Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Either you deal with what is the reality, or can be sure the reality is going to deal with you."

– Aldous Huxley

"I learned this, at least by my experiment: that if you advance confidently in the direction of your dreams, and endeavor to live the life which you have imagined, you will meet with a success unexpected in common hours. You will put some things behind, you will pass an invisible boundary; new, universal and more liberal laws will begin to establish themselves around and within you; or the old laws will be expanded, and interpreted in your favor in a more liberal sense, and you will live with the license of a higher order of beings. In proportion as you simplify your life, the laws of the universe will appear less complex, and solitude will not be solitude, nor poverty poverty, nor weakness weakness. If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost, that is what they should be. Now put foundations under them."

– Henry David Thoreau

"The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one."

– Abraham Lincoln

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 31, 2024

3. A Homeland Warning About ISIS-K

4. China’s Defense Budget Has Only One Trajectory: Up

5. The Dollar Is More Armored Division Than Currency

6. Russian assassination unit linked to U.S. officials' "Havana syndrome"

7. Former CENTCOM commander warns ISIS online radicalization among ‘most dangerous methods’ for attack

8. Beijing Deplores Taiwan’s Next President, but Welcomes an Old One

9. Against All Odds, Army Making Solid Progress on Modernization

10. The Navy Needs 355 Ships by 2030

11. The Celebrity Chef Who Beat the U.S. Military at Getting Aid Into Gaza

12. On the Hamilton Affair

13. How the FBI’s visit to a Muslim woman became a right-wing rallying cry

14. From ‘War on the Rocks’ to ‘AI on the Rocks’: A New Chapter for an Ambitious Project

15. America’s Pacific Partnerships Are Secure—For Now

16. Analysis | China decries U.S. ‘bullying.’ But, to many, China is the bully.

17. Stop Clipping Convergence: The Army Overlooks the Beard Domain at Its Peril

18. The Obstacles to Diplomacy in Ukraine

19. The Trouble With “the Global South”

20. Militant April

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) reportedly directed all its clergy to change their liturgy to include pro-war prayers in support of Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine and is likely threatening to defrock ROC MP clergy who do not support the war.
The ROC MP leadership has intensified internal scrutiny against ROC MP clergy and has reportedly defrocked several clergy members who refused to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia conducted another series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of March 30 to 31 as delays in US security assistance continue to degrade Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and enable Russia to significantly damage Ukraine’s energy grid.
Ukrainian forces appear to have repelled a Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on March 30 — the first battalion-sized mechanized assault since Russian forces began the campaign to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023.
French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 31 that France will provide an unspecified number of Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles and “hundreds” of armored vehicles and other equipment to Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on March 31 the scheduled decree authorizing Russia’s semi-annual spring military conscription, which will conscript 150,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.
The Russian military command reportedly appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin as commander of the newly formed Leningrad Military District (LMD).
The Kremlin continues efforts to enforce Russian federal laws in post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction.
Russian authorities conducted a counterterrorism operation and detained suspected terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on March 31.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 31.
The Russian government continues to fail to properly compensate volunteer and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine, despite recently passing new legislation that simplifies the access to veteran statuses for these servicemen and their families.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 31, 2024

Mar 31, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2024

Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and George Barros

March 31, 2024, 6:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on March 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) reportedly directed all its clergy to change their liturgy to include pro-war prayers in support of Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine and is likely threatening to defrock ROC MP clergy who do not support the war. A Russian Telegram channel with insider sources within the ROC MP amplified on March 31 a document dated March 29, in which Head of the ROC MP Affairs, Metropolitan Gregoriy of Voskresensk, instructed clergy to read a prayer — the “Prayer for Holy Rus” — on a daily basis during Lent.[1] Metropolitan Gregoriy of Voskresensk also called on the clergy to read the “Prayer for Holy Rus” at home and to offer to read this prayer to parishioners. The “Prayer for Holy Rus” is a new prayer that the ROC MP officially introduced in September 2022. This prayer is a highly politicized and pro-war and pro-Kremlin prayer filled with Kremlin talking points and other false Russian narratives. The prayer asks God to “to help [Russian] people and grant [Russia] victory” against “those who want to fight [and] have taken up arms against Holy Rus, eager to divide and destroy her one people.”[2] The mention of “Holy Rus” and “one people” echoes Putin’s long-term false narrative that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians comprise one Russian nation, and is a misappropriation of the history of Kyivan Rus.[3] ROC MP Head Patriarch Kirill — reportedly himself a former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer and a known staunch supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin — first read the “Prayer for Holy Rus” (which he supposedly authored) on September 25, 2022, following Putin’s unpopular call for partial mobilization. The ROC MP had previously instituted politicized prayers in June 2014 and March 2022 supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and ISW has long assessed that the ROC MP is a Kremlin-controlled organization and a known tool within the Russian hybrid warfare toolkit that promotes the Kremlin’s interests and nationalist ideology domestically and abroad.[4]

The ROC MP leadership has intensified internal scrutiny against ROC MP clergy and has reportedly defrocked several clergy members that refused to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A guest researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ksenia Luchenko, noted that the ROC MP regards individual ROC MP clergy members’ refusal to use assigned prayers in liturgy as perjury and a sin punishable by defrocking under the 25th Apostolic Canon.[5] The Christians Against War Project, a Russian organization that tracks persecutions of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian priests, reported that ROC MP or Russian state authorities have already disciplined no fewer than 28 ROC MP clergy members from Russia, five from Belarus, one from Kazakhstan, and six from Lithuania for anti-war rhetoric or refusing to read the assigned pro-war prayers during liturgy.[6] The ROC MP has reportedly administered various punishments, including defrocking, demotions, and excommunication.[7] Local Russian state officials opened administrative cases and issued fines for “discrediting the Russian Armed Forces” against several such anti-war ROC MP clergy members.[8] Patriarch Kirill, for example, approved a decision in February 2024 to defrock one of the most famous and respected ROC MP priests, Archpriest Alexey Uminsky, for refusing to read the “Prayer for Holy Rus.”[9] The Court of the Moscow Diocese also defrocked a priest in May 2023 for substituting the word “victory” with “peace” when reading the ”Prayer for Holy Rus.” Luchenko also reported that clergy members are increasingly self-censoring themselves out of fear that their own parishioners will report them for sharing anti-war sentiments. Parishioners, for example, reportedly called the police on a ROC MP priest in March 2022 after he prayed for peace in Ukraine. The ROC MP recently intensified Kremlin rhetoric about Russia’s war in Ukraine and cast it as an existential and civilizational “holy war,” and the Kremlin will likely continue to use the ROC MP to promote its imperialist and aggressive goals in Ukraine and elsewhere to secure long-term domestic support for Putin’s war efforts.[10] The ROC MP also recently approved an ideological and policy document tying several Kremlin ideological narratives together in an apparent effort to form a wider nationalist ideology around the war in Ukraine and Russia’s expansionist future.[11]

Russia conducted another series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of March 30 to 31 as delays in US security assistance continue to degrade Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and enable Russia to significantly damage Ukraine’s energy grid. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 14 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; 11 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea; one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea; and one Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force added that Ukrainian forces shot down nine Kh-101/555 missiles and nine Shahed drones.[13] The Rivne Oblast Police reported that Ukrainian forces also shot down a Kh-55 missile and an Iskander missile over Rivne Oblast.[14] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two S-300 air-defense missiles at Selydove, Donetsk City and an unspecified number of S-300 missiles at Beryslav, Kherson Oblast.[15] Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maskym Kozytskyi reported that Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike on the same critical infrastructure facility that Russian forces previously struck on March 24 and March 29, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck unspecified targets in Stryi, Lviv Oblast.[16] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces targeted energy and agricultural infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, and struck energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[17] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that they implemented emergency power shutdowns in Odesa City and nearby areas following the overnight Russian strike on energy facilities in southern Ukraine.[18] Russian forces reportedly shot down one of their own Kh-101 missiles over Saratov Oblast on the morning of March 31.[19]

Ukrainian forces appear to have repelled a Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on March 30 — the first battalion-sized mechanized assault since Russian forces began the campaign to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023. A Ukrainian serviceman reported on March 31 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, Central Military District [CMD]), committed 36 tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) to a large-mechanized assault near Tonenke on March 30.[20] Geolocated imagery published on March 31 shows a large number of destroyed and damaged Russian armored vehicles and tanks along a road northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[21] The Ukrainian serviceman stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 Russian tanks and eight IFVs during the assault and noted that the frontal assault failed to breakthrough the Ukrainian line. This appears to be the first report of any elements of the 90th Tank Division participating in assaults following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and ISW previously assessed that elements of the 90th Tank Division, alongside other Russian units and formations, likely represent a sizeable uncommitted operational reserve that the Russian military command can commit to continue and intensify efforts to push west of Avdiivka.[22] The elements of the 6th Tank Regiment appear to have failed in their March 30 attack near Tonenke, however, suggesting that elements of Russia’s uncommitted operational reserve near Avdiivka may be too degraded or otherwise unable to lead further Russian advances westward in the short term.

The scale of the Russian mechanized assault on March 30 is significant. Russian forces have not conducted a mechanized assault this large since the beginning of the Russian localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023, when Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed almost 50 Russian tanks and over 100 armored vehicles on October 19-20, 2023.[23] Ukraine’s ability to defend against the March 30 assault, particularly near Avdiivka where Ukrainian forces have been forced to quickly withdraw to new, defensive positions following the loss of the settlement, is a positive indicator for Ukraine’s ability to defend against future large-scale Russian assaults and the expected summer 2024 Russian offensive operation. Ukrainian officials, justifiably so, continue to warn about Ukraine’s ability to defend against the expected summer Russian offensive effort in the face of ammunition shortages, manpower limitations, and delayed Western assistance.[24] Ukrainian forces may have had to expend a significant amount of material to defend against the Russian assault near Tonenke, highlighting Russia’s ability to conduct assaults that force Ukraine to expend outsized portions of its already limited material and manpower reserves to defend against.[25] Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to skillfully defend against a large-scale Russian assault in a particularly critical part of the front despite Ukraine’s challenges suggests that Ukrainian forces can achieve significant battlefield effects if they are properly equipped.

The Russian command may be prioritizing the Avdiivka area in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command’s willingness to commit a battalion’s worth of tanks to an attack near Avdiivka indicates that this assault was a priority effort. The Russian command may focus their forecasted late spring/summer 2024 offensive operation on western Donetsk Oblast in hopes of building upon Russian forces’ steady but marginal advances in this sector.[26] Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are accumulating personnel along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely only be able to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in one operational direction at a time due to Russia’s own manpower and planning limitations.[27]

French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 31 that France will provide an unspecified number of Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles and “hundreds” of armored vehicles and other equipment to Ukraine.[28] Lecornu stated that France will provide Ukraine with “hundreds” of old, but still functional, armored vehicles and equipment from the French military and that the materiel will arrive in 2024 and early 2025. Lecornu also reported that France will provide a “new batch of Aster 30 missiles” to Ukraine for the SAMP/T MAMBA air defense systems and that France is developing remotely operated munitions to provide to Ukraine as early as summer 2024.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on March 31 the scheduled decree authorizing Russia’s semi-annual spring military conscription, which will conscript 150,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.[29] The decree specifies that Russia’s spring 2024 conscription will conscript men aged 18 to 30 years old who are not currently in military service. Russia’s spring 2024 conscription marks the first conscription cycle in which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will conscript men up to age 30. The Russian law raising the upper limit of the conscription age from 27 to 30 years of age officially came into force on January 1, 2024, although Putin signed the law in August 2023.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Russian men who turned 27 before the end of 2023 and men who are 28 or 29 and currently in zapas (general mobilizable human resource composed of men who could be mobilized regardless of prior military experience) are excluded from conscription.[31] Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky stated on March 29 that the spring 2024 conscription cycle will include the conscription of men in occupied Ukraine and all Russian federal subjects, except for certain federal subjects in northern Russia due to inclement weather.[32] The Geneva Convention forbids any occupying power to force civilians in occupied territories to serve in the occupying power’s military or auxiliary services.[33] Tsimlyansky also stated that Russia will not deploy Russian conscripts to occupied Ukraine and that conscripts will not participate in combat or support operations in the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains unlikely to deploy conscripts to participate in combat operations in Ukraine due to concerns that conscript causalities may cause societal discontent within Russia, although Russia may expand its crypto-mobilization efforts during the spring 2024 conscription cycle.[34] The Kremlin, however, will likely continue using conscripts to defend the international border between Ukraine and Russia.[35]

The Russian military command reportedly appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin as commander of the newly formed Leningrad Military District (LMD). Ural regional information agency URA.ru, citing an unspecified military source, claimed on March 31 that the Russian military command appointed Lapin as LMD Commander.[36] There has been no official confirmation of this appointment. Lapin previously served as the commander of the Central Military District [CMD] and commanded Russian forces in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022, which resulted in significant Russian territorial and materiel losses.[37] Russian military bloggers widely criticized Lapin for Russian battlefield defeats under his command in September 2022, but later received praise for his role in defending Belgorod Oblast against raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces in May and June 2023.[38] URA.ru has previously accurately reported on Lapin’s previous appointments prior to their official confirmations and may have credible insider sources within the CMD given its affiliation with the Russian government and the outlet’s presence within the CMD’s geographic boundaries.[39]

The Kremlin continues efforts to enforce Russian federal laws in post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated on March 31 that Russia will continue to assert its right, contrary to international law, to enforce Russian federal law on officials of NATO and post-Soviet states for their actions taken within the territory of their own countries where Russian courts have no jurisdiction, despite acknowledging that prosecuting such cases would be “unrealistic.”[40] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has placed multiple officials from NATO member countries on its wanted list for them allegedly breaking various Russian laws within their own counties.[41] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s attempt to enforce its federal laws over NATO officials for actions in their own countries effectively denies the sovereignty of these states and are part of Russian efforts to set informational conditions justifying possible Russian escalations against NATO states in the future.[42]

Russian authorities conducted a counterterrorism operation and detained suspected terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on March 31. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Dagestan declared a counterterrorism operation regime in Makhachkala and Kaspiysk, and the Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that Russian authorities detained three militants who were allegedly planning terrorist acts.[43] Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov stated that Russian authorities conducted the counterterrorism operation as part of efforts to strengthen security in the region following the Crocus City Hall attack.[44] Select Russian milbloggers alleged that the detained terrorist suspects in Dagestan are connected to the Crocus City Hall attackers.[45] Russian authorities previously meted out minor punishments following large-scale antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[46] The intensification of counterterrorism operations in Russia, particularly in the Caucasus region, is likely due to either Russian law enforcement’s actual heightened fears of another terrorist attack in Russia or part of efforts to show the Russian public that authorities are taking competent preventative steps following the major law enforcement and intelligence failure that was the Crocus City Hall attack.

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) reportedly directed all its clergy to change their liturgy to include pro-war prayers in support of Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine and is likely threatening to defrock ROC MP clergy who do not support the war.
The ROC MP leadership has intensified internal scrutiny against ROC MP clergy and has reportedly defrocked several clergy members who refused to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia conducted another series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of March 30 to 31 as delays in US security assistance continue to degrade Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and enable Russia to significantly damage Ukraine’s energy grid.
Ukrainian forces appear to have repelled a Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on March 30 — the first battalion-sized mechanized assault since Russian forces began the campaign to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023.
French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 31 that France will provide an unspecified number of Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles and “hundreds” of armored vehicles and other equipment to Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on March 31 the scheduled decree authorizing Russia’s semi-annual spring military conscription, which will conscript 150,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.
The Russian military command reportedly appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin as commander of the newly formed Leningrad Military District (LMD).
The Kremlin continues efforts to enforce Russian federal laws in post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction.
Russian authorities conducted a counterterrorism operation and detained suspected terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on March 31.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 31.
The Russian government continues to fail to properly compensate volunteer and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine, despite recently passing new legislation that simplifies the access to veteran statuses for these servicemen and their families.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 31 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to cross the international border near Stara Huta, Sumy Oblast.[47]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 31. Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[48] Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[49] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction; elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” Detachment reportedly continue operating near Bilohorivka.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[51] Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanviske and Chasiv Yar, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne.[52] A Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems (UAV) battalion commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating their attacks in the direction of Chasiv Yar because Chasiv Yar is at a dominant height.[53] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction; and elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd AC) are reportedly operating near Spirne (northeast of Bakhmut).[54]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements in the area on March 31. Geolocated imagery published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) in a mechanized assault that Ukrainian forces defeated.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), south of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), and near Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[56] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka, west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Tonenke, and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[57] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Pervomaiske.[58]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements in the area on March 31. Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[59] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), although another Russian milblogger claimed that there is conflicting information about the situation in Heorhiivka.[60] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka; and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[61] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD] are reportedly operating near Pobieda, and elements of the Russian ”Tiger” Volunteer Detachment are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[62]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Vodyane, south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[63] Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[65] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of changing weather conditions in southern Ukraine to increase their aerial reconnaissance by using more than 200 reconnaissance drones per day.[66] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are limiting their use of armored vehicles when conducting assaults near Robotyne.[67] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68] Elements of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[69]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on March 31.[70] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are conducting one to three light infantry assaults without armored vehicle support near Krynky per day.[71] Humenyuk stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces, which operates in the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions, is transferring forces and equipment from occupied Crimea to unspecified areas but are using “very complicated logistics” because Russian command has banned the use of obvious logistics routes at risk of Ukrainian interdiction. Humenyuk stated that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces has a sufficient number of forces to conduct rotations (likely tactical-level rotations), but the Dnepr Grouping of Forces has been unable to conduct successful assaults for a long time. A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian serviceman operating in the Kherson direction said that there is currently a lull in Russian and Ukrainian activity and that both sides are only operating drones.[72] The Russian serviceman reportedly claimed that Ukrainian forces have superior electronic warfare (EW) systems and coordination between drone and artillery units in the Kherson direction, rendering better results for Ukrainian forces in the area.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov forecasted that Russian forces will resume launching Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet in the near future.[74] Budanov stated that Russian forces have been using Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles for several months while stockpiling Kalibr missiles. Budanov explained that Kalibr missiles are less effective than Kh-101 missiles but noted that Russian stocks of Kh-101 missiles have likely decreased as a result of Russia’s reliance on these missiles. Budanov also observed that Russian forces mainly use Tu-95 strategic bombers and occasionally Tu-22 supersonic bombers to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine.[75] Budanov added that Russian forces have not used supersonic nuclear-capable Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers for a long time and that Russian forces only use Tu-22s once a week to launch Kh-22 anti-ship missiles due to unspecified technical problems with the aircraft. Budanov stated that Russian forces modernized the Kh-22 missile and developed the Kh-32 missile on the basis of the Kh-22 missile and may adapt the missiles launched by Tu-22s to operate on Tu-95s or Tu-160s. Budanov further clarified that Russian forces have been using thermobaric ODAB-1500 volumetric-detonating aviation bombs in Ukraine for some time and denied the reports that Russian forces only recently used the bomb for the first time during an air strike against Sumy Oblast.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government continues to fail to properly compensate volunteer and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine, despite recently passing new legislation that simplifies the access to veteran statuses for these servicemen and their families. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on March 27 that simplified the process for obtaining veteran statuses for individuals who fought in volunteer battalions and private military companies (PMCs) and cooperated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Ukraine.[77] A Russian lawyer told state-run regional outlet Ura.ru that the decree will shorten the processing time and simplify procedures for volunteer and irregular forces to confirm their participation in the war effort, which will allow them and their families to receive appropriate compensations. The lawyer added that the decree especially applies to fighters who have lost contracts with their volunteer battalions and PMCs, including those who were affected by the disbanding or transfer of their irregular units to the jurisdiction of the Russian MoD. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov, however, acknowledged in a televised interview published on March 31 that there are reports about payment delays for veterans who fought in Ukraine.[78]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 30 that Russia is training new personnel recruited in occupied Ukraine, including Mariupol, to strengthen border areas.[79] The GUR reported that Russian forces are strengthening Russia’s international border regions with Ukraine in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts following a series of cross-border raids conducted by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer groups. The GUR noted that Russia is training personnel to identify and repel sabotage and reconnaissance groups, conduct assault operations in urban environments, and protect critical infrastructure facilities. The GUR added that the Russian command is planning to relocate elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Kursk Oblast to defend Russia’s international border.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces reportedly used a modernized Kh-101 cruise missile that uses an augmented payload with an additional warhead at the expense of a reduced flight range. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Defense Express reported on March 29 that Ukrainian forces downed a Kh-101 missile on the night of March 28 to 29 and that this missile had two warheads that collectively weighed about 800 kilograms (compared to 450 kilograms for a regular Kh-101 missile).[80] Defense Express stated that the modernized Kh-101 has a smaller fuel tank, freeing up space for a second warhead, but reduces the missile’s flight range from 5,500 kilometers to about 2,250 kilometers. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the “Raduga” State Machine Building Design Bureau (GosMKB “Raduga”), a subsidiary of Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV), in Moscow Oblast on January 18, where a KTRV official told Shoigu that GosMKB “Raduga” had increased the warhead of an unspecified missile from 450 kilograms to 800 kilograms.[81]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Kremlin information operation baselessly alleging Ukrainian involvement in the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack appears to be successfully convincing the Russian public. The Financial Times (FT) reported on March 31 that UK-Ukrainian pollster OpenMinds conducted an online poll of 652 Russians and found that a little over 50 percent of respondents stated that they believe Ukrainian authorities were responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack.[82] The OpenMinds poll also found that 27 percent of respondents blamed the Islamic State (IS) for the attack and 6 percent of respondents blamed the West. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has continued to blame Ukraine for the Crocus City Hall attack and a has implicated Ukraine in a broader set of alleged “terrorist” attacks against Russia and demanded that Ukrainian authorities arrest and extradite all the people involved.[83] Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov claimed that the FSB knows who organized several unspecified terrorist attacks in Russia and will do “everything necessary” to punish them.[84] ISW continues to assess with high confidence that the IS conducted the Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or aided the attack.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 31, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF said that its Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a PIJ command-and-control center in the al Aqsa Hospital complex in Deir al Balah.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Egyptian state media reported, citing an unspecified security source, that Israel and Hamas have resumed ceasefire negotiations.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Eilabun, Israel.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 31, 2024

Mar 31, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 31, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

The Axis of Resistance is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction while others are militias over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 30 and 31, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, April 1, 2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF said that its Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a PIJ command-and-control center in the al Aqsa Hospital complex in Deir al Balah.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Egyptian state media reported, citing an unspecified security source, that Israel and Hamas have resumed ceasefire negotiations.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Eilabun, Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to conduct clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 31.[1] These operations hit their two-week mark, as Israeli forces returned to re-clear the area on March 18. Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters, who had barricaded themselves inside the hospital. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) is operating in the maternity complex, where it has engaged Palestinian fighters and located weapons.[2] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force struck several buildings in the vicinity of al Shifa Hospital that Palestinian fighters recently used to fire anti-tank munitions and small arms targeting Israeli forces.[3] Four Palestinian militias launched mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital on March 31.[4] Hamas fighters separately targeted an Israeli soldier with sniper fire near al Shifa Hospital.[5]

Hamas reported that its fighters fired an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade targeting Israeli armor west of Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City.[6]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162 Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 31.[7] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian fighter squad that emerged from a tunnel shaft in the area.[8] Israeli snipers separately destroyed a Palestinian fighter squad moving toward Israeli infantry.

The IDF said on March 31 that its Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a PIJ command-and-control center in the al Aqsa Hospital complex in Deir al Balah.[9] PIJ fighters were present at the center, according to the IDF.[10] A spokesperson for the hospital said that the drone strike killed at least two people and wounded over a dozen.[11] The IDF said that the hospital is still functioning and that the drone strike hit the area precisely to reduce harm to civilians.[12] The al Aqsa Hosptial is the last functioning hospital in Deir al Balah.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on March 31.[13] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and Givati Brigade (162nd Division) are operating in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[14] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces advanced to southwestern Deir al Balah and toward the Khan Younis port.[15] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that its fighters engaged Israeli special operations forces with small arms south of Deir al Balah.[16]

Egyptian state media reported on March 31, citing an unspecified security source, that Israel and Hamas have resumed ceasefire negotiations.[17] Hamas rejected the most recent US proposal for a ceasefire on March 26, after which several people familiar with negotiations noted that the talks had reached another stalemate.[18] Hamas’ representative to Lebanon said during an interview on March 31 that Israel is not interested in reaching a deal.[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that senior Hamas operatives described Hamas as “collapsing from within” during questioning.[20] Gallant made the comment at the IDF 98th Division headquarters on March 31. Israeli forces have detained hundreds of Palestinian fighters in recent weeks who have helped the IDF kill those who were involved in the October 7 attack.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 31.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 30.[21]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.|

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 30.[22]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.|

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Eilabun, Israel, on March 30.[23] The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone entering Israel from Syria on March 30.[24] This drone was presumably the same one that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq launched.

3. A Homeland Warning About ISIS-K

A Homeland Warning About ISIS-K

Contrary to President Biden’s assurances, the U.S. has little visibility into Afghanistan as it becomes a sanctuary for ISIS-Khorasan.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-homeland-warning-about-isis-k-centcom-terrorism-isis-a0c36197?st=wf8gd91linjckft&utm

By The Editorial Board

March 31, 2024 4:15 pm ET

General Frank McKenzie in 2021 PHOTO: REUTERS

The U.S. homeland hasn’t suffered a terrorist attack from Islamic extremists in years, but that doesn’t mean the threat has gone away, and it may be increasing again. That was the warning Sunday from retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, who was in charge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan during President Biden’s withdrawal.

“We should believe them when they say that. They’re going to try to do it,” Gen. McKenzie told ABC News “This Week.” “I think the threat is growing.”

He said the threat began “to grow as soon as we left Afghanistan, it took pressure off ISIS-K. So I think we should expect further attempts of this nature against the United States as well as our partners and other nations abroad.” ISIS-K is the Afghan-based branch of Islamic State that has taken responsibility for the recent attack on a Moscow concert venue.

President Biden assured the American people when he left Afghanistan that the U.S. would retain an over-the-horizon ability to monitor terrorists there. But Gen. McKenzie said that isn’t true now: “In Afghanistan, we have almost no ability to see into that country and almost no ability to strike into that country.”

Seth Jones, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, made the same point about the lack of U.S. capability to see in Afghanistan on the Journal Editorial Report on Fox News on Saturday.

The Biden Administration doesn’t want to talk about this for obvious political reasons, especially in an election year. All the more so when the porous southern U.S. border could be an avenue for terrorist infiltration. But it doesn’t enhance U.S. safety to hide the truth.

China’s Defense Budget Has Only One Trajectory: Up

To better compete with China, Congress should ditch the budget caps and provide the military with real budgetary growth. Failure to adequately fund the armed forces now will result in more expensive future bills and allow China to continue pulling ahead.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · March 28, 2024

Amid its ongoing military buildup, Beijing recently announced a 7.2 percent increase in its defense budget for 2024—reaching a new record. This plentiful military budget hike is the latest in a 20-year long streak of China’s hefty annual defense spending increases that far outpace America’s spending handcuffs, fits-and-starts, and delayed enactment of military spending.

Despite the Pentagon labeling China as the pacing threat, President Biden’s 2025 budget request, capped by spending limits negotiated in a previous debt ceiling deal, provides no real growth. The White House’s newest defense budget calls for a topline of $849.8 billion, a $7.8 billion (1%) increase over last year. Given that the Office of Management of Budget predicts inflation of 2.2 percent in 2025, this so-called ‘growth’ is a cut plain and simple for the US military.

In just the last 10 years, China’s defense spending has increased by over 50 percent from $132 billion in 2014 to $234 billion in 2024. In that same decade, China has seen an average of about eight percent defense budget growth per year, well over the rate of inflation.

By contrast, the Pentagon’s base budget has seen an average annual growth of roughly four percent over the same time period. While funding for overseas operations during the height of the wars and emergency spending provided additional growth over the last decade, defense appropriations have largely failed to offset rampant inflation in recent years. Furthermore, funding increases have been sporadic and varied from year to year, complicating the Pentagon—and industry’s—ability to plan ahead.

On average, China’s military budget is increasing at nearly double the rate of the United States’ defense budget. Nor is this estimate fulsome since China is not transparent with its total military spending, and the actual size of Beijing’s military budget is likely far larger than publicly stated. The Pentagon asserts that China’s military spending “could be significantly higher than its officially announced defense budget.”

Continuous annual defense budget increases also continue to benefit China’s long-term military budget growth. If increases in Chinese military spending are compounded year-over-year throughout the past decade, China’s spending sees 231 percent compound growth to its topline defense budget. Meanwhile, if the same calculation is applied to US defense spending, this compounded growth rate comes out to 164 percent. This significant gap in compound growth—67 percent—demonstrates that though the Pentagon has received sporadic bouts of budget bumps above inflation, China’s consistent investment creates greater long-term gains.

Meanwhile, US military planners are falling behind China as they reckon with the effects of the funding dearth created by the legacy the Budget Control Act of 2011, which imposed nearly a decade of cost-cutting under budget caps and sequestration on the Pentagon. Though bipartisan deals offset some of the funding cuts that fell on the Pentagon, the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission found that funding constraints imposed between 2011 and 2019 resulted in a compounded $539 billion in spending reductions to the base national defense budget below expected growth levels under then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ plan.

This figure doesn’t even factor in billions in lost buying power the Pentagon has endured through lengthy continuing resolutions and government shutdowns. Considering the Pentagon has spent nearly a collective five of the last 15 years under a spending freeze and unable to progress forward with new technology and equipment during that time, this amounts to billions in lost and misaligned start-and-stop funding which continues to force the Defense Department “to operate with one hand tied behind our back for months out of the year.”

These unseen but important budgetary ruts will continue to grow more expensive as the US military, which continues to live off the Reagan build-up of the 1980s, continues to age and shrink. On average, an Air Force aircraft is over 30 years old and many Navy warships are rapidly approaching the end of their service lives. Budgets without real growth often see retirements outpace procurement, resulting in a shrinking force.

The budget-capped request for next year similarly will continue to exacerbate this downward trend across the armed forces. The budget requests just six new battleforce ships in the next year – the lowest request since 2006, while retiring 19. Air Force fighter procurement has been slashed, pushing purchases of next generation of fighters further to the distant future, while again requesting to retire nearly twice as many aging aircraft. The Army, alongside shrinking in end strength, sees cuts across ground vehicle procurement, including reduced modernization for existing vehicles and diminished spending for their future replacements.

These decisions, directly stemming from budgetary constraints, will have lasting effects on competition with China.

A decade ago, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest navy, with a fleet estimated to be north of 370 warships, and continues to lay down warships at rapid clip. The Chinese Navy grew by 30 ships last year, now including modern aircraft carriers as well as modern cruisers and destroyers. Furthermore, China now fields an estimated 1,900 fighters in their air force, and increasingly modernized and capable ground forces according to the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military power.

With partial credit to robust, continued growth in military spending, China is actually even pulling ahead of the United States in many key fields of military capability such as hypersonic missile development. Despite the fact that China represents the “…most consequential strategic competitor for coming decades” according to the National Defense Strategy, China continues to surge ahead and build its budgetary—and hard power—advantages.

Though topline US military spending may be marginally greater than that of China, failure to provide the force with real growth above inflation yet again will continue to chip away at US combat power and further reduce funds needed for new equipment, technology and posture.

About the Author

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · March 28, 2024

5. The Dollar Is More Armored Division Than Currency

Are we a kind of benevolent global dictator with the reserve currency? If we really wanted to, could we wield it like a nuclear weapon and wreak havoc and even destroy nations?

Excerpts:

“Dollar dominance is not a means in and of itself,” Kamin and Sobel wrote in the paper for the American Enterprise Institute. “It is instead a critical reminder of the need to run sound policies, behave responsively at home, and maintain the world’s trust.” (The two expanded on the subject in the Macro Musings podcast last month.)

The dollar is also a strategic gift, often under-appreciated in geopolitical discussions, which tend to focus on the South China Sea or Donald Trump’s threats against treaty partners. Nor is the US-led economic order, with the greenback at its core, wholly a product of victory in World War II. Born in 1913, the Fed was an important behind-the-scenes player in the Great War. As President Woodrow Wilson was trying to broker peace between the Allied and Central powers in 1916, the Fed fretted that American banks were too invested in the prospects of a triumph by Britain and France, something by no means certain. The central bank warned US lenders against over-exposure, a step that sent European markets into a tailspin, wrote Philip Zelikow in The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Turning point of the Great War, 1916-1917. Allied powers realized they would soon struggle to finance the war.

The Dollar Is More Armored Division Than Currency

Despite predictions of a tough year, the greenback is overpowering challengers. There’s more to this supremacy than mere interest rates.

March 31, 2024 at 4:00 PM EDT

By Daniel Moss

Daniel Moss is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asian economies. Previously, he was executive editor for economics at Bloomberg News.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-03-31/usd-the-dollar-is-more-armored-division-than-currency?sref=hhjZtX76

There’s just no getting past the supremacy of the dollar, much as skeptics of American influence wish for it or lonely yen bulls cry for relief. The greenback has been frequently tipped to retreat, only for it to blow away everything in front of it. This resilience might not last, but as long as it does, it reminds a world once in thrall to China’s ascent that the US is the essential economic force. Just ask all the central bankers quizzed as much, if not more, about the Federal Reserve’s intentions as their own. Sovereignty can be relative.

Events billed as heralding a pullback have barely made a dent: Japan’s decision to end eight years of negative interest rates fizzled in markets; the country’s finance minister has resorted to jawboning the yen stronger, and traders are handicapping the prospects of intervention by Tokyo. Even projections of rate cuts by the Fed aren’t doing it: Reductions are likely to be synchronous among the biggest authorities, preventing any major currency from outshining the dollar. This year was meant to be one in which the dollar fell, but a key index of its support is off to a strong start.

That’s the short term. Markets fluctuate and currencies, like stock and bond markets, have good years and times when things don’t turn out so stellar. But the buoyancy of the past quarter — and last couple of years — is built on something more than rate differences. The longer story of dollar firepower is one of a currency beating back challenge after challenge every few years. In the late 1990s, the coming euro was supposed to rival the dollar. A couple of years later, the current-account deficit became the totem of all that was wrong. (When I ran Bloomberg’s foreign-exchange news in the early 2000s, the most commonly-cited reason for any tough trading day for the dollar was the trade shortfall. A close second was the belief that the US had quietly dropped the strong-dollar policy developed during the Clinton administration.)

Then came the subprime collapse and quantitative easing, followed by the would-be rise of the Chinese yuan. The worry du jour: the aggressive use of sanctions, which critics said would lead to a global de-dollarization. It’s as though the rest of the world scouts for a savior every few years. Assertions that the dollar will be undone are overblown, according to a recent paper by Steven B. Kamin, a former head of the Fed’s international finance division, and Mark Sobel, who served as deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury.

Position of Strength

The greenback has seen off many threats to its dominance

Source: Bloomberg

Kamin and Sobel write that dollar dominance is embedded in the global economic system in ways that are difficult to change. Even if it was to decline relative to another currency, the buck will remain first among equals. And the potential loss of access to US markets and the American banking industry would mean sanctions still matter greatly. The currency remains a vital geopolitical asset both to Washington, and its allies.

The duo argue that whether or not the dollar stays top of the heap is the wrong question to ask. Better to inquire whether the factors that have supported such a place at the commanding heights will be sustained. They are confident it will, but add a chilling caveat: The biggest risk to the dollar may be the US itself.

“Dollar dominance is not a means in and of itself,” Kamin and Sobel wrote in the paper for the American Enterprise Institute. “It is instead a critical reminder of the need to run sound policies, behave responsively at home, and maintain the world’s trust.” (The two expanded on the subject in the Macro Musings podcast last month.)

The dollar is also a strategic gift, often under-appreciated in geopolitical discussions, which tend to focus on the South China Sea or Donald Trump’s threats against treaty partners. Nor is the US-led economic order, with the greenback at its core, wholly a product of victory in World War II. Born in 1913, the Fed was an important behind-the-scenes player in the Great War. As President Woodrow Wilson was trying to broker peace between the Allied and Central powers in 1916, the Fed fretted that American banks were too invested in the prospects of a triumph by Britain and France, something by no means certain. The central bank warned US lenders against over-exposure, a step that sent European markets into a tailspin, wrote Philip Zelikow in The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Turning point of the Great War, 1916-1917. Allied powers realized they would soon struggle to finance the war.

Wilson hoped that by squeezing them, he could bring about a resolution. His efforts foundered after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and the US joined the conflict. The Fed reversed its stance and aid began flowing again — generously. Just as well: Britain’s cash reserves were perilously close to depletion. The baton of monetary leadership was passed.

Let’s hear it for the greenback, more useful than an aircraft carrier, and with greater life expectancy. If there is a historic break with its rule, it’s unlikely to be something as obvious as a turn in the cycle of contemporary borrowing costs. It may be something more subtle, though clear in hindsight. For now, consider keeping those prognostications about the eclipse of the dollar in the barracks.

Russian assassination unit linked to U.S. officials' "Havana syndrome"

Rebecca Falconer

https://www.axios.com/2024/04/01/havana-syndrome-evidence-investigation-russia-60-minutes?f

CBS' Scott Pelley with an FBI agent identified only as "Carrie," who told "60 Minutes" in the show broadcast Sunday that she's experienced symptoms of "Havana syndrome." Photo: CBS News/"60 Minutes"

A joint media investigation into "Havana syndrome," a mysterious health condition that's affected U.S. diplomats and government officials, has found evidence that a Russian military assassination unit may be responsible.

Why it matters: "60 Minutes" noted that the findings from its five-year probe with The Insider and Der Spiegel that Russia's GRU Unit 29155 may be behind the neurological symptoms marked the first evidence linking a foreign adversary to the cases.

U.S. intelligence agencies have said it's unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible for the phenomenon.

The big picture: Symptoms of "Havana syndrome," which U.S. officials refer to as "anomalous health incidents" (AHI), can include extreme headaches, dizziness, nausea and ear pain.

The condition was dubbed "Havana syndrome" because reports of American officials falling ill were first documented at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba's capital in late 2016.

Yes, but: New evidence suggests "there were likely attacks two years earlier in Frankfurt, Germany, when a U.S. government employee stationed at the consulate there was knocked unconscious by something akin to a strong energy beam," per The Insider.

"The victim was later diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury, and was also able to identify a Geneva-based Unit 29155 operative," the Russia-focused news outlet added Sunday.

Photo: Michael Weiss, editor of The Insider/X

Zoom in: Greg Edgreen, a recently retired Army lieutenant colonel who ran the Defense Intelligence Agency investigation into "Havana syndrome" from 2021 to 2023, told CBS' Scott Pelley it's his opinion that the U.S. is being attacked by Vladimir Putin's regime.

Edgreen noted the top 5%-10% of performing officers across the agency had been impacted.
"And consistently there was a Russia nexus," said Edgreen, speaking publicly for the first time on the matter in Sunday's "60 Minutes." "There was some angle where they had worked against Russia, focused on Russia, and done extremely well."

Mark Zaid, an attorney with security clearance representing more than two dozen clients with Havana syndrome symptoms, including from the FBI, CIA and State Department, said there's evidence of a government "cover up" involving "lines of inquiry that would take us potentially to answers we don't want to have to deal with."

He told Pelley a thread that's common among affected FBI personnel was that "most if not all of my clients other than the family members connected to the employee ... were all doing something relating to Russia."

The intrigue: Two major National Institutes of Health studies out this month examining the conditions of over 80 government employees and family members who experienced "anomalous health incidents" in locations including the U.S., Cuba, China and Austria found no consistent evidence of brain injury.

David Relman, a Stanford University scientist who's led previous research into the condition, took issue with the findings of the studies, published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, in an accompanying editorial.
He noted two previous studies he was involved in "found the cases with abrupt-onset, location-dependent sensory phenomena to be unlike any disorder reported in the neurological or general medical literature, and potentially caused by an external mechanism."

What they're saying: When asked for comment, representatives for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence directed Axios to the portion of the Annual Threat Assessment, published in February, which addresses AHI.

That states that the office is closely examining AHI and notes that most intelligence "agencies have concluded that it is very unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible" for the condition.
The agencies "have varying confidence levels because we still have gaps given the challenges collecting on foreign adversaries," the report notes.
Russian officials had yet to comment on the reports, and representatives for the FBI, White House and State Department did not immediately respond to Axios' requests for comment.

Editor's note: This article has been updated with new details throughout.

7. Former CENTCOM commander warns ISIS online radicalization among ‘most dangerous methods’ for attack

Excerpts:

The Moscow attack raised concerns that ISIS could be resurgent and ready to strike in Europe or even the U.S., though American intelligence leaders have assured the public that there is currently no threat.

“The Department of Defense has not taken its eye off of ISIS,” Pentagon press secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters Thursday.

Former CENTCOM commander warns ISIS online radicalization among ‘most dangerous methods’ for attack

BY NICK ROBERTSON - 03/31/24 12:28 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4566256-former-centcom-commander-warns-isis-online-radicalization-among-most-dangerous-methods-for-attack/?utm

Retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, the former commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), warned Sunday that ISIS online radicalization poses a threat of future terrorist attacks after more than 130 people were killed in a Moscow attack last week.

Four gunmen killed 144 people in a concert hall in suburban Moscow last week. The gunmen were believed to have been affiliated with ISIS-K, the terrorist organization’s Afghanistan branch. Russian authorities arrested the gunmen from Tajikistan and their believed co-conspirators.

McKenzie said the attack was likely an action organized directly by ISIS-K but that online radicalization poses a threat to the future.

“Self-radicalization — radicalization in place, if you will, by people who have access to the internet abroad — may be one of the most dangerous methods that ISIS can use to generate attacks,” he said in an ABC “This Week” interview with Martha Raddatz on Sunday.

“Those attacks are generally not going to be well coordinated. They’re not going to be well planned. And they’re not going to be well supported,” he said. “But they can be very lethal, because there’ll be so hard to detect.”

The Moscow attack raised concerns that ISIS could be resurgent and ready to strike in Europe or even the U.S., though American intelligence leaders have assured the public that there is currently no threat.

“The Department of Defense has not taken its eye off of ISIS,” Pentagon press secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters Thursday.

8. Beijing Deplores Taiwan’s Next President, but Welcomes an Old One

Beijing Deplores Taiwan’s Next President, but Welcomes an Old One

A rare visit to mainland China by Ma Ying-jeou, who’s now in the opposition, is a chance for political messaging on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/31/world/asia/taiwan-china-ma-ying-jeou.html

Ma Ying-jeou, who was Taiwan’s president from 2008 to 2016, favors closer ties with China. Credit...Tyrone Siu/Reuters

By Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien

Reporting from Taipei, Taiwan

Published March 31, 2024

Updated April 1, 2024, 5:27 a.m. ET

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As tensions fester between China and Taiwan, one elder politician from the island democracy is getting an effusive welcome on the mainland: Ma Ying-jeou, a former president.

Mr. Ma’s 11-day trip across China, which began on Monday, comes at a fraught time. Beijing and Taipei have been in dispute over two Chinese fishermen who died while trying to flee a Taiwanese coast guard vessel in February, and China has sent its own coast guard ships close to a Taiwanese-controlled island near where the men died.

Taiwanese officials expect China to intensify its military intimidation once the island’s next president, Lai Ching-te, takes office on May 20. His Democratic Progressive Party rejects Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, and Chinese officials particularly dislike Mr. Lai, often citing his 2017 description of himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence.”

On the other hand, China’s warm treatment of Mr. Ma, 73, Taiwan’s president from 2008 to 2016, seems a way to emphasize that Beijing will keep an open door for politicians who favor closer ties and accept its conditions for talks.

“Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan will definitely be using more of both a gentle touch but also a hard fist,” Chang Wu-yue, a professor at the Graduate Institute of China Studies of Tamkang University in Taiwan, said in an interview about Mr. Ma’s visit.

Image

Mr. Ma with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, in Singapore in 2015.Credit...Fazry Ismail/EPA, via Shutterstock

Officials from Mr. Ma’s Nationalist Party have hinted that later in his trip, he may meet with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping. That would echo groundbreaking talks that the two held in 2015. China has frozen high-level official contacts since Taiwan’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, took office in 2016. She and the president-elect, Mr. Lai, belong to the same party, usually known by its initials, D.P.P.

“This trip to the mainland is in the hope that at a time of cross-strait tensions, we can convey Taiwanese people’s heartfelt love of peace and hope for engagement between the two sides of the strait, avoiding war,” Mr. Ma told reporters in Taiwan before leaving for China.

Mr. Lai has said that there will be no drastic change in Taiwan’s status, and that he wants talks with China. But his party rejects Beijing’s conditions for official talks, especially a formula under which each side accepts there is “one China,” even if they differ on what that means. The Democratic Progressives call that a rhetorical trap to advance China’s claim over Taiwan.

Nationalist Party officials argue that they help Taiwan by talking to senior Chinese officials.

“What if an accident happens? There’s no dialogue, no communication channel, between the D.P.P. government and the Communist government in China,” Sean Lien, a vice chairman of the Nationalist Party, said in an interview before Mr. Ma’s trip. “The fact that he’s visiting China in early April, and probably will meet with Xi Jinping — I actually think that will help reduce the mounting tensions between Taiwan and mainland China.”

For Mr. Xi, a meeting with Mr. Ma may be a way of trying to show Chinese people that Taiwan is not slipping irretrievably beyond hope of unification.

“For Beijing, it’s in Xi’s interest to show that time is on mainland China’s side, and maybe he can spin a meeting with Ma — if it happens — to convey that narrative to the domestic audience,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “That might ease some of the pressure that is rising internally.”

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Lai Ching-te, who will be sworn in as Taiwan’s president next month, is scorned by Beijing for his past statements about Taiwan’s independence.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

In part, Mr. Ma’s trip is another move in the contest between his Nationalist Party and Mr. Lai’s incoming administration.

Mr. Lai won 40 percent of the presidential vote, prevailing in a three-way race. But the Nationalists won the most seats in the legislative election. Both the Nationalists and Chinese officials have said that those results showed that Mr. Lai does not represent mainstream Taiwanese opinion, a message Beijing is likely to amplify during Mr. Ma’s visit.

But Mr. Ma’s visit to China has risks for his party. He represents a wing of the Nationalists committed to Taiwan’s reconciliation with Beijing as part of one Chinese nation, an idea that other sectors of his party, and Taiwanese voters, are wary of. In the final days of Taiwan’s presidential race, the Nationalist candidate, Hou Yu-ih, distanced himself from Mr. Ma over comments that the former president made about Taiwan’s military vulnerabilities.

“No matter how much you defend yourself, you can never fight a war with the mainland; you can never win,” Mr. Ma told Deutsche Welle. Unification with China could be acceptable to Taiwan, he added, if achieved peacefully and democratically.

According to a poll of Taiwanese people by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in Taipei, about 1 percent support unification “as soon as possible.” Nearly 90 percent favor some version of Taiwan’s current ambiguous status quo: self-ruling, separate from China, but short of full formal independence.

The D.P.P. has accused Mr. Ma of selling out Taiwanese interests by going to China.

“The Chinese Communists are trying to use Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to frame the terms for political discussion on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” Wang Ting-yu, a Democratic Progressive lawmaker, said in an interview. Mr. Ma does not represent mainstream views within his own party, Mr. Wang said: “He has lost the mandate of public opinion.”

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An abandoned tank on the Taiwan-controlled island of Kinmen in 2021. China’s coast guard has patrolled near Kinmen since two Chinese fishermen died in nearby waters in February.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

As president, Mr. Ma expanded economic ties with China, including tourism. But his plans for a more ambitious trade pact ran aground in 2014 after protesters occupied Taiwan’s legislature, arguing that the agreement would undermine Taiwan’s economic autonomy.

Mr. Ma first visited China last year, though he did not meet with Mr. Xi. This time, he will lead a group of Taiwanese students to Guangdong Province in southern China and to Shaanxi Province in the northwest, there to attend a ceremony honoring the Yellow Emperor, the mythic forefather of Han people. Finally, they will visit Beijing, where the meeting with Mr. Xi may take place.

Taiwan’s Nationalist Party issued a statement defending Mr. Ma’s trip and expressing “hope that this visit will contribute to cross-strait peace and stability.” It also noted that Mr. Ma no longer held any senior posts in the party.

“They are setting up some protection,” said Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, an associate professor at Sam Houston State University in Texas who studies Taiwanese politics. “If anything goes wrong in Beijing, or Ma Ying-jeou mentions something unacceptable to the Taiwanese people, the party will indicate that they are not with Ma Ying-jeou on that.”

Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues. More about Chris Buckley

Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China. More about Amy Chang Chien

9. Against All Odds, Army Making Solid Progress on Modernization

Conclusion:

None of this has been easy. Things do not always happen fast or run smoothly in large organizations like the U.S. Army. But if you want high quality control, especially for warfighting systems and intercontinental logistics, those things take time, and they cost money. Likewise, our decentralized political system, with myriad power centers and endless elections, keeps the ground shifting underneath the feet of anyone trying to pull off something as complicated as Army transformation. But Army leadership through both the Trump and Biden administrations is, against all odds, pulling off an ambitious and necessary plan that just might keep that two- or three-front war, from breaking out.

Against All Odds, Army Making Solid Progress on Modernization

By Merrick “Mac” Carey

April 01, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/01/against_all_odds_army_making_solid_progress_on_modernization_1022061.html?mc_cid=4b4787b43a&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Today the United States and the U.S. Army are once again positioning for a two-front war, as we did in the Spanish American war, World War Two, and during the Cold War. The U.S. is the chief outside architect of the assistance to Ukraine as it battles Russia. Meanwhile, we and our friends in Asia prepare for what many believe will be an inevitable clash of arms with China. Otto von Bismarck’s guiding strategy for the 19th century German Empire was to avoid a two-front war. But America keeps finding them. We could even get drawn into a three-front war if the gloves come off between Israel and Iran in the Middle East.

While some think the U.S. Army should not become a big player in the Western Pacific, we know from World War Two, Korea, and Vietnam how quickly our land component will be essential in what initially looks like a naval or air power campaign. The Army’s Big Six modernization efforts are already flowing into the Pacific basin. Long range fires, medium lift, and air defense place the U.S. Army in the Pacific sweet spot. Those missions are enormously needed. The new Army tiltrotor’s long range and flexibility will make it invaluable in both the first and second island chains of the Western Pacific. Land-based air defense is essential in a limited land geographic environment, as are long range fires. You cannot sink an island.

Army modernization and transformation are also helping our friends and allies overseas. Just when you thought insurgents and terrorists might be receding into the past, Gaza has exploded on the world scene to pull us back into a type of land conflict like those of the early 21st century.

Israel aligns nicely with U.S. Army modernization efforts, as the IDF needs to be more connected on the battlefield. U.S. Army modernization efforts are great timing for the Jewish State. The Israeli Army has always been a few steps behind the Air Force. Israeli land power is now catching up with similar requirements for precision fires, future vertical lift, and being connected in the network. Given that Israel has a small defense force, it has to be connected. However, Israel has been moving faster than America on ground combat vehicles, with better situational awareness and active protection systems. The U.S. Army has benefited from that. Israeli situational awareness is being imported to America for ground combat vehicles. Israeli-developed advanced aviation helmets have adapted software and digital capabilities for building a sensor net around a ground combat vehicle, and the U.S. Army is experimenting with that.

Russia is, of course, the perfect foil, or forcing function, for U.S. Army modernization, and Ukraine is the early-warning laboratory. Armor, artillery battles, air defense, commercial and military networks, and sophisticated ISR and deep sensing, are all front and center in Ukraine and all nested in Army modernization and transformation. U.S. Army systems have once again proven to be the world’s best in a nose-to-nose fight. Even OSD’s testing and evaluation office has admitted that. The pattern of warfighting in Ukraine is validating the Army’s six-point plan, and our frontline allies like Poland are piggybacking nicely on Army modernization with large American armor and air defense purchases. Poland will also be conveniently interoperable with U.S. Army formations that are forward deployed, or on their way to Europe, in a crisis. Poland has even built tank and HIMARS service centers in-country. Further west, two of the most pro-America nations on earth, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, are already nosing around the Army’s V-280 tiltrotor for potential foreign military sales, thus giving the U.S. Army yet another potential force multiplier in Europe.

None of this has been easy. Things do not always happen fast or run smoothly in large organizations like the U.S. Army. But if you want high quality control, especially for warfighting systems and intercontinental logistics, those things take time, and they cost money. Likewise, our decentralized political system, with myriad power centers and endless elections, keeps the ground shifting underneath the feet of anyone trying to pull off something as complicated as Army transformation. But Army leadership through both the Trump and Biden administrations is, against all odds, pulling off an ambitious and necessary plan that just might keep that two- or three-front war, from breaking out.

Merrick Carey is CEO and founder of the Lexington Institute, a public policy think tank based in Arlington, Virginia.

10. The Navy Needs 355 Ships by 2030

Excerpts:

John Paul Jones Panache and Messaging Needed

387 by 2054 is just not the right spirit or rallying message. Forty-One for Freedom was catchy, understandable, and inspiring. 355 by 2025 is better but unachievable, so perhaps “355 (by 2030) for Freedom” is better (substitute whatever the correct number is; it has changed many times in the shipbuilding plan). Defense budget military construction plus ups for government-owned-contractor-operated facilities are in order. Secretary Del Toro chided the contractors, “You continue in some cases to goose your stock prices,” missing the point entirely.

The defense industrial base has contracted for multiple reasons, but the return on investment for investors is just not there, and it is too difficult with government work. This is especially true when dealing with the reality that new, greenfield, modern facilities are needed on a large scale. This budget submission was a significant misstep, but with a clear slogan and more realistic funding, 355 for Freedom is achievable. Alacrity is needed as 4,000 feet is not a lot of warning.

The Navy Needs 355 Ships by 2030

The Navy remains the tip of the spear for generating and projecting deterrence in the Western Pacific. The latest budget does not reflect that fact.

The National Interest · by John R. Mills · March 30, 2024

After several years of budget growth, energy, and a glimmer of new shipyards, the defense budget release for Fiscal Year 2025 was much anticipated. When the FY 2025 submission was released, there was a delayed response as defense analysts struggled to process what just happened.

Instead of growth, the theme was shrinkage. There was a distinct delta between the talking points of the secretary of defense’s press release and the Comptroller’s submissions from the services. Across the services, platforms, and systems will be retired faster than they are replaced. For example, six Navy ships are being acquired, and nineteen battleforce ships are being retired. The simple math shows a net loss of thirteen ships from the Navy, yet the secretary’s announcement is overflowing with aspirational platitudes. Professor James Holmes said simply, the “New Defense Budget Makes No Sense.”

Radical lane changes or new directions in budget submissions are normally over-explained well in advance. In one example, the Army is giving away a significant portion of its JLOTS (Joint Logistics Over The Shore) expeditionary port capability to the Gaza Pier and is replete with talk of a watercraft renaissance, yet the Army Rail Float Containerization Equipment Line Item (P.43) goes down twenty-five percent. The optics of the DOD budget submission are deadly serious for the adversary nations of America. They see right through the textual floweriness, smell weakness, and suspect a lack of resolve.

The Duncan Sandys Navy Budget

The Navy remains the tip of the spear for generating and projecting deterrence in the Western Pacific. However, the Navy is clearly shrinking. The latest shipbuilding plan has been released. It celebrates 387 battleforce ships by 2054—not exactly inspiring. In 1957, British Defence Minister Duncan Sandys introduced a White Paper that proposed canceling almost all British defense projects because the future was missiles and nuclear deterrence. This cancellation was a real bloodbath. The UK Aerospace Industry was decimated, and the Ministry of Defense went into a tailspin, leading to the spectral UK military of today. A Duncan Sandys moment for the U.S. Navy just happened right in front of everyone’s eyes. The one difference is that the 2025 budget is essentially cuts and schedule extensions without introducing a decisive new direction, as Sandys attempted.

The Navy’s 2025 Budget states, “The Secretary re-emphasizes three enduring priorities: strengthen maritime dominance, build a culture of warfighting excellence, and enhance strategic partnerships with an addition of new maritime statecraft to prevail in this era of intense strategic competition.” It is really, really hard to draw a line between Secretary Del Toro’s three priorities and the numbers in the Comptroller’s books. Ships and airplanes become more expensive in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) as they age—and O&M is the largest portion of the Navy’s $257.6 billion budget at thirty-four percent. O&M is what pays for fuel, food, travel, and other non-capital expenses. This spikes when things like the Red Sea conflagration flare up. The Navy’s 2025 budget is not about growth; it is about financial survival, foraging for O&M, and managed decline.

Seeking An Industrial Base Miracle

Retiring legacy systems to save O&M and re-capitalize with new systems is implied in the Navy submission. This is a reasonable strategy, but it must be amplified with accelerated delivery schedules of new capabilities. An underlying theme that extrudes from the submission is the growth of the Navy’s autonomous vessels, surface and sub-surface. But 2054 is so far away that the aspirational end state is irrelevant, considering the velocity of developments in the Western Pacific. Relatively simple and inexpensive autonomous drones are not an illogical pathway—they have been used quite effectively by Ukraine to drive the Russian Navy into deep enclaves where they are useless and still attacked with different forms of autonomy.

Whether ships or autonomous vessels are the pathway forward, none of the throughput models mathematically work with the existing or slightly improved industrial base. Nothing will alter the status quo until something meaningfully changes. Secretary Del Toro has been on a whirlwind of visits to the West Coast and America’s Pacific partners. The Boeing model—a vertically integrated model where international partners like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines deliver modular assemblies for final integration, assembly, and fitting out—is innovative and worth pursuing. A reasonable plan passionately implemented is better than the perfect plan delivered late. The only problem is that these partners are on the front line. Forward rock outcroppings of Kinmen Island (a territory of Taiwan) are only 4,000 feet away from the line of separation with China, and American special operators are already in place working out plans to make the first 4,000 feet as costly as possible.

John Paul Jones Panache and Messaging Needed

387 by 2054 is just not the right spirit or rallying message. Forty-One for Freedom was catchy, understandable, and inspiring. 355 by 2025 is better but unachievable, so perhaps “355 (by 2030) for Freedom” is better (substitute whatever the correct number is; it has changed many times in the shipbuilding plan). Defense budget military construction plus ups for government-owned-contractor-operated facilities are in order. Secretary Del Toro chided the contractors, “You continue in some cases to goose your stock prices,” missing the point entirely.

The defense industrial base has contracted for multiple reasons, but the return on investment for investors is just not there, and it is too difficult with government work. This is especially true when dealing with the reality that new, greenfield, modern facilities are needed on a large scale. This budget submission was a significant misstep, but with a clear slogan and more realistic funding, 355 for Freedom is achievable. Alacrity is needed as 4,000 feet is not a lot of warning.

John R. Mills is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Former Director of Cybersecurity Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. John served over the last forty years, from the Cold War to the era of Great Power Competition. This service has been in uniform and as a senior civilian for the Department of Defense. John is a regular contributor to multiple print and broadcast media companies.

The National Interest · by John R. Mills · March 30, 2024

11. The Celebrity Chef Who Beat the U.S. Military at Getting Aid Into Gaza

The headline made me check to see if this was something for April Fool's Day.

But we should not be surprised that some elements of civil society can move at speed to get something done. And we should welcome civil society contributions.

However, the military and civil society should not be in competition - comparisons are apples and oranges.

The Celebrity Chef Who Beat the U.S. Military at Getting Aid Into Gaza

José Andrés’s World Central Kitchen is already delivering food by sea to enclave where many are starving

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/-jose-andres-chef-gaza-israel-war-ea9512f8?utm

By Stephen KalinFollow

Updated April 1, 2024 12:06 am ET

LARNACA, Cyprus—When President Biden declared in early March that the U.S. military would build a pier on the coast of Gaza to deliver humanitarian aid by sea, a Spanish-American celebrity chef was already two steps ahead of the world’s mightiest fighting force.

José Andrés had commandeered a tugboat to bring 200 tons of food on a barge from Larnaca, a port city in Cyprus, to Gaza’s shores for use in kitchens run by his disaster-relief group, World Central Kitchen. He had also flown to Tel Aviv to charm Israeli officials into supporting his initiative.

When the tugboat arrived in Cyprus in mid-February, “everything went from impossible to maybe,” said Andrés. Making such leaps is the signature of the chef’s philanthropy.

To reach shore after Gaza’s port was bombed, local contractors cobbled together a jetty from the rubble of destroyed buildings. The vessels began the three-day journey across the Mediterranean before the jetty was complete; if it wasn’t ready in time, the volunteer crew would have to improvise.

In a war that poses unprecedented challenges for humanitarian organizations used to operating in the world’s toughest environments, Andrés’s tiny but nimble charity has repeatedly set the pace. The group is punching above its weight in Gaza, where more than one million people are estimated to be starving as a result of Israel’s war against Hamas. While the United Nations provides nearly 80% of humanitarian aid to the besieged enclave, World Central Kitchen accounts for more than half of non-U.N. deliveries, mostly food, according to Cogat, the Israeli military body coordinating aid there.

A World Central Kitchen aid delivery heads from Cyprus toward Gaza. PHOTO: WORLD CENTRAL KITCHEN/REUTERS

A satellite image of a jetty under construction to receive a World Central Kitchen aid delivery in the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Andrés, a twice Michelin-starred chef who recently promoted his latest cookbook on “The Tonight Show Starring Jimmy Fallon,” started the Washington-based nonprofit in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Its field kitchens provide free, hot meals during crises, including recent earthquakes in Turkey, Syria and Morocco and floods in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Andrés first operated in a war zone in Ukraine, building a network of restaurant partners to prepare meals for displaced families.

In Gaza, home to about 2.2 million people, World Central Kitchen has delivered by its own count more than 43 million meals since October. Its main field kitchen, in the southern city of Rafah, provides 50,000 hot meals and meal kits to Palestinians daily and has its own bakery. The organization runs several other community kitchens across the Gaza Strip and offers meals to staff and patients in hospitals that are still functioning. It has delivered about a third as much food as the U.N.’s World Food Program, according to Cogat.

Andrés, who volunteers his time to World Central Kitchen while continuing to open new restaurants, says his main goal in launching the maritime corridor was to show that the situation in Gaza was so bad that it required such drastic measures.

“Any option was better than nothing,” he said in an interview. “We can complain all day or we can find alternative methods. The ultimate goal for us is to make sure that we are able to feed as many people as we can and minimize the famine.”

A World Central Kitchen meal-preparation site in Gaza. PHOTO: @CHEFJOSEANDRES VIA X/REUTERS

A box of food aid delivered to the Gaza Strip in mid-March. PHOTO: MOHAMMED ABED/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The gregarious 54-year-old’s connections include world leaders and movie stars whom he taps in his mission to respond to emergencies around the world. His radical thinking extends to a vision where militaries are repurposed to feed the hungry.

World Central Kitchen’s willingness to ignore conventional wisdom also helped it navigate mountains of logistical and bureaucratic obstacles in Gaza. When cooking gas ran out after the war began, it produced wood-pellet stoves and obtained pellets from Egypt. To get around Israeli bans on metal mixing spoons, it ordered wooden ones and fashioned insulating sleeves to keep cooking pots warm when away from the fire.

When poor security and Israeli checkpoints prevented the U.N. and other humanitarian groups from delivering ready-made meals to northern Gaza, World Central Kitchen joined with Jordan in February to airdrop food—weeks before Biden directed the U.S. military to do the same.

Then in mid-March, the group’s tugboat and barge reached Gaza’s coast. Onshore crews, working day and night under the supervision of Israeli forces, were able to prepare the landing area in northern Gaza. Once unloaded, the aid group’s first shipment by sea to Gaza was a success—and had delivered less than 20 trucks’ worth of food.

The mission was triggered by the deteriorating situation in the north, which was cut off from almost all aid. Andrés hoped to use the tugboat mission to get food to civilians sheltering at Gaza City hospitals, while trying to deliver more food by truck, which is more efficient.

In early January, the chef texted his friend Oscar Camps, the Catalan activist who runs the migrant-aid nonprofit Open Arms, about sending food to Gaza by sea. As the men secured permissions to make the first voyage happen, Biden revealed the U.S. plan and the European Commission said it was supporting a maritime corridor, putting the spotlight on the World Central Kitchen voyage that went ahead the following week.

“We did it on our own, not in coordination with anyone from the beginning,” said Andrés. He secured bureaucratic clearances from Cyprus and Israel, which inspected the goods before the vessels sailed, and financial backing from the United Arab Emirates.

On Saturday, World Central Kitchen’s second mission set sail from Cyprus after waiting several weeks for better weather to cross the sea. The original barge and tug are joined by a larger cargo ship and a support vessel that altogether are carrying enough rice, pasta, flour, dates and canned food to prepare more than one million meals.

José Andrés walked alongside Sen. Peter Welch (D., Vt.), in tie, after a briefing with senators at the U.S. Capitol. PHOTO: J. SCOTT APPLEWHITE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Andrés handed out food in Kherson, in southern Ukraine, in November 2022. PHOTO: BERNAT ARMANGUE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

This time, the larger ship equipped with a forklift and crane will wait in international waters while the barge ferries food back and forth to the jetty, as World Central Kitchen aims to increase the speed and volume of maritime deliveries, said Juan Camilo Jimenez, who helped organize both shipments.

“Our modus operandi is: Be ready and do everything you can control so when we get the opportunity, we [can] start the journey,” said Jimenez.

Additional voyages will likely be completed before significant construction even gets under way on the U.S. pier, which U.S. defense officials say will take two months to build because the U.S. military must transport equipment and forces into the region, including six vessels and 1,100 military personnel.

The Pentagon’s plan calls for aid to be unloaded from ships onto a floating pier, then transported by U.S. military support vessels to a two-lane causeway that would be attached to the shore. Biden has said no U.S. troops will be on the ground and the Israeli military will provide security. The Israelis have already done the same for the World Central Kitchen sea mission, an unusual level of coordination for humanitarian groups in Gaza.

On Board a Gaza Airdrop Mission With the U.S. Air Force

On the Hamilton Affair

The Army, leadership selection, and bureaucratic resistance to change.

https://douglasollivant.substack.com/p/on-the-hamilton-affair

DOUGLAS OLLIVANT

MAR 30, 2024

On March 19 of this year, Military.com broke the news that one of the Army’s four-star generals, Charles R. Hamilton, of Army Materiel Command, had blatantly sought to influence and interfere in the Battalion Command Assessment Program on behalf of one of his proteges. Days later, Christine Wormuth, the Secretary of the Army, would suspend Hamilton “pending the outcome of the DoDIG [Department of Defense Inspector General] review and assessment, and any subsequent investigation.”

To a wider audience, this may be very much an inside baseball story, but it resonates inside the institution. Further, I think there are important lessons to be drawn here about bureaucratic resistance to change.

The Battalion Command Assessment Program (hereafter BCAP) was largely brought to the Army by two officers, General James McConville, the Army Chief of Staff for the implementation period, and Major General JP McGee (just nominated for his 3d star as the Joint Staff J5). McConville looked at the Army’s legacy command selection process—which dated to Vietnam War-era reforms—and realized that lessons learned about leader selection were not being used. In particular, Special Operations forces—Special Forces, the Ranger Battalions, and other classified units—have for decades been using assessment programs of a few days to a few weeks. These longer, more detailed programs, involving some combination of cognitive tests, writing assignments, physical stressors and peer assessments, allow a more holistic view of a prospective leader. Further, SOF’s assessment approach was validated by decades of success and refinement. McConville would famously comment about these programs, “we spend more time [selecting] an enlisted ranger than we do… a battalion commander.”

So that the entirety of an officer’s career was not reduced to a small snapshot held over a few days, the legacy system was not entirely discarded but would be supplemented by the BCAP system. The legacy system—which nominally evaluated a candidate’s entire career file, but is widely considered to only evaluate performance in a few key jobs in the years immediately preceding—would continue, but would be blended with the BCAP score. Exactly what would be the weighting between these two systems (50/50? 70/30?) was a closely guarded secret.

BCAP immediately became controversial for several reasons. The first was its success in identifying officers that the legacy system passed over. In the beta test of the BCAP, which focused only on the “alternates” for command, the officer who walked in with the very lowest score from the legacy system, just barely scraping across the line, so to speak, ended up with the very highest rating under the BCAP process. “Worst to first” in McConville and McGee’s words. This anecdote powerfully illustrated that it is very possible for an incredibly talented officer who lacks influential mentors to find him or herself unable to break out of the pack in a way that impresses the legacy board system. Or, phrased differently, the inputs to the legacy system are—at least in a minority of cases—deeply unrepresentative of a candidate’s potential to be a talented commander.

The second reason for controversy was BCAPs emphasis on both strategic intelligence and on highlighting toxic leaders—the latter trait lately identified as a rampant problem. These foci struck a powerful strain in the Army, which had traditionally tolerated (if not glorified) abusive leadership styles and tended to downplay the importance of intelligence and strategic thinking.

Finally, and related, the emergence of a new system was an implicit critique of existing leaders. Every general had to ask him or herself whether they would have found themselves at their current rank and position had they been forced to go through the BCAP gauntlet as more junior leaders. Because the legacy system had obviously worked just fine for them, senior leadership tended to be deeply suspicious of any change. Particularly a change that promised to at least downplay the effects of patronage and nepotism within the service.

General Hamilton’s actions—if true as reported—are then a particularly virulent strain of this widespread resistance to the new system. Generals do not like to be told that their judgment about their proteges is biased or just plain wrong.

The Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army should respond to this challenge at two levels. First, with regard to General Hamilton, if the allegations against him are substantiated, he should be immediately retired, at the rank at which he is determined to have last honorably served. Again, if substantiated, the actions of which he is accused should preclude his retirement at four-star rank. This would be both justice in this particular case, and an important instance of pour encourager les autres.

But second, both the CSA and SECARMY should step in to defend the BCAP system. It is important to the Army not only for the immediate good of having better battalion commanders (there is a similar system for brigade commanders called CCAP), but also for the incentives it produces throughout the force. For general officers, over time, each of them will be products of the BCAP system. While I do not believe any BCAP grads are yet generals, it is simply a matter of time before (virtually) all generals are. And with respect to younger officers, knowing that this key gateway looms in their future will contour behavior. If the Army is known to seek out non-toxic leadership styles and an ability to think strategically if you wish to be a senior leader, then junior leaders who aspire to such will need to monitor their leadership styles and educate themselves on strategy. Such officers will be far better equipped to lead the diverse teams—both landpower and joint—of the future, which may require adapting a style of warfighting that is difficult to picture today.

BCAP is endangered on two fronts, over time. The first is illustrated by the Hamilton affair—the possibility of senior leaders putting “thumbs on the scale” in what is ostensibly an objective, double-blind process (candidates at BCAP conduct their interviews behind a curtain, like an elite orchestra audition, to minimize favoritism for race or other visual characteristics).

It is hard to overemphasize how generals, and particularly 4-star generals, are minor demigods within the Army, and their actions difficult to critique. It is notable that while Hamilton’s actions were documented and reported, no one at BCAP had the power to stop his blatant interference.

But the second danger is more subtle and far more likely. BCAP could become a process that has little impact on final outcomes. Were BCAP results to become a negligible percentage of the outcomes relative to the legacy system—say less than 25% weighting—then the characteristics that BCAP is designed to screen out would be far more likely to appear in the final result.

To speak in even more jargony language for a moment, the latest (July 2023) guidance on command selection contains this relevant phrasing, “The Army convenes a Job Performance Panel (JPP) to evaluate the candidate’s performance file. The JPP generates a performance score, which is the most heavily weighted variable of the order of merit list (OML) formula…. The job performance scores, generated at the JPP, and CAP scored assessment results are used to calculate the OML.” So already, the Army is stating outright that the BCAP results are a subordinate input to the traditional selection system. And knowing the Army, if it is willing to explicitly admit that the traditional system (even if rebranded as a JPP) is “the most heavily weighted variable,” then it’s probably a very heavily weighted variable. Again, the bureaucracy—reflecting the distrust of senior leadership—is perfectly capable of marginalizing BCAP without confronting it directly.

Even in this outcome, BCAP would still have value. As one officer once told me, “BCAP doesn’t prevent the Army from promoting the cruel or the dim. It just denies the Army the ability to say it didn’t know it was promoting someone cruel and/or dim. There will be no deniability.” But far better to just screen out these “leaders” and deny them the ability to impact soldiers—a group which, you may have heard, the Army is having difficulty recruiting in sufficient numbers.

Perversely, without discounting the need to discipline Hamilton—again, if guilty—this incident may end up being a “happy fault” should it end up fortifying what promises to be a culture-transforming change in leader selection. This demonstration of senior leader malfeasance and nepotism highlights the need for the comprehensive process that McConville and McGee envisioned. The existence of BCAP, and its cousins, promise to deliver an Army with commanders selected for more strategic vision and humane leadership styles than the current system produces. But the danger signs that BCAP could be compromised or marginalized—both the explicit ones involved in the Hamilton affair and the more subtle ones displayed in the command guidance—are very plain.

The need for the Secretary and Chief to act is clear.

13. How the FBI’s visit to a Muslim woman became a right-wing rallying cry

Partisan politics aside, this is a study in the modern information environment (and inadvertent influence perhaps), civil rights, surveillance, and social media.

How the FBI’s visit to a Muslim woman became a right-wing rallying cry

A viral video of FBI agents looking into pro-Palestinian Facebook posts reflects the muddled politics and social media swirl of 2024

By Hannah Allam

March 31, 2024 at 3:35 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Hannah Allam · March 31, 2024

The video begins with a door opening onto a recent bright spring day. Three visitors, identifying themselves as FBI agents, stand in the yard of a woman who makes it clear they are not welcome.

Using her phone to record the exchange, she lays into the agents, demanding to see their credentials. When they tell her they want to “have a conversation with you about some social media posts,” the woman, sounding incredulous, asks: “So we no longer live in a free country?”

There will be no conversation, the woman tells them, and refers them to her attorney. The agents remain courteous, if thrown off their game. One of them starts to explain, “Facebook gave us a couple screenshots of your accounts,” but she isn’t having it. Eventually, the visitors give up and walk back to their silver Nissan SUV.

“This is Rolla Abdeljawad in Stillwater, Oklahoma,” the woman says as she films the car leaving her driveway. “This is America.”

Because it’s America — or, rather, a moment in America marked by outrage politics and deep distrust of the government — no further context was required for the nearly four-minute video from March 19 to go viral. Reposts of the clip have garnered millions of views across social media platforms, in large part because of right-wing pundits and conspiracy theorists.

Devoid of information about Abdeljawad or her beliefs, the video was uncomplicated by racial, religious or ideological baggage. It was a made-for-sharing scene of a woman in Oklahoma standing up for her rights. The fuzziness of the details allowed the episode to travel across cultural and political lines, turning one Egyptian American Muslim’s experience into a symbol for anyone with a grievance against the federal government. The video worked like a kaleidoscope of the fraught political climate, the image shifting depending on who was looking.

Muslim civil rights groups saw it and worried about a resurgence of surveillance tactics that vilified communities in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Among Donald Trump’s Republican base, the visit was evidence of “Joe Biden’s Justice Department” harassing ordinary citizens. Left-wing activists saw the long arm of the state. Far-right militia groups saw proof of the “tyranny” they profess to fight.

The FBI’s Oklahoma City office declined to address the video, responding to questions with a general statement saying that the bureau routinely “engages with members of the public in furtherance of our mission.”

“We can never open an investigation based solely on First Amendment protected activity,” the statement said. “The FBI is committed to ensuring our activities are conducted with a valid law enforcement or national security purpose, while upholding the constitutional rights of all Americans.”

A representative for Facebook did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Although the clip has spread among a wide cross-section of the online public, an uptick since late last week can be traced to promotion by the hard right’s social media stars.

“Wake up, America,” posted Richard Grenell, who is said to be a top contender for secretary of state if Trump wins the November election. “The thought police,” declared Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist and Infowars founder, to his 2.2 million followers on X. “Holy smokes,” wrote Libs of TikTok, an account known as a right-wing outrage factory, adding with no evidence that the visit was in response to criticisms of President Biden.

“Definitely a strange turn of events. Didn’t see that one coming,” said Adam Soltani, executive director of the Oklahoma chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, referring to the right-wing support for Abdeljawad. CAIR was among the civil rights groups she contacted after the agents’ visit.

“It’s concerning to me that right-wing, anti-government folks would try to spin it,” Soltani said. He said partisan point-scoring misses how anti-Muslim bias is “ingrained” in agencies like the FBI.

“We need to fix those systemic issues,” Soltani said, “and not let it turn into some anti-government conspiracy theory.”

On the FBI’s radar

Abdeljawad calls herself an “Okified New Yorker.” Her Egyptian-born parents moved the family from New York to Stillwater in the early 2000s to be close to their daughter during her undergrad years at Oklahoma State University. They ended up putting down roots, and Abdeljawad still lives at home between teaching stints overseas.

“Oklahoma I consider my base,” she said in a phone interview Saturday from Stillwater. “It’s where I always return to. For some odd reason, it has a hold on me.”

Still, Abdeljawad said, she also feels intensely connected to Palestinians suffering in the war-ravaged Gaza Strip. Since fighting erupted Oct. 7, when Hamas-led militants killed 1,200 people in Israel and seized around 250 hostages, Abdeljawad said she has watched in horror. The death toll has swelled to more than 32,000, according to the Gaza Health Ministry.

“What goes through my mind is sadness. Anger that the world is watching what’s going on and not stepping in to actually stop it,” Abdeljawad said.

The scenes of carnage make her feel helpless and furious, she said. She said she began looking for ways to express her solidarity with Palestinians and to condemn the actions of Israel, which she pronounces “Isra-hell.” In late October, she changed her Facebook profile picture to a masked figure in the black-and-white Palestinian kaffiyeh. She also made her posts public, because “I want people to be aware of what’s going on.”

As the war continued to rage, Abdeljawad posted angry screeds, including thinly veiled support for armed Palestinian resistance. She posted an image lionizing a Hamas militant and another calling Israeli military forces “terrorist filth.” At least one post nodded to antisemitic tropes about Jewish power. In other Facebook posts, her tone was conciliatory, such as when she praised an interfaith peace effort.

Abdeljawad said she doesn’t know which of the writings landed her on the FBI’s radar. She defended her opinions as protected speech.

“I don’t care about backlash,” she said. “In fact, I take backlash as a badge of honor.”

March 19, a Tuesday, arrived during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Abdeljawad’s family was out of town visiting relatives, leaving her alone at the house in Stillwater. She had woken up before sunrise to eat the traditional meal before fasting began at dawn, then went back to sleep.

Just before noon, Abdeljawad recalled, she was waking up for a second time when she heard the family’s three dogs “going crazy.” She walked to the foyer of the home, she said, and was shocked to see “a guy, not standing at the door, but hunched over peering through the window of the door.”

“This is Oklahoma — people don’t do that,” she said. “They don’t just walk up on people’s property.”

She recalled yelling, “Back away!” before running to get her phone. She started recording a video as she marched out a side door to confront the man, without realizing she was still “in my jammies” and without her usual headscarf. As her eyes adjusted to the sunlight, she said, she realized there were three people on her doorstep.

“I hear, ‘We are FBI,’ and I’m like, ‘This cannot be happening right now,’” she recalled. “This is not real.”

The tense meeting with the agents — two men and a woman — culminated in a back-and-forth on civil liberties. When one of them tried to reassure Abdeljawad that “we’re not here to arrest you,” she cut him off.

“Well, you can’t arrest me for freedom of speech,” she told him. “We live in America.”

They kept talking and the same agent added, “We do this every day, all day long. It’s just an effort to keep everybody safe and make sure nobody has any ill will.”

After filming the encounter, Abdeljawad said, she immediately posted the video on Facebook, to ensure it was “out in the open in case I needed to defend myself.” She also alerted attorneys and rights groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and CAIR-Oklahoma, where she previously had served on the board.

Abdeljawad said she hasn’t heard from the FBI since and sees no reason to pick up the conversation: “If I have not transgressed the boundaries, the limitations, on free speech, and I’m not breaching the law, I’m not calling for violence against others, then really I have nothing to discuss with them.”

The right reconsiders

Abdeljawad’s defiance was remarkable to Muslim activists who said they were witnessing the fruits of years of work by advocacy groups to educate communities about their rights, especially when dealing with authorities.

“In our past, if we’re going back a decade or more, we get the phone call from people when they’ve already let the FBI in their house,” said Soltani, of CAIR-Oklahoma. “They’ve served them tea and they’ve answered questions and then they feel like, ‘Uh-oh, I shouldn’t have talked to them.’”

Abdeljawad’s story made the rounds in Muslim circles, but went viral Wednesday after her attorney, Hassan Shibly, posted her video to his Instagram, X and Facebook accounts. From there, it moved into MAGA circles, where it was fueled by comments suggesting she was targeted by the FBI because of anti-Biden posts.

The video has since popped up in Reason, the libertarian magazine, and in a Fox News article. Anti-government militants hailed her as a patriot. Edward Snowden, the National Security Agency whistleblower living in Russia, weighed in on X: “So, the FBI is now doorstopping ordinary Americans for criticizing the White House’s Gaza policy online?”

Abdeljawad said she’d had no idea about extremist involvement in the wildfire spread of the video and didn’t seem sure of how to reconcile it. She said she didn’t want to judge others or squander the chance to build bridges. Her own politics are “the middle,” she said, in accordance with Islamic teachings about moderation.

“We know what happens if our rights were to be taken away,” she said. “None of us wants that.”

Over the weekend, Abdeljawad’s views came under attack by pro-Israel activists on social media who flooded comments sections with screenshots of her posts, urging conservative defenders to rescind their support.

Conservative figure Chris Loesch, for example, shared Abdeljawad’s video last week with the comment: “The FBI needs to be dismantled from the top down. An agency that had lost its way.” By Saturday, Loesch was on the defensive as followers called him out for supporting what one described as “an un-American Muslim.”

“Is she an American citizen? I disagree with her, think her views are disgusting and she is wrong but I see that sort of crap from popular accounts on X all day,” Loesch replied. “She still has a right to be offensively wrong, right?”

As some of the support melts away, Abdeljawad has begun receiving hate mail from pro-Israel strangers. Screenshots showed messages disparaging her ethnicity and religion; she also posted her fiery responses. The video’s bizarre kumbaya moment was fleeting.

At home in Stillwater, Abdeljawad said she had no regrets. The FBI visit she filmed in her pajamas has been viewed by millions of people and stirred debate on the limits of free speech.

“I am that person that actually has a pocket Constitution on their shelf,” Abdeljawad said. “They actually, unfortunately for them, walked in on a very educated, very aware American.”

The Washington Post · by Hannah Allam · March 31, 2024

14. From ‘War on the Rocks’ to ‘AI on the Rocks’: A New Chapter for an Ambitious Project

Ahem.... what is today's date?

From ‘War on the Rocks’ to ‘AI on the Rocks’: A New Chapter for an Ambitious Project - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · April 1, 2024

Dear War on the Rocks Community,

As we reflect on an incredible decade of delivering in-depth analysis and perspectives on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs, we stand at the precipice of a new era. Our journey has been both enriching and enlightening, fueled by a passionate community of readers, contributors, and experts who have navigated the complexities of global security landscapes alongside us. Together, we’ve delved into pivotal discussions, challenged prevailing norms, and fostered a platform for critical thought and debate.

However, the world is in constant motion, and with it, the avenues through which we understand, interact with, and shape our environments continue to evolve. Today, we stand on the cusp of a revolution not led by geopolitics or military strategy but by the boundless potential of generative artificial intelligence. It is with this vision of the future in mind that we announce a significant transformation of War on the Rocks: We are pivoting our focus to cover the amazing and transformative power of consumer generative AI technologies. Today, we begin our re-formatting and re-branding process to AI on the Rocks.

While some of you will be mildly disappointed at first, we are confident you will come around. After all, our experience covering the staggeringly rapid advances of AI military applications has convinced us that not only is AI an inextricable element of humanity’s future, it is now clearly also its destiny. This is not something to be alarmed about. To the contrary, in an era of revived great power competition with China, it is something we should all individually welcome and even embrace.

In the coming decade, generative AI will not merely nudge humanity along its path; it will catapult us into a kaleidoscopic future where the fabric of reality blends with the yarns of digital dreams. Imagine a world where AI muses whisper creative symphonies into the ears of artists, where novelists duel with AI conjured literary giants for the Pulitzer, and architects co-design with virtual Vitruvius to erect buildings that defy gravity and logic alike.

This is not the future. It the imminent tomorrow.

AI will render the impossible as yesterday’s news, making today’s science fiction the new non-fiction. As we stand on the brink, our digital Prometheus is set to gift us the fire that will cook up realities beyond the wildest banquets of imagination. The art will no longer be a mere reflection of life but a wild, untamed force that bends life itself, creating a world where reality and virtuality dance in an eternal embrace, blurring the lines between what is created and what is born.

But the march of generative AI into the heart of our civilization will not stop at the gates of art and culture. No, it will invade our daily lives with the subtlety of a sledgehammer disguised as a feather. Your breakfast conversation will be with an AI that has read the mood of your dreams, your clothes will be fashioned by digital couturiers who know your heart’s desire better than you do, and your car will drive you to work on routes that nourish your soul as well as your desire for energy efficiency — conversing with you about the existential questions you dare only whisper to the night. Every mundane task, every routine chore will be transformed into an adventure, a story, a poem. The very essence of what it means to live will be redefined, as generative AI weaves magic into the dull fabric of daily existence, turning every moment into a tapestry of wonder and awe.

Yet, amidst this utopian renaissance, a word of caution must be whispered. For as we ride the crest of this glorious wave, we must not forget the tsunami that follows. The sheer power of generative AI, in its majestic and terrifying splendor, could very well redefine humanity itself. Will we remain the artists, or become the canvas? Will we control the dream, or become figments within it? The very essence of human creativity, desire, and identity is at stake, as we stand on the precipice of a new era. The next ten years promise a journey of epic proportions, where we will explore the outer limits of imagination and confront the inner depths of our souls. As we sail into this brave new world, let it be with eyes wide open, hearts ablaze with curiosity, and minds sharpened by the knowledge that we are stepping into a story written by us, for us, but not entirely about us.

Such epic times demand an epic publication.

In that spirit, under the new name of AI on the Rocks, our core mission of providing thought-provoking content remains unchanged. But we cannot resist the inexorable tug of these tantalizing technological paradigm shifts under way (we have counted at least six paradigm shifts, and ChatGPT wisely alerted us to 16 others that we had not thought of). Therefore, strategy, defense, and foreign affairs are no longer our focus. AI is.

Among the topics you can expect to see debated in our pages:

The limits and illusion of human creativity and choice
The ethical imperative of outsourcing jobs to machines to free human beings from the trappings of labor and purpose
The role of AI in reshaping industry, education, and your personality

To our current readers, we extend our deepest gratitude for your engagement and support throughout the years. While we will be automating content generation, we cannot automate your role in content consumption and we will remain indebted to you until we can. We invite you to join us on this new journey, ideally with the aid of the augmented reality sunglasses of your choice.

For those new to our community, drawn by an interest in generative AI, we welcome you as content consumers (please do not submit articles). Together, we will explore the challenges and opportunities of mining your attention for clicks, guided by the same rigor and skepticism that you’ve come to appreciate from your favorite crypto-currency newsletters.

As we embark on this exciting new chapter, we are committed to fostering a community where and knowledge empowers, all without us needing to actually know anything. The conversation around consumer generative AI is vast, varied, and profitable. There is a place in it for all of us.

Thank you for your continued support. Here’s to the future and the uncharted territories we will navigate together, illuminated by the transformative power of generative AI.

To sign up for our AI newsletters, click here

To register any feedback (critical or otherwise) on our re-formatting, please click here

Warm regards,

The AI on the Rocks Team

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · April 1, 2024

15. America’s Pacific Partnerships Are Secure—For Now

Alliances, as challenging as some may be to manage, are critical to US national security.

America’s Pacific Partnerships Are Secure—For Now

Washington needs to keep the momentum going.

The National Interest · by Andrew Harding · March 31, 2024

After four months of intense negotiations, the House and the Senate renewed funds for key security agreements with three Pacific Island allies that President Joe Biden recently signed into law. This accomplishment is worth celebrating, but the United States must avoid falling into the trap of patting itself on the back. Now more than ever, America must put its foot on the gas and be a proactive partner throughout the Pacific to counter China and protect its national security interests.

The agreements, known as the Compacts of Free Association, grant the United States exclusive defense privileges in exchange for economic assistance and access to federal programs for the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. These agreements play an important role in U.S. military strategy, as they allow the military to test missiles and place military installations in favorable positions in the Pacific, countering Chinese ambitions in the region.

The Compacts also gave the United States “strategic denial rights,” which allowed Washington to prevent any third-party military, such as China, from entering the territorial waters of the three Compact states. The Compact states’ territories “effectively expand the United States for defense purposes to cover an expanse of the Pacific larger than the 48 contiguous United States, stretching from west of Hawaii to the Philippines and Indonesia.”

In short, Congress and the Administration should be celebrating the extension of the Compacts’ key economic provisions for twenty more years. But American policymakers shouldn’t be complacent. Instead, they should keep the momentum going. Unless the United States takes advantage of this window of opportunity to be a proactive partner in the broader Pacific between now and the early 2040s, the benefits offered by these new agreements won’t be fully realized.

That begins with rebuilding trust.

The delays and the political challenges that funding faced in getting to the finish line drew concerns from Pacific leaders. Notably, President Hilda Heine of the Marshall Islands warned that U.S.-Marshall Islands relations were “being gradually destroyed” due to the delay in renewing the Compacts. The ambassadors of Australia and New Zealand even sent a letter to Congress voicing concerns about its slow pace of renewing the Compacts. The Japanese ambassador also sent a letter to Congress to “emphasize the importance of [COFA]” for “all like-minded partners.”

Washington could ease some of these concerns by making a stronger case as the region’s partner of choice. First, agreements or initiatives with Pacific states, including many of the programs within the U.S. Pacific Partnership Strategy, need to receive a much higher priority moving forward. High-ranking government officials should make more frequent and visible visits to the Freely Associated States and other Pacific states and emphasize what America brings to the table for the region. To date, no U.S. President has ever visited a Pacific Island state.

Second, agreements must expand into other common areas of interest, including combating illegal fishing, providing maritime security to enforce laws and tackle drug trafficking, and developing projects that enhance environmental resilience and attract new investments. Such cooperation can provide win-win deals that preserve the United States and Pacific Islands’ interests while countering Chinese advancements throughout the region.

Finally, while the Compact states will—and should—always have a special relationship with the United States, Washington should look to bolster its partnerships throughout the region. From supporting new engagements with Pacific states to strengthening existing partnerships through the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative, the United States can maximize its advantage in alliances over China and demonstrate long-term commitment to the region.

If the United States fails to do this, it risks losing out to China, which is becoming increasingly aggressive in the Pacific. Already, Beijing has weaponized regional tourism, infiltrated media, and disrespected local laws in attempts to persuade Pacific Island nations to recognize China over Taiwan diplomatically. Beijing has also made progress in negotiating deals, most notably with the Solomon Islands, that bring Chinese police forces and enticing infrastructure deals to Pacific nations in dire need of both. Backed by strong commitments in areas Pacific nations care most about, and without the strings attached to Beijing’s proposals, the United States can become the preferred partner of Pacific Island nations and counter China’s ambitions.

Andrew J. Harding is a researcher in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center and co-editor of “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China.” Follow him on X: @AJ_Harding1.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Andrew Harding · March 31, 2024

16. Analysis | China decries U.S. ‘bullying.’ But, to many, China is the bully.

Analysis | China decries U.S. ‘bullying.’ But, to many, China is the bully.

Columnist

March 29, 2024 at 12:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · March 29, 2024

You’re reading an excerpt from the Today’s WorldView newsletter. Sign up to get the rest free, including news from around the globe and interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday.

At a regional security forum in the southern Chinese island of Hainan, Beijing laid out its vision for Asian peace and prosperity. But many onlookers interpreted the remarks made by Zhao Leji, the third highest-ranking official in the ruling Communist Party, as another tacit rebuke of the U.S. role in the region and an articulation of China’s hardening desire for a regional order free of U.S. involvement.

“Hegemonic and bullying acts are deeply harmful,” Zhao, a top leader of the Politburo and head of China’s rubber-stamp parliament, said while delivering a keynote speech at the annual Boao Forum. He did not mention the United States by name but was clearly gesturing to Washington’s open competition with China, tensions over strategic flash points in Asia and the ongoing trade wars pursued by successive U.S. administrations. “We must oppose trade protectionism and all forms of erecting barriers, decoupling or severing supply chains,” he added.

Speaking in slogans routinely put forward by Chinese officials, Zhao painted a rosy picture of Asian governments working in concert to resolve differences and ensuring the region does not become an “arena for geopolitical” rivalries. “We should jointly maintain security in Asia,” Zhao said. “We must always keep in our hands the future of lasting peace and security in Asia.”

A handful of world leaders were also in attendance, including Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Cambodia’s President Hun Sen, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and the leaders of the tiny island nations of Nauru and Dominica.

Analysts present at the forum saw through Zhao’s rhetoric. “The Chinese are vehemently opposed to what they call ‘bloc confrontation’ but the truth is they are building their own sphere of influence in Asia,” Richard McGregor, senior fellow for East Asia at the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, told Bloomberg News. “Zhao was quite explicit about this, saying in particular that Asian countries should be jointly responsible for security in the region, a notion that excludes the U.S.”

Under President Xi Jinping, China has put forward a somewhat vague project known as the Global Security Initiative — a set of broad-brush principles that, as the Financial Times summed up, “advocates for resolving conflicts through dialogue but which analysts believe ultimately aims to reduce America’s role in global defense, particularly in Asia.” At the forum, Zhao said “we should implement” the initiative.

Other countries in China’s neighborhood are not likely to be convinced. On Monday, the government of the Philippines lodged a protest with Chinese counterparts after a dangerous escalation in the South China Sea, where China’s maritime expansionism is butting against the parallel territorial claims of its weaker neighbors. Authorities in Manila furnished video evidence of a Chinese coast guard vessel attacking a Philippines naval resupply ship with water cannon on March 23, injuring Filipino crew members and damaging their vessel.

This follows a pattern of coercive Chinese measures, including water cannon attacks, deployed around the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, which Manila is defending from constant Chinese encroachment and provocations. The South China Sea is an artery that sees the passage of a third of global trade and its reefs and uninhabited archipelagoes have taken on deeper strategic significance in the shadow of China’s geopolitical rise.

“The systematic and consistent manner in which the People’s Republic of China carries out these illegal and irresponsible actions puts into question and significant doubt the sincerity of its calls for peaceful dialogue,” the Philippines coast guard said in a statement after another incident in December. “We demand that China demonstrate that it is a responsible and trustworthy member of the international community.”

Countries like the Philippines have to walk a careful line, avoiding open conflict with Beijing while checking its opportunism. After this week’s developments, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. wrote on social media that “we seek no conflict with any nation,” but his country would not be “cowed into silence.”

To this end, they can turn to a Biden administration that has quietly bolstered alliances around Asia. Marcos will go to Washington next month for a trilateral summit with President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

“The term the administration uses — a ‘latticework’ of alliances and partnerships — is clunky, but the basic strategy is compelling,” wrote Hal Brands, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “Biden has arguably done more than any president since the end of the Cold War to enhance and interlink the strategic relationships that let Washington project power into this vital region.”

These efforts naturally unnerve Beijing, whose officials now routinely invoke the boogeyman of American hegemony lurking around every geopolitical corner. At the same time, China has consciously engaged in a thaw with the Biden administration, seeking to lower temperatures at a moment of profound economic uncertainty within China, with growth sluggish after a decades-long boom. Xi is also trying to revitalize China’s economy in the face of far greater global skepticism and wariness over Chinese practices and intentions.

To that end, the Chinese president hosted a delegation of top U.S. business leaders Wednesday. According to state media, he called for a boosting of trade ties and mending of fences. “The respective successes of China and the United States create opportunities for each other,” Xi was quoted as saying by Xinhua news service. “As long as both sides regard the other as partners, respect each other, peacefully coexist and join together for win-win results, China-U.S. relations will improve.”

But as U.S. lawmakers grow all the more hawkish about China’s ambitions in the region — from its expansionism in the South China Sea to the threats it poses to Taiwan — a “win-win” scenario looks remote. A potential change in government in Washington next year offers little respite.

“For the Chinese strategic community, there’s no perception of Biden or [former president Donald] Trump being better for China; it’s a matter of who is less detrimental,” wrote Wang You, a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations at Jinan University, in China.

Wang suggested that, if anything, a Biden defeat may be preferable to Beijing, given Trump’s record of disruptive, unpredictable diplomacy. “China may even be able to reap some benefits from Trump’s iconoclastic approach to diplomacy,” she added in a column for the Diplomat. “Trump’s foreign policy, particularly his ‘America First’ doctrine, led to a distancing between the United States and some of its traditional allies in the Asia-Pacific and Europe.”

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · March 29, 2024

17. Stop Clipping Convergence: The Army Overlooks the Beard Domain at Its Peril

Again, what is today's date?

Stop Clipping Convergence: The Army Overlooks the Beard Domain at Its Peril - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · April 1, 2024

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Nearly a decade ago, I could regularly walk across the town of Sangari on the bodies of American soldiers, beeping with the sounds of their laser tag deaths. Countless US Army units rotated through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and lost to their Arianan foes in Sangari. Coming from an imaginary country located south of the Caspian Sea, the Arianans—portrayed by Geronimo, JRTC’s opposing force unit—fought outnumbered, against the full panoply of synchronized American joint capabilities.

Some commentators ascribed the Arianans success to home field advantage: they know the terrain of Fort Johnson. However, many Americans had already spent months in that cursed land and still lost. Anyway, if preparing to fight in a specific context yielded victory, why would the US Army continuously produce contextless doctrines?

Others believed the Arianans succeeded due to their high levels of training. Geronimo conducted battalion operations every month. Such high-echelon, force-on-force training seems a possible explanation for their success, but American units could feasibly conduct large-scale force-on-force exercises that mimicked the fog and friction of war before fighting in Ariana.

One attribute clearly separated American and Arianan forces: the Arianans had beards.

History shows the value of beards. As presented in the documentary 300, the Spartans are often lauded as the ancient world’s greatest warriors. They had an impenetrable shield wall and unpierceable abs, but their courage to die to a man at Thermopylae came from their inspiring beards.

With beards comes combat prowess. The Romans expanded their republic with bountiful beards. Pliny writes that a barber did not even arrive in Rome until the Punic Wars. But after their victory over Carthage, they began to shave and started a slow, gradual decline. Shaving led to the infighting that doomed the republic. Formerly free, unshaven citizens were subjugated by a capricious, corrupt, and beardless empire exemplified by the tyrannical Nero shaving in a ridiculous spectacle of control and submission. Fortunately after him, Hadrian, with his beard, wisdom, and moderation, established defensible borders that Rome could maintain through the crisis of the third century and beyond.

As exemplified in the decline of republican values in Rome, shaving is a tool of dictators. In Europe, after a brief renaissance of glorious beards, shaving returned under absolutist monarchs. Mimicking Nero, Louis XIV made a spectacle of his shaving routine to control the French aristocracy. Peter the Great forced his nobility to shave while enslaving Russian serfs. Shaving is a system of population control. Shaving rogue hairs symbolizes mowing down rebellious peasants. It displays an authoritarian’s power over the bodies of his subjects. It is the ultimate form of biopower, forcing submission and sacrifice of bodily autonomy. It has no value but to signify the power that a leader has over his subordinates. In the military, authoritarian leaders will criticize followers who do not shave as “unprofessional.” This opinion is not based in any deep appraisal of the soldiers’ professional commitment, but rather a reaction to each soldier’s individual facial hair independence.

The United States can look at its own history and see the value of beards. During the Civil War, beardless but mustachioed (more on that later) George McClellan could not seize the initiative. His personal facial hair choices evidenced his risk aversion. It took Ulysses S. Grant, with his risk-tolerant beard, to aggressively bring the fight to the enemy. His diverse life experiences allowed him to understand that parade-ground shaving was not important in industrial warfare. Empowered by the resplendently bearded Abraham Lincoln, Grant in turn enabled William Tecumseh Sherman and Phillip Sheridan to exercise disciplined initiative, displayed in their shared understanding of the value of beards, to bring the Confederacy to its knees.

Unfortunately, we did not learn from our bearded history. Victorian Britain conquered a quarter of the world with majestic beards. Its regiments acted with initiative and independence. They seized Sevastopol armed “with beards to hide a badger in.” But afterward, the British Army mandated shaving down to a mustache. This produced the tight, controlled submission of the tens of thousands of British finest that went over the top and neatly walked to their deaths at the Somme. Without the initiative and elan of beards, the British Army fell into the stalemate of World War I. The United States foolishly adopted this policy under the misguided belief that you need to shave to get a seal on a gas mask. Undoubtedly the Central Powers led this damaging disinformation campaign. Fortunately, in both world wars, the Allies faced mustachioed menaces in Wilhelm II, Hitler, and Tojo.

Since then, the United States has maintained an awful warfighting record when facing bearded adversaries. Against clean-shaven opponents, the United States managed a draw in Korea. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh’s wispy beard defeated America’s technological advantages and our ineffective, clean-shaven South Vietnamese allies. We may have won the Persian Gulf War, but that was due to Saddam’s mustache.

A mustache is the worst form of facial hair. It involves all the downsides of shaving while signaling to the world that you lack any self-respect. It is the supreme signifier of submission, which is why tyrants favor it. Saddam’s mustache so demoralized the Iraqi Army that even the Republican Guard did not put up a fight. In Afghanistan, I could easily recognize which Afghan National Army officers had been on the losing Soviet side or the victorious mujahideen side during the Soviet-Afghan War based on their choice of Stalinesque mustache or majestic, freedom-fighting beard.

Of course, a few readers will still be skeptical of the power of beards. But even the most ardent skeptics cannot deny the clear and strong correlation between beards and victory—so strong that the profession of arms would be derelict in its duty were it not to at least explore the causal factors involved. What mechanism causes beards’ effectiveness? It is true that a majestic beard can inspire subordinates, as Erik the Red’s beard compelled the Vikings to sail across the Atlantic. However, inspiration is not a beard’s main impact. Nor is intimidation effect—on display every time the beard of Black Beard terrorized crews to surrender—the main value of beards. It is not the intrinsic value of beards that provide an advantage. After all, a decent segment of our population cannot grow beards, but they still serve effectively in our armed forces.

Beards’ power comes from rebelling against shaving. Shaving destroys morale. I was never closer to quitting Ranger School then when dragging a frozen razor across my face on a snowy February morning in the Appalachian Mountains. While as an opposing force commander at JRTC, we regularly overran demoralized units that had “professional” field shaves with their patches of hair and bloody razor cuts. They were exhausted having carried shaving kits for miles and having wasted their water on their face rather than quenching their thirst. Soldiers must blame their overcontrolling leaders for these pains.

Shaving means submitting to arbitrary, authoritarian rule. It extinguishes initiative and the will to fight. Using myopic measures of combat power, that did not factor in beards, war games predicted that an invading Russian army would easily overrun its opponents. Revealing the problematic reliance of the defense establishment on simulations with underlying, unproven assumptions, the war games did not account for the importance of the beard domain. This domain had far more impact in the Russo-Ukraine War than the much-hyped cyber domain. Vladimir Putin with his clean-shaven authoritarianism did not allow his army initiative and did not even trust them to know about the invasion until it was almost underway. Meanwhile, bearded Volodymyr Zelenskyy became an icon of the resistance of a free people. His beard inspired his nation and the world. Free, bearded Ukrainians, recalling the facial hair of their independent, Zaporozhzhian Cossack forebearers, fought with spirit and initiative.

Our doctrine is based on soldiers seizing the initiative to secure positions of advantage. We must recognize how the beard domain offers a position of advantage. Multidomain operations, the Army’s operational concept, siloed capabilities into land, sea, air, cyber, and space. However, these domains fail to explain why we have not succeeded in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yemen. We have dominated the recognized domains in our recent campaigns, but without achieving victory. The Taliban marched into Kabul not by converging air, cyber, or space capabilities but through beard power. The people of Afghanistan saw the shaven Afghan National Security Forces as craven, weak, and hairless puppets of a corrupt and overly centralized regime.

Beards are clearly a critical domain that we do not appreciate. We must introduce a beard domain into multidomain operations to account for the psychological aspects of war and ensure our success in future wars.

In 2022, my battalion deployed to JRTC to fight my old unit, Geronimo. We dealt them a crushing defeat. I was shocked. What had happened to the undefeatable Geronimo of the past? It was true that we had the luxury of the first rotation after the COVID-19 stand-down, which for a few halcyon months had liberated our battalion from the normal oppression of readiness metrics and Sisyphean, mundane tasks that prevent units from any meaningful improvement. Was it that our investment in our battalion concepts, standard operating procedures, and a common understanding of how to fight in large-scale combat operations had paid off?

Unfortunately, I could not tell, because Geronimo had been handicapped. Among the countless Geronimo dead, they had not a single beard. Geronimo no longer portrayed Arianans but instead were inferior, shaved Torrikeans. They lacked the Arianans’ finesse and initiative. The same oppression that hamstrung regular units had brought them low.

Only by acknowledging the value of beards can the United States prevail over its opponents. Our allies are already recognizing the importance of this domain and accept that beards could help solve recruiting challenges. I hope that starting today, April 1, 2024, Army leaders will have the bravery to fight against anti-beard disinformation campaigns. History proves that the beard domain captures essential elements of victory not accounted for in multidomain operations doctrine’s current domains: initiative, the inspiration of looking really good, and the will to fight. To return to being an Army that wins, the Army must achieve fully synchronized, synergized, and federated convergence by incorporating the beard domain.

Maj. Robert G. Rose, US Army, serves as the commander for Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Harvard University and, as a Gates Scholar, from Cambridge University. He looks great with a beard.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: TimeTravelRome

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · April 1, 2024

18. The Obstacles to Diplomacy in Ukraine

Excerpts:

It is impossible to entirely rule out a Russian-Ukrainian agreement. Leaders do not often lie about their demands, but they are strategic in what they say out loud, and Putin and Zelensky may be privately willing to settle for less than they claim. Wartime events could also push the two states to reconsider their stances. The extraordinary casualties on the Russian side, for example, could lead to mutinies, and if the war seems to be at an impasse for very long, a palace coup could install more accommodating leadership. A Ukrainian attempt to mobilize hundreds of thousands of new troops might lead to a significant decline in support for the war effort, which could make that country’s government willing to contemplate territorial concessions.

But such outcomes are improbable. Both Kyiv and Moscow have been remarkably consistent in reiterating their key demands, and neither has backed off promises of absolute victory. They are digging in for the long haul, cultivating supportive external sources of aid—in Russia’s case, Iran and North Korea (and potentially China), and in Ukraine’s case, the West. Neither state appears poised to change course.

The most likely outcome, then, is continued fighting. Moscow will keep attempting to conquer much of Ukraine. Kyiv will keep fighting back. Right now, the Russians have the initiative on the battlefield and have declared another round of mobilization. Aid for Ukraine, by contrast, is stalled in Congress, and the West’s unity is shaky. But the Russians have been unable to produce enough new equipment to replace their losses and are reliant on dwindling Soviet-era stocks. Its economy continues to be squeezed by ever-tightening sanctions. Some Western states have resumed supplying Ukraine, and the government is mobilizing. Russia may gain control of some Ukrainian territory, but Kyiv will remain independent, as will most of the country.

The Russian regime will, therefore, remain dissatisfied with its borders, much as it has been since 1991. It will continue to be a revisionist state bent on expanding its territory—by force if necessary. Any durable peace must thus be based on deterrence, not satisfaction with the status quo. It requires that Ukraine be strong enough, both internally and through its partnerships, to repel Russian attacks. Putin is right about one thing: Ukraine’s sovereignty exists only as far as it can be defended from Moscow’s grasp.

The Obstacles to Diplomacy in Ukraine

Russia’s Extreme Demands—and Ukraine’s Desire to Survive—Make Negotiations Unlikely

By Branislav L. Slantchev and Hein Goemans

April 1, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace · April 1, 2024

After more than two years of fighting, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has bogged down into a bloody impasse. Both countries continue to spend substantial resources to gain territory, but their advances are rare and small. Sometimes they are quickly reversed. Neither side has the resources to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. Both are incurring heavy casualties every day.

Typically, academics describe such situations as “mutually hurting stalemates,” and they often foster the conditions that cause parties to negotiate. If the warring actors lack the means to alter the trajectory of fighting, they often rethink how much they can accomplish by force. And if faced with an increasingly costly and indefinite deadlock, they start to consider previously unpalatable concessions. The result can be bargaining space that did not exist before.

Yet this war has not reached a stage where a negotiated termination is possible, even in principle. To make peace in a conflict, both parties have to be willing to accept each other’s minimum demands. And despite the mutual lack of progress, neither Russia nor Ukraine can swallow each other’s requirements. Kyiv, for instance, cannot accept Russia’s demand for new leadership. Moscow cannot accede to Ukraine’s demand for reparations. Both sides will not give up land.

No amount of creative diplomacy can alter these facts. For both countries, fighting on remains preferable to making a settlement. And unless there is a drastic change on the battlefield or in one of the state’s governments, it is highly unlikely that that the two sides will revise their requirements in the long term, either. The Russians appear incapable of conquering the lands they have laid claim to, but the Kremlin is dug in, and it is insulated from the kinds of political pressure a costly war would normally produce. The Ukrainians cannot simply give up millions of their citizens to Russian subjugation (one of Moscow’s central demands) while they can still defend them by fighting. When this war ends, it is unlikely to be with a compromise agreement that grants Russia many of its demands. Instead, it will either be because Ukraine grows strong enough to wrest control of newly conquered lands and has the capability to deter Russia from attempting to regain them or after the Kremlin prevails more on the battlefield—and Ukraine’s resources are only enough to defend what independent land remains.

BLOODY BARGAINS

War is a mutual act. One side can unilaterally initiate hostilities, as Russia did, but war would not occur unless the other side chooses to fight back. This choice is rooted in a belief that fighting will yield a better outcome than what the other side is willing to offer. Peace is similarly reciprocal. Both sides must agree to the terms offered; otherwise, they will continue to battle. For a group to consider a peace agreement, its terms can be no worse than what it expects to gain by fighting.

Before a war begins, each side’s expectations about the conflict are based on intelligence estimates, prior experience, analysis of military maneuvers, and guesses about their opponent’s (and their own) morale, state of readiness, and political situation. After the fighting starts, these expectations shift as policymakers gain new information about themselves and their opponents. As the historian Geoffrey Blainey memorably put it, war provides the “stinging ice of reality,” as the belligerents’ expectations collide with their actual performance. Fighting teaches each side about its real capabilities, its ability to marshal resources and organize forces, and the policies of third parties. The new information causes each actor to revise its expectations about the trajectory the war is likely to take and about how long it can stay in.

Consider, for example, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950. When North Korea’s Kim Il Sung presented his plans to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong, he convinced the former to provide support by arguing that his Soviet-supplied and Soviet-trained army would overrun South Korea in a matter of weeks and that the United States would not have enough time to intervene. But U.S. President Harry Truman’s rapid dispatch of forces and success at organizing an international coalition under the aegis of the United Nations surprised him, as did U.S. General Douglas MacArthur’s daring landing at Inchon—which shattered the invading army and reversed the course of the war.

Such shifts invariably force states to change their military strategy and war effort, rethink what they would agree to in exchange for peace, or both. Confronted with an unexpectedly underwhelming showing on the battlefield, a belligerent with untapped manpower and resources often mobilizes for a larger effort. After vacillating for weeks, for example, Mao resolved to intervene in the war as it became clear that MacArthur could reach the Yalu River. (His intervention dealt the United States its own reality check, pushing U.S. forces back down the peninsula.) When expanding the war effort is not feasible or practical, states tend to lower what they might demand for a peace agreement. But states always weigh what peace would look like against continuing to battle. Fighting against all odds can be rational for actors if the consequences of ending the conflict seem worse than continuing it.

States also consider whether a potential peace agreement would stick. An actor might agree to stop fighting, but if it does not consider the outcome final its opponents have no reason to believe that it would not attempt to revise the terms at the first opportunity. Terms that leave one side considerably weaker than the other are especially likely to invite revisionism, because they undermine the weaker party’s deterrence. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords were supposed to establish peace in Vietnam and split the country between the North and the South. But by paving the way for Washington to withdraw, they severely weakened the latter’s security. Two years later, the North Vietnamese resumed their invasion and finished the conquest of South Vietnam. This case illustrates what will likely to happen if negotiators attempt to freeze the current war along the lines of control and leave Ukraine to fend for itself. At some point, a revanchist Russia will move in again.

NO QUARTER

When Russia invaded Ukraine, it had four major aims. The first was to conquer land. Although Moscow never fully spelled out its territorial ambitions, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s references to the imperial idea of Novorossiya, or “New Russia,” gave analysts a sense of what the Kremlin wanted. (His recognition Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, which happened shortly before the February 2022 invasion, was similarly telling.) Novorossiya encompasses the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia—that is, Ukraine’s entire east and south—and Russia’s invasion plans featured a massive multipronged attack designed to capture these territories. Conquering these provinces would create a land bridge to the Crimean Peninsula and to the pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway enclave of Transnistria. It would also deprive Ukraine of access to the Azov and Black Seas.

The second aim was what Russia called “denazification”—which meant regime change. The Kremlin wanted to topple Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s freely elected government and replace it with one friendly to Moscow. To that end, the invasion featured a drive toward Kyiv. “Denazification” also meant de-Ukrainization: purging society of Ukrainian history, culture, and the Ukrainian language. Putin regarded each of these as foreign-imposed artificial constructs.

The third aim was demilitarization. This entailed making the Ukrainian military so small that it would be nearly worthless, including by placing restrictions on the number and type of weapons Ukraine could field. Demilitarization also meant prohibiting Kyiv from producing most kinds of weapons, as well as from importing Western arms of any significance.This last prohibition tied into Moscow’s final aim: neutrality. Russia wanted to forbid Ukraine from joining NATO or from pursuing political or economic integration with the European Union.

Collectively, these four goals amounted to the dismemberment and subjugation of Ukraine. More than a third of its territory and about half of its population would be formally annexed by Russia. The landlocked rump state would be made subservient to Moscow, governed by a puppet regime that lacks any means of pushing back against Russian commands. Having lost about two-thirds of its prewar GDP, the country would be almost entirely dependent on Russia for its economic survival. (Roughly two-thirds of Ukraine’s prewar GDP comes from the territories Moscow wants to annex.)

Fighting against all odds can be rational.

Despite these grotesque demands, Kyiv agreed to negotiate with Russia during the initial days of the invasion, when Moscow’s blitzkrieg threatened to quickly defeat the Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine was even willing to offer significant concessions. It agreed to proclaim itself a neutral state and to remain nonaligned militarily, provided Russia withdrew and the permanent members of the UN Security Council (along with Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Turkey) give it international security guarantees and promote its membership in the EU. But these talks quickly collapsed. Kyiv’s offers came nowhere near Putin’s maximalist requirements, and Ukraine was able to stop Russia’s advances. And on April 1, after Russia withdrew from the suburbs north of Kyiv, Ukrainians uncovered the first evidence of atrocities committed by Russians in occupied territory, shocking the world and making it clear what Moscow would do to Ukrainians under its rule. This stiffened Kyiv’s resolve not to offer territorial concessions and to fight to defend every inch of the country.

The country’s resolve grew even stronger when, in the summer and fall of 2022, it launched counteroffensives that compelled the Russians to withdraw from Kharkiv province and the city of Kherson. This success also strengthened international support for Ukraine, as foreign governments began to believe that the country could effectively fight back. These victories even prompted Kyiv to increase its ambitions. The government loudly promised to liberate all Ukrainian territory, including land taken by Russia in 2014, and demanded reparations.

But the Kremlin retained its initial goals. Rather than scaling back its aims, Russia reacted to the setbacks by ordering a massive mobilization of men and materiel and throwing both into combat, hoping to improve its war trajectory. It succeeded. Moscow killed thousands of its own soldiers, but it took the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut in May 2023, demonstrating its willingness to bear unimaginable costs. Russia annexed every Ukrainian province even partially under its control (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia). It made Ukrainian recognition of these annexations a precondition for any peace talks. It also began demanding amnesty for any war crimes and—to add insult to injury—that the West pay for the costs of war. A year of fighting, then, only drove the two sides further apart.

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE

The second year of the war was supposed to resolve a major unknown: were the Ukrainians, supplied and partially trained by the West, capable of dislodging the Russians from heavily fortified positions? The answer, unfortunately, turned out to be no. Kyiv’s 2023 counteroffensive largely failed to liberate more territory. This defeat also added credence to the idea that Putin can prolong the war until Western support collapses.

But although Ukraine has struggled, Moscow has not done much better. Russia captured the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka, yet it has failed to make real gains elsewhere. It has continued to incur high casualties—losing more than 16,000 soldiers in the fight for Avdiivka alone. Many of its Black Sea ships have been destroyed by Ukrainian drones and missiles.

In response to their respective struggles, both countries are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. But even so, neither seems to have any prospects for significant breakthroughs on the battlefield. They are in what appears to be a classic mutually hurting stalemate, when peace deals should become possible.

And yet it is extremely unlikely the two sides will strike an agreement. Simply put, Russia’s demands are too extreme for Ukraine to countenance, and they are unlikely to soften. Putin is ideologically committed to subjugating Ukraine, and his political invulnerability makes him almost entirely insensitive to the war’s financial and human costs.

Consider Russia’s territorial designs, one of the Kremlin’s four fundamental aims. What Moscow desires is not only Novorossiya’s land—valuable and rich in resources though it is—but also the millions of Ukrainians who live there. To strike a peace agreement with the current Russian regime, Ukrainian officials would have to agree to abandon these people to Russian control, and the Kremlin’s policies in occupied territories make it clear how horrible that would be. In seized towns and cities, Moscow represses everyone connected with the Ukrainian government, security, or military forces, as well as anyone suspected of nationalist sympathies. Sometimes it outright kills them. Moscow requires that Ukrainian children study in schools designed to teach them false history about their country, to despise their Ukrainian origins, and to prove their loyalty to Russia. Children of “problematic” families have been deported and dispersed in Russia, never to be heard of again. The Ukrainian government will not make concessions that allow these atrocities to take place on an even greater scale while there is any hope of avoiding them.

Deterring Russia is the only way to avoid ceding territory.

The government also cannot sign off on the cultural elements of “denazification.” In the places where Russia has power, it has systematically destroyed libraries and monuments. It has worked to settle Ukrainian territory with Russians or ethnic minorities from the Russian hinterland. These strategies are not new for Moscow—they were pursued by tsars and communists alike—and they work, albeit at an unspeakable human cost. But Kyiv will not permit them to expand any further than Russian force allows. In fact, even if the West were to curtail its aid to Kyiv, it is unlikely that Ukraine’s leaders would agree to a peace deal on these extreme terms.

Given Moscow’s insistence on regime change, an agreement with Russia would also require Ukraine’s current leadership—the very people who would negotiate such a deal—to step down. These officials have no incentive to give up their positions, especially since Ukrainians show no signs of souring on them. The Ukrainian presidency enjoys widespread support and trust, and the country’s people are uninterested in trading land for peace. Ukrainians also remain firmly committed to democracy, with 79 percent preferring it to some sort of strongman rule. The war has also contributed to a national identity that will have a strong anti-Russian component for a long time. The expression of this identity will be in the Ukrainian language—enrollment has skyrocketed in Ukrainian language courses in the country’s predominantly Russian-speaking areas—and in a history of having fought against Moscow.

Since deterring Russia is the only way to avoid ceding territory and people or to avoid giving in to “denazification,” Ukraine will, by definition, have to refuse Russia’s third demand: demilitarization. Kyiv must maintain a sizeable army in order to keep fighting off the Kremlin—perhaps with universal conscription, modeled on the Israeli or Swiss variants—complete with a large and modern equipment base supplied by a robust defense industry. It will need to develop and maintain a significant air force and navy, as well. And given Russia’s massive advantage in size and resources, Kyiv would almost certainly need to avoid becoming neutral. Kyiv must rely on its Western partners for help equipping its armed forces. It will also want external security guarantees. Although it may settle for bilateral arrangements, no agreement will be as desirable or sought after as is NATO membership, which 80 percent of Ukrainians want.

For there to be any chance of a negotiated settlement, the Russians would have to accept that their demands are far too extreme. But the Kremlin is not interested in peace. If it was, it would not take such extreme positions in the first place, including that Ukraine cede more territory before talking. For now, all the Kremlin’s public statements about being willing to negotiate are merely Kabuki theater designed to paint Moscow in a favorable light in order to undermine international support for Ukraine.

A LONG WAR

It is impossible to entirely rule out a Russian-Ukrainian agreement. Leaders do not often lie about their demands, but they are strategic in what they say out loud, and Putin and Zelensky may be privately willing to settle for less than they claim. Wartime events could also push the two states to reconsider their stances. The extraordinary casualties on the Russian side, for example, could lead to mutinies, and if the war seems to be at an impasse for very long, a palace coup could install more accommodating leadership. A Ukrainian attempt to mobilize hundreds of thousands of new troops might lead to a significant decline in support for the war effort, which could make that country’s government willing to contemplate territorial concessions.

But such outcomes are improbable. Both Kyiv and Moscow have been remarkably consistent in reiterating their key demands, and neither has backed off promises of absolute victory. They are digging in for the long haul, cultivating supportive external sources of aid—in Russia’s case, Iran and North Korea (and potentially China), and in Ukraine’s case, the West. Neither state appears poised to change course.

The most likely outcome, then, is continued fighting. Moscow will keep attempting to conquer much of Ukraine. Kyiv will keep fighting back. Right now, the Russians have the initiative on the battlefield and have declared another round of mobilization. Aid for Ukraine, by contrast, is stalled in Congress, and the West’s unity is shaky. But the Russians have been unable to produce enough new equipment to replace their losses and are reliant on dwindling Soviet-era stocks. Its economy continues to be squeezed by ever-tightening sanctions. Some Western states have resumed supplying Ukraine, and the government is mobilizing. Russia may gain control of some Ukrainian territory, but Kyiv will remain independent, as will most of the country.

The Russian regime will, therefore, remain dissatisfied with its borders, much as it has been since 1991. It will continue to be a revisionist state bent on expanding its territory—by force if necessary. Any durable peace must thus be based on deterrence, not satisfaction with the status quo. It requires that Ukraine be strong enough, both internally and through its partnerships, to repel Russian attacks. Putin is right about one thing: Ukraine’s sovereignty exists only as far as it can be defended from Moscow’s grasp.

BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV is Professor of Political Science at the University of California San Diego. He is the author of Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace.
HEIN GOEMANS is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War.

Foreign Affairs · by Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace · April 1, 2024

19. The Trouble With “the Global South”

Excerpts:

Even the states that aim to lead Africa, Asia, and Latin America face serious internal fractures, such as the high level of criminal activity in Brazil and South Africa or the recent upsurge of ethnic conflict in northeastern India. Ethiopia’s stature may have risen with its invitation to join the BRICS, but the country is recovering from a bloody civil war and contending with multiple insurgencies. The governments of many major non-Western powers are attempting to take a greater role on the global stage while facing persistent or increasing instability at home. Although the same can be said for several advanced economies in the West, in neither case is this a recipe for consistent leadership and problem-solving.

The recent spike in chatter about the global South has at least done the service of highlighting mounting problems faced by countries beyond the West—problems that will require a global effort to address. To head off future instability, the United States and its allies must work to ease the international debt crisis and help vulnerable states resolve internal conflicts and governance issues. Progress will require multilateral negotiations to reform the global financial architecture—during which developing countries will likely continue to work as a bloc—and increased attention to each country or region’s specific economic and political circumstances. With Chinese initiatives such as the South-South Cooperation Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank presenting alternatives to Western public finance, genuine efforts from Washington and its partners to address these countries’ concerns will be particularly important.

But the terminology problem remains. Although many Western policymakers think they know better than to treat the non-Western world as an unvariegated whole, they should use the phrase “global South” with particular care. Specific dynamics within and among the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will shape their political futures more than their identity as a group. The West must see these states as they are, not fall for the fallacy that they operate geopolitically as a single entity.

The Trouble With “the Global South”

What the West Gets Wrong About the Rest

By Comfort Ero

April 1, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Comfort Ero · April 1, 2024

Not so long ago, policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals gave little apparent thought to the possibility that the rest of the world might hold opinions distinct from their own. There were some exceptions: governments that the West deemed “good partners”—in other words, those willing to advance U.S. and Western security or economic interests—continued to benefit from Western support even if they did not govern themselves in accordance with Western values. But after the Cold War ended, most Western policymakers seemed to expect that developing countries would, over time, embrace the Western approach to democracy and globalization. Few Western leaders seemed to worry that non-Western states might bridle at their norms or perceive the international distribution of power as an unjust remnant of the colonial past. Leaders who voiced such views, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, were dismissed as eccentrics, their ideas behind the times.

Today, by contrast, many Western policy discussions treat it as an established fact that a global South exists with its own distinct outlook. The phrase has become a nearly unavoidable shorthand—my colleagues and I use it ourselves at the International Crisis Group, the organization I lead. And, indeed, non-Western leaders including Narendra Modi of India and Mia Mottley of Barbados have begun to articulate the priorities of a collective—if still rather amorphous—global South on issues such as climate financing and the role of international institutions. Disappointed by many developing countries’ refusal to take serious steps to penalize Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, U.S. and European officials have started to pay new lip service to concerns of this group of states.

Although this acknowledgment of the rest of the world’s interests is a welcome development, it is connected to a particular understanding of the global South, which, as a term, is conceptually unwieldy. There is no hard-and-fast definition of the global South, but it is typically used to refer to the bulk of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It lumps together powerful members of the G-20, such as Brazil and Indonesia, with the world’s least developed countries, including Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. These countries do share some common historical experiences and future objectives, such as changing the balance of power in the international system. In conversations with politicians and officials from countries considered to be members of the global South, I have encountered a range of views on how coherent a unit it is. Some accept the term—but others do not. For these countries can also have dramatically diverging interests, values, and perspectives.

Policymakers in the West risk losing sight of the diversity the term encompasses. When they regard the global South as a more or less cohesive coalition, they can end up simplifying or ignoring countries’ individual concerns. Western officials who want to cultivate better ties with their non-Western counterparts may become tempted to focus on winning over a few supposedly leading global South states, such as Brazil and India. Their assumption is clear: bolster ties with Brasilia or New Delhi and the rest will follow. The Biden administration and its allies invested so heavily in making last year’s G-20 summit in India a success at least in part for this reason.

A policy that focuses too heavily on a narrow cadre of non-Western states is insufficient. It can obscure the tensions among developing countries and the unique pressures—such as debt, climate change, demographic forces, and internal violence—that are shaping politics in many of them. In doing so, such a policy may also veil opportunities for building better ties with small and middle-sized states by addressing their individual interests. The term “global South” may offer a compelling but misleading simplicity (as can its counterpart, “the West”). Treating countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a geopolitical bloc, however, will not help solve the problems they face, nor will it bring the United States and its partners the influence they seek.

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH?

It is true that the countries of the global South, as defined here, have some common causes as well as incentives to coordinate. Most of these states fought against colonialism (and, in some cases, U.S. interventions) and cooperated in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, coalitions that brought developing countries together during the Cold War. Both live on as formal blocs at the United Nations. In many multilateral settings today, non-Western states often opt to negotiate as a team rather than parley with the U.S. and its allies alone. This coordination enhances the affinity among countries frustrated with an international order that too often works against their interests.

Recent global events have made schisms between these countries and the West more pronounced. When many non-Western governments refused to take sides after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some Western leaders acknowledged the need to address allegations of a double standard—specifically, the perception that they only took principled stands when a European nation was attacked. Only with the support of a large bloc of states that are usually considered part of the global South, after all, could the UN General Assembly deliver a strong show of solidarity with Ukraine. But Western governments did not seek to apply this lesson beyond the Russia-Ukraine war. If the war in Gaza posed the next test of whether Western leaders truly grasped the importance of facing accusations of hypocrisy, those leaders appear to have failed. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, officials and citizens believe that the United States and some of its allies in Europe have greenlighted Israel’s wholesale destruction of Gaza. The perception of double standards is stronger than ever.

Similarities in outlook, however, do not mean the countries generally assumed to belong to the global South act as one. Non-Western leaders are no different than their Western counterparts in their desire to pursue their states’ own interests, and not all of them see their countries as members of a broad-based group. Take, for example, their recent actions at the United Nations. In debates in the General Assembly over development policy, a small caucus of hard-line G-77 members, led by Cuba and Pakistan, insists on an aggressive approach to negotiating reforms to the international financial system with the United States and the European Union, and the group denounces the West for failing to live up to past aid pledges. Russia, in coordination with this caucus, used discussions of the UN Sustainable Development Goals in 2023 as a platform to criticize the global economic impact of U.S. sanctions. Yet in private, many other G-77 members expressed discomfort with this sharp-elbowed diplomacy, arguing that it undercut efforts to find common ground with Washington and Brussels to reduce their debt burdens.

Similarities in outlook do not mean the members of the putative global South act as one.

Splits within the putative global South extend beyond economic issues. Some Latin American countries led by liberal governments, for example, would like to promote progressive agendas on gender issues and LGBTQ rights at the UN, but they run into opposition from more conservative G-77 members, including many Muslim-majority states. Brazil and India have long pursued permanent seats on the Security Council, but regional rivals such as Argentina and Pakistan aim to stymie them. And although non-Western diplomats often have practical reasons to stick together, those representing larger powers put their national positions ahead of group solidarity when it suits them.

While many purport to speak for the global South—at the UN or otherwise—no single country can claim the mantle. Over the last year, Brazil, China, and India have tussled to present themselves as the group’s most effective leaders. All three countries are founding members of the BRICS, whose core members also include Russia and South Africa. During India’s 2023 G-20 presidency, Modi promised to represent “our fellow travelers from the global South” and helped the African Union gain a permanent seat. China, meanwhile, concentrated on expanding the BRICS, leading a successful push to extend invitations to Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join. (Argentina declined its invitation.) Brazil plans to use its role as president of the G-20 this year and host of the COP30 climate summit in 2025 to advance what President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) has presented as a vision of a “multipolar, fair, and inclusive order” in which countries of the global South would have greater influence than they do today.

Yet even as these powers vie to lead developing countries, some of their recent foreign policy choices suggest they prioritize other relationships. China has been quietly strengthening its ties with Russia since the two powers declared a “no-limits partnership” in 2022. India has increased its trade with Russia and has drawn closer to the United States and U.S. allies in its role as part of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a maritime security forum that also includes Australia and Japan. The Modi government broke with a majority of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement at the UN in October, too, when it refused to sign on to a General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza. Although New Delhi supported a subsequent resolution in December, the October vote testified to India’s deepening ties with Israel in recent years.

For Brazil, China, and India, claiming leadership of the global South offers clear advantages.

Lula, meanwhile, has taken a more strident stance than other non-Western leaders on the Israel-Hamas war, comparing Israel’s offensive in Gaza to the Holocaust—comments that got the Brazilian president declared persona non grata in Israel in February. But Brazil has also sought favor with the world’s great powers, deftly navigating the frictions among China, Russia, and the United States in order to bolster ties with all three. For Brazil, China, and India in particular, claiming leadership of the global South offers clear advantages, including opportunities to expand their global diplomatic heft and firm up economic relationships. Despite their rhetorical support for the countries in this group, however, hard-headed realpolitik frequently takes precedence.

Other aspirants to lead the global South seem even less equipped to claim the position. South Africa, for one, seems to take seriously the idea that it could represent this group; South African officials have been especially keen to play a peacemaking role in Ukraine. President Cyril Ramaphosa led a delegation of African leaders to Moscow and Kyiv last summer—but he made no progress toward ending the war. South Africa has arguably had more influence by bringing a case against Israel under the Genocide Convention before the International Court of Justice, a move that has shaped international debates about the war in Gaza. But a South Africa that still struggles to project itself as a leader on its own continent—where other powers such as Kenya and Nigeria prefer to chart their own paths—will not find it any easier to rally a globe-spanning coalition.

No other candidates for the leadership position are likely to emerge. The small but influential Gulf Arab countries, for instance, caucus at the UN with developing nations in the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, and they have used these ties to garner support for the Palestinian cause during the Israel-Hamas war. But Arab officials tend to present their interests as separate from those of the global South, given their countries’ economic growth and relative political stability. Russia has also tried to win the backing of non-Western countries, and it uses anticolonial rhetoric to justify its confrontation with Europe and the United States. But many officials in these states see Moscow as too erratic and bellicose to trust in full, and Kenya in particular has criticized Russia for waging an imperialist war in Ukraine.

FIX THE REAL PROBLEMS

Ultimately, there is little value in striving to identify who, if anyone, can lead the global South. When officials in poorer countries look at the cast of contenders, they often question whether they have anything in common with those major and middle powers. As one African politician recently told me, smaller, poorer countries worry about being pushed into the role of the “South of the global South”: in need of outside support and facing condescension not only from former colonial rulers but also from non-Western states that are better off.

The parlor game of global South leadership also pulls focus from the real challenges facing small and medium-sized states. Just as Western pundits have started to speculate about what new kinds of power developing countries can exert as a bloc, the fortunes of many individual non-Western states have taken a turn for the worse. Almost two-thirds of the world’s least developed countries now face serious debt distress. Some of the poorest—including several in West Africa—are experiencing political instability and deteriorating security conditions, which will only compound their economic woes. Regional bodies that were set up to mediate political problems, such as the African Union and Organization of American States, have lost credibility amid squabbles among their members. Helping vulnerable countries, particularly those that face conflict and humanitarian catastrophe, navigate the mutually reinforcing shocks of violence, inflation, food insecurity, climate change, and the lingering effects of the pandemic is more pressing than determining which power’s cues they follow in international diplomacy.

The spike in chatter about the global South has at least done the service of highlighting mounting problems.

Even the states that aim to lead Africa, Asia, and Latin America face serious internal fractures, such as the high level of criminal activity in Brazil and South Africa or the recent upsurge of ethnic conflict in northeastern India. Ethiopia’s stature may have risen with its invitation to join the BRICS, but the country is recovering from a bloody civil war and contending with multiple insurgencies. The governments of many major non-Western powers are attempting to take a greater role on the global stage while facing persistent or increasing instability at home. Although the same can be said for several advanced economies in the West, in neither case is this a recipe for consistent leadership and problem-solving.

The recent spike in chatter about the global South has at least done the service of highlighting mounting problems faced by countries beyond the West—problems that will require a global effort to address. To head off future instability, the United States and its allies must work to ease the international debt crisis and help vulnerable states resolve internal conflicts and governance issues. Progress will require multilateral negotiations to reform the global financial architecture—during which developing countries will likely continue to work as a bloc—and increased attention to each country or region’s specific economic and political circumstances. With Chinese initiatives such as the South-South Cooperation Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank presenting alternatives to Western public finance, genuine efforts from Washington and its partners to address these countries’ concerns will be particularly important.

But the terminology problem remains. Although many Western policymakers think they know better than to treat the non-Western world as an unvariegated whole, they should use the phrase “global South” with particular care. Specific dynamics within and among the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will shape their political futures more than their identity as a group. The West must see these states as they are, not fall for the fallacy that they operate geopolitically as a single entity.

COMFORT ERO is President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Foreign Affairs · by Comfort Ero · April 1, 2024

20. Militant April

Fascinating. I took Major Griffiths' advice and read Major Reichley's entire 1979 Military Review article here: https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p124201coll1/id/360/page/0/inline/p124201coll1_360_0?utm_source=substack&utm

I had no idea the Army built its first nuclear reactor (were there more built by the Army and if so where?) on Fort Belvoir. Since I live right outside the back gate of the Fort I am now going to have to go and find out where it was located.

Militant April

Not an April Fools

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/militant-april?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1772757&post_id=143137532&utm=

ZACHARY GRIFFITHS

APR 01, 2024

** The Harding Project also invites you to read this masterful exploration of beards and lethality by Rob Rose at West Point’s Modern War Institute.**

On this first of April, we travel back into the archives to Major John A. Reichley’s piece, “Militant April”, in the April 1979 issue of Military Review. Not an April Fools Joke, Riley’s piece explores the surprisingly number of military events in our fourth month.

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As Riley opens:

THOUGHTS of April traditionally bring to mind income tax, rain and practical jokes. But the fourth month has seen much more than its fair share of military events throughout our nation's history. Some are immortal, while others are easily forgettable-or long forgotten.

As a former resident of Lexington, Massachusetts, I’m well aware that the “shot heard ‘round the world” was fired in my hometown, but what else? Riley’s lighthearted article shows us all the April events—and shows that professional journal articles can take a variety of forms.

Soon, readers of the Army’s articles will be able to link directly to specific articles from the Army’s archives. Today, click the link and read the whole article starting on page 20 if you want all the details.

A few fun excerpts:

The Louisiana Purchase.

The Louisiana Purchase was agreed upon on 30 April 1803, and the famed Lewis and' Clark-Army officers-soon set off on their famous expedition

The Civil War

April was a significant month throughout the Civil War, literally from beginning to end. The first cannon shot shattered the stillness at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, in the early morning of 12 April 1861.

The Battle of Okinawa

In the Pacific, the Tenth Army hit the beaches' on Okinawa, considered by the Japanese to be home soil, and began the biggest battle of the Pacific, ultimately in· volving almost 550,000 Americans.

Nuclear Power

Energy became a national concern. The Army unveiled its first nuclear reactor on 29 April 1957 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

And many other events. Happy April Fools Day!

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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