“When people feel insecure about their social standing in a group, they are more likely to use jargon in an attempt to be admired and respected,” 

- Adam Galinsky, Columbia University psychologist

"However vast the darkness, we must supply our own light."

- Stanley Kubrick

“Modern writing at its worst... consists in gumming together long strings of words which have already been set in order by someone else and making the results presentable by sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing, is that it is easy."

- George Orwell

• Russian forces are consolidating and preparing for further operations along the western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, especially in the Irpin area on the west and the Brovary area on the east;
• Ukrainian forces are challenging the extended Russian lines reaching from Sumy, which Russian forces have not yet taken, to the eastern outskirts of Kyiv;
• Russian troops are likely attempting to bypass Mykolayiv and cross the Southern Bug upriver of that city to permit an advance on Odesa that will combine with an impending amphibious operation against that city; and
• Russian forces are driving north from Crimea toward the city of Zaporizhya.

• Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
• Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
• Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
• Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.

• Russian forces may launch an attempt to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself within the next 24-96 hours;
• Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya city itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it from the east and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces besieging Mariupol take that city;
• Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug in the next 24-48 hours.

• 
  
• 
  

• 
  
• 
  

A strong U.S. economy is the most effective and credible tool for countering adversaries seeking to undermine confidence in the dollar. Countries and companies comply with U.S. sanctions because they seek to retain access to U.S. markets, to the U.S. dollar, and to the broader U.S.-led global system. The U.S. government should be aware of the unintended consequences of its sanctions policy and find ways to undermine Russia and China’s de-dollarization partnership. If Washington fails to act, it will be in effect choosing to discard the mantle of its global leadership.

Cyber-operations could pull the United States or NATO into the conflict.

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) March 5, 2022

• What we know about the Russian general killed in Ukraine
• Where is the Russian air force? Experts break own why they might be hiding
• Meet Army Col. Daniel Blackman, the accidental face of romance scams around the world
• How the US can beat Russia in Ukraine without firing a shot

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html

Science of Resistance

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/science-resistance.pdf

Resistance Manual

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-manual.pdf

Understanding States of Resistance

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/understanding-states-resistance.pdf

Understanding States of Resistance - Pocket Guide

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/understanding-states-pg.pdf

Resistance and the Cyber Domain

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-cyber.pdf

Narratives and Competing Messages

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Narratives_v2.pdf

Conceptual Typology of a Resistance

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/typology-resistance.pdf

Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Legal_Status-BOOK.pdf

"Little Green Men" A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-14

https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UNCLASS-hi-res.pdf

Resistance Operating Concept

https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/U-SMA-Brief-SOCEUR-Resistance-Operating-Concept.pdf

Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) by Otto C. Fiala with foreword by Major General Kirk Smith and Brigadier General Anders Löfberg

https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=54216464

•Assessments – Special Forces Area Study/Area Assessment, PSYOP Target Audience Analysis, and Civil Affairs Civil Reconnaissance

•Who is the resistance?

–Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.

•Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?

–What are the underlying causes/drivers?

•What are the objectives of the resistance?

–Do they align with the US and friends, partners, and allies? If not, who with?

•What is the resistance narrative?

–How is it shaping the information environment?

•Where is it operating?

–From where is it getting support?

•When did it begin?

–When will it/did it commence operations?

•How will it turn out?

–E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?

•Most important - An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?

The risk of escalation remains ever present. The Russians might respond by striking across the borders of a NATO country to eliminate a safe haven, thus triggering Article 5 of the alliance’s founding treaty. Or Putin could launch a full-scale cyberattack on US financial systems on the rationale that the United States is more dependent on such systems than Russia, and that in any case, Russia has little more to lose economically. Or Russian troops in Ukraine might start committing widespread atrocities against civilians in retribution for acts of resistance. The United States must anticipate these possibilities and develop contingency plans—some of which may simply involve unequivocally messaging Putin about the consequences of taking such actions. In weighing these risks, US policymakers need to keep two thoughts foremost in mind.

• Due to the growth of Iran’s 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium stocks, breakout timelines have become dangerously short, far shorter than just a few months ago. Iran now has enough 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)) to use as feed for production of enough weapon-grade uranium (WGU) (taken as 25 kilograms (kg) per weapon) for two nuclear weapons, producing the first quantity of WGU in as little as two to three weeks after breakout commences, including a set up period, and producing the second quantity by the end of that month.
• In total, Iran has enough 60, 20, and 4.5 percent enriched uranium to make sufficient WGU for four nuclear weapons. The third quantity could be produced soon after the start of the second month after breakout commences, and the fourth in somewhat less than four months. The third and fourth quantities would depend on stocks of uranium enriched between 2 and 4.5 percent and would be produced significantly more slowly than the first two quantities of WGU.
• In essence, Iran is effectively breaking out slowly by producing 60 percent enriched uranium and continuing to accumulate it. As of February 19, Iran had a stock of 33.2 kg of near 60 percent enriched uranium (in uranium mass or U mass), or 49.1 kg (in hexafluoride mass). If Iran accumulated about 40 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium (U mass), it would have enough to be able to further enrich it and quickly produce 25 kg of WGU (U mass) in just a few advanced centrifuge cascades.
• Alternatively, 40 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium is more than enough to fashion a nuclear explosive directly, without any further enrichment, although Iran’s known nuclear weapons designs use WGU.
• Iran’s current production rate of 60 percent enriched uranium is 4.5 kg per month (U mass), meaning that it could accumulate its first amount of 40 kg in less than two months from now.
• Iran is learning important lessons in producing WGU and breaking out to nuclear weapons, including by experimenting with skipping typical enrichment steps as it enriches up to 60 percent uranium-235 and building and testing out equipment to feed 20 percent enriched uranium and withdraw highly enriched uranium (HEU). It is starting from a level below 5 percent LEU and enriching directly to near 60 percent in one cascade, rather than using two steps in between, a slower process entailing the intermediate production of 20 percent enriched uranium. It has used temporary feed and withdrawal set ups to produce HEU from near 20 percent enriched uranium feed. Iran is also implementing a plan to allow IR-6 cascades to switch more easily from the production of 5 percent enriched uranium to 20 percent enriched uranium. As such, Iran is experimenting with multi-step enrichment while seeking to shortcut the process.
• Iran started to produce 20 percent enriched uranium in one cascade of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in addition to the six IR-1 cascades that were already producing 20 percent enriched uranium.
• The production rate of 20 percent enriched uranium at the FFEP increased by 50 percent from a monthly average of 13.2 kg (U mass) or 19.5 kg (hex mass), to 19.7 kg (U mass) or 29.2 kg (hex mass).
• Iran has installed a second cascade of 166 IR-6 centrifuges at the FFEP, but has not yet fed it with UF6. The installation of advanced centrifuges at the FFEP enhances Iran’s ability to break out using a declared but highly fortified facility.
• As of February 19, Iran had an IAEA-estimated stock of 182.1 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium (U mass and in the form of UF6), an increase from the previous reporting period’s 113.8 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium in UF6 form. Iran also has an additional stock of 36.5 kg (U mass) of 20 percent uranium in other chemical forms.
• Since the previous report, Iran has not produced any uranium metal.
• At the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), Iran has installed 36 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges, six cascades of IR-2m centrifuges, and two cascades of IR-4 centrifuges. Of those, 31 IR-1 cascades, six IR-2m cascades, and two IR-4 cascades were being fed with uranium.
• Iran’s current, total operating enrichment capability is estimated to be about 13,400 separative work units (SWU) per year, compared to 12,400 SWU per year at the end of the last reporting period.
• While average daily production of 5 percent LEU increased at the FEP, Iran’s total usable stock of below 5 percent LEU decreased compared to the previous reporting period, as the average feed rate at the FFEP increased.
• Near 5 percent LEU production during this reporting period, which spanned 104 days at the Natanz FEP, totaled 596 kg (U mass), for a daily average production rate of 5.7 kg (U mass), a slight increase from the previous reporting period’s daily average production rate of 4.9 kg (U mass). This reflects Iran’s slightly increased enrichment capacity at the FEP.
• Iran’s overall reported stockpile of LEU increased due to a significant increase in Iran’s stock of up to 2 percent enriched uranium, much of which was produced as tails in the production of 20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium.
• On January 24, the IAEA visited Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing workshop at a new location in Esfahan, relocated from the Karaj site, and installed surveillance cameras to replace those at the Karaj site. The IAEA will not have access to Esfahan or Karaj video recordings and data, which Iran claims it will keep in its custody, until it receives relief from sanctions. The IAEA, for more than one year, has not been able to monitor Iran’s production of advanced centrifuges, particularly rotors and bellows, per JCPOA monitoring provisions, and faces a difficult challenge in reconstructing events should Iran turn over these data.
• The IAEA also faces a gap in knowledge about Iran’s advanced centrifuge manufacturing activities from June 2021 until January 2022, raising doubt about its ability to ascertain whether Iran may have diverted centrifuge components.
• The IAEA report does not discuss the status of Iran’s construction of a new advanced centrifuge assembly facility in a tunnel near the main Natanz complex.
• The IAEA does not report whether Iran has turned over a missing recording unit and storage data from a camera that was destroyed at Karaj in June 2021.
• Combined with outstanding safeguards issues in Iran, the IAEA has a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran’s complex and growing nuclear program, which notably has unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions. The IAEA’s ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished.

• In a video interview that aired Monday night, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russian soldiers of being “war criminals.” A growing number of Western leaders are also raising questions about possible war crimes — which Moscow denies — citing reports of attacks on civilians.
• The Pentagon will send an additional 500 U.S. troops from the United States to Europe to bolster American forces in the eastern part of the continent, a senior U.S. defense official said.
• Shell says it will halt operations in Russia and apologized for buying Russian oil. The U.S. national average gas price climbed to over $4 this week, according to the AAA Gas Prices website, a record high since July 2008.
• A third round of talks Monday between Russia and Ukraine failed to achieve a substantial breakthrough, although further talks were expected to continue as soon as Thursday.