Quotes of the Day:
“The backbone of the army is the noncommissioned man!”
-Rudyard Kipling, “The ‘Eathen”
"The secret of freedom lies in educating people, whereas the secret of tyranny is in keeping them ignorant."
- Maximilien Robspierre
"People are never so near playing the Fool as when they think themselves wise."
- Lady Mary Wortley Montagu
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 14 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Ukraine War Update - April 15, 2022 | SOF News
3. C.I.A. Director Airs Concern That Putin Might Turn to Nuclear Weapons
4. Russia warns U.S. to stop arming Ukraine
5. U.S. Support for Ukraine Moves Further Into Offensive Assistance
6. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards leader vows to back all Islamic militias
7. What Would Happen If Russia Invaded Finland? Experts Weigh In
8. Putin purges more than 100 FSB agents in apparent retaliation amid Ukraine invasion quagmire
9. US military aid to Ukraine now has surpassed $3 billion under Biden. Here's what's been provided
10. Six U.S. lawmakers arrive in Taiwan on unannounced trip
11. In future wars, US Marine special operators will need to do more than 'kicking down a door,' top Marine says
12. Document reveals $14 billion backlog of US defense transfers to Taiwan
13. DOD: Security Assistance Support to Ukraine Not Affecting U.S. Readiness
14. Inside Ukraine's Makeshift Training Camps, Where Soldiers Are Forged from Civilians
15. What Artillery and Air Defense Does Ukraine Need Now?
16. Republican lawmakers call for reopening US Embassy in Ukraine’s capital
17. Biden Rejects Unanimous NSC ‘More Often Than You Might Think’
18. What China gets wrong
19. The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy
20. The Outsiders – How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia
21. Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine
22. Strategic sabotage is coming to a global conflict near you
23. Russian warship told to 'go f--- yourself' was either f---ed by Ukraine or by itself
24. The Latest Propaganda Wars
25. FBI Documents Expose Bureau's Big Jan. 6 'Lie'
26. Sex, Lies, and UFOs: Pentagon's Head of Counterintelligence and Security Ousted
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 14 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 14 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
April 14, 7:15pm ET
The Russian missile cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, sunk on April 14 after a likely Ukrainian anti-ship missile strike on April 13. Ukrainian forces claimed to strike the Moskva with two Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles on April 13.[1] The Kremlin denied this claim and stated the Moskva suffered damage from an accidental fire and ammunition explosion.[2] Initial Ukrainian claims to have sunk the warship on April 13 were likely false, but the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the Moskva sank in a storm while being towed to Crimea after the crew evacuated.[3] ISW cannot independently confirm that a Ukrainian strike sunk the Moskva, though Ukrainian forces likely have the capability to have done so.
The loss of the Moskva—regardless if from a Ukrainian strike or an accident—is a major propaganda victory for Ukraine. The sinking of the Moskva, which was involved in the infamous “Snake Island” incident in the early days of the Russian invasion, is a boon to Ukrainian morale as a symbol of Ukrainian capabilities to strike back at the Russian navy. The Kremlin will conversely struggle to explain away the loss of one of the most important vessels in the Russian fleet. The Kremlin’s current story of losing the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet due to an accidental fire and ammunition explosion will, at minimum, likely hurt Russian morale and cannot be hidden from the Russian domestic audience. Both explanations for the sinking of the Moskva indicate possible Russian deficiencies—either poor air defenses or incredibly lax safety procedures and damage control on the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship.
The loss of the Moskva will reduce Russia’s ability to conduct cruise missile strikes but is unlikely to deal a decisive blow to Russian operations on the whole. The Moskva’s main role was likely conducting precision strikes with Kalibr cruise missiles on targets in Ukrainian rear areas, including logistics centers and airfields. These Russian strikes have been effective but limited in number compared to airstrikes and ground-launched cruise missiles throughout the invasion, and the loss of the Moskva is unlikely to be a decisive blow. Ukraine's possibly demonstrated ability to target Russian warships in the Black Sea may change Russian operating patterns, however, forcing them to either deploy additional air and point-defense assets to the Black Sea battlegroup or withdraw vessels from positions near the Ukrainian coast.
Key Takeaways
- The flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet sunk on April 14 following a likely Ukrainian cruise missile strike on April 13. The loss of the Moskva is a significant propaganda victory for Ukraine but will likely have only limited effects on Russian operations.
- Ukrainian officials admitted Russian forces captured “some” personnel from Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade in Mariupol despite initial denials, though Ukrainian defenders predominantly continued to hold out against Russian assaults.
- Russian forces may have committed damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to combat operations in eastern Ukraine for the first time on April 14. Continued daily Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are failing to take any territory.
- Ukrainian partisans have likely been active in the Melitopol region since at least mid-March.
- Russian forces continued to redeploy from Belarus to Russia for further deployment to eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian conscription measures in Donbas have been largely unsuccessful, reporting Russia sought to mobilize 60-70,000 personnel by an unspecified date and has only recruited 20% of its goal.[4] ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, though they are consistent with the demoralization observed among Russian and proxy personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that unspecified elements of Russia’s Northern Fleet and 8th Combined Arms Army are preparing to deploy to Ukraine, though the Russian military likely has little effective combat power remaining to send to Ukraine.[5]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued assaults against Ukrainian defenses in southwestern and eastern Mariupol on April 13, though ISW cannot confirm any territorial changes. Ukrainian officials admitted on April 14 that Russian forces captured “some” personnel from Ukraine's 36th Marine Brigade during their breakout from the Ilyich plant to link up with Ukrainian forces in the Azovstal plant in eastern Mariupol on April 13.[6] Petro Andryushenko, advisor to Mariupol’s mayor, provided a detailed report on April 14 on areas of active fighting in Mariupol, which we used to refine our control of terrain assessment in the accompanying maps.[7] Andryushenko said Russian forces are concentrated on capturing the Mariupol port in the southwest with heavy air and artillery support, contradicting Russian claims to have previously captured the port.[8] Andryushenko further stated that Russian forces are strictly controlling entry and exit in Mariupol and are “filtering” Ukrainian civilians—a term used by Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine to describe searches, interrogations, and possible targeted killings of Ukrainian civilians.[9]
Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that elements of Russia’s 2nd Combined Arms Army—which was previously withdrawn from the Chernihiv axis—are deploying around Severodonetsk.[10] If confirmed, this is the first Russian unit withdrawn from fighting in northeastern Ukraine to be recommitted to eastern Ukraine. These units likely remain degraded, and Russian forces will face challenges integrating units from several military districts into a cohesive fighting force.[11]
Russian forces continued unsuccessful daily attacks against Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka and did not make any territorial advances on April 14.[12] The DNR claimed its forces drove back Ukrainian forces around Marinka on April 14, but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[13] The UK Ministry of Defense reported on April 14 that Russian forces in eastern Ukraine are employing “massive rocket and artillery strikes,” consistent with reports on the ground of continued Russian shelling along the line of contact.[14]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)
Local social media reports confirmed Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian Special Forces destroyed a bridge near Izyum while a Russian military convoy was crossing it on April 13.[15] Ukrainian Special Forces are likely successfully interdicting Russian operations to reinforce the Izyum axis. Russian forces launched limited attacks around Izyum in the last 24 hours but did not make any territorial advances.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces concentrated on reconnoitering Ukrainian positions and resupplying forward positions.[17] Russian forces reportedly deployed an information and psychological operations unit to Belgorod, Russia, to support unspecified efforts to demoralize Ukrainian forces and civilians in Kharkiv Oblast.[18]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Fighting continued west of Kherson city on April 14, though ISW cannot confirm any specific Ukrainian or Russian attacks. Russian forces conducted minor attacks against Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka, 30 km west of Kherson city, on April 14.[19] Ukraine’s Airborne Forces command claimed on April 14th that the 80th Airmobile Brigade (previously operating in Mykolayiv) liberated unspecified villages in southern Ukraine but declined to name them for operational security reasons.[20] ISW cannot independently confirm any Ukrainian counterattacks in the last 24 hours.
Ukrainian forces may have destroyed a Russian supply depot in Kherson on April 13. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych stated Ukrainian forces destroyed ammunition depots of Russia’s 22nd Army Corps at an unspecified location in Kherson on April 13, and social media users reported heavy Ukrainian shelling of the Choronbaivka airfield.[21]
Ukrainian partisans have likely been active in the Melitopol region since at least mid-March. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that “unknown patriots” killed 70 Russian personnel in Melitopol on April 12, while the Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian partisans killed 70 personnel in the area from March 20 to April 12—a more likely report.[22] ISW has previously assessed that growing Ukrainian partisan activities are likely tying down Russian forces in the region but we have not previously seen reports of specific Ukrainian partisan actions.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
Russian forces continued to redeploy from Belarus to Russia for further deployment to eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported several Central Military District units are redeploying from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts (near Chernihiv and Sumy) to Belgorod and Voronezh Oblasts (along the Kharkiv axis) but have not been recommitted to combat operations as of April 14.[23] Elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District are also likely redeploying from Gomel Oblast, Belarus, to western Russian Oblasts.[24] Commercial satellite imagery taken on April 12 confirmed that Russian aircraft have predominantly departed Belarusian airfields for likely redeployment to the Izyum axis or eastern Ukraine, though ISW cannot confirm their final destination.[25]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas region, feeding reinforcements into the fight as they become available rather than gathering reinforcements and replacements for a more coordinated and coherent offensive.
- Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol will not be able to hold out indefinitely, but it remains unclear how quickly Russia will be able to secure the city.
2. Ukraine War Update - April 15, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - April 15, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: Romanian troop while training with NATO Response Force (NRF) during an exercise in Romania. Image from video by NATO Multimedia filmed on April 12, 2022.
Editor’s Note: We jumped the gun in the headline on the Russian Flagship of the Black Sea Fleet in Thursday’s article. Following the lead of numerous news reports, we initially reported the Moskva was sunk. Apparently, it was badly damaged, the crew evacuated, and was being towed to port. In the latest update, as of late Thursday night, Russia has announced that the Moskva sank while being towed to port.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Current Tactical Situation and Assessment
The Russians are consolidating and reinforcing their forces in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine; especially around the town of Izyum. Additional Russian helicopters are arriving in the area of operations. The Ukrainian military believe a Russian offensive in the area will begin soon. There are reports the Russians may make another attempt for Kharkiv. Russian air operations are mostly focused on the Donbas region. There are about 44,000 Ukrainian troops in the Donbas region. The Russians have about 65 operational Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) in the south and east of Ukraine.
Sinking the Moskva. This is a major blow to the Russian forces that has strategic consequences. The Black Sea fleet now knows it is not invulnerable. Russian ships have moved away from the Ukrainian coastline towards the south. The attack on the Moskva was about 65 nautical miles due south of Odesa, so now the Russian ships are an even further distance away. The possibility of an amphibious landing is lessened, which means more Ukrainian troops defending the coastline can be moved to the east along the coast to confront Russian ground troops. The Russian naval fleet has lost significant air defense capability making them more suseptable to air attack. The information operations battle is another aspect to be considered.
Mariupol. There are some initial reports that about 1,000 troops from the 36th Independent Marine Brigade have surrendered. Predictions of an imminent Russian victory in Mariupol are announced every day, yet the city continues to hold out. Ukrainian ministry officials say that the two remaining Ukrainian units – the Azov Regiment and elements of the 36th Independent Marine Brigade are now fighting together. Elements of the 36th broke through Russian lines to join the Azov Regiment’s positions in Mariupol. The two units were fighting in two separate areas of the city.
General Information and Commentary
Sweden and Finland . . . and NATO. On Wednesday (Apr 13) the Finnish and Swedish prime ministers held a joint press conference outlining plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They did not provide a time table but indicated it the joining process would begin soon. The Swedish Social Democrats have already decided to apply for NATO membership and may submit the application to join at the upcoming Madrid summit at the end of June.
Russia’s president has provided the exact opposite effect that he had desired and anticipated – instead of weakening NATO and reducing its presence on Russia’s borders – NATO has now become stronger and more border areas of Russia will be adjacent to NATO countries. Russia is threatening to deploy nuclear weapons in the Baltic region if Sweden and Finland join NATO.
UK SF . . . Doing a Little Training. Persistent reports keep surfacing about contributions of the British special forces (SAS, SBS, Special Reconnaissance Regiment, and Special Forces Support Group) in the Ukraine War. (National Herald (India), Apr 12, 2022).
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. More than 4.5 million Ukrainians have fled the country. Ninty percent of those who have left are women and children. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. UN OCHA’s situation report for April 14th is posted here. The Biden administration is preparing to roll out a new program for Ukrainian refugees (CNN Politics, Apr 12, 2022).
Russian Hackers and Ukraine’s Power Grid. Attempts to target the Ukrainian power grid to cause a blackout for over two million people were made using a wiper. This is malware specifically designed to destroy targeted systems by erasing key data and rendering them useless. (MIT Technology Review, Apr 12, 2022).
Transformation of Ukrainian Army. Daniel Michaels details the long-term training relationships the Ukraine military forces have had with the United States and other NATO countries. He points out that the effort by NATO trainers has had a dramatic effect from “foot soldiers to the defense ministry to overseers in parliament.” Concepts such as a strong NCO corps, mission command, and other western approaches to warfare were introduced over the past eight years that professionalized the Ukrainian military. Much of the training took place near the city of Yavoriv, located 10 miles east of Ukraine’s border with Poland. Read more in “The Secret of Ukraine’s Military Success: Years of NATO Training”, The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2022.
Russian Tanks – Pictures of War. Social media is awash with pictures and videos of Russian tanks getting blown up by artillery, anti-tank missiles, or via remotely-controlled drones. Many of the tank turrets are completely separated from the chassis when the projectile blast causes all the tank’s ammunition to detonate. The resulting overpressure blows the tank’s turret off the tank body. “Here’s why Russian tanks keep getting decapitated in Ukraine”, Task & Purpose, April 13, 2022.
Prisoner Exchange. The fourth exchange of prisoners took place since the war began. 30 Ukrainian prisoners of war were released; it is unknown how many Russians were released.
The Importance of Odesa? The Ukrainians have done well in pushing the Russians out of the Kyiv region and the northern area of Ukraine. They now face a determined Russian force in eastern Ukraine that intends on seizing the whole of the Donbas region. In addition, Ukraine needs to still pay attention to those Russian forces that are threatening Mykolaiv and perhaps Odesa. If Odesa falls to the Russians, Ukraine will become landlocked and economically crippled and the Dnieper River could become the ‘New Berlin Wall’. “An Irrevocable Blow” What Happens if Russia Conquers Odesa?”, by Dr. Can Kasapglu, Hudson Institute, April 2022.
Anti-Ship Missiles – A Game Changer. Brian Frydenborg explains how Ukrainian anti-ship missiles can negate the power of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. His article was published just hours before reports surfaced indicating that two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles severely disabled the Flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, on Wednesday, April 13. (SOF News, Apr 13, 2022). A week ago an article pointed out that Russia’s most powerful warship in the Black Sea was operating in a pattern (Naval News, Apr 7, 2022). The United Kingdom has announced it will supply Ukraine with its truck-mounted version of the U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles. Read more in “Why Russia’s Navy in Ukraine War is Doomed (or Irrelevant)”, Small Wars Journal, April 13, 2022.
Foreigners Can Serve. The Ukrainian parliament passed admendments to the law regulating the work of Ukraine’s intelligence agencies. As of April 14th, foreigners can serve in Ukraine’s intelligence agencies during the war.
Ukraine and Identity. Siamak Tundra Naficy, a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School and an anthropologist, explains how Putin’s War will actually strengthen the Ukrainian identity as an independent nation. Something that Putin was trying to diminish. Read more in “A Ukrainian State of Mind”, War on the Rocks, April 13, 2022.
Putin and His War Crimes. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jerry Boykin and Lela Gilbert argue that the international community has to ensure that Vladimir Putin is held accountable for his war crimes in Ukraine. If he isn’t brought to justice, then “. . . the whole concept of tribunals on behalf of those who have suffered war crimes becomes a farce.” Read more in “Vladimir Putin Must be Tried for War Crimes”, Newsweek, April 8, 2022.
EU Oil Embargo. European Union officials have begun drafting another response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although energy prices may increase around the globe, the EU is considering an embargo on Russian oil products. An move that would hurt the economy of Russia, as well as European nations.
Putin and Central Asia. During February 2022 the Russian president made numerous phone calls to the leaders of the Central Asian states seeking their public support for his invasion of Ukraine. He also wanted the leaders to recognize the breakaway republics of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. The idea of diplomatic recognition was a non-starter for the Central Asian states. However, the economy of these nations and the economic sanctions imposed by the West against Russia are major factors in the diplomatic stance that these countries are taking on the Ukraine War. Like many countries around the world – the leaders of these countries are in the midst of a balancing act. Gregory Gleason, a professor at the Marshal Center, provides a detailed explanation in “Saving Central Asia From Putin’s Embrace”, War on the Rocks, April 8, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
3. C.I.A. Director Airs Concern That Putin Might Turn to Nuclear Weapons
This will continue to cause us to "self deter."
C.I.A. Director Airs Concern That Putin Might Turn to Nuclear Weapons
By David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes
April 14, 2022
William J. Burns, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, cautioned that he had seen no “practical evidence” that would suggest such a move was imminent.
Send any friend a story
As a subscriber, you have 10 gift articles to give each month. Anyone can read what you share.
An apartment building in Vasylkiv, Ukraine, was destroyed by Russian missiles in February.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times
April 14, 2022, 7:40 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON — The director of the C.I.A. said on Thursday that Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s “potential desperation” to extract the semblance of a victory in Ukraine could tempt him to order the use of a tactical or low-yield nuclear weapon, publicly discussing for the first time a concern that has coursed through the White House during seven weeks of conflict.
The director, William J. Burns, who served as American ambassador to Russia and is the member of the administration who has dealt most often with Mr. Putin, said the potential detonation of such a weapon — even as a warning shot — was a possibility that the United States remained “very concerned” about. But he quickly cautioned that so far, despite Mr. Putin’s frequent invocation of nuclear threats, he had seen no “practical evidence” of the kinds of military deployments or movement of weapons that would suggest such a move was imminent.
“Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons,” Mr. Burns said during a question-and-answer session following a speech he delivered at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
He spoke in response to a question from former Senator Sam Nunn, of Georgia, who helped create the program that brought nuclear weapons out of Ukraine and other former Soviet states 30 years ago.
Tactical weapons are sometimes called “battlefield nukes,” smaller weapons that can be shot out of a mortar or even exploded like a mine, as opposed to “strategic” weapons that are put on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia has a large arsenal of tactical weapons; the United States keeps comparatively few. Low-yield nuclear weapons have been designed to produce a fairly small explosion, which sometimes blurs the difference between conventional and nuclear weapons.
Mr. Burns also argued that the disclosure of Mr. Putin’s intentions by U.S. intelligence officials before the outbreak of the war had made it harder for Mr. Putin to hide the “raw brutality” his forces have used in Ukraine, reminiscent of the damage Russian forces inflicted in Chechnya in the 1990s.
“I have watched over the years as Putin has stewed in a combustible combination of grievance and ambition and insecurity,” Mr. Burns said. He said the Russian president has nursed grievances against the West for decades, convinced the United States took advantage of Russia’s weakness after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
President Biden and his national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, both acknowledged Thursday that the White House was debating sending a high-level official to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, in a show of support for the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Prime Minister Boris Johnson of Britain recently took a secret trip to Kyiv by train.
Mr. Sullivan said that the White House had briefly considered having Mr. Biden go into Ukraine, but as soon as it became clear “what kind of footprint that would require, what kind of assets that would take from the Ukrainians as well as the U.S.” to keep him safe, the idea was rejected.
When pressed on reports that he, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken or Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III might go to Kyiv, Mr. Sullivan declined to discuss it, saying that “if and when that happens, we want to make sure it’s done in a very secure way.” Mr. Biden told reporters no decision had been made to send an envoy.
Mr. Sullivan also said that in coming days the United States would announce a crackdown on countries and companies violating the Western sanctions on Moscow, imposed since the invasion began in late February.
The Commerce Department on Thursday identified 10 aircraft that were flying into or operated by Belarus, with the apparent intention of registering them in Russia. The sanctions would prevent servicing or fueling the aircraft internationally, effectively grounding them.
William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, said the U.S. remained “very concerned” about the possibility of Russia detonating a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Credit...Brynn Anderson/Associated Press
Mr. Sullivan had made a similar vow to crack down on violators just ahead of Mr. Biden’s trip to Brussels and Warsaw last month. But on Thursday, speaking at the Economic Club of Washington, he said he believed that some of the sanctions — particularly export controls on defense technology — were beginning to hurt Russia’s military readiness.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
Card 1 of 5
A blow to Russian forces. The flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet suffered catastrophic damage that forced the crew to abandon it. Russia said that a fire had caused the damage, though Ukraine claimed to have struck the vessel with missiles. The ship subsequently sank while being towed to port.
A boost to NATO. Finland and Sweden are considering applying for membership in the alliance. Dmitri A. Medvedev, Russia’s former president and prime minister, said Moscow would be forced to “seriously strengthen” its defenses in the Baltics if the two countries were to join.
Gathering evidence of atrocities. A wide-ranging investigation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe detailed what it said were “clear patterns” of human rights violations by Russian forces in Ukraine.
“Russia’s ability to retool and replenish,” he said, was being set back because many of its systems “rely on Western microchips and components.”
“They are exhausting the stock of some of the high-end weapons,” Mr. Sullivan added, though he acknowledged that the continuing purchase of natural gas from Russia was helping to fund the war.
“I’m not sitting here suggesting we have so starved them of those resources they literally can’t field an army and continue to try to make progress on the battlefield,” Mr. Sullivan said. But he said Washington was stepping up the effort to help Europe wean itself off Russian gas by delivering supplies of liquefied natural gas from the United States.
But Mr. Sullivan also indicated that so far he had seen no evidence that China was stepping in to help Mr. Putin with either military or financial aid. His statement was notable because Mr. Biden, in a call with President Xi Jinping of China four weeks ago, had warned about American penalties should China aid the war effort. But the evidence since then has suggested that despite Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi’s declaration in February that their relationship has “no limits,” China in fact appears to be of mixed views on how much to support the war.
Mr. Burns and Mr. Sullivan both acknowledged that the war was moving to a new phase now that Russia appears to have narrowed its objective to taking the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russia separatists have been fighting since 2014.
Gen. Philip Breedlove, the former supreme allied commander in Europe, who is now retired, said Thursday that while Mr. Putin may be able to paint his narrower operation as a win, the war will be a loss for Russia in the long term.
“Ukraine is still going to try to fight what I call the American Revolutionary War again, skirmishing and counterattacking and ambushing,” General Breedlove said. “It is just going to be a lot harder for them.”
By moving his forces to the east, Mr. Putin is looking to move the war to more favorable territory, trying to make it more difficult for the Ukrainian forces to stick with those tactics. “They are now prepared to fight the war that they really want,” General Breedlove said. “They want to meet force on force in open fields.”
4. Russia warns U.S. to stop arming Ukraine
We must not back down in response to this diplomatic note and rhetoric. To do so will signal to Russia that they can go all in in trying to invade, occupy, and pacify Ukraine. Ukraine has the right to self defense and freedom loving nations have the right (and the responsibility) to help a nation remain free.
Russia warns U.S. to stop arming Ukraine
The formal diplomatic note from Moscow, a copy of which was reviewed by The Washington Post, came as President Biden approved a dramatic expansion in the scope of weapons being provided to the government in Kyiv
By Karen DeYoung
Yesterday at 8:03 p.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoungToday at 8:03 p.m. EDTBy Karen DeYoungToday at 8:03 p.m. EDT · April 15, 2022
Russia this week sent a formal diplomatic note to the United States warning that U.S. and NATO shipments of the “most sensitive” weapons systems to Ukraine were “adding fuel” to the conflict there and could bring “unpredictable consequences.”
The diplomatic démarche, a copy of which was reviewed by The Washington Post, came as President Biden approved a dramatic expansion in the scope of weapons being provided to Ukraine, an $800 million package including 155 mm Howitzers — a serious upgrade in long-range artillery to match Russian systems — coastal defense drones and armored vehicles, as well as additional portable anti-air and antitank weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition.
The United States has also facilitated the shipment to Ukraine of long-range air defense systems, including Slovakia’s shipment of Russian-manufactured Soviet-era S-300 launchers on which Ukrainian forces have already been trained. In exchange, the administration announced last week, the United States is deploying a Patriot missile system to Slovakia and consulting with Slovakia on a long-term replacement.
Shipment of the weapons, the first wave of which U.S. officials said would arrive in Ukraine within days, follows an urgent appeal to Biden from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as Russian forces were said to be mobilizing for a major assault on eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and along the coastal strip connecting it with Russian-occupied Crimea in the south. Russian troops have largely withdrawn from much of the northern part of the country, including around the capital, Kyiv, following humiliating defeats by the Ukrainian military and local resistance forces.
“What the Russians are telling us privately is precisely what we’ve been telling the world publicly — that the massive amount of assistance that we’ve been providing our Ukrainian partners is proving extraordinarily effective,” said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity about the sensitive diplomatic document.
The State Department declined to comment on the contents of the two-page diplomatic note or any U.S. response.
Russia experts suggested Moscow, which has labeled weapons convoys coming into the country as legitimate military targets but has not thus far attacked them, may be preparing to do so.
“They have targeted supply depots in Ukraine itself, where some of these supplies have been stored,” said George Beebe, former director of Russia analysis at the CIA and Russia adviser to former vice president Dick Cheney. “The real question is do they go beyond attempting to target [the weapons] on Ukrainian territory, try to hit the supply convoys themselves and perhaps the NATO countries on the Ukrainian periphery” that serve as transfer points for the U.S. supplies.
If Russian forces stumble in the next phase of the war as they did in the first, “then I think the chances that Russia targets NATO supplies on NATO territory go up considerably,” Beebe said. “There has been an assumption on the part of a lot of us in the West that we could supply the Ukrainians really without limits and not bear significant risk of retaliation from Russia,” he said. “I think the Russians want to send a message here that that’s not true.”
The diplomatic note was dated Tuesday, as word first leaked of the new arms package that brought the total amount of U.S. military aid provided to Ukraine since the Feb. 24 invasion to $3.2 billion, according to Pentagon spokesman John Kirby. In a public announcement Wednesday, Biden said it would include “new capabilities tailored to the wider assault we expect Russia to launch in eastern Ukraine.”
The document, titled “On Russia’s concerns in the context of massive supplies of weapons and military equipment to the Kiev regime,” written in Russian with a translation provided, was forwarded to the State Department by the Russian Embassy in Washington.
The Russian embassy did not respond to requests for comment.
Among the items Russia identified as “most sensitive” were “multiple launch rocket systems,” although the United States and its NATO allies are not believed to have supplied those weapons to Ukraine. Russia accused the allies of violating “rigorous principles” governing the transfer of weapons to conflict zones, and of being oblivious to “the threat of high-precision weapons falling into the hands of radical nationalists, extremists and bandit forces in Ukraine.”
It accused NATO of trying to pressure Ukraine to “abandon” sputtering, and so far unsuccessful, negotiations with Russia “in order to continue the bloodshed.” Washington, it said, was pressuring other countries to stop any military and technical cooperation with Russia, and those with Soviet-era weapons to transfer them to Ukraine.
“We call on the United States and its allies to stop the irresponsible militarization of Ukraine, which implies unpredictable consequences for regional and international security,” the note said.
Andrew Weiss, a former National Security Council director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs, and now vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recalled that Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a speech on the February morning the invasion began, warned that Western nations would face “consequences greater than any you have faced in history” if they became involved in the conflict.
Attention at the time focused on Putin’s reminder that Russia possesses a powerful nuclear arsenal, Weiss said, but it was also “a very explicit warning about not sending weapons into a conflict zone.” Having drawn a red line, he asked, are the Russians “now inclined to back that up?”
Such an attack would be “a very important escalatory move, first and foremost because it represents a threat to the West if they aren’t able to keep supplies flowing into Ukraine, which by extension might diminish Ukraine’s capacity for self-defense.” That risk “shouldn’t be downplayed,” he said, noting the added risk that an attempt to strike a convoy inside Ukraine could go awry over the border into NATO territory.
Senior U.S. defense officials remain concerned about the possibility of such attacks. “We don’t take any movement of weapons and systems going into Ukraine for granted,” Kirby said Thursday. “Not on any given day.”
Kirby said Ukrainian troops bring the weapons into Ukraine after the United States brings them into the region, and “the less we say about that, the better.”
Dan Lamothe contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoungToday at 8:03 p.m. EDTBy Karen DeYoungToday at 8:03 p.m. EDT · April 15, 2022
5. U.S. Support for Ukraine Moves Further Into Offensive Assistance
We need to stop pole vaulting over mouse turds. Russia will interpret every weapon sent to Ukraine as an offensive weapon. Most weapons can be used for offensive and defensive purposes, it all depends on how they are used. Take one of the most important weapons that we will see in the upcoming fight: artillery. It is equally important in the offense and defense. To defend itself Ukraine does need to conduct offensive weapons. It will need to conduct aggressive offensive operations to successfully defend itself by defeating the Russian army.
We need to stop deluding ourselves and telling ourselves stories that if we only provide defensive weapons and only help Ukraine with their defense there will be no escalation. That story may play well among some political factions in the US but it does not wash with Putin (or with Ukraine).
It is good to see the administration sending the weapons Ukraine needs to achieve victory. That should be what we focus on now.
I am sure the Ukrainians believe the quote. We need to understand their willingness to fight and die for their country and support their right to be free.
Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.
- Winston Churchill.
U.S. Support for Ukraine Moves Further Into Offensive Assistance
A new American military aid package is intended to help Kyiv push back Russian forces
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-support-for-ukraine-moves-further-into-offensive-assistance-11649971906?mod=livecoverage_web
Apr. 14, 2022 5:31 pm ET
As Ukraine prepares to resist a new Russian military assault in the east, it likely will be doing so with weapons and equipment the U.S. once considered too risky to provide to Kyiv, highlighting how the line between offensive and defensive assistance has blurred in recent weeks.
The shift in weaponry comes as Kyiv has made increasing pleas for military assistance in recent days, warning of potential Russian escalation and the potential for mass civilian casualties amid Russia’s expected offensive in the Donbas area. It also follows President Biden’s allegation that Russia was conducting “genocide” in Ukraine.
Mr. Biden on Wednesday announced $800 million in additional security assistance for Ukraine, including artillery, armored personnel carriers, and Humvees, bringing total military aid committed to Ukraine since he took office to more than $3 billion. The new package includes heavier weaponry than the U.S. previously had provided and—for the first time—American-made artillery pieces.
Following a shelling, at house burned April 6 in Ukraine’s Donbas area.
PHOTO: FADEL SENNA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
While U.S. officials in the past have debated whether the U.S. government should limit itself to providing Kyiv with weapons designed to defend the country from attack, that distinction appears to have grown fuzzier as Russia moved its forces deeper into Ukraine. Any weapons designed to push Moscow’s forces out of the country arguably could be considered defensive, so long as it doesn’t involve hitting targets inside Russia, say U.S. officials and outside experts.
William Taylor, vice president for Russia and Europe at the United States Institute of Peace, said that given the current state of conflict in Ukraine, “there’s no distinction to be made between offensive and defensive weapons.”
How Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and TB2 Drones Are Being Used In Ukraine
How Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and TB2 Drones Are Being Used In Ukraine
Play video: How Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and TB2 Drones Are Being Used In Ukraine
The U.S. and its NATO allies have been sending Javelins, Stingers and other weapons to Ukraine to help the country defend itself from Russian attacks. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday explains how some of these weapons work, and why experts say they’re useful to Ukrainian forces. Photo: Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press/AFP via Getty Images
After failing to take Kyiv, Russian forces in recent days have pulled back from the Ukrainian capital and other northern cities and begun redeploying to southern and eastern Ukraine, where Moscow made early gains in the first weeks of the invasion. The latest arms package, which comes in parallel with greater intelligence sharing, is meant to help Ukrainian forces in the expected battle there.
Mr. Taylor, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, welcomed the decision to send additional weapons to Ukraine. While the anti-armor and antiaircraft missiles provided to date have proved effective at repelling Russian forces near Kyiv, Mr. Taylor said “the big battle that’s coming in the east is on different terrain” and will require longer-range systems.
Advertisement - Scroll to Continue
As with weapons, when it comes to intelligence, the distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” intelligence is an artificial one, says Jeffrey Edmonds, a Russia specialist who served at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. He argues it would make little sense to withhold detailed information—such as the position of Russian artillery—as the U.S. is shipping hundreds of millions of dollars in advanced weaponry to the Ukrainian government.
“That’s no different in my mind from providing Javelins,” he said, referring to anti-tank missiles the U.S. has sent to Ukraine.
Mr. Edmonds, who was in government during Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and is now at CNA, a Virginia-based nonprofit research group, said there is little risk that wider intelligence-sharing would escalate the conflict. “The Russians assume we’re providing all the intelligence we can,” he said.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who spoke last week in Brussels, has argued that in the current Ukraine context there is no difference between defensive and offensive weapons.
PHOTO: STEPHANIE LECOCQ/SHUTTERSTOCK
The argument about the lack of distinction between offensive and defensive assistance amid an invasion is one Ukrainian officials have been making since the invasion started. Speaking last week in Brussels, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba blasted what he called the hypocrisy of those countries that would provide only what they labeled defensive weapons.
“When it comes to Ukraine, there should be no such difference as between defensive weapons and offensive weapons,” he said. “Because every weapon used in the territory of Ukraine, by the Ukrainian army, against a foreign aggressor is defensive by definition.”
That said, the administration still appears to be drawing the line at certain types of support, such as a no-fly zone, which could draw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization directly into an armed conflict with Russia. Fears of escalation into a full-scale war between Russia and NATO members were key to U.S. rejection of a plan to provide Polish MiG-29 jet fighters to Ukraine.
It isn’t just conventional weapons that still face limits. While the Biden administration has been open about the kind of defensive cybersecurity assistance it has provided Kyiv—deploying technical teams to Ukraine to help identify and patch vulnerabilities Russian hackers could exploit, for example—it continues to draw lines on the kind of cyber operations against Moscow it is willing to engage in, officials and experts have said.
Some of those hesitations are rooted in a longstanding policy doctrine in Washington to not engage in destructive hacking that could prompt escalatory retaliation from an adversary, especially because the U.S. is highly digitized and therefore vulnerable to counterattack.
Pentagon press secretary John Kirby on Wednesday challenged the notion that Washington’s provision of new equipment and plans to train Ukrainian forces on their use amount to escalatory moves, though he declined to speculate how Moscow might interpret them.
“We committed from the very beginning, even before the invasion, to helping Ukraine be able to defend itself,” he said. “This is a piece of that, and this is representative of the kinds of capabilities that the Ukrainians themselves have asked for and said they need as this fighting now gets focused on the eastern part of the country.”
Ukrainian soldiers in the in the Lugansk region, on April 11.
PHOTO: ANATOLII STEPANOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The United Kingdom also has taken the position that providing an increasingly sophisticated complement of weapons to Ukraine isn’t escalatory, because those weapons are being deployed in defense of the country.
James Cleverly, U.K. minister of state for European and North America, said Monday that from his government’s perspective, providing Ukraine with the means to defend itself against Russia isn’t escalatory.
“I totally understand the concerns about escalation, and they are meaningful and we need to be conscious of those,” he said, but the Ukrainians should have the equipment required “to fight effectively.”
“We need to give them the tools to finish the job,” he added.
Dustin Volz and Warren Strobel contributed to this article.
6. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards leader vows to back all Islamic militias
The Quds force conducts unconventional warfare (with Iranian characteristics) through, with, and by all Islamic militias.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards leader vows to back all Islamic militias
The head of the Quds Force, the elite branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has vowed to continue “leading” militias across the region at a time nuclear talks have stalled because of the force’s terrorist designation by the US.
In a strong speech to supporters in Tehran on Thursday, Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani said his Quds Force would continue to back any anti-US and anti-Israel movement in the world.
“The . . . [US] and the Zionists should know that this path is our definite path,” Ghaani said in a ceremony attended by the most senior commanders of the guards, to which foreign media were also given rare access.
“The Islamic revolution [of Iran] knows how to guide young, motivated Muslims to defend themselves,” he said, adding that all Islamic militias would “undoubtedly” enjoy Iran’s support.
The US has designated the Quds Force a terrorist organisation since 2007 and went further in 2019 by adding the whole Revolutionary Guards to its list. The expeditionary force is fundamental to Iran’s ideology and security strategy to prevent the US from expanding its presence in the Middle East.
The Islamic republic has established a network of proxies across the region, creating an unprecedented swath of influence that stretches from the Gulf to the Mediterranean notably in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Palestine.
The US and its regional allies accuse Tehran of backing armed groups to stoke instability and conflict. Donald Trump, former US president, ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the charismatic commander of the Quds Force, in Baghdad in 2020. Ghaani replaced Soleimani.
Diplomatic efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers have become deadlocked after Iran’s demand to remove both the guards and its Quds Force from the terrorist list before it rolls back its nuclear advances, analysts say.
Ghaani’s speech came a day after the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet announced it was establishing a new multinational task force to focus on countering arms smuggling, drug and people trafficking in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, vital waters surrounding Yemen.
The US Navy has led multinational maritime task forces in the region for two decades. But Commander Tim Hawkins, a spokesman for the Fifth Fleet, which is based in Bahrain, told the Financial Times that the US was “restructuring the multinational partnership to bring to bear a more focused, co-ordinated effort among partner navies”.
The task force would be used for “detecting, deterring and disrupting destabilising activity,” he said.
The formation of the task force comes after pressure on the US from the United Arab Emirates to strengthen and institutionalise security co-operation to counter the threat of the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen.
Relations between the UAE and the US hit a low this year after Emirati leaders were angered by what they considered to be Washington’s tepid response to a string of missile and drone attacks on Abu Dhabi, the Gulf state’s capital, in January and February. Saudi Arabia has also been seeking more US support to counter the Houthis, which regularly fire missiles and drones into the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been fighting the Houthis since Riyadh formed an Arab coalition in 2015 that intervened in Yemen’s civil war after rebels ousted the government. The Gulf states and the US accuse Iran of supplying the Houthis with missile and drone technology and advising and training the rebels.
Ghaani said the Houthis, whom he called “the new children” of the Islamic Republic, were making missiles with a range of more than 1,000km. “In their basements under bombardments, they are making missiles themselves,” he said.
7. What Would Happen If Russia Invaded Finland? Experts Weigh In
What Would Happen If Russia Invaded Finland? Experts Weigh In
Darragh Roche - Yesterday 11:38 AM
The Nordic nations of Finland and Sweden will consider applying to join the NATO military alliance despite warnings from Russia that the countries should not change their current status.
Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said her country will hold a debate on the matter and make a decision shortly afterwards, while Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson joined Marin at a press conference in Stockholm on Wednesday and said her country was also considering applying for NATO membership.usia's invasion of Ukraine. The change in the security landscape
Both countries have a long and often difficult history with Russia, marked by war and mutual distrust. The decisions to consider NATO membership appear to be prompted by Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24 and has seen around 11 million Ukrainians flee their homes.
"If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the land borders of the alliance with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these borders will have to be strengthened," said Medvedev, who is currently deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council.
Russian threats may be of particular concern to Helsinki, which shares a border with Russia that is more than 800 miles long. Finland has been invaded by Russian or Soviet forces three times since 1918.
Experts who spoke to Newsweek suggested that a Russian attack on Finland would not go particularly well for Moscow, citing the country's recent difficulties in Ukraine.
Tapped Out
Dr. Stephen Biddle is an adjunct senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He told Newsweek that a Russian invasion of Finland would not be an easy matter.
"Russia is now very nearly tapped out for combat maneuver forces as a result of their operations in Ukraine," Biddle said.
"They don't have a lot left for a major offensive in Finland, and anything they commit to Finland detracts from their ability to prosecute the war in Ukraine," he said.
"The Finns' military isn't huge, but it isn't tiny either, and is much better trained and motivated than the Russians," Biddle added.
Striking Finland
Though Russia's military operations in Ukraine may mean it cannot commit forces to an invasion, Biddle suggested Russia could take some form of action.
"I could imagine Russia striking Finland with missiles, artillery or air strikes as a way to create a conflict that would make NATO wary of admitting Finland, but I think it's very unlikely that Russia could simply conquer Finland given all this," he said.
"And I suspect the Russian General Staff is wary of starting another war that could easily become another stalemated quagmire on top of the one they could be facing in Ukraine," Biddle added.
A History of Conflict
Dr. Ian Johnson is assistant professor of military history at the University of Notre Dame. He told Newsweek that Russian forces had not previously been able to conquer Finland.
"Russian or Soviet forces have launched three major invasions of Finland since 1918," Johnson said. "None of the conflicts resulted in outright military defeat for Finland, despite the vast disparities in the size and population of the two states."
Johnson explained that the Red Army invaded Finland during the Russian Civil War in 1918 but their opponents, the Finnish Whites, "eventually won in three months of fighting, drove the Russians out, and established the modern Republic of Finland."
In the Winter War of 1939-40, the USSR invaded Finland "with the aim of seizing several border regions, and, if possible, establishing a pro-Soviet puppet government."
"Soviet plans to occupy the whole country fell apart after crushing military defeats suffered in the first month of the war," Johnson said.
"But eventually, superior Soviet numbers began to overwhelm Finnish defenses. In March 1940, the Finnish government agreed to a peace treaty that gave Stalin what he had sought territorially, but left Finland independent," he said.
Huge Advantages
The two countries went to war again in 1941 when Finland attacked the USSR with the aim of regaining the lost territory. This occurred after Nazi Germany launched its own invasion of Josef Stalin's Soviet Union and Soviet air raids against Finnish cities, Johnson said.
"The Continuation War, as it became known, was marked by a rapid Finnish advance, followed by trench warfare that lasted until 1944," Johnson explained.
"In the end, Finnish forces inflicted heavy losses on the Soviets, but eventually sued for peace, once again ceding territory," he said.
Johnson noted that the two wars "cost Finland 15 percent of its national territory."
"But Finland avoided the fate of its Baltic neighbors, which were annexed by the USSR and suffered heavily at the hands of Soviet secret police," he said.
"In the Winter War and the Continuation War, the Soviets suffered roughly six casualties for every Finnish casualty, despite huge advantages in equipment and manpower," Johnson said.
"High Finnish morale, effective leadership, the use of encirclement, and effective defense of the country's heavily wooded terrain were the major reasons behind the successes of Finnish forces," he went on.
If history is any guide, a Russian invasion of Finland would be difficult and potentially costly for the invaders. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine may also serve as an example not unlike previous Finno-Russian conflicts.
Military Reserves and Western Weapons
Johnson told Newsweek that while Finland had been forced to "demobilize much of its military" when peace negotiations with the USSR ended in 1947, the country was allowed to have military reserves.
"As a result, Finland has maintained near-universal conscription, with a large active reserve force," Johnson said.
"Although its full-time professional military numbers only 22,000 active personnel, roughly 900,000 Finns constitute the country's reserve forces," he went on.
"And unlike Ukraine, these forces are armed primarily with western European and American weapons systems, including the German-made Leopard tank and U.S.-made F-18 Hornet fighter," Johnson explained.
"The Russian armed forces are very fully engaged in Ukraine, and already suffering manpower and logistical shortages," he went on.
"But in the unlikely event Russia should attempt military action against Finland in the near-term, both history and the realities of Finnish military preparations suggest that it would not go well," Johnson said.
NATO and Russia's Failure
Dr. Patrick Bury is associate professor in security at the University of Bath in the U.K. He served in the British army as an air assault infantry captain and later worked as an analyst for NATO. Bury told Newsweek he expected Finland and Sweden would be accepted into NATO quickly.
"Both are NATO Partnership for Peace members already, so will have an understanding of NATO organization and standards," Bury said.
"In the event of a formal application to join, I'd expect NATO to accept both countries quickly, proving another Russian failure to fully understand the implications of its invasion."
Bury also pointed out that Finland joining the alliance would increase NATO's border with Russia "by 830 miles—a not insignificant area when the alliance is currently rethinking its force posture on its eastern flank."
Newsweek has asked the Finnish Ministry of Defense for comment.
8. Putin purges more than 100 FSB agents in apparent retaliation amid Ukraine invasion quagmire
And "For What It's Worth:"
Paranoia strikes deep
Into your life it will creep
It starts when you're always afraid
You step out of line
The man come and take you away
HERE
Putin purges more than 100 FSB agents in apparent retaliation amid Ukraine invasion quagmire
Dr. Rebecca Grant weighs in as Ukraine braces for new Russian offensive in the East on 'Fox News Live.'
NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!
Russia's invasion of Ukraine appears not to be going according to plan, and President Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming his old colleagues at the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) – the intelligence agency successor to the KGB – for the quagmire.
Putin reportedly purged more than 100 agents from the FSB, and his government sent the head of the department responsible for Ukraine to prison.
About 150 FSB officers have been dismissed, The Times of London reported Monday. The ousted agents belonged to the Fifth Service, a division that Putin – then director of the FSB – set up in 1998 in order to carry out operations in the countries of the former Soviet Union, aiming to keep those countries in Russia's orbit.
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to female flight attendants in comments broadcast on state television on Saturday, March 5, 2022. (Reuters Video)
Authorities placed Sergei Beseda, the former head of the Fifth Service, under house arrest last month. He has since been moved to the FSB-run Lefortovo prison in Moscow, The Times reported. The NKVD, the KGB's predecessor, used the prison for interrogation and torture during Stalin's 1930s Great Purge.
This move sent a "very strong message" to other elites in Russia, Andrei Soldatov, an expert with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told The Times.
"I was surprised by this," Soldatov said. "Putin could have very easily just fired him or sent him off to some regional job in Siberia. Lefortovo is not a nice place and sending him there is a signal as to how seriously Putin takes this stuff."
In this image from video provided by the Ukrainian Presidential Press Office, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks from Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, April 8, 2022. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP)
Soldatov suggested that Russian authorities may suspect Beseda of having passed information to the CIA.
Analysts previously told Fox News that Beseda's house arrest sentence seemed a form of retaliation for intelligence errors in Ukraine.
Soldatov said the Fifth Service represents "the most sensitive department of the FSB department, which is in charge of espionage in Ukraine. And now it looks like Vladimir Putin finally understood that the intelligence he was given before the invasion was not extremely accurate. And he has started looking around trying to find someone to blame."
While Russian troops fight to take ground in Ukraine, Moscow is also fighting an intelligence war. The U.S. FBI announced last week that it had disrupted a Russian military hacking scheme to set up a "botnet" on victim devices in the U.S. and elsewhere. Late last month, Ukrainian intelligence released a purported list of more than 600 Russian spies.
Rep. Ritchie Torres, D-N.Y., called on the FBI to investigate the Russian Diplomatic Compound, located in New York City, which experts previously told Fox News Digital houses diplomats who are in the U.S. to spy on America.
A view of the Russian Diplomatic Compound at 355 West 255th Street; Inset: Russian President Vladimir Putin (Getty Images) (Getty Images/Google Maps)
"We have been appalled and alarmed by Vladimir Putin's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. We have been appalled by his war crimes against the Ukrainian people, and it is in that context that I have formally requested that the FBI open an investigation into reports of espionage at the Russian diplomatic compound," Torres told reporters Tuesday about the white high-rise tower located at 355 West 255th Street, in the Bronx borough.
The Bronx Democrat called it "both metaphorically and literally a structure of surveillance."
9. US military aid to Ukraine now has surpassed $3 billion under Biden. Here's what's been provided
A useful roll-up/summary.
US military aid to Ukraine now has surpassed $3 billion under Biden. Here's what's been provided
Over the last nine months, the Biden Administration has approved billions in military assistance - including anti-aircraft systems and Javelin missiles - to help Ukraine stop Russia's brutal invasion.
| USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — More than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems. Some 5,500 Javelin missiles. Over 7,000 small arms. And 50 million rounds of ammunition.
Vowing the U.S. will continue to "stand with Ukraine," President Joe Biden and his administration have committed $2.6 billion in U.S. military aid to Ukraine since Russia's Feb. 24 invasion, supplying a range of weapons for Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression.
The latest round, $800 million in military aid authorized Wednesday, raised the total committed to Ukraine to $3.2 billion since Biden took office. There's also been indirect assistance to allies such as a Patriot missile system the U.S. repositioned to Slovakia after its government agreed to supply an S-300 air defense system to Ukraine.
"We won’t be able to advertise every piece of security we give because our allies and partners are supplying to Ukraine through us," Biden said last week, "but advanced weapons and ammunition are flowing in every single day."
Most of the assistance has been authorized through the Foreign Assistance Act. Still, Biden has rebuffed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's calls to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine and a proposal from Poland to send fighter jets to a U.S. airbase in Germany to facilitate its transfer to Ukraine.
Zelenskyy has repeatedly pushed western allies, particularly the U.S., to provide even more aid amid allegations of war crimes and genocide directed at Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"Without additional weapons, this war will turn into an endless bloodbath that will spread misery, suffering and destruction. Mariupol, Bucha, Kramatorsk – the list goes on," Zelenskyy tweeted this week. "No one will stop Russia except Ukraine with heavy weapons." He ended with the hashtag, "#ArmUkraineNow."
Missiles, drones, helicopters and more: The full scale of military aid
According to the Pentagon, the U.S. has provided the following assistance to Ukraine:
- more than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems
- more than 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems
- more than 14,000 other anti-armor systems
- more than 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems
- 18 155mm Howitzers (long-run cannons) and 40,000 155mm artillery rounds
- 11 Mi-17 helicopters
- hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
- Over 7,000 small arms
- Over 50 million rounds of ammunition
- 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets
- Laser-guided rocket systems
- Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems
- unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels
- 14 counter-artillery radars
- four counter-mortar radars
- two air surveillance radars
- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
- C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
- tactical secure communications systems
- night-vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders
- commercial satellite imagery services
- explosive ordnance disposal protective gear
- chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear protective equipment
- Medical supplies and first aid kits.
Here's a timeline of Biden's infusion of aid:
April 13 – $800 million
The Biden administration Wednesday authorized $800 million in additional security assistance to Ukraine following a call between Biden and Zelenskyy earlier in the day. The aid comes as Russia concentrates attacks in the eastern Donbas region after retreating from the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.
New weapons and machinery – 18 155mm Howitzers (long-range cannons), 40,000 artillery rounds and 200 M113 armored personnel carriers – are meant to expand Ukraine's military capabilities for a drawn-out fight. The new round of aid also provided 500 Javelin missiles and anti-armor systems, adding to the supply the U.S. has already provided.
The package includes 10 AN/TPQ-36 counter-artillery radars, two AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air surveillance radars, 300 switchblade tactical unmanned aerial systems, 11 helicopters, and 100 armored multipurpose vehicles. Other equipment included "unmanned coastal defense vessels," though the Department of Defense did not elaborate.
April 6 – $100 million
Biden on April 6 authorized a drawdown of $100 million in security assistance to support Ukraine, with the bulk of aid providing Javelin missiles for Ukraine forces.
At the time, Pentagon spokesman John Kriby said Javelin anti-armor systems are an "urgent Ukraine need" that have been used effectively by the Ukrainians against Russia.
"We know they're using them," he said. "You can see the evidence for yourself when you look at the videos and the images on TV of these burnt-out tanks and burnt-out trucks and armored personnel carriers."
April 1 – $300 million
The Biden administration on April 1 authorized $300 million in aid to Ukraine to fill many of the requests Zelenskyy has made. The package came via the Defense Department's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative package – which, unlike a presidential drawdown, involves new contracts rather than the U.S. military's existing stocks.
The package included laser-guided rocket systems, armed drones, armored vehicles, machine guns, commercial satellite imagery services, medical supplies, night-vision devices, thermal imagery systems and tactical secure communications systems.
March 16 - $800 million
Biden authorized $800 million in military aid for Ukraine on March 16, just hours after Zelenskyy made an impassioned appeal for help during a virtual address to U.S. Congress. It marked the single-largest military funding drawdown at the time, later matched by the infusion of aid on April 13.
The package included: 800 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 2,000 Javelin missiles, 1,000 light anti-armor weapons, 6,000 AT-4 anti-armor systems, 100 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems, 100 grenade launchers, 5,000 rifles, 1,000 pistols, 400 machine guns; 400 shotguns; and 25,000 sets of body armor and helmets.
March 12 - $200 million
A little more than two weeks into Russia's war in Ukraine, the Biden administration authorized an additional $200 million for Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the aid would help Ukraine "meet the armored, airborne and other threats it is facing."
The package included an assortment of small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons as well as military services, education and training.
Feb. 26 – $350 million
The first infusion of U.S. military aid following Russia's invasion came two days later on Feb. 26 with $350 million toward Javelin missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, small arms and ammunition.
"It is another clear signal that the United States stands with the people of Ukraine as they defend their sovereign, courageous, and proud nation," Blinken said, some 48 hours after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
December –$200 million
As the White House ramped up warnings about a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration Jan. 19 confirmed it authorized $200 million in military aid in late December.
The package, which came as Moscow military forces were building up on the Ukraine border, included Javelin and other anti-armor systems, grenade launchers, munitions, and nonlethal equipment. It arrived in Ukraine on Jan. 25.
August – $60 million
Coinciding with a White House meeting between Biden and Zelenskyy, the White House on Aug. 31 committed $60 million in military aid to Ukraine as Russia increased its military presence around Ukraine.
The package included additional Javelin anti-armor systems and other lethal and non-lethal defense capabilities.
“Russia’s buildup along the Ukrainian border has highlighted capability shortfalls in the Ukrainian military’s ability to defend against a Russian incursion,” the White House sent in a notification to Congress “Ukraine’s significant capability gaps must be urgently addressed to reinforce deterrence in light of the current Russian threat.”
$13.6 billion in humanitarian, security aid in budget bill
In addition to the military drawdowns, Biden signed a $1.5 trillion government spending bill March 15 that included $13.6 billion in humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.
The White House said the funds would "augment" other aid to provide additional defense equipment for Ukraine, humanitarian assistance and U.S. troop deployments to neighboring countries
About half the $13.6 billion was to arm Ukraine and cover the Pentagon’s costs for sending U.S. troops to surrounding Eastern European nations. The remaining is going toward humanitarian and economic assistance, strengthening regional allies’ defenses and protecting their energy supplies and cybersecurity needs.
Contributing: Associated Press
2022-04-14T22:40:23Z
10. Six U.S. lawmakers arrive in Taiwan on unannounced trip
Six U.S. lawmakers arrive in Taiwan on unannounced trip
TAIPEI, April 14 (Reuters) - A group of six U.S. lawmakers, including chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez, landed in Taiwan on Thursday for a previously unannounced visit, in a show of support to the island in the face of Chinese pressure.
The United States has no formal relations with Chinese-claimed Taiwan, but is its most important international backer and arms supplier.
Taiwan has been heartened by the continued U.S. support offered by the Biden administration, which has repeatedly talked of its "rock-solid" commitment to the democratically governed island. That has strained already poor Sino-U.S. relations.
Register now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com
The bipartisan group, which will meet with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on Friday morning on their two-day visit, arrived at Taipei's downtown Songshan airport on a U.S. Air Force aircraft and were greeted by Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu.
The visit not only shows the bipartisan U.S. support for Taiwan, but also the "rock solid" nature of Taiwan-US relations, Presidential Office spokesman Xavier Chang said in a statement.
"The Presidential Office looks forward to continuing to deepen the Taiwan-U.S. partnership through this face-to-face exchange, and continuing to work together to contribute to global and regional peace, stability, prosperity and development," he added.
Menendez, a Democrat, is a staunch supporter of Taiwan. In February he co-proposed a bill that would require the United States to negotiate the renaming of Taiwan's de facto embassy in Washington as the "Taiwan Representative Office". read more
Senior Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is also on the trip.
Register now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com
Reporting by Ben Blanchard Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky
11. In future wars, US Marine special operators will need to do more than 'kicking down a door,' top Marine says
I do think the Raiders already do less door kicking and more special operations. But it seems like the Commander of USSOCOM will have something today about the organization, training, equipping, and education for the MARSOC force as well as how it is employed. And of course the is Title 10, sec. 167 here: https://codes.findlaw.com/us/title-10-armed-forces/10-usc-sect-167.html
And I do not think the Marine Raiders are "attached" to USSOCOM. They are assigned to USSOCOM and designated as SOF by the SECDEF IAW Title 10 Sec. 167.
Excerpt:
The Marine Raider Regiment, as the Marine unit attached to SOCOM is known, specializes in direct-action missions like raids, special reconnaissance operations, and foreign internal defense — the training and advising of partner forces. They can also conduct unconventional warfare, which involves working with proxy fighters, and counterterrorism operations.
In future wars, US Marine special operators will need to do more than 'kicking down a door,' top Marine says
US Marines with the 1st Raider Battalion train with the US Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, September 29, 2015.
US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Jacob Snouffer
- The top Marine general is taking the Corps back to its naval roots amid a shift to great-power competition.
- That has implications for the Corps' special operators, Marine Forces Special Operations Command.
- The Marine Raiders have "great value" that conventional forces don't, Gen. David Berger says.
Get a daily selection of our top stories based on your reading preferences.
US special-operations forces have been on the frontlines for more than 20 years.
Those forces have played a major role in US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. But with Russia and China posing a growing challenge, the Pentagon is looking at how to employ those operators' unique skills in a different environment.
Each US military branch has been brainstorming how its special operators can contribute. For Marine Forces Special Operations Command, the question is particularly pertinent.
SOCOM's newest member
US Marine Raiders in front of a Japanese dugout on Bougainville in the Solomon Islands in January 1944.
US Marine Corps Photo
The other US military branches established their special-operations commands in the late 1980s and early 1990s. US Special Operations Command, a combatant command overseeing each branch's special-operations component, was formed in 1987.
The Marine Corps resisted invitations to contribute to SOCOM because of a belief that "every Marine is special" and that Marines didn't do separate special-operations forces. The Corps eventually relented, however, and MARSOC joined SOCOM in 2006.
The Marine Raider Regiment, as the Marine unit attached to SOCOM is known, specializes in direct-action missions like raids, special reconnaissance operations, and foreign internal defense — the training and advising of partner forces. They can also conduct unconventional warfare, which involves working with proxy fighters, and counterterrorism operations.
"MARSOC initially started out with a unique organizational structure and capabilities," which were unparalleled in US Army Special Operations Command or in Naval Special Warfare Command, retired Marine Raider Maj. Fred Galvin told Insider.
Marines take part in MARSOC's Assessment and Selection course at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, January 30, 2015.
US Marine Corps/Sgt. Donovan Lee
"These capabilities provided a very robust 'raid' capability with an organic infantry security platoon, which even Tier 1 units do not have in their organic organization, nor do Tier 1 units have available for integrated training throughout their entire pre-deployment training life cycle," Galvin added.
Galvin is the author of "A Few Bad Men," an account of the first Marine Special Operations combat deployment to Afghanistan and how it overcame attacks from all sides.
Throughout the global war on terror, Marine Raiders deployed and fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and across Africa. Marine Raiders made the headlines in January 2020 when they were the first responders to an al-Shabab attack on a Kenyan military base that killed three Americans.
With the end of major combat operations in the Middle East and the resulting decline in demand for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, MARSOC has been competing with Naval Special Warfare and Army Special Operations for funds and missions.
Culture, language, and low-visibility operations
Marines with 3rd Marine Raider Battalion during urban-combat training at Camp Lejeune, November 17, 2016.
US Marine Corps/Cpl. Christopher A. Mendoza
During a conference in February, US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger offered some insight into how the Marine Corps' special-operations forces might be fighting in the future.
With the war on terror winding down, SOCOM has declared a need to better balance deterrence of strategic rivals with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
Having a forward-deployed force working with allies and partners across the world to build credible defenses against near-peer adversaries, such as China and Russia, is as important as targeting violent extremist organizations.
For MARSOC to support such a pivot, Berger described an emphasis on low-visibility and operational preparation of the battlefield operations, which aren't combat operations but prepare a battle space for potential kinetic actions.
Members of the Marine Raider Regiment conduct a free-fall jump from an MV-22B Osprey over North Carolina, September 1, 2015.
US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Austin A. Lewis
The Marine Raiders' "great value is their persistent presence forward and in their deeper cultural and language" skills, as well as "their connectivity through the country team into the nation," Berger said. "Conventional forces don't normally have any of that."
For example, a Marine Raider team could go into Kenya to map out roads, safe houses, active or potential airstrips, and other points of interest that could be used to support the quick deployment of special operators in response to an attack.
To conduct such operations, special-operations units need to have mature troops who can blend into the environment, and the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the US special-operations community facilitates that goal. For example, units like the Army's 7th Special Forces Group, which is assigned to Central and South America, emphasize those cultural connections and tailor their language instruction to that region.
Special operators with those backgrounds and skills can blend in to where they're operating, making it easier to connect with potential partners and harder for rival forces to detect them.
'Back to naval roots'
Marines with the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion helocast during Visit, Board, Search and Seizure training near Camp Pendleton, California.
US Marine Corps/Cpl. Kyle McNally
Berger has sought to reorient the Marine Corps toward the maritime realm after years of combat in places like Afghanistan, and he said he'd like to see a similar shift for Marine Raiders.
"Hopefully if you were to look two or three or four years into the future, [MARSOC] would follow a similar path as the rest of the Marine Corps, back to naval roots [and] how does it support the naval expeditionary forces forward," Berger said at the National Defense Industrial Association conference.
Berger's push to ditch "big heavy things" and build a smaller, lighter, more naval-focused force has won support in Congress and among Pentagon leaders, but it has also drawn backlash. More than two dozen retired generals have mounted a campaign against it.
MARSOC has come a long way, developing "greater combat capabilities and integration with more assets that provide their deployable forces with enhanced lethality that did not previously exist," Galvin said.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
12. Document reveals $14 billion backlog of US defense transfers to Taiwan
If Apollo 13 were doing security assistance and cooperation: "Houston, we've had a problem."
Perhaps the CODEL that is in Taiwan now can fix this.
Document reveals $14 billion backlog of US defense transfers to Taiwan
WASHINGTON — Pandemic-related acquisition issues have sparked a backlog in the U.S. delivering $14.2 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan that the island has purchased since 2019.
Rep. Steve Chabot, the top Republican on the House’s Asia and Pacific panel, told Defense News that the Foreign Affairs Committee held a meeting to discuss the backlog last week.
“We need to make sure that we provide Taiwan with the assistance that they need as well so that they’re not vulnerable to the [People’s Republic of China],” the lawmaker from Ohio said. “Obviously Ukraine is in the limelight right now — and rightfully so — but we best not forget about Taiwan because China’s actions have been more and more provocative.”
Defense News has obtained a spreadsheet detailing the backlogged equipment, which includes Taiwan’s $8 billion purchase of 66 F-16 fighter jets as well as $620 million to replace expiring components of its Patriot missile system.
The delayed deliveries also consist of smaller, asymmetric weapons systems Washington believes would be useful in deterring and thwarting a potential Chinese invasion. China considers the self-governing island a rogue province and has promised to bring it back under Beijing’s control, by force if necessary.
Those asymmetric weapons include Stinger missiles, heavyweight torpedoes, high-mobility artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, MS-110 reconnaissance pods and a field information communications system. They also include $2.37 billion in Harpoon Block II surface-launched missiles and $1 billion in air-launched SLAM-ER missiles.
Taiwan's American-made Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries pass during a parade in Taipei, Taiwan, on Oct. 10, 2007. (Wally Santana/AP)
The $14.2 billion backlog of sales accounts for the vast majority of the approximately $17 billion in military equipment Taiwan agreed to purchase from the United States since July 2019. The U.S. State Department notified Congress of another $95 million sale to provide contracting support for Taiwan’s Patriot missile system just last week. (Foreign Military Sales notification figures represent potential arms sales that the State Department internally clears. They must then clear a congressional review period, during which costs and quantities can change.)
Neither the Defense Department nor Taiwan’s diplomatic office in Washington replied to Defense News’ request for comment about the backlog.
But Taiwan’s envoy to the United States, Hsiao Bi-khim, raised the alarm bells on Capitol Hill last week in a bid to urge Washington to address the backlog.
Hsiao addressed it during a breakfast with Rep. Mike McCaul, R-Texas, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and pushed for Taiwan’s inclusion alongside the U.S. and more than two dozen other participants in the biennial Rim of the Pacific naval exercises off the coast of Hawaii.
“Her biggest complaint to us is that while we have notified and signed off on these systems, they have yet to be delivered to Taiwan,” McCaul told the State Department’s No. 2 diplomat, Wendy Sherman, during a hearing last week on the Indo-Pacific region.
He likened Taiwan’s position vis-a-vis China to that of Ukraine in the lead-up to the Russian invasion.
“Is Taiwan able to defend herself?” McCaul asked. “I think the answer is ‘no’ right now, and I’m worried about that. I don’t want to make the same mistake of waiting until after an invasion because that’s going to be too late.”
However, it remains unclear what — if anything — the United States can do to address the pandemic-related acquisition issues that prompted the backlog.
“Our primary issue — and we see this playing out in Ukraine also — is that the industry has been delayed in the development of these systems,” a Republican staffer on the House Foreign Affairs Committee told Defense News.
The staffer also noted the U.S. defense industry has attributed supply chain issues, staff shortages and shipping delays to COVID-19 — problems that have cascaded into broader production troubles.
“Honestly, the bottom line is there is very little that the government can do at this juncture to address supply chain issues,” Rupert Hammond-Chambers, the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, told Defense News.
Hammond-Chambers pointed to the federal government’s inability to address semiconductor supply chain issues that contributed to higher car prices around the globe.
Soldiers take part in a military exercise in Hsinchu County, northern Taiwan, Tuesday, Jan. 19, 2021. (Chiang Ying-ying/AP)
“There’s a great deal of political and international pressure to sort it out, but it’s having almost negligible impact on the ability of the companies to produce the chip that is necessary for the auto industry,” he said.
Prior to the backlog, Congress had largely remained focused on incentivizing Taiwan to make cheaper purchases consisting of large quantities of asymmetric munitions versus the more expensive, state-of-the-art weapons that China may quickly incapacitate during an invasion.
And while much of Taiwan’s U.S. defense purchases bolster its asymmetric capabilities — including many of the backlogged articles — some in Washington raised their eyebrows in 2019 when Taipei opted to move ahead with a $2 billion purchase of Abrams tanks.
“The United States encourages Taiwan to purchase weapons that will enable [it] to adopt a strategy of denial that will prevent China from being able to seize and control Taiwan, so that it will not have the confidence to do so and therefore will not be tempted to do so,” Bonnie Glaser, the Asia Program director at the German Marshall Fund, told Defense News.
For instance, Chabot introduced a bill last year with Rep. Ami Bera, D-Calif., calling on Taiwan to further invest in asymmetric defense capabilities.
Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has also introduced a bill to authorize $2 billion a year in Taiwanese military aid, but only if Taipei produces long-term plans for joint capability development with the United States.
Another bill, introduced by Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., would authorize $3 billion in Taiwanese military aid annually. The bill would place more explicit requirements stipulating the funding go toward developing Taipei’s asymmetric defense capabilities against China.
The Biden administration has also encouraged Taiwan to invest more in its asymmetric capabilities, even as many of those munitions remain backlogged.
“We are also encouraging Taiwan to focus on capabilities that would deter the [People’s Republic of China] from taking Taiwan by force,” Sherman said during her testimony before Congress last week. “This means a focus on capabilities that are cost-efficient, mobile, lethal, resilient and capable of operating and surviving a contested environment.”
Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and national security in Washington since 2014. He previously wrote for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.
13. DOD: Security Assistance Support to Ukraine Not Affecting U.S. Readiness
But we need to get the defense industrial base firing on all cylinders to replenish stockpiles.
DOD: Security Assistance Support to Ukraine Not Affecting U.S. Readiness
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Feb. 24, the U.S. government has provided $2.6 billion in security assistance to the Ukrainians to help them regain and defend their sovereignty. Much of what has been sent has come straight out of U.S. military stockpiles. Nevertheless, the U.S. military's own readiness has not been affected by having sent that gear overseas, said Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby during a briefing today.
35:30
"I can assure you that we are not at the point where our inventories of these systems have ... or will imminently affect our readiness," Kirby said. "We're comfortable that our stocks are in keeping with our readiness needs. But we obviously know that, as these packages go on, and as the need continues inside Ukraine, we want to lead turn. ... We want to be ahead of the bow wave on that and not get to a point where it becomes a readiness issue."
Yesterday, the Defense Department announced an additional $800 million security assistance "drawdown" package to support Ukraine. A drawdown package allows the president, in certain circumstances, to withdraw existing weapons, ammunitions and material from U.S. military stocks to provide to other nations.
The support package announced yesterday is the seventh security assistance drawdown package that has been sent to Ukraine.
Info Check
Senior Airman Jansen Esteves, a 436th Aerial Port Squadron special handler, verifies shipment information for supplies bound for Ukraine at Dover Air Force Base, Del., March 20, 2022.
SHARE IMAGE:
Photo By: Air Force Staff Sgt. Marco A. Gomez
VIRIN: 220320-F-QD007-0103
During a briefing yesterday, Kirby said Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen H. Hicks met with leaders of U.S. defense contractors to discuss production of the very kinds of systems, equipment and weapons the U.S. is sending to Ukraine.
"We wanted to make sure that we had a good, honest, candid discussion with these CEOs about the systems that they're producing; about the rate at which they're being produced; about the possibility for accelerating some of those production lines and expanding them based on the heavy draw on our inventory to support Ukraine," Kirby said.
While Kirby said the focus of Wednesday's meeting with defense contractor leadership was heavily focused on their ability to produce the very kinds of things that are being sent over to Ukraine, he also said the meeting was part of a regularly occurring series. For instance, there was a similar meeting focused on hypersonic technologies held several months ago.
Northern Strike
Soldiers drive an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier during Exercise Northern Strike on Camp Grayling, Mich., Aug. 14, 2018. As of April 14, 2022, the U.S. has sent 200 M113 systems to Ukraine.
SHARE IMAGE:
Photo By: Army Pfc. Jonathan Perdelwitz, National Guard
VIRIN: 180814-A-TN401-1263M
At yesterday's meeting, Kirby said, defense contractors such as Boeing, L3-Harris, Raytheon, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, Huntington-Ingalls, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman were all represented.
"It was a good discussion," Kirby said. "We were very grateful ... for their willingness to come on in and have this discussion."
So far, Kirby said, the Defense Department has not seen any efforts by Russia to interdict the security assistance being sent to Ukraine, but the U.S. remains cautious about its ability to provide the Ukrainians with what they need.
Launch Ready
Marine Corps Lance Cpl. David Parrott launches a Switchblade unmanned aerial vehicle during training at Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 7, 2021. As of April 14, 2022, the U.S. has sent 700 Switchblade systems to Ukraine.
SHARE IMAGE:
Photo By: Marine Corps Pfc. Sarah Pysher
VIRIN: 210707-M-EA659-1117
"We don't take ... any movement of weapons and systems going into Ukraine for granted," he said. "That's why we're very careful about how much information we put out there about it. That's why … we are careful to modulate that activity on any given day. We're not taking it for granted."
The Ukrainians are not taking the provided weapons and systems for granted, and they are moving the supplies inside their country, said Kirby.
According to a Defense Department fact sheet published today, as of April 14, the U.S. has provided or committed to provide Ukraine, more than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; 700 Switchblade tactical unmanned aerial systems; 7,000 small arms; 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; and 18 155mm Howitzers with 40,000 155mm artillery rounds; 16 Mi-17 helicopters; hundreds of armored Humvee vehicles and 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers.
14. Inside Ukraine's Makeshift Training Camps, Where Soldiers Are Forged from Civilians
Train the trainers. Now the trainers train the civilians.
Inside Ukraine's Makeshift Training Camps, Where Soldiers Are Forged from Civilians
military.com · by 14 Apr 2022 Military.com | By Katie Livingstone · April 14, 2022
LVIV, Ukraine -- The echo of excited voices bounces off the arched ceiling of a blue-and-orange gymnasium in Lviv, Ukraine, as dozens of volunteers pool around tables. Every day starting at 8 a.m., Ukrainian officials sit, hurriedly scribbling down names and details, waving to the next recruit to step up. There isn't much time. Hundreds more potential fighters are already waiting outside for the chance to join, some returning day after day after failing to make it through the lengthy line.
The ranks of Ukraine's 25 regional Territorial Defense Forces have surged since Russia began its invasion of the country earlier this year. As a reservist branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this regional battalion was designed to be deployed as a last line of defense against invading Russian troops if the national military is unable to hold the line, an outcome that had already happened in some destroyed towns in the north, east and south of the country.
In western regions like Lviv, the new home of hundreds of thousands of displaced people fleeing the devastated east, militia recruitment centers are buzzing with new recruits and nonstop training sessions.
Gingerly handling a rifle or bazooka thrust into their arms by an instructor short on time, recruits at the gym pause to feel the weight and shape of the new weapon before looking down to make sure their fingers are positioned to pull the trigger. Most of the men and women of the Territorial Defense Forces have never shot a gun before and are expected to learn quickly. The recruitment center has held training sessions for new fighters all day, every day since the war started.
One nearby group is crammed into a dim hallway, pointing at the various, laid-out parts of a disassembled mine, while asking a veteran to explain more details about how to safely exit a minefield. A larger group makes a semicircle outside around an officer adeptly loading and then disassembling a Soviet-era Kalashnikov assault rifle as he shouts out each step. Another group of soldiers in the field shows more than 50 trainees how to use tactical teamwork to stay safe under fire. And in an old amphitheater, a rapt audience of new recruits listens to newly minted combat medics demonstrate battlefield medicine techniques without having the supplies to practice for themselves.
Just over five weeks after the start of the war, tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have been killed as entire cities like Mariupol have been destroyed by Russian bombardment. International leaders have accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of war crimes and, more recently, genocide. As a result, hundreds or thousands of Ukrainians have dropped everything to take up arms with these local militias in what many see as anything but a choice.
And although Russia said earlier this month that it had completed the initial phase of its military operation in Ukraine, Ukrainian officials and many international experts are doubtful that these promises will end the war. Reports show that Russian forces have retreated from Kyiv and some central towns, but shelling has continued across much of the country and intensified along the eastern borderlands. Russia recently mobilized another 60,000 reservists and installed the "Butcher of Syria," Gen. Alexander Dvornikov, to lead the invasion. The worst could be yet to come.
"What was I supposed to do?" asked Andre, a skinny 29-year-old student with curly, brown hair and a quick smile, as he eagerly watched a demonstration about how to load an AK-47. "I need to stand up like everyone else," he said with conviction, diverting his eyes to the ground before quickly looking back to the hypnotizing display of the pro's seamless assembly of the Kalashnikov.
Listening to an instructor tell him where to place his fingers and rest his gaze, a volunteer fighter holds a bazooka for the first time amidst a small group of new recruits in Lviv, Ukraine. (Military.com photo by Katie Livingstone)
Each of the regional militias is made up of tens of thousands of former teachers, IT professionals, doctors and other civilian professionals determined to do everything they can to stop the invasion of their country. Although Ukraine's military is the biggest in Europe, it is still about five times smaller than Russia's and significantly less equipped, even with the recent deluge of weapons sent by Western countries since the start of the war. Many experts point to the indelible resolve of the Ukrainian people, especially its military and endless number of volunteer fighters, to explain how the small nation has been able to withstand the invasion for so long.
Most of the recruits are men aged 18 to 60 who, as part of the country's general mobilization announced by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the day the war began, had to report for service or sign up for the draft. They were also forbidden from crossing the borders. "Now my country needs me to be a soldier. There are no other options," Andre said, staring ahead.
Stories like Andre's are common, but not all recruits fall into this category.
Thirty-seven-year-old Oksana is a rheumatologist turned informal combat medic who joined the Territorial Defense Force in the week following the first strikes. Almost every day since then, she drives her three young daughters about 15 miles outside of Lviv to her parents' home, where they are less likely to be hit by surprise shelling, she says. Then she drives back into town and climbs the stage of the auditorium to teach tactical medicine to dozens of fresh-faced recruits eager to learn survival skills before getting sent out to the battlefield.
"I never expected to be in this position -- responsible for teaching soldiers how to stop major bleeding or wrap wounds with shrapnel still lodged inside," she said tiredly, with just a hint of sadness in her voice. "But we are all doing what we can now to end this war and protect our country."
With bright white hair and thick glasses, 55-year-old Volod also joined the battalion last week. Ordinarily a high school teacher, he knew that problems with his heart would prevent him from serving in a squadron but hoped his military experience from decades ago could still be put to use. In the spirit of leveraging every available resource, officials decided to make him an informal trainer of tactical formation and weaponry -- two areas of combat that have changed little over the decades since he trained under Soviet military tutelage.
An officer points to the pieces of a disassembled mine, explaining to the new members of the Territorial Defense Forces which part is the trigger and how they can safely dismantle the bombs if necessary. (Military.com photo by Katie Livingstone)
"This war has united our country," he said proudly while surveying the hundreds of people clumped in small groups across the courtyard learning the profession of arms. His 29-year-old son is also a member of the Territorial Defense Force, but he has already been mobilized and sent to the front in the southeastern city of Kharkiv. "The world should support us as much as they can and treat Ukraine as a member of Europe," he added, pausing for a moment as the first show of emotion started coloring his cheeks red. "We are not different; we are all the same."
With a population of between two and three million people, the region of Lviv has been mostly spared the death and destruction experienced in other parts of the country until now. Bordering Poland to the west, the capital of the region is only about 35 miles away from the deconfliction zone set up by NATO, along with its 130,000 troops meant to dispel any chance of a spillover of the war into the European Union.
That hasn't stopped the Kremlin from testing those limits, however. First, there was a deadly strike that killed 35 and wounded 150 on the former NATO training center in Yavoriv, about 30 miles west of Lviv, that had been housing weapons brought in from western Europe and thousands of military recruits, including hundreds of foreign nationals from the International Legion.
The legion shot to international fame when Ukrainian leaders began pleading for military veterans to come join the fight, and is now made up of tens of thousands of volunteers from around the world. In March, Russia denounced the group as "foreign missionaries" who were unworthy of protection under the Geneva Conventions as soldiers. Despite the news coverage, the Legion makes up only a tiny fraction of the forces fighting to repel the Russians.
The United Nations has reported that more than 10 million Ukrainians have been displaced due to the war -- about one out of every four citizens. Officials estimate that at least four million people, including 50% of the country's children, have fled into neighboring countries like Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, and further into Europe.
Ukrainian troops and civilians have said again and again how grateful they are to the international community for the billions of dollars in weaponry and humanitarian aid that has already been sent to the besieged country since late February. Many soldiers know which country has given which weapons to Ukraine, specifically thanking the U.S. on more than one occasion for the Javelins and Stingers that have helped the country repel some devastating air raids.
But it's not enough, they say.
"We are not only defending Ukraine, but the whole world," said Taras Ishchyk, communication adviser of the 103rd Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces. "The West is afraid of starting World War III by directly engaging with Russia, but they don't understand that WWIII has already started today, in Ukraine. Tomorrow it will be in your country."
He noted how the war has already disrupted energy supplies, food systems and political stability across the planet.
"We don't expect you to fight our war for us," he clarified. "But we need the international community to help us close the skies.
"You risk genocide," he said heavily.
Katie Livingstone is a freelance correspondent currently reporting from Ukraine and Eastern Europe. A graduate of Medill and Wellesley, her work has appeared in Foreign Policy Magazine, Rolling Stone Magazine, USA Today, UPI and more. Katie speaks five languages and currently lives in Washington, D.C.
military.com · by 14 Apr 2022 Military.com | By Katie Livingstone · April 14, 2022
15. What Artillery and Air Defense Does Ukraine Need Now?
Excerpts:
Much has been written and said in recent weeks about the need to field weapons to the Ukrainians that can be immediately employed to stop the Russian offensive. That was wise counsel and has achieved its ends. Those weapons should continue to flow. The argument that more sophisticated weapons aren’t viable because of the associated training and follow-on logistics support simply isn’t correct given where Ukraine now finds itself in the fight. As the war settles in for a longer-term artillery duel, more appropriate and sustainable weapons systems should be brought to bear. The training to use those systems is not overly complex and can be accomplished in neighboring NATO countries in relatively brief periods of time. The maintenance and other tasks above the operator level can be performed by contracted logistics support in the operational environment as well as in neighboring countries for depot-level maintenance. Most importantly, the precision, lethality, and efficiency to be successful against Russian artillery systems is best provided by the more sophisticated capabilities available from NATO. Just as NATO has provided sophisticated systems — such as the Javelin, the Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon, Stinger, Starstreak, and Panzerfaust 3 — NATO should provide similar levels of sophistication for Ukraine to succeed in this next phase and mitigate the human suffering there as much as possible.
Now is the time to transition to NATO artillery and air-defense systems before Ukraine loses the momentum it has gained.
What Artillery and Air Defense Does Ukraine Need Now? - War on the Rocks
While the Russian military is on the back foot in Ukraine, its shifting operations reveal severe shortcoming in Ukraine’s arsenal and capabilities — one that NATO member states could fix. Washington has recognized this and President Joe Biden has approved a new arms package for Ukraine that includes artillery and more sophisticated anti-air systems, including more sophisticated and heavier weapons and platforms than have been provided thus far. As a defense professional who has focused on artillery for most of his career, I am encouraged by this decision. These systems will allow Ukrainian forces to continue to press the fight against Russia’s military.
After failing in the first phase of the war, Russian forces seem intent on using artillery and air-delivered munitions to create a zone of destruction in the Donbas. While Ukraine has extensive Soviet-era field and air defense artillery, augmented by shoulder-launched capabilities from NATO member states, it lacks the logistical resilience and range necessary to stand toe-to-toe with Russia in this next phase of the war. The integration of air-defense artillery with surface-to-surface artillery would enable Ukrainian forces to take out the most effective remaining weaponry in Russia’s arsenal: artillery.
Destroying Russian artillery is the key to Ukrainian success in the next phase of the war. There are readily available artillery systems in NATO member and partner arsenals that would allow Ukraine to thwart Russian objectives. Some might be concerned that Ukraine will be unable to field and maintain such weapon systems, but these concerns should not be overstated. While supplying these weapons would require a short period of time for training and equipping, upgraded Ukrainian batteries and battalions could begin taking the field as early as May — if Western policymakers act with urgency, which they seem to be interested in doing.
A Shifting Campaign
Russian forces have all but withdrawn from areas in northern Ukraine. Russian ground offensives are concentrated in the south and east of Ukraine. The next phase of the war will likely be a war of attrition focused on the Donbas, with the possibility of Russia re-opening its front north of Kyiv. Withdrawing Russian forces have left a path of destruction in their wake. As Russia shifts its posture, it has conducted a relentless bombardment of built-up areas, most notably in Mariupol. Artillery is the weapon of choice in Russia’s campaign of destruction, which seems intended to denude areas of the basic infrastructure necessary to sustain a viable population. Artillery, precision aircraft strikes, and long-range missiles continue to target Ukrainian infrastructure.
Ukrainian forces have done an outstanding job denying air superiority to the Russian air force using man-portable air-defense systems provided by NATO. They have also succeeded in using Javelins to stop tanks in their tracks. However, Ukraine has no effective options to counter a prolonged Russian artillery offensive. This should trouble those who want to see Ukraine prevail as Russia can rely upon an extensive supply of artillery platforms and munitions that it will likely use to lay waste to large swaths of eastern Ukraine and thwart a Ukrainian counter-offensive to retake the country.
The State of Ukrainian Artillery and Air Defense
The Ukrainian army has made good use of its legacy equipment over the past eight years of combat in the Donbas and during the first seven weeks of the Russian invasion, but that equipment is largely destroyed, run-down, ineffective, or outdated. As the campaign goes on, this legacy equipment will continue to breakdown and be destroyed in combat. Logistics and maintenance for this equipment will become ever more difficult as Ukraine’s supply of lethal munitions for equipment on hand dries up. The Ukrainian army lacks sufficient counter rocket, artillery, and mortar capabilities, which is particularly critical in defending its own counter-fire radar systems. Perhaps the most effective capabilities the Ukrainians do have in their inventory are Russian air-defense systems. The S-300, gifted to Ukraine by Slovakia, is an effective long-range system, but even with outside help provided thus far, Ukraine does not have the right systems and missile magazine depth for this to be a viable long-term option.
Ukrainian artillery such as BM-21, 2S1, and D-30, as well as air-defense capabilities such as the SA-6 and the SA-13, stem primarily from lower-tech Soviet, domestic, or regional production. Ukraine does not have the latest technology in self-propelled howitzers. While older systems are useful for imprecise area fires, the latest NATO systems and their munitions are faster, more lethal, and more survivable. They would allow Ukraine to do things it cannot currently do well: quickly determine locations of enemy artillery and target them with counter-battery fire, and destroy tanks and other armored vehicles with artillery, rather than only with anti-tank guided missiles and other tanks.
Further, these newer artillery systems are fully digitized and integrated with precision equipment based on internal, gyroscopic, self-locating devices supplemented by GPS updating. They also have modular components that can be swapped out, thus simplifying repairs. This is important because Ukraine currently lacks the ability to produce munitions and repair parts, especially as Russian forces bombard Ukrainian industrial facilities. Most newer systems require a relatively brief period of training on individual weapon systems and munitions. They are easy to use and employ for artillerymen already trained in basic field craft.
More Western Kit for Ukraine
What specific systems should be considered for provision to Ukraine?
Sweden produces the Archer, a wheeled self-propelled howitzer with a range of 30 kilometers. The system is in production and a battalion’s worth of guns (12 to 18) could probably be provided immediately. It has on-board fire control computation, auto-loading and resupply, and requires only a three-man crew. France produces a similar howitzer, the CAESAR II. This is an extremely capable, wheeled, self-propelled, 155-milimeter howitzer that can integrate with NATO command and control systems.
These two howitzer systems are arguably the best in the world today. They are fully digitized and boast fully automated unmanned cannon turrets, power-assisted resupply systems, and onboard fire-solution computation systems. That means they can quickly receive and integrate all the data needed for counter-battery fire. These individual howitzers can fire a platoon’s worth of projectiles in a single fire mission and then drive to another location less than five minutes later to avoid Russian counter-battery fire. Both of these systems can fire the latest sensor-fuzed munitions, meaning each projectile can kill a vehicle that might be a tank, a self-propelled howitzer, and enemy radar system, or a logistics vehicle. In artillery, the ability to shoot, move, and shoot again is key to survivability. Both systems are highly mobile wheeled systems built on common truck chassis from Volvo and Tatra that can move quickly across road systems and have sufficient range to reach equivalent Russian cannon artillery systems from relative safety behind the forward line of troops. They are equipped with auto-loader systems and emplacement/displacement times measured in a handful of minutes. That gives them high rates of fires that enable them to do something called “multiple rounds, simultaneous impact” — one howitzer can have three to six rounds it fires land on a target area at the same time.
The U.S.-produced High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is also one of the best in the world. In addition to being highly mobile and digitized like the Archer and CAESAR, it can fire the full suite of sophisticated Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets and eventually the long-range Precision Strike Missile, when it comes online. This system and the associated rockets and missiles require minimal train-up for basic artillerymen to employ. To complete the Ukrainian artillery kill-chain, the United States currently produces a long-range, highly accurate, counter-fire radar, the Q-53, which the Ukrainian army is already somewhat familiar with.
Outfitting with NATO howitzers and rocket launchers provides Ukrainian forces with the ability to employ NATO projectiles, rockets, and missiles, which include the best in sensor-fused weapons (such as the German SMArt155mm and the Swedish BONUS), GPS-guided precision rockets, and high-yield precision missiles. Integrating multi-mission radars and the counter-battery Q-53 radar would allow Ukrainian forces to identify Russian artillery systems, defeat incoming rounds by blasting them out of the sky using NATO or Russian counter-rocket systems, and provide counter-battery fire using sensor-fused munitions and area effects rockets to decimate Russian artillery forces. Finally, the United States should consider providing Ukraine with the Patriot Air Defense system to complete an integrated air-defense complex.
How to Set Ukraine Up for Cannon-Fed Success
The United States and its allies should also support Ukraine’s artillery arsenal with the necessary doctrine, materiel, and training, as well as logistical support in terms of maintenance and supply. Those NATO countries that produce many of the artillery systems have the industrial base to continue to supply repair parts and munitions for the foreseeable future. The United States and its NATO allies often use contracted logistics support as a stop-gap measure. This essentially involves personnel from Western defense firms going into theater, including forward positions in a conflict zone, in order to perform important maintenance and logistics activities for newly fielded weapons systems. Due to recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are many professionals and technicians from Western defense companies who have experience working in war zones. While this happens, Ukrainian military personnel can train and become familiar with the new equipment both at forward locations and in the rear. For major repairs and overhauls, the systems would be transported back to neighboring NATO countries.
Adapting and integrating NATO techniques and systems will enable the Ukrainian army to benefit from speed and data already enjoyed by its NATO partners. Training on many of the tactical systems can be completed in as little as a month since many of the fire-control complexities are accomplished by onboard computers. Training on sustaining and repairing these complex systems will take longer but can be supplemented by contracted logistics support while sustainers are in training. Fielding NATO-developed and integrated equipment will enable NATO member states to aid with targeting and battle-damage assessments from outside the combat zone. The secure nature of much of the NATO equipment will also stymie Russian efforts to gather intelligence on Ukrainian tactical activity.
As time goes on, individual NATO countries have begun considerations to supply various advanced western weapon systems on their own. Rumors have been circulating that Slovakia is considering sending Zuzana II howitzers, while the German arms consortium Krauss-Maffei Wegmann has flown trial balloons regarding the Panzerhaubitze 2000. Both systems represent advances over current Ukrainian systems, but the initiatives are disjointed and don’t take into account the important aspect of counter-battery radar, digital input to firing data, and the lethal munitions associated with the platforms.
The Artillery Fight is Here
Much has been written and said in recent weeks about the need to field weapons to the Ukrainians that can be immediately employed to stop the Russian offensive. That was wise counsel and has achieved its ends. Those weapons should continue to flow. The argument that more sophisticated weapons aren’t viable because of the associated training and follow-on logistics support simply isn’t correct given where Ukraine now finds itself in the fight. As the war settles in for a longer-term artillery duel, more appropriate and sustainable weapons systems should be brought to bear. The training to use those systems is not overly complex and can be accomplished in neighboring NATO countries in relatively brief periods of time. The maintenance and other tasks above the operator level can be performed by contracted logistics support in the operational environment as well as in neighboring countries for depot-level maintenance. Most importantly, the precision, lethality, and efficiency to be successful against Russian artillery systems is best provided by the more sophisticated capabilities available from NATO. Just as NATO has provided sophisticated systems — such as the Javelin, the Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon, Stinger, Starstreak, and Panzerfaust 3 — NATO should provide similar levels of sophistication for Ukraine to succeed in this next phase and mitigate the human suffering there as much as possible.
Now is the time to transition to NATO artillery and air-defense systems before Ukraine loses the momentum it has gained.
Michael Jacobson is a field artillery subject-matter expert and a field artillery colonel serving in the U.S. Army Reserves. The opinions and views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Army Reserves, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
16. Republican lawmakers call for reopening US Embassy in Ukraine’s capital
I would bet if you polled our diplomats who are serving at the US embassy in Ukraine (in exile) there would be unanimous support to return Kyiv right now (and most would argue that we should never have left).
Perhaps they could fly back in on Air Force One with the President when he makes his visit to President Zleensky.
Republican lawmakers call for reopening US Embassy in Ukraine’s capital
A woman walks past the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, Jan. 24, 2022. Some Republican lawmakers are calling for the U.S. to resume its diplomatic presence in Ukraine and reopen its embassy in Kyiv now that Russia’s invading forces have withdrawn from the city’s surrounding areas. (Efrem Lukatsky/AP)
WASHINGTON — Republican lawmakers are calling for the U.S. to resume its diplomatic presence in Ukraine and reopen its embassy in the capital Kyiv now that Russia’s invading forces have withdrawn from the city’s surrounding areas.
Multiple countries recently announced plans to reopen embassies in Kyiv, including Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Austria and Turkey. The embassies of Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have already opened their doors, as has the diplomatic office of the European Union. The U.S. needs to quickly follow suit, Republicans said.
“It’s time,” said Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, an Army veteran. “We have numerous American [non-governmental organizations] operating in Ukraine, thousands of Americans who never left, and American news operations in the country. It’s time to return – and show Ukraine, and the world, our enduring commitment to their freedom.”
The U.S. Embassy moved its consular operations to the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, near the Polish border, days before Russia’s invasion and shuttered its Kyiv office entirely on Feb. 28. Diplomats and staff have been working from Poland ever since.
White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki on Monday declined to set a timetable for a return. Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, said Sunday that U.S. officials are “working through” when to send diplomats back to Kyiv. The State Department said it is constantly evaluating safety in Kyiv and does not have specifics on when the U.S. Embassy there could reopen.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Thursday that resuming operations at the embassy would require consultation with the Defense Department. The Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, a brigade-sized organization of the Marine Corps, provides security for U.S. diplomatic missions worldwide. About 2,500 Marines are stationed at more than 150 embassies and consulates, according to the State Department.
At least some of the security detachment that worked in Kyiv is likely guarding personnel and sensitive U.S. government information in Poland, Kirby said. The State Department would not confirm how many Marines were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.
“In the meantime, we continue to stay in close touch with the government of Ukraine and its leadership at all levels and engage in conversations with our Ukrainian counterparts every day,” a State Department spokesperson said Thursday.
Ernst criticized the administration of President Joe Biden for being “far too risk-averse” about restoring a diplomatic presence in Ukraine and said a U.S. diplomat she met in Poland last month “tearfully told me she wanted to return.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has urged governments to send back their embassy staff, saying the return of foreign missions would signal to Russia “that Kyiv is ours.” Russian forces retreated from the northern part of the country earlier this month after failing to seize the capital.
“We need your support, even at the level of symbols and diplomatic gestures,” Zelenskyy said last week in a video address. “Please come back, everybody who is brave, please come back to our capital and continue working.”
Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., praised foreign governments for heeding that call and said the U.S. must now back up its commitment to Ukraine and diplomacy with on-the-ground action.
“We must safely reopen the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv as quickly as possible,” Wittman said. “To do so will send a clear message of our support for Ukraine, emphasize the country’s unquestioned sovereignty, and support and facilitate critical diplomatic channels between the U.S. and Ukrainian governments at various levels.”
Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., cautioned that a diplomatic return to Kyiv would need to be carefully vetted for security. Embassy personnel in Poland have continued to perform their “important work” even outside the country, she said.
“While it is valuable to have a diplomatic presence on the ground in Ukraine, the State Department will have to determine when our diplomats are able to safely carry out their mission in Kyiv,” she said.
Top politicians, as well as envoys, have poured into the city in recent days.
The presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia traveled by train into Kyiv to meet with Zelenskyy on Wednesday. Last week, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen toured the nearby town of Bucha, where Russians are accused of committing mass atrocities. The United Kingdom's prime minister, Boris Johnson, walked the streets of Kyiv with Zelenskyy in a surprise visit on Saturday.
Rep. Stephanie Bice, R-Okla., described Johnson’s visit as a “powerful demonstration of support for the people of Ukraine.” There are no plans for President Joe Biden to make a similar trip, White House officials have said, though there are reportedly discussions of sending another high-level official to the Ukraine capital.
On Thursday, Rep. Victoria Spartz, the first Ukrainian-born member of Congress, and Sen. Steve Daines, R-Mont., became the first U.S. officials to travel to Kyiv since the start of the war. Spartz asked Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday to consider redeploying diplomats to Lviv, a city largely untouched by Russian shelling that has served as a hub for people displaced by the war.
“As the single largest provider of military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, it is past time that the United States follow our European allies in kind," Spartz, R-Ind., wrote in a letter to Blinken.
17. Biden Rejects Unanimous NSC ‘More Often Than You Might Think’
As the Commander in Chief should do as he sees fit.
He has to exercise coup d'oiel (the "inward looking eye"or "inner eye"), which is the ability to cut through the fog and friction of war (or politics) and based on education and experience and with imperfect information make sound judgments at the right time. Although Clausewitz was describing the General or military leader I think it serves as the foundation for the job description for the president and CINC.
Biden Rejects Unanimous NSC ‘More Often Than You Might Think’
“We will prepare consensus recommendations and he’ll say, ‘I don’t buy that,’” Jake Sullivan said.
President Joe Biden regularly deviates from the recommendations made by his national security team, one of his top advisors revealed Thursday.
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Biden overruling decisions from top national security officials, including when there’s agreement between Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, is not uncommon and is “one of the humbling things” about his job. Sullivan argued the president’s questioning of his aides improves the overall decision-making process.
“We can run a whole process that involves multiple layers of review and decision and a lot of people who are pretty smart and very knowledgeable on the subject all coming together collectively around a consensus recommendation,” Sullivan said at an event hosted by the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. “We can take it to the president, who will have spent that day focused on domestic policy or something totally different, and he will look at it and then he will ask a question that makes you think, ‘Oh wow, we didn’t even really get to that.’”
“He’ll get to the heart of the matter, and say, ‘I question this underlying premise of the decision you just came out with.’” Sullivan continued. “That happens more often than you might think.”
The most public example is Biden rejecting top generals’ advice not to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which led to the rapid Taliban takeover of the country, an Afghan international refugee crisis, and the deaths of 13 troops during a dangerous evacuation mission. Biden pursued his plan to remove all American troops from the country by September 2021, regardless of conditions on the ground, despite advice from current and former military leaders, diplomats, and outside experts that America should maintain a small counterterrorism force in Afghanistan or at least withdraw more gradually.
Biden may feel confident in his own decisions in part because of his extensive foreign policy leadership experience. In the Senate, he was a leading lawmaker voice during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and later served for more than a decade as either chairman or ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even counseling then-Senator Obama on nuclear policy. Biden grew a reputation for offering bold if unpopular solutions to international crises, such as proposing to divide Iraq into three semi-autonomous regions. Obama later assigned Biden an active role in foreign policy while serving as his vice president, including overseeing the drawdown of American troops from Iraq. Biden continued to give his unfiltered and countervailing advice to Obama, including opposing large U.S. troops surges into Afghanistan and disagreeing with Obama’s decision to proceed with the Osama bin Laden raid.
“There is something about having a chief executive who has perspective, experience, the ability to kind of see things from multiple different angles who just brings a different level of capacity to decision making,” Sullivan said. “It does mean that we will prepare consensus recommendations and he’ll say, ‘I don’t buy that. You need to improve that,’ Or, ‘I’m on the other side of that,’ and then obviously he’s the boss. But I think it makes for a more effective decision-making process.”
Sullivan said the “skeleton” of Biden’s national security enterprise is much the same as Obama’s, part of an effort to return policymaking to regular order after a tumultuous period under President Donald Trump. (Obama’s national security apparatus, by contrast, was regularly criticized as too large and filled with too many young and unqualified policy staffers.) But NSC officials also have new priorities that reflect how threats to the United States have evolved over the years that Biden was out of office, including more focus on evolving technology, energy, and climate change, and added instability due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
“We have…a broader constellation of actors around the table,” Sullivan said. “That’s probably the biggest way in which things have evolved.”
18. What China gets wrong
Excerpt:
The three regrets
These strengths remain. Yet China’s system of government is developing new flaws as power grows more concentrated. Authoritarian states can get things right but hate to admit when they are wrong. The more Mr Xi’s status is officially exalted ahead of the party congress, the more sycophancy there will be. When bureaucrats compete to demonstrate zeal, the administration becomes less effective; if officials fear to speak up, the feedback mechanism fails. A test of China’s long-term prospects is whether it can change course. For now, if you think China’s ascent is inevitable, look at the deserted streets of its biggest city, and ask yourself if Mr Xi has a monopoly on wisdom.
What China gets wrong
The pandemic, the economy and the war in Ukraine
Apr 16th 2022
IT IS OFTEN said that China’s government plans decades ahead, carefully playing the long game as democracies flip-flop and dither. But in Shanghai right now there is not much sign of strategic genius. Even as the rest of the world has reopened, 25m people are in a citywide lockdown, trapped in their apartments and facing food and medical shortages that not even China’s censors can cover up. The zero-covid policy has become a dead end from which the Communist Party has no quick exit.
It is one of a trio of problems faced by China this year, alongside a misfiring economy and the war in Ukraine. You may think they are unconnected, but China’s response to each has a common root: swagger and hubris in public, an obsession with control in private, and dubious results. Rather than being the product of statecraft with the Yellow Emperor’s time horizon, China’s actions reflect an authoritarian system under Xi Jinping that struggles to calibrate policy or admit when it is wrong.
This is the year for China’s president when everything has to follow the script. In the autumn he is expected to use a five-yearly party congress to launch a third term as its chief, in defiance of norms that he step aside after two and opening a pathway to lifelong rule. For this coronation to go smoothly, China must be stable and successful.
In some ways Mr Xi has triumphed. The propagandists can boast of a covid-19 mortality rate that is the lowest of any big country, and an economy that has grown by more than any other in the G20 since 2018. As Europe descends into war, China stands apart and secure, with a growing nuclear arsenal and the muscle and money to project power from the Pacific to the Caribbean.
Yet look closer and Mr Xi’s final year as a political mortal betrays China’s weaknesses under his rule as well as its strengths. Start with the pandemic. Since the virus was detected in Wuhan, China has pursued a zero-covid strategy. Its borders have been closed for two years and outbreaks are met with quarantines, coercive mass testing and harsh lockdowns. Early on, China’s rulers decided on a giant utilitarian experiment, leading to a largely covid-free life for the majority, at the cost of forfeited individual liberties, pain for those in lockdown and national isolation.
But the outbreaks are becoming harder to control. In addition to Shanghai, five provinces have partial lockdowns and Guangzhou has closed its schools. At least 150m people are affected. Having granted autonomy to Shanghai to manage its lockdown, Mr Xi has seized back control. And there is no exit strategy. The party has not prepared the public for living with covid and has failed to jab enough vulnerable old folk or use more effective Western vaccines. The choice now is between a redoubled vaccination campaign alongside an exit wave that could, according to some models, kill 2m people, or indefinite isolation and repeated curfews.
Those lockdowns are hurting growth, amplifying a botched attempt to recast the economy. Mr Xi has called on Chinese capitalists to become less predatory and more self-reliant. But in an attempt to implement vague slogans such as “common prosperity”, zealous officials have reasserted state control and intimidated the most successful entrepreneurs. A once-glittering tech industry is in intensive care, with the largest ten firms having lost $1.7trn of market value after a barrage of regulations. The bosses of Alibaba and Tencent are reduced to displays of cringing obedience and barred from expanding in some new areas. In recent weeks the party has tried to reverse course. But global investors are wary. Those ten largest tech firms are valued at a 50% discount to their American peers.
In their place China hopes to create a loyal new generation of startups that follow the party’s austere goals. Registration documents point to tens of thousands of these firms being created in inland cities, which purport to be at the cutting edge of the cloud, robotics and artificial intelligence. For now, patriotic investors are cheering them on but many are duds or frauds tolerated by officials keen to meet local development targets. A tech industry where the incentives are subsidies and fear, and which is separated from an increasingly globalised system of venture capital, is likely to fall behind the frontier of innovation.
The last problem involves Ukraine and foreign policy. Mr Xi has sided with Russia, in keeping with his belief that the West is in decline. Yet this stance has costs. It will further hurt relations with America and Europe, upon whose markets China relies. China hopes Europe can be prised apart from America, but the war has revived NATO and transatlantic co-operation in energy. It is true that many countries do not want to pick sides between the West and China and Russia. But China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy is backfiring, as foreigners balk at the insults and threats issuing from Beijing. Across rich countries, public perceptions of China are at their worst for two decades. The same is true in some developing ones, such as India, that fear Chinese aggression.
Underestimating China is foolish. Its centralised governance allows vast resources to be concentrated on strategic tasks, from building a navy to dominating the battery business. Public opinion can be mobilised. The sheer size of the domestic market lets firms achieve economies of scale without leaving home—and the potential pool of profits will always tempt global firms to be present, and mercantilist governments to support them.
The three regrets
These strengths remain. Yet China’s system of government is developing new flaws as power grows more concentrated. Authoritarian states can get things right but hate to admit when they are wrong. The more Mr Xi’s status is officially exalted ahead of the party congress, the more sycophancy there will be. When bureaucrats compete to demonstrate zeal, the administration becomes less effective; if officials fear to speak up, the feedback mechanism fails. A test of China’s long-term prospects is whether it can change course. For now, if you think China’s ascent is inevitable, look at the deserted streets of its biggest city, and ask yourself if Mr Xi has a monopoly on wisdom. ■
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "What China gets wrong"
19. The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy
Conclusion:
For too long, policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons from cyber-operations. The absence of escalation across decades of strategic interaction in cyberspace—a record that has only been reinforced in the conflict in Ukraine—should cause policymakers to reevaluate long-standing assumptions about the cyber-domain. In doing so, they may be able to see how cyber-actions are but one of a number of strategic tools that, properly understood, can limit the risk of conflict as much as increase it. Of course, the potential for cyberattacks to temporarily paralyze large information networks or even whole sectors of an economy should not be discounted. But in a world in which armed conflict continues to destroy entire cities and wreak terrible human costs, both civilian and military, cyber-operations should be regarded less as another form of hard power than as a way for states to pursue strategic goals by other means.
The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy
What the War in Ukraine Reveals About State-Backed Hacking
April 15, 2022
During a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in March, Senator Angus King, an independent from Maine, pressed General Paul Nakasone, the head of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, about the lack of significant cyber-operations in Russia’s war in Ukraine. After all, Russia has long been known for targeting Western countries, as well as Ukraine itself, with cyberattacks. Echoing the surprise of many Western observers, King said, “I expected to see the grid go down, communications too, and that hasn’t happened.” Indeed, although President Joe Biden and members of his administration have also warned of potential Russian cyberattacks against the United States, there were remarkably few signs of such activity during the first six weeks of the war.
That is not to say that cyber-activity has been entirely absent. Proxy cyber-groups and hackers have mobilized on both sides, ranging from Ukraine’s 400,000-strong “IT Army” to Russia’s Conti ransomware group. Sandworm, an outfit linked to Russian military intelligence, also has a long record of cyberattacks against Ukraine.
Yet since the war began, such operations have mostly been limited to low-cost, disruptive incidents rather than large-scale attacks against critical civilian and military infrastructure. Two potential exceptions only underscore the relatively limited role of cyber-operations. There is some evidence that at the start of the war Russian-linked actors conducted a cyberattack against Viasat, a U.S.-based Internet company that provides satellite Internet to the Ukrainian military and to customers in Europe. But the impact was temporary and, more important, did not meaningfully affect the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate. Additionally, Ukrainian officials recently announced that, in early April, the Sandworm group attempted, but failed, to carry out a cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid. While the hackers appeared to have gained access to a company that delivers power to two million Ukrainians, they were thwarted by effective defenses before being able to cause any damage or disruption.
In fact, the negligible role of cyberattacks in the Ukraine conflict should come as no surprise. Through war simulations, statistical analyses, and other kinds of studies, scholars have found little evidence that cyber-operations provide effective forms of coercion or that they cause escalation to actual military conflict. That is because for all its potential to disrupt companies, hospitals, and utility grids during peacetime, cyberpower is much harder to use against targets of strategic significance or to achieve outcomes with decisive impacts, either on the battlefield or during crises short of war. In failing to recognize this, U.S. officials and policymakers are approaching the use of cyberpower in a way that may be doing more harm than good—treating cyber-operations like any other weapon of war rather than as a nonlethal instrument of statecraft and, in the process, overlooking the considerable opportunities as well as risks they present.
The Myth of Cyber-Escalation
Much of the current understanding in Washington about the role of cyber-operations in conflict is built on long-standing but false assumptions about cyberspace. Many scholars have asserted that cyber-operations could easily lead to military escalation, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. Jason Healey and Robert Jervis, for example, expressing a widely held view, have argued that an incident that takes place in cyberspace, “might cross the threshold into armed conflict either through a sense of impunity or through miscalculation or mistake.” Policymakers have also long believed that cyberspace poses grave perils. In 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned of an impending “cyber-Pearl Harbor,” in which adversaries could take down critical U.S. infrastructure through cyberattacks. Nearly a decade later, FBI Director Christopher Wray compared the threat from ransomware—when actors hold a target hostage by encrypting data and demanding a ransom payment in return for decrypting it—to the 9/11 attacks. And as recently as December 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted that in cyberspace, “norms of behavior aren’t well-established and the risks of escalation and miscalculation are high.”
Seemingly buttressing these claims has been a long record of cyber-operations by hostile governments. In recent years, states ranging from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea have used cyberspace to conduct large-scale espionage, inflict significant economic damage, and undermine democratic institutions. In January 2021, for example, attackers linked to the Chinese government were able to breach Microsoft’s Exchange email servers, giving them access to communications and other private information from companies and governments, and may have allowed other malicious actors to conduct ransomware attacks. That breach followed on the heels of a Russian intrusion against the software vendor SolarWinds, in which hackers were able to access a huge quantity of sensitive government and corporate data—an espionage treasure trove. Cyberattacks have also inflicted significant economic costs. The NotPetya attack affected critical infrastructure around the world—ranging from logistics and energy to finance and government—causing upward of $10 billion in damage.
But the assumption that cyber-operations play a central role in either provoking or extending war is wrong. Hundreds of cyber-incidents have occurred between rivals with long histories of tension or even conflict, but none has ever triggered an escalation to war. North Korea, for example, has conducted major cyberattacks against South Korea on at least four different occasions, including the “Ten Days of Rain” denial of service attack—in which a network is flooded with an overwhelming number of requests, becoming temporarily inaccessible to users—against South Korean government websites, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure in 2011 and the “Dark Seoul” attack in 2013, which disrupted service across the country’s financial and media sectors.
No cyber operation has ever triggered a war.
It would be reasonable to expect that these operations might escalate the situation on the Korean Peninsula, especially because North Korea’s war plans against South Korea reportedly involve cyber-operations. Yet that is not what happened. Instead, in each case, the South Korean response was minimal and limited to either direct, official attribution to North Korea by government officials or more indirect public suggestions that Pyongyang was likely behind the attacks.
Similarly, although the United States reserves the right to respond to cyberattacks in any way it sees fit, including with military force, it has until now relied on economic sanctions, indictments, diplomatic actions, and some reported instances of tit-for-tat cyber-responses. For example, following Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Obama administration expelled 35 Russian diplomats and shuttered two facilities said to be hubs for Russian espionage. The Treasury Department also levied economic sanctions against Russian officials. Yet according to media reports, the administration ultimately rejected plans to conduct retaliatory cyber-operations against Russia. And although the United States did use its own cyber-operations to respond to Russian attacks during the 2018 midterm elections, it limited itself to temporarily disrupting the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm.
These measured responses are not unusual. Despite decades of malicious behavior in cyberspace—and no matter the level of destruction—cyberattacks have always been contained below the level of armed conflict. Indeed, researchers have found that major adversarial powers across the world have routinely observed a “firebreak” between cyberattacks and conventional military operations: a mutually understood line that distinguishes strategic interactions above and below it, similar to the threshold that exists for the employment of nuclear weapons.
But it is not just that cyber-operations do not lead to conflict. Cyberattacks can also be useful ways to project power in situations in which armed conflict is expressly being avoided. This is why Iran, for example, might find cyberattacks against the United States, including the 2012–13 denial of service attacks it conducted against U.S. financial institutions, appealing. Since Iran likely prefers to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States, cyberattacks provide a way to retaliate for perceived grievances, such as U.S. economic sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear program, without triggering the kind of escalation that would put the two countries on a path to war.
The Advantage of Ambiguity
In addition to the ways they are used, cyber-operations also have two general qualities that tend to distinguish them from conventional military operations. First, they typically have limited, transient impact—especially when compared with conventional military action. As the Hoover Institute fellow Jacquelyn Schneider recently told The New Yorker, “If you’re already at a stage in a conflict where you’re willing to drop bombs, you’re going to drop bombs.” Unlike traditional military hardware, cyberweapons are virtual: even at their most destructive, they rarely have effects in the physical world. In the extraordinary instances when they do—such as the Stuxnet cyberattack, which caused the centrifuges used to enrich uranium in Natanz, Iran, to speed up or slow down—cyber-operations do not inflict the kind of damage that can occur in even a minor precision missile strike. And when states have launched cyberattacks against civilian infrastructure, such as Russia’s 2015 hit on Ukraine’s power grid, the impact has been short-lived. To date, cyberattacks have never caused direct physical harm; the only known indirect death associated with a cyberattack occurred in 2020, when a German patient with a life-threatening condition died as a result of a treatment interruption caused by a ransomware attack on a hospital’s servers.
In practice, governments themselves have also recognized the contrasting impacts of cyberattacks and conventional military attacks. Consider the incident between Iran and the United States that occurred in the summer of 2019: according to reports in the U.S. media, when Iran attacked oil tankers in the region and downed a U.S. drone, the Trump administration chose to respond in cyberspace, allegedly by hacking Iranian computer systems to degrade their ability to conduct further attacks against oil tankers. What stands out about this case is that there was a credible military option on the table that was subsequently revoked: President Donald Trump called off plans to conduct military strikes against Iranian targets. At the time, Trump tweeted that he changed his mind after learning of the potential for civilian casualties. By implication, a cyber-operation may have been seen as less risky precisely because it was unlikely to cause loss of life or even major destruction.
A satellite image of Mariupol, Ukraine, April 9, 2022
Maxar Technologies / Reuters
Second, in contrast to most military strikes, cyber-operations tend to be shrouded in secrecy and come with plausible deniability. Analysts have argued that uncertainty about responsibility makes interactions in cyberspace perilous and undermines deterrence. Cloaked in anonymity, so the logic goes, malicious actors can provoke conflict while remaining in the shadows. It is true that false-flag cyberattacks are common. For example, when a group linked to the Chinese government conducted cyber-operations against Israel in 2019 and 2020, it masqueraded as Iranian, presumably to confuse Israeli attribution efforts. Yet secrecy need not have negative implications: it can provide opportunities for states to maneuver in crises without the drawbacks that more conventional uses of hard power might have, such as exacerbating domestic political tensions. It can also offer a way to explore the extent to which the other side is willing to negotiate or resolve the crisis: ambiguity creates breathing space.
For example, when the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, experts worried that Iran might retaliate, perhaps by attacking U.S. personnel or U.S. interests in the Middle East. Instead, Iran appeared to respond with increased cyber-activity that was ambiguous and not escalatory. Although the Iranian cyber-operations were noted within a day of the U.S. announcement, they were not the kind of massive attack that many commentators had anticipated; they mostly appeared to be attempts to conduct reconnaissance and probe for vulnerabilities. If Iran intended for this activity to be uncovered, it would largely serve symbolic purposes—communicating Iran’s presence to the United States.
Put simply, cyber-operations by their very nature are designed to avoid war. They can act as a less costly alternative to conflict because they are ambiguous, rarely break things, and don’t kill people. By continuing to depict cyberspace as an escalatory form of warfare itself, policymakers risk overstating the role of cyber-operations in armed conflict and missing their true importance.
Tools Not Weapons
The recognition that cyber-operations are unlikely to lead to military escalation—and that they play at most a supporting rather than decisive role in actual armed conflicts—has direct consequences for U.S. policy and strategy. For one thing, it means that the United States may have greater room to use cyberspace to achieve objectives without precipitating new crises or exacerbating existing ones. Since 2018, for example, the U.S. Defense Department has treated cyberspace as an arena in which the military can operate more routinely and proactively rather than wait to respond to an adversary’s activity. According to the Pentagon, Washington needs to “defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source.” This approach encompasses maneuvering on networks controlled by U.S. adversaries or third parties and even conducting offensive cyber-operations.
At the time that the 2018 cyber strategy was released, many experts expressed alarm that it could provoke military escalation. Adding to the concerns, in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the secretary of defense to conduct cyber-operations as a traditional military activity, which meant that cyber-operations would no longer be treated as a form of covert action requiring a presidential finding to be approved. Yet in the four years since the defend forward concept was implemented, the escalation that many feared has not materialized. This should give some assurances to policymakers that the United States can continue to conduct offensive cyber-operations without risking a wider conflict.
In 2021, for example, U.S. Cyber Command, working with a partner government, conducted a cyber-operation to limit the ability of the Russian-linked criminal group REvil to conduct ransomware attacks. Several months later, U.S. officials acknowledged that the military had “imposed costs” against ransomware groups. There is also some evidence that efforts to counter Russian cyber-activity during the current Ukraine crisis may have blunted a more effective Russian cyberoffensive, with Nakasone alluding to work done by the Ukrainians and others to hinder Moscow’s plans.
But just because the Pentagon’s plan has not led to escalation does not mean it is tool the U.S. can use to solve all of the cyber challenges it faces. For the very same reasons that offensive cyber-operations have not led to escalation, their constraints should cast doubt on the notion that the United States can use them to coerce adversaries into changing their behavior or punish them by inflicting high costs.
Cyber operations rarely break things, or cause loss of life.
Second, the reality that cyber-operations are used by states in many different ways means that policymakers need to develop a more nuanced approach for responding to cyberthreats. Because cyber-operations are consistently seen as representing an existential threat to the United States, Washington has tended to deal with cyber-incidents of contrasting scope and scale with the same policy tools. For instance, senior U.S. officials described both Russia’s 2016 election interference and 2021 SolarWinds operation as acts of war. But the first was a cyber-enabled information operation and the second was in fact a large-scale cyber-espionage campaign—and neither resembled open war in any conventional sense. Moreover, the policy responses in both of these cases (as in many other cyber-incidents) were similar: a combination of public attribution, indictments, and sanctions. Instead of responding with inflammatory language and standard forms of retaliation, policymakers should consider how to employ cybertools and non-cybertools in ways that are tailored to specific incidents, taking into account the extent and gravity of a given operation. Responses can also be proportionate without being symmetrical. Rather than responding in kind, the United States should apply varying and more creative approaches that reflect differences in adversaries’ centers of gravity. What is important to Beijing and therefore what may motivate its behavior is different from what is important to Moscow, Tehran, and so on.
A one-size-fits-all approach to adversary cyber-operations may raise particular problems in the Ukraine conflict. Anticipating potential Russian cyberattacks against member states, NATO leaders have reaffirmed that Article 5, the treaty’s collective defense clause, applies to cyberspace, but they have also expressed ambiguity about what specific operations might trigger it. A lack of clarity about how thresholds and responses are defined risks undermining the credibility of this pledge and the effectiveness of NATO’s overall cyberstrategy.
A third lesson of cyber-operations over the past decade is that U.S. officials should adopt a more flexible mindset in their response to them. Rather than focusing on retaliatory action, the United States should devote more resources to enhancing resilience—the ability to absorb and rapidly recover from disruptive occurrences. Embracing this type of approach means accepting that cyberattacks are likely to take place and, more important, that the overwhelming majority of them will not have cataclysmic effects. Over the past several years, the United States has improved its resilience to such attacks, expanding the agencies responsible for working with and maintaining critical infrastructure, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The U.S. government has also created the Office of the National Cyber Director to harmonize its cybersecurity efforts and collaborate with the private sector. But these entities are still relatively new, and efforts to implement meaningful regulation of the private sector to promote resilience still have a long way to go.
A Cyber Escape Valve?
Just because cyber-operations have not yet caused escalation does not mean that they will never do so. If conflicts such as the war in Ukraine lead to greater instability in the international system and increased great-power competition, the risks of cyber-escalation may grow. The opposite is also possible, however: in a more unstable world, cyber-operations may provide an important outlet for recurring tensions, given their lack of physical violence and relatively limited effects. As international politics become more dangerous, cyberspace can offer a way for states to respond to perceived aggressions without causing physical destruction or loss of life, thus providing a kind of stability in itself.
Ultimately, escalation is in the eye of the beholder—it depends as much on the target’s perception of an event as on the perpetrator’s intent or the reality of the strategic context. Therefore, a further priority of U.S. policymakers should be to improve their understanding of how adversaries interpret Washington’s activities in cyberspace and leverage that knowledge to conduct cyber-operations that minimize the risk of escalation. During a crisis, for instance, the United States may want to avoid conducting cyber-operations in a manner that an adversary might perceive as a precursor to conflict or to a military strike, especially if that is not the intent. If there is a pressing strategic or military imperative to conduct these types of operations, they should occur in tandem with efforts to communicate their purpose to avoid misunderstandings.
For too long, policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons from cyber-operations. The absence of escalation across decades of strategic interaction in cyberspace—a record that has only been reinforced in the conflict in Ukraine—should cause policymakers to reevaluate long-standing assumptions about the cyber-domain. In doing so, they may be able to see how cyber-actions are but one of a number of strategic tools that, properly understood, can limit the risk of conflict as much as increase it. Of course, the potential for cyberattacks to temporarily paralyze large information networks or even whole sectors of an economy should not be discounted. But in a world in which armed conflict continues to destroy entire cities and wreak terrible human costs, both civilian and military, cyber-operations should be regarded less as another form of hard power than as a way for states to pursue strategic goals by other means.
20. The Outsiders – How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia
It is in US national interests to make the rules based international order work.
Excerpts:
Keep Them Close
Such reforms would not represent a return to the order building of the 1990s. The United States has neither the power nor the will to go back to that approach. Indeed, institutional realpolitik should involve selective retrenchment. Washington should be willing to identify places where it overextended at the height of U.S. primacy. It may make sense to pull back from the globally oriented, hyper-legalized institutional structure of the WTO, which has benefited countries that are not playing by its rules, such as China. Washington should also be willing to let its regional allies and partners take the lead in institution building. Strong regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the EU, are critical to halting revisionist projects, even if they sometimes act against the United States’ interests.
The next era of great-power competition is already here, but this is not the time to be ramping up military confrontations and shutting down or pulling away from international institutions. U.S. policymakers should reject the false dichotomy that suggests that Washington must choose between realpolitik and institution building. Seeking to reinvigorate international alliances and institutions is not evidence of a lack of imagination or a naive faith in multilateralism. Rather, it is a tried-and-true way to play the game of great-power politics.
The Outsiders
How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia
By Stacie E. Goddard
May/June 2022
In late February, as Russian forces moved into Ukraine, Vladimir Putin declared that his offensive was aimed not just at bringing Russia’s neighbor to heel but also at repudiating the U.S.-led liberal international order. “Where the West comes to establish its own order,” the Russian president railed, “the result is bloody, unhealed wounds, ulcers of international terrorism and extremism.” Moscow would now seek to roll back the expanding order as “a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a people.” Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine is only the most recent act in a years-long effort to overturn the existing status quo, one that has featured cyberattacks, assassinations, a war against Georgia, meddling in U.S. elections, military involvement in Syria, and the annexation of Crimea.
As Putin’s troops neared Kyiv, many observers kept an eye on China, the other authoritarian power busy rejecting the U.S.-led order. Over the last decade, Beijing has contested territorial norms in the South China Sea and built new international economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to compete with Western-dominated ones, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Beijing and Moscow seem to have joined forces in their effort to undermine the order. Just weeks before Russia’s invasion, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin promised to place “no limits” on the two countries’ cooperation as they seek to redefine norms of democracy, push back against universal definitions of human rights, and secure their “core interests.”
It was not supposed to be like this. After the Cold War, the United States relied on a strategy of luring into the order would-be revisionist powers—that is, countries that have both the means and the motivation to challenge the status quo. U.S. leaders argued that by cooperating with China and Russia and incorporating them into international institutions, they could curb those countries’ ambitions and perhaps even push them onto a path of progressive liberalization. Both countries joined economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization; security institutions, such as the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and even human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As U.S. President Bill Clinton’s 2000 National Security Strategy argued, although the United States must be “mindful of threats to peace,” it should seize “on the desire of both countries to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that both accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration.”
What went wrong? Some blame poor U.S. leadership. After four years of the Trump administration, the argument runs, liberal institutions were left rudderless, providing an opening for revisionist powers. The Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan confirmed that the United States was weakened and in retreat. Others, by contrast, contend that the strategy was futile from the start. According to this view, it was hopelessly optimistic to expect that China and Russia would embrace liberal values and accept the idea that the United States should maintain its position at the top of the international order.
Both of these views are problematic. There is very little Washington could have done to stave off challenges to the liberal order. Historically, integration into international institutions has not restrained countries hoping to challenge the status quo. To the contrary, it has enhanced their ability to mobilize allies, secure leverage over their trading partners, and gain legitimacy for their normative visions. It is not simply that international institutions were unlikely to check China’s and Russia’s revisionism; their membership in fact assisted their efforts to transform world politics.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to dismiss institutional integration as a complete failure. If judged by the high ambitions set by U.S. policymakers, who thought that incorporating expansionist powers into international institutions would temper their ambitions, then it has not lived up to its promise. But judged by a more reasonable standard, it has succeeded: although institutional integration can’t prevent revisionism, it can shape the strategies revisionists use. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that countries bent on expansionism will charge ahead regardless, on the whole, international institutions can channel this aggression so that it doesn’t devolve into bloodshed. Rather than giving up on institutions, then, Western policymakers should adopt a realistic approach to them. While they may not lead to completely harmonious relations, they can be a potent tool for preventing war.
A strategy of institutional realpolitik would also recognize that for all their coordination, China and Russia are very different types of revisionists. China’s assaults have been less violent but in many ways more consequential; where Moscow has relied on strategies of disruption and violence, Beijing has preferred to exert influence through growing networks and its position within international institutions. That is why the one-size-fits-all strategy of the past fell short—and why a new approach is called for. To that end, the United States needs to see international institutions not as a way to transform the fundamental nature of its rivals but as places that can become better forums for communicating preferences, resolving disputes, and establishing clear redlines. That, not lofty plans to change China and Russia or a wholesale abandonment of institutions, should help keep the revisionists in check.
Dream of the ’90s
In the 1990s, Western leaders dealt with countries that seemed eager to upend the status quo by ushering them into multilateral institutions. This was a rational extension of post–World War II policy: the United States, after all, had poured considerable resources into multilateral organizations devoted to security and economic development. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that NATO was going to not only persist but expand. The United States, moreover, was working to transform the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT—a collection of informal processes for managing international trade that emerged in the postwar era—into the far more expansive and powerful World Trade Organization (WTO).
Even then, potential revisionists lurked on the horizon. By the mid-1990s, China had emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. In a 1999 speech, Clinton outlined the challenge of a rising China for American foreign policy, noting that “if it chooses to do so, China could . . . pour much more of its wealth into military might and into traditional great-power geopolitics.” In contrast to China, post-Soviet Russia was a declining power, so there was little concern that the country would emerge as a global competitor to the United States. Still, Russia had the potential to become a serious revisionist. Many feared the rise of a Russian nationalist right, one that would reestablish authoritarian government at home and attempt to reassert Russian imperial dominance over the former Soviet states.
U.S. officials turned to multilateral institutions to deal with these incipient threats. These policymakers believed that membership in liberal institutions would make China and Russia more liberal themselves and thus less inclined to buck the existing international order. Clinton’s top goal was to help Russia become a consolidated democracy, one firmly embedded in Western institutions. As for China, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the United States’ position in 1997: “It is our hope that the trend toward greater economic and social integration of China will have a liberalizing effect on political and human rights practices”—although she also acknowledged that “given the nature of China’s government, that progress will be gradual, at best, and is by no means inevitable.”
The speed and extent of China’s entry into international institutions is astonishing.
Although recent critics of institutional integration have focused on the failure of international institutions to liberalize China and Russia, this wasn’t the only—or even the primary—way integration was supposed to prevent revisionism. Even if the two countries remained illiberal at home, admitting them into existing institutions was supposed to encourage good behavior abroad. Free trade and foreign direct investment would make them rich. Participation in international institutions would grant them status and prestige. And if such carrots were not enough to make China and Russia play by the rules, institutional membership would also provide the United States and its allies with sticks they could use to increase the costs of revisionism. The more Beijing and Moscow came to depend on international institutions for their wealth, power, and influence, the easier it would be to punish them if they decided to break the rules. Integrating them into global financial markets, for example, would not only help unlock economic growth; it could also make the two countries more vulnerable to sanctions.
Finally, institutions were supposed to bind China and Russia more closely to the status quo. When countries join international institutions, their wealth and power become tied to these organizations in ways that are hard to change down the road. This was the logic behind incorporating Germany into Western security institutions, such as NATO, after World War II. And it was the premise of France’s decision to rope Germany into the French economy through the European Coal and Steel Community: in doing so, France ensured that it would retain a voice in German affairs and that any attempt by Germany to increase its power would be channeled through institutional pathways.
Return of Revisionism
At first, integration seemed to work. The speed and extent of China’s entry into international institutions, especially economic ones, during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations were nothing short of astonishing. Throughout the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s rule, the country remained isolated from international institutions, even after joining the UN, where it had inherited Taiwan’s seat in 1971. After its opening in 1979, China was still slow to join international organizations. But by 2000, it had become a member of over 50 of them. It signed both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 2001, China entered the WTO with the Clinton administration’s enthusiastic support, and despite vocal protest from American protectionists on both the left and the right.
Russia faced a rockier road to integration. Urged on by U.S. economists, Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched a 13-month plan of “shock therapy,” designed to rapidly privatize the Russian economy. Instead of economic growth, Russia’s economy saw its GDP fall by almost half, and poverty increased from two percent to 40 percent of the population. Former Soviet elites took advantage of their position to monopolize ownership over newly privatized petroleum and gas resources. Talks of bringing Russia into the European security order stalled in 1994, when the United States abandoned its plans for the so-called Partnership for Peace, which would have brought eastern European states and Russia into a security umbrella framework, and chose instead to expand the NATO alliance into eastern Europe.
By the end of the decade, however, Russia seemed to be turning a corner. The country’s new president, Vladimir Putin, was no democrat, but he appeared to be introducing legal and economic reforms that could liberalize the country in the long run. To support economic privatization, the United States persuaded the G-7 countries to pledge $28 billion of collective aid for Russia. In 1998, Russia joined the newly created G-8. In 2012, Russia’s accession to the WTO concluded after 18 years of negotiations. The 9/11 attacks brought the United States and Russia closer, and the two cooperated on counterterrorism and arms control initiatives.
It is tempting to dismiss Washington’s embrace of institutional integration as futile and naive.
At first, the optimism of those who favored institutional integration seemed warranted. At the turn of the millennium, both China and Russia appeared eager to act as “responsible stakeholders,” as Robert Zoellick put it in 2005, when he served as U.S. deputy secretary of state. Soon, however, concerning signs emerged. By 2009, some political scientists began pointing to China’s “artificial-island-building spree” and saber rattling in the South China Sea as harbingers of territorial expansion. In 2013, China launched both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive program investing in infrastructure projects in the developing world. China’s leaders claimed that these initiatives complemented existing institutions and filled gaps in the current economic order. Many in Washington, however, suspected that China was seeking to construct an alternative economic order devoid of liberal values.
Meanwhile, in 2008, Russia launched its first violent attempt to redraw the borders of the post–Cold War world when its troops invaded two breakaway territories in Georgia. It went further in 2014, invading eastern Ukraine and annexing the Crimean Peninsula. In 2015, against vocal Western opposition, the Russian military intervened in the Syrian civil war to buttress President Bashar al-Assad’s fragile regime, providing critical—and often indiscriminate—air support for Syrian government forces, which with this assistance began to retake contested territory.
At the time, advocates of institutional integration dismissed these revisionist moves as insignificant and unsustainable. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry, for example, insisted in these pages in 2014 that despite these transgressions, “Russia and, especially, China are deeply integrated into the world economy and its governing institutions.” At most they were “spoilers,” he concluded: “They do not have the interests—let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies—to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions.” Policymakers in Washington echoed these confident assessments. In a 2014 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama recognized that “Russia’s aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China’s economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors.” But he expressed optimism that international institutions would continue to “reduce the need for unilateral American action and increase restraint among other nations.”
In hindsight, it is easy to see that this confidence was misplaced. A better understanding of the intersection of international institutions and great-power revisionism might have tempered such expectations. Historically, the constraining effects of international institutions on revisionism have been inconsistent at best. Even when revisionist states were brought into the institutional order, they were still able to pursue their aims. When Prussia launched a war in 1864 that would set the stage for German unification, it was considered a core member of the Concert of Europe, the order established after the Napoleonic Wars to help keep the peace. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, it was a member in good standing of the League of Nations and the so-called Washington system, which maintained limits on great-power shipbuilding. Both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were members of the League of Nations when they began their efforts to conquer Europe. In short, history gave the lie to the theory that institutional integration alone could restrain revisionism.
Not All Revisionists
Given the mixed record of institutional integration, it is tempting to dismiss Washington’s embrace of this approach as not only futile but also naive. Indeed, this is precisely what the harshest critics of U.S. grand strategy are saying. Bringing China into international institutions, the political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote in these pages in 2021, “may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history: there is no comparable example of a great power actively fostering the rise of a peer competitor.”
But such criticism overlooks the fact that international institutions change how revisionists choose to disrupt the international order. Institutions may not have eliminated revisionist ambitions, but they have shaped the way China and Russia have pursued their aims. Even with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its past military action in Crimea and Chechnya, the country has embraced force much less than similar states in history; current events are so shocking in part because they have become so rare, a testament at least to some extent to the effects of integration.
Witness how, in the past, a common way to change the status quo was to mount an aggressive attack. Napoleon’s France conquered wide swaths of Europe as it sought to obliterate the last vestiges of the eighteenth-century dynastic order. When imperial Japanese leaders decided to break clean of the League of Nations and the Washington system, they relied on brute force to expand their influence and wrest economic resources, first in China and then in Southeast Asia.
Ultimately, both France’s and Japan’s revisionist campaigns brought nothing but disaster for their leaders. With this historical antecedent, it is easy to see why institutionalists of the 1990s believed revisionism was unlikely. Regardless of their ambitions, countries will often decide to content themselves with the existing international order. The costs of major-power wars were staggering in previous centuries; they would be catastrophic in the present day.
When revisionist countries unleash military attacks, it is often a last resort.
But revisionists do not always need to use force to upend the status quo. In fact, the most transformative revisionists engage in rules-based revolutions. These revisionists start out looking like reformers, working within existing institutions to achieve their aims. Over time, however, their “salami slicing” of existing rules and norms can create significant weaknesses in international institutions that undermine the broader institutional order. When Russia sought to expand its influence in the Ottoman Empire after the Greek Revolution of 1821, it used the forums established by the Concert of Europe to push its allies to recognize Russian rights in Ottoman territories. By using available diplomatic resources, Russia slowly fragmented the boundaries of the existing territorial order until it shattered them in the Crimean War, in the mid-nineteenth century.
Prussia provides another example of this approach, with even more transformative results. From 1864 to 1871, it unified the German states under its rule at little cost and with limited use of force. German unification not only upended European boundaries; it also laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution in Germany, which would vault the country into the top tier of great powers by the end of the century. Ideologically, Prussia mobilized new forces of German nationalism, ripping apart the conservative foundations of European institutions. Yet Prussia achieved this revolution without sacrificing its position as a core member of European security and economic institutions. In this way, the country undermined the foundations of the European order from both within and without.
To challenge existing institutions, other revisionists created alternative institutional systems to establish their own spheres of influence and attract new supporters to their cause. In the years following World War II, especially after the United States launched the Marshall Plan in 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew from various Western institutions. Joseph Stalin hoped to increase Soviet power not by overtly challenging Western alliances but through political purges in eastern European states. When Moscow would challenge institutions, it would do so either covertly or in areas geographically outside the core of the dominant order.
Looking at the varied historical record of revisionism, three things stand out. First, it is not simply that international institutions fail to restrain revisionists. In fact, membership in international institutions can give countries resources with which to challenge the status quo. Second, how a revisionist decides to challenge those institutions depends on how it is positioned within them. Only revisionists that are members in good standing can use the strategy of working within institutions to advance their ambitions. Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom, violent revisionism is not the norm in international politics. Indeed, when revisionists unleash military attacks, it is often a last resort. Only when imperial Japan failed to achieve its expansionist aims within existing institutions did it turn to military force. Military aggression is a sign not of strength but of weakness.
Lashing out
Russia, of course, has taken the path of military aggression in its war against Ukraine. That brutal attack against democratization and liberalism has demonstrated how—despite their recent declaration of unity—China and Russia are in very different institutional positions and are therefore pursuing distinct revisionist strategies. Putin’s Russia may be disruptive in the short term, but it is ultimately too weak to build an alternative institutional order. Although Russia has sought access to liberal international institutions, the country was always a bit player within them. As a result, it could not rely on the existing order to negotiate its demands. Nor does Russia have many resources outside the U.S.-led institutions that make up the dominant liberal order that would allow it to exit the system. For all the talk about Russia building its own sphere of influence, the country has been outflanked by NATO and the European Union in eastern Europe, and China is competing with it for influence in Central Asia.
Lacking the resources to effectively challenge the existing order or build its own, Russia has resorted to disruption and violence. It launches violent military actions against its neighbors and uses political interference, propaganda, and economic coercion—for example, funding right-wing populist parties in Austria and France, banning agricultural imports from the EU, and threatening gas cutoffs—to sow division in Western polities and drive wedges between NATO allies. Far from signaling some grand scheme, Russia’s violence is best viewed as a strategy of last resort.
China is different. The good news is that Beijing has little need to use violence, because its participation in the international order has strengthened its ability to challenge the status quo without resorting to force. The resources provided by membership in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, and the UN Security Council have allowed China to expand its global footprint, even though they also constrain Beijing’s ambitions. For supporters of the liberal order, however, the bad news is that China has membership in institutions both inside and outside that order, and it is precisely this type of position that allows states to pursue transformative revisionism.
The growing alarm about China’s and Russia’s revisionism has amplified calls for the United States to abandon its institutionalist strategy and instead embrace traditional realpolitik. The goal is no longer integration; it is deterrence: the United States must ensure that its military and alliances are strong enough to dissuade China and Russia from using force to achieve their aims. This was the stated approach of the Trump administration. Its 2017 National Security Strategy argued that while the United States would still “seek areas of cooperation with competitors,” its primary aim would be to “deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of managing competitions without violent conflict.”
The United States needs to embrace a strategy of institutional realpolitik.
But turning away from institutional engagement with revisionist powers would be a mistake. Although military instruments remain important, the United States already holds a sizable advantage in military power over all its rivals, and any increased investment would matter only on the margins. And given that no major power today wants to engage in a large-scale conventional or nuclear war, it is doubtful that military power would be the weapon of choice in direct international political rivalries. Revisionists will continue to use force, but only in places where they believe the United States and its allies are unlikely to directly counter their violence. Washington was unable to deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it remains improbable that Putin will directly attack a NATO member. Even in Taiwan, Beijing is not liable to turn to force if it can avoid it. There is no reason to risk escalation with the United States and its Asian allies if economic and diplomatic instruments are just as likely to secure Chinese aims.
Better Inside the Tent
Instead of abandoning institutional integration in favor of saber rattling, Washington needs to make better use of institutions to exert its influence and limit that of its rivals. Even the most hardened proponents of realpolitik concede that institutional cooperation is necessary to deal with existential threats such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemic disease. Ensuring that all the great powers remain firmly integrated in institutions that address these collective dangers—such as the Paris climate accord and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—should be the goal.
Beyond this, the United States needs to embrace a strategy of institutional realpolitik. To begin with, it should abandon the idea that the purpose of international institutions is to eliminate revisionism or expand liberal global governance. Rather, international institutions are a tool to manage power politics. The most straightforward and significant aim should be to channel revisionist ambitions toward institutional forums and away from more violent and destructive behavior. International institutions could be designed not to stop competition through power politics but to direct it and make it more predictable by providing channels of communication, forums for negotiation, and clear rules about what counts as appropriate behavior.
In Ukraine, this may seem like too little, too late. But at some point, the war will be over, and it is important to consider what will come next. This is not to advocate another “reset” or a substantive partnership with Russia, which must not be permitted to subjugate its neighbors. The goal, instead, should be to redirect a hostile relationship back into more predictable forums—of the kind that stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Some might decry this as tantamount to appeasement. To be clear, the United States and its allies should make such cooperation contingent on Russian acceptance of existing territorial boundaries, including those of Ukraine. The United States should support similar institutions to modify China’s actions in the South China Sea. At a minimum, Washington should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to give it more legitimacy in pushing back against illegal Chinese behavior.
The United States should also try to outflank its rivals by thinking strategically about where revisionists could mobilize support for an alternative and more illiberal international order in the future. This is particularly important in the coming long contest with China, in which Washington, so far, seems to be largely on the defensive. AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom; the G-7; and the Five Eyes partnership with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are all designed to shore up the United States’ security relationships. But Washington remains strangely reluctant to engage in offensive institution building. Biden has yet to reverse his predecessor’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, whose successor institution, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, established a free-trade zone stretching from Vietnam to Australia and encompassing around 40 percent of global GDP. The United States is also excluded from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a regional free-trade pact that is likely to build stronger ties between China and Southeast Asian countries. Finding a way to interact with these new institutions is critical if Washington wishes to bind itself to its allies and partners in meaningful, credible, and durable ways.
Moreover, China has significantly expanded its footprint in areas that the United States has treated as peripheral. Although originally Chinese officials portrayed the infrastructure projects of the BRI as a complement to the liberal economic order, Beijing has since begun to frame them as steps in building an alternative order, or a “community of common destiny.” Reforming international economic institutions to make them more attentive to the needs of aid-recipient countries could help outflank the BRI, which has experienced its own difficulties. For example, the United States could use its own existing institutions—the Millennium Challenge Corporation or the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation—to invest in infrastructure that would buttress the efforts of the new African Continental Free Trade Area and stymie China’s influence.
Keep Them Close
Such reforms would not represent a return to the order building of the 1990s. The United States has neither the power nor the will to go back to that approach. Indeed, institutional realpolitik should involve selective retrenchment. Washington should be willing to identify places where it overextended at the height of U.S. primacy. It may make sense to pull back from the globally oriented, hyper-legalized institutional structure of the WTO, which has benefited countries that are not playing by its rules, such as China. Washington should also be willing to let its regional allies and partners take the lead in institution building. Strong regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the EU, are critical to halting revisionist projects, even if they sometimes act against the United States’ interests.
The next era of great-power competition is already here, but this is not the time to be ramping up military confrontations and shutting down or pulling away from international institutions. U.S. policymakers should reject the false dichotomy that suggests that Washington must choose between realpolitik and institution building. Seeking to reinvigorate international alliances and institutions is not evidence of a lack of imagination or a naive faith in multilateralism. Rather, it is a tried-and-true way to play the game of great-power politics.
21. Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine
Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine
Immediate Release
April 14, 2022
The United States has committed more than $3.2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including approximately $2.6 billion since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked assault on February 24.
On April 13, the Department of Defense outlined the seventh drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2002; this seventh drawdown, valued at up to an additional $800 million, is tailored to meet urgent Ukrainian needs for today’s fight as Russian forces shift the focus of their ruthless aggression to eastern Ukraine.
In addition to the U.S.-produced short-range air defense systems the Ukrainians have been using to great effect, the United States has also identified and is helping the Ukrainians acquire additional, longer-range systems on which Ukraine’s forces are already trained, as well as additional munitions for those systems.
The United States continues to expedite the authorization and facilitation of additional assistance to Ukraine from our Allies. At least 30 countries have provided security assistance to Ukraine since this Russian invasion began. In 2022, the Department of State authorized third-party transfers of defensive equipment from more than 14 countries, a number that continues to grow as Allies and Partners increase support to Ukraine.
As of April 14, United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:
- Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- Over 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
- Over 14,000 other anti-armor systems;
- Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- 18 155mm Howitzers and 40,000 155mm artillery rounds;
- 16 Mi-17 helicopters;
- Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- Over 7,000 small arms;
- Over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition;
- 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
- Laser-guided rocket systems;
- Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
- 14 counter-artillery radars;
- Four counter-mortar radars;
- Two air surveillance radars;
- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
- C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
- Tactical secure communications systems;
- Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;
- Commercial satellite imagery services;
- Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
- Medical supplies to include first aid kits.
Subscribe to Defense.gov Products
Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox.
22. Strategic sabotage is coming to a global conflict near you
Sabotage and subversion are the essence of unconventional warfare and resistance. Just because the modern US definition of UW no longer states sabotage and subversion that does not mean they are no longer two of the pillars of UW. And of course our adversaries very embrace these aspects of UW.
Strategic sabotage is coming to a global conflict near you
“The mission was very clear cut, we are going to prep that battlefield for the invasion and get rid of Saddam Hussein,” CIA team leader Sam Faddis said of his eight-man paramilitary cell infiltrating Iraq in the summer of 2002.
Ahead of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a small team of CIA officers quietly moved into the Kurdish-held north. Their mission to wipe out the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group and discover if they had manufactured chemical weapons is now well known. What is less known is that the CIA also trained Kurdish operatives to act as saboteurs behind enemy lines.
Strategic sabotage operations have become something of a lost art, but one that has taken on renewed relevance in special operations and intelligence circles as America attempts to shift away from a 20-year focus on counter-terrorism to confronting peer and near-peer adversaries.
In the past, the U.S. military not only knew how to conduct these types of operations, but excelled at it. During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services and Jedburgh teams ran successful sabotage missions in the European theater. During the Cold War, Green Berets assigned to Detachment A in Berlin lived in local communities, planning and training to sabotage railways and power stations in the event that the USSR invaded.
Today, the Wall Street Journal reports that a U.S. Special Forces team is stationed full time in Sweden as has traditionally been the case in South Korea. Their mission is to, “help the country’s 22,000-strong Home Guard—part-time citizen-soldiers—plan sabotage, ambush and other operations to disrupt any attempted occupation.” Similar efforts to train so-called stay-behind elements that would conduct acts of sabotage during and after an invasion are underway in Estonia and have been proposed in Ireland.
But what would an actual sabotage campaign look like in a contemporary conflict?
In the run up to the invasion of Iraq, “we ended up with a lot of teams which in the end were mostly Kurds operating inside Iraqi controlled space,” Faddis said. The CIA trained and deployed over 70 of these teams, according to Faddis.
Ground Branch paramilitary officers had to train these sabotage cells on an extremely compressed timeline, essentially throwing normal training procedures right out the window. Simply finding the know-how to conduct these sabotage techniques, not really undertaken by Americans since World War II was a challenge. For instance, there is a lost art and science to sabotaging a rail line, one that had to be relearned.
"We literally dug up the guys, some old timers and really went back to finding some guys who had been put out to pasture and said 'OK, this is lost tribal knowledge, how do we do this?'” Faddis described. The CIA stood up a crash training program for their paramilitary officers to teach these skills before rushing them to Kurdistan before the invasion. One of the Kurdish sabotage teams they trained blew up the rail line into Mosul, laying a 90-car train on its side.
“It's a way of saying screw you, we're here, this is over, and Saddam is done,” Faddis said. In another instance, Faddis sent a team in to blow up the office of an Iraqi intelligence officer. “They put satchel charges in his office and blew it off the face of the earth.”
As policy makers dust off old war plans and take a second look at sabotage, it is also worth recalling instances where such operations produced diminishing returns, led to national embarrassment or failed entirely. The CIA's 1984 mining of the harbors in Nicaragua for example led to national outrage and Congressional condemnation, for little if any strategic benefit to the United States. Likewise, the French intelligence service sabotaged Green Peace's ship, the Rainbow Warrior, in 1985 only for the operation to be exposed and French officials humiliated without any tangible benefit for French national interests. For all of its success, OSS operations to sabotage railway tunnels in Italy during World War II failed not once, but twice in 1944 due to poor planning and logistics.
When it comes to training sabotage cells for use as clandestine stay-behind networks, Operation Gladio provides a stark reminder of the inherent dangers in training such teams without oversight and accountability mechanisms. After the CIA and Special Forces trained these Cold War-era teams in Italy, some went rogue and committed acts of terrorism according to researchers such as Daniele Ganser. By comparison, Special Forces Detachment A in Berlin was staffed by actual soldiers and was professionally run without known scandals or indiscretions.
While sabotage missions may sound like a dated concept, romanticized by lone commandos working with tribal populations such as in the case of T.E. Lawrence, these types of operations are as relevant today as they were a century ago, points out Daniel Meegan in his thesis paper for the Naval Postgraduate school titled, "Breaking Other People's Toys: Sabotage in a Multipolar World."
According to his research, the underlying technology used by rail roads is almost identical to a century ago.
"While materials have improved, the assembly of rail lines has remained essentially unchanged since trains were invented," he writes. While the construction techniques have become more efficient a road, a rail line or a power line is basically built the same way it was a 100 years ago. Blowing a rail line stops a train; blowing a power cable turns the lights off.
Today, Joint Special Operations Command maintains a capability for strategic sabotage, including destroying and disrupting an adversary's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Since Iran, North Korea and other nations dig deep underground to protect the facilities that produce WMDs, JSOC has been given the Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets, or HDBT mission. In the 1980s and 90s this mission involved infiltrating a foreign country, breaching their underground bunkers, and then disabling or destroying WMDs.
For example, in the early 1990s, Delta Force worked on a planned operation to infiltrate Libya and destroy Gaddafi's underground chemical weapons facility in Tarhuna. The mission plan called for an insertion on military hovercraft over the beachhead and then an overland movement on vehicles to the site, where industrial drilling equipment would be used to bore a channel through the earth and into the facility, according to a JSOC planner involved and a Delta operator who was part of the planning cell. Afterwards, an explosive slurry would be poured down the hole and detonated. The mission never got the green light as Gaddafi agreed to shut the facility down.
Post 9/11, this mission evolved and operators were given the additional requirement of actually removing a nuclear device from an enemy bunker system and extracting it via helicopter, according to one retired Delta Force operator. Delta Force and SEAL Team Six conduct training exercises at the Nevada Test Site in an underground complex called P-tunnel, practicing explosive breaching techniques on fortified bunker doors deep under the earth, a retired operator described.
Special breathing apparatuses were also developed so operators could breath in contaminated air as well as specialized four-wheeled ATVs which could be driven in the tunnels.
In another instance, the operators were given a new mission requirement in the event that they were asked to sabotage chemical weapons reactors. Previously, their technique was to use a shaped charge on the reactors, which were large metal vats, and punch a triangular shaped hole in them. Now planners wanted them to render the reactor inoperable, but without exposing the dangerous materials inside. At first many operators and explosives experts thought it was an impossible task.
At the Nevada Test Site, a demolitions expert from Delta Force began experimenting. Working with different configurations of explosives, he came across a method in which they could be arranged on the outside of the vat and detonated in a sequence, which shattered the glass lining inside the chemical weapons vat, without breaching the metal exterior.
However, Meegan's research points out that sabotage is simply a tool in the toolbox, not a silver bullet that will win wars. In the cases of the OSS, SOE, Jedburgh teams and even Faddis' Iraq experience, sabotage was simply one facet of an unconventional warfare campaign designed to soften up the enemy prior to the full weight of U.S. military power being brought to the forefront.
Sabotage my also have uses below the threshold of war. Demonstrating the capability, even telegraphing it, forces an adversary to spend time and resources planning to defend against it. An actual sabotage mission outside of war, for example a tailored access cyber strike such as Stuxnet demonstrates that such capabilities exist and that if an adversarial nation continues its course of action, there will be a price to pay.
In a future conflict, American sabotage teams could potentially target enemy ports, airfields, radar stations, rail junctions, bridges, aircraft still on the ground, WMD facilities, telecom infrastructure, server farms, power plants and other critical nodes in denied areas. As Meegan writes, these teams have a light footprint with "the overall Greek campaign at its peak only used 30 British and American advisors" in World War II while also being more exact than airstrikes as explosives are placed by hand, potentially limiting collateral damage.
Whether sabotage operations are directly conducted by JSOC operators in a clandestine or overt manner, by U.S. Special Forces working alongside indigenous personnel or by the CIA training surrogates that then conduct the mission, it appears that sabotage is back on the menu of options as policy makers and military planners look for ways to complicate the enemy's decision making process.
Want to get more connected to the stories and resources Connecting Vets has to offer? Click here to sign up for our weekly newsletter.
23. Russian warship told to 'go f--- yourself' was either f---ed by Ukraine or by itself
:-). . Karma?
Russian warship told to 'go f--- yourself' was either f---ed by Ukraine or by itself
The Russian warship that was famously told to 'go fuck yourself' has apparently done so.
SHARE
Update: This article has been updated after publication to note that Russian state media announced that the Moskva had indeed sunk.
The Russian cruiser Moskva has gone from the “fuck around” to the “find out” phase of combat operations.
It didn’t take long for karma to strike. On Wednesday evening, the Moskva was rocked by a large explosion. Ukrainian forces claimed to have struck the cruiser with two Neptune anti-ship missiles, but the Russian defense ministry initially countered with claims that a fire broke out aboard the vessel after ammunition exploded. After publication, Russian state media reported that the Moskva had sunk.
It is unclear if any of the roughly 500 sailors aboard the Moskva were injured or killed in the explosion. Russia’s defense ministry claimed that the ship’s crew had been evacuated. A senior defense official told reporters on Thursday that damage to the ship was extensive and, at the time, the crew was still battling a “significant” fire.
During its final hours on Thursday morning, the Moskva was under its own power, and the prevalent theory at the time was that the Moskva was headed to the Russian naval base of Sevastopol for repair, the official said during a Pentagon news briefing.
In this photo taken on Thursday, Dec. 17, 2015 and provided by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, Russian navy missile cruiser Moskva is on patrol in the Mediterranean Sea near the Syrian coast. (Vadim Savitsky/Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)
The U.S. military cannot definitively say whether the Moskva was hit by missiles or if the explosion aboard the ship was caused by a fire, the senior defense official said. At the time of the blast, the vessel was about 60 nautical miles south of Odessa, and that is in range of Ukraine’s Neptune missiles. But like all surface combatants, the Moskva has plenty of combustible materials onboard.
“What we can see, what we can know, what we can independently verify doesn’t give me — as a former naval officer myself — the confidence to say that this absolutely has to be the result of a missile,” the senior defense official said. “It very well could be. But from what I’ve seen, we’re just not ready to make such a definitive call.”
“It certainly appears from what we have been able to see that the fire aboard her is extensive — it’s big,” the official continued. “It’s not a small fire. But that a fire is big doesn’t necessarily mean that it was caused by a particular munition. These ships have flammable and explosive material on board that can exacerbate even a small source of an explosion or fire.”
As the former flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva was armed with sophisticated sensors and defenses to protect the ship against enemy aircraft and missiles. It is not clear whether the Ukrainians used Turkish-made drones to distract the Moskva prior to the alleged missile strike.
Not sure if y’all aware of this — that iconic “Russian warship, go fuck yourself” was initially addressed to the Moskva cruiser pic.twitter.com/vCk75OwV7a
— Illia Ponomarenko (@IAPonomarenko) April 14, 2022
The sinking of the Moskva could be the biggest naval loss of any country since the 1982 Falklands War, when a British nuclear submarine sank the Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix. The Argentinians also sank several British ships including the destroyer HMS Sheffield, which was struck by an Exocet anti-ship missile. (As the Sheffield’s crew formed a human chain in the water, they awaited rescue by singing “Always look on the bright side of life,” from Monty Python’s Life of Brian.)
The U.S. Navy’s most significant losses of naval vessels in recent decades have not been connected to combat at all. Both the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard and the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Miami were damaged beyond repair by fires while they were in port.
In a bit of irony, the Moskva went down on the 110th anniversary of the British passenger liner RMS Titanic striking an iceberg. A video has already sprung up on Twitter showing the Moskva sailing with the theme song from the movie “Titanic” playing in the background.
— Ukraine War Report (@UkrWarReport) April 14, 2022
What’s new on Task & Purpose
Jeff Schogol is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488. Contact the author here.
24. The Latest Propaganda Wars
A fascinating read for all the PSYOP, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and influence experts.
And everyone else.
The Latest Propaganda Wars
memri.org · by A Brief Review Of Russia's Influence Over Mali – To France's Detriment
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been a fascinating real-time lesson in propaganda, by Ukrainians, Russians, and Americans. The Ukrainians have been aided in their messaging by a powerful and indisputable reality, that they were attacked and are defending themselves, and that Russia is the aggressor, brutally invading and attacking a neighboring country.
Those basic, essential truths aside, the Ukrainians have been very effective in doing the hard work of propaganda, churning out content, capturing the news cycle, carrying out "strategic communications, psychological operations."[1] In a war, the best content is victory, but if that is not always available, anything will do: compelling anecdotal stories, the other side's abuses and war crimes, dramatic statements, content that inspires, content that demonizes. All of it has a role to play.[2]
Ukrainian propaganda reminds me in a sense of content from the Syrian Civil War (the first true "social media war") pioneered by the Syrian revolution and later copied by the terrorist group ISIS (I am not criticizing the Ukrainians – I am complimenting them). The underdog Syrian revolutionaries had daily campaigns and themes and online influencers, and they developed a large, diffuse online community of supporters who would amplify and disseminate these messages, both official and amateur (when ISIS later copied Syrian revolutionaries, this community would be the so-called "ISIS fanboys"). The fact that the Ukrainian government is leading this charge is particularly impressive given that governments are often risk adverse when it comes to messaging, and are often uncomfortable with the "dark creativity" in media that is found among revolutionaries.
The Ukrainians' great truth – that they are the victims defending themselves and doing so with dogged determination and sacrifice – is buttressed by very real Russian brutality, such as the massacre at Bucha and elsewhere.[3] To this reality is added a constant, steady drumbeat of other information, even exaggerated or false content – one recalls early incidents as the Ghost of Kiev or the heroes of Snake Island – lapped up by online communities and by an American media hungry for material and covering Ukraine more extensively than it covered America's own wars in the Middle East. A prominent Chechen general is killed, but maybe not. Claims about "mobile crematoria" or chemical weapons are presented uncritically, if enthusiastically. The Ukrainians have done very well, but in a sense, they have been pushing at an open door, given both Russian aggression and an American media that has become hooked on overgrown fantasies of Russian interference in American politics since 2016.[4]
The Ukrainians are also helped by simple Western ignorance – while there is a world of difference between Americans fighting terrorist ISIS and brutal Russians assaulting Ukraine, there is little difference to the naked eye between urban warfare in Mariupol in 2022 and urban warfare in Mosul in 2017; the ruins are eerily similar.[5] But Westerners haven't been paying attention to either the actions of Westerners fighting in distant wars or even to savage war and slaughter not involving Westerners in distant lands.
For those who follow these conflicts, a bombed-out wrecked Ukrainian city looks very much like Raqqa or Kobani or Taiz in Yemen (none of those three involved Russia) or Grozny or Aleppo (where Russia did play a role). If you haven't been paying attention to what has happened elsewhere, Ukraine seems particularly new, raw and shocking.[6] But if, unlike the others, the Ukrainians are "a people like us," then the shock makes sense.[7] Ukraine becoming the next big thing for the West – as Black Lives Matter and Covid were in their day – is both sincere and artificial, orchestrated and serendipitous, born of honest human emotion and solidarity, born from Ukrainian intentional messaging, born from revulsion at Russian actions.
If the Ukrainians have done very well in their relentless messaging (directed especially towards the West), the Russians have not. Leaving aside the fact of Russia being the guilty party in the conflict, the Russians have failed in the basic work of matching the scope and tempo of Ukrainian propaganda, and have not mastered manipulating the Western news cycle (ironic given past hysteria of Russia's supposed media manipulation of the West). One pro-Russian social media account blamed Russian officials' "boomer" mentality, compared to the hip young Ukrainians, for this failure. The best pro-Russian English language Twitter account, the cheeky "Russians With Attitude," with over a 120,000 followers, was briefly suspended on April 13.[8]
One sharp difference is that while both sides are messaging to global audiences and to each other, the Ukrainians naturally prioritize messaging to the West, their source of weapons and economic pressure on Russia. Russia's priority media audience seems to be the Russian people, with messaging to the West a secondary focus.[9] Not surprisingly, some of the other more prominent accounts in English supporting Russia in this war have a Syrian Civil War/Middle East connection (for example, Twitter accounts such as Moon of Alabama, Zoka, and Suriyak). Russia has a propaganda presence in, of all places, American radio.[10] But the flood of direct Russian social media messaging trying to discount specific atrocities after the fact doesn't seem to have succeeded very well.[11]
Also worth mentioning is the controversial role of propaganda produced by Chechen leader and Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov.[12] Widely reviled in the West and by the Ukrainians (and not just them, some pro-Russian accounts mocked Kadyrov videos in the early days of the war, showing lots of standing around, driving, and even dancing, but very little fighting), Kadyrov does seem to have a sense of showmanship (the less charitable might call it buffoonish bluster) that is well suited to our digital age.[13] He has two million followers on his Kadyrov_95 Telegram channel.[14] There is something weird and startling in watching a Kadyrovtsy war video, full of macho Chechen posturing, cries of "Allahu Akbar," and pro-Russian Army geniality – weird, startling, and unbelievable. But the fear and the hatred that the Kadyrovites generate among their enemies seems very real.[15]
If the two belligerents are furiously messaging, one better than the other, so are the U.S. and its allies. The now hoary tradition of the Department of Defense and intelligence community influencing and using the American media to uncritically put out their talking points is as alive as ever.[16] While messaging to help Ukraine and hurt Russia is logical – the U.S. openly supports the brave fight of the Ukrainians – some other American messaging seems incendiary.[17] Other strands are despicable.
A Biden administration that is deeply unpopular and fighting for its domestic political life has tried to shift blame for the American inflation building over the past year onto Putin.[18] The ridiculous recent talking point of blaming shocking inflation rises on the "Putin Price Hike" seems particularly ludicrous, when you consider the administration saying last summer that the inflation was "temporary." Liberal pundits in late 2021 even wrote that inflation was "good," particularly because it prevented Americans from buying things they didn't need. So, in less than a year, inflation was temporary, then good, and now Putin's fault.
The beauty of blaming Putin, after a 2021 filled with massive U.S. domestic spending bills, is that it puts the onus on a foreign dictator rather than on your own recent policies. Accepting ruinous prices becomes patriotic. The hope is that the American taxpayers' hatred for the Russian ogre will be greater than their memory of political events inside the U.S. over the past year.[19] This is perhaps a risky bet on the part of the administration.
Unlike American politicians, for Ukrainians, certainly, and even for Russians, this war is an existential life-or-death event. The propaganda war will be a worthy subject of study, especially the effective Ukrainian role, once the conflict ends and the full truth of things is revealed and can be examined dispassionately and seriously.
*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI
[1] Washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/16/ukraine-zelensky-information-war, March 16, 2022.
[2] Fastcompany.com/90727022/ukrainian-ad-agencies-joining-propaganda-war, March 2, 2022.
[3] Nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/04/osint-sleuths-hunt-for-russian-war-criminals-in-bucha.html, April 8, 2022.
[4] Rrealclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/12/08/why_the_russiagate_scandal_outranks_the_rest_146853.html, December 8, 2021.
[5] Theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/mosul-iraq-abadi-isis-corruption/533067, July 10, 2017.
[6] Nnpr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/03/04/1084230259/not-every-war-gets-the-same-coverage-as-russias-invasion-and-that-has-consequenc, March 4, 2022.
[7] Telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/02/26/vladimir-putins-monstrous-invasion-attack-civilisation, February 26, 2022.
[8] Twitter.com/RWApodcast.
[9] Theconversation.com/as-horrific-evidence-of-massacres-is-uncovered-in-ukraine-russian-propaganda-gathers-pace-180657, April 6, 2022.
[10] Msn.com/en-us/news/world/as-the-war-rages-in-ukraine-radio-sputnik-occupies-the-airwaves-in-american-heartland/ar-AAW71RQ?ocid=uxbndlbing, April 11, 2022.
[11] Reuters.com/technology/how-meta-fumbled-propaganda-moderation-during-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-04-11, April 11, 2022.
[12] Aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/what-role-is-chechnyas-ramzan-kadyrov-playing-in-ukraine, March 24, 2022.
[13] News.yahoo.com/chechen-chief-kadyrov-says-over-055223759.html, April 13, 2022.
[15] Aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/ukrainian-fighters-grease-bullets-against-chechens-with-pig-fat, February 28, 2022.
[16] Nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-using-declassified-intel-fight-info-war-russia-even-intel-isnt-rock-rcna23014, April 6, 2022.
[17] Compactmag.com/article/away-from-the-abyss, April 2, 2022.
[18] Youtube.com/watch?v=R13Rf-lTlKs.
[19] Washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/putins-price-hike-began-long-before-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-data-show, April 13, 2022.
memri.org · by A Brief Review Of Russia's Influence Over Mali – To France's Detriment
25. FBI Documents Expose Bureau's Big Jan. 6 'Lie'
Who would/ve thought? From Rolling Stone magazine.
FBI Documents Expose Bureau's Big Jan. 6 'Lie'
The bureau says it lacked the authority to monitor social media activity ahead of the pro-Trump insurrection, but it did exactly that during 2020 racial justice and police violence protes
In the aftermath of the Jan. 6 insurrection, the FBI told Congress and the American people that the agency had failed to prevent or fully prepare for the worst attack on the U.S. Capitol in more than 200 years in part because it lacked the authority and capabilities to more aggressively monitor social media, where much of the planning for the insurrection took place.
As FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress last summer, the FBI had circulated intelligence materials and other resources before Jan. 6, but the agency had limits in what it could and couldn’t gather from social media. “When we have an authorized purpose and proper predication, there are a lot of things that we do at social media and we do do,” Wray said, “but [what] we cannot do on social media is, without proper predication and authorized purpose, just monitor just in case on social media.”
Wray added, “Now, if the policies should be changed to reflect that, that might be one of the important lessons learned coming out of this whole experience. But that’s not something that currently the FBI has either the authority or certainly the resources, frankly, to do.” Since Wray’s testimony, the bureau has sought to ramp up its online surveillance capabilities, including by entering into one of the largest social-media monitoring contracts of any federal agency.
Yet internal FBI records obtained by Rolling Stone show that, well before Jan. 6, the bureau already engaged in ongoing and widespread tracking of Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and other social-media platforms. The new documents suggest the agency has all the authority it needs to monitor the social-media platforms in the name of public safety — and, in fact, the bureau had done just that during the nationwide wave of racial justice protests in 2020. Critics of the FBI say that the bureau’s desire for more authority and surveillance tools is part of a decades-long expansion of the vast security apparatus inside the federal government.
The documents refer to teams of employees engaged in what law-enforcement agencies call “social-media exploitation,” or SOMEX. According to the documents, SOMEX teams gather reams of data from social media and distribute that information to special agents and other law-enforcement representatives. The documents show SOMEX data included in situation reports, or “sitreps,” distributed within the bureau.
The documents were first obtained by Property of the People, a government-transparency nonprofit group. “The documents bring into relief three consistent truths about the FBI,” says Ryan Shapiro, executive director of Property of the People. “One: At its core, the FBI is a political police force that primarily targets the left while ignoring or outright enabling the far-right. Two: FBI spokespersons lie like they breathe. Three: The Bureau shamelessly exploits national crises to expand the already dystopian reach of its surveillance.”
In a statement sent to Rolling Stone, an FBI spokesperson said: “The FBI uses social media tools to search publicly available information pertinent to predicated investigations to identify and respond to threats of violence, acts of terrorism, and potential federal violations within the scope of the FBI’s mission. As with any technology, the FBI routinely reviews and updates its social media capabilities to ensure the continued utility of these tools in accordance with law, regulation, and policy.”
Legal experts say the documents illustrate how much latitude the bureau already has to trawl social media for information without needing additional authority. “I think it has more authority than it needs frankly,” says Faiza Patel, co-director of the Liberty and National Security program at the Brennan Center for Justice. “What we’ve seen basically is that the FBI did not take this [Jan. 6] threat as seriously as they should have.”
Patrick Eddington, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former CIA officer, adds that the FBI Director Wray’s testimony last year runs counter to the bureau’s existing social-media tracking capabilities as well as its broader guidelines for domestic surveillance activities. “If your flavor of the week is right-wing extremism, they can track it,” Eddington, a vocal critic of the FBI, tells Rolling Stone. “If it’s left-wing extremism, they can track it.”
He adds, “When Wray says they don’t have the authority, he has affirmatively lied to the Congress, flat out.”
The documents — which cover the years 2019, 2020, and 2021 — indicate that FBI employees and their local law-enforcement partners regularly used social-media exploitation to track protests and demonstrations related to a range of issues from racial justice and anti-fascist organizing to right-wing extremism and environmental activism.
In the summer of 2020, the FBI’s second-ranking official, David Bowdich, wrote a memo warning about “a national crisis” as racial-justice protests roiled the country. Acts of vandalism, property destruction, and violence had accompanied some of the demonstration, and Bowdich implored the bureau’s employees to investigate “violent protesters,” “instigators,” and “inciters.” As part of these efforts, Bowdich called for using “robust social media exploitation teams” to gather information about alleged criminals who seemed to be acting with a “highly organized behavior.”
The internal documents reviewed by Rolling Stone show that social-media tracking was used in responses to protests and communications about police violence. In June, agents in the bureau’s Seattle office circulated SOMEX data related to protests targeting the police department in Lakewood, Washington. A month earlier, a Lakewood police officer shot and killed a man named Said Joaquin during a traffic stop, and protests sprang up seeking to hold the officer and the police department accountable.
A June 4 FBI situation report included information about what people were saying and planning in response to Joaquin’s death. “The theme found on SOMEX within the Seattle [Area of Responsibility for the overnight hours of 3 June 2020 to 4 June 2020 was of positive of continued de-escalation of tensions with police and the rejection of violent methods and actors. No chatter of violent tactics or actions,” read the report. “Multiple Twitter postings discussing the use of passive tactical techniques used by the Hong Kong protesters and adaptation for use the current protest environment. Posting provided links to videos, and internet articles and encouraged views to conduct their own research.” The report also listed possible future meeting sites for people who wanted to hold the local police accountable.
Other FBI documents show bureau employees using Instagram, Snapchat, and Reddit to monitor possible threats, flagging certain hashtags, and tracking attempts to publish personal identifying information for law enforcement officers on the dark web. The bureau appeared to have cast a wide net in its online monitoring, according to the records. One document describes potential targets as “individuals involved in or present at locations of lawful protests are [who] part of an organized effort associated with anti-government-anti-authority extremism, militia extremism, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, or violent gangs.”
On Sept. 20, 2020, for instance, a special agent in the FBI’s Minneapolis office sent an all-staff email about demonstrations and counter-protests planned for an upcoming court hearing for the four police officers involved in the death of George Floyd. The agent’s email listed the different events and their locations, the estimated number of people who planned to attend based on social media postings, and the local police department’s planning for the event. The agent’s email adds that “Intel will be conducting SOMEX” during the demonstrations.
Eddington, the Cato Institute expert, says two clear themes are seen in the documents. One is how widely information — including social-media data — on protesters was shared among numerous state and federal law-enforcement agencies. “Law-enforcement social media monitoring is absolutely routinized at the local, state, and federal levels,” Eddington says.
He also notes that the documents show how focused the FBI was on possible threats to police officers. “Not much question that helps create an ‘us-vs.-them’ mentality vis a vis police and those engaged in lawful, First Amendment-protected protest activities,” Eddington says.
The bureau may have failed to fully anticipate the Jan. 6 attack, but it has joined a massive, government-wide manhunt to hold accountable the people who stormed the Capitol that day. A top Justice Department official, Lisa Monaco, described the agency’s investigation as the “most complex that this department has ever undertaken.” DOJ is spending $15 million with a staff of nearly 70 people in that investigation, according to NBC News.
Experts who study domestic surveillance point out that the social-media tracking described in the cache of FBI documents speaks to larger questions around how much authority the bureau should have in investigating Americans.
Right now, experts say, the bureau’s employees have wide latitude to track and monitor Americans without a specific predicate or authorization. Justice Department guidelines put in place in 2008 for FBI investigations spell out three formal stages for an investigation: an assessment, a preliminary investigation, and a full investigation. If the investigation targets a politician, a political party, a civil society group, a religious organization, or a media outlet, then it’s tagged as a “sensitive investigative matter” given the possible First Amendment implications.
There are constraints on FBI investigations the more formal and intensive they become. But the DOJ’s guidelines also make “100 percent clear,” says the Brennan Center’s Faiza Patel, that “there are no guidelines constraints on the FBI looking at social media,” adding, “The only constraint is they shouldn’t be looking at it solely on First Amendment grounds.”
Yet despite having wide latitude to monitor social-media activity for years predating Jan. 6, the FBI says it needs more authority and technology to monitor online activity. The bureau’s newly inked agreement, costing $5 million in its first year, to license a SOMEX tool called Babel X demonstrates the FBI’s desire to continue escalating what it can see, hear, and read online.
“What I always worry about — and I’ll be the first one to admit that this is a fine line — is the FBI going after people on the basis of speech under the mistaken belief that it’s some imminent incitement to violence,” Eddington says. “I worry about groups that are out there vigorously advocating in the public domain for major changes in prevailing policies.”
26. Sex, Lies, and UFOs: Pentagon's Head of Counterintelligence and Security Ousted
Quite the expose. The UFO story caught my eye - okay the headline is pure clickbait. I have never heard of "The Debrief" before.
A long painful read.
Sex, Lies, and UFOs: Pentagon's Head of Counterintelligence and Security Ousted - The Debrief
Former Director for Defense Intelligence Garry Reid (Image Source: DoD)
As the Pentagon’s Director for Defense Intelligence and a senior executive in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security OUSD(I&S), Garry Reid was in charge of all counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement operations within the Department of Defense.
This, in addition to heading up the Afghanistan Crisis Action Group, the office tasked with evacuating Afghan refugees during America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Now, in an exclusive, The Debrief has learned that Reid was recently dismissed from his responsibilities within the U.S. government.
Before his ousting as Director of Defense Intelligence, Reid had been the subject of a nearly two-year-long investigation by The Debrief. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, multiple current and former Pentagon employees told The Debrief Reid had engaged in wide-ranging misconduct and corruption for years.
In the past four years, the DoD’s Inspector General’s Office had investigated Reid on numerous allegations, including maintaining a sexual relationship with a subordinate employee, sexual harassment, and fostering a hostile work environment.
In 2020, the IG Office found that Reid had violated Joint Ethics Regulations by creating an appearance of an inappropriate relationship or preferential treatment with a female subordinate and mishandling of Controlled Unclassified Information.
In May 2021, Reid was named in yet another formal IG complaint, this time involving former Director of National Programs Special Management Staff at OUSD(I&S), Luis Elizondo.
In his complaint, Elizondo accused Reid of playing a central role in obfuscating information regarding the Pentagon’s intriguing newfound interest in “unidentified aerial phenomena,” more commonly known as UFOs. Reid was also accused of maliciously misleading the public about Elizondo’s involvement with the DoD’s quasi-secret UFO program, the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).
It’s not entirely clear what led to Reid’s recent dismissal. However, multiple defense officials familiar with the situation told The Debrief they believed the weight of the numerous past allegations, the disastrous withdrawal of refugees from Afghanistan, and current investigations into misconduct were too significant, and ultimately led to his dismissal.
In an email, Senior Spokesperson for the Department of Defense’s Public Affairs Office, Susan Gough, did not refute that Reid had been dismissed. However, the DoD declined to provide any further comment on the matter at this time.
Sex…
According to a “Report of Investigation” obtained by The Debrief via the Freedom of Information Act, in late 2019, Reid was investigated by the DoD’s Inspector General’s Office regarding four separate complaints of him having sexual affairs with subordinate employees, sexual harassment and creating a “negative work environment.”
Two of the complaints accused Reid of having a sexual affair and providing preferential treatment to a female subordinate, identified in the report as “Employee 1.”
Various witnesses told IG investigators they had observed Reid and Employee 1 engaging in questionable behavior, including kissing, hugging, and close personal interactions. “They definitely stand closer to each other than I would stand next to any of my [colleagues],” one witness told investigators.
In 2018 and 2019, Reid and Employee 1 took personal trips out of town together on at least two occasions. During a third official trip to Europe in 2018, investigators said Reid and Employee 1 took two days of personal leave to go “sightseeing.”
Daily lunches between Reid and Employee 1 also raised eyebrows among co-workers.
According to witnesses, Reid and Employee 1 frequently enjoyed office lunches together, with some accounts saying the door to Reid’s office was often seen closed. Several witnesses also described the lunchtime powwows as “very weird.”
“[There were] two place settings, like … a restaurant” complete with “salt and pepper shakers, a side table, and some sparkling water,” witnesses were quoted saying.
IG investigators determined that for more than a year, Reid and Employee 1 regularly commuted to work and went to the gym together. One witness described the couple’s carpooling as “odd.”
“He’s the boss, and she’s a subordinate,” said one witness. “[I have] never seen that type of relationship between a supervisor and subordinate.”
Out of twenty witnesses interviewed by IG investigators, only three said Reid and Employee 1’s relationship was “solely professional.” The remaining witnesses described the couple as “close,” “very close,” “perceived close,” or “inappropriately close.” Several witnesses told investigators the relationship between Reid and Employee 1 made them feel “awkward.”
Then-Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Kari Bingen told IG investigators she had heard “rumors” that Reid and Employee 1 spent a lot of time together and had even raised the issue with him sometime in 2019. According to the report, Reid told Bingen he was merely “mentoring” Employee 1.
Independent investigation by The Debrief revealed the perception that Reid and Employee 1 were involved in an inappropriate relationship extended far beyond just the offices in OUSD(I&S).
Former senior officials who worked directly for former Secretary of Defense James Mattis and in the White House during the Trump administration told The Debrief it was “common knowledge” that Reid and Employee 1 were involved in an inappropriate, assumed romantic relationship.
One official who worked within the Office of the Secretary of Defense said they had heard a rumor that Reid and Employee 1 had been caught engaging in some type of sexual activity in the Pentagon parking lot. The official, who still works for the Department of Defense, reiterated this was only a rumor
During interviews, both Reid and Employee 1 denied allegations of being in a sexual affair, both describing their relationship instead as merely a very close friendship.
Employee 1 told IG investigators that she referred to herself as the “[Reid] whisperer and [Reid] interpreter” because “people bring things to me first, and they make me deliver the bad news,” which is “kind of my role.” For his part, Reid described his interactions with Employee 1 as being akin to a mentor and mentee.
Both Reid and Employee 1 admitted that on occasion, they may have kissed on the cheek or briefly hugged each other, but in a strictly platonic manner. Employee 1 told investigators that all of the kisses she received from Reid were “never uncomfortable” and didn’t “feel aggressive or inappropriate or meaningful.”
Reid denied providing preferential treatment, saying any added responsibilities or inclusion on travel trips outside of Employee 1’s scope of employment were part of his mentorship. Reid said this was done based on guidance by Deputy Undersecretary Bingen to “build up a bench” as part of talent management efforts by the DoD.
Though unmentioned in the IG report, The Debrief learned in its independent investigation that Employee 1 was promoted to a high-level executive position with OUSDI.
Ultimately, the IG Office concluded that Reid had violated DoD Joint Ethics Regulations by “establishing and maintaining a close and unduly familiar relationship with Employee 1, creating a widespread perception of an inappropriate relationship and favoritism.”
In a rebuttal to the IG Office’s conclusions, Reid said his frequent interactions with Employee 1 were due to an administrative reorganization in February 2019.
Short of flatly accusing Reid of lying, IG investigators said his statements “minimized his interactions” with Employee 1 by failing to highlight they had taken personal out-of-town trips and were commuting, eating lunch, and attending the gym together daily, in at least 2018.
While there was considerable circumstantial evidence, the IG’s Office ultimately said they could not substantiate that Reid and Employee 1 were engaged in a “sexual affair.” Investigators, however, noted they uncovered “many instances of conduct by Mr. Reid and her that were unduly personal and not professional or performance-related.”
The report’s authors underscored their conclusion by highlighting that Reid kissed Employee 1 on at least one occasion in her office and “routinely in the morning and evening hours during their commute together.”
Lies…
In 2020 the DoD Inspector General’s Office investigated Reid regarding another allegation that he was involved in an inappropriate sexual affair with a subordinate female co-worker, identified in reports as “Employee 2.”
The dynamics of the IG’s investigation quickly changed when Employee 2 denied that she had been in a sexual relationship with Reid, instead claiming she had been the victim of repeated sexual harassment.
According to the IG’s report, Reid had “kissed and hugged” Employee 2 in the workplace on multiple occasions, something Employee 2 said made her “uncomfortable” and was “unwelcome and inappropriate.”
Employee 2 said Reid kissed and hugged her “always in the context of some goodbye” or after a heated exchange as a “let’s make up [and] let’s hug it out.”
During hugs, Employee 2 said she would always try to turn her head away because Reid “would try to kiss her on the ‘cheek or closer.'” Employee 2 said Reid would kiss her on the “mouth, side of the mouth, or cheek, depending on how quickly she could move her head.”
Employee 2 admitted she had never confronted Reid, who was her supervisor, about the unwanted interactions out of fear of the consequences.
“If you tell Reid, ‘I’m really not comfortable with that, that’s really inappropriate,’ then you have Hell to pay. Your life is miserable. And it just wasn’t worth it. So you put up with it,” Employee 2 was quoted.
“I just felt like this is a real crappy thing that I have to put up with. … So, I don’t, I mean, it’s not like I was like, ‘Oh my God, I’ve been violated. I need to call the sexual assault helpline,” said Employee 2 when asked how the kisses and hugs made her feel.
“Like, I’m so conditioned to just deal with it. [It] sucks that women have to put up with this, and I’m one of them, and it’s just part of doing business.”
Ironically, Employee 1 from the first IG complaint told investigators she had witnessed Reid “kiss Employee 2 occasionally,” but that it did not “make an impression on [her] as anything concerning or noteworthy.”
When confronted with the allegations, Reid told investigators that he had “never sexually harassed anybody, male or female.” Reid did not deny, however, that he occasionally hugged or kissed Employee 2, but only on the cheek. Reid said Employee 2 never told him his kisses were unwelcome or gave a “negative response.”
“I sit here watching TV with Harvey Weinstein and everything else going on here, and again I’m still in shock that you came in here, and you told me of all the things you included, that I sexually harrassed [Employee 2],” said Reid. “But I did nothing of the sort and did everything to the contrary to help her, and she agreed with the help, and she would be the first to tell you I helped her.”
Reid went on to say he thought perhaps Employee 2’s allegations of sexual harassment were out of “revenge and retaliation” because he did not support her career advancement. “She took that very negatively – – that [I] didn’t have her back.”
During their investigation into the sexual harassment allegations, IG investigators said they examined text messages and emails between Reid and Employee 2. Investigators said messages showed Employee 2 “frequently engaging Reid in common interest conversations” and seemed to show “support for his work.”
In light of Reid admitting to on occasion kissing or hugging Employee 2, the IG office concluded: “Considering the totality of the relationship between Mr. Reid and Employee 2, we did not find sufficient evidence to determine that Mr. Reid’s conduct toward Employee 2 constituted sexual harassment or some other form of misconduct.”
The Debrief was able to speak with a female former Pentagon official who was familiar with the IG’s 2020 investigation into Reid for sexual misconduct and harassment. The former official requested anonymity out of concern for reprisal. The Debrief verified the former official was indeed in a position to comprehensively understand the workplace dynamics in OUSDI under Reid’s leadership.
According to the former official, Reid’s inappropriate behavior towards female employees was apparent and widely known amongst the staff at OUSDI. “He was extremely arrogant. It didn’t matter who was around, senior civilian staff, attorneys, military officials. It didn’t matter. He would still do completely inappropriate things.”
The career female defense official said she understood why “Employee 2” in the IG investigation didn’t initially report Reid’s behavior, and it only came to light due to another allegation of misconduct.
“As a woman working in the Pentagon, which is still largely a boy’s club, when you see someone like Reid blatantly behaving like he did, you say, ‘Why bother?’ Why speak out because all that is going to happen is you’re going to be penalized, but nothing will happen to someone like Reid. So you just accept it’s not worth it.”
“And look what happened,” the former female defense official added. “Nothing was done about him sexually harassing one co-worker [Employee 2], while the other co-worker [Employee 1] he was having an affair with got promoted into a senior position. What kind of message does that send?”
Another current female defense official who was not working in the Pentagon during the IG’s initial investigation, but whose current position put her in contact with Reid and OUSD(I&S) told The Debrief that she would like to hope things are changing for the better. However, evidence often suggests otherwise.
“Let’s be honest here. He [Reid] didn’t get run off until he screwed up Afghanistan and a man [ Elizondo] filed an IG complaint,” said the current female Defense official.
“As a woman, personally I look at his behavior and think he’s a pig,” the current female Defense official added. “Professionally, I’d consider him a huge CI [counterintelligence] risk. If I’m a foreign adversary, I realize all I need to do to compromise this guy is wave a skirt in front of him. It’s kind of remarkable he was the head of counterintelligence.”
[Editorial Note: During its investigation, The Debrief was able to determine the identity of “Employee 2.” However, the individual is no longer in public service, and their identity has therefore been withheld from this report.]
Garry Reid during a Pentagon press briefing, August 16, 2021. (Image Source: DoD)
In yet another IG complaint during the 2019-2020 time frame, an anonymous co-worker accused Reid of creating a hostile and combative work environment. Of twenty-one witnesses interviewed by IG investigators, one-third gave unfavorable appraisals of Reid’s leadership, describing him as “nasty,” “gruff,” “moody,” “unpredictable,” “not very communicative,” or “incredibly inconsistent.”
One witness said Reid could get “angry” and “downright mean” when things weren’t going well, and he wanted answers.
“When he’s talking to you, like he’s interrogating you, [and] talking to you like you’re the gum on his shoe, bottom of his shoe. Just no, even basic human respect. I mean it was like he had no time for you,” said one witness. “If he was not happy with you, you knew it and felt it.”
Twelve witnesses offered a slightly more favorable appraisal, saying Reid was “firm” and “blunt” but also “smart,” “strategic,” and “successful.”
Reid’s then-boss, Deputy Undersecretary for Intelligence Kari Bingen, described him as a “pit-bull as in if you give him something and he will kind of be dogged about getting it down.”
Bingen admitted there had been “several, or a handful of individuals” who said it had been “really hard to work for him” during exit interviews upon leaving the Pentagon. Bingen, however, told investigators she had seen “flashes of him doing his job very well, him building relationships, [and] him getting things done effectively.”
Ultimately, the Inspector General’s Office said the negative comments about Reid’s leadership “did not rise to the level of violations of the JER,” concluding Reid had not fostered a negative work environment.
During their overall investigations in 2020, the DoD IG said they uncovered that Reid had at times used his personal email account to conduct “official DoD business.” On 65 occasions, investigators found Reid had used his personal email to share Controlled Unclassified Information.
Reid claimed he had only used his personal email for “rare and extraordinary” situations but agreed, “I probably should have known better.” In their final conclusion, the IG Office said Reid violated DoD policies regarding email use, highlighting his later remarks and agreeing “[He] should have known better.”
And UFOs…
In October 2017, the then-Director of National Programs Special Management Staff at OUSD(I&S), Luis Elizondo, resigned from the Pentagon following a lengthy career in which he had served in various senior intelligence roles.
Elizondo’s reason for suddenly departing his employer of over 20 years involved UFOs, or in contemporary parlance, unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).
Elizondo says he headed up a secretive working group within the Pentagon for over half-a-decade investigating UAP encounters by members of the U.S. military under the moniker of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).
Elizondo’s sudden October 2017 resignation was in protest after it became clear that some in Pentagon leadership were preventing senior defense officials from being briefed on these concerning UAP incidents.
In December 2017, Elizondo revealed the existence of AATIP in an expose by the New York Times. Following the feature article–which thrust Elizondo, AATIP, and UAP into the limelight–was the release of three DoD videos captured in 2004 and 2015 by the targeting cameras of F/A-18 fighter jets. The Pentagon has since begrudgingly admitted the objects seen in the videos are characterized as UAP.
In the ensuing years, Elizondo has become one of the most prominent and vocal advocates for the formal investigation of these mysterious incidents.
To their credit, the Pentagon and Congressional leadership have backed up Elizondo’s most extraordinary claim: That devices of apparent intelligent control and unknown origin are flying in our skies with impunity.
Perhaps unsurprising given the taboo nature of UFOs, that’s not to say there hasn’t been some controversy regarding Elizondo’s claims.
Specific to the well-known UFO whistleblower, after initially confirming Elizondo ran AATIP since the spring of 2019, the DoD has been steadfast in claiming he had no “assigned responsibilities” in the program. In fairness, over the last 5 years, the DoD’s position on AATIP or UAP has been, at best, indecisive.
According to Elizondo and several current and former defense officials that The Debrief spoke with, the Pentagon’s inconsistent messaging on Elizondo’s involvement in AATIP and general aversion to being open about its interest in UAP is in large part due to one person: Luis Elizondo’s former boss at OUSD(I&S).
Or as one current senior Intelligence Official worded it when speaking with The Debrief, “Garry Fucking Reid.”
Luis Elizondo (Image Source: CBS/ 60 Minutes)
According to documents related to a May 2021 IG complaint filed by Elizondo, which was reviewed by The Debrief, shortly after resigning on October 5, 2017, Elizondo received a call from his former boss Garry Reid.
A “clearly upset” Reid wanted to know what he should do with Elizondo’s resignation letter and demanded he come to see him at the Pentagon. When Elizondo declined the invitation, Reid reportedly threatened him, saying he would “tell people you are crazy, and it might impact your security clearance.”
By November, Elizondo said he received several phone calls from former colleagues at OUSD(I&S) warning him that Reid and “Employee 1” (from the IG complaint) were “coming after him.”
This could be written off as an apparently emotional and volatile former boss blowing off steam. However, it would seem, Reid indeed did attempt to make good on his threats.
On December 22, 2017, five days after Elizondo and AATIP made headlines in the New York Times, an investigation into Elizondo and the release of the three DoD videos depicting UAP incidents was launched by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI).
A copy of the final report obtained by The Debrief via the Freedom of Information Act indicates AFOSI’s primary task was to investigate the release of the three UAP videos under the presumption these videos were classified. The report notes the videos were classified as Secret/No Foreign.
The fact that AFOSI investigators initially thought the videos were Secret is intriguing.
The DoD has since admitted the three brief clips were never classified. Additionally, emails obtained through FOIA show that this was abundantly clear as far back as the summer of 2017, when Elizondo was trying to get the videos cleared for public release.
Given that they were indeed unclassified, Elizondo could have, at most, potentially committed an administrative violation for publicly releasing the videos before they had been cleared by the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR).
From the onset, had AFOSI been aware of this, they would have known that an investigation was pointless since Elizondo was no longer working for the DoD. Nevertheless, the impression that the videos were classified caused it to become a criminal matter, which allowed AFOSI to initiate the investigation.
After over four months of investigation, AFOSI arrived at the same conclusion that should have been abundantly clear from the beginning: “The three videos obtained by the SUBJECT were confirmed to be UNCLASSIFIED.” Both AFOSI and the Unauthorized Disclosure Program Management Office considered the matter closed on April 13, 2018.
Copies of AFOSI’s final report were forwarded for “Action” to OUSDI, acknowledging OUSDI as the office initially requesting the investigation.
The person working out of OUSDI in charge of all counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement operations for the DoD at the time had been Garry Reid.
Speaking under the condition of anonymity, a senior defense official who had firsthand knowledge of the incident told The Debrief they knew for certain that the 2017-2018 AFOSI investigation was done at the behest of Reid as a way of retaliating against Elizondo.
Reid’s aim, reportedly, was to try and get Elizondo’s security clearance revoked. Treating it as a counterintelligence matter only ensured increased scrutiny.
“OSI all but came back and told him [Reid] it was improper use of their resources. Based on his position, they couldn’t actually say that, but if you read between the lines on the report, that’s what you see.”
According to the Defense official, this was far from the only act of retribution Reid took against Elizondo.
“Reid had USDI Security put an entry in Elizondo’s file on Scattered Castles, which is the clearance system used for IC interagency clearance passage, so that if he tried to go to any SCIF in the IC, Reid would get a call and be able to cause questions so that Interagency partners would come to believe there was a ‘problem’ and not let him in,” the Defense official explained.
“This is a stealth administrative way to block someone’s access without overtly putting anything out there. These types of admin dirty tricks were perpetrated by Reid against Elizondo over and over again.”
Multiple former and current Defense Officials familiar with the matter told The Debrief that going after Elizondo’s security clearance had been only one of the administrative dirty tricks Reid played.
Initially, when news of AATIP came to light in 2017, then-Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White acknowledged Elizondo had run the program.
By Spring of 2019, however, the DoD did an about-face, releasing the boilerplate statement that “Mr. Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the AATIP program while he worked in OUSDI [the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence].”
A former senior advisor to Secretary of Defense James Mattis told The Debrief they had been briefed at the Pentagon by Elizondo several times in early 2017 on UAP incidents and were dumbfounded when they saw the DoD’s new “no responsibilities” position.
“I actually called PAO and said, ‘How can you say that? I was read into this and [was] briefed by him [Elizondo].'” The former advisor says they never provided an adequate explanation for why the DoD was now denying Elizondo’s role with the program.
Two current Defense officials told The Debrief they knew that senior leadership at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who at the time was managing the DoD’s officially sanctioned UAP Task Force, had provided clarifying statements to the Public Affairs Office reflecting Elizondo had been the senior ranking official in the joint working group investigating UAP known as AATIP.
Documents reviewed by The Debrief show that on June 3, 2020, Elizondo emailed the DoD’s newly appointed UAP public affairs czar, Susan Gough, requesting a correction to previous statements that more correctly reflected his involvement with AATIP. In the email, Elizondo provided 14 names of individuals ranging from senior Pentagon officials, private contractors, to members of Congress who could verify his involvement.
Each of Elizondo’s attempts to correct the record on his former s role with the AATIP program went unrecognized.
Several current and former Defense officials tell The Debrief that the DoD’s steadfast denial regarding Elizondo and often inconsistent and confusing public statements on UAP can be traced back to Elizondo’s last boss, Garry Reid.
After three years of attempts at clearing his name and setting the record straight, Elizondo finally filed a formal complaint with the DoD Inspector General’s Office in May 2021.
In unclassified documents reviewed by The Debrief, Elizondo accused Reid of “malicious activities, coordinated disinformation, professional misconduct, whistleblower reprisal, and explicit threats.”
In the cover letter to his complaint, Elizondo said, “I am fully aware of the magnitude of my allegations against certain individuals in the Department, and I am able to substantiate these claims.”
Speaking with The Debrief, Elizondo said part of Reid’s vendetta against and misleading statements about his involvement with AATIP are likely related to the fact he was never made aware of the program. “Since I could not trust him, I never indoctrinated him into the program, and instead was working with echelons within the Department above him,” said Elizondo.
“I was aware of his perceived misconduct and could not risk the integrity of the program by involving him. Last I heard, he was coaching Pentagon Spokesperson, Susan Gough how to respond to inquiries by the media about me. This would explain the obvious inaccuracies provided to the media about me by Ms. Gough,” surmised Elizondo.
The Inspector General’s Office declined to comment on Elizondo’s complaint.
Just before Elizondo filed his complaint, the IG’s Office announced they were launching an evaluation “to determine the extent to which the DoD has taken actions regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP).”
Both the investigations into Elizondo’s complaint and the evaluation of the DoD’s handling of UAP are still ongoing;and when it comes to the DoD’s handling of UAP, once again all roads lead to Garry Reid.
Screenshot of purported UAP captured by US Navy F/A-18 pilots in 2015. (Image Source: The Department of Defense)
In August of 2020, the DoD officially announced the establishment of a UAP Task Force to “improve its understanding of, and gain insight into, the nature and origins of UAPs.”
However, copies of emails obtained by The Debrief via FOIA show that senior DoD leadership, as high as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of the Navy, were being briefed on UAP at least a year earlier in 2019. Lawmakers on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee were also receiving briefings on UAP by 2019.
And while all of these efforts in 2019-2020–including those by the UAP Task Force–were being managed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the cognizant authority for the DoD’s UAP investigations was the Defense Intelligence, Collection, and Special Programs Office at OUSD(I&S), which fell under the direct control of the Director of Defense Intelligence: Garry Reid.
The same Reid that multiple defense officials say has not only maintained a years-long vendetta against Elizondo but also played a central role in obstructing efforts to formally investigate purported UAP sightings going back to at least late 2017.
With Reid’s sudden departure, the Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) Air Force Major General Aaron Prupas will likely take over leadership of the AOIMSG, at least for the time being.
Pentagon Spokesperson John Kirby, with Garry Reid in the background. August 16, 2021. (Image Source: DoD)
But Wait, There’s More…
In light of having been named in multiple past IG complaints; in violation of DoD Joint Ethics Regulations; ” and the subject of a still ongoing IG investigation involving allegations of “malicious activities”; miraculously, in July 2021, Reid found himself named as the Director of the DOD Crisis Action Group for Afghanistan.
In this role, Reid served as the lead DoD official overseeing the relocation of refugees and transportation of U.S. embassy staff, American citizens, allies, and other partners during the U.S.’s frantic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Horrific images of desperate Afghans clinging to the landing gear of massive C-17 cargo planes as they took to the sky would suggest that Reid’s Afghanistan Crisis Action Group was a complete disaster. And the data would concur.
In a joint press conference with Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby on August 16, Reid said while working closely with the Department of State, the Crisis Action Group was focusing on relocating Special Visa Applications (SIV). “To date, nearly 2,000 Afghans have passed through this process,” said Reid.
According to a February 2022 report issued by the Association of Wartime Allies, of the 81,000 SIV applicants who had pending visa applications on the day of Reid’s press conference, on August 31, when the final U.S. cargo planes went wheels up, 78,000 were left behind.
Six months after America’s withdrawal, AWA collected data on 10,803 of the 78,000 Afghan refugees left behind. Of those surveyed, 30% had been imprisoned by the Taliban; 88% reported loss of employment; 94% reported economic hardship; 70% said they went without food at least once in the last month; 84% reported going without medical care due to angst about leaving home and facing reprisals from the Taliban; and 77% said they had witnessed some form of physical violence against others for their service to the United States.
The State Department has disputed AWA’s figure that 78,000 Afghan refugees were left behind, saying in early August 2021, there were about “18,000 SIV applicants.” Both organizations agree that only 3,000 SIV applicants were ultimately evacuated by August 31.
So while the State Department’s total figure of SIV applicants is considerably smaller than AWA’s estimate, it still reflects the U.S. didn’t get out nearly 84% of Afghan refugees.
According to some senior Defense officials, including those from the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Intelligence Community, Reid and Crisis Action Group out of OUSD(I&S) bear a large part of the blame for the U.S. not being able to get more refugees out of Afghanistan.
Officials tell The Debrief that all evacuation of refugees had to go through Reid’s office in OUSD(I&S), which created a bureaucratic bottleneck that often brought operations to a standstill.
Frustrated that some military agencies were still doing everything they could to get refugees out as the Taliban swooped in and seized control of Kabul, Defense officials said OUSD(I&S) ordered all U.S. military helicopters grounded, with permission to fly having to be granted by them.
“JSOC folks and some other agencies were already working to get people out, but USDI and Reid suddenly came in and put everything to a halt. They repeatedly held things up, for no other reason than they just wanted to say they were in charge,” one senior JSOC official speaking on the condition of anonymity told The Debrief.
“The military, JSOC, and other agencies, were getting it done. I can’t overstate it enough how much USDI and Reid’s group just came in and screwed things up.”
The bureaucratic ineptitude of the DoD’s evacuation process was so incredible that an ad hoc group of former U.S. special operators, aid workers, and intelligence officers with experience in Afghanistan banded together in what was dubbed “Task Force Pineapple” to save as many of their former Afghan allies as possible.
An Afghan SIV applicant who was ultimately left behind told AWA, “We are suffering the worst days of our life. I never go outside my living area. I have [not] left my home since the Taliban took over the country… I have lost my job furthermore, I cannot walk freely in the city/village because the Taliban will arrest me.”
Garry Reid during a Pentagon press briefing, August 16, 2021. (Image Source: DoD)
Unusual Problems Seem to Always Surround Reid
Since Spring of 2020, The Debrief had been investigating claims of misconduct by Reid after a current Pentagon official reached out and expressed concerns.
The individual said they knew of the past investigations, and because Reid “had friends in high places,” they had little faith in the DoD’s formal oversight channels. Hence their decision to turn to the media.
In examining the claims against Reid, The Debrief reached out and spoke with numerous current and former Pentagon and Intelligence officials who had either worked with or were familiar with Reid over the following nearly two years.
Of these individuals, the only remotely favorable evaluation was from one former Senior Advisor who said they “knew about rumors” of past misdeeds, including the alleged affair with Employee 1, but their interactions with Reid were always generally good.
The remaining persons The Debrief spoke with painted a picture of an arrogant and spiteful senior public official, who some seemed afraid of due to his significant power in the DoD’s security and law enforcement apparatus.
Being judicious in our investigation and not mischaracterizing someone based merely on others’ subjective opinions, The Debrief attempted to further evaluate several individuals’ claims about Reid.
On May 18, 2020, The Debrief filed a Freedom of Information Act Request for copies of various communication records, including all of Reid’s emails, calendar invites, real-time communications on government cell phones, Blackberry devices, or messages using SameTime or similar computer-based real-time messaging.
On July 27, 2020, The Debrief was informed by OSD’s FOIA Office that OUSD(I&S) had replied that our “request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and does not reasonably describe the documents being processed. Further, based on the scope and terms of your request, the component is not able to reasonably suggest an appropriate, more narrow search/request.”
The Debrief was informed it had until the close of business on July 7 to clarify the scope of our request, or the matter would be closed. The cutoff date was twenty days before we were ever initially asked to clarify the request.
OUSD(I&S) ‘s claim that the original FOIA request was “overly broad” was odd. Initially, The Debrief’s legal counsel had drafted a 19-page FOIA request that explicitly indicated what records were sought and exactly where these items could be located.
Adding to the confusion, on the same day The Debrief had filed a FOIA request for Reid’s communications, it had made identical requests regarding two other senior DoD officials, one of whom worked in OUSD(I&S) for Reid. The two other exact requests were being processed. Only the one for Reid had faced problems.
When reminded of this, OSD’s FOIA Office told The Debrief to disregard the previous concern, and the records request was now being processed.
For more than a year, The Debrief didn’t hear anything until October 19, 2021, when OSD’s FOIA Office sent the exact same response that OUSD(I&S) claimed our response was “overly broad.”
Ultimately, it is unknown why repeated problems have arisen in seeking copies of records pertaining to Garry Reid. The other two identical requests have continued to be processed without issue.
At the time of his dismissal, The Debrief was engaged in legal efforts to facilitate the release of Reid’s communication records.
(Image Source: DoD)
“It’s a HUGE Deal”
The ultimate reason for Garry Reid’s dismissal from his responsibilities at the DoD remains unknown.
When The Debrief reached out to Public Affairs to clarify if Reid had been reassigned, suspended, voluntarily resigned or was terminated, the Department of Defense declined to comment. Seven current Defense officials, however, confirmed to The Debrief that Reid is no longer in his position and his Deputy, Tara Jones is currently serving as acting Director of Defense Intelligence.
Current and former Defense officials familiar with the situation said the official claimed reason for Reid’s ousting remains a mystery to them as well. However, out of the Officials who spoke with The Debrief, all universally said it was likely from a combination of factors and that investigation into Lue Elizondo’s formal complaint by the IG Office likely uncovered all sorts of nasty skeletons.
“Although I cannot confirm what ultimately led to his termination, I can surmise that it was caused, in part, by information contained in my IG complaint,” Elizondo told The Debrief.
When asked how they felt on hearing the news, officials The Debrief spoke with said that Reid’s departure as Director of Defense Intelligence was long overdue. Many also expressed surprise at his ousting.
“The guy was part of the system for a very long time. To fire him is no joke!” said one former Defense official. Another current senior Pentagon advisor said, “The guy ran all counterintelligence, security and law enforcement for the entire DoD, worldwide. This is a huge deal!”
Some who had known Reid for years expressed disappointment in the overall situation. Prior to going to work in the Pentagon in 2007, Reid had served nearly 30 years in U.S. Army Special Operations, including as the Command Sergeant Major. By all accounts, even those who spoke poorly of Reid’s Pentagon behavior, said he had been a respected member of the Special Operations community. “He just lost his way when he got to the Pentagon,” said one long-time JSOC official.
Assuming past allegations of misconduct and Pentagon Official’s descriptions of his behavior are any indication, Reid’s fall from grace will likely have an immediate positive impact on OUSD(I&S).
When it comes to former Pentagon officials turned advocates for formal scrutiny of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, they say Reid’s departure will have a significant positive impact on Government’s investigations into UAP.
“It’s a really big deal,” said Elizondo. “He was one of the biggest obstacles to the DoD’s investigations and public transparency of unidentified aerial phenomena.”
Given that he was on the receiving end of Reid’s ire for several years, The Debrief asked Elizondo how he felt about Reid’s removal as Director of Defense Intelligence.
“While I profoundly respect his past military service to our country, obviously in his later career, he forgot his promise to the American people,” Elizondo said.
“This action by the Department is significant and should be taken as a warning to others in the Department who continue to obfuscate the UAP topic and deny our previous efforts and findings in the AATIP program as they relate to a legitimate potential threat to the National Security of the United States,” Elizondo added.
Before publication, The Debrief sent several unanswered requests to Reid for comment.
“As I indicated before, those involved in the purposeful and deliberate obfuscation of the truth will be held accountable,” added Elizondo.
“We are now seeing this process in action.”
(Correction: An earlier version reported Reid was formerly the Command Sergeant Major for the Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment, “Delta Force.” While it is confirmed he was a Command Sergeant Major in U.S. Army Special Operations, subsequent questions arose regarding whether this was with “Delta Force.” The Debrief has amended the article until this can be further verified. Additionally, it was incorrectly reported that “Employee 1” had left OUSDI for a position within the newly formed Defense Counterintelligence & Security Agency (DCSA). This should have been attributed to “Employed 2” from the DoD IG’s 2019-2020 investigation. )
Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing covers defense, national security, and the Intelligence Community. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan. Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
