Quotes of the Day:
"Mariupol is the heart of this war. If it stops beating, our positions will be weaker."
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy
"Wisdom consists of the capacity to confront disturbing ideas, even intolerable ideas, with equanimity."
- Leo Rosten
"Just like the nation it defends, the U.S. military strives to be a more perfect version of itself. And I will take that over our competitors any day."
- Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at USMA Graduation May 22, 2021
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 10 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. A Shadow War Against Putin – How America Can Covertly Undermine the Kremlin
3. The Pentagon Must ‘Campaign’ Against China, Not Hope for a Goal-Line Stand
4. Production Of The V-22 Osprey Is Ending. The Pentagon Needs To Be Sure It Has Bought Enough.
5. A Message to NATO from an SAS Soldier
6. The wartime president: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks with Scott Pelley in Kyiv
7. Ukraine's Zelenskiy says tens of thousands killed in Mariupol, seeks military aid from S.Korea
8. Desperate Ukraine tells U.S. 'bureaucracy' is no excuse for failing to provide critical weapons and ammunition
9. What weapons to send to Ukraine? How debate shifted from helmets to tanks.
10. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes
11. The Jack Ryan career path: How veterans can join the CIA
12. War in Ukraine - April 11, 2022 | SOF News
13. Russian students are turning in teachers who don’t back the war
14. If you thought Russia was bad, just try China
15. Ukraine, Russia Gear Up for War’s Biggest Battles
16. East Ukraine focus of new Russian assaults
17. Russia may be winning the Ukraine information war outside the West
18. ‘It feels like the end of the world’: Taiwan civilians practise for war as Ukraine revives China fears
19. SASC lawmakers bemoan classification, lack of detail in Pentagon strategies, budget
20. The Far-Right Idealized the Russian Military. Ukraine Exposes All the Ways They’re Wrong.
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 10 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 10 (putin's War)
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird
April 10, 5:00 pm ET
Russian forces made territorial gains in Mariupol in the past 24 hours and continued to reinforce operations along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis but did not make other territorial gains. Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on April 10, isolating the remaining Ukrainian defenders in two main locations: the main port of Mariupol in the southwest and the Azovstal steel plant in the east. Russian forces, including a convoy of hundreds of vehicles captured in Maxar Technologies imagery on April 8, continue to reinforce Russia’s offensive in Izyum to link up with Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on April 10, isolating the remaining Ukrainian defenders in the southwestern port and eastern Azovstal Steel Plant.
- Russian forces again made little to no progress in frontal assaults in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but continue to cohere further reinforcements.
- Maxar Technologies satellite imagery captured hundreds of Russian vehicles in Kharkiv Oblast redeploying to support Russian operations near Izyum.
- Ukrainian counterattacks may threaten Kherson city in the coming days or weeks.
The Russian Defense Ministry is reportedly offering cash bonuses to incentivize forces withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to reenter combat operations. Radio Svoboda published images of a document on April 10 that it reported was issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on April 2 offering specific bonuses for Russian troops in Ukraine.[1] The document specifies large payments including 300,000 rubles for destroying a fixed-wing aircraft, 200,000 for destroying a helicopter, and 50,000 for armored vehicles and artillery. Radio Svoboda stated the payments are intended to coerce units withdrawn from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions to reenter combat. We have previously reported several instances of Russian soldiers refusing orders to return to Ukraine after being pulled back.[2]
Russian forces are implementing increasingly draconian measures to conscript previously ineligible personnel. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 10 that Russian forces are now conscripting previously ineligible categories of people, including those with childhood disabilities and workers in protected industries.[3] The GUR reported that DNR/LNR authorities are enabling traffic inspectors to issue on-the-spot conscription notices and are establishing checkpoints on key highways. DNR and Russian military police are additionally reportedly destroying documents granting exemptions—such as medical records or work certificates—to forcibly conscript people.[4]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on April 10, isolating the remaining Ukrainian defenders in two main locations—the main port of Mariupol in the southwest, and the Azovstal steel plant in the east. Several geolocated videos released by pro-Russian accounts on April 10 confirm that Russian assaults from downtown Mariupol captured the fishing port west of the Azovstal steel plant, likely confirming Russian control of the city center as well.[5] Petro Andryushenko, an advisor to Mariupol’s mayor, reported on April 10 that Russian forces are setting up checkpoints in central and northeastern Mariupol to detain or kill Ukrainian citizens that resist the Russian occupation.[6] Andryushenko additionally stated that Russian forces are building crematoria and digging mass graves for Ukrainian civilians in Mariupol, but ISW cannot independently confirm this report. Russian forces continued assaults on both pockets of Ukrainian defenders in the last 24 hours without any major gains.[7]
Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued assaults on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Severodonetsk in the past 24 hours but did not make significant territorial gains.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled eight attacks and destroyed four tanks, eight armored vehicles, and seven unarmored vehicles in the past 24 hours.[9] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on April 10 that approximately 60,000 Russian personnel are deployed in eastern Ukraine, but ISW cannot independently confirm this number or if it includes DNR/LNR troops.[10] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych stated on April 9 that Russian forces have begun their major offensive on Donbas, which Kyiv expects to last 2-3 weeks.[11] Arestovych and other Ukrainian military forces stated that Russia is deploying additional unspecified units from the Southern Military District, undeployed Eastern Military District units, and forces withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine, though none of these forces have arrived in Donbas as of April 10.[12]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)
Russian forces continue to redeploy to the Kharkiv area to support the ongoing Russian offensive south of Izyum toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove. Maxar Technologies satellite imagery (see below) captured a convoy of hundreds of vehicles (including armored vehicles, towed artillery, and support equipment) extending at least eight miles moving south through Vleykyi Burluk, approximately 100km north of Izyum and 90km east of Kharkiv, on April 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Central and Eastern Military District units continued to arrive in Russia’s Belgorod, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts for further deployment to the Izyum front.[13] Russian forces likely repaired the main bridge in Izyum on April 10, supplementing their previously established pontoon bridge.[14] A pro-Russian Telegram channel depicted T-80 tanks from the 4th Guards Tank Division (which previously redeployed from the Sumy axis) at an unspecified location in Kharkiv Oblast on April 9.[15] These forces are likely deploying to support ongoing Russian operations near Izyum, which have not taken any territory in the last 48 hours.[16]
Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.
Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.
Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces launched unsuccessful counterattacks against recent Ukrainian gains in Osokorkivka (north of Kherson) and Oleksandrivka (35km west of Kherson city) on April 10.[17] Ukrainian forces claimed to strike (unclear if with airstrikes or artillery) a Russian airfield and command post in Melitopol on April 10.[18] Ukrainian counterattacks continue to put Russian forces on the defensive, and Ukrainian troops may attempt larger-scale attacks toward Kherson city itself in the coming weeks.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant activity reported on this axis in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will renew offensive operations in the coming days southeast from Izyum, possibly diverting first to the southwest to avoid Ukrainian defensive positions, in an effort to reach and seize Slovyansk.
- Russian forces have bisected Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol and will continue efforts to complete the seizure of the remaining pockets of Ukrainian resistance.
- Russian forces may conduct attacks to seize Rubizhne, Popasna, and Severodonetsk in the coming days, although they may wait for reinforcements and for Russian troops to complete the encirclement of this area along the Izyum-Slovyansk-Debaltseve road.
[6] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/216
[10] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/1414.
2. A Shadow War Against Putin – How America Can Covertly Undermine the Kremlin
From a former senior CIA officer in the Clandestine Service.
I fear we fear escalation too much and we are "self deterring" from many of the actions that should consider.
Excerpts:
Escalation is always a risk, but so is acting too conservatively. Lighting a match in Belarus, Chechnya, and Kazakhstan, not to mention within Russia itself, could start a fire. The unintended consequences could bring more human suffering, loss of life, destabilization of the international economy, or still worse autocratic governments. They could also bring Russia and the West into direct armed conflict. But long-standing political instability in all three former republics suggests that underlying tensions will eventually erupt regardless of whether the United States intervenes.
Establishing contact now with opposition forces would increase the likelihood of the United States’ exerting positive influence on the outcome—rather than being forced to react later—and, at minimum, provide a suite of capabilities and options for further down the road. Likewise, fueling Putin’s paranoia poses some risks; making him doubt his inner circle could prompt yet more desperate measures to rally national support by escalating into armed conflict with NATO. But that downside risk is small, and efforts to recruit or otherwise connect with members of his inner circle could provide insight into and influence over a move against Putin that might very well evolve with or without U.S. interference.
The United States and its allies have the means to apply significant pressure in the shadows and asymmetrically. What Washington can’t afford to do is expect that incentives might lure Putin into cooperation. It is simply not the way his risk versus gain calculation works. Neither can the United States afford to coast on existing sanctions without escalating the pressure for which the Russian leader might otherwise adapt and survive if given the breathing space. For years, Putin has employed covert means to keep the West off balance, divide and conquer, stress its political fabric, and redirect its focus inward. The time has come to return the favor—and the United States has the means to do so.
A Shadow War Against Putin
How America Can Covertly Undermine the Kremlin
April 11, 2022
As peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine continue against the horrific background of what appear to be Russian atrocities, it is unclear whether Russian President Vladimir Putin genuinely wants an off-ramp. While Russian forces have moved out of Kyiv and the surrounding area, they are regrouping for what is expected to be a major assault on the Donbas region in the east. As the United States and Europe look for ways to convince Putin to pursue his goals at the negotiating table instead of on the battlefield, it is important that they do not offer concessions and face-saving paths that could incentivize the Russian leader to try something like invading Ukraine again.
That’s because the more conciliatory the West appears, the less likely Putin will be to compromise. For years, Europeans offered him incentives to cooperate, hoping that an economically vibrant Russia that depended on the West would not cut off its nose to spite its face. That, however, is not how Putin thinks. As a career intelligence officer in the KGB, he was conditioned to believe that people are driven primarily by money, ideology, coercion, and ego—a combination that intelligence officers refer to using the acronym MICE. He values credible threats that leverage vulnerabilities rather than rewards. Beating Putin requires an approach that targets his fears, stretches his resources, and makes him look over his shoulder. The only carrot worth offering him is the absence of a stick: he sees concessions as a sign of weakness, and they only embolden him.
A far better way for the West to build leverage to use against Putin would be to foment unrest in his own house and weaken his regime from within. This would be taking a page from Putin’s playbook: strengthening one’s hand by weakening that of an opponent. Unable to directly challenge the United States militarily, economically, or politically, Putin attacked it asymmetrically, through disinformation that amplified populist themes of victimization; interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; and carried out aggressive cyber-operations with the intent of destabilizing the U.S. economy.
Putin’s confrontational, multidomain strategy distracted Americans from foreign policy issues, polarized the country politically, weakened its national institutions, and countered the historically accepted image of Russia as the most threatening adversary to the United States, as witnessed during the Trump administration. It was an effort also aimed at driving wedges between Washington, NATO members, and other U.S. allies.
The United States should now consider using similar tactics against Russia, sowing division and threatening Putin’s grip on power, especially in places such as Belarus, Chechnya, and Kazakhstan. In those former Soviet states, anti-Russian sentiment is already running high—a threat that Putin cannot not afford to ignore, despite his massive military commitment in Ukraine. Likewise, the United States can target Russia’s grassroots opposition. Overtly and covertly, the United States can amplify news of the economic costs of the war and the toll it’s taken on Ukrainian and Russian lives. In response to this pressure, Putin would prioritize stabilizing his position at home, which could mean accelerating an end to his ill-fated war.
FUEL TO THE FIRE
There are a handful of places in Putin’s backyard that could cause him major trouble if civil unrest were to grow. Barely a year ago in Belarus, hundreds of thousands took to the streets following election results that were widely regarded as fraudulent, demanding that the country’s president, Putin ally Alexander Lukashenko, step down after decades in power. The demonstrations ended after a brutal crackdown and mass arrests, but it’s likely that anti-Russian hostility remains.
In Chechnya, where Russian troops and Putin’s Federal Security Service (FSB, the former KGB), battled anti-Russian separatists for years, the conflict has never really ended. The thuggish pro-Kremlin despot whom Putin put in charge, Ramzan Kadyrov, has for years carried out a brutal campaign of repression of critics and opposition figures, some of whom are now fighting in Ukraine on Kyiv’s side against Kadyrov’s forces. Russia’s ruthlessness in Chechnya left many seeking to settle old scores, offering a rich target pool from which the United States could mobilize opposition and, if appropriate, revolt.
And in January, widespread protests in Kazakhstan demanding the government’s resignation turned violent. Russian troops were sent to help quell the uprising, which grew despite Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s efforts to defuse the crisis by offering economic and political concessions. As in Russia, popular frustration in Kazakhstan is fueled by rampant corruption, unapologetic nepotism, and the Moscow-aligned elite’s unwillingness to share the energy-rich nation’s spoils. But this year’s broad unrest in Kazakhstan suggests discontent, as in Belarus, is already simmering and ripe for escalation.
For the United States and its allies, overt political support and messaging to those who seek to break the chains of authoritarian rule in these places could be complemented by more active (but still plausibly deniable) covert efforts. Doing so would require a presidential finding, which authorizes the CIA to conduct covert operations, and the notification of Congress. Such a campaign would not necessarily be a significant stretch from the covert support that Washington is reportedly providing to Ukrainian intelligence, security, and special operations forces. Unlike the U.S. cooperation with sovereign Ukrainian government institutions, however, the United States would be engaging and managing a decentralized assortment of sometimes rival opposition elements and leaders across Russia and its former republics. The dynamic is not without its operational, political, and logistical challenges. The United States should look at its problematic covert support to the opposition in Syria and its more successful campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan for lessons learned.
Beating Putin requires an approach that makes him look over his shoulder.
There are a range of measures the United States might secretly undertake in all the former republics as well as within Russia itself. Beginning with a lighter touch, the United States could orchestrate covert influence campaigns to stir up outrage regarding these regimes’ repression and corruption. The United States has the means to do so, via short-wave broadcasts, in print, or by distributing bootleg DVDs and USB flash drives through established internal clandestine networks.
To get those messages out, the U.S. intelligence community would finance the networks and train them in secure communications, intelligence gathering, and organization. Such assistance could eventually evolve into guidance on how to stage demonstrations and, if warranted, how to carry out violent acts of revolt and insurgency with training in military organization and tactics and the provision of lethal aid.
The United States has experience, for better or worse, in fomenting unrest that has overthrown regimes in Chile and Iran, stirred anticommunist forces in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and enabled militant insurgencies against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s. These activities serve as blueprints that can be tailored for these three former Soviet states. Ultimately, the goal need not be pushing them into revolution or expecting pro-Western liberal democracies to follow but merely putting in motion steps that exploit Putin’s fear of losing control of this crucial sphere of influence.
It’s true that the United States has a mixed record in such covert campaigns, which includes failures in Cuba, Libya, Mozambique, and, most recently, Syria. But it is arguable that those misadventures were doomed from the outset by questionable end goals, inconsistent policy support, and a lack of popular domestic enthusiasm for the cause. In Ukraine, U.S. strategy has been refreshingly cohesive and has reflected the national consensus. A critical component for success would be the U.S. ability to regulate the pace and unforeseen consequences of its support to such groups, making sure they are not abandoned but also pressuring Putin without escalating the conflict beyond control.
CLOSER TO HOME
Pressuring Putin requires demonstrating that he will suffer significant consequences on account of his aggression. The economic sanctions that Russia is facing now will likely not suffice to get Putin to concede in Ukraine. If Washington truly wants to put the squeeze on Putin, it needs to drive a wedge between him and his vital supporters and confidants—especially the siloviki, the former KGB and military officials who secured great fortunes and power through their close associations with Putin. While much of the Russian elite has publicly rallied to Putin’s cause, those with the most to lose, or those vulnerable to the ongoing blame game and prospective “purification,” might be receptive to a waiting American life raft and discreet back-channel contact.
Apart from those within the government holding prominent positions in Russia’s national security institutions, and who, as such, are more difficult to engage privately, the most promising candidates for this kind of approach would ostensibly be private sector insiders like Igor Sechin, the billionaire CEO of Russia’s Rosneft Oil. Sechin was Putin’s chief of staff in the 1990s and remains a close confidant. He knows which closets hold Putin’s skeletons—and likely placed many there himself.
There is also Nikolay Tokarev, CEO of state-controlled Transneft, the world’s largest oil pipeline company. A former KGB officer who was born in Kazakhstan, Tokarev goes back years with Putin, and was part of the Mafia-like organization that Putin assembled during his time as mayor of St. Petersburg.
This year’s broad unrest in Kazakhstan suggests discontent is already simmering and ripe for escalation.
Outreach to these and other of Putin’s reputed confidants and lieutenants could be useful in various ways. Discreet and ideally clandestine contact offers them the cover to play fixer if they choose to tell Putin, and to offer themselves to him and the West as a safe conduit through which to negotiate terms beyond public view. More conspiratorially, such engagement could serve as a lifeboat by which they could save themselves, by providing the United States with intelligence, exerting influence on Putin, conspiring to remove him, or as a means of escape if their number comes up in Moscow for “purification and blame.”
The more certain achievement against the admittedly long odds that they might genuinely cooperate is the win-win nature of such approaches. If exposed, U.S. outreach to his inner circle contributes to Putin’s apparent paranoia and elevates the internal pressure that might cause him to be more amenable to an off-ramp in the interest of his own survival.
Why would this be effective on Putin? Because Putin was trained as a spy, and spies are always on the lookout for threats and skeptical about people’s true agendas. Merely the appearance of wavering on the part of any siloviki might fuel Putin’s doubt about loyalty within his inner circle and his anxiety about the risk to his political or physical survival in a country with a history of conspiracy and skullduggery at the top. Even if his close confidants were to inform him of approaches by U.S. intelligence agencies, Putin would have to wonder who else might have been approached, and possibly turned.
NOT WITHOUT RISK
Escalation is always a risk, but so is acting too conservatively. Lighting a match in Belarus, Chechnya, and Kazakhstan, not to mention within Russia itself, could start a fire. The unintended consequences could bring more human suffering, loss of life, destabilization of the international economy, or still worse autocratic governments. They could also bring Russia and the West into direct armed conflict. But long-standing political instability in all three former republics suggests that underlying tensions will eventually erupt regardless of whether the United States intervenes.
Establishing contact now with opposition forces would increase the likelihood of the United States’ exerting positive influence on the outcome—rather than being forced to react later—and, at minimum, provide a suite of capabilities and options for further down the road. Likewise, fueling Putin’s paranoia poses some risks; making him doubt his inner circle could prompt yet more desperate measures to rally national support by escalating into armed conflict with NATO. But that downside risk is small, and efforts to recruit or otherwise connect with members of his inner circle could provide insight into and influence over a move against Putin that might very well evolve with or without U.S. interference.
The United States and its allies have the means to apply significant pressure in the shadows and asymmetrically. What Washington can’t afford to do is expect that incentives might lure Putin into cooperation. It is simply not the way his risk versus gain calculation works. Neither can the United States afford to coast on existing sanctions without escalating the pressure for which the Russian leader might otherwise adapt and survive if given the breathing space. For years, Putin has employed covert means to keep the West off balance, divide and conquer, stress its political fabric, and redirect its focus inward. The time has come to return the favor—and the United States has the means to do so.
3. The Pentagon Must ‘Campaign’ Against China, Not Hope for a Goal-Line Stand
Campaigning is key to strategic competition as well as warfighting.
Excerpts:
Campaigning could operationalize dissuasion by creating a feedback loop between U.S. or allied actions and Chinese decision-making. U.S. military posture changes, experiments or demonstrations, exercises, and new tactics and concepts should sway Chinese leaders’ assessments of how easily the People’s Liberation Army could defeat China’s neighbors and at what cost. A well-orchestrated series of U.S. and allied actions could convince officials in Beijing to defer hostilities until they are more confident of success on acceptable terms.
If the U.S. intelligence community’s insight into China’s internal decision-making is on par with what it demonstrated with Russia, Pentagon planners could use Chinese assessments of U.S. actions to develop and refine a dissuasion campaign over months or years. And if U.S. intelligence lacks the level of penetration it has in Russia, leaders could still rely on observable responses to build a model of Chinese decision-making that would help shape the campaign.
However, analysis is only half the battle. Whether it depends on direct intelligence, models, or both, campaigning requires sustained action to generate surprise and create measurable responses. Persistent engagement has paid off in cyberspace for U.S. Cyber Command and in the media for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The Pentagon could apply persistent engagement across other domains in a campaign against China if U.S. leaders are willing to accept a modest risk of escalation.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders are concerned China could attempt to forcibly reunite with Taiwan during this decade. Moreover, the failure of deterrence against Russia shows threats of denial or punishment may not be credible against peer militaries fighting in their own back yards. The U.S. military should quickly launch a new approach toward preventing hostilities against allies and partners. With its emphasis on campaigning, the new defense strategy offers a path to dissuading China rather than waiting to mount a goal-line stand that is unlikely to succeed.
The Pentagon Must ‘Campaign’ Against China, Not Hope for a Goal-Line Stand
To dissuade aggression, the U.S. military must continuously persuade its adversaries to doubt their chances of success.
By BRYAN CLARK and DAN PATT
APRIL 10, 2022 06:00 AM ET
During the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration released an unprecedented amount of classified intelligence regarding Russian plans, even revealing insider knowledge of Vladimir Putin’s intentions. This attempt at deterrence by detection failed; Putin invaded anyway. But the quality of allied intelligence-gathering and the new National Defense Strategy point toward a potentially better way to dissuade adversaries, through what the Pentagon calls “campaigning.”
Most discussion of the new NDS centers on its approach of Integrated Deterrence, in which all instruments of national power are orchestrated to prevent aggression. But the mixed results, at best, from the West’s combination of sanctions, intelligence revelations, and diplomacy suggests that capable, nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia and, more importantly, China may not be stopped by Integrated Deterrence’s threats of last-minute denial or punishment.
The new defense strategy’s inclusion of campaigning as one of its three main lines of effort provides a way for the Pentagon to break from simply trying to deny or punish aggression. Drawn from Marine Corps doctrine, campaigning refers to the orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals. Through campaigning, U.S. forces would attempt to undermine adversary attempts at coercion, complicate enemy planning, and develop U.S. warfighting capabilities.
Campaigning may seem like another word for what the U.S. military does every day but is intended to convey a deliberate and methodical approach to cause specific results in a particular context, rather than generally support U.S. allies or deter opponents.
Russia demonstrated a form of campaigning during the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine and in the months thereafter. In combination with building up foreign exchange reserves to insulate the country from sanctions, Russian leaders threatened cyber attacks, energy warfare, and nuclear escalation to suppress Western retaliation. Partly in response, U.S. leaders foreswore putting boots in the ground or conducting large cyber operations to protect Ukraine.
Another relevant example is the Cold War, when strategists devised a plan to undermine Soviet leaders’ confidence in their plans and capabilities. Rather than relying solely on forces in the Fulda Gap to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion, U.S. and allied militaries developed new capabilities like the Tomahawk missile to threaten the Soviet periphery, sent submarines to the Barents Sea to hold Soviet nuclear missile subs at risk, pursued “Star Wars” missile defenses, and fielded stealth fighters and precision-guided weapons to imperil Soviet reinforcements.
Many of these new technologies did not reach the field before the Cold War ended, and some—like Star Wars—never achieved their ambitions. But the combination of concepts and capability development with persistent U.S. and allied forward operations arguably kept leaders in Moscow off-balance and less likely to initiate aggression.
China is in most ways a more formidable opponent than the Cold War Soviet Union or today’s Russia. If threats of denial or punishment did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine, they are even less likely to deter leaders in Beijing from attacking Taiwan. Instead, the United States and its allies will need to pursue a long-term effort at dissuasion, or an effort to reduce the likelihood of an adversary taking an undesirable action.
Campaigning could operationalize dissuasion by creating a feedback loop between U.S. or allied actions and Chinese decision-making. U.S. military posture changes, experiments or demonstrations, exercises, and new tactics and concepts should sway Chinese leaders’ assessments of how easily the People’s Liberation Army could defeat China’s neighbors and at what cost. A well-orchestrated series of U.S. and allied actions could convince officials in Beijing to defer hostilities until they are more confident of success on acceptable terms.
If the U.S. intelligence community’s insight into China’s internal decision-making is on par with what it demonstrated with Russia, Pentagon planners could use Chinese assessments of U.S. actions to develop and refine a dissuasion campaign over months or years. And if U.S. intelligence lacks the level of penetration it has in Russia, leaders could still rely on observable responses to build a model of Chinese decision-making that would help shape the campaign.
However, analysis is only half the battle. Whether it depends on direct intelligence, models, or both, campaigning requires sustained action to generate surprise and create measurable responses. Persistent engagement has paid off in cyberspace for U.S. Cyber Command and in the media for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The Pentagon could apply persistent engagement across other domains in a campaign against China if U.S. leaders are willing to accept a modest risk of escalation.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders are concerned China could attempt to forcibly reunite with Taiwan during this decade. Moreover, the failure of deterrence against Russia shows threats of denial or punishment may not be credible against peer militaries fighting in their own back yards. The U.S. military should quickly launch a new approach toward preventing hostilities against allies and partners. With its emphasis on campaigning, the new defense strategy offers a path to dissuading China rather than waiting to mount a goal-line stand that is unlikely to succeed.
Bryan Clark and
During the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration released an unprecedented amount of classified intelligence regarding Russian plans, even revealing insider knowledge of Vladimir Putin’s intentions. This attempt at deterrence by detection failed; Putin invaded anyway. But the quality of allied intelligence-gathering and the new National Defense Strategy point toward a potentially better way to dissuade adversaries through what the Pentagon calls “campaigning.”
Most discussion of the new NDS centers on its approach of Integrated Deterrence, in which all instruments of national power are orchestrated to prevent aggression. But the mixed results, at best, from the West’s combination of sanctions, intelligence revelations, and diplomacy suggests that capable, nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia and, more importantly, China may not be stopped by Integrated Deterrence’s threats of last-minute denial or punishment.
The new defense strategy’s inclusion of campaigning as one of its three main lines of effort provides a way for the Pentagon to break from simply trying to deny or punish aggression. Drawn from Marine Corps doctrine, campaigning refers to the orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals. Through campaigning, U.S. forces would attempt to undermine adversary attempts at coercion, complicate enemy planning, and develop U.S. warfighting capabilities.
Campaigning may seem like another word for what the U.S. military does every day but is intended to convey a deliberate and methodical approach to cause specific results in a particular context, rather than generally support U.S. allies or deter opponents.
Russia demonstrated a form of campaigning during the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine and in the months thereafter. In combination with building up foreign exchange reserves to insulate the country from sanctions, Russian leaders threatened cyber attacks, energy warfare, and nuclear escalation to suppress Western retaliation. Partly in response, U.S. leaders foreswore putting boots in the ground or conducting large cyber operations to protect Ukraine.
Another relevant example is the Cold War, when strategists devised a plan to undermine Soviet leaders’ confidence in their plans and capabilities. Rather than relying solely on forces in the Fulda Gap to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion, U.S. and allied militaries developed new capabilities like the Tomahawk missile to threaten the Soviet periphery, sent submarines to the Barents Sea to hold Soviet nuclear missile subs at risk, pursued “Star Wars” missile defenses, and fielded stealth fighters and precision-guided weapons to imperil Soviet reinforcements.
Many of these new technologies did not reach the field before the Cold War ended, and some—like Star Wars—never achieved their ambitions. But the combination of concepts and capability development with persistent U.S. and allied forward operations arguably kept leaders in Moscow off-balance and less likely to initiate aggression.
China is in most ways a more formidable opponent than the Cold War Soviet Union or today’s Russia. If threats of denial or punishment did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine, they are even less likely to deter leaders in Beijing from attacking Taiwan. Instead, the United States and its allies will need to pursue a long-term effort at dissuasion, or an effort to reduce the likelihood of an adversary taking an undesirable action.
Campaigning could operationalize dissuasion by creating a feedback loop between U.S. or allied actions and Chinese decision-making. U.S. military posture changes, experiments or demonstrations, exercises, and new tactics and concepts should sway Chinese leaders’ assessments of how easily the People’s Liberation Army could defeat China’s neighbors and at what cost. A well-orchestrated series of U.S. and allied actions could convince officials in Beijing to defer hostilities until they are more confident of success on acceptable terms.
If the U.S. intelligence community’s insight into China’s internal decision-making is on par with what it demonstrated with Russia, Pentagon planners could use Chinese assessments of U.S. actions to develop and refine a dissuasion campaign over months or years. And if U.S. intelligence lacks the level of penetration it has in Russia, leaders could still rely on observable responses to build a model of Chinese decision-making that would help shape the campaign.
However, analysis is only half the battle. Whether it depends on direct intelligence, models, or both, campaigning requires sustained action to generate surprise and create measurable responses. Persistent engagement has paid off in cyberspace for U.S. Cyber Command and in the media for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The Pentagon could apply persistent engagement across other domains in a campaign against China if U.S. leaders are willing to accept a modest risk of escalation.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders are concerned China could attempt to forcibly reunite with Taiwan during this decade. Moreover, the failure of deterrence against Russia shows threats of denial or punishment may not be credible against peer militaries fighting in their own back yards. The U.S. military should quickly launch a new approach toward preventing hostilities against allies and partners. With its emphasis on campaigning, the new defense strategy offers a path to dissuading China rather than waiting to mount a goal-line stand that is unlikely to succeed.
Bryan Clark are Dan Patt is Senior Fellows at the Hudson Institute.
4. Production Of The V-22 Osprey Is Ending. The Pentagon Needs To Be Sure It Has Bought Enough.
I remember the briefings from long ago about how procuring this aircraft for the military would revolutionize commercial transportation and we would see hub and spoke airports with CV-22 like aircraft shuttling people from satellite airports to major transportation hubs. I don't see any civilian CV-22 like aircraft on the horizon.
If we are going to stop production, what is the replacement aircraft in development that will replace it?
Excerpts:
Bell and Boeing have already approached the services about how they should prepare for shutdown of the line.
Before that fateful step is taken, planners ought to make sure they have enough tiltrotors to get them through mid-century with all the attendant complications that might arise.
Once Osprey production ceases, it almost certainly will never restart; now is the time to get the fleet size right because nothing else can do what a tiltrotor does.
Production Of The V-22 Osprey Is Ending. The Pentagon Needs To Be Sure It Has Bought Enough.
Forbes · by Loren Thompson · April 8, 2022
Production of the most revolutionary rotorcraft in the U.S. joint fleet is winding down.
With nearly all of the 481 V-22 Osprey tiltrotors in the program of record now ordered or about to be, the Bell-Boeing team that builds the aircraft expects new production to cease sometime in the next several years.
After getting off to a rocky start during the closing days of the Cold War—Dick Cheney repeatedly tried to kill it during his four-year tenure as defense secretary—Osprey went on to become the most versatile rotorcraft in history.
I say “rotorcraft” because V-22 isn’t a helicopter in the conventional sense.
... [+]Wikipedia
It combines the vertical agility of a helicopter with the speed and range of a turboprop airplane, thanks to engines at its wingtips that pivot 90 degrees (in as little as 12 seconds) once it is airborne.
So, unlike any other rotorcraft in the world, V-22 can cruise at over 300 miles per hour to an unrefueled range of a thousand miles, and then land on a dime.
The aircraft was originally conceived to satisfy the diverse needs of all four military services, but the Army dropped out in 1988 just as the Pentagon was gearing up to kill a hundred weapon programs thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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It was left largely to the Marine Corps to protect the program through the difficult days of the “peace dividend” in the 1990s when military modernization fell to a low ebb.
The Marines never lost faith in the concept, beating back Secretary Cheney’s assaults with the help of Congress, and Osprey went on to transform the way in which amphibious operations were conducted.
It would be hard to overstate what a gamechanger the aircraft turned out to be, and the Marines were not the only beneficiaries: the Air Force bought 56 for its special operations wing, and the Navy bought dozens to supply aircraft carriers and other warships at sea.
In each case, military planners saw that an airframe combining the performance features of a helicopter with those of a turboprop plane would enable missions previously impossible to accomplish.
For instance, the Navy’s carrier onboard delivery version of Osprey can reach warships far out to sea with time-urgent supplies, and unlike the aircraft it replaces can service a variety of vessels, not just carriers.
Boeing and Bell/Textron, which split production workshares on the program, have benefited handsomely from the success of the program (both companies contribute to my think tank).
But the last handful of tiltrotors required by the Marines and Navy will likely be ordered in 2023, at which point the companies will have to accelerate their pursuit of other opportunities.
Bell has gotten a lift from the V-22’s performance in its bid to replace thousands of Army Black Hawk helicopters with an advanced rotorcraft, and Boeing is working hard to secure the success of a competing team.
Before V-22 production closes out, though, it is important to ascertain that the military services have all the tiltrotors they will require through 2055, when the aircraft will be retired.
That is only prudent, because the unique performance features of Osprey mean that if they run out before planned retirement, there will be nothing else in the joint inventory that can efficiently replace them in carrying out missions like lifting Marines from ship to shore or executing extended-range special operations.
The Marines alone plan to operate a fleet of 360 Ospreys, and their performance of expeditionary operations today centers on the flexibility afforded by tiltrotor technology.
Unfortunately, there is no way of reliably forecasting what kind of attrition might occur in conflicts over the next several decades, or what new missions might arise requiring a tiltrotor airframe.
The new missions could include anything from providing aerial refueling to performing electronic warfare to conducting combat search and rescue.
So, saying the Marines will soon have all the Ospreys their plans require isn’t the same thing as saying they will have enough ten or twenty years hence.
This problem is even more pronounced for Air Force special operators, because their fleet of Ospreys is relatively small; Air Force officials have repeatedly warned against the high cost of sustaining small numbers of specialized airframes.
And then there is the Navy, which cut a planned buy of 48 Ospreys to 44 for the carrier onboard delivery program, without apparently thinking through how distributed maritime operations might increase demands on its very minimal tiltrotor fleet.
The joint force has a tendency to size its forces as if no attrition will be suffered in future wars, but with the national defense strategy now firmly focused on great-power rivals like China, planners ought to be considering what it would mean for operations if a significant number of tiltrotors were lost to hostile fire.
Such concerns take on added urgency today, because if all goes according to plan, new production of Osprey will soon cease.
The Marines will continue upgrading earlier models to the latest configuration, but the supply chain of 400 contractors in 42 states will gradually dissipate once new production is completed.
Bell and Boeing have already approached the services about how they should prepare for shutdown of the line.
Before that fateful step is taken, planners ought to make sure they have enough tiltrotors to get them through mid-century with all the attendant complications that might arise.
Once Osprey production ceases, it almost certainly will never restart; now is the time to get the fleet size right because nothing else can do what a tiltrotor does.
Forbes · by Loren Thompson · April 8, 2022
5. A Message to NATO from an SAS Soldier
You Got Fat!
NATO, you got fat and flabby and lazy. You sat on the laurels earned by and taught to you by the deaths of sixty million in WW2. You thought and taught that it could never happen again.
During the cold war you maintained your armed forces and remembered the horrors that tyranny and authoritarianism can create. Your warriors remained alert and ready while your academics and historian taught the lessons of the past. You remembered the sacrifices of a whole generation.
But you grew soft! You questioned the morality of defensive war, you allowed holier than thou students to reduce your heroic actions to the level of the thug. At school you stopped teaching your own history with pride and instead gave equity to those who would undermine your values. You let that great grubby god 'Money' steal your values and virtue, - substituting cash with the excuse 'Someone else will take it if I don't'.
Generals allowed their armies to be reduced to bland green reservists whose sole purpose was to march in concert with the lowest common denominator. Cheap and cheerful made it look good. By reducing your effectiveness in the name of 'equality', you trained your youth to cry and whine when confronted with failure and disappointment. You trained them to remain childish like puppies for their entire existence.
While the monsters of communism and fascism rebuilt their followings you wore your Hugo Boss and took your cash and told us we were yesterdays people. You were the new awakening. Well you are awake now the monster has returned and yes, - he still has nuclear weapons, - he still cares nothing for your values and he certainly doesn't care if you cry - or die!
Where are your warriors, where are your leaders? Where are the men and women who understood evil and the lessons of history? Not in your parliaments, not in your police forces and not in your schools. All your human rights are as nothing when a T72 tank comes down your road. Tanks don't understand 'INAPPROPRIATE'. There are new sacrifices to be made. Are you prepared to meet them as you ought?
"When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things."
You are awake now little children and it's time to grow up!
Slava Ukraine.
Who Dares Shares!
6. The wartime president: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks with Scott Pelley in Kyiv
For those who missed President Zelensky on 60 Minutes last night, the transcript is below.
The wartime president: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks with Scott Pelley in Kyiv
On February 24, with the Russian invasion coming at him from three sides, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reached for his most powerful weapon – his phone. The moment Zelenskyy told his people he refused to flee, Ukraine refused to fall. Leaders don't become legends often, but over these nearly seven weeks, this 44-year-old former comedian inspired his country to stand up to the overwhelming force of Russia. Last Wednesday, we were admitted to Zelenskyy's fortified war rooms to meet the man who stands between the Russian army and the free world.
We met President Zelenskyy in the blacked-out hallways of his command center in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv. It is a fortress, crowded with troops, machine guns, mines, explosives and a great deal more.
Scott Pelley: Are you safe here?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking Ukrainian: Yeah, I'm fine. I feel pretty calm about it. Our guards are worried because there could be an airstrike. But when we get the air-raid evacuation signal we head downstairs.
Scott Pelley: Mr. President, what has it been like working under these conditions?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in English: We, we, found a way to work. We don't have another way.
Scott Pelley: You found a way how to work, you don't have any other way.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking Ukrainian: It has to be dark in here, you can't switch the lights on because a bomb could just fly in, during an airstrike.
Scott Pelley interviews Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Scott Pelley: You have troops sleeping…
The president and his staff have lived here for 46 days now. The Russian invasion plan expected Kyiv to fall in 3 days. But that relied on one assumption – that Zelenskyy would run.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: When everyone is telling you, you need to go, you need to think. Before I do something, I analyze the situation. I've always done it calmly, without any chaos. I might not be the strongest warrior. But I'm not willing to betray anyone.
Scott Pelley: What did you tell your wife and children about your decision?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: I told them this is my choice. And I can't do it any other way. I'm the president of my country. I'm the president of our people. And even if I wasn't president, I would have stayed here. [My family] understood. Not only understood, but fully supported my decision. Fully.
It was the decision that saved Ukraine from immediate collapse.
"Good evening, everyone," he said. "We are all here, our soldiers are here, the citizens of the country are here. We are all here protecting our independence, our country and we're going to continue."
Scott Pelley: You had made a decision to give your life for your country if it came to that.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: I don't want to make myself out to be a hero. I love my family. I want to live many more years, but choosing between running or being with my people, of course I'm ready to give my life for my country.
For a man with 44 million lives in his hands, we found Zelenskyy buoyant, gracious, humble and brutally honest.
The day before our visit, an angrier Zelenskyy scolded the UN Security Council – "where's the security?" he asked.
Scott Pelley: In speaking to NATO, you called them weak. In speaking to the UN Security Council, you said, if you can't help, you shouldn't exist. Not very diplomatic of you. I wonder why you feel the need to speak so bluntly.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: When you are [working] at diplomacy, there are no results. All this is very bureaucratic. That's why the way I'm talking to them is absolutely justifiable. I don't have any more lives [to give]. I don't have any more emotions. I'm no longer interested in their diplomacy that leads to the destruction of my country. A lot of countries have changed their mind about Ukraine and about our people. But I think we've paid too high price for that.
Scott Pelley: What must the world understand?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: We are defending the ability of a person to live in the modern world. We are defending the right to live. I never thought this right was so costly. These are human values. So that Russia doesn't choose what we should do and how I'm exercising my rights. That right was given to me by God and my parents.
God was hard to find on our visit to Kyiv's northern suburbs which Russia occupied for weeks. Much of what we found will be difficult to watch. Behind St. Andrew's Church there is a sandy trench not quite full of civilian residents of the town of Bucha. Ukraine stopped the Russians here, 45 minutes from the center of the capital city. The Russian retreat was so hasty, it seems there was no time to cover up the war crimes. President Zelenskyy visited Bucha two days before our interview.
Scott Pelley: What did you see in Bucha?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Death. Just death.
Last Monday was the first time Zelenskyy saw, with his own eyes, what Russia has done in what Vladimir Putin calls the liberation of Ukraine. The day after our interview, we found civilian neighborhoods in Bucha, blocks and blocks shelled and blasted with no purpose but terror. Bodies and parts of bodies lay in the streets, "left out like trash," Zelenskyy told us. No one knows how many victims are still in their homes, yet to be found.
Scott Pelley: There's a photograph, Mr. President, of you in Bucha with an expression on your face that you have not allowed your people to see during this war. And I wonder what we're seeing there. Is that heartbreak? Is it anger?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: It's anger. It's anger because we don't understand [the Russians]. You can't really understand this world. That there are people on this planet who give these orders and people [who carry them out].
In Bucha, neighborhood relief for the hungry and the homeless looked like World War II in color. Valeriy Matvienko was so angry about the senseless Russian bullet wound in his leg, we can't repeat what he told us in English.
Valeriy Matvienko, translation: Some of the Russians were normal. Some of them were totally crazy. You could walk, and they would shoot sometimes up in the air, sometimes at your legs. So, you have to jump in front of them. [Cars] were run over by Russian tanks. Very brutal. Not human.
Scott Pelley: Can you tell me what you saw?
We met Tetyana Dmitriivna, who compressed the occupation into a single word.
Tetyana Dmitriivna, translation: Horror. Horror. Gunfire was nonstop day and night. Thanks to God it all passed and we survived. It's simply a miracle. I had two grandchildren with me in the basement. [I never thought] I would live to see this horror.
Tetyana Dmitriivna talks with Scott Pelley.
Scott Pelley: Mr. Zelenskyy told us he couldn't believe that human beings could do something like this.
Tetyana Dmitriivna: We never believed it either. We are simply in shock. All of us.
Scott Pelley: What evidence is there of war crimes across Ukraine?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: The Ukrainian Security Service has intercepted communications. There are [Russian] soldiers talking with their parents [about] what they stole and who they abducted. There are recordings of [Russian] prisoners of war who admitted to killing people. There are pilots in prison who had maps with civilian targets to bomb. There are also investigations being done based on the remains of the dead.
Scott Pelley: Should Vladimir Putin be prosecuted for war crimes?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Look, I think everyone who made a decision, who issued an order, who fulfilled an order, everyone who is relevant to this, I believe they are all guilty.
Scott Pelley: Do you hold Putin responsible?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: I do believe he's one of them. That's what I believe.
The slaughter of civilians could have been stopped, Zelenskyy told us. He's deeply grateful for the weapons NATO and the U.S. are sending around the clock. But he's bitterly disappointed the allies refuse to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. President Biden has called that an invitation to World War III. But in Zelenskyy's view, it's the kind of inaction the world has suffered before.
Scott Pelley: Mr. President, in a speech to NATO you said, quote, 'All the people who die will die because of you, because of your weakness.' Are you saying that the West bears some responsibility for these atrocities?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: I remember, all of us remember, books about the second World War, and about the devil in uniform – Adolf Hitler. Are those countries who did not participate in the war responsible? The countries who let German forces march throughout Europe? Does the world carry responsibility for the genocide? Yes. Yes, it does. When you [have the ability to] close the sky – yes it's scary, that a world war could start. It's scary. I understand [that]. And I cannot put pressure on these people because everyone is afraid of war. But whether the world [is responsible] for this, I believe so, yes. I believe so. Stand in front of the mirror every day and ask yourself, were you able to do something? Or were you unable to do something? You will find the answer in the mirror to this question, and to another question – who are you? That's what I believe.
Perhaps Zelenskyy reaches for World War II because of his homeland's history of catastrophe and because he's Ukraine's first Jewish president. Zelenskyy is 44 years old, holds a law degree. He's married with a son and daughter. His family is safe, somewhere in Ukraine. In this war, Zelenskyy is the leading man in a tragedy but he worked his entire career to make people laugh. He was Ukraine's favorite comedian whose sitcom was popular in Russia too.
In his show, called "Servant of the people," he played a high school history teacher whose anger at corruption in Ukraine explodes into a profane rant. A student posts the tirade and the teacher is elected president.
In 2019, Zelenskyy turned parody into power. He ran on an anti-corruption platform and won 73% of the vote. He was 41 years old. He brought longtime friend and business partner, Andriy Yermak, in as chief of staff.
Andriy Yermak: He's smart. He's strong. He's brave. And he is person who is self-made. Zelenskyy is not just the leader of our heroic nation. I think he is the leader of the free world.
Scott Pelley: Why do you say President Zelenskyy is the leader of the free world now?
Andriy Yermak: Because Ukraine defend not just Ukraine. We defend all democracy.
Zelenskyy has been defending Ukraine since his inauguration day. That green T-shirt which caught the eye of the world was no surprise to Ukrainians. He keeps fatigues in his office because he often visited the battlefront near the Russian border where Ukraine has been in a shooting war with Russia since 2014.
That was when Putin invaded part of Ukraine called the Donbas and seized Ukraine's Crimea peninsula. In 2014, before Zelenskyy was elected, a Russian anti-aircraft battery in Ukraine shot down an airliner killing 298 civilians.
In our interview, Zelenskyy told us he's been trying to warn the world that Putin will not stop at Ukraine.
Scott Pelley: Mr. President, it appears that the free world has calculated that the suffering of your people is not worth even the risk of a nuclear exchange.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: I think so. That's how it is. Some are using that politically, as an excuse, by saying, 'We can't defend Ukraine because there could be a nuclear war.' I think that today, no one in this world can predict what Russia will do. If they invade further into our territory, then they will definitely move closer and closer to Europe. They will only become stronger and less predictable.
Scott Pelley interviews Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. CBS News
Scott Pelley: President Biden says he is outraged by Bucha. NATO leaders say they are outraged by Bucha. So, what should they do now?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Weapons, number one. They need to be very serious about it. They definitely understand what I'm talking about right now. They have to supply weapons to Ukraine as if they were defending themselves and their own people. They need to understand this: If they don't speed up, It will be very hard for us to hold on against this pressure. The second factor is sanctions. Because we've found some things in sanctions that are easy for financial experts to circumvent. Russia has been circumventing them, and this is absolutely true. The Western world knows it. This shouldn't be allowed. This is not a movie, this is real life. Stop fearing the Russian Federation. We've shown we are not afraid.
Friday, a Russian missile strike hit a crowd of refugees striving to escape eastern Ukraine by train. At least 50 were killed, five children. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calls it a war crime. Tonight, Zelenskyy is fighting a powerful Russian assault on Ukraine's East and South. Russia has not seized its strategic objectives so, instead, it's shelling defiant cities to ruin. The one exception, at least now, is Kyiv. In a feat of arms no one expected, Ukraine's outgunned army defeated the massive Russian force that had been ordered to take the capital city.
Kyiv survives, for the moment, a capital of mummified monuments and 19th century grace. Before, it was a bumper-to-bumper city with 3 million residents. But now the streets are congested only by shadows. Air raids are still a danger but, after nearly seven weeks, the siren doesn't quicken the step like it used to.
Scott Pelley: Have you won the battle of Kyiv?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Kyiv. I think, yes, but, this isn't the final victory. I will only be able to tell after we win this war. When we liberate our country, then I will be able to tell. Because Bucha is part of greater Kyiv. Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel if the people of those [towns] were wiped out, then did we win this battle? I'm not sure. We've withstood, and we did not give up what is ours. But whether we won, I can't say.
Scott Pelley: No one expected Ukraine to fight Russia to a standstill. And I wonder, how did you manage?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: We united as a nation. Even though [our people] understood that they would be outnumbered tenfold, and there would be no way out, just no way out, we fought for our existence and for survival. That's the combined heroism of everyone – of the people, of the authorities, of the armed forces. We became a single fist.
We saw the Ukrainian punch in the town of Bucha where the remains of a Russian armored column rusted, dead in the street. Neighbors, holed up for weeks, emerged to remember what victory looks like. No one seemed in a hurry to deal with the bits of Russian soldiers in the wreckage. The full story of how the outmanned Ukrainian army stopped the invasion of Kyiv, will fill history books but we already know part of it.
Because the Russians believed that Kyiv would fall in a matter of days, they literally did not bring enough food or fuel for their armored columns. On the other side, the Ukrainians had been trained for years by the California National Guard and other U.S. units. When the invasion happened, the U.S., Britain and other countries flooded Ukraine with light-weight, shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles.
Scott Pelley:How much difference have American arms made in this war?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: They're helping. Frankly speaking, I would have wanted more. I don't know if I have the right to say that. But the fact that the United States has helped a lot is true.
Zelenskyy's man in charge of arming Ukraine is chief of staff Andriy Yermak. When we met, he'd just finished a two-hour call with U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley. Yermak asked for heavier weapons – faster – first there was artillery.
Andriy Yermak: The second, we need the tanks. We need the military jets. And we need everything which give to us opportunity to closed our sky.
Scott Pelley: When you ask the Biden administration for artillery, tanks, jet airplanes, the administration says what?
Andriy Yermak: We had very deep and very detailed conversation. This is American president who has done for Ukraine more than all other president. But then you have the war and we have openly said we need more. It's not enough. We need it as soon as possible. If we receive this support in time, we will win.
A White House official tells us Yermak got a "yes" to his requests. But filling orders takes time. The Ukrainians need Russian-made weapons that they already know how to use. The U.S. is cajoling allies to ship their Russian gear now on the promise that the U.S. will replace it later. America has thrown in nearly $2 billion in military aid. From the Ukrainian point of view, of course, nothing is fast enough. Russian bombardment is escalating in the East and South. Cities are being shelled to ruin, including Mariupol, with 450,000 residents.
Scott Pelley: What are you expecting now in the East and in the South?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: We think this will be a new wave of this war. We don't know how much [Russian weaponry] there will be. But we understand that there will be many times more than there is now. [All] depends on [how fast] we will be helped by the United States. To be honest, whether we will be able to [survive] depends on this. I have 100% confidence in our people and in our armed forces. But unfortunately, I don't have the confidence that we will be receiving everything we need.
Scott Pelley: And so what are you asking of President Biden?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: To tell you the truth. Long ago, I asked President Biden for very specific items. He has the list. President Biden can enter history as the person who stood shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainian people who won and chose the right to have their own country. [This] also depends on him.
Scott Pelley: You are frustrated with President Biden?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: No. I'm not disappointed. I don't know how another president in his place would help us, I don't know. It's difficult. We have a good relationship. I think so at least. Ukraine depends on the support of the United States. And I, as the leader of a country at war, I can only be grateful.
As for the other president at war, we asked Zelenskyy if he would meet, now, face to face with Vladimir Putin. He told us it was worth the chance. They wouldn't resolve everything, Zelenskyy said, but they might stop the killing.
Scott Pelley: Are you willing to give up any part of Ukraine for peace?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Overall we are not ready to give away our country. I think we have already given up a lot of [lives]. So, we need to stand firm for as long as we can. But this is life. Different things happen.
Scott Pelley: It's negotiable?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Well, this issue would definitely be raised in the course of negotiations. We understand the Russian side. We understand one of their provisions that is always talked about is to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. I will definitely not recognize that. [And] they would really like to take the southern parts of our country. I clearly understand that questions like this will be raised [in negotiations] – if there ever are any. But we were not ready to give up our territory from the beginning. Had we been willing to give up our territory, there would have been no war.
Scott Pelley: Mr. President, in almost every speech to your country you say that Ukraine is going to win. What does winning look like to you?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, translation: Victory. First of all, our people would definitely feel victory. They will come back. The return of [refugees] is blood for the body of Ukraine. Without them there is nothing. The bombardments would end. We would recover our territory. There would be no Russian soldiers in our country. Yes, I understand they will not withdraw from Crimea, and we'll be arguing and negotiating for one territory or another in the south of our country, the Donbas. I know exactly what [has to] happen, after which we can say, 'this is victory.' But, if [you don't mind], I'm not going to talk about it just yet.
Scott Pelley: Mr. President, we wish you all the luck in the world.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in English: I need half of it. I think even half will be enough.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy has borrowed more luck than anyone expected. With the reprieve of Kyiv, Ukraine has turned mere admiration into credibility. Its people are suffering grievous loss every hour, but they have proven – there was a moment in Kyiv – when they silenced the guns of Russia.
Produced by Maria Gavrilovic. Associate producer, Alex Ortiz. Broadcast associate, Michelle Karim. Edited by April Wilson and Sean Kelly.
Correspondent, "60 Minutes"
7. Ukraine's Zelenskiy says tens of thousands killed in Mariupol, seeks military aid from S.Korea
"South Korea needs to step up" according to President -elect Yoon. WHat will he do after he assumed office on May 10th
Ukraine's Zelenskiy says tens of thousands killed in Mariupol, seeks military aid from S.Korea
KYIV, April 11 (Reuters) - Tens of thousands of people have likely been killed in Russia's assault on the southeastern city of Mariupol, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday, as he asked Seoul for any military aid it could provide.
"Mariupol has been destroyed, there are tens of thousands of dead, but even despite this, the Russians are not stopping their offensive," Zelenskiy said in a video address to South Korean lawmakers.
Reuters has confirmed widespread destruction in Mariupol but could not verify the accuracy of his estimate of those killed in the city, which lies between eastern areas of Ukraine held by Russian-backed separatists and Russian-annexed Crimea.
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Zelenskiy did not specify which weapons he sought, but said South Korea had many weapons that could not only help save the lives of ordinary Ukrainians, but help prevent Russia from attacking other nations.
"Ukraine needs various military technologies from airplanes to tanks," he said through an interpreter. "South Korea can help us."
South Korean defence minister Suh Wook and Ukrainian defence minister Oleksii Reznikov held a phone conversation on Friday on Reznikov's request. Reznikov thanked Suh for sending humanitarian aid and supplies and asked South Korea to send anti-aircraft weapons, Seoul’s defence ministry said on Monday.
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Reporting by Pavel Polityuk in Kyiv and Soo-hyang Choi and Josh Smith in Seoul; writing by Conor Humphries; editing by Philippa Fletcher
8. Desperate Ukraine tells U.S. 'bureaucracy' is no excuse for failing to provide critical weapons and ammunition
Ask yourself this question: if US troops were engaged in combat would resupplying them be this hard or take this long? We need to do better. “Desperate Ukraine tells U.S. 'bureaucracy' is no excuse for failing to provide critical weapons and ammunition”
Desperate Ukraine tells U.S. 'bureaucracy' is no excuse for failing to provide critical weapons and ammunition
CNBC · by Amanda Macias · April 10, 2022
A monument to Taras Shevchenko is seen near a residential building destroyed by the russian army shelling in Borodyanka, Kyiv Region, north-central Ukraine.
Hennadii Minchenko | Nurphoto | Getty Images
WASHINGTON – A Ukrainian delegation warned U.S. officials in Washington this week that security assistance packages are not arriving quick enough in the besieged country, a plea that comes amid Western security claims that the Kremlin will soon intensify its military campaign.
Over the past week, the delegation of Ukrainian civil society advocates, military veterans and former government officials met with 45 lawmakers, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, officials at the departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council at the White House.
"It's the 44th day of the war that we were supposed to lose on the third day," began Daria Kaleniuk, who runs Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Action Center, a national organization that assists Ukraine's parliament and prosecutor's office.
"What we need now is to arm our military and our territorial defense units to be able to prevent more graves in the backyards of innocent people," she said on Friday.
Kaleniuk added that U.S. lawmakers and Biden administration officials outlined a number of justifications for why certain weapons systems cannot be delivered, citing logistics issues, lack of inventory and bureaucratic limitations.
"The six-year-old boy who is visiting his mother's grave in his backyard does not want to hear about bureaucracy as an excuse for not delivering weapons to Ukraine," Kaleniuk said.
"This is an extraordinary situation where extraordinary measures have to be done. Lift your bureaucracy, lift it now. The president of the United States has huge power, Congress has huge power. We know it's possible," she added.
In the courtyard of their house, Vlad Tanyuk, 6, stands near the grave of his mother Ira Tanyuk, who died because of starvation and stress due to the war, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, April 4, 2022.
Rodrigo Abd | AP
Earlier in the week, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba also made a plea to NATO allies to catalyze the delivery of their arms commitments.
"Either you help us now, and I'm speaking about days not weeks, or your help will come too late," Kuleba told reporters at NATO's headquarters on April 7.
"I have no doubt that Ukraine will have the weapons necessary to fight. The question is the timeline. This discussion is not about the list of weapons. The discussion is about the timeline when do we get them and this is crucial," he said, adding "people are dying today, the offensive is unfolding today."
When asked about Kuleba's comments, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken downplayed concerns that allies were withholding weapons explicitly requested by Ukraine.
"They're coming forward with new systems that they think would be helpful and effective," Blinken said from NATO's headquarters.
"We put our own expertise to bear, especially the Pentagon to help determine what indeed we think could be effective. What Ukrainians will be ready to use as soon as they get it, and what we actually have access to and can get to them in real-time," he said, adding that the U.S. is working expeditiously to get appropriate weapons to Ukraine.
Blinken's comments echo those of U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley. Austin and Milley told lawmakers last week that some weapons systems on Ukraine's wish list require months of training in order to operate.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (L) meets with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 6, 2022.
Evelyn Hockstein | AFP | Getty Images
"Our point is, give Ukraine what it needs, what it asks, period," explained Olena Tregub, Ukraine's former director for international assistance at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
"We need strike drones, long-range and medium-range strike capabilities because as we sit here with you the Russians are moving huge columns, huge forces into the southeast of Ukraine," Tregub said.
Western intelligence reports have recently assessed that Russian forces will soon focus their military might in eastern and southern Ukraine after weeks of stalled ground advances on the capital city of Kyiv.
In the past six weeks, Russian forces on the ground in Ukraine have been beset with a slew of logistical problems on the battlefield, including reports of fuel and food shortages as well as frostbite.
"When Russia started this war, its initial aims were to seize the capital of Kyiv, replace the Zelensky government and take control of much if not all of Ukraine," national security advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters at the White House on April 4.
Sullivan said that U.S. officials believed the Kremlin is now revising its goal in the war.
A senior U.S. Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to share new details from the Pentagon, said Russian troops once near Kyiv are currently being resupplied with additional manpower in Belarus.
The official said the Pentagon believes those troops will soon deploy back to the fight in Ukraine. When asked where the troops would likely go, the official said the Pentagon believes the majority of them will move to the Donbas region, the site of an ongoing conflict since 2014.
An woman walks in front of destroyed buildings in the town of Borodianka on April 6, 2022, where the Russian retreat last week has left clues of the battle waged to keep a grip on the town, just 50 kilometres (30 miles) north-west of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv.
Genya Savilov | AFP | Getty Images
"We need protection for our sky," said Maria Berlinska, a Ukrainian military veteran who fought in the conflict in Donbas. She asked U.S. lawmakers during a round-robin of meetings in Washington, D.C., for "serious weapons," including middle-range surface-to-air missile systems, jets, tanks and armored vehicles.
"We are almost out of ammunition. If you don't have ammunition you can't do anything," she said, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin's war will likely spill over Ukraine's borders.
"It's very naive to think that if Putin will take Ukraine he will stop," added Berlinska, who trains Ukrainian military volunteers in aerial reconnaissance.
"If we don't win this war, then it will be fought on NATO territory because Putin will not stop. He has larger plans and he has to be stopped in Ukraine," she warned.
Ukrainian soldiers walk next to destroyed Russian tanks and armored vehicles, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in Bucha, in Kyiv region, Ukraine, April 6, 2022.
Alkis Konstantinidis | Reuters
Since Moscow's Feb. 24 invasion, the Biden administration has deployed more than 100,000 U.S. troops to NATO-member countries and authorized $1.7 billion in security assistance.
In addition, the NATO alliance has readied more than 140 warships as well as 130 aircraft on heightened alert. Meanwhile, NATO has consistently warned Putin that an attack on a NATO member state will be viewed as an attack on all, triggering the group's cornerstone Article 5.
Ukraine, which has sought NATO membership since 2002, is bordered by four NATO allies: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Poland currently hosts the majority of the troops from the 30-member alliance and has thus far taken the lion's share of refugees fleeing Putin's war.
"I think we've proved to the world that we are not going to surrender because we know that if we surrender there will be concentration camps. Putin is not even hiding what he is going to do with Ukrainians," the Anti-Corruption Action Center's Kaleniuk said.
"It's a genocide, the elimination of an entire nation and I'm not exaggerating," she added.
The UN has confirmed 1,793 civilian deaths and 2,439 injuries in Ukraine since Russia invaded its ex-Soviet neighbor on Feb. 24.
CNBC · by Amanda Macias · April 10, 2022
9. What weapons to send to Ukraine? How debate shifted from helmets to tanks.
Fundamentally we have to ask what is our strategy and campaign plan in terms of "quartermastering" the war.
We know there are a lot of people in the Pentagon and EUCOM working hard to try to make things happen.
I do not think this is a military problem as much as authorities and permissions. I would think the President and Congress could agree to designate this a Title 10 named operation and waive the peacetime bureaucratic requirements and allow the US military to do what it does best- “move the iron mountain” - if they chose to do so.
What weapons to send to Ukraine? How debate shifted from helmets to tanks.
April 9, 2022|Updated April 9, 2022 at 5:16 p.m. EDT
Ukrainian officials are clear on what they want from the United States and Europe: weapons. Big, heavy weapons. Not helmets. Tanks.
They say they need these weapons now, not later. And a lot of them.
The message has been broadly the same from the start of Russia’s invasion, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly said “I need ammunition, not a ride,” to this past week, when Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told NATO leaders in Brussels that he had a threefold agenda: “weapons, weapons and weapons.”
But in the United States and Europe, the discussions over what types of weapons to send are far different from what they were just six weeks ago.
This is a pivotal moment of the war, and as the battlefield shifts, the sorts of weapons Ukrainian forces need are changing, too. There is no longer a fear that the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, could fall within days. Russian forces are repositioning for a fight over eastern Ukraine — what many predict will be full-scale confrontation on flat, open, rural terrain, between infantry, armor and artillery, in the kind of engagements not seen in generations.
On Saturday, Britain’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a surprise visit to Kyiv to meet with Zelensky. His main message was about weapons: that Britain would supply 120 more armored vehicles, in addition to anti-ship missile systems to support Ukraine in the Black Sea.
This next phase of war in Ukraine could be “protracted” — “measured in months or longer,” national security adviser Jake Sullivan warned at a White House briefing. It could look like something from World War II, with two large armies facing off, Kuleba told NATO foreign ministers earlier this week.
“To win such a war, we need different help than what we have been receiving before,” said Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov, in a video appeal released Thursday. “We want to liberate the enemy-occupied territories as soon as possible. To do this, we need other weapons.”
In the early days of fighting, NATO countries worried that the weaponry they gave to Ukraine might be quickly captured by superior Russian forces, or that Ukrainian troops did not have the time to train to use new equipment effectively, or that sending offensive weapons would escalate the conflict and enrage Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was rattling his nuclear sword.
Weapons are easier to give than to take back.
But as the war has gone on, those concerns have begun to recede. Now, some NATO countries are preparing to supply Ukraine with more lethal, sophisticated, long-range and heavily armored weapons.
The question is whether those will come as fast as Ukrainian officials want — to stop Russia’s advance and push out Russian troops.
What do Ukrainian forces need?
Ukrainian service members study a Carl-Gustaf M4, a Swedish-made shoulder-launched weapon system, during an April 7 training session near Kharkiv, Ukraine. (Andrew Marienko/AP)
Since the Feb. 24 invasion, Western governments have supplied Ukraine with billions of dollars worth of weapons, including thousands of easy-to-use, shoulder-fired missile systems, which proved especially deadly, in the hands of small Ukrainian commando groups, in slowing, stopping and then reversing the Russian assault on Kyiv.
These “shoot-and-scoot” launchers were decisive, according to military analysts. “We know that military assistance is having a critical impact on this conflict,” Sullivan said Monday, highlighting the U.S.-produced, shoulder-fired antiaircraft Stingers and antitank Javelins that have been shipped to Ukraine.
Now, as the war pivots to the east, the numbers and types of weapons supplied by the United States and Europe will again prove critical for Ukraine. Its forces need to quickly rebuild, to replace equipment lost in six weeks of fighting and to supply the reserve units that the Ukrainian military is now trying to put into the field. They also need to prepare for a new sort of war, with the ultimate aim of not only defending cities but also turning out Russian forces.
“So antitank missiles alone are not going to cut it,” said Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at CNA, a think tank based in Arlington, Va.
Kofman estimated that Ukraine needs “hundreds” of armored combat vehicles, including tanks, and a tremendous amount of ammunition.
Reznikov ticked off a longer list: air defense systems and combat aircraft to protect citizens and Ukrainian troops from missiles and airstrikes; long-range artillery to keep Russian forces at a distance; tanks and armored vehicles to break through Russian defenses and liberate the occupied territories; and anti-ship missiles to beat back the Russian naval siege and unblock ports on the Black Sea.
Western governments have been reluctant to send such heavy weaponry. But the Czech Republic has become the first NATO country to contribute tanks, a senior Czech official confirmed to The Washington Post on Saturday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a transfer that hasn’t been announced officially.
“Hopefully, that will start a race to who can supply more,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
“It’s hard to be the first one” to send tanks, “but when someone breaks the ice, it’s much easier,” said Margiris Abukevicius, a Lithuanian vice minister of defense who was in Washington this past week to discuss military cooperation with the United States.
What can Ukrainian forces use?
Self-propelled artillery vehicles flying Ukrainian flags pass a checkpoint in Kyiv’s Obolon district on Feb. 28. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
In the opening weeks of the war, Ukraine’s backers were mostly focused on providing weapons that Ukrainian forces already knew how to use or that could be deployed with minimal training. A soldier could learn how to fire a Javelin, for instance, by watching a short video. And formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe could share their stockpiles of Soviet- and Russian-made equipment that integrates easily with Ukraine’s existing stock.
But European defense officials told The Post that their thinking about the number and types of weapons they are willing to send has evolved, as Ukrainian forces have shown the ability to fight — and have bought themselves time to train on more complicated Western-made equipment.
At the outset, “we were supplying weapons only if we knew the Ukrainians were able to operate them from the first moment. Now we are seeing more advanced weapons and a willingness to invest some time to help them use it,” Abukevicius said.
At NATO meetings in Brussels this past week, the focus was on getting Ukrainian forces more advanced weapons systems as quickly as possible.
“Countries indicated they are willing to go further, because we recognize that this is a new offensive, that the Russian forces are more concentrated and that more advanced weapons will be required,” said a Western official at the NATO sessions who spoke on the condition of anonymity to freely discuss the talks.
The British prime minister on Saturday said his country will be providing Ukraine with 120 heavily armored troop carriers called Mastiffs — and that British troops will help train the Ukrainians in their operation. Britain will also supply anti-ship weapons for the first time.
Ukraine’s president welcomed Britain’s “decisive and significant support” and urged other allies to keep the pressure on Russia.
The latest package from the United States, Sullivan said, includes laser-guided rocket systems, Puma drones and armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles.
More arms shipments from the United States are coming soon, Sullivan said, promising that the types of advanced weapons headed to Ukraine will be “extraordinary” and “unprecedented,” though he declined to offer specifics.
For tanks and air defense, the focus remains on older systems.
Central Europe holds warehouses of old Soviet and post-Soviet tanks — the T-72s and even earlier T-64s — and Alberque said Ukrainian forces know how to drive and repair those tanks.
In some cases, the White House has agreed to send new equipment to Central European countries if those countries give their old equipment to Ukraine. So a steady stream of their defense officials have passed through Washington in recent weeks, seeking assurances that the United States would backfill them with more modern equipment in short order.
President Biden said in a statement Friday that the United States would reposition a Patriot missile system to Slovakia, after that country sent an S-300 air defense system to Ukraine.
Will weapons from the West escalate the war?
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Javelins, not jets: How the U.S. is arming Ukraine against Russia
Washington Post Pentagon and national security reporter Karoun Demirjian explains the difficulties of deciding which weapons to send Ukraine. (Video: Joshua Carroll/The Washington Post, Photo: The Washington Post)
The debate about weaponry has evolved along with the conflict, although there remain divisions about the risks of NATO involving itself too deeply in the fight.
The Ukrainians say it no longer makes sense for Western governments to debate whether arms sent to Ukraine are “defensive” or “offensive” — or might somehow “escalate” the war, which has seen dense urban centers indiscriminately shelled by Russia, alongside charges that Russian forces have committed war crimes by deliberately targeting civilians.
At the NATO meeting in Brussels this past week, the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons appeared to be falling away.
“This is about defending Ukrainian territory, therefore they need all the types of equipment that we are able to supply,” a NATO official told The Post, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss defense decisions.
“I have urged allies to provide further support of many different types of systems, both the light weapons but also heavier weapons,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said.
But there is still wariness among Western allies. Russia has warned that it will treat arms shipments to Ukraine from NATO countries as “legitimate targets” for military action, potentially setting up more-direct confrontations between Russia and NATO.
At the same time, supplying Ukraine with long-range artillery, for example, includes the risk of the conflict spilling over borders.
Germany, which was chided for offering to send 5,000 protective helmets in January, has embraced the need for lethal aid, though it has been reluctant to see larger, more offensive weapons sent to Ukraine. NATO countries, too, have so far agreed that they will not send warplanes to the Ukrainian air force.
But backers of arming Ukraine more vigorously say that if Kyiv doesn’t win now, the next battle will be with NATO anyway.
“In the beginning, we were supplying weapons to sustain their fight. Now we are supplying weapons to advance and win,” Abukevicius said.
How fast can weapons get to Ukraine?
Ben Hodges, who served as commander of U.S. Army Europe during the Obama and Trump administrations, said there is a narrow window to arm Ukrainian forces as the war enters a new phase.
“The next three weeks are critical,” he said, and “will determine if Ukraine can break the back of the Russian forces, or if this goes for months, maybe years.”
Ukraine has expressed frustration with the speed of weapons delivery.
Reznikov warned this past week that “procrastination with the provision of weapons leads to the death of our children, to the depletion of our country.”
Booth reported from London, Rauhala from Brussels and Birnbaum from Washington. David Stern in Mukachevo, Ukraine, contributed to this report.
10. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes
Conclusion:
A definitive victory for one side would require a collapse of the army and domestic political will of the other side. Russia could declare victory and withdraw after annexing more Ukrainian territory and inflicting what it perceives as sufficient punishment on Kyiv. A negotiated settlement would reflect both the military realities on the ground and the political and economic realities inside each country. In Russia’s case, a negotiated settlement is unlikely to provide results that justify having gone to war. A long war of attrition, similar to the one between Egypt and Israel from 1967-1970, that left both countries with ruined economies, militaries, and societies, is possible. A peace agreement after such a war would most likely be reached as a result of mutual exhaustion and unlikely solve anything, except perhaps to provide a rest period before the next war.
Which scenario is most likely to occur? Russia faces a myriad of daunting tactical, logistical, manpower, and morale challenges in continuing the war, but it is not impossible for it to annex portions of Ukraine if its army and national will remain intact. However, under the best circumstances, what Russia would “win” would be an occupied population seething with resentment and offering years of resistance, a West united against Russia, and an economic future for Russia that is really no future. Russia’s only hope for “victory” is for Ukraine to become exhausted before it does, but even this type of victory would redefine the term “Pyrrhic.” More likely Russia will either see its invasion eventually repelled or will have to compromise at the negotiating table. Either event would cause seismic waves inside Russian society and body politic. That much of the canvas is clear after six weeks.
Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes - Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philip Wasielewski is a 2022 Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Destroyed houses are seen in Borodyanka, amid Russia’s invasion on Ukraine, in Kyiv region, Ukraine, April 5, 2022. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
Correlation of Forces and Strategies
A lack of unity of command, wherein the army conducts several disjointed fights rather than one coordinated campaign, impairs Russian operations. Russian tactical communications are an open book to the Ukrainians, which gives them excellent intelligence and targeting opportunities. Further intelligence comes from the ubiquitous presence of cell phone cameras amongst the occupied populations and their ability to disseminate targeting information via cellular networks. Russia still struggles to achieve air control, let alone air superiority.
Russia may hold Ukrainian territory, but it has no hold on the population. Occupied Ukrainians have not rallied to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cause as happened to some extent in Crimea and in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014. Furthermore, the almost entirely road-bound Russian forces only truly control the towns that they occupy, the roads they sit on, out to the range of their main tank guns.
Russia is changing tactics due to its failure to the win the war quickly via a coup d’main of Kyiv. Russia has turned to air and artillery bombardments to destroy urban resistance and avoid further losses of its armored and infantry forces. These tactics to surround, shell, and starve cities into submission conquered Grozny and Aleppo, but face a different environment in Ukraine.
Russian forces used siege tactics in Chechnya and Syria against relatively small numbers of lightly armed insurgents who had no air defenses. Even then, the sieges of Grozny and Aleppo took many weeks, even months, to complete. In Ukraine, Russia has not one Grozny or Aleppo to conquer but multiple fortified cities whose supply lines have not been cut (except Mariupol) and whose forces have abundant supplies of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The Russian military will be hard-pressed to resupply the large amounts of ammunition needed for multiple sieges. After six weeks of fighting, it has expended immense amounts of precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and other ordnance, which cannot be quickly replaced.
Ukrainian service members stand in a front of an Antonov An-225 Mriya cargo plane, the world’s biggest aircraft, destroyed by Russian troops as Russia’s attack on Ukraine continues, at an airfield in the settlement of Hostomel, in Kyiv region, Ukraine April 3, 2022. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
In regard to manpower, reinforcements from Russia’s Far East and the Caucasus have entered the conflict, while other units redeploy from the north of Ukraine to the south. Once they arrive on the battlefield, they may be the last trained and equipped combat units that Russia can generate for months. If these reinforcements and revised tactics do not achieve success, then the Russian military has limited options to quickly generate additional forces. Belarus is reluctant to enter the war, and recruiting Syrian volunteers for urban combat is wishful thinking since part of the reason for Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria came from the reluctance of Syrian forces to engage in urban combat.
Russia has already committed three quarters of its available ground and airborne tactical units to Ukraine. It has only approximately 30-35 battalion tactical groups in reserve, and some of these must stay in Kaliningrad and the North Caucasus to leave a modicum of military power for other contingencies. Unlike the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Russia does not have a large enough army to send in endless echelons of troops to steamroll enemy opposition. What forces it commits in the next few weeks will be its strategic reserve. For the first time in the history of modern European warfare, Russia may run out of soldiers.
If this is Russia’s backup strategy, then it will be as hard to achieve as its first. A Donbas offensive faces several challenges. First, supply lines from Russia to the recently captured city of Izium, a likely attack position for a Donbas offensive, are very tenuous. Second, Russian command and control and logistics capabilities to date offer little confidence that they can coordinate and support deep tactical movements. Third, Ukrainian forces have the advantage of interior lines of communication and could shuttle forces to attack dispersed Russian axes of advance. The withdrawal of Russian forces near Kyiv also frees Ukrainian forces to deploy to the Donbas and strike the flanks of any Russian encircling movement. Fourth, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north may provide additional troops for the Donbas offensive, but these units require time to refit and reassemble. The road movement of forces from the vicinity of Kyiv to attack positions near Izium or Donetsk via Gomel, Belarus; Belgorod, Russia; and Luhansk, Ukraine is the equivalent of driving from St. Louis to New York City. If it does not use railcars and tank transporters, the mechanized forces completing that road march will require extensive maintenance before any attack, and the troops will need time for refitting and recovery. Finally, if Russia takes too long to concentrate men and materiel for a Donbas offensive, then the Ukrainian military may strike first. If Ukraine can quickly reorganize its forces, then it could preempt any Russian offensive by trying to retake Kherson and possibly the Perekop Isthmus to Crimea.
Whatever Russia does next, if it does not strike soon and succeed, then the initiative for offensive action could shift to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces on the offensive would require Russian forces to defend disjointed fronts with unreliable supply lines or face the most difficult of tactical maneuvers: a fighting withdrawal. Therefore, Russia’s next steps must either win this war, or it will soon have no good military alternatives.
A local woman salutes Ukrainian service members, as Russia’s attack on Ukraine continues, in Chernihiv region, Ukraine April 2, 2022. Picture taken April 2, 2022. REUTERS/Serhii Nuzhnenko
Understanding the Tangible and Intangible Supporting Elements of the War
For both Russia and Ukraine, their ability to turn tactics on the ground into strategic success will depend largely on three factors: a capability to continue to field combat units, supply them, and have them fight. Therefore, this article will now analyze casualties and losses of war materiel, logistics, and morale for each side. Understanding, as best as possible due to the fog of war, the losses that both sides have sustained provides an approximate yardstick regarding the challenges to come in maintaining tactical units on the front lines. A brief review of logistics should show the limitations each side may face in carrying out the fight. Finally, a review of each nation’s information operations and the morale of their armed forces and population may give a sense of the will of each army to continue this fight as well as the will of each country’s population to make sacrifices for it.
Casualties and Materiel Losses
Logistics
Russia. Russia’s logistical system has been unable to fully support Russian operations and is unlikely to improve in the next several weeks. Russian soldiers have complained about a lack of materiel support and have looted stores for food, most likely less out of maliciousness and more out of self-preservation. No new Russian offensive will succeed if its troops are not resupplied, nor will plans to shell Ukrainian cities into submission succeed if sufficient munitions never reach the front.
Meeting of the Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, with foreign journalists, March 2, 2022. (Office of the President of Ukraine)
Information Operations and Morale
Putin has not taken a public-facing role to garner domestic support. Since his initial address to the nation on February 24, Putin rarely appears in public or speaks on television to rally support for the war. In two appearances, a televised meeting with regional governors and at a concert-rally celebrating the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, he castigated enemies, external and internal. Unlike during the Second Chechen War, he has not been seen decorating heroes or visiting soldiers at the front and the wounded in hospitals.
Just as domestic anti-war sentiment is visible despite recent draconian legislation to punish opposition to Russia’s “special military operation,” Russian soldiers in the field are also demonstrating that their morale is less than solid. There are reports of soldiers damaging vehicles to have an excuse to leave the battlefield, surrendering of their own free will, and otherwise expressing discontent, if not with the war, then at least with leadership and logistics.
Ukraine. Ukrainian information operations aim to mobilize domestic and international support while simultaneously attempting to undermine Russian military and civilian support for the war. Their methods will probably be studied for years to come. Some are very powerful, such as the Telegram channel Search for Your Own (Ищи Своих in Russian), which show either the faces of dead Russian soldiers or the videotapes of captured Russian soldiers speaking to their parents. Such pictures and videos are contrary to the Geneva Conventions, but, since they pale in comparison to Russia’s targeting of civilians, there has been limited international reaction to their use. Almost all videos of the war, as well as most press reporting, come from Ukrainian or Ukrainian-sympathetic sources, and it is Ukraine’s information that is shaping the world’s view of this war.
Future Scenarios
Based on the above review of the war to date and factoring in trends regarding casualties, logistics, and morale, there are five possible paths forward for this war:
1. Russia defeats Ukraine. Victory would be defined by Ukraine accepting Russia’s maximalist demands, including recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics; possible surrender of other territory near Crimea; agreement never to join NATO or the EU; and limitations on the size of its military. For this to happen, the Ukrainian military would have to be decisively defeated on the battlefield, and Ukrainian national will would have to collapse. For that to happen, Russian military effectiveness would have to improve dramatically, and the war would need to continue until Russia could grind Ukraine’s military into defeat. This assumes Russia’s domestic situation remains calm, and its economy can support an extended war despite sanctions. Russian victory is possible, but numerous factors would have to line up in Russia’s favor and Ukraine’s disfavor.
What makes this scenario unlikely is Ukraine’s national will to resist. Breaking it would require a drastic change of circumstances on the battlefield. This is why some speculate that Putin may consider using a nuclear weapon, the “escalate to de-escalate” option. Putin may convince himself that the only path to victory is via an overwhelming psychological blow to Ukraine’s national will. Putin’s justification for such extreme action could be the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to force Japan to sue for peace and prevent horrific casualties from an invasion of its home islands. However horrible, this is an option if the Russian military is willing to carry out a nuclear strike command.
2. Russia declares victory and partly withdraws. If Russia cannot coerce Ukraine into meeting its maximalist demands but does not wish to negotiate and compromise, then it could declare that it had achieved the goals of the “special military operation” and withdraw troops back into Belarus, Russia, and those areas of Ukraine that it wishes to annex. These areas are most likely to be in southern Ukraine to connect Russia with Crimea (should Mariupol fall) or at least secure for Crimea’s access to fresh water from the Dnepr River. Since Ukraine would never agree to this annexation, a Russian declaration of victory and withdrawal to a fortified defense line would present Ukraine with a dilemma: accept a ceasefire under unfavorable conditions or continue the war. Putin could claim that Ukraine had been “punished” to put a positive spin on a disastrous campaign and serve as a warning to other states on Russia’s periphery of the damage that they will sustain if they ever violate Russia’s perceived security interests. This move might also prevent the destruction of the Russian army and avert domestic unrest that could threaten Putin’s hold on power.
3. Ukraine defeats Russia. A Ukrainian victory would be defined by a return to the status quo before February 24, without conditions that violated its sovereignty. This would require either a collapse of the Russian army in the field or a political agreement with Russia, most likely due to a change of government in Moscow, which then would withdraw its army to end international sanctions. In other words, this scenario requires a close repeat of Russian history in 1917. However, even in victory, Ukraine would face years of rebuilding and resettling its refugees and internally displaced persons, the costs for which seized Russian assets would hopefully help defray.
4. A Negotiated Settlement. Russia’s devastation of Ukraine’s cities, coupled with Ukraine’s devastation of Russia’s army and the effects of international sanctions, could lead both sides to a negotiated settlement. Zelensky no longer believes NATO membership is possible and has signaled that Ukraine is willing to compromise on this key Russian demand. The Kremlin recognizes that regime change is impossible and that it needs Zelensky’s credibility to get Ukrainians to agree to any compromises that give Russia a face-saving way out of this war. Both sides could continue to agree to disagree about the status of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics, which would then put negotiating positions close to the status quo ante bellum. From Moscow’s perspective, it could declare victory and announce to domestic audiences that Ukraine had “learned a lesson” and would never again threaten Donetsk and Luhansk. From Kyiv’s perspective, a negotiated settlement would allow Ukraine to rebuild and await favorable circumstances to regain territories lost in 2014.
5. A War of Attrition. As horrible as it is, this war does not have to end soon if both countries have the will to continue to fight, if not to victory, then to avoid defeat. The front could stabilize with Russia’s military unable to advance and Ukraine unable to dislodge it. As the war continues, both the Russian and Ukrainian economies would suffer, and millions of refugees could remain in Europe. Like South Korea and South Vietnam before it, Ukraine would become the hot focus of a new Cold War.
Conclusion
A definitive victory for one side would require a collapse of the army and domestic political will of the other side. Russia could declare victory and withdraw after annexing more Ukrainian territory and inflicting what it perceives as sufficient punishment on Kyiv. A negotiated settlement would reflect both the military realities on the ground and the political and economic realities inside each country. In Russia’s case, a negotiated settlement is unlikely to provide results that justify having gone to war. A long war of attrition, similar to the one between Egypt and Israel from 1967-1970, that left both countries with ruined economies, militaries, and societies, is possible. A peace agreement after such a war would most likely be reached as a result of mutual exhaustion and unlikely solve anything, except perhaps to provide a rest period before the next war.
Which scenario is most likely to occur? Russia faces a myriad of daunting tactical, logistical, manpower, and morale challenges in continuing the war, but it is not impossible for it to annex portions of Ukraine if its army and national will remain intact. However, under the best circumstances, what Russia would “win” would be an occupied population seething with resentment and offering years of resistance, a West united against Russia, and an economic future for Russia that is really no future. Russia’s only hope for “victory” is for Ukraine to become exhausted before it does, but even this type of victory would redefine the term “Pyrrhic.” More likely Russia will either see its invasion eventually repelled or will have to compromise at the negotiating table. Either event would cause seismic waves inside Russian society and body politic. That much of the canvas is clear after six weeks.
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[1] Mykola Bielieskov, “Ukraine’s Strategy in Russian Invasion: similar to Finland’s Winter War,” Euromaidan Press, March 11, 2022, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/03/11/ukraines-strategy-in-russian-invasion-is-similar-to-finlands-winter-war/.
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[2] Olena Roshchina, “Росія прагне захопити Херсонську, Донецьку й Луганську області повністю – зведення Генштабу [Russia intends to completely seize Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts – General Staff summary],” Ukrainska Pravda, April 2, 2022, https://www.pravda.com/ua/news/2022/04/2/7336585.
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[3] Reuters, “Russia says 498 of its soldiers killed, 1,597 wounded in Ukraine – RIA,” March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-498-of-its-soldiers-killed-1597-wounded-ukraine-ria-2022-03-02/; and Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia More Than Doubles Count of Its Troops Killed in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-25/card/russia-more-than-doubles-count-of-its-war-dead-to-1-351-troops-killed-in-ukraine-Db3WixxGFfHSIRnLbYPZ.
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Washington Post, March 8, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2002/03/08/russian-military-deaths-ukraine/.
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CNN, March 18, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/17/europe/russian-casualties-ukraine-military-readiness/index.html; and Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, “As Russian Troop Deaths Climb, Morale Becomes an Issue, Officials Say,” New York Times, March 17, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html.
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[7] There is no more complicated or controversial subject than trying to determine Soviet casualties during the Second World War/Great Patriotic War. In the best attempt for accuracy for this report, the killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.3 is determined from figures found in a 1993 Russian Ministry of Defense study prepared by General G.F. Krivosheev, which is not without its detractors because of disagreements over the losses of POWs and other categories separate from combat dead and wounded. The Krivosheev report specifies that during the Second World War, Soviet forces sustained 6,329,600 killed in action or died of wounds; 555,500 non-combat deaths (disease, accidents, etc.); and 14,685,593 wounded in action. Using these figures provides a killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.32. The percentage of non-combat deaths to killed in action is approximately 9%. Krivosheev’s report is at https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=11359251@cmsArticle and an English translation is available at documents.theblackvault.com/documents/SovietLosses.pdf.
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[8] Interfax-Ukraine, “There are currently 562 Russian prisoners of war in Ukraine – Vereschuk,” March 19, 2022, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/815830.html.
- Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and The Invasion of Japan, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2009, p. 4.
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[10] Stijn Mitzer, “Attack on Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html. Accessed April 6, 2022.
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[11] Svitlana Kisilova, “РФ заявляє, що тримає в полоні 500 українців йvготова до обміну, але проосить менше “злоби” [Russia says it holds 500 Ukrainians captive and ready for exchange, but asks for less “malice”],” Ukrainska Pravda, March 21, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333410.
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[12] Stijn Mitzer, “Attack on Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html. Accessed April 6, 2022.
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[13] Jeremy Herb, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler, and Oren Liebermann, “Pentagon says Polish proposal to transfer jets to US to give to Ukraine isn’t ‘tenable’,” CNN, March 8, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/politics/poland-jets-ukraine-russia/index.html.
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[14] Kseniya Kirillova, “Putin Is Losing the War, but Russians Have Stockholm Syndrome,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, volume 19, no. 33, March 10, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/putin-is-losing-the-war-but-russians-have-stockholm-syndrome/.
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[15] Moscow Times, “Russia Detains Around 4,600 at Ukraine Conflict Protests,” March 7, 2022, https://www.moscowtimes.com/202/03/07/russia-detains-around-4600-at-ukraine-conflict-protests-a76797.
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[17] Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1982, pp. 163-164.
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[18] Miriam Berger, “A majority of Ukrainians support armed resistance and oppose concessions to Russia, poll finds,” Washington Post, March 10, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/10/ukraine-poll-majority-ukrainians-support-armed-resistance-oppose-concessions-russia-new-poll-finds/.
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[20] This concept was first developed by Antulio Echevarria when he stated that the mind of the commander-in-chief was the American center of gravity in war. See, Tom Ricks, “Echevarria: The president’s mind is the true American center of gravity, plus why landpower is different, and more thoughts,” Foreign Policy, October 1, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/01/echevarria-the-presidents-mind-is-the-true-american-center-of-gravity-plus-why-landpower-is-different-and-more-thoughts/.
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[1] The unstated second part of this strategy is to wait for Russia to collapse, either militarily on the field of battle or politically at home. While Russia’s initial offensive culminated in the north, it still holds the initiative in the south, and conventional wisdom is that in the next phase of the war, forces will attempt to destroy Ukraine’s will to fight by pulverizing cities and seizing the Donbas. Russia also continues its efforts to seize Mariupol to create an uninterrupted land bridge from Russia proper to Crimea.
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[2] To do so, Russia may attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas. If successful, Russia could claim that it has “demilitarized” Ukraine and use the occupied territory as a bargaining chip in negotiations or formally incorporate these regions into Russia.
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Russia. Due to the wide area of the battlefield and the confusion of multiple combat operations, determining exact casualties is problematic even for the Russians themselves. On March 2, 2022, Russia announced that 498 troops had died, with 1,597 wounded, and on March 25, it updated that casualty list to 1,351 dead and 3,825 wounded.[3] On March 8, a U.S. intelligence official estimated Russian deaths between 2,000 and 4,000.[4] Ten days later, press reports of U.S. and allied intelligence assessments put the range of Russian killed in action (KIA) between 3,000 and 10,000, with one report calling a figure of 7,000 deaths “conservative.”[5] Taking the middle figure of these two assessments provides a KIA rate of approximately 3,000-3,500 KIA every ten days. On March 23, the Wall Street Journal reported a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assessment that since February 24, the Russian military had suffered between 7,000-15,000 KIA and total casualties could number 40,000.[6] The figure of 15,000 KIA circa March 23 is unlikely because it would mean a jump from 7,000 to 15,000 KIA over a ten-day period. That doubles the KIA rate at a time when much of the Russian army was conducting an operational pause. However, if the loss rate stayed basically the same or slightly lower due to fewer Russian attacks during the last ten days of March, then a more likely figure for Russian KIA by early April sits at approximately 10,000.
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[7] Additionally, the most recent official Russian casualty claims had a killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.8, less than the 1:3 or 1:4 ratio common to military planning. Therefore, a killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.3 approximates the number of Russian wounded at 23,000 if there have been 10,000 KIA.
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[8] Second, considering winter conditions, there must be a number of cold-weather casualties, frostbite, trench foot, and hypothermia, and illnesses, such as pneumonia, flu, or COVID, that have taken men off of the battlefield. Third, accidents—vehicle crashes, negligent discharges of weapons, etc.—are natural occurrences on any battlefield. In the Second World War, Soviet non-combat deaths were approximately nine percent of combat deaths, which would mean Russian forces in Ukraine may have sustained approximately 900 non-combat deaths beyond the estimated 10,000 combat deaths. Fourth, psychiatric casualties are not uncommon on a battlefield. For example, one account of U.S. casualties in World War II states that 312,354 men were discharged for combat-related psychiatric breakdowns in comparison to the 671,846 who were physically wounded.[9] Finally, there are the missing in action: those who are genuinely lost or cut off from their units and trying to make their way back and those, as noted below in the discussion on morale, who have purposefully absented themselves from the battlefield and have fallen back to a safe position to avoid further fighting. The number of total Russian casualties after six weeks of fighting probably exceeds 35,000 men, and when all factors are considered, the figure could approach 38,000. Higher numbers are possible, as are lower, but this figure is still an astounding casualty rate for an army in a post-World War II conventional conflict.
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[10] Again, based on conservative methodology, actual losses are probably much higher, and these do not account for a plethora of other destroyed vehicles, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft weapons, etc. In the short run, Russia has the reserve capacity to replace these losses, if it can transport new equipment to the battlefield. The question, then, considering combat losses and a limited number of reserves is: who will man this replacement equipment if it ever arrives?
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Ukraine. On March 12, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the Ukrainian military had suffered approximately 1,300 deaths in the first 16 days of fighting. Kyiv has not provided additional official updates, so casualty rates must be extrapolated—therefore, like Russian losses, can only be rough estimates. If the Ukrainian KIA rate remained constant with the first official announcement and a slight downturn is factored in for decreased fighting over the last ten days, then, as of early April, Ukraine may have suffered approximately 3,100 KIA. Since Ukrainian military medical services can use nearby civilian medical infrastructure, a 1:3.5 ratio for killed-to-wounded could be assumed, which would mean Ukraine has had approximately 10,850 combat wounded. According to press reporting, Russia has given the International Red Cross information on 500 Ukrainian military prisoners.[11] In addition to prisoners of war, adding factors, such as illnesses, accidents, missing in action, and psychiatric casualties, would put total casualty figures for the Ukrainian military as of early April at approximately 16,000-18,000. This, too, is a substantial casualty rate for a modern army, but Ukraine is in a better position to mitigate these losses than Russia. Fighting on its own territory, Ukraine can more easily find replacements for its casualties due to its ability to mobilize citizens, including an informal reserve of nearly 400,000 veterans, who fought between 2014-2022 along the line of control in Donbas, into local territorial defense units.
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[12] True losses are likely greater but have not affected the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian military, which is maximizing man-portable anti-air and anti-tank missiles against Russian forces as much as its armored and mechanized vehicles. However, for the Ukrainian military to transition from a defense utilizing small groups of soldiers and territorial reservists with hand-held weapons to a conventional combined arms offense, it will need to find a way to reconstitute its regular army infantry, armor, and artillery units. The side—Russia or Ukraine—which is the quickest to reconstitute its tactical units, may have the best chance to gain the initiative in the next phase of this war.
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Ukraine. Ukraine has three supply sources: domestic arms factories and stockpiles, international shipments, and captured Russian equipment and ordnance. This has been sufficient to maintain its army in the field. However, usage rates of anti-aircraft missiles and losses of aircraft are critical vulnerabilities as both are hard to replace. Suggestions and plans for providing alternative sources of these items have been made but not enacted.[13] The failure to do so will degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend itself from the air beyond short-range man-portable anti-air missiles. Also, the failure of the West to provide Ukraine with anti-ship missile systems leaves Ukraine’s remaining port of Odessa vulnerable to the threat of an amphibious assault and allows the Russian navy to continue to blockade Ukraine’s maritime commerce with impunity.
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Russia. Russia has opted out of the information war to win over international public opinion, probably knowing it would never win sympathy for its Goliath fighting the Ukrainian David. Instead, Russia has concentrated its information operations on a more important center of gravity: domestic public opinion. To a degree, that strategy is working. Currently half of Russians support the war either actively or passively, and even Russian dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky acknowledges an uptick in popular support for Putin due to patriotic impulses of a nation at war.[14] The “Z” symbol serving as an identity marker on many Russian vehicles in Ukraine has become a rallying sign for pro-war Russians.
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[15] Probably more unsettling for the Kremlin are the cracks showing in its normally tame mainstream media. On a pro-Kremlin prime time talk show, guests not only criticized the war in Ukraine saying it will be worse than the Soviet war in Afghanistan, but also complained about the war isolating Russia.[16] One Russian media figure, Marina Ovsyannikova, dramatically protested the war by disrupting a news program.
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[17] It is unlikely that the average Russian solider in Ukraine has much evidence that he is part of a well-integrated and well-lead team, and his morale probably reflects these circumstances.
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[18] A more recent poll showed that 93% of those questioned believed that Ukraine will repel Russia’s attack.[19]
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[20] The winner of this war may be the leader, Zelensky or Putin, who most effectively galvanizes his country to fight and then manages the armed forces, and the logistics to sustain those forces, to achieve the nation’s war aims.
11. The Jack Ryan career path: How veterans can join the CIA
A public service and recruiting announcement for veterans.
The Jack Ryan career path: How veterans can join the CIA
In the Tom Clancy universe, Jack Ryan is a mild-mannered history teacher and former Marine whose military skill set combined with history and economics degrees lead him to a career as an analyst at the CIA.
Jack Ryan may be fiction — especially considering he eventually ends up as president — but an economics expert or a veteran with a strong knowledge of military strategy can be just as valuable a part of the intelligence team as an operative.
CIA recruits can range from those with a high school diploma or a GED to a PhD. A former enlisted recruit with six years of service can be as viable as a candidate with a doctorate in cybersecurity.
Candidates sought by the agency have earned degrees that range from engineering, economics, psychology, and technology and from law school to war college. Most important to those transitioning from service, CIA places a high value on the skills, dedication, and unique perspectives former military members bring to their mission. Veterans play a vital role in all departments of its diverse workforce.
The agency encourages former military — who understand the importance of OPSEC — to apply and offers specific benefits tailored to veterans who chose to join. For example, current openings, such as paramilitary officer, are paying hiring bonuses up to 25% of base pay.
Here’s a primer on why veterans may be a good fit for the agency.
What it takes
Each candidate is carefully vetted through several intensive interviews and security screenings. The entire process can take more than a year. The positions are not for those without a clear idea of what type of life and career they want. Working for the CIA is a lifestyle choice, not a job. According to the website, all of the department positions at the agency require dedication to one common core goal: to keep the country safe.
The basics of applying
The CIA prefers candidates are physically in the United States or one of its territories when submitting an online application. They must also be a U.S. citizen (dual U.S. citizens also eligible) and willing to move to the Washington, DC area (Virginia). They must also be able to successfully complete and pass full security and medical evaluations, including a background investigation, a polygraph interview, and a physical and psychological examination.
The benefits
Special benefits and credits exist for former military (see below), but benefits for all agency employees include health insurance through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, including dental, vision, and long-term health; there are also indoor and outdoor on-site fitness facilities and three hours a week allotted to fitness. Paid time off, sick leave, childcare, flexible-scheduling, overtime, holiday, night differential, and premium pay, student loan repayment assistance, retirement, continuing education, foreign language school — and financial compensation for certain existing language skills — are among other benefits available.
Special veterans credits and benefits
Candidates’ veteran status may influence the benefits received. Veterans get credit for time served. Unlike a civilian entering the agency’s workforce, they don’t start at the bottom. When it comes to leave, aka vacation and retirement, time in service counts.
Service credit for retirement
Those who are separated, but not retired, can use uniformed service for credit toward their civilian retirement by making a 3% deposit to the Federal Employees Retirement System.
Retired military can use their uniformed service toward civilian retirement by making a deposit to the retirement fund and waiving their military retirement pay at civilian retirement. However, if a military retiree wishes to keep their military retirement pay, they can’t use that military service toward civilian retirement.
The Central Intelligence Agency currently offers over 100 career choices for qualified veterans. Openings vary from administrative, logistics, human resources, accounting, targeting, security, analysts, information technology, paramilitary, and operations officers. Career choice depends on education level, specific experience, aptitude, and language skills. Being bilingual is not required.
Security caveats:
- Do not tell anyone — friends, family, or organizations — of your interest in CIA or joining CIA.
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If you are interested in a position with CIA, it is required that you do not follow, friend, share, interact, post, or mention the agency on any of your social media platforms.
- Do not download unauthorized copies of items or illegally downloaded music, movies, software, animations, courses, or TV episodes.
- Do not use illegal drugs within twelve months of your application, and do not remain in the presence of those who use illegal substances.
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You may not contact CIA while outside the United States using any means of communication, phone, email, or snail mail.
Seriously. Your application could be canned before you begin.
Military leave accrual for National Guard or Reserves duty
Full-time employees in the National Guard or the Reserves for Active Duty or Training accrue 15 days of military leave each year. Accrual rates for part-time employees are prorated. Employees can carry up to 120 unused military leave hours into the new year. Employees on military leave receive both civilian and military pay.
The nitty-gritty on the agency’s military leave policy
Employees required for emergency duty as ordered by the president or state governor receive up to 22 days of leave per calendar year; however, leave cannot be carried over into the next calendar year. Therefore, civilian salary is reduced by the amount of pay for the days of military leave. However, agency employees may choose to take annual instead of military leave and receive both military and civilian pay.
The CIA’s hiring process
For those seriously considering a second career in the intelligence field, the agency prides itself on an open, organized, logical hiring process. The process is broken down into five chronological steps, and each of these steps is broken down into different requirements or sections. As the hiring process is arduous, the agency allows candidates to apply for up to four job openings at once.
The five hiring steps at the CIA, broken down
While it may only be listed as five steps, there are many components in the application and hiring process. Know that CIA expects an immediate response to their communications and a delayed response can disqualify you.
- Apply online
- Screening, testing, and interviews
- A conditional offer of employment and SF-86
- Security and medical evaluations as part of the clearance process
- Official job offer and onboarding
12. War in Ukraine - April 11, 2022 | SOF News
War in Ukraine - April 11, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: Patriot Missile System. The United States is deploying a Patriot missile system from Germany to Slovakia. The Slovakians are providing the Ukrainians with a S-300 anti-aircraft system. The Patriot will backfill the S-300. NATO photo, March 2022.
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Big Picture of the Conflict
Ground Situation. The nature of the fight ahead will likely change. The Ukrainians will no longer be limited to defending cities but will find themselves confronting an enemy in open terrain that allows for the movement of armor. There are less forested areas from which the Ukrainians can mount small ambushes behind enemy lines. The Russians have an overwhelming superiority in tank and armored vehicle numbers. Read more in “Battles may be tougher for Ukrainians as war shifts to wide-open terrain in east”, The Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
Izyum – The Next Objective? Some analysts say that the eastern city of Izyum in the Kharkiv Oblast may likely be the next target. A very large column of Russian armor has been spotted on the move in the Kharkiv Oblast and may be headed in that direction.
New Russian Commander. The Russians invaded Ukraine from several different avenues of approach – each under a separate command of different military districts. This resulted in a disjointed plan and executed campaign. The Russians have now appointed a single unified commander for the Ukraine War. This will simplify the Russian command structure. The revised campaign plan for the Russians will be to seize and hold the portions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that it does not currently control after the seizure of Mariupol. The new commander, General Alexander Dvornikov, is a veteran of the Syrian conflict as well as a significant amount of time in Donbas over the past several years. He was most recently commanding Russia’s southern military district. Read more in “What to know about Russia’s new top commander in Ukraine”, The Washington Post, April 10, 2022.
Russian Reinforcements. There are reports that Russia will be mobilizing 60,000 reservists to join the war in Ukraine. In addition, the annual spring conscription period began, which will bring in over 120,000 new conscripts for a one year long term of service. These conscripts will need to undergo a training period before being assigned to combat units in Ukraine. The British Ministry of Defense reported on Sunday (Apr 10) that Russia is recruiting people from the Russian-occupied Transnistria (Moldova) and to bring in personnel discharged from Russian military forces since 2012.
Missile Strike on Kramatorsk Train Station. The casualty figures for the short-range ballistic missile (SS-21) that struck a city in the Donbas region have risen – at least 52 are now known dead including several children. The people killed were waiting on an evacuation train to take them to western Ukraine and on to safety. Kramatorsk is the capital of Donetsk Oblast. The incident has sparked protests around the world against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Officials say that evacuation by trains from the conflict areas to western Ukraine will continue; along with bus evacuations. There have been over 1,500 missile launches since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Maritime Activities. Merchant mariners and their ships are stranded in the Black Sea region. This has halted the import and export of vital commodities for Ukraine. Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea have been blockaded by Russia and Ukrainian mines have made travel through the northern Black Sea area dangerous. There are about 1,000 mariners from crews on 86 small and large vessels that need to be evacuated. “Extended Russian Ukraine Invasion has Stranded Merchant Mariners, Crippled Wheat Production”, USNI News, April 7, 2022.
Tactical Situation
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine was considered the primary objective of the Russians. The capture of Kyiv would have allowed Russia to put in place its puppet government. It now appears that almost all of the Russian units in the Kyiv region have moved north into Belarus. One of these units, the 331st Guards Parachute Regiment, met their match when they tried to advance on Kyiv. “The heavy losses of an elite Russian regiment in Ukraine”, BBC News, April 2, 2022.
Donbas Region. The next month will be potentially decisive for both Ukraine and Russia. The Russians certainly suffered a defeat in the failure to capture Kyiv. They were surprised by the valiant effort of the Ukrainians and not prepared for a months-long engagement. Now, however, they are limiting their goals to the Donbas region and the ‘land bridge’ between Russia and Crimea along the Sea of Azov. Instead of supporting several axes of advance, there will just be a few. This means better cross-coordination, less logistical problems, shorter supply routes, and the ability to concentrate forces. Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), provides an analysis of the next phase of the Ukraine conflict. “Why the battle for Donbas will be very different from the assault on Kyiv”, The Guardian, April 9, 2022.
Kharkiv. The western and southern corridors to the city are open and controlled by Ukrainian forces. The Russians continue to probe the Ukrainian defenses to the north of the city. The second largest city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, is located in the northeast of the country and has been under attack since the start of the invasion.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol has been under siege by the Russians for weeks. The Russians have slowly been gaining ground. News reports say that the defenders are now split between two sections of the city.
Mykolayiv and Odessa. A city near the Black Sea, Mykolayiv, is still experiencing shelling by the Russians. This city of 500,000 has been on the front lines since the start of the war. It is the roadblock between the Russians and the city of Odessa – the seaside port that many believed to be an initial primary objective of the Russians. “Mykolaiv region on edge amid fear of new Russian offensive”, The Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. Read an assessment of the Russian offensive campaign by the Institute for the Study of War (April 10). View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces. Some very good reference maps are available for those ‘handlers’ assisting in the evacuation of people from the conflict areas – provided by Map Action.
UK Prime Minister Visits Ukraine. Boris Johnson paid a surprise visit to Ukrainian President Voloddymyr Zelensky in Kyiv in a show of solidarity with the Ukrainian people. He announced that more weapons were on the way to Ukraine, condemned Russia’s ‘despicable’ attacks on civilians, congratulated Ukraine on its successful defense of Kyiv, and called for a complete embargo of Russian energy resources. Johnson pledged 120 more armored vehicles and new anti-ship missiles. After an office meeting, the two walked through central Kyiv.
“I made clear today that the United Kingdom stands unwaveringly with them in this ongoing fight, and we are in it for the long run. We are stepping up our own military and economic support and convening a global alliance to bring this tragedy to an end, and ensure Ukraine survives and thrives as a free and sovereign nation.”
Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Kyiv, Saturday, April 9, 2022.
UK APCs and More to Ukraine. A number of armored vehicles will be sent to Ukraine, with training on the vehicles to be conducted in an adjacent country. The APC carries eight troops, plus a crew of two. It carries machine guns and can be outfitted with a 40mm automatic grenade launcher. “Britain sending Mastiff armoured vehicles to Ukraine”, UK Defence Journal, April 8, 2022. There are also reports that Britain may be sending coastal defense cruise missiles to Ukraine.
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. Over 4,500,000 Ukrainians have left the country. Most have gone to Poland (2.6 million). Romania and Hungary have also received many refugees as well. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.
Wagner Group. A Russian private military corporation (PMC) has been assisting Russia with its national interests around the world. It has been present in Venezuela, Syria, and in African nations. And it is in Ukraine. There are likely more than 1,000 employees of the corporate entity at work in Donbas. “What is the Wagner Group, the Russian mercenary entity in Ukraine?”, The Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
Mozart Group. A former U.S. Marine Corps officer has set up a military training center in Ukraine to pass on his and other veteran’s experience to the Ukraine military. Colonel (Ret) Andrew Milburn is a former commander of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) in Iraq. His organization is called the Mozart Group. Milburn has already hired on several British Army veterans. “Training Ukraine’s Special Forces”, Forces.net, April 7, 2022. Read more about Milburn in “Book Review – When the Tempest Gathers”, SOF News, February 19, 2021.
POW Exchange. The third round of prisoners of war exchanges took place over the weekend. At least 26 Ukrainians were released – including 12 soldiers and 14 civilians. It is the third exchange since February 24, the day the war began.
Cyber and Information Operations
Ukraine – Winning the Propaganda War? Analysts say Russia is showing unexpected weakness at influencing foreign opinion. Although Russian propaganda is working internally, it is failing in Europe and in other parts of the world. “Why Ukraine is winning the propaganda war”, CBC News, April 6, 2022.
Is Russia Really Losing the IO War? Western media is reflecting the narrative that Ukraine would like to see disseminated. And that leads most all observers to believe that Ukraine is beating Russia in the information operations arena. Not so much. In the areas outside of ‘the west’ there are indications that Russia is getting its message across. That could affect how nations like India posture themselves when taking sides on the Ukraine War. “Russia may be winning the Ukraine information war outside the West”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 8, 2022.
China – A Russian IO Weapon. The tech giants and governments have crippled the Russian state media reach across its borders, but Chinese outlets are advancing the same Russian talking points around the world. China is helping to shape the narrative about Russia’s ‘special operation’ in Ukraine. “China is Russia’s most powerful weapon for information warfare”, The Washington Post, April 8, 2022.
World Response
Weapons for Ukraine. The West continues to send military equipment of all types to Ukraine. One of the more important weapons systems offered are the anti-armor weapons. The U.S. has been sending the Javelin – and has sent thousands of them from their Army stockpiles. The time is coming where the U.S. will have to increase its production capacity of these weapons. “As Ukraine Pummels Russians With Javelin Missiles, Can Production Keep Pace With Demand?”, The War Zone, April 7, 2022.
Zuzana Howitzers for Ukraine? Slovakia may be sending some self-propelled 155-mm howitzers to Ukraine. The 155mm SpGH Zuzana has a high rate of fire and good accuracy. I has a maximum range of 50 kilometers and can fire any standard NATO 155-mm ammunition.
Informal Logistics Network. Drones, body armor, communications equipment, and more are making their way to Ukraine. Private volunteer groups, Ukrainian and foreign, have developed imaginative methods to acquire and ship needed equipment to the frontlines. “Inside the covert network sending arms and drones to Ukraine forces”, The Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
Russian Spies Expelled. Western nations have sent hundreds of Russians working in embassies and consulates packing. Most of them were using diplomatic cover to conduct intelligence operations. Almost all countries do this but the Russians are using the diplomatic posts for intelligence purposes on a huge scale. The expulsion of the spies is in a direct response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but it will likely have no immediate effect on military decision-making or the outcome of the war. Read more in “Spy Games: Russian intelligence personnel expelled from Western embassies”, The Soufan Center IntelBrief, April 11, 2022.
Russia Pushes Finland Closer to NATO. The attack on Ukraine was meant to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to push back the NATO presence on Russia’s borders. It may not work out that way. The NATO presence on Russia’s borders could double if Finland joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Finns may arrive at a decision this spring on pursuing NATO membership. Finland has fought two wars with the Soviet Union and managed to keep its independence and democracy throughout the Cold War. But its ‘neutral’ stance may soon change. “Finland is hurtling towards NATO membership”, The Economist, April 8, 2022.
Commentary
Has the Era of the Tank Gone By? The war in Ukraine has broke into sharp focus the vulnerability of the tank to infantry with good anti-armor weapons. The Javelin (U.S.), NLAW (UK), and AT4 (Sweden), and other anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainian forces have wrecked havoc on Russian tank formations. The Ukraine War has underlined the vulnerability of tanks to a range of cheap and effective anti-armor weapons in a modern conventional conflict. “Tanks for the memories?”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 8, 2022.
9 Ways Russia Failed. The world’s second most powerful army has bungled almost every move since the first day of the Ukraine invasion. Now the Ukrainians have the momentum and the Russians were forced to make a humiliating retreat from the north of the country. The Russian advances have been stalled or halted in most other parts of Ukraine. A recent news article identifies crucial errors made by the Russians. “Nine ways Russia botched its invasion of Ukraine”, The Washington Post, April 8, 2022.
Failure at Antonov Airport. Russia’s failed attempt to take Kyiv, force President Zelensky from office, and install a puppet government can be traced to the failure to capture the airport northwest of Kyiv. This was to be the hub where the Russians would air land forces that would support an armored push into Kyiv. But Putin’s lightning strike on the airport failed due to a series of misjudgments and strategic errors. The emphasis on armored columns, lack of sufficient air power, and long supply lines hindered the operation. In addition, the Russians severely miscalculated the Ukrainians ability to react quickly to the attack on the airfield. “Russia lost the battle for Kyiv with its hasty assault on a Ukrainian airport”, LA Times, April 10, 2022.
Ukraine: U.S. Got it Wrong Decades Ago. A former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine provides his perspective on what the United States should have done upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the Russian occupation of Crimea and parts of Ukraine in 2014, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He says there should be a red line on Russian actions in Ukraine. “1st US ambassador to Ukraine: ‘I think we handled it wrong from the get-go'”, CNN.com, April 10, 2022.
What Lies Ahead for Ukraine? Philip Wasielewski is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. His article tries to discern the larger canvas of the war and the several possible strategic outcomes. “Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 8, 2022.
Covert War Against Russia. Douglas London describes how America can covertly undermine the Kremlin and Putin’s rule. “A Shadow War Against Putin”, Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2022.
How Does It End? George Friedman analyzes that war thus far and then looks into the future. Things are not going well for Russia. He sees a potential ‘defeat’ of Russia and perhaps the end of Putin’s regime. “How the Ukraine War Will Likely End”, Geopolitical Futures, April 5, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Weapons of the Ukraine War.
13. Russian students are turning in teachers who don’t back the war
The nature of totalitarian regimes - perhaps the core or soul.
Russian students are turning in teachers who don’t back the war
The cases are part of a Soviet-style hunt for “traitors” who oppose the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Yesterday at 8:50 a.m. EDT
RIGA, Latvia — When Irina Gen’s students in western Russia asked why a European sports competition had barred them from attending, the 55-year-old teacher let loose with a tirade against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
“So long as Russia doesn’t behave itself in a civilized way, this will go on forever,” she fumed, adding that she endorsed the European ban. Russia “wanted to get to Kyiv, to overthrow Zelensky and the government. This is a sovereign state,” she said. “There’s a sovereign government there.”
Little did she know that her students were recording her outburst and that a copy would make its way to law enforcement, who opened a criminal investigation March 30 under a new national law banning false information about the military.
Gen is one of at least four teachers recently turned in by students or parents for antiwar speech, in some of the starkest examples of the government’s quest to identify and punish individuals who criticize the invasion.
It’s a campaign with dark Soviet echoes, inspired last month by President Vladimir Putin, who praised Russians for their ability to identify “scum and traitors” and “spit them out like a fly.”
“I am convinced that this natural and necessary self-cleansing of society will only strengthen our country,” Putin said March 16 in a televised speech, accusing the West of wanting to use a “fifth column” to destroy Russia.
A screen shows President Vladimir Putin delivering a speech during a stadium concert in Moscow marking the eighth anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. (Vladimir Astapkovich/Sputnik/Pool/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)
In the last several weeks, a list of “traitors and enemies” has cropped up online, published by the Committee for the Protection of National Interests, a shadowy group claiming a duty to expose public figures who support “anti-Russian” sanctions and political pressure.
The regional government of Kaliningrad sent text messages to local residents urging them to report “provocateurs and scammers” who were undermining the “special operation in Ukraine,” according to the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. And a string of activists, journalists and opposition politicians have found the word “traitor” and vile graffiti painted on their front doors.
“After a rather significant period of freedom … fear has returned to Russian society, and informants have become more active against those who express disagreement with the authorities,” said Nikita Petrov, a longtime historian at the human-rights group Memorial, which a Moscow court abolished in December after years of government pressure on the group.
War opponents can easily run afoul of the law given the new censorship rules. Recent additions to the criminal code make it illegal to discredit the armed forces or to spread “fake” information about the military — which in practice means anything contradicting official government reports.
The cases of children informing on teachers recall the young Soviet folk hero Pavlik Morozov, who, legend had it, betrayed his father to the authorities for anti-Soviet activity. Generations of Soviet children were encouraged to be like Pavlik, to show loyalty to the state above all else.
Students spend leisure time drawing at the Pavlik Morozov Children Palace of Culture in Moscow in 1950. (Pictorial Parade/Getty Images)
Russian propaganda today stresses similar themes. “To be a human, to be a good citizen, to be moral, is to identify with the state and to identify in particular with the state’s language,” said Ian Garner, a historian of Russian propaganda. “That is especially the case when it comes to young people,” whom the Kremlin hopes to mold into obedient citizens, he said.
In the weeks since the invasion began, Russian social media have been flooded with photos of schoolchildren attending special patriotic lessons or posing for pictures as they formed the letter Z — a symbol signifying support for the war.
Education Minister Sergey Kravtsov said in early March that more than 5 million children across Russia had watched a lesson called “Defenders of Peace.” It was part of a government-produced series reviewed by The Washington Post that promotes many of the Kremlin’s arguments and justifications for the attack on Ukraine.
Until her resignation under pressure this month, Gen taught English to eighth-grade students in the city of Penza, 400 miles southeast of Moscow, according to Pavel Chikov, the head of an association of human rights lawyers now representing Gen. She did not respond to requests for comment.
Gen’s answer to the students’ questions about why they couldn’t compete in the sports event was “emotional,” Chikov said. “Somebody recorded this conversation and then reported it to the police.”
A copy of the recording spread quickly online. In it, Gen can be heard sparring with her students. One girl seems to object to the teacher’s criticism of the invasion, saying “we don’t know all the details.”
“Exactly, you don’t know anything. You don’t know anything at all,” Gen replies. “I look at 100, 200 different independent sources … We have a totalitarian regime. Any dissent is considered a crime of thought.”
“We’re a rogue country! We’re North Korea,” she adds. “We’re not accepted anywhere now.”
A farewell ceremony in the Novosibirsk region of Russia honors Sergei Sokolov, a young soldier killed during the fighting in Ukraine. (Rostislav Netisov/AFP/Getty Images)
Informants have turned in a variety of war critics, including a church deacon who shared his views with parishioners and colleagues, according to a Russian media report.
A 17-year-old in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk is being investigated for a news report about the war that he shared in a chat group on the social media platform Telegram, according to his lawyer, Stanislav Seleznev. He said it was possible that law enforcement was monitoring the group or that one of the 400 participants reported his client.
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Returning to Bucha to search for loved ones in a mass grave
Investigators exhumed 21 of at least 67 bodies suspected to be lying in a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine April 8. (Video: Joyce Koh/The Washington Post, Photo: The Washington Post)
Several other teachers have also been targeted, including a university lecturer in the Siberian region of Amur, who was fined for disseminating “false information” to her students about Russian military actions in Ukraine, according to a local court. Witnesses to the offending lecture gave testimony that helped establish the teacher’s guilt, the court added.
On Sakhalin Island, off Russia’s Pacific Coast, another teacher of English was secretly recorded by a student last month. She was fired from her job and fined 30,000 rubles, about $375, by a court that said she had discredited Russian troops.
The teacher, Marina Dubrova, told a Siberian news site affiliated with the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that she had called the war a mistake during after-class discussions. The student’s tape of her comments ended up with the police — possibly through the parents, Dubrova said, though she wasn’t certain. She did not respond to The Post’s requests for comment.
“On Monday morning at school I was greeted with the words: ‘Marina Gusmanovna, the police are here for you,’” Dubrova said in the interview, using her formal name with patronymic.
“A protocol was drawn up against me, and the trial took place on the same day. I explained my position that the president of our country is just a person, like everyone else, that he can make mistakes. And I think this decision is wrong,” Dubrova continued.
“I was told that, as a teacher, I cannot say such things to students. But I don’t agree,” she said. “Teaching is a humanistic profession, first and foremost, to teach people to hear different opinions, to form positions based on different points of view. Is that really a bad thing?”
14. If you thought Russia was bad, just try China
An ominous warning.
Excerpts:
The threats from Russia and China differ, yet they exploit the same big western weaknesses: ignorance, arrogance, complacency, timidity and greed. We discounted warnings (abundant since the 1990s) about both Russian neo-imperialism and China’s long-term ambitions. We hurried to forget the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square and Putin’s blood-soaked rise to power. We overestimated the risks of action and underestimated the risk of inaction. Most of all, we put profit first. We rushed China into the World Trade Organization in 2001 on the flimsy grounds that prosperity would fuel political liberalisation. It did not. Similarly, our business elite feasted for three decades at the Russian trough. We in Britain laundered reputations and fortunes. Germany gobbled gas. Italy and France sold holidays and luxury goods.
Now, we are waking up. Sleepy Europeans are boosting defence spending, dropping their anti-Americanism and trying hastily to unwind commercial ties with Russia. The dilemmas seem hard: a possible recession in Germany, speed limits on motorways. Next winter we may have to turn down the thermostats. But these are hiccups compared with what awaits us in the real drama: the struggle with the Chinese behemoth.
China is already preparing for this confrontation, boosting its self-sufficiency in vital technologies such as aerospace and semiconductors. Our efforts to make our economy resilient have barely begun. Yet the stakes are far higher. Russia is targeting our allies. Whether we like it or not, China is targeting us.
EDWARD LUCAS
If you thought Russia was bad, just try China
Beijing’s wealth and ambitions make it a far more complex adversary than Putin’s Kremlin
Monday April 11 2022, 12.01am BST, The Times
I
f you think confrontation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia is alarming, consider how much worse it could be. Imagine our academic, media, political and showbiz elites were all deeply in hock to Moscow, based on decades of assiduous schmoozing, and that its propaganda, far from being splenetic and contradictory, was subtle, patient and effective. Suppose our supply chains, export markets and critical infrastructure were crucially dependent on Russia, which, far from being sideswiped by sanctions, had spent years preparing to foil them.
Those are just some of the problems we face with China: a far more potent and serious adversary than the flailing, ramshackle and stagnant system run by Putin.
Start with economic clout. Apart from vodka, you are unlikely to have anything Russian-made in your home. Chinese-manufactured products are ubiquitous. China is ten times larger in population terms and gets 20 times more foreign direct investment than Russia. Its fast-growing economy is bigger, measured by purchasing power, than that of the United States.
The ambitions are different too. Russia wants to obliterate Ukraine, dominate its neighbourhood and end the American nuclear presence to Europe. But Xi Jinping believes that China should be the world’s most powerful country and plans to achieve this by 2049, the centenary of the Communist Party’s takeover.
China’s efforts are far more serious than Russia’s. It ruthlessly exploits the openness of western societies. America Second: How America’s Elites Are Making China Stronger, a new book by the China-watcher Isaac Stone Fish, outlines Beijing’s influence in American life. Henry Kissinger, the guru of US foreign policy, is one target: a lobbyist for Beijing, Fish contends. Chinese pressure has defanged critics such as Bloomberg, which prioritises its financial-data business over investigative journalism. Publishers wanting access to the Chinese market fillet their catalogues. Hollywood blacklists pro-Tibet stars such as Richard Gere and tweaks plots to please Chinese censors.
Russia cannot match that. It offers gilded access to the annual Valdai pow-wow with Putin. Visa bans, harassment and libel suits curb some media criticism. But such efforts pale beside China’s influence. In countries that expect their universities to act like businesses, Chinese students keep cash-strapped higher education afloat. Critics see their budgets shrivel. Campus debate is constrained, syllabuses are pruned of sensitive material. Attacking academia is China’s most potent weapon: it corrodes our ability to understand what is going on.
Other assets include giant infrastructure projects — roads, railways, airports and ports — tailored to the needs of emerging economies, with no concerns about human rights or transparency. Last month a new segment of a China-financed railway opened between Hungary and Serbia, two bastions of Beijing’s influence in Europe. Platforms such as TikTok and the technology sold by Huawei and other companies also create economic and political influence (in some cases with hidden censorship capabilities built in). They also support a voracious data-collection programme that gathers and analyses the personal information of tens of millions of foreigners.
Russia has its weapons too. It offers a “repression in a box” mixture of mercenaries, cyber-attacks and weapons to African dictators in return for concessions on natural resources. It hires retired western politicians and subsidises current ones. Marine Le Pen, who could well win the French presidency, benefited from a Russian loan. Nato, the EU and Britain’s defence partnership with France would be undermined if she does win. But Russia’s weaknesses hobble these efforts. Even before the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s fanbase was limited: ethnic and religious bigots on the right, and America-bashers on the left. Two decades of Putin’s rule provides little to celebrate. For all the Chinese Communist Party’s abominable behaviour, China’s rise is impressive.
The threats from Russia and China differ, yet they exploit the same big western weaknesses: ignorance, arrogance, complacency, timidity and greed. We discounted warnings (abundant since the 1990s) about both Russian neo-imperialism and China’s long-term ambitions. We hurried to forget the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square and Putin’s blood-soaked rise to power. We overestimated the risks of action and underestimated the risk of inaction. Most of all, we put profit first. We rushed China into the World Trade Organization in 2001 on the flimsy grounds that prosperity would fuel political liberalisation. It did not. Similarly, our business elite feasted for three decades at the Russian trough. We in Britain laundered reputations and fortunes. Germany gobbled gas. Italy and France sold holidays and luxury goods.
Now, we are waking up. Sleepy Europeans are boosting defence spending, dropping their anti-Americanism and trying hastily to unwind commercial ties with Russia. The dilemmas seem hard: a possible recession in Germany, speed limits on motorways. Next winter we may have to turn down the thermostats. But these are hiccups compared with what awaits us in the real drama: the struggle with the Chinese behemoth.
China is already preparing for this confrontation, boosting its self-sufficiency in vital technologies such as aerospace and semiconductors. Our efforts to make our economy resilient have barely begun. Yet the stakes are far higher. Russia is targeting our allies. Whether we like it or not, China is targeting us.
15. Ukraine, Russia Gear Up for War’s Biggest Battles
I do not think we have seen anything yet. What is to come may be on a scale of combat that we have not seen in decades. Or maybe Russia's military incompetence will doom it to failure.
Ukraine, Russia Gear Up for War’s Biggest Battles
Officials expect large-scale tank and artillery battles; it ‘will remind you of the Second World War,’ Ukraine’s foreign minister says
Ukraine and Russia poured reinforcements into eastern Ukraine this weekend, preparing for what are likely to become the war’s biggest battles as refugees continued to flee the looming Russian assault.
Russia’s main objective now is to seize the parts of the eastern Donbas region not yet controlled by Moscow. Unlike the first phase of the six-week-old conflict, that shift is forcing Ukraine into fighting conventional battles involving tanks, artillery and aircraft on flat, often barren terrain that allows Russia to leverage its superiority in military equipment.
Fresh Russian tank and artillery units, as well as forces withdrawn from areas around Kyiv, began arriving in recent days to staging grounds for the offensive north of the Ukrainian city of Izyum, according to footage shown on Russian military television. Ukraine, too, started moving toward Donbas combat units from areas of northern Ukraine that it recovered after Russian troops retreated.
Skirmishes along the contact line in Donbas and nearby regions continue daily, with Russian forces trying to push south of Izyum. The timing of a major campaign, Western and Ukrainian officials said, is up to Moscow, which may press the offensive imminently with available forces, or wait a few weeks to reconstitute units that suffered losses in northern Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials said Moscow’s aims likely go far beyond seizing the Donbas region, and that Mr. Putin seeks to destroy the best Ukrainian units in the battle of Donbas to then try again to seize the rest of the country, including Kyiv.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for urgent assistance ahead of this new round of the conflict, warning that Moscow hasn’t given up on its aspirations to subjugate Ukraine. “Russia can still afford to live in illusions, gathering new armor and new troops on our soil. And that means that we need even more sanctions, and even more weapons for our state,” he said in a late Saturday video address.
Russian Missile Hits Ukrainian Train Station, Killing Dozens Attempting to Flee
Russian Missile Hits Ukrainian Train Station, Killing Dozens Attempting to Flee
Play video: Russian Missile Hits Ukrainian Train Station, Killing Dozens Attempting to Flee
Russian forces hit a train station in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on Friday, killing at least 52 people and injuring more than 100, local authorities said. The strike marks a new chapter in Moscow’s invasion by pivoting its troops away from capturing the capital. Photo: Fadel Senna/AFP/Getty Images
Attempting to disrupt the Ukrainian redeployment, Russia has said that its forces carried out airstrikes on Ukrainian railway hubs. Some 57 people died in Friday’s Russian missile attack on the railway station in the Donbas city of Kramatorsk while it was packed with civilians trying to board evacuation trains toward the relative safety of western Ukraine, according to Ukrainian authorities. Moscow denied it carried out that particular strike.
Authorities over the weekend urged all civilians in Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions—which comprise Donbas—and two districts of the Kharkiv region to use all available means to leave immediately. They organized additional trains and buses.
Workers in Borodyanka, Ukraine, search Sunday among remains of a residential building destroyed by shelling.
PHOTO: ZOHRA BENSEMRA/REUTERS
A destroyed school in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, on Sunday.
PHOTO: MARKO DJURICA/REUTERS
Russia launched several missile strikes on the Dnipropetrovsk region just west of Donbas on Sunday, destroying the airport terminal and another infrastructure facility in the city of Dnipro and an industrial facility in the city of Pavlohrad, the regional administration said. Six rescue workers were injured in Dnipro as a Russian missile hit one of the sites for a second time later in the day, it said. Ukrainian forces overnight destroyed a Russian column that was moving toward Izyum, according to the governor of Kharkiv. The claim couldn’t be independently verified.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said it targeted Dnipro with Kalibr missiles from a Black Sea fleet frigate and that its missiles also struck the southern Ukrainian region of Mykolayiv and a military airfield near Kharkiv, where it said it destroyed an S-300 antiaircraft missile system. Those claims couldn't be confirmed independently. Dnipro, one of Ukraine’s biggest cities, is the logistical hub for Ukrainian military operations in Donbas.
Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv and other cities in northern Ukraine collapsed in late March, in part because nimble Ukrainian units attacked Russian tanks and armored vehicles using guerrilla tactics, striking at Russia’s long supply lines that ran through woods and villages whose residents relayed intelligence to Ukrainian forces. Light, portable missiles supplied by the U.S. and its European allies, such as the Javelin and the NLAW, played a big role in that success, as did Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones.
Many Russian battalion tactical groups that withdrew from northern Ukraine were battered so badly that they won’t be able to redeploy to the Donbas front anytime soon, Ukrainian and Western officials said. “We’ve seen indications on some units that are, literally, for all intents and purposes, eradicated,” a senior Pentagon official said. Russia, he said, is trying to mobilize some 60,000 reservists to fill the gap in manpower.
Ahead of the coming offensive, Moscow appointed Army Gen. Aleksandr Dvornikov, who leads the southern military district that is responsible for operations in Donbas, to oversee the campaign, a U.S. official said. In the initial phase of the war, when Russia attacked from multiple directions, commanders of four military districts acted autonomously—a lack of coordination that military analysts say hampered Russia’s war effort. Moscow hasn’t issued an official announcement about Gen. Dvornikov’s role.
Smoke rises from Dnipro airport on Sunday.
PHOTO: RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Satellite imagery showed a large military convoy moving south on Friday through Velykyi Burluk, a northeastern Ukrainian town near the Russian border.
PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The tactical situation is more advantageous for Russia on the Donbas front. Russian supply lines are shorter, and the more concentrated area of operations allows Russia to more effectively use air support, Ukrainian and Western military officials said.
This different type of warfare, with large formations facing each other instead of small-unit strikes, is a major reason why Kyiv says it urgently needs heavy weapons, such as artillery, tanks and antiaircraft batteries that most Western allies have been reluctant to supply so far.
“The battle for Donbas will remind you of the Second World War, with its large operations and maneuvers, the involvement of thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, planes and artillery. And this will not be a local operation, based on what we see in Russia’s preparations,” Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said after meeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization ministers this past week. “Either you help us now—and I’m speaking days, not weeks—or your help will come too late and many people will die.”
While Ukraine initially sought Soviet-designed heavy weapons systems that its troops are trained to use, the limited supply of this equipment and ammunition, combined with the prospect of a lengthy conflict, mean that Kyiv is now requesting purchases of NATO-standard heavy weapons, Ukraine Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said.
“The Soviet-made weapons that we have obtained can only strengthen Ukraine for a short time,” he said in a speech posted by the Ministry of Defense.
Ukraine managed to win the first round of the war because of close-contact infantry engagements, he said, but now Russia has changed its tactics and is relying more on long-range artillery, aviation and missile strikes—weapons that Ukraine has limited ability to counter.
“The war is entering the phase of competition for resources, which are almost unlimited in Russia in comparison to Ukraine,” Mr. Reznikov said. “To win in this war, we need a different kind of assistance from what we received before.”
Western leaders are stepping up support. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who Saturday took a walk around Kyiv with Mr. Zelensky, announced new military and other assistance that includes 120 armored vehicles and new antiship missile systems. That is on top of Friday’s package of Starstreak short-range antiaircraft missiles, 800 more antitank missiles and high-tech munitions that loiter above targets for precision strikes.
Bodies of civilians were exhumed from a well in Buzova, near Kyiv, on Sunday.
PHOTO: ZOHRA BENSEMRA/REUTERS
A woman in Buzova waited Sunday for police to exhume the body of her son, who according to the head of the village was killed by Russian soldiers.
PHOTO: ZOHRA BENSEMRA/REUTERS
“This war will be won on the battlefield,” European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell tweeted on Saturday. He traveled to Kyiv on Friday, along with the head of the European Commission, which afterward said the EU is proposing 500 million euros, equivalent to $544 million, in new support for Ukraine’s military, on top of 1 billion euros previously allocated for weapons.
The U.S. announced $400 million in additional military aid to Ukraine in April, out of a total of $1.4 billion since the war started Feb. 24. Washington is supplying Javelins, Stinger missiles, hundreds of Switchblade loitering drones and counter-artillery radars—but, so far, no heavy weapons requested by Kyiv.
Only the Czech Republic has supplied Ukraine with tanks, sending Soviet-designed T72Ms, while Slovakia shipped to Ukraine its S-300 air-defense system after the deployment of Patriot batteries to replace it.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February, Ukraine controlled about two-thirds of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that comprise Donbas. The rest were governed by the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, statelets created following Russia’s intervention in 2014, when Moscow also annexed Crimea from Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin in February recognized these statelets in their claimed borders that cover the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the cities of Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and Severodonetsk that remain under Ukrainian control.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is slowly trying to retake the only regional capital still in Russian hands, the southern city of Kherson. Fighting has inched to the northern outskirts of the city, with artillery barrages audible to residents almost every night. On Sunday, several hundred Kherson residents gathered in the city with Ukrainian flags for a protest rally that was dispersed by Russian troops firing in the air, according to eyewitness accounts.
People gathered Sunday for the funeral for Ukrainian soldier Andriy Zagornyakon in Kamianka-Buzka, Ukraine.
PHOTO: JOE RAEDLE/GETTY IMAGES
People lined up to get water on Sunday in Mariupol.
PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS
Unlike in the northern regions of Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy, where support for Ukraine’s independence from Russia has long run high, Moscow can count on at least some cooperation from locals in Donbas and nearby areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, where some part of the population is sympathetic to Russia. In the Luhansk region, four city mayors have already switched sides and begun collaborating with the Russian military, including the mayor of the front-line city of Rubizhne, according to the regional administration.
In besieged Mariupol, where fierce Ukrainian resistance continues in parts of the city, tying up a large Russian force, a member of the city council from a pro-Russian political party has assumed mayor’s duties under the auspices of Russian occupation forces, according to his appearances on Russian TV. Ukraine said it has begun treason proceedings against him.
At least 5,000 people, and possibly many more, have died in Mariupol under Russian shelling and bombing, according to the city’s elected mayor. Russian state media usually blame the destruction there, and elsewhere in Ukraine, on Ukrainian “Nazis” who allegedly shell their own cities to incriminate Moscow.
In an unusually frank admission, Aleksandr Sladkov, Russian state television’s military commentator, wrote in a social-media post that Mariupol is being leveled to present an example to the rest of Ukraine.
“Let them see in Kyiv and Lviv, Cherkasy and Poltava, Ternopil and Chernivtsi—if the city doesn’t surrender, it gets annihilated,” he wrote. “The cities of central and western Ukraine will also be destroyed if they decide to resist Russian troops.”
An armored vehicle parked on Sunday outside a theater that was damaged during the onslaught of Mariupol.
PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS
Max Colchester, James Marson and Gordon Lubold contributed to this article.
16. East Ukraine focus of new Russian assaults
This was a previous title of this article: "Ukrainian troops have repulsed several Russian assaults in the country's east"
East Ukraine focus of new Russian assaults
- Summary
- Companies
- Russian assaults in east repulsed
- Rockets destroy Dnipro airport
- Austria's Nehammer to meet Putin in Moscow on Monday
- World Bank forecasts 45% drop in Ukraine GDP output
LVIV, Ukraine, April 11 (Reuters) - Ukrainian troops have repulsed several Russian assaults in the country's east, the focus of a new offensive by the invading forces, British intelligence said on Monday, while President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said this week will be crucial to the course of the war.
Austrian leader Karl Nehammer planned to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Monday and will call for an end to the conflict. It would be Putin's first face-to-face meeting with a European Union leader since Russia's invasion started on Feb. 24. read more
Russian forces were also pushing their offensive to establish control over the southern port city of Mariupol, a key target whose capture would link up areas of Russian control to the west and east.
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The Russian invasion has left a trail of death of destruction that has drawn condemnation from Western countries and triggered concern about Putin's broader ambitions.
About a quarter of Ukraine's 44 million population have been forced from their homes, cities turned into rubble, and thousands of people have been killed or injured - many of them civilians.
Russian forces have abandoned their attempt to capture the capital Kyiv but are redoubling their efforts in Ukraine's east. Britain's defence ministry said Russian shelling continued in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Ukrainian forces had beaten back several assaults and destroyed Russian tanks, vehicles and artillery equipment, it said in its regular intelligence bulletin.
The report also said Russia's continued reliance on unguided bombs greatly increased the risk of further civilian casualties.
Powerful explosions rocked cities in the south and east and air raid sirens blared out across Ukraine early on Monday.
"IT MUST STOP"
President Zelenskiy kept up his tireless campaign to generate international support and rally his countrymen, warning the coming week would be important and tense.
"Russian troops will move to even larger operations in the east of our state. They may use even more missiles against us, even more air bombs. But we are preparing for their actions. We will answer." he said in a late night video address.
He was due to address South Korea's parliament by videolink on Monday.
The general staff of Ukraine's armed forces said it was likely the Russians would try to disrupt supply lines and strike at transport infrastructure.
Russia's defence ministry said high-precision missiles had destroyed the headquarters of Ukraine's Dnipro battalion in the town of Zvonetsky. read more
Reuters could not immediately confirm the reports.
Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer said he would meet Putin on Monday in Moscow.
"We are militarily neutral, but (have) a clear position on the Russian war of aggression against #Ukraine," Nehammer wrote on Twitter. "It must stop! It needs humanitarian corridors, ceasefire & full investigation of war crimes."
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Since Russia invaded, Zelenskiy has appealed to Western powers to provide more defence help, and to punish Moscow with tougher sanctions including embargoes on its energy exports.
Zelenskiy said he had confidence in his own armed forces but "unfortunately I don't have the confidence that we will be receiving everything we need" from the United States.
CIVILIAN TOLL
Mounting civilian casualties have triggered widespread international condemnation and new sanctions.
Ludmila Zabaluk, head of the Dmytriv Village Department, north of Kyiv, said dozens of civilian bodies were found in the area.
"There were more than 50 dead people. They shot them from close distance. There's a car where a 17-year-old child was burned, only bones left. A woman had half her head blown off. A bit farther, a man lying near his car was burned alive.”
Reuters could not immediately confirm the reports.
Moscow has rejected accusations of war crimes by Ukraine and Western countries. It has repeatedly denied targeting civilians in what it calls a "special operation" to demilitarise and "denazify" its southern neighbour. Ukraine and Western nations have dismissed this as a baseless pretext for war.
ECONOMIC COST
French bank Societe Generale (SOGN.PA) became the latest company to retreat from Russia, agreeing to sell its stake in Rosbank and the Russian lender’s insurance subsidiaries to Interros Capital, a firm linked to billionaire Vladimir Potanin.
The Russian invasion has triggered a barrage of financial sanctions from the United States, Europe and Britain, prompting Western companies to sell their Russian assets.
SocGen had faced mounting pressure to cut ties with Russia and end its more than 15-year investment in Rosbank.
The World Bank on Sunday forecast the war would cause Ukraine's economic output to collapse by 45% this year, with half of its businesses shuttered, grain exports mostly cut off by Russia's naval blockade and destruction rendering economic activity impossible in many areas. read more
The bank forecast Russia's GDP would contract by 11.2% this year due to punishing Western sanctions.
(This story was refiled to correct dateline.)
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Reporting by Reuters bureaus and Lidia Kelly in Melbourne; Writing by Lincoln Feast and Angus MacSwan, Editing by Stephen Coates and Nick Macfie
17. Russia may be winning the Ukraine information war outside the West
I admit I am mesmerized by President Zleensky's strategic influence campaign.It is well targeted at the US and western allies. But is it effective among Russian allies? We think Russia is failing at operations in the information environment but that may not be the case with Russian allies and like minded countries.
Russia may be winning the Ukraine information war outside the West | The Strategist
It has become commonplace for commentators on Russia’s war in Ukraine to assert that Ukraine is winning the information war.
Indeed, Russia’s information operations seemed clumsy, and in some cases completely absent, in the early days of the invasion. In contrast, Ukraine, with much fewer resources, has seemed to dominate in all domains—broadcast, print and social.
After the horrific Russian atrocities against unarmed Ukrainian civilians revealed in Bucha, Irpin and elsewhere this week, it’s difficult to believe that Russia could win the information war anywhere.
However, Carl Miller, research director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at UK think tank Demos, cautions that while this might be true for Western and English-language information spaces, it’s probably not true outside the West.
Miller says that the wall-to-wall pro-Ukraine sympathy that Western audiences are seeing on social media shouldn’t engender complacency.
‘In fact, it might be blinding us to where the information war is really happening. It could mean that the West is not the battleground over which the information war is currently being fought.’
This view is supported by a report this week from Meta detailing a surge in disinformation across its platforms in which Russia and its allies are playing major roles.
Miller and his team have been pulling apart a Twitter influence operation that began on 2 March, focused on two pro-invasion hashtags, #IStandWithPutin and #IStandWithRussia.
Researchers looking at the activity on these hashtags saw obvious and suspicious patterns, says Miller, indicating a probable information operation.
The key features included accounts that did nothing but fire off retweets, accounts from different linguistic and national arenas that suddenly started posting the hashtags on the same day, and sharp spikes in the creation of these accounts on the day of the invasion as well as on the day of the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s actions.
But, says Miller, in the world of open-source intelligence it’s very difficult to find hard evidence to link campaigns back to state actors, in this case Russia.
Miller’s team wanted to find out more about this campaign by building a picture of the linguistic profile of accounts used.
The first thing they found was that very few of these accounts claimed to be from the West. Most used Hindi, Farsi, Urdu, Sindhi and other languages and identified themselves as coming from India, South Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia.
And their messages did not address the West at all. The narratives they amplified were all about Western hypocrisy and NATO expansionism.
‘They were talking about anti-colonial solidarity, they were talking about BRICS solidarity, they were talking about Putin’s role in national liberation movements in Africa in the 1980s,’ explains Miller.
A lot of these narratives were amplified by a small number of memes receiving huge numbers of retweets and ‘likes’ from the suspect accounts.
Miller says that these memes can be divided into two categories.
‘You’ve got memes which are explicitly addressing India and BRICS countries, especially South Africa. Lots of Indian and Russian flags crossed, and ones invoking Russia’s diplomatic support for India over the years, as well as what Ukraine has done to undermine Indian aims over the years.
‘But tied in with that there are pure internet memetics. Putin riding a bear and India as Jon Snow in Game of Thrones, standing up to a charging horde of Western diplomatic pressure.’
He notes, however, that it’s important to recognise that a lot of this messaging doesn’t really belong in the category of disinformation.
‘There isn’t a tremendous number of truth claims really being contained in these memes. There is no actual truth or lie in Putin riding around on a bear.
‘So this is often actually not really about fact or falsehood at all. It’s acting in the world of feeling and slick TikTok rock music videos, and making Russia look cool and powerful. It is much more to do with identity and belonging and sense of place in the world, I think, than overt fake news or propagating a lie.’
While it’s difficult pin these campaigns on states without sustained investigative journalism, Miller says many of them use paid-to-engage services, which offer to create amplification accounts that up retweets, followers and replies. The aim is to create an illusion of high engagement that might then tip over into authentic engagement.
‘You’re one Google away from these services. For instance, in the three Indian tweet clusters which we found, pretty much every single account is currently talking about Kashmir Files, a very divisive Indian-language film that’s been released. So, my guess is that they’re commercial.’
The fact that businesses have sprung up expressly to service both commercial and state-based information operations is an often overlooked aspect of information warfare.
‘It probably has much more to do with the grubby, benign day-to-day world of spam than it does grand geopolitics and the great game,’ says Miller.
But the geopolitical effects can be very real. Miller notes that the #IStandWithPutin campaign is attempting to ‘couch what I see as an essentially an imperial invasion in anti-colonial terms’.
If the Indian government sees an upswing in pro-invasion Twitter sentiment, that might influence it to take action to help Russia circumvent sanctions and to downplay India–US relations—both desirable objectives for Moscow.
According to Miller, the information space across BRICS and Southeast Asia is much more contested than Western decision-makers might be aware of.
‘I’ve had lots of journalists reach out to me from Malaysia, India and Singapore and Indonesia. They are seeing much more joined conflict on Ukraine in their information spaces than what we are seeing in the West.’
So how best can Ukraine-supportive governments counter these campaigns? First, they shouldn’t just copy these tactics, argues Miller, because all that would do is help strip information of authenticity or true meaning, ‘hastening the militarisation of things that shouldn’t be militarised’.
‘The responses have to be asymmetric. We have to look beyond the platforms. Facebook and Twitter removing accounts isn’t enough. We have to put more direct pressure on the servers that are being used to attack these platforms,’ says Miller.
‘And ultimately, I think we’ve got to clean up the world of spam. Because it’s not okay that there are these companies out there selling retweets to anyone, because who’s going to pay for them are information warfare officers. It’s not okay that this stuff is legal and it’s not okay that it’s functioning freely in the open market.’
18. ‘It feels like the end of the world’: Taiwan civilians practise for war as Ukraine revives China fears
I make this sarcastic comment to make the point that Taiwan has to prepare its strategic influence to generate the support and help from the free world in addition to preparing its citizens to say "We live for resistance!" (also from the song "Kyiv Calling.")
Instead of using US Army training videos, imagine if we re-established the Taiwan Resident Detachment we had femur 1957 through 1974 with SF soldiers permanently assigned. They could help the Taiwan Special Forces to train a civilian resistance.
‘It feels like the end of the world’: Taiwan civilians practise for war as Ukraine revives China fears
Community groups use US army training videos to rehearse for disaster, yet the government is reluctant to support a civilian defence force
On a muggy night in a Taipei park, its concrete pavilion lit by the glow from nearby lampposts, a dozen people spread yoga mats and plastic bags on the floor.
The atmosphere is convivial and relaxed as they warm up, taking turns to lead the group through exercises copied from US army basic training videos online. They practise drills, dragging each other as injured deadweights, out of the way of a fictional harm.
The scene, inside the charming Da’an Park, is made all the more incongruous by the pavilion’s other visitors: young people on dates or in study groups, a couple practising bachata dancing to tinny Latin music.
But there is a seriousness among those here. The group is preparing for, well, anything. Taiwan has been under the threat of invasion for decades, but the ratcheting up of Chinese military missions and government rhetoric in recent years, and last month’s attack on Ukraine by Xi Jinping’s key ally Vladimir Putin, have set nerves on edge. Beijing claims Taiwan as a Chinese province and has sworn to “unify” it, by force if necessary.
A group of volunteers trains for disaster in Da’an Park, Taipei. Photograph: Helen Davidson/The Guardian
Those gathered on this night – a mix of men and women of various ages and occupations including market researchers, tour guides, landlords and digital designers – joined the group months ago, but membership has tripled since the Ukraine invasion.
They are learning first aid, self-defence and military fitness, but others practise firearms drills with airguns.
“It feels like the end of the world,” says 34-year-old Lin. (Few participants opt to give their full names.) “It was just fitness [when we started], but then we added first aid … A lot of people want to learn these skills but don’t have access, so this is a start.”
The invasion of Ukraine has provided a powerful lesson for people in Taiwan: that a smaller party can resist, and even fight back against a mightier invading force. Residents who spoke to the Guardian said Taiwan shouldn’t rely on others for its survival, pointing to the lack of international boots on the ground in Ukraine, and early delays in coordinating sanctions and other responses.
Before the war, a 2021 survey found public support for better training, longer national service and even conscription of women across demographic and political groups. Anecdotally there is an even greater hunger for civilian defence programs. Existing community groups and courses have reported three- to 10-fold increases in inquiries, and new grassroots initiatives have sprung up across cities.
Enoch Wu, the founder of one of the more high-profile and professional civil training courses, says the undercurrent of demand was there for some time, but “the events in Ukraine gave us an opportunity to express that desire more urgently, and drove more people to take immediate action”.
Taiwanese protest against the war in Ukraine during a rally in Taipei in March. Photograph: Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images
Calls for a citizens’ army
Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, the former navy chief and chief of the general staff, is among those who have called for a government-backed territorial defence force. Lee’s proposal, written with Michael Hunzeker, a military expert at George Mason University, suggested Taiwan should develop a force made up of civilians of any age and gender. The force could be deliberately decentralised, trained in small but powerful arms such as javelin missiles and small drones, with hyper-local leadership and access to weapons and first aid caches.
“They can conduct guerrilla warfare, hit and run – they can be kinds of logistical force,” Lee tells the Guardian.
He acknowledges the proposal would require a dramatic and unlikely shift in the government’s current stance and direction, including changes to gun laws.
“The Territorial Defence Force in Ukraine destroyed a lot of tanks and armoured cars,” he says. “It’s time for the leadership to change [its thinking].”
Huang Kwei-bo, a professor of diplomacy at the National Chengchi University and former deputy director of the KMT opposition party, doesn’t think a European-style civilian force would work well in Taiwan.
“A territorial defence force [TDF], all voluntary and part-time, is not impossible in Taiwan, but if not trained and equipped well, it will become both a branch and a burden for the armed forces,” Huang says.
Taipei protests in March against the Ukraine invasion. Photograph: Ritchie B Tongo/EPA
Both Admiral Lee and the creators of, and participants in, existing civil groups stress they are not just about preparing for war.
Taiwan is a land of frequent disasters, both natural and manmade. A year ago this week, 49 people were killed and more than 200 injured in a horrific train derailment in Hualien. Unable to access crushed carriages, first responders were luckily able to rely on communication with some uninjured passengers who had trained or served with the military and fire departments. People like Enoch Wu want to broaden these skills out to everyone.
But the government, which recently drew up a civilian defence handbook instructing people on evacuation routes, does not appear supportive yet of any level of civilian combat force.
The defence minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, has fended off calls from fellow legislators, saying he was unaware of desires for a “citizen army” and needed more time to examine it. He told reporters last week the existing system of reservists and armed forces was the priority. “If you want to be included in the training, you need to join the whole process, not just two days,” he was quoted by local media as saying.
‘You have to prepare’
Not everyone who wants more training believes in a formalised citizens’ army. One of the Da’an Park group’s organisers, Tân Lê-i, is adamant that the benefit of their program is its volunteerism, and any government involvement – even support – would diminish it.
“The spirit of our program is autonomy. People need free will to realise what they want to achieve,” Tân says. Some other members say they would relish weapons and tactical training.
Chen, a middle-aged woman in North Face activewear, is sweaty and laughing after the drills but sombre when asked about her reasons for being here.
She spent a decade as a carer for family members and knows being healthy and safe is not guaranteed. “My job was dealing with life and death, and I understood how things can change in a short time,” she says.
Chen joined the group several months ago and felt vindicated after Russia’s invasion, when she saw videos of older Ukrainians “saying if they hold a weapon it lessens the burden on young people”.
“Maybe one day I can use this – the preparation isn’t perfect but you have to prepare.”
Additional reporting by Chi Hui Lin
19. SASC lawmakers bemoan classification, lack of detail in Pentagon strategies, budget
Too much classification and I hear rumors that it is only going to get worse.
SASC lawmakers bemoan classification, lack of detail in Pentagon strategies, budget - Breaking Defense
“I think having this hearing without any detailed information about the budget and when we are unable to openly discuss any of the administration’s strategy documents directly undermines the committee’s ability to conduct its oversight work,” Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., said.
Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE) speaks during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the conclusion of military operations in Afghanistan on September 28, 2021 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Patrick Semansky-Pool/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: Two Republican lawmakers on the Senate Armed Services Committee pressed Defense Department leaders recently over the Pentagon’s classified National Defense Strategy and the lack of details surrounding its fiscal 2023 budget request, with one senator saying it undermines the committee’s ability to conduct public oversight.
DoD last week submitted classified versions of the NDS, the nuclear posture review and the missile defense review to Congress. But those documents, which SASC Chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., said Thursday “will serve as key guideposts” for the committee’s oversight work, have yet to see an unclassified counterpart released publicly.
Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., expressed concern over the Pentagon’s classified strategy documents as well as what she said was a lack of detailed budget justification data.
“I think having this hearing without any detailed information about the budget and when we are unable to openly discuss any of the administration’s strategy documents directly undermines the committee’s ability to conduct its oversight work,” Fischer said. “And it is contrary to the spirit of transparent government that these public hearings are intended to support.”
She added the documents should be unclassified “so that the people in this country understand the threats that we face, so that when they have the information and can review that for themselves, they will support our national defense, they will support our national security.”
Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said there’s “not much anything that’s classified” in the NDS and DoD could get that out publicly pretty soon.
Austin confirmed an unclassified version of the national defense strategy will come out “a bit later,” but didn’t lay out a clear timeframe for when that might happen.
The “national defense strategy advances our goals in three main ways: forging integrated deterrence, campaigning and building enduring advantages,” Austin said. “Integrated deterrence means combining our strengths across all warfighting domains to maximum effect to ward off potential conflict. Campaigning means our day-to-day efforts to gain and sustain military advantage and to counter acute forms of coercion by our competitors, and to complicate their preparations for aggression. And to build enduring advantages, we need to accelerate force development, acquiring the technology that our warfighters need.”
The lawmaker complaints about the lack of unclassified versions of the national security strategies come just weeks after a leading Democrat on the committee, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., raised concerns about the Pentagon restricting unclassified data in a critical Pentagon weapons report. (Warren did not weigh in on the classification debate Thursday.)
In January, the Pentagon’s independent weapons tester eliminated data about the performance of more than 20 weapon programs from the public version of its annual report and, for the first time ever, included with a “controlled unclassified information” version. That version was available only to Congress and DoD personnel. In total, information was redacted from the public version for a total of 22 programs.
Then-acting head of the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Office Raymond O’Toole said the decision to release the controlled version of the report was because some of the unclassified information could wind up in adversaries’ hands.
Dan Grazier, a fellow at the Project on Government Oversight, previously told Breaking Defense it was concerning to see the leaders of DOT&E bending to pressure from the services on their anti-transparency push.
“Congress established DOT&E in 1983 over the furious objections of service and defense industry leaders because members knew they weren’t getting the truth about the performance of new weapons,” he said. “The law clearly states that there should be two versions of the annual testing report, a classified version and an unclassified version. By caving to pressure inside the Pentagon and hiding unclassified information behind a pseudo classification, the current leaders of DOT&E are undermining the effectiveness of their own agency.”
20. The Far-Right Idealized the Russian Military. Ukraine Exposes All the Ways They’re Wrong.
The Far-Right Idealized the Russian Military. Ukraine Exposes All the Ways They’re Wrong.
Editor’s Note: The Russian military has long bragged about its toughness, contrasting its recruits with what it considers the effeteness of the West—a theme picked up by critics of changes in the U.S. military designed to make it more inclusive. Stehanie Foggett of The Soufan Center examines how the poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine is being portrayed online in far-right circles and argues that now is the time to dispel the myth that hypermasculine militaries fight better than inclusive ones.
Daniel Byman
***
Gender narratives feature heavily in the rhetoric, messaging and propaganda of the far right. The online ecosystems frequented by this movement are rife with rhetoric and visual content that is rooted in misogyny and calls for the subjugation of, and violence against, women and girls. This sexist rhetoric intersects with racist, anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-democratic narratives to reinforce the violent worldview of far-right extremism and white supremacy.
One popular falsehood among the far right has been that security is defined by masculinity, and that Russia is the apex of this ideal. This idea has seeped from the fringe to permeate the mainstream, as demonstrated by Sen. Ted Cruz last year when he equated diversity to a U.S. military filled with “pansies.” And on April 5, Rep. Matt Gaetz admonished the U.S. military for falling behind in capabilities and strategy because of “mandatory pronoun training” and other “woke-ism” causes. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is a strong refutation of these baseless beliefs.
For years now, Russian President Vladimir Putin has learned how to court the far right and tap into their shared disdain of democracy and liberalism. To that end, Russia has made common cause with right-wing political movements in the United States and Europe, as well as through “indirect” support to Western extremist groups. Putin is now in search of fault lines to challenge the cohesion and resolve of the international response to his actions in Ukraine.
To understand the reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine among the online far right, analysts must understand the gender dynamics of these groups. Social and cultural issues provide an ideal focal point for these communities. Russia has been exploiting issues of gender, sexuality and race in the West for years. Putin has mastered how to play into the far right’s lionizing of traditional values and hypermacho authoritarian politics, including the use of sexist and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric.
Take, for example, a common talking point among the far right and white supremacists that the United States and other Western militaries are being destroyed by diversity. Milestones in support of gender integration, diversity, and inclusion in the armed forces are met with vitriol and assertions that Western militaries cannot possibly include women, minorities, and LGBTQ+ soldiers without reducing military effectiveness and fighting power.
The far right is fixated on the idea of “natural” gender roles, with men cast as the protectors of white identity in their countries and their women as fragile victims needing to be defended. Their worldview dehumanizes and threatens with violence non-white populations, feminists, and the LGBTQ+ community, whom they consider agitators and subversives not entitled to full rights of citizenship. The far right fights to keep gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, racial equality, and other human rights causes out of national institutions under the banner of fighting “wokeness,” and their approach to the military is no different. The inclusion of people with diverse gender identities and sexual orientations in the armed forces, as well as efforts to combat historical racial inequality, has been met with expected derision by the far right, and even by some right-wing politicians. “Anti-woke” military discourse on the far right claimed that they would be proven right should the “ranks of wokeness” meet Russia on the battlefield. Events in Ukraine expose how hollow this thinking always was.
Many of these far-right talking points have entered the mainstream. Sen. Ted Cruz tweeted last year that “[p]erhaps a woke, emasculated military is not the best idea,” as he fawned over a video comparing a hypermacho Russian military recruitment ad featuring shirtless, muscular Russian male recruits to a U.S. ad showcasing diverse American recruits representative of what the country actually looks like. In the same vein, BlazeTV host Dave Rubin of The Rubin Report said when comparing the U.S. and Russian recruitment videos: “We’re screwed, people. … Can you imagine that Russian guy coming up against that girl? … If you give me an East Village lesbian versus Vladimir Putin, who’s going to win?” A Fox News article surveying these responses to the opposing recruitment strategies between Russia and the United States highlighted posts by conservatives on Twitter, including one that read, “Pick your fighter.”
Russian state media also entered the debate. In the words of Russia’s English language broadcaster RT, now sanctioned in Europe, the videos “contrasted the Russian approach to attracting men to serve in the armed forces to that recently adopted by the U.S. military,” and another article referred to U.S. military recruits as “slim pickings.”
The moment is ripe to replace the sexist, racist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic tropes that have circulated for years, favoring macho military bravado over smart and inclusive security. The far right and their mainstream pundits assured their audiences of the primacy of hypermasculine military supremacy. With Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine, this bombast has lost its power. From the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, the military balance of power was always in Russia’s favor, making the Kremlin’s military losses even more shocking to observers all over the world.
The reasons for Ukraine’s military successes to date are myriad and will be studied by military scholars for years to come. Some aspects, though, directly refute the far-right narrative and are worth highlighting: Women make up an estimated 15 percent of Ukraine’s armed forces and contribute heavily to noncombat support roles. Ukrainian LGBTQ+ soldiers are participating in combat operations and fighting for their country and their lives. And, in reforming its military, Ukraine did not look eastward to Russia but instead west toward meeting NATO military standards, which has included embracing NATO’s common values, rules, and processes, as well as promoting civilian control of the armed forces. This outlook has paid dividends for Ukraine, in contrast to Russia’s mounting death toll, low morale, and inability to control criminality and looting. Accusations of Russian war crimes abound, exposing the vacuous, and often gendered, Russian tropes that assert that their military defends the defenseless.
In Ukraine, the world can see on display the weakness of Russia’s antiquated and ineffective concept of power. Security experts should capitalize on the moment to dismiss once and for all the far-right fiction that masculinity wins wars, that security is not inclusive and that Russia represents any semblance of enviable military standards in the 21st century.
Stephanie Foggett is the director of global communications at The Soufan Group and a research fellow at The Soufan Center focused on international security, counterterrorism, gender and geopolitics. From 2012 to 2015, she worked in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
