​Quotes of the day:

“America is in even greater danger because of its cult of toughness, its hatred of sensitivity, and someday it may have to pay a price for this, because atrophy of feeling creates criminals.”

– Anais Non, April 1940

"It's really a wonder that I haven't dropped all my ideals, because they seem so absurd and impossible to carry out. Yet I keep them, because, in spite of everything, I still believe that people are really good at heart. I simply can't build up my hopes on a foundation, consisting of confusion, misery, and death. I see the whole world gradually ​being turned into a wilderness. I hear the ever approaching thunder, which will destroy us, too, I can feel the sufferings of millions ​and yet, if I look up into the heavens, I think that it will ​all come right, that this cruelty to​o will end​, and that peace and tranquility will return once more."

– Anne Frank

"Caution in handling generally accepted opinions they claim to explain whole trends of history is especially important for the historian of modern times, because the last century has produced an abundance of ideologies that pretend to be keys to history, but are actually nothing but desperate effort to escape responsibility.

– Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

​My politics and bias:

​Some people have called into question my politics on social media so I will clarify them.

I have never belonged to any political party. I am aligned with Madison and Federalist 10 and the danger of factions.

Since 1976 I have voted my conscience in every election (and did not always choose the victor).

My only ideological "leaning" is to support and defend the constitution of the United States and to live the Special Forces ideal of De Oppresso Liber which is best interpreted as "to help the oppressed free themselves."

I usually state my bias but make no mistake, my bias is for US alliances as I believe alliances are the "super sauce" that make the US a superpower.

When it comes to the national security of the US and US governance, I call balls and strikes as I see them without regard to politics or political leaders, as I believe every informed citizen has the responsibility to do.

​1. Strategic Alignment in an Era of Uncertainty: Next Steps for the US–South Korea Alliance by Patrick M. Cronin

2. In Brief: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict by Clint Work

3. In a Washington on edge, North Korea policymakers fear for the future

4. Hegseth Reassures Asian Allies in Meetings at Tokyo and the Philippines but Skips South Korea

5. South Korea’s Constitutional Court will rule Friday on Yoon’s impeachment

6. China Says It Is Aiming to Coordinate Tariff Response With Japan, South Korea

7. Putting the Screws on the Partnership Between North Korea and Russia

8. Five Questions For A General Podcast: General Martin Dempsey and General Walter Sharp

9. The abrupt end to 75 years of U.S. policy on South Korea?

10. north Korean Unification presentations - "Korea Dream: Pathway to Peace and Freedom"

11. [NNP 뉴포초대석] 데이빗 맥스웰에게 묻는다 "한국이 중국에 전쟁을 선포해야 할까?" [NNP Newport Invitation] Asking David Maxwell, "Should Korea declare war on China?"

12. Trump says there's 'communication' with N.K. leader Kim

13. Constitutional Court to rule on Yoon's impeachment Friday

14. Police to deploy 14,000 personnel in Seoul as court poised to rule on Yoon's impeachment

15. Roads in central Seoul to be closed Friday as court delivers Yoon verdict

16. Russia's party delegation arrives in N. Korea amid deepening bilateral cooperation

17. N. Korean arms factories pivot to advanced weapons under Kim's new strategy

18. N. Korean officials show unprecedented effort during 'Friday labor' sessions

1. Strategic Alignment in an Era of Uncertainty: Next Steps for the US–South Korea Alliance by Patrick M. Cronin

​Download the 53 page PDF here: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Strategic+Alignment+in+an+Era+of+Uncertainty+Patrick+Cronin.pdf

Many people contributed to Patrick's excellent work:

Numerous Korean officials, foundation staff, and other experts offered indispensable insights, particularly those who participated in workshops at Hudson or hosted me during my frequent visits to Korea over the past year. Ambassador Shin-wha Lee was particularly supportive in getting this project started, as was Korean Ambassador to the US Hyun-Dong Cho. Former Korean Ambassador to the US Ho-young Ahn was extremely generous with his time in guiding my thinking on several occasions. I am especially grateful for the insights of those who spoke at one of my five main workshops over the past year. These include Jenny Town, Hyuk Kim, Daniel Salisbury, Hanbyeol Sohn, Markus Garlauskas, Soohoon “Alex” Lee, Seukhoon Paul Choi, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Myong-hyun Go, James Przystup, Riley Walters, Tetsuo Kotani, Minjung Kim, Rebeccah Heinrichs, Koichiro Matsumoto, Randall G. Schriver, Heungkyu Kim, Jennifer Lee, Ankit Panda, Jae-jeok Park, Olivia Enos, Bruce Bechtol Jr., Bernard S. Champoux, Wooyeal Paik, David Maxwell, and Kyung-joo Jeon. Many other Hudson colleagues beyond those who spoke at my workshops, both senior and junior, contributed in various ways, including John Walters, Joel Scanlon, Ken Weinstein, William Chou, Thomas Duesterberg, Taylor Bragg, Elizabeth Heller, Ray Jones, David Altman, Iku Tsujihiro, Kayacan Kaya, and Pinshan Lai. Special thanks to Hudson’s Mark Melton for expediting a polished version of this report.

The 10 key recommendations:

1. Restore the warrior ethos and accelerate OPCON transition.
2. Establish a “Golden Dome” missile defense consultative group.
3. Forge a US–South Korea maritime power partnership.
4. Expand alliance defense industrial base cooperation.
5. Establish a “3D” deterrence, defense, and diplomacy council.Five Economic Recommendations:
6.  
7. Eliminate the trade imbalance.
8. Increase investment in AI-driven data centers.
9. Strengthen energy cooperation through SMRs and LNG.
10. Create an LNG energy corridor from Alaska into East Asia.
11. Leverage chips and supply chains for advanced manufacturing and reindustrialization.

Mar 31, 2025

Hudson Institute

Strategic Alignment in an Era of Uncertainty: Next Steps for the US–South Korea Alliance

Patrick M. Cronin

https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/strategic-alignment-era-uncertainty-next-steps-us-south-korea-alliance-patrick-cronin?utm

Executive Summary

This report makes 10 recommendations for how to improve the United States–South Korea alliance, split evenly across security and economic domains. These concepts, proposals, and deals can be mutually reinforcing of the alliance and the overall bilateral relationship at a time of considerable international uncertainty.

Five Security Recommendations:

1. Restore the warrior ethos and accelerate OPCON transition.
2. Both US and South Korean forces need to reinvigorate military discipline and readiness. They should increase joint training, improve combat effectiveness, and set a firm deadline for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea to reflect its growing self-defense capabilities.
3. Establish a “Golden Dome” missile defense consultative group.
4. The two countries should form a consultative body to co-develop next-generation, layered missile defense systems that integrate emerging technologies and lessons from recent conflicts. South Korea should strengthen its KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense) system and align efforts with the US Iron Dome for America initiative.
5. Forge a US–South Korea maritime power partnership.
6. Washington and Seoul should combine South Korea’s shipbuilding expertise with US naval modernization efforts. They should also expand joint production, reduce reliance on Chinese maritime supply chains, and co-develop autonomous vessels and maritime energy infrastructure to counterbalance China’s maritime dominance.
7. Expand alliance defense industrial base cooperation.
8. The allies should capitalize on South Korea’s defense manufacturing capabilities to co-produce precision munitions, expendable drones, and advanced military systems. And they should strengthen joint research and development projects, diversify supply chains, and position South Korea as a key supplier in global defense networks.
9. Establish a “3D” deterrence, defense, and diplomacy council.
10. The US and South Korea should create a high-level council to coordinate nuclear deterrence strategies, missile defense planning, and diplomatic initiatives. The countries should also enhance extended deterrence credibility, improve South Korea’s conventional retaliatory power, and manage inevitable tensions that arise from growing regional nuclear threats and questions about the American nuclear umbrella.

Five Economic Recommendations:

1. Eliminate the trade imbalance.
2. The trading partners need to address America’s $66 billion trade deficit with South Korea by encouraging new investment in US industries like auto, steel, and semiconductors in exchange for tariff relief and strategic incentives. They should also consider renegotiating the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) to promote balanced trade.
3. Increase investment in AI-driven data centers.
4. The countries should build joint artificial intelligence supercomputing hubs and promote bilateral investment in AI infrastructure. They can also integrate South Korean expertise into US-led initiatives like Stargate to ensure leadership in AI, large-language models, and high-performance cloud computing.
5. Strengthen energy cooperation through SMRs and LNG.
6. Washington and Seoul need to exploit US liquified natural gas (LNG) and allied capabilities in small modular reactors (SMRs) to power energy-intensive data centers. They should launch joint projects to deploy clean, resilient power infrastructure for AI ecosystems and digital industries.
7. Create an LNG energy corridor from Alaska into East Asia.
8. The allies should develop a strategic LNG corridor from Alaska to East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. They can combine US energy abundance with South Korea’s LNG shipbuilding prowess to build infrastructure that supports regional energy security and counterbalances unreliable energy sources.
9. Leverage chips and supply chains for advanced manufacturing and reindustrialization.
10. As America seeks transformation and the renewal of its industrial manufacturing capabilities, it should work more closely together with South Korea to bolster semiconductor chip manufacturing, harness AI, secure critical mineral supply chains, and reduce overreliance on Chinese industrial products.

2. In Brief: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict by Clint Work

​The complete 42 page report can be downloaded here: https://keia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KEI-Taiwan-Report.pdf

You can see the discussion with Clint Work and Alexis Turek here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WSHumqUZBI&t=3s

The two main takeaways:

First, regarding alliance signaling on Taiwan, successive South Korean administrations—both progressive and conservative—began to use and expand language on the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait less because of innate concerns about Taiwan or a commitment to act in the event of a cross-strait conflict and more to achieve intra-alliance and Korea-centric objectives. The Moon Jae-in administration’s adoption of new language regarding Taiwan was mostly driven by a desire to garner U.S. support to reenergize engagement with North Korea. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration expanded such language to strengthen Washington’s extended deterrence commitment to Seoul.

Second, respondents highlighted the fact that official alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict were at a very nascent stage, if not nonexistent. When the subject of a Taiwan conflict is broached, South Korean officials—from the top down—immediately insist on turning the focus to North Korea and highlighting concerns about the use of United States Forces Korea (USFK) for Taiwan’s defense. Although the shifting alliance signaling on Taiwan has increased commentary, research, and analysis—including by South Korean experts—on how the alliance and South Korea should navigate a cross-strait conflict, it does not seem to have translated into official or detailed discussions within the alliance thus far. There remains deep-seated resistance.

In Brief: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Published March 27, 2025

Author: Clint Work

Category: Taiwan, Indo-Pacific

Executive Summary

This project builds upon earlier research tracing U.S.-South Korea signaling on “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” The current project was based on the premise that there is a significant gap between such diplomatic rhetoric and the U.S.-ROK alliance’s preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Through dozens of interviews with U.S. and South Korean current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project shows there has been a lack of substantive alliance discussions about a Taiwan conflict and, thus, a serious lack of preparedness for one; that numerous challenges obstruct such discussions; and that the alliance would face interconnected and complex variables in the event of such a conflict, which amplify existing issues within the U.S.-South Korea relationship but also extend well beyond it.

The Korea Economic Institute of America will publish the full report, titled Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict at an exclusive hybrid launch event on Monday, March 31 at 2:00 p.m. EST. RSVP by clicking here.

The Evolution and State of U.S.-ROK Alliance Discussions on a Taiwan Conflict

Respondents described notable shifts in alliance signaling on the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the current state of official alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict. Their observations can be synthesized as two main takeaways.

First, regarding alliance signaling on Taiwan, successive South Korean administrations—both progressive and conservative—began to use and expand language on the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait less because of innate concerns about Taiwan or a commitment to act in the event of a cross-strait conflict and more to achieve intra-alliance and Korea-centric objectives. The Moon Jae-in administration’s adoption of new language regarding Taiwan was mostly driven by a desire to garner U.S. support to reenergize engagement with North Korea. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration expanded such language to strengthen Washington’s extended deterrence commitment to Seoul.

Second, respondents highlighted the fact that official alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict were at a very nascent stage, if not nonexistent. When the subject of a Taiwan conflict is broached, South Korean officials—from the top down—immediately insist on turning the focus to North Korea and highlighting concerns about the use of United States Forces Korea (USFK) for Taiwan’s defense. Although the shifting alliance signaling on Taiwan has increased commentary, research, and analysis—including by South Korean experts—on how the alliance and South Korea should navigate a cross-strait conflict, it does not seem to have translated into official or detailed discussions within the alliance thus far. There remains deep-seated resistance.

Challenges to Discussing a Taiwan Conflict

Respondents highlighted a range of challenges and obstacles, which help explain the lack of substantive alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict. These include:

• Washington’s mixed signals: Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan and mixed signals about whether it would come to Taipei’s defense undermine Seoul’s willingness to discuss the issue. Although arguing that this elides the main issue, some respondents acknowledged the need for U.S. officials and analysts to move beyond “are you with us or not”-style questions and initiate detailed discussions about the different types of contingencies and concrete expectations they have for Seoul and the alliance.
• Fitful evolution of hub-and-spokes alliance system: Despite new U.S. concepts of operations (CONOPS) that stress the distribution and interconnectivity of defense infrastructure in allies’ sovereign territory, there remains a lack of allied input. These CONOPS put new stresses on the longstanding hub-and-spokes alliance system, which has not properly evolved and requires adjustments. If there are expectations for allies in a Taiwan conflict, there must be a framework and plan in place—not necessarily a treaty but some sort of instrument that defines the concept—that includes allied involvement and buy-in.
• Faulty assumptions about other U.S. allies: Many respondents assumed other U.S. allies—Japan, Australia, and the Philippines—were more likely to be involved in a Taiwan conflict than South Korea. Such thinking could disincentivize South Korea from discussing a more active role and/or reduce expectations from U.S. policymakers about South Korea’s willingness to contribute. There is also a lingering misalignment between Washington and Seoul on the letter and spirit of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. These assumptions and misalignment require greater scrutiny and interrogation, in which allied involvement and steady and considerate U.S. leadership are crucial.
• Complex and highly partisan views on China within South Korea: Despite growing negative sentiments toward China, South Koreans do not share the same threat perception or adversarial view of China—or anywhere near the same bipartisan consensus on competition with China—as Americans. Furthermore, contested views of China and a potential cross-strait conflict are inextricably linked with South Korea’s highly partisan domestic politics, which complicates the U.S.-ROK alliance’s ability to engage in detailed or formal discussions about such a conflict. However, partisan divides and perceptions thereof do more to muddle than clarify the picture.
• South Korean decision-making and bureaucratic dynamics: The top-down nature of South Korea’s foreign and national security process—with a presidential office that supervises and politically intervenes in the process—results in a weak buffer between the executive branch and the defense and military bureaucracy. The single five-year presidential term and notable policy shifts across administrations instill a fear of future demotions, can undermine the receptivity to top-level orders or policy lines, and limit how and to what extent relevant information moves upwards. Despite South Korea’s shift in diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan, no further clarity has been provided on discussions or contingency planning for navigating a contingency. These bureaucratic dynamics disincentivize working-level officials and military officers from proactively exploring such planning in an alliance context.
• South Korea’s psychological dissonance: Respondents noted a psychological dissonance within South Korea—described as a lingering discrepancy between the country’s self-image of weakness and desire to keep focus siloed on the Korean Peninsula and its actual capabilities and broader responsibilities in the region—that obstruct discussions of a Taiwan conflict. While conceding the government had adopted a more robust rhetorical stance on Taiwan, respondents thought South Korea’s preference was to keep its “head in the sand” and proactively avoid the Taiwan issue.
• Uncertainty and ignorance within South Korea-Taiwan ties: Respondents highlighted a lack of security cooperation between South Korea and Taiwan, resulting in South Korean doubts about Taiwan’s preparedness and will to fight. Yet, South Korea was deeply reticent to move beyond low-level and unofficial engagement to address such doubts for fear of angering China. Also, rather than embrace being part of a holistic regional architecture or feel solidarity as partners who both face immediate adversaries in key geopolitical flashpoints, South Korea and Taiwan feel a degree of competition for the U.S. commitment. There remains persistent ignorance among the South Korean population and some political leaders about the deep economic linkages between South Korea and Taiwan (and the Taiwan Strait), with some even seeing advantages for South Korea in Taiwan’s misfortune.

Navigating a Taiwan Conflict

Respondents also provided insight on important variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate ahead of, during, and beyond a cross-strait conflict. Respondents broadly agreed that the variables could rapidly evolve depending on the level, pace, and geographic scope of escalation. Although this made for a complicated mix of interventions, it provides a holistic picture for analysts and policymakers to consider when weighing the complexity and gravity of the issues involved in a Taiwan conflict. While the subsections below do not follow a clearly linear conflict scenario, they interconnect in important ways, hopefully providing as cohesive a picture as possible.

• Applying the strategic flexibility of USFK to Taiwan: The strategic flexibility of USFK—the deployment of U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula to a regional contingency—is a longstanding topic of discussion and debate. Nonetheless, USFK’s force structure, posture, and mission make it ill-suited for direct military contributions to a Taiwan contingency. Were an appreciable number of USFK personnel and assets pulled from the peninsula into a Taiwan conflict, it likely means that the conflict has significantly escalated in intensity and geographic scope, U.S. forces have experienced heavy losses, and the United States and South Korea’s concerns have metastasized beyond the question of USFK’s strategic flexibility. Still, the alliance should hold in-depth discussions about the necessity for and possible levels of USFK’s involvement in a Taiwan conflict—depending on the course and speed of escalation—and how South Korea would fill capability gaps.
• Recalibrating USFK’s posture and structure: Historically, U.S. administrations have explored but not actualized ideas about transforming parts of USFK into mobile reserve units for flexible deployment to regional contingencies or into a more air- and naval-centric force posture. In the context of the new CONOPS, respondents considered restructuring USFK into a force that combined deterring North Korea with a more fluid regional role. However, such a change could spark U.S. inter-service rivalries and competition over billets on the peninsula depending on how the shift would change the existing four-star-led command structure. Also, it would undercut South Korea’s perception of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, with the country possibly filling the perceived gap in fundamentally new ways. Finally, even if a reconceptualized USFK maintained sufficient capabilities for dealing with North Korea, it could spark serious concerns given its new multi-purpose regional role.
• Ensuring proper force allocation: A more immediate concern is that in the event a Taiwan conflict erupted first, U.S. forces normally slated for deployment to a Korean conflict would be diverted to the Taiwan Strait. This diversion would affect U.S. forces in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), both of which would play a critical role in the event of a Korean conflict. Such a diversion would significantly hamper the U.S. ability to deal with both theaters and could incentivize North Korea to opportunistically aggress, putting greater stress on South Korea and USFK to compensate for the lack of follow-on forces and undermining South Korea’s ability to contribute to cross-strait security.
• Altering the “arithmetic of deterrence”: Deterrence relies on capabilities and their credible, timely availability. A relative reduction in U.S. capabilities could weaken deterrence against North Korea, potentially encouraging opportunistic aggression, whether independently or in coordination with Beijing. If U.S. response options are limited due to Taiwan-related demands, officials may escalate deterrence measures more quickly, including nuclear signaling, to reassure Seoul. But North Korea might interpret these signals in different ways: as a credible threat requiring de-escalation, as justification for its own escalation, or as a bluff due to U.S. strategic overstretch. This situation would place a greater burden on South Korea, possibly leading to an unrestrained response if it perceives reduced U.S. support. Despite potential complications in the timely and cohesive functioning of alliance consultative mechanisms, the United States would likely try to restrain South Korea to avoid full-scale war, which could strain the alliance.
• Strengthening nuclear deterrence and reassurance: To address South Korea’s security concerns surrounding a Taiwan conflict, respondents proposed steps to enhance extended deterrence such as stronger nuclear signaling, deeper consultations on U.S. nuclear policy, redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, establishing a nuclear-sharing arrangement, and revising the bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to allow South Korea to foster nuclear latency. Many noted that if the United States expects South Korea to shoulder greater responsibility on the peninsula, accept USFK’s strategic flexibility, and possibly engage in a Taiwan conflict, South Korea may need its own nuclear weapons.
• Constituting South Korea as a “retrograde and reconstitute” hub: Managing a Taiwan conflict in the Indo-Pacific’s contested logistics environment would be highly challenging. Respondents emphasized South Korea’s defense infrastructure and national capacities would be crucial in supporting U.S. and allied operations. Some saw South Korea as a “retrograde and reconstitute” hub, providing various kinds of rear-area support, depending on the scale of the conflict. Relevant South Korean capabilities include vast fuel storage, maintenance depots, deep ports, airfields, extensive transportation networks, and significant munitions production. However, some South Korean respondents stressed the need for the country to focus on civilian logistical support to avoid being perceived as a direct participant by China, which could trigger coercion or attacks. Given that Washington expects allied support in such a scenario, Seoul’s failure or unwillingness to offer its infrastructure and capabilities could raise concerns about alliance credibility.
• Aligning diplomatic signaling, connectivity, and sanctions: Diplomatic messaging will likely be critical, particularly in the early stages of a Taiwan conflict amid rampant mis- and disinformation. It will be important to form a coalition of countries willing to formulate individual and collective statements condemning Chinese aggression. South Korea was seen as a potentially critical country in galvanizing Global South involvement, given its diplomatic profile. Furthermore, respondents assumed China would attempt to significantly disrupt Taiwan’s digital connectivity through cyberattacks and by severing undersea cables. In such a scenario, South Korea could provide digital redundancies to help Taiwan maintain connections with the outside world. South Korea would also likely be expected to join multilateral sanctions against China in a Taiwan conflict.
• Enhancing South Korea’s role around and beyond the peninsula: If U.S. forces sustained casualties in a Taiwan conflict, South Korea would be an ideal place for medical evacuations. Additionally, the United States and South Korea would both be concerned about noncombatant evacuation operations of foreign nationals from Taiwan. Medical and noncombatant evacuation operations are critical yet non-military activities that fall under humanitarian support, which may be less likely to garner Chinese retaliation. More controversially, some respondents highlighted South Korea’s Jeju Naval Base—and an enhanced South Korean and allied maritime presence in the lower Yellow Sea/West Sea area—might serve an important role in deterring the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Northern Theater Command Fleet either from aggression around the Korean Peninsula or deploying assets to the fight around Taiwan. The idea reinforced the growing sense that the line between defense of the Korean Peninsula and regional security was blurring. Respondents added that South Korea could also help uphold maritime security in the East China Sea by cooperating with other U.S. allies and partners to help escort and protect trading vessels around the Taiwan Strait. Such maritime operations could serve a range of non-military purposes, including humanitarian assistance, and would require multinational cooperation, all of which would provide strength in messaging and numbers and prevent South Korea from being overly exposed.

Big Picture Takeaways

Based on the dozens of interviews and open-source research, there are several takeaways that apply to the U.S.-ROK alliance and other regional allies and partners:

• Make-or-break role of allies: The United States would face multiple, complex challenges contesting a Chinese attack against Taiwan, even with the support and involvement of U.S. allies and partners. However, without allied support and involvement, the United States would very likely not succeed in deterring and defending against Chinese aggression, particularly if the conflict increased in scale and duration.
• Allied support not guaranteed: U.S. officials and analysts take things for granted or make grossly under-examined assumptions about what allies will or will not do, ranging from non-involvement to full mobilization. These assumptions require greater scrutiny and allied input during the clarification process, during which steady and considerate U.S. leadership is critical.
• Allied dissonance: U.S. allies like South Korea prefer the United States intervene on behalf of Taiwan in the event of a conflict because failing to do so would ultimately undermine their own core national interests. Yet, South Korean counterparts persistently maintain a deep reticence to discuss how they themselves would support or navigate such a conflict, with some hoping to avoid involvement altogether. The United States and its allies must reduce such dissonance if they are serious about the need to defend Taiwan.
• Beyond the U.S.-ROK alliance: The U.S.-ROK alliance cannot prepare for a Taiwan conflict on its own. It is not solely an alliance issue. The multiple dilemmas involved in a Taiwan conflict, its various interconnected spillover effects, and the need for multiple countries to work together to address the myriad risks involved, require multilateral cooperation and solutions.
• Taiwan’s inclusion: Deeper discussion about a Taiwan conflict must involve the Taiwanese people. As the people most vulnerable to a Chinese attack and blockade, the Taiwanese people and their leaders must be engaged directly—if prudently—to better understand their specific needs and expectations and the degree to which they would prefer others assist them in the event of such a conflict.
• Diplomacy must come first: Preparedness and messaging should be geared toward enhancing deterrence and reducing tension to prevent the outbreak of a conflict rather than further galvanizing the security dilemmas that make one more likely. Such a balance is immensely difficult to strike. It requires a multilateral approach to both maintain diplomatic pathways and cultivate risk-reduction and military-to-military communication with China.

Clint Work is a Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

Feature image from Shutterstock.

KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

3. In a Washington on edge, North Korea policymakers fear for the future

​I am not sure about this. I see a lot of Korea watchers speaking out.

Is the center of gravity for Korean policy Hooker, Wong, and Kim?

Excerpts:

Opinion was split on whether substantive engagement is likely to resume. 

Some, including senior officials working on North Korea, believe that Trump sees nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong Un as “unfinished business.” One source even speculated talks could already be underway behind the scenes. 

Those who believe DPRK will be a priority pointed to the re-appointment of several key figures from Trump’s first term — like Allison Hooker, Alex Wong and Kevin Kim — as evidence of the administration’s intent to pick up where things left off. One said that Hooker, above all, has spent a lot of time thinking about North Korea issues over the past few years and that her insight will be clearly visible once the ongoing policy review concludes.

Others were more skeptical, arguing Washington’s focus on China as the paramount strategic challenge, with the Ukraine crisis a close second, leaves little bandwidth for Trump on North Korea. 

And while Trump has twice described the DPRK as a nuclear power, skeptics noted that his remarks have simply been reactions to press questions — not exactly an indicator that he is prioritizing the issue.

In a Washington on edge, North Korea policymakers fear for the future

Many in US expect Trump to pursue talks again, but few are willing to speak frankly as budget cuts raise alarm​

https://www.nknews.org/2025/03/in-a-washington-on-edge-north-korea-policymakers-fear-for-the-future/

Chad O'Carroll March 27, 2025

Image: Tim Evanson via Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0), edited by NK News

The NK News team traveled to the U.S. for meetings with members of the North Korea watcher community this month, and the trip made one thing abundantly clear: Donald Trump’s return has put Washington on edge, and raised existential concerns for an array of institutions working on the DPRK.

Our recent trip to Washington and New York took place during a week of great upheaval and uncertainty, as the Trump administration moved swiftly to implement further major cuts and restructuring across the federal bureaucracy.

While our meetings and discussions were off the record, what we learned from them was troubling in many ways, and the overall atmosphere we encountered was one of fear, caution and concern about the future. 

As one senior foreign diplomat bluntly put it to me: “My American counterparts are scared to speak publicly. They’re cautious about articulating anything that might contradict Trump’s team — the fear of being fired or humiliated is real.”

Indeed, even on topics that seemed relatively benign, such as funding cuts for Voice of America and Radio Free Asia — issues the White House has addressed directly and are widely discussed in open sources — officials parsed their words carefully or demurred entirely. The trepidation of saying something that could later contradict what the president wants to happen appeared clear.

Trump and Kim during their Hanoi summit | Image: Rodong Sinmun (March 1, 2019)

PROSPECTS FOR DIPLOMACY

Amid the caution, the questions posed to us offered glimpses into how the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea may evolve. Some asked for our thoughts on what it would take to bring Kim Jong Un back to the negotiating table, though others tempered that by suggesting the DPRK is not a top priority for the administration at the moment. 

The general consensus seems to be that the U.S. is in a “wait and see” holding pattern for now, with the ever-present possibility that Trump will say something that contradicts the emerging policy positions being devised by bureaucrats working inside the system.

Opinion was split on whether substantive engagement is likely to resume. 

Some, including senior officials working on North Korea, believe that Trump sees nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong Un as “unfinished business.” One source even speculated talks could already be underway behind the scenes. 

Those who believe DPRK will be a priority pointed to the re-appointment of several key figures from Trump’s first term — like Allison Hooker, Alex Wong and Kevin Kim — as evidence of the administration’s intent to pick up where things left off. One said that Hooker, above all, has spent a lot of time thinking about North Korea issues over the past few years and that her insight will be clearly visible once the ongoing policy review concludes.

Others were more skeptical, arguing Washington’s focus on China as the paramount strategic challenge, with the Ukraine crisis a close second, leaves little bandwidth for Trump on North Korea. 

And while Trump has twice described the DPRK as a nuclear power, skeptics noted that his remarks have simply been reactions to press questions — not exactly an indicator that he is prioritizing the issue.

Donald Trump at an event in Washington | Image: Trump White House’s Flickr

BUDGET CUT FEARS

Beyond the tea leaf reading on policy, there was a palpable sense of alarm in Washington at how looming budget cuts could ravage the North Korea-focused policy and analysis community.

Deep cuts and restructuring appear imminent at institutions like the Wilson Center, U.S. Institute of Peace, Voice of America and Radio Free Asia — mainstays of the DPRK watching ecosystem that will be difficult to replace.

As one prominent analyst put it, federal funding is the lifeblood that sustains much of the think tank, academic and journalistic work on North Korea, often in opaque ways. If that foundation is suddenly yanked away, the long-term viability of many experts’ work could be in jeopardy, even for those who aren’t well-known to rely on federal funding. 

Without hyperbole, the Washington I encountered on this trip was one of the strangest and most unsettling environments I’ve encountered in over 15 years of working on North Korea issues with those in D.C. A tense mix of paralysis and anxiety permeated nearly every discussion, and it is hard to be optimistic about the future of the field.

For those inside the U.S. government, an abundance of caution reigns supreme, though there are faint hopes that Trump could revive attention on North Korea issues after four years of Joe Biden’s strategic patience 2.0.

But for the vibrant open-source community covering Korea issues, the coming weeks and months could pose an existential threat to their work unless alternative funding sources materialize rapidly.

Only time will tell how the story unfolds, but one thing is clear — for those in the trenches of North Korea policy and analysis, these are days of fear and uncertainty.

Edited by Bryan Betts 

4. Hegseth Reassures Asian Allies in Meetings at Tokyo and the Philippines but Skips South Korea

​The SECDEF is still getting his feet on the ground and is drinking from the fire hose on Asia since he has no experience there. He made a lot of good statements on the trip but he cannot please everyone (re:Korea)

Excerpt:

Mr. Hegseth, before leaving Washington did say Americans needed to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with their Korean as well as Japanese and Filipino allies but, to the chagrin of South Koreans, barely mentioned Korea in the Philippines and then Japan. It was up to Mr. Nakatani to affirm “multilateral cooperation with regional partners, including Australia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines.”

Hegseth Reassures Asian Allies in Meetings at Tokyo and the Philippines but Skips South Korea

The trip was clearly intended to remove recurring questions on Taiwan, for which Congress last year approved the sale of $1 billion in arms and equipment.

DONALD KIRK

Published: Mar. 31, 2025 04:40 PM ETUpdated: Mar. 31, 2025 05:04 PM ET

nysun.com

SEOUL — Defense Secretary Hegseth is leaving no doubt about it: President Trump is as firmly “committed” as was President Biden to the defense of America’s Asian allies — and also the free island province of Taiwan that China’s President Xi has vowed to recover by 2027.

In stops in the Philippines and then in Japan, Mr. Hegseth has talked tough and unequivocally about the need to stand up to Communist China, just as his boss is doing in imposing steep tariff increases beginning Tuesday.

Winding up his first overseas trip as defense secretary in Tokyo, standing beside Japan’s defense minister, Gen Nakatani, Mr. Hegseth declared, “America is committed to sustaining robust, ready and credible deterrence in the Indo Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait.” Japan, he said, “would be on the front lines of any contingency we might face in the western Pacific and we stand together in support of each other.”

That unequivocal assurance of America’s commitment was clearly intended to remove recurring questions as to whether Mr. Trump would be willing to go to war for Taiwan, for which Congress last year approved the sale of $1 billion in arms and equipment. If nothing else, Mr. Hegseth sought to dispel worries that Mr. Trump might prefer to appeal to America’s foes, notably President Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, while abandoning allies and friends, such as South Korea and Ukraine.

“We have a robust alliance agenda that will strengthen our deterrence posture, keep the enemy guessing, creating dilemmas for them,” he said. Then, in a specific rebuff to China, he said America’s renewed commitment also meant “expanding access to key terrain in the first island chain, such as Japan’s southwest islands” — from the southernmost Japanese prefecture of Okinawa where American marines and air force planes are based, and extending to Taiwan and the South China Sea, claimed by China.

In one brief sentence, Mr. Hegseth hyped-up the possibility of more elaborate joint military exercises in defiance of China anywhere from Okinawa to the South China Sea where China has built naval and air bases on atolls and islets. Achieving that goal, he said with understated menace, “means exercising together at those critical locations.” To make it happen, America has begun “upgrading U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters,” increasing “our readiness to respond to contingency or crisis” and “help Japan and U.S. forces defend this territory.”

Mr. Hegseth did not mention that the upgrade of the bond was initiated under the Biden administration. Nor did he refer to the alliance of “Australia, United Kingdom, and the U.S.” known as AUKUS, formed under Mr. Biden, but his remarks were the clearest affirmation yet that Mr. Trump might go further than Mr. Biden in defending an arc running from South Korea and Japan to the Philippines and on down to Australia and New Zealand.

The downside of Mr. Hegseth’s first overseas mission as defense secretary was that, like his predecessor, Lloyd Austin, he had to skip South Korea, ordinarily a “must” stop on top-level American missions to the region. Koreans suspect Mr. Hegseeth did not want to compromise Mr. Trump’s stated desire to renew acquaintances with Mr. Kim, with whom he has said he “fell in love” in their summit in Singapore in June 2018, but South Korea’s ongoing leadership crisis is to blame

Washington does not want to take sides or interfere in South Korean affairs while the constitutional court considers whether to approve or dismiss a motion passed by the national assembly to impeach the South’s conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol. The court’s eight sitting justices are reportedly at odds with one another while the government is in the hands of the acting president, Han Duck-soo, a former ambassador to Washington who was prime minister when Mr. Yoon was impeached.

Mr. Hegseth, before leaving Washington did say Americans needed to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with their Korean as well as Japanese and Filipino allies but, to the chagrin of South Koreans, barely mentioned Korea in the Philippines and then Japan. It was up to Mr. Nakatani to affirm “multilateral cooperation with regional partners, including Australia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines.”

nysun.com

5. South Korea’s Constitutional Court will rule Friday on Yoon’s impeachment

W​aht does that foreshadow? Why Friday? Why not Thursday or why not tomorrow? Is one day better than others for either ruling?  

South Korea’s Constitutional Court will rule Friday on Yoon’s impeachment

by HYUNG-JIN KIM, Associated Press - 03/31/25 10:25 PM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-south-koreas-constitutional-court-will-rule-friday-on-whether-to-dismiss-impeached-president-yoon-2/

A protester wearing a mask of impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol attends a march during a rally calling for Yoon to step down in Seoul, South Korea, Saturday, March 29, 2025. The banner reads “Dismiss Yoon Suk Yeol.” (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea’s Constitutional Court will rule Friday on whether to formally dismiss or reinstate impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol — a decision that either way will likely deepen domestic divisions.

The court has been deliberating Yoon’s political fate after he was impeached in December over his brief imposition of martial law that has triggered a massive political crisis.

Millions of people have rallied around the country to support or denounce Yoon. Police said they’ll mobilize all available personnel to preserve order and respond to acts of vandalism, arson and assault.

The Constitutional Court said in a brief statement Tuesday that it would issue its ruling at 11 a.m. Friday and that it will be broadcast live.

The opposition-controlled liberal National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon soon after he imposed martial law Dec. 3. In addition to the Constitutional Court’s ruling on his impeachment, Yoon was indicted in January on criminal rebellion charges.

If the Constitutional Court removes Yoon from office, South Korea must hold an election within two months for a new president. If the court overturns his impeachment, Yoon would immediately return to his presidential duties.

At the heart of the matter is Yoon’s decision to send hundreds of troops and police officers to the National Assembly after imposing martial law. Yoon has insisted that he aimed to maintain order, but some military and military officials testified Yoon ordered them to drag out lawmakers to frustrate a floor vote on his decree and detain his political opponents.

Yoon argues that he didn’t intend to maintain martial law for long, and he only wanted to highlight what he called the “wickedness” of the main liberal opposition Democratic Party, which obstructed his agenda, impeached senior officials and slashed his budget bill. During his martial law announcement, he called the assembly “a den of criminals” and “anti-state forces.”

By law, a president has the right to declare martial law in wartime or other emergency situations, but the Democratic Party and its supporters say South Korea wasn’t in such a situation.

The impeachment motion accused Yoon of suppressing National Assembly activities, attempting to detain politicians and others and undermining peace in violation of the constitution and other laws. Yoon has said he had no intention of disrupting National Assembly operations and detaining anyone.

Martial law lasted only six hours because lawmakers managed to enter the assembly and vote to strike down his decree unanimously. No violence erupted, but live TV footage showing armed soldiers arriving at the assembly invoked painful memories of past military-backed dictatorships. It was the first time for South Korea to be placed under martial law since 1980.

Earlier public surveys showed a majority of South Koreans supported Yoon’s impeachment. But after his impeachment, pro-Yoon rallies have grown sharply, with many conservatives fed up with what they call the Democratic Party’s excessive offensive on the already embattled Yoon administration.

Yoon was released from prison March 8, after a Seoul district court cancelled his arrest and allowed him to stand his criminal trial without being detained. Ten top military and police officials have also been arrested and indicted over their roles in the martial law enactment.

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Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

6. China Says It Is Aiming to Coordinate Tariff Response With Japan, South Korea

​Again, the operative words: "China says." Hopefully China will not lure South Korea and Japan into an anti-American trade position.

But we need to work on alliance management and attacking our allies with tariffs hardly seems good alliance management. Then again, I fear that allies are not a priority any longer.

China Says It Is Aiming to Coordinate Tariff Response With Japan, South Korea

President Trump is expected to announce a new slate of broader, higher tariffs on Wednesday

https://www.wsj.com/economy/china-says-it-is-aiming-to-coordinate-tariff-response-with-japan-south-korea-c7a19540?mod=latest_headlines

April 1, 2025 4:52 am ET

Senior trade officials from the three Asian export hubs had held their first economic dialogue in five years on Sunday. Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

China is seeking to coordinate its response to U.S. tariffs with Japan and South Korea, Chinese state media said Monday, as the world’s second-largest economy looks to bolster regional economic collaboration.

Japanese and Korean officials said there was no decision to coordinate action with Beijing, but said the countries have recently discussed trade issues amid three-way talks over the weekend, the first such dialogue in five years.

A social-media account run by China’s state broadcaster said in a Weibo post on Monday that the three countries will strengthen dialogue on supply-chain cooperation and export controls, and plan to conduct speedy negotiations toward a trilateral free-trade agreement.

According to the post, Japan and South Korea are hoping to import some semiconductor raw materials from China, while China is also interested in importing chip products from Japan and South Korea.

A South Korean trade ministry spokeswoman told The Wall Street Journal that there were “some exaggerated aspects” in the Chinese social-media post.

“The three countries exchanged views on the global trade environment, and as you can see in the joint statement, you can understand that they shared an understanding of the need for continued economic and trade cooperation,” she said, referring to a statement published by the three countries on Sunday.

Japan’s trade minister Yoji Muto said at a news conference on Tuesday that the three countries exchanged opinions on the trade environment but added that they didn’t reach any agreement to take joint action against U.S. tariffs.

The comments come after senior trade officials from the three Asian export hubs held their first economic dialogue in five years on Sunday as they gear up for more tariffs from the U.S. this week. President Trump is expected to announce a new slate of broader, higher tariffs on Wednesday aimed at reducing trade deficits and bringing manufacturing jobs back to the U.S.

All three are major trading partners of the U.S. running historically high trade surpluses. Japan and South Korea are among the top auto exporters and steel suppliers to the U.S.

Since taking office in January, Trump has slapped an extra 20% tariff on all Chinese imports. On top of in-effect levies on steel imports, he also announced new 25% tariffs on imported cars and auto parts last month, sending major auto-exporting nations into crisis mode.

In response to the auto tariffs set to take effect on April 3, South Korea said it planned emergency support for the auto industry, with trade minister Ahn Duk-geun saying the industry faced “considerable damage.”

Tokyo has said it will keep asking Trump for a tariff exemption, with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba saying Japan will “thoroughly examine the impact on domestic industries and employment and take all necessary measures.”

Relations among Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo have been strained over the years by issues including territorial disputes. Some analysts say that Trump policies could shift relations between the three Asian countries, particularly as Japan and South Korea stand to be among the hardest hit by U.S. tariffs.

“We reaffirmed our conviction that trilateral efforts in the economic and trade sectors are essential for fostering the prosperity and stability of the regional and global economy,” according to a joint statement released by the three Asian countries after the Sunday meeting.

The countries also said Sunday that they will speed up negotiations for a trilateral free-trade agreement, which have been in process since 2012 but have yet to produce tangible results.

Write to Singapore Editors at singaporeeditors@dowjones.com

7. Putting the Screws on the Partnership Between North Korea and Russia

​Excerpts:

However, some experts consider that heightened Russo-North Korean cooperation could persist, given North Korea’s need for security assurances from Russia and Russia’s interest in North Korean labor forces. Russia has experienced a severe workforce shortage, reaching nearly 5 million workers in 2023. North Korean cheap labor force will help resolve the huge labor shortage in Russia. Bolstering this prospect, Andrei Rudenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, explained this month that Russia and North Korea were preparing for Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia.

In this scenario, North Korea will be able to improve relations with the United States, by using Russia’s diplomatic influence over the Trump administration. With Russia’s diplomatic support, North Korea might repeat its five specific demands to resume the U.S.-North Korean denuclearization talks. Conceding to these demands would weaken U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees for South Korea. Moreover, North Korea could use its alliance with Russia to initiate provocations against South Korea. In the worst-case scenario, this could escalate into a military crisis, destabilizing the Indo-Pacific and complicating the U.S. military responses across the region.

To ensure lasting regional security, the United States and South Korea must remain vigilant in monitoring and responding to evolving Russo-North Korean ties. Their success — or failure — will shape Asia’s security landscape well into the future.

Putting the Screws on the Partnership Between North Korea and Russia - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · April 1, 2025

As the war between Ukraine and Russia has raged on, cooperation has grown between Moscow and Pyongyang. Following the Russo-North Korean summit in September 2023, North Korea began providing large-scale military assistance to Russia, reportedly sending military equipment starting that month and deploying troops from October 2024. This has led to an economic recovery in North Korea. Since North Korea is leveraging its military cooperation with Russia to expand and enhance its own military capabilities, the United States and South Korea should employ a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economic tools to encourage a significant reduction in Russia’s military ties with North Korea both during and immediately after negotiations aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian War.

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What Would This Look Like?

Unless North Korea suspends nuclear and missile development, the United States and South Korea should employ coercive diplomacy to prevent Russian military aid from strengthening North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Enhanced multilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO allies could tighten arms trade restrictions and sanctions enforcement against both Russia and North Korea. Further, prioritized intelligence sharing and targeted sanctions should specifically address high technology transfers, such as space, nuclear, and unmanned technologies, between Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Lastly, recognizing that these measures may not fully curb North Korea’s military advancements, the United States and South Korea should proactively bolster deterrence strategies, including missile defenses and readiness across ground, air, maritime, and undersea domains.

Russia might continue a limited level of military exchange with North Korea to replenish its weapon stockpiles in the post-war period. However, Moscow is likely to shift its strategic focus from wartime necessities to post-war reconstruction, potentially adjusting its partnership with North Korea in line with its evolving strategic priorities, thereby placing less emphasis on strategic cooperation with North Korea. If this is realized, North Korea will no longer be able to rely comfortably on its partnership with Russia and may seek to improve relations with Washington and Seoul.

Constraints on North Korea’s Weapons Production

While production facilities, skilled labor, and basic materials were sufficient, limited demand for weapons constrained the expansion of North Korea’s defense industry after the Cold War. Despite being primarily perceived as a nuclear-armed state, North Korea had already established a self-sufficient defense industry in the 1970s and actively promoted arms exports in the 1980s. Even after the Cold War ended, Pyongyang maintained an overexpanded defense industry under the banner of a “military-first” policy during Kim Jong Il’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s, despite its technological limitations. North Korea’s defense industry technology has often been compared to that of the former Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s.

To address its outdated production capabilities, North Korea introduced computerized numerical control technology in the early 2010s. In 2016, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un also ordered the modernization of the Tae-sung Machine Factory, aiming to transform it into “a world-level ultra-modern machine producer.” These factories enabled North Korea to manufacture modern missiles. As the Tae-sung Machine Factory was considered a key missile production facility, its modernization underscored Pyongyang’s effort to acquire modern equipment for missile development. North Korea then successfully tested the solid-fuel Pukguksong-2 missiles a year later in February 2017, followed by the “March 18” engine, which featured greater thrust, the next month.

Although approximately half a million North Korean defense industry workers suffered from famine, along with the rest of the population, during the mid-1990s, the North Korean government prioritized investment in the defense sector, ensuring the retention of skilled labor thereafter. Regarding basic materials, although Pyongyang still relies on the importation of special alloys and advanced electronic components from other countries, it has maintained a largely self-reliant defense industrial system since the middle of the Cold War.

The primary restraint on North Korea’s defense industry has been declining international demand for its weaponry. The operational rate of its defense industry plummeted from 50 percent in the mid-1980s to just about 20 percent in 1991, following the end of the Cold War. While other countries reduced military spending and reallocated resources to social welfare and economic programs after the Cold War, North Korea instead viewed the post-Cold War world as hostile and prioritized military capabilities. North Korea’s decline in weapon production primarily stemmed from its economic crisis as well as reduced demand for weapons. These differences in both the causes and effects of reduced weapon production in North Korea stood in sharp contrast to the “peace dividend” experiences of other countries.

While North Korea has claimed success in developing advanced and modern weapons using domestic technological capacity, it remained largely isolated from international technology exchange networks. This technology isolation became more pronounced after Pyongyang formally committed to advancing its nuclear capabilities during its last party congress in 2021. Since then, North Korea has struggled to develop key military technologies, including military reconnaissance satellites, nuclear-propulsion submarines, and multiple reentry vehicles.

Although North Korea outlined five modernization priorities for its conventional forces in December 2017, these efforts stalled in early 2020 as Kim Jong Un prioritized nuclear weapons development. However, given North Korea’s significant disadvantage in conventional capabilities compared to South Korea — particularly in naval and air forces — modernizing its conventional forces remains an urgent challenge. Bridging this gap would be nearly impossible without external military assistance.

How Russo-North Korean Military Cooperation Strengthens North Korea’s Defense Industry

The current partnership initiative between Russia and North Korea extends to two key areas: expanding North Korea’s weapons production capacity and advancing military technology. Russia’s ammunition shortage prompted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2023. Shortly thereafter, North Korea escalated its military assistance, primarily supplying artillery shells. This move coincided with Kim Jong Un’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok two months later. Experts estimated that North Korea may have covered at least half of Russia’s additional ammunition demand, supplementing Moscow’s domestic production. According to a South Korean agency’s estimates, North Korea had supplied Russia with approximately 20,000 containers of weaponry by October 2024. Pyongyang presumably sent mainly artillery shells, short-range missiles, and anti-tank missiles to Moscow. If Moscow continues to require weapon stockpiles, even after the Russo-Ukrainian War ends, arms trade between the two countries is likely to persist.

North Korea leveraged its military aid to Russia to strengthen its defense industry. As Pyongyang and Moscow established a supply chain for military production, Kim Jong Un intensified his focus on boosting North Korea’s arms manufacturing. During on-site inspections of defense factories, Kim repeatedly emphasized increasing the production of artillery shells, tactical missiles, tactical missile launchers, and strategic missile launchers. His directives signal that factories must meet these targets with tangible results. Moreover, he prioritized modernizing production facilities, implying governmental investment in acquiring advanced engineering equipment. During his on-site inspections following Shoigu’s visit, Kim publicly stated that modernization efforts are required in the defense sectors, including ammunition production, tactical missiles, tactical missile launchers, and combat shipbuilding.

While meeting Russia’s wartime demands, North Korea’s weapons production and modernization efforts were also driven by its own military priorities. For instance, its plans to increase the production of strategic launchers and modernize combat shipbuilding facilities were largely unrelated to Russia’s needs in Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang used its arms trade with Russia as a means to circumvent international sanctions, further insulating its defense industry from external pressure.

Beyond weapon production, Russo-North Korean military cooperation significantly bolstered Pyongyang’s military technology development. During his visit to Russia’s Far East and Vladivostok in September 2023, Kim Jong Un toured major defense industry sites, including the Vostochny Cosmodrome, an aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and the Russian Pacific Fleet. His itinerary demonstrated a broader ambition beyond North Korea’s five-year weapons development plan — highlighting his interest in modernizing the country’s outdated navy and air force. As a result, Kim sought Russian expertise in several military domains, including space vehicles and reconnaissance satellites, conventional weaponry (ground, air, and sea), and emerging technologies like drones and electromagnetic operations.

Among these sectors, technical cooperation was particularly evident in space vehicle development, aircraft, anti-air missile systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, North Korea’s May 2024 reconnaissance satellite launch featured a new kerosene-liquid oxygen engine, presumably based on Russian technology. Additionally, reports from early 2024 suggested that Russian aircraft engineers assisted North Korea in upgrading its aircraft plants, possibly to improve its Mig-29s fleet. Furthermore, Russia’s transfer of five attack drones and one reconnaissance drone to North Korea strongly suggested an exchange of military technology, allowing Pyongyang to reverse-engineer these systems to start its domestic drone capabilities.

Despite these developments, concerns remain over the broader implications of growing military exchanges between Russia and North Korea. The recent deployment of North Korean troops to Russia further raises questions about deeper cooperation. While no concrete evidence has surfaced regarding technology transfers in areas such as strategic missile systems, nuclear propulsion submarines, or modern warship technologies, continued monitoring and containment efforts are essential to prevent further proliferation of advanced Russian capabilities to North Korea.

Countering a Russo-North Korean Military Partnership

President Donald Trump has said that North Korea’s military support for Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War was “a very complicating” factor. The expansion of North Korea’s defense industrial base — bolstered by its military partnership with Russia — poses an increasing security threat to Northeast Asia. Thus, the United States and its allies, especially South Korea, should address the implications of Russo-North Korean military cooperation on the evolution of North Korea’s military capabilities. Failure to do so could mean that even if the United States ultimately succeeds in ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, President Trump will face a heightened threat and increased demands from North Korea when attempting to negotiate with Kim Jong Un thereafter. Moreover, as long as Russo-North Korean military cooperation continues, North Korea is unlikely to show any interest in improving relations with the United States, remaining content with Russia’s diplomatic, military, and economic support. The Trump administration, therefore, needs to limit Russo-North Korean military cooperation until the Russo-Ukrainian War ends, and work to induce Russia to terminate its military cooperation with North Korea concurrently with the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. If Russia agrees to scale back the acquisition of North Korean weapons at the end of the war, it may lose interest in defense industrial cooperation and military technology transfer to North Korea as its dependency on Pyongyang diminishes.

First, before negotiations between the United States and Russia to end the Russo-Ukrainian War began, the United States and South Korea had to resort to coercive diplomacy to dissuade Russia from supplying advanced technologies and sanctioned materials to North Korea. Therefore, Seoul warned Russia that Moscow’s continued military cooperation with Pyongyang could prompt South Korea to provide lethal aid to Ukraine. However, after the inauguration of President Trump, the United States and Russia agreed to begin negotiating to end the war in Ukraine. Under this new context, Washington can leverage the negotiations to persuade Moscow to refrain from providing North Korea with the kind of military cooperation that contributes to North Korean missile and nuclear programs.

Second, to counter North Korea’s expanding defense production capabilities — enabled by its military cooperation with Russia — the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO countries should intensify efforts to restrict arms trade between Pyongyang and Moscow. These nations, which share concerns over North Korea-produced ammunition and missiles, should further strengthen intelligence-sharing mechanisms to track North Korea’s sanctions evasion tactics. Keith Kellogg, the U.S. president’s special envoy for Ukraine, said that the United States could employ economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia to end Moscow’s war-sustaining effort. In addition, China could play a pivotal role in curbing Russo-North Korean military cooperation, particularly in the context of potential Sino-American engagement during the second Trump administration.

By leveraging collective efforts, they can reinforce export controls against both North Korea and Russia. Moreover, the revival of multinational sanctions enforcement mechanisms — including the UN Security Council’s 1718 Sanctions Committee — should be pursued alongside new initiatives like the Multinational Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was established last October by the United States, South Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The second Trump administration has continued its participation in this team, aiming to fully implement the United Nations sanctions regarding North Korea.

Third, preventing military technology transfers between Russia and North Korea requires enhanced intelligence-sharing and targeted sanctions. North Korea’s recent deployment of additional troops to Russia may be met with reciprocal transfers of high-tech military technology from Russia. Therefore, monitoring cooperation in key areas — including space systems, nuclear technology, conventional arms, and unmanned weapons — should be prioritized for nations seeking to curtail Pyongyang’s growing capabilities. Tracking bilateral engineering exchanges and illicit high-tech equipment transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran will enable the United States and its allies to impose sanctions on individuals and entities engaged in proliferation activities within these sensitive sectors.

Fourth, these measures alone may not be sufficient to fully halt North Korea’s defense industry expansion and modernization, meaning that its military threat to neighboring countries will likely persist. In response, the U.S.-South Korean alliance should prepare to deter future North Korean provocations across multiple domains, particularly in ground and air operations. As the Russo-Ukrainian War winds down, North Korea is expected to acquire more advanced missiles and artillery shells with improved production capacity while simultaneously improving fighter capabilities with Russian military assistance that they secured during the war. Seoul and Washington, therefore, should proactively reinforce deterrence measures.

Furthermore, Washington and Seoul should develop strategic responses to North Korea’s threats in maritime and undersea domains, as well as its efforts to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. There remains a possibility that Russia could eventually transfer shipbuilding technologies, submarine development expertise, and multiple warhead technologies to North Korea should their defense partnership continue. Should this occur, the urgency for robust countermeasures will escalate significantly. During a confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg stated that North Korea remained focused on expanding its illicit nuclear weapons and improving its ballistic and cruise missile programs and highlighted the need to improve missile defense systems for the U.S. homeland.

The Future Trajectory of the Russo-North Korean Partnership

When the Russo-Ukrainian War nears its end, Moscow may downgrade its partnership with Pyongyang. A historical precedent can be found in the early 1990s when heightened Russo-North Korean cooperation in the mid-1980s quickly faded once Moscow reconciled with Washington and Beijing. At that time, Moscow disregarded Pyongyang’s demands and established normal relations with Seoul in September 1990, abruptly severing military and economic assistance to North Korea.

If Russia takes similar steps again, Russia may disregard North Korea’s standing in future negotiations with the United States after its relations with Washington improve following the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Then, North Korea may face the prospect of domestic instability due to a cessation of Russian assistance and another “No Deal” negotiation with the United States. In this case, North Korea will seek to rely on China just, as it did after the failed negotiation with the United States in 2019. The diplomatic stalemate between North Korea and the United States could be prolonged for years.

However, some experts consider that heightened Russo-North Korean cooperation could persist, given North Korea’s need for security assurances from Russia and Russia’s interest in North Korean labor forces. Russia has experienced a severe workforce shortage, reaching nearly 5 million workers in 2023. North Korean cheap labor force will help resolve the huge labor shortage in Russia. Bolstering this prospect, Andrei Rudenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, explained this month that Russia and North Korea were preparing for Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia.

In this scenario, North Korea will be able to improve relations with the United States, by using Russia’s diplomatic influence over the Trump administration. With Russia’s diplomatic support, North Korea might repeat its five specific demands to resume the U.S.-North Korean denuclearization talks. Conceding to these demands would weaken U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees for South Korea. Moreover, North Korea could use its alliance with Russia to initiate provocations against South Korea. In the worst-case scenario, this could escalate into a military crisis, destabilizing the Indo-Pacific and complicating the U.S. military responses across the region.

To ensure lasting regional security, the United States and South Korea must remain vigilant in monitoring and responding to evolving Russo-North Korean ties. Their success — or failure — will shape Asia’s security landscape well into the future.

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Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

Image: The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · April 1, 2025

8. Five Questions For A General Podcast: General Martin Dempsey and General Walter Sharp

​The 30 minute podcast is at the link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/five-questions-for-a-general-podcast-general-martin-dempsey-and-general-walter-sharp/

​Some very important commentary over a broad range of critical national security issues from the Indo-Pacific, Korea, and Europe, information, all volunteer military, defense industrial base and more.

Five Questions For A General Podcast: General Martin Dempsey and General Walter Sharp - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Charles Faint · March 31, 2025

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Welcome to Five Questions for a General, a new podcast from the Modern War Institute at West Point. The series features specially selected cadet hosts who are given an incredible professional development opportunity—to sit down with senior military officers and ask carefully crafted questions about everything from leadership to their unique experiences while serving to their expectations about the future of war.

This inaugural episode features a discussion with retired General Martin Dempsey and retired General Walter Sharpe. Both members of the West Point class of 1974, General Dempsey retired from the US Army after serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Sharpe culminated his Army career by serving simultaneously as the commander of United Nations Command, US Forces Korea, and ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Cadet Sebastian Witt hosts this episode and asks them about the military profession, emerging threats on today’s strategic landscape, and the changes that have taken place at West Point since their graduation in 1974.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Charles Faint · March 31, 2025

9. The abrupt end to 75 years of U.S. policy on South Korea?

I do not think this is an April 1st article because this is the type of stuff Professor Robertson usually writes.

I​ do not hear the lady singing yet. We have weathered many storms before. Recall President Carter tried to withdraw US troops?

But Professor Robertson makes a point about "transactionalism" and the damage it can do. We must be careful what we ask for as we may get it (i.e., a completely transactional relationship).

Excerpts:

The relationship is sold to the public as shared democratic ideals and shared sacrifice in pursuit of freedom. Peel back the public rhetoric of shared values and enduring friendship, the Korea–U.S. relationship is purely transactional. South Korea offers strategic positioning and economic partnership, and the U.S. provides military protection and technological collaboration.

This give-and-take nature occasionally becomes clear in negotiations over defense cost-sharing, trade disputes, and technology transfers, where each side leverages its assets to extract concessions. Far from being a bond of pure principle, the alliance functions as a calculated transaction, sustained not by sentiment but by mutual benefit.

Trump’s upfront emphasis on transaction removes any last vestige of sentiment. Democratic ideals and shared sacrifice mean nothing. It removes the assumptions inherent in seventy five years of international relations thought on South Korea.

Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski and the assumption that South Korea is a regional balancer—inherently always supporting a stable U.S.-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific is dead in the water. Peeling back the sentiment, and leaving only the transaction pushes South Korea’s policy towards a more autonomous, interest-driven foreign policy. A foreign policy that will not inherently align with that of the U.S.

The choices South Korea makes in the coming decade will likely defy Washington’s expectations—and come as a profound shock to many of its most celebrated foreign policy minds still using Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski to understand South Korea and its role in the region. South Korea is not your grandfather’s country. It’s time to rethink the Korean Peninsula.

Commentary

The abrupt end to 75 years of U.S. policy on South Korea?

South Korea is not your grandfather’s country. It’s time to rethink the Korean Peninsula.

https://www.junotane.com/p/the-abrupt-end-to-75-years-of-us-policy-on-korea?r=7i07&utm

Apr 01, 2025

South Korea has long been shaped—directly and indirectly—by the intellectual legacy of America’s most influential international relations thinkers. Figures like Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski cast long shadows over South Korea. It is through their works that decision-makers formed modern U.S. policy on South Korea.

Trump’s approach to the Korean Peninsula upends seventy five years of international relations thought on South Korea. What happens when Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski are no longer relevant?

Share Junotane

Morgenthau’s focus was on the broad principles of international politics and the behavior of major powers in the context of the Cold War. While he occasionally referred to geopolitical events in Asia, including the Korean War, these were brief mentions used to illustrate general principles of power politics, rather than analyses of South Korea itself. South Korea appears in passing as part of the U.S.–Soviet strategic competition, but Morgenthau never paid close attention to it. However, this did not stop others from applying his work to South Korea.

For Morgenthau, it was natural that South Korea should align its policies with U.S. strategic priorities while also reinforcing its own regional power. South Korea acts as a bulwark against Chinese and North Korean influence in East Asia. Therefore, Seoul should increase defense spending, enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, and support a stable balance of power in the region.

However, reflecting U.S. interests, South Korea also had to be constrained, and discouraged from being too assertive or nationalistic in ways that would provoke conflict and destabilize the U.S.-led order. From a realist standpoint, the primary goal was to ensure South Korea remained a reliable (read controllable) and strategically valuable ally in maintaining U.S. influence and security architecture.

Much like Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger’s works discuss South Korea not as a major focus but rather in the broader context of U.S. Cold War strategy, East Asian geopolitics, and U.S.-China relations. Again, this did not stop others from applying his work to South Korea.

From this perspective, South Korea’s role is as a calculated and flexible partner within the broader architecture of regional balance. Seoul acted as a stable deterrent against North Korea and an important symbol of the U.S. continued presence in East Asia. Again, the ultimate aim was to ensure that South Korea contributed to a stable regional order that supported American primacy without provoking unnecessary confrontation. Moral ambitions—whether about spreading democracy or pursuing reunification—were to be subordinated to the more urgent need for balance, deterrence, and restraint.

Morgenthau and Kissinger then position South Korea in a distinct role - a junior partner, which needs to be strengthened but also controlled. These two thinkers—despite their intellectual brilliance—brought to the table assumptions about South Korea’s national interests that were deeply rooted in American strategic priorities, rather than Korean realities. They imagined a Korea whose core interest was to remain a loyal junior partner in the U.S.-led order, focused on deterrence and alignment. These assumptions, which are still very pervasive in certain thinktanks in Washington, have led to a fundamental misreading of Korean strategic intent, identity, and future direction.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, though often associated with liberal internationalism, shared key realist insights—particularly his emphasis on geopolitical strategy, spheres of influence, and the need for long-term planning in an unpredictable world.

Brzezinski viewed the Korean Peninsula as a critical geopolitical fault line where continental and maritime powers converge. His most influential work, The Grand Chessboard could almost be the blueprint for the last two decades of U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula.

Applying his thinking, South Korea’s role was not only as a U.S. ally, but as a pivotal actor in the broader architecture of Eurasian stability. The aim then was for South Korea to not maintain a passive or reactive stance in foreign policy but rather pursue a proactive shaping of the regional order through multilateral diplomacy, economic statecraft, and strategic foresight. This meant there was a need to deepen strategic alignment with the U.S. as part of a broader effort to maintain American primacy in Eurasia.

Brzezinski is distinct in that he recognizes Seoul has agency. Perhaps because of the time period, writing when South Korea was well on the way to being a globally significant actor, Brzezinski recognized South Korea’s capacity to choose how to interact with its region - even to the extent of not choosing the U.S.

Brzezinski recognized the temptations towards neutrality or regional accommodation with China that are an inevitable pull on South Korea. To address this, he argued for a robust trilateral alliance with Japan and the U.S. as a counterbalance to rising Chinese influence. In the same way, his ideals supported cautious engagement with North Korea—not out of idealism or cultural affinity, but as a tactical move to prevent Beijing from monopolizing influence.

The emphasis then, is placed on South Korea playing the role of a regional balancer—projecting strength, upholding liberal democratic norms, and supporting a stable U.S.-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

Brzezinski’s thought encapsulates the policies pursued under Republican and Democrat administrations until Donald Trump.

Trump upended seventy five years of international relations thought on South Korea. His transactional approach cannot be understood within the framework of international relations scholarly canon. Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski provide no guidance. All that is left is the transaction.

Trump’s transactional approach to South Korea opens a can of worms. For seventy-five years, the influence of Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski placed ideological constraints on the Korean Peninsula’s much longer tradition of transactional diplomacy - a tradition stretching back over millennia. It is a tradition that has often reared its head despite efforts to curtail it.

Agree to an armistice? Provide a mutual defense treaty! Want troops in Vietnam? Provide economic incentives and investment! Want troops in Iraq? We’ll send them to the more secure oil producing Kurdistan region! Provide lethal aid to Ukraine? Nope. Buy it instead!

The relationship is sold to the public as shared democratic ideals and shared sacrifice in pursuit of freedom. Peel back the public rhetoric of shared values and enduring friendship, the Korea–U.S. relationship is purely transactional. South Korea offers strategic positioning and economic partnership, and the U.S. provides military protection and technological collaboration.

This give-and-take nature occasionally becomes clear in negotiations over defense cost-sharing, trade disputes, and technology transfers, where each side leverages its assets to extract concessions. Far from being a bond of pure principle, the alliance functions as a calculated transaction, sustained not by sentiment but by mutual benefit.

Trump’s upfront emphasis on transaction removes any last vestige of sentiment. Democratic ideals and shared sacrifice mean nothing. It removes the assumptions inherent in seventy five years of international relations thought on South Korea.

Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski and the assumption that South Korea is a regional balancer—inherently always supporting a stable U.S.-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific is dead in the water. Peeling back the sentiment, and leaving only the transaction pushes South Korea’s policy towards a more autonomous, interest-driven foreign policy. A foreign policy that will not inherently align with that of the U.S.

The choices South Korea makes in the coming decade will likely defy Washington’s expectations—and come as a profound shock to many of its most celebrated foreign policy minds still using Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Brzezinski to understand South Korea and its role in the region. South Korea is not your grandfather’s country. It’s time to rethink the Korean Peninsula.

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10. north Korean Unification presentations - "Korea Dream: Pathway to Peace and Freedom"

​ In addition to this presentation at Emory University we have made presentations virtually and in person at the University of Chicago, Stanford, and Southern Methodist University as well as a high school in a Dallas suburb. We are scheduled to visit multiple schools on the West Coast later this month and some additional schools in the Northeast.

​T​his is presentation by my friend and colleague, Hyunseung Lee. He is a North Korean Affairs Specialist and escapee, ​and speaks about his experiences and deciding factors for leaving ​north Korea. Clipped from the "Korea Dream: Pathway to Peace and Freedom" event held on March 3 at Emory University in Georgia.

Why A North Korean Elite Defected To The US 

https://youtu.be/iIv17BVRYnA?t=1

​T​his is my presentation I gave at Emory University on March 3d along with my friend and colleague from north Korea, Hyunseung Lee

Strategic Approach to Denuclearization of North Korea

https://youtu.be/JDapeihzSW8?t=2​

The slides I am using in the presentation can be downloaded here (since you cannot see them in the video): https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-cjo3ayoaWa3Tjg0q6B6PZUCj_YCvZ6s/view?usp=sharing

11.[NNP 뉴포초대석] 데이빗 맥스웰에게 묻는다 "한국이 중국에 전쟁을 선포해야 할까?" [NNP Newport Invitation] Asking David Maxwell, "Should Korea declare war on China?"

​This is Part 1 of a podcast I did with a Korean American journalist Hong Seong-gu. A very provocative title (Spoiler alert: I did not recommend that South Korea declare war on China). This isi in English with Korean subtitles.

[NNP 뉴포초대석] 데이빗 맥스웰에게 묻는다 "한국이 중국에 전쟁을 선포해야 할까?"

[NNP Newport Invitation] Asking David Maxwell, "Should Korea declare war on China?"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTTWTr2njNA

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Mar 31, 2025 #News and Post #AmericanPolitics #Trump

Here is the first part of an interview with retired Colonel David Maxwell, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center, held in Washington, D.C. We asked him how Korean Peninsula experts in the U.S. view the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol, whether Korea should declare war on China, and why Trump is quiet. Let's hear his answers. Host: Hong Seong-gu, Chief Reporter, retired Colonel David Maxwell

12. Trump says there's 'communication' with N.K. leader Kim

​I have not seen any reporting on the communication. I am sure we have submitted something through the "New York Channel." But has there been two way communication?

Trump says there's 'communication' with N.K. leader Kim | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 1, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 31 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump said Monday there is "communication" with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un while noting he will "do something" on the recalcitrant regime "at some point."

Trump made the remarks during a press availability amid speculation he might resume direct diplomacy with Kim, which resulted in three in-person meetings between the leaders from 2018-2019.

"We have a great relationship, and yeah, we have ... there is communication," he said without elaborating. "I think it's very important."

He was responding to a question of when he plans to reach out to Kim.

U.S. President Donald Trump meets reporters as he signs executive orders at the White House in Washington on March 31, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

The president depicted North Korea as a "big nuclear nation" and its leader as a "smart guy."

He recalled June 2019, when he walked across the Military Demarcation Line into North Korea at Kim's invitation.

"(I) got to know him very well. I remember I put my foot across the line, and then I walked across the line," he said.

He added, "I will probably do something at some point."

Days after taking office in January, Trump said in an interview that he will reach out to Kim again.

Trump and Kim held three meetings -- the first in Singapore in June 2018, another in Hanoi in February 2019 and the last in the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in June 2019.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 1, 2025

13. Constitutional Court to rule on Yoon's impeachment Friday

​Get ready.

I will be interested in reading the responses from China and north Korea.

(2nd LD) Constitutional Court to rule on Yoon's impeachment Friday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 1, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with reactions, background; ADDS photos)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- The Constitutional Court said it will deliver its ruling on President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment at 11 a.m. Friday, raising hopes of an end to the political turmoil that has gripped the nation since his short-lived imposition of martial law in December.

The verdict will be delivered from the court and live broadcasts will be allowed, along with the attendance of members of the public, the court said in a notice to the press Tuesday.

The ruling will come nearly four months after Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on charges of violating the Constitution and laws through his brief imposition of martial law on Dec. 3.

In the interim, the country has had two acting presidents, including one who was impeached and then reinstated, and faced a myriad of political and economic challenges stemming in part from the leadership vacuum.

President Yoon Suk Yeol attends the fourth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Jan. 23, 2025, over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

During the trial, Yoon was accused of sending troops to the National Assembly to stop lawmakers from voting down the decree and ordering the arrest of prominent politicians, among other charges.

Yoon has denied wrongdoing, saying the order was meant as a warning to the main opposition party for what he described as its abuse of legislative power.

Under the Constitution, the consent of at least six justices is required to uphold an impeachment motion. There are currently eight justices on the bench.

If the impeachment motion is upheld, Yoon will be removed from office. If it is dismissed, he will be reinstated to serve out the remainder of his term through May 2027.

In addition to the impeachment trial, which effectively wrapped up with the final hearing on Feb. 25, Yoon has been standing a criminal trial on charges of inciting an insurrection through his martial law bid.

He was detained by investigators in January and held at a detention center until March 8, when he was released under a court ruling that his detention was invalid.

Soldiers prepare to enter the main hall of the National Assembly in Seoul in the wee hours of Dec. 4, 2024, following President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of martial law, citing the need to root out pro-North Korean forces and uphold the constitutional order. (Yonhap)

Yoon's legal team said his appearance at the court for the verdict is still undecided.

Both the ruling People Power Party and the main opposition Democratic Party welcomed the court's announcement.

"It's a relief that this state of constitutional instability will be resolved," PPP interim leader Kwon Young-se told reporters.

PPP floor leader Kweon Seong-dong reaffirmed that his party will accept the verdict, saying the court should not be "shaken by the offensives of the Democratic Party that is trying to induce a certain outcome."

Meanwhile, DP floor leader Park Chan-dae expressed confidence the justices will vote unanimously to remove Yoon from office.

"The best ruling that will suppress and end the current state of insurrection is undoubtedly the dismissal of insurrection ringleader Yoon Suk Yeol," he said.

The presidential office released a brief statement to the press saying it will "calmly wait for the Constitutional Court's decision."

Thirty-eight days is the longest the court has taken to deliver its ruling on a president's impeachment following the final hearing.

In the past cases of former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye, it took the court 14 days and 11 days, respectively.

Four of the six exits of Anguk Station near the Constitutional Court were temporarily closed after the announcement as a safety precaution against protestors rallying for and against Yoon's impeachment.

Trains will not stop at the station Friday, and the same could apply to the nearby stations of Gwanghwamun, Gyeongbokgung, Jongno 3-ga, Jonggak and City Hall, as well as Hangangjin near the official presidential residence.

Officials from the ruling People Power Party stage a rally in front of the Constitutional Court in Seoul on April 1, 2025, to call for the court to reject an opposition-led motion to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol in connection with his short-lived imposition of martial law in December, with those from the opposition bloc including the main opposition Democratic Party holding up banners saying "Immediately Remove Yoon from Office." (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 1, 2025

14. Police to deploy 14,000 personnel in Seoul as court poised to rule on Yoon's impeachment

To both the extremes, progressives and conservatives, please sustain your record of no political violence regardless of the outcome. Do not make this 1987 or 1980.

(2nd LD) Police to deploy 14,000 personnel in Seoul as court poised to rule on Yoon's impeachment | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS details on police response in paras 3, 10-11)

By Kim Hyun-soo

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- Police have decided to deploy some 14,000 personnel in Seoul, according to sources familiar with the matter Tuesday, as the Constitutional Court is poised to rule on President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment case later this week.

The court said it will deliver its verdict on whether to dismiss or reinstate Yoon over his failed martial law bid on Friday. For months, political polarization has deepened between supporters and opponents of Yoon's impeachment over his failed martial law bid.

The National Police Agency placed police forces on the "Gapho" alert, the highest level that puts all available police forces on emergency standby, starting Thursday midnight.

In addition, police will immediately arrest those who attempt to break into the Constitutional Court compound and beef up security service for all Constitutional Court justices.

Should Yoon decide to attend at the court for the verdict, police will take measures to secure the pathway from the presidential residence to the Constitutional Court, and separate the protesters calling for or against Yoon's impeachment on the way.

Yoon's legal representatives said a decision was yet to be made on whether Yoon will attend the court on Friday.

Officials from the ruling People Power Party stage a rally in front of the Constitutional Court in Seoul on April 1, 2025, to call for the court to reject an opposition-led motion to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol in connection with his short-lived imposition of martial law in December, while those from the opposition bloc, including the main opposition Democratic Party, hold up banners saying "Immediately Remove Yoon from Office." (Yonhap)

Shortly after the court's announcement of a date for Yoon's impeachment ruling, anti-Yoon protesters near Gwanghwamun Square, where they were holding an overnight sit-in, welcomed it and shouted "immediate ouster" of the suspended president.

Yoon Bok-nam, the president of Lawyers for a Democratic Society, also known as Minbyun, told reporters that the date for Yoon's impeachment ruling "came much too late, but it is still a relief."

However, pro-Yoon protesters near the Constitutional Court chanted "dismiss impeachment" while waving Korean and American flags.

Police had reportedly mobilized some 3,200 personnel near the Constitutional Court as of Tuesday afternoon following the court's announcement.

Police plan to turn the area around the court into a "vacuum state" by blocking access by the public, prompting pro-Yoon groups to remove tents installed near the court.

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2025

15. Roads in central Seoul to be closed Friday as court delivers Yoon verdict

​The South Korean security services have learned, adapted, and are now anticipating. (and of course planning for the worst while hoping for the best).

Roads in central Seoul to be closed Friday as court delivers Yoon verdict | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2025

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- Roads near the Constitutional Court in central Seoul will be closed Friday as the court delivers its ruling on President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment, with massive rallies expected both in support of and against him, police said Tuesday.

The Constitutional Court earlier announced that it will deliver its ruling on Yoon's impeachment at 11 a.m. Friday, nearly four months after Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on charges of violating the Constitution and laws through his brief imposition of martial law on Dec. 3.

Tens of thousands of people are expected to gather near the Constitutional Court, as well as in nearby areas, including Sejongdaero, Euljiro and Sajikro, on the day of the ruling, according to the police.

The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency plans to deploy 810 personnel for traffic control and to minimize public inconvenience, it added.

Police advised the public to use public transportation or get updates on the latest traffic information in the event they use their own vehicles.

Police have partially closed roads connected to a junction near the Constitutional Court after it announced the date for Yoon's ruling earlier in the day.

Police buses are parked near the Constitutional Court in central Seoul on April 1, 2025. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2025

16.  Russia's party delegation arrives in N. Korea amid deepening bilateral cooperation

​The fusion of foes continues.

(LEAD) Russia's party delegation arrives in N. Korea amid deepening bilateral cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 1, 2025

(ATTN: REWRITES lead; UPDATES with more info in paras 3-5)

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- A delegation of Russia's Communist Party has arrived in North Korea, Pyongyang's state media said Tuesday, as both nations have been deepening cooperation in the military and other fields.

The delegation, led by Kazbek Taysaev, secretary of the Russian party's central committee, arrived in Pyongyang on Monday, the Korean Central News Agency said, without disclosing other details, including the purpose of the visit.

The visit came as North Korea and Russia have expanded the scope of cooperation in the military, economy and other areas since they forged a mutual defense treaty in June last year.

"As the Communist Party is Russia's opposition party, (the delegation's trip) is seen as part of symbolic exchanges of their traditional and friendly ties," an official at Seoul's unification ministry, told reporters.

The Communist Party is Russia's second-largest party after the ruling United Russia. Taysaev also serves as head of the Russia-North Korea friendship parliamentary group of the State Duma.

The party delegation's visit came as Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko said last week that preparations are under way for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to visit Russia this year, without specifying the exact timing of the visit.

There is speculation that Kim may travel to Russia, possibly in May on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of Russia's Victory Day. Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Kim to visit Moscow during his trip to Pyongyang last June for summit talks.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 21, 2025, shows members of a Russian delegation, led by Russia's Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, laying a wreath at the Liberation Tower in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 1, 2025

17. N. Korean arms factories pivot to advanced weapons under Kim's new strategy

​All advanced weapons serve three purposes:

Support to political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

Support to proliferation to make money for the regime.

Support to warfighting.

N. Korean arms factories pivot to advanced weapons under Kim's new strategy - Daily NK English

One factory in Jagang province is being reorganized to increase production of cruise missile components, including fuselages, engines, guidance systems, and warheads

By Jeong Tae Joo - April 1, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 1, 2025

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on May 29, 2024, that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had visited the Academy of National Defense Science the previous day (May 28) to celebrate the 60th anniversary of its establishment. In the photograph, Kim is seen touring the facility. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

North Korean arms factories have begun reorganizing production under Kim Jong Un’s new military strategy. These abrupt changes are disrupting previous production plans and increasing pressure on factory workers.

“To implement Kim Jong Un’s plans to boost national defense and expand arms production, the Munitions Industry Department ordered the Second Economic Committee in mid-March to revamp production lines at arms factories. Some factories have already received technical guidance about reorganization,” a source in North Korea told Daily NK recently.

While North Korea’s arms factories have traditionally focused on conventional weapons, the latest orders aim to shift production toward new weapons systems including drones, cruise missiles, tactical nuclear-capable missiles, and hypersonic missiles, the source said.

According to the source, Factory No. 26 in Jagang province and the Hung Nam Ki Machine Factory in South Hamgyong province are being reorganized to increase production of cruise missile components, including fuselages, engines, guidance systems, and warheads.

Production lines for advanced hypersonic missile parts are also being added to several plants in North Pyongan province: Factory No. 39 in Kusong, Factory No. 78 in Taegwan county, Factory No. 52 in Sakju county, and Factory No. 71 in Taechon county.

However, these restructuring efforts have hit some snags.

“Labor organizations and production plans are being adjusted as part of this sudden factory reorganization, causing temporary delays in the government’s original procurement timelines,” the source explained.

The ruling party’s Munitions Industry Department has increased oversight of factories undergoing upgrades. Officials are particularly focused on minimizing disruption to existing production schedules.

“Officials from the party’s Munitions Industry Department and the Second Economic Committee have been visiting factories personally, telling managers these orders come directly from the top. They’re emphasizing that reorganization is essential and must be achieved through the workforce’s ‘revolutionary zeal,'” the source said.

These visits by Central Committee officials appear designed to prevent internal resistance, reduce confusion, and motivate defense sector workers to meet production targets.

Factory managers responsible for implementing these production plans are extending work hours while framing the increased pace as an “expression of loyalty.”

“The song ‘Even in Death, Let’s Not Give Up Our Revolutionary Beliefs’ plays around the clock at work teams in arms factories. Workers who were already physically exhausted are now complaining about the mental burden too. Some say they’re more worried about losing their minds than their revolutionary beliefs,” the source added.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 1, 2025

18. N. Korean officials show unprecedented effort during 'Friday labor' sessions

​Although it may be difficult for some of us to see and realize, Kim Jnog Un is likely under greater internal stress than is South Korea's democracy. We need to be very observant for signs of resistance and internal instability and their effects. The ideological efforts the regime is undertaking shows that it is under great strain.

N. Korean officials show unprecedented effort during 'Friday labor' sessions - Daily NK English

Authorities have stressed that Friday labor isn't merely work but a "rewarding, patriotic endeavor" that contributes to societal development

By Jeong Seo-yeong - April 1, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 1, 2025

Workers at a textile factory in Pyongyang making face masks. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)

The behavior of North Korean officials has noticeably shifted since authorities began emphasizing the importance of “Friday labor” at central government agencies.

“Before the March 14 Friday labor session, ministries and central government agencies strongly criticized workers for their lack of dedication,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK recently. “As a result, officials working at farms in downtown Pyongyang that day showed unprecedented effort, drawing significant attention.”

Friday labor requires officials from party organizations and administrative agencies to perform physical labor at farms or factories every Friday. Traditionally, however, participating officials would often pretend to work or simply kill time until receiving their work certificates.

Recently, ministries and central government agencies have cracked down on this half-hearted approach.

According to the source, authorities highlighted various abuses: officials who should arrive around 9 a.m. would instead show up at 11, eat lunch, and leave around 3 p.m. after getting their work certificates, far short of proper work hours. Others would arrange for alcohol or food to be delivered, turning the sessions into social gatherings.

Authorities have stressed that Friday labor isn’t merely work but a “rewarding, patriotic endeavor” that contributes to societal development while transforming officials along “revolutionary lines.”

Under this increased pressure, officials’ attitudes during recent Friday labor sessions have changed dramatically.

“Ministry and central government officials working on farms on March 14 showed diligence completely unlike before, surprising farm workers with their sincere participation,” the source said.

Officials arrived at farms at 9 a.m., carried fertilizer boxes on their backs, and plowed fields with shovels and pickaxes—behavior farm workers had never witnessed previously.

They also ate simple packed lunches and engaged with farm workers, asking about challenges they faced and how officials might help.

Farm workers were astonished when they saw officials staying until 5 p.m. for the first time ever.

“The latest Friday labor session was important for spring farming preparations, but it was also a critical opportunity to demonstrate their revolutionary work attitude, so they seemed vigilant,” the source explained.

However, farm workers remain skeptical, saying they’ll “wait and see, as you never know when the officials’ attitudes will change again,” according to the source. “Some farm workers believe officials are only working hard because they fear losing their positions if caught slacking off as before, and that they won’t maintain this effort without constant pressure.”

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dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 1, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com