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Quotes of the Day:
“At least once every human should have to run for his life, to teach him that milk does not come from supermarkets, that safety does not come from policeman, that ‘news’ is not something that happens to other people. He might learn how his ancestors lived, and that he himself is no different – in the crunch his life depends on his agility, alertness, and personal resourcefulness.
- Robert Heinlein
“There is no greatness where there is no simplicity, goodness, and truth.”
- Leo Tolstoy
“Madness is something rare in individuals – but in groups, parties, peoples, and ages, it is the rule.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche
1. An organizational road map for Pentagon to deter China, win in Ukraine
2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023
3. How Gamers Eclipsed Spies as an Intelligence Threat
4. Taiwan: No Way Out By Bing West
5. NYT military journalist rips his employer after exposing leaker: We would have protected him If he came to us
6. Ukrainian special operations soldiers already using U.S.-made Black Hawk helicopter in combat
7. China launches weather satellite, flights avoid no-fly zone to north of Taiwan
8. War would bring disaster to China too, Taiwan presidential contender says
9. The military loved Discord for Gen Z recruiting. Then the leaks began.
10. US guns for more accurate, lethal and survivable nukes
11. 2 Years of Turmoil: Myanmar’s Grinding Stalemate
12. ARSOF Leaders Discuss Innovation with Industry and Academia in Boston
13. Is there a worldwide run on the Bank of the United States of America?
14. Pentagon intelligence breach renews scrutiny over clearances
15. Australia to host largest-ever Exercise Talisman Sabre
16. On this Day, 16 April 1987, USSOCOM was Established
17. Report: How Chinese are funding terrorist groups to gain access to mineral reserves in Nigeria
1. An organizational road map for Pentagon to deter China, win in Ukraine
An excellent article for reflection and critique. I think it is difficult for anyone to counter this assessment. Some important food for thought here.
Two points here. We need to improve our innovation. But also where we do innovate China uses what one of my former National War College students described as the PRC R&D approach; "steal to leap ahead." And it is not just technology, but ideas and concepts as well. (I have sometimes wondered if we could conduct a major deception program by publicly developing concepts that CHina would steal but that would never work and would in fact cause harm to the PLA when they try to implement them. We could develop a whole set of doctrine and concepts that the PLA would try to incorporate and it would end up causing failure in operations and combat. But that is a fantasy, I know).
Excerpts:
Copying Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s 2015 strategy, China has been engaged in civil-military fusion that employs a whole-of-government, coordinated effort to harness disruptive commercial technologies for its national security needs. To fuel the development of technologies critical for defense, China has tapped into $900 billion of private capital in civil-military guidance (investment) funds and has taken public, state-owned enterprises to fund their new shipyards, aircraft and avionics. Worse, China will learn from and apply the lessons from Russia’s failures in Ukraine.
But unlike America’s arch strategic rival, the U.S. has been unwilling and unable to adapt and adopt new models of systems — attritable systems, autonomous systems, swarms, and other new, emerging defense platforms — and operational concepts — ones that threaten but look beyond legacy systems as well as incumbent vendors, organizations and cultures — at the speed of our adversaries.
An organizational road map for Pentagon to deter China, win in Ukraine
By Joe Felter, Pete Newell and Steve Blank
Defense News · by Joe Felter · April 13, 2023
Today, the U.S. is supporting a proxy war with Russia while attempting to deter a China cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Both are wake-up calls that victory and deterrence in modern war will be determined by a state’s ability to simultaneously use traditional weapons systems and rapidly acquire, deploy and integrate commercial technologies (drones, satellites, targeting software, etc.) into operations at every level.
Ukraine’s military is not burdened with the U.S. Defense Department’s decades-old acquisition process and 20th century operational concepts. It is learning and adapting on the fly.
China has made the leap to a whole-of-nation approach. This has allowed the People’s Liberation Army to integrate private capital and commercial technology and use them as a force multiplier to dominate the South China Sea and prepare for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan.
The DoD has not done either of these. It is currently organized and oriented to acquire traditional weapons systems and execute operational concepts with its traditional vendors and research centers, and it is woefully unprepared to integrate commercial technologies and private capital at scale.
Copying Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s 2015 strategy, China has been engaged in civil-military fusion that employs a whole-of-government, coordinated effort to harness disruptive commercial technologies for its national security needs. To fuel the development of technologies critical for defense, China has tapped into $900 billion of private capital in civil-military guidance (investment) funds and has taken public, state-owned enterprises to fund their new shipyards, aircraft and avionics. Worse, China will learn from and apply the lessons from Russia’s failures in Ukraine.
But unlike America’s arch strategic rival, the U.S. has been unwilling and unable to adapt and adopt new models of systems — attritable systems, autonomous systems, swarms, and other new, emerging defense platforms — and operational concepts — ones that threaten but look beyond legacy systems as well as incumbent vendors, organizations and cultures — at the speed of our adversaries.
Concept art from the Air Force Research Laboratory shows a drone swarm that the service could potentially use. (U.S. Air Force)
Viewing the DoD budget as a zero-sum game has turned the major defense primes and K Street lobbyists into saboteurs for DoD organizational innovation that threaten their business models. Using private capital could be a force multiplier by adding hundreds of billions of dollars outside the DoD budget. The U.S. is on a collision course to experience catastrophic failure in a future conflict because of it. Only Congress can alter this equation.
For the U.S. to deter and prevail against China, the DoD must create both a strategy and a redesigned organization to embrace those untapped external resources — private capital and commercial innovation.
A reorganized and refocused DoD could acquire traditional weapons systems while simultaneously rapidly acquiring, deploying and integrating commercial technologies. It would create a national industrial policy that incentivizes the development of 21st century shipyards, drone and satellite factories, and a new industrial base along the lines of the CHIPS and the Innovation and Competition acts.
Congress must act to identify and implement changes. These include:
- Creating a new defense ecosystem that uses the external commercial innovation ecosystem and private capital as a force multiplier. Leverage the expertise of prime contractors as integrators of advanced technology and complex systems, refocus federally funded research and development centers on areas not covered by commercial tech.
- Reorganizing DoD research and engineering. Allocate its budget and resources equally between traditional sources of innovation and new commercial sources of innovation and capital. Split the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s research and engineering organization in half: Keep the current organization focused on the status quo; and create a peer organization, the “Under Secretary of Defense for Commercial Innovation and Private Capital.”
- Scaling up the new Office of Strategic Capital and the Defense Innovation Unit to be the lead agencies in this new organization. Give them the budget and authority to do so, and provide the services the means to do the same.
- Reorganizing DoD acquisition and sustainment. Allocate its budget and resources equally between traditional sources of production and the creation of new ones from 21st century arsenals — new shipyards, drone manufacturers, etc. — that can make thousands of low-cost, attritable systems.
- Coordinating with allies. Expand the national security innovation base to an allied security innovation base. Source commercial technology from allies.
National power is ephemeral. Nations decline when they lose allies, economic power or interest in global affairs, or when they experience internal or civil conflicts, or miss disruptive technology transitions and new operational concepts.
The case can be made that these are happening to the U.S.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is a precedent for Congress reorganizing the DoD. It created the combatant commands. Today, Congress must view the conflict in Ukraine and China’s actions in the South China Sea as a call for action. We urge it to establish a commission to determine what reforms and changes are needed to ensure the U.S. can fight and win our future wars.
While parts of the DoD understand we’re in a crisis, the DoD as a whole shows little urgency and misses a crucial point: China will not defer solving the Taiwan issue on our schedule. Russia will not defer its future plans for aggression to meet our dates. We need to act now.
We fail to do so at our peril and the peril of all those who depend on U.S. security to survive.
Joe Felter and Steve Blank are co-founders of Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Pete Newell, former director of the U.S. Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, is the CEO of advisory firm BMNT.
2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2023
Key Takeaways
- Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate.
- Certain Russian players in the information space have also misinterpreted Prigozhin’s essay, further exposing fissures between some Russian milbloggers.
- The Russian information space is reckoning with demographic transitions within Russia in a way that indicates that the nationalist ideologies underpinning the war in Ukraine will continue to have reverberating domestic impacts.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party announced its intention to recruit Russian military personnel who have served in Ukraine as candidates for elections in 2023 and 2024, likely in an effort to establish itself as the definitive pro-war party in Russia.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna and may be preparing to defend territory in the Kupyansk direction.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
- Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
- A Russian opposition news source reported that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
- The Russian State Security Service (FSB) is likely involved in efforts to target Ukrainian youth in occupied territories for law enforcement and counter-partisan purposes.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 15, 2023
Apr 15, 2023 - Press ISW
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023
George Barros, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 15, 5pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate.[1] Some Western reports covering Prigozhin’s April 14 essay on a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive and the future of the war miscontextualized a rhetorical statement in which Prigozhin established a strawman argument he attributed to Russia’s “internal enemies” who seek to rationalize Russia ending the war in Ukraine now.[2] The point of his essay was to attack this strawman, not to advance it. Prigozhin actually called on Russia to commit to a decisive fight that will either defeat Ukraine or result in a temporary Russian defeat that will catalyze Russia’s nationalist rebirth and set conditions for future victory.[3] A full reading of Prigozhin‘s essay, titled, “Only an Honest Fight: No Negotiations,” does not lend itself to any reasonable interpretation that Prigozhin advocated for an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Reading Prigozhin‘s public communications is not a straightforward undertaking. Much of the nuance included in Prigozhin’s speech is lost when translating Russian to English. Prigozhin has an idiosyncratic rhetorical and writing style that relies heavily on deadpan sarcasm, selective ambiguity, aphorisms, vulgarity, and ironic slang. Prigozhin’s isolated quotes separated from the full context of his messages often lose their initial meaning.
Certain Russian players in the information space have also misinterpreted Prigozhin’s essay, further exposing fissures between some Russian milbloggers. Pro-Kremlin news aggregator Readovka noted on April 15 that some unspecified Russian-language Telegram channels – like some Western media – simply repeated Prigozhin’s strawman argument about the seduction of settling for negotiations without “reading any further” into Prigozhin’s call for a protracted struggle.[4] Readovka endorsed Prigozhin’s actual argument that the “uncomfortable truth” is that Russia must continue to fight, concurring that negotiations to end the war would “do more harm than good.”[5] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin – an enemy of Prigozhin – leaned into the misinterpretation of Prigozhin’s essay (possibly on purpose) as part of their ongoing blogging feud. Girkin sarcastically asked, “Do I understand correctly that the Black Clown [Prigozhin] called for the Russian Federation to reject half of the Donetsk People’s Republic and a third of Zaporizhia Oblast...?”[6] Girkin also implied that that Russian prosecutors should investigate Prigozhin for his essay, likely for discrediting the Russian “special military operation,” given that the strawman argument advocates that Russia should simply retain only territory it currently occupies in Ukraine.[7] Prigozhin’s essay may continue to fuel debate along existing cleavages in the Russian information space where Prigozhin’s supporters and competitors may use selective readings of the essay to either praise or malign Prigozhin while advancing their own arguments.
The Russian information space is reckoning with demographic transitions within Russia in a way that indicates that the nationalist ideologies underpinning the war in Ukraine will continue to have reverberating domestic impacts. Russian outlet RBC reported on April 13 that a study published by the Russian New Economic Association found that an increase in the number of migrants from 390,000 to 1.1 million annually would help stabilize Russia’s population, which is in decline due to domestic levels of fertility and life expectancy as well as population outflow.[8] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrey Medvedev responded to the study and accused “lobbyists” of advocating for uncontrolled migration from Central Asia, which Medvedev claimed will bring more violence and extremism to Russia at great social and economic cost.[9] Medvedev called instead for a new law on the repatriation of ethnic Russians from all over the world in order to stabilize demographic shifts and save them from “Russophobia” abroad.[10] Russian State Duma Deputy for Defense Dmitry Kuznetsov relatedly reported on April 15 that Voronezh Oblast may begin a pilot program on the social integration of refugees and noted that this program is intended for pro-Russian refugees who left Ukraine for Russia.[11] Kuznetsov’s proposed bill underlines the same brand of staunch nationalism that Medvedev is advocating for and seeks to uphold and codify a sense of exceptionalism for ethnic Russians in Russian at the expense of all ethnic minority populations. The war in Ukraine has had, and will continue to have, substantial population and demographic impacts within Russia.[12] These impacts will leave the door open for the continued weaponization of intensely nationalist rhetoric as the war continues to empower the most staunchly xenophobic (and vocal) factions of Russian society.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party intends to recruit Russian military personnel who have served in Ukraine as candidates for elections in 2023 and 2024, likely in an effort to establish itself as the definitive pro-war party in Russia. United Russia Central Executive Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin announced on April 14 that the Young Guard of United Russia (United Russia’s youth wing) launched an educational module about participating in primaries for Russian military personnel and volunteers who have fought in Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.[13] Sidyakin reportedly stated that Russian military personnel and volunteers will be on United Russia candidate lists for upcoming regional elections in September 2023.[14] The United Russia party is currently nominating candidates for primaries until April 27, and primaries will run from May 22 to 28.[15] Young Guard of United Russia Chairman Anton Demidov reportedly stated on April 14 that Russian military personnel and volunteers will become the main speakers of the party during Russia’s 2024 presidential election.[16]
The recruitment of military personnel as political candidates during a time of war is typical for a society that holds elections, regardless of the fairness or significance of those elections. The Kremlin likely intends to recruit military personnel as candidates to a greater extent than is usual even for a war time country, however. The Kremlin likely aims to use candidates who have served in Ukraine as the public face of the United Russia party in upcoming elections to court the support of military constituents and their family members and to establish United Russia as the definitive political party for the pro-war movement. The potential “militarization” of the United Russia party likely does not presage a Kremlin effort to escalate the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely aiming to co-opt military personnel to support its ongoing effort to curry favor with the pro-war Russian ultranationalist community without fulfilling the community’s extreme demands.
Key Takeaways
- Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate.
- Certain Russian players in the information space have also misinterpreted Prigozhin’s essay, further exposing fissures between some Russian milbloggers.
- The Russian information space is reckoning with demographic transitions within Russia in a way that indicates that the nationalist ideologies underpinning the war in Ukraine will continue to have reverberating domestic impacts.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party announced its intention to recruit Russian military personnel who have served in Ukraine as candidates for elections in 2023 and 2024, likely in an effort to establish itself as the definitive pro-war party in Russia.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna and may be preparing to defend territory in the Kupyansk direction.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
- Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
- A Russian opposition news source reported that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
- The Russian State Security Service (FSB) is likely involved in efforts to target Ukrainian youth in occupied territories for law enforcement and counter-partisan purposes.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on April 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made limited advances north from Zolotarivka toward Bilohorivka.[18] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Regional State Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported that the most active fighting is occurring in the Kreminna forests in the Bilohorivka direction and that the frontline remains unchanged except in the Bilohorivka direction.[19] Footage published on April 15 purportedly shows the 6th Cossack Regiment of the 2nd Luhansk Army Corps operating near Bilohorivka.[20] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed an unspecified number of new T-90 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[21] Geolocated footage published on April 14 shows the Russian “Storm” detachment operating near Kreminna.[22]
Russian forces may be preparing to defend territory in the Kupyansk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces mined areas of four unspecified settlements in the Kupyansk direction, suggesting that Russian troops may be preparing for defensive actions in this area.[23]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on April 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that heavy battles continued in Bakhmut and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut).[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner Group assault detachments captured two unspecified blocks on the northern and southern outskirts of the city.[25] Russian sources claimed on April 14 and 15 that Wagner fighters captured the Bakhmut-2 railway station and that most Ukrainian forces withdrew from the area, although ISW has not yet seen visual confirmation of either claim.[26] Russian sources claimed that Wagner fighters have crossed unspecified sections of the railway line in central Bakhmut.[27] One Russian milblogger claimed that heavy fighting was ongoing near Vyzolyetliv Donbasu Street in western Bakhmut, although other available Russian reporting and the observed rate of Russian advances in the city indicate that the claim is likely an exaggeration.[28] Russian milbloggers who claim to be reporting from within Bakhmut reported that Russian forces are using T-90 tanks within Bakhmut itself, suggesting that Wagner has access to these modern tanks for its assault on the city.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack in the direction of Pryvillia (18km northwest of Bakhmut along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway).[30]
Russian discussions about Russian airborne forces (VDV) protecting Wagner’s flanks may imply that the Russian command views the Bakhmut front to be larger than just the immediate Bakhmut area. A Russian milblogger allegedly reporting from within Bakhmut claimed on April 14 that elements of the 106th VDV Division are holding Wagner’s flank near Yakovlivka (17km northeast of Bakhmut).[31] The VDV’s alleged presence near Yakovlivka suggests that Russian discussions about VDV units protecting Wagner’s southern and northern flanks encompass both the large Russian salient north of Bakhmut from Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) to Yakovlivka and the Russian salient south of Bakhmut from areas south of the T0504 highway to Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut). The milblogger’s claim suggests that VDV units are not necessarily focused on directly aiding Wagner attempts to encircle and capture Bakhmut and are likely deployed to the area to prevent possible Ukrainian counterattacks along a wider axis. Russian milbloggers continue to express concerns about a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novokalynove (13km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne (8km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed on April 14 that Russian forces occupied Ukrainian positions west of Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) along the H-20 highway.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka) and Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka), as well as in western Marinka.[36] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control all the high-rise buildings in Marinka, although fighting in Marinka has largely leveled the city and it is unclear how useful these supposed positions will be for further Russian attempts to capture the settlement.[37]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) on April 15. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 14 and 15 that Russian forces resumed assaults near Vuhledar and advanced near Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff, however, reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in this direction.[39]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine on April 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops continued defensive actions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that there have been no changes in the condition, composition, or position of Russian forces on this front.[40] Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces constructed trenches along the northern coast of occupied Crimea near Chornomorske between March 5 and April 14.[41] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in southern Ukraine on April 15.[42]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[43] The decree states that the LNR spring conscription cycle will align with the Russian spring conscription cycle, running from April 1 to July 15.[44] It is unclear how LNR authorities plan to build conscription apparatuses, send summonses, and implement conscription considering that the conscription cycle has already been ongoing for over two weeks. It is also unclear where these conscripts will serve, as Russian authorities have denied that other conscripts will fight in the war in Ukraine.[45] Pasechnik’s announcement directly contradicts Duma Defense Committee Chair Andrei Kartapolov’s March 30 claim that conscription will not occur in occupied Ukraine, highlighting the lack of coordination and consistent planning among Russian government organs and the exclusion of legal authorities from decision-making processes.[46]
Russian occupation authorities may be preparing to intensify mobilization efforts in occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) instructed raion-level occupation administrations to transfer lists of Russian passport holders to local military registration and enlistment offices by April 18.[47] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on April 15 that Russian authorities will add residents of occupied territories to the digital registry of Russians liable for military service.[48] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law authorizing the registry’s creation on April 14.[49] ISW previously assessed that this registry will enhance Russian authorities’ ability to crack down on mobilization evaders.[50]
Russian Department of Organization and Mobilization head Colonel Andrey Biryukov asserted on April 15 that Russian conscription is going according to plan and is set to be complete by July 15. Biryukov stated that the first wave of conscripts will deploy to permanent deployment points within Russia on April 20. Biryukov claimed that 52,000 citizens have received conscription notifications and that over 50,000 citizens have already arrived at military recruitment centers – 21,000 of whom will serve while 29,000 have received legal deferrals.[51] ISW continues to assess that Russia will not commit Russian conscripts to Ukraine in the foreseeable future.[52]
Russian authorities continue to create new military formations and use all available methods to increase and expedite military recruitment.[53] A regional branch of Radio Liberty reported that the Astrakhan Oblast military registration and enlistment office began to form the new, contract-based ”Lotos” subdivision on April 15.[54]
Endemic corruption poses an enduring challenge to Russian force generation efforts. Russian authorities sentenced Chechen military warehouse chief Ivan Popov to 1.5 years in prison on March 9 for embezzlement. Popov reportedly stole and resold 12.5 million rubles (about $153,250) worth of ammunition and specialized uniforms/gear between December 2021 and June 23, 2022.[55]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
The Russian State Security Service (FSB) is likely involved in efforts to target Ukrainian youth in occupied territories for law enforcement and counter-partisan purposes. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov held a meeting with the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) on April 11 to “improve the prevention of terrorism in the field of education and the youth environment.”[56] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov also attended the meeting, where participants discussed how to implement programs to counter extremist sentiments among youth, including in occupied areas of Ukraine.[57] The NAC meeting suggests that the FSB is likely directly involved in shaping youth policy in occupied areas to reflect a law enforcement and counterterrorism focus, which essentially serves as a method of militarizing youth in occupied areas. The FSB may also be attempting to recruit young Ukrainians as agents in the event that Russia loses control of some occupied territory. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky similarly noted on April 15 that the Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs is overseeing the development of a large-scale educational program called “Generation of the South” in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast that will focus on “creative and patriotic work.”[58] Russian occupation authorities will likely continue efforts to target youth in occupied Ukraine in order to expand social control of occupied areas.
Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Sergey Kiriyenko visited occupied Donetsk Oblast on April 15 to highlight purported developments in the oblast. Kiriyenko and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin visited Mariupol and discussed medicine prices, claiming that there are no existing issues with medicine supply in the city.[59] Pushilin and Kiriyenko also met with Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov and DNR Minister of Education Olga Koludarova to discuss education and children’s issues in occupied Donetsk Oblast as well as the implementation of the United State Exam that is required for entrance into Russian universities.[60] Kiriyenko stated that more children from occupied areas should be able to ”improve their health” and “rest” in Russian regions during summer vacation, setting conditions for additional deportation of Ukrainian children from Donetsk Oblast under the guise of “rest and rehabilitation” schemes.[61]
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 14 that officially switched occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to Moscow time.[62]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.
Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Vitebsk-based 103rd Airborne Brigade completed unspecified brigade tactical exercises at the Losvido Training Ground in Vitebsk, Belarus, on April 15.[63]
Belarusian engineering elements conducted exercises to cross water obstacles in Belarus. A pontoon-bridge company and other engineering elements of the Belarusian 30th Railway Brigade constructed a river crossing near Beshenkovichi, Vitebsk Oblast, on April 15.[64] A bridging battalion of the Belarusian 36th Road and Bridge Brigade established a pontoon bridge over a river (likely the Berezina River) near Vialikaje Stachava, Minsk Oblast, on April 15.[65]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...; https://www.newsweek.com/wagner-founder-urges-putin-end-special-military...; https://www.thedailybeast.com/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-claims-russi...; https://news.yahoo.com/wagner-group-leader-calls-putin-190000516.html?gu...; https://apple.news/AWXaXBuX0RyCrjwTUF9wfaA
[2] https://telegra dot ph/Tolko-chestnyj-boj-nikakogo-dogovornyaka-04-14
[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[4] https://t.me/readovkaru/3046
[5] https://t.me/readovkaru/3046
[6] https://t.me/strelkovii/4546
[7] https://t.me/strelkovii/4546
[8] https://www.rbc.ru/economics/13/04/2023/64368b0a9a7947a647a61a2c?from=ne...
[9] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13705
[10] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13705
[11] https://russian.rt dot com/russia/article/1136199-gosduma-bezhency-iniciativa-voronezh
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011323
[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/17524591
[14] https://t.me/kommersant/49762
[15] https://tass dot ru/politika/17524591
[16] https://t.me/kommersant/49762
[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy...
[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20338; https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?hl=ru&mid=1-_VTAZcilRrdZyF_05J8Amjb...
[19] https://www.unian dot ua/war/rosiyani-vpritul-nablizilis-do-bilogorivki-rva-12219615.html; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1647136946978803713
[20] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20437
[21] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9871
[22] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1647217342277988352; https://t.me/voenacher/42922
[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt...
[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy...
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/25665
[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56876 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1778 ; https://t.me/rybar/45814
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56876 ;
[28] https://t.me/basurin_e/762
[29] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27490.5/4748873/ ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15538
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945
[31] https://t.me/epoddubny/15538
[32] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11296 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15538
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy...
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945
[35] https://t.me/rybar/45814
[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36343
[37] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36343
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/11945 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46796
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy...
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy... https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02fgxtNuyLqs...
[41] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1646996764128608257?s=20
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iVMuWjoUbu4NLdoczQy... https://t.me/mod_russia/25665; https://t.me/basurin_e/762; https://t.me/hueviy_kherson/311; https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1647236356249120768 ; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1647257066510376960; https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1647236356249120768 ; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1647257066510376960; https://t.me/rusich_army/8392 ; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1646971388689895440; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18258; https://t.me/rybar/45813
[43] https://lug-info dot com/documents/ukaz-glavy-lnr-o-merah-po-obespecheniyu-prizyva-grazhdan-1996-2005-godov-rozhdeniya-na-voennuyu-sluzhbu-v-luganskoj-narodnoj-respublike-v-2023-godu; https://www.sovsekretno dot ru/news/v-lnr-proydyet-vesenniy-prizyv-vopreki-zayavleniyam-glavy-komiteta-gosdumy-po-oborone/; https://t.me/astrapress/24984; https://lnr-news dot ru/society/2023/04/14/167535.html; https://xn--80aafc4bdoy dot xn--p1ai/documents/bank/Ukaz_Glavi_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_%22Ob_utverzhdenii_Pravil_raspredeleniya_tarifnoi_kvoti_na_vivoz_s_territorii_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_za_predeli_territorii_Rossiiskoi_Federatsii_v_gosudarstva,_ne_yavlyayushchiesya_chlenami_Yevraziiskogo_ekonomicheskogo_soyuza,_pshenitsi_i_meslina_(kodi_1001_19_000_0,_______________________________________________________1001_99_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_yachmenya_(kod_1003_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_kukuruzi_(kod_1005_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_soevikh_bobov_(kod_1201_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_semyan_rapsa_______________________________________________________(kod_1205_10_900_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_dekabrya_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_semyan_podsolnechnika_(kod_1206_00_990_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_masla_podsolnechnogo_(kodi_1512_11_910_1,_1512_11_910_9,_1512_19_900_2,________________1512_19_900_9,_1517_90_910_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_podsolnechnogo_shrota_____________________________________________(kod_2306_30_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_avgusta_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_pomeshchaemikh_pod_tamozhennuyu_protseduru_eksporta%22?id=1242
[44] https://t.me/astrapress/24984
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...;
[46] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/kartapolov-prizyvnikov-ne-napravyat-sluzhit-v-novye-subekty-rf?ysclid=lfuu925mnd764589320; https://t.me/astrapress/24984
[47] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/04/15/rosiyany-planuyut-mobilizovuvaty-kolaborantiv-na-tot/
[48] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1725
[49] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11106; https://t.me/severrealii/16091; https://t.me/bazabazon/16951; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202304140051?index=55&rangeSize=1; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/14/putin-podpisal-zakon-ob-elektronnyh-povestkah-i-ogranicheniyah-dlya-uklonistov
[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/25660
[52] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[53]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VH2qUAHexbmSk27jJt...
[54] https://t.me/idelrealii/26640
[55] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11121; https://kartoteka dot io/news/35647-nachaljnik_veshchevogo_sklada_vojskovoj_chasti_v_hankale_ivan_popov_ukral_i_prodal_spetsodehdy_i_amunitsii_na_126_mln; https://t.me/vchkogpu/37805
[56] http://nac.gov dot ru/nak-prinimaet-resheniya/predsedatel-nacionalnogo-antiterroristicheskogo-komiteta.html
[57] http://nac.gov dot ru/nak-prinimaet-resheniya/predsedatel-nacionalnogo-antiterroristicheskogo-komiteta.html
[58] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/984
[59]https://t.me/pushilindenis/3322 ; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3323
[60] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3322
[61] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3324
[62] https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/5227464/; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11064; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82945
[63] https://t.me/voentv_by/3718; https://t.me/modmilby/25798
[64] https://t.me/modmilby/25782
[65] https://t.me/modmilby/25816
Tags
Ukraine Project
File Attachments:
DraftUkraineCoTApril15,2023.png
Kharkiv Battle Map Draft April 15,2023 .png
Donetsk Battle Map Draft April 15,2023.png
Bakhmut Battle Map Draft April 15,2023.png
Zaporizhia Battle Map Draft April 15,2023.png
Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 15,2023.png
3. How Gamers Eclipsed Spies as an Intelligence Threat
And here is something else we need to follow: China has been investing in the gaming industry and is beginning to play a dominant role in the industry. This is where the young people of the world reside. China wants to infuse games with subtle pro-China narratives to exert long term influence over the younger generations. And as this article notes it is a platform for intelligence operations.
Excerpts:
The fusion of intelligence operations and internet culture, long a theme of cyberpunk science fiction, is fast becoming reality. In a world where niche video game influencers moonlight as informants, FBI agents trawl K-Pop Discord servers for potential leakers, and AI-generated girlfriends operated by foreign intelligence agencies target lonely analysts, the future of counterintelligence will be digitally native. The world of spy catchers will look less like John le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and more like Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash or Charles Stross’s Halting State. As Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins put it: “Sometimes it takes the terminally online to catch the terminally online.”
How Gamers Eclipsed Spies as an Intelligence Threat
The latest leak has profound implications for counterintelligence.
By Jonathan Askonas, an assistant professor of politics at the Catholic University of America, and Renée DiResta, a technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory.
Foreign Policy · by Jonathan Askonas, Renée DiResta · April 15, 2023
The recent leaks of classified U.S. military documents on the Russian-Ukrainian war count among the worst Western intelligence failures in recent history. Veteran intelligence officials, however, are shocked for a different reason: The particular way the top-secret documents spread—and the apparent motivation for the leaker. The information was not disclosed to a foreign intelligence agency or sympathetic media outlet but posted to an online gaming chat server dedicated to memes, video games, and internet camaraderie. The leak had nothing to do with traditional espionage or hacktivism but appears to have been motivated by clout-chasing on an obscure internet forum.
The likely motivations of the leaker—on Friday, prosecutors charged Airman First Class Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old working in the intelligence wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, with two violations of the Espionage Act—are impossible to understand without digging into the deepest layers of internet culture. This leak is not a strange one-off but a harbinger of a future where secret statecraft meets an online world in which, for many people, the virtual is replacing the physical as a source of companionship, camaraderie, and social clout. This online world is fast replacing traditional espionage as a source of intelligence leaks—a shift that has profound implications for the future of spycraft, especially counterintelligence.
The leaked documents—containing, among other things, highly classified assessments of Russian and Ukrainian losses, information on some 100 Western special operations troops deployed in Ukraine, and information on arms deals between foreign countries—made their way across an archipelago of niche servers on Discord, a platform for private online communities that particularly attracts video games enthusiasts. They began their journey on Thug Shaker Central, a Discord server moderated by Teixeira dedicated to military-themed video games, cool guns, and other shared interests. His group of 20-odd members had previously broken away from a larger server dedicated to a popular military YouTube influencer with the pseudonym Oxide.
From there, the documents hopped to a forum for fans of YouTuber wow_mao, and to another online forum called Minecraft Earth Map, where they were used by an anonymous user to own an opponent in an online argument about the war in Ukraine. Other users then took the documents out of the Discord realm, spreading them to other hubs of the chronically online. These forums included 4chan—the anonymous message board notorious for intentionally shocking photos, cyberpranks, and viral memes—as well as pro-Russian channels on Telegram.
This slow creep took several months—the opposite of a viral, targeted intelligence leak. Teixeira, under his username OG (short for “original gangster,” internet slang for “old-school”), seems to have dropped documents into Thug Shaker Central at a steady clip. But only after three months or more did the classified documents finally come to the attention of Western media outlets and bewildered intelligence agencies. In the early days of OG’s posting, his chat companions on Thug Shaker Central kept his spilled secrets among themselves.
While the trajectory of the documents may seem novel, a closer look reveals that many significant intelligence leaks over the past 15 years have been substantially motivated by online reality. These leaks are not the product of espionage, media investigations, or political activism, but 21st-century digital culture: specifically, by the desire to gain stature among online friends.
Beginning in 2021, for example, secret information about weapons systems design and performance has repeatedly been posted to forums related to War Thunder, a massively multiplayer combat video game featuring highly realistic weapons. Hoping to win arguments about such details as a tank turret’s rotation speed or cajole developers into improving the realism of virtual weapons, players have posted classified armor blueprints, restricted manuals for F-16 fighter jets, and Chinese tank specifications. War Thunder’s developers have had to implore users to stop posting classified materials to the game’s forums.
Even where ideological commitments have motivated leakers, internet culture has often played a major role. U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning’s involvement with WikiLeaks began when she started monitoring—and then actively participating in—the forum’s chat channel. Her decision to leak diplomatic cables was initially motivated by debates about Icelandic politics on the WikiLeaks channel. When one looks at Manning’s conversations with WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and others on the channel, they read very much like someone trying to connect with and impress her new internet friends; later, it was a similar desire to connect online that led to her arrest. Edward Snowden, too, attributed his decision to leak documents about National Security Agency surveillance programs to his concerns that they undermined the values he cherished as an avid denizen of early internet forums and chatrooms: anonymity, self-expression, and the right to reinvent oneself. (Snowden is now a Russian citizen living in Moscow.)
Access to classified documents, such as those shared by Teixeira, requires a government clearance. Given the potential for human frailty, the process for obtaining one has long included assessments designed to gauge whether someone might be prone to sell secrets, have an exploitable secret such as a concealed drug problem, or become entangled in a romantic relationship. Counterintelligence professionals warn of the risks of psychological manipulation by foreign agents looking to con targets into divulging information.
What drives this new kind of leak, however, is a different kind of social bond. Greasing the wheels of the globe-spanning U.S. national security system are tens of thousands of technically gifted young people—just like the 21-year-old Teixeira. By virtue of their jobs and missions, they may find themselves socially isolated, moving around, deployed abroad, or working strange hours. They can’t talk about their work with friends or family. They may also find themselves ill at ease with the work culture inside their agencies.
Instead, they may find solace, joy, and real connection where so many others of their generation do: playing video games or chatting with others on the internet who share their interests or ideas. As Manning explained, online chats with WikiLeaks volunteers “allowed me to feel connected to others even when alone. They helped me pass the time and keep motivated throughout the deployment.”
There is an additional motivation driving this new kind of leak. Internet communities operate as gift economies, where one’s status is largely determined by the valuable content one brings to the community—spicy memes, obscure videos, interesting links, or secrets. Interviews with Teixeira’s friends trace an evolution: He began by posting summaries of classified secrets he had access to, establishing himself as a person worth knowing, a real-life Jason Bourne. This earned him something of a fandom. Younger members absorbed not only the secrets he relayed but also OG’s opinions about them, which included conspiracy theories. When his fans’ attention seemed to flag, he apparently grew frustrated and began posting images of documents directly.
There seemed to be a high degree of trust and bonding within this small anonymous space. One member described the leaker as his best friend and commented that seeing the documents hop beyond Thug Shaker Central was something of a surprise—and a betrayal. Perhaps even more surprisingly, reporting by the Washington Post suggests that Teixeira was surprised, dismayed, and scared by the journey his leaks had taken—as if he had never considered the real-world consequences of his online profile-building.
In the past, when national security professionals indulged in an inner fantasy life of adventure and intrigue, it might have manifested as hints dropped at dinner parties or a pseudonymously published spy novel. Today, online reality has increasingly taken on the characteristics of a role-playing video game, as one of the authors, Jonathan Askonas, has been chronicling at the New Atlantis. The internet provides the chance to build a new identity, level up socially, show off to peers, and build a more exciting life than the physical world affords. When the players are national security professionals whose day jobs are more boring than the secrets they happen to have access to, the temptation to leak information can be powerful—to settle an online argument, gain clout, or impress one’s friends.
There are some obvious policy fixes to these new kinds of leaks. They include more sophisticated fingerprinting of classified documents and more calibrated restrictions on who has access to secret reports. But intelligence officials who may have found the leaks “incredibly weird” need to come to terms with how dramatically the counterintelligence landscape has changed. Already, agents associated with the Wagner Group, the Russian military contractor fighting in Ukraine, have been caught trying to infiltrate servers for the video game Minecraft. On Thursday, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced a review of the department’s procedures “to inform our efforts to prevent this kind of incident from happening again.” But adapting U.S. counterintelligence efforts to an entirely new leak culture will take much more than a few procedural tweaks.
The fusion of intelligence operations and internet culture, long a theme of cyberpunk science fiction, is fast becoming reality. In a world where niche video game influencers moonlight as informants, FBI agents trawl K-Pop Discord servers for potential leakers, and AI-generated girlfriends operated by foreign intelligence agencies target lonely analysts, the future of counterintelligence will be digitally native. The world of spy catchers will look less like John le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and more like Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash or Charles Stross’s Halting State. As Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins put it: “Sometimes it takes the terminally online to catch the terminally online.”
Foreign Policy · by Jonathan Askonas, Renée DiResta · April 15, 2023
4. Taiwan: No Way Out By Bing West
Excerpts:
Either we declare we will fight with Taiwan, and so increase the odds that Xi does not attack. Or we do nothing until Xi assembles his invasion force, and then we decide in haste. That leaves the incremental approach. The White House could gradually deploy U.S. troops ashore in Taiwan. Special Forces training teams already shuttle in and out. This fall, a Marine battalion of 800 troops could practice landing on the Pacific side of the island, far from the Taiwan Straits. In winter, an Army battalion of 1,000 soldiers could conduct an exercise, leaving behind a support element for the next exercise. Such incremental steps would avoid anything dramatic. There would be no flamboyant gesture akin to President Kennedy’s 1963 declaration — “Ich bin ein Berliner” — when the Soviet Union controlled half of that divided city. But the message is the same: America is here with you. That would put Xi on the spot. If he attacked, he would know that he must engage American forces. There is, however, no public evidence to suggest that either our military or the White House is contemplating such an approach.
In sum, there’s no way out of Taiwan. Our elected leaders are procrastinating. They are content to drift downstream, knowing there are falls ahead.
NATIONAL REVIEW
https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/04/taiwan-no-way-out/
Taiwan: No Way Out April 15, 2023
By Bing West
There is no avoiding the consequences of appeasement if China swallows it up.
In recent weeks, there has been a flurry of support for Taiwan from the U.S. House of Representatives, typified by the visit of the Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Representative Michael McCaul. If China invaded Taiwan, he said, sending U.S. forces into the fight “would be discussed by Congress and with the American people.” McCaul was hewing to the congressional Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which designates Taiwan a “Major Non-NATO Ally” but leaves ambiguous whether the U.S. would fight alongside it or instead treat it as it does Ukraine, sending arms but not entering the fight.
Chairman Xi Jinping has instructed his country’s military to “be ready by 2027” to invade Taiwan. Obviously, his preference is to achieve Taiwan’s capitulation through political maneuvers and threats. But his pledge to employ force during this decade must be taken as firm. A day after McCaul made his unremarkable remarks, China dispatched 80 military aircraft and ships into Taiwan’s littoral space and threatened to board and “inspect” commercial vessels. The Chinese general in command said this was intended as a “serious warning against the joint provocations of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and external forces.” The White House issued an infelicitous response, saying there was no reason for China to “overreact.”
Let’s have no illusions about what is at stake. Taiwan is both the linchpin and the weakest link in the security agreements and trade and military resources that make America the superpower in the vast Pacific. China already has imposed dominance in the 3.5 million square miles of the South China Sea, through which an estimated $5 trillion in goods passes each year. If China next controls Taiwan by force, then South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines will adhere to China’s rules. With China ascendant, the U.S. would retrench back to Guam and Pearl Harbor, while clinging to seaborne ties with a tepid Europe.
No longer a global superpower, America would morph into the Brazil of North America. There is no avoiding the consequences of appeasement as Taiwan is swallowed up. History may write that China was more determined than America. That is nonsense. There is no person named “History” — it is human beings who make decisions.
Who are the human beings currently making America’s history? President Biden as commander in chief has proposed a defense budget that is 2 percentage points less than the 5 percent rate of inflation. He also supports decreasing the Navy’s warships from 297 to 280. The current secretary of defense is a platitude without conviction, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is overstuffed with self-importance. Not one of the top three makes a vigorous case for increasing our military capabilities to stand up to China.
General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has said, “We’ve got three or four years to get Taiwan in a position where they will create the perception in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers that the cost exceeds the gains.” It’s preposterous to believe that tiny Taiwan (population of 24 million) by itself can deter mighty China (population of 1.4 billion). Note that Milley did not say, “We’ve got four years to get the U.S. and Taiwan into a strong position.” Yet war games and pundits suggest that, if we were to fight for Taiwan, there’s a good chance we would lose. War games can’t predict outcomes. But they do indicate that the national-security community writ large is highly uneasy about our military capabilities, while our defense budget decreases. With eyes wide open, we are lurching toward failure.
Why? We are paralyzed because our nation lacks a shared sense of will and determination. Congress should pass a mutual-defense pact with Taiwan, as we have with the Philippines. That would be the strongest measure to dissuade Xi. But as is equally true of reining in our debt, no politician can gather a consensus for such a resolution. Opponents in Congress would claim it’s a vote for World War III and quash it. For example, congressional leaders have universally condemned the Chinese app TikTok. They are proposing, as a solution, an anodyne bill authorizing the Commerce Department to apply sanctions, if necessary, against China, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. The secretary of Commerce then observed that a ban would cause Democrats to “literally lose every voter under 35, forever.” So the odds are that TikTok is not banned. Congress talks tough, and does nothing.
As the years pass with falling defense budgets, our military may counsel to avoid conflict of any size with China. When Hitler moved to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936, his military said they were not ready. Hitler reassured them that he would pull out the occupying force if the British initiated a countermove. The British military, however, told Whitehall that they were too weak to stand up to the Nazis. If Xi posed a challenge in, say, 2026, our military might respond as did the British.
We are neither increasing our martial might nor enhancing deterrence by resolving to fight alongside Taiwan. A Founding Father, James Madison, warned that Americans could not take for granted that elected officials would overcome such domestic divisions: “It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”
Where does our divisiveness lead? If Taiwan does not bow to political pressure and accede, then Xi has two broad options. The first is blockade, crippling Taiwan’s trade and altering the passage of all commercial shipping in the western Pacific. Through intimidation, Xi can accomplish this without a mighty fleet. But here’s the rub: Blockades require months to succeed. This gives the president and Congress time for debate and resolution, to include enlisting Australia, Japan, and South Korea. In 1949, Russia blockaded Berlin. It eventually had to desist because America airlifted food daily into the city. Under escorts from several nations, Taiwan can be similarly provided indefinitely. The burden would be on Xi to fire the first salvoes against the escorts. He would initiate the war by attacking U.S. and allied warships. That would lead to a reverse blockade. It would be China that could no longer export or import. As Pearl Harbor was not a sensible war option for Japan, so too a blockade is not sensible for Xi.
The second option is a full assault against Taiwan. Here again, Xi has a problem. He must mobilize and preposition thousands of aircraft and ships, a task taking more than a month. With that much warning, our military would have ample time to deploy. The critical variable becomes the interaction between the president and Congress, with our military as the principal external adviser. In the case of Ukraine, the president, knowing that Russia was going to invade, withdrew our warships from the Black Sea and withheld arms delivery to Ukraine. In the Taiwan case, regardless of the predilections of who is the president, the decision to go to war would rest with a Congress that would fully debate the issue with the White House. But even then, Congress might duck a vote on any measure that had teeth.
Either we declare we will fight with Taiwan, and so increase the odds that Xi does not attack. Or we do nothing until Xi assembles his invasion force, and then we decide in haste. That leaves the incremental approach. The White House could gradually deploy U.S. troops ashore in Taiwan. Special Forces training teams already shuttle in and out. This fall, a Marine battalion of 800 troops could practice landing on the Pacific side of the island, far from the Taiwan Straits. In winter, an Army battalion of 1,000 soldiers could conduct an exercise, leaving behind a support element for the next exercise. Such incremental steps would avoid anything dramatic. There would be no flamboyant gesture akin to President Kennedy’s 1963 declaration — “Ich bin ein Berliner” — when the Soviet Union controlled half of that divided city. But the message is the same: America is here with you. That would put Xi on the spot. If he attacked, he would know that he must engage American forces. There is, however, no public evidence to suggest that either our military or the White House is contemplating such an approach.
In sum, there’s no way out of Taiwan. Our elected leaders are procrastinating. They are content to drift downstream, knowing there are falls ahead.
Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security, is a military historian and the author of a dozen books about America’s recent wars. @BingWest
Taiwan: No Way Out | National Review
There is no avoiding the consequences of appeasement if China swallows it up.
5. NYT military journalist rips his employer after exposing leaker: We would have protected him If he came to us
Hypocritical? Perhaps. But if he had come to the NY Times he would still be a traitorous bastard but he would just have been their traitorous bastard and they would have protected him.
But the logic seems off. This guy was not a "leaker." He was not exposing secrets for some altruistic or misguided patriotic reasons that would justify the media printing his leaks and protecting him. This guy was dangerously exposing US secrets and the media had every right to seek the identity of the person.
The media writ large should never "protect" leakers. It is only the responsibility of the journalist who develops a source to protect that source. But in this case the National Guard Airman was not anyone's source so therefore I would think it would be fair game for the media to seek his identity.
NYT military journalist rips his employer after exposing leaker: We would have protected him If he came to us
foxnews.com · by Gabriel Hays | Fox News
Video
Gutfeld! - Friday, April 14
FBI, Leaker, Kenyan Chess Player
New York Times military correspondent David Philipps ripped his employer over its coverage of the massive Pentagon leaks.
On social media, Philipps accused the paper of having a double standard, stating it would’ve tried to protect the identity of the leaker if he gave his information to the Times, as opposed to "feverishly" tracking him down, as he claimed they’ve done.
The New York Times reported the identity behind the leak of U.S. military intelligence many have described as the largest information leak in U.S. history. The paper identified the leaker as 21-year-old National Guard airman Jack Teixeira.
PENTAGON DOCUMENT LEAK HAS IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY: SUCKS UP ‘A LOT OF OXYGEN’
The New York Times was blasted by its own military correspondent recently for its coverage of the Pentagon leaker. (REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton/File Photo)
According to reports, Teixeira’s arrest came less than two hours after the New York Times identified him as the leaker.
On Twitter, Philipps called out the paper, writing, "The NYT worked feverishly to find the identity of the guy leaking TS docs on Discord. Ironically, if they same guy had leaked to the NYT, we'd be working feverishly to conceal it."
It appears that Philipps deleted the tweet after posting. In a subsequent post, the military correspondent seemed to allude to the missing tweet, writing, "I just deleted a tweet that lacked nuance. Much more nuance coming soon."
WHO IS JACK TEIXEIRA, THE AIR NATIONAL GUARDSMEN ALLEGEDLY BEHIND LEAKED CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS?
This image made from video provided by WCVB-TV, shows Jack Teixeira, in T-shirt and shorts, being taken into custody by armed tactical agents on Thursday, April 13, 2023, in Dighton, Mass. (WCVB-TV via AP) (WCVB-TV via AP)
Independent journalist Glenn Greenwald saved a screenshot of Philipps’ controversial post, and commented, "I had a strong feeling that the NYT's military reporter, @David_Philipps, would end up deleting his tweet (or being told to delete it) given what a revealing admission he made. So I screen-shot it last night just in case. It's actually an amazing and important confession."
Teixeira has been accused of leaking classified materials to online social platform Discord. As Fox News Digital reported, "Photographs showing classified intelligence briefings detailing Ukraine's combat abilities, information about the Ukrainian and Russian militaries, and highly sensitive analysis of U.S. allies and adversaries, including China," were among the materials.
Fox added, "Teixeira joined the Air National Guard in September 2019 and worked as a cybersecurity systems journeyman, a position in which he held the highest level of security clearance granted by the federal government for top secret information."
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The FBI arrested Teixeira at his Massachusetts home on Thursday and is being investigated for what Attorney General Merrick said was the "alleged unauthorized removal, retention and transmission of classified national defense information."
If convicted, the National Guard airman could face up to 15 years in prison.
The criminal complaint against Jack Teixeira is photographed Friday, April 14, 2023. The Massachusetts Air National Guardsman appeared in court on Friday in Boston, accused in the leak of highly classified military documents. (AP Photo/Jon Elswick)
Gabriel Hays is an associate editor for Fox News Digital.
foxnews.com · by Gabriel Hays | Fox News
6. Intelligence leaks are an opportunity as well as a threat, says Thomas Rid
Learn, adapt, and anticipate.
Conclusion:
Doing the opposite is in the interest of liberal democracy: learning from mistakes, including our leaks, to become stronger. The world’s strongest intelligence community needs to work in an open society, not a closed one.
Intelligence leaks are an opportunity as well as a threat, says Thomas Rid
The scholar of spycraft says the private sector learns a lot from security breaches
Apr 13th 2023
The Economist
OVER THE past dozen or so years, America’s government and its intelligence apparatus has suffered five mega-leaks: the release of diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks in 2010; the disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013; the publication of National Security Agency (NSA) and CIA hacking tools in 2016 and 2017; and, now, the appearance of large amounts of intelligence reports on Discord, a messaging platform.
On April 13th Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old member of the intelligence wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested on suspicion of leaking highly sensitive documents. Whoever made the leak uploaded “hundreds and hundreds” of documents, says Aric Toler of Bellingcat, an investigative group, who interviewed several members of the Discord channel to which the files were uploaded. Most media organisations reporting on the leaks have access to approximately 50 of these documents. About 20 pages of those are so-called “serial reports,” concise one-paragraph missives on world events, prepared by multiple intelligence agencies. The rest are maps and tactical updates relating to the war in Ukraine, some with dazzling levels of detail.
All mega-leaks differ in their causes and details, but they always have two effects. They do damage, sometimes catastrophically so. However, they also offer an opportunity to advance the conversation about intelligence: among the public, among experts, and in the private sector, where some of the best intelligence is produced today. The leaks, in short, have damaged American intelligence in the short run, but improved it in the long run.
Assessing the damage caused by a big leak is hard, and doing so in a matter of days without access to inside information is especially so. Yet it is probably safe to assume that the Discord leaks are very bad. The disclosures will be damaging to capabilities, to technical access and human sources, and to allied relationships, as South Korea’s insulted reaction illustrated this week. The leak will also be harmful on the battlefield, as some Ukrainian weaknesses are now exposed.
How can governments stop such leaks happening? Preventing unauthorised disclosures is hard, and the risk can only be managed, not eliminated. Some measures are as obvious as they are overdue. One is over-classification. The more documents that are classified “top secret”, the more this level of protection is watered down. Truly sensitive documents may no longer be treated with due caution, as their classification becomes more ordinary. A related problem is a classification marker system and the use of serial numbers that reveal highly sensitive sources to a large number of intelligence consumers—for instance, whether a particular piece of intelligence came from human agents or communication intercepts, thus making disclosures more damaging.
Then there is over-clearance. In the autumn of 2019, 1.25m Americans had “top secret” security clearance, the highest level, and another 1.7m had “secret” clearance, a 2.7% increase on the previous year. The number is so large that the concept has lost much of its meaning as a filter. One result, it appears, is a culture of lax security.
CD-drives, USB devices and printers have been used to exfiltrate classified information for the mega-leaks of the past decade. Unplugging most printers and ripping out hardware will not solve the problem, but it might lower the frequency and volume of spillages. The government should work harder to prevent leaks. It should also punish leakers harshly to deter imitators. It remains jarring that the American government has not even identified, never mind charged, the perpetrators of the NSA mega-leaks of 2016 and 2017, known as the “Shadow Brokers”, who masterminded a devastating series of disclosures that led to North Korea and Russia re-purposing the disclosed NSA hacking tools in two of the most costly cyber-attacks in history.
Nevertheless, once the spillage has happened—and it will almost certainly happen again—intelligence agencies should immediately shift gears: first minimise damage, then maximise utility.
The mega-leaks of the past decade had a transformative effect on the culture and practice of intelligence more broadly. A large number of private sector “threat hunters” in big technology firms pored over the leaks of the 2010s in great detail in ways that often informed their own investigations. The intelligence agencies of the Five Eyes—America, Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand—thus inadvertently showed their private counterparts the art of the possible. Investigators learned about truly advanced capabilities, they better understood how to operate stealthily and how to unmask others doing so. And they saw examples of how world-class intelligence agencies attributed computer network operations to foreign governments. Some were even able to identify “threat actors”—groups of hackers whom they tracked—as Western intelligence agencies, thus maturing and improving their own tradecraft in the process.
When officials from the NSA or GCHQ, its British counterpart, appear at tech conferences today, they get respect from the tattooed hacker crowd. That is because of the leaks. When the American government makes an attribution claim—such as blaming Russia for a particular cyber operation—even without providing any forensic indicators, it has credibility to a large extent because of the spilled secrets of the past decade. They exposed not just extraordinary collection capabilities, but also the ability of the world’s most geeky spy alliance to out-innovate authoritarian opponents.
The expert conversation on intelligence today is much better informed as a result of the leaks of the 2010s. And the internet generally is more secure because of them. The Snowden leaks, for instance, dramatically accelerated the collective move toward stronger encryption by default.
In spite of this, leaked files are treated as forbidden literature in Washington (in London less so). American regulations are agency-specific, but most cleared personnel and contractors believe they are technically not allowed to see or possess material that remains classified, and if they download—or fail to report—classified material in the open they could jeopardise their security clearance. So some 3m people—and millions more who would like to get clearance one day—assume they cannot look at publicly disclosed files, lest they run into problems with their polygrapher. They avert their eyes from files and screenshots on social media and even from news articles and books that use such material.
■
Thomas Rid co-directs an intelligence degree at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and teaches a class on signals intelligence and leaks. He is the author of “Active Measures. The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare” (2020).
The Economist
6. Ukrainian special operations soldiers already using U.S.-made Black Hawk helicopter in combat
Photos at the link: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3696622-ukrainian-special-operations-soldiers-already-using-usmade-black-hawk-helicopter-in-combat.html
Ukrainian special operations soldiers already using U.S.-made Black Hawk helicopter in combat
Ukrainian multimedia platform for broadcasting
Sunday, 16 April 2023, 16:09
ukrinform.net
According to Ukrinform, the agency said this in a post on Telegram.
"In recent days, in one area of the front, special operations units of the Main Intelligence Directorate took part in regular training on interaction with the Black Hawk multi-purpose helicopter. The special forces practiced the landing of combat groups on the battlefield, evacuation, disembarking from landing ropes, as well as night flights," the report said.
According to fighters and helicopter pilots, the combat helicopter is much better than its Soviet analogs Mi-8 and Mi-24 in terms of almost all characteristics.
"The helicopter impresses with its reliability, ease of operation and combat survivability," the agency quotes the helicopter's flight engineer as saying. According to him, the Ukrainian crews mastered the Black Hawk extremely quickly - in a matter of hours. "Having experience operating the Mi-8 and Mi-24, we flew on the Black Hawk on the first day we received it. We just sat down and made the flight," the Main Intelligence Directorate quoted a Ukrainian pilot as saying.
According to Ukrainian defenders, the Black Hawk is many times more maneuverable than the Mi-8, much better in maneuverability, and wins in terms of horizontal flight speed. The helicopter is capable of flying continuously for about three hours and can easily cover a distance of more than 600 kilometers.
This type of helicopter is designed to fire guided and unguided Hellfire missiles and is also designed to support infantry and transport various cargoes. It takes 3-4 seconds for the helicopter to unload a group of 12 fighters and evacuate another group from the battlefield.
"Over the past year, the level of our pilots has grown enormously. Currently, Ukraine can easily receive about a hundred multi-purpose Black Hawk helicopters, about 50 Apache attack helicopters, as well as about 40-60 Chinook cargo helicopters. We could receive such a number in minimal time for the retraining of our pilots," said the first pilot of the helicopter with the call sign "Maestro."
According to him, this Black Hawk helicopter is already taking an active part in hostilities, including on enemy territory.
ukrinform.net
7. China launches weather satellite, flights avoid no-fly zone to north of Taiwan
Perhaps we should defend the Jet Stream. If all these "weather" (spy) balloons use the jet stream and the westerly winds to reach the US, then maybe we need to develop a line of defense out over the Pacific Ocean and drop any of these balloons before they reach the US. (please note my sarcasm but perhaps China would like us to invest scarce resources to create such a defense - US weather balloon defense equals the USSR star wars defense - again note additional sarcasm).).
China launches weather satellite, flights avoid no-fly zone to north of Taiwan
Reuters · by Reuters
BEIJING/TAIPEI, April 16 (Reuters) - China launched a weather satellite on Sunday as civilian flights altered their routes to avoid a Chinese-imposed no-fly zone to the north of Taiwan which Beijing put in place because of the possibility of falling rocket debris.
Taiwan's transport ministry said Beijing had initially notified Taipei it would impose a no-fly zone from Sunday to Tuesday but later said that period had been reduced to 27 minutes on Sunday morning after Taiwan protested.
The no-fly announcement rattled regional nerves as it followed shortly after China staged new war games around Taiwan, which Beijing views as sovereign Chinese territory.
The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, China's main contractor for its space programme, said the weather satellite Fengyun 3G had successfully launched from the northwestern province of Gansu at 9:36 a.m. (0136 GMT).
The satellite then entered its set orbit, the contractor said, describing the launch as a "complete success". The Fengyun 3G is a low-earth orbit satellite designed to track rainfall.
It did not say what the flight path of the Long March 4B rocket carrying the satellite was, but the time coincides with China's previous announcement about the no-fly zone.
China has said it is inaccurate to call it a no-fly zone, though Taiwan has issued a notice to airmen, or NOTAM, that uses the wording "airspace blocked due to aerospace flight activity".
Taiwan's defence ministry said some debris from the rocket launch had fallen into the "warning zone" off the island's northern coast, but it did not affect Taiwan's territorial safety.
Flights to and from Taiwan and China, Taiwan and South Korea and Taiwan and Japan were amongst those detouring around the zone on Sunday morning, according to routes tracked on Flightradar24.
Normal flight paths resumed shortly after 10 a.m. (0200 GMT).
The zone is in an area over the East China Sea slightly northeast of Taiwan that routinely sees heavy civilian flight traffic.
Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration said in a one-hour period starting from 9 a.m. (0100 GMT) 33 flights had to alter their routes, adding an extra five to 10 minutes of flying time.
China has denounced what it has called hype around China's space activities and an attempt to escalate confrontation across the Taiwan Strait.
Reporting by Bernard Orr and Ben Blanchard; Editing by William Mallard
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
8. War would bring disaster to China too, Taiwan presidential contender says
Well that is a BFO (blinding flash of the obvious).
Excerpts:
Speaking at a campaign event in southern Taiwan's Tainan, Lai, currently Taiwan's vice president, said a war would have no winners, something he hoped China properly understood.
"China should clearly realise that once war is launched on Taiwan, Taiwan will admittedly be directly harmed but it will also cause a global catastrophe China will find it hard to bear," Lai said, according to comments provided by the DPP.
...
Lai angered China in 2018 while he was premier, telling parliament he was a "Taiwan independence worker" and that his position was that Taiwan was a sovereign, independent country - a red line for Beijing.
As the campaign develops and if Lai wins we should expect the CCP to key on the last line above.
War would bring disaster to China too, Taiwan presidential contender says
Reuters · by Reuters
TAIPEI, April 15 (Reuters) - War over Taiwan would bring about a "global catastrophe" that China would find it hard to bear, the presidential candidate for Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), William Lai, said on Saturday.
China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, staged war games around the island this month, expressing its anger at a meeting in Los Angeles between Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy.
China said it had tested precision strikes and a blockade of Taiwan, whose government denounced the drills and rejects Beijing's territorial claims.
Speaking at a campaign event in southern Taiwan's Tainan, Lai, currently Taiwan's vice president, said a war would have no winners, something he hoped China properly understood.
"China should clearly realise that once war is launched on Taiwan, Taiwan will admittedly be directly harmed but it will also cause a global catastrophe China will find it hard to bear," Lai said, according to comments provided by the DPP.
Lai formally became the party's presidential candidate this week. After two terms in office, Tsai is constitutionally bared from running again in next January's election.
Taiwan's main opposition party, the Kuomintang, or KMT, traditionally favours close ties with China and has repeatedly criticised the DPP for being hostile and antagonistic to Beijing.
The KMT has yet to decide its presidential candidate.
Lai said as China had not renounced the use of force over Taiwan, the island must make ready its defences, but noted nobody wants to "take the initiative to attack China".
He said he would not abandon any chance at peace, reiterating Tsai's call for dialogue with China based on equality and respect.
China has rebuffed Tsai's calls for talks, believing her to be a separatist. Both she and Lai say that only Taiwan's people can decide the island's future.
Lai angered China in 2018 while he was premier, telling parliament he was a "Taiwan independence worker" and that his position was that Taiwan was a sovereign, independent country - a red line for Beijing.
Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by David Holmes
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
9. The military loved Discord for Gen Z recruiting. Then the leaks began.
The military loved Discord for Gen Z recruiting. Then the leaks began.
Defense officials told service members not to ‘post anything in Discord that you wouldn’t want seen by the general public.’ But by then, hundreds of secret documents had already spilled out.
By
April 15, 2023 at 5:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Drew Harwell · April 15, 2023
For years, the U.S. military has pushed to meet prospective Generation Z recruits on Discord, the online group-chat tool where many spend their time. It even runs a 17,000-member chatroom there for service members to talk about first-person shooter games, meet with career counselors and participate in what one sergeant in 2019 called the “Army of tomorrow.”
But Defense Department officials have also struggled to confront the risks of how Discord’s closed channels operate — and the ease with which they can be used to expose military intelligence. Last month, in a detailed guide aimed specifically at Discord users, Special Operations Command, which oversees the country’s most elite forces, told service members: “Don’t post anything in Discord that you wouldn’t want seen by the general public.”
By then, hundreds of classified documents had already spilled onto a Discord server frequented by a 21-year-old National Guard airman, Jack Teixeira, who had used the government secrets, interviews and an FBI charging document suggest, to impress the teenagers and 20-somethings who’d joined the chatroom.
The Discord Leaks
Dozens of highly classified documents have been leaked online, revealing sensitive information intended for senior military and intelligence leaders. In an exclusive investigation, The Post also reviewed scores of additional secret documents, most of which have not been made public.
Who leaked the documents? Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested Thursday in the investigation into leaks of hundreds of pages of classified military intelligence. The Washington Post reported that the individual who leaked the information shared documents with a small circle of online friends on the Discord chat platform.
What do the leaked documents reveal about Ukraine? The documents reveal profound concerns about the war’s trajectory and Kyiv’s capacity to wage a successful offensive against Russian forces. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment among the leaked documents, “Negotiations to end the conflict are unlikely during 2023.”
What else do they show? The files include summaries of human intelligence on high-level conversations between world leaders, as well as information about advanced satellite technology the United States uses to spy. They also include intelligence on both allies and adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, as well as Britain, Canada, South Korea and Israel.
What happens now? The leak has far-reaching implications for the United States and its allies. In addition to the Justice Department investigation, officials in several countries said they were assessing the damage from the leaks.
1/5
End of carousel
That attempt to flex his military status for online approval ended with Teixeira’s arrest Thursday. On Friday, he was charged with two counts of retaining and sharing classified national defense information, punishable by up to 15 years in prison.
But the arrest doesn’t end the dilemma for the military: how to supervise a young workforce that has access to classified secrets but lives much of its life online — including in corners of the internet where many share a fascination with military hardware and an eagerness to show off for strangers and friends. Two-thirds of U.S. military personnel are under the age of 30, with the vast majority of those under 25.
“Young men who may not feel their life gives them cachet and importance, they’re trying to find that online … often by attaching themselves to the gravitas of war and combat,” said James D. Ivory, a Virginia Tech professor who researches the social dimensions of online communities and video games.
Some of them, he said, seek to overcome feelings of isolation and gain clout with their peers by spending time in these small online communities where they may feel they can push the boundaries and build camaraderie — even though the groups offer only the illusion of privacy and control.
“We’re seeing massive security breaches and potential global instability just because someone was insecure about their popularity,” he added, “and wanted people to know they knew cool stuff about the military.”
Video games are one of the most popular forms of media for the 18-to-21-year-olds who are the target for the Defense Department’s recruiting efforts and make up much of its junior ranks. The military sponsors esports tournaments to drive interest and advertises on the popular game-streaming site Twitch.
Many gamers have flocked to Discord for its fast-moving mix of public and private chatrooms, known as servers, where members can exchange jokes, memes and voice clips in a place largely invisible to the open web. Founded in 2015 in San Francisco, Discord says its 19 million servers attract 150 million active users every month.
Teixeira’s group first met up on a Discord server devoted to Oxide, a YouTube creator known for his gaming clips and detailed breakdowns of combat rifles, body armor and military loadouts. The server, like many on Discord, was frenetic and irreverent: A clip from 2020 shows the room devolving into a chaos of gunfire noises and shouts of “Allahu akbar.”
A close-knit group from that server broke off into its own — named, for a pornographic meme, Thug Shaker Central — where they chatted about guns, games and geopolitics, and exchanged dark and racist jokes, members told The Washington Post.
Teixeira began sharing the documents late last year, FBI investigators said. By last month, a group member had reposted some of them in a separate Discord server, effectively sparking their viral spread.
In the offline world, Teixeira had worked in a relatively low-level IT-focused role as a “cyber transport systems specialist” in the Air National Guard, which gave him access to a computer network hosting top-secret information.
He worked at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Mass., far from the grisly realities of combat. When federal agents arrested him Thursday at his family home in the woody suburb of Dighton, Mass., he was dressed in gym shorts and a green T-shirt.
In the Discord server, though, Teixeira had built a devoted following as “O.G.,” framing himself as a gun lover with a honed sense of combat strategy and intimate access to military secrets. A former Thug Shaker Central member told The Post that O.G. had shared the documents to educate his peers and build social capital on a slice of the internet where he was king.
Teixeira’s profile on the gaming marketplace Steam shows him playing lots of first-person shooters and military simulations with millions of players: the realistic military shooter “Arma 3,” the hardcore survival game “Project Zomboid” and the battle royale shooter “PUBG: Battlegrounds.”
But he also inhabited a die-hard subculture attracted to the precise details of military weapons, technologies and strategies. His ability to use those secrets to gain him credibility within the group, members said, ended up becoming a temptation he could not ignore.
On the server, he talked openly about guns, Catholicism, libertarian politics, and the raids at Ruby Ridge in Idaho and in Waco, Tex., a common flash point for the anti-government fringe. He also posted video of himself firing a rifle while shouting racist and antisemitic slurs.
Though investigators said he used anonymous screen names such as “jackthedripper” and “excalibureffect,” Teixeira proved, ultimately, not hard to find. In a charging document Friday, an FBI agent said his Discord account information, which the San Francisco-based company provided to authorities, had included Teixeira’s real name and home address.
That kind of online bravado is common in Discord gaming groups steeped in the macho, hard-charging culture of tactical shooters and military combat, Ivory said. Some members end up egging each other on toward increasingly cavalier behavior, he said, often because they feel safer in a closed-communal setting than if they were broadcasting their feelings to social media or the world.
That lack of discretion, he said, has led some members to adopt increasingly radical attitudes and behaviors. That’s a potential risk for young service members, he said, particularly those who enlisted with expectations of combat duty but ended up working a job that now plays out largely on a screen.
“Some people may join the military because of the allure of the warrior ethos, and they may not feel very validated sitting in front of the computer all day,” Ivory said.
Discord said in a statement that it is cooperating with law enforcement and declined to comment further. The company said it scans for violent and other rule-breaking content but also depends on volunteer moderators to flag potential threats, probably allowing some risks to go unseen.
In a report by the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, Discord officials were said to have acknowledged that “the risks of relying too much on user moderation when the userbase may not have an interest in reporting problematic content.”
The Defense Department, facing a recruiting shortage, has nevertheless adopted a nationwide strategy of using gaming and online culture to attract new troops, many of whom grew up with Xboxes and iPads and who live much of their lives online.
Nearly every service branch now has an esports team that competes on first-person shooter games such as the Halo franchise and “Valorant,” some of which have their own private Discord servers where service members can chat.
Military esports teams also participate in nationwide competitions and stream their gameplay on Twitch. The Army’s esports Discord server welcomes active-duty Army and National Guard members, as well as contractors, veterans, and their families and friends, encouraging them in a welcome banner to “be all you can be.”
Progressive activists have criticized the military for using Twitch streamers and gaming channels popular with young viewers to promote military life and shape their perceptions about war.
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) sponsored a House amendment in 2020 to ban the military from using Twitch to recruit that did not pass. “War is not a game,” she said on Twitter. “We should not conflate military service with 'shoot-em-up’ style games and contests.”
But Amy J. Nelson, a technology expert and foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the Discord leaks reflect a broader challenge of how to block the sharing of classified information.
Discord is “a tainted concept now,” she said. “Does the Pentagon still use it? Does it use it officially? Does it use it unofficially?”
The Pentagon’s detailed guide to Discord shows military officials counseling users to be aware of “personal security vulnerabilities” and suggests specific privacy and safety controls for an app that it said allows “friends and communities to stay in touch and spend time together.”
“It may be a private server,” the guide says, “but conversations and photos/videos can be captured by screenshot or recorded and leaked.”
The military command has also published similar guides to Twitch, TikTok, and the dating apps Tinder, Bumble and Hinge, among other apps, recognizing that people in their 20s and younger are likely to be unwilling to give up online habits they’ve held for a lifetime.
The TikTok guide doesn’t even discourage using the popular short-video app, which is banned on military devices but allowed for personal use, though it does recommend settings and guidelines that could limit the risks of an app owned by a Chinese firm.
Roughly 3 million Americans have undergone the months-long process of acquiring security clearance, where they are asked about details of their behaviors and personal histories and made to provide names they might use online. But many Discord servers are invite-only and ask for direct confirmation of members’ authenticity, blocking them from public view.
President Biden said in a statement Friday that he had directed the military to “further secure and limit distribution of sensitive information.” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Thursday that he had ordered a review into the Pentagon’s intelligence controls and reminded anyone with classified access that they had “a solemn legal and moral obligation to safeguard it.”
The leaks could amplify calls in Washington to more closely monitor chatrooms and social media. Such a measure is not unheard of: Undercover governmental investigators have in the past closely monitored jihadi forums organized by Islamic State and al-Qaeda militants for the purposes of investigation or intervention.
But civil liberties advocates have argued such tactics could violate Americans’ First Amendment rights of free expression or their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches.
“We do not have nor do we want a system where the United States government monitors private internet chats,” Glenn Gerstell, the former general counsel of the National Security Agency, told NBC on Wednesday.
On Discord, some servers already joke about the possibility of being surreptitiously infiltrated by the government. Using a word first coined on the anything-goes message board 4chan, people commonly accuse others of being “glowies” — federal agents whose out-of-place behaviors are so obvious that they practically glow.
But surveilling gamer chatrooms might also end up pushing away the same young recruits the military desperately needs, all for questionable practical gain: The internet is full of ways to anonymously share images, videos and documents.
Before the Discord leaks, similar breaches had played out on the official message board of the ultrarealistic combat game “War Thunder,” with users from around the world divulging secret information about anti-armor shells and attack helicopters.
One message board poster, who claimed to serve in a French military unit, uploaded a classified manual in hopes of winning an argument about the turret rotation speed of a Leclerc S2, one of the nation’s main battle tanks.
Jordan Uhl, a progressive activist who has criticized the use of Twitch for recruiting, said the military’s heavy advertising through video games and Discord chats could end up backfiring by attracting young people with a “warped impression” of military life.
“This is a new challenge for the military: When you have all the people who grew up in a purely digital age enlisting, the lines are blurred for how they communicate,” he said.
“People are growing up playing military videos and consuming military propaganda through YouTube in ways prior generations never experienced,” he added. “The way they’re recruiting and the places they’re recruiting, the military is going to get more people like this.”
Aaron Schaffer, Pranshu Verma and Taylor Lorenz contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Drew Harwell · April 15, 2023
10. US guns for more accurate, lethal and survivable nukes
Excerpts:
A 2023 study by the Center for Global Security Research mentions that China and Russia are bound by hostility to US-led global and regional orders and are resolved to bring about their end, with both having large nuclear arsenals and new ideas for using them to break US alliances and sap US political will to defend its interests.
The report also mentions that China and Russia’s use of nuclear brinksmanship and blackmail threatens the US and its allies. US allies’ dependence on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence has increased steadily over the last two decades, making it imperative that US nuclear security guarantees remain credible.
It also mentions a potential Sino-Russian nuclear concert, underscoring concerns that the US may not be able to deter China and Russia at the same time, noting that while the US may be preoccupied with one near-peer nuclear adversary, the other may choose to act in a limited manner against US interests, exploiting America’s distraction and playing up the threat of using nuclear weapons as strategic cover for its actions.
US guns for more accurate, lethal and survivable nukes
US plans next generation reentry vehicle for its land-based nuclear arsenal to deter China and Russia’s new collective threat
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 13, 2023
The US has unveiled plans for a new reentry vehicle to be mounted on the next generation of the land-based leg of its nuclear triad. The announcement comes amid increased tensions with China and Russia, two of the world’s other leading nuclear powers, at what some see as the outbreak of a New Cold War.
This month, Breaking Defense reported that the US Air Force had started soliciting plans for the Next Generation Reentry Vehicle (NGRV) to be mounted on its new LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), with design objectives requiring increased survivability, lethality and accuracy.
The report states that a reentry vehicle houses a nuclear missile’s warhead. The US Air Force plans to put one warhead on each LGM-35A Sentinel missile in its inventory but could put two or three warheads on each in response to changes in the international security environment.
Breaking Defense notes that the NGRV will be modularly developed using open system architecture and digital engineering to incorporate future warhead designs and countermeasures.
The project follows US efforts to replace its long-serving land-based ICBM. Last April, Asia Times reported on US plans to replace the Cold War-era LGM-30G Minuteman III with the LGM-35A Sentinel. The US aims to complete this modernization effort by 2029, with the latter missile being in service until the 2070s.
In contrast to the LGM-30G Minuteman III, the LGM-35A Sentinel features a modular design and open software architecture, allowing for easy replacement of obsolete components and multiple contractors to compete for system upgrades and improvements such as safety measures, guidance systems and penetration aids.
The LGM-35A Sentinel also allows warhead maintenance with closed silo doors, eliminating a security vulnerability and reducing security detail manpower requirements compared to the LGM-30G Minuteman III.
The LGM-35A Sentinel has improved throw weight compared to the LGM-30G Minuteman III, allowing the former to carry heavier payloads including up to three warheads or increased penetration aids.
An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during an operational test at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Photo: US Air Force / Senior Airman Ian Dudley
That ICBM upgrade project underscores the enduring importance of the US land-based nuclear arsenal. Given that, Todd Harrison, in a 2017 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, notes that ground-launched ICBMs serve two main roles in the US nuclear triad.
First, Harrison mentions that ground-launched ICBMs act as a “missile sponge” to draw incoming enemy missiles, saying that an adversary must spend at least one missile to neutralize geographically-dispersed targets in a pre-emptive strike, increasing the missile numbers and scale needed for such an attack to be successful.
Second, Harrison says that land-based ICBMs provide a first-strike capability because, unlike nuclear weapons on aircraft and submarines, nearly all are always on alert and can launch within minutes.
But despite the strategic importance of the US land-based nuclear arsenal, it is in dire need of modernization. In a September 2022 article for Time, W J Hennigan reported that the US land-based nuclear arsenal built around the LGM-30G Minuteman III still uses vintage components from the 1960s, struggles with obsolete command and control equipment, is housed in dilapidated infrastructure and faces increasingly difficult and expensive maintenance.
Despite these challenges, Hennigan mentions that a land-based nuclear arsenal is critical for the US to maintain strategic deterrence against China, North Korea and Russia.
Although he says critics point out that US air and sea-based nuclear weapons are more than enough to deter potential adversaries, land-based nuclear missile silos are tempting targets for an enemy nuclear attack as an accident in one of those facilities can result in a nuclear catastrophe.
Still, the enduring need for the US to maintain its strategic deterrent posture against evolving nuclear threats from near-peer adversaries and to reassure its allies has prompted US nuclear arsenal modernization efforts.
A Sino-Russian nuclear concert could tip the global balance of nuclear weapons away from the US. Last month, Asia Times reported on Russia’s plans to provide fast breeder reactor technology to China, which could allow it to produce more plutonium for its nuclear arsenal expansion.
Russia’s nuclear energy exports, which have surged since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have given it a lifeline to compensate for lost energy and weapons sales revenues.
It also shows that Russia has set aside long-term concerns about China’s long-term threat in its Far East and signifies Russia’s increased desire for cooperation with China.
The possible upsizing of China’s nuclear arsenal from 400 warheads today to 700, coupled with more diverse delivery systems such as stealth bombers, road-and-rail mobile launchers and ballistic missile submarines, gives China a credible second-strike capability, options for limited theater-level nuclear strikes and the means to brandish nuclear weapons coercively.
Given that, the US, for the first time in its history, is squaring off against two nuclear-armed near-peer adversaries, making it imperative to modernize its nuclear arsenal.
An intercontinental ballistic missile at a military parade in Moscow, May 9, 2017. Photo: TASS / Valery Sharifulin
A 2023 study by the Center for Global Security Research mentions that China and Russia are bound by hostility to US-led global and regional orders and are resolved to bring about their end, with both having large nuclear arsenals and new ideas for using them to break US alliances and sap US political will to defend its interests.
The report also mentions that China and Russia’s use of nuclear brinksmanship and blackmail threatens the US and its allies. US allies’ dependence on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence has increased steadily over the last two decades, making it imperative that US nuclear security guarantees remain credible.
It also mentions a potential Sino-Russian nuclear concert, underscoring concerns that the US may not be able to deter China and Russia at the same time, noting that while the US may be preoccupied with one near-peer nuclear adversary, the other may choose to act in a limited manner against US interests, exploiting America’s distraction and playing up the threat of using nuclear weapons as strategic cover for its actions.
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 13, 2023
11. 2 Years of Turmoil: Myanmar’s Grinding Stalemate
Why so little international support?
Excerpts:
Lastly, while resistance forces lament the lack of international support, they still hope to demonstrate viability and gain international assistance. The passing of the BURMA Act in the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act rekindled hopes of military aid flowing in from sympathetic countries, with NUG leaders saying that the right weapons will “end the war in six months.”
Absent this external support, the conflict shows no sign of abating. The junta claims things are under control while the resistance insists total victory is just around the corner, but the state of the battlefield suggests otherwise. Inebriated by their respective Kool-Aids, there are no current prospects for negotiations. There is also creeping fear that Myanmar may become the subject of a proxy war between Western countries and the autocratic regimes in Moscow and Beijing. Only time will tell how the quagmire proceeds, but by then, it will be too late for too many people.
2 Years of Turmoil: Myanmar’s Grinding Stalemate
thediplomat.com · by Naw Theresa · April 14, 2023
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Editor’s Note: This is the second article in a three-part series about Myanmar’s escalating political crisis. The first part offered an overview of the conflict, and the state of the humanitarian emergency and economic crisis affecting post-coup Myanmar. The second part analyzes the overall conflict and the status of the two sides, while the third will explore ignored undercurrents that provide a fuller picture of the civil war.
Myanmar’s conflict is currently locked in a bloody stalemate: The State Administration Council (SAC) junta and the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) pretend they can stamp out their armed opponents, while the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and its affiliated People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have spoken of imminent final victory ever since the coup of February 2021. The morbid reality is that Myanmar’s worsening civil war will be drawn out and everybody will ultimately lose.
The two sides are in no frame of mind to de-escalate or manage the conflict. The international community continues to call for a peaceful resolution, but neither camp is interested. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) who had hoped that their Five-Point Consensus would temper the crisis are increasingly exasperated and can only watch as their black sheep writhes in self-mutilation.
The regime has shamelessly abnegated its own commitments to de-escalation made to ASEAN while its opponents talk of a “blood debt” stretching back to 1988 that leaves no room to off-ramp the fighting. Labeling each other “terrorists,” both the SAC and the resistance insist on militarily vanquishing their respective foes, sowing the seeds for a conflict that will likely continue for decades.
The junta underestimates its opponents’ resolve, built on decades of injustice, and believes that elections will magically resolve the country’s problems, most of which it had a hand in creating. The globally condemned executions of prominent activists Ko Jimmy and Phyo Zeyar Thaw were intended to shock its opponents into submission and demonstrated the military’s bunker mentality, which blinds it to the breadth and depth of public animosity and defiance.
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Conversely, the resistance, having romanticized war as clean and quick, overestimates the public’s appetite for conflict amid the growing hardships of daily life. Justified outrage at the junta’s excesses has made the public uncritically accepting of aspirational or wildly improbable promises from resistance sources and aligned personalities, so much so that NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La warned the resistance against raising “false hope.”
Overall, the conflict remains low-intensity, with intermittent bursts of fierce fighting. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, citing local and resistance-aligned sources, indicates a slight decrease in both aggregate battle deaths and clashes since mid-2022, but it is difficult to suggest a trend. Seasonal factors play a role, with the monsoon often bringing a lull in fighting while the dry months from November to May are referred to as “fighting season.”
The battle lines snake through patches of divergent control but no solid frontline exists where clashes are sustained beyond a few days. The two sides love to show off captures of enemy camps or fortified hillocks, and the weapons hauls seized. In highly contested areas in the northwest, resistance tollgates are said to be within sight of Tatmadaw checkpoints. Huge chunks of Sagaing and Magway regions have devolved into islands of competing control with villages aligning themselves with one side or the other based on pre-coup leanings or the simple question of who mobilized first.
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For all their claims, the two sides do not have much staying power. Tatmadaw formations supported by allied local militias still seem able to flush out resistance positions, often indiscriminately killing and torching homes in the process. However, they are unable to consolidate their gains and generally pull back, after which resistance groups quickly return and the cycle restarts. Logistics remains a major challenge for the anti-SAC forces and limits their ability to sustain operations or head-on engagements.
Competing Claims
Given the messy nature of the conflict, the two sides have advanced competing claims of territorial control. Both the SAC and the NUG project themselves as having the upper hand in order to garner international acceptance. As a result, they throw about numbers that need to be taken with a very large grain of salt.
The junta controls the main cities and economic corridors but has to rely on helicopters to link towns in resistance strongholds like Chin State and western Sagaing Region. In resistance-controlled “liberated areas,” the NUG and PDFs have introduced local administrations, brick and mortar schools, sports events, and township courts, but these remain on the move or vulnerable to SAC attacks.
In his speech in late January extending the nationwide state of emergency, SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing claimed that out of Myanmar’s 330 townships, 198, or 60 percent, were “peaceful”; 67 (20 percent) required an “emphasis on security”; and 65 (20 percent) needed “effective provision of security.” The regime has tried to squeeze out as much positive news as it can from contested areas, such as highly-choreographed official visits, to prop up its claims.
Meanwhile, the NUG in April 2022 asserted that it controlled half the country but refused say where such areas were. That September, the pro-NUG Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) reported that the junta only controlled 72 townships (22 percent of the total) with the resistance poised to control half the country including major cities by 2023. In late February of this year, Duwa Lashi La said that resistance forces controlled more than half the country and that the NUG has formed administration teams for 154 townships. All the while resistance leaders continuously speak of imminent blitzes by which they will take over the country in one fell swoop.
All these pronouncements are highly questionable. The junta placed 40 additional townships under martial law in February to “restore stability and peace” but these places instead saw an upsurge in fighting. The NUG claimed to be in full control of these 40 townships, with resistance forces’ capture of Thantlang in Chin State lending some credence to its claims.
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Resistance platforms claim complete dominance over certain areas and say that the junta is on its last legs, yet at the same time report Tatmadaw troop surges in such places. The SAC-M perplexingly labelled territory firmly controlled by the powerful Wa, who stand aloof from the conflict and recently met Min Aung Hlaing, as areas fully administered by the NUG. It also stated that the junta’s control was collapsing in downtown Yangon and Mandalay when the junta has actually solidified its grip on major urban centers, barring assassinations.
Casualty figures are impossible to ascertain. The Tatmadaw never publishes figures, though it has admitted losses. To date, the NUG has said that resistance forces have killed over 20,000 junta troops while sustaining around 2,000 losses, based on PDFs’ self-reporting. Others estimate that over 10,000 military personnel have defected. Popular PDF commander Bo Nagar opined early this year that the SAC only had 40,000 soldiers left. However, sober assessments see these numbers as embellished for propaganda purposes and advise caution.
The NUG publishes daily SAC casualty reports based on PDFs’ self-updates that often show lop-sided battlefield performances where a few resistance fighters are reported killed while the junta suffers dozens of deaths. These claims are amplified by resistance-aligned platforms and widely shared on social media, but the veracity is highly questionable. Notably, better-armed and well-experienced ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have reported less-skewered regime casualties in their many clashes with SAC forces.
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In their respective echo chambers, the junta and the resistance both say they are winning. The state mouthpieces cover armed incidents by purporting that security forces “crushed” PDF cells or were in “relentless pursuit” of PDFs who “fled in disarray.” Pro-military Telegram channels regularly gloat and publish photos purportedly of resistance fighters’ corpses or screengrabs of their funerals to crassly dispel the resistance’s assertion of decisive victories.
Meanwhile resistance-aligned media act as the PDFs’ stenographers and town criers and help paint bullseyes around targets. PDFs continuously tally high regime losses, but videos of most incidents provided by these outfits cannot corroborate the numbers. Videos of PDF drone attacks are very popular on social media and are touted as effective and fear-inducing on regime troops, but on closer examination, show questionable efficacy or verifiability.
Incompetent Goliath
While the Tatmadaw outguns its opponents, it is undeniably overstretched. Soldiers, remilitarized police, and “Pyu Saw Htee” militias are spread thin not just across active conflict hotspots, but are also required to guard key installations, checkpoints, government offices, civil servant housing compounds, and utilities, as well as military-owned businesses often targeted by resistance attacks. In certain areas, the SAC has strengthened allied EAOs to counter PDF incursions while the revival of a gun ownership law and the regime’s peace parleys with other groups are interpreted as signs of desperation.
The resistance and commentators are closely monitoring the Tatmadaw’s cohesiveness and hope that unit-level defections will occur, and help turn the tide. The military is holding townhouse meals to maintain loyalty among the rank and file. It is also resorting to soldiers’ wives and retirees to plug manpower gaps, having lost access to its traditional recruiting grounds in the Bamar heartland that are now hotbeds of the resistance.
The regime is also turning to air power to counter resistance forces, launching hundreds of air strikes. These have had mixed efficacy but have killed an estimated 300 civilians, according to the NUG. There have been a few notable tragedies in which a single sortie kills scores of civilians, such as in A Nang Pa, Let Yet Kone, and most recently, Pa Zi Gyi. On the other hand, a rights group tallied eight militants killed and six civilians injured by a total of 53 sorties over Chin State in two months, indicating the air force’s questionable capacity.
The military has been slow to adapt, sticking with outdated and indiscriminate tactics. Soldiers continue to patrol in light trucks or civilian vehicles along frequently mined roads. Regularly attacked checkpoints and outposts remain lightly defended with bamboo fences and shade netting, probably out of hubris. And police officers and local government functionaries keep getting assassinated in tea shops, despite numerous precedents.
Nonetheless, the SAC has been brutal in flushing out PDF cells and interdicting their supply routes. There are regular reports of arms seizures, arrests, and executions of PDF guerrillas, though the resistance counter that those nabbed and killed are often innocent bystanders. At one point, the regime made great fanfare out of supposed PDFs “returning to the legal fold” but only a few hundred did so by the regime’s own tally and resistance groups naturally rubbished the defections as fiction.
Security forces are also accused of grotesque massacres and widespread torching of civilian properties in contested areas while the indiscriminate firing of heavy ordnance into nearby villages seems to be the preferred method of retaliating against resistance raids. In return, the PDFs have used the security forces’ propensity to shoot at everything in sight against the regime, launching attacks on public places as well allegedly luring troops into villages.
The purging of the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence apparatus back in 2004 crippled the Tatmadaw’s surveillance activities and it has ever since struggled to replicate the once-feared organ. Nonetheless, the regime appears to have reconstituted a functioning network that includes double agents and informants (“dalans”) bolstered by Chinese surveillance technology. The military has sparingly deployed drones despite having frequently boasted of them before the coup, again suggesting limited capabilities.
The Tatmadaw’s true strength has always been a guessing game, and commanders have long inflated numbers to pocket the extra pay and dispel pressure from above to meet expansion quotas. The army’s current effective combat strength has been estimated at anywhere from 100,000 to 150,000, not counting the sizable remilitarized police force and the much larger rear echelon manpower, retirees, and allied militias that are now being mobilized and can possibly double those numbers.
Determined Davids
Resistance forces are expanding their footprint and tactical capacity in major conflict zones despite the Tatmadaw’s Four Cuts Strategy. While they remain vastly outgunned, PDF outfits have adapted well to asymmetrical warfare, embracing 3D-printed guns, commercial drones, landmines, and jerry-rigged artillery shells, and making progress in producing firearms, albeit with mixed results. Resistance forces are also raiding military camps and convoys to make up for the armaments gap. Much-publicized defections and a steady drip of leaks suggest the resistance has sympathizers inside the military, often termed “watermelons.”
NUG spokesperson Dr. Sasa claimed in mid-July 2022 that there were 2 million resistance fighters while the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar) says there are over 200,000 PDF members. Other assessments estimate between 50,000 to 100,000 guerrillas, the majority of whom are unarmed. Most are fighting in “liberated areas” as well as across the country’s porous borders while cells remain active in major cities, despite the SAC’s closing nets.
Based on the axiom that the Tatmadaw cannot operate in more than one theater and taking a page out of earlier EAOs’ playbooks, different resistance forces are working to link up and open new fronts to basically play tag with the military in order to whittle it down. The NUG’s Ministry of Defense has established a chain of command and says it has brought most armed groups under its aegis, but a unified command structure remains absent, with the estimated 500-plus PDFs and Local Defense Forces (LDFs) units mostly acting on their own accord and with limited support.
Most PDF cells operate mainly by ambushing patrols or checkpoints and then quickly withdrawing. In areas with a strong EAO presence, there have been efforts to take the fight directly to the SAC, as seen in attempts to seize the Karenni State capital Loikaw in early 2022, Kyainseikgyi and Kawkareik in Karen State in late 2022, alongside frequent raids on Myawaddy to choke the border trade with Thailand, and the capture of the town of Thantlang in Chin State in February 2023.
Outside conflict hotspots, PDFs mainly operate by striking soft targets, particularly local administrators, dalans, and persons or businesses allegedly supporting the SAC’s ability to function (“dauktine”), though who or what constitute these two vague categories is interpreted liberally. Government offices and infrastructure such as power pylons, bridges, gas pipelines, and passenger trains have also been struck. These attacks demonstrate the SAC’s inability to fully govern even in its “safe areas,” and are intended to give the regime a taste of its own medicine.
Compared to the regime’s soldiers, the mostly young PDF guerrillas hailing from Generation Z are extremely motivated. Some have seen their friends and family killed on the streets or in the jungles, or their homes torched. Like many EAO foot soldiers, they are unpaid and live off the land with limited donations. It is an article of faith among resistance supporters that the creativity and revolutionary zeal of the youths will triumph over the junta’s vast resources.
Lastly, while resistance forces lament the lack of international support, they still hope to demonstrate viability and gain international assistance. The passing of the BURMA Act in the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act rekindled hopes of military aid flowing in from sympathetic countries, with NUG leaders saying that the right weapons will “end the war in six months.”
Absent this external support, the conflict shows no sign of abating. The junta claims things are under control while the resistance insists total victory is just around the corner, but the state of the battlefield suggests otherwise. Inebriated by their respective Kool-Aids, there are no current prospects for negotiations. There is also creeping fear that Myanmar may become the subject of a proxy war between Western countries and the autocratic regimes in Moscow and Beijing. Only time will tell how the quagmire proceeds, but by then, it will be too late for too many people.
thediplomat.com · by Naw Theresa · April 14, 2023
12. ARSOF Leaders Discuss Innovation with Industry and Academia in Boston
Excellent initiative.
Please allow SSG Youngjin Kim to work on a combined Psychological Operations campaign on the Korean peninsula. north Korea is a laboratory for psychological operations. Let slip the information dogs of war.
ARSOF Leaders Discuss Innovation with Industry and Academia in Boston
https://www.army.mil/article/265778/arsof_leaders_discuss_innovation_with_industry_and_academia_in_boston
By Maj. Russell GordonApril 15, 2023
BOSTON, Mass. – The young noncommissioned officer held up a small, plastic and common soap container. “It’s a radio in a soapbox,” said Staff Sgt. Youngjin Kim, a Psychological Operations Specialist. The crowd of senior commanders and general officers watched quietly as Staff Sgt. Kim gave a demonstration of the idea he was pitching.
Kim along with 10 other tactical-level innovators joined the senior leaders of 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) in a weeklong roundtable discussion in Boston alongside innovation experts in private industry, the Department of Defense, and academia. On the agenda for this day, the innovators, representing the 11 subordinate commands across the organization of 23,000 soldiers and civilians, pitched ideas for innovation at the esteemed Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Labs.
Kim opened the soapbox and held up a Raspberry Pi, which is a small, popular single-board computer known for its modularity and open design. Using the computer, Kim explained how Psychological Operations could use it as a way to perform live broadcasts. The concept would decrease the need for larger, similar systems and could have applications for evolutionary innovation in how PSYOP Specialists deliver information.
Imagine a situation in a country where Soldiers are supporting a humanitarian mission following a devastating natural disaster. Winds and flooding destroyed commercial infrastructure, which includes antennas and broadcast stations. A PSYOP team could deploy a similar broadcast system mounted to an unmanned aerial system to help people receive critical information on where to find water, medicine, and food.
Kim demonstrated the broadcast as the room waited in silence. He turned it on and Rick Astley’s popular song, “Never Gonna Give You Up” played over the speaker. The use of the well-known ’80s hit song in an unexpectedly bait-and-switch style meme is affectionately known as Rickrolling. The audience laughed at the lighthearted moment.
“Innovation, at its core, is passion,” said Kim. “Being able to explore our passion here is important. When new tech emerges, our adversaries quickly use them. We have to be able to compete with them.”
Kim, originally from the Republic of Korea and a former Soldier in the Korean Army, represents the first Special Operations Forces Truth—people are more important than hardware. Although innovation may include new technology, concepts, and organization, at its heart innovation is a mindset and it begins with people.
The rest of the week focused on a tour with Lincoln Labs as innovators met experts in their fields of interest. Leaders and innovators also attended a lecture with academia and industry leaders at MIT’s Innovation Headquarters located in the heart of Boston.
Another key moment from the week was a tour of the USS Constitution, the nation’s oldest ship still afloat from 1797 and last saw combat in the War of 1812.
“You’re probably asking why we are here,” said Maj. Gen. Rick Angle, commander 1st Special Forces Command to the crowd. “This is original innovation built out of necessity.”
The USS Constitution was one of the six original frigates of the US Navy designed by American shipbuilder John Humphreys. Humphreys realized the United States was no match in size compared to the navies of Europe so he came up with a design that focused on speed and used a hull constructed in superior American oak. Humphreys designed its ribs to be four inches apart meant to take a pounding in battle. The English ships' ribs were ten inches apart. It was a small change but one that would prove to be invaluable. During a battle in the War of 1812, an 18-pound English cannonball bounced off the side of the Constitution. A sailor yelled out, “her sides are made of iron” and that’s how she became known as Old Ironsides.
The USS Constitution demonstrated that innovation is nothing new. It’s challenging and arguably more so in today’s age of big data, high tech, AI and machine learning. Innovation occurs out of necessity, and it takes being able to see what’s coming not just in a few years but in decades to come. The ship serves as a reminder to innovate today for the unknown of tomorrow.
By the week’s end, the command left Boston with new concepts and ideas to help build Army Special Operations of 2030 and beyond while remaining the nation’s premier partnered irregular warfare force.
13. Is there a worldwide run on the Bank of the United States of America?
Excerpts:
Some believe these things are happening because a growing number of political and business leaders around the world now lack confidence in the United States, believing our country truly is in disarray, decline and increasingly polarized and politicized. Will such concerns accelerate a “run on the Bank of the United States” with assets being transferred to China or even Russia?
Only time will tell. But as with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the signs are out there, should the analysts care to pay attention.
Is there a worldwide run on the Bank of the United States of America?
BY DOUGLAS MACKINNON, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/15/23 12:00 PM ET
The Hill · · April 15, 2023
In talking this week with a friend about the United States seemingly imploding from within across multiple sectors, my friend stressed: “It’s not just from within. There is a run on the United States from certain nations and business interests around the world. Just like there was a run on banks after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, many nations are either thinking about — or actually proceeding with — transferring at least a portion of their allegiance, assets and commitments from the ‘Bank of the U.S.’ to the ‘Bank of China’ or elsewhere.”
This was not just some person sitting on a porch casually talking about current events while whittling a stick waiting for his Social Security or pension check to hit the mailbox. This was a former high-level U.S. government official, now a CEO, someone who sits on the boards of directors for multiple companies. He has massive real-world and business experience and believes the United State may be on the verge of collapse.
He is far from the only one to think that.
Some fear the Biden administration is losing control of our southern border; losing control of our decaying, crime-infested big cities; creating a recession; vilifying and needlessly destroying the fossil fuel industry while pushing suspect and subsidized “green” energy alternatives; leaving tens of billions of dollars in military equipment in Afghanistan while withdrawing our troops and abandoning an ally; stepping closer to a trip-wire in the Ukraine war, which could trigger a nuclear strike; turning on Israel over ideological issues as Turkey and others call on Arab and Muslim nations to unite and crush the Jewish State; weakening our military with one “woke” edict after another; focusing on “trans” issues at the expense of failing transportation infrastructure; cheerleading the social justice warrior takeover of our colleges and universities; and weakening the dollar (the currency much of the world depends upon).
Is it any wonder, then, that nations such as France, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Mexico, Brazil and others are suddenly hedging their bets by looking beyond the United States of America for partnerships and stability?
On top of those problems, our allies and certain foreign corporations now have the legitimate concern of wondering what between them and the United States will be kept private and secure, in light of the massive and reportedly deliberate leak of classified Pentagon documents.
Who is an ally or foreign business partner to trust? More importantly, in the eyes of some of these nations and foreign business interests, who will prove to be the more stable and dependable partner in the coming years and decades?
In an example of a world leader hedging his bets, French President Emmanuel Macron recently traveled to Beijing to meet with China’s President Xi Jinping. Macron did not travel alone. He brought along Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission. Some saw this as Macron advertising that much of the European Union was with him in spirit as he met with Xi.
On his way back to France after the meeting, Macron emphasized that Europeans should not be “just America’s followers” and “get caught up in crises that are not ours.” Even though the French leader seemed to be spelling it out in 100-font, one could read between the lines and assume he meant not getting dragged too deeply into the Ukraine war or defending Taiwan, should China invade. The last part was music to the ears of China’s strongman, Xi.
Next, we have Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador openly criticizing — and challenging — the leadership of the United States for months, by calling the U.S. an “oligarchy, not a real democracy.” He threatened to sabotage calls for U.S. military action against Mexican cartels, and has made it clear that he is not afraid to pick a fight with what he may see as a United States in decline.
Or, last month’s news that Saudi Arabia was inching closer to joining a China-led Asian security and economic bloc, after having been granted the status of a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Aside from China and Russia, the bloc also includes India, Pakistan and some ex-Soviet states. It’s an organization one might view as not always having the best interests of the United States in mind.
As Ali Shihabi, a Saudi analyst and writer, made clear during an interview: “The traditional monogamous relationship with the US is now over. And we have gone into a more open relationship, strong with the U.S. but equally strong with China, India, [the] UK, France and others.”
Finally, we have Brazil — China’s most important trading partner in South America — announcing a new agreement to conduct bilateral commerce in their respective currencies, rather than the U.S. dollar. The move not only shocked many in the U.S. government but opened the eyes of others around the world to the possibility of decoupling from the dollar.
Is anti-‘sweatshop’ activism making Bangladeshis poorer? Biden’s executive order makes regulators even less accountable
Some believe these things are happening because a growing number of political and business leaders around the world now lack confidence in the United States, believing our country truly is in disarray, decline and increasingly polarized and politicized. Will such concerns accelerate a “run on the Bank of the United States” with assets being transferred to China or even Russia?
Only time will tell. But as with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the signs are out there, should the analysts care to pay attention.
Douglas MacKinnon, a political and communications consultant, was a writer in the White House for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and former special assistant for policy and communications at the Pentagon during the last three years of the Bush administration.
The Hill · by Zack Budryk · April 15, 2023
14. Pentagon intelligence breach renews scrutiny over clearances
As I have written and tweeted, my guess is as an IT guy he was given system admin privileges in order to diagnose and fix IT problems from the server to the individual computer. That most likely provided him access to all the websites in the system. He was probably board one day and surfed the system- viola!
But I think we forget what it takes to manage all these IT systems and to post all the intelligence and classified documents necessary for national security decision makers. These documents and this kind of intelligence will not magically appear in decision makers' inboxes without a large human infrastructure managing the systems.
Unfortunately we need young people like Airman Jack Teixeira You are not going to find LT C X, COL Y, or General Z doing the work of this airman.
We can restrict clearances and try to further restrict access but I fear we will cut off our nose to spite our face and over react to this incident.
Pentagon intelligence breach renews scrutiny over clearances
BY REBECCA BEITSCH AND LAURA KELLY - 04/14/23 1:14 PM ET
The Hill · · April 14, 2023
The arrest of Jack Teixeira in connection with the leak of classified government documents has quickly raised a series of questions, including how a 21-year-old guardsman at a base in Cape Cod had access to such sensitive information.
Authorities arrested Teixeira on Thursday, following a series of reports identifying him as the leader of a group on gamer site Discord, where documents with significant intelligence on adversaries as well as allies were posted in recent months before spilling over onto other social media sites.
Teixeira, who served in 102nd Intelligence Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was a technology support staffer, a relatively low-ranking position, but one that still came with access to the Pentagon’s Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), a clearinghouse for intelligence information.
Dozens of pieces of information that appear to come from the database were shared with 20 to 30 members of “Thug Shaker Central,” a group where participants reportedly expressed enthusiasm for guns, racist and antisemitic humor, and devout Catholic views.
The Pentagon has begun culling their distribution lists, but the episode has renewed discussions over how the intelligence community shares information and doles out clearances.
“There are systems that provide people access, based on the level of classifications that they’ve been provided. And so they can see stuff that they maybe don’t need to know, and I don’t know how you cordon that stuff off. But, we rely on people to honor their clearances. And there’s a lot of people that don’t take it very seriously,” said David Schenker, a former senior State Department and Pentagon official under the Trump and George W. Bush administrations.
“There’s those people that have grievances and aren’t loyal Americans, and we have to be consistent about throwing the book at these people, but also, maybe do some rethinking about classification and access.”
How security clearance works
Nearly 3 million Americans have a security clearance, while about 1.2 million have access to information that is considered top secret.
In Teixeira’s case, what started as summarizing intelligence reports for his friends on the internet escalated to printing and taking photographs of classified intelligence, including some labeled “NOFORN,” indicating it should not be shared with foreigners.
While printing, photographing and sharing classified information is a crime — Teixeira was arraigned Friday on charges that include the Espionage Act — many were surprised by the ease of doing so and that it went undetected for so long.
Glenn Gerstell, who previously served as the general counsel of the National Security Agency, said Teixeira’s access highlights an issue with JWICS.
“He’d have to log in with his specific credentials, but once he’s in that network, he then would be entitled to see anything that his clearance level allows him to see,” Gerstell said, something that in theory should only allow him to see information on a “need to know” basis relevant to his job.
“It doesn’t sound like that principle was adhered to in this practice,” Gerstell said.
Calls for access reviews
Among the reportedly 300 documents allegedly leaked by Texeira were detailed assessments on Russia’s war in Ukraine, including intimate conversations among high-level Russian officials. Also leaked was intelligence on allies and partners — like Israel, South Korea, Egypt and Turkey — spanning those countries’ domestic issues and their deliberations surrounding Russia and Ukraine.
“Now, how it is that he was able to access such a wide array of materials — even though his job seems to be far more limited — and how it is he was able to print this out without attracting notice; and how it is he was able to walk out the door with copies of these documents on multiple occasions over an extended period of many months is going to be the subject of military inquiry,” Gerstell asked.
Related stories from The Hill
Some lawmakers have already initiated calls to review access.
“There are systemic issues that need to be addressed, including protocols for how intelligence is handled, the security clearance process, and how officials can prevent intelligence leaks like this from ever happening again. Congress will be briefed further and corrective steps will be taken,” Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement Thursday.
Gerstell said the intelligence community has rethought how it shares and relays information in recent years, a result of both prior leaks and major events like 9/11, which spurred agencies to begin sharing more information with partners.
“The national security apparatus realized that we really needed to make information more freely available to more people, to share information, break down walls between the FBI and law enforcement and the intelligence community and one another, and make sure that we can do everything we can to facilitate easy sharing of information. Because you never know what kind of information you need to connect the dots,” he said, something that has had real benefits.
Amid criticism over the handling of Iraq, the intelligence community began to more regularly “show our work,” Gerstell said, offering richer detail about how information was collected, including when it came from human sources, and even direct quotes.
“And you get what we have now, which is a vast amount of detailed information being made available to lots of lots of people, all for very good, rational reasons,” Gerstell said.
“That’s the problem. And the pendulum swings back and forth and we’ve gone wildly in favor of excessively available information to too many people, including too much information,” he said.
Monitoring access and beyond
That information is only shared with those who have undergone the lengthy clearance vetting process, one that requires disclosing foreign contacts and in some cases can even include a polygraph. It doesn’t probe a candidate’s private social media history or political views, as the government cannot base hiring decisions on the latter.
But the scrutiny largely ends once an employee has a clearance.
“The clearance vetting process, even as invasive as it may be, does not generally probe into your personal political views and opinions. While it may become a subject of interest if those views resulted in a person engaging in illegal conduct or otherwise exhibit behavior raising doubts about their trustworthiness, the agencies lack the time, resources and overall interest to dig into social media accounts and personal politics,” Brad Moss, a national security law expert, told The Hill by email.
“The larger issue will be the after-action reports that emerge out of the Government on how this junior level IT official got his hands on all of this classified material and managed to extract it out of secured facilities without anyone noticing.”
Gerstell said while many workplaces in the intelligence community do monitor their employees practices at work, including their printing habits, doing so outside of work could violate employees’ First Amendment rights.
Gaining access to Thug Shaker Central, the private chat group online, would require a warrant, one that could only be gained after demonstrating sufficient cause for the need to obtain such records.
A possible cascade of issues from leaks
But the whole episode demonstrates the ability of one actor to have a serious impact on national security for numerous countries.
“The whole thing is troubling. I mean, so many leaks all the time, but this is incredibly damaging,” said Schenker, noting that the government spends upward of $90 billion a year on intelligence services.
“And it is top notch. And the fact that so many people have access, and so many people have either mental illness or grievances, there’s no way it’s going to be incredibly hard going forward to keep secrets.”
Schenker noted the sharing of secrets can have real world consequences, even deadly ones.
He pointed to the assassination in 2021 of Lokman Slim, a Lebanese columnist, publisher and filmmaker and outspoken critic of the terrorist-designated group Hezbollah.
Between 2010 and 2011, Slim’s name was included in a trove of diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks that discussed his conversations with American diplomats and meetings in Washington, where he provided perspective on Lebanese politics and Hezbollah. The leak of documents led to a series of threats on his life.
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“So it does get people killed,” Schenker said of intelligence leaks. “And some of them are Americans. Or some of them are US grant recipients or people the agency has cultivated to be sources.”
Slim was killed in February 2021, shot six times while sitting in his car, three times in the head, The New York Times reported at the time.
“He was my best friend in Lebanon,” Schenker said.
The Hill · by Julia Mueller · April 14, 2023
15. Australia to host largest-ever Exercise Talisman Sabre
The largest Freedom Shield in Korea. The largest Balikitan in the Philippines. Now the largest Talisman Sabre in Australia. What message does that send?
Australia to host largest-ever Exercise Talisman Sabre
Department of Defence
miragenews.com · by Mirage News · April 15, 2023
Australia will host the largest ever Exercise Talisman Sabre this year across northern Australia, with approximately 30,000 military personnel to participate, almost double the number involved in 2021.
Now in its tenth iteration, Talisman Sabre is the largest bilateral combined training activity between the Australian Defence Force and United States military, reflecting the closeness of our Alliance.
The biennial exercise is an opportunity to exercise high-end, multi-domain warfare capabilities, build and affirm military-to-military ties and interoperability, and strengthen strategic partnerships across the region.
Confirmed participating partner nations in Talisman Sabre 2023 include Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, France, United Kingdom, Canada and Germany.
The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand will attend as observers.
Talisman Sabre 2023 will run from 22 July to 4 August primarily in Queensland but also in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and New South Wales.
The 14-day exercise will include large scale logistics, multi-domain firepower demonstrations, land combat, amphibious landings and air operations.
Quotes attributable to Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Richard Marles MP:
“Talisman Sabre is a practical demonstration of our enduring Alliance with the United States, through deepening cooperation in training and innovation.”
“Australia is excited to host what will be the largest ever iteration of Talisman Sabre this year, involving more of our partner nations than ever before.”
“Talisman Sabre reflects a shared commitment to enduring relationships between trusted partners, and a stable Indo-Pacific through an upholding of the rules-based order.”
Quotes attributable to Talisman Sabre Exercise Director, Brigadier Damian Hill:
“Talisman Sabre 2023 will be the largest ever iteration of the exercise in terms of both geographic span and also partner nation involvement. Considerable planning has gone into a safe and productive exercise for all participants.”
“This year’s exercise will demonstrate our ability to receive large volumes of personnel and equipment into Australia from across the Indo-Pacific and stage, integrate and move them forward into the large exercise area.”
“Talisman Sabre 2023 will be held across a range of Defence and non-Defence training areas across northern Australia and I thank the traditional owners, landowners, state authorities, and key community stakeholders who have helped us develop a safe and productive exercise for all participating nations.”
/Public Release. This material from the originating organization/author(s) might be of the point-in-time nature, and edited for clarity, style and length. Mirage.News does not take institutional positions or sides, and all views, positions, and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author(s).View in full .
miragenews.com · by Mirage News · April 15, 2023
16. On this Day, 16 April 1987, USSOCOM was Established
You can read the 40 page fact book to learn the details of USSOCOM here: https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2023%20Fact%20Book.pdf
Location - MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
Established - April 16, 1987
Commander - U.S. Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton
Command Sergeant Major - U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Shane W. Shorter
Deputy Commander - U.S. Navy (SEAL) Vice Adm. Collin P. Green
Vice Commander - U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Francis L. Donovan
Role - Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests
People - Headquarters approximately 2.500/Entire command nearly 70,000
17. Report: How Chinese are funding terrorist groups to gain access to mineral reserves in Nigeria
Unfortunately the report at The Times is behind a firewall.
Report: How Chinese are funding terrorist groups to gain access to mineral reserves in Nigeria | TheCable
thecable.ng · by Samad Uthman · April 15, 2023
The Times, a British national daily, says Chinese nationals in the mining sector are funding terrorist groups in parts of Nigeria to secure access to the country’s mineral reserves.
In an exclusive report published on Saturday, the newspaper said through bribes and illegal transactions, “Beijing could be indirectly funding terror in Africa’s largest economy”.
The report revealed that some Chinese nationals who have worked informally as miners in Zamfara serve as runners for some militant groups in the state and other north-western parts of the country.
“Chinese companies working in parts of Nigeria where attacks are frequent have been striking security deals with insurgents, The Times has learnt. Attacks on Chinese citizens, of whom there are said to be between 100,000 and 200,000 in Nigeria, have become regular occurrences in recent years amid the country’s many conflicts,” the report said.
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“Research shared with The Times from SBM Intelligence, a Lagos-based analytical group, has revealed videos on social media and WhatsApp of militant leaders boasting that they are so powerful that Chinese workers wishing to operate in their areas must pay them ‘rent’. They have taken over swathes of northwest Nigeria, turning the region into the country’s bloodiest conflict zone.
“In one pocket of Zamfara, researchers found, interaction with militants runs so deep that some serve as runners for Chinese miners who have spread throughout Nigeria, controlling digs for gold. The country has some of the largest gold reserves in the world.
“Often operating informally in small groups as contractors registered to clearing-house companies, they speak local languages and can stay for years at a time living in remote areas that western companies consider off-limits.
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The Times also said Chinese mining contractors, who often pay a pittance to locals working on their fields, often smuggle minerals out of the country illegally and are sometimes arrested.
“Chinese mining contractors, who local communities have accused of abuses and paying pitiful wages, often smuggle minerals out of the country illegally and are sometimes arrested.
“In 2020, 27 miners, including 17 said to be Chinese, were arrested in Osun state. Last October a Chinese citizen, Gang Deng, 29, was jailed for five years after being found with 25 tonnes of a mineral thought to be lepidolite, containing lithium, which is used in batteries.
“SBM also found Chinese workers involved in the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria’s northeast, with a case of a Chinese smuggler being paid to help a jihadist group move metal ore out of the country.”
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thecable.ng · by Samad Uthman · April 15, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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