Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"To think is easy. To act is difficult. To act as one thinks is the most difficult."

– Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe

“Satirists, be careful. In the 1931 film by Rene Clair “Vive la Liberte” a song says, “Work is freedom.” In 1940 the sign on the gates to Auschwitz said: “Arbeit macht frei.”

– Stanisław Jerzy Lec

"A man can be destroyed but not defeated. Always do sober what you said you’d do drunk. That will teach you to keep your mouth shut."

– Ernest Hemmingway

1. Scoop: Biden told Bibi U.S. won't support an Israeli counterattack on Iran

2. The US is basically facing World War III — but Biden & Co. aren’t acting like it

3. Opinion: View From the Ivory Tower

4. Trump Has a Plan for Ukraine: It’s Biden’s

5. Live updates: U.S. helps Israel thwart Iranian attack of 300 drones and missiles

6. America’s Chip Renaissance Needs Workers

7. The Only Way for Israel to Truly Defeat Hamas

8. Why Israel is losing the war of global public opinion over its tactics in Gaza

9. America’s Foreign Policy Utopians Ignore Culture

10. How to Prevent an American Decline

11. Opinion | Now it’s up to Israel: De-escalate or retaliate against Iran?

12. Drones are crowding Ukraine’s skies, largely paralyzing battlefield

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

14. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 13, 2024

15. Strike Complexes and the Operational Art

16. Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries shows the growing threat AI drones pose to energy markets

17. U.S. Military Isn't That Concerned About War With Iran

18. How Will Israel Respond to the Iranian Attack?

19. Iran's attack on Israel raises fears of a wider war, but all sides have also scored gains

20. The New Civil War Movie Is Eerily Right About How the Country Could Split Apart

1. Scoop: Biden told Bibi U.S. won't support an Israeli counterattack on Iran

The right of self defense is never denied. Responding to an attack to prevent further attack is part of self defense. I believe that POTUS' statement undermines the defense of Israel but also undermines the credibility of the US and I fear that the "gospel of de-escalation" is what is going to lead to conflict.

Scoop: Biden told Bibi U.S. won't support an Israeli counterattack on Iran

https://www.axios.com/2024/04/14/biden-netanyahu-iran-israel-us-wont-support

Barak Ravid

U.S. President Joe Biden walks on the South Lawn of the White House on Saturday, Apr. 13, 2024. Photo: Shawn Thew/EPA/Bloomberg via Getty Images

President Biden told Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a call on Saturday that the U.S. won't support any Israeli counterattack against Iran, a senior White House official told Axios.

Why it matters: Biden and his senior advisers are highly concerned an Israeli response to Iran's attack on Israel would lead to a regional war with catastrophic consequences, U.S. officials said.

Iran launched attack drones and missiles against Israel on Saturday night local time in retaliation for an airstrike in Syria that killed a top Iranian general.
"More than 200 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles were fired from Iran," IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said. Most of the threats were intercepted outside of Israeli airspace, he said.
A U.S. defense official earlier said U.S. forces in the region shot down Iranian-launched drones targeting Israel.

Behind the scenes: Biden told Netanyahu the joint defensive efforts by Israel, the U.S. and other countries in the region led to the failure of the Iranian attack, according to the White House official.

"You got a win. Take the win," Biden told Netanyahu, according to the official.
The official said that when Biden told Netanyahu that the U.S. will not participate in any offensive operations against Iran and will not support such operations, Netanyahu said he understood.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke on Saturday with his Israeli counterpart Yoav Gallant and asked that Israel notify the U.S. ahead of any response against Iran, a senior Israeli official said.

What they're saying: Biden said in a statement after the call that the U.S. military moved aircraft and ballistic missile defense destroyers to the region over the course of the past week, which helped Israel take down nearly all of the incoming drones and missiles from Iran, Yemen, Syria and Iraq.

"I told Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to defend against and defeat even unprecedented attacks — sending a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel," Biden said.

What to watch: Biden said he is going to hold a call on Sunday with the G7 leaders to coordinate a united diplomatic response to Iran's attack.

"My team will engage with their counterparts across the region. And we will stay in close touch with Israel's leaders. And while we have not seen attacks on our forces or facilities today, we will remain vigilant to all threats and will not hesitate to take all necessary action to protect our people," Biden said.

Editor's note: This story has been updated to clarify that Biden told Netanyahu he won't support an Israeli counterattack against Iran. It has also been corrected to reflect that Lloyd Austin is U.S. Secretary of Defense, not Secretary of State.

2. The US is basically facing World War III — but Biden & Co. aren’t acting like it

This is from the NY Post. The same two authors have a similar OpEd in the Kyiv Post on the same date.

Can be interpreted as a hit job but this caught my eye:

Yet Biden’s overall national intelligence strategy fails to realize that all of the dots it maps are connected — and, allegorically speaking, clearly form the maps of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.

The US is basically facing World War III — but Biden & Co. aren’t acting like it

By Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth

Published April 12, 2024, 5:27 p.m. ET

New York Post · April 12, 2024

Gen. Omar Bradley is often credited with the saying, “Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.” The Biden administration does neither.

In September 2022, we argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “Arsenals of Evil” — North Korea and Iran — couldn’t help the Kremlin retrieve its faltering position in Ukraine.

We were wrong.

We didn’t factor in Washington throwing in the towel after Putin’s “special military operation” was on the ropes.

President Biden left the US badly exposed to Russia and China, a process that began when he prematurely withdrew troops from Afghanistan, Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth write. REUTERS

The two rogue states, each as anti-American as it gets, are providing Putin with drones, artillery and cruise missiles to defeat the United States and our NATO allies in Ukraine, all while pursuing their nuclear weapons programs unabated.

To underscore the extent to which America has fallen behind, Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, head of US Central Command, testified before Congress that “the Russians are firing five times as many artillery shells as the Ukrainians.”

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Kurilla warned that Putin’s advantage in artillery shells would increase to 10 to 1 “in a matter of weeks.”

Russia is outproducing the US and NATO — churning out 250,000 artillery munitions per month, while NATO’s artillery coalition, led by France and the Czech Republic, is forced to scrounge on the open market to secure a one-time purchase of 800,000 rounds.

According to a senior European intelligence official, the US and Europe, collectively, can produce just 100,000 munitions each month.

And they’re not even doing that.

The arsenals of democracy are failing.

Franklin Roosevelt is likely turning in his grave at Hyde Park, especially given that it’s Joe Biden, a fellow Democrat, now occupying the White House.

Opinion: View From the Ivory Tower

kyivpost.com · by Jonathan Sweet, Mark Toth · April 12, 2024

Biden has sacrificed his leadership role in world affairs. Fearing Russia’s threats and a possible election loss, Ukraine’s victory – if not survival – has been sacrificed.

By Jonathan Sweet

By Mark Toth

April 12, 2024, 6:55 pm |

US President Joe Biden speaking at Georgetown Law in 2016.

Evidently, President Joe Biden and his national security team do not fully subscribe to a widely accepted national security premise presented by Richard Hass in his 1997 book The Reluctant Sheriff.

Hass argued that “Americans need to resist the lure of isolationism and maintain spending on defense, intelligence, foreign aid, and diplomacy at current levels.” He warned “anything less risked squandering the spoils of winning the Cold War – and setting the stage for a new era of dangerous global competition.”

Biden is undermining Hass’ maxim by choosing the path of least resistance to avoid direct confrontation with Russia.

The President, to his credit, has organized the NATO “posse” to come to Ukraine’s aid in Hass-like fashion. However, the Biden administration continues to refuse to fully empower Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and his generals to put an end to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s gang rampage of the Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula.

Evidently, from his White House Ivory Tower, Biden cannot grasp the suffering of the Ukrainian people as civilian population centers are terrorized throughout the country by Russian missiles and drone strikes. Nor, just how precarious it is becoming on the frontlines in Avdiivka and Bakhmut as the artillery munition shortage deepens, giving Moscow a 5:1 advantage.

According to Gen. Chris Cavoli, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander and the head of US European Command, that advantage is expected to grow to 10:1 in the coming weeks.

Artillery is no longer the only munition in short supply though, air defense systems are coming up short and Russian missiles and drones are getting through at an alarming and deadly rate.

In failing to put an end to Putin, a callous modern-day Billy the Kid, Biden is proving Hass correct on a broader global scale. Putin’s co-gangs are aligning and wreaking havoc unafraid of a reluctant sheriff in the form of Biden.

High noon is here.

Not only has an emboldened Russia invaded Ukraine. Hamas brutally attacked Israel, killing over 1,200 civilians. And China is poised to invade Taiwan and North Korea threatens South Korea and Japan.

All are aggressively taking advantage of the permissive environment Biden first began creating by prematurely and haphazardly withdrawing from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. Essentially, in Hass parlance, the sheriff got out of Dodge recklessly leaving it and the world stage to the outlaws in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang.

Biden is compounding this by withholding critical weapon systems and munitions needed in Ukraine. He is slow-rolling their deployment to the battlefields and is setting conditions on their use. The US even secretly modified their HIMARS so Ukraine could not use them to fire long-range missiles into Russia.

Now, in playing November politics with an eye on Michigan, Biden is irresponsibly attacking members of his own posse. He has publicly undermined President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to target Russian oil refineries – legitimate military targets. And he has harshly criticized how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is conducting combat operations against Hamas.

Biden, instead of “assuming the role of global sheriff, forging coalitions or posses of states and others for specific tasks,” as Hass puts it, has abandoned his role as sheriff and taken a spot on the bench all the while criticizing and second-guessing allies who are under fire.

The President has even had the audacity to complain as European nations step up to assume the leadership mantle he vacated. Biden’s posses have taken notice, as evidenced by NATO members seeking a new European sheriff suggesting the US step aside from leading the Ramstein Group.

Biden appears more intent on casting blame than taking on the task of Commander in Chief.

Evidently, securing votes in November has become his priority calculus – not decisively winning wars. Defeating Putin or deterring Chinese President Xi Jinping, both trying to impose their authoritarian vision of a multipolar world, is secondary. Biden’s blind spot from his Oval Office perch is obscuring his understanding of just how dangerously the world is devolving into war.

Washington, and Biden as its reluctant sheriff, need to wake up. Our nation’s enemies are at the gates of the city, and our country’s national security is badly exposed and vulnerable – as are that of our allies, especially Ukraine.

As the saying goes, “if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem.” Washington has not been part of the solution since November 2023 and does not appear to be heading down that path. Ukraine is running out of time – Russian mass beats empty artillery tubes every time.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

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Jonathan Sweet

Army Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet (@JESweet2022) served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14.

Mark Toth

Mark Toth (@MCTothSTL) writes on national security and foreign policy. Previously an economist and entrepreneur, he has worked in banking, insurance, publishing and global commerce. A former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, he has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world.

kyivpost.com · by Jonathan Sweet, Mark Toth · April 12, 2024

4. Trump Has a Plan for Ukraine: It’s Biden’s

Again, "if I could turn back time."

Excerpts:

This column thought Mr. Biden should be more enterprising in the early days, when Mr. Putin was flummoxed by failure, before sunk costs and thousands of deaths had to be justified. But Biden policy has been suspiciously unnimble, with perhaps the main instruction to national security adviser Jake Sullivan being: Keep the war of low salience to the American voter.

A frozen, Korea-style outcome may have been the lightly spoken Biden aim all along. Now comes a Washington Post report detailing a “secret” Donald Trump plan that strikes fundamentally the same note.

Trump Has a Plan for Ukraine: It’s Biden’s

Whoever wins, Europe might get ready for a period of lackluster American leadership.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-has-a-plan-for-ukraine-its-bidens-putin-nato-russia-war-1dafe8a7?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.

April 12, 2024 4:40 pm ET

Joe Biden and Donald Trump. PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS

Like a slim majority of Americans and strong majority of pundits, I disagree with the House GOP rump seeking to stop aid to Ukraine. But America has a two-party, adversarial political system. It isn’t a polity of enforced unanimity. Nothing is ever unopposed (48 House Democrats voted against the creation of Medicare).

We have one president at a time and Joe Biden has been pro-Ukraine only in comparison to the GOP renegades. He has consistently withheld requested weapons, fearing escalation as if Vladimir Putin might commit global suicide because a war outside his borders is going badly (did the U.S resort to nukes in Iraq?).

This column thought Mr. Biden should be more enterprising in the early days, when Mr. Putin was flummoxed by failure, before sunk costs and thousands of deaths had to be justified. But Biden policy has been suspiciously unnimble, with perhaps the main instruction to national security adviser Jake Sullivan being: Keep the war of low salience to the American voter.

A frozen, Korea-style outcome may have been the lightly spoken Biden aim all along. Now comes a Washington Post report detailing a “secret” Donald Trump plan that strikes fundamentally the same note.

Last time I wrote about this subject a reader taxed me with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who claimed Mr. Trump in private vowed to cut off Ukraine. My response: “Orbán speaks for Orbán. He was speaking to a Hungarian audience. I wasn’t there to question him about exactly what Trump said or what he thought he heard Trump say but if Trump wanted to say something intelligible on Ukraine, he would.”

Not surprisingly, the Post now tells us Mr. Orbán’s claim was categorically “false.”

Mr. Trump, his critics are correct, has no fixed star. He wants outcomes that glorify Mr. Trump. These same critics, incapable of consistency whenever a cheap talking point beckons, actually credit him with one fixed and consistent position: pro-Putin and anti-Ukraine. When you hear this, you’re hearing hackery. It’s a complete misunderstanding of who Mr. Trump is and how he operates.

Nor does it help.

The great navigational shoal in this war isn’t Russia’s interest, it’s Ukraine’s. The Zelensky government has been unwilling to explain to its public that even if Russian forces could somehow be expelled it would be a temporary outcome.

Ukraine is a weak polity—it won’t level with its people about the real price of victory, a long cold war until Russia changes, yet neither will it draft its young into the fight.

Mr. Putin’s is a weak polity—squandering its troops rather than husbanding them for a decisive offensive, refusing to impinge on its urban elite with conscription. The Kremlin’s budgeting indicates its effort must peak this year.

The collective West is proving weak too. Gifted with an undeserved strategic opportunity, armed with 20 times Russia’s GDP, NATO could stop the war tomorrow by writing a sizable but affordable check to deny Mr. Putin hope of further advances.

In this situation, Mr. Trump, it’s a slight oversimplification to say, is high-risk and high-reward and Mr. Biden is low-risk and low-reward. In fact, it’s hard to see much good happening either way. With Mr. Trump, there’s a slight chance of some out-of-left-field deal, but your main expectation should be very similar whoever’s elected: half-baked drift unless and until the Russians mount a competent threat to capture Kyiv, then a panicked, unpredictable response.

U.S. management of recent wars shouldn’t fill voters with confidence. Neither should its management of the Trump phenomenon. The collapse of elite credit with a large part of our electorate, those now supporting the GOP isolationist wing, is directly traceable to the lame Russia hoaxes that were the elite answer to the Trump electorate’s message of dissatisfaction.

In his most important job, healing this breach, Mr. Biden quickly went AWOL, then added insult to injury by specifying electric-vehicle handouts and student-loan forgiveness as his alternative agenda. Against all evidence, he now decides America wants him for a second term, missing the opportunity history sometimes gives a one-term president to advance difficult, unpopular, necessary decisions that a hostile world requires, even if the electorate hasn’t caught up with realities yet.

The failing spirit turns to a deus ex machina in such circumstances. How bad could Kamala Harris be? Three of the last four vice presidents who acceded unexpectedly to the presidency (TR, Coolidge, Truman) worked out fine. LBJ was the exception, using his fortuitous elevation to launch agendas that mostly played out poorly for America.

Failing some wild card, I would advise Ukraine’s European friends to be ready for an extended period in which the U.S. is unable to provide leadership amid the rising dangers of the world.

Live updates: U.S. helps Israel thwart Iranian attack of 300 drones and missiles

The Washington Post · April 14, 2024

Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles toward Israel in its first full-scale military assault against the country. U.S. military forces in the region helped Israel intercept the strikes, President Biden said, adding that he would convene the Group of Seven leaders Sunday for a “united diplomatic response.”

Here's what to know:

More than 99 percent of the missiles and drones were intercepted, Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said. A few fell inside Israeli territory, causing minor damage to a military base and seriously injuring a 10-year-old girl, he added.

Iran’s attack was in retaliation for a deadly Israeli strike earlier this month on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria. That attack killed seven members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including two senior commanders.

Biden condemned the attacks and spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the phone, reaffirming the United States’ “ironclad commitment” to Israel’s security, the White House said.

Iran’s mission to the United Nations warned the United States to stay away from the conflict between Iran and Israel. On social media, the mission also indicated that the strikes could be the end of its retaliation, but said that “should the Israeli regime make another mistake, Iran’s response will be considerably more severe.”

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End of carousel

Here's what to know

End of carousel

The Washington Post · April 14, 2024

6. America’s Chip Renaissance Needs Workers

This is a major strategic weakness of the US in the 21st century - our lack of skilled high tech laborers.

When the Koreans asked for work visas for Koreans to come to train US workers at these factories, the Biden administration's response is that US workers can go to community college to get the training. What community colleges are providing the technical education for high tech skilled laborers?

But I hope the program at Purdue is effective and spreads to other educational institutions.

Excerpts:

The theory behind CHIPS is that, by matching Asia’s subsidies, the U.S. can again be competitive in chip making. Nonetheless, there is a chicken-egg problem. Fabs need a ready supply of skilled workers. But without fabs, America’s best and brightest have little incentive to pursue careers in the sector.

That may be changing. Mark Cramer, a junior in chemical engineering at Purdue, knew almost nothing about the industry, even though his father worked in a fab for Texas Instruments many decades ago. Then last year he participated in a Purdue summer program providing hands-on exposure.

He wore a white “bunny suit” in a fab clean room where sophisticated tools etch countless transistors on silicon wafers. “Every week my interest grew. Every company talked about how…we have to create more semiconductor engineers to keep up with the growing advancements in technology. I wanted to be part of the innovators.” This summer, he will intern at an Intel fab in Hillsboro, Ore.

Purdue under past president Mitch Daniels (a former Indiana governor) promoted itself as a partner to industry, offering land and research collaboration to companies such as Saab and Rolls-Royce. Around the time SK Hynix came calling a few years ago, Purdue was launching several specialized semiconductor graduate, undergraduate and certificate programs. Meanwhile, Congress passed the CHIPS, program which requires grant recipients to show workforce-development plans.

America’s Chip Renaissance Needs Workers

As SK Hynix builds a huge new semiconductor complex in Indiana, it’s working with Purdue University to staff it

https://www.wsj.com/tech/americas-chip-renaissance-needs-workers-204cbf81?mod=hp_major_pos1#cxrecs_s

By Greg Ip

April 11, 2024 5:30 am ET

A high-bandwidth memory chip made by SK Hynix. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WEST LAFAYETTE, Ind.—Last week South Korea’s

SK Hynix announced it would partner with Purdue University on a $3.9 billion semiconductor complex here, the largest single corporate investment in state history.Now comes the hard part. SK Hynix must not only build the fabrication plant, or fab, which will package high-bandwidth memory chips used in artificial intelligence, and a connected research-and-development center. It also has to staff them.

“We need several hundred engineers to operate our advanced-packaging manufacturing fab—in physics, chemistry, material science, electronics engineering,” Kwak Noh-Jung, chief executive of SK Hynix, said in an interview following last week’s announcement.

Staffing a fab is harder in the U.S. than in South Korea, where SK Hynix has contracts with local universities and its own in-house university. Nonetheless, Kwak said, “the final goal is very clear. We need to have very good engineers for our success in U.S.”

The U.S. is trying to do something unprecedented: reverse a shrinking share in a key manufacturing sector. Between 1990 and 2020, the U.S. share of world chip making shrank to 12% from 37%, while the combined share of Taiwan, South Korea and China grew to 58%.

The federal CHIPS program has showered billions of dollars on

Intel for fabs in several states, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.in Arizona and GlobalFoundries in New York and Vermont. SK Hynix hopes for support as well.Subsidies alone won’t guarantee a sustainable industry. Fabs need customers, a supply chain and, above all, a skilled, specialized workforce.

From 2000 to 2017, U.S. employment in semiconductor manufacturing shrank to 181,000 from 287,000. It has since recovered to about 200,000.

Why did the U.S. share of semiconductor production shrink? As in other industries, the U.S. became an expensive place to manufacture.

Susan Houseman of the Upjohn Institute, who has studied outsourcing, said this wasn’t “primarily a story about offshoring.” U.S. companies still lead in chip design:

Nvidia in artificial intelligence, Qualcomm in communications and Apple in smartphones. Over time they mostly contracted out fabrication of their chips to foundries such as TSMC who benefited from generous domestic subsidies.The theory behind CHIPS is that, by matching Asia’s subsidies, the U.S. can again be competitive in chip making. Nonetheless, there is a chicken-egg problem. Fabs need a ready supply of skilled workers. But without fabs, America’s best and brightest have little incentive to pursue careers in the sector.

March Inflation Comes in Hotter Than Expected

The Only Way for Israel to Truly Defeat Hamas

Why the Zionist Dream Depends on a Two-State Solution

By Ami Ayalon

April 11, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Friendly Fire: How Israel Became Its Own Worst Enemy and Its Hope for the Future · April 11, 2024

The war Israel launched on Hamas after the group’s horrific October 7 attacks is a righteous mission. Hamas fighters massacred hundreds of innocent people, deliberately killed children and the elderly, and raped and mutilated women. They abducted hundreds of civilians—including women, infants, and octogenarians—and held them captive in dismal conditions, subject to abuse and starvation. Their actions contravened any sense of law and humanitarian principles. The slaughterers, still spattered with blood, made gleeful boasts about their atrocities that were broadcast horrific videos and quoted in news articles. In response, Israel has waged a just war of self-defense.

But Israelis are not the only ones suffering. Tens of thousands of people have been killed in Gaza, many of them civilians, including thousands of women and children. The war is especially cruel because the fighting is taking place in congested population centers and because the enemy has turned schools, mosques, and hospitals—places where civilians seek shelter—into military command centers, communications hubs, and weapons factories and caches. Hamas, which governs Gaza, has turned the people it is obligated to protect into human shields. While Hamas’s leaders and fighters hide in Gaza’s hundreds of miles of underground tunnels, civilians are defenseless in the line of fire.

Understandably, Palestinians see the conflict differently than Israelis. Most tolerate or may even support Hamas because, in their eyes, it is waging a war of liberation against Israeli occupation, even if they reject the group’s radical Islamist agenda or recognize the inherent depravity of its sacrifice of civilians. Hamas, despite its methods, is gaining support not just among Palestinians but also in Arab-majority countries and Muslim-majority countries outside the Middle East.

The rest of the world is watching, too. As time passes and the number of Palestinians killed continues to rise, Hamas’s atrocities on October 7 are fading from public consciousness, and Israel’s have weakened its own case to possess the moral high ground. The recent strike that mistakenly killed seven workers from the relief organization World Central Kitchen who were trying to provide food to the Gazan population has further diminished Israel’s international standing. The global narrative has definitively shifted in favor of Israel’s enemies.

Israel needs to win back the narrative if it is to win the wider war. Making a convincing case is not about choosing different words—it requires Israel to change its approach. The country’s leaders have failed to outline political objectives for the war, and at this point, continued fighting will not bring the Israeli and Palestinian peoples closer to long-term peace. Israel must now launch a diplomatic track that revives the ultimate goal of a two-state solution, and it needs new leadership to do so. Only by demonstrating its commitment to a negotiated settlement can Israel reclaim the support it needs from partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States, which has been undercut by the past six months of war in Gaza.

FINDING A WINNING NARRATIVE

International perceptions of Israel’s war with Hamas are especially important in an era when information is relayed directly from the battlefield to online media consumers, in real time and without filtration. Unlike battlegrounds in previous conflicts, the combat zone today is measured not by the range of weaponry but by the reach of an Internet signal. For many viewers at home, the war has become something of a television miniseries. People around the world reach conclusions about the justice of a particular military operation not on the basis of a legal debate but through the prism of their particular media consumption. The public decides who is right and who is not and which side is good and which is bad, and it puts pressure on its government to craft policy accordingly. The cumulative effect of global opinion is critical to Israel’s prospects for victory. If Israel’s partners deny it military, economic, or diplomatic support at a pivotal moment, Israel might lose the war despite battlefield successes.

Israel has had global opinion on its side before. International support for Israel was strong during the 1990s after the signing of the Oslo accords, which were intended to lead to a Palestinian state—even though Israel was waging an uncompromising battle against Palestinian terrorism at the same time. The international community considered this fight legitimate, however, because Israel was genuinely engaging in a parallel diplomatic track aimed at bringing about peace for both peoples. I was serving as the director of the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, during this period. Our collaboration with Palestinian security organizations led to a dramatic decrease in Hamas terrorism, but my Palestinian partners also made it clear that their continued cooperation depended on political progress toward the end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Israel must launch a diplomatic track that revives the goal of a two-state solution.

Yet what the world now sees is an Israel whose government denies the existence of a Palestinian people and strives to establish a “Greater Israel” by building more settlements in the West Bank—and potentially in Gaza, as well—and moving toward annexation of parts or all of the Palestinian territories. Seen through this lens, Israel’s war in Gaza looks less like a just war conducted in self-defense and more like an act of expansionist aggression.

No one should be naive about Hamas. It is a murderous organization that must not be allowed to remain in charge of Gaza. In every position I held in the Israeli security establishment, I treated Hamas as a ruthless terrorist group that Israel must fight. I opposed any attempt to negotiate with Hamas because such outreach boosted the group’s power and weakened that of the Palestinian Authority, which had recognized the Israeli people’s right to have a country.

Israel cannot win this war merely by disarming Hamas and eliminating its leadership. Even if Israel prevails on the battlefield, Hamas’s ideology will not disappear. The group will be truly defeated only when it loses the support of the Palestinian people. For that to happen, they must have reason to believe in a diplomatic process that will bring about the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

WORDS INTO ACTION

At this point, there are only two things Israel can do to change the story: choose new leaders and return to the goal of a two-state solution as part of a diplomatic end to this war. To regain global support, Israel—a country founded after the Holocaust to safeguard the survival of the Jewish people—must accept the resolutions of the international community and work to create a reality of two states for two peoples. Pursuing that path would demonstrate that Israel’s war in Gaza is an act of legitimate self-defense and would show the world that the target of the war is not the Palestinian people but Hamas, a jihadi terrorist organization that seeks to destroy Israel and drive Jews out of the Holy Land.

Seeking a two-state reality is not just a means to win back international support. It is also vital to achieve a political victory over Hamas and to ensure Israel’s long-term security. In a November 1997 interview with Filastin al-Muslima, a monthly magazine published by Hamas, the group’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was asked about the prospects for war against Israel. He claimed that the only thing that would prevent Hamas’s eventual victory—defined as the establishment of a Greater Palestine stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, governed under a sharia-based constitution—would be a scenario in which Israel accepted a Palestinian state alongside its own. Were the two-state solution to become reality, Yassin said, Palestinian society would not support Hamas’s preferred path. And without popular backing among Palestinians, Hamas would not exist as a political and military entity.

Yassin was right. A two-state solution would not be a defeat for Israel but a victory—and would be the only way to truly weaken Hamas. Pursuing that outcome would represent neither a capitulation to terrorism nor a submission to American diktats. Rather, it is the best way to realize the Zionist dream of an enduring state of Israel that is Jewish and democratic.

A WAR WITHOUT AN END

In his 1990 book War and Strategy, the retired Israeli general turned scholar Yehoshafat Harkabi made a crucial distinction between the thinking of military leaders and that of statesmen. “In military thinking, the enemy is a collection of targets that need to be attacked; in diplomatic thinking, the enemy is a human and political entity that also needs to be won over and satisfied,” he wrote. “In military thinking, we are indifferent to the adversary’s agonies and therefore seek to increase them; in diplomatic thinking, we must be mindful of his pain as well.”

In this war, Israel has no statesmen and no diplomatic thinking. At the beginning of the war, Israel’s cabinet decided to ignore “the day after” in Gaza because merely having a discussion of the “political goal” of the operation would undermine the stability of the governing coalition. The cabinet’s members are hemmed in by their own political considerations, and they are taking the country down a dangerous road.

This failure of leadership has left Israel without a concept of victory beyond military accomplishments. War has become an end in itself, rather than a means to achieve a better political reality. Israeli history demonstrates that wars without political objectives drag on for years and conclude only after inflicting great trauma. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which around 2,650 Israelis were killed, the Israeli government recognized that it could not guarantee security through military means alone, and it changed its defense doctrine accordingly. Israel accepted Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s peaceful overture in 1977 and began withdrawing its forces from the Sinai Peninsula in 1979. The Egyptian-Israeli peace deal signed in 1979 provides Israel with real security on what had historically been its most dangerous front. Despite that successful record, however, Israel seems to have forgotten the lesson that political agreements provide the best route to security.

War has become an end in itself, rather than a means to achieve a better political reality.

Today Israel is sinking in quicksand in Gaza. The disaster on February 29, in which more than 100 Palestinian civilians were killed and hundreds more injured as they surrounded trucks of humanitarian aid guarded by soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces, together with the killing of the seven World Central Kitchen workers and the lack of declared political objectives, have almost totally erased the legitimacy of a war that most of the world considered unavoidable when Israel was attacked in October. If Israel does not now announce attainable political goals and activate a diplomatic channel to achieve them, the war will march the country to the precipice.

Israel must acknowledge that its past mistakes enabled Hamas’s October 7 attack, which most Palestinians now see as a victory. These mistakes include Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy of bolstering Hamas, which involved encouraging Qatar to send the group millions of dollars while undercutting the Palestinian Authority, Hamas’s rival in the West Bank. To turn Hamas’s victory into defeat, Israel must use this moment to embark on a diplomatic track.

Israel can no longer reach any meaningful objectives through the continuation or intensification of its military operation in Gaza. Pressing forward in an attempt to kill Hamas’s remaining leaders will not bring Israel a wider political victory, even if that narrow goal is achieved—it will only boost Hamas’s power on the Palestinian street.

VICTORY THROUGH DIPLOMACY

The Palestinian issue is now widely understood to be the linchpin of any potential regional accord. And the Biden administration has insisted that only an accord that leads to a two-state reality will enable the creation of a moderate Middle Eastern bloc that can serve as a counterweight to Iran and its proxies both in Gaza and across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Israel’s immediate priority must be to bring home all of the hostages still held in Gaza. Doing so would not be a military victory but a victory for morality and communal responsibility, a repayment of the debt owed to those who were forsaken by the Israeli government and the entire defense establishment. Like any debt, there is a price attached. The country will be forced to free terrorists held in Israeli prisons, including people with the blood of Israeli civilians on their hands. But Israel must agree to as long a cease-fire as necessary to secure the hostages’ release.

Then, in the longer term, Israel must choose between two courses of action. The first is to continue the occupation and creeping annexation of the West Bank. That path spells ongoing war, international isolation, and the loss of Israel’s Jewish and democratic character. The second is to pursue a diplomatic accord that will lead to an agreement with the Palestinian people within a regional framework. The United States and Europe would oversee such an agreement, and it would include normalization with Saudi Arabia and aim to build a broader coalition with moderate Sunni countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states.

Israel must agree to as long a cease-fire as necessary to secure the hostages’ release.

Israel can only be secure if we choose the second option and participate in international “day after” discussions. The goal should be a regional accord that is based on UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which established the “land for peace” framework for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and on the Arab Peace Initiative, first raised two decades ago by Saudi Arabia, which provides a blueprint for member states of the Arab League to establish normal relations with Israel. All these plans call for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, with strong security guarantees.

In spite of all the challenges Israel faces, there is cause for optimism, especially stemming from the strength of Israeli civil society. For ten months before October 7, hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens flooded the streets, defending Israel’s justice system from the government’s attempt to take it over. They proved that they are the guardians of Israeli democracy.

Yet this struggle for democracy ignored the occupation and the existence of the Palestinians as a people. On October 7, Israelis were reminded that there is no way to separate the occupation from democracy—or from security. Walls alone, no matter how high or deep, cannot protect Israel. If Hamas or groups like it think they have nothing to lose, they will choose the “Samson option,” risking all to find ways to get past any barrier Israel can erect.

More and more Israelis are now returning to the streets in anger over their government’s inability to protect its citizens and to define achievable goals for the war. They are calling for the release of the hostages still held in Gaza and new elections to replace the Israeli government. Only a coalition that excludes right-wing extremists can chart a course toward lasting peace. With a bold new leadership that recognizes the failure of policies advanced by the hard right, and with the support of the Israeli public and the country’s friends around the world, Israel may finally be able to climb out of its grief and agony and reach for a sustainable political settlement.

Since October 7, the motto “Together We Will Win” has rallied the Israeli public in the fight against the perpetrators of that day’s attacks. But Israelis must remember that any military victory will turn into defeat if it undermines the core values of a Jewish and democratic Israel.

AMI AYALON is a former Commander of the Israeli navy, former Director of the Israeli Security Agency, and the author of Friendly Fire: How Israel Became Its Own Worst Enemy and Its Hope for the Future.

Foreign Affairs · by Friendly Fire: How Israel Became Its Own Worst Enemy and Its Hope for the Future · April 11, 2024

8. Why Israel is losing the war of global public opinion over its tactics in Gaza

This is a useful follow-up to Ami Ayalon's Foreign Affairs article.

Excerpts:

MARTIN: Do you have hope that a better day will be possible?

AYALON: Yes, I have hope, because I was the deputy and then the commander of the navy and, later, the director of the Israeli Shin Bet. I was sitting with Palestinians who are in our jails. We saw them as terrorists, but they became my friends - you know, Jibril Rajoub and Mohammad Dahlan - and we cooperated. And they told me every day, we are doing everything in order to stop terror, Jewish terror and Palestinian terror, just because we believe that on the end of the road, we shall see, we shall have our freedom, our state alongside Israel. The moment that our people will not believe, forget about us. And if you ask me what happened, when the diplomacy collapsed, this is exactly what happened. They lost hope, and when they do not have hope, we shall not have security.

MARTIN: That is Ami Ayalon. He is a former commander of the Israeli navy and a former director of the Israeli Security Agency, the Shin Bet. We are talking about a piece that he's just published in Foreign Affairs. Admiral Ayalon, thank you so much for speaking with us.

Why Israel is losing the war of global public opinion over its tactics in Gaza

APRIL 12, 20245:17 AM ET

HEARD ON MORNING EDITION

https://www.npr.org/2024/04/12/1244265663/why-israel-is-losing-the-war-of-global-public-opinion-over-its-tactics-in-gaza

LISTEN· 5:25

NPR's Michel Martin talks to Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel's domestic security service, about Israeli leaders' political mistakes as the tide of global opinion turns against them.

LEILA FADEL, HOST:

More than 33,000 Palestinians have been killed, the majority women and children, since Israel's war in Gaza began, according to health authorities there. Ami Ayalon is a former director of Israel's internal security service, the Shin Bet. In an essay published by Foreign Affairs this week, he argues that global opinion is turning against Israel, but he still believes the war is justified.

AMI AYALON: It's a war of defense, and it is a response to the horror, violence. Hamas do not recognize our right to a state, a Jewish state, on the land of Israel.

FADEL: Speaking to our co-host, Michel Martin, Ayalon says Israel is currently winning on the battlefield but will ultimately lose the war if they don't maintain the support of the international community and lay out a plan for peace.

AYALON: The major mistake that our leaders did is that on the second or the third day after the 7 of October, our Cabinet ministers decided not to discuss the day after. Once we do not know to describe the day after, we do not have any concept of victory, we do not have any political goal. We tend to forget that, you know, war is only a means to achieve a better political reality. This is the definition of victory. Our leaders do not understand that when we fight a war against a terror - ideological, theological, radical terror organization, we are fighting in two dimensions. One is a battlefield, but in order to defeat Hamas, we have to win the war of ideas. And we cannot do it by the use of military power. The only way to do it is to create or to present a better idea.

MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:

Can that still happen?

AYALON: Of course. The first question that we have to ask is why - why Palestinians are fighting. My answer is very, very simple. They see themselves as a people. We do not recognize them as a people who deserve a self-determination and a state alongside of Israel, but what Biden is telling us now - and I believe that he is totally right - that we have to launch again the negotiation, in order to create hope among Palestinians.

MARTIN: Can I ask, based on your experience as the former director of the Israeli Security Agency, did the scale of the October 7 attack surprise you?

AYALON: No, it did not surprise me because 50 years earlier, on the 6 of October, the October War started, and we lost 2,000 and almost 700 people. And what we learned after Yom Kippur is that our security doctrine should be based on, yes, a major and very powerful military organization, IDF, but in addition, we have to use diplomacy. And this is something that we forgot, because I think that most Israelis do not understand that victory for Israel is to see, on the other side of the border, a Palestinian state, because once they will have a state, they will have something to lose, and if I learn something in the Shin Bet, the most dangerous enemy is an enemy that has nothing to lose. This is exactly what we saw on the 7 of October.

MARTIN: The leader of the Democrats in the United States Senate, Chuck Schumer, said recently that, you know, he feels that Netanyahu needs to step down, that a new government needs to take place in order to achieve these results. Do you agree with that?

AYALON: I totally agree. I think that Netanyahu - he's a great leader, but this is a leader who leads his people to a dead end. He is leading us to the end of Zionism. If we shall follow Netanyahu, we shall go on, you know, building settlements, and we shall face an ongoing war that nobody, nobody knows when it will end. The only way for us, first of all, to defeat Hamas - because for Hamas, it's a nightmare - this is the end of the of the dream of Greater Palestine, so in order to defeat Hamas, the ideology of Hamas, we have to present a better future in which most Palestinians will believe.

MARTIN: Do you have hope that a better day will be possible?

AYALON: Yes, I have hope, because I was the deputy and then the commander of the navy and, later, the director of the Israeli Shin Bet. I was sitting with Palestinians who are in our jails. We saw them as terrorists, but they became my friends - you know, Jibril Rajoub and Mohammad Dahlan - and we cooperated. And they told me every day, we are doing everything in order to stop terror, Jewish terror and Palestinian terror, just because we believe that on the end of the road, we shall see, we shall have our freedom, our state alongside Israel. The moment that our people will not believe, forget about us. And if you ask me what happened, when the diplomacy collapsed, this is exactly what happened. They lost hope, and when they do not have hope, we shall not have security.

MARTIN: That is Ami Ayalon. He is a former commander of the Israeli navy and a former director of the Israeli Security Agency, the Shin Bet. We are talking about a piece that he's just published in Foreign Affairs. Admiral Ayalon, thank you so much for speaking with us.

AYALON: Thank you.

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.

9. America’s Foreign Policy Utopians Ignore CultureAmerica’s Foreign Policy Utopians Ignore Culture

Although Drucker was talking about business and company culture when he said "culture eats strategy for breakfast," that quote is applicable )perhaps moreso) in national security and foreign policy.

And of course culture influences war and vice versa:

War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.

--John Keegan in A History of Warfare

America’s Foreign Policy Utopians Ignore Culture

They want the facade of ‘peace’ but let Hamas' culture of death live on.

https://spectator.org/americas-foreign-policy-utopians-ignore-culture/https://spectator.org/americas-foreign-policy-utopians-ignore-culture/

by SHMUEL KLATZKIN

April 13, 2024, 10:35 PM

Hamas terrorist on killing spree Oct. 7, 2023 (Times Now/Youtube)

Culture counts. It is not everything, but it is often the most important influence, whether in an organization or a corporation or a nation.

I spent some time in Japan on business, and I loved the culture of precision, efficiency, care, and self-sacrifice, replete with an insistence on finding the natural beauty wherever it is. I knew I didn’t dare come to the station a minute late for my train—I’d see it departing as I would be running up the stairs. Not like my Amtrak experiences, where the only question was how late the train would be.

And they will not be there on the receiving end when the next obscene incursion inevitably pours forth.

I could rely on people paying attention, whether it was the desk clerk that left her post at the hotel to help me get my bags down to the train platform across the street, and refused to take a tip; or the driver who saw me walking down a street in Hiroshima looking for my errant hotel, who saw my lost look, offered his help, and drove me to my lodgings. (READ MORE from Shmuel Klatzkin: The Eclipse Transcends Politics and Division)

I can rely on my Toyota Corolla that I bought new in 2007 and now has over 600k miles on it.

These things are in the culture.

There were other things in that culture that were prominent eight decades ago—aggression, cruelty, and a disregard for life—especially that of nationalities they considered lesser than their own. They made the Japanese formidable warriors and it made them cruel masters. The Rape of Nanking is a brutal chapter in history; their making sex slaves of thousands of Korean women was horrific. Their cruelty to prisoners of war is infamous.

The goal of the nations Japan attacked in World War II was not just to turn Japan back and get it to give back conquered territory. It was also to obliterate its war machine and to remake its culture. Here General Douglas MacArthur had the greatest success of his career. I could feel the result and I admire the culture today.

The utopians running American foreign policy feel that people are infinitely malleable and that there are no real constraints on people that can stop them from being perfect. No need to pay attention to culture—if we can imagine a place for them in our thought, that’s good enough.

The problem is that most empowered utopians really don’t want to suffer the consequences of their policies, and they don’t much care about those little people to whom those consequences are exclusively diverted.

And so they ignore culture. Their utopian program will fix everything and is to be instituted without any thought of the beliefs, attitudes, goals, or behavior of the people they are fixing.

But if there is one thing the deeply committed people know, it is how to outlast trends in thought and politics. They think long-term. Whether it is a religion of life or a cult of death, they make plans to survive til their opportunity arises.

Thus Hamas waited out the trendiness of the utopians in Israel and the U.S., knowing it would bring them an opportunity to do what is at the core of their religious commitment—bring death to Israel and, they hope, to the United States. That is their culture, which they inculcate from the earliest childhood years. For the West, they make videos of suffering as a consequence of the war they start. On their own media, in their own language, though, they are explicit about their deadly aims, with mothers and grandmothers urging their offspring to become martyrs, so long as they can kill some Jews. (READ MORE: A Political Movement Upends the Word ‘Genocide’)

Our Utopians at Foggy Bottom pay no attention. They want the outer trappings of peace, They do not have to live next door to the rump of Hamas whose survival they guarantee. So what if another 10,000 rockets fall on Israel. You won’t hear them squawk as they did at Israel’s prosecuting its war against Hamas’ army of rapists. And they will not be there on the receiving end when the next obscene incursion inevitably pours forth. They won’t pay much attention. They care more about their own pristine dream.

10. How to Prevent an American Decline

NATIONAL REVIEW

April 14, 2025

How to Prevent an American Decline

If America is to remain great, the rising generation will need to make a compelling case for fiscal solvency at home and steadfast strength abroad.

https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/04/how-to-prevent-an-american-decline/

(Adapted from Bing West’s remarks in the annual Greater Issues address to the South Carolina Corps of Cadets at the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., on March 28.)

General Walters, Distinguished Guests and Corps of Cadets: I am honored to be at The Citadel to give the annual “greater issues” address. Permit me to discuss three such issues.

First: Your success. Let’s start by quoting how Google describes your college: “The Citadel is a hard school. It's one of the most challenging places. If you want to make something of yourself and actually learn something come to the Citadel, but to excel takes a thick skin.”

A “thick skin”? Whoa, wait: You’re Gen Z. AI ChatGPT says: “Generation Z faces unique mental health challenges, including high rates of anxiety, depression, and stress.” With a tough skin, you’re not holding up the image of Gen Z; in fact, you’re the antithesis. You worked hard to be admitted to the top public university in the South. You’re in good physical shape, self-disciplined and serious about learning. All 2,400 of you get up a five every morning and make your bed with tight corners. You rarely turn on your iPhones and you ignore social media apps. You’ve failed at some tasks and done well at others. You know how to lead and how to follow.

You study, strive and compete within an atmosphere of integrity. I saw a small sign in one classroom: I will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do. You do not see that pledge in most colleges, including the declining Ivies. You’ve absorbed into your bloodstream, into your DNA, the ingredients for success. You benefit from the reputation of The Citadel, forged by the generations who went before. The result is that you’re set up to do well in life, a theme I will return to.

Issue Two. How do you view life? On dozens of battlefields over three wars, I shared meals, laughed and patrolled with more than thirty grunts who were killed close to me. In one battle in the paddies in 1966, we slugged it out all day with the North Vietnamese. Replacements were flown in at dusk, and battle raged on through a dark, chaotic night. The next morning, four Marines were carrying a body in a poncho to a chopper. “Who is he?” I asked. They read from his dog tag a name I had never heard of. The unknown Marine had come straight from the States, joined us at dark and was dead before dawn. Five minutes after the chopper flew out with his body, we were again on the move. We accepted death as part of the daily mission.

It's part of your mission too. Look around. Before you are forty, some of your comrades sitting here today will die in combat or in a combat-related accident. Poof - no longer on this earth. So don’t leave here unprepared for the loss of a colleague in Yemen or Mongolia or Timbuktu. Reflect on why you do - or do not - believe in God and a life on the other side. Prepare to cope with death. I’ve seen soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan too shocked to process death. Then it becomes a crutch for not doing much later. That’s a bad attitude.

Spend time now getting straight with mortality. Think about what makes you who you are. Sometime in the next ten to twenty years, you’ll be knocked flat on your butt. No one – no one - gets through this life without being knocked down hard. The reason may be a divorce, being fired or passed over. Whatever. You will be stunned, and probably won’t know what to do.

Let me give you an example. I’ve worked for several secretaries of defense. The finest was Jim Schlesinger, who also served as Director of the CIA. I was his special assistant as Vietnam was falling in 1975. Congress had turned against the war, but Jim kept requesting aid for the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. His persistence irritated President Ford, who was running for election. The president abruptly fired his secretary of defense, who had scant savings and eight young children. A few days later, I looked out my Pentagon window to see him sitting on a park bench next to the Secretary of Army. After a few minutes, they parted ways.

Fast forward ten years to 1984. Without a real plan, I had left my job as the assistant secretary of defense. That former Secretary of the Army, now a partner in a white-shoe law firm, sat me down on a park bench. Where are you going with your life, he asked. I babbled about maybe joining an oil corporation or a lobbying firm. He shook his head and took out a plain envelope. He said, “I gave this to Jim Schlesinger a decade ago. Now it’s your turn. Here. You have twenty seconds to write on the back of this envelope what you really want to do. Don’t think. Just write it down.”

Jim Schlesinger, he continued, scribbled one word: “Banker.” Banker! Where did that come from? None of us expected that calling. Yet for the next thirty years, Jim enjoyed working in international finances, and five presidents sought his advice.

You can guess what I wrote: “Writer.” So I returned to combat to tell the stories of our warriors.

Come that day when you are knocked flat on your butt, take out an envelope and write down what burns in your soul. It might be family, job or career. Whatever it is, follow your faith in yourself, because you have grit. If you didn’t have grit, you wouldn’t be at The Citadel today. The second issue, then, is how you view life.

The third issue is your role in safeguarding our beloved nation. America is a declining power, with an electorate bitterly divided. We are placating our enemies in order to rationalize reducing our military. The chaotic bug-out from Kabul was shameful. The Houthis, a 9^th Century tribe, blockade the Red Sea. The administration impedes our production of energy and authorizes billions for Iran, our implacable enemy. As China ratchets up pressure against Taiwan, our Navy is cut. Congress struggles to provide aid to Ukraine, while the administration champions a wide-open southern border.

For you, worse is still to come. My generation of selfish politicians is cavalierly loading a staggering debt onto your backs. “Great civilizations are not murdered,” Toynbee wrote. “They commit suicide.” He meant that countries once colossi eventually lose their dynamism and run up bills they cannot pay. 17th-century Spain, 18th-century France and 20th-century Britain – all collapsed as global powers. Even more apposite of our condition is 4^th Century Rome. Its end came when the ruling class over-indulged itself, while dispensing bread and colosseum spectaculars to keep favor with the people. The Roman senate ran out of money to pay the legions. The soldiers walked off the job, and the Goths sacked Rome.

Now look at us today. Since World War II, America has reigned as the fair-minded global power. The past seven decades have witnessed unequalled prosperity, freedom and security for America and for dozens of nations protected by our power. Currently, we remain the world’s great civilization. Yet year after year we complacently reduce the funds for our military. Beset by adversaries, how do we expect to avoid the fate of Rome?

Every nation has a mysterious, collective spirit manifested by the toils and behavior of tens of thousands, who in turn lead by their influence tens of millions of others That collective dynamic is why we refer not to one leader, but to our Founding Fathers (plural). The Declaration of Independence had 56 signatories, not one or two. Most suffered grievously for their beliefs and most remain anonymous to this very day. They, not one man, led our nation.

In your careers and communities, each of you will interact with thousands of others. An astonishing percentage of your generation is ignorant of our history and embraces wokeism, a socialist ideology demanding ever-increasing benefits without increasing productivity. Government spending of your money to achieve that nirvana is unsustainable. Within fifteen years, the debt incurred by today’s politicians will degrade your standard of living as individuals and imperil America as a great civilization.

We don’t want our economic stability, our international credibility and our domestic cohesion to degenerate to that of Brazil or Argentina. We don’t want our defense to crumble, as happened to the Roman empire. We don’t want to be replaced on the world stage by the despot of China. Yet that is where we are lurching by domestic profligacy and foreign policy weakness.

To arrest that sharp decline, in your careers and in your communities you must make a compelling case for fiscal solvency at home and steadfast strength abroad. Others will listen to you. It is the five percent that lead the ninety-five percent. By your example, you will influence the direction of America.

In summary, I have addressed three issues. First, you’re set up to succeed in your careers, because of the academic and personal discipline you are exhibiting at The Citadel today.

Second, think through what you believe about death and about being here on earth. Take the envelope test. Figure out who you are before you are knocked to your knees by life’s tragedies.

And third, the greatest issue: Speak up for your beliefs. You are leaders. As you succeed in life, you owe back to speak out on behalf of commonsense, solvency and security for our beloved country.

Thank you very much, and God bless you.

Military historian Bing West served as a combat Marine in Vietnam and as assistant secretary of defense. His bestselling books chronicle our wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

11. Opinion | Now it’s up to Israel: De-escalate or retaliate against Iran?

You do neither. Do not succumb to the "osple of de-escalation" or you will continue to be attacked. Instead you respond in self defense to attack the right targets to prevent further attack. This is not retaliation but an act of self defense. Perhaps semantics for some people but if you are going to shape the narrative you should consider the right words to describe the actions taken..

Opinion | Now it’s up to Israel: De-escalate or retaliate against Iran?

By Max Boot

Columnist

Author followed

April 14, 2024 at 10:58 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · April 14, 2024

Disaster was narrowly averted on Saturday night in the longstanding conflict between Israel and Iran. Israel, aided by the United States and other allies, successfully repelled a massive Iranian drone and missile strike. But the reprieve might be short-lived.

The latest round of hostilities began Oct. 7, when Hamas, a terrorist organization funded and armed by Iran, launched a barbaric attack on Israel. Israel responded by first bombing and then invading the Gaza Strip. Six months later, Israeli forces continue to battle Hamas in Gaza, with Palestinian civilians suffering devastating damage as Hamas hides among them.

Iran did not launch a full-scale war of its own after Oct. 7, despite what must have been Hamas leaders’ hopes, but Iran’s proxies in Hezbollah opened steady rocket and missile fire from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, forcing roughly 60,000 Israelis from their homes. The Houthis, another Iranian-backed militia, began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Other Iranian-backed militia opened fire on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. While U.S. forces retaliated against Iranian proxies for attacks on U.S. bases, Israel has kept up a series of strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon while also continuing to target Hezbollah’s Iranian supply lines in Syria.

On April 1, Israel upped the ante by bombing the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The dead included two senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals and several other officers. This air strike was no doubt intended to put pressure on Iran to end the Hezbollah attacks on Israel, but this public humiliation — which included the destruction of a diplomatic facility that is technically sovereign Iranian territory — backed the mullahs into a corner. From Tehran’s perspective, retaliation became necessary to save face both with its own public and with its regional allies.

In the past two weeks, there was a public debate in Tehran about how to calibrate a response that would show strength against the “Zionist entity” but not drag Iran into a broader war with Israel and its allies. Israel had plenty of warning and so did the United States; President Biden even returned to the White House on Saturday afternoon from his home in Delaware to be ready to address the assault he had warned Iran not to launch.

On Saturday night, the Iranian attack finally materialized: Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles against Israel. This was the first time that the Islamic state had directly attacked the Jewish state; normally Iran prefers to operate through terrorist proxies. But while Iran’s attack was large and unprecedented, it had little chance of success in the face of Israel’s multilayered air defenses, buttressed by support from the United States, Jordan, Britain, France and other friendly states. Israel announced that 99 percent of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted, and the damage was minimal.

The mullahs must have known that this would be the likely outcome. This attack was reminiscent of the Iranian missile strike on two U.S. bases in Iraq following the U.S. killing of the IRGC’s Gen. Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, which also inflicted no fatalities — and prompted no U.S. retaliation. Both attacks were performative acts designed to make a statement, not to inflict mass casualties.

On Saturday, the Iranians could have tried to overwhelm Israel air defenses by directing Hezbollah to unleash its arsenal of some 150,000 missiles. Given Hezbollah’s geographical proximity to Israel, the flight times would have been short and Israel would have had little time to prepare. But that’s not what the mullahs did. They opted for an attack launched mainly from Iranian soil, giving Israel and its allies plenty of time to activate their own defenses.

The Iranians are no more eager for a bigger war with Israel than Israel is eager for a bigger war with Iran. Both sides prefer to wage a low-intensity conflict, as they have been doing for many years: Iran sponsors terrorist attacks against Israel by its “axis of resistance,” while Israel launches covert actions against Iran’s nuclear program and air strikes against Iranian operatives in Syria and Lebanon. But, however much the two sides want to avoid a larger conflict, they could still stumble into one if the action-reaction cycle spins out of control.

Now it’s up to Israel’s war cabinet to decide whether to strike back against Iran. The pressure to respond would have been much greater if the Iranian attack had caused mass casualties. That didn’t happen, lessening the pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to do something rash.

Indeed, in many ways the attack was a defeat for Iran. It gave the appearance that Israel’s military is strong enough to defend the country against Iran, and it reduced Israel’s international isolation after more than six months of brutal war in Gaza. Even nations that have been calling on Israel to implement a ceasefire and lessen civilian suffering rallied to its side on Saturday. House Republicans now say they will rush a floor vote on long-delayed military aid to Israel. (Given that Ukraine is also under regular air attack — often from Russia’s Iranian-made drones — it would be a travesty if the aid bill did not include Ukraine.)

If he were so inclined, Netanyahu could chalk up the exchange as a win for Israel — and for his embattled government. Or he could use the attack as a perfect excuse to bomb Iran’s nuclear program or other Iranian military installations.

Iran has signaled its desire to de-escalate: Even before Iran’s drones and missiles had reached Israel on Saturday night, its mission to the United Nations had written on X that “The matter can be deemed concluded.” Biden, for his part, reportedly told Netanyahu in a Saturday phone call that the United States won’t support an Israeli counterstrike on Iran. But Israel’s defense minister said on Sunday that the confrontation “is not over yet.”

The decision now rests with Netanyahu and the Israeli war cabinet. Israel would be fully justified morally and legally in ordering air strikes on Iran. But it wouldn’t be smart strategically. Iran is a nation of 88.5 million people, while Israel is nation of just 9.5 million. Iran has more than half a million active duty military personnel, a sophisticated defense industry, and a vast network of powerful proxies across the region. Israel can hurt Iran, but it can’t defeat Iran — or even destroy its well-hidden and well-fortified nuclear program. It doesn’t even have heavy bombers like B-52s capable of carrying the largest bunker-busting munitions.

Even the United States would be hard-put to defeat Iran, and the Biden administration rightly has no desire to get dragged into a war with the Islamic Republic that would be likely to lead to a spike in oil prices and a global economic downturn. Biden is urging restraint on Netanyahu. But will he listen now when he has so often ignored Biden’s pleas in the past?

Israel was lucky to escape serious harm in the latest Iranian attack. It may not be so lucky next time. The prudent step now would be to avoid escalation, which could embroil the entire region in a calamitous conflict. Israel would be better advised to focus on ending the war in Gaza rather than widening it. More can be done to stymie Iran’s regional designs if Israel draws closer to the Arab states that are also enemies of Iran than if it blindly retaliates. But emotions are running high on both sides, and the risks of miscalculation are growing.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · April 14, 2024

13. Drones are crowding Ukraine’s skies, largely paralyzing battlefield

Excerpts:

“If we don’t get enough ammunition we will lose this war,” said Denys, 31, a drone commander in Ukraine’s 45th brigade who conducts surveillance deep inside Russian-controlled territory, and who is being identified only by his first name for security reasons.

In the meantime, “we are holding off their advance with FPV drones,” said Nepal, 32, a drone operator in the same brigade who, like others in this article, spoke on the condition he be identified only by his call sign, in keeping with military rules.

Ukraine has trained tens of thousands of soldiers like Nepal as drone pilots — a role that effectively did not exist when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014. In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky formalized the role of drone operators, establishing a new military branch called the Unmanned Systems Forces. “Repelling ground assaults is primarily the task of drones,” Zelensky said, acknowledging that the role of infantry soldiers has changed dramatically.

Ukrainian factories are producing a wide range of drone models, including ones that strike inside of Russia, and civilian volunteers are building FPVs themselves, following directions on YouTube.

Demand for drones is outpacing supply, Fedorov said. “Even if we meet all the needs that are formally there now … tomorrow there will be 10 more attack drone companies that also need drones,” he said.

Drones are crowding Ukraine’s skies, largely paralyzing battlefield

By Siobhán O'Grady and Kostiantyn Khudov

April 14, 2024 at 1:08 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Siobhán O'Grady · April 14, 2024

DONETSK REGION, Ukraine — So many drones patrol the skies over Ukraine’s front lines — hunting for any signs of movement — that Ukrainian and Russian troops have little ability to move on the battlefield without being spotted, and blown up.

Instead, on missions, they rush from one foxhole to another, hoping the pilots manning the enemy drones overhead are not skilled enough to find them inside. Expert drone operators, their abilities honed on the front, can stalk just a single foot soldier to their death, diving after them into hideouts and trenches.

The surge in small drones in Ukraine has turned the area beyond either side of the zero line — normally known as “the gray zone” — into “the death zone,” said Oleksandr Nastenko, commander of Code 9.2, a drone unit in Ukraine’s 92nd brigade. Those who dare to move day or night under the prying eyes of enemy drones “are dead immediately,” he said.

Cheap drones deployed in Ukraine have transformed modern warfare — and initially gave Ukrainian troops an advantage on a battlefield where they are perpetually outnumbered and outgunned. “This is the evolution of our survival,” Nastenko said.

But the Russians quickly caught on and began mass producing their own drones.

What followed was an overabundance of disposable, deadly drones and electronic warfare devices known as jammers that disrupt their flights. Most common are first-person-view, or FPV drones, typically controlled by a pilot wearing a headset and holding a remote controller.

“What we’re witnessing right now is blitzkrieg drone warfare,” said Andrew Coté, chief of staff at BRINC Drones, a Seattle-based drone company sending equipment to Ukraine. Coté said that drones in Ukraine are as game changing as tanks were in World War I. “It is pretty stalemate,” he said, “because if you are out in the open, you will be hunted.”

The technological advances probably have saved lives because drone pilots can work slightly farther from the zero — or contact — line than traditional infantry. But the saturation of drones, many with thermal cameras that work at night, has also shrunk the space where troops can move safely without being spotted — leading to high casualties and, in recent months, largely preventing either side from making major breakthroughs.

These conditions — combined with widespread minefields and shortages of ammunition and soldiers — now make it virtually impossible for Ukraine to retake swaths of territory as it did in 2022.

Russia, which has ample missile stocks and superior aviation power, capitalized on Ukraine’s ammunition shortages to seize the strategic eastern town of Avdiivka, and is now pushing to take more land. On Saturday, Ukraine’s commander in chief Oleksandr Syrsky warned that the situation on the eastern front had “significantly deteriorated.”

Ukraine will rely largely on drones to make it difficult for the Russians to press forward without putting expensive Russian fighting vehicles at risk whenever they move.

With large-scale drone production underway in Russia, Ukraine is racing to manufacture more than a million drones this year in hopes that it will prevent further Russian gains.

That task is turning even more urgent as Kyiv rapidly runs out of artillery and air defense ammunition from its Western partners, including the United States. For months, Republicans in Congress have blocked a $60 billion aid package proposed by President Biden.

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s minister of digital transformation who is overseeing much of the country’s drone development, said Ukrainian drones have proved more accurate than artillery on some enemy targets. Still, artillery is a top need.

Earlier in Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian troops relied on artillery to destroy high-value targets such as Russian tanks and halt the Russian advance. Now, a severe shortage of 155-mm shells means that even if surveillance drones identify dozens of targets, few will be attacked.

“If we don’t get enough ammunition we will lose this war,” said Denys, 31, a drone commander in Ukraine’s 45th brigade who conducts surveillance deep inside Russian-controlled territory, and who is being identified only by his first name for security reasons.

In the meantime, “we are holding off their advance with FPV drones,” said Nepal, 32, a drone operator in the same brigade who, like others in this article, spoke on the condition he be identified only by his call sign, in keeping with military rules.

Ukraine has trained tens of thousands of soldiers like Nepal as drone pilots — a role that effectively did not exist when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014. In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky formalized the role of drone operators, establishing a new military branch called the Unmanned Systems Forces. “Repelling ground assaults is primarily the task of drones,” Zelensky said, acknowledging that the role of infantry soldiers has changed dramatically.

Ukrainian factories are producing a wide range of drone models, including ones that strike inside of Russia, and civilian volunteers are building FPVs themselves, following directions on YouTube.

Demand for drones is outpacing supply, Fedorov said. “Even if we meet all the needs that are formally there now … tomorrow there will be 10 more attack drone companies that also need drones,” he said.

The sheer number of drones means the battlefield is “almost transparent on both sides,” Nepal said, speaking from a makeshift base near the front line filled with parts for FPVs.

The devices, while fairly cheap to construct, are so strategically valuable that Nepal spends hours at his desk working to repair those seized from the Russians or fixing their own in hopes they can be used again.

Jamming systems, which disrupt drone frequencies and turn pilots’ screens to static, have made missions even more difficult. Sometimes, Nepal said, he must hit his targets “being almost blind.”

There is little besides jamming the signal that troops can do to protect themselves from a drone. Nepal often watches as Russian troops, holding assault rifles, try to save their lives by shooting down his explosive-laden drones before they crash into them.

Nepal’s commander, Fox, 32, said nonstop flights of Russian drones mean “everything is in danger.” Last fall, his troops could fly their drones freely, taking out Russian targets. Now, due to jamming, they often cannot move them much more than one mile before their screens go gray.

Stanislav, 35, who runs a drone unit in eastern Ukraine said that within a 10-kilometer radius controlled by his brigade and two others, there might be 100 reconnaissance and attack drones flying back-and-forth.

“The most challenging thing to figure out is if it’s Ukrainian or Russian drones,” Stanislav said. “When you see 10 drones in the sky there’s no way to understand if it’s our drone coming back after reconnaissance in Russian-controlled territory or if it’s their drone which is coming for reconnaissance or attacking Ukrainian-controlled territory.”

Although the jamming systems he uses, developed by Ukrainian company Kvertus, help disrupt Russian flights, they also hamper his own. He said he wishes there was a “magic button” to disrupt all signals, but with drones using an increasingly wide range of frequencies such technology is not available.

Russia knows how valuable drone pilots are to Ukraine and “are targeting our drone operators with aerial guided bombs and grad systems,” Fox said.

Nastenko compared the precision of an advanced pilot to that of a jeweler; Fox likened the skill set to that of a Formula 1 racecar driver.

On a recent mission, Nastenko’s team — working from a foxhole near the zero line — launched a Vampire drone toward Russian positions. The thermal camera combed over dead trees until it found Russian troops hiding on their side of the line. Then, the drone dropped its payload, igniting a massive explosion. A recording showed Russian troops’ bodies as they went flying.

The drone returned back to its base, where the Ukrainian troops loaded it up again and sent it back to kill any survivors. Meanwhile, another drone called a Mavic lingered overhead, monitoring Russian movements. Its camera picked up two disoriented soldiers running side by side in circles, their camouflage uniforms turned an eerie white under the thermal lens. Then they separated, looking for anywhere to hide. The Vampire drone homed in and fired again.

Intercepted communications showed that the attack, which took roughly an hour, killed eight Russian troops, Nastenko said.

Days later, troops in his unit embarked on another mission. While in the field, they came under an artillery attack, losing two of their own.

David L. Stern in Kyiv contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Siobhán O'Grady · April 14, 2024

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance.
The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance.
The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general.
Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions.
Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.
Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign and ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Donetsk City.
Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 13, 2024

Apr 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 13, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

This update considers some most dangerous courses of action (MDCOAs) that could occur if Ukrainian forces continue to suffer from critical shortages in essential artillery, air defense, and other munitions and systems. ISW is not currently forecasting that these MDCOAs will occur, and, on the contrary, assesses that they are very unlikely to occur if additional US and Western aid is rapidly forthcoming. Current Ukrainian shortages of shells and air defense systems, however, have increased the likelihood of these MDCOAs to the level at which they demand careful consideration. These MDCOAs have become more likely because of acute Ukrainian shortages of materiel and manpower rather than because of improvements in Russian tactical or technical capabilities.

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 13 that the situation in eastern Ukraine has significantly worsened in recent days and that Russian forces are conducting mechanized attacks in the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Pokrovsk (west of Avdiivka) directions.[1] Syrskyi stated that hot and dry weather conditions have made most open terrain accessible to Russian tanks and that Russian forces are dedicating new units to achieving tactical successes despite heavy losses. The Russian efforts in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions each pursue operationally significant objectives, but these operations are not mutually supporting, and Russian forces still seem to be alternating emphasis among the different operational directions rather than leaning into all three at any given time.[2] Ukrainian forces have successfully defended against prior Russian operational-level offensive efforts of this sort when they had the resources the US is currently withholding, forcing these efforts to culminate before they could achieve operationally significant results.[3] Ukrainian forces currently struggle with significant shortages of both artillery shells and air defense means, both of which are critical components of their defense, and Russian forces are capitalizing on these shortages and improved weather conditions.[4]

The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance. Russian forces have recently periodically shifted their focus among offensive operations in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions; Russian forces first prioritized the capture of Avdiivka in early 2024, alongside simultaneous but less intense operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, then leaned into the Lyman direction while slightly decreasing the tempo near Avdiivka, and now are intensifying efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in March-April 2024.[5] Though Russian forces likely lack the ability to conduct more than one simultaneous effective large-scale operational effort as they have throughout the war, Russian forces are now able to use multiple alternating offensive efforts to stretch Ukrainian defensive capabilities amid Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages.[6] The current pattern of Russian offensive operations allows elements of units participating in less intensive efforts to rest and reconstitute while other units, presumably those that are more rested or those that have recently received reinforcements. They can then intensify efforts in another operational direction, forcing Ukrainian forces to reallocate their defensive resources across the theater and creating vulnerabilities that Russian forces can exploit. Russian forces are reportedly developing operational- and strategic-level reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, likely to support an anticipated spring-summer offensive effort.[7] ISW continues to assess that these reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale mechanized assaults in 2024 as long as Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.[8] Russian forces would more likely use these reserves to restaff or reinforce existing formations and continue grinding, infantry-led assaults with occasional limited mechanized pushes in their direction of choice at key moments. If the United States does not resume providing aid to Ukraine and Ukrainian forces continue to lack essential artillery and air defense munitions in particular, however, even badly-trained and poorly-equipped Russian troops might be able to conduct successful offensive operations.

The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have long aimed to capture a group of major cities in Donetsk Oblast that include Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka, and the Russian military initially attempted and failed to conduct a wide operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast by driving on Slovyansk in spring 2022.[9] The Ukrainian liberation of Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast and further advances in northern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts during the fall of 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of this Ukrainian “fortress” belt.[10] Russian forces continued their drive towards the southern portion of the Donetsk Oblast “fortress” belt with their attritional, months-long effort to seize Bakhmut, but the seizure of the city and the culmination of Russian offensive operations in the area in May 2023 did not allow Russian forces to immediately threaten the southern edge of the “fortress“ belt.[11] Russian forces began localized offensive operations west of Bakhmut in November 2023 and are now operating on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar. The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would allow Russian forces to begin attacking the southern “fortress” cities in the Ukrainian defensive belt directly. Chasiv Yar is roughly seven kilometers from Kostyantynivka (the southernmost “fortress” city) and roughly 20 kilometers from Druzhkivka. Russian forces could launch subsequent offensive operations directly on Druzhkivka or Kostyantynivka after some period of rest and replenishment following the possible seizure of Chasiv Yar. Russian forces could also drive on Oleksiilevo-Druzhkivka (15km west of Chasiv Yar) in an effort to cut off and isolate Kostyantynivka from the rest of the “fortress” belt and set conditions for the operational encirclement of the city. These options depend on the Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar, however, which is not certain.

Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general. The isolation of Kostyantynivka or the outright seizure of the settlement would likely significantly degrade Ukraine’s ability to hold the frontline further south in Donetsk Oblast as it would sever a major ground line of communication along the H-20 (Kostyantynivka-Donetsk City) highway and require Ukrainian forces to commit a significant portion of manpower and materiel to the defense of the remaining “fortress” belt and relatively less fortified areas of central and western Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances through Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka and then further west into Donetsk Oblast would likely present Russian forces with greater opportunities to collapse the Ukrainian frontline in Donetsk Oblast and possibly restore relatively rapid maneuver to the battlefield in pursuit of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will be challenged to seize either city rapidly as long as Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to defend them, however. ISW is not forecasting that the Russians will be able to seize either city in the near term. Russian advances further west of these “fortress” cities into Donetsk Oblast could also present Russian forces with opportunities to make offensive operations along diverging axes along the Donetsk Oblast frontline mutually supporting an offensive push on Pokrovsk and the western borders of Donetsk Oblast. The possible Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka would significantly degrade Ukraine’s operational position even if the frontline then stabilized since the possible Russian seizure of these cities would present Russian forces with more secure positions from which threaten a wider area of Donetsk Oblast that is more sparsely populated and offers less advantageous terrain to defend. These cities, even after the likely widescale destruction that a Russian offensive operation would cause, would present opportunities for Russian forces to establish a significant defensive line that could materially degrade the prospects for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations to retake them. The threat to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka presents a potential major operational setback for Ukraine that would be very challenging to reverse. ISW is neither forecasting that Russian forces will seize Chasiv Yar nor forecasting that Russian forces will be able to threaten or even seize Kostyantynivka or Druzhkivka. ISW offers these considerations of the threat that the Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would present because they are a plausible most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) especially if the US does not rapidly resume the provision of military assistance to Ukraine.

Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions. The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces and substantial elements of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are currently responsible for offensive operations from northeast of Bakhmut to southeast of Chasiv Yar, and elements of the 98th VDV Division, 11th VDV Brigade, the 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking the immediate outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[12] Elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) and Volunteer Corps and limited elements of the 98th VDV Division are attempting to advance on Chasiv Yar from the northeast, and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, the Luhansk People’s Republic 2nd Army Corps (AC), and the 3rd AC are currently attempting to recapture territory southeast of Chasiv Yar and push Ukrainian forces across the Siversky-Donets Donbas Canal.[13] Russian forces appear to have committed their most combat-effective elements in the area to frontal assaults on Chasiv Yar, and these frontal assaults will likely produce gradual gains at attritional costs as long as Ukrainian defenders have essential materiel. The elements that Russian forces have currently concentrated northeast and southeast of Chasiv Yar are relatively less combat effective and will struggle to make advances similar to those made east of Chasiv Yar against supplied Ukrainian defenders. Russian tactical gains east of Chasiv Yar have not set conditions for an encirclement or envelopment of the settlement, and Russian forces would likely have to make notable tactical gains southeast and northwest of Chasiv Yar before pursuing an envelopment or encirclement of the settlement, which may require additional and combat effective units and formations. Available imagery, which ISW will not present or describe in greater detail at this time to preserve Ukrainian operational security, shows that Ukrainian forces have established significant fortifications in a ring shape in the Chasiv Yar area, and Russian forces will likely struggle to rapidly break through these defenses at their current offensive tempo in the area as long as Ukrainian forces have the ammunition needed to resist.[14] In the absence of significant new Russian deployments, Russian forces will likely have to fight their way directly through the town or attempt a narrow tactical-level turning movement, which would force Russian forces to contend with Chasiv Yar’s fortifications, elevated Ukrainian positions, and the obstacle of the Siversky-Donets Donbas Canal.

The possible Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar in itself does not allow Russian forces to conduct a successful operation to threaten Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka, and Russian forces would likely need to set other operational conditions to threaten the southern “fortress” cities. The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would create a notable salient, and a Russian attempt to advance further west immediately from Chasiv Yar would make that salient increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces would likely need to recapture territory that Russian forces lost southeast of Chasiv Yar during the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive to stabilize the advancing Russian front, an effort that elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 2nd AC, and 3rd AC have struggled to pursue. Russian attempts to advance towards Kostyantynivka would likely allow Ukrainian forces to use positions in the Toretsk-Pivnichne area to interdict and threaten rear Russian logistics lines and possibly isolate the immediate battlespace west of Chasiv Yar. The terrain between Chasiv Yar and the southern edge of the Ukrainian “fortress” belt is predominantly open fields with limited cover and concealment, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct effective mechanized maneuver to advance up to the cities. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to repel intensive Russian mechanized assaults and degrade Russian logistics when well-provisioned, and the Russian ability to leverage the operational significance of Chasiv Yar likely rests in large part on whether the US will resume security assistance to Ukraine.[15]

Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are strengthening the “most problematic” areas at the front with electronic warfare (EW) systems, air defense systems, drones, and anti-tank missiles.[16] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces also need to improve the quality of their training, especially for infantry units to optimize their use of limited and dwindling Western-supplied weapons and equipment. The Telegraph reported on April 12 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated at the end of February 2024 that Russian forces often have three times as many artillery shells as Ukrainian forces and that some Ukrainian artillery units only have enough shells to strike a single Russian mechanized assault group out of several Russian mechanized groups, forcing the Ukrainians to use small arms to defend against subsequent Russian mechanized assaults.[17] A Russian Storm-Z instructor stated on April 13 that recent Russian mechanized assaults have achieved tactical successes but have been unable to make significant advances due to Ukrainian counterattacks, the exhaustion of Russian fire support during the assault, and the incompetence of Russian forces that are meant to consolidate gained positions.[18] The instructor stated that recent Russian tactical advances are not the result of improvements in the quality of Russian combat capabilities, increases in Russian technical means, or the optimization of Russian organizational structures but are rather due to Russia’s increased use of glide bombs and constraints on Ukrainian artillery fire resulting from the lack of US supplies. The instructor claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to compensate for their decreased firepower by increasing their use of strike drones but noted that Ukrainian drones are able to strike but not destroy Russian armored vehicles, as ISW has previously observed.[19]

ISW continues to assess that continued delays in US security assistance are specifically impacting Ukraine’s ability to respond to an increased tempo of Russian mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine.[20] Sparse and inconsistent Ukrainian air defense coverage along the front resulting from shortages in Ukrainian air defense systems and missiles has facilitated Russia’s intensification of guided and unguided glide bomb strikes, which Russian forces used to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and which Russian forces are using again during their current offensive operations near Chasiv Yar.[21] Ukrainian forces have also suffered from ongoing artillery ammunition shortages, which they have partially mitigated by using first person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults.[22] ISW continues to assess, however, that while Ukrainian FPV drones are likely able to temporarily render armored vehicles hors de combat, the relatively light payloads on the current FPV drones are unlikely to destroy armored vehicles very often.[23] Ukrainian forces have been partially able to repel the recently increased tempo of Russian mechanized assaults despite these shortages but will likely be unable to continue to defend against Russian mechanized assaults as effectively in the future should delays in US security assistance continue.

Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to repel Russian mechanized assaults and inflict significant equipment losses on Russian forces when adequately provisioned. Ukrainian forces destroyed significant elements of a Russian motorized rifle brigade that tried to cross a pontoon bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River in 2022, and Russian forces lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) during a three-week offensive near Vuhledar in 2023.[24] Ukrainian forces were recently able to inflict serious armored vehicle losses during several waves of Russian mechanized assaults on Avdiivka in fall 2023 before artillery shortages worsened through the winter into the spring of 2024.[25] ISW has generally observed that recent Russian mechanized assaults have exhibited the same tactical patterns that have previously resulted in large Russian vehicle losses in 2022 and 2023, and Ukrainian forces are therefore likely able to repeat their previous successes against Russian mechanized assaults should the US provide Ukraine with the necessary assistance.[26]

Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign amid ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 13 that Germany will immediately transfer another Patriot system to Ukraine to defend against the ongoing increased Russian strike campaign against the Ukrainian energy grid.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later clarified that the Patriot system includes an unspecified number of missiles and that Germany and Ukraine are discussing the provision of an additional IRIS-T air defense system.[28] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian citizens and infrastructure is endangering Ukraine’s energy supply and destroying defense industrial facilities that are critical to Ukraine’s operational readiness.[29] Zelensky and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently called on Ukraine’s Western allies to send Ukraine more Patriot batteries to protect Ukrainian cities and frontline areas, particularly Kharkiv City, from Russian ballistic missiles.[30] Kuleba stated on April 10 that Ukraine urgently needs seven Patriot batteries, and the additional German-provided Patriot system will significantly ease, but not resolve, the strain on Ukraine‘s air defense umbrella and the limited number of Patriot batteries currently in Ukraine.[31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhaylo Podolyak stated during an interview on April 13 that Ukraine has not run out of Patriot and IRIS-T missiles, but that Ukraine’s supply of Western air defense missiles is “in deficit.”[32] Former Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat warned in January 2024 that Ukraine began rationing its air defense equipment and ammunition and used a considerable amount of Ukraine’s existing air defense missile stockpile in defending against several large Russian drone and missile strike series in the first two weeks of January.[33] Recent large-scale Russian strikes have likely only further degraded Ukraine’s air defense missile stockpiles, and the German MoD and Zelensky did not specify how many additional Patriot missiles Germany is sending to Ukraine alongside the system.

Ukrainian officials also continue to discuss their envisioned use of F-16 and other fixed wing aircraft as part of Ukraine’s broader air defense umbrella. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on April 13 that Ukraine needs at least 150 aircraft to effectively conduct air operations and noted that the Ukrainian Air Force will base its rearmament around F-16s, Swedish produced Gripen multirole fixed-wing aircraft, and other aircraft.[34] Yevlash stated that Ukraine will use F-16s to augment existing Ukrainian ground-based air defenses defending against Russian Shahed-136/131 drones and cruise and guided missiles and to constrain Russian aviation operations. Yevlash noted that even two squadrons, roughly 18 aircraft, could significantly influence the situation in the Ukrainian air space and ease pressure on strained Ukrainian air defense systems. Zelensky stated on April 6 that the promised F-16 fighter jets from Ukraine’s Western partners only account for 10 percent of the fighter aircraft that Ukraine would need to defeat the Russian aviation threat.[35] Zelensky suggested that Ukraine will need a combination of air defense systems and fighter aircraft to defeat the Russian aviation threat. Some of the promised European-provided F-16s are expected to arrive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024, although ISW continues to assess that only the United States can rapidly provide aircraft and air defense systems to Ukraine at the scale necessary to significantly improve Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.[36]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance.
The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance.
The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general.
Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions.
Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.
Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign and ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Donetsk City.
Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued near Kreminna on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske and south of Kreminna near Dibrova, the Serebryanske forest area, and Bilohorivka.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow strike against the Luhansk Machine Building Plant in Luhansk City on April 13.[39] Geolocated footage published on April 13 shows a smoke plume and fires near the Luhansk Machine Building Plant in Luhansk City.[40] Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the Luhansk Machine Building Plant, which Russian authorities had been preparing to reopen soon.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW will be orientating activity in the immediate Bakhmut area around Chasiv Yar for the foreseeable future as ISW assesses that the seizure of Chasiv Yar is the current Russian operational objective in the area.

Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut on April 13. Positional fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[42] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating north of Vesele (southeast of Siversk).[43]

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on April 13. Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[44] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) on the evening of April 12 but failed to establish footholds in the area, and the Ukrainian officials stressed that Ukrainian forces still control the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Bohdanivka and advanced closer to Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and further west of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the Kanal microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not observed further Russian advances on the outskirts of the Kanal microraion since April 4.[47] Fighting also continued near the Novyi microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar); southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Opytne, and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Pivdenne.[48] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske.[49] Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and elements of the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west and southwest of Avdiivka on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 13 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Pervomaiske, although ISW assessed that Russian forces captured the settlement as of April 9.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced on the southern outskirts of Novokalynove (northwest of Adiivka), in the western outskirts of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), further west within Semenivka (west of Avdiivka), and south of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka) along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway.[52] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 4.95 kilometers in width and 1.6km in depth towards Umanske and Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka).[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka, Umanske, and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Netaylove.[54] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Ukrainian forces repelled mechanized Russian assaults of unspecified size in the Avdiivka direction and destroyed a column of an unspecified number of Russian armored vehicles.[55] Elements of the Russian 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations in the area on April 13. Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains on the southeastern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[57] Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced during at least squad-sized mechanized assaults north of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[58] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Kostyantynivka (west of Novomykhailivka), and Vodyane.[59] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Marinka direction.[60]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 13 amid claims of intensified Russian offensive activity in the area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[61] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Urozhaine, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Urozhaine a few days ago but that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of the settlement.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed a bridge between Velyka Novosilka and Vremivka, and geolocated footage published on April 13 shows Russian forces striking a bridge over the Mokri Yaly River northeast of Vremivka.[63] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Urozhaine.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne, where a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwards along Silska Street.[65] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions northwest of Verbove (northeast of Robotyne) and that Ukrainian forces are now four kilometers from the settlement.[66] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim, however. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are assessing Ukraine’s strength on the Robotyne-Verbove line and that Russian forces have not established lasting positions in Robotyne.[67]

Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on April 13.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.[69] A source familiar with US intelligence told Bloomberg that 70 percent of Russia’s machine tool imports and 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronic imports came from China in the last quarter of 2023 (October-December). The source stated that Chinese companies are also working to produce drones in Russia. Sources familiar with US intelligence told Bloomberg that there is no evidence that Chinese firms are supplying Russia with lethal assistance but noted that the Russian defense industry would struggle without Chinese imports. Bloomberg reported on April 6 that China has provided Russia with microelectronics, optics, machine tools for tanks, propellants for missiles, and nitrocellulose — an intermediary good used in producing gunpower and explosives.[70] Russian imports of Chinese-made electronic components and machine tools are likely part of Russia’s efforts to address its reliance on sanctioned, Western-produced precision machine tools and components in the short-term as Russia works to develop its domestic production capacity for these products in the long-term.[71]

The United States and United Kingdom (UK) continue to issue sanctions aimed at reducing Russia’s war chest. The US Department of Treasury and UK announced on April 12 that the United States and UK issued new sanctions prohibiting the import of Russian origin aluminum, copper, and nickel and limiting the use of these three Russian origin metals on global metal exchanges and in over-the-counter derivatives trading.[72]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied area today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced on April 12 that Belgian prosecutors are investigating Russian interference in the June 2024 European Parliament election.[73] De Croo stated that Belgian intelligence services have discovered pro-Russian interference networks operating in Belgium and several other unspecified European countries to promote pro-Russian candidates in the elections. De Croo stated that Czech authorities found that Kremlin-affiliated actors paid European members of parliament to promote pro-Russian policies.

Kremlin officials continue to falsely implicate the West and Ukraine as sponsoring terrorism following the Crocus City Hall attack. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continued to promote the Russian claim that the West and Ukraine have financed terrorist attacks in Russia and abroad “for many years.”[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance.
The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance.
The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general.
Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions.
Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.
Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign and ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Donetsk City.
Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 13, 2024

Apr 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 13, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance.
The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance.
The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general.
Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions.
Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.
Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign and ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Donetsk City.
Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on April 13.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied area today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

14. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Iran launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory.
The IRGC Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel
Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun.
West Bank: The IDF announced that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom. Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 13, 2024

Apr 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 13, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 7:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The following coverage of the Iranian attack on Israel has an information cutoff of 7:00 pm ET. The rest of the coverage has an information cutoff of 2:00 pm ET.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on April 13.[1] This marks the first time Iran has targeted Israel directly from Iranian territory.[2] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari confirmed that Iran launched drones and then missiles from Iranian territory toward Israel.[3] The IRGC announced the start of operation “True Promise” at approximately 15:30 EST on April 13.[4] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council approved the attack and the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the attack under the supervision of the Armed Forces General Staff. The IRGC launched hundreds of drones toward Israel, including Shahed-136 one-way attack drones.[5] The attack included at least three attack waves over the course of several hours.[6] Israeli media reported that the IRGC launched its operation from Kermanshah city, Kermanshah Province, and Dokuh, Hormozgan Province, in western Iran.[7]

The United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Jordan began intercepting drones and missiles outside of Israeli airspace between 1700 and 1800 ET, according to Israeli media and several unspecified sources speaking to Israeli media.[8] IDF spokesperson Hagari said in a press briefing that Iran launched over 200 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.[9] Flight radar reported that the airspace over Iran, Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon is closed.[10] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations posted on X (Twitter) that the operation was launched in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Damascus. The Iranian Permanent Mission wrote that the Iranian “True Promise” operation “can be deemed concluded” at 1800 ET.[11]

Members of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to have conducted attacks targeting Israel simultaneously with Iran’s first wave of attacks. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed it fired “dozens” of Katyusha rockets targeting an Israeli missile and artillery base in the Golan Heights at 1800 ET.[12] The Houthis posted two promotional videos about destroying Israel during Iran’s wave of drone attacks, but has not claimed any attack at the time of writing.[13] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (True Promise Corps) congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on April 13 for participating in the attack targeting Israel.[14] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack at the time of writing. The Iranian-backed Badr Organization posted a graphic celebrating Iran’s attack on Israel stating that “we are among the criminals taking revenge” suggesting that the militia may have supported the attack on Israel in an unspecified capacity.[15]

The Israeli war cabinet convened on April 13 in Tel Aviv and remains in session.[16] Israel immediately took certain preventative measures after the first wave of drones were launched. Israel closed its airspace.[17] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) evacuated several bases, deployed aircraft, and raised air defense readiness.[18] The IDF instructed residents along its northern border in the Golan Heights, Eilat, Dimona, and Nevatim (Negev region) to remain close to shelters.[19]

Iran warned Israel’s partners, particularly the United States and Jordan, not to intervene in Iran’s attack against Israel. Supreme National Security Council-affiliated media warned the United States against intervening in Iran’s attack, claiming that Iran has prepared ballistic missile platforms to target “several US bases in the region.”[20] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN similarly warned the United States to “stay away” from the conflict between Iran and Israel.[21] The United States and the United Kingdom have intercepted over 100 drones outside of Israeli airspace at the time of this writing.[22] IRGC-affiliated media separately warned Jordan that it will be Iran’s “next target” if it participates in an Israeli response to Iran’s attack.[23] Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that Iran will give a “decisive response” to any country that allows Israel to use its airspace or territory to conduct a counterattack against Iran.[24] Israeli media reported that Jordanian aircraft shot down Iranian drones headed toward Israel over northern and central Jordan.[25]

The composition of the ongoing Iranian attack on Israel is similar to the composition of Russian strikes that have repeatedly targeted Ukraine. These Russian strikes have attempted to determine the optimal package to penetrate Western air and missile defenses. Russia has experimented with combinations of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside Iranian drones in Ukraine.[26] Iran’s use of drones and missiles shows how Iran is learning from the Russians to develop increasingly dangerous and effective strike packages against Israel. Iran has also used the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea to refine Iranian drone tactics by testing US Navy air defenses.[27] The ongoing Iranian attacks provide Iran opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US air and maritime defenses more effectively.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on April 13, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.[28] IRGC-controlled media published a video of IRGC Navy forces repelling from a helicopter onto the MSC Aries.[29] The Zodiac Maritime, a shipping company owned by Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer, owns the MSC Aries and chartered the vessel to the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC).[30] The MSC confirmed that the MSC Aries, which was en route from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to India, was “boarded by Iranian authorities” and “diverted from her itinerary towards Iran.”[31] IRGC-controlled media emphasized that the seizure of the MSC Aries “has nothing to do with Iran’s retaliatory measure” against Israel for the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[32]

The IRGC Navy’s seizure of the MSC Aries comes amid increased Iranian threats to the UAE. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri recently claimed that Israel’s presence in the UAE threatens Iran and reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9.[33] Israel has increasingly relied on an overland trade route that connects Haifa to Dubai via Jordan and Saudi Arabia to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[34] Tehran and its regional allies have threatened to disrupt the Israeli ground connection to the Persian Gulf. Iranian state media and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade through its territory.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have specifically called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan.[36] The IRGC Navy may have specifically targeted the Aries MSC to increase pressure on the UAE to sever economic ties with Israel.

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Iran launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory.
The IRGC Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel
Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun.
West Bank: The IDF announced that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom. Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun on April 13. The IDF Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) located the Palestinian fighters using a drone.[37] The IDF Northern Brigade most recently conducted a raid in Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City, south of Beit Hanoun.[38] CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[39] The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Hamas company commander for the Beit Hanoun area during clashes with Hamas fighters in the area on April 4.[40] Palestinian militias continued ability to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the assessed infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ intentions to reassert its governing authority following Israeli withdrawals.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations outside Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 13. Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[41] Israeli forces destroyed a Hamas weapons storage facility and confiscated military equipment belonging to the group during clearing operations.[42] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on April 12 shows flattened terrain in Zahra, north of Nuseirat, indicating that Israeli bulldozers and/or heavy vehicles are operating in the area.

Several Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces near Nuseirat on April 13. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted five attacks north of Nuseirat during the past two days, which included firing a rocket-propelled grenade at an IDF tank.[43] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces and a military position north of Nuseirat, respectively.[44]

The IDF Air Force struck over 30 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 13, including anti-tank equipment.[45]

PIJ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) conducted a combined rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel on April 12.[46] The IDF said that it intercepted three rockets.[47] Israeli artillery targeted the launch site of the attack in the Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force struck three rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip that contained about 20 rockets ready to be launched into central Israel.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF announced on April 13 that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom.[48] The IDF reported that unspecified persons killed the boy with a blade and that the investigation is ongoing.[49] The IDF initially began searching for the boy with Israeli settlers on April 12 near the Israeli settlement of Malachi HaShalom.[50] Israeli and Palestinian media reported violence occurred in al Mughayir, a Palestinian town west of Malachi HaShalom, during the search on April 12. The IDF reported that there were “violent disturbances” in al Mughayir but that the Israeli forces entered the town and removed the Israeli settlers from the area.[51] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media confirmed that at least one Palestinian civilian died during the violence.[52] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF is preparing for widespread riots and “disturbances” across the West Bank in response to the boy’s death[53][54]

Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence on April 13 in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body. The IDF reported that participants in clashes between Israelis and Palestinians in several areas of the West Bank threw stones and fired weapons.[55] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers rioted and committed acts of violence in al Mughayir, Dumas, Abu Falah, Beit Furik, and Kosra.[56] The Jerusalem Post cited unspecified Israeli, Arab, and US media who reported that Israeli settlers also targeted Deir Dibwan, Sinjil, and Beitin.[57] Israeli media and local reports reported that Israeli settlers set fire to cars and Palestinian homes.[58] There were also reports of casualties during the violence. The Palestinian Red Crescent reported that three Palestinians were wounded in al Mughayr.[59] Israeli media reported that Israeli settlers fired small arms, killing a Palestinian in al Mughayir.[60] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers shot and injured three Palestinians.[61]

Senior Israeli cabinet officials appeared to call on Israeli settlers to return home in an attempt to restore order. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Israeli citizens to allow Israeli forces to operate “unhindered.”[62] Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant added that “revenge” will make it difficult for Israeli forces to pursue the boy’s killers.[63] Gallant and Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz urged the Israeli settlers not to take the law “into [their] own hands.”[64] The IDF reported later on April 13 that clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians had ended.[65]

Palestinian militias called for a general mobilization of fighters and Palestinian civilians in response to settler violence that occurred in the West Bank on April 12 and 13. Hamas called on Palestinian militias and civilians in the West Bank to take up arms and escalate “resistance activity” against Israeli forces and settlers.[66] Hamas also called on the Palestinian Authority to exercise its authority to protect Palestinians in the West Bank.[67] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade announced a general mobilization of all of its fighters in Tulkarm to retaliate against the settler violence at al Mughayir.[68] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine posted a statement calling for the formation of a “popular protection committee” in all Palestinian towns in the West Bank to “confront” settler “crimes” and to “thwart their malicious goals.”[69]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 11.[70] Hezbollah fired one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome site near Kfar Blum.[71] The IDF confirmed that a drone fell in the Kfar Blum area.[72] Hezbollah claimed that the Israelis are using the site as an alternative to one at Kfar Blum after a Hezbollah attack targeting the Iron Dome batteries there in January 2024.[73] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the claim.

15. Strike Complexes and the Operational Art

Excerpts:

I would summarise this crucial issue as follows:

Command and Control: Ongoing challenges with integration of joint operations, different strike capabilities and the gap between strategy and tactical operations. The lack of an established command echelon above brigades means there is a gap between strategic direction and tactical action. This prevents coordination of wide-scale offensives as well as the operational strike necessary to attack Russian second and third echelon troops, and glide-bomb carrying aircraft, before they engage in combat with Ukrainian ground forces. It is an area where western nations could assist. Finally, it appears that Russia has developed the ability to plan and execute a large-scale air campaign. This was a key deficiency at the start of the war which it appears to have remediated.

That concludes the fourth in this series of insights into the status of the war in Ukraine. I will publish more insights from my latest Ukraine visit in the coming days.

Strike Complexes and the Operational Art

Observations from my latest Ukraine visit, Part 4

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/strike-complexes-and-the-operational?utm=

MICK RYAN

APR 13, 2024

∙ PAID

Image: Radio Free Europe

During my recent visit to Ukraine, I had the opportunity to speak with a variety of government and military officials, as well as experts in various think tanks. These conversations provided many new insights which built upon knowledge I have gained in my previous trips to Ukraine.

This article is the fourth in a series of short pieces that provide my thoughts in the wake of my most recent Ukraine visit. The first part in this series explored war strategy. The second part examined strategic communications and influence. In part three of this series, I wrote about the people issues which are having an impact on the war.

In this fourth article in the series, I explore operational command and control and the issue of strike operations. I also look at how Russia has now developed the ability to conduct a large and sophisticated air, missile and drone offensive campaign.

Tactical v Operational Thinking and Action

One of the issues that was apparent in the conduct of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023 was its inability to scale tactical operations to undertake integrated multi-brigade activities. While the counteroffensive employed many brigades, these were rarely employed concurrently in a way that placed the Russians in tactical or operational dilemmas.

Essentially, Ukraine was not able to undertake the application of multiple Brigade-level combat power concurrently. This, combined with the deep defensive belts, means that the Russians were rarely placed under significant pressure and that the Ukrainians did not generate uncertainty for the Russians by the conduct of multiple operations at the same time in different locations.

The inability to undertake multi-unit and multi-brigade operations is possibly magnified by the fact that they lack divisional and corps level command echelons. In general, Ukrainian brigades are ‘grouped’ by geography. Many brigades appear to lack the planning and control capacity for the execution of integrated combined-arms, air-land operations. If Ukraine is to conduct large scale offensive operations in future, this is a critical deficiency that must be addressed.

It is a function of training, and countries such as the US, UK and Australia are well placed to provide the training to develop this capacity in the Ukrainian military.

Additionally, the lack of a command echelon above brigades that can act as an integrating headquarters for multiple combat and support brigades, as well as air-land combat power, means there is a gap between strategic direction and tactical action. In western military organisations, this is described as the operational level; it is where strategic direction from government and national military institutions is interpreted and broken down into tactical activity for lower-level formations. This is a layer that is significantly underdone in Ukraine.

The importance of this echelon of command is demonstrated with a Cold-War example. In the 1970s and 1980s, NATO was concerned with how it might overcome a numerically larger Warsaw Pact ground force – the same issue Ukraine now has with Russia. The solution it developed was founded on being able to exploit new concepts and technology for air and ground operations at the operational level to interdict and destroy Russian second and third echelon forces before they could be brought into action in close combat.

One element of this was the U.S. Assault Breaker program, which aimed to move beyond the attack of massed second and third echelon Soviet forces with crewed aircraft. These strike operations were to be complemented with an array of new technologies for ISR and strike. This led to new technologies for the detect and destroy functions.

Ukraine, which is developing an array of technologies for striking Russian forces at distance, appears to be in the midst of similar program that may deliver like capabilities.

A doctrinal element that complemented Assault Breaker, from the U.S. Army, was Air Land Battle. As one US Army publication has described it:

Air Land Battle doctrine embodies four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Initiative places a premium on commanders actively setting the terms of battle. It accords high significance to winning the first battle, and likely with fewer troops than the opposition. Agility emphasizes the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. Depth underscores the expansion of operations in space and time so that the conduct of the deep battle supports success in the close battle.

Air Land Battle, which was encoded in the FM 100-5 publications was an important shift from a historic emphasis on tactical activities (winning battles) to a more operational focus, including rapid movement of forces, avoiding decisive confrontations with the adversary forces and a synchronised use of combat power for the deep and close fights. Air-Land Battle also emphasized the crucial nature of advanced technologies in modern war.

Importantly, the new doctrine shaped the training and education of personnel and was the foundation for collective training and readiness activities.

This is something Ukraine probably also needs to do now. It not only provides a way to attrit Russian forces before they are engaged in close combat, but it also ensures a better link between Ukrainian war strategy and the conduct of its tactical actions across a very long front line, as well as the more effective integration of intelligence and logistics. This piece by the late Dave Johnson provides insights into the lessons of Air Land Battle that might assist in the modern context.

A shift in tactical and operational thinking could be a useful part of the current transformation activities in the Ukrainian Armed Forces that were directed by President Zelensky when he appointed the new commander-in-chief. It may require reorganisation of command and control as well as strike capabilities, and a step up in production of reconnaissance and strike drones and missiles (including extended range HIMARS protected against Russian jamming).

At the same time, Ukraine may need to consider re-weighting its strike campaign. While focussed heavily on strategic strike, embracing operational level war will demand a greater emphasis on striking operational targets.

Strategic Strike Complexes

A final issue with Ukrainian command and control is their maturing strategic strike complex. I have written on this topic several times during the war. My most recent article on this topic can be read here.

Beginning from almost nothing in 2022, Ukraine has developed – and continues to evolve – a long range strike capability using aerial and maritime drones. It is increasingly sophisticated, as was demonstrated by the recent series of concurrent attacks on Russian airbases, and the very effective campaign to deny the western Black Sea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The issue however is that this strategic strike complex appears to actually be three separate and competing systems.

The first element is the Ukrainian Navy’s strike system, which include semi-submersible attack drones and missiles. The second system is the Ukrainian armed forces aerial attack systems which are used to attack military targets. The third element is the strategic strike capability of the intelligence services, which is employed to strike Russian energy infrastructure and strategic defence factories.

There is potential for these three systems to work at cross purposes, and a greater level of collaboration in planning, and cooperation in development of weapon systems, would be desirable.

A related issue is the recent comments by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. These comments, which noted U.S. unease with Ukraine striking targets in Russia, deeply offended many Ukrainians (and rightly so). Some in Ukraine, which is targeting legitimate military targets with Ukrainian weapons, saw these comments as unnecessary and another way in which the U.S. administration is trying to tie the hands of the Ukrainians in how they prosecute the war.

Russia Develops Its Air Campaign

Finally, it appears that Russia has now developed the ability to plan and execute a large-scale air campaign. This was a key capability deficiency at the beginning of the war which it appears to have remediated. It has stepped up production of key missiles and there has been a significant increase in the past six months of glide bombs and Iranian-designed Shahed drones against military and civilian targets. In the past month alone, Russia has damaged 30% of Ukraine’s power generation capacity. It has also evolved its strike tactics, which now generally accord with the following:

1^st wave. Shahed drones to unmask Ukrainian air defence radars and missile launchers.
2^nd wave. Cruise missiles to destroy Ukrainian air defence.
3^rd wave. Ballistic missiles to destroy key targets.

The strategic objectives of the Russian strike campaign appear to be two-fold: degrade Ukrainian defence production; and, terrorise the population into leaving, depopulating Ukraine. The destruction of power stations, and rapid follow-on attacks against first responders are part of this approach.

The longer the war continues, the more capable and sophisticated the Russians will be at running such integrated air campaigns. This will be of concern to Ukraine but should also worry NATO planners for future operations. It bears noting that we can almost be certain that China will also be learning from the Russian approach.

More air defence systems, and a constant flow of the interceptor missiles, is required.

Summary: Embracing Operational Art

I would summarise this crucial issue as follows:

Command and Control: Ongoing challenges with integration of joint operations, different strike capabilities and the gap between strategy and tactical operations. The lack of an established command echelon above brigades means there is a gap between strategic direction and tactical action. This prevents coordination of wide-scale offensives as well as the operational strike necessary to attack Russian second and third echelon troops, and glide-bomb carrying aircraft, before they engage in combat with Ukrainian ground forces. It is an area where western nations could assist. Finally, it appears that Russia has developed the ability to plan and execute a large-scale air campaign. This was a key deficiency at the start of the war which it appears to have remediated.

That concludes the fourth in this series of insights into the status of the war in Ukraine. I will publish more insights from my latest Ukraine visit in the coming days.

16. Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries shows the growing threat AI drones pose to energy markets

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries shows the growing threat AI drones pose to energy markets

KEY POINTS

Ukraine-launched drones have hit 18 Russian oil refineries with a combined capacity of 3.9 million barrels per day this year, according to JPMorgan.
The investment bank estimates 670,000 bpd of Russian refining capacity is currently offline due to the strikes.
Kyiv’s capabilities are growing, with drones demonstrating a longer range and utilizing artificial intelligence to improve precision.

CNBC · by Spencer Kimball · April 14, 2024

In this article

Smoke billows after Ukraine's SBU drone strikes a refinery, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Ryazan, Ryazan Region, Russia, in this screen grab from a video obtained by Reuters, March 13, 2024.

Video Obtained By Reuters | Via Reuters

Ukraine's campaign of attacks against Russian oil refineries is demonstrating how relatively cheap drones that utilize artificial intelligence could pose a major threat to global energy markets.

Ukraine-launched drones have hit 18 Russian oil refineries this year with a combined capacity of 3.9 million barrels per day, according to report published by JPMorgan earlier this month. Some 670,000 bpd of Russian refining capacity is currently offline due to the strikes, according to the bank.

Ukraine's capabilities are growing with its drones now demonstrating a substantially longer range. Earlier this month, Kyiv hit Russia's third-largest oil refinery, Taneco, which is located up to 1,300 kilometers — roughly 800 miles — from the frontlines, according to JPMorgan.

Ukraine is increasingly using drones that are enabled with AI, which helps the weapons navigate and avoid jamming, according to the bank.

"The AI guidance also delivers strike precision, maximizing the impact of the strikes by targeting specific areas like distillation towers, repairs of which requires Western technology," Natasha Kaneva, head of global commodities strategy at JPMorgan, told clients in the April report. "This makes the repairs costly and often require equipment that the country is not able to produce."

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made clear Tuesday that the Biden administration is worried about the strikes in a rare airing of public disagreement with U.S. allies in Kyiv.

"Certainly, those attacks could have a knock-on effect in terms of the global energy situation," Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "Quite frankly, I think Ukraine is better served in going after tactical and operational targets that can directly influence the current fight."

The U.S. has urged Ukraine to stop the attacks on Russian energy infrastructure out of concern that they could drive up crude oil prices and instigate retaliation from Moscow, three people familiar with the discussions told the Financial Times last month.

The losses to Russian refining capacity could worsen as Ukraine aims to build a full-fledge drone industry and produce a million units domestically this year, according to the JPMorgan report. If Kyiv is able to extend the drones' range to 1,500 kilometers (about 932 miles), they could potentially hit 21 refineries with more than 4.4 million bpd of refined capacity, according to the report.

"There's room for this to become a bigger problem, because we've come to count on Russian supply getting to the global market, which allows other non-Russian supply to go to other places," said John Kilduff, an energy expert and founding partner at Again Capital.

The deployment of AI drones also has broader implications for global energy markets, according to Bob Brackett, a senior research analyst at Bernstein. The drones are cheap to produce compared to the millions of dollars in damage they can cause and could empower nonstate actors to challenge superior fighting forces, Brackett told clients in Friday note.

"These drones can easily and asymmetrically disrupt global seaborne trade," Brackett wrote, warning that oil exporters such as Russia aren't the only countries that need to be worried. Oil importers, like China and India, will now have to worry about disruptions to crude flows from drone attacks, he said.

Impact on oil, gasoline prices

Ukraine's campaign of drone strikes comes at the same time as tensions are running red hot in the Middle East, with OPEC member Iran and Israel now teetering on the brink of a direct confrontation.

U.S. crude oil has rallied nearly 20% this year, while the global benchmark Brent has gained 17% as the wars in Middle East and Eastern Europe rage against the backdrop of rising crude demand and tightening supply. Gasoline futures have surged about 33% since the year began.

Bob McNally, president of Rapidan Energy, said the drone strikes are not a major issue for oil prices right now because the attacks on refineries are primarily affecting Russia's production of diesel at a time when the market is already glutted.

But Russia is also major exporter of a gasoline feedstock called naphtha. If naphta markets were to tighten because of the attacks it could have an impact on gas prices and balances, said McNally, who served as a senior energy official in the George W. Bush administration.

Goldman Sachs said in a research note last month that the strikes are bullish for diesel prices, but the impact on crude oil is mixed. Outages can lead to reduced oil demand from refineries, which is bearish for prices. But the market is worried Ukraine could increasingly hit oil production and transportation infrastructure, which would weigh on Russian crude exports, according to Goldman.

Bart Melek, head of commodity strategy at TD Securities, said the current strikes could have an indirect effect on oil markets. As Russian fuel exports decline due to the attacks, countries that rely on those exports then need to source fuel from refineries in other jurisdictions, Melek said. Those refiners need more crude to meet the demand which can stress oil supplies, he said.

Russian production already poses a problem for the Biden administration. Moscow has pledged to cut its oil output and exports by an additional 471,000 barrels per day in the second quarter to meet its commitments to OPEC+.

Those cuts could push the price of Brent crude to $100 by September, which will put pressure on the Biden administration just before the presidential election, according to a JPMorgan report last month.

The investment bank expects U.S. gas prices to hit $4 per gallon by May, the highest level since the summer of 2022.

"There are few issues that terrify a sitting American president in an election year more than surging gasoline prices," said Rapidan's McNally.

CNBC · by Spencer Kimball · April 14, 2024

17. U.S. Military Isn't That Concerned About War With Iran

Hmm... Does this hold up after the drone attack on Israel?

But this is quite an analysis of a single "indicator.' (morticians and bodybags?)

U.S. Military Isn't That Concerned About War With Iran

If Washington believed that Iran was about to start a war with Israel, would the Pentagon be bringing home its morticians?

Daniel Boguslaw

April 13 2024, 5:14 p.m.

The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw · April 13, 2024

Units on alert, naval ships repositioning, bombers postured to fly, Marines ready to storm the beaches. These are all of the routines of a crisis that signals U.S. military readiness for war. But there’s another routine that often eludes Washington’s acknowledgment: the military’s own deployment schedule when it comes to units venturing out there into the real world. The schedule is sacrosanct. So while some might think the potential for war with Iran — right now — is high and the U.S. military is on high alert, the reality is that it’s business as usual.

On Friday, the Pentagon made vague statements that it is moving assets to the Middle East to express American displeasure and readiness should Iran attack Israel. President Joe Biden made a public threat toward Iran: “Don’t,” referring to any Iranian strike. And the administration trumpeted the presence of Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, commander of Central Command, or CENTCOM, in Israel, there to “consult” with America’s ironclad partner.

But as Washington hawks and the news media hold their breath for what they call an “imminent” strike overseen by Tehran on Israeli soil, the U.S. military in the Middle East is sticking to its regular schedule of soldier comings and goings, including the redeployment of a high-profile Marine battle group that returned to the U.S. after an eight-month voyage.

In fact, thousands of Marines, Navy sailors, Army troops, and Air Force war fighters have cycled back stateside over the past few weeks and even since the Israeli attack on the Iranian Embassy compound in Syria on April 1. In a purely routine way, in accordance with existing plans, some half-dozen deployments to the Middle East have come to an end. For the armed services, maintaining soldier schedules is more important than geopolitics. And indeed, there’s no evidence that the military services take much notice of the contradiction between their schedules and a brewing escalation. They are more focused on trying to please service members, wives, and parents in their bids to recruit and retain enlisted people than they are on the Pentagon’s war game machinations.

Even the Army’s undertakers are calling it quits. According to a recent announcement, Army body-bag handlers returned from the Middle East this month. “The 54th Quartermaster Company is the Army’s only active-duty mortuary affairs unit,” the announcement reads. “The unit sent 29 Soldiers to Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates in support of a wide array of operations in the region. Today, we get to welcome back detachment number one, 29 of our best from CENTCOM,” the company commander Capt. Peter Kase said.

Meanwhile, service members overseeing rescue operations relating to air and naval attacks by Yemen returned home this month. An announcement celebrating the accomplishments and return of the U.S. Air Force Capt. Araceli Saunders last week details her efforts while deployed in Saudi Arabia, including “providing airborne alert for Operation POSEIDON ARCHER enabling thirty-one coalition strikes on Yemeni bases” and “reducing the threat to international maritime shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.”

Despite Houthi attacks from Yemen and Iran-backed militia strikes from Syria and Iraq, U.S. forces routinely cycle in and out of the Middle East. On March 16, more than 4,000 Marines and sailors with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit began their journey home from a deployment that was reoriented from pure training to direct support for American diplomacy and military readiness after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7.

Meanwhile, soldiers tasked with strengthening deterrence on land, according to the Army, have also ended their deployments. On February 8, artillery gunners with the Michigan Army National Guard returned from a deployment to Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. According to the press release, the soldiers supported Operation Inherent Resolve, the military’s ongoing war against ISIS.

“Alpha Battery’s accomplishments during their deployment underscore the Michigan National Guard’s commitment to ensuring the safety and security of our nation,” a spokespeople said. “Their dedication and proficiency in operating the HIMARS [long-range missile] system have significantly advanced our strategic objectives in the region.”

The return of soldiers from CENTCOM follows an announcement this past week that the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, based out of Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, is reorganizing to better meet its own internal deployment requirements. There’s no mention of strategic reshuffling to meet imminent plans for war, but rather “to provide predictability for Airmen” in future deployments and rotations, in other words, to meet quality-of-life objectives.

As intelligence officials give dire predictions to the New York Times about Iran’s threat, and Israeli military officials warn citizens against hoarding in preparation for a volley of cruise missiles, Iran continues to go to great lengths to avoid an out-of-control conflict with its sworn adversary, and its hawkish Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

A Financial Times report from this week details Iran’s efforts to convey through diplomatic channels that it does not wish to see an escalation that stokes all-out war with Israel and the United States. This and other news media reports say that Iran is engaging the United States through diplomatic channels to find a response that both demonstrates deterrence in response to the April 1 strike, without starting a war. (The U.S. and Iran have been talking through Oman to avoid an appearance of direct negotiations.)

In a subtle nod to its view that it’s business as usual, the U.S. Navy quietly relinquished command of the Red Sea Combined Task Force 153, handing it over to an Italian counterpart at the beginning of April. “I am incredibly proud of all the hard work and dedication by CTF 153 staff and units at-sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian,” outgoing U.S. Navy commander Capt. David Coles said. “Their efforts have directly contributed to regional maritime security and freedom of navigation in the CTF 153 area of operations. … It is a true honor to hand over command to an incredibly strong maritime partner like Italy. I know the Task Force is in good hands, and look forward to celebrating CTF 153’s future accomplishments under Capt. Messina’s stewardship.”

If Iran attacks Israel or the United States, on the ground, the American military posture looks routine, nowhere near matching the feverish vibes coming out of Washington. From his hotel room in Tel Aviv, Kurilla undoubtedly is closer to the action with his cellphone on red alert. But his visit is purely symbolic with regard to Iran. The truth is that the U.S. “mission” in the Middle East right now is as much to dissuade Israel from escalating.

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The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw · April 13, 2024

18. How Will Israel Respond to the Iranian Attack?

At least the headline editor used the right word in the title. Respond (versus retaliate).

If the main effort of the US is to avoid war... well ... that might be a policy that actually invites war or increases the ponteital for it.

Excerpts:

Finally, the U.S. position is simple. The United States wants to avoid a regional war that could drag in U.S. forces, roil international markets, and complicate the position of Washington’s Arab allies. It wants to protect Israel, but it also wants Israel to wrap up its operations in Gaza. The biggest sighs of relief were probably those in the White House Situation Room overnight, in the belief that neither Israel nor Iran is likely to do much more.

Nevertheless, although both Iran and Israel have strong reasons to de-escalate, politics in both countries are messy, and fear and uncertainty are running high. A simple miscalculation, such as the belief that the enemy will inevitably escalate, could be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

What Saturday’s fireworks hopefully also illustrated is the danger of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East. The region is not better without the United States; it is far more dangerous, unpredictable, explosive, and threatening to America’s own interests. U.S. diplomacy has helped reassure Israel and makes it less likely that Israel will escalate, while U.S. military forces are part of why Tehran hesitated to do more. The latest round of violence shows why it is important for the United States to take the lead on pushing back on Iran and its proxies and bolstering U.S. allies.

How Will Israel Respond to the Iranian Attack?

The answer could determine whether the region is heading for all-out war.

By Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and Kenneth M. Pollack, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Daniel Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack

Iran
Middle East and North Africa

April 14, 2024, 10:45 AM

The latest Iranian salvo against Israel is raising fears that a regional war will engulf the Middle East. On Saturday, Iran launched a large drone and missile attack against Israel and seized an Israeli-linked container ship in the Strait of Hormuz. These attacks followed the Israeli assassination of several senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders in Syria.

The Iranian assault on Israel included more than 300 drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. This is obviously quite a bit more than the 15 ballistic missiles Iran fired at Ayn al-Asad Air Base and Erbil International Airport in retaliation for the U.S. killing of Qassem Suleimani, who led the IRGC’s elite Quds Force, in January 2020. The difference speaks to several points worth considering.

First, the retaliation for Suleimani’s death was about nothing more than restoring Iranian honor. Brazenly killing so important and popular a figure as Suleimani demanded some Iranian response, but Tehran was cautious because it feared an escalatory war with the United States.

Those killed by the Israeli attack on Iran’s Damascus embassy complex on April 1 were not as famous or as powerful as Suleimani, but the retaliation was larger and more sophisticated. The difference suggests that this response was about more than just honor: It was about some element of deterrence.

Iran is well aware of the extent and capability of Israel’s air defenses. The scale of the strike was almost certainly designed to enable at least some of the attacking munitions to penetrate those defenses and cause some degree of damage. Their inability to do so was doubtless a disappointment to Tehran, but the Iranians can probably still console themselves that the attack was frightening for the Israeli people and alarming to their government. Iran probably hopes that it was unpleasant enough to give Israeli leaders pause the next time they consider an operation like the embassy strike.

Nevertheless, while 300 or more attacking munitions certainly sounds like a lot, it also shows signs of restraint that signal Tehran’s own concerns about further escalation. First, Iran could have launched considerably more—not orders of magnitude more but probably at least double what it did without badly depleting stockpiles of its longest-range assets. Second, initial reporting indicates that the attack reportedly focused on one or more military targets, including an Israeli air force base outside Beersheba. That, too, suggests an important degree of caution on Iran’s part. It could have launched at Tel Aviv or Haifa, where any impact would have been far more likely to kill Israeli civilians.

Third, Hezbollah did not participate. Hezbollah is Iran’s ace in the hole. With more than 150,000 rockets and missiles, the Lebanese militant group could overwhelm Israeli air defenses. But Hezbollah is an Iranian ally, not a puppet, and a massive Hezbollah strike could have provoked an all-out war with Israel, something Hezbollah has been trying to avoid. Tehran would only play the Hezbollah card if what it is doing is critically important to it.

All of this reinforces the strategic assessment that Iran is not looking to escalate with Israel and is, in fact, working very hard to avoid escalation. Although Israel has hit Iran’s ally Hamas hard, the war in Gaza has gone very well for Tehran so far. Israel was badly wounded in Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, 2023, plans for Israeli-Saudi normalization have been put on ice, and much of the Middle East and the wider world is blaming Israel and the United States for all of it. There is no reason for the Iranian leadership to jeopardize all that by giving Israel (or the United States) a justification to do massive damage to Iran, which could snatch defeat from the jaws of their victory.

Moreover, the clerical regime faces significant economic challenges, widespread protests, and violence from ethnic Balochis. In addition, Iran’s military is weak, and it would be on the losing end if there were an all-out confrontation with Israeli military forces, let alone if the United States came to Israel’s aid, as it likely would (and as Iran certainly believes it would). A regional war where Iran might be on the losing end is a risky proposition for a regime already in a difficult position.

Still, Iran has crossed a Rubicon, although it may not recognize it. Iran had never struck Israel directly from its own territory before Saturday. Israel has never openly hit Iranian territory either—all of its attacks on Iran have either been military attacks on Iranians in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere or covert attacks on Iranian territory, therefore invoking plausible deniability. This was an acknowledged, indeed trumpeted, military strike on Israel from Iran. It opens the door to Israel now doing the same, and Israel can do far more damage to Iran than Iran can to Israel.

Yet Israel’s calculations are also complex. Iran arms, funds, and trains an array of Israel’s regional foes, including Hamas and Hezbollah. Israeli leaders are preparing for a conflict with Hezbollah, and some even see it as inevitable. Iran also backs the Houthis in Yemen, who are attacking international shipping in the name of striking Israel. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders believe stopping Iranian influence in the region is perhaps the country’s top priority.

Moreover, Israel has always believed that the sanctity of its deterrent was vital to the survival of the state and the safety of its citizens. Time and again, Israel has responded to any attack guided by the most fundamental logic of deterrence theory: When someone hits you, if you want to make sure they will never do it again, you hit them back 10 times harder. Oct. 7 revived Israel’s commitment to this approach, after years when the country felt safe enough to pull some of its punches to solicit greater international support.

Despite the abject failure of the Iranian attack, Israel might still feel the need to hit Iran somewhere to demonstrate that it will never itself be deterred from responding to restore its deterrent.

The failure of the Iranian attack, however, makes such an Israeli response less likely, and Israel and its military already have their hands full. The war with Hamas is ongoing, and Israel has signaled it intends to clear Rafah despite widespread international resistance, including from Washington. As a result of the war, Israel’s international reputation has plummeted, support has fallen in the United States, and its rapprochement with the Gulf Arab states is on pause. Ordinary Israelis understandably want to return to a more normal life, and the Israeli economy has taken a major hit from both the war and the massive mobilization of reservists. Right now, the Israeli army and most of the Israeli government are looking to shed military problems, not proliferate them.

There are military technical considerations as well. A small but important point is Jordan’s stakes in all of this. The Royal Jordanian Air Force gamely supported Israel not just by shooting down Iranian drones and cruise missiles crossing Jordanian territory but also reportedly opening Jordanian airspace to Israeli fighters to do the same. Although any self-respecting country would have done the former, the latter was exceptional. The Israelis probably won’t forget it—they certainly shouldn’t. Israel should be reticent to launch strikes of its own that violate Jordanian airspace—and the same should be its view toward Saudi airspace for fear of further undermining its desired normalization with Riyadh.

That leaves only a Syria-Iraq or a Turkey-Iraq route for Israeli aircraft and missiles to fly to strike Iranian targets, neither of which is ideal. They are longer legs to many key Iranian targets than the flights across Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is a NATO ally with some formidable air defenses of its own. There are still Russian air and air defense assets in Syria.

Israel has a quintet of German-made submarines capable of firing cruise missiles of their own. These can be deployed in the Indian Ocean, where their missiles would overfly only international water and Iran itself. But they have only the five, with limited numbers of cruise missiles.

None of that precludes an Israeli counterstrike on Iran, now or in the future, but it certainly complicates it. It suggests that Israel may be more likely to just go back to targeting Iranian personnel and military assets in Syria and Lebanon, and probably Iraq and Yemen, to a greater and greater extent in the future. In other words, Israel won’t be deterred by the Iranian strike, but it probably won’t be provoked by it either.

Finally, the U.S. position is simple. The United States wants to avoid a regional war that could drag in U.S. forces, roil international markets, and complicate the position of Washington’s Arab allies. It wants to protect Israel, but it also wants Israel to wrap up its operations in Gaza. The biggest sighs of relief were probably those in the White House Situation Room overnight, in the belief that neither Israel nor Iran is likely to do much more.

Nevertheless, although both Iran and Israel have strong reasons to de-escalate, politics in both countries are messy, and fear and uncertainty are running high. A simple miscalculation, such as the belief that the enemy will inevitably escalate, could be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

What Saturday’s fireworks hopefully also illustrated is the danger of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East. The region is not better without the United States; it is far more dangerous, unpredictable, explosive, and threatening to America’s own interests. U.S. diplomacy has helped reassure Israel and makes it less likely that Israel will escalate, while U.S. military forces are part of why Tehran hesitated to do more. The latest round of violence shows why it is important for the United States to take the lead on pushing back on Iran and its proxies and bolstering U.S. allies.

Foreign Policy · by Daniel Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack

19. Iran's attack on Israel raises fears of a wider war, but all sides have also scored gains

Iran's attack on Israel raises fears of a wider war, but all sides have also scored gains

BY TIA GOLDENBERG

Updated 6:47 AM EDT, April 14, 2024

AP · April 14, 2024

Follow AP’s live updates on Iran’s attack against Israel.

TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) — The unprecedented attack by Iran on Israel early Sunday ratcheted up regional tensions, confirming long-held fears about the Israel-Hamas war spiraling into a broader conflagration. But Iran, Israel, the United States and Hamas also walked away with some gains.

Here’s a look at the fallout.

ISRAEL’S RESPONSE COULD RESTORE FAITH IN ITS MILITARY

As the more than 300 drones and missiles headed toward Israel in the early hours of Sunday, the country was able to successfully put to the test its aerial defense array, which, along with help from allies, blocked 99% of the projectiles and prevented any major damage.

By contrast, Israel’s military had suffered a bruising defeat at the hands of a far less equipped enemy when Hamas stormed from Gaza into Israel on Oct. 7. That was a major blow to Israel’s image as a regional military powerhouse and shattered any sense of invincibility. The response to Iran’s attack could be what restores faith in the country’s military, even as its forces are bogged down in Gaza, more than six months after Israel declared war on Hamas there.

Israel has also boasted about the coalition of forces that helped it repel the Iranian assault. It’s a much-needed show of support at a time when Israel is at its most isolated because of concerns surrounding its conduct during the war against Hamas, including a worsening humanitarian crisis and a staggering death toll in Gaza.

IRAN SHOWS OFF ITS MIGHT

Iran vowed repeatedly that it would respond to an apparent Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus on April 1 that killed two generals. Sunday’s assault allowed Iran to show to its citizens that it won’t stand by when its assets are attacked and that it was serious when it threatened revenge.

With its strike, Iran was able to exhibit its fierce firepower, instill fear in some Israelis and disrupt the lives of many through school cancellations. But with little damage actually caused in Israel, Iran might hope that any response will be measured. Several hours after it launched the drones and missiles, Iran said the operation was over.

THE UNITED STATES STOOD BY ISRAEL

The U.S. was a key player in repelling the assault, demonstrating to its allies around the world the power and reliability of American support.

Now, as Israel mulls how and whether to respond, that alliance will be put to the test, with the Biden administration seeking to exert its leverage on Israel and prevent it from carrying out a response that might worsen the conflict.

HAMAS MAY BENEFIT FROM IRAN’S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT

Hamas, which is backed by Iran, welcomed the strike on Israel. Since launching its Oct. 7 attack, Hamas had hoped that regional partners might come to its assistance and drag Israel into a broader war. While some have done — including the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and Yemen’s Houthis — Iran had not directly entered the fray until Sunday.

Hamas could hope that the attack is the first salvo in deeper Iranian engagement in the war in Gaza. It also could hope that violence in the West Bank, where an Israeli teen was killed and settlers rampaged in Palestinian towns, continues to heat up. At the very least, Iran’s attack may have emboldened Hamas to dig in its heels in current negotiations over a cease-fire, hoping the increased military pressure on Israel might lead it to accept the militant group’s harder-line terms for a deal.

TIA GOLDENBERG

Goldenberg is an Associated Press reporter and producer covering Israel and the Palestinian territories. She previously reported on East and West Africa from Nairobi.

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AP · April 14, 2024

20. The New Civil War Movie Is Eerily Right About How the Country Could Split Apart

The New Civil War Movie Is Eerily Right About How the Country Could Split Apart

The political violence in Alex Garland’s dystopian thriller is chaotic and random — which is exactly what makes it so scary. The real Civil War was a lot like that, too.

Politico · by JAMES ROMOSER

Kirsten Dunst plays a journalist in the movie Civil War. | Murray Close/A24 via AP

By Joanna Weiss

04/13/2024 07:00 AM EDT

Joanna Weiss is a writer in Boston and a contributing writer for Politico Magazine.

When the trailers for the movie Civil War dropped a few months ago, the internet assumed it knew what was coming. The promos, after all, leaned hard into disaster flick tropes: army helicopters descending on D.C., armored tanks rolling through urban streets, the Lincoln Memorial blown up spectacularly. On movie websites and Reddit threads, some called it irresponsible to glorify violence in a tense election year. On message boards populated by militia members, some imagined they’d be portrayed as heroes, fighting against the tyranny they always knew was coming.

All of them were wrong, since, like many movie trailers, these only loosely reflected what the movie is actually about. Yes, Civil War, which opened nationwide Friday, is packed with plenty of violence. But not on the scale you’d expect. The film is light on battlefield set-pieces and CGI explosions, spends scant time with government figures — and barely touches on political issues. Its main villains are insurgents who dot the war-torn landscape and exercise power, not to any greater end, but simply because they can.

The result is a take on wartime life that’s scarier than your standard Hollywood military flick — and especially resonant in these post-Jan. 6 times, when death threats come to federal judges overseeing Donald Trump’s trials, a lawmaker’s spouse is bludgeoned with a hammer and a gun-toting extremist shows up at the home of a Supreme Court justice. As Garland portrays it, the violence of war is much more random — and, probably, much more accurate.

Partly, that’s a matter of history: The real-life Civil War of the 1860s was also marked by terrifying brutality, far away from the official battlefields. “Much of the worst unnecessary violence of the American Civil War happened because of what we would call today insurgents — what they called guerrillas,” says Aaron Sheehan-Dean, a historian at Louisiana State University and the author of The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the Civil War.

Those independent actors, scattered and loosely organized, were the precursors to some of today’s armed militia groups and the unaffiliated radicals who latch on to their ideas. And in the event of a real-life political breakdown, some experts say, these are the people who might feel most empowered and unchecked. “Civil War” performs the sleight of hand of imagining a large-scale war, big enough to match our metaphorical divisions as we fight over blue and red, R and D.

But the real threat it lays out has little to do with those battle lines. It’s not the autocracy, but the chaos.

Civil War is set in what looks like present-day America, plus or minus some wide-scale bloodshed. A group of secessionist states known as the Western Forces, led by Texas and California, has been battling an authoritarian president (Nick Offerman) who is serving a third term, has disbanded the FBI and physically attacks his political enemies. (The movie takes pains to pretend it’s not an allegory about Trump, but it opens with Offerman giving a distinctly Trumpian speech on the eve of a fight: “Some are already calling it the greatest victory in the history of mankind.”)

Still, the opening scenes are the last we see of Offerman, or war, for a long while. The protagonists aren’t combatants, but observers: a group of war correspondents, including a world-weary Reuters photographer named Lee Smith (Kirsten Dunst), who pack into an old SUV labeled “PRESS” and travel from New York to Washington, hoping to get an interview with the president before his regime falls. Traveling to Washington is a suicide mission, they’re told, because journalists crossing city limits are “shot on sight.”

Skirting around the major fighting zones — they’re warned not to go anywhere near Philadelphia — they take a circuitous route through Pittsburgh, West Virginia and Charlottesville, Virginia, where the Western Front forces have gathered.

It’s the kind of road trip you’d see in a zombie movie, as the characters zoom through eerily quiet back roads, passing abandoned cars and empty storefronts, stumbling on pockets of peril. A group of men with rifles sit menacingly at a gas station, where they’ve been torturing their neighbors for reasons unknown. A pair of men swathed in expert camouflage aim at an unseen sniper at an abandoned “winter wonderland” theme park. A gun-wielding thug in flamboyant red sunglasses (Jesse Plemons) stands beside a dump truck that holds a shockingly large pile of bodies. Some of these armed men wear military-style fatigues, but it’s unclear who they’re fighting for — and in some cases, they don’t seem to know themselves. They’re moved by self-aggrandizement, or the sheer thrill of power, or a sense that this is the best way to survive.

“Nobody’s giving us orders, man,” one of the fighters in the winter theme park says. “Someone’s trying to kill us. And we are trying to kill them.”

Independent fighters, known at the time as guerrillas, were also common in the real-life Civil War, says Sheehan-Dean, the LSU historian. Most were white Confederate sympathizers who didn’t want to join the official army — either because they saw it as an emasculating experience with humiliating disciplinary tactics, or because they thought they could fight better and bolder on their own. In contrast to a robotic, regimented army, where soldiers fired huge volleys in unison under a central command, the guerrillas used smaller pistols and hit-and-run tactics to attack Union army detachments and civilian Union sympathizers. They also created a kind of cultural myth around themselves, often wearing distinctive embroidered shirts and priding themselves in their expert skills as horsemen.

“They imagined themselves as fighting with a kind of elan and flair that the corporatized and mechanized infantrymen didn’t have,” Sheehan-Dean says. And because they weren’t associated with an official army, they didn’t have to follow the rules of war, such as treating prisoners humanely and avoiding civilians. They killed, stole and plundered for supplies, Sheehan-Dean says, and “caused a huge amount of mayhem, far out of proportion to their size.”

The fictional journalists in Civil War also encounter men operating outside the war and the law, setting their own rules and enforcing them down the barrel of a gun. At a skirmish in an abandoned office building, insurgents capture some official army soldiers and proceed to mete out justice on the spot. On the grounds of an unassuming farm, Plemons engages in slow-motion psychological torture, buoyed by his enormous weapon and his victims’ evident terror. The character, like the Confederate guerrillas, seems unconnected to an institution, but loosely tied to an ideology. He’s intensely interested in where the journalists are from — what state, what country — and whether they represent “real” America.

Filmmaker Alex Garland told Time magazine that he modeled his movie insurgents on real-life examples of warlords, such as the Khmer Rouge. But it’s hard to escape the comparison with present-day American insurgency groups — Oathkeepers, Proud Boys — who came to greater prominence during Trump’s presidency. One thing these real-life militias have in common with the movie militants is a sense of independence from official political power, says Amy Cooter, director of research at the Center on Terrorism, Extremism and Counterterrorism at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

Though many militia groups converged on the Capitol on Jan. 6, they’ve never been fully in lockstep with Trump, says Cooter, who spent years interviewing members of those groups for her new book, Nostalgia, Nationalism, and the US Militia Movement. Nor are they aligned with every principle of Trump’s Republican Party. Some hold fast to traditional white supremacist views — even the nonwhite combatants — but some support abortion and LGBTQ rights. Some were embarrassed by Jan. 6, and some are reserving judgment on Trump until they learn the outcome of his ongoing court cases.

Their operating values, Cooter says, predate and transcend any single politician, and have more to do with a cultural idea. “What they seem to have in common is that this notion of an ideal version of society existed at some point in the past,” Cooter says. “Their job is to fight to get it back, or to prevent further slippage from that ideal.” Trump captured their attention, she says, because he was skilled at exploiting their fears, suggesting, “you’ve got all these concerns, and it’s even worse than you think.”

Militia groups are also preparing for a dark future, though they don’t share the same beliefs about what the immediate threat might be, says Sam Jackson, a senior research fellow at the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism. Some are convinced that the federal government is going to go door-to-door, confiscating people’s guns. Some are more generally preparing for social collapse — what’s known in online circles as “teotwawki,” for “the end of the world as we know it”— and are stockpiling weapons and supplies in anticipation.

Jan. 6 notwithstanding, formal militia groups often argue against violence in the short term, says Jackson, the author of Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Anti-Government Group. Some declare that they’ll never take the first shot, only the second one, he says. Some say they’re waiting for the right moment to act, though there are uncertain standards around what the right moment might be. In many cases, he says, militia leaders realize that violence would harm their reputations or wouldn’t achieve their goals.

But individual radicals, who stumble on militias’ online literature or wander into their chatrooms, aren’t subject to those same internal pressures. (Jackson says terrorism experts no longer use the term “lone wolf,” which implies someone operating in a vacuum, rather than immersed in a soup of insurrectionist propaganda and social media chatter.) “One of the things we’re starting to know about these landscapes is [that] sometimes the people who end up committing violence are unaffiliated,” Jackson says. “So if we’re focused on the formal groups, it might be that we are more likely to miss people who are more likely to commit violence.”

As the 2024 election approaches, Cooter agrees, close militia watchers anticipate a greater threat from independent actors than from organized groups. There are no signs of specific plots or threats right now, she says, but if anything erupts, it’s likely to happen on the local or state level: protests at state capitals, violence at election locations where votes are counted. And it’s likely to come from rogue actors, not broader organizations.

“We’re not seeing any mass coordination,” she says. Any violence after the election is “probably going to be small groups, individuals, taking it upon themselves to lash out at something they perceive in their communities.”

It’s that small-scale threat, honestly, that makes Civil War feel so scary — more horror flick than political parable, though maybe a little bit of both.

The movie looks dimly at everyone’s violence fetishes: the dudes in camouflage play-acting as warlords, the adrenaline-junkie journalists who rush excitedly into war zones, the movie audiences who pay good money to sit in a theater and watch symbols of America go up in flames.

But it’s one thing to stare at a CGI-driven battle and get a vicarious thrill from imaginary explosions and popcorn gore. It’s quite another to imagine yourself running into Jesse Plemons on a rural road with an AK-47, questioning who you are and how you fit into his world. He believes that he’s right — or at least that he’s righteous. And he’s not taking orders from anyone but himself.

POLITICO

Politico · by JAMES ROMOSER

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Scoop: Biden told Bibi U.S. won't support an Israeli counterattack on Iran

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