Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Too much consistency is as bad for the mind as it is for the body. Consistency is contrary to life. The only completely consistent people are the dead.”

– Aldous Huxley

“The man of knowledge must be able to not only love his enemies, but also to hate his friends.”

– Friedrich Nietzsche

“We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it.”

– George Orwell

1. Army FM 3-0 (March 2025)

2. Watch Out for Physical Sabotage by Chinese Spies in the U.S. | Opinion

3. ‘We’re Not Going Anywhere’ The CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on his court battle with the Trump administration.

4. Soldier becomes first woman to compete for Best Ranger title

5. Iran Has a Reason to Strike a Nuclear Deal: Its Economy Is in Trouble

6. America’s Tariffs: Was There Ever a National Emergency?

7. Russian Missile Strike Kills at Least 31 in Ukrainian City

8. Trump’s Tariffs Are Unique in History

9. The Awful History of Tariffs and Depressions

10. ‘Don’t panic, but don’t relax’: Taiwan’s plan ‘to use 7-Eleven chains’ as wartime hubs

11. World to Come: The Return of Trump and the End of the Old Order

12. How the G.O.P. Fell in Love With Putin’s Russia

13. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation fear Trump’s peace talks

14. Pentagon hits Accenture, Booz Allen and Deloitte with contract cancellations

15. Military intensifies operations vs rebels (Philippines)

16. Trump’s DEI Purge in the Military Puts U.S. National Security at Risk

17. The new war on words

18. Trump Has Found His Class Enemy

19. Trump goes with his gut and the world goes along for the ride

20. China Doesn’t Fear Tariffs. It Fears a Credible US Industrial Strategy.

1. Army FM 3-0 (March 2025)

The new FM 3-0 Operations was released last month. The 296 page document is publicly available and can be downloaded here: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43326-FM_3-0-000-WEB-1.pdf

I remember reading my first version of FM 100-5 Operations. It was the 1976 education and then the 1982 edition and then the 1986 version. As I skimmed over this, I reminisced about AirLand Battle and how that really was one of the very best organizing principles for our Army.

As an aside: The term "Air-Land Battle" first appeared in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, specifically in Chapter 8, which discussed joint procedures between the Army and Air Force. However, the AirLand Battle doctrine was formally introduced and fully developed in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5.

Since 2022 multidomain operations has been the organizing principle for our Army. Is it doing the job as well as AirLand battle did? I thought that AirLand battle was quite advanced (and I think it was at the time). But I think multidomain operations is even more sophisticated and intellectually challenging. But why don't we write it like AirLand Battle and capitalize it as in Mutidomain Operations to raise it to the visual stature of AirLAnd Battle? (slight attempt at humor)

Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 30). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.

But who are the thought leaders of multidomain operations who are the equivalent of the Airland Battle thought leaders? It seems to me that the single person who is working behind the scenes pulling all of this together is Rich Creed. Do we have senior leaders who are advocating for multidomain operations and inform the political leadership and public and educate and train the force the way our AirLand Battle thought leaders did. I am sure there are many who are doing a lot of important work but they just do not seem to be as visible as the leaders were in the 1970s and 1980s. Even as a Lieutenant and Captain in the 1980s I had heard the names of these senior leaders (and I have my first exposure to SAMS planners in 1985 as a Brigade Plans Officer in the 3ID in Germany. When we worked with the division planners (who were among the earliest SAMS graduates I knew I wanted to think like them and so I set my sights on SAMS (and attended 10 years later). I also worked for battalion and group commanders in 2ID and then 1st Special Forces Group for almost the entire 10 years until I attended SAMS.

1. General Donn A. Starry

Role: Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (1977–1981)
Contribution:
The primary architect of AirLand Battle.
Oversaw the development of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5.
Advocated for maneuver, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.
Emphasized integration of Air Force capabilities to counter the Soviet echeloned threat.
Legacy: His writings and reforms institutionalized operational-level warfighting and joint force integration.

2. General William E. DePuy

Role: First Commander of TRADOC (1973–1977)
Contribution:
Authored the 1976 FM 100-5 featuring "Active Defense."
Though not an AirLand Battle advocate per se, he laid the groundwork by calling for a doctrine to counter the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe.
Influenced later doctrinal shifts with his focus on training, doctrine development, and centralized operational design.

3. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege

Role: Founder of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Contribution:
Key conceptual architect of operational art within AirLand Battle.
Developed ideas of "operational maneuver" and campaign design.
Promoted the linkage between tactics and strategy at the operational level.
Authored influential internal papers shaping doctrinal thinking.
Legacy: SAMS graduates became core contributors to future doctrinal development.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich

Role: Strategic planner and doctrinal writer
Contribution:
Collaborated closely with Starry and Wass de Czege on drafting the 1982 FM 100-5.
A thought leader in bridging tactical realities with strategic aims.
Wrote and spoke extensively on doctrine, professionalism, and joint operations.

5. Major General Paul Gorman

Role: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Contribution:
Played a key role in the internal critique of Active Defense.
Promoted the view that doctrine needed to emphasize maneuver and depth, not just linear defense.
Helped sponsor war-gaming and studies that supported AirLand Battle concepts.

6. General Glenn K. Otis

Role: Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command (after Starry)
Contribution:
Continued development and refinement of AirLand Battle.
Oversaw implementation of related training and modernization efforts.

As I reflect on the many discussions I have online with various people and groups it strikes me that we might all go back to "first principles" and begni our discussions (and arguments) from the foundation of this document. So many of us (me included) argue based on our past experience as well as our biases.

So let me address my biases. That is the terminology we use. We have too many terms describing warfighting across the spectrum of conflict (see Threats and the Word We Use" HERE). However, I think FM 3-) does the best job of really distinguishing the two broad methods of warfare: conventional and irregular, as well as describes their interrelationship and the balance between the different forces.

Fro example:

Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused – in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare

Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare

I think this distinction is useful and important in that both forces operate among both methods of warfare with each in a primary or supporting role depending on the method of warfare being conducted. And most important is that conventional and irregular warfare can be conducted simultaneously. This should lead to the conclusion that planners and commanders should strive to use the right forces for the right missions despite this last sentence:

Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

And lastly I would say to note my real bias, special operations is more thoroughly discussed in this manual than in any previous one

METHODS OF WARFARE

1-38. Although the nature and principles of war reflect the continuity of war, the conduct of warfare, like dynamic operational environments, reflects wide variations. Therefore, depending on the situation, strategic actors pursue their objectives in war through different methods of warfare. There are many different methods, but they generally fall into two broad categories: conventional and irregular. Each method of warfare serves the same strategic purpose—to defeat an enemy—but they take fundamentally different approaches to achieving their purpose. Both methods share one characteristic, which is that they involve the use of lethal force to achieve a political end. Warfare rarely fits neatly into any of these subjective categories, and it almost always entails a blend of both methods over the course of a conflict.

Note. These broad categories describe the overall approaches to warfare. Other categories attempt to describe the dominant means used in a particular application, for example “information warfare,” “cyber warfare,” or “anti-submarine warfare,” In these cases, the terms “warfare,” “operations,” and “activities” are often used interchangeably.

Conventional Warfare

1-39. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation- states (ADP 3-0). Conventional warfare is generally carried out by two or more military forces through armed conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means to fight enemy forces directly, with comparable military systems and organizations. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting conventional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid imposition of the enemy government’s will on it and its citizens. Joint doctrine refers to conventional warfare as “traditional” because it has been understood that way in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, irregular warfare has a longer history, and it has been just as common as the “traditional” method of warfare in some societies.

1-40. Conventional warfare normally focuses on defeating enemy armed forces, enemy warfighting capabilities, and controlling key terrain and populations to decisively influence an enemy government’s behavior in favorable ways. During conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat openly against each other and generally employ similar capabilities. Conventional war may escalate to include nation-state use of weapons of mass destruction. Like the other branches of the armed forces, the Army is organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct or deter conventional warfare, especially its most lethal manifestation— large-scale combat operations.

1-41. Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives. The tradeoff is acceptable because conducting irregular warfare with forces prepared for large-scale ground combat incurs less risk than conducting large-scale ground combat with forces unprepared to do so.

Irregular Warfare

1-42. Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary capabilities by state and non-state actors to achieve policy objectives other than military domination of an enemy, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare (ADP 3-0). Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example, the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare:

The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle.
The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.

1-43. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces [ARSOF]), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

2. Watch Out for Physical Sabotage by Chinese Spies in the U.S. | Opinion

Video at the link: https://www.newsweek.com/watch-out-physical-sabotage-chinese-spies-us-opinion-2058610

Excerpts:

Countering Chinese espionage is no easy task. While the FBI, which leads U.S. counterintelligence efforts, aggressively investigates Chinese intelligence assets, there are growing risks that some spies could slip through the cracks.

China's strategy involves recruiting large numbers of sources with the expectation that some will not be detected. It uses students, businesspeople, and others whose legitimate covers are less likely to raise suspicion.

It's a numbers game and China has the advantage. In 2020, the FBI reported that about half of its nearly 5,000 active counterintelligence cases were related to China. Recent news reports suggesting the bureau's new leadership may be redirecting investigative resources from traditional priorities to immigration enforcement raises further concerns about whether the U.S. can keep pace with China's sprawling espionage operations.

One thing is clear: China's spy agencies are watching closely. And any sign that the U.S. is stepping back could embolden Beijing to become more aggressive with its operations on American soil.

Watch Out for Physical Sabotage by Chinese Spies in the U.S. | Opinion

Newsweek · April 11, 2025

By Ian Mitch

Senior policy researcher at RAND

For decades, China's cyber espionage centered on stealing intellectual property from the United States to bolster its own military and economy. But as its hackers grew more proficient at penetrating sensitive U.S. systems, these efforts moved beyond theft to positioning themselves to physically disrupt critical infrastructure. Last year, U.S. officials all but admitted defeat in halting China's growing cyber arsenal when it revealed a series of hacks that left Beijing poised to disable ports, power grids, and other critical systems around the country.

A similar progression may be unfolding among China's spy network. Much in the same way that China's hackers graduated from stealing trade secrets to building sophisticated cyber weapons, its spies in the U.S. may be developing the skills to physically sabotage critical infrastructure during a conflict.

But there's still time to halt its trajectory.

A Chinese military policeman stands guard in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing. A Chinese military policeman stands guard in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing. STEPHEN SHAVER/AFP via Getty Images

In recent years China's U.S. spy network expanded its activities to more aggressively target dissidents within the diaspora. U.S. residents have been stalked, harassed, assaulted and had their property damaged in retaliation for speaking out against Beijing.

So-called "China repatriation squads" have secretly hunted down dissidents, pressuring them to return to China by, among other tactics, threatening or imprisoning their relatives. A former U.S. correctional officer, acting on Beijing's behalf, burned down a sculpture in the Mojave desert depicting President Xi Jinping's head as a coronavirus in 2021. When a former pro-democracy leader from China, now a naturalized U.S. citizen, announced a run for the House of Representatives, a Chinese intelligence operative hired someone to derail the campaign by setting the candidate up with prostitutes, assaulting him, or tampering with his car to cause a crash.

China-linked groups have also incited mob violence. During Xi's 2023 visit to San Francisco, groups with ties to the Chinese state orchestrated coordinated assaults on anti-Beijing protesters, coming at them with flagpoles and chemical sprays, and tossing sand in their eyes.

These cases highlight China's obsession with silencing its critics. But they also demonstrate a shift toward more violent methods and clandestine tradecraft that could be redirected toward sabotage of infrastructure targets.

Consider that U.S. investigations reveal that China has amassed a deep bench of sources and contacts, including law enforcement officers, in multiple U.S. cities who are willing to harm civilians and damage property on Beijing's behalf.

In one case, operatives posing as art dealers interested in purchasing a work by a dissident artist secretly installed surveillance equipment in his workplace and a GPS tracker on his car. It is not hard to imagine how operatives trained in such covert surveillance could instead plant explosives, start fires, or carry out assassinations.

To be clear, there are few clear indications that China is actively planning acts of sabotage here. However, U.S. authorities have tracked dozens of incidents in which Chinese nationals, sometimes posing as tourists, attempted to access military bases and other sensitive sites. U.S. national security officials are concerned that such incidents may signal early efforts by Beijing to test security and develop plans to physically attack these locations.

The prospect of Chinese sabotage on U.S. soil should not seem far-fetched. Many of the United States' adversaries are already at it. Russia is waging a brazen covert campaign in Europe to undermine support for Ukraine that involves attempted assassinations, arson, bombings, physical assaults and cutting underwater cables. Similarly, Iran has long pursued murder-for-hire and kidnapping plots on U.S. soil, including a recently revealed plot to assassinate Trump last fall.

Countering Chinese espionage is no easy task. While the FBI, which leads U.S. counterintelligence efforts, aggressively investigates Chinese intelligence assets, there are growing risks that some spies could slip through the cracks.

China's strategy involves recruiting large numbers of sources with the expectation that some will not be detected. It uses students, businesspeople, and others whose legitimate covers are less likely to raise suspicion.

It's a numbers game and China has the advantage. In 2020, the FBI reported that about half of its nearly 5,000 active counterintelligence cases were related to China. Recent news reports suggesting the bureau's new leadership may be redirecting investigative resources from traditional priorities to immigration enforcement raises further concerns about whether the U.S. can keep pace with China's sprawling espionage operations.

One thing is clear: China's spy agencies are watching closely. And any sign that the U.S. is stepping back could embolden Beijing to become more aggressive with its operations on American soil.

Ian Mitch is a senior policy researcher at RAND, where his research focuses on homeland security, irregular warfare, and counterterrorism. He was previously a senior intelligence officer at the Department of Homeland Security.

3. ‘We’re Not Going Anywhere’ The CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on his court battle with the Trump administration.

(And Radio Free Asia as well)

The irony is that this organization and its journalists are still trying to accomplish their mission for America by informing the world about American policy and demonstrating American values (a chief one being that of freedom of the press) to serve as a beacon of hope for oppressed people or people threatened by authoritarian leaders even while that very government is attacking their work.

‘We’re Not Going Anywhere’

The CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on his court battle with the Trump administration.

By Rishi Iyengar, a reporter at Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar

Politics
United States
Russia
Europe
Ukraine
Rishi Iyengar

April 10, 2025, 1:01 PM

In the last two months, more than 50,000 U.S. government employees have been fired, put on leave, or told to halt work—most of them by the writ of billionaire Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). But some cuts, such as the one gutting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), came directly from the pen of President Donald Trump. In an executive order signed last month, Trump ordered widespread cuts to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), a congressionally funded organization that oversees several journalistic outlets, including RFE/RL, Radio Free Asia, and Voice of America.

RFE/RL fought back, swiftly filing a lawsuit against the Trump administration. It yielded almost immediate success—at least on paper—when the administration said it would reinstate its approximately $77 million funding grant. But most of that money is still “sitting in somebody’s bank account,” RFE/RL President and CEO Stephen Capus said in an interview with Foreign Policy. As of this week, USAGM has been ordered by a federal judge to provide RFE/RL with a new grant agreement.

Speaking from the outlet’s offices in the Czech capital of Prague on April 8, Capus—who previously spent two decades as a journalist and an executive at NBC—detailed the motivations and mechanics of RFE/RL’s legal battle with Trump, the expressions of support they’ve gotten from European leaders, and the lessons for U.S. media.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Foreign Policy: You got the Trump administration to publicly back down in its efforts to shut down your organization. What’s next?

Stephen Capus: We went to court exactly three weeks ago, which was three days after USAGM tried to terminate our grant agreement. We moved very quickly in the courts because we believe this is an unlawful act, that they had not presented any reason, any grounds for termination, and that they had given us no justification for withholding congressionally appropriated funds. So, at that time, we requested a temporary restraining order to prevent them from doing the grants termination, and then we requested a preliminary injunction around their continued efforts to withhold the $77 million of congressionally appropriated funds.

We need the funds to keep going. The court has sided with us so far, and we believe we have a strong case to make. The court strategy is one of many things that we’re doing right now. But it is the quickest way to get access to our funds.

Today [April 8], we received $2.8 million from them, which was for a very brief phase. So we still are owed $74.2 million. I don’t know why they decided to give us those funds now, but we’re still waiting for April. It’s now more than a week delayed. The funds that are sitting in somebody’s bank account doing no good for anyone could be used to keep us within operation through the end of the fiscal year as Congress intended.

We’re not even jumping up and down demanding our money. Congress has spoken—the will of Congress is very clear. There’s a line in the U.S. budget that says we shall receive this amount of money with our name. All of this could help a great deal.

We have a multinational workforce from people who grew up in some very, very difficult areas, like Afghanistan, Iran, Belarus, and Russia. If we go out of business as they [the Trump administration] are trying to do, then what happens to those people? Are they supposed to just simply go back to Iran? Or Kyrgyzstan? Or any of these other places that now call us foreign agents?

I’m really looking for a sign that the people at USAGM understand the implications of their move. I haven’t heard a single expression of support. Instead, I hear them disparaging us, using childish language to describe us. It’s a real blow to the people who risk everything to come and work for us because they believe in the mission.

FP: You mentioned that the courts are just one of the strategies you’re looking at. What are the others? Are you looking at other funding sources or backing from European governments?

SC: We’ve not exhausted all the possibilities with the United States. We’re still in court—nothing that I do will put that at risk.

We also have bipartisan support inside Congress. The United States options are what we’ve relied on for 75 years, and this is what we’re going to continue to aggressively explore.

But something happened the day that [then-USAGM senior advisor] Kari Lake announced that she was going to close our grant agreement—unceremoniously, no advance warning, no indication to us that this was going to happen. I immediately started getting calls of support from various European leaders. The Czech minister of foreign affairs was the first one, and very quickly, high-ranking European officials stepped forward. And almost to a person, they said to me: “This is deeply meaningful to me personally and my family. This was a lifeline to us any number of different times, including recently when we wanted to know what was happening in Ukraine.” We have journalists there who’ve risked everything to try to make sure that the world still knows what’s going on there. So they came forward and they said: “We believe in this mission. We don’t want to see it go away. Tell us how we can support.”

This is not the time for me to say to them: “OK, give us this, and everything will be OK.” It’s not the right time for that. But believe me, having that overwhelming response from the world community has been very, very gratifying, and it’s a little bit different than what we’ve heard from Washington.

What it turns into long term? It’s premature to say anything because we are a nonprofit corporation headquartered in the great state of Delaware, and that doesn’t change tomorrow. It doesn’t change the next day.

Get us our operating funds. If you want to cut us loose at that point, then let’s have a conversation.

Thank goodness, though, for those European leaders, those brave leaders, to step up and say: “We get it, we feel it, we understand it. We are terrified at the thought of Russia having all of this information space to themselves.” It’s not like we’re the only ones doing it, but we’re the most successful. We’ve got the biggest audiences. We’ve got 75 years of brand equity and relationships with our audiences. You know, we’re reaching 9 percent of the Russian audience on average every week. We’re reaching 10 percent of the Iranian audience on average every week.

We’re reaching close to 40 percent of the Ukrainian audience every week. Why is that? We’re doing something different in Ukraine. We’re covering Russian atrocities, we’re covering Russian war crimes, and we’re keeping the [Ukrainian] government accountable in the anti-corruption space.

FP: RFE/RL was set up to counter hostility to free speech and a free press in authoritarian nations. How do you view that same type of hostility now being shown by the U.S. government?

SC: Well, I don’t know what’s motivating them right now to take these actions. We’ve all seen what Elon Musk is up to in DOGE and the desire to save money—OK, I’m a proud American taxpayer, I like government efficiency, too, but I also have a healthy respect for our people who are doing this kind of work.

Generally speaking, I’m going to support the countries that want to have a free press and want to have access. Notions of a free press help keep societies healthier. It’s part of the reason that when we do our programming in some of the places that I listed before, I know we’re a thorn in their sides. I know that they don’t want the kind of coverage that we give to these regimes, and they go to great lengths to try to shut down our websites, block our feeds, beat up our journalists, and throw them in jail.

The head of Russia’s RT went on the air recently gloating that they’ve been trying to do this sort of thing to us for years, and she [basically] said: “We didn’t succeed, but thanks to the United States, it’s happening for us. Thank you, President Trump.”

That should give everybody pause. Everybody should be nervous if people like that are celebrating. Look at some of the rhetoric from China and Iran. It makes me personally ill to see that.

FP: What would your advice be to the American media that is trying to cover the Trump administration and its more authoritarian behavior?

SC: I think that the issues are somewhat different. We view this as an existential threat. I don’t think that the American media is facing an existential threat when the president chooses to criticize The Associated Press for the reasons that we’ve all seen, so it’s a little bit different.

I would just say that I know that this mission is respected, is valued, and is needed to keep everyone safe.

I like the work I did at NBC—The Today Show, Nightly News, Meet the Press—that was important. Is it the kind of thing that Americans at home are kept safe by? I don’t think it’s at the same degree. This work that we’re doing now is of vital importance. And it is something that we operate in concert with the national security interests of people all over the free world.

I think all democratic values are worth safeguarding and jealously protecting at all costs.

I’m not looking to get involved in the U.S. internal politics. I’m not saying that there were political reasons behind these moves. I don’t know what the motivation has been—it might simply be part of the DOGE efforts. But regardless of the intent, the inescapable conclusion is the world is not going to be as safe of a place without us. That’s what we hear from our supporters in Congress, that’s what I hear from government leaders all across Europe, and that’s why people come and do the kind of work that they do, at great personal risk in many cases.

FP: And what would your message be to other U.S. government agencies facing these cuts from the Trump administration that you have fought back against?

SC: I’m really reluctant to get in the middle of the U.S. political process right now, and I’ve got my hands full just with this case.

If anybody wants to take away some important things from our success thus far, it is: Act quickly, be prepared as much as possible, and if you have something worth fighting for, keep going.

FP: Radio Free Europe was, of course, created to go behind the Iron Curtain. How do you feel about the way Trump and the Trump administration have been dealing with Russia, and how are you seeing it in the regions where you broadcast?

SC: It’s not my place to weigh in on the political moves of the president. But what I would point out, and I do point out every time I’m in Washington, especially with members of Congress, [is that] our people who are based in Ukraine—which include Ukrainian journalists, which include people speaking in Russian for Russian audiences—all those people have told the world under no uncertain terms what’s going on there, including the outright commitment of war crimes that have happened in Ukraine, targeting a civilian population, looking at those schoolkids who were bombed to smithereens by Russian missiles.

But it doesn’t just stop there. At the same time, we’re holding the Ukrainian government accountable for all of this money that has poured in there. Everybody wants to follow the money. Everybody wants to know how true to anti-corruption measures are the Ukrainians being. We do this all day, every day. And what I would say to President Trump or what I’d say to our stakeholders in Congress: That’s the kind of work that should be supported. It helps the world, and [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelensky understands the importance of it. We’ve spoken face to face about it, and I believe it’s all true.

We document the war crimes. We follow the money. Ukraine is a beautiful country with wonderful people who are not just living in their evacuation shelters. They are resilient. They are proud. They are independent.

We’ve had to reduce the size of the staff, to slow our rate of spend. But you know what? Every single language service is existing right now. In some cases, people are volunteering. We program for 23 countries, 27 different languages—every single one of those services is still operating right now, even though they told us weeks and weeks ago that we needed to stop. We’re not going anywhere.

Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar

4. Soldier becomes first woman to compete for Best Ranger title

As I write this they are in 15th place and made the cut for the final day. Hooah.

Soldier becomes first woman to compete for Best Ranger title

by: Olivia Yepez

Posted: Apr 11, 2025 / 05:50 PM EDT

Updated: Apr 11, 2025 / 06:50 PM EDT

https://www.wrbl.com/news/soldier-becomes-first-woman-to-compete-for-best-ranger-title/

FORT BENNING, Ga. (WRBL) — The 41st Annual Best Ranger Competition kicked off at Fort Benning early in the morning. Fifty-two two-soldier teams are vying for the 2025 title; among the 104 soldiers, a history-making woman.

First Lt. Gabrielle White is a former West Point cadet, who graduated from Ranger School in 2022. Friday, she became the first woman to compete in the Best Ranger Competition.

“When we were cadets at West Point, we used to sing the song ‘I Want to Be an Airborne Ranger,’ knowing that in the 1980s, we would never have an opportunity to be an airborne Ranger,” said Kris Fuhr, who graduated from West Point decades before White in 1985.

Though she never went to Ranger School, Fuhr is an important part of its history. Ten years ago, she played an integral role in opening Ranger School to women. A decade later, she is watching White make another historic first.

Team 38 is made up of White and her teammate Capt. Seth Deltenre, representing the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort ...
First Lt. Gabrielle White became the first woman to compete in the Best Ranger Competition Friday, April 11, 2025. (Olivia Yepez)White is a former West Point cadet who graduated from Ranger School in 2022. (Olivia Yepez)Team 38 is made up of White and her teammate Capt. Seth Deltenre, representing the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort ...

First Lt. Gabrielle White became the first woman to compete in the Best Ranger Competition Friday, April 11, 2025. (Olivia Yepez)First Lt. Gabrielle White became the first woman to compete in the Best Ranger Competition Friday, April 11, 2025. (Olivia Yepez)

Fuhr remembers when everything shifted. Becoming a Ranger was an achievement reserved for men for decades, until it wasn’t.

“Women came to Ranger School as part of a pilot program in April of 2015,” Fuhr said. “The first two women graduated in August of 2015 and at that point they declared the pilot program to be a success, and they opened Ranger School to all soldiers.”

Now, 158 women have graduated from Ranger School.

Best Ranger Competition to begin next week at Fort Benning

Fuhr was proud to watch this year’s competitors, including Team 38 made up of White and her teammate Capt. Seth Deltenre, who are representing the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning.

Many of this year’s competitors are Rangers Fuhr first met years ago, as they went through Ranger School.

“It does my heart a lot of good and it makes me proud of this younger generation of soldiers,” Fuhr said, adding, “It makes me proud of old warriors, like myself, and the doors that we were able to open for these women to pass through and excel.”

Ranger School to implement new physical fitness assessment

At the end of the day, Fuhr says the Best Ranger Competition is truly a test of will for the best among the Army’s elite. White and her fellow Rangers will push their bodies to the brink of exhaustion as they compete to earn the Best Ranger title.

“Surrender is not a Ranger word,” Fuhr said. “And these soldiers really exemplify that.”

Standings from the afternoon of April 11 showed White and Deltenre ranked 21st out of the remaining 40 teams.

5. Iran Has a Reason to Strike a Nuclear Deal: Its Economy Is in Trouble

Excerpts:

Anecdotal accounts of Iran’s economic turmoil are scarce because of the country’s censorship and isolation. But economists say data paints a worrying picture, particularly for the rural poor and a shrinking middle class. The cost of food, for example, increased 41% in March from the same month last year, according to the Central Bank of Iran. And while the economy is expanding overall, growth is slowing and is further threatened by power shortages.

Gregory Brew, a senior analyst for the Eurasia Group specializing in U.S.-Iran relations, said sanctions imposed since 2018 didn’t cause a sudden crash, but a slow strangling of economic activity. Iranian consumers accustomed to European goods like cosmetics, clothes and jewelry—things that symbolized their ascendance to the middle class—have had to adjust their tastes as trade reoriented toward China and Russia.

Meanwhile, many ordinary Iranians are finding it harder just to get by. Mostafa Pakzad, an Iranian financial adviser, said that even residents of Tehran, who tend to be more affluent than those who live outside the capital, are struggling to cope with rising prices. Some have resorted to selling free medicine they get from the government to earn money for essentials like rice and bread, he said.

...

“Money is like ice, it melts very fast,” he said.

“Inflation is probably the No. 1 concern of the people right now,” said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech who specializes in Iran. “It’s very painful for people because there’s a psychological element of working hard, getting a wage, and then going to a store just to see it disappear,” he said.

Despite the pressure, he is doubtful Tehran will commit to major change. More likely, he said, the regime will give enough to keep talks going and extract small economic concessions from the U.S. while gradually chipping away at its demands.

“They have tolerated a lot of hardship, and they haven’t surrendered yet,” he said.

Iran Has a Reason to Strike a Nuclear Deal: Its Economy Is in Trouble

Crippling sanctions and systemic corruption push ordinary Iranians to the brink at a politically sensitive moment

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-has-a-reason-to-strike-a-nuclear-deal-its-economy-is-in-trouble-3d93838b?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Benoit Faucon

Follow and Feliz Solomon

April 13, 2025 9:19 am ET

Consumers in the Iranian capital, Tehran, are contending with sharp rises in prices. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA/Reuters

MUSCAT, Oman—The threat of U.S. military intervention helped bring Iran back to the negotiating table. Its hobbled economy is likely to keep it there.

Iran’s currency is among the weakest in the world. Inflation remains well above 30%. Young people are struggling to find work, and a frustrated middle class can no longer afford to buy imported goods.

Those troubles look set to intensify under a second Trump administration, which resumed its campaign of “maximum pressure” to force Iran to rein in its nuclear program and prevent it from developing a bomb. Already severely strained by sanctions and endemic corruption, political observers and analysts say a further deterioration of Iran’s economy could push its people to the brink.

“This is a country that’s creaking under the pressure of economic sanctions, sustained mismanagement and corruption,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, a think tank in London. “Ultimately, what they seek is durable sanctions relief, and they believe that Donald Trump could perhaps deliver that in a way that the Biden administration couldn’t.”

Officials from the U.S. and Iran convened in the Omani capital on Saturday for their highest-level talks in years, pledging to keep a conversation going. Washington wants a new deal to curb Tehran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting sanctions, after abandoning an earlier one during President Trump’s first term.

Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed to by Iran and other nations during the Obama administration in 2015, was followed by a wave of crippling sanctions targeting crucial sectors such as oil and finance. Since returning to the White House, Trump has ratcheted up pressure with more sanctions against Chinese terminal and ship operators that do business with Tehran.

Distrust is high on both sides, but each has reasons to want talks to succeed.

For Trump, a deal with Iran would burnish his peacemaker credentials, as his administration has made little progress toward ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza as he promised. For Tehran, an easing of sanctions could reverse a yearslong downturn in the economy that, if unaddressed, could threaten the authoritarian regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

There are signs that Tehran is worried about unrest at a politically sensitive time. The regime is quietly bracing for an eventual leadership change—Khamenei is 85 years old and has a history of illness. The reach of its military power has diminished abroad. Israeli attacks have crippled Iran-backed militias in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, while a revolution in Syria cost Tehran a close ally. The election last year of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian signaled that Iran’s security establishment was open to some degree of change.

“This was the Pezeshkian bet, and that of the people who allowed him to run and to win, that if they don’t allow reform, the consequence will be revolution,” said Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington.

Muscat, the Omani capital, ahead of negotiations between U.S. and Iranian officials. Photo: abdelhadi ramahi/Reuters

Alterman said Iran’s economic troubles could be nearing a tipping point. “There is a very visible class of Iranians who are tied to the power structure who drive expensive sports cars, and they’re billionaires,” he said. “Most of the rest of the country is growing gradually more impoverished, but they see that the children of senior government officials live unthinkably luxurious lives.”

Anecdotal accounts of Iran’s economic turmoil are scarce because of the country’s censorship and isolation. But economists say data paints a worrying picture, particularly for the rural poor and a shrinking middle class. The cost of food, for example, increased 41% in March from the same month last year, according to the Central Bank of Iran. And while the economy is expanding overall, growth is slowing and is further threatened by power shortages.

Gregory Brew, a senior analyst for the Eurasia Group specializing in U.S.-Iran relations, said sanctions imposed since 2018 didn’t cause a sudden crash, but a slow strangling of economic activity. Iranian consumers accustomed to European goods like cosmetics, clothes and jewelry—things that symbolized their ascendance to the middle class—have had to adjust their tastes as trade reoriented toward China and Russia.

Meanwhile, many ordinary Iranians are finding it harder just to get by. Mostafa Pakzad, an Iranian financial adviser, said that even residents of Tehran, who tend to be more affluent than those who live outside the capital, are struggling to cope with rising prices. Some have resorted to selling free medicine they get from the government to earn money for essentials like rice and bread, he said.

A 41-year-old man named Abbas, who lives in the central Iranian city of Shiraz, told The Wall Street Journal that he lost most of his savings when the country’s stock exchange crashed in 2023. About a year later, he lost his job of 15 years as an accountant. What little he has left is rapidly losing value as the currency continues its free fall and consumer prices rise.

“Money is like ice, it melts very fast,” he said.

“Inflation is probably the No. 1 concern of the people right now,” said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech who specializes in Iran. “It’s very painful for people because there’s a psychological element of working hard, getting a wage, and then going to a store just to see it disappear,” he said.

Despite the pressure, he is doubtful Tehran will commit to major change. More likely, he said, the regime will give enough to keep talks going and extract small economic concessions from the U.S. while gradually chipping away at its demands.

“They have tolerated a lot of hardship, and they haven’t surrendered yet,” he said.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Feliz Solomon at feliz.solomon@wsj.com

6. America’s Tariffs: Was There Ever a National Emergency?

Excerpts:

As I have recently written in The American Spectator, some decoupling from China is a good thing, but at this point, both Trump and President Xi Jinping need an exit ramp to save face. The 20th century has indeed shown the world the price of humiliation for a major power. (RELATED: America’s Tariffs: Clear Losers, but Decoupling From China)

Indeed, China is Trump’s main focus, and a real national emergency would be if China invaded Taiwan. That would settle their emotional grievances dating to the flight of the Kuomintang to what in 1949 was Formosa; blow a hole in the trade and investment framework of Asia; give China control of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the largest producer of chips in the world; intimidate our Asian allies to be subservient to Beijing; and humiliate the United States.

The anger against the White House is now palpable. If it does not subside before the midterm elections of next year, Republican control of Congress could be at risk, and the American people might then get to say, “We are your retribution.”

America’s Tariffs: Was There Ever a National Emergency?

It might be time to reevaluate the national emergency powers of the president.

The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics

spectator.org · by Frank Schell · April 11, 2025

The Current Crisis

On Inauguration Day, President Trump hit the deck running, knowing what he wanted to do immediately, knowing his powers would be at their highest. The country does not like all of it, but Trump has been true to his word.

The border with Mexico is now secure, with crossings averaging 95 percent less than during the Biden administration — after monumental misrepresentations by then-Vice President Kamala Harris (“the border is secure”) and Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas.

Trump has offered direct talks with Iran about its nuclear enrichment, and he has threatened military strikes if talks fail — unlike the Biden administration, which capitulated to Iran for years, and the Obama administration’s supine approach before that.

Not only that, Trump has taken an offensive posture toward strikes on the Houthis, an Iranian proxy, threatening “overwhelming lethal force” and warning Iran in the process, unlike the Biden administration, which adopted a mainly defensive stance to protect U.S. naval and commercial assets. In mid-March, the Pentagon advised that the Houthis have attacked the U.S. Navy and commercial vessels over 300 times since 2023. While recent attacks show more resolve, Yemen is about twice the size of Oregon, and the Houthis are still belligerent. (RELATED: The Meaning of US Airstrikes on Houthis)

Further, Trump’s wholehearted support for Israel and giving it latitude to defend itself are also in contrast with that of the Biden administration, which sought to censure Israel over its prosecution of the war in Gaza. The jury is out on Trump’s attempt to end the Russia–Ukraine war, but now President Vladimir Putin has been teed up as the obstacle to substantive talks.

In our hemisphere, the Trump administration is trying to reduce China’s operating influence in the Panama Canal through an acquisition of two ports owned by the Hong Kong firm CK Hutchison by the U.S. investment firm BlackRock.

Elon Musk has been mandated to reduce fraud and waste in the U.S. government and downsize it as well. Further, tax cuts, energy production, and deregulation are on the White House agenda. Other achievements in a matter of a few months include the eradication of DEI in government, and affirmation of biological gender identity — woke is no longer fashionable.

Unfortunately, the pandemonium in global equity markets caused by the imposition of tariffs on a massive scale threatens these accomplishments and makes the president look rash and whimsical.

The partial recovery on Wednesday was a relief, but the Dow Jones, NASDAQ, and S&P are still off about 12–18 percent from recent highs. Confidence has been damaged on Main Street, Wall Street, and in Silicon Valley, and our major allies are shocked. The risks of a global recession have increased markedly. (READ MORE: Are We Now in a Recession but Don’t Know It?)

America’s reputation and reliability may not recover quickly from what is viewed by some as capricious behavior, regardless of what deals may be reached with China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico. The apparent flippancy of it all has infuriated our allies. (RELATED: Tariff Delay Opportunities and Risks)

The White House has justified its actions by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. The intent of the act was to permit rapid action in the face of extraordinary jeopardy to U.S. security and includes various actions that the president may take — tariffs are not among them. To revoke the declaration of a national emergency, a supermajority of both the House and Senate is required. We should expect debate about whether the White House is acting within the intent of the act, although other presidents have used it to support policy changes, too.

However, some may argue that the right question is whether there was ever a national emergency in the first place.

Trade deficits have been a way of life for years and have therefore been a “known known.” They are evidence of the consumer’s freedom of choice and have helped the U.S. achieve a high standard of living. They have induced foreign governments and banks in countries like China and Japan to buy American treasury securities, thereby reducing our capital costs and making it easier to finance budget deficits.

While the level of trade and budget deficits is acknowledged to be dramatically outsized — the former borne of unfair trade practices — they could be addressed by selective tariffs and spending cuts, as DOGE is doing. A desperate sense of urgency that shocks the world, destroys market capital, infuriates allies whom we need to contain China and Russia, and frightens the American people is to be avoided. Tall in the saddle and going it alone are fine in Clint Eastwood’s Westerns, but the reality is that the United States needs allies.

As I have recently written in The American Spectator, some decoupling from China is a good thing, but at this point, both Trump and President Xi Jinping need an exit ramp to save face. The 20th century has indeed shown the world the price of humiliation for a major power. (RELATED: America’s Tariffs: Clear Losers, but Decoupling From China)

Indeed, China is Trump’s main focus, and a real national emergency would be if China invaded Taiwan. That would settle their emotional grievances dating to the flight of the Kuomintang to what in 1949 was Formosa; blow a hole in the trade and investment framework of Asia; give China control of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the largest producer of chips in the world; intimidate our Asian allies to be subservient to Beijing; and humiliate the United States.

The anger against the White House is now palpable. If it does not subside before the midterm elections of next year, Republican control of Congress could be at risk, and the American people might then get to say, “We are your retribution.”

Russian Missile Strike Kills at Least 31 in Ukrainian City

Attack comes two days after U.S. envoy met with Putin in effort to negotiate a cease-fire

https://www.wsj.com/world/russian-missile-strike-kills-at-least-31-in-ukrainian-city-e6c6443c

By Ian Lovett

April 13, 2025 8:17 am ET

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A Russian ballistic-missile strike killed dozens of people in the northern Ukrainian city of Sumy, two days after President Trump’s top negotiator travelled to Russia for peace talks with Vladimir Putin. Photo: Associated Press

KYIV, Ukraine—A Russian ballistic-missile strike on the northern Ukrainian city of Sumy killed at least 31 people, Ukrainian officials said, leaving civilian bodies lying bloodied and motionless in a central street.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said the attack, which took place Sunday morning while many people were celebrating Palm Sunday, was evidence that Russia had no intention of bringing its three-year war to an end.

The strike was the second Russian attack this month to cause mass civilian casualties and came two days after U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, as part of President Trump’s push for a cease-fire.

“Russia wants exactly this kind of terror and is dragging this war out,” Zelensky said on X. “Without pressure on Russia, peace is impossible. Talks have never stopped ballistic missiles and aerial bombs.”

Videos from central Sumy showed gruesome scenes in the aftermath of the two-missile strike. In one clip posted by Ukrainian officials, at least a dozen bodies can be seen lying in the street, many of them bloody and motionless, with limbs broken and twisted. Many cars were still on fire as emergency personnel waded through the rubble looking for survivors.

At least 87 people were injured, according to Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s interior minister.

“Deliberate destruction of civilians on a major church holiday,” Klymenko wrote on social media. “People were injured right in the middle of the street, in cars, public transport, in houses.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.

A resident next to a body at the site of the missile strike. Photo: Reuters

Trump’s push for a cease-fire has been thwarted by the Kremlin, which has stuck to its demands for Ukraine’s capitulation. Moscow has sought to project confidence that it is winning in Ukraine, even as its advances on the main battlefields in eastern Ukraine have slowed in recent weeks.

“Russia has to get moving. Too many people [a]re DYING, thousands a week, in a terrible and senseless war,” Trump wrote on social media Friday, ahead of the meeting between Witkoff and Putin.

On Sunday, Zelensky called for a strong response from the U.S. and other Western countries, making the case—as he has following past strikes on civilian areas—that the only way to get Russia to the negotiating table is through pressure.

Trump last week said he was “not happy about what’s going on with the bombing,” following a strike on the Ukrainian city of Kryviy Rih that killed 20 people, including nine children. But Trump has been unwilling to try to publicly strong-arm Moscow. Russia was left off the list of countries on which the Trump administration said it would impose tariffs.

Meanwhile, Europe has continued to impose new rounds of sanctions on Moscow. But the continent’s leverage against Moscow is limited without U.S. participation.

On Sunday, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security, condemned the Sumy attack.

“Horrific example of Russia intensifying attacks while Ukraine has accepted an unconditional cease-fire,” she wrote on X.

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

8. Trump’s Tariffs Are Unique in History

I think this is the fundamental question to be asked and answered: Is (or was) globalization bad for America? Of course where you stand depends on where you sit. But America has up to now had the strongest economy and is (but may soon not be ) the richest country in the world. But it seems that the current administration has made globalization the bad guy in perhaps the same way the US made the threat of communism the villain. But to follow the logic if globalization is bad that means it is America against the rest, to include our friends, partners, and allies. Is that the strategic framework we want to live under?

Trump’s Tariffs Are Unique in History

U.S. trade policy went through three eras, focused on ‘revenue, restriction and reciprocity,’ economist Douglas Irwin says. The 47th president likes all three Rs, and a fourth, ‘retribution.’

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trumps-tariffs-are-unique-in-history-douglas-irwin-trade-policy-protectionism-494d8cff?mod=opinion_lead_pos5

By Tunku Varadarajan

April 11, 2025 2:03 pm ET

Douglas Irwin Illustration: Ken Fallin

Donald Trump is shredding American trade policy—in real time. On April 2, which he deemed “Liberation Day,” he slapped almost the entire world with “reciprocal” tariffs: 10% for most countries and higher rates for the “worst offenders,” including 46% for Vietnam, 34% for China and 20% for the European Union.

In effect, Mr. Trump also slapped tariffs on 10005, Wall Street’s ZIP Code, for America’s markets cowered in horror. Dollar assets experienced such a rout that Mr. Trump himself took notice of the damage he’d done, postponing most of his latest tariffs for 90 days on April 9, the day they were to take effect. Except, that is, for China, whose cost of selling to the U.S. he hoisted to 145%.

Watching from the sidelines at Dartmouth College is Douglas Irwin, an economics professor. He knows more about U.S. trade policy than anyone alive, having written “Clashing Over Commerce” (2017), the first definitive economic history of trade since Frank Taussig’s “A Tariff History of the United States” (1931). In a Zoom interview, I ask what governments and businesses around the globe should make of Mr. Trump’s mercurial approach to trade and tariffs.

“It is incredible,” he says, but he doesn’t seem disbelieving. “Well, Trump twice said that the 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico would take effect and twice pulled them back, so perhaps we should have expected this. I think his heart is with this reciprocal tariff plan, and to walk that back because of pressure from the markets must be a big disappointment.”

But Mr. Irwin, 62, like most mainstream economists and business leaders, is unhappy. “To whipsaw the markets like this amounts to grossly irresponsible economic management.” On April 4 Mr. Trump asserted on social media that “MY POLICIES WILL NEVER CHANGE.” “And yet, after pausing the tariffs, he said, ‘You have to be flexible,’ ” Mr. Irwin notes.

Any relief that foreign governments might have over the tariff pause “will be accompanied by utter dismay over the shambolic nature of U.S. policymaking.” He calls Mr. Trump’s actions “cavalier” and says there is “no strategy. And this uncertainty is a tax on the economy, undermining consumer confidence and freezing up investment spending.” It could bring a recession.

Mr. Irwin notes that Mr. Trump “tolerated big losses in stocks for several days.” The president said on Wednesday that he decided to pause the tariffs because bond traders “were getting a little bit yippy, a little bit afraid.” As Mr. Irwin observes, “the bond market strikes right at the heart of the ability of the federal government to finance its operations.”

Mr. Irwin’s book recounts the history of U.S. trade policy from colonial days to Mr. Trump’s First Inaugural Address, in which he promised to “protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs.” He identifies three alliterative eras, “revenue, restriction, and reciprocity.”

In the first era, up to the Civil War, there was no income tax and “revenue was the key objective of trade policy.” In the second, which spanned the Civil War to the Great Depression, the main goal was “the restriction of imports to protect domestic producers.” The third era has focused on reciprocal agreements to reduce trade barriers, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization.

Are we entering a fourth era? Does Mr. Trump herald the death of reciprocity? “Well, Trump has a different view of reciprocity,” Mr. Irwin says. “But the interesting thing about Trump is that he likes all three of the Rs.” How so? “He loves the revenue. He thinks we’re going to be able to cut taxes and pay for some of the tax cuts with the revenue that’s going to flow in” from tariffs. He likes restriction and wants “to keep out foreign goods so he can reindustrialize and create jobs here.” And he likes reciprocity, “because he always wants to bargain, too, but it’s a slightly different take on reciprocity than we’ve seen in the past 80 years.” It is a “retributionist view of reciprocity, which is ‘You’re not treating us well, so we’re going to raise the tariff, and maybe we’ll make a deal, maybe we won’t. But we’ll see.’ ” (Mr. Irwin notes that “retribution” could also become a fourth R.)

This helps make sense of the contradictions in Mr. Trump’s trade rhetoric. He embraces revenue, restriction and reciprocity, but “it’s not clear which one’s the priority, because there are conflicts across them. If you’re going to bargain the tariffs away in reciprocity, that’s not a stable source of revenue. If you’re using tariffs to restrict imports into the U.S. in order to reindustrialize, well, then you can’t bargain them away either, because if you put the tariffs up and then put them down, businesses aren’t going to make decisions based on these quick tariff changes.”

We don’t know when Mr. Trump’s words are deal-making feints and when they aren’t. “Is that statement a negotiating statement? Or maybe it’s the end-game. When will the tariffs take effect? Are they still going to be in effect a year from now?” In July 2020 the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement supplanted Nafta. “The USMCA is Trump’s agreement,” Mr. Irwin says. “He negotiated and signed that in his first term. What’s the value of that trade agreement if he can come up with some new rationale to impose tariffs that’s outside the bounds of what was negotiated?”

Mr. Irwin sees Mr. Trump as “historically unique.” Previous big shifts in trade policy were the result of major “exogenous shocks.” The move from revenue to restriction in the 19th century was a consequence of the Civil War, and the switch from restriction to reciprocity in the 20th century happened because of the Depression, which the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 deepened. In each case, change occurred through a “societal and political consensus, including Congress, that we have to move the direction of trade policy.”

This time, Mr. Irwin says, “we’re changing direction in a major, historically unprecedented way on the whims of one person. Because Congress has not signed off on this. There’s no political and societal consensus.” Opinion polls show, Mr. Irwin says, that trade is low on the list of the American public’s concerns—behind inflation, the cost of living, healthcare, and the fiscal deficit.

Mr. Irwin wonders where Mr. Trump gets his history. He’s “lost track of the number of times the president has invoked William McKinley as his role model.” As chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, McKinley sponsored the Tariff Act of 1890, which raised import duties to nearly 50% to protect American industry. But as president, McKinley changed his mind on tariffs.

Also puzzling is Mr. Trump’s insistence that the high-tariff Gilded Age is a model to emulate. “Yes, there was a period of industrial expansion then. But there was another one between 1830 and 1860, before the Civil War. And during that period tariffs were going down. So this idea that we owe American industrial might in the 19th century to the tariff is erroneous. There were so many other factors going on that were making the U.S. economy wealthy”—among them technological change, mass immigration and capital inflows from Europe. “We were open to ideas, capital and people from the rest of the world.”

Republicans were the leading party between the Civil War and the Depression. “That’s important to understand,” Mr. Irwin says, “because the Republican Party got its political support from the North, the home of manufacturing that faced competition from abroad.” The tariffs of 1890, 1922 (known as Fordney-McCumber) and 1930 “reflect the same political coalition. You don’t really need to understand the details of the different bills. Their thrust is the same.”

The GOP shifted toward free trade during Ronald Reagan’s time as “its support began to move to the South.” The Democrats became more protectionist at the same time as their political support moved north. “The parties switched the regions they were representing.”

In keeping with this domestic geopolitical analysis, is it fair to ask whether Mr. Trump’s trade policy has been hijacked by the Rust Belt. “I’d put it the other way around,” says Mr. Irwin. “Trump tried to put Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio into play for the Republicans by appealing to the antitrade sentiment in those states—the idea that the Rust Belt has been a big loser here.” Even though Republican support from the 1970s and ’80s moved to the South, “you’ve still got to win some states in the North. And this [trade focus] has proved to help those swing states move Republican.”

Our conversation turns cultural. “Trump was playing on a victim mentality. ‘Other countries have been taking advantage of us.’ He said workers lost their jobs not because of state tax policies that pushed work to the South . . . because a lot of manufacturers moved from the North to the South. I mean, it’s not like we’ve just lost manufacturing!” Mr. Trump’s rhetoric told voters that “America isn’t responsible for the pain that you’re experiencing, it’s other countries. And we’re going to strike back at them. It’s trade as grievance.”

Mr. Irwin is on to something. The purely economic case for his sweeping tariffs is hard to make, if not impossible. Only the more partisan economists buy into it. So what does Mr. Trump do? He frames trade as part of the culture war he’s been so adept at winning. “Trump is saying other countries are taking advantage of us. We’re going to stand up—a very masculine virtue—and fight back. We’re not going to take it anymore. And if people don’t fully understand the nuances of trade, and what foreign trade policies are, standing up sounds like something that wimpy Democrats wouldn’t do. ‘They haven’t been standing up for us, have they?’ ” McKinley in 1890 sounded a lot like Mr. Trump. “What American,” he asked, “can oppose these worthy and patriotic objects?”

Mr. Trump has turned trade into an issue steeped in fairness and morality. “For decades, our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by nations near and far, both friend and foe alike,” the president said on Liberation Day. “American steel workers, auto workers, farmers and skilled craftsmen—we have a lot of them here with us today—they really suffered gravely.”

To which Mr. Irwin responds: “You don’t have to understand the facts, but who’s against fairness? Who’s against reciprocity? These concepts come naturally to people. And if someone’s doing some harm to you, should you fight back or just take it? He’s saying ‘Let’s fight back,’ even if the reality that other countries are taking advantage of us is very elusive.”

Smoot-Hawley taught generations of policymakers—including Reagan—to avoid tariffs. But that was 95 years ago, and Mr. Irwin says “that memory is lost.” The MAGA narrative insists that globalization has been bad for the U.S. “If we were talking like this in 1960,” Mr. Irwin says, “anyone who said, ‘We have trade problems, we have to raise tariffs,’ would have been told, ‘We just tried that. It didn’t work very well.’ It was lived experience. And we’ve lost that lived experience.”

Mr. Irwin believes we’re on the cusp of recovering some of that experience—in the most painful way. “We’re in a teachable moment, in some sense. Milton Friedman always said that it’s not ideas that change the world but experience that does.” Mr. Irwin reminds us that we hadn’t had any experience with inflation for a while “until the Biden bump-up, and that reminded people how much they disliked inflation, because people thought we could run the economy hot and all that sort of thing.”

“Maybe this is a period in which the younger generations that I’m teaching in my classroom will live through the experience” of a worldwide tariff war. “When they’re 60 or 70 years old, they’ll remember, ‘Gee, protectionism didn’t work out so well for the U.S.’ That’s a lesson that has to be relearned every generation or so.”

Does he plan a new edition of “Clashing Over Commerce” to account for the Trump years? “Let’s wait for the dust to settle.”

Mr. Varadarajan, a Journal contributor, is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and at the New York University Law School’s Classical Liberal Institute.

The Awful History of Tariffs and Depressions

What the 19th century teaches us about what happens next.

April 11, 2025, 2:00 PM

By Scott Reynolds Nelson, a history professor at the University of Georgia.

Foreign Policy · by Scott Reynolds Nelson

Economics
United States

Trump’s Second Term

Ongoing reports and analysis

It is rare that we can watch the unfolding of a global economic downturn with such precision as we can today. With a 145 percent U.S. tariff on China and a 125 percent retaliatory levy by Beijing, the world’s largest bilateral trading relationship is effectively frozen. We have not even begun to see the consequences and knock-on effects, from the coming U.S. inflation shock to a potential reversal of China’s purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds. Other countries have gotten a 90-day reprieve after new U.S. rates as high as 50 percent briefly went into effect, but the threat of a worldwide convulsion remains. With every day that businesses and investors in the United States and elsewhere cannot plan their purchases and investments—or trust that Washington won’t flip-flop again—the cogs of the global economy move slower and slower.

How quickly things can spiral down became clear after U.S. President Donald Trump announced steep new tariffs on almost all U.S. imports on April 2. Trillions of dollars were wiped off the financial markets in a matter of days. As investors began to pull money out of the U.S. dollar and U.S. bonds, signals of financial contagion began flashing red. With neither Trump nor Chinese President Xi Jinping showing any inclination to back down, the risk of their confrontation metastasizing into a global economic conflagration is high.

U.S. economic history has a lot to say about how trade wars can set off something much, much worse. Since the beginning of the 19th century, the United States has suffered six economic depressions—which I define as six or more quarters of sustained economic contraction, although there is no standard definition. All but one were either directly caused or significantly worsened by tariffs and trade embargoes. As a historian who studies international trade, global commodities, and financial panics, I can assure you that Trump’s tariff policies will be devastating unless someone manages to stand up to him and make it stop.

Large ships with many masts in the water next to loads of cotton lining the shore.

A 19th-century engraving depicts bales of cotton being loaded for export in Savannah, Georgia. Ann Ronan Pictures/Print Collector/Getty Images

A wood engraving shows a white overseer on a horse and enslaved workers loading large bags.

An engraving depicts enslaved workers in the South circa 1860 as they load sacks of cotton on a cart to be taken for dressing and ginning. Ann Ronan Pictures/Print Collector/Getty Images

One of the most powerful forces in economic life is comparative advantage, the benefit provided by international trade that allows a country to specialize based on its natural advantages in growing wheat, weaving cloth, or coding software. By trading these goods internationally, each country can allocate scarce resources to the things that its farmers, miners, and manufacturers can most cheaply produce. In theory, everyone benefits from international trade.

The theory has been borne out. When a continent-wide potato famine forced the United Kingdom and other European states to introduce free trade in food in 1846 it led to a shocking increase in prosperity that few expected. Some previously protected groups were hurt; European landowners grumbled that Russia and the United States benefited most. This was because the fertile plains of Russian-controlled Ukraine and the U.S. Midwest produced wheat so cheaply that the price of farmland dropped in Europe. It also led the rural poor in Britain and Europe to leave for the city, setting off a wave of urbanization and industrialization.

Of course, a large and well-endowed country or common market—like China, the United States, and the European Union—can put a thumb on the scales of free trade by jiggering exchange rates to favor exports generally or providing subsidies to push particular kinds of trade their way: corn over wheat, computer chips over textiles, textiles over rice. Environmental and labor regulations also tip the scales, often in unexpected ways. Monopolists in large countries often favor regulations, including tariffs, that shield against competition and multiply the value of their scarce assets.

As a former British colony, the United States has always been particularly vulnerable to tariff wars. For centuries, Britain molded its colonies’ trade to the motherland’s purpose. The colonies of New York, Maryland, and South Carolina were expected to provide flour and rice for the slave-powered tobacco and sugar plantations in Virginia and the Caribbean. Britain prohibited the colonies from manufacturing their own textiles, iron, and paper. The increasing limitations Britain imposed on the colonies’ international trade finally led to the American Revolution. From its start, the Articles of Confederation and then the Constitution sought to limit executive action that would sharply or rapidly change international trade. Revenue bills were lodged in the House, the Senate was required to approve them, and the executive remained limited to the power of the veto.

America’s first depression had its origin in 1816 when Britain—having just won a world war against Napoleon—dumped vast quantities of woolen fabric originally contracted to clothe European soldiers and sailors. It was Britain’s first Army-Navy surplus sale. American merchants and wool manufacturers balked at the sudden arrival of cheap woolen fabric and urged Congress to pass, in March 1817, the Navigation Acts, which blocked British ships and their cheap goods. Britain retaliated in May with orders-in-council that effectively blocked U.S. ships from delivering grain to Britain’s Caribbean colonies. U.S. farmers lost the Caribbean markets they had dominated for more than a century. By December 1818, U.S. wheat prices dropped 50 percent, and farmers could no longer pay the mortgages on their land owed to the U.S. Land Office. Farmers’ debts to country stores went unpaid, and so did country stores’ debts to furnishing merchants in U.S. cities.

The Panic of 1819 had begun, and the trade restrictions continued to distort markets. Over time, New York rescued itself by smuggling wheat across the Great Lakes to Canada, where Toronto and Montreal millers turned it into bonded British flour for sale in the Caribbean. Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina only prospered by shifting from wheat and rice to slave-based cotton production. Within a decade, the Anglo-American trade war had made the cost of feeding Caribbean plantations so high that slaveholders there pressed the mother country to abolish slavery—but not before reimbursing them for their slaves. International trade restrictions first passed in 1817 stifled U.S. grain exports, which further entrenched cotton production—and with it, slavery—in the U.S. South.

U.S. President Donald Trump reads the New York Post as he arrives at Trump National Golf Club in Jupiter, Florida, on April 5.U.S. President Donald Trump reads the New York Post as he arrives at Trump National Golf Club in Jupiter, Florida, on April 5.

Trump and Xi Are in a Tariff Trap

Neither wants to back down—and neither knows how.

Donald Trump points with one finger and gestures at Xi Jinping as they stand behind lecterns covere d in flowers. Behind them are flags of both countries against an ornate wall.Donald Trump points with one finger and gestures at Xi Jinping as they stand behind lecterns covere d in flowers. Behind them are flags of both countries against an ornate wall.

Can Washington and Beijing Walk Back Their Trade War?

Both countries have expressed interest in negotiations, but it may be a painful journey to get there.

Hasty executive action in international trade by President Andrew Jackson started the next American depression. Since the depression of 1819, long, snaking credit chains had funded the expansion of cotton plantations in the U.S. South. The Second Bank of the United States, together with seven British banks called the Seven Sisters, borrowed from British investors and issued bills of exchange that provided credit to smaller, regional U.S. banks, which then gave short-term loans to slave traders in the Upper South, who bought enslaved people in Virginia and South Carolina and sold them to cotton plantations in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Because interest rates were set by the Bank of England, a small increase in the rate in London could make it impossible for slaveholders to buy land or slaves in New Orleans.

Jackson, persuaded that the Second Bank and the Seven Sisters were plotting against him, passed a series of executive orders in 1834 and 1836 designed to break the slaveholders’ dependence on British credit. One order removed deposits from the Second Bank of the United States, transferring them to a series of favored banks connected to Jackson’s political allies. Another order prohibited farmers from borrowing from banks to pay their mortgages to the U.S. Land Office, forcing them to use gold, the currency at the time. This benefited Southern slaveholders with gold mines in northern Georgia and western North Carolina (this was before gold was discovered in California), but the sudden demand for gold greatly exceeded supply.

The Bank of England, seeing its own gold disappearing into the United States, raised the bank rate and briefly cut the Seven Sisters off from international exchange. Thus began the depression of 1837. Southern planters absconded from their debts, abandoned plantations, and carried their slaves to the independent Republic of Texas where they were safe from creditors. Stores folded. Manufacturers failed. Within five years, seven states failed to pay bonds they had issued internationally.

An illustration of a man in an old-fashioned 1890s suit at the center of a room holds a giant spoon and bottle of medicine. The walls are lined with sick men in hospital cots with signs above them labeling them as "Business man," "Populist," Jingoist," "Spoilsman," Anarchist," Filibuster," and "Monopolist."

A political cartoon circa the 1890s depicts President William McKinley as a physician dispensing tariff medicine. A sign on one man’s bed in the foreground reads “Hallucinations About Home Markets and Infant Industries.” Photo12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

The next depression, in 1873, followed drastic shifts in international commodity prices, but no hasty action on tariffs caused it. But that cannot be said for the depression of 1893. In 1890, the House of Representatives revised its rules for legislating, making Congress surprisingly efficient and powerful. Feeling their oats, Republicans passed the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, which raised tariffs on manufactured imports from 38 to 50 percent while eliminating the tariff on semi-refined sugar—a huge difference item for a country that exported canned foods like peaches, salmon, and beef, all of which used sugar as a preservative at the time. Steep tariffs, however, had the effect of drastically reducing U.S. revenue, as they often do. Within two years, this nearly drained the U.S. Treasury of gold, which led foreign lenders to sell off U.S. bonds, particularly those issued by railroad companies. Debtors feared that without gold in the Treasury, Washington would abandon the gold standard, and that bonds would be paid off in depreciated U.S. currency.

Finally, the drastic Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act contributed largely to the Great Depression of the 1930s, though some economic historians have emphasized the U.S. money supply, the boom-bust cycle in U.S. securities, and unresolved war debts in Europe as the more immediate causes. As a historian who focuses on the 19th century, I will not weigh in, except to say that rapid changes in tariffs change the way the world works. They radically alter international trade in ways that take many years to respond to—and usually result in a vast cascade of unforeseen consequences.

A truck loaded with several men is parked in front of the U.S. Capitol. It bears a sign: We Want Work.

Unemployed men arrive at the Capitol in Washington, D.C., during the Great Depression to appeal for aid.Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

What are the lessons of the past two centuries that could help us understand what happens next? In our current environment, Trump’s tariffs will force many, many companies to back out of settled transactions—just like the farmers, country stores, merchants, and slaveholders of the 19th century. The Pittsburgh-based aircraft supplier Howmet, for example, has already declared a force majeure event, threatening to stop shipments due to tariff impacts. Many other companies across various sectors—particularly those trading with China—are likely to abandon contracts now that the tariffs have taken effect.

Many of the transactions they are backing out of are funded by credit, which in turn is mostly held by banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries. Some of this credit is securitized and sold on to countless other investors. While stock markets are extremely flexible at absorbing losses, the much larger and substantially more complex credit markets are not, as anyone who remembers the 2008 crisis will recall. In 2008, the Federal Reserve bought impaired bonds to reinject liquidity into a frozen market.

Though I am just a historian, I believe that the Fed can handle the chaos we’ve seen so far. But we have yet to contend with the full effects of the China-U.S. trade freeze, and it also remains unclear what follows the 90-day reprieve on the rest of the world. If Congress cannot reassert its constitutional jurisdiction over tariffs—and if power over U.S. trade is now concentrated in the hands of one person, like it was with Jackson in the 1830s—then no central bank will be capable of sustaining the collapse of liquidity that will come with the international depression that I worry is on the horizon.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · by Scott Reynolds Nelson

10. ‘Don’t panic, but don’t relax’: Taiwan’s plan ‘to use 7-Eleven chains’ as wartime hubs

The "7-Eleven resistance and resilience method." And it is critical to ANTICIPATE and prepare now both to send a signal of resilience that can contribute to deterrence by demonstrating that the Taiwan population cannot be pacified if invaded and occupied and if deterrence fails then the people are actually prepared to resist, survive, and prevail.

Hopefully this is one indication that Taiwan wants to defend itself more than the US does.

‘Don’t panic, but don’t relax’: Taiwan’s plan ‘to use 7-Eleven chains’ as wartime hubs

From energy security to boosting internet connections, Taiwan is working on ways to protect its population if China attacks

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · April 11, 2025

If war comes to Taiwan, the local citizens might be sent to their nearest 7-Eleven.

No one knows for sure what a Chinese attack on Taiwan will look like, but there are some assumptions made by government planners. They expect Taiwan’s military and maybe police will be sent to frontlines, leaving civilian first responders in charge of care and control.

Outside assistance would almost certainly be cut off by a blockade. Domestic train lines might be taken out, and airspaces closed to non-military flights like cargo. The internet and maybe phone signal would probably be cut off.

If all this happened, Taiwanese residents could walk to one of the island’s more than 13,000 convenience stores to pick up rations and medical supplies, delivered by the chains’ own logistical transport systems, according to four people familiar with the discussions.

They could read government communications which have been faxed to the stores and displayed on the window. Or maybe they would be able to send a message using the store’s emergency hotspot.

Convenience stores, including 7-Elevens, worked with Taiwan’s government during the pandemic to ration out masks during the early times of shortages. Turning them into a wartime community hub would need a lot more preparation, but that is being discussed by a committee created by Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, to make his people resilient in the event of an attack or disaster.

This idea is among a number of scenarios being considered by Lai’s team of 27 senior cabinet and national security ministers, NGOs, and figures from the business, social and religious sectors.

The “whole of society defence resilience committee” is charged with preparing Taiwan’s society for war or disaster.

China’s annexation plans

China’s government wants to annex Taiwan. It says this would ideally be peaceful but military force will be used if needed. Analysts say China is not capable of the required full-scale invasion yet, but is getting closer.

In the meantime it bombards Taiwan with grey zone harassment; legal, economic, and cyberwarfare; disinformation and influence campaigns and espionage.

China’s military also frequently rehearses blockades of Taiwan’s main island, as recently as last week.

“If Taiwan loses its sea supply lines, its domestic resources will be quickly exhausted, and its social order will descend into chaos,” said academic and former Chinese general Meng Xiangqing on Wednesday.

While hoping for the best, Taiwan is also preparing its citizens for the worst.

Screenshot of aircraft carrier Shandong from a video released by the Eastern Theatre Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 1 April 2025. Photograph: Eastern Theatre Command/Reuters

“Faced with threats, whether they are natural disasters or authoritarian expansion ambitions, we believe that as long as the government and society as a whole are prepared, they can respond,” Lai told the committee at its second meeting in December.

The aim of the committee is to ensure that in the event of a crisis the government and core services continue, critical supplies, networks and infrastructure are protected, and that the community can give civil support to the military if needed.

A lot of the work builds on civilian programmes already started by NGOs, and the tens of thousands of new disaster relief centres and evacuation and air raid shelters. There is also the existing government response strategies for Taiwan’s frequent earthquakes and the pandemic. Convenience stores served as community hubs for both.

“Private businesses can play a crucial role in issues such as distributing critical supplies,” said Wen Lii, spokesperson for the president’s office.

“Private businesses have also joined discussions on providing shelter space, medical supplies and stockpiling.”

The committee has met just three times so far, but have already held one multi-branch tabletop exercise in December and one live drill in Tainan last week which involved civil responders and no military.

The tabletop exercise revealed some glaring weaknesses, and dangerous presumptions. One department in charge of food provision had no plan for the police force being unavailable to distribute it.

Another department representative had not considered they might be unable to post statements online or send communiques to neighbourhood leaders.

“After the tabletop exercises, things changed very fast because every ministry realised how unprepared they are,” said Poyu Tseng, a consultant at NGO Doublethink Lab, and committee member focused on civilian force training and utilisation.

“They’re just, one by one, realising, oh, this is a very weak plan … it’s forced people to think more.”

Energy and communication systems

A satellite image taken recently shows three Chinese barges in waters off Zhanjiang city, in southern China’s Guangdong province. These could be used to land heavy equipment and thousands of personnel in a possible invasion of Taiwan, defence experts say. Photograph: Planet Labs PBC/AFP/Getty Images

There are also critical weaknesses in Taiwan’s energy and communications systems.

Energy security is highly vulnerable to a blockade. About 97% of Taiwan’s energy supply is imported. There are strategic reserves depending on the fuel type, with about 90 days worth of coal and petroleum and 40 days of liquid natural gas.

“Energy will be the most critical problem that people will talk about, because the shelters, the transportation, the hospitals, they all need the energy,” said Dr Wen-ling Tu, a committee member focused on energy and critical infrastructure.

The Research Institute for Democracy, Society And Emerging Technology (DSET), of which Tu is director, has analysed potential blockade scenarios and resulting electricity restrictions, finding a need for more renewables, while Ukrainian delegations have advised Taiwan to ramp up battery storage and power bank production.

The state-owned Taipower’s electricity grid is also too centralised, with long transmission lines between large power plants all vulnerable to strikes.

Tsai-ying Lu, director of DSET’s climate resilience and sustainability programme said the government is diversifying imports and pursuing renewables, but needs to improve incorporating solar and wind energy into the grid, and preparing the private sector for potential power cuts during a crisis.

China is already exploiting Taiwan’s communication and information network frailties. In 2024 China made an average of 2.4m cyber-attacks a day on Taiwan’s government.

They have hacked into Taiwan’s government websites, train station displays and 7-Eleven screens, and allegedly a hospital administration system. China is also suspected of cutting undersea cables that supply Taiwan’s internet.

Taiwan does not have access to the Starlink satellite network after early negotiations with the Elon Musk-owned company fell over. Instead it is pursuing joint commercial low-Earth-orbit coverage, and its own domestic system, including 700 hotspots planned across the country for government and military but potentially civilian use as well.

Disinformation campaign

But before it takes out Taiwan’s internet and phone signals, Beijing would probably use them to spread disinformation and chaos. And Taiwan’s media is seen as highly vulnerable to planted fake news.

Staff at some major news outlets have described high quotas which allow little time for factchecking, while other outlets even have content sharing arrangements with Chinese state media.

But there appears to be little official appetite to address this vulnerability – one government official suggested Taiwanese people were pretty sceptical about any news report already.

Tseng said it is a “huge loophole”.

“From a [foreign information manipulations and interference] perspective, I think we really need a stronger stance, especially on malicious actors.”

The committee members and analysts who spoke to the Guardian were all cautiously optimistic about its goals.

Some said there was not a clear sense of direction yet, although it was early days. Others worried about the bipartisan support needed for its success.

People at a night market in Taipei. Defence analysts say Beijing could spread disinformation and chaos using Taiwan’s internet and phone signals. Photograph: Roland Nagy/Alamy

“We are on the right direction, but the reason I’m not so confident about the implementation is because it also depends on what kind of the resources that we can gather to invest,” said Tu.

Opposition parties currently control Taiwan’s legislature and have been slashing budgets including for Taipower (and its ability to strengthen its infrastructure) and for the ministry of digital affairs, which among other curtailment has had to drastically cut back the number of satellite hotspots being installed.

The political division also affects social cohesion, said Tseng.

“When you’re more polarised, you’re more chaotic, and when you’re more chaotic, you’re weaker,” she said. “Polarisation reverses resilience.”

7-Eleven and other companies represented on the committee declined to comment.

“For a society constantly threatened by natural disasters and other risks, there’s a useful principle: Don’t panic, but don’t relax,” said Wen Lii from the president’s office.

“We need to achieve a balance, in which we continue to build confidence and ensure economic growth, while also raising awareness about potential threats.”

Additional research by Jason Tzu Kuan Lu

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · April 11, 2025

11. World to Come: The Return of Trump and the End of the Old Order

I think the train may have left the station on #3 and #4. I don't think this Administration values #2 and i hope we can avoid #1.

Excerpts:

Preparing for a New Age

Lesson #1: Avoiding World War III

Lesson #2: Cooperation over Competition

Lesson #3: Avoiding the Next Financial Crisis

Lesson #4: Inclusivity: A More Representative Multilateral System

It is not just about avoiding catastrophes; it is about forging a future where shared prosperity, security, and sustainability become the foundation of a truly global order. The alternative is not merely failure—it is the collapse of everything we value.

World to Come: The Return of Trump and the End of the Old Order

The National Interest

Topic: Security

Region: Americas

April 9, 2025

By: Josef Braml, and Mathew Burrows

If it is to survive, a multipolar world will require more, not less, international cooperation to tackle climate change and prevent another financial crisis or military conflict.

Editor’s Note: The following is adapted from the first and final chapters of the forthcoming book World to Come: The Return of Trump and the End of the Old Order by Mathew Burrows and Josef Braml. It is reprinted with the permission of the publisher. The excerpt has been edited for style and clarity.

“The old world is dying, the new world struggles to be born,” wrote the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci at the end of World War I. “Now is the time of monsters.” A witness to the rise of fascism in Italy, Gramsci understood transitions can be dangerous. The world today is at a similar inflection point. With Donald Trump victorious in the 2024 presidential election, the Western liberal order presided over by the United States since the end of the Second World War is over. How will America, Europe, and the rest of the world manage this inflection point?

With Donald Trump’s second victory, America has closed the door on the post-World War II liberal order. It’s been some time since U.S. leaders and the American public believed in the effectiveness of the very multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank that past United States leaders created to ensure peace, stabilize the world economy, and end global poverty. That idealism persisted into the early years of the post-Cold War era when President Bill Clinton believed globalization would lift all boats and that other nations would come to resemble America. With the end of the Cold War, democracy, free markets, and American leadership were the destination for humanity in the U.S. elite’s “end of history” dream world.

Washington was one of the first to be disabused, coming to see globalization as a nightmare, accelerating the rise of its competitors. Whole industries and American jobs with them migrated to Mexico and China. The United States sought to impose democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, which went disastrously wrong. The 2008 financial crisis undermined U.S. financial credibility and Americans’ confidence in their own system; the financial sector—too big to fail—was bailed out while individuals were left struggling to hold on to homes and jobs.

The late 1990s saw the beginnings of a populist movement that Trump has masterfully exploited, leading him to the White House. Trump had all the hallmarks of his populist predecessors: he was straight-talking and made much of the fact that he was not a professional politician. His over-the-top language and in-your-face manner appealed to the disaffected and marginalized. His claims to wealth and business success captivated those who wanted a return of the American Dream.

His 2024 victory was even bigger than the 2016 one, attracting support from black and Hispanic men and the young, besides the white working class. More working-class voters voted for Trump than for Kamala Harris, turning the Democrats into the party of the rich. Voters forgave him for the failures of his first term, particularly his mishandling of the pandemic. Few other politicians have understood the seismic economic and social changes that have made many give up on the American Dream. Inequality has grown to unprecedented heights.

Despite being born wealthy, he has been able to connect with the poor and disaffected. In the short term, he will make them feel good with lower taxes and an end to the influx of millions of so-called illegal immigrants who blue-collar workers feared would take away their jobs. Both parties have become enamored with protectionism that could maroon U.S. industry, ceding many industry sectors to China, particularly in green technologies.

Neither party has a plan for curbing U.S. fiscal deficits and debts, and both Republicans and Democrats are big spenders. The mounting debt is a time bomb. Trump is tempting fate with a slew of new tax reductions that could add trillions to the debt. Trump is betting that the inevitable reckoning does not happen on his watch.

Trump is under the illusion that higher customs revenues will compensate for the lack of revenue from tax breaks. He said at his inauguration that “Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich other countries, we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens. For this purpose, we are establishing the External Revenue Service to collect all tariffs, duties, and revenues. It will be massive amounts of money pouring into our Treasury coming from foreign sources.” For Trump, tariffs are an all-purpose weapon. Their threat alone is intended to persuade friends and foes alike to abide by U.S. interests.

Under Trump, there might be less talk of war with China, but achieving harmony between the United States and China seems improbable. Although Trump avoids hawkish neocons, he is still influenced by some anti-China advisors. His push to decouple from China will likely harm the U.S. economy. Even if he doesn’t fully proceed with “friendshoring,” the chances of reviving global or regional trade, as in Obama’s era, are slim.

Trump’s disregard for the plight of others will be a problem for the West and an even bigger one in the near term for the Global South. Already, Biden lost the plot about the developing world, and Trump is even more ignorant. Africa and other developing countries are drowning in debt due to the pandemic’s extra health costs. After globalization lifted millions out of poverty, the number of poor people is growing again while Western assistance is declining.

There are now more interstate conflicts each year, most of which receive scant mention in the Western media. The ongoing Myanmar civil war has seen over 50,000 killed and 3 million people displaced, while the reignited Sudan internal conflict has resulted in almost 150,000 people killed in the past two years, along with over 3 million people displaced. Neither of these conflicts registered during the U.S. election. Climate change and the associated struggle for increasingly scarce resources will exacerbate conflicts between and within states, and the lack of Washington’s concern will dent America’s global leadership.

Trump believes climate change is a hoax, preferring to “drill, baby, drill,” as he repeated at his inaugural to secure fossil fuel independence. Nevertheless, on the current course, temperatures will likely rise to 2.9°C above pre-industrial levels this century. Like King Canute trying to hold back the tide, Trump’s denialism won’t keep the ever-more-powerful hurricanes from bashing the U.S. Southeast or extinguish the wildfires across the western United States, so vividly seen with the recent devastation of Los Angeles. Scientists already see a weakening of the Gulf Stream producing higher sea levels and the prospect—if it disappears—of freezing temperatures in North America and Europe. However, most of the climate burden will fall on poorer countries, which are more vulnerable to shocks and lack the resources to implement adaptation measures.

Trump pays little attention to the Global South. When the new president looks out on the world, he only sees the big players like China or Russia. The rest of the world is fuzzy to him, and the idea that Global South countries are middle powers with a say in the global system is unfathomable. For him, you are either for or against the United States. Trump is unprepared for multipolarity.

It’s unlikely that at the end of Trump’s term, there will be any better reckoning with America’s fading primacy in the international order. U.S. diplomacy is not ready for concessions or compromises in building a new order based on the balance of power. Unipolarity—though out of date and no longer feasible—remains ingrained into the psyche of the foreign policy elite. Trump’s desire to see less engagement in overseas wars may be positive, but his disengagement from the world could tip over into a damaging isolationism.

To return to the Gramsci quote that opens this chapter, at the end of his term, Trump won’t be finished with taking apart the old order—the post-World War II order—nor will he be far down the path to rebuilding global cooperation. Like Xi and Putin, Trump wants to break the old order. Much destruction will occur, but it’s our profound hope and belief that a new, fairer world can come out of this chaos and that nations can build a new order that reboots global cooperation.

Preparing for a New Age

There’s no doubt we face perilous times, a historical inflection point. Globalization has broken into value-based trading networks; nationalism is growing everywhere, and major state-on-state war has returned while the shift from West to East, along with a dizzying number of untested technologies, is accelerating. With international cooperation declining, we have lost valuable time in combating climate change, endangering the planet and the quality of life for future generations. What are the hard lessons needed to change the current self-interested directions of states towards cooperation?

Lesson #1: Avoiding World War III

There are two ways the current impasse can be resolved. The first is war, which Harvard political scientist Graham Allison sees as the historic norm for settling differences between two rivals. Under Biden, tensions flared, and there were worries the United States and China were headed to a conflict over Taiwan, but both sides pulled back from the brink. Putin also raised the specter of nuclear war with his repeated warnings of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Western support for Ukraine.

The second way is to learn from the past two centuries of the great powers trying to live together in peace and apply them to international relations today. For the United States, it must understand that global hegemony isn’t tenable. The price for sustaining it would be bankruptcy at home and conflict abroad, possibly ending in a nuclear holocaust. The balance of power worked after the Concert of Europe. If followed today, the United States would remain a great power but would have to recognize China and, over time, Russia as legitimate players, accepting that the world is multipolar, and America could not set all the rules.

A U.S.-China expert suggested that Washington should state that it approves of Taiwan’s unification with China if it is achieved peacefully. This would counter China’s belief that military force is the only way to avoid Taiwanese independence. Yet, in recent years, Washington has gone from helping Taiwan defend itself to claiming the island as a strategic asset that it cannot lose without undermining its naval superiority in East Asia. It may take a Cuban Missile Crisis-like event to persuade both sides to dial back the ruinous security competition and inaugurate confidence-building measures.

The Middle East is perhaps the hardest of the three conflicts, given the number of players and long-running wars. Annexation of Palestinian territories will only foment additional unrest. Five million Palestinians cannot be suppressed forever. Hamas and Hezbollah aren’t likely to disappear, even if they have been severely weakened. Indeed, in the waning days of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Blinken said the U.S. government assessed that “Hamas has recruited almost as many new fighters as it has lost.” Palestinian self-rule on the West Bank and Gaza is the only solution. Israel should take the help offered by Saudi Arabia and others to establish a Palestinian state that is strong enough to stop terrorists from operating from its territory. It may take some time for Israelis to tire of an unrelenting conflict. Yet taking steps to annex the West Bank and Gaza could ignite strife between Palestinians and Jews inside Israel. The Trump administration won’t want to pressure Israel, but Europeans, Saudis, and others should step in and convince the Trump administration against any recognition of annexation by the Israelis.

The United States has sought to implement regime change with its enemies all too often. Cornering Iran will only fast-track its resolve to produce nuclear weapons. Washington would do better to reach out, as Trump has mentioned in the campaign, but it will need to avoid the maximum pressure tactics, which, instead of softening up Tehran, will result in another failed attempt at cooperation. Russia and China play increasing roles and need to be engaged in an effort to achieve regional peace.

Lesson #2: Cooperation over Competition

Climate mitigation and adaptation efforts offer another chance to renew U.S.-China relations and build trust. Protecting oneself while ignoring global climate struggles is unsustainable. This must be a worldwide effort; success depends on it. China’s role in green technology makes its cooperation vital. Why shouldn’t the United States and Europeans explore joint efforts with the Chinese and others, for example, for the development of better and more long-lasting batteries? The United States fears an expansion of China’s near monopoly on battery production and wants to wean Western countries off any reliance on China and produce its own. Rather than competing with one another, some key technological innovations should be shared as public goods for everyone’s benefit.

American, Asian, and European green technology value chains could be severely impacted if the U.S.-China trade war escalates. True leadership in our multipolar world involves addressing global issues, not just self-interest. The West must show it considers broader interests beyond its own to maintain influence. Isolating behind its own “democracy wall” and ignoring the wider world will hinder the spread of Western values and undermine our economic foundations.

China has become the global renewable energy leader within the past decade and is expected to exceed its 2030 solar and wind energy target already in 2025. Its more affordable renewables are pivotal for the clean energy transition in the developing world. However, coal plants are also increasing, partly as backup for all the new wind and solar farms, and China is the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. Despite its progress, China too must do more. Russia has the most potential for solar, wind, and nuclear energies, but the government’s reliance on oil and gas revenues to fund the Ukraine war is a big obstacle to the green energy transition. Instead of confrontation, more cooperation is needed to tackle global climate change and prevent another financial crisis.

Lesson #3: Avoiding the Next Financial Crisis

In today’s multipolar world, international coordination would again be needed to reduce worsening macroeconomic imbalances, which have the potential to turn into a crisis. These risks were evident during the global economic and financial crisis of 2007–08, when global imbalances were large and a key factor in the spread of the crisis.

Imbalances are on the rise and won’t be reduced by Trump’s tariffs and decoupling supply chains, but by long-term, structural adjustment processes: surplus countries such as Germany and China should save less and consume more. Such a move by Germany would also strengthen Europe’s political unity. Chinese leaders are only likely to favor a turn towards a consumer-led economy if tensions with the United States ease. Deficit countries such as the United States should save more and reduce government deficits and debt, which are also promoting macroeconomic imbalances.

As long as the United States has a budget deficit, it will have trade deficits, and the twin deficits —budget and trade—are in part a consequence of a strong dollar. Hence, measures should be taken to reduce the structural overvaluation of the dollar as well as force a correction of the undervalued Chinese yuan. John Maynard Keynes proposed a global trade and capital regime in 1944 that involved a synthetic currency designed to absorb global imbalances, such as a supranational currency based on the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund. Yet, none of the major players—the United States, the EU, and China—will want to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies in such an arrangement, which would be seen by all of them as a loss of sovereignty.

Even another Plaza Accord that sought to appreciate the yuan against the dollar and try to cut back on Chinese exports is unlikely. The 1985 Plaza Accord was a deal struck by Washington with its allies to bail out the United States by appreciating their own currencies. America is in a similar situation to today, roiled by inflation and suffering high fiscal and trade deficits. China has no doubt absorbed the lesson that Japan learned. In helping out the United States, Japan increased the value of the yen, making its exports unaffordable and ushering in the long deflationary decade at home.

More practicable may be an informal but regularized trilateral mechanism by the Big Three—United States, European Union, and China—central bank and treasury heads for sharing views on the threats to global financial stability and needed macroeconomic changes that each should take. Establishing such routine, high-level, confidential exchanges won’t necessarily prevent another financial crisis, but could help accelerate the rapid decision-making needed if a crisis unfolds. As in 2008, financial crises often require quick agreements to avoid further escalation. The routinised three-way, high-level discussions would also build trust and facilitate solutions to other problems, such as the debt crisis in poorer countries.

Lesson #4: Inclusivity: A More Representative Multilateral System

Historically, the best time for multilateral reform was when there was a recognized global hegemon. Paradoxically, with multipolarity, it is harder to reform with various rising powers vying for a permanent seat and suspicious of changes that could favor their opponents. Therefore, the reform of the UN Security Council has been stymied. While UN membership has risen from fifty-one to 185 countries, Security Council seats have only increased from eleven to fifteen in the mid-1960s. The five permanent members were victors in the Second World War and each retains a veto. The ten non-permanent members represent different regions and only serve for two years.

Without such reform of the UNSC and other multilateral institutions, developing countries would tend to put more hope and trust in Russian and Chinese-founded bodies such as the BRICS, where their voices are more likely to be heard. Competing multilateral bodies will increase confrontation and undermine cooperation necessary to enable a sustainable and peaceful future.

Woodrow Wilson, the twenty-eighth president of the United States, failed to achieve a new, more peaceful world order at the end of World War I, not least because of the domestic restrictions against the United States joining the League of Nations and assuming a bigger global role. Isolationist and protectionist voices prevailed in U.S. foreign policy—one that was unilateral and inward-looking, disentangling itself from “extra-hemispheric” security commitments and turning away from international economic cooperation. We all know how this story ended: a second world war.

It is not just about avoiding catastrophes; it is about forging a future where shared prosperity, security, and sustainability become the foundation of a truly global order. The alternative is not merely failure—it is the collapse of everything we value.

Dr. Mathew Burrows is the Counselor and Program Lead of the Stimson Center’s Strategic Foresight Hub. Prior to joining Stimson, he had a distinguished career in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the last ten years of which he spent at the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

Dr. Josef Braml is the Secretary General of the German Group and the European Director of the Trilateral Commission—an influential global platform for dialogue between America, Europe, and Asia. Previously, from 2006 to 2020, he worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

Image: Rawpixel.com / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest

12. How the G.O.P. Fell in Love With Putin’s Russia

I suppose I am a dyed in the wool Cold Warrior with my views shaped by the last two decades of the Cold War. But I fail to understand how anyone could see any redeeming value in cozying up to Putin.

How the G.O.P. Fell in Love With Putin’s Russia

What explains the Trump administration’s radical reversal toward Moscow?

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/12/magazine/trump-russia-putin.html?smid=bsky-nytimes&smtyp=cur&utm

By Jonathan Mahler

April 12, 2025

In 1989, shortly before the fall of communism, Boris Yeltsin — the reformer who would soon become the first freely elected president of post-Soviet Russia — visited a supermarket in Houston, Texas, and was overwhelmed by the dizzying array of meats and vegetables on offer. “What have we done to our poor people?” he later asked an associate traveling with him. The story became instant fodder for the crusade to convert Russia to capitalism.

Listen to this article, read by Eric Jason Martin

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Now jump ahead to last year, when the right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson provided a mirror image of Yeltsin’s supermarket visit, only this time the supermarket was in Moscow. Carlson was in Russia to conduct a sympathetic interview with President Vladimir Putin. While he was there, he went grocery shopping and professed to be similarly overwhelmed by the range of options and affordable prices. The superpowers had traded places. It was America that now apparently needed to be converted — to Putinism. “Coming to a Russian grocery store — ‘the heart of evil’ — and seeing what things cost and how people live, it will radicalize you against our leaders,” Carlson said after passing through the checkout line. “That’s how I feel anyway — radicalized.”

President Trump, it seems, has also been radicalized. During his first term, he made no shortage of startlingly pro-Putin comments, and even sided with Russia’s president against his own intelligence agencies. But in the first few months of his second term, Trump has gone much further, overturning decades of American policy toward an adversary virtually overnight. He has claimed that Ukraine was responsible for its own invasion by Russia and berated Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, during a televised meeting in the Oval Office. His administration also joined North Korea and several other autocratic governments in refusing to endorse a United Nations resolution condemning Russia for the attack. And he has filled his cabinet with like-minded officials, including his director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who has been described as a “comrade” by Russian state TV.

It’s almost impossible to overstate the magnitude of this pivot, as Sasha Havlicek, the chief executive of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank that analyzes global extremism and disinformation, points out. “If, in fact, we are witnessing a total ideological shift of America away from its post-World War II role as guarantor of the international order and an alignment with Putin and other authoritarian nationalists against the old allies that constituted the liberal world order,” she says, “there couldn’t be anything more dramatic than that.”

Russia has long served as much more than a geopolitical rival for America. It has been an ideological other, a foil that enabled the United States to affirm its own, diametrically different values. In the words of the historian David S. Foglesong, Russia is America’s “imaginary twin” or “dark double,” the sister superpower that the United States is forever either demonizing or trying to remake in its own image. Or at least it was. Trump’s policies and rhetoric seem aimed at nothing less than turning America’s dark double into its kindred soul.

Some administration officials and their allies have characterized this as a strategy — a “reverse Kissinger.” Rather than trying to undermine Russia by making peace with China, the argument goes, Trump is trying to isolate China — an even more daunting rival — by building closer ties to Russia. It’s the America First version of realpolitik. As Vice President JD Vance has said, it would be “ridiculous” for the United States “to push Russia into the hands of the Chinese.”

Others see it as primarily personal. Trump has never made a secret of his affinity for Putin, and the Justice Department’s investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election only brought the two leaders closer together. “Let me tell you, Putin went through a hell of a lot with me,” Trump said during his meeting in the Oval Office with Zelensky. Putin has worked the personal angle. Last month, he told Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, that he went to his local church to pray for Trump when he was shot last summer and gave Witkoff a portrait of the American president that he had commissioned. Witkoff, in turn, eagerly shared these stories in an interview with Tucker Carlson.

Seen through a different lens, though, the reorienting of America’s relationship with its imaginary twin is not about geopolitical maneuvering or the president’s personal proclivities. It’s about the improbable triumph of a set of ideas — political and cultural — that have been bubbling up on the American right for years.

‘The Focus of Evil in the Modern World’

Before Trump’s recent reset, the dark-double framework defined the Russia-U.S. relationship going back to the last decades of the 19th century, when the United States first took up the cause of trying to redeem Russia. In the summer of 1882, an American journalist named James Buel traveled across the country and returned with an account of a “barbarous” nation that desperately needed to be freed from tsarist oppression — “whether with bayonet or psalm-book,” he wrote.

In the decades after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, when Russia became the Soviet Union, it morphed into a different, more menacing other — “not just despotic but diabolical,” as Foglesong writes in his book “The American Mission and ‘The Evil Empire’” (2007). The Bolshevik ideology of global revolution represented the ultimate threat to the United States, spurring the paranoia that fueled Senator Joseph McCarthy’s infamous witch hunts. The specter of nuclear warfare only intensified the panic over the Red Menace — or, as President Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union in 1983, “the focus of evil in the modern world.”

The collapse of the Soviet state over the next decade brought a fresh campaign to Americanize Russia by cajoling it to build its post-Communist future around the beacons of democracy and capitalism. Things didn’t work out as either Russia or the United States hoped. By the end of the 20th century, Russia’s G.D.P. had collapsed, its new stock market had crashed, it had defaulted on its foreign loans and a former K.G.B. spy — Putin — had become president.

After his re-election as president in 2012, Putin took Russia in a new direction. He adopted a crusade of his own against Western “decadence” and “the destruction of traditional values,” beginning with a ban on L.G.B.T.Q. “propaganda,” part of an effort to win over conservative Russians who had been disillusioned by their country’s post-Soviet turn toward the West. The familiar pattern seemed destined to repeat itself, and for a while it did. The United States had a new foil, and it was an old foil. Asserting America’s moral superiority in response to Putin’s crackdown on gay rights, President Obama included three retired gay athletes in the official American delegation to the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2013.

Putin has since done just about everything in his power to reinforce Russia’s identity as America’s spiritual adversary, even describing the West as “satanic.” Harking back to the Cold War, he embarked on a global campaign to upend the United States-led international order, creating troll farms that flooded the internet with social media posts designed to spread misinformation and sow discord. At the same time, he reasserted Russia’s imperial ambitions, first annexing Crimea in 2014 and then invading the rest of Ukraine.

And yet with Trump now back in the White House, the cycle of history may finally have been broken.

An Alliance Against Liberalism

Whether he knew it or not when he began his campaign to defend traditional values in 2012, Putin was aligning himself with a small cadre of conservatives inside the United States who shared his disdain for modern liberalism. That common cause would become a genuine alliance.

Its roots can be traced back to 1995 — before Putin was even president — when two Russian sociologists, Anatoly Antonov and Viktor Medkov, summoned Allan C. Carlson, an academic and the president of a conservative think tank in Illinois, to Moscow. Carlson had published a book in defense of traditional families, “Family Questions: Reflections on the American Social Crisis.” Antonov and Medkov were worried about the population decline in Russia, and were convinced that the solution was contained between the book’s covers.

Out of this meeting sprang a new organization, the World Congress of Families, whose aim was to foster a global network of like-minded conservatives to fight feminism, homosexuality and abortion.

Image

Credit...Photo illustration by Pablo Delcan

In America, this fight had a prominent spokesman: Patrick J. Buchanan, a veteran of the Nixon and Reagan White Houses and a Republican presidential candidate in 1992, 1996 and 2000. Buchanan represented the paleoconservative wing of the party, which was articulating a very different vision of the post-Cold War world from that of its neoconservative rivals.

As Buchanan saw it, the great struggle of the 21st century wasn’t a geopolitical battle between East and West, or freedom and oppression. It was a cultural battle between traditionalists and the secular, multicultural, global elite. In this context, America’s crusade to spread democracy was bound to lead it astray. “If communism was the god that failed the Lost Generation,” he wrote in the early ’90s, “democracy, as ideal form of government, panacea for mankind’s ills, hope of the world, may prove the Golden Calf of this generation.”

Buchanan had a following, but he was very much on the margins of a party dominated by neocons, who saw America’s victory in the Cold War as the decisive triumph of liberal democracy. The post-Cold War world order appeared to be set; history had ended. The attacks of Sept. 11, and the overwhelming bipartisan support for America’s military response to them, only reaffirmed the urgency and righteousness of the cause.

In 2013, Buchanan turned his gaze toward Russia. He had recently published his best-selling book “Suicide of a Superpower,” bemoaning what he saw as America’s ongoing social, moral and cultural disintegration. It was an apocalyptic warning about the country’s declining birthrates, the diminishing influence of Christianity, the vanishing nuclear family and what Buchanan called “third world” immigration. Chapter titles included “The End of White America” and “The Death of Christian America.”

Against this backdrop, Buchanan saw Putin as an inspiration. While Obama condemned the Russian president as an enemy of American values, Buchanan embraced him as one of his own. “Is Vladimir Putin a paleoconservative?” he wrote in 2013 in The American Conservative. “In the culture war for mankind’s future, is he one of us?” When Russia annexed Crimea the following year, Buchanan characterized the invasion as part of Putin’s divine plan to establish Moscow as “the Godly City of today and command post of the counterreformation against the new paganism.”

Mainstream conservatives distanced themselves from Buchanan — and Putin — but the ground was shifting beneath them. A backlash was brewing on the right against immigration and progressive social change, as well as America’s misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan and the American project to export liberal democracy. A new generation of nativist, reactionary thinkers gravitated toward Putin’s Russia as an ally in their culture war to turn America instead toward an antiglobalist nationalism. Putin’s critiques of Europe’s liberal immigration policies and his talk of rebuilding a Russia with citizens who felt “a spiritual connection to our Motherland” resonated. “In 20 years, Russia will be the only country that is recognizably European,” the right-wing commentator and author Ann Coulter said in 2017.

During Trump’s first term, many of the ideas that Coulter and her fellow reactionaries were expressing began migrating toward the Republican Party’s power center. This new, more favorable vision of Russia was developing its own intellectual architecture, one that married isolationism, nationalism and traditionalism with a growing appreciation for autocratic strongmen who were bending their countries to their will.

Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister who has cracked down on immigration and put in place policies to raise birthrates, has been the most widely and openly admired of these European strongmen. But Putin, too, has his admirers, and they are no longer just fringe characters.

In 2017, Christopher Caldwell, now a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, a think tank closely aligned with the Trump movement, paved the way with an address at the conservative Christian Hillsdale College titled “How to Think About Vladimir Putin.” He praised Putin’s refusal to accept a “subservient role in an American-run world system drawn up by foreign politicians and business leaders,” and described him as “the pre-eminent statesman of our time.”

Soft Power Pays Hard Dividends

Putin originally embraced the conservative side of the culture war for domestic reasons. It was a way to reassure Russians that he was attuned to their concerns about a rapidly changing world, and to provide a new binding ideology for generations weaned on communism. But this morphed into what Mikhail Zygar, an exiled Russian journalist, has called “a form of statecraft” — a means by which to build support on America’s far right and, in so doing, undermine its politics from within.

Putin’s rhetoric and policies are designed, in part, for American consumption. “He is, in essence, forming a kind of Far-Right International, similar to the Communist International, which promoted the Soviet revolution in the first half of the 20th century,” Zygar wrote last year in Foreign Affairs.

The strategy seems to have worked out better than even Putin could have imagined. In the many years since Buchanan first praised the Russian president, his fans have moved from the margins of conservative media to the center of White House decision-making. The soft power is paying hard dividends as American foreign policy bends in Russia’s direction.

As ambitious as it is, though, the Trump administration’s Russia reset may have its limits. According to a Quinnipiac poll released in mid-March, only 7 percent of American voters have a favorable opinion of Putin, while 81 percent have an unfavorable opinion of him. Similarly, 55 percent of American voters disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war in Ukraine, and only 38 percent approve of it. Trump and his cabinet may look at today’s Russia and see a kindred soul. But most of America still sees a dark double.

The right-wing politicians and pundits who view Russia as an ally appear to be a disproportionately powerful minority driving an agenda that is out of step with most of the public they represent. As radical as this particular agenda may seem, the broader phenomenon is one that the United States has seen before. “America’s foreign policy is conducted by elites,” says Jacob Heilbrunn, the author of the 2024 book “America Last,” a history of America’s modern romance with foreign dictators. “You’ve just got a new one that has come into power now.”

The reorientation of America’s Russia policy, then, may say less about the persuasiveness of a set of beliefs than it does about the takeover of the Republican Party by a group of ideologues who have been welcomed in from the fringe. In this sense, they are no different from the neoconservatives and globalists who drew Buchanan’s wrath 20 years ago by committing the United States to unpopular wars in the name of ideology.

Source photographs for opening illustration: Dziurek/Getty Images; JohnDWilliams/Getty Images.

Source photograph for nesting-doll illustration: Nicolette Wollentin/Getty Images.

Read by Eric Jason MartinNarration produced by Tanya PérezEngineered by Ted Blaisdell

Jonathan Mahler, a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, has been writing for the magazine since 2001.

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Hillsdale College, Republican Party, Patrick J Buchanan, Tucker Carlson, Tulsi Gabbard

13. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation fear Trump’s peace talks

De Oppresso Liber.

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation fear Trump’s peace talks | CNN

CNN · by Ivana Kottasová, Svitlana Vlasova · April 13, 2025

Photo Illustration by Alberto Mier/CNN/Getty Images/Reuters

CNN —

Asked why she and other Ukrainian people choose to keep living under Russian occupation instead of fleeing, the woman paused for a moment.

“I don’t know how to explain the feeling,” she said. “It’s like you just can’t believe that evil could win. Even after three years, people can’t believe that this is it. They still believe that the occupation will end. That’s why they are still staying here and not running away.”

The woman, a member of the all-female resistance group Zla Mavka, lives in a city in southeastern Ukraine that fell under Russian control just days after Moscow launched its full-scale, unprovoked invasion of the country in February 2022.

Zla Mavka – which translates as Angry Mavka, Mavka being a female forest spirit in Ukrainian folklore – engages only in non-violent activities. But taking part in any form of protest and speaking to Western media is extremely dangerous, which is why CNN is not publishing the woman’s name or location.

She told CNN that life under Russian occupation is exhausting and incredibly scary.

“You can be arrested for anything. You have to worry about everything. You have to check your phone, you have to check what you have in your apartment, you have to hide a lot of things, you can’t say what you’re thinking and you cannot trust anyone,” she said.

Photo Illustration by Jason Lancaster/CNN/Getty Images

US President Donald Trump has made it clear that he wants the war in Ukraine to end, even if it means further territorial losses for Kyiv. Trump has said it was “unlikely” Ukraine would get all of its pre-war territory back, saying: “(Russia) took a lot of land, and they fought for that land, and they lost a lot of soldiers.”

This could include the Zla Mavka woman’s hometown.

“People abroad always talk about territories, and they forget, maybe, that it’s not only about territories. It’s about people. And people here are still waiting. People have not moved, and they don’t want to move. And why (should) they have to move from their homes?” the woman said.

Russian forces currently occupy nearly a fifth of Ukraine’s territory, home to about 6 million people, including 1 million children, who are living in what the United Nations has described as a “bleak human rights situation.”

Stepan, a 22-year-old Ukrainian man who recently escaped from an occupied area in southern Ukraine to Kherson, which is under Kyiv’s control, has experienced firsthand what the occupying forces are capable of.

Stepan and his parents were detained by Russian troops in summer 2022. He was held for two weeks and repeatedly beaten and tortured with electricity. His parents were held for several more months.

None of the family was ever told why they were being detained. They have never been convicted or charged with any crimes.

When Stepan was released, he was separated from the rest of his family. He ended up on the left bank of the Dnipro River, which is still occupied by Russia. His mother Olha managed to escape to a government-controlled area after she was released in spring 2023.

“I was very afraid,” Stepan said of his time living under occupation. “Whenever I went outside, I looked around to see if they were there to take me away again or do something to me. I wouldn’t leave the house if I didn’t have to. It was like that every day,” he told CNN.

Stepan was lucky – he managed to escape and was reunited with his family last month. He was brought back thanks to a “coordinated effort” that involved the “Angels,” a Ukrainian special forces unit that rescues vulnerable people from occupied territories, according to Roman Mrochko, the head of Kherson City Military Administration. Stepan and his family said they were not allowed to share details of the operation.

A Russian torture and detention centre was discovered inside a police station in Kherson after Ukrianian troops liberated the city in November 2022.

Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Dire consequences

Both Stepan and the Zla Mavka member said that even the slightest suspicion of being “pro-Ukrainian” can have dire consequences for people living under occupation.

“My friends and acquaintances were often taken away because they did not want to get a Russian passport or for not registering for military service. They were taken away and brought back a week later with broken arms and legs, sometime heads. There were many, we are talking about dozens of people,” Stepan said.

Human rights groups say that Moscow has intensified its campaign to “Russify” occupied Ukraine in recent months, likely to stake claim to the areas in any future peace negotiation.

“They try to remove anything Ukrainian from our city, from the language to traditions,” the Zla Mavka woman said, adding that the group has made it one of its missions to keep Ukrainian culture alive under occupation.

“We are spreading Ukrainian poems and the works of Ukrainian authors, and (celebrating) Ukrainian holidays, the traditional ones, just to remind to everybody that this is not Russia, and never was, and never will be,” she said.

She described living in the city like “getting into a time machine and going back to the USSR.”

Top US officials met with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia in February 2025.

Evelyn Hockstein/AFP/Getty Images

“There’s propaganda and Soviet-style monuments, and Soviet holidays, and we are always waiting in lines, like in Soviet times, to get help, or to go to the doctor, or to get some documents, you have to wait in these long lines and there are no normal shops and no brands… just stuff you can get in the street markets and some strange Chinese products.”

Russian authorities have been meticulously erasing Ukrainian national identity, religion and language in occupied Ukraine. They have staged sham referenda on joining Russia and have been forcing the local population to become Russian citizens.

Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new decree ordering Ukrainian citizens living in these areas to “regulate their legal status” by adopting Russian citizenship. According to the decree, those who don’t do so by September will become foreigners and will only be allowed to stay for limited time.

But Moscow has already effectively coerced many Ukrainian people into accepting Russian passports because life is nearly impossible and very dangerous without them.

Those who don’t have Russian documents face the daily threat of arrest and deportation to Russia, have no right to work, no access to even the most basic health services or pensions and are barred from owning property.

“You can’t even call an ambulance without (a Russian passport). If you don’t have a Russian passport, the ambulance will not come,” the resistance woman said.

Human rights watchdogs have repeatedly said that Moscow is breaking international law by forcing the Ukrainian population to adopt Russian passports.

“And then the big problem for men, the men who (were forced to get) Russian passports, they are now trying to mobilize them into the Russian Army. They want to force them to fight against their own people,” the woman added.

Uniformed participants attend the joining ceremony for the Youth Army movement in a Russian-controled part of the Donetsk region in September 2024.

Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

A man walks past a store damaged in a shelling in Donetsk in Russian-controlled area of Ukraine, in January 2025.

Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

The risk of trying to leave

Millions of Ukrainians are refusing to leave their homes in occupied territories – most because they still believe that Kyiv, with the help of its Western allies, will eventually liberate all its land.

There are also some who sympathize with Russia and are happy with the new regime – although both the Zla Mavka woman and Stepan said they believe this is only a small minority.

“These are often people who did not have a very good life before. For example, they didn’t have education and didn’t have a good job, but now, if they cry out loud ‘I love Russia,’ they will get a job in the government, they will get help and money from Russia,” the Zla Mavka member said.

SOS Donbas, a Ukrainian helpline for people living in occupied territories and combat zones, received more than 57,500 calls last year. Violeta Artemchuk, the director of the organization, said most people are asking for advice on how to leave safely, how to access help and what are the implications of staying and being forced to take a Russian passport.

The Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly told people in occupied areas to do whatever they need to stay safe.

US President Donald Trump at the White House on March 21, 2025.

Yuri Gripas/Abaca/Bloomberg/Getty Images

“If you need to get some documents, get them. This does not change your status,” Heorhii Tykhyi, a foreign ministry spokesperson, said after the decree requiring Ukrainians in occupied territories to become Russian citizens was announced.

Tykhyi said that “the best solution, if possible, is to leave for the controlled territory of Ukraine.”

But for many, leaving is impossible because it’s too dangerous, too expensive and too treacherous.

“Theoretically, it’s possible to leave, but you have to go through filtration,” the Zla Mavka woman said, referring to a security screening process conducted by Russian forces on all exits from the occupied areas.

“They’re checking everything there, so… let’s say there is a woman whose husband was a soldier in 2014, and if they find out, she will have a huge problem, so for her, it is safer not to try. But this could be anything, like a comment on social media, something on your phone, they can just arrest you and deport you to Russia,” she said.

A flag commemorating Soviet military victories flies in Melitopol, a city under Russian occupation.

Andrey Borodulin/AFP/Getty Images

Thousands of Ukrainian citizens have been illegally detained and sent to Russia, and CNN has documented cases of people who were picked up at Russian filtration points and subsequently sent to facilities thousands of miles away from Ukraine.

It is impossible to cross directly from occupied Ukraine into government-controlled areas, which means that anyone wishing to flee must travel through Russia, get out of Russia and then travel through Europe back to Ukraine.

“It’s not easy to leave everything and become a refugee. You can’t sell your apartment, you cannot cross the border with a large amount of money, you can’t take much… so it is possible, but not for everyone,” the woman said.

So, for now, she and millions of others are staying and watching the news coming from the White House and elsewhere in horror.

“People are very nervous and they’re very afraid to hear about a negotiation, and how our cities will become Russia, this is the biggest fear. But I can tell you that even if this happens, resistance won’t stop.”

CNN · by Ivana Kottasová, Svitlana Vlasova · April 13, 2025

14. Pentagon hits Accenture, Booz Allen and Deloitte with contract cancellations

Pentagon hits Accenture, Booz Allen and Deloitte with contract cancellations

washingtontechnology.com · by $(function() { GEMG.HoverGroup.init({}); });

The Defense Department says it has found $4 billion in savings by cutting consulting and non-essential contracts with Accenture, Booz Allen Hamilton, Deloitte, and other unnamed companies.

The contracts had a total value of $5.1 billion, according to a DOD memo and a video released of Defense Sec. Pete Hegseth announcing the cuts Thursday night. The cuts are part of the Department of Government Efficiency reviews at DOD.

Of the cuts, $1.8 billion were found at the Defense Health Agency, which involved contracts held by Accenture, Booz Allen, Deloitte and other unnamed contractors.

According to GovTribe data, Booz Allen has won $345 million in contract obligations at DHA over the last three years. Deloitte has $264 million over the same period, and Accenture is listed with $66 million in obligations.

Accenture, Booz Allen and Deloitte did not respond to requests for comments.

Another $1.4 billion cut was an Air Force contract held by Accenture to resell enterprise cloud IT services.

This contract may be the Air Force Cloud One task order that Accenture won in September. It had a $1.6 billion ceiling over five years and was described as cloud reselling contract across multiple cloud services.

When Accenture officially announced the win in Octoer, the company said it was a managed services contract with features such as real-time cost transparency and multi-cloud billing. According to Deltek data, only $48 million in work has been obligated through the contract.

Other cancellations announced this week include $500 million in business process consulting work at the Navy’s administrative offices of the bureau of medicine.

Also being cut is a DARPA IT helpdesk contract that duplicates services that DISA could provide.

DOD did not identify the contractors involved at DARPA and the Navy.

While the contracts are being terminated, the work will shift to DOD personnel, Hegseth said.

DOD is also pausing $500 million in grants with Northwestern and Cornell universities, which is on top of $70 million grants that the department froze at Columbia, Penn, Brown, and Princeton universities.

“As if any of these institutions need more government money at all,” Hegseth said.

To date, the DOGE has found $6 billion in contract cuts at DOD, including this latest batch, in the first six weeks that it has been combing through the department’s spending, according to Hegseth.

The memo also says that DOGE and DOD will work together over the next 30 days to prepare a plan to in-source IT consulting and management services to the department's civilian workforce. The plan will include how to negotiate better pricing on software and cloud services. "So the DOD pays no more for IT services than any other enterprise in America," according to the memo.

By April 18, DOD and DOGE will complete an audit the department software licenses so it is only paying for features it uses and at the most favorable rates.

Below is Hegseth's announcement of the cuts:

washingtontechnology.com · by $(function() { GEMG.HoverGroup.init({}); });

15. Military intensifies operations vs rebels (Philippines)

Communism remains a threat.

Military intensifies operations vs rebels

https://www.philstar.com/nation/2025/04/13/2435541/military-intensifies-operations-vs-rebels

Michael Punongbayan - The Philippine Star

April 13, 2025 | 12:00am

Members of the Philippine Army celebrate their 127th founding anniversary at the Training and Doctrine Command, Camp O’Donnell in Capas, Tarlac on March 22, 2024.

STAR / KJ Rosales

MANILA, Philippines — The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has intensified operations against a remaining unit of the New People’s Army (NPA) in Northern Luzon.

From April 5 to 11, troops under the Joint Task Force Tala of the Army’s 5th Infantry Division (ID) launched security operations after unidentified armed men were spotted in the mountainous area of Kabugao town in Apayao.

The AFP’s Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) said a recent firefight between government troops and suspected NPA guerrillas belonging to the Ilocos-Cordillera Regional Committee (ICRC) resulted in the recovery of several firearms including rifles, pistols, a grenade launcher and improvised explosive devices (IED) as well as phones and subversive documents.

Military units in the area have been ordered to continue pursuit operations, establish blocking positions and coordinate with the local police and medical facilities to intercept any fleeing rebel.

“Our troops remain focused and determined. This is part of our relentless pursuit to deny communist terrorist groups of a safe haven. We are committed to hit them hard and sustain pressure until peace and security are achieved in the region,” Nolcom chief Lt. Gen. Fernyl Buca said.

The military has condemned the NPA for using IEDs. It urged the public and families of wounded rebels to cooperate with authorities and help facilitate the provision of proper medical attention to their relatives.

He said bloodstains were found at the scene of the encounter, indicating the rebels suffered injuries during the encounter.

Buca said the Nolcom is bent on dismantling the NPA-ICRC.

“The command is determined to decimate all remaining communist terrorist groups,” Buca said.

16. Trump’s DEI Purge in the Military Puts U.S. National Security at Risk

Can we examine these issues objectively or will those on both sides of the issues dismiss the argument of the other?

One thing to keep in mind is that among the strongest proponents for maintaining standards are the women who actually volunteer for the tough jobs. They do not want standards lowered and they do not want to be "diversity-hires." I think we should be listening to them.

Excerpts:

Various roadblocks still exist for women and minorities in national security and foreign policy. Among the problems women in the military face, none is more serious than the continued high rate of sexual assault and harassment, despite reforms in the military justice system to prosecute such crimes. Women and minorities struggle to achieve promotion rates even when they are equally qualified for other reasons. One study on low retention in the naval officer corps published in the journal Proceedings enumerated the need for more family-friendly policies and more senior leaders as role models.

Attrition at the top will reverberate throughout the U.S. military. Franchetti’s retirement following her dismissal as head of the Navy leaves the U.S. military without any four-star generals or admirals who are women. And if Chatfield retires, there will be only eighteen women three-star generals and admirals in the entire U.S. military. Women comprise 18 percent of the active-duty military as of January 2025. Today, women comprise 31 percent of the Naval Academy’s class of 2028, and the academy is led by its first woman superintendent, Rear Admiral Yvette Davids. They are vital parts of the U.S. national security force, and their premature departures would deprive the country of greatly needed talent.

Trump’s DEI Purge in the Military Puts U.S. National Security at Risk

The administration’s “anti-DEI” campaign targets vital expertise and experience in government agencies.

Post by Linda Robinson

April 11, 2025 5:57 pm (EST)

cfr.org · by Linda Robinson

The crusade against women and minorities that the U.S. government has unleashed since Donald Trump’s inauguration as president is doing incalculable harm to government and public service. The “anti-DEI” campaign is turning into a witch hunt against anyone who has embraced the idea—and government policy until January—that a more representative government is better equipped to address the country’s rapidly expanding challenges. This notion does not contradict the idea of meritocracy but rather is a way of ensuring that institutions and organizations harness additional, untapped talent. Starting in the first Trump administration, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) efforts were launched to ensure that women and minorities have an equal chance to compete for jobs and promotions. Just as tariffs are immensely destructive to American livelihoods and prosperity, the DEI witch hunt, if not quickly halted, will deprive the government of expertise and experience and cause the next generation to shun public service.

Recent Dismissal of Shoshana Chatfield

The dismissal of the two top women in the U.S. military last month was followed this week by the dismissal of Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield from her position as the U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee. The U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Sean Parnell said the move was due to “a loss of competence in her ability to lead.” She has been targeted by rightwing groups for statements supporting diversity. Her departure deprives the United States of experience at a historic juncture when the United States has raised questions about its commitment to Europe. The new U.S. ambassador to NATO does not have a background in foreign policy, national security, or NATO. Chatfield, on the other hand, has years of NATO experience: before becoming the U.S. military representative to NATO in 2023, she previously served as senior military assistant to the supreme allied commander Europe and as the U.S. deputy military representative to the NATO Military Committee from 2015 to 2017.

Among her qualifications earned in 38 years of service, Chatfield is a combat veteran, helicopter pilot, former commander of Joint Region Marinas, and the first woman of the Naval War College, armed with a master of public administration from Harvard and a doctorate in education. The Navy only selects its most qualified leaders to head the Naval War College in Newport; she followed an august line that included admirals Art Cebrowski, Stansfield Turner, and James Stockdale.

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Democratic senators and members of congress including ranking members of the armed services and intelligence committee have condemned this latest firing, but as yet no Republicans leaders have expressed concern that highly qualified service leaders are being fired without concrete or valid justification. In 2022, thirty-five retired senior defense officials, including four former chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, signed an amicus brief supporting diversity as vital for the nation’s armed services. “History has shown that placing a diverse Armed Forces under the command of a homogeneous leadership is a recipe of internal resentment, discord, and violence,” they said. The latest firings have prompted several retired senior officers to publicly denounce the snowballing number of dismissals that appear to be motivated solely by prejudice.

Retired Rear Admiral Jamie Barnett, who teaches at the University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, called for Congressional Republicans to act in a LinkedIn post applauded by a number of former officers. Barnett wrote: “Dear Republicans, especially Senator Wicker (Retired Air Force Lt Colonel) and Congressman Trent Kelly (Major General Natl Guard): You know that firing senior officers such as Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield is wrong and dangerous for our country! You must speak out. Now. VADM Chatfield is a seasoned pilot, she commanded a unit in Afghanistan, she earned a Bronze Star and two Legion of Merit medals, she is brilliant, and she served as President of the Naval War College. Republicans, only you can stop this. Stop this!”

DEI Purge in Naval Academy Library Ahead of Pete Hegseth’s Visit

The latest firing comes on the heels of growing purges of books from military libraries. In a frightening Orwellian turn, the very use of the word “diversity” is not only a cause for dismissal but a justification for censorship. Officials are using keyword searches including diversity, gender, feminism, and racism to purge the service academy libraries that help educate public servants. On the eve of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s visit to the Naval Academy in Annapolis, 381 books of academic and instructional value were removed from its library. The culling removed books about leadership and management in the context of daily realities that include racism and gender diversity and ranged so far as to purge a book on girls in Afghanistan and studies of sexuality in the literature of Henry James, William Faulkner, and Thomas Pynchon. The book burnings staged by Savonarola come to mind.

Last fall, Hegseth advertised in a podcast with Shawn Ryan that he would conduct such purges. He said, “Any general that was involved, any general, admiral, whatever, that was involved in any of the DEI/woke s--t has got to go.” He also flatly opposed women serving in combat, despite their longstanding combat roles in many of our allies’ militaries. Since January, other high-ranking women who have been fired include Admiral Linda Fagan, the commandant of the Coast Guard; Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the chief of naval operations; and Lieutenant General Jennifer Short, senior military assistant to the secretary of defense, whom Hegseth removed as soon as he arrived at the Pentagon.

Another retired rear admiral who served in multiple senior roles in the Pentagon predicted that the Trump administration’s actions will have a damaging effect on the armed services. “I think these actions and the accompanying rhetoric will have the effect of discouraging young women, and young men like me back in the day, from being part of an organization that does not see women as equal to men,” he told me. “Not only will this adversely affect the quality of those who join and stay, it will empower misogynistic men to treat women who do stay like they did in the ’80s and ’90s when the rules said they were not equal.”

Reversal on Diversity Hiring and Programs Since First Trump Term

The third distressing episode this week was a hearing convened by the oversight subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 9. The title of the subcommittee indicated that its chair, Rep. Cory Mills (R-FL) had already reached his conclusions: “Deficient, Enfeebled & Ineffective: The Consequences of the Biden Administration’s Far-Left Priorities.” Mills proceeded to interrupt and badger the chief witness, longtime foreign service officer Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, as she testified in very precise terms about her role as the State Department’s chief diversity and inclusion officer (CDIO) from April 2021 to 2023. The State Department’s goal, she succinctly summarized, was to ensure diversity in recruiting, and merit in hiring. Only those meeting the qualifications would be hired.

Ambassador Abercrombie-Winstanley pointed out that the diversity unit at the State Department got its start during President Trump’s first term. A Government Accountability Office study found clear evidence that underrepresented groups were promoted at much lower rates than white males and that “the proportion of racial or ethnic minorities and women was lowest at management and executive levels.” The State Department was 68 percent white in 2018, and various practices had prompted successful equal opportunity lawsuits against the department. The ambassador pointed out that, for example, openings for deputy assistant secretary, the critical gateway to higher leadership, were not posted for all to see and apply for.

The ambassador recalled that State’s policy changes were strongly embraced at the time. Abercrombie-Winstanley noted that in her first congressional testimony as CDIO, then-Senator Marco Rubio expressed his support, stating that “not only is our nation’s diversity our strength, but if our workforce doesn’t reflect our population then it merits inquiry.”

Various roadblocks still exist for women and minorities in national security and foreign policy. Among the problems women in the military face, none is more serious than the continued high rate of sexual assault and harassment, despite reforms in the military justice system to prosecute such crimes. Women and minorities struggle to achieve promotion rates even when they are equally qualified for other reasons. One study on low retention in the naval officer corps published in the journal Proceedings enumerated the need for more family-friendly policies and more senior leaders as role models.

Attrition at the top will reverberate throughout the U.S. military. Franchetti’s retirement following her dismissal as head of the Navy leaves the U.S. military without any four-star generals or admirals who are women. And if Chatfield retires, there will be only eighteen women three-star generals and admirals in the entire U.S. military. Women comprise 18 percent of the active-duty military as of January 2025. Today, women comprise 31 percent of the Naval Academy’s class of 2028, and the academy is led by its first woman superintendent, Rear Admiral Yvette Davids. They are vital parts of the U.S. national security force, and their premature departures would deprive the country of greatly needed talent.

cfr.org · by Linda Robinson

17. The new war on words

This is a very good discussion of the term woke and how "woke" is used on the extreme left and the extreme right. It is really the modern history of the term "woke." I recommend keeping an open mind when listening to the discussion.

Listen to the 46 minute broadcast here:

https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2025/04/09/trump-diversity-dei-woke-right-left

Excerpts:

So explain for our listeners who may not have read your piece what you think woke means and how it began.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: That's such a great place to start. Because I think that this is one of those words that everybody at this point has heard, but it means different things to different people. Wokeness is not even a term that I necessarily would choose myself.

But it's the one that has stuck. And it really describes what I think is this idea that the world is controlled by some sort of systemic power, whether that's white supremacy, systemic racism, or patriarchy or whatever. And that you need to be awakened to be able to see all the ways in which this kind of power inequality creates classes of victims and oppressors.

And then it inspires a kind of politics of grievance in which everything, specifically institutions, but also norms must be dismantled, and society has to be wholly restructured from the ground up. This paranoid style has, it certainly was ascendant on the left. I would say from definitely the second term of the Obama administration.

It peaked during COVID and the racial reckoning of 2020. And then I would say that it came precipitously down after the attacks in Israel on October 7th and the campus protests that created quite a backlash. But now we're in the phase of a backlash that has fully become woke from the right.

We didn't just recenter things in the middle. We have a kind of paranoid style from the right that wants to dismantle everything, but it's fully fastened to the power of the government now. So I think it's much more horrifying than what preceded it.

BECKER: Yeah. I have to say the title made me uncomfortable, right?

Because woke is now really a pejorative term. It reminded me of when folks used to say someone was PC, or politically correct. But the ideas behind being politically correct, the initial ideas, it just is the initial ideas behind looking at society and seeing where the power dynamics are and perhaps speaking up against them.

Those initial ideas are not bad. Those are very positive things. It's just how they then become culturally or socially enforced. And, as you said, it became almost paranoid, right? So explain that a little bit, of how we went to something that was really a call to activism, to something that's now negative.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: That's a great point and I think it's important that you take the moment to specify that. Yes. The reason why wokeness has been so appealing and has really been an animating energy on both the left and the right is because there really are inequalities and power imbalances and forms of oppression that we do notice, and that do disturb people of good conscience in this society.

And you start by saying that, look, it looks Black people are discriminated against, or Latinos are discriminated against, or women are not fully represented in this area. And it gets taken to a kind of all-encompassing extreme at the worst, in the worst excesses, where then that becomes the only lens through which you perceive any interaction.

And every single aspect of reality has to be reformatted to address this one single discrepancy. And I think on the right too, if what the left was concerned with was systemic power imbalances from racism and patriarchy. You could say that the right is really concerned with what we could call like the post-war liberal order. And all of the kind of imbalances that come through globalization and all these different ways in which there really are some problems that should be addressed.

But the bad aspect of this kind of activist inspired politics of grievance is that it loses all sense of proportion, and it makes things so intense that there's no ability anymore to compromise.

The new war on words

wbur.org · by Claire Donnelly

Many on the political right accuse the left of policing what people can and can't say.

Now, the Trump administration is cracking down on words related to diversity and inclusion.

Has a so-called 'woke right' replaced the so-called 'woke left?'

Guests

Thomas Chatterton Williams, staff writer at The Atlantic. Hannah Arendt Center Senior Fellow at Bard College. Author of the recent piece “How the Woke Right Replaced the Woke Left.”

Jason Stanley, professor of philosophy at Yale University. Author of seven books, including “The Politics of Language” and “Erasing History: How Fascists Rewrite the Past to Control the Future.”

Transcript

Part I

DEBORAH BECKER: The fight over the power of language seems to have taken a twist. Many conservatives have long accused the left of policing language, saying that liberals are trying to dictate speech.

SHAPIRO: Midwives have been told to say chest feeding instead of breastfeeding, and to replace the term mother with mother or birthing parent.

WATTERS: The left says you can identify as anything, a tree, six genders. You cannot identify as a Black conservative.

VANCE: This whole crazy left-wing idea that we're not allowed to debate ideas, that we're not allowed to discuss things, that we have to silence people, censor them.

WATTERS: What's next? The Ninja Turtles apologize for appropriating karate. Are the X-Men now the Latinx-Men?

BECKER: That was conservative commentator, Ben Shapiro, Fox News host Jesse Watters and Vice President JD Vance. Conservatives say this speech policing is pushing a quote, woke ideology. Indeed, there has been a push, particularly on the progressive left to reconsider certain words.

AMBER MILLER: Owner suite. It's a term many people have never heard of, but as of late is gaining traction. The better-known term, master suite being frowned upon in some circles looked at as racist and sexist.

@MEI.FAE: Nibbling is just a gender-neutral term for niece or nephew. So if your siblings' child is gender non-conforming or non-binary, nibbling a great term for them.

JONATHAN JAYS-GREEN: This conversation around Latinx has been to be able to make sure that we have language that is inclusive to queer, trans, and gender non-conforming people like myself.

BECKER: That was reporter Amber Miller, TikTok, creator Mei Fae and activist Jonathan Jays-Green. Now, President Trump is taking on language speaking at the Justice Department last month, he touted his order, which is titled Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship.

DONALD TRUMP: On day one, I signed an executive order banning all government censorship and directing the removal of every bureaucrat who conspired to attack free speech and many other things and values in America.

BECKER: Yet the same day, Trump also issued an executive order declaring the policy of the United States is that there were only two genders, male and female.

TRUMP: For four long years, we had an administration that tried to abolish the very concept of womanhood and replace it with radical gender ideology. Maybe you heard something about that.

They destroyed women's spaces and even tried to replace the word mother with the term birther person.

BECKER: As a result of Trump's executive orders, agencies are scrubbing or trying to avoid using certain words on government websites and documents. Those words include female, gender identity, race, and DEI. Is the Trump administration changing language to reflect its policies or is it engaging in the same language policing that conservatives accuse the left of perpetrating? This hour we wanna talk about this War on Words. Joining us is Thomas Chatterton Williams. He's a staff writer at the Atlantic. ... He wrote a recent piece in the Atlantic titled "How the Woke Right Replaced The Woke Left."

Thomas, welcome to On Point.

THOMAS CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: Hi, Deborah. Thanks for having me.

BECKER: So let's start with your piece. This is why we asked you to be on today. "How the Woke Right Replaced The Woke Left," and you start off by describing a sort of social justice orthodoxy that swept through the culture during a specific time.

So explain for our listeners who may not have read your piece what you think woke means and how it began.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: That's such a great place to start. Because I think that this is one of those words that everybody at this point has heard, but it means different things to different people. Wokeness is not even a term that I necessarily would choose myself.

But it's the one that has stuck. And it really describes what I think is this idea that the world is controlled by some sort of systemic power, whether that's white supremacy, systemic racism, or patriarchy or whatever. And that you need to be awakened to be able to see all the ways in which this kind of power inequality creates classes of victims and oppressors.

And then it inspires a kind of politics of grievance in which everything, specifically institutions, but also norms must be dismantled, and society has to be wholly restructured from the ground up. This paranoid style has, it certainly was ascendant on the left. I would say from definitely the second term of the Obama administration.

It peaked during COVID and the racial reckoning of 2020. And then I would say that it came precipitously down after the attacks in Israel on October 7th and the campus protests that created quite a backlash. But now we're in the phase of a backlash that has fully become woke from the right.

We didn't just recenter things in the middle. We have a kind of paranoid style from the right that wants to dismantle everything, but it's fully fastened to the power of the government now. So I think it's much more horrifying than what preceded it.

BECKER: Yeah. I have to say the title made me uncomfortable, right?

Because woke is now really a pejorative term. It reminded me of when folks used to say someone was PC, or politically correct. But the ideas behind being politically correct, the initial ideas, it just is the initial ideas behind looking at society and seeing where the power dynamics are and perhaps speaking up against them.

Those initial ideas are not bad. Those are very positive things. It's just how they then become culturally or socially enforced. And, as you said, it became almost paranoid, right? So explain that a little bit, of how we went to something that was really a call to activism, to something that's now negative.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: That's a great point and I think it's important that you take the moment to specify that. Yes. The reason why wokeness has been so appealing and has really been an animating energy on both the left and the right is because there really are inequalities and power imbalances and forms of oppression that we do notice, and that do disturb people of good conscience in this society.

And you start by saying that, look, it looks Black people are discriminated against, or Latinos are discriminated against, or women are not fully represented in this area. And it gets taken to a kind of all-encompassing extreme at the worst, in the worst excesses, where then that becomes the only lens through which you perceive any interaction.

And every single aspect of reality has to be reformatted to address this one single discrepancy. And I think on the right too, if what the left was concerned with was systemic power imbalances from racism and patriarchy. You could say that the right is really concerned with what we could call like the post-war liberal order. And all of the kind of imbalances that come through globalization and all these different ways in which there really are some problems that should be addressed.

But the bad aspect of this kind of activist inspired politics of grievance is that it loses all sense of proportion, and it makes things so intense that there's no ability anymore to compromise.

BECKER: Do you have an example that comes to mind right away of how you think wokeness went awry and what you think maybe may have been a touchstone for when things turned?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: I've got a book coming out this summer on this subject.

BECKER: Tell us all about it.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: It's called Summer of Our Discontent, and I've got some examples that really stuck out in my mind. But this is not gonna be news to many of your listeners, but in the summer of 2020, many people in America, especially some people in the media and other institutions of some influence, became so concerned about criminal justice reform and police brutality that the idea of, for instance, dismantling or abolishing the police actually got serious consideration.

I would say that's an extraordinary loss of proportion that started from a good place, being concerned about a man dying on video and taking it to an extreme that actually warps and distorts our social fabric and our politics and creates the very backlash that it purports to want to address.

There were so many situations like this. If you look at a place like, if you look at the media, people were scapegoated and fired oftentimes for things that were not considered wrong even in the previous day. So you look at James Bennet at the New York Times opinion pages, he was fired, ultimately scapegoated by a kind of incensed mob of his junior staffers who demanded his resignation because he published a sitting U.S. Senator, Tom Cotton.

On an opinion that was certainly charged, that the president should consider sending in the National Guard to stop the looting and rioting that was happening in the wake of George Floyd's death. But that was an opinion that the majority of Americans did agree with, whether we like it or not.

And the idea that made minorities unsafe to hear the opinion was an idea that was pushed rather forcefully and had real consequences for people's lives. I think that's a moment where you have to step back and say, what are we doing and have we become so awakened or awoken to all forms of injustice that we are creating new forms of injustice in turn?

BECKER: And so of course those questions and what happened there have really now been taken over and became really a campaign rally for President Trump.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: Yes. So one of my main issues with the kind of great awokening that the ascendant left enjoyed for the past decade and change is that it simply is ineffective on a pragmatic level.

It created the very Trump revolution that swept him back into office, because he was able to make some valid points about where institutional elites abused their cultural dominance. Now I think he's instituting things that are far worse, far less concerned with actually fixing what's genuinely wrong in society and much more a kind of camouflage for acquiring power and exploiting it.

But that cannot be addressed, I don't think. And it cannot be combated without seeing the ways in which the left made possible the conditions for this abuse from the right.

Part II

BECKER: Before the break, Thomas, you were making some points about why or how you think the woke left really set the stage for the woke. And I'm wondering if you would just expand on that a little bit. I know you talked about what you felt were perhaps some extremes of what the left did and what Progressives did right around the time of 2020. And how that may have really set the stage for a second Trump administration.

Can you just expand on that a bit?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: Sure. The thing that was so disturbing about Trump's second win was that he had expanded the multicultural coalition that was voting for him. He had grown the support among non-white voters to a higher level than had been than the Republicans had enjoyed since the Nixon administration.

So he really found some issues that connected. And we can't just dismiss it as a kind of white backlash or racism, but one of the issues that he hit upon that seems to have really resonated was this ad that was extraordinarily effective last fall about Kamala Harris being for they/them, and Donald Trump being for you.

This was a kind of self-imposed own goal that the left never had, the Democrats never had to make. It was a kind of niche issue that starts from a place of caring about a marginalized group, but actually ballooning the care for that group to such an extent that it alienates the mainstream. And you really, what we have to contend with now is the realization that you really can't help anybody if you concede all power to somebody that would oppress them.

So it doesn't matter really where your heart is in these issues. As the left often tried to signal through activism and through forced language and forced virtue signaling, it doesn't matter how pure the signals you virtue, the virtues you signal are if you can't exercise political power.

BECKER: So it's not so much the specific issue that is really what people should be faithful to? Is that what you're saying?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: I think that you have to have values and principles, but you cannot be completely divorced from the reality of where the country is. People often compare these kind of issues to the civil rights movement in the previous century. But the fact is that that took getting the majority of Americans on board, it took a long campaign of exercising real political power through the electorate and the courts, but not just imposing from the top down, a kind of worldview that alienated the rest of the country.

BECKER: I wanna bring another voice into the conversation now. Jason Stanley, as a professor of philosophy at Yale University, he's written seven books, including one titled The Politics of Language, another titled Erasing History, how Fascists Rewrite the Past to Control the Future. Jason, welcome to On Point.

JASON STANLEY: Thank you, Deborah. And hello, Thomas.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: Hi, Jason.

BECKER: So what I wanna ask you, Jason, is I'm wondering what your thoughts are about all of this, about language policing on the right, and I'm assuming you know that Thomas just wrote a recent piece in the Atlantic titled how the Woke Right Replaced the Woke Left.

And we've been talking about some of these ideas here and I'm wondering if you could just give us maybe a broad overview of your thoughts about language and the woke, if you will, Jason.

STANLEY: Yeah, so Thomas and I co-authored the New York Times piece a while back about the woke really attacking their bans on critical, their sort of legalized bans on critical race theory.

So I really applaud his standing up for this issue on when the right does it though Thomas and I have strongly differing views on issues like backlash. For example, I think it's really problematic to say this is the fault of whatever came before Trump. Because Elizabeth Hinton has a book called America On Fire and one of the chapters is called The Cycle, and she talks, she documents how in small city after small city in the United States, for decades, there's a Black, there's police violence against a Black person, and then there's a response by the Black population, and then everyone agrees to do something about it, and then there's a harsh white backlash. I think Hinton demonstrates that this is just the structure of American life and has been for many decades.

Now coming to the issue of banning speech, what you're really doing here is you're banning perspectives. You're banning ideologies. So ideologies are perspectives on the world. And central to an ideology is a way of talking about the world. Each perspective on the world comes with a way of talking about the world.

So for example, if you want trans acceptance of trans people, you're gonna have to alter language a bit. And these alterings of language or debates about language are nothing new. Carter G. Woodson in his 1933 book, Miseducation of the Negro, has an appendix called What we Call Ourselves, where he's 'Grumpy old manning' about the arguments about what Black Americans call themselves.

So this is an age-old issue. So now what the Trump administration is doing, and Thomas rightly calls our attention to it, is they're using the government, the state power, rather than social shaming. To ban perspectives, by targeting the characteristic words in the speech practices of those perspectives.

BECKER: So they've got the power of the government to do this, whereas before it was maybe you were canceled on social media or perhaps you lost your job, or there were other institutions that kind of enforced some of what was considered acceptable at that time. But now it's very different.

STANLEY: That's right.

BECKER: Go ahead. I'm sorry.

STANLEY: Yeah. When the government does it, as Thomas said, it's always going to be the case that a democratic society is gonna involve contestation of perspectives. And as a philosopher of language who follows J.L. Austin, speech is a way of doing and when you speak, it's a way of behaving in the world.

And so people are always going to struggle to argue about that, just like they argue about ways of, other ways of behaving in the world.

BECKER: I wanna go back to what you said about backlash just for a moment, because I do think it's interesting. You think that this is a natural backlash to what happened.

What we're seeing now from the right and from government is a natural backlash to what happened, say starting pre 2020 and then through the pandemic.

STANLEY: This is for Thomas or for me?

BECKER: This is for you, Jason.

STANLEY: Oh. I don't think it's a natural backlash at all. I think it's the different societies have different historical patterns, and what Hinton's work shows is that our historical pattern is this pattern of Black struggle and white response.

I think, BLM, it's always been the case that Black protests are described in terms of looting and rioting. This is all the way back to the 1960s. So no matter what you do in Black protests, it's gonna be described. They're gonna focus on some instances and generalize it to looting and rioting. Tom Cotton's piece called all Black Lives Matter protests looting and rioting.

And it was a general sort of, so I don't think, I think like the goal is, there were certain aspects of Black Lives Matter, like defunding the police that I think were problematic in the ways that Tom, in much the ways that Thomas said. But I think the ultimate thing is that just a larger version of what, as Hinton has demonstrated, happened in city, after city.

And it's a struggle not against the police specifically, but against the entire criminal legal system where the United States incarcerates until El Salvador, Bukele, the highest, has the highest rate of incarceration of any country in the world. And in 2015, the last time I spun those numbers, almost10% of the world's prison population came from the tiny group of Black Americans, which suggests that something is structurally off about the United States. So as long as those numbers stay the same, there's going to be, as long as there's radical structural inequality, there's gonna be protest against that radical structural inequality.

And as long as there are protests, as we know from history, there's gonna be backlashes to those protests.

BECKER: When we talk about policing language and what we're seeing now and this coalescing around President Trump and the White House and a more conservative viewpoint.

I wonder, Thomas, how much of this is is human behavior in a way that's tribal, like-minded people are gathering around an ideology. And now I know that certainly Jason has mentioned that now, and you have mentioned as well that now that you have the government behind this and enforcing some of these ideas, it takes a very different tone.

But what would you say, what are some of the other differences if there are any, that are evident right now?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: That's a great question. One thing that just jumps out to me is the fact that yes, this is human nature. The urge to scapegoat, mob justice, polarization, tribalism. These are things as old as time.

But what we have to contend with now is the complete breakdown in the trust of expertise in institutional, influence and the kind of fractured, fragmented media environment we all have to navigate with people having not just different views or political inclinations, but actual different sets of facts.

We have a kind of epistemological crisis, to use more philosophical language with Professor Stanley, that I think is really exacerbating all of these problems and making, also it's allowing us to interact at scale in a way that was unprecedented in human history. So I don't really think that we're all supposed to be constantly arguing with each other and all in forms where we can weigh in on each other's linguistic choices every day, in a way that kind of heightens tension and pushes us further apart.

I think that we can't separate the political crisis we're in from the kind of technological changes that have swept the country and the globe in the past decade and a half.

BECKER: To your point here we have the example of changing even historical words, right? In the Trump administration, perhaps most notably the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America. And in February, at a White House press briefing, a reporter asked press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, whether it was retaliatory for the White House to limit the Associated Press' access to some White House events because the AP was continuing to call the Gulf of America, the Gulf of Mexico.

We have a little bit of how Leavitt responded. Let's listen.

KAROLINE LEAVITT: If we feel that there are lies being pushed by outlets in this room, we are going to hold those lies accountable. And it is a fact that the body of water off the coast of Louisiana is called the Gulf of America. And I'm not sure why news outlets don't want to call it that, but that is what it is.

The Secretary of Interior has made that the official designation in the geographical identification name server. And Apple has recognized that. Google has recognized that. Pretty much every other outlet in this room has recognized that body of water as the Gulf of America, and it's very important to this administration that we get that right, not just for people here at home, but also for the rest of the world.

BECKER: And we should note that yesterday a judge ordered the White House to allow the AP to cover the Oval Office saying that it was unlawful to block the AP because of its choice of words. But I think this is a very telling example here, not only in the choice of changing the name of something that was historically called something else, but also the mention there from Karoline Leavitt, that Apple, Google, big companies were immediately going along with this name change. Jason Stanley. What do you take from this example of what's happening with the language in the Trump White House?

STANLEY: This is a great example of what Thomas pointed out earlier, his insight that this has to do with power and domination.

This language, using the government in this way to police language serves the purpose centrally of expressing domination. And here what the White House Press Secretary is doing is expressing domination. She's saying, we decided we made this nonsensical choice. This is like far, the extreme nationalist choice.

That's silly. But the fact that we made it shows that we dominate Google, Apple. The media and we're telling the media that you better do what we say. And this is just a loyalty oath. A lot of what happens in authoritarian societies is there's a lot of silly loyalty oaths, you swear allegiance to them that the 2020 election was stolen as federal workers are being asked now, and this is another one. What she's literally saying is as Thomas intuited earlier, is media, you better step in line. And this is for us, we don't care about the issue. This is just about you expressing subservience to us.

BECKER: And Thomas, I wonder what are your thoughts about this debate, this controversy, I guess is a better word, over the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: I couldn't agree more with Jason's remarks here, it is about dominance. It's also about who gets to control how we perceive reality. And here, I think whether we like it or not, we do have to go back further and see the ways in which people on the left open the door to this kind of very cynical exploitation that the Trump administration seems bent on constantly using.

There were many people I think, who are not paying attention to politics every day who are just low information voters who are very persuaded by the argument that the left told you that there are 112 genders or whatever, and force you to say words that don't exist and that the left force you to say Latinx and all these things.

And so we're just giving them a taste of their own medicine. I can't tell you how many times people I've seen on Twitter and also in real life have brought that up as a persuasive point. So I think that this is worse. It's deeply cynical. I think I agree with Jason, that it does tend towards real authoritarianism, but I think that there are many Americans who are not nearly as offended by it as they should be, and we have to look in the mirror and understand how we got in a kind of situation where this is even plausible in the first place.

BECKER: Why such a focus on race and gender? What are your thoughts about that?

Who?

Thomas? Sorry, I was still talking to Thomas.

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: A focus from the Trump administration.

BECKER: Why are we seeing such a focus on race and gender in words that specifically deal with race and gender? Why do you think that is so important to the White House?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: Here I also really agree with what I believe Jason's point of view would be, which is that those are just very easy and salient ways to divide. And this administration and the kind of reactionary political movement that brought it, swept it back into power is benefiting from our social and political divisions.

And that's the simplest answer I can think of.

Part III

BECKER: We're talking about policing language and how the right is now policing and even changing language and in fact borrowing some of what the left had done earlier and perhaps reacting in some ways to what the left had done earlier, but I wonder, we also have social media now that's been such a big player in all of this, on both the left and the right.

What are your thoughts about how social media affects the policing of language?

STANLEY: I'm gonna begin by challenging a little bit of the premise of your question. Okay. Which is at the right is borrowing from the left. I view things globally. I'm also a professor at the Kyiv School of Economics, where I spend several weeks, every six months teaching.

And it's worth, so I see things globally and what you're seeing in the United States is just an instance of a global strategy. It's a boring authoritarian playbook. Putin justified the Ukraine War by appealing to a war against gender ideology, he said on the eve of the full-scale invasion that one of the reasons they're invading is because of the parent one, parent two, civilization destroying ideology.

So this, now in the United States, it's not just gonna be the scapegoats, as Thomas pointed out, are not just gonna be LGBTQ citizens or trans citizens particularly. The international attack focuses on gender. It focuses on women being somehow oppressed by trans women or something like that.

But in United States, of course, you're gonna add race to it. In Germany, adds Nazis and the Holocaust to it. So there's local things, but all over it's the same thing. And I just don't think that gender ideology is in any sense to be blamed for Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

And all of these leaders are just doing the same thing. So I think it's too local to look to talk about borrowing from the left. It doesn't respond to the global facts. Now as social, as far as social media goes, I think this is going back to a point, Thomas, also correct, rightly made the social media.

These arguments about language, as I pointed out from Carter G. Woodson, 1933, he's reporting on big arguments between Black Americans about what they should call themselves. So in other words, all of this is old. The Nazis were responding to Magnus Hirschfeld who was a gay, Jewish man who had an institute who was investigating gender variability.

So all of this is just really old, and we have to ask ourselves, as Thomas put it, what do you do when you add these new technologies to the kind of debates between perspectives? Should we accept certain perspectives, should be reject certain perspectives that are just part of human culture and society.

BECKER: But if I just wanna go back to something you said. Yes. This has been happening for forever really. Political leaders have done this for a very long time, so what's interesting to me here is the psychology, right? What happens when folks who may be looking for that sort of certainty and that this assertion, this confidence assertion of a truth from a political leader, and that may provide them with some reassurance, right?

But in this case, it looks like the truth keeps shifting, right? The foundation keeps shifting, right? You're completely devoted to this position one day, but it changes 180 degrees the next day, and yet that person needs to remain loyal to the personality and not necessarily the ideology. So what psychology is happening there and is that different from what we've seen throughout history?

STANLEY: I wouldn't say political leaders have done this for a long time. Using the government, as both Thomas and I have been urging, using the government rather than civil society. Civil society will always respond to these pressures in the way civil society has. But when it's mandated top down from the government, that's an authoritarian move.

And there can be left authoritarianism, there can be right authoritarianism, but it's generally an authoritarian move. So now when you switch it up, like Putin does or Trump is doing, and you just introduce nonsensical, like the Gulf of America and people have to speak one way one day, and one way another day. That's again, the theme that we've both been urging of expressing dominance. You're trying to say, okay, what the official state ideology is today, it's just whatever the leader wants.

BECKER: So it's deliberate.

STANLEY: Yeah, it's one of the questions we always, that always comes up when I'm talking to people about authoritarianism is how much is deliberate and how much is just the natural way, if you're a natural authoritarian, the way you act.

BECKER: And what do you say, you've written, I know, extensively about this, but how would you describe changes and language changes even if they're shifting, as affecting society and our history? What do you tell folks? What's the main, we only have an hour for this entire program, but what's your main point about how this has long lasting real effects on other things, besides just what we're seeing in perhaps an executive order at the moment?

STANLEY: If you think, if you wanna understand how central speech is to culture, think of Denazification in Germany. Denazificationwas the targeting of Nazi ways of speaking. So they weren't illegalized, though some words were illegalized, but they were strong social sanctions about speaking in the way that Nazis did. And Nazism introduced ways of speaking. That's why one of the great books on Nazism by Victor Klemperer is called Language of the Third Reich. And that's why Alternative für Deutschland. And so what happened post-World War II, this is the post-World War II era in Germany, is you had this strong reaction to Nazi ideology.

And the way that was implemented is by banning and social sanctions against ways of speaking. Now the reason you find Elon Musk and others focused so much on Alternative für Deutschland, JD Vance meeting with its head when he went there, is because they're pushing back on Denazification.

They want to speak the way the Nazis spoke as part of their mission to say, Germans shouldn't feel so guilty about the past. And if you can change the way Germans think about the past and note that changing the way people think about the past here goes with changing the way they talk. So the ways we talk are not separate from the perspectives we have.

And the focus on Germany is if you can reverse Germany's struggle with the past, that's like the top case. And so then you can do it everywhere.

BECKER: I wanna point out that you have been at Yale for more than a decade but in the fall, you'll be going to the University of Toronto.

Partly because of some of the things we're talking about today. Is that right?

STANLEY: Yeah. The attack on freedoms, the attack on our institutions and universities, the attack, the scooping up. Yeah. Solely because of this.

BECKER: And why is it better to be at the University of Toronto?

What is there in Canada that might be more beneficial than maybe continuing to fight at Yale?

STANLEY: I don't, I think that I'm going to want to be participating in the defense of the people being attacked in America wherever I am. But I don't hear the elite institutions, all the Democratic institutions are being attacked.

The media, the law firms, the universities, the K-12 education. They're all being attacked. And so there's a lot of work that my colleagues are doing and the administration at Yale is doing, trying to figure out how to defend the particular institutions, but in a way, I'd rather go, it also has to do with my kids and raising them outside of this kind of culture.

What happens under authoritarianism is you're always worried about whether or not you are safe. You're like, oh, they're only going after non-citizens now, phew, or they're only going after the people in the pro-Palestinian protests, phew, and having that lifted off you. Like authoritarianism does that to everybody.

So everyone is oh, phew, I'm safe. But it would be nice not to have that pressure. And also, the University of Toronto is creating a center with funding where we'll be able to bring journalists from democratically backsliding countries and civil society workers to strategize together. So that's pretty exciting for me.

BECKER: It reminds me of the quote from former President Reagan. I think he's quoted as saying, freedom is never more than a generation away from extinction. Am I quoting that correctly? I believe so. And many people say that we are watching, right, democracy go extinct. And Thomas, let's bring you back into this conversation here. Is that, it sounds dire Jason, quite honestly. And I'll get your thoughts on that in a minute, but I wanna hear from Thomas first. Is it that dire?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: I think it's a very serious moment in this country's history.

I think that we are, depending on how the next four years ago, next two years with midterm elections, we are deciding whether we're gonna remain the open society, or whether we're going to turn the page into something that's much darker and that really does restrict the kind of freedoms that we thought were our birthright here.

I think it's very serious. And I think that also at the same time, many people's lives will more or less continue undisturbed, so they may not take it as seriously as it needs to be taken or address it and respond with the urgency that the moment demands.

BECKER: Do you think it's a moment of urgency, Jason?

STANLEY: Oh my God. Yeah. Yes. And I should say that Thomas recognized this early on when we were writing against the critical race theory, anti-critical race theory laws. We both recognized, once you move to the legal aspect of firing people legally for their ideologies. But yeah, I view myself in a long tradition of intellectuals who have fled a country, declining early, on when the democracy was being eroded or eradicated by an authoritarian movement. My father, my grandmother, when my father fled Berlin, but they fled really late, but plenty of intellectuals fled in '31, '32, '33.

I'm not saying the future is determined. But I looked at the expected utilities and did a calculation, and they were high enough that this society will turn completely into something like a fascist dictatorship that I thought, may as well follow history and just in case.

BECKER: What do you say to people who aren't leaving and who are, is there hope there? How do you give them hope?

STANLEY: Oh absolutely. And I have an incredible opportunity. I'm so lucky and privileged and I think I would be safe if I stayed, because Yale has done a great job protecting its scholars, unlike other universities that I won't mention.

And so generally, Yale has been great. And I think that I have, I know I have a position of immense privilege. So I feel guilty in that sense. But I have kids and I have to take this opportunity. But what I would say is just, Thomas talked earlier about patriarchy and racism being ways to exploit people.

And we're seeing patriarchy very much being a way. But this is why it's so confused to think of patriarchy and racism as dividing oppressors and oppressed. Patriarchy targets all of us. Racism targets all of us. Du Bois and Black Reconstruction argued that race was a way to divide poor whites and poor Blacks from each other.

So they couldn't unify to fight for their material interests. And what I would say is so it's not patriarchy and racism, don't divide oppressors and oppressed because white people are the victims of racism and men are the victims of patriarchy too. So we have to hopefully see that as we go forward.

And if we can overcome those ways of dividing us, I think we can fight back effectively.

BECKER: Thomas last word to you in terms of hope in the future when language is being changed, and ideas are being changed and our perspectives really are at risk here. What is your final message to folks?

CHATTERTON WILLIAMS: I would say that we have to take seriously the truth that ideas matter, that language matters, that culture matters, that politics really matters. And resist the urge to simply soothe ourselves with our phones and with kind of our creature comforts.

And to allow ourselves to be entertained to death and amused to death, and to not take things seriously because we see that this kind of political moment is also somewhat entertaining. I think we're really, we have to fight to remain serious and to stay optimistic, finally. I think that nothing can happen if you acquiesce to the kind of cynicism that this administration and the learned helplessness, this administration hopes to impose.

We have to be serious, but we also have to be vigilant and optimistic.

wbur.org · by Claire Donnelly

18. Trump Has Found His Class Enemy

PMC = professional managerial class.

Everyone needs a scapegoat, a villain to blame.

Ouch - this is a stinging criticism that will simply be dismissed (since it is from The Atlantic)

Excerpts:

In a way, Trump is practicing his very own form of Maoism, a cultural revolution against the intelligentsia—what the Communist Party of China memorably deemed the “stinking ninth” class. Although Trump’s purges have been tame by comparison, there are parallels. Like Trump, Mao wanted to create manufacturing jobs in the homeland. Defying expert opinion and shunning economic common sense, Mao launched his Great Leap Forward—a disastrously unsuccessful policy of rapid industrialization—in the late ’50s. During that period and the subsequent Cultural Revolution, he resorted to scapegoating his own PMC, especially the professoriate and other cultural elites. (“Better red than expert” was a rallying cry.) His minions subjected its members to public humiliation and horrifying violence; the state exiled members of the urban bourgeoisie to the countryside for reeducation.

It’s a stretch to imagine such a scenario unfolding on American soil. But voices in MAGA are floating versions of these ideas. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently told Tucker Carlson that fired federal workers could supply “the labor we need for new manufacturing.” That is reeducation, Trump-style.

The lesson of the Cultural Revolution is that purging the PMC culminates in economic stagnation at best. In the aftermath of Maoism, social distrust flourished; anti-intellectualism resulted in historical amnesia and conformist thinking. Even if the United States avoids those outcomes, the global economic turmoil that has followed Trump’s tariff announcements hints at the perils of banishing and stigmatizing expertise. This is the dark reality of the Trump project—a vision far more comprehensive, and therefore far more corrosive, than an autocratic president’s mere thirst for vengeance.

Trump Has Found His Class Enemy

The president unleashes a Marxist theory of power—but against knowledge workers, not billionaires.

By Franklin Foer

The Atlantic · by Franklin Foer · April 13, 2025

Even the educated mind, or perhaps especially the educated mind, is skilled at deflecting harsh realities. That’s why so many white-shoe lawyers have failed to publicly support their colleagues in firms that President Donald Trump has targeted. It’s why universities have barely fought him in court, even as he has butchered their funding. Law partners and university presidents like to talk their way out of problems, and they apparently believe that they can ultimately evade the fate that befalls those who resist Trump. They assume that he merely craves gestures of submission—and that once obeisance has been paid, he will move on to his next target.

That, however, underestimates the social revolution that the Trump administration is trying to unleash. Its goal isn’t just to shatter a few institutions. It intends to crush the power and authority of whole professions, to severely weaken, if not purge, a social class.

The target of the administration’s campaign is a stratum of society that’s sometimes called the professional managerial class, or the PMC, although there’s not one universal moniker that MAGA applies to the group it is now crushing. That group includes society’s knowledge workers, its cognitive elite, the winners of the tournament that is the American meritocracy. It covers not only lawyers, university administrators, and professors, but also consultants, investment bankers, scientists, journalists, and other white-collar workers who have prospered in the information age. Back in the 1990s, as the group began to emerge in its current form, the liberal economics commentator Robert Reich hailed its members as “symbolic analysts”—people who identify and solve problems by thinking through ideas rather than via physical labor. A decade later, the urbanist Richard Florida put forth an even more triumphalist term: the “creative class.” That is, its members had the academic training to master the complexities of a globalized economy, the intellectual skills to conquer the digital world.

John Bolton: The only question Trump asks himself

Not so long ago, the upper-middle-class Americans who exemplify the PMC would have filled the ranks of both parties. But beginning in the 1990s, professionals began migrating in large numbers to the Democrats. Many affluent people with a cosmopolitan outlook were repelled by the GOP’s social stances and drawn to the economic moderation of politicians such as Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.

As the group made this partisan turn, the right zeroed in on the PMC as the enemy within. Conservative populists didn’t just disagree with the PMC’s political preferences; they accused an institutional elite of conniving to extend its own power. By inculcating a worldview hatched on university campuses—call it progressive or “woke”—this elite hopes to assert its dominion over the rest of society. It masquerades as the purveyor of science and objectivity, but it really is a hegemonic caste.

Animosity to the PMC is a propulsive force in Trump’s second term. Rather than merely replacing its ideological foes—by installing its own appointees in federal agencies—the administration is bent on destroying their institutional homes, and the basis for their livelihood. That’s the lesson of the Department of Government Efficiency. In short order, DOGE has engaged in mass firings—sweeping attacks on the civil service as an autonomous bastion of power. The administration has moved to uproot the diversity, equity, and inclusion bureaucracy that sprawls across corporations and nonprofits. Although the federal government cannot crush entire universities and law firms outright, Trump has attempted to undermine their business models. The administration has eliminated many of the grants that fund research at major universities—and Republicans in Congress have proposed taxing these institutions’ endowments as well. Trump has stigmatized law firms by reprimanding them in executive orders, signaling to clients and potential clients that these firms will always be at a disadvantage in dealings with the government.

In its strange inversion of American politics, the Trump administration has come far closer to executing a Marxist theory of power than any of its progressive predecessors. It has waged class warfare, not against billionaires but against a far more ubiquitous enemy. And it has done so with a certainty that justifies terrible excesses, a desire to purge that it has only just begun to realize.

When Donald Trump first entered presidential politics, his attitude toward the elite was comically inconsistent. One lobe of his brain equated Ivy League degrees with intelligence. “I went to Wharton School of Business,” he once said. “I’m like, a really smart person.” He would extol his son-in-law Jared Kushner as a Harvard man. But another lobe of his brain processed the world in the blunt dichotomies of populism: The elites were shafting the people; the globalists were lining their pockets at the expense of real Americans; there was a “swamp” and a “deep state.”

Franklin Foer: The good son

The American right’s version of populism has always been the product of a divided mind. In the 1960s, William F. Buckley Jr., a Yale graduate and the child of an oil magnate, famously quipped, “I should sooner live in a society governed by the first two thousand names in the Boston telephone directory than in a society governed by the two thousand faculty members of Harvard University.”

But the ideological roots of the Trump administration’s campaign against the PMC can be traced back decades further. In the 1930s, the political theorist James Burnham was a disciple of the exiled Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky. Burnham absorbed Trotsky’s core complaint with the Soviet Union: that it had been hijacked by a clique of bureaucrats who tended to their own interests at the expense of society, and had veered from the righteous path.

Accepting that critique of the Soviet state set Burnham on a path of apostasy. In 1940, he broke ranks with Trotsky, rejected socialism altogether, and turned rightward. But in the course of his conversion, he retained a strain of his former idol’s old analysis. Nearly everywhere he turned, he saw the danger of a domineering bureaucratic caste, even in the United States, the heart of the free-market economy.

In his 1941 book, The Managerial Revolution, Burnham argued that within the American corporation, power actually resided with managers, the experts who mastered the sprawling, technically intricate means of industrial production, not with the men who owned companies. The same dynamic held in government. It was bureaucrats, not members of Congress, who determined the path of democracy. The bureaucrats were an authoritarian cabal in the making.

The book became an unlikely hit, selling more than 100,000 copies. Burnham’s critique of the managerial elite also became a canonical text for young conservatives such as Buckley. Over time, Burnham’s idea thrived and morphed to keep pace with the zeitgeist.

Thanks to the Baby Boom, universities were exploding by the late 1960s, creating a huge new professoriate. Thanks to Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, the federal bureaucracy was expanding too, creating an army of social workers, government lawyers, and economists. Society showed the influence of what Irving Kristol described as “the new class.” To Kristol, an intellectual who had followed Burnham’s trajectory from Trotskyism to conservatism, this new class seemed nefarious because it showed little interest in making money. Instead, it craved power and exploited progressive ideas as a guise for achieving it. By Kristol’s account, the new class leveraged its control of the media, the academy, and the government to implant its self-serving ideas in the nation.

Matthew Cooper: Why the left should miss Irving Kristol

Conservatives weren’t the only ones who perceived the power of the PMC; indeed, the term professional-managerial class was popularized by the liberal intellectuals Barbara and John Ehrenreich. But arguments such as Burnham’s and Kristol’s have made a deeper impression on the modern right than on the left. As conservatives gained control over the levers of government, especially in the George W. Bush administration, an ever more overt disdain for expertise guided policy, as the White House eschewed opinions emanating from CIA analysts and mainstream economists. By 2016, Peter Thiel, the Trump booster and Silicon Valley investor, was fuming that America was now “dominated by very unelected, technocratic agencies.” During Trump’s first term, American Affairs, the most rarefied of the MAGA-adjacent outlets, ran essay after essay about the pernicious power of the professional managerial class. But the theories of new class and managerial caste didn’t truly become the guiding ideology of the state until the second Trump term.

In the battle between the warring lobes of Trump’s brain, his sense of grievance ultimately prevailed. Subjected to media criticism and legal investigations during his first term, he not only raged against his PMC adversaries but also began to fantasize about exacting retribution against them.

To the right’s own intelligentsia, two major developments that gathered force during Trump’s first presidency seemingly vindicated Burnham as a prophet who foresaw how the PMC would flex its power. One was the institutional embrace of left-wing identity politics. Corporations had spawned whole new bureaucracies devoted to DEI. Workers at Google, Nike, and The New York Times prodded the owners to shift politically in a progressive direction, ousting employees who allegedly held retrograde opinions on race and gender, propelling firms to promote minorities and invest in Black businesses. The PMC was flexing the power it had clawed away from corporate overlords.

The other development was COVID-19. At the behest of public-health authorities, societies ground to a halt. The shutdown exposed the entitlements of life in the PMC, whose members holed up in their homes, streaming movies and baking bread, as others exposed themselves to the disease in the course of packing meat and delivering groceries. The opinions issued by the likes of Anthony Fauci became the basis for a new gripe: that arrogant experts were using a once-in-a-century pandemic as a pretext for stifling reasonable policy debate and exerting their own control over the country.

Many titans of Silicon Valley, not just Thiel, were attracted to this critique, although they were arguably members of the PMC themselves, or at least had attended elite universities and frequented fancy conferences in mountain resorts. But they resented how the underlings in their own companies forced them to adopt progressive politics as corporate policy. And as engineers, who believed in the gospel of tinkering, they never considered themselves card-carrying members of the PMC establishment.

Elon Musk, for one, adopted a Burnham-like disdain for the PMC as a business plan. When he took over Twitter in 2022, he laid off 80 percent of the workforce, including the Trust and Safety Council and a chunk of the company’s content moderators. As the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Antonio García Martínez put it, Musk was taking a stand against “the professional-managerial class regime that otherwise elsewhere dominates.” Not only did he treat this caste with disdain; he implied that it was doomed to the dustbin of history, because its members’ functions could be so easily subsumed by artificial intelligence. A shared hatred of the PMC drew Musk to Trump, and the Twitter purge foreshadowed Musk’s approach in government.

Rumman Chowdhury: I watched Elon Musk kill Twitter’s culture from the inside

Even before Musk attached himself and his fortune to Trump, MAGA types were making bold plans for the wholesale eradication of the PMC from American institutions during a second Trump term. Contempt for the “unaccountable bureaucratic managerial class” was a dominant theme of Project 2025, the playbook produced by the Heritage Foundation.

The attack on the PMC has proceeded with astonishing velocity. Thousands of federal employees have been fired since Trump’s inauguration, and many others have fled oppressive workplaces of their own accord. Once-thriving institutions—the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, Voice of America, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, to name a few—have been either eliminated or reduced to ineffectual nubs of their former selves. Hatred for the PMC burns so intensely that it becomes the justification for sacrificing research into cures for cancer and ignoring accumulated expertise about the workings of the economy.

In a way, Trump is practicing his very own form of Maoism, a cultural revolution against the intelligentsia—what the Communist Party of China memorably deemed the “stinking ninth” class. Although Trump’s purges have been tame by comparison, there are parallels. Like Trump, Mao wanted to create manufacturing jobs in the homeland. Defying expert opinion and shunning economic common sense, Mao launched his Great Leap Forward—a disastrously unsuccessful policy of rapid industrialization—in the late ’50s. During that period and the subsequent Cultural Revolution, he resorted to scapegoating his own PMC, especially the professoriate and other cultural elites. (“Better red than expert” was a rallying cry.) His minions subjected its members to public humiliation and horrifying violence; the state exiled members of the urban bourgeoisie to the countryside for reeducation.

It’s a stretch to imagine such a scenario unfolding on American soil. But voices in MAGA are floating versions of these ideas. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently told Tucker Carlson that fired federal workers could supply “the labor we need for new manufacturing.” That is reeducation, Trump-style.

The lesson of the Cultural Revolution is that purging the PMC culminates in economic stagnation at best. In the aftermath of Maoism, social distrust flourished; anti-intellectualism resulted in historical amnesia and conformist thinking. Even if the United States avoids those outcomes, the global economic turmoil that has followed Trump’s tariff announcements hints at the perils of banishing and stigmatizing expertise. This is the dark reality of the Trump project—a vision far more comprehensive, and therefore far more corrosive, than an autocratic president’s mere thirst for vengeance.

The Atlantic · by Franklin Foer · April 13, 2025

19. Trump goes with his gut and the world goes along for the ride

The question is: Does President Trump possess Clausewitz' coup d'oiel? e.g., The inward looking eye of genius that results from education and experience and allows him to exercise sound judgment in the face of imperfect information and the fog and friction of domestic and foreign affairs (and for Clausewitz, ultimately, war).

I have heard arguments for yes and no. But based on Bill Maher's interview, he describes a side of him that none of us can see since we do not know him or have worked with him.

Time will tell.

Trump goes with his gut and the world goes along for the ride

By CHRIS MEGERIAN

Updated 8:34 AM EDT, April 13, 2025

AP · April 13, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — After President Donald Trump reversed course on his tariffs and announced he would pursue trade negotiations, he had a simple explanation for how he would make decisions in the coming weeks.

“Instinctively, more than anything else,” he told reporters this past week. “You almost can’t take a pencil to paper, it’s really more of an instinct than anything else.”

It was the latest example of how Trump loves to keep everyone on edge for his next move. Trump has not only expansively flexed the powers of the presidency by declaring emergencies and shredding political norms, he has eschewed traditional deliberative procedures for making decisions. The result is that more of life around the country and the world is subject to the president’s desires, moods and grievances than ever before.

“We have a democratic leader who seems to have the authority to act as whimsically as a 19th century European autocrat,” said Tim Naftali, a historian and senior research scholar at Columbia University. “He sneezes and everyone catches a cold.”

The White House rejects criticism that Trump is overstepping his authority or improperly consolidating power. Administration officials frequently emphasize that the Republican president won a clear election victory and is now pursuing the agenda that he campaigned on. In this view, resisting his will, such as when courts block his executive orders, is the real threat to democracy.

“Trust in President Trump,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Friday while answering questions about economic policy. “He knows what he’s doing.”

The presidency has been accumulating power for years, long before Trump ran for office, and it is not unusual for administrations to veer in various directions based on political and policy priorities. But Trump’s new term has been different in the early months, and he seems to recognize it.

“The second term is just more powerful,” Trump marveled recently. “When I say ‘do it,’ they do it.”

Although international trade offers the most extensive example of Trump’s inclination to act unilaterally since he returned to office in January the same approach has been evident elsewhere.

He installed himself as chair of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts to overhaul programming at Washington’s premier cultural institution. He issued an order to purge “improper ideology” from the Smithsonian Institution’s network of museums. He punished law firms associated with his opponents. He directed the Justice Department to investigate former officials who crossed him during his first term.

When Trump decided to remove regulations on household water efficiency — he wants more water flowing in showers — his executive order said the normal public comment period “is unnecessary because I am ordering the repeal.”

“What the president ends up having is what he wants, which is everyone’s attention all of the time,” Naftali said.

Trump’s ambitions stretch beyond the United States, such as his goal of annexing Greenland. Vice President JD Vance visited the island last month to talk about its strategic location in the Arctic, where Russia and China want to expand their influence, but also its importance to Trump himself.

“We can’t just ignore the president’s desires,” Vance said.

Trump has spent decades trying to turn his impulses into reality, whether it’s skyscrapers in Manhattan or casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. He once sued a journalist for allegedly underestimating his net worth. During a deposition, Trump said “it goes up and down with the markets and with attitudes and with feelings, even my own feelings.”

A lawyer for the journalist appeared puzzled. “You said your net worth goes up and down based upon your own feelings?”

Trump said yes. “I would say it’s my general attitude at the time that the question may be asked.”

He took a similar approach into the White House for his first term. While talking about the economy with The Washington Post, Trump said “my gut tells me more sometimes than anybody else’s brain can ever tell me.”

Leon Panetta, who was White House chief of staff under Democratic President Bill Clinton and later served in national security roles for Democratic President Barack Obama, said there normally is a more deliberative process for critical issues.

“If you throw all of that out of the window and operate based on gut instincts, what you’re doing is making every decision a huge gamble,” Panetta said. “Because you just haven’t done the homework to really understand all of the implications.”

“When you roll dice,” he added, “sometimes it’s going to come up snake eyes.”

Because Trump does not have a clear process for making decisions, Panetta said “that means everybody has to kowtow to him because that’s the only way you’re going to have any impact.”

Trump has seemed to enjoy that aspect of the ongoing controversy over tariffs. During a Republican dinner this past week, he said foreign leaders were “kissing my ass” to talk him out of his trade agenda.

The saga began on April 2 when Trump declared that trade deficits — when the U.S. buys more products from some countries than it sells — represented a national emergency, enabling him to enact tariffs without congressional approval.

The stock market collapsed and then the bond market began to slide. On Wednesday, Trump backed off his plans.

Although high taxes have been left in place on imports from China, many of the other targeted tariffs have been paused for 90 days to allow time for negotiations with individual countries.

“Americans should trust in that process,” said Leavitt, the press secretary.

Scott Lincicome, vice president of general economics at the conservative Cato Institute, expressed concern that the course of international trade was becoming dependent on the “whims of a single dude in the Oval Office.”

Lincicome said the White House timeline to reach trade deals was “not credible” given the complexity of the issues. A more likely scenario, he said, is that the resulting agreements will be nothing more than “superficial nothingburgers” and Trump will ”declare a great victory and all this stuff settles down.”

Peter Navarro, Trump’s trade adviser, said in an interview with Fox Business Network that there’s “a whole portion of our White House working day and night” on negotiations.

“We’re going to run 90 deals in 90 days,” he said. “It’s possible.”

AP · April 13, 2025

20. China Doesn’t Fear Tariffs. It Fears a Credible US Industrial Strategy.

But to the question on reshoring - can we reshore those industries anytime soon? Sooner than a generation or two? And by bringing them back will we torch the economy so that even if we had them all onshore we could not afford the defense bill to keep them functioning? What I do not see in any of the arguments from the Administration or its opposition is a clear articulation of the time requirements to do all these things and what happens between now and when reshoring is accomplished?

China Doesn’t Fear Tariffs. It Fears a Credible US Industrial Strategy.

Tariffs alone cannot undo decades of offshoring. Without a complementary labor strategy and industrial policy in the United States, China’s manufacturing advantage will remain intact.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/china-doesnt-fear-tariffs-it-fears-a-credible-us-industrial-strategy/

By Li Qiang

April 12, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos

On April 2, U.S. President Donald Trump rolled out a bold new tariff package aimed at jumpstarting U.S. manufacturing. It sparked headlines across the world, but two challenges remain unresolved: a severe skilled manufacturing labor shortage and a fragile, incomplete supply chain.

The United States does not lack jobs; it lacks stable and accessible quality employment. A 2024 report from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted that Wisconsin had only 54 available workers for every 100 job openings, with Pennsylvania and other Midwestern states facing similar shortages.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of January 2025, there were approximately 513,000 unfilled positions in the manufacturing sector – further highlighting the ongoing labor shortage and making it difficult for companies to sustain large-scale production in the United States.

Companies in the U.S. also struggle to live up to their labor promises. Foxconn’s failed pledge to create 13,000 jobs in Wisconsin – ending with fewer than 1,000 by 2023 – stands as a cautionary tale of what happens when policy fails to align with labor and supply realities. Similarly, after struggling to staff its Nevada Gigafactory, Tesla shifted focus to Shanghai – where its facility now produces over half of the company’s global deliveries. In 2024 alone, the Shanghai plant delivered 916,660 vehicles, as reported by Bloomberg.

Consider Foxconn’s iPhone plant in China. Even after extensive use of robotics, it still employs up to 200,000 workers at $2.50 an hour, working long shifts in dormitory-style housing. This model may work in places like Vietnam or Bangladesh, but in the U.S., such conditions are unacceptable to American workers. And that’s just one facility – Apple’s entire supply chain requires more than 1 million such production workers. Can these labor requirements be fulfilled in the United States? Apple’s CEO Tim Cook does not think so.

Since 2000, the U.S. has lost 4.4 million manufacturing jobs – a 25.8 percent decline. Of the remaining 12.76 million manufacturing workers today, 3.2 million are foreign-born, underscoring the industry’s long-standing reliance on immigrant labor. The deindustrialization of the United States over recent decades lies at the heart of its labor conundrum, which has led to the loss of manufacturing supply chains and a labor market lacking experienced manufacturing workers. Meanwhile, in Shenzhen, an entire laptop can be assembled, tested, and packaged in a single day – thanks to dense industrial clusters, coordinated logistics, and decades of supply chain integration. This level of efficiency is virtually impossible without a fully localized and responsive supplier network, alongside a dynamic and robust labor force.

These examples show that tariffs alone cannot bring manufacturing back to the U.S. Without addressing structural manufacturing labor shortages and rebuilding foundational supply chain capabilities, even the most ambitious investment plans will struggle to revive the country’s manufacturing sector.

If the U.S. is serious about rebuilding domestic manufacturing, it must restore each link of the supply chain and ensure its labor market can fulfill its manufacturing needs. Washington needs a practical strategy – one grounded in the labor realities the country faces. Taiwan and Malaysia use millions of non-resident workers to power $432 billion in combined exports, without demonstrably negatively affecting local job markets.

The U.S. must fix its labor crutch if it wants to revive manufacturing. It could consider piloting industrial zones – either in manufacturing-heavy states or near the southern border – managed jointly by federal or state governments and industry partners. These zones would integrate multiple segments of the supply chain within strategically designed areas. The president could also introduce a Special Industry Visa Pilot Program to allow temporary non-resident workers to fill designated roles within approved zones. These visas would be time-bound and tied to specific employers and projects, with oversight to ensure labor compliance and transparency. Upon completion of their contracts, workers would return to their countries of origin.

If the idea of establishing domestic industrial zones proves politically contentious, the United States could instead revisit the maquiladora concept – setting up American-administered industrial zones in Mexico, complemented with duty-free reimportation and enforceable labor standards. These zones would offer American workers more employment choices and allow them to focus on higher-value roles such as supervision, quality control, and training. More importantly, they could offer structured and lawful employment alternatives – transforming today’s labor challenges into long-term economic growth, as demonstrated by successful models in other countries.

To ensure workers’ rights are protected, labor standards in these zones should be developed and monitored by a coalition of employers, labor groups, and civil society organizations. Many products Americans use daily are still made under conditions unacceptable at home – yet overseas factories often keep these problems invisible. While many multinational companies have codes of conduct for their suppliers, an overall lack of enforcement remains a serious problem. Bringing some of this production back under a transparent, U.S.-based system – even with its own challenges – would offer greater visibility, accountability, and protection for workers. It would also mark a meaningful step toward restoring Washington’s ability to lead by example in setting global labor standards. In addition, placing more of U.S. supply chains on U.S. soil would not only help revive local economies, but also strengthen national resilience in an increasingly uncertain world.

As the trade war escalates and global markets plunging – with tariffs on China increasing to 145 percent, China’s introduction of retaliatory 125 percent tariffs, and the EU adopting tariffs on $23.2 billion of U.S. goods – a reindustrialization strategy is no longer optional but essential. It would help restore domestic supply chains, strengthen labor protections, and give the U.S. a structural edge in the manufacturing race against China. Tariffs alone cannot undo decades of offshoring. Without a complementary labor strategy and industrial policy, the goals of “America First” will remain out of reach. Tariffs may create pressure on companies, but they cannot rebuild a weakened manufacturing base on their own.

While the idea of establishing industrial zones may generate political debate, it represents a more practical and achievable path – especially when compared to some of the more confrontational policies Trump has already pursued in areas such as trade, foreign aid, and immigration. If successful, it would address the twin challenges of industrial revitalization and equitable employment and may achieve the administration’s aim of bringing manufacturing back to the U.S.

For the American working class, bringing back factory jobs requires more than tariffs – it requires a system that works for both employers and workers.

Authors

Guest Author

Li Qiang

Li Qiang is the founder and Executive Director of China Labor Watch and a human rights advocate with over 30 years of experience investigating global supply chains.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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Trump Has Found His Class Enemy

Trump goes with his gut and the world goes along for the ride

China Doesn’t Fear Tariffs. It Fears a Credible US Industrial Strategy.