Quotes of the Day:
"Only by decisions of national policy based upon accurate information can we have the chance that peace will endure."
- William J. Donovan
"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous."
- Hans von Seeckt
"Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments."
-Frederick the Great
1. April is likely to be a busy month for North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un
2. South Koreans Could Learn A Lot From the War in Ukraine
3. Exclusive: GOPs Ask Why Biden Not Sanctioning North Korea and China
4. The Emerging North Korean-Russian Cybercrime Partnership
5. N.K. leader urges 'ideological offensive' by propaganda officials
6. N. Korea resumes construction activity at nuclear test site: report
7. North Korea shows signs of SLBM launch
8. Yoon delegation to depart for US Sunday
9. [Lee Kyong-hee] Myopia, machismo and Dragon Hill
10. Struggling North Koreans say they are in no mood to celebrate missile launch
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Young People are Fleeing from Jong-un's Luxury Tourism Special Zone.
12. Yoon considering visit to Camp Humphreys next week
13. North Korea is using American Dell computers and Microsoft Windows OS…possible sanctions violations - OKN
14. COVAX cuts all COVID-19 vaccines allocated for N. Korea: global charity
15. 4 killed in collision, crash of 2 Air Force trainer jets
16. North Korean ICBM Launch May Have Been Fake. It’s Still Important.
17. North Korea restricts public access to Pyongyang following failed ICBM test launch
1. April is likely to be a busy month for North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un
Conclusion:
If North Korea refuses to re-engage, then the only principled option, working with our allies in South Korea and Japan, is to intensify a policy of containment and deterrence, with additional sanctions imposed on North Korea when they continue to violate United Nations resolutions prohibiting ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. Also, the deployment of additional missile defense systems should be pursued, with an upgrade in joint military exercises.
Obviously, getting North Korea to return to negotiations with the United States and resuming inter-Korean talks with South Korea are our principled objectives with North Korea. Failure to accomplish these objectives will contribute to instability in the Indo-Pacific region.
April is likely to be a busy month for North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North [...] Read more
EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — On March 24, North Korea successfully launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) called the Hwasong-17. The missile flew for 68 minutes and traveled up to a maximum altitude of 3,900 miles and a distance of 680 miles, making it capable of reaching the whole of the United States.
The Hwasong-17 is considerably larger than the two ICBMs launched in 2017 – the Hwasong 14 and 15 – and is likely capable of delivering multiple warheads. That’s concerning. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was quoted by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), saying North Korea is “fully ready for long-standing confrontation with the U.S. imperialists.”
This was the twelfth ballistic missile launched in 2022. Launches over the last six months, have included two hypersonic ballistic missiles, a train-mounted ballistic missile, an intermediate range ballistic missile, submarine-launched ballistic missile, long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missile launches that tested systems related to military reconnaissance satellites. North Korea did not issue airspace or maritime safety notifications for any of these launches, representing a serious risk to international civil aviation.
North Korea’s nuclear programs also appear to be very active. On March 7, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that there were “ongoing indications consistent with the operation of the 5-megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon site.” The IAEA also said they continued to observe construction activities at the Yongbyon site, including the construction of an annex to the reported Centrifuge Enrichment Facility, while commercial satellite imagery analysis indicated that there was renewed activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, the first time since its closure in 2018.
April 15 will mark the 110th anniversary of the birth of Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim il-sung. It’s likely Kim will memorialize the event with the launch of a military reconnaissance satellite, something Kim attempted to do in 2012, but was unsuccessful. We should also expect continued ballistic missile launches and a seventh nuclear test.
Ever since the failed Hanoi Summit in February 2019, between former President Donald Trump and Kim, negotiations with North Korea have ceased. And during these three years, North Korea has been upgrading its ballistic missile capabilities while continuing to produce fissile material for additional nuclear weapons. All this, despite the lock down in the North due to the COVID pandemic.
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China is North Korea’s only ally and its economic lifeline. The Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of July 1961 was recently renewed for another 20 years by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kim. China now provides over 90% of the crude oil and petroleum products the North needs, and over 90% of the North’s trade is with China. It is apparent that China has significant leverage with North Korea.
In 2003, when North Korea started to reprocess spent fuel rods at its nuclear facility in Yongbyon, for the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons, former Secretary of State Colin Powell reached out to his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and asked that China intercede with the North, which China did. This was the beginning of the Six Party Talks that China hosted in Beijing, with China’s current Foreign Minister and State Counselor, Wang Yi, hosting the talks. Despite a September 19, 2005, Joint Statement signed by all six countries, that committed North Korea to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities, in return for security assurances, economic development assistance and a path to normal relations, the implementation of the Joint Statement ended in 2009, when North Korea refused to permit nuclear monitors to inspect undeclared suspect sites outside the Yongbyon complex.
It is time for China to again intercede with North Korea and, using its leverage, get the North to accept the unconditional invitation from the United States to meet anytime, anywhere. Once at the table, the United States and North Korea can resume a twenty-seven-year dialogue, with some hope that North Korea will realize that a path to normal relations with the United States, in return for complete and verifiable denuclearization and appreciable progress on human rights issues in the North, is in Kim Jong-un’s interest. The initial goal should be to get North Korea to agree to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and a moratorium on all ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. A willingness to lift certain sanctions if North Korea accepts this initial proposal should appeal to Kim. This, then, would be the first phase in a long action-for-action negotiation process that will focus on the complete and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and facilities in North Korea.
If North Korea refuses to re-engage, then the only principled option, working with our allies in South Korea and Japan, is to intensify a policy of containment and deterrence, with additional sanctions imposed on North Korea when they continue to violate United Nations resolutions prohibiting ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. Also, the deployment of additional missile defense systems should be pursued, with an upgrade in joint military exercises.
Obviously, getting North Korea to return to negotiations with the United States and resuming inter-Korean talks with South Korea are our principled objectives with North Korea. Failure to accomplish these objectives will contribute to instability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.
2. South Koreans Could Learn A Lot From the War in Ukraine
LTG Chun provides some very unique analysis and recommendations that I hope Koreans living in the South will follow.
Excerpts:
It is my observation that to most South Koreans, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of the ROK-US Alliance and the need to strengthen South Korean military capabilities, as these two factors serve as guarantees for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Surely, South Koreans are taking note of the actions that are currently being taken by the US, which seem to be measured and effective at this juncture. The US has contained the Russians at Ukraine’s borders while simultaneously supplying mass quantities of military arms and implementing an effective economic blockade against Russia. One thing South Koreans are certain of is that the difference between war and no war, especially with a larger, nuclear-armed adversary, is a US troop presence on your soil. In my opinion, the cost-benefit of having US troops in Korea should and must be a central part of the lesson from this current, ongoing war in Eastern Europe.
An extension of this belief is the importance of having the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea. North Korea has been alleging that the UNC’s presence is unlawful, claiming it is actually a US military organization that promotes US interests on the Korean Peninsula. The Moon administration has not been supportive of a revitalized UNC and has been suspicious of its activities in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement. This line of thinking is widespread among South Korean progressives and dangerous, to say the least. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how difficult, if not impossible, it is to create an international military effort that is supported by the United Nations (UN). On the other hand, the ROK already has a mandate from the UN that guarantees the security of the South Korean people. While North Korea attacking such an organization is to be expected, South Koreans find such logic difficult to understand.
Conclusion:
South Koreans understand that the economic sanctions being levied on Russia are comprehensive and, despite the ripple effects these sanctions will have on the world’s economy, are necessary for assisting Ukraine and pressuring Russia into ending their aggression. Nonetheless, when inflation hits, it will make clear to the ROK what its stance in the world should be, how closely connected things are and that the role of a middle state comes with both prestige and a great deal of responsibility. Two takeaways for South Korea to consider in the midst of all of this should be what it needs to do to truly strengthen the US-ROK alliance and what its military modernization priorities should be.
However, the biggest lesson for South Korea right now is: if you want peace, you need to prepare for war.
South Koreans Could Learn A Lot From the War in Ukraine - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · by LTG (ret.) In-Bum Chun · March 31, 2022
(Source: Yonhap)
When the first artillery and rockets struck targets in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, South Koreans were having their lunch break that same Thursday. Topics of the day were the upcoming South Korean presidential elections in less than two weeks and the ever-changing situation with COVID-19. It took until late that afternoon for South Korean media to realize that a full-scale attack had been launched against the Ukrainian people. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded South Koreans of their own precarious situation and highlights the security dangers that they too face. However, the current mood of South Korean society is calm, which could be more about citizens being resigned to their fate, as opposed to being a sign of confidence in their ability to handle the aforementioned situation.
Ukraine and the Presidential Election
The resolve of the Ukrainian people and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership has inspired many South Koreans, echoing how their own freedom came at a high cost. It serves as a stark reminder that the Korean War, which began in 1950, is still not over. While there are many in South Korea these days who would seek peace above all else—the archaic idiom that “better red than dead” seems to have renewed appeal—most recall the enormous sacrifices made during the Korean War to win our own freedom from the tyranny of the North and have empathy for Ukraine.
Because the Russian invasion occurred during a very crucial stage in the South Korean presidential election, citizens were divided over how to best understand the war in Ukraine along with how South Korea should respond and how it all relates to the threat of North Korea (DPRK). Initially, the progressive government of Moon Jae-in fumbled its own response. Instead of making a clear and strong statement against the violence being committed against Ukraine by Russia, Moon seems to have been more concerned about his relationship with Vladimir Putin and salvaging economic relations rather than taking a stand. Another example of political priorities taking precedence over good sense was progressive candidate Lee Jae-myoung’s remarks about Volodymyr Zelensky, claiming that Zelensky had “spurred the attack by the Russians because he was a novice in politics with only six months of experience as a politician, which led to publicly calling for a membership in NATO.” He later apologized for the remarks that appeared to be aimed at pointing out the potential consequences of presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol’s inexperience. That said, the conservatives were no better in condemning Putin, except that they used stronger language to denounce the attack.
South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is being confronted with the reality the world is changing for the worse and that trying to act as a balance between greater powers is more than difficult; it’s actually impossible when trading with countries that have conflicting interests. However, while many nations are in a similar predicament, South Korea has a unique and critical relationship with the United States for ensuring its own security.
Lessons Unfolding
It is my observation that to most South Koreans, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of the ROK-US Alliance and the need to strengthen South Korean military capabilities, as these two factors serve as guarantees for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Surely, South Koreans are taking note of the actions that are currently being taken by the US, which seem to be measured and effective at this juncture. The US has contained the Russians at Ukraine’s borders while simultaneously supplying mass quantities of military arms and implementing an effective economic blockade against Russia. One thing South Koreans are certain of is that the difference between war and no war, especially with a larger, nuclear-armed adversary, is a US troop presence on your soil. In my opinion, the cost-benefit of having US troops in Korea should and must be a central part of the lesson from this current, ongoing war in Eastern Europe.
An extension of this belief is the importance of having the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea. North Korea has been alleging that the UNC’s presence is unlawful, claiming it is actually a US military organization that promotes US interests on the Korean Peninsula. The Moon administration has not been supportive of a revitalized UNC and has been suspicious of its activities in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement. This line of thinking is widespread among South Korean progressives and dangerous, to say the least. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how difficult, if not impossible, it is to create an international military effort that is supported by the United Nations (UN). On the other hand, the ROK already has a mandate from the UN that guarantees the security of the South Korean people. While North Korea attacking such an organization is to be expected, South Koreans find such logic difficult to understand.
The thinking of many South Korean progressives is that since there is no security threat from North Korea, there is no need to worry. Their logic is that the DPRK has nuclear weapons for defensive purposes only, which would then only be used on South Koreans if provoked. They view the DPRK as an impoverished country that cannot conduct a war against the ROK, which has the sixth-largest military in the world. However, this line of thinking comes across as naive as it implies that South Korea is not reliant upon organizations like the UNC being involved in inter-Korean relations and takes the presence of US forces on the peninsula for granted. The war in Ukraine shines a spotlight on the harsh reality that dictatorships, such as North Korea, Russia and China, are able to start a war and use violence to achieve political goals, especially when armed with nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, conservatives in South Korea appear to underestimate the survival instincts of the Kim family and the uncanny resilience of the North Korean regime. The biggest mistake of the last two conservative governments in South Korea was that they thought that Kim Jong Un was not going to last, thereby underestimating the resolve and capability of North Korea.
South Koreans were immediately aware that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would affect them one way or another, but it was unclear what the actual ramifications on their daily lives would be. Then, whether by design or coincidence, the DPRK conducted tests claiming to be related to reconnaissance satellite development in clear violation of international law. Despite very clear and strong warnings being issued, there should be no doubt that North Korea will launch or test a “satellite” very soon. Satellite technology is a means to improve the DPRK’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and is a direct threat to the US. Furthermore, North Korea has now also launched ICBMs—whether the new Hwasong-17 or the older Hwasong-15—in recent weeks, the first tests since 2017.
It would seem that Kim Jong Un is betting that the United States’ preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, not to mention the effective paralysis of the UN Security Council at the moment, provides North Korea with an opportunity to conduct these activities with few consequences. Even if Kim achieves his goals, it will be at the price of whatever good faith that was built during the diplomatic process over the last five years and will serve to strengthen the position of US and ROK hardliners. South Korean conservatives are already committed to large-scale exercises and discarding the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), all of which will heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea resuming its nuclear activities is not only the problem, as it is also running an active program to continue to develop its tactical weapons. The DPRK continues to arm itself with SA-16 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) that are similar to the highly-effective US Stinger missile, along with its own version of the Kornet, the Bulsae (불새) anti-tank missile that rivals the US Javelin anti-tank missile. These systems are not new, but the war in Ukraine exemplifies the effectiveness of such weapons against a superior army. Both Ukraine and Russia have called for international fighters to join the fight, and thousands have volunteered on both sides of this war. Russia has also asked for Chinese support with logistics like field rations, though it seems unlikely to remain limited to this scope. As such, it is worth considering the possibility of a North Korean contingent disguising itself as Chinese or going as itself and assisting the Russians in exchange for technological and firsthand experience in areas such as cyber hacking.
Finally, South Korea needs to realize the importance of having the moral high ground in war. Recently, the use of first strike options was debated as an election issue. Had the Ukrainians conducted a preemptive strike against a certain Russian attack, it calls into question whether the European Union/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States could have provided Ukraine the support we see now.
South Koreans understand that the economic sanctions being levied on Russia are comprehensive and, despite the ripple effects these sanctions will have on the world’s economy, are necessary for assisting Ukraine and pressuring Russia into ending their aggression. Nonetheless, when inflation hits, it will make clear to the ROK what its stance in the world should be, how closely connected things are and that the role of a middle state comes with both prestige and a great deal of responsibility. Two takeaways for South Korea to consider in the midst of all of this should be what it needs to do to truly strengthen the US-ROK alliance and what its military modernization priorities should be.
However, the biggest lesson for South Korea right now is: if you want peace, you need to prepare for war.
38north.org · by LTG (ret.) In-Bum Chun · March 31, 2022
3. Exclusive: GOPs Ask Why Biden Not Sanctioning North Korea and China
Perhaps some revisionist history (except that in the past sanctions were a bipartisan effort). While we imposed sanctions we certainly did not do a good job of enforcing them.
I am concerned about the growing partisan divide over Korean security. (re HR 3446)
But sanctions are not sufficient., useful and important, but not sufficient. We need a strategy. It would be better if there was a bipartisan demand for a comprehensive strategy.
Congressmen would do well to read former Secretary Gates' recent book. Two excerpts to which they should pay attention (though I disagree with the Secretary as I think Kim Jong-un has been very predictable if we just understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime). Sanctions look tough. Strategy not so much.
“Members of Congress love to impose sanctions on countries whose actions they object to, even though usually the only effect is to make the members feel righteous and look tough to their constituents. In fact, all too frequently, the imposition of sanctions is simply a political gesture, intended mainly to show that the United States is doing something in response to another country’s bad behavior without much expectation of success. For example, economic sanctions were imposed on China in 1989 after the brutal suppression of demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing and on Russia in 2014 after the seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine because no one was prepared to support a military response. The sanctions had little impact on China, and while the post-Crimea sanctions hurt the Russian economy, President Putin would not consider taking the actions required to get them lifted (although they may have constrained him from other acts of aggression).”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/aq7PJrg
“North Korea is a wild card among military (and nuclear-armed) powers given the unpredictable nature of its leader, Kim Jong-un. The regime has been relentless for some two decades in developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. From Kim’s perspective, Muammar Qaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program and is dead, his regime gone; Saddam Hussein never got nuclear weapons and he is dead, his regime gone. Ukraine gave up 1,500 nuclear weapons in 1994 based on the pledge by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia (and separately, France) to guarantee its territorial integrity; it has since lost Crimea and the eastern part of its country. Kim is smart enough to understand these lessons.”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/9szEFiW
Exclusive: GOPs Ask Why Biden Not Sanctioning North Korea and China
Breitbart · by Kristina Wong · March 31, 2022
House Republicans are pressing the Biden administration on why it is not making full use of congressionally approved sanctions against China for providing support to North Korea in light of Pyongyang’s recent illicit ballistic missile testing, Breitbart News has learned.
In a March 31, 2022, letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken led by Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL), members of the Republican Study Committee noted the uptick in North Korea’s illicit missile testing and activities with Chinese support in recent weeks.
They wrote:
On March 4, North Korea launched a ballistic missile toward the sea off its east coast, its second missile test that week. On February 26, Japan and South Korea claimed that Pyongyang launched a ballistic missile which the Kim regime claimed was for a reconnaissance satellite system. Your administration has recently assessed that these latter two missiles are components of new intercontinental ballistic missile system under development. North Korea has launched at least 11 projectiles this year, including two modified long-range cruise missiles and its first intermediate-range ballistic missile since 2017, the Hwasong-12, which can reach the U.S. territory of Guam.
“In the face of these developments we find your administration’s North Korea policy lacking and urge you to levy, tighten, and enforce sanctions based on congressional statutes as well as the broad executive authorities available to incumber North Korean military modernization and counter the Kim regime,” they wrote to Blinken.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken participate in a meeting with President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea in the State Dining Room of the White House on May 21, 2021. (Stefani Reynolds-Pool/Getty Images)
They noted that Congress passed mandatory sanctions on North Korea in 2016, 2017, and 2019 by “overwhelming bipartisan majorities,” adding, “Despite this bipartisan track record of calling for pressure on North Korea, your administration does not appear to have a serious sanctions strategy nor implementation plan for mandatory penalties on North Korea.”
They noted that the Biden administration has issued sanctions focused on North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs twice — on January 12, 2022, targeting six North Korean individuals, including four based in China, a Russian individual, and a Russian entity; and on March 11, 2022, against three Russian companies and two individuals for supporting North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
But they asked specifically why the administration did not designate additional entities in China and Russia as part of its North Korea sanctions designations and why the administration is not sanctioning entities in China associated with illicit coal shipments to North Korea documented by the United Nations Security Council.
“Does the Department assess that North Korea exported coal in 2021? If so, why has the administration not issued sanctions against entities, individuals, and financial institutions, including in China, associated with these activities?” the lawmakers asked Blinken.
Cammack said in a statement to Breitbart News:
Sanctions against North Korea will not work until we hold China accountable. Under President Trump, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Chinese banks and financial institutions that provided support to North Korea, but ever since Biden took office, we’ve seen zero sanctions out of this White House.
Despite several missile launches and provocations, this administration repeatedly fails to hold China accountable for its work with North Korea. I am pleased to lead my Republican Study Committee colleagues in calling out the Biden State Department for its gross failures on this front.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at May Day Stadium on September 19, 2018, in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Pyeongyang Press Corps/Getty Images)
In addition to Cammack, the letter is signed by RSC Chairman Jim Banks, RSC National Security and Foreign Affairs Task Force Chairman Joe Wilson, and Reps. Ted Budd, Guy Reschenthaler, Dan Crenshaw, Neal Dunn, Buddy Carter, Byron Donalds, Jeff Duncan, Doug LaMalfa, Debbie Lesko, Doug Lamborn, Jake LaTurner, John Joyce, Tracey Mann, Blake Moore, Markwayne Mullin, August Pfluger, Bryan Steil, Greg Steube, Chris Stewart, Mike Waltz, Brad Wenstrup, Brian Babin, Ben Cline, Nicole Malliotakis, and Bob Good.
Banks said in a statement:
Sanctions on North Korea are worthless if you refuse to hold China accountable. President Trump understood this, but more than a year into his presidency, Joe Biden has failed to impose the sanctions the Trump administration placed on Chinese banks and financial institutions that support North Korea. It’s a puzzle and the only explanation I can find is that Biden wants to protect his family’s multi-million-dollar business dealings.
I’m grateful to the more than 20 members of Republican Study Committee who joined Rep. Cammack’s letter to the Biden State Department.
Wilson added:
The Biden administration is severely lacking in its policy on North Korea as Kim Jong Un continues testing ballistic missiles. We need answers as to why this administration refuses to designate individuals in China and Russia under sanctions against North Korea’s ballistic missile program.
The lawmakers also said they are disturbed by the U.N. reporting that North Korea and Iran have “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects” and asked what the status of cooperation is between the two nations on ballistic missile cooperation and what the Biden administration is doing about it.
The Biden administration is seeking to reenter the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran and has been opaque on details of the negotiations.
“We seek your written answers to these questions no later than March 31st, 2022 at 11:59 PM,” the House Republicans wrote.
Breitbart · by Kristina Wong · March 31, 2022
4. The Emerging North Korean-Russian Cybercrime Partnership
The all-purpose sword. This could/should be a pressure point. We can take aggressive action to interdict regime cyber operations. And if we do not and the partnerships continue to evolve and strengthen we are going to see greater and greater cyber threats. I think the administration needs to take off the gloves and turn the cyber forces loose to deal with north Korean (and Russian and Chinese) cyber operations. It will serve three purposes: better protect the US, exert necessary pressure on the regime, and cut off flow of funds that the regime cyber operations can bring in.
The Emerging North Korean-Russian Cybercrime Partnership
Cyber operations are increasingly seen by the regime as one of the few sources of foreign revenue generation for the Workers’ Party elite.
Amidst Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, countless national security analysts and cybersecurity experts have been warning about the dangers of increased Russian cyberattacks on U.S infrastructure. Lesser known are the ties between Russian-language cyber actors and the North Korean government. On March 22, U.S national security advisor Jake Sullivan brought this connection to the national spotlight when he said, “North Korea’s cyber capabilities have been manifest in the world and they work with all kinds of cybercriminals around the world, including Russian cybercriminals.” Sullivan’s statement confirms that Russia’s shadowy network of cybercriminals has found allies in the North Korean government, which uses cyber activities to circumvent heavy international sanctions and bolster Kim Jong-un’s coffers.
Moscow’s cyber ties to Pyongyang stretch back to 2017, when it was first reported that a Russian telecommunications company had started providing North Korea with a second Internet connection. Previously, North Korea had solely accessed the worldwide web via Chinese servers. In 2020, cybersecurity firm Intel 471 discovered that Lazarus, an elite North Korean hacking unit, was working together with a Russian malware operation. Intel 471 noted in its report that “DPRK threat actors likely are active in the cybercriminal underground and maintain trusted relationships with top-tier Russian-speaking cybercriminals." The report also indicated that North Korean-made malware was offered for sale on underground Russian marketplaces. A North Korean cyber unit was also reportedly found working in the Russian Far East.
Due to their technical skills and ability to conduct cyberattacks on Western enterprises, Pyongyang’s cyber agents see Russia’s cybercriminals as beneficial partners. The Kremlin is passive towards its domestic cybercriminal underworld and sometimes works in tandem with Russian cybercriminals. For North Korean hackers, working with Russian cybercriminals provides unprecedented access to Western financial institutions and consistent opportunities for low-level financial crime. For the Russian cyber underworld, working with North Korean hackers offers an opportunity for big paydays. North Korean hackers are well-known for their ability to hack into robust financial institutions and generate large amounts of revenue.
For most casual observers, the idea of the stodgy socialists in North Korea working with the Russian cybercriminal underground seems odd or out of the place. However, this fits into a historical pattern first established by former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Under the guidance of the “Great Leader,” North Korean government officials in the 1980s and 1990s were encouraged to generate revenue for the Korean Workers’ Party by any possible means. These illicit funds were then used to develop the regime’s nuclear arsenal and support the luxurious lifestyles of the North Korean elite. This meant that North Korean agents were encouraged by the leadership to engage in contraband trade with the Asian criminal underworld. In order to generate revenue for the heavily sanctioned regime, North Korean agents sold drugs to Chinese triads, Taiwanese gangs, the Russian mafia, and the Japanese yakuza. According to a Wall Street Journal report, “between 1999 and 2001, Japanese authorities seized more than 2,400 pounds of amphetamines en route from North Korea, 34 percent of Japan's total seizures of the drug.” In December 2002, the Japanese Coast Guard sank a North Korean ship that was trafficking amphetamines to Japanese gangs. During Kim Jong-il’s reign, North Korea gained a global reputation for its smuggling activities and drug trafficking operations.
North Korea’s long-established links to international criminal organizations have now shifted into cyberspace. The ties between Russian cybercriminals and the Kim family regime may seem new, but they are in fact part of a long-term North Korean strategy to align organized crime with Pyongyang’s priorities. In the North Korean system, supporting and upholding the dignity of the supreme leader overrides all other concerns. There is also concern that North Korea’s cyber activities will inspire other rogue nations to follow suit. Cybersecurity researcher Yana Blachman notes that “the cybercrime model of North Korea could create a blueprint for other nations to develop similar programs. Without international action, this could result in escalating cyber guerrilla warfare, putting all nations at significant risk.
The North Korean state refers to its cyber activities as its “all-purpose sword,” and Kim Jong-un uses state hackers for both political and financial espionage. The turn to cybercriminal activities reflects the changing international situation and geopolitical dynamics facing the Kim family regime. Cybercrime is a low-risk and high-reward activity for the regime. Due to heavy international sanctions and COVID-19 border closures, North Korea has never been as isolated as it is now. While much of this is due to Kim Jong-un’s own decisions, it has meant that North Korean cyber operations are increasingly seen by the regime as one of the few sources of foreign revenue generation for the Workers’ Party elite.
The intelligence community needs to continue to keep a close eye on the emerging linkages between the cybercriminal underworld and North Korean state-affiliated hackers. Looking forward, we are likely to see a proliferation of North Korean cyber espionage that aligns with the regime’s nuclear provocations.
Benjamin R. Young is an assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University. He is the author of the book Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World, and his writing has appeared in a range of media outlets and peer-reviewed scholarly journals. Follow him on Twitter @DubstepInDPRK.
Image: Reuters.
5. N.K. leader urges 'ideological offensive' by propaganda officials
The regime is really leaning into ideology. It is all it has for the people. There is nothing else to give them unless the regime opens up and allows outside aid. And of course what really needs to happen is the regime needs to reform but of course to reform is a threat to the legitimacy of the regime. Reform is an existential threat to the regime.
N.K. leader urges 'ideological offensive' by propaganda officials | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took a commemorative photo in person with the participants of a workshop of the ruling party's propaganda officials and called for accelerated "revolution through a powerful ideological offensive," according to the country's state media Friday.
Apparently, Kim paid keen attention to the workshop, which opened in Pyongyang on Monday and brought together officials in the "information field" of the Workers' Party of Korea. He sent a letter to the attendees on the first day of the event and met with them for the photo session Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
He expressed "belief that the participants in the workshop would hold fast to the Juche theory of giving importance to ideology as the motive force of innovation, creation and advance and dynamically accelerate our revolution through a powerful ideological offensive," the KCNA reported. Juche means self-reliance.
The workshop was held at a time when the Kim regime is intensifying its provocative stance, highlighted by the launch of a long-range missile last week.
The North has often sought to tighten social discipline and rally internal unity in the face of growing pressure from the international community over its provocations leading to the escalation of regional tensions.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. N. Korea resumes construction activity at nuclear test site: report
Excerpt:
In its annual Threat Assessment report, released earlier this month, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence said the North may be expected to resume nuclear and ICBM testing this year.
N. Korea resumes construction activity at nuclear test site: report | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has recently resumed construction activity at an underground nuclear test site north of Pyongyang, which suggests a possible nuclear test down the road, a news report said Thursday, citing unidentified U.S. officials.
"North Korea has recently resumed digging tunnels and construction activities at its underground nuclear test site, according to five US officials," CNN reported.
The report comes after government sources in Seoul said the North may be working to create a shortcut to one of the underground tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site that it purportedly dismantled in 2018 in an internationally observed event to show its willingness to denuclearize.
One of the sources has said the North had abruptly stopped its initial construction work to restore the entrance to an underground tunnel at Punggye-ri, and is now digging up the side of the tunnel apparently to create a shortcut to the tunnel.
The source added creating such a shortcut may allow the completion of restoration work "in a month."
Punggye-ri has been the site of all six of North Korea's known nuclear tests.
The work to restore the underground tunnels was detected earlier this year after Pyongyang said in January that it may consider restarting "all temporarily suspended activities," apparently referring to its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing that had been in place since late 2017.
The North fired an intercontinental ballistic missile last Thursday (Seoul time), ending its self-imposed restrictions on long-range missile testing.
In its annual Threat Assessment report, released earlier this month, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence said the North may be expected to resume nuclear and ICBM testing this year.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. North Korea shows signs of SLBM launch
Again - ICBM test, nuclear test prep and now apparent SLBM prep are all designed to raise tensions to support blackmail diplomacy. The regime believes it is creating conditions to force the Biden administration into making concessions. Kim Jong-un is miscalculating because the administration is not going to give into the regime's political warfare and long con. Concessions will not stop these provocations and other hostile actions (because the regime is the country actually executing a hostile policy). Concessions will be assessed as success; therefore, Kim will double down and not turn into a responsible member of the international community.
North Korea shows signs of SLBM launch
Posted April. 01, 2022 07:48,
Updated April. 01, 2022 07:48
North Korea shows signs of SLBM launch. April. 01, 2022 07:48. weappon@donga.com.
Signs have been detected at Sinpo Shipyard in South Hamgyong Province that North Korea is preparing to launch an SLBM. Experts observe that North Korea may launch its newly developed SLBM in the days preceding and following April 15, Kim Il Sung’s birthday anniversary, subsequent to last month’s failed test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can strike the U.S. mainland.
Beyond Parallel, the website on North Korea run by Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), released on Wednesday eight satellite images showing unusual activities of the 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero) experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA), a harbor tug, and the submersible missile test stand.
The photograph taken on March 22 showed a small harbor tug pulling the stern of the 8.24 Yongung experimental ballistic missile submarine from underneath the canopy. On March 23, the submarine was concealed below the canopy, and the tugboat anchored beside the floating dry dock. The 8.24 Yongung SSBA, tugboat, and dry dock are the three elements of North Korea’s test firing of SLBM. North Korea pulls the floating dry dock by a harbor tug to the nearby waters and test-fires underwater ballistic missile.
Analysts point out that there is a possibility of North Korea test-fire its SLBM named the North Star-4 and North Star-5, which it unveiled at the military parade in October 2020 and January 2021, respectively. As North Korea has reportedly failed to test fire the new ICBM Hwasung-17 on Feb. 16, it is likely to show off its military might by firing the new SLBM.
An official familiar with the South Korean Defense Ministry said that North Korea may attempt to demonstrate its military power by conducting new SLBM targeting U.S. bases in South Korea and in Japan, subsequent to its ICBM provocation targeting the mainland U.S., using “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth” approach.
8. Yoon delegation to depart for US Sunday
Excellent. Note the delegation includes MG Pyo the recently retired military attache.
Yoon delegation to depart for US Sunday
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol /YonhapA delegation of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will leave for the United States on Sunday for a weeklong trip aimed at coordinating policy ahead of the launch of the new government, an official said Friday.
The seven-member delegation, led by Rep. Park Jin of Yoon's People Power Party, will hold meetings with U.S. government and congressional officials, as well as experts on alliance and security issues, Yoon's spokesperson, Kim Eun-hye, said.
The delegation will meet with "key people in positions of responsibility" to conduct "practical policy consultations," Kim said when asked whether there are plans for a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden.
"We are focused on discussing policy and exploring areas of cooperation with our counterpart before President-elect Yoon's inauguration," she said.
The delegation also includes former Vice Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yong; Chung Jae-ho, a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University (SNU); Park Cheol-hee, a professor of the SNU Graduate School of International Studies; Pyo Se-woo, former defense attache at the South Korean Embassy in Washington; Yeon Won-ho, a researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy; and Kang In-sun, the president-elect's spokesperson for foreign press. (Yonhap)
9. [Lee Kyong-hee] Myopia, machismo and Dragon Hill
And how many Americans thought the author is talking about the Dragon Hill Lodge (she is not but that was my first thought when I read the headline).
Excerpts:
In effect, Yoon wants to do what some of his predecessors desired. The site of the current president’s office and residence -- Cheong Wa Dae, or the Blue House -- has been blamed for the fate of former presidents who have been ousted, imprisoned, or accused of corruption involving their family members. Some experts of feng shui, the ancient geomancy practice, have said that a mountainside lot behind a royal palace is inauspicious.
Apart from the mystical theory of interactions between topographic and human energies, a more practical explanation for the often-cited “secrecy and inefficiency” of the Blue House is that its sprawling grounds and exclusive office layout have isolated presidents, keeping them removed from the public.
[Lee Kyong-hee] Myopia, machismo and Dragon Hill
Published : Mar 31, 2022 - 05:30 Updated : Mar 31, 2022 - 05:30
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s plan to relocate the presidential office before his May 10 inauguration is abrupt and absurd. The decision, slathered in opaqueness, not only defies public opinion and risks gross overspending, it intensifies security concerns amid increasing North Korean missile tests.
None of that seems to matter to Yoon, known for his bulldog mentality when he was a prosecutor. With logistics denying his original relocation plan, he now wants to move to the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan-gu, central Seoul. To make way, the Defense Ministry will move to the adjacent Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters, which have to move to the Capital Defense Command compound miles away.
According to Yoon, a park will be built in front of the relocated presidential office, on land that the US Army occupied, “so that anyone can see the president at work.” Idealistic, of course. Security concerns will keep all but a tiny fraction of Koreans outside.
The surprised Defense Ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have remained stoic. They must be befuddled. Soldiers must be ready to move anytime, anywhere, supporters of the plan argue. But we are not at war. We are in a presidential transition period. The reins of government obviously need to be passed efficiently, without undue distractions like counting moving boxes and deciding where staff members should sit. This is particularly critical now.
On March 24, four days after Yoon unveiled his relocation plan, North Korea tested its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile to date, heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In its 11th missile launch this year alone, the latest test demonstrated an ability to hit anywhere in the United States. It also fits the North’s pattern of provocative action to gauge the attention of new South Korean leaders. The war in Ukraine also raises security concerns for the peninsula. The results of Russia’s invasion of the former Soviet republic will likely influence the strategies of major powers in East Asia.
In effect, Yoon wants to do what some of his predecessors desired. The site of the current president’s office and residence -- Cheong Wa Dae, or the Blue House -- has been blamed for the fate of former presidents who have been ousted, imprisoned, or accused of corruption involving their family members. Some experts of feng shui, the ancient geomancy practice, have said that a mountainside lot behind a royal palace is inauspicious.
Apart from the mystical theory of interactions between topographic and human energies, a more practical explanation for the often-cited “secrecy and inefficiency” of the Blue House is that its sprawling grounds and exclusive office layout have isolated presidents, keeping them removed from the public.
Hence, in the run-up to the election, the electorate in general welcomed Yoon’s pledge to open the “Gwanghwamun Era” as the fulfillment of true democracy. The street in front of Gwanghwamun, the south gate of Gyeongbokgung, the main palace of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), has functioned as a citizens’ agora and the heart of the capital.
Yoon initially said that his new office would be made in a government complex along this street, just a few blocks away from the Blue House. Then, after the election, he said his promise was found to be infeasible, due to security risks and “catastrophic” inconveniences to the public, including traffic jams.
Chaos is ongoing with opponents arguing that the hasty relocation will cause security risks for the president and the nation, not to mention unnecessary spending of taxpayer money. The estimated cost reportedly ranges from 49.6 billion won ($40.1 million) to more than 1 trillion won ($822.7 million). Opinion polls indicate that more than half of the general public opposes Yoon’s plan. Approval ratings for him have dipped below 50 percent, an unusual showing for an incoming president.
“Withdrawal” and “pause” are not in Yoon’s vocabulary –- or so it seems. “I don’t think the opinion polls matter,” he said. He even said that, if the move is not completed by May 10 due to a lack of cooperation from the incumbent administration, he would continue to work in the transition team’s office after his inauguration, commuting from his home in Gangnam across the Han River.
Yoon’s unrelenting stance has fueled his standoff with President Moon Jae-in, who fears poor preparedness for North Korea’s provocations. Rumors run rampant that Yoon’s wife, Kim Kun-hee, who still stays out of the public eye, has been advised by shamans that the Blue House is cursed and Yongsan is a blessed spot. Yongsan means “dragon hill.” In the East Asian tradition, a dragon is identified with a king. Yoon, indeed, appeared with the Chinese character “wang (king)” written on his palm during early days of his campaign.
The rumors about superstitious belief held by the first couple aside, the lack of priority is mind boggling; a makeshift plan to change the president’s workspace is the top agenda item rather than pressing problems such as the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea’s recent actions or economic problems.
Many pundits suggest Yoon end the controversy by announcing that he will begin his tenure at the Blue House and rethink his relocation ambitions The presidential office means a lot more than the president’s workspace: it is the nation’s historic and cultural symbol. The Republic of Korea deserves the presidential office and residence of the class befitting its rising cultural power, not to mention its economic capability.
In this regard, the Blue House, overlooking the old city center of Seoul -- clustered with government offices and major cultural facilities and assured of security by scenic mountains at the back -- is far better than Yongsan-gu, which has long been the home of foreign troops. Yoon has two viable options: restructuring the Blue House to meet his standards of communication with his aides and the public, or consulting with relevant experts for a master plan that produces a new presidential office “for the future of the nation.”
Lee Kyong-hee
Lee Kyong-hee is a former editor-in-chief of The Korea Herald. -- Ed.
10. Struggling North Koreans say they are in no mood to celebrate missile launch
I read these reports and I think to myself imagine if we turned loose the PSYOP professionals. north Korea is the country most ripe for PSYOP. Please let slip the PSYOP dogs of war.
Struggling North Koreans say they are in no mood to celebrate missile launch
An ICBM test fire has been used to praise Kim Jong Un, but soldiers and citizens say it doesn't solve shortages.
By Hyemin Son and Myung Chul Lee
2022.03.31
Following North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch last week, its first since 2017, the country’s media has been lauding it as evidence of Kim Jong Un’s leadership and bravery, sources in the country told RFA.
But citizens and soldiers alike are beginning to resent the use of missile launches to praise Kim Jong Un, who is reverently referred to as the “Highest Dignity,” and would rather the government pay more attention to issues like food and supply shortages.
Though it was initially believed that North Korea launched the Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24, South Korean military authorities reported Tuesday that it was in fact the older Hwasong-15. The Hwasong-17 was involved in a failed launch on March 16 and exploded over Pyongyang, they said.
“Today, while I was reading the news report in the Rodong Sinmun newspaper app on my smartphone, there was a report saying the Highest Dignity signed an order to launch an ICBM and I was skeptical whether our leader is the right person,” an official of Ryongchon county, in the northwestern province of North Pyongan, told RFA’s Korean Service.
“This year, the authorities insist that the food problem should be solved by decisively increasing agricultural production. Cooperative farms are struggling because they do not have fertilizer and other materials that are desperately needed for farming preparations, but the authorities do not provide any funds,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
He said that the money the government is using for nuclear and missile development could be better used to boost the agricultural sector, but the government keeps launching missiles, so farm officials are angry.
In the city of Chongju in the south of the province, government loudspeakers have been broadcasting propaganda about the missile test.
“It says the Highest Dignity directly guided the launch of an ICBM that could stand up to a long-term confrontation with the United States,” a resident of the city told RFA. “This is the 13th missile they launched this year alone. They are acting like kids playing war games. Is this something we should be proud of?
“The authorities’ propagandize that the launch of the ICBM was carried by the handwritten order of the Highest Dignity, which said to ‘launch bravely for the great dignity and honor of the country and people’. The residents find it absurd … expressing anger at authorities who turn a blind eye to their livelihoods,” the second source said on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.
Soldiers in the military also see through the propaganda, griping that authorities are telling to sacrifice their lives for the nation, just as the soldiers who launched the missile are somehow sacrificing themselves to fulfill the orders of Kim Jong Un.
The soldiers and officers have been attending daily “mental education classes” where they learn that the Red Flag Company, which launched the ICBM, are elite fighters who follow through on Kim Jong Un’s orders.
“The ideological education emphasizes that the Red Flag Company is a family that shares joy and suffering with the Supreme Leader. They say the Red Flag Company are dedicating themselves to defending him,” the military source said. “They are told the Red Flag Company are warriors prepared to sacrifice their lives for the Supreme Commander by following the spirit of defending the leader.
“However, the soldiers who listened to the instructor's lecture continued to have expressionless faces as if they did not know what they were willing to sacrifice their lives for. The soldiers griped about the military authorities, who were forcing them to listen to this propaganda when they needed time to rest after their grueling winter training,” the third source said.
Another military source, in North Pyongan, told RFA that the officers there are not buying the propaganda.
“They know that another intercontinental ballistic missile launch failed on the 16th, so they are wondering how much money was wasted again for this launch,” the fourth source said.
“Rather than focusing on the development of missiles, officers believe that it is urgent for the authorities to improve the poor supply situation in order to increase the morale of the soldiers. This would also increase the actual combat power of the military,” he said.
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Young People are Fleeing from Jong-un's Luxury Tourism Special Zone.
When will collective action become feasible?
Excerpts:
The Samjiyon development is a top national priority project directly under Kim Jong-un. It is prohibited for young people who have been assigned to the project under the direction of the Workers' Party to leave the project. This is the reason why the authorities are punishing them severely.
One of our reporting partners said the following.
"The youths who went to Samjiyon became 'rats in a trap.' They can't move inside, and they can't go outside either."
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Young People are Fleeing from Jong-un's Luxury Tourism Special Zone. "No Chinese tourists because of coronavirus. We can't eat." Samjiyon of the North.
Kim Jong-un visited Samjiyon in November 2021. Photo quoted from the Labor Newspaper.
◆Authorities confronted with the punishment
Create a world-class international tourist city...
In November 2016, Kim Jong-un suddenly ordered the construction of a "mountain cultural city" in Samjiyon County located in Ryangang Province, the northernmost part of North Korea.
Samjiyon is located at the foot of Mt. Paektu and has been advocated by the regime as a "sacred place of revolution." South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who visited North Korea in September 2018, has stood at the top of Mt. Paektu with Kim Jong-un via this place of Samjiyon.
Kim Jong-un, who is enthusiastic about the development of Samjiyon, has frequently visited the site and rushed the construction work, leading to the completion of the project in December 2019. The plan was to generate foreign currency revenue by attracting tourists from China.
The North Korean authorities demolished all the shabby houses in the centre of Samjiyon, built new apartments and a hospital, placed many young people as new residents, and elevated the area from a county to a city. Now, however, these young people are reportedly leaving Samjiyon as if in a competition. What is happening?
In mid-March, we spoke with our reporting partner, who lives in Ryanggang Province.
The special tourism zone in Samjiyon, which was built through a rush construction project at the initiative of Kim Jong-un. The state-run media widely publicized the project. Quoted from the Labor Newspaper.
◆ No Chinese tourists because of coronavirus.
――Why are young people leaving Samjiyon?
"People were told that '(Chinese President) Xi Jinping said he would send them 100 million tourists.,' and they expected this city to become a tourist city and bring in more income, but not a single tourist from China has come because of coronavirus. Although the young men were sent into the area in groups, the life deep in the mountains was too hard for them to adapt."
―― But I heard that there is a splendid all-electric apartment building built in Samjiyon and that the electricity supply is much better than in other places.
"A new hospital has indeed been built and electricity is available for more than 15 hours a day, but there are no tourists, so there is no income. Since the area is a potato-producing region, the rationing is all potatoes. Many people have given up because they can't do business and don't know when the pandemic will end."
――What do you mean that people can't do business?
"Markets are not allowed in Samjiyon in the first place. The market is closed, and only state-run and cooperative stores are operating."
Map of the Chinese-North Korean border region (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Young people who were forcibly deployed left the city.
――What kind of young people are fleeing?
"The authorities forced young people who had graduated from high schools and universities to go to Samjiyon in groups, making them say, 'I want to go to Samjiyon.' There was frustration from the beginning because the authorities would often transfer the residence registration document without the person's knowledge about it."
――Can one freely leave Samjiyon?
"They need a reason, of course. They are fleeing more and more, making up excuses such as marrying, getting medical treatment, family difficulties, etc."
◆Authorities have tightened penalties, even banishment.
――Don’t the authorities regulate?
"No way. The People's Committee (local government) is intensively investigating the matter. They prohibit business trips to other places, and in the case of an illness, they do not even allow the patient to return to his/her parents' home for treatment without a hospital certificate. In the case of women, the city labour department will not transfer food ration documents to those who try to leave Samjiyon with the excuse of getting married. Many who have left without telling have been sent to the "Labour Training Corps". In the worst cases, they even exile them to completely different remote areas."
*Labour training corps are short-term forced labour camps.
The Samjiyon development is a top national priority project directly under Kim Jong-un. It is prohibited for young people who have been assigned to the project under the direction of the Workers' Party to leave the project. This is the reason why the authorities are punishing them severely.
One of our reporting partners said the following.
"The youths who went to Samjiyon became 'rats in a trap.' They can't move inside, and they can't go outside either." (Kang Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)
※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
12. Yoon considering visit to Camp Humphreys next week
Is it really a good idea for the president-elect to visit before he takes office? We can expect a possible north Korea propaganda effort in response.
Yoon considering visit to Camp Humphreys next week
Yoon Suk-yeol, presidential candidate of the main opposition People Power Party, looks at the North Korean side with binoculars during his visit to the Baekgol observation post at the South Korean Army’s 3rd Infantry Division in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province. (Yonhap)
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is considering visiting the US military base Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek next week, sources said Thursday.
The base is located some 70 kilometers south of Seoul and serves as the headquarters of the 28,500-strong US Forces Korea.
Yoon will likely make the visit at the end of next week and meet with USFK Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and other military leaders.
Yoon's spokesperson, Kim Eun-hye, refused to confirm the plan but said it should be considered from the point of view of the South Korea-US alliance and combined defense in light of North Korea's recent provocations. (Yonhap)
13. North Korea is using American Dell computers and Microsoft Windows OS…possible sanctions violations - OKN
No surprise.
North Korea is using American Dell computers and Microsoft Windows OS…possible sanctions violations - OKN
This article was originally posted on VOA and translated by OKN Correspondent.
A recently released photo confirmed that North Korean authorities are using American computers and software that are prohibited to be sold in North Korea. Questions arise as goods prohibited by sanctions against North Korea are still being used. Ham Ji-ha reports.
On March 10, North Korea’s state media, including Rodong Sinmun, released photos, stating that Kim Jong-un is being hands-on at the National Aerospace Development Administration.
However, this photo also shows about 50 “Dell” computer monitors from the United States all around Kim.
All of these monitors, believed to be LCD or LED, appear to be the same product as the “Dell” logo was printed on the back of the screen.
Also, it’s likely the monitors were connected to computers placed under the desk, but is impossible to verify, but highly possible it is also a Dell product.
Founded in 1984 by an American businessman, Dell manufactures and sells personal-use computers and related products, and its headquarters is based in Texas, USA.
Currently, the U.S. government is imposing sanctions to prevent the sale of American technology and products to North Korea, and the UN Security Council also prohibits the export of computers and various machinery to North Korea.
Therefore, if these Dell computers in question were not approved by the U.S. government for export and by the UN Security Council, bringing in any Dell computers into North Korea is a violation of sanctions.
In another photo released by the press, it shows a screen on the Dell monitor in which the Windows 7 software produced by Microsoft was running.
As with the computers, bringing in American-made software is subject to violating U.S. and UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea.
North Korea released a photo on March 10, saying that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is guiding the National Aerospace Development Administration.
VOA has reached out to Dell and is currently waiting for a response in this matter.
This is not the first time North Korea was found with products sanctioned or prohibited luxury items from being brought into the country.
Most recently, VOA reported in 2020 that North Korean media edited photos using software such as Adobe Photoshop 7.0 or Photoshop CS6, also an American company.
In addition, when North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in July 2017, a TV manufactured by Japan’s Sony was found at the launch site.
Expensive vehicles such as Maybach, Mercedes-Benz, and Lexus, which are being used by Kim, have also been spotted several times.
In 2018, when South Korean President Moon Jae-in was part of a car parade in Pyongyang, several brand-new Mercedes-Benz vehicles were caught on film with Pyongyang license plates. It’s also been confirmed that several CF650Gs produced by CFMOTO, headquartered in Hangzhou, China, are used by the North Korean security detail.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1718 was adopted in 2006 to impose an embargo on luxury goods. Subsequently, in 2013, an additional resolution was adopted to create a list of luxury goods, including “high-priced vehicles.”
In addition, as the embargo was imposed on goods used by the North Korean military, the possibility of violating sanctions was raised due to those motorcycles found in Pyongyang.
Currently, the most expensive luxury good found in North Korea is known to be a yacht.
A panel of experts on the UN Security Council said that the British yacht ‘Princess 95MY’ was found in North Korea, which is priced to be from $4 million to $6 million, manufactured between 2007 and 2011, and is said to have sold only 21 units worldwide.
North Korea also brought luxury goods to the Masikryong Ski Resort in 2014, including snowplows, cable cars, and snowmobiles made by companies from Italy, Canada, Austria, and China.
To read the original article in Korean, please click here.
Author
14. COVAX cuts all COVID-19 vaccines allocated for N. Korea: global charity
The regime is the people's worst enemy.
Excerpt:
The announcement came amid a protracted setback in shipment-related efforts apparently attributable to lack of cooperation from the country's reclusive regime.
COVAX cuts all COVID-19 vaccines allocated for N. Korea: global charity | Yonhap News Agency
By Yi Won-ju and Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea no longer has COVID-19 vaccines allocated for its people under the COVAX Facility initiative, an international group co-leading the vaccine-sharing program confirmed Friday.
The announcement came amid a protracted setback in shipment-related efforts apparently attributable to lack of cooperation from the country's reclusive regime.
"COVAX has no concrete allocations for DPRK currently," a spokesperson for the Gavi vaccine alliance told Yonhap News Agency, using the acronym for the North's official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The vaccines that were not accepted by the North were "re-allocated to other countries so the doses could be used in a timely fashion," the official added, citing the organization's 2022 policy of "needs-based vaccine allocations."
The U.N. Children's Fund's COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard also showed no vaccines had been allocated to the North as of early Friday, reflecting COVAX's decision to cut 1.29 million doses of AstraZeneca vaccines previously set aside for Pyongyang.
The spokesperson, however, stated, "We will offer doses to DPRK in subsequent allocation rounds should the country decide to introduce COVID-19 immunizations as part of the national pandemic response."
North Korea has not responded so far to the offer, claiming to be coronavirus-free, with strict border controls in place against the pandemic.
In February, COVAX reportedly cancelled a batch of 252,000 Covovax vaccines developed by Novavax Inc. allocated for Pyongyang.
"Gavi and COVAX are continuing the dialogue with DPRK to operationalize the COVID-19 immunization program," the spokesperson said.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. 4 killed in collision, crash of 2 Air Force trainer jets
Military training is dangerous. RIP young pilots and their instructors.
(5th LD) 4 killed in collision, crash of 2 Air Force trainer jets | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 3, 9)
SACHEON, South Korea, April 1 (Yonhap) -- Two Air Force KT-1 trainer jets collided in midair and crashed in southern South Korea on Friday, killing all four pilots aboard the planes, the Air Force and local disaster response officials said.
The jets went down in a rice paddy in Sacheon, about 300 kilometers south of Seoul, after colliding with each other in midair at around 1:37 p.m. during training, just minutes after their takeoffs from a nearby base, they said.
The Air Force said each jet carried a trainee pilot, ranked first lieutenant, and a civilian flight instructor. All four ejected from the planes but were later found dead, the Air Force added.
Over 62 firefighters and emergency responders were dispatched to the crash site. A fire broke out on the rooftop of a church after debris from the jet fell but was soon put out.
Yoon Dae-gyu, a 75-year-old farmer who lived near the crash site, said he heard a thunderous noise and later saw a piece of metal falling from the sky.
"It's scary imagining that I could have been hit by that," he said.
The Air Force formed a task force, led by its deputy chief of staff, to handle the aftermath of the accident with a plan to look into what caused it.
South Korea has operated the homegrown single-engine, two-seat basic training aircraft since 2000.
According to the Air Force, this is the first midair collision of two KT-1 jets, and the first such accident involving any pair of Air Force planes since two F-5E fighter jets collided in 2008.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
16. North Korean ICBM Launch May Have Been Fake. It’s Still Important.
Yes of course it is important. The Hwasong 15 can reach he homeland. But the acting of deception is also important as it is another indicator of the regime's hostile policy, political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and long con.
Excerpts:
Hwasong-17 or not, the North’s latest missile launch still violated U.N. resolutions and the country’s self-imposed moratorium on ICBM tests. It also demonstrated significant technological advances. The missile soared 3,852 miles into space, compared with an altitude of 2,796 miles that the Hwasong-15 achieved in its last test in November 2017.
The main question appears to be whether the weapon was an improved and more powerful version of the Hwasong-15 or the same Hwasong-15 equipped with more fuel and a lighter payload allowing it to fly higher.
“We should not pay too much attention to whether this was a Hwasong-15 or 17,” said Kim Dong-yup, an expert on the North Korean military at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. “I don’t think you can generate such flight data by just reducing the payload or using a little more fuel. This clearly marks a technological advance.”
North Korean ICBM Launch May Have Been Fake. It’s Still Important.
South Korea says Kim Jong-un disguised an older missile as a new one to exaggerate his country’s weapons achievements when he badly needs political leverage.
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A photograph provided by North Korean state media showing what it said was a successful test launch of the Hwasong-17 at Pyongyang International Airport in North Korea on March 24.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Associated Press
By
March 31, 2022
South Korea now says it may have been a ruse.
In a report to the National Assembly on Tuesday, the South Korean Defense Ministry endorsed what some analysts had already suspected: North Korea actually fired its older Hwasong-15 ICBM — which was tested in 2017 — and exaggerated Mr. Kim’s weapons achievements by falsely claiming a successful Hwasong-17 launch.
Mr. Kim badly needs to strengthen his diplomatic leverage with the United States and South Korea, and a successful new launch may have helped. But more important, South Korean officials said, Mr. Kim used the launch and a crude, fake presentation of video and photos to demonstrate his infallible leadership to the long-suffering people of North Korea.
The country will celebrate the 110th birthday of Kim Il-sung, Mr. Kim’s grandfather and North Korea’s founder, next month. With his economy hobbled by international sanctions and the pandemic, Mr. Kim has often used such occasions to focus on his growing nuclear capabilities and to show off his power.
“We suspect the latest launch had more to do with domestic considerations,” the Defense Ministry said in its parliamentary report.
When North Korea first unveiled the Hwasong-17 during a military parade in October 2020, it appeared to be the largest mobile-launcher ICBM the world had ever seen. Some analysts suspected that, unlike the Hwasong-15, which is built to carry a single warhead, the Hwasong-17 appeared to be designed to carry multiple nuclear warheads. A successful launch would have marked a significant milestone in North Korea’s ICBM program.
The Hwasong-17 on display in October 2020 during a military parade in Pyongyang.
North Korea began testing the Hwasong-17 this year. On Feb. 27 and March 5, it tested the missile’s first-stage booster rocket and other components, but not at full range. In its third test, conducted on March 16, something went wrong, and the rocket exploded in the sky near Pyongyang, the capital, shortly after liftoff.
“The explosion was visible to the naked eye, as its debris rained down through the sky over Pyongyang,” Ha Tae-keung, a South Korean lawmaker, told reporters this week. “Pyongyang citizens were shocked, and it could even have led to some instability.” South Korean officials said Mr. Kim likely used the successful test flight of the Hwasong-15 disguised as the Hwasong-17 on March 24 as damage control.
“Now that Pyongyang citizens had witnessed the failure, they needed to send a message of success and do so quickly in order to prevent rumors from spreading and to ensure regime stability,” the Defense Ministry said in its parliamentary report. “So they launched a Hwasong-15 model whose reliability had been confirmed through a test in 2017.”
The Hwasong-17 is bigger and longer than the Hwasong-15. Its first-stage booster rocket has four nozzles, while the Hwasong-15 has only two. But Mr. Kim’s propagandists edited and combined video footage and photos from the earlier Hwasong-17 tests with those from the Hwasong-15 last Thursday, creating the illusion of a successful Hwasong-17 launch, South Korean officials said.
North Korea’s ICBM Tests
By The New York Times
While unsuspecting North Koreans may have been fooled, the alleged fakery did not escape the scrutiny of South Korean defense officials and private analysts.
The weather around Pyongyang last Thursday was overcast, but some photos of the test released by North Korean media showed a fine and clear day. The test took place in the afternoon, but in some photos and video footage, the shadow of Mr. Kim at the test site suggests that he was inspecting a test in the morning. (All three previous Hwasong-17 tests, including the one that failed, took place in the morning.)
Kim Jong-un walking around what appeared to be the Hwasong-17 in a photograph provided by North Korean state media.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Associated Press
The engine burn time and trajectory data from the test also hinted at a Hwasong-15 rather than the Hwasong-17, South Korean officials said. And lastly, satellite and other data indicated that the missile had two nozzles, not four, officials said.
With no free news media allowed in North Korea, it is extremely difficult to verify official claims independently. When North Korea conducts a weapons test like the one last Thursday, outside analysts have few sources of information other than North Korean state media and a small amount of data released from Seoul or Tokyo. And in North Korea, propaganda routinely trumps the truth.
The Significance of North Korea’s Missile Tests
Card 1 of 5
U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
An escalation. North Korea started a new round of testing in September after a six-month hiatus. It has since completed several tests, including the firing of multiple intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, that violated the 2017 U.N. resolutions.
Still, it is unusual for the South Korean military to dispute a North Korean claim so publicly and with so much detail. Some analysts say the South Korean military has a history of downplaying the power of its Northern rival.
The South Korean military may also have been particularly upset by the launch because it came in the middle of a rocky presidential transition in Seoul: President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol told the Defense Ministry to move out of its current location so he could use it for his presidential office after his inauguration on May 10.
Hwasong-17 or not, the North’s latest missile launch still violated U.N. resolutions and the country’s self-imposed moratorium on ICBM tests. It also demonstrated significant technological advances. The missile soared 3,852 miles into space, compared with an altitude of 2,796 miles that the Hwasong-15 achieved in its last test in November 2017.
The main question appears to be whether the weapon was an improved and more powerful version of the Hwasong-15 or the same Hwasong-15 equipped with more fuel and a lighter payload allowing it to fly higher.
“We should not pay too much attention to whether this was a Hwasong-15 or 17,” said Kim Dong-yup, an expert on the North Korean military at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. “I don’t think you can generate such flight data by just reducing the payload or using a little more fuel. This clearly marks a technological advance.”
17. North Korea restricts public access to Pyongyang following failed ICBM test launch
Control. Population and resources control measures.
North Korea restricts public access to Pyongyang following failed ICBM test launch
North Korean authorities have reinforced checkpoints at entry points to Pyongyang and commenced thorough inspections of inbound vehicles and people
Disease control officials testing drivers for COVID-19 symptoms in Pyongyang’s Manggyongdae District. (Rodong Sinmun)
Daily NK has learned that North Korea has been strictly controlling public access to Pyongyang since North Korea’s failed test launch of an ICBM on Mar. 16, when the missile exploded in the sky above the North Korean capital.
According to a Daily NK source on Thursday, North Korean authorities have reinforced checkpoints at entry points to Pyongyang and commenced thorough inspections of inbound vehicles and people.
It remains unknown exactly when North Korean authorities bolstered their entry inspections into Pyongyang, but the area surrounding Pyongyang was reportedly in a state of heightened alert from the failed missile test on Mar. 16 to right before the launch of North Korea’s so-called “Hwasong-17” ballistic missile from Sunan Airfield on Mar. 24.
In particular, inspections were reportedly quite strict at checkpoints into Pyongyang from the neighboring city of Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, with some people turned away from entering the capital.
Inspections have intensified even in Pyongyang itself. One provincial resident who entered Pyongyang using somebody else’s residency card was dragged off to a collection point after he was busted in a nighttime hotel inspection.
Normally, the alert posture in Pyongyang relaxes between the time of the late North Korean leader’s birthday on Feb. 16 and late North Korean founder Kim Il Sung’s birthday on Apr. 15. This year, however, the authorities have intensified inspections and the local alert posture in March as well, a fact many people found strange.
South Korean lawmaker Ha Tae-keung, a member of the legislature’s National Defense Committee from the People Power Party, met with reporters after receiving a closed door report from the Ministry of Defense on Tuesday. He said missile fragments rained down on Pyongyang after the Hwasong-17 ICBM launched on Mar. 16 exploded several kilometers above the city. He said civilians suffered property damage, though it remains unconfirmed whether there was loss of life.
In fact, exactly what losses North Koreans suffered from the rocket’s debris remains unknown.
However, given that people could see the explosion with the naked eye and debris rained down on homes, North Korean authorities may have limited access to Pyongyang to deal with the situation and keep things quiet.
Meanwhile, North Korean authorities have come under fire for testing the missile from Sunan near Pyongyang, despite the danger to civilians.
Ha said South Korea never launches a missile from the west side of the country toward the east because debris could fall on people in the event of a failure, but North Korea conducted a test that could endanger its citizens because the regime cares little for human rights, public welfare, or safety.
In fact, North Korea tends to fire long-range missiles from inland regions close to the country’s western coast.
Yang Uk, an associate research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, told Daily NK that when North Korea fires long-range missiles at high angles, it must do so from as far west as possible to avoid impacting Japan.
He said a dangerous situation could arise when a launch site is near a civilian area, as was the case on Mar. 16, but North Korea authorities apparently used Sunan Airbase as a launch site anyway because, from their perspective, it was more important that the missile production and assembly facilities are near Pyongyang.
Daily NK reported in 2020 that North Korean authorities were building the country’s largest missile production complex in Sinni-dong, Hyongjesan District, Pyongyang. The complex would be responsible for manufacturing and maintaining all kinds of missiles, from multiple rockets to ICBMs, as well as researching tactics and strategies.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
