American-led counteroffensive — part of what Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, the head of Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, calls a doctrine of “persistent engagement” in global networks — explains at least some of the absence.
Government officials are understandably tight-lipped, saying the cyberoperations underway, which have been moved in recent days from an operations center in Kyiv to one outside the country, are some of the most classified elements of the conflict. But it is clear that the cybermission teams have tracked some familiar targets, including the activities of the G.R.U., Russia’s military intelligence operations, to try to neutralize their activity. Microsoft has helped, turning out patches in hours to kill off malware it detects in unclassified systems.
Arming Ukraine: 17,000 Anti-Tank Weapons in 6 Days and a Clandestine Cybercorps
March 6, 2022
The United States has walked to the edge of direct conflict with Russia in an operation that is reminiscent of the Berlin airlift of 1948-49, but far more complex.
French military equipment is unloaded from a freight airplane at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania last Thursday.
March 6, 2022, 7:02 p.m. ET
On a snowy tarmac at Amari Air Base in northern Estonia on Sunday morning, pallets of rifles, ammunition and other weapons were being loaded onto one of the largest cargo planes in the world, an Antonov AN-124, belonging to the Ukrainian air force. It is an artifact of the Cold War, built and purchased when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union.
Now it is being turned back against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, part of a vast airlift that American and European officials describe as a desperate race against time, to get tons of arms into the hands of Ukrainian forces while their supply routes are still open. Scenes like this, reminiscent of the Berlin airlift — the famed race by the Western allies to keep West Berlin supplied with essentials in 1948 and 1949 as the Soviet Union sought to choke it off — are playing out across Europe.
In less than a week, the United States and NATO have pushed more than 17,000 antitank weapons, including Javelin missiles, over the borders of Poland and Romania, unloading them from giant military cargo planes so they can make the trip by land to Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, and other major cities. So far, Russian forces have been so preoccupied in other parts of the country that they have not targeted the arms supply lines, but few think that can last.
But those are only the most visible contributions. Hidden away on bases around Eastern Europe, forces from United States Cyber Command known as “cybermission teams” are in place to interfere with Russia’s digital attacks and communications — but measuring their success rate is difficult, officials say.
In Washington and Germany, intelligence officials race to merge satellite photographs with electronic intercepts of Russian military units, strip them of hints of how they were gathered, and beam them to Ukrainian military units within an hour or two. As he tries to stay out of the hands of Russian forces in Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine travels with encrypted communications equipment, provided by the Americans, that can put him into a secure call with President Biden. Mr. Zelensky used it Saturday night for a 35-minute call with his American counterpart on what more the U.S. can do in its effort to keep Ukraine alive without entering into direct combat on the ground, in the air or in cyberspace with Russian forces.
Mr. Zelensky welcomed the help so far, but repeated the criticism that he has made in public — that the aid was wildly insufficient to the task ahead. He asked for a no-fly zone over Ukraine, a shutdown of all Russian energy exports and a fresh supply of fighter jets.
It is a delicate balance. On Saturday, while Mr. Biden was in Wilmington, Del., his National Security Council staff spent much of the day trying to find a way for Poland to transfer to Ukraine a fleet of well-used, Soviet-made MIG-29 fighter jets that Ukrainian pilots know how to fly. But the deal is contingent on giving Poland, in return, far more capable, American-made F-16s, an operation made more complicated by the fact that many of those fighters are promised to Taiwan — where the United States has greater strategic interests.
Polish leaders have said there is no deal, and are clearly concerned about how they would provide the fighters to Ukraine and whether doing so would make them a new target of the Russians. The United States says it is open to the idea of the plane swap.
“I can’t speak to a timeline, but I can just tell you that we’re looking at it very, very actively,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said on Sunday, during a trip that has taken him to Moldova, another non-NATO country that American officials fear may be next on Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s hit list of nations to bring back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.
And in downtown Washington, lobbying groups and law firms that once charged the Ukrainian government handsomely for their services are now working for free, helping Mr. Zelensky’s embattled government plead for more sanctions on Russia.
The Ukrainians are also asking for more money for weapons, though they reject the idea that Washington is manipulating Mr. Zelensky’s image to present him as Churchill in a T-shirt, rallying his country to war. Covington & Burling, a major law firm, filed a motion pro bono on behalf of Ukraine in the International Court of Justice.
It is, in many ways, a more complex effort than the Berlin airlift three-quarters of a century ago. West Berlin was a small territory with direct air access. Ukraine is a sprawling country of 44 million from which Mr. Biden has pulled all American forces in an effort to avoid becoming a “co-combatant” in the war, a legal term that governs how far the United States can go in helping Ukraine without being considered in direct conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia.
But as the weapons flow in and if efforts to interfere in Russian communications and computer networks escalate, some U.S. national security officials say they have a foreboding that such conflict is increasingly likely. The American legal definitions of what constitutes entering the war are not Mr. Putin’s definitions, one senior American national security official warned over the weekend, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the American overt and covert efforts to aid Ukraine.
Mr. Putin warned on Saturday that any nation that attempted to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine would be “participating in the armed conflict.” On Sunday the Russian ministry of defense issued a statement warning NATO countries like Romania against allowing their bases to be used as a safe haven for the remaining planes in the Ukrainian air force. If they do so, it said, any “subsequent use against the Russian armed forces can be regarded as the involvement of these states in an armed conflict.”
Twenty years ago this month, as American forces began to flow into Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus famously asked, “Tell me how this ends.” In the case of Ukraine, a senior American official said, the question resonating around the White House is more like: “Tell me how we don’t get sucked in to a superpower conflict.”
A Flow of Arms Becomes a Torrent
To understand the warp-speed nature of the arms transfers underway now, consider this: A $60 million arms package to Ukraine that the U.S. announced last August was not completed until November, the Pentagon said.
But when the president approved $350 million in military aid on Feb. 26 — nearly six times larger — 70 percent of it was delivered in five days. The speed was considered essential, officials said, because the equipment — including anti-tank weapons — had to make it through western Ukraine before Russian air and ground forces started attacking the shipments. As Russia takes more territory inside the country, it is expected to become more and more difficult to distribute weapons to Ukrainian troops.
Within 48 hours of Mr. Biden approving the transfer of weapons from U.S. military stockpiles on Feb. 26, the first shipments, largely from Germany, were arriving at airfields near Ukraine’s border, officials said.
The military was able to push those shipments forward quickly by tapping into pre-positioned military stockpiles ready to roll onto Air Force C-17 transport planes and other cargo aircraft, and flying them to about half a dozen staging bases in neighboring countries, chiefly in Poland and Romania.
Still, the resupply effort faces stiff logistical and operational challenges.
“The window for doing easy stuff to help the Ukrainians has closed,” said Maj. Gen. Michael S. Repass, a former commander of U.S. Special Operations forces in Europe.
U.S. officials say Ukrainian leaders have told them that American and other allied weaponry is making a difference on the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers armed with shoulder-fired Javelin anti-tank missiles have several times in the past week attacked a mileslong convoy of Russian armor and supply trucks, helping stall the Russian ground advance as it bears down on Kyiv, Pentagon officials said. Some of the vehicles are being abandoned, officials said, because Russian troops fear sitting in the convoy when fuel-supply tanks are being targeted by the Ukrainians, setting off fireballs.
A Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone.
The convoy has also come under attack several times at different places along the column from another weapon supplied by a NATO member state. Armed Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, which the Ukrainian military used for the first time in combat against Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine last October, are now hunting Russian tanks and other vehicles, U.S. officials said.
A senior Pentagon official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said American military officials had been impressed by how the Ukrainians had used the equipment and slowed the Russian advance.
Even the elements have sided with the Ukrainian military in the war’s early days. Bad weather in northern Ukraine has grounded some Russian attack planes and helicopters, a senior Pentagon official said. Many Russian vehicles that have driven off the main roads to avoid the stalled convoy have gotten stuck in the mud, making them more vulnerable to attack, officials said.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Things to Know
Card 1 of 3
Protests in Russia. Amid antiwar rallies across Russia, the police said more than 3,000 people were arrested Sunday, the highest nationwide total in any single day of protest in recent memory. An activist group that tracks arrests reported detentions in 49 different Russian cities.
But the U.S. intelligence also has its limits. Mr. Biden’s ground rules forbid flying surveillance aircraft over Ukraine, so they have to peer in over the border, much as surveillance is often conducted over North Korea. There is reliance on new, small satellites — providing images similar to those that commercial firms like Maxar and Planet Labs are providing.
A War in Cyberspace That Has Barely Begun
One of the odd features of the conflict so far is that it runs the gamut of old and modern warfare. The trenches dug by Ukrainian soldiers in the south and east look like scenes from 1914. The Russian tanks rolling through the cities evoke Prague in 1956. But the battle of the present day that most strategists expected to mark the opening days of the war — over computer networks and the power grids and communications systems they control — has barely begun.
American officials say that is partly because of extensive work done to harden Ukraine’s networks after Russian attacks on its electric grid in 2015 and 2016. But experts say that cannot explain it all. Perhaps the Russians did not try very hard at the outset, or are holding their assets in reserve. Perhaps an American-led counteroffensive — part of what Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, the head of Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, calls a doctrine of “persistent engagement” in global networks — explains at least some of the absence.
Government officials are understandably tight-lipped, saying the cyberoperations underway, which have been moved in recent days from an operations center in Kyiv to one outside the country, are some of the most classified elements of the conflict. But it is clear that the cybermission teams have tracked some familiar targets, including the activities of the G.R.U., Russia’s military intelligence operations, to try to neutralize their activity. Microsoft has helped, turning out patches in hours to kill off malware it detects in unclassified systems.
All of this is new territory when it comes to the question of whether the United States is a “co-combatant.” By the American interpretation of the laws of cyberconflict, the United States can temporarily interrupt Russian capability without conducting an act of war; permanent disablement is more problematic. But as experts acknowledge, when a Russian system goes down, the Russian units don’t know whether it is temporary or permanent, or even whether the United States is responsible.
Similarly, sharing intelligence is perilous. American officials are convinced that Ukraine’s military and intelligence agencies are populated with Russian spies, so they are being careful not to distribute raw intelligence that would reveal sources. And they say they are not passing on specific intelligence that would tell Ukrainian forces how to go after specific targets. The concern is that doing so would give Russia an excuse to say it is fighting the United States or NATO, not Ukraine.
The Lobbyists Fight, Too
Ukraine has been receiving lobbying, public relations and legal assistance free of charge — and it is paying off. Mr. Zelensky held a Zoom call with members of Congress on Saturday, pushing for tougher sanctions on Russia and urging specific types of arms and other support.
An ad hoc team includes Andrew Mac, an American lawyer who has been volunteering as a lobbyist and nonstaff adviser to Mr. Zelensky since late 2019, and Daniel Vajdich, a lobbyist who had been paid by the Ukrainian energy industry and a civil society nonprofit group, but is now working for free. But American lobbyists are a sensitive topic in Ukraine, after Paul Manafort, later President Trump’s campaign chairman, worked for a pro-Russian president who was ousted in 2014, and after Mr. Trump tried to make military aid to Kyiv dependent on its willingness to help find dirt on then-candidate Biden and his son, Hunter.
Mr. Vajdich said he hoped his clients would redirect any funds they would have paid his firm to military defenses and humanitarian aid for Ukrainians forced from their homes by the fighting, drawing a comparison to early Nazi military aggression.
“Knowing what we know today, if we were living and operating in 1937 to ’39, would we have asked the Czechoslovaks for compensation to lobby against Neville Chamberlain and his policies?” he asked, referring to the British prime minister who ceded part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in the Munich Agreement of 1938.
“No,” he said, “certainly not.”
David E. Sanger reported from Wilmington, Del., and Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes and Kenneth P. Vogel from Washington. Helene Cooper reported from Amari Air Base, Estonia.
6. House working on bill to ban Russian oil imports
Just banning Russian oil imported to the US will not hurt Putin sufficiently. We need to sanction their entire energy industry so no one buys Russian oil. But the blowback is probably not something the American people are ready for. The extremist political tribes in the US will exploit this for political purposes rather than show unity for US national security and defense of democracy.
House working on bill to ban Russian oil imports
The Hill · by Monique Beals · March 6, 2022
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said in a letter Sunday that the House is exploring legislative options to isolate Russia, including a ban on Russian oil and energy.
"Our bill would ban the import of Russian oil and energy products into the United States, repeal normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus, and take the first step to deny Russia access to the World Trade Organization," Pelosi said in a letter to colleagues. "We would also empower the Executive branch to raise tariffs on Russian imports."
The House speaker noted that the Biden administration had requested $10 billion for "humanitarian, military and economic support for Ukraine," and said "Congress intends to enact this emergency funding this week as part of our omnibus government funding legislation."
Pelosi's letter comes after a bipartisan bill was introduced in the Senate earlier in the week to ban Russian oil imports. That measure was led by Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), who chairs of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), a senior member of the committee.
“The United States cannot continue to purchase millions of barrels of oil while Putin wages an unprovoked and unjustified war on Ukraine,” said Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), who said on Saturday that he would support the bill.
The billions in new funding for Ukraine would be part of omnibus spending plan. The Ukraine push adds even more pressure on Congress to wrap up work on government funding legislation in time for a March 11 deadline, after the cutoff date was previously pushed back several times to buy negotiators more time for spending talks.
Though the Biden administration has been hesitant to target Russia's energy resources in its crippling sanctions on the country, the White House signaled on Friday that the president was considering steps to reduce U.S. imports of Russian oil.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken said earlier on Sunday that the U.S. was engaging in an “active discussion” about the possibility of banning Russian oil imports.
“When it comes to oil, Russian oil, I was on the phone yesterday with president and other members of the Cabinet on exactly the subject. And we are now talking to our European partners and allies to look in a coordinated way at the prospect of banning the import of Russian oil while making sure that there is still an appropriate supply of oil on world markets,” Blinken said on CNN.
On Thursday, White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters that the U.S. does not “have a strategic interest in reducing the global supply of energy and that would raise prices at the gas pump for the American people around the world.”
However, Pelosi voiced support of the move on Thursday when asked about a potential ban.
“Ban the oil coming from Russia," she said. “I'm all for that — ban it."
The Hill · by Monique Beals · March 6, 2022
7. Putin’s plan is failing in ways he could not have imagined
"The moral is to the physical as three is to one" - Bonaparte
Conclusion:
Instead of serving up a pack of lies, the Kremlin would have done better to have ordered its conscripts, and itself, to read War and Peace. On the eve of Borodino, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky says war is not chess; “success never depends . . . on position, on equipment, or even on numbers, and least of all on position”. “On what, then?” someone asks. “On the feeling that is in me and him . . . and in each soldier.” Leo Tolstoy, who had seen war close up, was right. Which is why, in the end, the Russian conquest of Ukraine will also be Putin’s abysmal defeat.
Putin’s plan is failing in ways he could not have imagined
The hardware of the Russian invasion may well be operational but the software of its narrative has seized up
The writer is an FT contributing editor
States are built with hardware, but nations run on software. Which is the more indispensable to the life or death of a nation state, we are, through Ukraine’s bloody ordeal, just discovering. The hardware of state power consists of armies, bureaucracies, security police, imposing buildings, abysmal prisons. National software is something less tangible but no less powerful: the obstinacy of allegiance under extreme stress; the kinship of calamity; the surge of patriotic emotion; the fortitude of families; the swell of civic pride even as neighbourhoods are besieged or destroyed; the inconvenient resistance of truth; and, not least, the transfiguring experience of creating, amid torment, an unforgettable national epic.
The 60km Russian convoy, stalled in the mud, hobbled by blown tyres, fuel and food shortages, is the ultimate embodiment of dumb hardware: a lumbering dinosaur, inexorably destructive, fire-breathing its oxygen-sucking terror, yet also brainlessly impotent, incapable, for all its death-dealing, of achieving any politically strategic end. Which is not to say, of course, that monstrous atrocities such as depriving cities such as Mariupol of the most basic human needs — water and sanitation — will not have been committed en route to the dead end of Putinite imperialism.
Countless small acts of defiance, a daily astonishment — doubtless to the Kremlin as to the rest of the admiring world — are all over the internet: villagers draped in Ukrainian flags, impeding tanks and armoured cars, leaving the soldiers who man them bewildered about what to do next with the crowd whose grateful acclaim they had been told to expect. Hatred rains down on their head rather than nosegays. Troops who have no difficulty firing missiles on faraway, unseen targets, pull up short before gunning down grandmothers and teenagers. Notwithstanding the grotesque disparity in military resources between the invaders and the invaded, there have been pitched battles where the ostensibly larger force has come off worse.
It doesn’t do, of course, to make light of the devastating firepower of the invaders, capable as it is of reducing Ukrainian cities to piles of smoking ash and rubble. The barbaric cruelty of those operations — expressly designed to terrorise a civilian population and becoming ever more monstrous as the Kremlin’s anticipated end game is frustrated — has already succeeded in producing a tidal wave of a million refugees flooding across the western borders, not to mention the desperate multitudes of the internally displaced. Yet this too will prove a pyrrhic victory, since the Ukrainian diaspora will instil the characterisation of the Putin regime as genocidal murderers. Generations will neither forgive nor forget.
The hardware of the Russian invasion may well be operational but the software of its narrative has seized up. Whatever power the Putinite autocracy might have over Russian reception of the “story”, evidence flooding the internet makes the targeting of civilians indelibly clear. And did no one in the Kremlin notice that characterising a people governed by a Jewish president as Nazis might beggar belief? And how exactly was this campaign of “denazification” furthered by a missile strike hitting the Babyn Yar holocaust memorial? Against those blunders, President Volodymyr Zelensky uncorked the lethal one-liner. Informed of the attack, his instant response was “That is Russia. Congratulations.”
It has been calculated that each day of the invasion is costing Russia more than $20bn. The campaign may, in the end, expire from the haemorrhage of cash. But equally, if not more damaging to its prospects, may be the disenchantment of Putin’s conscripts. The more these troops are exposed to the raking fire and hostility of the Ukrainians, the more confused they will become. Napoleon is said to have estimated that the success of any campaign was one-quarter attributable to numbers and material and three-quarters to morale. If that holds good in Ukraine, the troubles facing Putin are just beginning. The long-term occupation, which is the only possible alternative to the failed blitzkrieg, will add to the numbers of young men returning to Russia hideously wounded or in body bags, as an intractable insurgency takes hold.
Recommended
In an essay of 2021, Putin let it be known that he didn’t think Ukraine was actually a country at all. But the war has imprinted on Ukraine its epic identity in flesh, blood and tears in ways he could not have imagined. Not only will he fail but the failure will eat away at his domestic omnipotence. Disillusioned troops returning from the eastern front in the first world war had a crucial part to play in the revolutions of 1917. And no less astonishing and courageous than the resistance in Ukraine, has been the eruption of protest in St Petersburg and Moscow. When your credibility demands the arrest of the 77-year-old Yelena Osipova, you know you’re in trouble. It is a truism that the majority of Russians who get their news from state television will never be swayed by crowds of the young in the big cities. But as the numbers of widowed and orphaned inexorably mount, hostility to those responsible for their bereavement will morph a student revolt into popular fury.
Instead of serving up a pack of lies, the Kremlin would have done better to have ordered its conscripts, and itself, to read War and Peace. On the eve of Borodino, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky says war is not chess; “success never depends . . . on position, on equipment, or even on numbers, and least of all on position”. “On what, then?” someone asks. “On the feeling that is in me and him . . . and in each soldier.” Leo Tolstoy, who had seen war close up, was right. Which is why, in the end, the Russian conquest of Ukraine will also be Putin’s abysmal defeat.
8. Why the War in Ukraine Seems Destined to Get Far Worse
I fear the only way the war in Ukraine ends is with Putin's downfall.
Conclusion:
Putin has strong incentives to prosecute the war, even as Ukraine evolves into a major, unanticipated proxy war with the West. Putin’s rule at home and reputation abroad rests on his image of toughness and iciness. He needs to reverse last week’s humiliation. He also needs the Chinese to know they have backed a winner. On the Ukrainian side, there is growing confidence that they might fight the war to a stalemate, and therefore need not accede to Putin’s demands. Both sides are looking for a battlefield decision now.
Why the War in Ukraine Seems Destined to Get Far Worse
There has been a flurry of effort to contain the level of violence in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine have met in Belorussia to discuss terms. Russia and Ukraine also agreed to humanitarian corridors through which civilians in Ukrainian cities could flee (although these appear to be breaking down). Russian President Vladimir Putin has also spoken with other leaders, including France and Israel, would-be mediators of the war.
Ideally, these efforts would bring about some kind of cease-fire or pause. Even Putin – judging by the light force he originally sent in to take the country – can see the advantages of avoiding the destruction of Ukraine. Devasting the country in order to win means there is little to win, and it drives up the cost of the war. And mass civilian casualties will likely ignite an insurgency, making Russia’s hard-fought victory tenuous. Putin can see the threat of a replay of the Afghan insurgency against the Red Army in the 1980s just as well as we can.
Putin’s Demands are Unacceptable to Ukraine
Putin was badly embarrassed in the first week of the war. The whole world has watched as a supposed military superpower was fought to a standstill by a middle power led by a former comedian. We have seen pictures of abandoned or destroyed vehicles. We have heard the stories about Russian units running out of food, fuel, and ammunition, or conscripts not even realizing they were in a war and surrendering. Putin almost certainly wishes he could get out of this mess before it becomes worse.
But Putin is a leader rather obsessed with traditional metrics of power. He has long been prone to tough-guy posturing; his shirtless photo-ops are notorious. He relentlessly insists that Russia is a great power on par with the United States; he has refused to admit Russia’s reduced ability to pursue capacious goals such as his pre-Ukraine War demand that NATO returns to its 1997 borders. He suffers from an acute imperial hang-over or nostalgia, not only for lost Soviet power but even the old Russian empire which he has bandied about in his speeches justifying the Ukraine incursion.
His answer to last week’s confusion will almost certainly be escalation – artillery shelling of cities and vague nuclear threats at the West. And his conditions for a ceasefire will be non-starters with the Ukrainian government: the deposition of Volodymyr Zelensky as president, and his replacement by a pro-Russian quisling like Victor Yanukovich; recognition by Ukraine of Crimea’s loss to Russia in 2014; acceptance of the independence of the Lugansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (declared in late February); a massive reduction in the size of the Ukrainian military; and iron-clad guarantee that Ukraine will never join NATO or the EU.
These demands are enormous. The Ukrainians would likely reject even one of them; as a package, they will never accept them. The parties are so far apart politically that there is no ‘off-ramp.’ Both are looking for a military decision at the moment.
The Chinese are Watching
Russia is the junior partner in that relationship. Its economy is much smaller and even more corrupt. Russia is highly dependent on natural resource exports and technology imports, which makes it very susceptible to sanctions. China can stand more on its own, and in less than a decade, its aggregate GDP will exceed America’s. A sanctioned, isolated, postwar Russia will be hugely dependent on China financially and economically.
To keep some balance to the relationship, Putin needs to show he is a winner, that he can tangle with the West and hold his own. Russian belligerence in Europe creates political space for China’s own projects in East Asia. But now Putin cannot reduce a smaller number of people with a weaker military. His vaunted military is stuck in the mud. China will be tarred with the consequence of supporting Putin, much as the world hangs North Korea around its neck. But those costs are worth it if Moscow and Pyongyang prove their worth as troublemakers. In short, Putin needs to win to justify Chinese sponsorship.
Putin has strong incentives to prosecute the war, even as Ukraine evolves into a major, unanticipated proxy war with the West. Putin’s rule at home and reputation abroad rests on his image of toughness and iciness. He needs to reverse last week’s humiliation. He also needs the Chinese to know they have backed a winner. On the Ukrainian side, there is growing confidence that they might fight the war to a stalemate, and therefore need not accede to Putin’s demands. Both sides are looking for a battlefield decision now.
Dr. Robert Kelly is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University in South Korea and a 1945 Contributing Editor. Follow his work on his website or at Twitter.
9. Making the Most of Foreign Volunteers in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Much like the character of this war, the future of the International Legion remains unclear. It will depend on Ukraine’s leaders and their ability to develop the administrative capacity to quickly process, equip, and transport foreign recruits. The Ukrainian government should work to ensure they join and fight in regular combat units. Foreign volunteers should not be permitted to form or join independent pro-government militias. Ukraine should follow through on its stated intention to formalize the enlistment process as this may help to mitigate some of the downrange risks discussed here. While not a panacea, this can facilitate positive socialization, monitoring, and accountability for recruits with less discipline or nefarious motives.
Ukraine has flung its military open wide to foreigners. As they pour in, the host may find many of their new guests to be capable and committed advocates of their cause. Foreign volunteers stand to offer a much-needed, immediate boost in manpower. But as more arrive and stay for longer, new vulnerabilities and points of friction may emerge.
Making the Most of Foreign Volunteers in Ukraine - War on the Rocks
Foreign volunteers are hardly new to war — or to Ukraine. While scholars have begun to study foreigners who join another government’s military, calling them “legionnaires” or “noncitizen soldiers,” this literature is still emerging. Therefore, while the persons traveling to Ukraine may not fit traditional notions of “the foreign fighter” — i.e., foreigners who travel to join insurgencies and terrorist groups — the wealth of studies on these conflict actors points to a number of possible short- and long-term implications.
To be sure, foreigners offer Ukrainian forces an immediate boost in manpower and may help stave off military defeat. However, the incoming stream of volunteers also poses a set of risks to the local population and to the volunteers’ countries of origin. The immediacy and severity of the Russian threat means that Ukraine will likely overlook any downrange risks in favor of having more friendly boots on the ground as soon as possible. To mitigate these risks, however, the Ukrainian government should ensure foreign volunteers enlist in regular combat units rather than semi-independent militias.
How Foreign Volunteers Could Help Ukraine
In eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists and government-aligned forces have been at war since 2014. Foreigners have played a significant role in these hostilities. Sources estimate that more than 17,000 foreigners from 50 countries have participated in the conflict since its onset. Of those, roughly 13,000 have joined the constellation of militant groups that make up the pro-Russian separatist forces. The remaining 4,000 foreign fighters have served on behalf of the Ukrainian government, whether in paramilitary militias or in the regular armed forces. Most are Russian, but not all. BuzzFeed recently reported that hundreds have come from the European Union, at least 40 have arrived from the United States, and at least 12 from the United Kingdom.
Ukraine’s approach to foreign volunteers has, until now, been more passive than active. That is, while the country has allowed foreigners to enlist since 2016, it has done little to further motivate their travel. Zelensky’s recent overt recruitment pitch and formal establishment of the International Legion signals, among other things, the severity of the crisis and an urgent desire to compensate for Ukraine’s poor matchup with Russia’s conventional capabilities.
This week marks a new phase in the war. On the heels of an invasion campaign frustrated by logistical challenges, a robust defense of key positions, and a unified international response, a 40-mile convoy of Russian tanks is approaching the capitol of Kyiv and preparing for a reinvigorated assault. Russian forces have relentlessly shelled Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv. In the immediate term, using the influx of foreign volunteers to support the defense of key urban areas may prove especially efficient. John Spencer, an expert in urban warfare, recently estimated that it usually takes five attackers to one defender to successfully execute an urban assault. Therefore, while it remains to be seen how many individuals will cross the border to fight against the Russian invasion force, the foreign recruits already on site carry the potential to produce an outsized tactical effect in defending Kyiv and other major cities. This would not be the first time that foreign combatants were used to increase chance of mission success in an urban campaign. For example, foreign fighters improved the lethality of al-Shabaab’s tactics during the 2010 Ramadan offensive in the Battle of Mogadishu. Similarly, foreign fighters played a key role in exploiting Russian vulnerabilities during the First Battle of Grozny.
In the intermediate term, as the war wages on and more foreigners arrive, these volunteers may affect the war’s trajectory in a number of ways. Studies of foreign fighters and foreign legionnaires alike suggest their potential impact on Ukraine’s resistance is mixed. It is conditional on a number of factors, including recruits’ degree of military experience, levels of discipline, and the command structure of the host force. In general, when foreigners join insurgencies, they help reduce the likelihood of military defeat. Relatedly, foreign recruits may introduce new skills and tactics, building on current modes of warfighting. While many travelers report no prior military experience, this war is attracting notable attention from veteran communities across the world. A team of American and British special-forces veterans are reportedly in Poland, for example, preparing to cross the border to bolster Ukrainian defenses. The arrival of experienced, high-quality recruits stands to improve Ukraine’s urban-warfare tactics and their proficiency in executing complex operations.
Managing Potential Risks
Of course, the arrival of foreign combatants is not without risk, including to the volunteers themselves. Foreigners who join insurgent or terrorist groups, for example, tend to have an especially high mortality rate. But outside recruits also raise potential risks to the local population and, upon return, to their home countries. A number of experts have already expressed concern that travelers risk exposure to violent extremist ideology. This concern is warranted; the conflict in Donbass has been marked by significant levels of neo-Nazi and white-supremacist engagement on both sides. Relatedly, there is a non-negligible risk that foreign travelers who are already radicalized will continue to attempt to travel to Ukraine for the direct purpose of receiving training and combat experience, which would make them more significant threats to their home countries.
In addition, the arrival of foreign fighters tends to correspond with higher levels of civilian victimization, including wartime sexual violence. A 2010 review of interview reports from over 2,000 foreign fighters, for example, found that those motivated by revenge and thrill-seeking were more likely to commit atrocities against civilians who they came across while serving in a foreign conflict zone. While it remains to be seen whether foreign volunteers for Ukraine’s military are similarly motivated, the consequences could be significant. Not only would these abhorrent practices exploit an already vulnerable population, they would provide Russia with new propaganda to use towards putting a moralizing veneer on their aggressive invasion. Local and international community should invest in programs to monitor for possible wartime atrocities.
Much like the character of this war, the future of the International Legion remains unclear. It will depend on Ukraine’s leaders and their ability to develop the administrative capacity to quickly process, equip, and transport foreign recruits. The Ukrainian government should work to ensure they join and fight in regular combat units. Foreign volunteers should not be permitted to form or join independent pro-government militias. Ukraine should follow through on its stated intention to formalize the enlistment process as this may help to mitigate some of the downrange risks discussed here. While not a panacea, this can facilitate positive socialization, monitoring, and accountability for recruits with less discipline or nefarious motives.
Ukraine has flung its military open wide to foreigners. As they pour in, the host may find many of their new guests to be capable and committed advocates of their cause. Foreign volunteers stand to offer a much-needed, immediate boost in manpower. But as more arrive and stay for longer, new vulnerabilities and points of friction may emerge.
10. 20,000 foreigners volunteer to fight for Ukraine, foreign minister Kuleba says
20,000 foreigners volunteer to fight for Ukraine, foreign minister Kuleba says
LVIV, Ukraine — Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said more than 20,000 people from 52 countries have already volunteered to fight in Ukraine, where they will serve in a newly created international legion.
He did not say how many of the foreign volunteers have arrived in Ukraine.
“The whole world today is on Ukraine’s side not only in words but in deeds,” Kuleba said on Ukrainian television Sunday night.
He did not name the home countries of the volunteers, saying that some of them forbid their citizens from fighting for other countries.
Kuleba also urged Ukrainians living in other countries to begin a campaign to push for Ukraine’s membership in the European Union.
NEW YORK – Two of the so-called Big Four accounting firms are pulling out of Russia over its war in Ukraine.
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers both said Sunday they would end their relationships with their Russia-based member firms. KPMG said it was also pulling out of Belarus.
KPMG International said in a statement it would be “incredibly difficult” to have its Russia and Belarus firms leave the network. KPMG has more than 4,500 employees in the two countries.
PricewaterhouseCoopers said it has 3,700 employees at its PwC Russia firm and is working on an “orderly transition” for the business.
The two other Big Four companies - Deloitte and Ernst & Young - didn’t immediately return requests for comment Sunday.
Copyright © 2022 The Washington Times, LLC.
Click to Read More and View Comments
Click to Hide
11. If Russia Hacks a US Satellite, Is It an Act of War?
Excerpts:
Whether America views satellite hacking or attacking as basis for a war declaration, though, isn’t so cut and dry.
“The United States has an abiding interest in a secure, safe, sustainable and accessible space domain for the benefit of all humanity,” a State Department spokesperson told Nextgov on Thursday. “We urge all space actors to abide by their international obligations.”
...
He noted that now, there’s an “incredible wealth of information” flowing in from civilian and government satellites—and when combined with cell phone footage and social media, it has “created a conflict that feels like it's observed to a level that we haven't seen before.” It’s all part of a larger trend that first surfaced in conflicts in Syria and Iraq, but the scale of the current conflict “is pretty overwhelming, at times,” Singer said.
In some ways, space is already playing a crucial role in this modern conflict.
“But there are other elements where it hasn't played a role—for good reason. That doesn't mean that if there was, for example, a war between the U.S. and Russia, we would not see massive space elements of it,” Singer added. “[But] I'd be wary of drawing conclusions about the entire future of space warfare out of a couple of days of the Russian-Ukraine conflict.”
If Russia Hacks a US Satellite, Is It an Act of War?
After a Russian official issued dire warnings against tampering with satellites, U.S. officials declined to follow suit.
Russia’s senior space official recently warned that any tampering with the nation’s satellites is grounds for war, underscoring how reliant modern communications and military operations are on the orbiting tools.
Whether America views satellite hacking or attacking as basis for a war declaration, though, isn’t so cut and dry.
“The United States has an abiding interest in a secure, safe, sustainable and accessible space domain for the benefit of all humanity,” a State Department spokesperson told Nextgov on Thursday. “We urge all space actors to abide by their international obligations.”
That response came after inquiries to multiple federal entities, including the Space Force, Defense Department and other federal components regarding whether it would be considered an act of war if U.S. satellites were targeted.
“Again, I'm not going to be able to comment. The only thing I really can say in response to that, I think, is that anyone who attacks a U.S. asset has to be very concerned about the consequences of that act,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said on Thursday. “You're talking about something that's fairly unprecedented, quite frankly.”
He was responding to a question regarding whether America considers such actions worthy of a war declaration, during the Air Force Association’s Warfare Symposium. Kendall’s remarks came one day after Roscosmos Director-General Dmitry Rogozin said on Rossiya 24 television that hacking a Russian satellite would be an act of war.
“I want to warn everyone who tries to do it that it is essentially a crime, which should be toughly punished,” Rogozin said, which Interfax and Reuters first reported. “Because disabling the satellite group of any country is generally a casus belli, that is, a reason to go to war. And we will be looking for those who organized it."
Those comments followed previous threats Rogozin made about potentially crashing the International Space Station—which Russia partners with the U.S. and other nations to maintain—into Earth, in response to sanctions set to impose costs for Russia’s large-scale, ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The claims also came after a group of hackers said it hit Russia’s civilian space agency-run satellites, but Rogozin dismissed that in his statement.
Reflecting on their initial reactions to Rogozin’s comments, two national security experts expressed hesitancy believing any statements from Russian leadership.
“My first thought was that either they have been hacked or they are preparing a misinformation campaign to justify further aggression in space,” Todd Harrison, a senior fellow in the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ International Security Program told Nextgov this week. “Russia could claim a cyberattack against their space systems and use that as a pretext for attacking other space systems.”
New America Strategist and Senior Fellow Peter Singer noted his first response was, “‘I hope [Rogozin] remembers this the next time Russia tries it.’”
“Second,” he added during a separate conversation with Nextgov, “it fits within a larger pattern of bluster that [Rogozin] and the Russian government have thrown out towards the West in the midst of their invasion of Ukraine.”
Both officials pointed out that documented instances of cyberattacks against space systems during peacetime already exist. Harrison, who also serves as director of CSIS’ Defense Budget Analysis and Aerospace Security Project, noted that Russia possesses a full suite of counter-space capabilities—like jammers that can disrupt signals going to and from satellites, lasers that can blind satellites and missiles that can shoot down satellites.
There are a variety of ways the ongoing crisis might play out at this point, but it’s unfolding in a technology-driven era.
“I think what is different in this conflict is that commercial space remote sensing is playing a more important role than ever before, and it is possible that this could be the first conflict in which counterspace weapons play a major role—depending on what Russia chooses to do,” Harrison said. He further added that “the partnership with Russia on the ISS may also be a casualty of this conflict, but that depends in large part on how Russia chooses to respond and whether it tries to use the ISS as leverage to get relief from sanctions.”
In 2021, the White House published its Space Priorities Framework. The Space Force also released a high-level doctrine in 2020, but like the later document, it’s not comprehensive on America’s space policies.
“It doesn’t provide a lot of specificity, so it's not particularly helpful for a conflict like this,” Harrison said. “And a further complication is, what if there is a cyberattack against a commercial space system? So Russia is, you know, saying that there was a cyberattack against them, in which case, what they're actually saying, what's out there in public, is that it was an attempted cyber attack on a non-state actor against Russia. What if Russia uses retaliatory attack also against a non-state actor in the form of a U.S. commercial space company? How would the U.S. government respond to that? And that's where I don't think we have a lot of experience, and it's not clear that the government has actually formulated policy and courses of action for that outcome.”
Certain elements playing out now will carry to future wars, in Singer’s view, but he also emphasized that it’s also one particular case at a particular stage of conflict.
He noted that now, there’s an “incredible wealth of information” flowing in from civilian and government satellites—and when combined with cell phone footage and social media, it has “created a conflict that feels like it's observed to a level that we haven't seen before.” It’s all part of a larger trend that first surfaced in conflicts in Syria and Iraq, but the scale of the current conflict “is pretty overwhelming, at times,” Singer said.
In some ways, space is already playing a crucial role in this modern conflict.
“But there are other elements where it hasn't played a role—for good reason. That doesn't mean that if there was, for example, a war between the U.S. and Russia, we would not see massive space elements of it,” Singer added. “[But] I'd be wary of drawing conclusions about the entire future of space warfare out of a couple of days of the Russian-Ukraine conflict.”
Defense One’s Tara Copp contributed to this article.
12. Truth Is the Best Way to Defeat Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine
This is why we need to bring to bear all our information capabilities and Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are on the front lines of this effort and need to be fully resourced and empowered.
In addition we need to execute a superior form of political warfare versus authoritarian regimes and influence operations are a key pillar of such warfare. While we say war is a continuation of politics by other means our adversaries/authoritarian regimes believe politics is war by other means.
Conclusion
How the free world pushes back against Russian disinformation, especially inside Russia, will have implications for other autocracies—including China, North Korea, and Iran. Today, China is propagating Russia’s lies about Ukraine to its own population. Getting the truth to the Russian people now could bring Putin’s dangerous reign to an end and have a deterring effect on other regimes’ future behaviors.
Truth Is the Best Way to Defeat Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine
The best way to defeat Putin’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine is to make sure the Russian people know what is happening and focus public opinion on Putin himself.
By Rear Admiral Ben Wachendorf, U.S. Navy (Retired)
March 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/3/1,429
It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia cannot win a strategic victory in Ukraine. Its much larger military force may achieve tactical defeat of individual Ukrainian military units and temporarily overtake cities, but Russia does not have the ability to secure the vast expanse of Ukraine—about the size of Texas—for an extended period against the Ukrainian people and their military units who are exhibiting incredible bravery in defense of their homeland.
The best and fastest way to bring an end to the Russian invasion is to do everything possible to inform the Russian population about the truth of what Putin has said, done, and is trying to do. This is not an easy task. Russia’s state-controlled media, government crackdowns on dissent (including imprisonment and assassination of reporters), and widespread intimidation by Russian security forces of any element of society that opposes the government are designed to keep Putin in power. But it can be done. When the Russian people see what the rest of the world has already seen, they will fight to bring this war to an end.
It is important to understand that the Russian people are very proud and patriotic. Some years ago, Senator John McCain said, “Look, Russia is a gas station masquerading as a country.” We should not forget that, in addition to generations of world-class performance in the fields of music, art, dance, and literature, a Russian scientist, Dmitry Mendeleyev, was the father of modern chemistry. Russia beat the United States to space in the 1950’s. For a period of several years after the retirement of NASA’s Space Shuttle fleet, Russian heavy lift rockets were the only way to get U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station.
We also should remember that the Russian people demonstrated extraordinary heroism and patriotism in defense of their country during World War II. The 900-day siege of Leningrad is just one of many examples of tremendous courage and persistence by Russians under horrific conditions. The Soviet Union lost approximately 28 million people in World War II. Sadly, about 8 million of those were killed by their own government acting under orders from Josef Stalin (a leader Vladimir Putin reveres).
In the Cold War, Russians generally looked down on their allies in the Warsaw Pact. Lately, however, they can see that their quality of life (as measured by life expectancy, access to health care, and standard of living) is inferior to that in former Warsaw Pact nations including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, not to mention the former Soviet Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Most Russians have no desire to return to Communism and will reject their totalitarian government if given an opportunity to see that they have the power to change it.
The best way to do this is massive, consistent, repeated reporting by multiple sources about the true situation in Ukraine and the nearly world-wide condemnation of Putin’s actions. Economic sanctions are important because their impact will be felt by Russian elites and ordinary citizens. Military assistance to Ukraine is important because it will allow heroic Ukrainians to continue defending their nation and increase Russian losses. The Russian government is trying to hide its casualty numbers, but they will become increasingly apparent to the Russian public over time—just as they did during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. International seizures of Russian oligarchs’ property, including large yachts and expensive real estate, should be widely publicized. Denial of air space to Russian aircraft is another way to demonstrate that the international community is united in opposition to the invasion. Russian military strikes on civilian targets, including schools, apartment buildings, and hospitals, need to be widely reported to repudiate Putin’s aggression. International relief efforts and humanitarian aid must also be reported widely in Russia.
Russia has never had a free and fair election. Since the overthrow of the Romanov tsars, Soviet and Russian leaders have gained power largely through non-democratic means. Throughout the past hundred years of Russian and Soviet history, leaders from Lenin to Stalin to Putin have sought to control the media and spin the information available to the Russian people. Moscow’s control of the media and internet have increased under Putin’s reign, culminating this week with a massive media crackdown.
Russia has blocked access to western social media sites in an effort to dominate the narrative about the war in Ukraine.
In the face of this information embargo, getting the truth in the hands of ordinary Russians will not be easy, but it must be a priority for every nation that values the rule of law. Social media and internet service providers must do everything they can to maintain their reach into Russia. The U.S. government should reemphasize the Voice of America Russian service—a powerful tool during the Cold War. Every mass media tool available must communicate the undeniable truth about what the Russian military is doing in Ukraine, 24 hours a day, and tell the story with voices, pictures, and video to overcome the information control of a corrupt totalitarian regime.
How the free world pushes back against Russian disinformation, especially inside Russia, will have implications for other autocracies—including China, North Korea, and Iran. Today, China is propagating Russia’s lies about Ukraine to its own population. Getting the truth to the Russian people now could bring Putin’s dangerous reign to an end and have a deterring effect on other regimes’ future behaviors.
13. Options to Mitigate Cognitive Threats
The only domain that encompasses "all domains" in multi-domain warfare is the cognitive domain. We should be investing most heavily in this (e.g. Clausewitz' coup d'oeil - education and experience to develop the skills to cut through the fog and friction of war, exercising the best judgement despite lack of sufficient information to make the right decision at the right time).
Options to Mitigate Cognitive Threats
John Chiment is a strategic threat intelligence analyst and has supported efforts across the Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the LinQuest Corporation, any of LinQuest’s subsidiaries or parents, or the U.S. Government. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Cognitive attacks target the defender’s ability to accurately perceive the battlespace and react appropriately. If successful, these attacks may permit an attacker to defeat better equipped or positioned defenders. Defenders who deploy defenses poorly matched against the incoming threat – either due to mischaracterizing that threat or by rushing to respond – likely will suffer greater losses. Mitigation strategies for cognitive attacks all carry risks.
Date Originally Written: January 31, 2022.
Date Originally Published: March 7, 2022.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is an American threat intelligence analyst with time in uniform, as a U.S. government civilian, and as a DoD contractor.
Background: Effectively countering an attack requires the defender to detect its existence, recognize the danger posed, decide on a course of action, and implement that action before the attack completes its engagement. An attacker can improve the odds of a successful strike by increasing the difficulty in each of these steps (via stealth, speed, deception, saturation, etc.) while defenders can improve their chances through preparation, awareness, and technical capabilities. Correct detection and characterization of a threat enables decision-makers to decide which available defense is the most appropriate.
Significance: A defender deploying a suboptimal or otherwise inappropriate defense benefits the attacker. Attackers who target the defender’s understanding of the incoming attack and their decision-making process may prompt defenders to select inappropriate defenses. Technological superiority – long a goal of western militaries – may be insufficient against such cognitive manipulations that target human decision-making processes rather than the capabilities the defender controls.
Option #1: Defenders increase their number of assets collecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data in order to more rapidly detect threats.
Risk: Increasing ISR data collection consumes industrial and financial resources and may worsen relationships with other powers and the general public. Increasing collection may also overwhelm analytic capabilities by providing too much data [1].
Gain: Event detection begins the defender’s process and earlier detection permits the defender to develop more options in subsequent stages. By increasing the number of ISR assets that can begin the defender’s decision-making process, the defender increases their opportunities to select an appropriate defense.
Option #2: The defender increases the number of assets capable of analyzing information in order to more rapidly identify the threat.
Risk: Increasing the number of assets capable of accurately processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) information consumes intellectual and financial resources. Threat characterization decisions can also be targeted in the same ways as defense deployment decisions [2].
Gain: A larger network of available PED analysts may better address localized spikes in attacks, more evenly distribute stress among analysts and analytic networks within supporting agencies, and lower the risk of mischaracterizing threats, likely improving decision-maker’s chances of selecting an appropriate defense.
Option #3: The defender automates defense deployment decisions in order to rapidly respond with a defense.
Risk: Automated systems may possess exploitable logical flaws that can be targeted in much the same way as defender’s existing decision-making process. Automated systems operate at greater speeds, limiting opportunities for the defender to detect and correct inappropriate decisions [3].
Gain: Automated systems operate at high speed and may mitigate time lost to late detection or initial mischaracterization of threats. Automating decisions also reduces the immediate cognitive load on the defender by permitting defensive software designers to explore and plan for complex potentials without the stress of an incoming attack.
Option #4: The defender increases the number of assets authorized to make defense deployment decisions in order to more likely select an appropriate defense.
Risk: Increasing the available pool of authorized decision-makers consumes communication bandwidth and financial resources. Larger communication networks have larger attack surfaces and increase the risk of both data leaks and attackers maliciously influencing decisions into far-off engagements. Attacking the network segment may produce delays resulting in defenders not deploying appropriate defenses in time [4].
Gain: A larger network of authorized decision-makers may better address localized spikes in attacks, more evenly distribute stress among decision-making personnel, and lower the risk of rushed judgements that may prompt inappropriate defense deployments.
Option #5: The defender trains authorized decision-makers to operate at higher cognitive loads in order to more likely select an appropriate defense.
Risk: Attackers likely can increase attacks and overwhelm even extremely well-trained decision-makers. As such, this option is a short-term solution. Increasing the cognitive load on an already limited resource pool likely will increase burnout rates, lowering the overall supply of experienced decision-makers [5].
Gain: Improving decision-maker training can likely be achieved with minimal new investments as it focusses on better utilization of existing resources.
Option #6: The defender prepositions improved defenses and defense response options in order to better endure attacks regardless of decision-making timelines.
Risk: Prepositioned defenses and response options consume logistical and financial resources. Actions made prior to conflict risk being detected and planned for by adversaries, reducing their potential value. Rarely used defenses have maintenance costs that can be difficult to justify [6].
Gain: Prepositioned defenses may mitigate attacks not detected before impact by improving the targeted asset’s overall endurance, and attackers knowledgeable of the defender’s defensive capabilities and response options may be deterred or slowed when pursuing goals that will now have to contend with the defender’s assets.
Other Comments: Risks to the decision-making processes cannot be fully avoided. Options #3 and #6 attempt to make decisions before any cognitive attacks target decision-makers while Options #2 and #4 attempt to mitigate cognitive attack impact by spreading the load across a larger pool of assets. Options #1 and #2 may permit decision-makers to make better decisions earlier in an active attack while Option #5 attempts to improve the decision-making abilities of existing decision-makers.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[2] Corona, I., Giancinto, G., & Roli, F. (2013, 1 August). Adversarial attacks against intrusion detection systems: Taxonomy, solutions and open issues. Information Sciences, 239, 201-225. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2013.03.022
[3] Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A. Xiao, C., Prakash, A., Kohno, T., & Song, D. (2018). Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification [Paper Presentation]. Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945v5
14. Why Putin will regret launching this war (Interview with MG Mike Repass)
Excerpts:
Bergen: How much manpower would Putin need to control the territory?
Repass: Difficult to say.
The Russians must have enough people to coerce the 41 million people in Ukraine to cooperate with the Russian government. It took a large part of the German Army's Eastern Front to subdue the Ukrainians so they could pursue the campaign into southern Russia during World War II.
So, I don't see how Putin's going to be able to pull that off.
I think the Western liberal democracies have both a moral obligation and a political imperative to support a nation fighting for its independence and the pursuit of a liberal political order in the Western tradition. If not here, where will we take a stand against autocratic and revisionist forces? What should Georgia and Azerbaijan conclude from our timidity in the face of evil? Surely Taiwan is next.
I believe Russia's assault on Ukraine is the leading edge of militarily strong states preying upon weaker ones. Few of us thought we would be here, but so it is. What are we going to do now?
History has been unkind to nations when they tolerate or appease such aggression. The concepts of territorial integrity and democracy cannot end at NATO's borders. Is the rest of the world to be left to the wolves while there is but one island of security? Russia's attack on Ukraine cannot succeed if we hope to build and sustain the benefits of democracy beyond NATO's borders.
Why Putin will regret launching this war
CNN · by Opinion by Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst
Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at New America and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion on CNN.
(CNN)Has Vladimir Putin's assault on Ukraine outrun the resources he's committed to it? That's the view of retired US Army Major General Mike Repass, who has an informed vantage point on the conflict, having worked in the Ukrainian security sector since 2016. The former commander of the US Special Operations Command in Europe, Repass provides education and advisory support to the Ukrainian military on a US government contract.
In discussions Thursday and Friday, I spoke to Repass about why new leadership and the improved training of the Ukrainian military has markedly improved its performance in recent years, the kind of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons the Ukrainians hope that the US and its NATO allies will supply them with and what he sees happening next as the war in Ukraine grinds on. He predicts a campaign by the Russians that could turn the cities of Ukraine into rubble, creating a refugee crisis that overwhelms bordering nations, and destabilizes Central and Eastern Europe.
Peter Bergen
But Repass believes that while the Russians may be able to overcome Ukraine's stiff defense, they will not be able to hold onto the country because Putin doesn't have sufficient forces in theater to occupy large swaths of Ukraine indefinitely. In short, Putin has bitten off more than he can chew.
Disclosure: Repass is on the advisory council of the Global Special Operations Foundation, where I am the chairman of the board. Our conversation was edited for clarity and length.
Repass: The bottom line is the Ukrainian military forces have acquitted themselves exceptionally well thus far in the war. Russia will have a very difficult time subduing them because they are willing to fight until it becomes seemingly "futile," or they no longer have the resources to do so.
Read More
The Ukrainians have been overmatched by Russian technology and outmanned and outgunned -- by Russian tanks, artillery, precision long range strike missiles, armored personnel carriers -- but the terrain favors the defenders, especially in the north and east of Ukraine, although less so in the south.
I think time and mass are on the Russian side, and they're going to be able to either create conditions for peace suitable to Putin's liking, or they will outright destroy the cities of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military with it, which to me still leaves a resistance scenario for the Ukrainians. So, there are multiple plausible futures.
Bergen: Why are the Ukrainians fighting better than many had expected?
Repass: I'm not surprised at how well the Ukraine army is fighting. I am surprised at the lethargy of the Russian assault; it seems to be slow and plodding up north. In the east, they're getting their butts handed to them. In the south, they seem to be making steady progress.
Putin expected the Ukrainians to capitulate like they did in 2014 when he took Crimea, but overall, NATO and the US have done a magnificent job in training the Ukrainian military and reforming it and building it into a viable national defense force since 2014. The difference between then and now is the leadership of Ukraine is set on unifying with the West, politically, militarily, and economically.
On the military side, President Zelensky had inherited an old cadre of guys that he has replaced. The military leadership he brought in last year are all younger general officers, and they served together in the Donbas region in combat against the Russians. The leadership he has on the military side is much more engaged and much more influential.
Zelensky also brought in a new minister of defense. The previous minister was not up to the task for several reasons, so he brought in Oleksiy Reznikov, and he's been outstanding.
So, the new leadership has really picked up the pace of reforms they were on. Given another year or two, those guys would have been in a different place altogether, looking much more like a NATO country's armed forces.
How does Russia's army compare with Ukraine's? 02:25
I've visited 100, 150, 200 tactical units in various places -- in Afghanistan and Iraq, where I served two combat tours -- and I know instantly when I walk into a tactical unit environment, what the dynamic is there. When I visited a Ukrainian Special Forces unit in September, I sensed that immediately these guys were well-trained; they looked like our guys. They had the same mannerisms. They had the same planning processes.
Bergen: I thought Putin's attack on Ukraine would be like the US military seizing Baghdad in 2003 and that the Russians would decapitate the Ukrainian regime quickly.
Repass: I think that's what the world expected. So, strategically, the NATO mindset was, "Hey, we're not going to get involved because by the time we commit to this thing, we get cranked up and get engaged, the damn thing is going to be over. So we're not going to risk the political capital with another nuclear power to do this." Yet now, we have another geostrategic reality in that the Ukrainian defense is pretty doggone viable. I think Ukrainians are in the vanguard of protecting the liberal democracies of Europe.
Bergen: For the Ukrainians, what weapons are needed now from NATO and the US? Or is it at the point where it's too late to get weapons in because of logistical issues?
Repass: No, it's not too late. Every Ukrainian tactical commander is asking for air defense and anti-tank weapons. They want air defense weaponry like Stingers or SA-7s, and they want anti-tank weapons. They know where the enemy is. They know how to get to him, but they don't have the means in the field.
There's congestion in the NATO weapons delivery pipeline because the spigot was only turned on days ago, and they haven't reached the Ukrainian tactical units yet.
I'm not speaking for NATO in any way, shape, or form when I say what I'm about to say, but one of the things is that they must have a common communication system. Right now, there are dissimilar and cumbersome communications between the Ukrainian commands and the nations that are providing support.
The second thing is because it isn't a NATO operation, NATO hasn't responded in a formalized way to stand up movement coordination centers and logistic control centers. So there's a lot of improvisation going on with the coalition of the willing and able, putting together the transportation networks and the logistics networks. There's a lot of work that can be done among and between the individual NATO member states to shore up efficiency and effectiveness and speed up the delivery of the lethal weaponry.
Bergen: Why is a 40-mile Russian convoy on the road trying to take Kyiv? It seems a strange approach.
Repass: Yes. Everybody is scratching their head about that. There are a couple things that I think feed into this. So, it's 40 miles long now, but the convoy started out in segments. And those segments were somewhere between 50 and a couple hundred vehicles at a time. The idea was for these segments to deploy, but then the congestion started happening due to combat fatalities and breakdowns.
Also, if the vehicles and tanks get off that road, then they're in a quagmire. There's mud in the region that persists for basically the springtime, running from now for another six weeks or so.
So, cross-country mobility is exceedingly inhibited in the northern part of the country. The southern part of the country, you don't have that problem. So you don't see these massive convoys down south. You only see it up north where getting off the road is a problem.
Bergen: Why was this so poorly planned, or was it just that it was likely to not go well because of the weather circumstances we're seeing?
Repass: We assume the Russians are capable of efficient planning, but they're also capable of bad planning. They haven't done this level of planning and execution in any of their training exercises. So, they're somewhat unfamiliar with the large maneuver and sustainment aspects of what they're attempting to do.
Bergen: What's next?
Repass: A Russian campaign to turn the cities into rubble, creating a refugee crisis, overwhelming the borders and the border nations, and destabilizing Central and Eastern Europe.
They're going to target government infrastructure and then means of command and control -- public communications, internet, radio towers, cell phone towers -- anything they can do to disrupt communications, so they separate the people from the government.
Video shows Russian military strike on TV tower near Kyiv 02:44
With this campaign, they want to create mass shock and panic in the society to create complex challenges for the government and degrade the will of the people. Already about a million refugees have crossed the borders out of a population of around 41 million. That's going to go up significantly. You're going to have several million people streaming to the west.
Belarus and Russia will likely declare martial law, and they'll be able to clamp down on all manner of public discourse, media, internet, and cut down any potential for resistance or coup attempts internal to their countries.
They likely will combine forces, move to seal off the western border of Ukraine, first, to create a greater humanitarian disaster in Ukraine; and second, to cut off any resupply coming in from the West.
I think at that point in time, the Ukraine military, will continue to fight primarily west of the Dnieper River. In other places, particularly in the Ukrainian urban centers, you're going to have an insurgency. A resistance will rise up either pre-planned or organically, and they will inflict pain and destruction on the Russians to the extent that they can.
This is where the term "indigestible" comes into play. The Russians may be able to consume Ukraine, but they cannot digest it. It will be too painful to hold onto it, and eventually they will have to spit it back out. In essence, the cost of occupation is too great compared to the returns.
The Russians may eventually control the urban areas, but there are vast areas between them -- 50 kilometers, 80 kilometers apart -- where there's nothing. There are many small villages and small towns that are not controlled by Russians.
The devastation is going to horrify Europe and North America. The non-intervention argument will eventually be overridden by the human suffering problem. And then, potentially a coalition of the willing might impose something along the lines of a no-fly zone or safe havens for refugees and citizens of the major metropolitan areas.
Repass: Yes, something like that, in western Ukraine.
Bergen: What is the minimum that Putin wants to achieve in Ukraine?
Repass: The one critical thing that Putin must have is control of the North Crimea Canal.
Bergen: Why is that?
Repass: Because when he invaded Crimea and Donbas in 2014, the Ukrainians shut off the North Crimea Canal source at the Dnieper River. So, it dried up, and they've been relying on groundwater in Crimea since, and then the groundwater has all dried up. So, Putin has had no fresh water in Crimea until now.
The Russians captured the North Crimea Canal and fresh water just showed up in Crimea in the last day or so. So that's the one thing he had to have.
What he also wanted to have is a land bridge from Donbas over to Crimea and to secure that land route and the North Crimea Canal source at the Dnieper River. He would essentially have control of all territory east of the Dnieper River, going up to Kyiv and then arcing north and eastward to Donbas. If Putin seizes enough land east of the Dnieper River, then he's willing to bargain everything else away.
But even with the geographic territory that I just described, Putin's circa 175,000 troops which are presently deployed in and around Ukraine are not enough to maintain control of that geography.
Bergen: How much manpower would Putin need to control the territory?
Repass: Difficult to say.
The Russians must have enough people to coerce the 41 million people in Ukraine to cooperate with the Russian government. It took a large part of the German Army's Eastern Front to subdue the Ukrainians so they could pursue the campaign into southern Russia during World War II.
So, I don't see how Putin's going to be able to pull that off.
I think the Western liberal democracies have both a moral obligation and a political imperative to support a nation fighting for its independence and the pursuit of a liberal political order in the Western tradition. If not here, where will we take a stand against autocratic and revisionist forces? What should Georgia and Azerbaijan conclude from our timidity in the face of evil? Surely Taiwan is next.
I believe Russia's assault on Ukraine is the leading edge of militarily strong states preying upon weaker ones. Few of us thought we would be here, but so it is. What are we going to do now?
History has been unkind to nations when they tolerate or appease such aggression. The concepts of territorial integrity and democracy cannot end at NATO's borders. Is the rest of the world to be left to the wolves while there is but one island of security? Russia's attack on Ukraine cannot succeed if we hope to build and sustain the benefits of democracy beyond NATO's borders.
CNN · by Opinion by Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst
15. Putin’s War Is Xi’s Worst Nightmare
Excerpts:
The big unknown is how Beijing will navigate this new and unfamiliar terrain. The simple answer is no one knows—not even the Chinese. It is not an exaggeration to claim the entire world has been upended over the last two weeks, and the battle for Ukraine remains far from finished. Nevertheless, it seems all but certain that China will not launch a war it might lose, let alone lose badly. Instead, Beijing will do what it does best: Double down on its long-term, incremental strategy of retaking Taiwan by “all means short of war.” Taiwan will likely face increasing cyberattacks and other forms of non-kinetic coercion aimed at demoralizing the population into eventual capitulation. China will also accelerate its campaign to delegitimize Taiwan on the international stage, denying Taipei recognition in various international fora and perhaps even whittling down the already small number of countries that officially recognize Taiwan.
That’s the bad news.
The good news is the Ukrainians have, in their own way, provided the United States as well as countries throughout Europe and the Pacific with a road map of sorts for how to bolster Taiwan’s resilience. That means hardening Taiwan’s cyberinfrastructure, devoting additional resources toward early detection and monitoring, and investing in training and specialized equipment designed to enable Taiwan’s civilian population to repel a Chinese military invasion. Indeed, such moves must occur in conjunction with Western efforts to augment Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. The trick will be to balance these self-reinforcing efforts while denying Beijing any legitimate rationale to launch an unprovoked attack—or at least one that would be broadly accepted by the international community.
All of that is easier said than done, of course. But so, too, was rallying the world to Ukraine’s defense.
Putin’s War Is Xi’s Worst Nightmare
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Beijing is watching closely. And it doesn’t like what it sees.
By Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a ceremony at Tsinghua University in Beijing on April 26, 2019. Kenzaburo Fukuhara - Pool/Getty Images
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s worst nightmare is playing out in Ukraine. Regardless of whether he possessed detailed or advance knowledge of Russia’s invasion plans, two things are almost certain: Xi expected Russia’s battle-hardened military to quickly rout the Ukrainians, and the international community’s response would be muted.
Neither came to pass.
Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s messy Ukrainian war has morphed into a case study on how not to conduct an invasion. Even worse, Putin’s many battlefield setbacks have likely neutralized any optimism Chinese military planners may have harbored about easily retaking Taiwan by force.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s worst nightmare is playing out in Ukraine. Regardless of whether he possessed detailed or advance knowledge of Russia’s invasion plans, two things are almost certain: Xi expected Russia’s battle-hardened military to quickly rout the Ukrainians, and the international community’s response would be muted.
Neither came to pass.
Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s messy Ukrainian war has morphed into a case study on how not to conduct an invasion. Even worse, Putin’s many battlefield setbacks have likely neutralized any optimism Chinese military planners may have harbored about easily retaking Taiwan by force.
The upshot is Putin’s unprovoked, all-out assault on Ukraine may have accomplished what until recently seemed all but impossible: derailing Beijing’s timetable to invade Taiwan.
Prior to Russia’s invasion, the likelihood of a near-term Chinese attack on Taiwan was already low. Although China has sought to close its military’s capability gaps with the United States, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still lacks the means and know-how needed to make good on Beijing’s reunification threats. Moreover, there remains scant evidence that China is actively considering plans to invade Taiwan. The reason: Xi is keen to maintain stability before this fall’s 20th Communist Party Congress, when he will assume a once-unthinkable third term as party secretary.
Certainly, China has stepped up its incursions in and around Taiwan’s airspace. Nevertheless, these provocations do not signal a near-term invasion. Rather, such operations are intended to stoke domestic nationalism and often correlate with important symbolic anniversaries. For example, the PLA dispatched a record of nearly 80 fighters and bombers into Taiwan’s airspace last October to mark China’s founding. Other incursions were clearly aimed at discouraging Taiwan from embracing policy positions abhorrent to Beijing. Last week, Chinese fighters entered Taiwan’s airspace just after Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen voiced her support for Ukraine and other Taiwanese politicians sought to draw an equivalence between Russia’s dispute with Ukraine and China’s with Taiwan.
Regardless, a military reunification with Taiwan will not happen overnight. Put differently, it will not be a strategic surprise, just as Russia’s invasion preparations were there for all to see. Weeks, if not months, will be required to position Chinese forces and various logistical elements at pre-identified staging areas along China’s coast. Those herculean efforts pale in comparison to the immense difficulty China’s military will face in safely transporting its forces to the limited number of suitable Taiwanese landing sites located more than 100 nautical miles away. Further complicating China’s planning is that its military has not experienced anything resembling combat in more than 40 years. That is the principal reason why China has sought Russia’s counsel as it devises workarounds to these and other challenges. Look no further than January’s trilateral naval exercises—dubbed 2022 Maritime Security Belt—during which China, Russia, and Iran sought to hone their anti-air and nighttime operational skills at sea.
What then must China’s military planners be thinking as they observe their Russian partners struggling to accomplish any of their stated objectives in Ukraine?
On a purely operational level, invading Ukraine should have been a walkover for Russia, at least from Beijing’s perspective. Russia enjoys close physical proximity to its victim, including the ability to easily insert ground forces via accessible land routes. Having previously annexed Crimea in 2014, Russia also maintains extensive knowledge about the theater of operations. In contrast to China, Russia’s military is also skilled in urban warfare. What’s more, Russia spent decades fostering deep economic and trade linkages with countries throughout Europe that might have neutered the Western response. As we all know, many European countries are more dependent than ever on Russian oil and gas. Some—such as Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, and Finland—rely on Russia for most if not all their energy needs. Putin’s hedging strategy was thus predicated on constraining Europe’s ability to retaliate against Russia should it harass or invade its neighbors.
Of greatest intrigue to China should be the willingness of everyday Ukrainians to risk their lives to defend their democracy as well as Kyiv’s ability to thoroughly control the information environment. Every hour, videos of Russian troops battling with Ukrainian resistance fighters are beamed into living rooms and editorial offices around the world. Having refused to leave the country, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with little more than a smartphone, has become a symbol of democratic defiance. Worse yet, hundreds of Russian soldiers have voluntarily laid down their arms, refusing to kill innocent civilians.
Could the same tactical challenges befall China’s inexperienced military during an invasion of Taiwan? The simple answer: Of course they could, which is why China is acutely monitoring the situation.
More broadly, Beijing could hardly have predicted the overwhelmingly unified international response to Russia’s incursion. Frankly, no one did. The severity of Western sanctions imposed on Moscow, including cutting off Russia’s central bank from the global financial system, is without precedent. Already, Western sanctions, along with new export controls, are wreaking havoc on the Russian economy—to the point that it may never fully recover. At the same time, Europe and the United States appear prepared to absorb the costs associated with such harsh measures, even at the expense of their own economic growth and extensive ties to Russia’s private sector.
China now finds itself defending Russia’s actions alongside a tiny number of failed states, including North Korea, Syria, and Belarus.
Russia’s ejection from the international order also extends to the United Nations, where China has worked extensively to build up its international brand and exert its influence. In a matter of days, U.N. diplomats have reduced Russia, a veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council, to near-pariah status. China now finds itself defending Russia’s actions alongside a tiny number of failed states, including North Korea, Syria, and Belarus. Leading that group of international misfits is a far cry from Xi’s goal of ushering in a “new era of international relations,” one in which Beijing and Moscow supplant the United States and European Union. Moreover, if China envisioned that its trade links with other countries would shield it from multilateral condemnation after a military strike on Taiwan, all available evidence suggests that Beijing needs to rethink those assumptions.
The big unknown is how Beijing will navigate this new and unfamiliar terrain. The simple answer is no one knows—not even the Chinese. It is not an exaggeration to claim the entire world has been upended over the last two weeks, and the battle for Ukraine remains far from finished. Nevertheless, it seems all but certain that China will not launch a war it might lose, let alone lose badly. Instead, Beijing will do what it does best: Double down on its long-term, incremental strategy of retaking Taiwan by “all means short of war.” Taiwan will likely face increasing cyberattacks and other forms of non-kinetic coercion aimed at demoralizing the population into eventual capitulation. China will also accelerate its campaign to delegitimize Taiwan on the international stage, denying Taipei recognition in various international fora and perhaps even whittling down the already small number of countries that officially recognize Taiwan.
That’s the bad news.
The good news is the Ukrainians have, in their own way, provided the United States as well as countries throughout Europe and the Pacific with a road map of sorts for how to bolster Taiwan’s resilience. That means hardening Taiwan’s cyberinfrastructure, devoting additional resources toward early detection and monitoring, and investing in training and specialized equipment designed to enable Taiwan’s civilian population to repel a Chinese military invasion. Indeed, such moves must occur in conjunction with Western efforts to augment Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. The trick will be to balance these self-reinforcing efforts while denying Beijing any legitimate rationale to launch an unprovoked attack—or at least one that would be broadly accepted by the international community.
All of that is easier said than done, of course. But so, too, was rallying the world to Ukraine’s defense.
Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat. Twitter: @CraigMSingleton
16. FDD | Biden’s Coming Iran Deal Will Be Even Worse than Obama’s
Excerpts:
Steps will also be needed to deny Russia the benefits of the deal. Sanctions targeting Russian economic, nuclear, and military relations with Iran should be reinstated or strengthened. The same might be considered for China, which has announced a 25-year economic-cooperation program with Tehran.
Finally, the question of military deterrence will take center stage. The coming deal makes it more likely that the United States or Israel will soon have to choose between military action or a nuclear-armed Iran. Congress should consider what tools Israel may need to defend itself in the wake of a strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Unfortunately, a chaotic and dangerous world is about to get a bit more chaotic and dangerous. At least until Congress or a new administration can change course.
FDD | Biden’s Coming Iran Deal Will Be Even Worse than Obama’s
What the U.S. is agreeing to in Vienna is a shorter and weaker agreement that provides even more sanctions relief in exchange for fewer restrictions.
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · March 4, 2022
President Joe Biden vowed this week to isolate Russia, yet his negotiators stayed at the table with their Russian counterparts in Vienna, putting the finishing touches on an Iran nuclear deal 2.0 that will benefit Russia and Iran and endanger the U.S. and its allies.
The new agreement is even worse than the 2015 deal made by the Obama administration. Biden’s version would lift U.S. terrorism sanctions on Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, and leave Tehran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure intact without first demanding a full accounting of Iran’s secret nuclear work.
Under the deal, Iran would get access to more than $100 billion, which it could spend on terrorism, missiles, and the pursuit of regional hegemony. Enforcement remains weak or non-existent, so there is no barrier to Iran’s crossing the nuclear threshold at a time of its choosing. Terrorism sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil Company, and a host of other banks and companies will be suspended without any evidence that these institutions are no longer engaged in financing terrorism.
The State Department may even rescind the terrorist designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps despite its continuing sponsorship of terrorism and history of targeting Americans — a slap in the face to nearly 1,200 Gold Star family members who recently pled with the White House not to release any funds to Iran until the regime first paid $60 billion in judgments owed to American victims of Iran-sponsored terrorism.
But wait, there’s more: America may trust Russia to maintain custody of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile with a promise to return the stockpile to Iran if the U.S. ever reimposes sanctions. The full contents of the near-final agreement remain unknown, so it is not clear whether Biden will lift U.S. sanctions prohibiting Moscow from transferring conventional arms and missiles to Iran — part of an executive order issued by former president Donald Trump.
How did we get here? At the end of 2020, Iran was down to just $4 billion in accessible foreign-exchange reserves thanks to the historic success of the Trump administration’s maximum-pressure campaign. The regime was reeling from the loss of its terror mastermind, Qasem Soleimani, and its nuclear-weapons architect, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Iran wasn’t enriching uranium to higher levels — not 20 percent, let alone 60 percent — nor had it curtailed U.N. inspectors’ access to key facilities. Meanwhile, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency was on course to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty over Tehran’s refusal to cooperate with an ongoing probe into concealed nuclear materials, sites, and activities.
The maximum-pressure campaign was working in draining Iran’s reserves and pushing the regime to the brink of economic collapse. But Team Biden had a different strategy in mind: Be nice. The administration stopped enforcing sanctions, eased Iran’s access to frozen funds, and halted pressure on Iran to declare its secret nuclear work. Iran responded by racing forward with its nuclear program and ordering its terror proxies to step up attacks against U.S. forces and allies in the Middle East. For months, Biden’s critics urged a change in strategy — a return to maximum pressure before Iran could erase all U.S. leverage and turn the tables on Washington.
Then came the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Vladimir Putin wasn’t the only dictator in the world to perceive American weakness. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei pressed forward with Iran’s nuclear advances, betting Biden would do nothing but offer more carrots. He bet correctly.
As Biden came into office, his administration’s stated policy objective was to negotiate a longer and stronger agreement than the 2015 nuclear deal that faced bipartisan opposition from Congress. What Biden is agreeing to in Vienna is a shorter and weaker agreement that provides even more sanctions relief in exchange for fewer restrictions.
The original deal left Iran’s nuclear-enrichment capabilities intact, provided no restrictions on the development of nuclear-capable missiles, and came with expiration dates — or “sunsets” — on key international restrictions. The first sunset, lifting a U.N. ban on transferring conventional arms to Iran, arrived in late 2020. The next one, lifting a U.N. ban on transferring missile parts to Iran, arrives next year. The deal then allows Iran to conduct the very same nuclear work that we see today in the years that follow.
Moscow loves the old deal, especially the sunsets. Russia stands to make a lot of money off arms sales if Biden rescinds Trump’s executive order. That’s on top of the money Putin will already make building nuclear-power plants in Iran.
The new deal is even better for Putin — the timing of its announcement likely by his design. He will tout it as Russia’s contribution to international peace and security — a contribution requested by Washington.
Now is the time for Congress to act. The White House knows this agreement would never win ratification by the U.S. Senate if submitted as a treaty. Biden may even try to avoid submitting it for congressional review before lifting sanctions, defying a 2015 statute that requires him to do so.
Congress should defend the integrity of U.S. terrorism sanctions by mandating new sanctions on any institution in Iran — including the Central Bank of Iran — that continues to finance the activities of the Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations. Congress should condemn as wholly illegitimate the removal of terrorism sanctions without a cessation of illicit conduct. Biden is setting a dangerous precedent for U.S. counterterrorism policy.
New legislation should set a deadline for Iran to fully account for its undeclared nuclear work or face the full reimposition of U.S. sanctions. Removing sanctions for a supposed nuclear deal that knowingly allows Iran to hide its clandestine nuclear activities defies common sense.
Steps will also be needed to deny Russia the benefits of the deal. Sanctions targeting Russian economic, nuclear, and military relations with Iran should be reinstated or strengthened. The same might be considered for China, which has announced a 25-year economic-cooperation program with Tehran.
Finally, the question of military deterrence will take center stage. The coming deal makes it more likely that the United States or Israel will soon have to choose between military action or a nuclear-armed Iran. Congress should consider what tools Israel may need to defend itself in the wake of a strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Unfortunately, a chaotic and dangerous world is about to get a bit more chaotic and dangerous. At least until Congress or a new administration can change course.
Richard Goldberg is a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He served on Capitol Hill, on the U.S. National Security Council, as the governor of Illinois’s chief of staff, and as a U.S. Navy Reserve intelligence officer. Follow him on Twitter @rich_goldberg. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · March 4, 2022
17. Biden's bold gamble might just save Ukraine | Opinion
Excerpts:
Much of the world and most of the commenting class did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. The risks of being wrong, of having exaggerated, to say nothing of the risks of burning sources or helping a rival formulate a better plan, were huge.
So Biden amped things up. Beginning in January, the Biden administration started sharing specific intelligence warnings that the Russians would seek to engineer some sort of provocation in the Donbas region that would result in a firefight between Russian and Ukrainian forces. A danger to ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine would serve as a pretext for violating the lines of control from 2015 and pushing Russian forces into Ukraine and beyond those lines, at least to the internal Ukrainian boundaries for Luhansk and Donetsk. As Ukrainian forces would not doubt react, this then would be the casus belli for a full-scale assault on Ukraine as a whole.
...
Instead, for the first few days of the war, there was only silence from the assorted agitators that acted as spoilers when global powers nearly stepped up to enforce the famous "red line" on the use by the Assad regime of chemical weapons in Syria. What came instead was a tidal wave of unanimity that has been, if anything, a bit frightening (a topic for another essay). It enabled the kind of offensive non-military action that probably won't be enough to reverse the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but may very well deter future actions—by Russia or other large nuclear powered states resentful about the de facto independence of territories they think belong to them.
Kudos to Biden for taking such a risk. It has already paid off.
Biden's bold gamble might just save Ukraine | Opinion
SHANY MOR , ADJUNCT FELLOW, THE FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
ON 3/4/22 AT 2:07 PM EST
The Ukraine War is only a week old, so it's far too soon to make any judgements about its outcome. One thing is clear, though: Russian President Vladimir Putin badly miscalculated. He is facing two tactical surprises at the moment that may prove to have dire consequences.
Putin was clearly not prepared for the fight that the Ukrainians have put up to his invading forces. It's the only explanation for the logistical failures and enormous reported losses (even discounting for the obvious exaggerations): The Russian Army expected to meet a Ukrainian opposition similar to what it saw in Donbas in 2015 or even in Crimea in 2014.
But the Ukrainians have spent the past eight years learning the lessons of those earlier defeats. They have built a diplomatic network of support they didn't have a decade ago, and they have purchased arms and developed tactics to make the most of the weapons they have been able to obtain.
Which leads me to the second surprise Putin is facing, namely, the intensity of global sanctions against Russia. He no doubt expected some Western actions, but nothing like the rapid cutoff of Russia from banking, trade and aviation that took place in the past week.
The first surprise fed the second: The failure of Russian forces to extract a quick surrender from the Ukrainians meant the battle would be bloody, heightening outrage. It also meant that opposing Putin would not be seen as hopeless posturing.
This provided the groundwork for the response of the international community, which has been harsher than anything seen in modern diplomacy. It's harsher than any reaction to Soviet invasions of Hungary or Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, harsher than the global response to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, harsher than any sanctions or weapons embargo on South Africa or Iran or Burma. The only precedent for anything remotely like this is the global reaction to the last time a regional power endeavored to invade and occupy whole a neighboring state: when Iraq conquered Kuwait in 1990.
Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow, Russia, on March 3, 2022. ANDREY GORSHKOV/Getty
Putin probably expected a more severe form of the sanctions Russia has already been facing since 2014. What we've seen instead is a quantum leap of non-military offensive action that has cut Russian banks off from the global financial system, cut Russian airlines out of the airspace of much of the world, and stands to leave the Russian economy permanently hobbled unless it is reversed in the next few months.
And this was all made possible by a bold decision of the Biden administration to share intelligence information regarding Russian invasion plans with the world—repeatedly, in detail, and over a sustained three-month long period beginning last November.
It's hard to exaggerate just how unprecedented and risky this decision was, and impossible to overstate its impact on the course of events. Already in November, intelligence officials were sharing with the media serious concerns about Russian war plans. These were not couched in equivocal language about "doubts" or "mobilizations" or "operations" or "possibilities." On the contrary, big words like "invasion" were freely bandied about in background briefings, then by senior officials like Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the President himself.
Much of the world and most of the commenting class did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. The risks of being wrong, of having exaggerated, to say nothing of the risks of burning sources or helping a rival formulate a better plan, were huge.
So Biden amped things up. Beginning in January, the Biden administration started sharing specific intelligence warnings that the Russians would seek to engineer some sort of provocation in the Donbas region that would result in a firefight between Russian and Ukrainian forces. A danger to ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine would serve as a pretext for violating the lines of control from 2015 and pushing Russian forces into Ukraine and beyond those lines, at least to the internal Ukrainian boundaries for Luhansk and Donetsk. As Ukrainian forces would not doubt react, this then would be the casus belli for a full-scale assault on Ukraine as a whole.
It's tempting to think that this would not have mattered. After all, who would have believed such an obvious Russian lie? Not readers of this magazine, to be sure. And not leaders in major Western capitals either. And yet, those leaders would have faced loud dissenting voices from precisely the fringes of Left and Right that the Russian disinformation machine has cultivated in the last decade, crowding the space and slowing down a consensus within countries and subsequently among them.
Everyone from Corbynites to Trumpkins and their legions of keyboard warriors would have railed against Western hypocrisy and double-standards, questioned whether Ukrainians really are Nazis, and screamed into the wind "What about Palestine?" An atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty would have blocked the most severe actions, or at least delayed their implementation long enough that they would have become meaningless.
The tailwinds wouldn't have just come from the fringes either. The first morning after the war broke out, former French Prime Minister François Fillon tweeted out a throat-clearing condemnation of Putin's action which nevertheless managed to lay all the blame on Western powers and NATO expansion. This talking point could have been a major distraction, but it simply gained no traction; a day later, Fillon severed his business ties with Russia.
Instead, for the first few days of the war, there was only silence from the assorted agitators that acted as spoilers when global powers nearly stepped up to enforce the famous "red line" on the use by the Assad regime of chemical weapons in Syria. What came instead was a tidal wave of unanimity that has been, if anything, a bit frightening (a topic for another essay). It enabled the kind of offensive non-military action that probably won't be enough to reverse the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but may very well deter future actions—by Russia or other large nuclear powered states resentful about the de facto independence of territories they think belong to them.
Kudos to Biden for taking such a risk. It has already paid off.
Shany Mor is an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a lecturer at IDC Herzliya.
The views in this article are the writer's own.
18. Putin Is Making a Mockery of the United Nations
Excerpts:
As Russian forces march deeper into Ukraine, now is the time for Washington to fix its international-organizations strategy.
The U.S. and its allies need a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to advance the interests of free nations within these organizations while countering the corrosive influence of Russia and China. U.S. leadership will be critical, as many other countries will be reluctant to confront Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, while the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution this week deploring Russian “aggression against Ukraine,” it amounted to little more than a strongly worded letter, recommending no consequences for Russia’s actions.
Congress, meanwhile, must better calculate the costs and benefits of providing billions of dollars to agencies manipulated by U.S. adversaries—and wield its power of the purse accordingly. And the Biden administration must finally recognize what engagement at the U.N. can and cannot do.
An international system that Putin and other dictators can flout or corrupt with impunity is doomed to fail. So is an American international-organizations strategy that mistakes “engagement” for results and relies on corrupted institutions to defend itself and its democratic allies. That reality was laid bare the minute Russia invaded Ukraine.
Putin Is Making a Mockery of the United Nations
Russian ambassador Gennady Gatilov gives a speech at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 3, 2022. (Photo by Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images.)
Members of the U.N. Security Council sat around a table in New York last week, pleading with Moscow to call off its assault on Ukraine. Ambassador after ambassador took turns vowing Russia would be isolated on the world stage for such a blatant violation of international law. Some even warned the U.N. would suffer the fate of its failed predecessor, the League of Nations. One hour into debate, Vladimir Putin announced a full-scale invasion.
The meeting was surreal, and not just because the entire proceeding was chaired by Russia, which held the Security Council’s rotating presidency in February. The imbroglio exposed as hollow the mistaken belief—far too common in Western nations, including here in the United States—that public shaming in multilateral organizations can deter ruthless dictators bent on war. Indeed, Putin announced the beginning of Russia’s invasion just as the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, delivered her speech urging Russia to de-escalate. Moments later, Russian missiles began raining down on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.
Of course, this is hardly the first time Russia has made a mockery of an institution established to defend international peace and security. Russia also routinely wields its Security Council veto to shield itself and other rogue regimes from international accountability, for example by blocking U.N. sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons against its own people.
Indeed, last week’s meeting was just the latest reminder of how Russia, China, and other U.S. adversaries flout international law while simultaneously manipulating international organizations to serve their narrow ends. Unfortunately, despite having proclaimed engagement at the U.N. to be an important plank of its foreign policy agenda, the Biden administration’s international-organizations strategy is broken.
“Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy,” President Biden declared shortly after taking office. Yet when it comes to the U.N. system, U.S. diplomacy needs to do a better job of defending American interests and values.
The U.N. Human Rights Council is case in point. In 2019, Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a former Russian government official to be the director-general of the U.N. office in Geneva. That mission is also home to the Human Rights Council — a deeply flawed body to which Russia was elected in 2020 despite an abysmal human rights record that has only worsened since.
This irony may soon become even grimmer. A recent U.S. letter to the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, whose office serves as the UNHRC’s secretariat, warned that Russian forces “are creating lists of identified Ukrainians to be killed or sent to camps following a military occupation.” The Russians also “will likely use lethal measures to disperse peaceful protests or otherwise counter peaceful exercises of perceived resistance from civilian populations,” the letter said. The International Criminal Court’s top prosecutor says there’s already “a reasonable basis to believe that both alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Ukraine.”
Nevertheless, when Kyiv requested an emergency UNHRC debate on February 24, the council didn’t hold the meeting until March 3, in order to “be as non-disruptive as possible to [its] programme of work.” As human rights activist Hillel Neuer noted, the council has previously convened emergency debates on the same day—when the crisis in question involved criticizing Israel.
Yet instead of recognizing the UNHRC is broken, Biden rejoined the council earlier this year, pledging to reform it from within. Last month, a State Department spokesperson declared that the council “plays a crucial role in promoting respect for human rights as well as fundamental freedoms around the world.”
Although Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield has called for Russia to be isolated at the United Nations, the Biden administration last week issued a list of exemptions to Russia’s supposed diplomatic isolation. At the top of the list: U.S. diplomats are authorized to keep working with Russia at the U.N., other international organizations and in multilateral settings like the Iran nuclear talks.
The UNHRC isn’t the only organization where Moscow enjoys influence. For example, Russia serves on the executive board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which Biden wants to rejoin this year and subsidize with a taxpayer check for $500 million. Moscow also sits on the decision-making council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, while a former Russian nuclear utility official serves as deputy director general and head of the department of nuclear energy at the International Atomic Energy Agency. A longtime Russian diplomat currently serves as U.N. under-secretary-general for counterterrorism. These posts add to Russia’s international prestige and, in some cases, give its officials access to sensitive information.
Russia, meanwhile, is running Rashid Ismailov, a former Russian government official and executive at China’s Huawei, to become the next director general of the International Telecommunication Union, a key standard-setting body for the internet, 5G, and other digital technologies. If he wins, Ismailov would be well-positioned to support Moscow’s longstanding efforts to reduce U.S. influence in internet governance and shape international norms pertaining to cybersecurity.
As Russian forces march deeper into Ukraine, now is the time for Washington to fix its international-organizations strategy.
The U.S. and its allies need a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to advance the interests of free nations within these organizations while countering the corrosive influence of Russia and China. U.S. leadership will be critical, as many other countries will be reluctant to confront Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, while the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution this week deploring Russian “aggression against Ukraine,” it amounted to little more than a strongly worded letter, recommending no consequences for Russia’s actions.
Congress, meanwhile, must better calculate the costs and benefits of providing billions of dollars to agencies manipulated by U.S. adversaries—and wield its power of the purse accordingly. And the Biden administration must finally recognize what engagement at the U.N. can and cannot do.
An international system that Putin and other dictators can flout or corrupt with impunity is doomed to fail. So is an American international-organizations strategy that mistakes “engagement” for results and relies on corrupted institutions to defend itself and its democratic allies. That reality was laid bare the minute Russia invaded Ukraine.
Richard Goldberg, a former National Security Council official, is a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where John Hardie is research manager and analyst.
19. Russia Recruiting Syrians for Urban Combat in Ukraine, U.S. Officials Say
As I saw someone ask, what does this say about the Russian army isf they need to import help from Syrian combat veterans?
Russia Recruiting Syrians for Urban Combat in Ukraine, U.S. Officials Say
Moscow is looking for help from foreign fighters to take cities including Kyiv
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef and Alan Cullison
It is unclear how many fighters have been identified, but some are already in Russia preparing to enter the conflict, according to one official.
Officials declined to elaborate on what else is known about the deployment of Syrian fighters to Ukraine, the status or precise scale of the effort.
According to a publication based in Deir Ezzor, Syria, Russia has offered volunteers from the country between $200 and $300 “to go to Ukraine and operate as guards” for six months at a time.
Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic.
Photo: Yelena Afonina/Zuma Press
Fighters are also pouring into the country to fight on the side of the Kyiv-based government. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week that 16,000 foreigners have volunteered to fight for Ukraine, part of what he described as an “international legion.”
With volunteers from other countries flowing into Ukraine, the conflict there could become a new center of gravity for foreign fighters, said Jennifer Cafarella, national security fellow at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C.
“The Russia deployment of foreign fighters from Syria into Ukraine internationalizes the Ukraine war, and therefore could link the war in Ukraine to broader cross regional dynamics, particularly in the Middle East,” she said.
A Russian serviceman on guard in front of the Kremlin.
Photo: kirill kudryavtsev/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Tens of thousands of Russian troops are inside Ukraine and mortar, missile and other attacks are occurring daily in the northern, eastern and southern regions of the country. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have fled the cities, which were home to roughly two-thirds of the population before the invasion began Feb. 24.
Ukraine remains in the hands of Mr. Zelensky’s government, and the largest cities, Kyiv, the capital, and Kharkiv in the east, remain under government control. Russia has taken over the port city of Kherson, and Ukraine’s other cities now face an assault from Russia.
Syrian fighters have spent nearly a decade fighting urban warfare, while Russia’s largely conscripted force lacks this skill set. Ms. Cafarella said Syrian forces deployed to Ukraine could also be asked to work a support role, based on how they worked in Syria with the Wagner Group, a mercenary force that some see as a proxy for the Russian government.
Charles Lister, a Syria expert at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., questioned how useful the recruits from the Middle East could be in Ukraine. Mr. Lister said there are some Russian-trained Syrians who were involved in hunting members of Islamic State who might be in Ukraine, but generally Moscow didn’t consider Syrian fighters to be good at urban warfare.
“Bringing Syrians into Ukraine is like bringing Martians to fight on the moon,” Mr. Lister said. “They don’t speak the language, the environment is totally different.”
Russia has been a key backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since it entered that conflict, largely through airstrikes, as well as Russian armed forces. The Wagner Group, which arrived in Syria shortly after Russia entered the conflict on behalf of the Assad regime, has conducted support operations such as seizing oil and gas fields and securing other government infrastructure, such as airports.
Russia, which positioned nearly 200,000 troops along the Ukrainian border in the weeks leading up to the invasion, said Wednesday 498 of its troops have been killed and another 1,597 have been injured, a rare public admission of battlefield losses. Others have put the figures much higher, including the Ukrainian armed forces’ general staff, which, according to a Reuters report, said the estimate for Russian troop deaths was closer to 11,000.
—Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef and Alan Cullison
20. Decoding the 'Z' — the mysterious Russian military symbol that's been co-opted by Russia's nationalist movement
Decoding the 'Z' — the mysterious Russian military symbol that's been co-opted by Russia's nationalist movement
- A new emblem has surfaced in the Ukraine-Russia conflict: a "Z," stylized in a thick brushstroke.
- The "Z" was spotted on Russian tanks invading Ukraine and painted on the sides of military vehicles.
- It may have started off as a Russian signal for victory, but has been appropriated as a symbol of the far-right.
Over 3 million people read Morning Brew; you should too
A new symbol of Russia's war against Ukraine has emerged — a white "Z" emblem, stylized in a thick brushstroke. It has found its way onto the signs and t-shirts of ultra-right, pro-Russian protesters, been painted on Russian tanks and military vehicles, and been worn as a show of support for Russia's invasion.
In the past several weeks, the "Z" has gone from a military marking to a potent symbol of support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And there are signs that Russian nationalist groups have co-opted the mark as well.
The emblem was first spotted on Russian tanks in February
The original meaning of the "Z" symbol is unclear and has not been confirmed by official sources.
Twitter commenters speculated that the "Z" symbols, which appeared on tanks framed by squares, triangles, and other painted shapes, could be a way to delineate infantries.
Kamil Galeev, a former Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the policy think tank the Wilson Center, tweeted that some interpreted the "Z" as short for "za pobedy" — the Russian term for "victory." Others have guessed the "Z" is short for "zapad" (or west) and is meant to designate west-bound infantry.
—Kamil Galeev (@kamilkazani) March 6, 2022
The meaning of the symbol has yet to be confirmed by Russian military sources.
A symbol of Russian nationalism and a rallying cry in support of Putin
The "Z" symbol has appeared on the sides of Russian military vehicles in the country's invasion of Ukraine.
Cars were spotted around Russia emblazoned with the "Z" logo, and businesses have also co-opted the symbol.
—Kamil Galeev (@kamilkazani) March 6, 2022
—Samuel Ramani (@SamRamani2) March 6, 2022
Similarly, a group of Russian nationalist protesters in Leningrad were filmed wearing hoodies emblazoned with a white "Z" along with the words "We don't give up our own." It is unclear when the video was taken, but it surfaced on social media in the first week of March.
The slogan echoed false Russian propagandist claims that the invasion is meant to "liberate" and "de-Nazify" Ukraine — an independently-governed democracy led by a Jewish president.
On Sunday, a Russian gymnast appeared at a medal ceremony with a "Z" taped to his uniform
—Denis Kazakiewicz (@Den_2042) March 6, 2022
—Francis Scarr (@francska1) March 3, 2022
21. WATCH: Russian POW Tells Truth About Ukraine War, Putin Throws Russia Back To the U.S.S.R.
Ukraine has been doing great work fighting the influence war. HOWEVER....
While this video makes you feel good about fighting Russia and discrediting Putin, Ukraine must stop televising POWs. It is violating the law of land warfare. Ukraine must maintain the moral high ground in all areas. This seems effective and expedient in the short run but Ukraine must take a long term view. We must remember this fight is about protecting the rules based international order. I know Ukraine can be creative and create the same effects without exploiting POWs in violation of the law of land warfare.
Video at the. link:
WATCH: Russian POW Tells Truth About Ukraine War, Putin Throws Russia Back To the U.S.S.R.
Vladimir Putin has decided to put his own people in a vise. He lies to them that he is “freeing” their neighboring sister state, “liberating” it from Nazis and fascists and that the people of Ukraine welcome his help. It’s complete fantasy and Putin knows it, ergo why would he be so anxious to cut off social media and pass bills which imprison journalists who print anything other than the official Russian government narrative?
That’s with respect to the war front. With respect to the domestic, the Russian economy is being crushed like a Faberge egg. Mastercard and Visa suspended operations in Russia yesterday, while the World Bank is making plans to provide immediate financial support to Ukraine. Putin is left with one option: win in Ukraine while Russia can still support a war effort. And so far that’s not happening.
Putin can’t keep the truth of his invasion of a democratic state a secret from his own people for very much longer. Watch this amazing video of a captured Russian soldier. The man is down to earth and highly articulate. It runs nine minutes but is worth the time spent.
This, out of #Ukraine, is 100% one of the most incredible videos I have ever seen.
This war of Putin’s is a disaster on a public relations level and it is equally ineffectual on a military level. Letters From An American:
There are suggestions, too, among those who study military strategy that the Russian invasion has been far weaker than they expected. The Russian forces on paper are significantly stronger than those of Ukraine, and by now they should have established control of the airspace. Ground forces are also not moving as efficiently as it seems they should be.
Today, Phillips P. O’Brien, Professor of Strategic Studies at University of St Andrews, outlined how the Russian military, so impressive on paper, might in fact have continued the terrible logistics problems of the Soviet Union. On the ground, they appear to have too few trucks, too little tire maintenance, out-of-date food, and too little fuel. In the air, they are showing signs that they cannot plan or execute complicated maneuvers, in which they have had little practice.
Russia expert Tom Nichols appeared to agree, tweeting: “Ukrainian resistance has been amazing, but I am astonished—despite already low expectations—at how utter Russian military incompetence has made a giant clusterf**k out of an invasion against a much weaker neighbor.”
Meanwhile, Russians are now aware that they are at war—something that Putin had apparently hidden at first—and a number are protesting. The government has cracked down on critics, and rumors are flying that Putin is about to declare martial law. It appears he is already turning to mercenaries to fight his war. The U.S. government has urged all Americans to leave Russia.
And so, time is a key factor in this war: will Russian forces pound Ukraine into submission before their own country can no longer support a war effort?
The US and European allies have chosen to squeeze Russia’s economy, which in turn squeezes ordinary Russians. It’s going to get bad fast, said Maxim Mironov, a professor of finance at the IE Business School in Madrid. “The inhabitants of Russia, even the educated, for the most part do not understand what awaits them,” he said Wednesday.
“Many people ask me to comment on the sanctions,” he said in Russian, according to Google Translate. “In short, my scientific conclusion as a professor of finance, doctor of the University of Chicago is FUCKED.”
Mironov said employment will fall while prices rise. Meanwhile, he said, “the Russians will face a shortage of basic products. I’m not talking about all kinds of iPhones, the import of which has already been banned, but food, clothes, cars, household appliances, etc.”
As one wag put it, it’s “Back to the USSR.”
It’s no joke, though. The point of sanctions is to punish Putin for invading Ukraine. Moreover, it’s to create conditions by which ordinary Russians can agitate for reforms even more than they already are. (Another theory is that those conditions might spark a coup d’etat.)
Martial law? Coup d’etat? We had rumors of the first and our own version of the second in this country last year. Now it’s Russia’s turn. We live in interesting times.
Help keep the site running, consider supporting.
22. The world after the war in Ukraine: Who or what will stop Putin?
From one of my many mentors. I was fortunate to have many great discussions with him when our offices were across from each while we were both at Georgetown.
I think we are suffering from a form of "self-deterrence" and this makes us unwilling or unable to do what is necessary to fully defend our interests and protect and advance the rules-based international order which is clearly one of our interests.
Excerpts:
These and other questions won’t be asked or answered if we fail to see the reality unfolding before our eyes and understand its broader implications. To say “No one wants war” is to miss the obvious: Putin does. He has launched an aggressive war, and he won’t stop by himself or by sanctions alone. This is not the kind of world order conducive to American prosperity, or anyone else’s. To focus too narrowly on the Ukraine crisis misses the opportunity to address the larger geopolitical challenges that Ukraine represents.
The world after the war in Ukraine: Who or what will stop Putin?
The Hill · by James M. Dubik, opinion contributor · March 6, 2022
We cannot seem to believe the raw, extreme realism by which Russia’s Vladimir Putin is acting against Ukraine. Raw realism is so abominable to American thinking that we would rather believe he is crazy.
Yet raw realism is what we are seeing in Ukraine: Putin has the might, so he is intent on making the right. He is sure that the West will not intervene militarily, which is not hard to conclude since the U.S. position has been stated, publicly, multiple times. He has made Russia resistant to sanctions in the near term and concluded that, by the time sanctions take full effect, Ukraine will be his. Further, he has judged that Europe is too dependent on Moscow to continue sanctions in the long term. Putin also knows that once force is used, only an equal or greater force will stop him. He knows that sanctions alone are not that equal-or-greater force. He has already escalated his use of force in Ukraine — and has very publicly put his nuclear deterrent forces on high alert — until he gets what he wants, because he’s convinced he can.
Like other raw realists, Putin has no intention of stopping with Ukraine. He’ll wait for the right conditions, or, better stated, he’ll work directly to create the right conditions elsewhere so that he can execute another “special military operation” after being “invited” to assist some future fig-leaf entity. Raw realists such as Putin take what they can, when they can, until someone stops them.
Putin has been working to replace the post-World War II, rules-based order for a long time. He made that clear 15 years ago at the Munich Security Conference. He began by falsely accusing Georgia of aggression to “justify” his August 2008 invasion of that country. He backed Ukraine’s Donbas separatists, who he helped generate, and then annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014. He also has been hard at work eroding Western democracies, trying to create a gap between the U.S. and Europe, trying to weaken NATO, rebuilding the Russian military and honing it in several operational areas, launching cyberattacks, and now brazenly and illegally invading a sovereign country. Putin’s idea of a replacement to the post-World War II world order is playing out before our eyes. But will we believe it?
We didn’t believe the reality before us when, on Aug. 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden published a declaration of war on the United States; we dismissed him and his declaration, believing it was meaningless because it came from a “thug,” “a terrorist hiding in a cave.” The bombing of two U.S. embassies in 1988, the failed attack on the USS The Sullivans, and the successful attack on the USS Cole, were insufficient to change the American position. Only the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, convinced American political leaders to take al Qaeda seriously.
We must not repeat this error with Putin.
Everyone hopes that Ukrainian resistance supported by U.S. and NATO military arms and equipment will be enough to stop Putin. But the sad reality is that Ukraine may be lost because, unless conditions change drastically, the U.S. and NATO won’t reverse their policy of no direct military support. That, of course, would risk a wider war — a risk Putin believes the West will not take. This reality is tragic for the people of Ukraine, a moral blow to what the West stands for, an insult to the political and military leaders who worked so hard to establish the order from which we and our allies have benefited so long, and an affront to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines whose sacrifices created the opportunity for those leaders.
As we watch the Russian bear devour an innocent country, the question now is what can the U.S. do next?
Concerning the trans-Atlantic alliance: Can the U.S. send military supplies to Ukraine and temporary reinforcements to Europe faster, and to more locations? When will the U.S. start discussions within NATO about a new, permanent force posture in Europe? Will the U.S. encourage other NATO nations to follow Germany’s lead by increasing defense spending? What portions of the NATO Charter or other governing documents should be modified to fit current realities? How will the U.S. and Europe work together to reinforce their economies so that they can weather the sanctions imposed on Russia and become stronger as a whole?
Concerning the broader strategic environment: What are the necessary diplomatic and informational actions that the U.S. must lead to prevent what some are already calling “a new normal” from becoming normal? How will the leaders of the West and our allies across the globe adapt to the multiple post-World War II organizations that make up the rules-based order? Will the U.S. try to re-engage China based upon Putin’s raw aggression? Will the U.S. lead an effort in the U.N. to challenge the legitimacy of a criminal aggressor, Russia, having a seat on the Security Council?
These and other questions won’t be asked or answered if we fail to see the reality unfolding before our eyes and understand its broader implications. To say “No one wants war” is to miss the obvious: Putin does. He has launched an aggressive war, and he won’t stop by himself or by sanctions alone. This is not the kind of world order conducive to American prosperity, or anyone else’s. To focus too narrowly on the Ukraine crisis misses the opportunity to address the larger geopolitical challenges that Ukraine represents.
James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries.
The Hill · by James M. Dubik, opinion contributor · March 6, 2022
23. The stakes couldn't be higher in Ukraine. Here's why and what to do next | John Nagl
Excerpts;
Which is not to say that there isn’t more the West can do to support the Ukrainians in their just fight.
Every expression of support, from cutting Russia off from SWIFT to confiscating Russian oligarch’s yachts to removing Putin from his honorary chairmanship of the world Judo organization puts pressure on a creaky regime that is making bad decisions and implementing policy poorly.
It is impossible to know what will be the final push that topples Putin—but it is not too soon to suggest that his days are numbered after a decision to invade Ukraine that makes stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba seem reasonable and rational.
The question now is how long he can survive in power, and how much damage he does on the way out the door.
The stakes couldn't be higher in Ukraine. Here's why and what to do next | John Nagl - Pennsylvania Capital-Star
6:30
Commentary
The stakes couldn’t be higher in Ukraine. Here’s why and what to do next | John Nagl
At this critical time, discretion is the better part of valor for the United States and the global alliance we lead
March 5, 2022 6:30 am
LONDON, ENGLAND – FEBRUARY 24: Ukrainians demonstrate outside Downing Street against the recent invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 in London, England. Overnight, Russia began a large-scale attack on Ukraine, with explosions reported in multiple cities and far outside the restive eastern regions held by Russian-backed rebels. European governments reacted with widespread condemnation and vows of more sanctions. (Photo by Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images)
By John Nagl
It can be difficult to understand that one is living through an epochal event in world history.
That was not the case in October 1962, when the world held its breath as the United States and the Soviet Union stared each other down over Nikita Khrushchev’s covert stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba.
After diplomacy backed by the threat of military force, the Soviet Union blinked and withdrew its missiles, and Khrushchev lost power about eighteen months later in the world’s closest known brush with nuclear Armageddon.
We may be in a similar moment now. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has gone badly, far worse than he reportedly expected, due both to extraordinary Ukrainian valor, substandard Russian logistics, planning, and battlefield performance.
The global reaction has been nearly unanimous and fierce, with Russia facing crippling economic sanctions, Germany lifting its longstanding prohibition on allowing the transport of lethal aid, and NATO gaining significant strength including the possible addition of new members Finland and Sweden.
There has never been an international reaction of such speed and ferocity to an action by any state, a testament both to the nakedness of Putin’s aggression and the masterful diplomacy of the Biden administration.
Putin is cornered like a rat in a cage. But caged rats don’t have nuclear weapons.
Putin’s decision to increase the readiness of his nuclear forces is an illustration of just how precarious and critical a moment we are in.
Putin’s mistakes to date have been so egregious that informed observers have questioned his rationality; he is known to have been isolated during the pandemic, and dictators are not famous for being willing to listen to advice that they don’t want to hear.
Putin’s televised national security council meeting and public takedown of his intelligence chief did not inspire confidence that his team has the courage or the ability to tell their boss no.
I have previously argued that a Ukrainian insurgency against a Russian occupation, with its steady drip of Russian conscript casualties headed home, could put pressure on the Putin regime, but the situation is now even more urgent than that.
The military and economic disaster Putin faces will have survival level political implications for his regime. It took eighteen months for the Politburo to remove Khrushchev from power for a mistake that was far less public and humiliating than this fiasco has been; while it is impossible to predict what will happen in the small group of frightened men and women around Putin, it is not difficult to imagine the intense stress under which they labor.
Putin is cornered like a rat in a cage. But caged rats don’t have nuclear weapons.
At this critical time, then, discretion is the better part of valor for the United States and the global alliance we lead.
The valor of our Ukrainian partners has been inspiring, and it is entirely normal for Americans to wish to support them in any way possible in their fight for democracy and freedom.
It is understandable that even very responsible leaders like Republican U.S. Rep. Adam Kinzinger can seriously suggest that the United States support a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace to provide protection for the freedom fighters against naked Russian aggression.
That is also the worst possible idea. The Biden administration’s current policy of supporting Ukraine with weapons — Secretaary of State Antony Blinken announced the release of another $350 million recently—goes as far as is prudent toward tipping the scales in Ukraine’s favor without putting U.S. forces in direct combat against Russian pilots.
A no-fly zone would require the suppression of Russian air defenses on the ground—in layman’s terms, bombing Russian troops. It is not hard to see this idea escalating quickly and very, very badly. Frustrating as it is—and likely will continue to be—to see Ukrainian fighters fighting and dying in combat under Russian bombing runs, restraint is the correct policy on the ground.
Which is not to say that there isn’t more the West can do to support the Ukrainians in their just fight.
Every expression of support, from cutting Russia off from SWIFT to confiscating Russian oligarch’s yachts to removing Putin from his honorary chairmanship of the world Judo organization puts pressure on a creaky regime that is making bad decisions and implementing policy poorly.
It is impossible to know what will be the final push that topples Putin—but it is not too soon to suggest that his days are numbered after a decision to invade Ukraine that makes stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba seem reasonable and rational.
The question now is how long he can survive in power, and how much damage he does on the way out the door.
John Nagl is a visiting professor of National Security Studies at the Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
24. Top Republican says no-fly zone over Ukraine could lead to ‘beginning of World War III’
As an aside, I think we are the most "self deterred" nation in the world.
In supporting Taiwan, we are afraid it will provoke China.
In responding to north Korean provocations we are afraid of what will happen to Seoul (or worse)
In support of Ukraine we are afraid it will provoke Putin to use nuclear weapons.
Iran...
What is the common denominator? All these countries have (or will have) nuclear weapons. Who best deters with their nuclear weapons?
Top Republican says no-fly zone over Ukraine could lead to ‘beginning of World War III’
ABC News
(NEW YORK) — Sen. Marco Rubio, vice chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine amid Russia’s unprovoked invasion could lead to the “beginning of World War III.”
“I think people need to understand what a no-fly zone means … it’s not some rule you pass that everybody has to oblige by,” Rubio, R-Fla., told ABC “This Week” anchor George Stephanopoulos on Sunday. “It’s the willingness to shoot down the aircrafts of the Russian Federation, which is basically the beginning of World War III.”
In a Zoom call with U.S. lawmakers that Rubio participated in Saturday, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reiterated his request for the West to implement a no-fly zone over his country. But if that can’t be done, Zelenskyy asked for planes instead, several members of Congress said after the call.
Stephanopoulos asked Rubio about a potential deal with Poland to supply aircraft, which Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. is “actively looking at.”
“How about this provision of fighter jets? We would provide the fighter jets to Poland, other Eastern European nations, they would send the jets they now have to Ukraine, do you support that?” Stephanopoulos pressed.
“I do. If that can be done, that would be great,” Rubio answered. “I do have concerns about a couple of things. And that is sort of, you know, can they actually fly them given the amount of anti-aircraft capability that the Russians possess and continue to have deployed in the region? … But generally speaking, it’s something I’d be supportive of.”
Bipartisan support to ban Russian oil imports continues to grow among U.S. lawmakers, but the White House has yet to back it.
“The president has resisted banning Russian oil imports, of course, that would send gas prices soaring even more here in this country. Do you support that?” Stephanopoulos asked.
“I do and I don’t think — you know, I think that’s something that you can construct a plan to phase that in pretty rapidly,” Rubio said. “And you could use reserves for the purposes of buffering that. But we have more than enough ability in this country to produce enough oil to make up for the percentage that we buy from Russia.”
Rubio said the Biden administration’s unwillingness to stop importing barrels of Russian oil each day is simply “an admission that this guy, that this killer, that this butcher, Vladimir Putin, has leverage over us.”
“Why would we want that leverage to continue,” Rubio asked. “Why would we have someone like him to have the power to raise gas prices on Americans which is basically if he cuts us off, what would happen in the reserve?”
“So I think we have enough that we should produce more American oil and buy less Russian oil or none, actually, none at all,” he added.
When asked whether it was “responsible” for Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina to suggest in a tweet that someone should assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin and “take this guy out,” Rubio did not condemn the comments, as others, like Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, did.
“Well, look, people are watching what’s happening in Ukraine and what this man is doing to these people, what this monster is doing to human beings, and they’re very angry about it,” Rubio said, adding that “at the end of the day I do think Vladimir Putin is going to face some problems internally in Russia.”
“How the Russians seek to take care of it is up to them,” Rubio continued. “I’m not sure he was calling for a U.S. action in that regard. I think what he was basically trying to say, at least my reading of it is, I wish someone would take this guy out and remove him from power one way or the other. I think the whole world wishes that.”
Copyright © 2022, ABC Audio. All rights reserved.
25. The battle for Kyiv will be on a scale the world hasn’t witnessed for 75 years
Think about this.
The battle for Kyiv will be on a scale the world hasn’t witnessed for 75 years
Opinion
Military leader and strategist
March 2, 2022 — 3.45pm
March 2, 2022 — 3.45pm
It is six days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. Six long days where the Ukrainians have courageously defended their homeland against the behemoth that is the Russian military machine. Until this point, the ground combat, with battles large and small, has largely taken place outside of major populated areas. That is about to change.
Currently, the war is split between two key areas, and two forms of military operations. The north and northeast front on one hand is slow and plodding. The southern front on the other seems to be seeing a more imaginative form of combined arms and joint force manoeuvre.
Kremlin warns Kyiv residents to flee the city as at least five killed as Russian missile hits TV tower
But in both areas, there is an increasing focus on cities. On surrounding them and capturing them. In his recent book on urban warfare, British scholar Anthony King wrote that “urban combat has become a central, maybe even defining form of warfare in the 21st century. In the 20th century, armies prepared to fight in the field. Today, it seems all but inevitable that they will fight in cities.” Written just a year ago, these words are prophetic.
The southern Ukrainian city of Mariupol is probably surrounded, according to the latest update from the British Ministry of Defence. CNN is reporting Russian military vehicles have entered Kherson, also in the south. It is very likely these cities will be the locations of urban combat. This may draw in Russian forces that might otherwise have been used to continue securing other areas in the south.
At the same time, the Russians (and their allies from Belarus and beyond) continue to commit more combat forces in the north and east. Kharkiv is also probably encircled by Russian forces. Kyiv is the focus of Russian forces on the northern front who will seek to surround the city, hoping it surrenders. That is unlikely. Hope is a poor way of planning military operations.
There is an increase in the use of artillery, rockets, thermobaric weapons, and air delivered munitions in all these cities. The recent strikes on the centre of Kharkiv and in Kyiv are probably, sadly, are just the beginning of this more brutal phase of Russian operations.
Click to reload
What does this mean for the coming days?
Many reputable analysts have predicted that in the next few days a more brutal and destructive phase of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will play out. In the south, the Russians may slow their formation of the Russia to Crimea land bridge because their combat forces will be sucked into urban combat in Kherson and Mariupol. However, it is unlikely that they will allow this to distract them from their thrust north from Crimea.
Kyiv will remain a major draw for Russian combat power and the attention of the world. Kyiv is a city with an area of around 840 square kilometres (just slightly larger than the size of Canberra) and a population of over 2 million (bigger than Brisbane). The Ukrainians have undertaken significant preparations for what is likely to be a decisive and highly destructive battle.
Related Article
Even if the Russians do “brute force” their way to seizing these cities, it can only be a pyrrhic victory. There is no successful political outcome for Putin in such a scenario.
However, it is unlikely that the courageous Ukrainians will surrender, even if these cities are lost. They are fighting for something that the Russians will never be able to give them – democracy, freedom, and national sovereignty. Why would they give up on these aspirations, particularly that the world has rallied to the support of the Ukrainian government and its people?
The “Battle of the Cities” in Ukraine has begun. These urban fights will seize the attention of the world. They will also have a major impact on the eventual terms under which war termination takes place.
The Opinion newsletter is a weekly wrap of views that will challenge, champion and inform your own. Sign up here.
Major General Mick Ryan served in the Australian Defence Force for more than 35 years and the author of War Transformed: The Future of 21st Century Great Power Competition and Conflict. He was most recently commander of the Australia Defence College.
26. Ukraine needs clandestine help from the West | Column
They already have. Who do we think has trained he resistance? (along with the other three latter agency I am sure).
I like to interpret the SF motto as "to help the oppressed free themselves."
Conclusion.:
If democracies do not support one another against a nuclear-capable tyrant, like Putin, we are all in big trouble. Ukraine may be the first, but it certainly won’t be the last to fall to an oppressor. The motto of the U.S. special forces is De Oppresso Liber, which translated from the Latin means “to free the oppressed.” The Russians overmatch the Ukrainians in every military category except courage. I can think of few times in their history when the Green Berets were needed more.
Ukraine needs clandestine help from the West | Column
Special forces could make a big difference in fighting back the Russian invasion.
12
4
Ukrainian soldiers take positions outside a military facility as two cars burn, in a street in Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, Feb. 26, 2022. Russian troops stormed toward Ukraine's capital Saturday, and street fighting broke out as city officials urged residents to take shelter. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti) [ EMILIO MORENATTI | AP ]
Published Mar. 5
The United States and Russia have the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons. But only two people are talking about their potential use: Russian President Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister. Let’s call it what it is: nuclear blackmail.
Robert Bruce Adolph is a former US Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and United Nations Chief Security Advisor, who holds graduate degrees in both international affairs and national security studies and strategy. His previously published works have appeared in nearly every US military publication of note. Most recently, he penned the commentary series “Dispatch from Rome” for the Military Times. Adolph also recently published the book entitled “Surviving the United Nations: The Unexpected Challenge.” [ Courtesy of Robert Adolph ]
Putin knows the weaknesses of democracies. He knows that no politician in the West would ever seriously contemplate the use of even tactical nuclear weapons, fearing the escalation ladder and threat to their populations. He knows that he can do as he pleases with Ukraine, and without fear of significant Western reprisals beyond EU and U.S. economic warfare that crashed the ruble.
He wants Ukraine, period. Sanctions and diplomatic discussions will not change his behavior. Nor will humanitarian concerns of over a million refugees. Nor will the deaths of hundreds and perhaps soon thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. It was his plan to invade Ukraine all along. The fact that he is willing to place nuclear capable forces on high alert when facing a non-nuclear adversary is telling. The goal is intimidation.
From the autocrat’s perspective, regaining control over Ukraine would be the capstone that would secure his historical legacy as the great Russian patriot. At 69 years of age, he may feel the passage of time more acutely. Hence, his need to act now.
What can be done? There is an option that I hope is being discussed behind closed doors in Europe and America: sending in clandestine military units, special forces (Green Berets), to assist their Ukrainian freedom-loving kin. Simply put, clandestine means secret and deniable. There are U.S. and European special operations warriors that already speak the language and could blend in with the populace. The objective would be to further train and support the Ukrainian resistance: to take the fight to the Russians. Special forces employment — with political plausible deniability — could be a highly effective tool against conventional Russian units. NATO, a defensive alliance, would not be directly involved. Individual countries, who are NATO members, could be. It is a distinction with an important difference. Special forces employment in this manner keeps us off the nuclear escalation ladder.
The French supported the 13 colonies in their war of independence against an absolutist English king. The United States of America might not exist today without their intervention. The Ukrainians are in the same fight, a battle for their liberty. There is no nobler cause. Plus, I hate the thought of surrendering to any dictator’s intimidation, nuclear or otherwise.
If democracies do not support one another against a nuclear-capable tyrant, like Putin, we are all in big trouble. Ukraine may be the first, but it certainly won’t be the last to fall to an oppressor. The motto of the U.S. special forces is De Oppresso Liber, which translated from the Latin means “to free the oppressed.” The Russians overmatch the Ukrainians in every military category except courage. I can think of few times in their history when the Green Berets were needed more.
Robert Bruce Adolph is a former senior Army Special Forces soldier and United Nations security chief, who holds graduate degrees in both international affairs & strategy. He is the author of the new book entitled, “Surviving the United Nations: The Unexpected Challenge.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.