Quotes of the Day:
"If you ever need a helping hand, it's at the end of your arm. As you get older, you must remember you have a second hand. The first one is to help yourself, the second one is to help others."
- Audrey Hepburn
Do the difficult things while they are easy and do the great things while they are small. A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step.
- Lao Tzu
I have brought myself, by long meditation, to the conviction that a human being with a settled purpose must accomplish it, and that nothing can resist a will which will stake even existence upon its fulfillment.
- Benjamin Disraeli
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 8
2. Years of planning paid off in rapid Europe deployments, Army chief says
3. U.S. says up to 4,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine invasion
4. 2022 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
5. Ukraine war mystery: What’s wrong with the Russian military?
6. Banning Russia’s oil imports is the easy part. Protecting American consumers is much harder.
7. Most Americans are willing to pay more at the pump for Ukraine
8. How Ukraine Could Do the Impossible: Win a War Against Russia
9. I’ve studied all the possible trajectories of this war. None are good
10. Who Is Volodymyr Zelensky? Ukraine’s Wartime President Is a Former TV Star
11. Iron Curtain Comes Down on Energy
12. Live Updates: Biden Bans Russian Oil Imports and Major U.S. Brands Close Outlets
13. Opinion | Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me
14. I was the head of the UK’s Syria team. Our mistakes are being repeated in Ukraine
15. Russia's military losses in Ukraine are a gold mine for US intelligence
16. How the Ukrainian Military Went from 'Decrepit' to Surprisingly Strong
17. Concern Rising That Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons
18. Russia looks to Chinese financial plumbing to keep money flowing
19. New Iran Nuclear Deal? Same Old Missile Problems.
20. Washington must do more to support companies facing Russian hackers
21. Nine lessons from Ukraine to apply in the Taiwan Strait
22. Russia's War in Ukraine Is About So Much More Than Territory
23. Yale researchers release running list of companies still operating in Russia
24. Hints of a Ukraine-Russia Deal?
25. Axios Wants Us to Read Everything in Bullet Points
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 8
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 8
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 8, 3:00 PM EST
Russian forces continued concentrating in the eastern, northwestern, and western outskirts of Kyiv for an assault on the capital in the coming 24-96 hours. The reported appearance of forces belonging to Chechen leader Ramazan Kadyrov, Russia’s Rosgvardia internal security formations, and the Liga (former Wagner) Private Military Company in the western outskirts of Kyiv may indicate that the Russian military is struggling to assemble sufficient conventional combat power to launch its assault on the capital. Russian forces near Kyiv made limited gains and prepared for limited drives to continue their attempted encirclement to the west.
Ukrainian forces have continued to challenge the lengthy Russian ground lines of communication leading from near Sumy to eastern Kyiv. Russian forces near Kharkiv have been steadily diverting to secure and extend those lines over the past few days, as we have reported. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 8 that Russian troops currently near Chernihiv appear to be moving east. We assess that those forces may seek to link up with troops coming from near Sumy to help them consolidate and protect their extended lines in support of the planned offensive against Kyiv.
The situation in eastern Ukraine and southwestern Ukraine remained largely unchanged in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian General Staff reporting of additional Russian efforts to advance on the city of Zaporizhya likely confirm that Russia intends to make blocking that city a priority. The forces Russia is so far moving toward Zaporizhya appear to be far too small to encircle or take it.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces are consolidating and preparing for further operations along the western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, especially in the Irpin area in the west and the Brovary area in the east;
- Ukrainian forces are challenging the extended Russian lines reaching from Sumy, which Russian forces have not yet taken, to the eastern outskirts of Kyiv;
- Russian troops are likely attempting to bypass Mykolayiv and cross the Southern Bug upriver of that city to permit an advance on Odesa combined with an impending amphibious operation against that city; and
- Russian forces are also driving north from Crimea toward the city of Zaporizhya.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, east.
Russian forces continue preparations for an assault on Kyiv in the coming days. They have made limited but notable gains in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts and continued to concentrate forces for an attack into the city.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that elements of Russia’s Rosgvardia security forces, Ramazan Kadyrov’s Chechen fighters, and Wagner Group mercenaries (which the General Staff indicated have rebranded into a private military company called “Liga”), are preparing to join the renewed assault on the capital.[1] The use of such forces in addition to conventional military units to lead an assault is unusual. It likely indicates that the Russian military is struggling to amass sufficient combat power on this axis from the available conventional military units. Observed and reported casualties among Russian mechanized and airborne forces in the vicinity of northwestern Kyiv Oblast have been very high, and various reports suggest that the morale and combat effectiveness of the remaining conventional forces there are low.
The former Ukrainian mayor of Irpin reported that the Russians have consolidated control over towns around Irpin including Bucha and Hostolmel (the town near Antonov Airfield).[2] The Russians are using siege-and-starve tactics in these areas—preventing inhabitants from leaving while depriving them of food, fuel, and other necessities. Irpin is roughly 20 kilometers from the center of Kyiv and an important staging area for continued Russian operations against the capital.
The Ukrainian General Staff also reported indications that Russian force elements drawn from the 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies; airborne troops; and naval infantry from the Pacific Fleet are preparing to renew efforts to encircle Kyiv.[3] In particular:
- Two Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA), likely part of this undertaking, advanced on Byshiv, which is the furthest point forward of the Russian drive to encircle Kyiv on the western bank and roughly 50 kilometers southwest of the city center.
- An unspecified number of BTGs from elements of the 35th CAA and 36th motorized rifle brigade of the 29th CAA began offensive operations against Ivankiv on March 8. Ivankiv is roughly 70 kilometers northwest of Kyiv’s center.
- Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne Division and the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade launched an attack near Rakivka, about 30 kilometers northwest of Kyiv, on March 7 but were reportedly repulsed by Ukrainian defenders.
Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne Division and the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade were also reportedly located near Dymer, about 40 kilometers northwest of Kyiv close to the Dnipro River, on March 8.[4]
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv axis
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 8 that Russian forces of the 2nd CAA, 41st CAA, and 90th Tank Division are trying to block Chernihiv in preparation for attacking Sumy to the west.[5] It previously reported its assessment that Russian troops intend to seize Chernihiv city on March 6.[6] Major Russian combat operations against Chernihiv City have not been reported as of this publication.
Subordinate supporting effort—Sumy axis
Russian troops continue attempting to establish themselves in Kyiv’s eastern outskirts as of March 8. At least six Russian tanks and two armored personnel carriers were observed driving through Bohdanivka, a village approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Kyiv’s center, on March 8.[7] Ukrainian forces in Sumy are degrading Russia’s ability to assemble forces east of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 8 that Ukrainian forces stopped an offensive of up to five BTGs of the 90th Tank Division and four BTGs of the 2nd CAA from Glukhiv, Sumy Oblast, on March 8.[8] The Russians are likely amassing forces to overcome this resistance. Ukraine's General Staff shared its assessment on March 7 that up to 12 BTGs of the 1st Tank Army, up to eight BTGs of the 20th CAA, and up to two BTGs of the 6th CAA and 14th Army Corps are focusing on Kaniv in Cherkassy Oblast in central Ukraine.[9]
ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces in and around Brovary likely came from the Sumy axis and continue to be supported along the roads stretching east through Sumy to Russia. The Russians face challenges sustaining that long logistics line, however, particularly since they have not yet captured Sumy itself and as Ukrainian forces continue to conduct attacks along it. The Ukrainian General Staff assessed again on March 8 that Russian forces are focused on encircling Sumy (and other cities).[10] Continued Russian airstrikes and artillery attacks on Sumy on March 7 were likely meant to set conditions for a ground offensive against the city.[11]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces likely did not make territorial advances in Kharkiv Oblast over the past 24 hours. Ukraine’s General Staff stated on March 8 that elements of Russia’s 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th CAA withdrew from Kharkiv and returned to Belgorod to restore its combat capability.[12] Kharkiv Oblast governor stated that Ukrainian defenders repelled an unsupported Russian air assault against Vovchansky, a town roughly 60 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv, on March 8.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian troops that attempted to attack Izyum, a town roughly 70 kilometers southeast of Kharkiv’s city center, on March 7.[14] ISW is unable to verify at this time the Ukrainian government’s March 7 claim that Ukrainian forces killed First Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the 41st CAA Vitaly Gerasimov in Kharkiv.[15]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
There was no significant activity reported in this area in the past 24 hours.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continued their encirclement of Mariupol and have increased efforts to break into the city as well as to consolidate control of terrain in Donetsk Oblast. Russian proxies claimed to have gained control over the highway between Volnovakha and Mariupol on March 8.[16] Ukraine’s General Staff stated on March 7 that up to three BTGs of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th CAA are regrouping for offensive operations against Mariupol.[17] Russian troops also attempted to enter the neighborhood of Troiitske, West of Mariupol, on March 7 but were repulsed according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[18] Russian forces continue to falsely claim that Ukrainian forces are blocking civilian evacuation corridors from Mariupol as of March 8.[19] Social media posts testify to the intensity of combat in and around Mariupol.[20]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
The general situation in this area remained unchanged in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian naval infantry conducted a raid that destroyed 30 Russian helicopters at Kherson Airbase.[21] Roughly 49 Russian helicopters had been spotted at Kherson Airbase on March 6.[22] ISW has no independent confirmation of the reported raid or its effects.
Russian forces appear to be prioritizing operations north from Crimea toward Zaporizhya City itself. Russian forces continued making territorial gains toward Zaporizhya on March 8. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that two BTGs of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment occupied Hulyaipole and Orikhiv on March 8.[23] Social media users observed a Russian armored train in Novobohdanivka, roughly 85 kilometers south of Zaporizhya, on a rail line that leads to Zaporizhya on March 8.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that up to four BTGs of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th CAA are moving in the direction of Zaporizhya.[25] Its previous report had identified three Russian BTGs advancing north toward Zaporizhya.[26] Zaporizhya is a large city of nearly three-quarters of a million people. Russian troops are unlikely to be able to encircle or seize it with an attack on this scale if Ukrainians defend it as they have defended other threatened cities.
Russian troops are increasing their efforts to close in on Mykolayiv. Ukraine’s General Staff reported that a Russian element—possibly up to a single BTG—unsuccessfully attempted offensive operations in the direction of Ternivka but was repulsed and driven back to existing Russian force concentration areas near Kapustyne, Balovne, and Novomatviyivske.[27] Kapustyne and Balovne are approximately 10 kilometers from Mykolayiv’s city center. Russian forces are unlikely to capture Mykolayiv without committing additional forces to that effort. Russian forces may instead bypass Mykolayiv entirely and opt to drive north to a crossing further up the Southern Bug before advancing west toward Odesa.
ISW is unable to verify Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian rocket artillery sunk the Russian patrol boat Vasily Bykov near Odesa on March 7.[28]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces may launch an attempt to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself within the next 24-96 hours;
- Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya city itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it from the east and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces besieging Mariupol take that city;
- Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast between Odesa and the mouth of the Southern Bug in the next 24-48 hours.
[12] UA General Staff SITREP of 1200 MAR 8 stated that elements of the 25th Motorized Rilfe Brigade (6th CAA) left the combat zone in Kharkiv and returned to Nekhoteevka, Belgorod, to restore its combat capability.
[16] https://t dot me/rian_ru/152015
[19] https://izd dot ru/1302198/2022-03-08/v-dnr-zaiavili-o-blokirovke-ukrainskimi-natcionalistami-vykhoda-iz-mariupolia; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13999337; https://www.rferl dot org/a/ukraine-russia-invasion-evacuations-shelling/31742341.html
[28] https://novynarnia dot com/2022/03/07/ukrayinczi-na-odeshhyni-vrazyly-rosijskyj-korabel-vognem-rszv-video/; https://www.slovoidilo dot ua/2022/03/07/novyna/suspilstvo/zsu-pidbyly-chornomu-mori-rosijskyj-korabel; https://novynarnia dot com/2022/03/08/hronika-oborony-ukrayiny-den-13-08-03-2022; https://24tv dot ua/ru/zatoplennym-rossijskim-korablem-mozhet-byt-vasilij-bykov-iz-okkupirovannoj_n1894623; https://www.ukrinform dot ru/rubric-ato/3422644-raketnym-zalpom-s-pobereza-odessiny-povrezden-patrulnyj-korabl-cf-rf-vasilij-bykov.html
2. Years of planning paid off in rapid Europe deployments, Army chief says
Is there still some Reforger in the Army's DNA?
Years of planning paid off in rapid Europe deployments, Army chief says
FORT BELVOIR, Va. — The ease with which U.S. Army units have flowed into Europe over the past two weeks in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is owed to planning, unit standups and forward-thinking logistics conducted in recent years, the Army’s top officer said Tuesday.
Planning, staging, new units and a re-focus on Europe have allowed U.S. troops to “set the theater,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville told Army Times following his remarks early Tuesday at an Association of the U.S. Army event at the service’s national museum.
“It’s incredibly important that we have a theater command there, the fact that we have structure in place, the fact that we have Army pre-positioned stocks,” McConville said. “We have strong allies and partners and they’re willing to accept our forces or allowed us to respond the way we did.”
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Air Force tankers and Army support personnel will back up troops already in Germany.
After two decades of small wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, the Army began re-positioning and evaluating its footprint and capabilities in Europe. The moves reversed the trend of drastic drawdowns on the continent since the fall of the Soviet Union.
“What we’re seeing right now is a return on the investments made in our alliances and partnerships,” McConville said.
For all of the planning and positioning, the four-star acknowledged the changing conditions on the ground — there is a different threat in Europe now than what many saw even 18 months ago, he said.
But he was encouraged by recent actions from allies and partners.
“NATO has come together with strength,” he said. “We see countries change their whole philosophy, their whole strategy in a couple of days.”
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With no end game in sight for the conflict, governments on both sides of the Atlantic are beginning to settle in for the long haul.
There could even be moves to permanently station more forces in Europe, a move away from heel-to-toe rotational deployments that have been in practice for decades.
“[But] that’s going to be a policy decision,” McConville said. “We’ll provide options. We do have permanent and rotation forces, we have the dynamic employment of forces, all the menu-type items.”
A significant move in early 2020 was the re-activation of V Corps, which included 635 soldiers positioned at Fort Knox, Kentucky, along with another 200 personnel rotating to Europe.
In his remarks to an audience of about 200 attendees, primarily Army veterans, defense industry and press, McConville rattled off a list of units that have deployed to Europe, many falling in on pre-positioned stocks of weapons and vehicles.
- 173rd Airborne Brigade’s 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, out of Italy.
- About 4,700 paratroopers with the 82nd Airborne Division, out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- Dozens of Army AH-64 Apache helicopters arriving in Poland and other Baltic states.
- Roughly 1,250 Stryker squadron troops repositioned from Rose Barracks, in Germany, to Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.
- Approximately 3,800 soldiers from 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, out of Fort Stewart, Georgia.
In a not-so-veiled jab at Russia’s logistical stumbles early in the Ukraine invasion, McConville noted the essential role that supply lines have played to allow for so many American units to arrive ready for their missions.
“If you don’t have gas, ammo, parts, then those weapons just become paperweights,” he said. “They sit on the side of the road and you can’t fight them.”
Task Force Palehorse, assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, arrives in Poland, Feb. 25, 2022. The Air Cavalry Brigade moved AH-64 Apaches and UH-60 Blackhawks from Greece to Poland as the U.S. increased its military presence in Europe in recent days. (Sgt. Agustín Montañez/Army)
McConville also tipped his hat to Gen. Gustave Perna, who retired last year but ended his Army career heading U.S. Army Materiel Command. He reworked the Army’s pre-positioned stocks and coordinated major planning for pairing those stocks with units rotating to the continent.
The chief said Perna and his team’s work elevated the Army to, “an incredible level of readiness.”
The decades-old V Corps was deactivated back in 2013. At the time, the Army’s forces in Europe were transforming into more agile units built around a cavalry brigade equipped with highly mobile Stryker vehicles and an airborne infantry brigade. But the service reversed course seven years later.
Shortly after V Corps’ reactivation in early 2020, the service planned a division-sized Defender Europe exercise with allies and partners. That exercise was severely curtailed due to the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
The two units contained only about 500 soldiers. But they pack capabilities that allow them to punch above their weight class. Officially activated in September 2021, the MDTF in Europe was a tailored version of another MDTF first stood up in the Pacific theater.
The concept merges sensing, precision long-range fires and non-kinetic capabilities, such as electronic warfare, cyber and space assets. All of these are aimed at converging fires throughout a linked network to provide the right shooting platform to strike the right target rapidly.
In a release at the time, Gen. Chris Cavoli, head of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, said the MDTF would hold field artillery, air and missile defense, intelligence, cyber, EW, space, aviation and brigade support elements. The general noted that the theater fires command would “improve readiness and multi-national interoperability by integrating joint and multi-national fires.”
The recent unit deployments showed a variety of readiness applications, McConville said.
Soldiers with the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, hold a live fire exercise with M1A2 Abrams tanks at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, March 3, 2022. (Pfc Destinee Rodriguez/Army)
To underscore how rapid the deployments were in recent weeks, McConville related how he had planned to visit the 1st ABCT, 3rd ID, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, before it deployed.
“We gave them a week to deploy,” McConville said. “I went down there to see them and they were already gone.”
And on Monday, the Pentagon announced 300 more soldiers from an ordnance company and maintenance company out of Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart, respectively, will deploy to support 1st ABCT, 3rd ID.
McConville also gave a shout out, by name, to two units not only for this deployment but their work in recent years on short notice — the 82nd Airborne Division and the Minnesota Army National Guard’s 34th Infantry Division.
The 34th ID responded to civil unrest in their state in the wake of Black Lives Matter protests in 2020; they activated for the COVID-19 pandemic the same year; and they deployed to Hamid Karzai International Airport for the 2021 Afghanistan evacuation. The unit was also the first to conduct a National Training Center rotation at Fort Irwin, California, during the pandemic.
The 82nd Airborne Division, which is assigned the Global Response Force mission, was also activated at least four times with little-to-no notice since McConville took his post as chief of staff less than three years ago.
The division got the call on New Year’s Eve in 2019 for U.S. embassy support in Iraq, response to Washington D.C. for the U.S. Capitol attack in early 2021, and the Afghanistan evacuation.
“And now they’re in Europe,” McConville said.
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
3. U.S. says up to 4,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine invasion
Urinae is reporting some 11,000 Russians KIA. I am sure the reprtoing and vetting standards account for the discrepancy and because the US does not have direct reporting from US units I am sure the US reports will tend to beconservative.
U.S. says up to 4,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine invasion
NBC News · by Ken Dilanian · March 8, 2022
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that between 2,000 and 4,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the two-week invasion of Ukraine — possibly more than the number of Americans killed in the 20-year war in Afghanistan.
Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said during a worldwide threats hearing before the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday morning that analysts give the estimate low confidence, and it was based in part on information from “open sources,” which can mean media and social media reports.
The estimate underscores the steep price Russia is already paying for a conflict that Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, in the same hearing, called “a shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the future that we are only beginning to understand.” An estimated 2,448 American service members were killed during two decades of war in Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press.
Russian President Vladimir Putin perceives the war he started in Ukraine as one “he cannot afford to lose,” Haines said, adding that intelligence analysts anticipate a protracted conflict with a “persistent and significant insurgency” by Ukrainian forces.
“I think Putin is angry and frustrated right now,” CIA Director William Burns added. “He is likely to double down and try to grind down the Ukrainian military with no regard for civilian casualties.”
Haines said American intelligence agencies assess that “Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of military challenge,” but Putin may feel compelled to fight on nonetheless, as the Russian military operates “with reckless disregard” for the safety of noncombatants.
She said it was unclear if Russia will continue the “maximalist plan” to seize all of Ukraine and that the economic crisis Russia is now experiencing because of international sanctions is “driving domestic political opposition to Putin.”
Putin did not anticipate the resistance from the West and the pullback from Russia by international business interests, she added.
His public announcement of heightened nuclear alert was something not seen since the 1960s, she said, adding that it was “extremely unusual.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses the nation in Kyiv late Monday.Ukrainian President's Office / via AP
Her remarks came after the release of a worldwide threats assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies that concluded that Russia does not want to engage directly with the U.S. military. That threats analysis was finalized before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
“We assess that Russia does not want a direct conflict with U.S. forces,” the document by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said. “Russia seeks an accommodation with the United States on mutual noninterference in both countries’ domestic affairs and U.S. recognition of Russia’s claimed sphere of influence over much of the former Soviet Union.”
“We are witnessing the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II,” House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, D-Calif., said as he opened the threats hearing. “We also face numerous other strategic challenges, from the rise of an increasingly bellicose and belligerent China to the threats posed by Iran and North Korea.”
The document listed China first among worldwide threats, followed by Russia, Iran and North Korea. As the world enters a third year of a global Covid pandemic, health security was listed next, with the intelligence analysts noting that “the economic fallout from the pandemic is likely to continue to challenge governments and hold back human development and wellbeing, particularly in low-income countries.”
Climate change was also featured prominently.
“We assess that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security interests as the physical impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount about how to respond to the challenge,” the document said. “Meanwhile, environmental degradation will increasingly intersect with and worsen climate change effects in many countries, particularly low-income countries.”
The threat from cyberattacks, both military and economic, was discussed in connection with each adversary country.
“We assess that China presents the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to U.S. Government and private sector networks,” the document said. “China’s cyber pursuits and export of related technologies increase the threats of attacks against the U.S. homeland, suppression of U.S. web content that Beijing views as threatening to its control, and the expansion of technology-driven authoritarianism globally.”
NBC News · by Ken Dilanian · March 8, 2022
4. 2022 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
IThe information cut off is January but the Ukraine estimates seem to have been accurate. Nearly 2 full pages on north Korea.
Tuesday, 08 March 2022 08:46
2022 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Date: March 8, 2022
This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 116-260). This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.
5. Ukraine war mystery: What’s wrong with the Russian military?
All warfare is based on deception - Sun Tzu.
I worry we will become complacent and misunderstand the Russians due to reports like these.
But I do have to say based on what we have seen so far I can't understand what is happening to the Russians.
I too fear there are dark days ahead.
Excerpts:
As for hopes of an ongoing insurgency, Vershinin told Grid, “I’ve seen what partisan warfare did to Iraq. I wouldn’t wish that on any nation.”
Right now, the fact that Ukraine has more leverage than expected means that it is unlikely to agree to the ceasefire terms Russia is putting forward. But refusing those conditions could lead to the wholesale destruction of Ukrainian cities and many more people being displaced or killed.
For two weeks, much of the global narrative around this war has portrayed plucky Ukrainians standing up to bumbling Russians. There is truth in both characterizations. But it is also very possible that the story will take an even darker turn in the days to come.
Ukraine war mystery: What’s wrong with the Russian military?
Losses, desertions and a convoy that doesn’t move: Questions are mounting about one of the world’s largest armies.
Global Security Reporter
March 8, 2022
Why did Russian President Vladimir Putin decide to use military force to achieve his political objectives in Ukraine? Perhaps because recent experience has taught him that it works. In Georgia in 2011, Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and in Syria starting in 2015, Russia achieved its objectives at relatively little military or economic cost.
We can say with some certainty that the 2022 war in Ukraine has not gone that way.
As of this writing, nearly two weeks into the conflict, Russia has committed more than 90 percent of its planned forces to the fight but does not appear to have accomplished any of its strategic objectives. Ukraine’s government remains in Kyiv and in command of Ukraine’s military, and the Russians have taken only one major Ukrainian city, Kherson in the south, and even there the occupiers were met with significant protests by locals over the weekend.
The number of Russian troops killed is likely somewhere between the roughly 500 claimed by Russia and 11,000 claimed by Ukraine — even the lower figure is high for two weeks of fighting — and there have been widespread reports of desertions and low morale. Russian forces are massing around the capital, Kyiv, but accounts differ as to the degree to which they have the city surrounded.
It’s true that Ukraine’s military and civilian resistance has proved more effective than many expected, and the country has received more international support than anticipated, but some of the Russian forces’ difficulties are also clearly due to their own strategic mistakes and logistical difficulties.
How damaged is the Russian military — in terms of training, logistics and morale — and how much does it matter for the future of this conflict?
Strategic blunders
The first sign that this was not going to go quickly or easily for Russia came on the first day of the war, when Russian paratroopers attempted to seize Hostomel Airport northwest of Kyiv, which would have allowed them to airlift in troops to take the capital. But the paratroopers landed well ahead of the invading force, had little air cover and ended up in a violent struggle with the Ukrainian military that left the airport unusable. The Russians were forced to transport their troops over land.
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Overall, the early days of the Russian invasion were characterized by small units moving on their own, without logistics support or air cover, getting into skirmishes with Ukrainian defenders. An example was a seemingly halfhearted attempt by small detachments of Russian forces to take Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, in the first days of the war. This spread-out and haphazard approach was baffling to some of those who study Russian military tactics, which typically emphasize heavy artillery.
“From what we understand, or what we thought we understood, about Russian doctrine, they’re doing everything wrong,” David Shlapak, a senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, told Grid. “They came in completely ignoring the principles of combined arms. They came in without employing artillery and firepower the way we would have expected them to. They undertook some fairly risky operations. Their doctrine is actually pretty clear on how they intend to fight. And they just didn’t do that.”
Another mystery for many observers is why we haven’t seen more concerted use of Russian air power. The invasion began as generally expected, with cruise and ballistic missile salvos against Ukrainian air defenses and radar systems. As Justin Bronk, an air power analyst at the Royal United Services Institute recently wrote, the logical next step “would have been for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to mount large-scale strike operations to destroy” the Ukrainian Air Force. It’s a maxim of modern war; the first thing you do is take control of the skies. Instead, Russian fighter jets have launched only limited sorties into Ukraine, usually in singles and pairs at low altitudes to avoid Ukrainian air defense systems.
Low morale and confusion
Reports have been emerging of Russian troops surrendering en masse, sabotaging or abandoning their vehicles to avoid fighting, and even being forced to ask Ukrainians for food or loot grocery stores. These reports, which the Ukrainian government and its allies have an incentive to highlight, should be taken with a grain of salt. But it is becoming abundantly clear that many Russian officers were not aware they were going to be part of an invasion of Ukraine until just before it began. Some rank-and-file troops may not have known they were no longer on a “training mission” until after they crossed the Ukrainian border. This is all the more remarkable given the detailed accounts of Russian plans being publicized by Western intelligence agencies. It appears that officials in Washington and certain European capitals knew more about the mission than the Russian soldiers themselves.
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The Russian government had been denying for weeks that it planned to invade, and Putin and his top military aides may have been paranoid about leaks. But the lack of preparation may explain some of the strategic confusion in the early days of the war.
At a higher level, the war’s planners may have started to believe some of their own propaganda suggesting that Ukrainians were actually Russian patriots, waiting to be liberated from their Western-installed Nazi overlords. The nearly 200,000 troops Russia assembled along Ukraine’s borders didn’t constitute that large a force if the aim was to conquer a country larger than France, with a population of over 40 million. The thinking may have been that at least some Ukrainians would welcome them, and that resistance would crumble under a barrage of cruise missiles and lightning raids into the country’s main cities.
That’s not what happened.
“I’m increasingly beginning to think that it was a combination of hubris and miscalculations based on some sort of warped understanding of force ratios and poor assessment of motivation among the Ukrainians,” Margarita Konaev, a research fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, told Grid.
The traffic jam from hell
The Russians may have relied too heavily on “thunder raids” by small, lightly defended detachments in the early days of the war, but today, attention is fixed on a 40-mile-long convoy of trucks and military vehicles that has sat for a week now, hardly moving, about 15 miles from the center of Kyiv. It’s a military traffic jam of vehicles and soldiers hampered by fuel and food shortages, according to U.S. officials.
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Satellite image showing the northern end of a Russian logistics convoy near Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Feb. 28. (Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.)
Alex Vershinin, a recently retired U.S. Army officer with experience in war gaming, wrote a widely cited article prior to the war predicting that the Russian advance could be slowed by the difficulties of supporting Russia’s artillery heavy units with fuel, spare parts and other supplies.
Vershinin told Grid, “The question is, did that column stop because it ran out of supplies? Or did it stop because they had known they would run out of supplies and intentionally halted in that area to wait for the supporting echelon to catch up?”
Either way, Russia has left a large amount of supplies and armor and soldiers on an open road, exposed for a strangely long time.
Stuck in the mud
During the lead-up to the war, a fair bit of commentary focused on the infamous rasputitsa, or thaw, which turns unpaved ground into muddy soup in Ukraine and western Russia. That in turn provoked some eye-rolling at the notion that mud would really be an issue for a modern mechanized army as advanced as Russia’s. But as the video below, of a $15 million air defense system apparently abandoned in the mud near Kherson shows, the terrain has been an issue.
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) February 28, 2022
“You can ask basically any American tanker ever about having to dig a tank out of the mud,” Dan Grazier, a retired U.S. Marine Corps tank officer now with the Project on Government Oversight, told Grid. “When you’re talking about big, heavy, armored vehicles, even with tracks, if they get stuck in the mud, it becomes a big deal really quickly. In most of the pictures that I’m seeing, the tanks are sticking to the roads, which tells me that there’s plenty of concern about getting all those T-72s and T-90s stuck in the mud.”
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Low-tech war
It’s been decades since the world has seen a major land war between two industrialized countries. Technological advances have transformed modern combat in recent decades — or so we thought.
At least so far, Russia’s invasion has been surprisingly low-tech. There have been cyberattacks and a use of malware, but not the sort of devastating blows knocking out Ukraine’s communications or energy grid that many feared. (Whether this is due to lack of trying on Russia’s part or effective cyberdefense from Ukraine is not yet clear.) Rather than taking the fight to cyberspace, Russia is simply bombing Ukraine’s communications infrastructure and power plants. Russia has also made less use than expected of the drone capabilities it has demonstrated in other conflicts, notably in Syria.
“I’ve been following the modernization of the Russian military and its significant improvements and investments in areas like electronic warfare, drones. We haven’t seen good use of any of those elements,” Konaev said.
Grazier, who today researches defense procurement issues, said the war should prompt some changes in thinking about defense priorities going forward.
“I think a lot of people who’ve been urging lawmakers to lavish money on these new Pentagon programs because the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed are going to be pretty embarrassed,” he said. “What I’m seeing so far is very conventional operations. What are we talking about here? Tanks, artillery pieces, fuel, mud.”
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Fog of war
A word of caution is in order for any reader concluding that Russia is failing and likely to lose the war.
Ukraine is undoubtedly winning the global information war, building global sympathy and inspiring support for its cause. But Ukraine has also dominated the messaging to an extent that it may be giving a misleading picture of what’s happening on the battlefield.
What we do know is that while Russian advances have stalled in many places in the north, they’ve made much faster progress in the south, along the coasts of the Sea of Azov and Black Sea. These are critical gains in that they risk choking Ukraine’s key lanes of commerce. Ukraine’s government may soon face a difficult choice about whether to pull forces from eastern Ukraine to keep them from getting cut off. Russian forces now appear to be regrouping for major assaults on Kyiv and Kharkiv. For all the talk of Russia’s mistakes and generally slow advance, it’s worth remembering that it took around a month for U.S. forces to take Baghdad during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. History now regards that as a remarkably rapid operation.
The fact that this war is turning out to be a fairer fight than many expected also creates new political and moral dilemmas. The West is currently funneling weapons into Ukraine to help its army hold off the Russians or bolster an underground resistance if the Ukrainian government falls. But while Russia’s early tactics seemed designed to avoid heavy fighting in urban centers and civilian casualties, the longer war drags on, the more the Russian military is likely to employ the kind of scorched-earth tactics it used on cities in Chechnya and Syria. This could include the use of powerful “thermobaric” weapons, also known as vacuum bombs, to demolish large urban areas. “The Russian approach to warfare is typically, when in doubt, flatten the grid square,” said Shlapak.
As for hopes of an ongoing insurgency, Vershinin told Grid, “I’ve seen what partisan warfare did to Iraq. I wouldn’t wish that on any nation.”
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Right now, the fact that Ukraine has more leverage than expected means that it is unlikely to agree to the ceasefire terms Russia is putting forward. But refusing those conditions could lead to the wholesale destruction of Ukrainian cities and many more people being displaced or killed.
For two weeks, much of the global narrative around this war has portrayed plucky Ukrainians standing up to bumbling Russians. There is truth in both characterizations. But it is also very possible that the story will take an even darker turn in the days to come.
6. Banning Russia’s oil imports is the easy part. Protecting American consumers is much harder.
I saw regular gas on Fort Belvoir at $4.15 today. The worst is yet to come.
Banning Russia’s oil imports is the easy part. Protecting American consumers is much harder.
The White House announced on Tuesday that it would ban the importation of Russian oil, natural gas and coal. The move followed mounting pressure from the public and Congress to exclude the roughly 700,000 barrels per day Russia can sell to the U.S.
It marks a dramatic policy shift from the first days of the war, when such a ban was off the table.
Although the European Union and the United States quickly implemented unexpectedly strong sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine — essentially impounding Central Bank assets, cutting off major portions of its financial sector from the world banking system — they could not have been clearer about one thing: Russian energy exports would be exempt. Russia could continue to ship its oil and gas, even to countries implementing the other sanctions.
And yet even before Tuesday’s announcement, the global oil market started to seize up. According to data from the Energy Information Administration, American imports of Russian oil fell dramatically following the invasion. Russian oil was even sold at a discount as trading companies, oil companies and insurance and financial market actors grew leery of either the legal or reputational risk of dealing with the country’s energy industry. Shell even felt the need to issue a news release explaining why it purchased Ural crude.
“I think what you saw last week was the market trying to get its head around not just what sanctions had been enacted but also what was likely to happen in the future,” explained Dan Katz, a former Treasury official and co-founder of Amberwave Partners.
Like so much else in the Ukraine war, the politics of the import ban have been moving very quickly, and they have now outpaced those initial decisions to allow for the trade in Russian oil and gas to continue. On Feb. 24, President Joe Biden said, “We specifically designed [the sanctions] to allow energy payments to continue.” Just four days ago, the Treasury Department issued FAQs explaining how energy businesses could continue if sanctions came.
The impact
The amount of Russian oil that the U.S. imports is typically a small portion of its overall imports — far more oil is imported from Canada, with Mexico being the U.S.’s second-biggest foreign supplier. And that number was shrinking before the announced ban — according to the Energy Information Administration, Russian oil imports to the U.S. have dropped from 138,000 barrels per day a month ago to zero in the most recent week of data.
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But in the longer term, Russia’s supply of oil was a key part of the U.S. energy supply that can’t be replaced overnight. Russia’s exports “were less than 5 percent of U.S. total imports of oil products, 1-2 percent of total consumption,” Rachel Ziemba, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Grid, but “even [that] is not negligible.”
The United States is already facing an imbalance between demand for energy — and especially for gasoline — and supply, thus leading to spiraling higher prices. Any move to reduce that supply can only make things tighter for American consumers.
Now, the U.S., not to mention allies that may have to forgo Russian oil because private actors refuse to deal in it for their reasons, will have to reduce their demand, source additional supply or prepare to endure further spikes in gas prices.
American consumers, despite their own rather small exposure to Russian oil, are already experiencing the effects of a tight energy market. Gas prices have hit an all-time high, with Americans paying an average price of just over $4.10 a gallon, according to GasBuddy.
Making up for the shortfall
“At a high level, there isn’t an enormous amount that the administration can do in the very short run to increase U.S. production. If you magically waved a wand,” Katz explained, “it would still take time.”
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While the White House has tried to nudge energy producers to increase output by pointing to the high price for oil, pure exhortation and high prices can do only so much. The White House is trying to find oil supply where it can, sending a delegation to Venezuela — an oil producer and ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s — and trying to wrap up a new nuclear deal with Iran, which would unfreeze shipments from that country.
In terms of boosting domestic output, even if the oil industry could reach some regulatory accord with the Biden administration to boost production, exploration and drilling still needs capital from investors.
“People don’t put millions of dollars at risk based just on the price of oil today. They need to look at a multiyear time horizon,” Katz said.
There’s another issue to consider when it comes to new drilling or exploration in the short term: Like any other massive physical projects, these would be constrained by existing labor and material shortages that are making it hard to find a garage door for a newly built home, let alone drill for oil and gas.
“There are significant labor shortages in the industry, as skilled people have been drawn away from the oil fields,” said Thomas Emanuel Dans, an Amberwave co-founder who served as a counselor in international affairs at the Treasury Department. “They can’t be brought back immediately. There are other shortages, including for drill pipe. I wouldn’t expect very short-term changes in terms of our supply picture. We’re probably short at least 100 rigs in this country. That’s a physical constraint.”
7. Most Americans are willing to pay more at the pump for Ukraine
I do not want to say this "good news." But I am pleasantly surprised to read this. Some interesting statistics at the link:
Most Americans are willing to pay more at the pump for Ukraine
Reporter
Published 5 hours ago
Overall, 71% of Americans supported a ban on Russian oil even if it resulted in higher gas prices, according to the survey, which was conducted from March 4 to 6. Oil was trading around $130 a barrel on Tuesday, while a regular gallon of gasoline was an average $4.17 at the pump.
Democrats were the most likely to back the ban, but the support rates were also high for independents and Republicans.
Support for Ukraine
The majority of Americans—78%—were also in favor of accepting Ukrainian refugees into the US, and 64% had a favorable view of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has emerged as a hero figure over his handling of the conflict.
Meanwhile, Americans seem to understand the precarious position the war has put the Russian population in, with 86% saying Russians have no say on what Vladimir Putin or his government does. The new sanctions add pressure on his regime, which is already dealing with the ruble’s collapse and Russian oil trading at a discount to Brent.
8.How Ukraine Could Do the Impossible: Win a War Against Russia
Excerpts:
That sentiment was echoed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who told the BBC that Ukraine can “absolutely win” the war against Russia.
“The war has already not gone as Russian president Vladimir Putin might have planned,” he said.
A U.S. official also told Reuters that the Ukrainians have a “significant majority of their air combat power available to them, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing as well as unmanned systems and surface-to-air systems.”
Retired United States Army lieutenant general Herbert Raymond McMaster, who served as former President Donald Trump’s National Security Advisor between 2017 and 2018, also indicated that Ukraine can win the war. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has already effectively lost by not winning outright.
Can Ukraine win? Possibly – but it all depends on how determined Vladimir Putin is to continue this conflict.
How Ukraine Could Do the Impossible: Win a War Against Russia
U.S. Officials Say Ukraine Can Win War Against Russia – A combination of increasingly severe Western economic sanctions levied against Russia and clever military strategy could be enough for Ukraine to win the war with Russia, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, former U.S. national security adviser H.R. McMaster, and retired Admiral William McRaven.
Ukraine’s Small Army Fights Back
In 2018, Ukraine had 297,000 troops – a figure not substantially different from the 256,000 troops it had in 2014 when Russia successfully annexed Ukraine. By the time Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to invade Ukraine, he had built up roughly half of that number on the border with Ukraine already – and the Russian military still has more than a million soldiers ready in the homeland.
Despite having a substantially smaller military, however, Ukrainian troops and citizens have done a remarkable job of fending off Russian troops, destroying military equipment, and blocking Russian convoys. Using American military equipment and training from the US, the UK, and Baltic states on that hardware, Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed at least 280 Russian armored vehicles with 300 shots – a 93% kill rate.
Russian tanks continue to be seized by Ukrainian citizens – some of whom have literally pulled tanks out of their convoys using agricultural tractors. NATO allies also armed Ukrainian soldiers with 17,000 anti-tank weapons in just six days, giving the nation’s small army the tools they need to fight back. For comparison, Russia has only a total of 12,00 tanks total in its entire military.
Could It Be Enough?
During an interview with CNN, retired Admiral William McRaven said that the longer the fight in Ukraine goes on, the better chance the Ukrainians have of beating Russia.
McRaven said that from a conventional standpoint, the Russians have clearly overmatched the Ukrainians in terms of combat power. In terms of what it means to “win” the war, however, McRaven said that he doesn’t see Russia successfully subjugating the Ukrainian people and taking over their territory completely.
“People are standing tall, they are fighting hard, as the Russians begin to move into Kiev and Kharkiv they’re going to find themselves in an urban combat environment, and the urban environment is going to favor the Ukrainians,” he said.
He added that Ukrainian people know the alleyways and the streets better than the Russians do, and eventually, the Russian military and leadership will need to consider whether they can sustain the morale of troops to continue the fight.
“I would say, the longer this fight goes, the better chance the Ukrainians have of winning it,” he said.
That sentiment was echoed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who told the BBC that Ukraine can “absolutely win” the war against Russia.
“The war has already not gone as Russian president Vladimir Putin might have planned,” he said.
A U.S. official also told Reuters that the Ukrainians have a “significant majority of their air combat power available to them, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing as well as unmanned systems and surface-to-air systems.”
Retired United States Army lieutenant general Herbert Raymond McMaster, who served as former President Donald Trump’s National Security Advisor between 2017 and 2018, also indicated that Ukraine can win the war. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has already effectively lost by not winning outright.
Can Ukraine win? Possibly – but it all depends on how determined Vladimir Putin is to continue this conflict.
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and report on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.
9. I’ve studied all the possible trajectories of this war. None are good
Reporting is all over the map. Where you stand depends on where you sit.
I’ve studied all the possible trajectories of this war. None are good | Christopher S Chivvis
There are two likely paths: continued escalation, potentially across the nuclear threshold, or a bitter peace imposed on a defeated Ukraine
Wars sometimes start easily, but it is a tenet of strategy that they are always unpredictable and extremely hard to end. Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine is already escalating faster than most experts would have imagined just a week ago. He has now encircled major Ukrainian cities with his army and threatens to flatten them with thermobaric weapons, cluster munitions and guided missiles. This will terrorize the civilian population and could demoralize the budding Ukrainian resistance. He could escalate the conflict to another region, such as the Balkans, where longstanding conflicts fester and Russia has an extensive network of intelligence and security services. He may turn the lights off in a major US city with a cyber-attack. Most frighteningly, he has raised the alert level of Russian nuclear forces and may be considering introducing martial law.
Meanwhile, Nato, the G7 and a host of other countries have turned the dial of economic punishment up to unprecedented levels. Several European nations that had previously hesitated to involve themselves militarily in the conflict have now done so, sending weapons and financing Ukraine’s resistance. A growing number of voices in Washington are clamoring for a more aggressive approach from the United States and Nato, pressuring the White House to support a Ukrainian insurgency with a broad menu of weaponry or even calling for Nato to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
Amid this escalation, experts can spin out an infinite number of branching scenarios on how this might end. But scores of war games conducted for the US and allied governments and my own experience as the US national intelligence officer for Europe suggest that if we boil it down, there are really only two paths toward ending the war: one, continued escalation, potentially across the nuclear threshold; the other, a bitter peace imposed on a defeated Ukraine that will be extremely hard for the United States and many European allies to swallow.
Putin deliberately frames his operation in Ukraine in the same way that the United States has framed its own regime-change operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya, charging that Ukraine has committed human rights violations and is a terrorist state. For good measure, Putin throws in the ludicrous assertion that Ukraine is fascist. These are transparent fig leaves for what is nothing more than a war of brute imperialism.
Judging from how things stand now, Putin, having invested so much in this war already, seems unlikely to settle for anything less than the complete subjugation of the Ukrainian government. If the current uneven pace of Russian military progress doesn’t accomplish the job, the most likely strategy for doing this is to make an example of a city like Kharkiv, leveling it as if it were Grozny or Aleppo, both cities that Russia has brutally destroyed in the recent past, and then threatening to burn Kyiv to the ground. He can accompany this with special forces attacks in the capital to disrupt the civilian population and sow further confusion and discontent. Ultimately, he needs at least to force the removal of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his government.
In this case, Russia will install a puppet government in Kyiv, which will sign terms of surrender highly favorable to Russia. The terms will almost certainly include a pledge of Ukrainian neutrality, and might go further by committing Ukraine formally to Russia’s sphere of influence with a membership in Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization or its Eurasian Economic Union.
Putin seems unlikely to settle for anything less than the complete subjugation of the Ukrainian government
At this juncture, the United States and its allies would face an extraordinarily difficult policy choice. Disgust with Putin’s war has greatly increased the chances that Washington and some of its allies would seek to fight on, for instance by supporting a Ukrainian insurgency. This would roughly mirror the strategy that the United States used to assist French resistance against Nazi Germany. The more effective Nato support to the insurgency is, the more the Kremlin would likely be willing to risk attacks on safe havens in Nato territory – most likely employing irregular forces or even the infamous Wagner Group, a private organization that operates globally as a quasi-special force of the Kremlin. These operations could lead to a massive escalation that would open the door to a much wider war between Nato and Russia – exactly the war that Joe Biden has been trying to avoid.
Alternatively, the insurgency might greatly weaken Russian forces. The Ukrainian insurgent army could impose heavy damages on Russian forces and erode Putin’s position among Russian elites, on whose support he depends for power. Ukrainian forces would have major incentives to take their fight inside Russian territory, attacking Russia’s rearguard in Belarus and Russia itself.
There are possible other paths toward further escalation, but they all eventually lead toward the nuclear threshold. Scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine make it clear that Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon if he concludes that his regime is threatened. It is hard to know exactly what turn of events would scare him enough to cross the nuclear threshold. Certainly a large Nato army entering Russian territory would be enough. But what if events in Ukraine loosened his grip on power at home? Indeed, achieving regime change in Russia indirectly by making Putin lose in Ukraine seems to be the logic behind some of those who are pushing for escalation today.
Moving across the nuclear threshold wouldn’t necessarily mean an immediate, full-force nuclear exchange – in other words, global thermonuclear war. But it would be an extremely dangerous, watershed event in world history.
The nuclear option that has been most frequently discussed in the past few days involves Russia using a small nuclear weapon (a “non-strategic nuclear weapon”) against a specific military target in Ukraine. Such a strike might have a military purpose, such as destroying an airfield or other military target, but it would mainly be aimed at demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons, or “escalating to de-escalate”, and scaring the west into backing down.
Some analysts have questioned Russia’s ability to actually carry out such an operation, given its lack of practice. Unfortunately, this isn’t the only or even the most likely option available to the Kremlin. Based on war games I ran in the wake of Putin’s 2014 invasion, a more likely option would be a sudden nuclear test or a high-altitude nuclear detonation that damages the electrical grid over a major Ukrainian or even Nato city. Think of an explosion that makes the lights go out over Oslo.
Those war games indicated that the best US response to this kind of attack would be first to demonstrate US resolve with a response in kind, aimed at a target of similar value, followed by restraint and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate. In most games, Russia still responds with a second nuclear attack, but in the games that go “well”, the United States and Russia manage to de-escalate after that, although only in circumstances where both sides have clear political off-ramps and lines of communication between Moscow and Washington have remained open. In all the other games, the world is basically destroyed.
Even in the better case where both sides take their fingers off the triggers, the nuclear taboo has been broken, and we are in an entirely new era: two nuclear superpowers have used their nuclear weapons in a war. The proliferation consequences alone would be far-reaching, as other countries accelerate their nuclear weapons programs. The very fact that the nuclear taboo had been broken increases the odds that the nuclear threshold is crossed again in future conflicts, not just between Russia and America, but also with China, between India and Pakistan, in the Middle East, or elsewhere. Even this outcome in which the world is “saved”, the United States is far worse off than it was before the war in Ukraine broke out last month.
What is the alternative? Once again, infinite scenarios and branches are possible, but there is a single basic one that helps to simplify thinking. It begins with an effort to avoid further escalation today. So far, the Biden administration has wisely restrained direct US military involvement in the conflict, but holding off against the rising chorus of voices pushing for escalation may be hard in the coming days if Russian forces brutally devastate Ukraine’s cities. But the most difficult challenge lies a little further down the road with the scenario described above: how to respond if Russia imposes a puppet regime in Ukraine. This would put the United States in the near-impossible position of having to choose between further escalation and compromising on the very principles that drove it toward the war in the first place – the right of a nation like Ukraine to be free and independent of subjugation to foreign rule.
In this scenario, the Biden administration would have to show extraordinary leadership and strength to hold together its coalition and steer it toward restraint. It would face extremely high levels of pressure from European capitals, Ukrainian lobbies, and others to reject the puppet government and fight on, perhaps by recognizing a Ukrainian government-in-exile. The administration is already facing calls from hawkish corners of Washington to pre-empt any negotiated settlement to this war. Emotions are likely to have a much greater effect on the free democracies fighting for Ukraine than on the autocrat sitting in the Kremlin, but they will affect both sides. As they escalate, the prospects of negotiation diminish further.
Would Nato’s door remain open to a Russian-dominated Ukraine? Probably, but it would be similar to claiming that Nato’s door is open to North Korea or Iran (which it theoretically is). All of the consequences that are likely from this conflict – growing conventional force buildup on the Nato-Russia border, higher levels of defense spending in the United States at the expense of domestic programs, an end to efforts to draw down US military posture in the Middle East, and fewer resources for strategic competition with China – would still be a better outcome than the alternative, in which nuclear weapons have been used.
Wars can start quickly or slowly, but it is a dictum of strategy that once started, they take on a logic of their own. It is not too soon to think about how to bring this war to a close. The chances that Putin emerges strategically weak are real. But that does not mean the US can win. It will have to settle for a picture that is much uglier than it was before the war, and the sooner Washington accepts that, the better.
Christopher S Chivvis is the director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
This piece originally published by Carnegie Endowment
10. Who Is Volodymyr Zelensky? Ukraine’s Wartime President Is a Former TV Star
Who Is Volodymyr Zelensky? Ukraine’s Wartime President Is a Former TV Star
After ‘Dancing With the Stars’ and voicing ‘Paddington,’ he now leads country’s resistance to Russia’s invasion
Since the Russian strikes began on Feb. 24, Mr. Zelensky has captured the world’s imagination, often dressing in ballistic vests as he urges people to press the fight during videos he posts to Telegram, Facebook and Instagram from the center of Kyiv. At other times, the 44-year-old has harangued Western leaders to step up their sanctions against Mr. Putin, speaking regularly with figures such as U.S. President Biden, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and French President Emmanuel Macron, and describing Russian missile strikes as terrorism.
As the Russian onslaught intensifies, with air and missile strikes widening to hit more civilian targets, Mr. Zelensky knows that he is at the head of the Kremlin’s kill-or-capture list, but insists that neither he nor his family will leave as he tries to keep his battered country together. He is also growing frustrated with the West’s unwillingness to intervene militarily. On March 6, he again urged Western leaders to reconsider their decision against enforcing a “no-fly” zone over Ukraine after saying Russian missiles had destroyed an airbase in Vinnytsia in central Ukraine.
“If you don’t at least give us planes so we can protect ourselves, there’s only one thing to conclude: You want us to be killed very slowly,” he said, before making a similar point in an address to the British Parliament on March 8. “We still have the sky open,” he told the lawmakers after invoking the wartime resolve of Winston Churchill, Britain’s World War II leader. “Do what you can, do what you must. Because greatness obliges greatness, of your state and your people.”
How long has Volodymyr Zelensky been president of Ukraine?
Mr. Zelensky was elected president in 2019, defeating the incumbent Petro Poroshenko by casting himself as an antiestablishment outsider bent on cleaning up corruption and securing better relations with Moscow. His pitch was largely based on the role he played on his TV show, where he portrayed an ordinary man thrown into the presidency to clean up the country. Even his political party was named after the show.
Volodymyr Zelensky visited a front in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region this past October.
Photo: Ukrainian Presidency/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Fragments of a downed aircraft were strewn across a Kyiv neighborhood in late February.
Photo: Oleksandr Ratushniak/Associated Press
How has Zelensky handled the invasion?
Early on, Mr. Zelensky directed much of his energy toward projecting a sense of calm as Russian forces steadily built along Ukraine’s borders to eventually total as many as 190,000 troops. He said U.S. warnings of an imminent invasion were overblown and were damaging Ukraine’s economy. Mr. Zelensky pointed to an even larger Russian buildup last spring that was eventually withdrawn.
But after the first Russian strikes began to hit Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities on Feb. 24, he pivoted hard toward shoring up Ukraine’s defense, securing as much Western assistance as he could obtain. With Russian propaganda claiming he had already fled the country, he made a hand-shot video of himself out on the street in front of the presidential palace in Kyiv to urge on Ukrainians in their defense of the country. It drew millions of views on Telegram and Facebook. Gone were the suits and ties, in came military sweatshirts.
Mr. Zelensky spoke frequently with Western leaders, urging them to increase sanctions on Moscow in the hope of breaking the Russian advance. As he pleaded with European leaders in a video call to take tougher action, he warned them that this might be the last time they saw him alive, according to several diplomats.
“The silence in the room was impressive,” a senior European Union official said. Shortly after, the 27-nation bloc moved to significantly expand the range of measures as the West hardened its response to Moscow’s aggression.
From left, Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Paris in December. Mr. Zelensky has urged the West to step up sanctions on Russia.
Photo: alexey nikolsky/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
How has Zelensky’s stance against Russia evolved?
Mr. Zelensky initially sought a rapprochement with Russia when he was elected president in 2019. Ukraine had been at loggerheads with the Kremlin since 2014, when Russian forces annexed the Black Sea port of Crimea and stirred up a rebellion that led to two pro-Russian regions breaking away from Kyiv’s control. Mr. Zelensky pledged to improve relations with Mr. Putin, and had some early successes. He secured a prisoner exchange with Russia and moved toward a deal on how to build on a 2015 cease-fire agreement.
Street protests against his plans forced him to change tack. Western diplomats warned him that Mr. Putin was trying to get him to sign an agreement that would provide him with long-term influence over Ukraine’s future via Russia’s proxies in the breakaway regions, with the goal of barring the country from joining the EU or NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Mr. Zelensky instead turned toward persuading NATO to engage in a closer relationship with Ukraine while launching a popular campaign to win back control of Crimea. A person close to him said Russia had begun to see him as being too similar to Mr. Poroshenko, whom he succeeded as president, and someone Moscow saw as intent on pushing Ukraine closer to the West.
Political analysts said the prospect of Ukraine aligning itself more closely with the West had enraged Mr. Putin, who has long been trying to restore Russia’s sphere of influence, which had been curtailed severely since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years earlier.
On March 1, the fifth day of the invasion, Mr. Zelensky said the Ukrainian people were now fighting to become equal members of the EU—with many paying the ultimate price. “We are giving our lives for the right to be equal,” he said, unshaven and wearing a green army T-shirt. “Prove that you are with us and will not let us go.”
Supporters crowded around Volodymyr Zelensky as he arrived at parliament in Kyiv for a swearing-in ceremony in 2019.
Photo: sergei supinsky/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
How did Zelensky rise from television comedian to president?
Mr. Zelensky studied law at university but after graduating entered the entertainment business, founding a television-production company. He became famous for his skits, including one where he and some accomplices dropped their trousers and pretended to play a piano with something other than their hands. Later, he won the Ukrainian version of “Dancing with the Stars” in 2006 and voiced the role of Paddington in the eponymous movie about a young bear who visits London.
It was his TV show “Servant of the People” that captured the mood of the country when the program first aired in 2015, however. Mr. Zelensky played a humble schoolteacher who candidly ranted on a video about the everyday corruption many Ukrainians need to contend with. The clip went viral, launching a political career that ultimately propelled his character into the presidential palace.
The success of the show convinced Mr. Zelensky that he should try his hand at politics for real. His campaign echoed many of the themes he explored in the TV show and his political party carried the same name, “Servant of the People.” He won the second-round runoff against the incumbent, Mr. Poroshenko, with about 73% of the vote.
What is Zelensky’s family background?
Born on Jan. 25, 1978, Mr. Zelensky grew up in a gritty, Russian-speaking region in southeast Ukraine. His background was Jewish; several family members died in the Holocaust while his grandfather served in World War II as an officer in the Soviet army. His father, a mathematician, and his mother, an engineer, chose to stay in Ukraine while many other Jews departed for the U.S. or Israel when the former Soviet Union permitted them to emigrate. Childhood friends recall how he stood out for his earring and his good grades in school. He later obtained a law degree at Kyiv National Economic University.
Mr. Zelensky himself has made little of his Jewish identity, saying in 2020 that he came from an ordinary Soviet Jewish family and that most such families weren’t religious. This appears to ignore how Jews in the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, largely had to suppress their religious identity and were viewed as outsiders. Some commentators have suggested this has informed Mr. Zelensky’s own self-image as an outsider, reflected in both his TV work and his presidential campaign in 2019.
Ukrainians appear more favorably disposed toward Jews than do the people of other countries that were in the Soviet bloc. A Pew Research Center poll in 2019 found that 5% of Ukrainians were unwilling to accept Jewish people as fellow citizens, compared with 18% in Poland, 19% of Czechs and 22% in Romania. And Ukraine’s prime minister when Mr. Zelensky became president, Volodymyr Groysman, is also Jewish.
When Mr. Putin said Russia’s invasion was designed to “de-Nazify” Ukraine’s leadership—a potent slur in Russia, referring to World War II—Mr. Zelensky was quick to ridicule the Russian leader’s claims.
Volodymyr Zelensky met with President Trump on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in 2019.
Photo: saul loeb/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
What happened between Zelensky and Donald Trump?
Shortly after becoming Ukraine’s president, Mr. Zelensky was thrust into the center of U.S. politics after President Donald Trump was accused of pressuring him in a telephone call to investigate his chief rival at the time, Joe Biden. An impeachment resolution in the House of Representatives alleged that Mr. Trump had made the provision of $391 million in U.S. security aid contingent on Mr. Zelensky publicly announcing a probe. After Mr. Trump’s actions came to light, the resolution charges, he released the aid, which was meant to strengthen Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the country.
Mr. Trump rejected allegations of wrongdoing and, while he was impeached in the House, he was acquitted by the Senate.
Mr. Biden went on to be elected president.
This article might be updated.
11. Iron Curtain Comes Down on Energy
Excerpts:
In other words, if you’ve already spent big on your domestic economy and now you’re going to spend big on decarbonizing it, maybe you don’t want other countries undercutting you with cheaper exports that don’t factor in the cost of emissions. The EU, now contemplating an enormous issuance of joint bonds to overhaul its energy and military capabilities, won’t want that all spent elsewhere. This is the thinking behind the EU’s proposed carbon border-adjustment mechanism, and such tariffs have a way of spreading, even to the carbon-tax shy U.S.
Russia, whose economy is a relative furnace, always stood to lose more than most if these tariffs become commonplace. And that was before it gave the West added reason to isolate it. Yet tariffs, like sanctions, are weapons of mutual destruction. Cutting off Russian oil and gas, officially or not, is plainly inflationary for energy costs, as any trading screen today will tell you. But deglobalization will do the same to clean tech, or at least the harder bits of it. Look at what’s just happened to nickel, a critical ingredient in many battery technologies, for which Russia is a major supplier. Sure, it’s a short squeeze; but it’s being squeezed for a reason.
One lesson relearned this past year is that surging demand combined with disrupted supply results in something that anyone under the age of 30 also won’t remember: inflation. We are poised at a moment when governments propose to radically reconstruct their economies to address climate change — even as international trade in energy commodities and technology is rupturing. On the way to the transition, we somehow stumbled into the energy partition.
Iron Curtain Comes Down on Energy
Countries already working toward an energy transition suddenly face rising costs — and a strengthened desire for energy independence.
March 8, 2022, 9:00 AM EST
The lamps aren’t yet going out all over Europe. 1 But they are dimming in a real sense in Russia’s shadow. With the invasion of Ukraine, tight energy markets are now fracturing, raising the prospect of not just high prices but actual cutoffs.
In response to the invasion, the U.S., the European Union and other allies are waging a surprisingly cohesive and aggressive form of financial warfare. Russia’s access to capital along with numerous goods and services has been severely curtailed both by official sanctions and by foreign firms’ self-sanctioning.
That includes Russia’s economic lifeblood: energy exports. Millions of barrels of heavily discounted Russian oil cannot find buyers. And Western oil majors including BP Plc and (gasp) Exxon Mobil Corp. are walking away from multi-billion-dollar investments in the country. The dislocation and sheer discombobulation are evident, with Brent crude oil topping $135 a barrel at one point this weekend even as the discount on Urals crude blew out.
For many of us, the nearest comparison is the embargo placed on oil from Iraq and occupied Kuwait in 1990, which led gasoline prices to almost double within a couple of weeks. Yet that episode was relatively brief and happened at a time when oil inventories were high and Saudi Arabia was ready to make up for shortfalls. Russia is a bigger exporter of both oil and gas (as well as metals, coal and grain). And Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC+ now seem to prefer risking global economic turmoil to crossing their partner in Moscow. We — especially those too young to remember even the Gulf War’s imperfect parallel — are in deeply unfamiliar territory here.
One big difference concerns time. Russia’s attack on Ukraine represents a broader war on the international order by a nuclear power spanning two continents. It has probably dealt a fatal blow to energy trade with Europe, which endured the Cold War, post-Soviet chaos and prior spats with President Vladimir Putin. A European summit later this week will discuss extraordinarily ambitious proposals to sever the relationship altogether — and Russia now threatens to do it first. This isn’t, as they say, transitory.
Added to this is the imperative for countries to decarbonize their energy systems in the face of climate change. The EU already has net-zero targets that imply a sharp reduction in Russian energy imports over time. The attack on Ukraine shifts priorities. Coal-fired power, for example, will probably make a comeback in the near term to help offset pricey or absent gas imports. But anyone thinking that this would spell the end of the EU’s climate ambitions is perhaps unaware that there’s a war on. Today’s exigencies, while demanding some compromises on emissions, also add a pressing security dimension that strengthens the green impetus. It’s become simply unrealistic to any longer tie Europe’s fate to Russian energy exports.
In some respects, high and volatile fossil-fuel prices are a boon for alternatives like renewable energy. Yet today’s mayhem also portends trouble for clean technology.
The entire energy system is a product of an era of globalization that began at the end of the Second World War and expanded at the end of the Cold War. The diversification of oil and gas supply chains, linking even adversaries, kept prices remarkably stable and affordable for much of the time. For things like renewable energy and batteries, technology transfers and the muscle of Chinese manufacturing married with subsidies elsewhere have spurred a sharp drop in costs.
Well, goodbye to all that. Years before Russia’s attack, globalization generally and specifically in energy markets had come under attack. Former President Donald Trump’s “energy dominance” agenda explicitly linked U.S. oil and gas exports with geopolitical leverage. Energy of all types featured prominently in his trade war with China. President Joe Biden may not be a proponent of freedom fracks but he has certainly cast his green industrial policy as a weapon in that same confrontation. For its part, China has worked assiduously to build leading positions in several areas of clean tech and, with a wary eye on Ukraine, warns against the creation of a Pacific version of NATO. Meanwhile, German economy minister Robert Habeck, in comments to Reuters this weekend about a 200-billion-euro fund for industrial transformation, spoke of the “need to invest in our energy sovereignty” (emphasis mine).
The underlying logic here extends back perhaps to the 2008 financial crisis and governments’ largesse in seeking to mitigate it. As ClearView Energy Partners, a Washington-based analysis firm, concluded in a report last summer:
To the extent that fiscal stimulus promotes protectionism, we have argued that the recent spate of green recovery outlays could transform prevailing trade war into carbon trade war. 2
In other words, if you’ve already spent big on your domestic economy and now you’re going to spend big on decarbonizing it, maybe you don’t want other countries undercutting you with cheaper exports that don’t factor in the cost of emissions. The EU, now contemplating an enormous issuance of joint bonds to overhaul its energy and military capabilities, won’t want that all spent elsewhere. This is the thinking behind the EU’s proposed carbon border-adjustment mechanism, and such tariffs have a way of spreading, even to the carbon-tax shy U.S.
Russia, whose economy is a relative furnace, always stood to lose more than most if these tariffs become commonplace. And that was before it gave the West added reason to isolate it. Yet tariffs, like sanctions, are weapons of mutual destruction. Cutting off Russian oil and gas, officially or not, is plainly inflationary for energy costs, as any trading screen today will tell you. But deglobalization will do the same to clean tech, or at least the harder bits of it. Look at what’s just happened to nickel, a critical ingredient in many battery technologies, for which Russia is a major supplier. Sure, it’s a short squeeze; but it’s being squeezed for a reason.
One lesson relearned this past year is that surging demand combined with disrupted supply results in something that anyone under the age of 30 also won’t remember: inflation. We are poised at a moment when governments propose to radically reconstruct their economies to address climate change — even as international trade in energy commodities and technology is rupturing. On the way to the transition, we somehow stumbled into the energy partition.
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On the eve of his country's entry into World War I, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, remarked to a friend: "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." He was at the time looking out of his office window at dusk as gas lamps were being lit along the Mall in central London.
"Fifty-Five Shades of Green,"July15, 2021.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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12. Live Updates: Biden Bans Russian Oil Imports and Major U.S. Brands Close Outlets
LIVEUpdated
March 8, 2022, 7:17 p.m. ET28 minutes ago
28 minutes ago
Live Updates: Biden Bans Russian Oil Imports and Major U.S. Brands Close Outlets
McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Starbucks are among those suspending operations in Russia, and Pepsico is suspending soda sales. The U.S. average gas price hit $4.17 per gallon. The Ukrainian president spoke to the British Parliament by telelink, and the flow of refugees surpassed two million.
13. Opinion | Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me
Excerpts:
There is simply no pathway that I see for Putin to win in Ukraine in any sustainable way because it simply is not the country he thought it was — a country just waiting for a quick decapitation of its “Nazi” leadership so that it could gently fall back into the bosom of Mother Russia.
So either he cuts his losses now and eats crow — and hopefully for him escapes enough sanctions to revive the Russian economy and hold onto power — or faces a forever war against Ukraine and much of the world, which will slowly sap Russia’s strength and collapse its infrastructure.
As he seems hellbent on the latter, I am terrified. Because there is only one thing worse than a strong Russia under Putin — and that’s a weak, humiliated, disorderly Russia that could fracture or be in a prolonged internal leadership turmoil, with different factions wrestling for power and with all of those nuclear warheads, cybercriminals and oil and gas wells lying around.
Putin’s Russia is not too big to fail. It is, however, too big to fail in a way that won’t shake the whole rest of the world.
Opinion | Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me
Thomas L. Friedman
Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me
March 8, 2022, 7:00 p.m. ET
Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
By
Opinion Columnist
If you’re hoping that the instability that Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine has wreaked on global markets and geopolitics has peaked, your hope is in vain. We haven’t seen anything yet. Wait until Putin fully grasps that his only choices left in Ukraine are how to lose — early and small and a little humiliated or late and big and deeply humiliated.
I can’t even wrap my mind around what kind of financial and political shocks will radiate from Russia — this country that is the world’s third-largest oil producer and possesses some 6,000 nuclear warheads — when it loses a war of choice that was spearheaded by one man, who can never afford to admit defeat.
Why not? Because Putin surely knows that “the Russian national tradition is unforgiving of military setbacks,” observed Leon Aron, a Russia expert at the American Enterprise Institute, who is writing a book about Putin’s road to Ukraine.
“Virtually every major defeat has resulted in radical change,” added Aron, writing in The Washington Post. “The Crimean War (1853-1856) precipitated Emperor Alexander II’s liberal revolution from above. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) brought about the First Russian Revolution. The catastrophe of World War I resulted in Emperor Nicholas II’s abdication and the Bolshevik Revolution. And the war in Afghanistan became a key factor in Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms.” Also, retreating from Cuba contributed significantly to Nikita Khrushchev’s removal two years later.
In the coming weeks it will become more and more obvious that our biggest problem with Putin in Ukraine is that he will refuse to lose early and small, and the only other outcome is that he will lose big and late. But because this is solely his war and he cannot admit defeat, he could keep doubling down in Ukraine until … until he contemplates using a nuclear weapon.
Why do I say that defeat in Ukraine is Putin’s only option, that only the timing and size is in question? Because the easy, low-cost invasion he envisioned and the welcome party from Ukrainians he imagined were total fantasies — and everything flows from that.
Putin completely underestimated Ukraine’s will to be independent and become part of the West. He completely underestimated the will of many Ukrainians to fight, even if it meant dying, for those two goals. He completely overestimated his own armed forces. He completely underestimated President Biden’s ability to galvanize a global economic and military coalition to enable Ukrainians to stand and fight and to devastate Russia at home — the most effective U.S. coalition-building effort since George H.W. Bush made Saddam Hussein pay for his folly of seizing Kuwait. And he completely underestimated the ability of companies and individuals all over the world to participate in, and amplify, economic sanctions on Russia — far beyond anything governments initiated or mandated.
When you get that many things wrong as a leader, your best option is to lose early and small. In Putin’s case that would mean withdrawing his forces from Ukraine immediately; offering a face-saving lie to justify his “special military operation,” like claiming it successfully protected Russians living in Ukraine; and promising to help Russians’ brethren rebuild. But the inescapable humiliation would surely be intolerable for this man obsessed with restoring the dignity and unity of what he sees as the Russian motherland.
Incidentally, the way things are going on the ground in Ukraine right now, it is not out of the realm of possibility that Putin could actually lose early and big. I would not bet on it, but with every passing day that more and more Russian soldiers are killed in Ukraine, who knows what happens to the fighting spirit of the conscripts in the Russian Army being asked to fight a deadly urban war against fellow Slavs for a cause that was never really explained to them.
Given the resistance of Ukrainians everywhere to the Russian occupation, for Putin to “win” militarily on the ground his army will need to subdue every major city in Ukraine. That includes the capital, Kyiv — after probably weeks of urban warfare and massive civilian casualties. In short, it can be done only by Putin and his generals perpetrating war crimes not seen in Europe since Hitler. It will make Putin’s Russia a permanent international pariah.
Moreover, how would Putin maintain control of another country — Ukraine — that has roughly one-third the population of Russia, with many residents hostile to Moscow? He would probably need to maintain every one of the 150,000-plus soldiers he has deployed there — if not more — forever.
There is simply no pathway that I see for Putin to win in Ukraine in any sustainable way because it simply is not the country he thought it was — a country just waiting for a quick decapitation of its “Nazi” leadership so that it could gently fall back into the bosom of Mother Russia.
So either he cuts his losses now and eats crow — and hopefully for him escapes enough sanctions to revive the Russian economy and hold onto power — or faces a forever war against Ukraine and much of the world, which will slowly sap Russia’s strength and collapse its infrastructure.
As he seems hellbent on the latter, I am terrified. Because there is only one thing worse than a strong Russia under Putin — and that’s a weak, humiliated, disorderly Russia that could fracture or be in a prolonged internal leadership turmoil, with different factions wrestling for power and with all of those nuclear warheads, cybercriminals and oil and gas wells lying around.
Putin’s Russia is not too big to fail. It is, however, too big to fail in a way that won’t shake the whole rest of the world.
14. I was the head of the UK’s Syria team. Our mistakes are being repeated in Ukraine
The subtitle and this excerpt summarize the problems and our strategic weakness:
Putin now assumes two things: that the west won’t risk direct military confrontation with Russia — he learned this in Syria when the entry of Russian forces led to a paralysis of western policy there — and that the west will tolerate Russian annexations in the neighborhood to avoid confrontation, which he learned in Georgia and Crimea.
I was the head of the UK’s Syria team. Our mistakes are being repeated in Ukraine
I left because I was convinced that we had made a catastrophic mistake and left millions to death, torture and starvation. The situation in Ukraine is a direct consequence of weak western policy
In 2013, as head of the UK Foreign Office’s Syria team, I watched as our promises to intervene to protect civilians evaporated after the UK Parliament voted against military action following Assad’s chemical weapons attack. We failed to act to save lives. I left the Foreign Office because I was convinced that we had made a catastrophic mistake and left millions to death, torture and starvation.
In the years that followed, from my new role at an NGO working with democratic Syrians, I watched the death toll rise to hundreds of thousands. In 2015, Russia deployed its forces to help Assad directly murder civilians, flatten cities and blow up hospitals. The west ruled out assistance to protect civilians for fear of direct confrontation with Russia. That same fear now risks consigning Ukraine to a similar fate.
NATO’s public rejection of the Ukrainian request to close the skies was a mistake. The only way to stop Putin taking Ukraine at the expense of massive civilian losses, and to deter him from future misadventures, is to keep all options on the table to defend Ukraine. That includes direct action to close Ukraine’s skies and protect civilians, should it become necessary to prevent Ukraine’s defeat.
Putin’s war in Ukraine is a direct consequence of the weakness of western policy over the past 15 years: Weakness with respect to Russia in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and weak responses to most foreign policy crises in the last ten years in particular — including Syria, Myanmar and Venezuela. The west has consistently failed to draw lines and to enforce them.
Putin now assumes two things: that the west won’t risk direct military confrontation with Russia — he learned this in Syria when the entry of Russian forces led to a paralysis of western policy there — and that the west will tolerate Russian annexations in the neighborhood to avoid confrontation, which he learned in Georgia and Crimea.
Each time that Putin “wins”, he is emboldened, his assumptions about western inaction are reinforced and his next nefarious foreign adventure becomes still more destructive.
If we are to protect European — and global — security, we need to buck Putin’s assumptions by protecting international law. We need to ensure not only that Putin fails to take Ukraine, but that he loses more than he started with: in other words, he should be pushed back to the pre-2014 status quo, losing Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the process.
Ukraine’s resistance has been ferocious and brave. Russian forces have not advanced as quickly as they had planned. Western support — particularly through the supply of weapons — has and will make a difference. But we saw in Syria what Putin is willing to do to win. Russia indiscriminately murdered Syrian civilians, bombed hospitals and used siege and starvation as tools of war. We are seeing some of the same in Ukraine. If it continues, the civilian death toll will soar and it will be near impossible for Ukrainian forces to prevail alone — even with a plentiful supply of weapons.
Under those circumstances, the west will face a stark choice: watch the slaughter of tens of thousands (or more) of Ukrainian civilians and the overthrow of their democratic government; or get involved more directly to protect civilians and prevent Ukraine’s defeat.
Most western commentators and leaders have ruled out direct involvement, citing risks from direct confrontation with Russia to provoking a deranged Putin to hit the nuclear button. It’s understandable — these sound scary, and it is always preferable to limit direct military engagement. But there are good reasons — moral, strategic and tactical — not to rule out closing the skies above Ukraine if it becomes clear that Russia is headed for victory at the expense of civilian life.
First, the moral case is obvious. We have seen the degree to which Russia is willing to target civilians. International law was designed to protect civilians from the horrific excesses of war, but it only works if it is enforced. As responsible democratic nations that respect the rule of law, we must shoulder some risk to save Ukrainian lives and revive a respect for International laws and norms that have been eroded over the past decade as a consequence of our failure to enforce them.
Second, a Putin victory in Ukraine would be strategically disastrous. Given the intensity of western rhetoric and concrete support to Ukraine, Russian victory would represent a defeat of the EU and NATO. It is an existential threat to democratic values. Putin will know that his threats, bullying and nuclear insinuations can win over even a united western world wielding massive sanctions and supplying arms; and that when it comes to a choice between direct confrontation or handing over democratic nations, we choose the latter. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Finland — none will be safe.
Third, tactically, closing Ukraine’s skies to Russian aircraft will not win the war in and of itself. But it will deny Russia a potent weapon, and give Ukrainians themselves the space to limit movement of Russian troops and target Russian ground forces and artillery. Breaking the morale of Russian forces and pushing them back will become more achievable. And enabling a shift in the balance of military power is more likely to open up the possibility of meaningful negotiation and diplomatic efforts — the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended war in Bosnia was a product of such a shift.
Every option carries risks. But the decision on whether to intervene directly to close the skies needs to take into account the risks that we have already triggered and the risk of losing Ukraine. Much is made of the danger of Putin lashing out. Yet we have already vowed to defeat him in Ukraine. And we have been transparent about the supply of weapons and who is supplying them. If we’re serious about those weapons inflicting a loss on Putin, we already face the risk of retaliation, regardless of whether we decide to close the skies. The means by which Putin loses are less likely to influence his response than the fact of the loss itself.
An attempt to close the skies will bring risks to western service personnel. That’s not a decision that any leader takes lightly. The risk must be set against the alternative. If Ukraine is overrun, the west will be stuck supporting a messy, deadly and costly insurgency for years, if not decades, with no guarantee of success. Ukrainian civilians will lose their lives day after day; Europe will have a protracted conflict on its territory; and constant Russian breaches will be another nail in the coffin of international law. A concerted effort to close the skies, on the other hand, gives a greater chance of success in a shorter timeframe, while protecting more Ukrainian civilians from indiscriminate attack.
Reza Afshar OBE is Executive Director of Independent Diplomat, a non-profit diplomatic advisory group. Previously he spent 13 years in the UK’s Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office in a range of crisis and negotiating roles before his final role as head of the team responsible for Syria policy from 2012-2013
15. Russia's military losses in Ukraine are a gold mine for US intelligence
Excerpt:
As the war in Ukraine drags on, both Kyiv and Moscow claim successes on a daily basis. But rampant misinformation and the fog of war have obscured efforts to discern the validity of either side's claims.
Russia's military losses in Ukraine are a gold mine for US intelligence
Newsweek · by Naveed Jamali · March 8, 2022
Russian military equipment seized by Ukrainian forces throughout an explosive conflict poised to enter its third week may prove a gold mine for U.S. intelligence looking to get a rare look at Moscow's weapons and the encrypted command and control data they contain, current and former U.S. military personnel told Newsweek.
"The gear is huge," Mike Jason, a retired U.S. Army colonel who served in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, told Newsweek. "It's like capturing an enigma machine."
The term refers to the cipher device employed by Nazi Germany during World War II to mask the Third Reich's secret communications, a code ultimately unraveled by the Allies, constituting a major intelligence advantage.
Now as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to argue today for the "denazification" of Ukraine through what he has deemed a "special military operation" decried by much of the international community as an unjustified invasion of the neighboring country, an opportunity may exist to listen in on Moscow's war effort.
Should Ukraine get its hands on such assets, Jason said there are "immediate implications" and "long-term implications," including those that involve the country's foreign backers.
Among the potential "immediate" impacts would be that Kyiv "can perhaps listen in right now to what is happening, then exploit in real-time," Jason said. One of the possible "long-term" effects he identified was that "the equipment can be reverse-engineered, say, sent to a major foreign intelligence exploitation lab, etc."
Here, Jason said, even seemingly innocuous devices such as radios, if still intact, could contain important so-called "crypto" information, giving an insight into Russia's encoded communications.
"And then," he added, "technology can be developed to jam and/or listen in, etc."
A member of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces looks at what is said to be a destroyed Russian military vehicle in a forest outside Ukraine's second-biggest city of Kharkiv on March 7. U.S. officials told Newsweek that such assets may contain valuable insight into Moscow's encrypted command and control communications. SERGEY BOBOK/AFP/Getty Images
Given the active war effort, U.S. military officials have been reticent in speaking publicly about the extent to which intelligence was being shared between Washington and Kyiv. Reached for comment, a Pentagon spokesperson told Newsweek that "we have nothing to offer, as we do not speak to intelligence assessments."
But one U.S. cyberwarfare officer, who asked to remain anonymous, told Newsweek that "we have covert folks attempting to acquire hardware all the time."
And, though no reliable figures as to the extent of Russia's military losses thus far have been made public, reports indicate they have been relatively substantial. Unverified footage promoted by official Ukrainian outlets has documented Ukrainian captures of the likes of Russian command and control vehicles, a T-72-tank-mounted TOS-1A thermobaric multiple-launch rocket system and a number of Russian aircraft, including the Su-34.
Ukrainian state-owned defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom even claimed Tuesday it would offer sizable rewards for anyone willing to retrieve "stolen combat aviation equipment of the occupiers," including up to $500,000 for a captured military helicopter and $1 million for a warplane in working condition.
One particularly important alleged find for Kyiv was the Pantsir surface-to-air missile system, several of which have been said to have been taken intact by Ukrainian units. Jason said this would potentially be "a huge get," as it's assumed such a weapon "talks to friendly aircraft to deconflict friend-or-foe" and "would be tied to command and control systems at a high level."
Asked by Newsweek what the fate of such Russian equipment was once coming under Ukrainian control, a senior Ukrainian defense official who requested to not be named had a simple answer.
"It is recovered and used against the aggressor," he said.
A U.S. military aviator who also asked to remain unnamed gave some examples of the benefits of capturing enemy hardware.
"Getting actual equipment and manuals also helps with the human dynamic: how easy it is to operate, etc," the U.S. military aviator told Newsweek. "Can any 'Joe Shmoe' use this, or does it require a Ph.D. to operate it at the same level as the glossy brochure?"
But this aviator also noted that there were limits to the amount of useful information that could be extracted from these systems alone in the modern era, when a nation like Russia would likely be quick to take action to avoid critical channels being intruded on.
"As systems move from analog to digital, the exploitation game changes a bit," the U.S. military aviator said. "The software and source code are the critical items, because you can find zero-day vulnerabilities and build a tool to attack it if/when the time comes."
As such, the U.S. military aviator said that "crypto gear is less important these days because the value is in the keys, and they change all the time."
But fears of U.S. equipment falling into Russia's hands likely also played into hesitance to send more advanced, expensive weapons systems to Ukraine, beyond the simpler platforms such as Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile systems, a number of which the Russian Defense Ministry claims to have already confiscated. Ukraine's military also said its navy sunk its own flagship last week, the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, to avoid capture by Russia.
Attempts by Washington and Moscow to obtain one another's equipment were a central theme of the Cold War, and continue to influence U.S. opposition to allies like Turkey and partners like India acquiring Russia's S-400 surface-to-air missile system while also seeking advanced U.S. platforms.
Last month, the Pentagon dismissed Russian news reports that Moscow had recovered a sonar countermeasure device from a U.S. Navy Virginia-class submarine after an encounter with Russian warships in the northern Pacific Ocean, with spokesperson Eric Pahon telling Newsweek at the time that the claims were "nonsense and disinformation."
On Thursday, the Pentagon managed to complete an extensive operation to recover an F-35 fighter jet that had crashed earlier this year into the South China Sea, where the U.S.' stated top competitor on the world stage, China, operates extensively, and which it largely claims as its own territory.
Destroyed armored vehicles bearing the insignia of Russian military forces are seen in the city of Bucha, west of Kyiv, on March 4. ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images
As the war in Ukraine drags on, both Kyiv and Moscow claim successes on a daily basis. But rampant misinformation and the fog of war have obscured efforts to discern the validity of either side's claims.
And despite their ongoing hostilities, representatives of Russia and Ukraine have also engaged in three rounds of talks hosted by Russian ally Belarus. Among the more immediate topics of discussion is the implementation of a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors to allow citizens to flee the conflict, which threatens to soon take on an even deadlier character as Russian troops push to encircle major cities, including the capital.
On Monday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Reuters that Moscow would end the war "this moment" should Kyiv agree to four core demands: an end to Ukrainian military action, recognition of the independence of the pro-Russia separatist-held Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in the eastern Donbas region, Russia's control of the southern Crimean Peninsula annexed in 2014 and an amendment to Ukraine's constitution to declare neutrality from military blocs, ending its bid to join the U.S.-led NATO alliance.
In an interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later rejected what he called an "ultimatum" from Russia, but said his government had a "possible solution" to satisfy the conditions. To do so, however, he sought a direct line with Putin, who has not expressed any public plans to engage one-on-one with his Ukrainian counterpart.
Newsweek · by Naveed Jamali · March 8, 2022
16. How the Ukrainian Military Went from 'Decrepit' to Surprisingly Strong
Excerpts:
The Ukrainians’ stiff resistance is the result of four significant factors.
The first two were the Ukrainian government’s committed effort in 2016 to reform its military, coupled with millions of dollars’ worth of Western aid and military equipment.
The third factor was important changes in Ukrainian military thinking that now allows for junior leaders to make battlefield decisions. Until recently, those leaders needed to seek permission to change orders given by commanders, regardless of whether changing battlefield conditions had rendered those orders irrelevant.
The last significant factor, arguably the most important, occurred among the Ukrainian people – a national culture of military volunteerism emerged. As a result, a government agency was created to organize and train civilians in defense against military attacks.
...
A new culture has emerged, and the Ukrainians are fighting now with a newer version of the ends justify the means: Outcomes are more important than processes.
This cultural shift, combined with eight years of fighting in the Donbas, has created a generation of combat-ready officers.
How the Ukrainian Military Went from 'Decrepit' to Surprisingly Strong
Four factors have turned the country's defensive capabilities around since Russia first invaded in 2014.
BY LIAM COLLINS
FOUNDING DIRECTOR, MODERN WAR INSTITUTE, USMA
MARCH 8, 2022 02:05 PM ET
The first two were the Ukrainian government’s committed effort in 2016 to reform its military, coupled with millions of dollars’ worth of Western aid and military equipment.
The third factor was important changes in Ukrainian military thinking that now allows for junior leaders to make battlefield decisions. Until recently, those leaders needed to seek permission to change orders given by commanders, regardless of whether changing battlefield conditions had rendered those orders irrelevant.
The last significant factor, arguably the most important, occurred among the Ukrainian people – a national culture of military volunteerism emerged. As a result, a government agency was created to organize and train civilians in defense against military attacks.
From 2016-2018, I helped Ukraine reform its defense establishment. During that time, I also conducted field research in Georgia to study the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Based on that research, the Russian tactics used to invade Ukraine have not been surprising.
What has been surprising is the performance of the Ukrainian army.
In 2014, the Ukrainian government launched a comprehensive review of its national security and military defense. The review identified a number of issues that directly resulted in poor combat performance.
The shortcomings ranged from an inability to fight cyberattacks to poor medical care delivery. Corruption was rampant, troops were not getting paid and basic supplies always ran low. Overall logistics and command were also inefficient.
It was an ambitious plan that set a goal for completion in only four years. A herculean effort under the best of circumstances, the Ukrainians at the time were fighting a war against Russian separatists in the Donbas.
What motivated Ukrainian officials and accelerated the reforms was a deep-seated fear that Russia might launch an invasion. Though all the reforms have not been implemented as yet, significant improvements have occurred over the last six years.
The evidence has been seen in response to the Russian invasion.
To support Ukrainian military reforms, the U.S. increased its financial aid to Ukraine shortly after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its support of separatists in Ukraine’s east.
As part of this assistance, the United States helped train Ukrainian soldiers at the Yavoriv military base. The base quickly became a top-notch training center, where an estimated five battalions have trained annually since 2015.
In 2016, Poroshenko asked for senior defense advisers from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and Germany to advise Ukraine on modernizing its armed forces with the goal of reaching NATO standards, rules and procedures by 2020.
One such NATO rule was a requirement for civilian control of the military; at the time, Ukraine’s minister of defense was also an active duty general. Another important NATO standard was insuring that Ukraine was able to integrate its logistical support with other NATO units when deployed.
Western support also included various weapons and equipment, including Humvees, drones, sniper rifles, radars that locate the origin of enemy fire and thermal scopes that are used to identify targets during the day or night.
One item of particular interest to the Ukrainians was obtaining better anti-tank missiles. When Russia sent T-90 tanks across the border to support separatists in 2014, Ukraine’s existing weapons were unable to penetrate the armor of T-90s.
Once the invasion became imminent, Western nations sent additional weapons and munitions to Ukraine, including Stinger missiles from Lithuania and Latvia, Javelin anti-tank missiles from Estonia and anti-tank missiles from the United Kingdom.
In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture discouraged risk-taking by junior leaders – the lieutenants and captains who were conducting the fighting on the ground. Unable to make decisions, junior leaders were required to seek permission before they could act, thus ruling out the possibility for what are called “disciplined initiatives.”
These initiatives occur when initial battlefield orders are no longer relevant or fit the changing situation. Given the speed, maneuverability and lethality of modern warfare, disciplined initiatives can be the difference between success and failure.
While fighting Russian-backed separatists and Russian forces in the Donbas in 2014, the Ukrainians quickly learned that lower-level leaders, such as platoon leaders and company commanders, could not wait for approval from a higher headquarters for every move. The speed of battle was simply too fast.
A new culture has emerged, and the Ukrainians are fighting now with a newer version of the ends justify the means: Outcomes are more important than processes.
This cultural shift, combined with eight years of fighting in the Donbas, has created a generation of combat-ready officers.
Volunteers from across Ukraine flocked to the Donbas in 2014 to fight Russian-backed separatists. There were so many that entire volunteer battalions had to be created.
But there was little time for training. Volunteers were thrown into rapidly created units with mismatched camouflage uniforms and sent to the front with a hodgepodge of weapons.
Yet these volunteers bought time for Ukraine to mobilize and helped hold the line to prevent further Russian penetration deeper into Ukraine.
To remedy the problems in organizing the volunteer effort, Ukraine passed a law that took effect on Jan. 1, 2022. The law established a Territorial Defense Forceas a stand-alone branch within the military. Some of these positions are for professional soldiers; others are reservists.
The force will include 10,000 career positions in peacetime and organize 120,000 reservists into 20 brigades.
Russia initiated its invasion before this force could be fully established, but it does, nonetheless, provide an organizing structure as the war continues.
Despite these reforms and Ukraine’s resistance to date, Russia’s war machine still dwarfs Ukraine’s.
A successful defense against Russia is a daunting challenge and will require resolve, something that Ukrainians have demonstrated repeatedly over the past eight years and in the opening days of the current war.
Based on my time there, the Ukrainians are proud, patriotic and prepared to do whatever is necessary to defend their nation.
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17. Concern Rising That Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons
This is likely the message Putin wants to be transmitted.
This "self-deters" us.
Excerpts:
Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers that Putin may think such weapons give him an asymmetric advantage.
“I also believe that when he says something, we should listen very, very carefully and maybe take him at his word. So this question is the one that analysts are pondering right now, and I think we really do some more work on it,” Berrier said.
A former senior White House official familiar with Russian nuclear security issues told Defense One that the risk of a Russian first nuclear use is rising, largely because Putin doesn’t view such weapons in the same way as the United States, or even the former Soviet Union.
Concern Rising That Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons
Russian “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine suggests Putin is thinking the unthinkable.
The world should take Russia’s escalating nuclear threats very seriously, senior intelligence officials told lawmakers Tuesday, while noting that they have not yet seen clear indications that Russian leader Vladimir Putin would respond to military setbacks in Ukraine with nukes.
Putin sparked alarm among nuclear watchers last month when he ordered the country’s nuclear forces be put on a “special regime of combat duty.” Speaking to lawmakers on Tuesday, Avril Haines, the director of Office of the Director for National Intelligence, said that move was mostly “signaling” to keep NATO from intervening in Ukraine.
“He is effectively signaling that he's attempting to deter and that he has done that in other ways. For example, having the strategic nuclear forces exercise that we indicated had been postponed until February, again, then as a method of effectively deterring,” Haines said.
It’s not the first time Russian officials have said NATO activity in Ukraine could prompt them to use nuclear weapons. In 2017, Russian parliamentarian Vyacheslav Nikonov made a similar statement. But Haines and others told U.S. lawmakers that as the Russian invasion stalls, the threat of nuclear use is rising.
At the hearing, CIA director William Burns said the Russian military doctrine contemplates the use of smaller tactical nuclear weapons.
“You know, Russian doctrine holds that you escalate to de-escalate, and so I think the risk would rise, according to the doctrine,” Burns said.
Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers that Putin may think such weapons give him an asymmetric advantage.
“I also believe that when he says something, we should listen very, very carefully and maybe take him at his word. So this question is the one that analysts are pondering right now, and I think we really do some more work on it,” Berrier said.
A former senior White House official familiar with Russian nuclear security issues told Defense One that the risk of a Russian first nuclear use is rising, largely because Putin doesn’t view such weapons in the same way as the United States, or even the former Soviet Union.
“The [United States] has newer weapons to deter conventional conflict…Russia has nuclear weapons as part of a warfighting battle plan,” said the official, who called them just a “warfighting tool” for Russia. The former official said the danger is increasing “precisely because the conflict in Ukraine is going badly.”
The official outlined a scenario in which Putin consolidates some gains in southern Ukraine but fails to install a new puppet regime.
“Ukrainians may or may not cease and desist. The West may or may not continue to arm the Ukrainian insurgency and [Putin] might decide, ‘OK. I'm going to set off a bomb somewhere in western Ukraine to send a message that I have crossed the nuclear threshold, and you can follow me if you want.”
18. Russia looks to Chinese financial plumbing to keep money flowing
Interesting assessment:
All told, Sino-Russian financial links appear weaker than Russia might hope. The situation is likely to raise questions about the shortcomings in China’s efforts to build global financial networks. For CIPS, many of the problems are clear. In order to maintain control over capital flows, China has not linked the system directly with foreign banks outside mainland China, with the exception of Standard Chartered, a British bank with long-established links to China. CIPS’s indigenous messaging system works only with Chinese banks. To improve the system, China must continue opening it up and granting more direct links with foreign banks.
The lack of such links makes the system more difficult and less attractive to foreign financial institutions. CIPS is for the most part illiquid, says Natixis. It processes just 13,000 transactions per day, equivalent to about 5% of those processed by America’s domestic-payments system, known as CHIPS.
China’s President Xi Jinping has referred to Mr Putin as a “best friend”. The Russian conflict is laying bare some of China’s financial vulnerabilities. That may make the relationship less amicable.
Russia looks to Chinese financial plumbing to keep money flowing
It isn’t connected to the world well enough to help much
Mar 8th 2022
NATIONALIST BLOGGERS in China have a new fascination: global payment systems. Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine, followed by Western sanctions on Russia, have prompted internet pundits to extol the virtues of the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), the rails on which Chinese banks transfer and clear yuan-denominated payments around the world. Some have also taken to bashing SWIFT, the Belgium-based financial messaging system that has started excluding Russian banks from international payments. “That thing called SWIFT cannot be relied on,” avers one popular blogger on Weibo, a Twitter-like platform.
CIPS and SWIFT are far from being household names in China. But the sweeping sanctions against Russia—on the usage of SWIFT by some of its banks and on its central bank—have put a spotlight on China’s homegrown financial networks, and the extent to which it can use them to help Russia. Three primary Chinese financial channels are in place to assist—two legitimate, one not. None are remotely adequate substitutes for the links to the Western financial system that Russia has lost.
First, consider the direct connections between the two countries’ central banks, which do not require SWIFT messaging to transact. Russia has about $90bn-worth of mainly yuan-denominated deposits held with the Chinese central bank. It also has a 150bn-yuan swap-line agreement with China. It can use these funds to finance imports from China in the event that other trade-finance routes in dollars are blocked, note analysts at Natixis, an investment bank.
But this trade will largely remain in yuan, limiting what Russia can purchase. China’s regulators are still keen to avoid American “secondary” sanctions. Primary sanctions target Russian institutions and American firms that deal with them. The secondary sort have yet to be used, but would target third parties outside America that transact with Russian firms, even if those transactions are permitted by local law. Allowing Russia to sell yuan-denominated assets in order to raise dollars could attract scrutiny and goes beyond what Chinese officials are willing to do for their friends in Moscow, reckons Rhodium, a consultancy.
Next, there are the several complex financial networks China has spent decades building around the globe. Take, for example, the web of state-owned banks that have cropped up in commercial hubs around the world. China’s banking regulator may have stated on March 2nd that the country would not join Western sanctions, but most of its big banks will adhere to them, particularly those that interact most with the Western financial system and have legal entities that are domiciled in America. The four largest Chinese state-owned banks, for example, all have branches in Moscow. But according to the Federal Reserve, those same four firms also have offices in America which collectively had $106bn of assets at the end of September.
These large institutions that conduct the bulk of trade finance between the two countries are highly unlikely to risk getting blocked from dollar clearing in order to continue doing dollar-denominated business with Russia. Two large state-owned banks stopped issuing dollar-denominated letters of credit for purchasing Russian commodities as soon as sanctions were issued, according to Bloomberg, a news service. Maintaining full access to global financial markets is “more valuable than anything Russia can offer”, according to Neil Shearing of Capital Economics, a consultancy.
UnionPay, China’s state-owned bank-card firm, is another powerful financial network. It is set to gain market share in Russia in the wake of the departures of Visa and Mastercard, the American-based giants of global card payments, which were announced on March 5th. Several Russian banks have said that they will move to UnionPay, which already has a significant presence in the country.
This shift will not come easily, however. Within Russia, UnionPay’s network is small and many banks do not have prior agreements with the company. Banks will need to show they meet network requirements to be licensed as a card issuer, says Zilvinas Bareisis of Celent, a research group. The cards must be designed, certified and then distributed—a process which can take months. For Russians abroad the problem is that, despite being in more than 180 countries, UnionPay is a fringe service in America and Europe, says Jason Ekberg of Oliver Wyman, another consultancy. UnionPay could also open itself to secondary sanctions by offering some types of services to sanctioned Russian banks.
CIPS, meanwhile, will not be the miracle solution Chinese bloggers hoped for. That is because China has not been able to roll out its own messaging system. Foreign banks linked to CIPS still use SWIFT messaging to operate, notes Edwin Lai of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. That means Western sanctions will still apply to any transfers between SWIFT-barred Russian banks and foreign banks.
A final route for financial assistance will come through backchannel banks that dodge sanctions. China has a long history of turning a blind eye to smaller banks that finance trade with countries targeted by America and the UN. These activities usually occur on a small scale. And many are caught in the act and hit with secondary sanctions themselves. In 2012 Bank of Kunlun was hit with American sanctions for making $100m of payments with an Iranian bank. Five years later American regulators accused Bank of Dandong, another smallish lender, of dealings with North Korea. Some Chinese banks may take the risk with Russia, but these institutions will be minnows that are unable to provide the large-scale assistance Russia needs.
All told, Sino-Russian financial links appear weaker than Russia might hope. The situation is likely to raise questions about the shortcomings in China’s efforts to build global financial networks. For CIPS, many of the problems are clear. In order to maintain control over capital flows, China has not linked the system directly with foreign banks outside mainland China, with the exception of Standard Chartered, a British bank with long-established links to China. CIPS’s indigenous messaging system works only with Chinese banks. To improve the system, China must continue opening it up and granting more direct links with foreign banks.
The lack of such links makes the system more difficult and less attractive to foreign financial institutions. CIPS is for the most part illiquid, says Natixis. It processes just 13,000 transactions per day, equivalent to about 5% of those processed by America’s domestic-payments system, known as CHIPS.
China’s President Xi Jinping has referred to Mr Putin as a “best friend”. The Russian conflict is laying bare some of China’s financial vulnerabilities. That may make the relationship less amicable.
19. New Iran Nuclear Deal? Same Old Missile Problems.
Excerpts:
As I have previously assessed, datapoints from Iran’s progress on solid-propellants and increased SLV testing also supports the conclusion that Iran is working toward a full solid-propellant SLV, which would be a game-changer and in turn the clearest indication of its long-range strike capabilities evolving toward a potential ICBM capability. Iran has produced at least two solid-propellant motors, the smaller Salman motor in 2020, and larger Rafee motor in 2022, for its SLVs. It also already has two SLVs—the Qased and the Zuljanah—employing at least one solid-propellant motor in one of its stages. Both the Salman and the Rafee have thrust-vectoring capabilities and share other similarities. And just last month, a hardline Iranian newspaper heralded the Rafee as bringing ICBM-class missiles “more within range than ever” for Iran.
But Iran need not rush to an ICBM tomorrow to keep closing the gap between medium-range missiles and what it’s space-launch vehicles might be able to offer in terms of range. Iran has reportedly worked on improving the Khorramshahr ballistic missile, whose range Iran has grown through warhead modifications. Initially billed as an MRBM by Iranian sources, the Khorramshahr is based on a liquid-propellant nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM, which can travel between 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers) that Iran received from North Korea in the early 2000s. According to European reports to the U.N. in 2019, Iran’s new Khorramshahr variant is now essentially an IRBM. U.N. reports have also assessed that Iran and North Korea “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects” in 2020.
The U.S. and Europe ignore these developments at their own peril. An Iranian IRBM and potentially ICBM capability is coming, and perhaps sooner than one might think. In the face of such a possibility, the worst thing Washington might do is ink an agreement like the JCPOA that offers sanctions relief to Iran’s missile underwriters, ignores the evolution in Iran’s ballistic missile forces, and waters down U.N. restrictions all while failing to block a pathway toward an ICBM capability. Borrowing from the famed French diplomat Talleyrand, inking such an agreement as a stand in for counterproliferation policy on Iran would be “worse than a crime.” It would be “a mistake.”
New Iran Nuclear Deal? Same Old Missile Problems.
Iranian people stand under missiles at a military exhibition. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)
The Biden administration is nearing a deal with Iran that it hopes could put the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program “back in a box.” The problem? The agreement—which aims to restore the 2015 accord called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—would also relax restrictions on ballistic missiles, a weapon the U.S. intelligence community assessed only months after the JCPOA was implemented as Iran’s “preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them.”
For more than a decade, the U.S. intelligence community has continuously affirmed that Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is the biggest in the Middle East. Iran uses these missiles to intimidate and punish its adversaries while deterring a military reprisal. In a December 2021 interview, U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Kenneth McKenzie identified Iran’s missiles as “a more immediate threat than its nuclear program.” Iranian officials have worked assiduously to make that the case, enhancing the range, accuracy, and mobility of their missiles, while also proliferating whole systems and components parts to their proxies to use in attacks on U.S. partners. Any deal predicated on the JCPOA—or its accompanying U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231—that removes restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program, provides sanctions relief to its supporters, and ignores recent and groundbreaking Iranian ballistic missile developments would be a strategic mistake.
According to Annex B of UNSCR 2231, international prohibitions against Iranian ballistic missile tests and related activities will lapse in October 2023. In 2015 when the JCPOA was reached, this was sold as an eight-year moratorium. Unless amended, in 2022 however, the ban will be in place for only little longer than one year. While Iran has never respected this injunction—launching a combination of at least 27 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and space-launch vehicles (SLVs) while the U.S. was a party to the deal—the prohibition is the result of several last minute Iranian negotiating victories from 2015.
UNSCR 2231 amends an older and more stringent resolution containing a permanent ban on Iranian ballistic missile tests. The new injunction against missile testing lapsing in 2023 is but one of several phased prohibitions popularly termed “sunsets.” Iran, likely assisted by its Russian and Chinese lawyers in the P5+1 negotiating mechanism, successfully replicated and pushed for the sunset-driven model to be applied other areas as well, be it lapsing restrictions on its nuclear program found in the JCPOA or the now terminated prohibition against conventional arms transfers from UNSCR 2231.
Making matters worse, the circumscribed missile prohibition was also caveated. Employing deferential language, UNSCR 2231 “calls upon Iran” not to partake in activities related to ballistic missiles that were “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” And in addition to begetting overly technical debates pertaining to intention and design for known Iranian ballistic missile types, the distinction further redounded to Iran’s favor by ignoring that we still do not know everything about Iran’s past weaponization and miniaturization efforts, and that more broadly, ballistic missiles could be used to deliver other forms of WMD, such as chemical weapons. As a reminder, in 2016 the U.S. intelligence community seemingly left room for such an interpretation of Iran’s missile force when it judged that, “Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD.” The Islamic Republic has previously developed, employed, and even transferred chemical weapons.
Also in negotiations leading to the 2015 JCPOA, Tehran and its advocates further stymied efforts by Washington to make a case against Iranian violations by terminating an impartial “panel of experts” that previously investigated claims of violations pursuant to a mandate from older Iran-related resolutions. The Trump administration tried but failed to resurrect this panel in 2020. Instead of a panel, UNSCR 2231 requires only reports of alleged violations on a biannual basis.
Beyond the problem of lawyerly language and deference to Iran in UNSCR 2231 is a larger challenge created by EU and U.S. sanctions relief under the auspices of the JCPOA. According to the accord’s previous sanctions annex, the EU (as well as the U.K., given its autonomous post-Brexit Iran sanctions regime) is on track to remove from sanctions lists a broad swath of Iranian defense firms supportive of the regime’s ballistic missile program in October 2023. These are entities inclusive of, and tied to, the sanctioned Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), it’s various front companies and subsidiaries that aid specific parts of the ballistic missile program such as development of liquid- and solid-propellant systems, as well the sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its missile branch, the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF).
Retaining this schedule for delisting, which again was subject to an eight-year timeline in 2015 but now will be removed in just over a year, would make transatlantic coordination against Iran’s ballistic missile program more difficult. This raises questions as to how an already sanctions-skeptic and risk-averse administration might punish Iranian procurement nodes operating on the soil of an American ally. Lest the administration forget, then-candidate Biden pledged in an op-ed in 2020 to continue pressuring Iran’s ballistic missile program through targeted non-nuclear sanctions.
But based on what has been reported several times in 2021, non-nuclear sanctions relief undoing penalties imposed on Iran during the Trump administration is very much on the table, raising wider concerns about the dividends an agreement could provide Tehran. U.S. officials may have hinted at their willingness to offer such relief last year when they spoke of their preparedness to lift all sanctions deemed “inconsistent” with the JCPOA.
Accordingly, under the auspices of JCPOA reentry, the Biden administration might directly or indirectly remove sanctions on Iran’s missile program and its supporters, certain sectors of Iran’s economy aiding the missile program, as well as enable Iran access to frozen funds. Any or all of these moves will put Tehran’s ballistic missile and military technology procurement, production, and proliferation networks on steroids. Seemingly getting ready to compound the infusion of cash headed its way, the Iranian Parliament has already called for an allocation of 4.5 million euros from National Iranian Oil Company revenues to go toward the country’s defense capabilities.
This brings us to the final leg of the troika as to why a deal predicated on the JCPOA or UNSCR 2231 is a strategic mistake: ongoing Iranian ballistic missile advances. Iranian officials have never been shy about claiming that their missile program is non-negotiable. Nor have they been shy about touting their missile prowess and advances.
Brig. Gen. Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force recently exclaimed that, “The firepower and simultaneous launches of our missiles have increased 6 to 7 fold, and the preparation time and preparation intervals for launches have been greatly reduced.” Reducing sanctions pressure and making revenues more available for a program that has been able to advance while under pressure would embolden rather than placate the Islamic Republic. This can make a regional military conflict involving ballistic missiles more likely in the short-to-medium term given Iranian confidence in their systems. It can even expedite the ongoing evolution in Iran’s security strategy from deterrent and defensive to offensive and coercive.
This is not theoretical. As Tehran’s ballistic missile aptitudes evolved in the post-JCPOA era, so did its risk tolerance. Iran resumed ballistic missile operations from its own territory against foreign targets, engaging in four publicized operations between 2017 and 2020. Throughout 2021 and into 2022, despite indirect nuclear diplomacy taking place between Iran and the U.S., Iran continued to carry out military drills featuring short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, which can travel up to 1,000 kilometers) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, which can travel between 1,000 – 3,0000 kilometers), launching a reported 16 missiles during a drill conducted by the IRGC in late December, as well as to parading and releasing new systems.
This February, Iran unveiled and tested the latest upgrade to its domestically produced line of solid-propellant surface-to-surface missiles originating from the Fateh ballistic missile. Dubbed the “Kheybar Shekan,” or “Breaker of Kheybar,” the missile’s moniker memorializes an early Islamic military campaign against Jewish tribes in Arabia. The name is no accident, as the Islamic Republic is no stranger to courting antisemitism with its missile launches. The missile’s reported range of 1,450 kilometers establishes it as the third solid-propellant MRBM in Tehran’s arsenal. Solid-propellant systems are prized for their mobility and the speed with which they can be prepped prior to launch. Such systems have featured prominently in the four aforementioned Iranian military operations from 2017-2020.
Notably, the regime also did not curb, but rather sped up, its space-launch vehicle flight-tests, which offer a way to get around a self-imposed ballistic missile range cap of 2,000 kilometers and keep a pathway open for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Given that space-launch vehicles and ICBMs use similar technologies, an SLV program can inform an ICBM pathway through testing and studies of engines, staging, and more. In 2019, then IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami framed the ban as being purely political, claiming, “We have no technical limitations in increasing [missile] range, accuracy of missiles at long ranges, destructive power, and strong propulsive forces.” Salami then issued a threat, “If based on a conspiracy, today the Europeans or others want to pursue the missile disarmament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we will be forced to make a strategic leap.”
Previously, the U.S. intelligence community judged that, “Iran’s progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs.” This has remained a near consistent assessment in U.S. government reporting on Iran, whether it be from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), multiple other Worldwide Threat Assessments by the director of national intelligence (DNI), and the National Air and Space Intelligence Committee (NASIC).
As I have previously assessed, datapoints from Iran’s progress on solid-propellants and increased SLV testing also supports the conclusion that Iran is working toward a full solid-propellant SLV, which would be a game-changer and in turn the clearest indication of its long-range strike capabilities evolving toward a potential ICBM capability. Iran has produced at least two solid-propellant motors, the smaller Salman motor in 2020, and larger Rafee motor in 2022, for its SLVs. It also already has two SLVs—the Qased and the Zuljanah—employing at least one solid-propellant motor in one of its stages. Both the Salman and the Rafee have thrust-vectoring capabilities and share other similarities. And just last month, a hardline Iranian newspaper heralded the Rafee as bringing ICBM-class missiles “more within range than ever” for Iran.
But Iran need not rush to an ICBM tomorrow to keep closing the gap between medium-range missiles and what it’s space-launch vehicles might be able to offer in terms of range. Iran has reportedly worked on improving the Khorramshahr ballistic missile, whose range Iran has grown through warhead modifications. Initially billed as an MRBM by Iranian sources, the Khorramshahr is based on a liquid-propellant nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM, which can travel between 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers) that Iran received from North Korea in the early 2000s. According to European reports to the U.N. in 2019, Iran’s new Khorramshahr variant is now essentially an IRBM. U.N. reports have also assessed that Iran and North Korea “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects” in 2020.
The U.S. and Europe ignore these developments at their own peril. An Iranian IRBM and potentially ICBM capability is coming, and perhaps sooner than one might think. In the face of such a possibility, the worst thing Washington might do is ink an agreement like the JCPOA that offers sanctions relief to Iran’s missile underwriters, ignores the evolution in Iran’s ballistic missile forces, and waters down U.N. restrictions all while failing to block a pathway toward an ICBM capability. Borrowing from the famed French diplomat Talleyrand, inking such an agreement as a stand in for counterproliferation policy on Iran would be “worse than a crime.” It would be “a mistake.”
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iranian political and security issues and contributes to its Center on Military and Political Power.
20. Washington must do more to support companies facing Russian hackers
Excerpt:
None of this will happen quickly. It may be too late to prevent the worst blowback on U.S. critical infrastructure from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But when this current crisis has passed, the country must not simply move on. Individual companies or industries that escape unscathed should not breathe a sigh of relief and continue business as usual. Our nation must address the shortfalls that make us vulnerable today. Infrastructure resilience requires long-term investments and commitment by both individual companies and the U.S. government as a partner to the private sector. We’ve already waited too long to make these investments. Putin may soon demonstrate why we can afford to wait no longer.
Washington must do more to support companies facing Russian hackers
c4isrnet.com · by Mark Montgomery and Annie Fixler · March 8, 2022
As Russian missiles fly, President Vladimir Putin has warned that those countries that aid Ukraine will face consequences like they have never seen before.
The United States and its European allies, however, have stood firm with sanctions on the Russian financial system and on Putin and his closest advisors. They also imposed bans on technology exports to Russia. As Putin, his cronies and the Russian military itself begin to feel the effects of these sanctions, safe money bets on Russia expanding its cyberattacks to target the United States and Europe.
Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that its hackers — which include military and intelligence cyber units as well as “independent” proxies — have the capability to inflict untold damages on the infrastructure and companies the global economy depends upon. This past year, Russian hackers shut down a pipeline carrying half of the East Coast’s fuel supplies and a company that processes 20 percent of American meat products. The U.S. government has warned that Russia has been persistently targeting numerous U.S. critical infrastructures over the past decade, so it is reasonable to expect that malware already exists in critical U.S. water, energy, aviation, nuclear and manufacturing systems. Even if the Kremlin merely gives Russian criminal gangs a wink and a nod, U.S. and other Western companies are likely to face a surge of attacks. And with few exceptions, the private sector is not prepared for cyber war.
While the largest financial institutions have cyber defense capabilities that rival some nation states, they cannot function for extended periods if the power goes down. Electricity providers weather storms of all sizes, but hurricanes are not strategic actors that understand circuits and relays. Hackers, however, understand electricity generation’s dependence on natural gas pipelines, rail-transported coal and on water supplies used as a cooling medium.
Establishing resilience against cyber threats is a three-legged stool. It consists of: Sufficient investments by the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to defend themselves; a collaborative defense effort between government and the private sector; and reinforcing deterrence with a credible threat and capability to punish attackers via military, cyber and economic means. The regular stream of headlines about successful cyber and ransomware attacks on U.S. companies confirms that grades for the first leg of the stool are mediocre at best, and many companies need to do more to defend themselves.
Grades for the third leg are better. In cyberspace, U.S. government operators could no doubt reciprocate attacks against Russian infrastructure, although these Russian systems are less integrated and thus less vulnerable to cascading impacts than American systems. Putin may also be counting on his people’s ample experience with critical infrastructure failures to limit the psychological impact of these attacks. If citizens are accustomed to power outages from poorly maintained systems, a power outage from a cyberattack may be less meaningful.
However, the leg that truly threatens to topple the stool of infrastructure resilience is the lack of collaborative defense. To its credit, the Biden administration has been making strides to improve public-private collaboration through the appointment of the first-ever National Cyber Director and the creation of a Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative with cybersecurity and information technology companies. Yet the deficit in cyber readiness remains enormous. Infrastructure resilience requires the U.S. government to provide real time indications and warnings to owners and operators of our critical infrastructure. It demands the establishment and testing of collective defense mechanisms. And it may also necessitate an ability for the federal government’s most capable cyber assets to seamlessly defend privately owned critical infrastructure sectors under attack.
None of this will happen quickly. It may be too late to prevent the worst blowback on U.S. critical infrastructure from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But when this current crisis has passed, the country must not simply move on. Individual companies or industries that escape unscathed should not breathe a sigh of relief and continue business as usual. Our nation must address the shortfalls that make us vulnerable today. Infrastructure resilience requires long-term investments and commitment by both individual companies and the U.S. government as a partner to the private sector. We’ve already waited too long to make these investments. Putin may soon demonstrate why we can afford to wait no longer.
Mark Montgomery is senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and previously served as the executive director of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Annie Fixler is CCTI’s deputy director and research fellow at FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
21. Nine lessons from Ukraine to apply in the Taiwan Strait
A pretty comprehensive list of recommendations. However, my colleagues left out a crucial effort which would be to re-establish the Taiwan Resident Detachment (Special Forces) (which existed from 1959 until 1974) and advise and assist the Taiwanese in implementing a Taiwan unique resistance operation concept to support unconventional deterrence as the third pillar of integrated deterrence.
One important lesson from Ukraine is the importance of investing in a resistance capability developed over years. It takes time but it can make an important contribution to deterrence and after deterrence fails.
The first principle of deterrence must be Sir Lawrence Freedman's observation: "Deterrence works, until it doesn't." Recognize it can & eventually will fail and thus maintain readiness.
Second, deterrence must be built on a credible capability to defend and attack if necessary.
Third, integrated deterrence must include nuclear, conventional & UNCONVENTIONAL deterrence (resistance and resilience among populations) and include a psychological warfare competency integrated with and supported by all elements of national power.
Conclusion:
These nine investments will help deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. If deterrence fails — as it did in Ukraine — U.S. and Taiwanese military forces would be better prepared to defeat an attack by China. The United States acted too slowly in arming and assisting Ukraine. We should not make the same mistake with Taiwan.
Nine lessons from Ukraine to apply in the Taiwan Strait
By Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman
With the world’s attention fixed on the national security and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, a similar disaster is brewing in the Pacific. Taking a page from Putin’s playbook, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, is methodically assembling combat power to coerce or conquer the free people of Taiwan. Preventing that from happening will require Washington to learn the right lessons from the disaster in Ukraine. Among them is the need for Washington to spend less time worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies and more time working to defend threatened democracies before the invasion starts.
Meanwhile, the United States has been distracted elsewhere, unable to focus its strategic and fiscal efforts on the rising power in China. This has been compounded by consistent congressional failures to provide the Pentagon with the timely, sufficient and predictable funding necessary to modernize U.S. forces and maintain sufficient readiness and capacity. Indeed, the Department of Defense has received on-time funding only once in the last 13 fiscal years.
Exacerbating these dynamics, Washington has been slow in addressing serious concerns and specific requests for resources identified by Indo-Pacific Command in successive reports to Congress. Just last year, the command again warned that the military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies.
So, what’s to be done?
Working with its allies and partners, Washington must rapidly restore and enhance American-led deterrence of Chinese military aggression inside the first island chain. That means ensuring Taiwan can delay and disrupt any Chinese effort to impose a fait accompli before U.S. forces can respond. It will also require U.S. forces to expeditiously arrive in position near the Taiwan Strait so they can then rapidly attrite Chinese naval and air capability.
1. Expand the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile capability. Beijing already has the largest navy in the world and is sprinting to build more vessels. In an attack on Taiwan, China would focus this massive force on the island. Accordingly, the United States would need the ability to destroy a large number of Chinese naval vessels quickly and efficiently. An increased inventory of LRASMs and launch platforms would be vital to that effort.
Currently, the Navy can launch LRASMs from F-18 fighters (assuming there is an aircraft carrier in range), and the Air Force can launch them from B-1s (an aircraft with poor readiness that the Air Force has repeatedly tried to retire). The Navy needs to expedite configuring its 100-plus P-8 long-range surveillance aircraft to fire the LRASM, and the Air Force needs to rapidly configure a large number of its B-52s to fire large loads of LRASMs. Additionally, both services need to buy LRASMs in significant numbers — 50-75 per year, per service. (Inexplicably, the Air Force reduced its requested buy to zero in 2022.) When P-8s armed with LRASM weapons can take off from dozens of airfields throughout Asia, or when B-52s can launch dozens of missiles from one aircraft, Chinese defense planners will begin to question anew whether Beijing could conduct a successful assault against Taiwan.
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Activity by U.S. military ships and surveillance planes directed toward China has increased significantly under the Biden administration, a spokesperson for the Chinese Defense Ministry says.
2. Prioritize attack submarines. If the Chinese pursue a blockade strategy against Taiwan, or if Chinese naval vessels are successful in mitigating the impact of LRASMs, then the best way to threaten the People’s Liberation Army Navy is U.S. submarines. Fortunately, the United States has maintained a significant asymmetric advantage over China in the undersea domain. However, the challenge has been maintaining sufficient submarine capacity in the Pacific. To maintain overall submarine capacity, the Navy should continue to extend the service life of existing Los Angeles-class attack submarines as much as possible and invest in shipbuilding capacity to raise the construction rate of Virginia-class attack submarines from two per year to three per year. To enhance submarine proximity to the Western Pacific, the Navy should maximize its forward basing of submarines in Guam by placing as many as six submarines there instead of the current four. The Navy should also consider basing submarines in Australia.
3. Improve Guam’s air and missile defense. Guam sits on the second island chain and serves as home to roughly 170,000 American citizens. In any contingency with China, Guam will play an important role as a logistics hub and jumping-off point for combat forces headed toward the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The island will host numerous fighter aircraft, bombers and support aircraft, and will play an important role in supporting the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, too. The Chinese have made it clear that they plan to put the island at risk using ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles. Securing this territory will require funding a Guam defense system, to include a highly capable air surveillance radar (or two), numerous air defense missile launchers, offensive land-attack missile systems, and associated command-and-control systems. If the United States initiates this effort now, it can be functional in three years. There is no time to waste.
4. Acquire the E-7 Wedgetail. For more than 30 years, the United States has enjoyed air supremacy wherever it chose to fight. That will be difficult to manage against China inside the first island chain, but investments in maintaining U.S. air battle management capability with the E-7 Wedgetail aircraft can assist greatly. The Air Force had originally hoped to bypass this investment and transition directly from its aging E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system aircraft to an integrated space- and ground-based air battle management system. Current technology does not yet support such a step. Accordingly, the Air Force now needs to procure without delay the E-7 aircraft, which will enable and enhance the capabilities of U.S. fifth-generation fighters.
A Wedgetail early warning and control aircraft takes flight. (British Ministry of Defence)
5. Provide Taiwan with security assistance funding. Given the disparity in their economies, it should come as no surprise that Taiwan spends much less on defense than China. According to the Department of Defense, China’s official defense budget was roughly 15 times larger than that of Taiwan in 2019. Taiwan just increased its defense spending to about 2.4% of its gross domestic product, which is actually high relative to most other democracies. But considering the threats Taiwan faces, a defense budget of 3% of GDP is more appropriate. The United States should incentivize and enhance Taiwan’s defense spending by providing $2 billion to $3 billion a year in security assistance funding to Taiwan on a sliding scale, with the size of the grant increasing as Taiwan increases its defense budget. This funding would be used to purchase U.S. weapons that Washington and Taipei believe are most necessary to deter or defeat a Chinese attack.
6. Prioritize arms deliveries to Taiwan. The United States has granted Taiwan access to nearly $19 billion in arms sales over the past six years. This often puts Taiwan in a line of potential foreign purchasers for a U.S. system. The United States should prioritize Taiwan’s placement in the procurement lines, especially when it comes to systems that place Chinese invasion forces at risk, such as Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched standoff land-attack missiles. Congress should establish an annual statutory requirement for reports from the administration focused on additional steps to speed up the delivery of arms to Taiwan and other threatened democracies. Actual arms deliveries — not announcements about future deliveries — best deter aggression.
7. Begin a U.S.-Taiwan joint exercise program. American and Taiwanese military forces are not interoperable and thus ill-prepared to fight together — a weakness well understood in Beijing. If China launched an attack today, American and Taiwanese joint operations would not operate effectively together. A low-cost means to enhance the effectiveness of both militaries would be to execute a persistent joint exercise program that develops the ability of U.S. and Taiwanese forces to operate at a coordinated or even integrated level. Building interoperability among naval and air forces can be done with a limited or no U.S. footprint in Taiwan. This program should include joint U.S.-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises and war games. This will allow planners to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. support to Taiwanese forces, understand single-point weaknesses in American and Taiwanese plans, and inform U.S. logistics challenges in operations fought close to the adversary’s home bases.
8. Build U.S.-Taiwan combined cyber capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command has acknowledged that it conducts “hunt forward” cyber operations with allies and partners in Europe to counter Russian malicious activity. Similar, Cyber Command’s hunt-forward operations should be conducted with Taiwan’s cyber operators to help the island identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and existing Chinese malware, and to improve the resilience of Taiwanese cyber defense capabilities.
9. Welcome allies and partners to the effort. A final investment effort should include integrating willing allies and partners into these efforts. The United States should press Japan and Australia to commit to allowing U.S. military forces access during a crisis and to providing their own forces to counter Chinese aggression. The United States should expand this effort where possible to include Singapore, the Philippines and other possible partners who understand that Chinese expansion will not stop with Taiwan.
These nine investments will help deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. If deterrence fails — as it did in Ukraine — U.S. and Taiwanese military forces would be better prepared to defeat an attack by China. The United States acted too slowly in arming and assisting Ukraine. We should not make the same mistake with Taiwan.
Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy.
22. Russia's War in Ukraine Is About So Much More Than Territory
Fascinating first person perspective from direct engagement in Moscow four years ago.
Conclusion:
As I departed Moscow, I reflected on the bitterness I experienced in the Duma and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense; I was dismayed by Minister Lavrov’s intransigent view of the world. During our conversation, I asked him how Russia intended to reconcile its misgivings about NATO and the long list of perceived transgressions against his country. His reply was ominous and unbecoming of a diplomat. He suggested that Russia possessed the means and the will to establish a more favorable international order. If that was truly his intent, I replied that our next meeting was likely to lack the decorum exhibited in his conference room and reminded him of the Marine Corps’ ethos of “No better friend. No worse enemy.” After a week of fighting in Ukraine, it remains to be seen just how hard Russia will push the world order, and how hard the world’s people will fight to maintain it.
Russia's War in Ukraine Is About So Much More Than Territory
Sitting across the table from Sergey Lavrov, the long-serving foreign minister of Russia, I listened, open-minded but unpersuaded by his attempts to paint Russia as a victim on the world stage.
He insisted Russia was not a junior partner to America or China and expressed his intent to rearrange what he claimed as a prejudicial, rules-based order. He lamented everything: from NATO expansion to artwork that the Soviet Union had lent for an exhibit at New York’s Museum of Modern Art that was never returned. I thought he sounded petulant and hellbent on constructing a new world order based on chimeric notions of the past.
In 2018, I had the unique opportunity to travel to Russia on a Stanford Fellowship. After a few weeks in Moscow, I spent Thanksgiving with a family in the city of Tyumen. Despite the bitter cold outside, I found the people incredibly warm. In the heart of Siberia, I shared a meal with people who were willing to open their home to an American stranger and break bread. We discussed Vladimir Mayakovsky’s poem “Brooklyn Bridge,” and I promised that I’d show them around New York if they ever visited.
As an active duty Marine infantry officer, this was a rare chance to view foreign affairs from a seat at the table, rather than looking down the barrel of a gun. Today, I’m studying strategy at the US Naval War College and examining the instruments of power that nations possess to achieve their national interests.
One of the core concepts US Naval War College students study is called “war termination,” where we examine why so many countries struggle to end wars under favorable conditions. The culminating point of victory is when a nation has a strategic advantage to achieve its policy objective. When governments fail to recognize this moment, they miss an opportunity to maximize their leverage at the bargaining table. Russia nearly accomplished what Sun Tzu describes as the “acme of skills,” that is, “to subdue the enemy without fighting.” After they declared their intent to conduct “peacekeeping operations” in the Donbas region, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine indicated there was “no need” to complete his military’s mobilization and expressed a willingness to pursue a diplomatic solution. This was the moment Russia should have entered into negotiations.
But now that Russia chose to invade instead, what is the value of a destroyed Ukraine, a decimated Russian economy, a disgruntled Russian population actively protesting in the street, and a world largely united against Russia? Had Russia consolidated its gains in the Donbas, it might have enjoyed a Crimea-type scenario where they establish a new status quo after weathering a moderate amount of international condemnation. Instead, Russia will find itself bogged down in a protracted conflict that diminishes its standing on the world stage. This scenario reminds me of when Hannibal failed to capitalize on his successes in 216 BC by besieging Rome. One of his commanders, a Carthaginian cavalry officer quipped, “You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory.”
Last month, President Vladimir Putin of Russia framed the “peacekeeping operations” as a defense of what he calls the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, two fictitious satellite territories that he is trying to create from Ukrainian land he stole through force in 2014. Although these actions were internationally condemned and sanctioned, it appeared to be a fait accompli scenario. Russia was on the verge of achieving its political objectives to expand its sphere of influence and discourage NATO from admitting Ukraine into its alliance. But, any hopes of a quick, decisive victory were dashed when President Putin decided to advance his forces beyond the Donbas region. Facing a determined Ukrainian Army and taking devastating losses, it’s clear Mr. Putin overplayed his hand and is now locked into a sunk cost fallacy, where Russia must invest more machinery, lives, and treasure to salvage whatever they can from this conflict.
Many observers highlight Russia’s logistical challenges and failures to establish air supremacy — where their warplanes could fly over Ukraine at will, unchallenged — but I would argue their critical vulnerability in this fight is their inability to compete in what the military calls the information domain, and what is more commonly known as the court of public opinion. Russian belligerence has galvanized Europe and sparked a revolutionary moment: the new, continent-wide narrative that Mr. Putin cannot control. Tales of the Ghost of Kyiv and the sailors of Snake Island spread like wildfire around the world, uniting countries that, until this event, were fractured. T.E. Lawrence wrote: “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.” What we are witnessing is the printing press in the hands of each citizen. Social media has decentralized and democratized the flow of information. The veracity of these mythical stories does not matter because they become international folklore overnight, which causes nations to rally around Ukraine and buttresses their ability to execute a Fabian strategy.
As I departed Moscow, I reflected on the bitterness I experienced in the Duma and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense; I was dismayed by Minister Lavrov’s intransigent view of the world. During our conversation, I asked him how Russia intended to reconcile its misgivings about NATO and the long list of perceived transgressions against his country. His reply was ominous and unbecoming of a diplomat. He suggested that Russia possessed the means and the will to establish a more favorable international order. If that was truly his intent, I replied that our next meeting was likely to lack the decorum exhibited in his conference room and reminded him of the Marine Corps’ ethos of “No better friend. No worse enemy.” After a week of fighting in Ukraine, it remains to be seen just how hard Russia will push the world order, and how hard the world’s people will fight to maintain it.
Major Tom Schueman is an active-duty infantry Marine. In 2018, while enrolled in an M.A. program at Georgetown University, he was awarded a Stanford Fellowship that brought him to Moscow as part of his scholarly research. He is currently studying strategy at the US Naval War College.
23. Yale researchers release running list of companies still operating in Russia
Yale researchers release running list of companies still operating in Russia
As Russia continues its aggressive invasion of Ukraine, more companies, states and other entities have started pulling their business from Russia. Now one expert has put together a comprehensive list of companies that remain in the country.
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his research team at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute put together a comprehensive list of all the companies that remain operating in Russia to date. Sonnenfeld’s team continuously updates their list to reflect changes as companies assess their business operations in the country. On Tuesday alone, McDonald’s, Starbucks, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo announced they would be suspending all business activity in Russia.
Sonnenfeld appeared on CNBC’s ‘Squawk on the Street” Monday and explained companies continuing to operate in Russia contradict sanctions that the U.S. government has placed on the country, saying “the idea of these sanctions is to put pain on to the economy, we’re not trying to figure out how to advance the Russian economy right now.”
According to Sonnenfeld’s latest list, 29 companies are currently still operating in Russia, which includes Nestle, Hilton hotels, Marriott hotels, Papa John’s pizza and Kraft-Heinz, among others.
At the same time, more than 200 companies have withdrawn from Russia, including Apple, Airbnb, Disney, General Motors, IKEA and Netflix.
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New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli issued a letter to mulitple companies, including McDonald’s, PepsiCo and cosmetic brand Estée Lauder, to reconsider operating their businesses in Russia. DiNapoli banned any new investments in Russian companies on behalf of the state’s Common Retirement Fund and mandated a review of the fund’s investments to determine if any financial risks warrant a disinvestment.
“We believe that companies that continue to operate in Russia and invest in Russian assets face significant and growing legal, compliance, operational, human rights and personnel and reputational risks,” said DiNapoli in his letter.
The most prominent cry for withdrawal from Russia has been Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who told CNN “all western companies must withdraw from Russia” on humanitarian grounds.
Kuleba said to continue operating in Russia is “simply against basic principles of morale to continue working in Russia and making money there. This money is soaked with Ukrainian blood.”
For some brands there isn’t a clear and immediate path to cut off business in Russia, like for Yum! Brands, which owns Pizza Hut, KFC and Taco Bell. In a statement, the company said it has approximately 1,000 KFC restaurants and 50 Pizza Hut locations in Russia, nearly all of which are operated by independent owners under license or franchise agreements.
However, Yum! Brands has suspended all investment and restaurant development in Russia and is directing all profits from its Russia operations to humanitarian efforts.
24. Hints of a Ukraine-Russia Deal?
Could this be the way forward?
Excerpts:
Zelensky avoided answering the question directly but indicated he was willing to compromise on most of those points, saying he was “ready for a dialogue.” Regarding NATO, Zelensky said, “I have cooled down regarding this question a long time ago, after we understood that … NATO is not prepared to accept Ukraine. The alliance is afraid of controversial things and confrontation with Russia.”
On the question of separatist territories, the Ukrainian president also appeared somewhat conciliatory, at least on the issue of Donetsk and Luhansk. “I think that items regarding temporarily occupied territories and pseudo-republics not recognized by anyone but Russia, we can discuss and find a compromise on how these territories will live on,” Zelensky said. “What’s important to me is how the people in those territories who want to be part of Ukraine are going to live.”
Hints of a Ukraine-Russia Deal?
Zelensky appears to float suggestions of a compromise, but U.S. officials fear Putin could double down.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he speaks during a press conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 3. SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images
With Russia’s bloody aggression in Ukraine apparently bogged down, there are hints this week that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be tentatively opening themselves to compromises that might halt the 12-day-old war.
Even so, in testimony to the House intelligence committee on Tuesday, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told lawmakers that although Putin has been surprised by Ukrainian resistance and the global reaction to his invasion, he “is unlikely to be deterred by such setbacks and instead may escalate, essentially doubling down.”
In a TV interview released Tuesday, Zelensky was asked by David Muir of ABC News how he reacted to proposals from the Kremlin on Monday. “What is your message to Vladimir Putin right now?” Muir asked. Muir noted that to cease hostilities, Moscow was demanding that Ukraine change its constitution to reject any intention to enter NATO as well as recognize Crimea as part of Russia and the two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states.
With Russia’s bloody aggression in Ukraine apparently bogged down, there are hints this week that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be tentatively opening themselves to compromises that might halt the 12-day-old war.
Even so, in testimony to the House intelligence committee on Tuesday, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told lawmakers that although Putin has been surprised by Ukrainian resistance and the global reaction to his invasion, he “is unlikely to be deterred by such setbacks and instead may escalate, essentially doubling down.”
In a TV interview released Tuesday, Zelensky was asked by David Muir of ABC News how he reacted to proposals from the Kremlin on Monday. “What is your message to Vladimir Putin right now?” Muir asked. Muir noted that to cease hostilities, Moscow was demanding that Ukraine change its constitution to reject any intention to enter NATO as well as recognize Crimea as part of Russia and the two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states.
Zelensky avoided answering the question directly but indicated he was willing to compromise on most of those points, saying he was “ready for a dialogue.” Regarding NATO, Zelensky said, “I have cooled down regarding this question a long time ago, after we understood that … NATO is not prepared to accept Ukraine. The alliance is afraid of controversial things and confrontation with Russia.”
On the question of separatist territories, the Ukrainian president also appeared somewhat conciliatory, at least on the issue of Donetsk and Luhansk. “I think that items regarding temporarily occupied territories and pseudo-republics not recognized by anyone but Russia, we can discuss and find a compromise on how these territories will live on,” Zelensky said. “What’s important to me is how the people in those territories who want to be part of Ukraine are going to live.”
In the Ukrainian government’s official release of the full interview, Zelensky also called for a “collective security agreement” that would include Russia, though he added, “We cannot recognize that Crimea is the territory of Russia” and “I think it will be difficult for Russia to recognize that this is the territory of Ukraine.”
On Monday, two weeks after Putin declared in a grandiose speech that Ukraine was “an inalienable part” of Russia’s “history, culture, and spiritual space,” Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Moscow was ready to stop its military campaign “in a moment.” The Kremlin’s demands, Peskov said, were that Ukraine also halt hostilities, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, accept Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, and change its constitution to refuse entry into NATO or the European Union. Western-leaning Ukrainians have long sought to join the EU, and Putin’s move to annex Crimea in 2014 was triggered by huge protests that led to the ousting of Ukraine’s then-Russia-leaning president, Viktor Yanukovych, after he avoided signing an association pact with the EU. Only last week, Zelensky asked for fast-track EU membership to help thwart Russia’s invasion.
Putin has falsely suggested he is willing to compromise before, and Russia’s demands are not much different from the past. Even so, after a visit to Moscow on Saturday, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett—the only Western leader to have met Putin since the invasion—also indicated that a deal might be possible, according to Israeli news reports. Quoting unnamed sources “privy to details about the meeting,” the Jerusalem Post reported that although Bennett did not go to Russia with specific proposals in hand, the negotiations were “much more serious than what the West has been saying.” It added that Kyiv has not shared the details so as to maintain pressure on Putin. Bennett called Zelensky after his talk with Putin, which Zelensky had requested. “Talked to [Naftali Bennett],” the Ukrainian president tweeted. “Thanked [him] for Israel’s mediation efforts. Discussed ways to end the war and violence.”
If Moscow is more open to negotiations, it would signal a change in tone from Putin’s Feb. 21 speech, which occurred three days before the invasion. Since then, the Kremlin has appeared stunned that its attacks on major regions—especially Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv—have been stymied by Ukrainian resistance; Russia has also been flummoxed by the ferocity and unity of the response by the United States and European Union. Both have imposed unprecedented sanctions, effectively cutting Russia off from the international financial system. On Tuesday, U.S. President Joe Biden also announced he was banning imports of Russian oil, gas, and coal to the United States to further deprive Putin “of the economic resources he uses to continue his needless war of choice,” a senior administration official said.
“Putin’s country is already on ropes,” said Richard Andres, a national security expert at the U.S. National War College. “Russia is disconnected almost completely from the world banking system. There are already going to be millions of Russians who won’t be able to get enough to eat or enough electricity.”
Marlene Laruelle, director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and an expert on Putin, said that although it is possible Putin is just playing for time so as to regain the military advantage, she believes the Russian leader might be ready to talk.
“I think they are realizing that there is no political solution to the war, and they cannot win in the long run,” she said, adding that Putin probably realizes he can no longer dismiss the charismatic Zelensky as a Western puppet since Zelensky has become an international hero while Putin has been villainized around the globe. “He probably realizes he will have to have direct talks with Zelensky. He has been arrogant, and very often, you lose the war because of your arrogance.”
On Tuesday, both Haines and CIA director Williams Burns said Putin has too much at stake personally to be seen as backing down now. But with Russian discontent in the streets and even within his government rising, the Russian leader might also have to worry about his staying power for the first time. “We assess Putin feels aggrieved the West does not give him proper deference and perceives this as a war he cannot afford to lose, but what he might be willing to accept as a victory may change over time given the significant costs he is incurring,” Haines said.
Michael Hirsh is a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @michaelphirsh
25. Axios Wants Us to Read Everything in Bullet Points
Axios Wants Us to Read Everything in Bullet Points
The news organization that prides itself on short-format writing has big plans to expand in local news, paid newsletters and even the emails sent by your bosses.
Axios, a news site started in 2017, is spending $30 million on expansion this year, said Jim VandeHei, its chief executive.Credit...Jared Soares for The New York Times
By
March 7, 2022
With much of the digital media world combining forces to survive, the founders of five-year-old Axios think they have the right recipe for success on their own.
The pitch, in Axios’s trademarked “smart brevity” format, goes a bit like this:
What to know: The company’s executives think its short-format writing will build back trust in the media among busy audiences and can teach corporate America to quit its long-winded jargon.
This year, Axios is pouring $30 million into expanding its footprint, said Jim VandeHei, the chief executive. It is spreading into cities (Axios Local), industries (Axios Pro) and workplaces (Axios HQ).
Why it matters: Axios is forging its own path when many of its digital peers are merging to increase their audiences and better compete with the big technology companies for advertising. Mr. VandeHei sees opportunity in local news, a space that other publishers have moved away from, and is bullish on Axios HQ, the software company-within-a-company that he thinks could eclipse the multibillion-dollar messaging service Slack.
“We have really firm opinions about where the world is going, and we want to control our destiny,” Mr. VandeHei said. “If you do a deal, that’s hard.”
Yes, but: Can Axios actually scale the bullet?
Go Deeper
Axios, started in 2017 by Mr. VandeHei, Mike Allen and Roy Schwartz, made its mark with scoopy Washington coverage and short-and-sharp national newsletters. It now has more than 400 employees, with 150 in its newsroom in Arlington, Va., and 2.2 million subscribers across its 34 national and global newsletters, all of which are free and make money from advertising.
Last year, as deal talks dominated the digital media industry, Axios held discussions about a possible merger with the sports news website The Athletic and a sale to the German media giant Axel Springer. Both talks ended. Axel Springer instead paid more than $1 billion for the rival publication Politico, which Mr. VandeHei helped start 15 years ago. The New York Times bought The Athletic in January for $550 million. Axios then raised money from Cox Enterprises that valued the company at $430 million.
This year, the company is aggressively expanding into the three new areas, Mr. VandeHei said. The products are meant to address what he sees as the public’s desire for the most important information in a format that is easy to read on smartphones.
Mr. VandeHei said he expected more than $100 million in revenue this year, up from $86 million in 2021.
“America is screwed if we don’t restore fast a common connection, a common truth and a common reality,” he said. “This can only be done closer to people’s homes, professions and workplaces — the places they can see, touch, verify. You do this with smart, clinical news and information — devoid of opinion and needless noise — pushed to consumers in an efficient, quick, respectful way.”
An Axios staff meeting led by, from left, Aja Whitaker-Moore, the executive editor, and Sara Kehaulani Goo, the editor in chief.Credit...Jared Soares for The New York Times
Driving the News
Mr. VandeHei said he had never expected to get into the local news business in small and midsize cities. But with more people working remotely and moving out of big hubs like New York City, “power and population is going to move into these cities.”
“We want to be there first,” he said.
In December 2020, Axios bought The Charlotte Agenda, a profitable newsletter, for close to $5 million. Using that as a model, Axios has introduced the newsletter format in 14 cities, including Atlanta; Charlotte, N.C.; Nashville; and Philadelphia. It plans to expand to 11 more by summer.
Two local reporters were hired in each city to helm a daily newsletter that is a mix of original reporting and an aggregation of articles from other outlets, said Sara Kehaulani Goo, the editor in chief of Axios. (The company recently hired Jamie Stockwell, a New York Times deputy national editor, to oversee Axios Local.)
“Even sooner than we expected we saw that was successful from a journalism standpoint — we saw high open rates,” Ms. Goo said.
As advertising revenue from the local sites grows, some cities are getting a third reporter. Axios Local generated nearly $5 million in revenue last year and has 700,000 subscribers across the 14 cities, a spokeswoman said.
Evan Smith, the chief executive of The Texas Tribune, a nonprofit in Austin founded in 2009, said he was an early subscriber to Axios Austin and reads it every day. “I’m pulling for them,” he said, but added: “Can you sufficiently cover the largest cities in America — which Texas has more of than any other state — with two or three reporters?”
Mr. VandeHei said Axios was first ensuring that its model for local coverage was sustainable and could work on a larger scale.
“We’re trying to think about how we can do this in every community in America,” Mr. VandeHei said.
Between the Lines
The company kept hearing from readers who wanted to use its newsletter format at their workplaces to get more people to read internal emails, said Jordan Zaslav, the general manager of Axios HQ.
“It comes from corporate and it just flies right over your head and you archive it, and the economic cost of that is huge,” he said.
Axios HQ, which promises to teach corporate America how to trim the jargon, is separate from the newsroom. Companies pay about $10,000 for an annual contract and use the software to write team updates and sales notes, Mr. Zaslav said.
The software uses artificial intelligence to suggest editing and formatting to distill blocks of texts into shorter bullet points. Axios HQ also has analytics that show the clients whether employees opened the messages.
A year after its start, Axios HQ has 210 clients, from major companies like Delta Air Lines to state school systems to small start-ups, Mr. Zaslav said. He said it was aiming for 600 clients by the end of this year. The company has about 60 people working exclusively on Axios HQ.
Jordan Zaslav leads Axios HQ, which sells newsletter software to employers.Credit...Jared Soares for The New York Times
A remote participant in a staff meeting last month at Axios headquarters in Arlington, Va.Credit...Jared Soares for The New York Times
Axios HQ generated more than $3 million in revenue in 2021, including the editing and training services it also offers.
Brian Morrissey, a former editor in chief of the trade magazine Digiday who writes The Rebooting, a newsletter about the media industry, cautioned that the history of software businesses built by publishers “is not good.”
“There haven’t been very many success cases because they are very different businesses,” Mr. Morrissey said.
Catch Up Fast
While the national, global and local Axios newsletters are free, they are now supplemented by the new Axios Pro newsletters, which deliver hyper-niche reporting and are $599 for an annual subscription, or more for a corporate subscription. The initial tranche of Pro newsletters is focused on deal-making.
Three newsletters, about retail, fintech and health tech deals, went live this year. Two more — climate tech deals and media deals — will start this month.
The next set of Axios Pro newsletters will center on policy, and further out will be products for workers in the professional services, like managers and salespeople.
This is familiar territory — Mr. VandeHei helped set up the lucrative Politico Pro, a paid digital product from Politico providing policy coverage in Washington. While Axios has been almost exclusively supported by advertising, Mr. VandeHei said the Pro and HQ subscriptions might contribute to about 10 percent of the company’s revenue this year.
“People will pay a lot of money for products that will help them make more money,” Mr. Morrissey said of Axios Pro. “And the advantages of selling to businesses are that they are less price sensitive.”
Fabricio Drumond, the chief business officer, said Axios aimed for a 50-50 split between of advertising and subscription revenue.Credit...Jared Soares for The New York Times
Fabricio Drumond, the chief business officer at Axios, said the goal was to get to a 50-50 revenue mix with advertising and subscriptions. He said the company was not looking for additional funding from investors at the moment.
While Mr. VandeHei said he’s optimistic about the impact that Axios can have, particularly in covering local news, he’s clear on the end goal.
“We’re not doing this as some kind of romantic gesture,” Mr. VandeHei said. “We are ruthlessly capitalistic about only going into business lines that we think are going to be profitable in time.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
