Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

:My idea was that the role of the special forces were to train Vietnamese to behave as guerrillas, harassing the supply lines down through the mountains of the, ah, the Viet Cong. And the special American special forces were to train their special forces to do that."

- Roger Hilsman

"I’ve been invited to view a hostage rescue operation after supper tonight. Army Special Forces troops are well trained and equipped in such regards, but I wonder why any commander would waste area-oriented, foreign language-qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies. So, what’s my recommendation to SOF schoolteachers regarding missions, given my belief that planning on certainty is the worst of all military mistakes? Concentrate on responsibilities that currently are in demand, but maintain respectable competence in all others so you don’t have to reinvent the wheel when priorities shift unexpectedly, as they’ve repeatedly done in the past." - the late Colonel John Collins, AKA The Warlord

"I would hope that all educated citizens would fulfill this obligation—in politics, in Government, here in Nashville, here in this State, in the Peace Corps, in the Foreign Service, in the Government Service, in the Tennessee Valley, in the world. You will find the pressures greater than the pay. You may endure more public attacks than support. But you will have the unequaled satisfaction of knowing that your character and talent are contributing to the direction and success of this free society."

- John F. Kennedy

1. Opinion | The U.S. needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world by Robert M. Gates

2. A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

3. Social-Media Account Overseen by Former Navy Noncommissioned Officer Helped Spread Secrets

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 16, 2023

5. Wagner Boss Claims Russia’s Mission Accomplished in Ukraine

6. Opinion | TikTok is dangerously addictive. We should regulate it now.

7. America Needs Veterans to Serve in Public Offices - SOAA

8. Too many with access, too little vetting. Pentagon leaks were ‘a matter of time’

9. The Air Force Loves War Gamers Like Teixeira

10. America’s economic outperformance is a marvel to behold

11. Army Picked Pricier Black Hawk Replacement Over ‘Unacceptable’ Losing Bid, GAO Says

12. Swift Actions by JOs Prevented Warship Collision in San Diego Harbor, Investigation Finds

13. Can America sustain a volunteer military? Syracuse summit to look for answers

14. Notes from Central Taiwan: The Normandy Invasion trope

15. The Army Must Reward Smart Leaders, Not Just Strong Ones, if We Want to Win the Next War

16. US warship sails through Taiwan Strait following China war games

17. Russia struggling to cope with Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories

18. More than a Hobby: Informal Security Assistance to Ukraine

19. Who's Tackling Classified AI?

20. Why America Still Needs Europe

21. Germany Still Hasn’t Stepped Up

1. Opinion | The U.S. needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world by Robert M. Gates

Some thoughtful recommendations that we need to take seriously.

Excerpt:

The solution is not to re-create the USIA — the world has moved on. But a number of measures can be taken to dramatically improve the current lamentable state of affairs, some strategic, others operational. Many of them the president could implement immediately, while others would require congressional action.

...

But that’s just a “starter set” of actions. More will be needed to strengthen this critical instrument of American power — an instrument that was essential to our success in the Cold War and will be even more important in the global contest that lies before us.

Opinion | The U.S. needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world

The Washington Post · by Robert M. Gates · April 16, 2023

Robert M. Gates was defense secretary from 2006 to 2011 and is chairman of the Gates Global Policy Center partnered with William & Mary.

In the long contest ahead with Russia and China, U.S. military power will be of greatest importance, but non-military instruments of power will be essential to our ability to compete and win as well. The most crucial such instrument is economic, the importance of which is widely recognized, as both the executive branch and Congress work to promote strong growth and technological superiority.

We have, however, seriously neglected other instruments of power that were fundamental to winning the Cold War: telling our story to the world, telling the truth to populations of countries ruled by authoritarian governments and exposing disinformation spread by those same governments.

Strategic communications and engagement with foreign publics and leaders are essential to shaping the global political environment in ways that support and advance American national interests. In this crucial arena of the competition, however, Russia and China are running rings around us.

Russia’s militarized bid to reverse the Cold War verdict and resurrect its empire has relied heavily on propaganda and disinformation to spread false narratives among its own people and those outside its borders, as well as to undermine the West’s coherence and resolve. Because Russia has no positive narrative to offer, its strategic communications aimed at other countries mainly attack the United States and the West, and serve as spoilers intended to disrupt and divide.

China has taken a far more comprehensive approach. It has built an extraordinary global strategic communications and foreign influence operation, committing huge sums of money to building a modern media apparatus aimed at domestic and world audiences. China’s Xinhua News Agency has nearly 180 bureaus globally (and there is not a single country on the planet that is not reached by one or more Chinese radio, television or online outlets). Chinese companies buy stakes in domestic media outlets in numerous countries, especially in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. Chinese TV and radio broadcasts, websites and publications are readily available in the United States, but there is no reciprocity in China. More than 500 Confucius Institutes, ostensibly established to promote Chinese language and culture, spread China’s message around the world. The scale of the overall endeavor — and multiple mechanisms used — is without parallel.

In stark contrast, the United States after the Cold War largely dismantled its strategic communications and engagement capabilities. The U.S. Information Agency, our primary instrument to engage foreign publics throughout the Cold War, with a presence in 150 countries, was eliminated in 1999. Parts of it were parceled out to the State Department, and most of our know-how and key structures for engaging foreign publics were left to atrophy. The lack of priority attention to American strategic communications and engagement over the years is demonstrated most vividly by the fact that the undersecretary position in the State Department charged with overseeing these efforts has not had a Senate-confirmed occupant 40 percent of the time since it was created in 1999 and 90 percent of the time under Donald Trump and President Biden.

U.S. strategic communications and public diplomacy are fragmented among 14 agencies and 48 commissions. Yet, the State Department, which ought to be driving this train, lacks not just necessary resources in dollars and people but also, importantly, the authority to coordinate, integrate and synchronize these disparate and unfocused efforts. Further, there is no government-wide international communications and engagement strategy, and certainly no sense of urgency. In short, the country that invented public relations is being out-communicated around the world by an authoritarian Russia and increasingly totalitarian China.

Our approach must be different from theirs. Our advantage over the Soviet Union in strategic communications during the Cold War was that the USIA and our radio broadcasters such as Voice of America simply told the truth. We must continue to do so. However, in those days we had eager audiences in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The global audience today is more skeptical, so we must develop new approaches to effectively deliver our message.

The solution is not to re-create the USIA — the world has moved on. But a number of measures can be taken to dramatically improve the current lamentable state of affairs, some strategic, others operational. Many of them the president could implement immediately, while others would require congressional action.

First and foremost, the White House and State Department should develop a global engagement plan for strategic communications to explicitly advance U.S. national security interests. This plan should include a road map for engagement with foreign publics and leaders focused especially on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Underpinning this plan should be a significant expansion of people-to-people exchange programs that send American musicians, sports figures and artists abroad and bring foreign college students to the United States, with government support for private efforts in these areas.

Further, we need more aggressive efforts to breach the digital communications firewalls that allow China and Russia to propagate false narratives within their borders unchecked by independent views. We should also allocate additional resources to the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, the organization responsible for unmasking and discrediting foreign disinformation. These measures, among others, would give focus to our strategic communications efforts.

Operationally, the Senate should quickly confirm Elizabeth Allen, the president’s nominee for undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. The president should empower the secretary and, specifically, this undersecretary of state to synchronize the foreign strategic engagement efforts of all elements of the executive branch — including the Defense Department, which spends many times more on these programs than the State Department but is disconnected from our diplomatic strategies. Biden should also appoint a senior National Security Council official with responsibility (and authority) to ensure that strategic communications are an integral part of every NSC decision-making process. The president and Congress need to ensure that the secretary of state is empowered to provide broad strategic guidance to the Agency for Global Media, which manages all U.S. foreign broadcasting. Finally, our allies have their own strategic communications capabilities, and we need new efforts to coordinate our mutual capabilities, perhaps through a new office at NATO.

But that’s just a “starter set” of actions. More will be needed to strengthen this critical instrument of American power — an instrument that was essential to our success in the Cold War and will be even more important in the global contest that lies before us.

The Washington Post · by Robert M. Gates · April 16, 2023

2. A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

Anyone interested in information warfare or influence activities or psychological operations or public diplomacy should read this from Matt Armstrong one of our nation's foremost authorities on these topics.

A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

Notes & details behind my 8 minute presentation

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/a-look-at-the-good-the-bad-and-the?r=2lc2b

MATT ARMSTRONG

APR 14, 2023

I spoke at the #Connexions Conference on Global Media in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy this past Monday. The event was held at the University of Texas at Austin, and while I was remote, Dr. Nick Cull, the discussant, and Jeff Trimble, the moderator, were both in-person.

The conference keynote was given by Ukrainian Ambassador to the US Oksana Markarova. The Ambassador’s comments are worth your time.

Our panel was titled “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare.” We immediately followed the Ambassador’s keynote to provide a kind of scene-setter (at the 1hr mark at the above link). That was the hopeful intent to try to push conversations into either accurate and meaningful invocations of history in support of their arguments or leave aside the history they misread, don’t understand, or invent. One subsequent presentation, for example, checked all three boxes quickly, even as the presenter could have left out their (inaccurate) historical narrative without affecting anything.

As Nick noted at the start of his presentation following my 8-minute opener, our panel was in agreement. Rather than contention, we built upon each other’s statements. Jeff was a superb moderator with his context, pulling from outside statements, and teeing up questions. The only problem with the panel was its length: it was too short at 60 minutes, even after our brief opening comments, to allow for an extended question and answer, which, for me, is the real value and why I decided to participate in this event. I’m more interested in the conversation where I get to know and speak to the issues and concerns of the audience rather than just projecting stuff at the audience.

As Ambassador Markarova commented that Russian activities today are not new but can be traced back centuries, I preceded my planned remarks by supporting her accurate assessment by reflecting that another Ukrainian said the same thing nearly six decades ago. In 1964, Dr. Lev Dobriansky, then chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and a professor at Georgetown, offered this in a prepared statement before a Congressional committee:

Careful analyses along these and primarily substantive lines would reveal that what we classify today as Moscow's cold war techniques and methods are essentially traditional to totalitarian Russian empire-building. Contrary to general opinion, they are not the created products of so-called Communist ideology and tactics. Except for accidental refinements and considerable technologic improvements, many of the techniques manipulated by the rulers of the present Russian empire, and also applied by their Red Chinese competitors, can be systematically traced as far back as the 16th century. Indeed, over a half century before Marx, the Russian ambassadors of Catherine the Great utilized class-division techniques to prepare for the partitions of Poland. Countless other examples of striking comparative worth and value can be cited.

1

While technologies change, there is remarkable consistency in the basic methods and desired outcomes across time. We periodically rediscover that our adversaries don’t wish to or cannot confront us directly in combat, and we complain about it. However, an examination of our organizational and policy history reveals that while we periodically accept such a reality, we also consistently disregard it in favor of tangible military-based dissuasion, which, perhaps ironically, naturally encourages our adversaries to continue to operate below our fuzzy thresholds to employ the combat might we have invested in so heavily instead of prioritizing the non-military avenues they encroach upon and exploit. These ambiguous thresholds, shaped by our domestic politics and the White House’s willingness to act in some way at any given moment, are manipulated and exploited by the same or similar capabilities we implicitly, if not explicitly, push our adversaries to use. While this was not the explicit focus of my comments, it is foundational to understanding “the good, the bad, the ugly” of the US’s history around the politics of information warfare.

Based on the pre-meetings, my opening focused on four points. What follows is not a transcript of my remarks but an expanded discussion of my 8 minutes.

1. Unfulfilled Promises of USIA

My first point was the criteria in all of the recommendations supporting the establishment of the US Information Agency were never met. Yet, these same criteria are often heard today in calls to bring back USIA, whether on “steroids” or not. This fact increasingly feels like waving at windmills, but I’ll keep at it. If you want to recite history, know the history. More on that is below.

In other words, the US Information Agency (USIA) never was or became what it was supposed to be. It replaced an agency with a seat at the various tables, usually as the chair of the departmental and inter-agency committees. Beyond being embedded in the making and conducting foreign policy, this predecessor agency had greater authorities across a broader portfolio of efforts. This predecessor was the International Information Administration and, as a semi-autonomous unit in the State Department, had under it 50% of the Department's personnel and commanded 40% of the Department’s budget.

2What was USIA supposed to be? Three major reports in 1953 that recommended establishing an independent agency outside of the State Department had overlapping views.

The Advisory Commission on Information’s recommendation of February 1953

3 was clear on several points, the most relevant point here being:That the International Information Administration (IIA) be separated from the Department of State and placed in a new agency of Cabinet level in which there is vested authority to formulate psychological strategy and to coordinate information policies of all Government agencies and consolidate all overseas information programs.

The commission also commented on the paperwork reduction language

4 in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 that led to the “on request” phrase appearing in the legislation that subsequently became a barrier to access:That Congress authorize IIA to release domestically, without request, information concerning its programs.

It should be noted here the commission was not suggesting IIA, as it existed or would exist should it be separated into a new Cabinet-level agency, disseminate these materials. There is a difference between being available and active distribution. For example, imagine going to a library and being told you can access anything but can’t see the card catalog or enter the stacks. How are you supposed to know what is there? Now put this in terms of oversight and awareness. More on that later.

It should also be noted that in its reports of 1951 and 1952, the commission repeatedly stated it saw no reason or value to move the operations out of the State Department. Below is from the commission’s April 1951 report, which it recalled in its July 1952 (“Our position today is as it was in April of 1951”):

This Commision has no vested interest in the placement of the information program. We are only concerned with its maximum effectiveness. If we were persuaded that it could Function more effectively outside the State Department, we would feel obligated to say so. But our experience has led us to have grave doubts that the program in the hands of a separate agency would operate as well as it does now. We believe the subject requires very careful study.

The President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, also known as the Rockefeller Committee, recommended in April 1953 that a new information agency be established “in which would be consolidated the most important foreign information programs and cultural and educational exchange programs now carried on by the United States International Information Administration” and other agencies. Keeping the cultural and educational exchange programs together was also part of the Advisory Commission on Information’s recommendation. However, the Rockefeller Committee did not suggest a Cabinet seat. Instead, it advised:

The new agency would be established under the National Security Council under arrangements paralleling those set forth in the National Security Act for the Central Intelligence Agency.

5

The third report came from the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, also called the Jackson Committee after its chairman, former Deputy Director of the CIA, William H. Jackson.

6 This group landed on three scenarios: alignment with the Rockefeller Committee by making IIA an independent agency under the NSC; splitting the baby and keeping some exchange programs in State and creating a new agency responsible for information programs; or retaining IIA inside the State Department but with increased autonomy and a higher rank for the IIA chief. The Jackson Committee favored the third option – keeping IIA inside of State while increasing its authorities – as did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was pondering the subject.John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, did not want an operational role for the Department, let alone this IIA thing. So it was, he would say, a few years later, in 1957, when asked to consider reintegrating USIA into the State Department, a distraction to him and the Department from their core business of diplomacy.

Two of these reports were largely ignored, while the third bent to the wishes of a Secretary of State. The result was the segregation of information from policy. In a further rejection of calls for greater consolidation, it bifurcated various engagement and exchange programs from information and general policy discussions.

2. Calls to Reconsider USIA Began within a Few Years

My second point is briefer. I pondered how many people calling for a new USIA realize not just the failure to adhere to the several well-thought-out recommendations in 1952 but that within a few years, there were calls to replace or reintegrate USIA into the State Department.

In 1957, the Eisenhower Administration questioned whether USIA should be reintegrated into the State Department (Secretary of State Dulles, as noted above, said no).

In 1959, Senator Karl Mundt, formerly Representative Mundt, proposed a Department of International Public Relations responsible for international information policies.

7 Responding to Mundt's call, the chairman of the Advisory Commission on Information, Mark May, reminded Mundt the commission "had a similar idea" when it recommended "IIA be lifted out of the Department of State and placed in a new agency of Cabinet level" back on 1953.8Also, in 1959, the Brookings Institute analyzed the foreign policy apparatus at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It recommended establishing an overarching Department of Foreign Affairs with three cabinet-level departments. A Department of Information and Cultural Affairs would be co-equal to the other sub-departments: the Department of State and the Department of Foreign Economic Operations.

In 1960, another Eisenhower committee looked at the organization, which was led by Mansfield Sprague and included the USIA Director George Allen, CIA Director Allen Dulles, National Security Advisor Gordon Gray, Advisory Commission on Information Member Philip D. Reed, and others. Their January 1961 report did support keeping USIA and recommended increasing training, increasing activities, and “cease the continuous reorganization and review of USIA.” Also in 1960, the Advisory Commission on Information stated, “the time has come for the United States to consolidate all the foreign cultural, educational, and information programs in one agency of cabinet status.”

9The Kennedy administration in 1961 saw three more studies of USIA. One of these was part of the administration’s review of foreign policy machinery, with the USIA review led by Dr. Lloyd Free

10 from the President and two in-house USIA reports. All of these did maintain USIA should remain independent. Still, they all recommended substantial changes, including the USIA Director's participation in the National Security Council and an increased role for the USIA in making US foreign policy. Other recommendations included some of the consolidation recommended in 1953 that never happened.In 1968, the Advisory Commission on Information raised questions about USIA. Acknowledging USIA’s successes, it restated its call of 1960 (which it repeated in 1961) with added emphasis:

The continued separation of the exchange programs into United States Information Service (USIS) administration abroad and Department of State administration in Washington has become an anachronism, an anomaly leading co ineffectiveness, excessive bureaucracy and to an unfortunate diminution in funds for this imperative segment of long-range communications effort overseas. We believe that division should end; that it is time to draw together into a restructured USIA, or into a new independent agency, the reins leading to our now fractionalized public affairs programs overseas.

11

Five years later, in 1973, the commission reiterated the need for a serious study of USIA:

The Commission believes that the need for an overall review of USIA, including its position in the overall structure of the government’s foreign affairs community, remains necessary. After 25 years of experience, it is time for a reexamination and an appraisal of its accomplishments, its role and its future potential.

12

There continued to be recommendations for severe evaluation and change. Some argued that if USIA did not gain greater authority and a seat at the policy-making table, it should cease being an independent agency.

3. Misinformation and Disinformation Around the Smith-Mundt Act

I don’t want to spend too much time on the misinformation and disinformation

14 around the Smith-Mundt Act. Suffice it to say the perversions of the Smith-Mundt Act by Senator Fulbright in 1972, part of his years-long campaign to shutter USIA and to handicap if not shut the "Radios" (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty), further segregated information from policy while also tainting our views of what we say abroad as "propaganda" unfit for Americans, which is quite the statement.

4. Leadership Matters

My fourth point was that, ultimately, leadership matters. Each organizational iteration following IIA, portfolios shrank: USIA had less than the IIA, while the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, established in 1999, enjoyed substantially fewer authorities and actual capabilities than the USIA Director, and arguably even less now considering reorganizations and leadership vacuums. Considering the under secretary position has been vacant nearly 46% of days in the last twenty-four years, with gaps unheard of in the time of USIA or with any other leadership office, how does an organization and line of effort function, and what does it say about leadership’s view of the position and value?

One last point, as this note has gotten quite long. Mark Pomar, in a statement-question at the end, asserted USIA’s role in foreign policy in the 1980s with his comment he gave a two-hour brief to the NSC (I recommend his book). I noted earlier that people looking at USIA's “glory days” should consider the period they refer to. For example, the cold war of the late-1940s through the 1960s was remarkably similar to today, while the cold war of the 1980s was very unlike today. Pomar’s comment reflected a temporary high-level interest in the White House, an exception proving the rule over USIA's long haul.

That’s it for now. Congratulations on making it this far.

Hearings Relating to H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, and H.R. 11718, Providing for Creation of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964), p1281.

See the article last year (July 6, 2022) by my friend Chris Paul and me that the mythology around USIA distracts us from recognizing our problems and thus also potential solutions: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-irony-of-misinformation-usia-myths-block-enduring-solutions/.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Seventh Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1953).

The Congress’s intent in 1947 was that all information produced for foreign audiences would be immediately available in English and without restriction in the US for review—the reason: additional and immediate oversight. The Smith-Mundt bill passed by the House on June 24, 1947, included a floor amendment offered by Reps. Richard M. Simpson (R-PA) and Clarence J. Brown, Sr. (R-OH) requiring “All such press releases and radio scripts shall in the English language be made available to press associations, newspapermen, radio systems, and stations in the United States and to Members of the Congress of the United States upon request, within 15 days after release as information abroad.” In the Senate, the State Department raised a concern about the practical impact of what several anticipated would be blanket requests.

Here is a part of an exchange on this matter during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Smith-Mundt bill on July 3, 1947:

Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM): Now, what Mr. Benton would like to have clarified a little bit is, if some newspaper shotdd ask to have all radio scrips translated throughout the year.

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton: Which somebody will.

Hatch: These foreign-language broadcasts alone total 1,200,000 words a week. Would it be wise to include in the committee’s report that this language is intended to cover only representative samples of this material?

Benton: I do not take any exception to the intent, but you have a potential expense here of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, with rooms full of translators and mimeograph machines doing nothing but translating all this radio material.

We have gone through this kind of legitimate request with [Rep. John Taber (R-NY), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee] many times. He will say, “Give me every script of yesterday.” He will then want a sample. We will put translators to work. We will translate every script of yesterday and, of course, we will furnish it to him. But he doesn't ask for every script, every day, for a year.

Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ). Are not all these things prepared m English first, so that you have the English version before they are put in the foreign language?

Benton: No.

Two weeks later, on July 16, during an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to review the Smith-Mundt bill, Sen. Smith, the “Smith” in Smith-Mundt, suggested the following language to address the State Department’s concern about blanket requests:

On request, representative samples or specific individual press releases and radio scripts shall be made available in the English language for examination at the Department of State by representatives of press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems and stations, and be made available to Members of Congress, within 15 days after release as information abroad.

The committee accepted this. Subsequent wordsmithing, including removing the 15-day requirement, resulted in the text below as found in Public Law 80-402, the Smith-Mundt Act, signed by Truman on January 27, 1948:

Any such press release or radio script, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Department of State, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination by representatives of United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and, on request, shall be made available to Members of Congress.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d326

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/comp4

Mundt published this proposal in the Public Relations Journal and republished in various newspapers around the country.

Letter from Mark A. May to Sen. Karl Mundt, dated September 8, 1959.

See HR 3628, introduced by Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) on June 29, 1945, in the 79th Congress. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) supported the effort from the other chamber, including with the article “A Department of Peace for the American Government” in the September 1945 issue of Free World magazine. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the bill on November 8, 1945. The idea of this Department of Peace emerged as Congress and the State Department were working on the Bloom bill, which was then called but introduced originally by Rep. Karl Mundt (R-SD) in January 1945. In practical terms, the Department of Peace would initially have a subset of the Mundt/Bloom bill mission and authorities. (The explicit international information operations would not be added to the Mundt/Bloom bill, later known as the Smith-Mundt Act, until October 1945.) Two weeks after the Department of Peace hearing, the Secretary of State wrote to Sol Bloom (D-NY), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to say that while the Department of Peace was welcome, it overlapped with the existing Mundt/Bloom bill (then HR 4368 as an amendment to existing legislation, but soon to be rewritten as a stand-alone bill in December as HR 4982) and could create problems: “The Department believes it essential that such a program of relations between peoples, if supported by government funds, should be planned and integrated to assure conformity with the basic foreign policies of the United States Government, as provided in H. R. 4368, and that this can best be accomplished by centralizing responsibility for such a program in the Department of State, not in a new Department of Peace outside of the Department of State.”

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Fifteenth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1960), p30. The commission repeated this call in its subsequent report, the 16th, issued in January 1961.

Free’s bio is worth a look:

Dr. Lloyd A. Free is the president of The Institute for International Social Research. His educational experience includes Princeton University, Stanford University Law School, Yenching University, and The George Washington University. Early in his career he practiced law, was a Fellow with the Rockefeller Foundation, and then affiliated with Princeton University as a lecturer in the School of Public and International Affairs and later served as Associate Director, Princeton Public Opinion Project.

Dr. Free joined the Government in 1941 as the first Director of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. He subsequently served Government in numerous senior positions, some of which were Acting Director, Office of International Information of the State Department; Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs in Rome; Consultant to President Eisenhower on psychological aspects of American foreign policy; and Cochairman, Task Force on USIA to advise President Kennedy.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-third Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1968), p12-13.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-sixth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1973), p34.

See, for example, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-sixth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1973), p19-20.

My primary reason for using “disinformation” here is what I have come to view as willful malpractice by some academics, primarily, who falsely and without evidence make specific claims about the original or evolved nature of the Smith-Mundt Act. This is particularly true of academics and lawyers who accept Sen. Fulbright’s narrative of USIA and the “Radios” in 1967-1972 and work backward, imposing a revised history onto the past while taking his claim he rectified an oversight, all while not reading the whole transcripts they cite or seeing his transparent motivations. Moreover, these same authors never seem to discuss the difference in legislative discussions between the broadcast and other information operations vis a vis USIA and the State Department. Nor do they discuss, let alone mention, the narrow application of the Smith-Mundt Act to only the USIA and later some of the State Department (and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, now the US Agency for Global Media). See, for example, this:

Arming for the War We're In

No, the Smith-Mundt Act doesn't apply to the Defense Department

The misinformation around the Smith-Mundt Act is fantastic. Unfortunately, at some point, much of it, including public legal analyses and especially internal legal and other guidance, seems bent on earning the label of disinformation. I had not planned on publishing here for another week as I am focused on a more critical writing effort, but I was, I’ll…

2 months ago · 4 likes · 1 comment · Matt Armstrong

3.Social-Media Account Overseen by Former Navy Noncommissioned Officer Helped Spread Secrets

Curiouser and curiouser.

Social-Media Account Overseen by Former Navy Noncommissioned Officer Helped Spread Secrets

An American administrator of the Donbas Girl blogger network uses a pro-Russian persona across online platforms

https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-account-overseen-by-former-navy-noncommissioned-officer-helped-spread-secrets-a4b5643b

By Yaroslav Trofimov

and Bob Mackin

Updated April 16, 2023 3:46 pm ET

A social-media account overseen by a former U.S. Navy noncommissioned officer—a prominent online voice supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine—played a key role in the spread of intelligence documents allegedly leaked by Airman First Class Jack Teixeira, reposting files from obscure online chat rooms.

A purported Russian blogger known as Donbass Devushka, which translates as Donbas Girl, is the face of a network of pro-Kremlin social-media, podcasting, merchandise and fundraising accounts. But the person who hosted podcasts as Donbass Devushka and oversees these accounts is a Washington-state-based former U.S. enlisted aviation electronics technician whose real name is Sarah Bils.

Russia first intervened in the Donbas part of eastern Ukraine in 2014, and most of the recent fighting has focused on that area.

Ms. Bils, 37 years old, served at the U.S. naval air station on Whidbey Island until late last year, even as the accounts she had established and supervised glorified the Russian military and the paramilitary Wagner Group. They are among the most widely followed English-language social-media outlets promoting Russia’s views.

In an interview Saturday at her home in Oak Harbor, Wash., Ms. Bils said she is an administrator of the Donbass Devushka persona, and acknowledged raising funds and hosting podcasts under that name. She added, however, that she is one of 15 people “all over the world” involved in running the Donbass Devushka network. Ms. Bils declined to identify these people.

On April 5, the Donbass Devushka Telegram account posted four of the allegedly leaked classified documents to its 65,000 followers, according to a screenshot seen by The Wall Street Journal. That led several large Russian social-media accounts to pick up on the documents, after which the Pentagon launched an investigation. Ms. Bils says another administrator posted the four files.

Guardsman Arrested Over Leaked Classified Documents Is Charged

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 16, 2023

Apr 16, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 16, 2:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has returned to a “major” but unspecified role in Ukraine after reports that the Russian MoD replaced him on January 13.[1] UK MoD noted that Teplinsky’s return to command in Ukraine will not be limited to just VDV units, but that it is also likely that Teplinsky will try to promote the VDV’s traditional role as an elite force.[2] ISW previously assessed on April 1 that milblogger speculation that the Russian MoD recalled Teplinsky from ”leave“ suggests that Russia may be preparing to reshuffle senior commanders following the failed winter offensive and in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[3] The UK MoD’s apparent confirmation of Teplinsky’s reappointment to a senior command position supports ISW’s assessment, and additionally suggests that the Russian military command is likely seeking to place an increased emphasis on the role of VDV elements in Russian offensive operations. VDV units are actively engaged along critical sectors of the front in Luhansk Oblast and near Bakhmut and have recently received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, further indicating that the Russian military command may seek to elevate the VDV to greater operational prominence.[4]

News of Teplinsky’s reappointment suggests that the Russian MoD is seeking to work more closely with the Wagner Group in order to complete the capture of Bakhmut, despite obvious tensions between Prigozhin and the traditional MoD establishment. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin seemingly confirmed Teplinsky’s Wagner affiliations in a public show of support for Teplinsky following Teplinsky’s reported dismissal over a disagreement with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov in January.[5] Teplinsky became embroiled in the rising tensions between Prigozhin and the Russian MoD establishment (represented by Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu) as the Russian MoD appeared to be actively trying to cut the Wagner Group off from artillery shell supply and otherwise interfere with Wagner’s ability to operate around Bakhmut.[6] Over the past few weeks, however, it appears that the Russian military command has been working more closely with Wagner, likely in an effort to expedite the capture of Bakhmut. The Russian MoD and Prigozhin publicly acknowledged on April 11 that VDV elements are engaged in the Bakhmut area and holding Wagner’s flanks north and south of Bakhmut while Wagner pursues the main offensive effort in the city itself.[7] ISW has recently observed that elements of the 106th VDV division are operating in the Bakhmut area.[8] Prigozhin has also scaled down his explicit rhetorical attacks on the MoD in recent days. Russian milbloggers have reported that Wagner forces are operating T-90 tanks within Bakhmut, suggesting that Russian leadership has allocated more modern assets to Wagner in their efforts to take the city.[9] Teplinsky’s reappointment is therefore likely also an attempt by the Russian MoD to posture itself better to work with Wagner to finish the task of taking Bakhmut.

Teplinsky remains highly unlikely to restore the VDV to its prior status as an elite force due to widespread losses to the most elite Russian units. VDV units suffered extraordinarily high losses in the early phases of the war in 2022, and a prominent milblogger claimed on Russian state television on January 31 that VDV forces lost 40 to 50 percent of their personnel between the start of the war and September 2022.[10] BBC Russia Service confirmed the deaths of 1,669 VDV personnel as of April 14, 2023.[11] Widespread losses to previously elite units that are now being restaffed with poorly trained mobilized personnel are likely to have long-term impacts on the combat effectiveness of these units, and the replacement of a single commander is highly unlikely to be able to solve such pervasive damage.[12]

Russian milbloggers seized on an opportunity to denigrate St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov in a manner that indicates that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s anti-Beglov campaign has permeated the Russian ultra-nationalist information space. Russian milbloggers criticized Beglov for standing in front of a Ukrainian flag at a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg on April 13.[13] The milblogger-amplified image shows Beglov standing on the left side of the podium as another official speaks, and the angle of the image shows Beglov standing directly in front of the Ukrainian flag—a perspective likely not indicative of Beglov’s actual location relative to the flag.[14] The milbloggers claimed that a “high-ranking Russian official” such as Beglov should not stand in front of the Ukrainian flag, with one even claiming that the act was analogous to a Leningrad City head standing in front of the flag of Nazi Germany during World War II.[15] The milbloggers also criticized Beglov for standing in front of the flag just a few weeks after the assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tartarsky) in St. Petersburg.[16] Prigozhin himself claimed that the Russian “deep state” is responsible for the flag’s presence, implying that Beglov is part of this deep state.[17] Other milbloggers claimed that the inclusion of the Ukrainian flag at the meeting suggests that Russia has failed to put itself on a wartime footing.[18] One milblogger claimed that CIS protocol required the inclusion of the Ukrainian flag but noted the strangeness of the protocol given the current conflict.[19] Ukraine ended its affiliation with the CIS in 2018 and has never been a full CIS member state.[20]

Russian officials may have included the Ukrainian flag in an attempt to convey the fact that the Kremlin does not recognize Ukraine’s withdrawal from the CIS and refusal to conform to Kremlin-controlled international structures, falsely anticipating that the Russian information space would praise this underlying message. The Russian information space appears to be so poisoned against Beglov, however, that milbloggers jumped at the chance to criticize him regardless of the subtle Kremlin messaging. This attack against Beglov also suggests that Prigozhin’s Russian “deep state” narrative, about which also he notably warned in an April 14 essay, has the potential to similarly permeate the Russian information space.[21]

The Wagner Group returned 130 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on April 16, suggesting that Wagner may have engaged in the exchange independent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[22] Ukrainian sources confirmed that 130 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine but did not specify how many Russian POWs were exchanged in turn.[23] The Russian MoD deviated from its normal routine and did not confirm the prisoner exchange at all. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin posted a video showing Wagner forces preparing Ukrainian POWs for the exchange.[24] The lack of Russian MoD confirmation contrasted with Prigozhin’s engagement with the exchange may suggest that the Wagner Group maintains a level of autonomy from the Russian MoD and was able to negotiate the exchange with the Ukrainian government independent from the Russian MoD. In the posted video, Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner forces to provide Ukrainian POWs with food and water before their release and personally wished them good luck and health. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger noted that Wagner’s kindness to Ukrainian prisoners is particularly uncharacteristic for a unilateral prisoner exchange that was purportedly not coordinated with the Russian MoD or another entity.[25] Wagner is notorious for the mistreatment of POWs, engaging in several high-profile and widely circulated executions of both returned Wagner POWs and Ukrainian POWs under Wagner’s control.[26] The milblogger also criticized Prigozhin‘s decision to release such a large number of Ukrainian servicemen ahead of the anticipated large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive.[27] Prigozhin’s decision to release so many Ukrainian POWs at such a time likely suggests that the exchange returned high-value Wagner members whom he intends to redeploy on the battlefield. Prigozhin has previously accused Wagner POWs of being traitors and supported their execution, but the conditions of the April 16 prisoner exchange likely imply that he is prioritizing replenishing diminished Wagner units over his continued effort to project Soviet brutalist strength and appeal to Russian ultranationalists.[28]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov also commented on the prisoner exchange on April 16. Kadyrov reported that five Chechens returned as part of the prisoner exchange but that he refused to meet them upon their arrival in Grozny.[29] Kadyrov claimed that the five Chechen fighters should prove their honor by returning to the frontlines, stating that Chechens do not interpret capture as an excuse to lay down arms but instead as an action forced upon them.[30] Kadyrov is likely using the POW exchange to fortify his own reputation as a capable and brutal silovik.

The Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner, possibly in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine. Mobilized personnel from Moscow and Ivanovo oblasts alleged in a public complaint released on April 16 that the Wagner Group forced 170 mobilized personnel to sign contracts with Wagner.[31] Russian sources previously claimed that 100 mobilized personnel in Luhansk Oblast disappeared as of April 7 after refusing to sign contracts with the Wagner Group, and geolocated footage published on April 11 shows Wagner personnel detaining the mobilized personnel in Kadiivka before escorting the personnel to an unspecified training ground.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may allow mobilized personnel to fulfill their service obligations by signing contracts with Wagner, although the status of mobilized personnel initially assigned to conventional Russian units who have signed contracts with Wagner is unclear. Wagner’s reported impressment of poorly trained mobilized personnel, in addition to its change in approach to prisoner exchanges, suggests that Wagner is increasingly desperate for manpower as it continues to conduct highly attritional offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.

Key Takeaways

The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne (VDV) troops.
News of Teplinsky’s reappointment suggests that the Russian MoD is seeking to work more closely with the Wagner Group in order to complete the capture of Bakhmut, despite obvious tensions between Prigozhin and the traditional MoD establishment.
Russian milbloggers seized on an opportunity to denigrate St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov in a manner that indicates that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s anti-Beglov campaign has permeated the Russian ultra-nationalist information space.
The Wagner Group returned 130 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on April 16, suggesting that Wagner may have engaged in the exchange independent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner, possibly in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces reportedly intensified the rate of artillery strikes in southern Ukraine.
Russian mobilized personnel continue to publish public complaints against Russian commanders alleging mistreatment.
A Russian source stated that the Wagner Group is involved in the removal of Ukrainian children from Bakhmut.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on April 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Hryhorivka (9km south of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and that Ukrainian forces partially recaptured positions near Bilohorivka.[34] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen ”Akhmat” special forces elements repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Bilohorivka for five unspecified days and then ”escaped encirclement.“[35] Another milblogger claimed that positional battles occurred near the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna) on April 15.[36] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on April 16 that Russian forces use the most armored vehicles in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction and that Russian conventional forces mostly comprised of mobilized personnel operate along this line.[37] Cherevaty also reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three T-72 tanks, one BTR-80 armored personnel carrier, one BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle, one BREM-1 armored repair and recovery vehicle, and one Su-25 aircraft. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces have likely integrated TOS-1A thermobaric artillery into operations near Kreminna.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that the BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) “Kaskad” formation is operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted attacks in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces west of Bakhmut near Khromove (immediately west) and Ivanivske (6km west).[40] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces are throwing penal recruits at the front while conventional forces are more cautious.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern, central, and southern Bakhmut, including south of the AZOM plant in central Bakhmut, on April 15.[42] Another milblogger claimed on April 16 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in northern, western, and southern Bakhmut.[43] One milblogger tried to justify the delay of capturing Bakhmut as a deliberate operation to attrit Ukrainian forces for as long as Ukraine is willing to defend Bakhmut.[44] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn to three microraions in western Bakhmut. Geolocated footage shows that the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) was recently active south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk.[45]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne, and Pervomaiske, and attacked near Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), and in western Marinka on April 15.[47] Another milblogger claimed on April 16 that Russian forces attacked towards Keramik (7km north of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske and advanced along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk City highway east of Avdiivka.[48]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 16.[49] Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains southeast of Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast (36km northeast of Hulyaipole, Zaporizhia Oblast) on an unspecified date.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly intensified the rate of artillery strikes in southern Ukraine on April 16. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces have increased artillery fire on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing to use guided aerial bombs to strike civilian infrastructure.[51] Southern Operational Command also noted that Russian forces have resumed the practice of using S-300 surface-to-air missiles to strike ground targets deep in the Ukrainian rear and stated that Russian forces conducted an S-300 strike on the Bashtanskyi raion of Mykolaiv Oblast from positions on the east (left) bank.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted 25 S-300 strikes on Zaporizhia and Mykolaiv oblasts throughout the day.[53] S-300 surface-to-air missiles are notably a low precision system. Russian forces additionally conducted routine shelling along the frontline in southern Ukraine on April 16.[54]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on April 16 that Russian forces are preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Mayor of Enerhodar Dmytro Orlov stated that Russian forces are digging trenches, mining territory, and evacuating residents from Enerhodar and intensifying the practice of looting private property as they leave.[55] A Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian forces are concentrating in settlements along the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast for a possible attempt to cross the river.[56] Head of the Department of the Navy of the Ukrainian National Defense University, Stepan Yakymyak, suggested that the Russian Black Sea Fleet may be evacuating from the occupied Crimean Peninsula to prepare for the eventuality of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[57]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian mobilized personnel continue to publish public complaints against Russian commanders alleging mistreatment. Russian mobilized personnel from Moscow and Ivanovo oblasts, some of whom are a part of the 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District), released a video compliant on April 16 in which they accused Russian commanders of deploying the personnel to an unspecified area in Luhansk Oblast on April 5 after initially telling them they would be transferring to a Southern Military District (SMD) formation in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast.[58] The mobilized personnel claimed that they do not know where in Luhansk Oblast they are and that they are subordinated under the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps.[59] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian MoD is attempting to integrate DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) formations into the Russian Armed Forces by subordinating mobilized personnel under these formations.[60]

The Wagner Group likely continues to suffer heavy casualties in attritional offensive operations in Ukraine. Russian sources reported on April 16 that the Wagner Group’s cemetery in Bakinskaya, Krasnodar Krai grew by 60 graves since April 1.[61] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on April 15 of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin unveiling a new section of a cemetery for Wagner fighters near Nikolaevka, Samara Oblast.[62]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) postponed the start date for officer training in some higher educational institutions from September 1 to December 1.[63] The reported postponement may suggest that ongoing Russian force generation efforts are significantly taxing Russian training capacities and impeding the Russian MoD’s ability to train officers.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Russian source stated on April 14 that the Wagner Group is involved in the removal of Ukrainian children from Bakhmut.[64] The Russian source claimed that Wagner forces “evacuated” a group of civilians, including two children, from the center of Bakhmut to an unspecified location on April 16.[65] ISW continues to assess that Wagner forces are likely facilitating the removal of Ukrainian children further into Russian occupied territory or deporting them to Russia and using humanitarian aid as justification.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1647472578724872193; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040123

[2] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1647472578724872193

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040123

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040323

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031523

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022023

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041123; https://t.me/mod_russia/25641

[8] https://t.me/epoddubny/15538;

[9] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27490.5/4748873/; https://t.me/epoddubny/15538

[10] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1620409293353918464?s=20&t=HRTO.... Dot media/article/2022/04/25/bodycount_eng

[11] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-65277028

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://vecherka-spb dot ru/2023/04/14/v-peterburge-otkrilos-55e-plenarnoe-zasedanie-mezhparlamentskoi-assamblei-sng; https://vecherka-spb dot iu/2023/04/14/v-peterburge-otkrilos-55e-plenarnoe-zasedanie-mezhparlamentskoi-assamblei-sng

[14] https://t.me/vrogov/8769; https://t.me/mardanaka/13982

[15] https://t.me/epoddubny/15552; https://t.me/epoddubny/15547; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24343; https://t.me/juchkovsky/3570; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24334; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24342; https://t.me/pezdicide/2984

[16] https://t.me/vrogov/8769; https://t.me/mardanaka/13982; https://t.me/p... https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/96447; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24330

[17] https://t.me/basurin_e/773

[18] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13712; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24341; ; https://t.me/in_the_round/806; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24371;

[19] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13726; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24370

[20] https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-announces-plans-to-quit-cis-terminate-pa... ua/rubric-polytics/2756290-zodnoi-zaborgovanosti-ukraini-pered-snd-ne-isnue-mzs.html; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/8960

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[22] https://t.me/grey_zone/18266

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AWKSdTWm9waYCEXKvcG... ua/2023/04/16/z-polonu-zvilnyly-shhe-130-zahysnykiv-ukrayiny/; https://suspilne dot media/447243-ukraina-povernula-z-rf-130-polonenih-ermak/; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02Bv1L4bWvJYzB8wBSPGwqmER...

[24] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/766

[25] https://t.me/grey_zone/18262

[26] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/574; https://www.understandingwar.or...

[27] https://t.me/grey_zone/18262

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AWKSdTWm9waYCEXKvcG... https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/04/16/z-polonu-zvilnyly-shhe-130-zahysnykiv-ukrayiny/; https://suspilne dot media/447243-ukraina-povernula-z-rf-130-polonenih-ermak/; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02Bv1L4bWvJYzB8wBSPGwqmER...

[29] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3533

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3533

[31] https://t.me/astrapress/25041

[32] https://twitter.com/AmamNgc/status/1646131082532716544?s=20; https://t....

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB...

[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/11977

[35] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3534

[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/56928

[37] https://suspilne dot media/447072-velikden-na-fronti-j-v-tilu-sankcii-proti-vk-yandex-i-rambler-417-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681650767&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[38] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1647472578724872193/photo/1

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/11974

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037q8RHnbbEjr5u32B9Y...

[41] https://suspilne dot media/447072-velikden-na-fronti-j-v-tilu-sankcii-proti-vk-yandex-i-rambler-417-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681648052&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[42] https://t.me/readovkanews/56928; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46818

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/11977

[44] https://t.me/milchronicles/1781

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10207 ; https://t.me/astrahandm/8103 ; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1647328505229606913?s=20

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037q8RHnbbEjr5u32B9Y...

[47] https://t.me/readovkanews/56928

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/11977

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037q8RHnbbEjr5u32B9Y... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB...

[50] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1647570639560093700 ;

https://t.me/voin_dv/2413

[51] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid021jHiUN9xki...

[52] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid021jHiUN9xki...

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037q8RHnbbEjr5u32B9Y...

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB...

[55] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/2084

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/11977

[57] https://suspilne dot media/447072-velikden-na-fronti-j-v-tilu-sankcii-proti-vk-yandex-i-rambler-417-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681644930&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[58] https://t.me/astrapress/25041 ;

[59] https://t.me/astrapress/25041

[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823

[61] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11145 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/57167

[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83057

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02a2u3Ja2ZhhFSX8jKnB...

[64] https://t.me/brussinf/5869

[65] https://t.me/brussinf/5869

Wagner Boss Claims Russia’s Mission Accomplished in Ukraine

ca.style.yahoo.com · by Allison QuinnApril 14, 2023, 4:51 p.m.·4 min read

Reuters

Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin says Russia has already accomplished its goals in Ukraine—but must keep fighting even if it means humiliating defeat so that the country can ultimately rise again as a “war monster” that the international community will bow down to.

After recruiting thousands of prison inmates to help fight the war for Vladimir Putin and using his shadow army to emerge as a rival to Russia’s top military brass, the mercenary boss and Kremlin-linked businessman offered his thoughts on the state of the war in a lengthy article published Friday. In addition to predicting that Russia would ultimately come back stronger than ever, Prigozhin appeared to admit that Ukraine may win its territories back, acknowledged that the Kremlin’s plan had failed, and predicted a full-blown revolution in Russia.

“For the authorities and for society as a whole, it is necessary today to put a decisive end to the [special military operation.] The ideal scenario is to announce the end of the [special military operation], to inform everyone that Russia has achieved the results that it planned, and in a sense we have actually achieved them. We have ground down a huge number of fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and we can report that the tasks of the [special military operation] have been completed,” he wrote.

He claimed that “in theory,” Russia had already put a decisive end to the war by wiping out a huge chunk of Ukraine’s male population, sending refugees fleeing, and seizing territory. Omitted, of course, was that the same could be said about Russia on the first two points.

And bizarrely, amidst all of his pontificating, Prigozhin appeared to admit that Ukrainian territories seized by Russia aren’t actually with Moscow “forever,” as the Kremlin has so often claimed.

Ukraine stands to lose if the war comes to a standstill, he said, because “those territories, that are today under the control of the Russian Federation, can stay at the disposal of the Russian Federation for years.”

Prigozhin Says He Wants Mercenary Recruiters in Europe for ‘Mystery’ Plan

Lest anyone think he’s suggesting Russia should call it quits, however, Prigozhin went on to cheer on a planned counteroffensive by Ukraine—saying “the sooner it starts, the better.”

But he admitted the result could prove catastrophic to Russia, saying it’s “not very likely” Moscow could launch a “colossal counteroffensive” of its own and take territory deeper into Ukraine.

He also acknowledged that “many of those who initially supported [the war], are now doubtful, or categorically opposed to what’s happening,” and confessed that Russia “could not achieve the results that society expected.”

If Ukraine’s counteroffensive manages to break through Russian defenses, he said, “an army that for years considered itself one of the best in the world” would be thoroughly demoralized.

In that case, he said, “global changes in Russian society” could lead to an all-out revolution as pro-war patriots seek revenge against bureaucrats and figures who were either critical of the war or reluctant to use harsher battlefield methods.

His solution, strangely, is for Russia to let itself sink to rock bottom by doubling down even further despite its myriad losses over the past year. According to him, that’s America’s worst nightmare, because “if Russia gets to the bottom, then it will push off from there… and float back up like a huge sea monster, demolishing everything in its path, including the plans of the United States.”

He appeared to shrug off further losses and even a “battering” of the Russian military, saying Russia would simply “lick its wounds” if defeated in a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

“Russia cannot accept any agreement, only a fair fight. And if we come out of this battle battered, there is nothing to worry about.”

His comments came the same day classified U.S. documents said Russian special forces had been decimated fighting the war against Ukraine. Separately, a joint investigation by the independent media outlet MediaZona and the BBC’s Russian service counted 20,451 Russian troops killed so far in the war. The true number is thought to be significantly higher, as that tally includes only those confirmed through open source data.

Opinion | TikTok is dangerously addictive. We should regulate it now.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · April 14, 2023

Last week, I argued against banning TikTok. In talking to people about the platform, I came to see that the real concern most had was not about TikTok’s Chinese ownership, but rather just how scarily addictive it — and much of social media — is. That’s true and deeply worrying, and we should do something about it — and soon.

TikTok is the dominant app, by 2022 downloads, in the United States, and has about 150 million users nationwide. The Post’s Drew Harwell nicely summarizes the data: In 2021, its website was visited more frequently than Google. Two-thirds of American teens use it, with 1 in 6 saying they use it “almost constantly.”

It is also wiping the floor with the competition. Harwell quotes a Bernstein Research report that found that between 2018 and 2021, the time Americans spent on the app surged by 67 percent, while hours on Facebook and YouTube grew by less than 10 percent.

What is it that TikTok does that is so distinctive? No one quite knows. “It’s embarrassing that we know so little about TikTok and its effects,” Philipp Lorenz-Spreen, a research scientist at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, told the Guardian. Partly this is because TikTok is relatively new and partly because its algorithm is highly sophisticated. Instead of an image or a post chosen by a friend, TikTok presents you with a stream of videos and gauges what you like to give you more of it, replacing “the friction of deciding what to watch,” the Bernstein researchers explain, with a “sensory rush of bite-sized videos … delivering endorphin hit after hit.”

Follow Fareed Zakaria's opinionsFollow

Most psychologists would characterize it as also delivering dopamine, the chemical secreted in the brain when it expects a reward, such as food, drugs or sex. Anything that connects us to others triggers this sense of pleasure, because it is an evolutionary response — we survive better in groups than as individuals. Social media apps capitalize on this survival mechanism for profit. And TikTok provides this dopamine hit perhaps faster, better and more pleasurably than other popular apps.

The best way to understand how social media is affecting our brains is to go back to Psychology 101. B.F. Skinner, one of the foundational scholars in the field, demonstrated how “operant conditioning” works by using a simple system of continual rewards for pigeons, and taught them how to fly in circles, guide missiles, even play ping-pong. The simplest version is to watch a dog trainer, who will give the pet a stream of small treats to reward it for following directions. Social media apps provide those small dopamine hits just as reliably.

Jonathan Haidt has become famous as a critic of social media. A distinguished social psychologist (he teaches at NYU), Haidt argues that the rise of social media and its reward system is closely correlated with staggering declines in teenagers’ mental health. Around 2012, he argues, you begin to see all kinds of indications of declining mental health, from self-reported feelings to hospitalizations to suicide attempts. He says this has happened in the United States, Britain, Canada and several other countries with widespread use of social media. The rise in anxiety, depression and attempted suicides among teenage girls is particularly frightening. And these numbers are getting worse by the year.

The timing makes sense when you consider that the early 2010s is when teens were trading in their flip phones for smartphones loaded with social media apps — and that 2009 is when Facebook introduced the “like” and Twitter introduced the “retweet” feature that mimic the dog trainer’s treats. So by 2012, the year Facebook bought Instagram and its user base exploded, a large number of teens were “hooked.”

Haidt, who is working on a book on this topic, maintains an ongoing database of scholarly studies and related commentary on his Substack, After Babel. I came away from it utterly convinced that he is right, and we need serious rules and laws surrounding this technology.

He argues that the age at which social media companies can collect children’s data without parental consent should be raised from 13 to 16, thereby protecting the most vulnerable years of early puberty. (The initial Senate bill setting the age had chosen 16, he told me, but media company lobbyists were able to push it down.) There could be federal laws requiring more notifications when the app has been used for too long, automatic turn-offs at night, and more. For those worried about this kind of legislation, bear in mind that social media companies are largely protected from lawsuits by an extremely generous provision in the law, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. They can reasonably be asked, in return, to make their products safer for children.

The next technological leap is generative artificial intelligence. Once that is fully married to social media, those companies will have a superhuman capacity to create addiction machines of astonishing power that could hook us permanently, perhaps even rewire our brains with devastating consequences. We should act now, while we have the time — and the attention span.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · April 14, 2023

7. America Needs Veterans to Serve in Public Offices - SOAA

America Needs Veterans to Serve in Public Offices - SOAA

soaa.org · by Deanna Bowman · April 11, 2023

The United States of America has a leadership problem.

Leadership within a democratic republic can be defined in the simplest of terms as an elected official with a vision and responsibility to execute that vision. One demographic within the American populous is uniquely suited to lead the us through an uncertain future: Veterans.

In 1967, 75% of Members serving in the House of Representatives were veterans. In 1975, 81% of Members serving in the Senate were veterans. In the most recent 118th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate held 17% and 18.4%, respectively, of Veterans serving as elected officials – the lowest and second lowest since 1953. We think that’s a problem.

We are living in complicated times. Turmoil at home, retrenchment abroad, and growing tensions among our adversaries. Combat operations have largely ended in the Middle East, while the current administration is downsizing the military in the face of the largest recruiting and retention deficits in a generation. The withdrawal from Afghanistan left many Veterans confused and angry – giving our best years to a war that ended in chaos.

We offer an alternative – continue to serve your country through civil service.

The Special Operations Association of America is challenging all Veterans to get politically involved. From local elections to the White House, our nation needs you to be more engaged. We will work with leaders in all sectors to find, develop, and support Veteran candidates who can lead the United States into the future.

The American military is taught to lead from the moment we take our oath to protect the Constitution. That oath didn’t end when we left the military. We know first-hand how effective and impactful former Servicemembers are in the political arena. Veterans know how to set differences aside and put the mission first. Veterans live and breathe the ideology of “One Team One Fight!” We’re not afraid of a fight, but we resist war because we’ve seen it. Honor and integrity are bedrock characteristics refined through military service.

Leadership, accountability, and transparency cannot be separated.

In the spirit of transparency, we call on all Veterans who are currently serving as elected officials, and those who we hope will be soon announcing their candidacy, to release their DD214 military service records. It is our hope that by being transparent we will encourage openness, trust, and cooperation across political divides. As the Special Operations community, we are the tip of the spear and lead by example. With this commitment to transparency, our Executive Director and the President of our Board will be releasing their DD214’s, with all sensitive information redacted. This is our first call to action of many we will be announcing over the next few months heading into election season.

US Army non-commissioned officers define ‘responsibility’ as being accountable for everything you do and everything you fail to do. We believe inaction is heard louder than action in today’s public arena. If you’re not leading from the front, please, step aside.

Join the movement

Support the movement

Elkins DD214 Cook DD214

soaa.org · by Deanna Bowman · April 11, 2023

8. Too many with access, too little vetting. Pentagon leaks were ‘a matter of time’

Excerpts:

The problem facing the vetters is magnified by the enormous scale of the numbers involved. According to the office of the director of national intelligence, there are more than 1.2 million government employees and contractors with access to top secret intelligence materials.

Brianna Rosen, a former White House official, said that was a result of the 9/11 attacks, where some of the intelligence failings that allowed the hijackers to succeed involved a failure to share intelligence with law enforcement agencies.

“It’s a double-edged sword because, in one sense, a lack of this kind of information sharing is, in part, what contributed to 9/11,” said Rosen, a senior fellow at Just Security, an online forum on security, democracy, foreign policy and rights. “As a result of all of these increased intelligence-sharing programmes, you do have a situation where there is a vast amount of people that have access to sensitive information that they probably shouldn’t have access to, and that may not have been vetted as thoroughly as they should have been.

“It was really only a matter of time until something like this happened, which is why this is really a systemic problem that Congress and the Biden administration needs to address more closely.”

Too many with access, too little vetting. Pentagon leaks were ‘a matter of time’

Julian Borger and Manisha Ganguly

Jack Teixeira’s arrest has exposed a system weakened by the legacy of 9/11 and caught off guard by an enemy that is increasingly within

The Guardian · by Julian Borger · April 15, 2023

Jack Teixeira, 21 years old, clean-shaven, with buzz-cut hair and proudly uniformed, is the face of America’s newest security threat, one it is struggling to resolve.

The formidable US counter-intelligence infrastructure is adept at finding spies and rooting out whistleblowers. Teixeira, charged on Friday on two counts of the Espionage Act, is neither spy nor whistleblower.

His family history is the epitome of conservative patriotism. His stepfather served in the same unit, the 102nd intelligence wing of the Massachusetts air national guard, and his mother, who worked for years for veterans’ charities, celebrated the fact that her son was following the same path. The young recruit was an observant Catholic, who would pray with other members of his online chat group.

But Teixeira’s outlook had taken the same dramatic turn as much of American conservatism, becoming conspiratorial and distrustful of the very institutions earlier generations revered. Friends quoted in the Washington Post said he had come to regret joining up, as his view of the military dimmed.

His motive for allegedly sharing hundreds of top secret documents among the 20 or so young men and teenage boys on the Discord gaming server he moderated, at least as he explained it to them, was to alert them to shadowy forces driving world events. He reportedly posted the documents, photographed unfolded and laid on his family’s kitchen counter alongside glue and nail clippers, without commentary or any apparent underlying logic.

There is a vast amount of people that have access to sensitive information that they probably shouldn’t have access to

Brianna Rosen

It seems to have been a way to cement his status as the leader of the group, a man of mystery and action. It was as inchoate as the video he reportedly shared with his group, Thug Shaker Central, (named in apparently ironic spirit after a variety of gay porn), in which Teixeira shouts antisemitic and racist slurs then fires a rifle.

This was the young man, clearly still living out his adolescence, who was given one of the nation’s highest security clearances – “top secret/sensitive compartmented information” (TS/SCI) – so that he could do his job maintaining the sealed infranet system at Otis air base on Cape Cod, through which the nation’s most closely guarded secrets flowed.

To get that level of clearance you must, in theory, be extensively vetted. The process takes months, as investigators trawl through your history and interview friends and colleagues. But vetting standards differ across agencies, and those of the air national guard may not be on a par with the CIA, yet the staff at both see the same documents.

Other security arrangements at the Otis base also appear to have been lax. Teixeira is alleged to have first copied out text from secret documents and, then, in January, began to print them and take them home.

Jack Teixeira: ‘a young man still living out his adolescence’. Photograph: Facebook/Bayberry Farm & Flower Co

“The breakdown in physical security here appears stark and serious,” Bradley Moss, a lawyer specialising in national security, federal employment and security clearance, said. “The after-action review will absolutely need to assess where the process broke down by which no one noticed his removal of the records.”

There is another problem with trying to filter out people like Teixeira: the elastic limits of first amendment free speech rights, in a country where what was once extreme is increasingly mainstream.

The far-right Georgia Republican representative Marjorie Taylor Greene got Teixeira’s first name wrong on Twitter but hailed him as “white, male, christian, and antiwar”.

“That makes him an enemy to the Biden regime,” Greene said.

The Fox News talkshow host Tucker Carlson defended Teixeira and complained the airman, arrested by armed FBI agents at his home and charged in a Boston court the next day, was being treated worse than Osama bin Laden, who was shot in the head by US special forces in his bedroom in 2011.

The new Republican right views the state as an enemy when it is being run by Democrats or moderate conservatives. Part of the Trump legacy is a preference for foreign dictators over opponents in a democratic system. So weeding out enemies of the state within the intelligence and military community risks angering an increasingly significant and vocal part of the political arena.

“It’s difficult to truly quantify the scope of the threat, and part of the problem is simply holding repugnant political views is not truly a security issue. It’s more of an HR issue,” Moss said. He added the vetting process was not “designed to flesh out the details of an individual’s personal political leanings”.

“That’s deliberate: the government is largely forbidden from considering your political views in that context unless it implicates a separate concern [such as criminal conduct],” he said.

Pentagon documents: key takeaways from the Jack Teixeira charges

The problem facing the vetters is magnified by the enormous scale of the numbers involved. According to the office of the director of national intelligence, there are more than 1.2 million government employees and contractors with access to top secret intelligence materials.

Brianna Rosen, a former White House official, said that was a result of the 9/11 attacks, where some of the intelligence failings that allowed the hijackers to succeed involved a failure to share intelligence with law enforcement agencies.

“It’s a double-edged sword because, in one sense, a lack of this kind of information sharing is, in part, what contributed to 9/11,” said Rosen, a senior fellow at Just Security, an online forum on security, democracy, foreign policy and rights. “As a result of all of these increased intelligence-sharing programmes, you do have a situation where there is a vast amount of people that have access to sensitive information that they probably shouldn’t have access to, and that may not have been vetted as thoroughly as they should have been.

“It was really only a matter of time until something like this happened, which is why this is really a systemic problem that Congress and the Biden administration needs to address more closely.”

The Guardian · by Julian Borger · April 15, 2023

9. The Air Force Loves War Gamers Like Teixeira

Another aspect of the "culture wars?"

I think Dr Emma Briant has an agenda. Do we really equate the 4th PSYOP video encourages this kind of behavior?

Excerpts:

Teixeira’s blithe attitude toward sharing top secret documents on the channels is less surprising when we consider how the military’s recruitment and training eroded important boundaries separating harmless, at-home wargaming from real life military conflicts.

That followed last year’s problematic Army recruitment ads for its 4th Psychological Operations Group, which, amazingly enough, were created to appeal to young folks drawn to conspiracy theories. Research shows that the embrace of conspiracy theories can lead to radicalization and violence, which in the military may be worsened by combat-induced trauma or psychological distress. After concerns rose about active duty military members’ involvement in the January 6 U.S. Capitol siege, the DoD took steps to address insider threats from extremists, including retooling its recruitment pitches. But clearly problems run deeper.

Meanwhile, bigger data security risks come from third-party contractors themselves who, unlike Teixiera, Manning and Reality Winner, are rarely held accountable when things go wrong. In 2017 over 100 gigabytes of highly sensitive data was found unsecured on an Amazon Web Services server, believed to be linked to a defense contractor. It appears no one was held accountable.

Analysts are still trying to find out why Teixeira did what he did—not to mention how to stop future leaks like his. But before the AI ‘Insider Threat’ lobby demands more intrusive surveillance, it might be worth asking what kind of culture the digital military has been fostering. ###

The Air Force Loves War Gamers Like Teixeira

https://www.spytalk.co/p/the-air-force-loves-war-gamers-like

The Discord leaks reveal a digital culture problem that more AI surveillance can’t solve

DR. EMMA L BRIANT

APR 15, 2023

With the federal government spending at least $1 billion annually on defense and civilian agency programs to neutralize 'insider threats,' it’s no wonder that people are asking how it was possible that secret documents posted by Jack Teixeira, a low level 21-year-old Massachusetts Air National Guard airman, were able to circulate through the backwaters of the Internet for months before authorities even became aware of their existence.

Jack Teixiera via Twitter

After the massive document dumps by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, new systems were put in place to prevent, or at least rapidly track, such unauthorized access to top secret files. The shiny new application touted to detect insider threats was artificial intelligence. Obviously it didn’t work in the Teixiera case.

Today, defense contractors make millions of dollars selling AI insider threat systems that are meant to predict which government employee might pose a potential national security threat. These tech entrepreneurs make big claims about their AI’s accuracy in identifying leakers, and claim an urgent need both for their systems and for access to ever more data.

Palantir is probably the best known developer of such technologies. Its CEO Alex Karp recently claimed that AI systems are “very dangerous” but in the context of wars like Ukraine, have “fundamentally changed the world” and cannot be put “back in the box.” Palantir claims its tools for rooting out insider threats enables enterprises to “identify suspicious or abnormal employee behavior using a variety of algorithmic methods.” To a similar end, last year the Pentagon awarded a “multi million dollar contract” to Torch.AI, a Leawood, Kansas-based data infrastructure artificial intelligence company, “to support the Pentagon’s efforts to combat insider threats,” known as the System for Insider Threat Hindrance, or SITH. According to its CEO Brian Weaver, “There are few situations where the quality and availability of data is more important than cyber and insider threat.” Obviously it didn’t prevent Teixiera and his pals from widely sharing top secret documents.

Egg on its Face

The Discord leak is embarrassing for the National Insider Threat Task Force, a government-wide program under the Director of National Intelligence tasked with deterring, detecting, and mitigating threats just like this one. As recently as April 10, National Security Council spokesman John F. Kirby was in the dark on key aspects of the hemorrhage, saying the NSC still did not know how much material was public, who was behind it or their motive.

“Insider Threat” is a concept with a long history, catalyzed following the Chelsea Manning leaks in President Obama’s Executive Order 13857, which established an interagency Insider Threat Task Force to develop a government-wide program. Its concepts, also articulated in NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, have long sought AI prediction tools to identify potential leakers, based on past offenders like Snowden or Manning. But it would be old fashioned human-powered journalism by Bellingcat’s Aric Toler and The New York Times, not AI, that swiftly identified the leaker after spotting the documents on Russian Telegram.

Nigel Oakes, founder of the defense contractor SCL, the parent company of Cambridge Analytica, described to me in 2017 how the Pentagon’s insider threat model was “very flawed” because, with a limited sample of past national security leakers to study, “you can’t ever regress the data.” Not only that, if the pool of recruits is changing, the profile of future insider threats or leakers is also likely to shift, reducing their predictions to an imperfect science.

There are fundamental flaws in relying on a system that aims to predict future cases that are distinct, like the Discord leak, from cases that AI was trained on. Airman Teixeira evidently did not seek to blow the whistle on government programs he disagreed with and certainly didn’t take any meaningful steps to stay anonymous. Nor did he even seem to understand the full consequences of his actions, since he used his own name and address to register the Discord server. All the FBI had to do was request Teixeira’s personal information from Discord.

Yet the AI lobby argues that the solution to plugging such leaks is to undermine encryption that keeps apps and devices private and deepen Internet surveillance. But the Teixeira case is a weak justification for further eroding privacy of federal employees. Intrusive surveillance impacts everyone, not just those with ill intent, says Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower advocacy group. Devine has argued that insider threat defensive systems can be used to target individuals blowing the whistle on government waste, fraud, and abuse.

Whether or not tomorrow’s threat actors’ deceptions could be identified by eroding what remains of our privacy, the unlimited surveillance it would take to identify all threats carries the risk of undermining democracy itself. The preoccupation over government access to communication technologies may also distract from identifying underlying causes and solutions to ‘insider threats’.

Former senior CIA operations official John Sipher has claimed that the main problem is too many people having access to sensitive intelligence. He’s also suggested that background checks of teenagers work with so little life experience that they are not likely to detect problem recruits unless they have an arrest record. Whatever the truth of that, evidently no one in Teixeria’s chain of command, much less AI’s sniffers, picked up on months’ worth of Teixiera’s racist and antisemitic rants—or they failed to report it.

Youth Quake

In any event, the military depends on the constant recruitment of youngsters, including for intelligence billets. Teixeira came into intelligence through a side door as an IT technician, which enabled his access to a system holding the intelligence documents. His unit, the 102nd intelligence wing, is part of the Air Force's Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), which processes military intelligence, including foreign imagery from drones.

Perhaps what DOD needs to do is to examine its own recruitment process and culture.

As the military adapts to new technologies like AI, augmented reality and automation, it has increasingly sought recruits with relevant technical skills. This has prompted the military to intensify its efforts to recruit teenage gamers, who’ve developed skill sets such as the ability to visualise remote operations in far away places like Afghanistan, utilize screens for 12 hours at a time, or operate peripheral devices, to fill roles like those needed for the DCGS to disseminate data ingested by drones.

According to the Washington Post, the Air Force “has arguably become the leader in fostering gaming culture.” The military is recruiting on platforms popular with gamers like Discord, or through “military sponsorships of gaming leagues” that feature violent war games. While Teixeira’s role was in technology support, “trauma experienced within this program is not isolated to pilots, techs or sensor operators,” a veteran of DCGS explained to me on condition of anonymity. This veteran said “a culture change is needed” for recruits between the ages 18 and 24, who’ve spent countless hours alone honing their war game skills, to get adequate mental health support.

One of Teixeira’s high school classmates, Kailani Reis, told the Boston Globe that Teixeira was “super quiet” and gave off “loner vibes,” while another classmate, Sarah Arnold remembered him as being quiet and keeping to himself, according to the Associated Press.

In 2019, according to the Washington Post, the Air Force sponsored a gamer tournament to find its best players among 350 contestants. The idea was to foster mental health among its young rank-and-file during the pandemic.

Capt. Oliver Parsons, the founder of Air Force Gaming, has explained that what the service needed was to create an engaging activity with a support network to help young recruits deal with the isolation brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic.

“We’re not robots. We’re normal, average people,” Parsons said, adding that if the military doesn’t make gaming culture acceptable, service members are “going to go somewhere else.”

Meanwhile, in a supreme irony, it was the Air Force itself that encouraged the young gamers to use Discord, the very platform Teixeira turned to for anti-government bonding and sharing what he saw daily at work. When it encouraged use of the platform, however, the Air Force may not have grasped how many extremist users of 4Chan also use it to network and share content, which put their young military charges at greater risk of encountering the extremist fringe.

Teixeira’s blithe attitude toward sharing top secret documents on the channels is less surprising when we consider how the military’s recruitment and training eroded important boundaries separating harmless, at-home wargaming from real life military conflicts.

That followed last year’s problematic Army recruitment ads for its 4th Psychological Operations Group, which, amazingly enough, were created to appeal to young folks drawn to conspiracy theories. Research shows that the embrace of conspiracy theories can lead to radicalization and violence, which in the military may be worsened by combat-induced trauma or psychological distress. After concerns rose about active duty military members’ involvement in the January 6 U.S. Capitol siege, the DoD took steps to address insider threats from extremists, including retooling its recruitment pitches. But clearly problems run deeper.

Meanwhile, bigger data security risks come from third-party contractors themselves who, unlike Teixiera, Manning and Reality Winner, are rarely held accountable when things go wrong. In 2017 over 100 gigabytes of highly sensitive data was found unsecured on an Amazon Web Services server, believed to be linked to a defense contractor. It appears no one was held accountable.

Analysts are still trying to find out why Teixeira did what he did—not to mention how to stop future leaks like his. But before the AI ‘Insider Threat’ lobby demands more intrusive surveillance, it might be worth asking what kind of culture the digital military has been fostering. ###

Dr. Emma L Briant is an internationally recognized expert and academic of propaganda and information warfare, whose work was central in exposing the Cambridge Analytica scandal and continues to inform politicians, NGOs and industry.

10. America’s economic outperformance is a marvel to behold

Charts and graphics at the link: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/13/from-strength-to-strength

Excerpts:

On trade policy, one area where politicians from both sides of the aisle do see eye-to-eye, the consensus is deeply worrying. Its embrace of globalisation was a crucial background condition for America’s long run of strong growth, as a rising trade-to-GDP ratio in the 1990s and 2000s makes clear. Foreign competition pushed American companies to make their operations more efficient; opportunities abroad gave them a bigger canvas for growth.

Now, though, globalisation is a dirty word in Washington, DC. A focus on national security and industrial policy has taken over. Take semiconductors: although America long ago lost its mantle as a major manufacturer, it is home to firms, such as Qualcomm and Nvidia, that design the world’s most sophisticated chips. That has worked well for America, letting it capture the highest-value segments of the global semiconductor industry.

But it is no longer enough. The government has started to throw billions of dollars at bringing chipmakers to America—in effect trying to hoover up lower-value parts of the industry in the name of supply-chain security. And it is trying to do much the same for electric vehicles, wind turbines, hydrogen production and more, potentially spending $2trn, or nearly 10% of GDP, to reshape the economy. These are aggressive interventions that run counter to America’s post-1980s stance; they may end up costing it productivity as well as money.

The overarching irony is that most of these potentially self-harming policies have their roots in a declinist view that, economically at least, simply does not reflect the facts. The diagnoses are that China is getting ahead, or that immigrants are a menace, that large corporations are bastions of woke power and free trade a form of treachery. Their folly is all the more striking because it betrays a lack of appreciation for the bigger economic picture, and just how good America has it.

America’s economic outperformance is a marvel to behold

But the country could still undercut its own success

The Economist

American economic declinism is a broad church. Voices on the right claim that big government has stifled the frontier spirit and that soaring debt has condemned future generations to poverty. The left worries that inequality and corporate power have hollowed out the economy. In a rare display of unity, all parts of the ideological spectrum bemoan the death of American manufacturing and the crushing of the middle class.

Listen to this story.

Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android.

There is just one snag. On a whole range of measures American dominance remains striking. And relative to its rich-world peers its lead is increasing.

It is true that, by one measure, America is no longer the largest economy in the world. Using currency conversions based on purchasing power—that is, on what individuals can buy in their own country—China’s economy has been larger than America’s since 2016. Today China represents 18% of the world economy calculated in terms of purchasing power and America just 16%, whereas in 1990 the shares were 4% and 22% (see chart 1).

But though purchasing-power parity (PPP) is the right metric for comparing people’s well-being in different economies, in terms of what those economies can achieve on the world stage it is exchange rates set by markets that count. And looked at this way, American pre-eminence is clear. America’s $25.5trn in GDP last year represented 25% of the world’s total—almost the same share as it had in 1990. On that measure China’s share is now 18%.

More astonishing, and less appreciated, than its ability to hold its place in the world as a whole is the extent to which America has extended its dominance over its developed peers. In 1990 America accounted for 40% of the nominal GDP of the G7, a group of the world’s seven biggest advanced economies, including Japan and Germany. Today it accounts for 58%. In PPP terms the increase was smaller, but still significant: from 43% of the G7‘s GDP in 1990 to 51% now (see chart 2). So much for a declining power.

America’s outperformance has translated into wealth for its people. Income per person in America was 24% higher than in western Europe in 1990 in PPP terms; today it is about 30% higher. It was 17% higher than in Japan in 1990; today it is 54% higher. In PPP terms the only countries with higher per-person income figures are small petrostates like Qatar and financial hubs such as Luxembourg. A lot of that income growth was at the top end of the scale; the ultra rich have indeed done ultra well. But most other Americans have done pretty well, too. Median wages have grown almost as much as mean wages. A trucker in Oklahoma can earn more than a doctor in Portugal. The consumption gap is even starker. Britons, some of Europe’s best-off inhabitants, spent 80% as much as Americans in 1990. By 2021 that was down to 69%.

Money is obviously not everything. It is often argued (and not just in Europe) that Europeans make a trade off between extra pay and a nicer way of life. Instead of clogged roads and overstuffed wardrobes, they have longer holidays and generous maternity leave. What is more, they devote a lot less of their income to health care.

At a personal level such trade-offs may make perfect sense: there is much else to life besides income and shopping. But they are hardly new. Can the long-standing cultural difference on which they are based really account for a gap that continues to grow today? What’s more, America has been devoting a little more of its national treasure to helping its people. America’s social spending was just 14% of GDP in 1990 but had risen to 18% by the end of 2019, thanks in part to more medical insurance for its poor and elderly. That hardly makes it Sweden, which has spent a quarter of its GDP on social programmes for decades. But the gap is narrowing, not widening.

Fortunate sons

Americans are getting richer because they are getting more productive more quickly than workers in other rich countries. That advantage comes with real costs. America’s economy permits extreme volatility in individual livelihoods. Unemployment soars during downturns. Vast numbers end up chucked to the side: a combination of drugs, gun violence and dangerous driving has led to a shocking decline in average life expectancy in America. This suffering is concentrated among the country’s poorest, most marginalised communities. Money could mitigate most of these problems, and outperforming America has money aplenty. But this is not what it is spent on.

The fact that America has problems hardly sets it apart. All economies do. The striking thing about America’s is that they have not noticeably slowed down its growth. Investors are gratefully aware of this. A hundred dollars invested in the S&P 500, a stock index of America’s biggest companies, in 1990 would have grown to be worth about $2,300 today. By contrast, if someone had invested the same amount at the same time in an index of the biggest rich-world stocks which excluded American equities they would now have just about $510 (see chart 3).

Past performance is, of course, no predictor of future returns. Since America became the world’s largest economy in the 1890s its lead has waxed and waned. But three decades in, its current period of outperformance has gone on long enough to merit a closer look.

There are two things that matter to an economy in the long term: the size of its workforce and the productivity thereof. A higher fertility rate and a more open immigration system have long given America a demographic advantage over most other wealthy countries, and that continues. America’s working-age population—those between 25 and 64—rose from 127m in 1990 to 175m in 2022, an increase of 38%. Contrast that with western Europe, where the working-age population rose just 9% during that period, from 94m to 102m.

That said, a higher proportion of those Europeans actually work. America’s labour-force participation rate has been falling this century, largely because of men dropping out of the workforce. But this American oddity is not large enough to make up for the country’s advantage in raw numbers. Even with lower participation, the past three decades have seen America’s labour force grow by 30%. In Europe the number is 13%, in Japan, just 7%.

And this growing workforce is also becoming more productive. The Conference Board, a think-tank backed by American business, has found that between 1990 and 2022 American labour productivity (what workers produce in an hour) increased by 67%, compared with 55% in Europe and 51% in Japan. Add on to that the fact that Americans work a lot. An American worker puts in on average 1,800 hours per year (a 36-hour work week with four weeks of holiday), roughly 200 hours more than in Europe, though 500 less than in China.

Some of America’s productivity growth comes from more investment. But total factor productivity (TFP), which strips out those effects in an attempt to show increases in efficiency and the adoption of new technology, has also increased. According to the Penn World Tables, a database for cross-country comparisons, TFP in America increased by about 20% between 1990 and 2019. The G7 as a whole averaged less than half that.

How to account for this higher productivity? For starters it is useful to identify where America is at its most productive. In 2019 Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, the dean of growth studies in America, and Hassan Sayed of Princeton divided the economy into 27 different industries to pinpoint the stars. They found them in the flourishing information and communications technology industry, and saw that they shone brightest from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. But the rapid growth of the bit of the economy making and connecting computers was only part of the story. The rest of the economy busied itself in using the new technology productively. Productivity growth of American businesses doubled to more than 3% annually during that magical decade, whereas their European counterparts managed less than 2%. Since then American productivity growth has fallen back towards its long-run average of about 1.5%. But it is still faster than in most other rich countries, and still driven by the technology sector.

The roots of America’s success as a technological innovator go deep; Silicon Valley was generations in the building. The reason why its wares were put to such productive use, though, are more easily seen, and still apply today. Simply put, they are skills, size and spunk.

Big wheel keeps on turning

First, American workers are, on average, highly skilled. This might seem jarring given conventional wisdom, not least in America, about the failures of its schools. But America spends roughly 37% more per pupil on education than the average member of the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries. When it comes to post-secondary students it spends twice the average.

There are good reasons to question the efficiency of some of this spending: test results in science and maths for 15-year-olds could be better. But good—often privileged—students thrive. As a share of its working-age population, roughly 34% of Americans have completed tertiary education, according to data compiled by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee of Harvard and Korea University. Only Singapore has a higher rate. The Penn World Table’s human-capital index, which is based on years of schooling, currently has South Korea in the lead; but America has, on average, been first among major economies since 1990.

America is home to 11 of the world’s 15 top-ranked universities in the most recent Times Higher Education table. Along with educating many of the brightest Americans, they have long served as conduits which deliver the world’s smartest young people to the country. Some of them go on to join the 200,000 foreign students who enter the labour force through the “optional practical training” programme every year—a figure which stayed high even under Donald Trump.

America’s economy makes good use of its highly educated workforce. Spending on research and development across the public and private sectors—a useful, though not infallible, token of future growth—has risen over the past decade to 3.5% of GDP, well ahead of most other countries. Evidence of America’s innovative prowess is furnished by the number of its patents in force abroad, an indicator of international recognition: America’s share of such patents globally increased from 19% in 2004 (the first year for which data is available) to 22% in 2021, more than any other country.

A second set of explanations is tied to America’s size. A large single market always gives a country a leg-up; the rewards to scale seen in technology have amplified this effect in America. Europe has tried to craft a unified market, but linguistic, administrative and cultural differences still pose barriers to businesses such as e-commerce platforms. As India is not yet rich enough for its size to offer benefits on such a scale, China is the only country that can truly rival America in this regard. That helps to explain the vibrancy of its consumer-tech sector—at least until Xi Jinping got his fingers on it.

Size has other advantages. Covering almost 40% of the world’s third-largest continent means the United States has access to a wide variety of geological riches—some of which it has become newly adept at winkling out. In the first decade of the 2000s America imported more than 10m barrels of oil per day in net terms. But around the same time, a revolution was under way as energy firms perfected the techniques of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling to release the mineral riches in shale formations that dot the country from North Dakota to Texas. Gas and oil production soared; America now meets most of its energy needs from domestic production. In 2020 it became a net exporter of oil.

Come on the rising wind

That has both expanded the economy and diversified it, adding new resilience. And because the boom in gas came at the expense of coal, it has reduced greenhouse-gas emissions. Despite having had little federal climate policy worth speaking of until recently, America’s industrial carbon-dioxide emissions are 18% below their mid-2000s peak. Now that America is deliberately turning its attention to other resources which its size provides in abundance—such as sunshine and windy plains and coasts—it should accelerate that trend.

What makes American skills and size that much more potent is the third element in the mix: dynamism. This is often the attribute mentioned first by people trying to explain America’s success. It is also the one where definitions are sketchiest. But there are some clear correlates.

One is mobility. The ability and willingness of Americans to get up and go when opportunity calls is not what it was; but it is still impressive in international terms. In 2013 a Gallup survey found that about one in four adult Americans had moved from one city or area within the country to another over the past five years, compared with one in ten in other developed countries. About 5m move between states each year. William Frey, a demographer at the Brookings Institution, finds that the most educated are over-represented among these interstate movers, heading presumably to the most productive jobs.

America also has far and away the world’s deepest and most liquid financial markets, providing efficient, if occasionally unstable, channels for financing businesses and sorting the winners from the losers. Stockmarket capitalisation runs to about 170% of GDP; in most other countries it comes in below 100%. Funding for potentially high-growth startups is particularly bountiful: about half of the world’s venture capital goes to firms in America.

The hunger for starting something new, though, predates the world of tech and extends far beyond it. And the aftermath of covid-induced confinement has fired the American drive for reinvention as never before: 5.4m new businesses started in 2021, an annual record and a 53% increase from 2019. Many will not make it, but the founders will not be hurt as badly as they would be elsewhere: an OECD measure of the personal cost of failure for entrepreneurs consistently puts America and Canada at the bottom.

Odd as it may sound for a country that created both Mr Burns, the vulture capitalist of Springfield, and Dilbert, the quintessential office drone, the quality of corporate management is another source of dynamism. Since 2003 John Van Reenen of the LSE and Nicholas Bloom of Stanford have been attempting to provide analytical rigour to international comparisons of management by means of their World Management Survey. America sits at the top of their ranking. Fierce competition, the researchers believe, helps to explain America’s corporate culture. Bosses are more comfortable with firing employees (and more easily able to: America has much weaker employee-protection law than other large economies). Markets are readier to reward companies for evidence that they are well run. America’s managerial strength, their survey finds, explains as much as half of the productivity lead that it has over other developed countries.

It can be hard to square America’s incredible wealth with its failings in other areas. Even after taxes and transfers it has the most unequal income distribution in the G7. The earnings gap between rich and poor, which grew in the 1990s and early 2000s, was stabilised by a tight labour market over the better part of a decade. Recent pay bumps for low-wage earners have seen them starting to catch up with the middle tier, but the gap between top- and middle-income workers has persisted.

Run through the jungle

Even more jarring is its harshness of life: on average Americans born today can expect to live to 77, about five years shorter than their peers in other countries at similar levels of development. For the poor, with less access to medical care and more violence around them, the deficit is particularly obvious. A certain sort of Pangloss might argue that the harshness, distasteful as it is, is part of America’s recipe, impelling people to strive to get ahead.

Another interpretation is that the country lacks neither the wealth nor wisdom to make people’s lives much better, but chooses not to—and pays little by way of an economic price for that choice. “Economics is not a morality play,” says Adam Posen of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think-tank. “It would be nice if we could design policies that solve inequality and promote growth at the same time, but regrettably there are only a few policies that do both. Cruelty does not prevent an economy from growing.”

If cruelty doesn’t, what else might? What might see America’s decades of economic outperformance draw to a close? One possibility would be for its rich-world peers to do more to catch up. Europe has failed to produce giant tech firms like America but its robust anti-monopoly rules have fostered a more competitive market, especially for consumers, which might yet bear fruit. Japan has struggled to shake up its sluggish economic model, but it is not done trying yet. China is intent on sustaining rapid growth, despite evident structural challenges. Meanwhile, India’s rise will surely tilt the world’s economy ever more towards the Pacific.

But there are also ways for America to undercut its own success. Take demographics. Though America’s working-age population has grown more than Europe’s over the past 30 years the fertility rate has now drifted close to European levels. With lower fertility, America needs higher immigration to maintain its demographic advantage. But a rising current of nativism pushes against this. President Donald Trump tried, unsuccessfully, to pick apart America’s visa programmes for welcoming in high-skilled foreign workers and began building a wall to block lower-skilled arrivals. Even if he fails to win election again in 2024, he has set the tone for more suspicion of and hostility towards migrants. President Joe Biden has kept many of Mr Trump’s border policies in place. Border authorities have expelled at least 2m illegal migrants on his watch.

The ugly turn in America’s politics also threatens other pillars of success. Highly polarised state governments are starting to endanger the country’s vast unified market, forcing companies to face new choices. Texas, for instance, has banned financial firms from doing business with the state if it deems them unfriendly to the oil industry. Ron DeSantis, Florida’s governor and a likely candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, has used his office to try and humble Disney in response to the company’s “woke agenda”. California is attacking from the opposite end, with a new law that could force oil firms to cap their profits.

The potential for a greater act of political self-sabotage also looms uncomfortably large on the horizon. In the next few months a protracted stand-off between Democrats and Republicans may render Congress unable to lift the federal government’s debt ceiling, which would trigger a sovereign default. That would shake the faith of investors in American markets. It also may make funding costs for the government permanently higher, a big risk given the steep rise in public debt during the covid pandemic.

Is the end coming soon?

On trade policy, one area where politicians from both sides of the aisle do see eye-to-eye, the consensus is deeply worrying. Its embrace of globalisation was a crucial background condition for America’s long run of strong growth, as a rising trade-to-GDP ratio in the 1990s and 2000s makes clear. Foreign competition pushed American companies to make their operations more efficient; opportunities abroad gave them a bigger canvas for growth.

Now, though, globalisation is a dirty word in Washington, DC. A focus on national security and industrial policy has taken over. Take semiconductors: although America long ago lost its mantle as a major manufacturer, it is home to firms, such as Qualcomm and Nvidia, that design the world’s most sophisticated chips. That has worked well for America, letting it capture the highest-value segments of the global semiconductor industry.

But it is no longer enough. The government has started to throw billions of dollars at bringing chipmakers to America—in effect trying to hoover up lower-value parts of the industry in the name of supply-chain security. And it is trying to do much the same for electric vehicles, wind turbines, hydrogen production and more, potentially spending $2trn, or nearly 10% of GDP, to reshape the economy. These are aggressive interventions that run counter to America’s post-1980s stance; they may end up costing it productivity as well as money.

The overarching irony is that most of these potentially self-harming policies have their roots in a declinist view that, economically at least, simply does not reflect the facts. The diagnoses are that China is getting ahead, or that immigrants are a menace, that large corporations are bastions of woke power and free trade a form of treachery. Their folly is all the more striking because it betrays a lack of appreciation for the bigger economic picture, and just how good America has it. ■

Stay on top of American politics with Checks and Balance, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter, which examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. You can also visit our dedicated hub and follow along as we track shifts in Joe Biden’s approval rating.

The Economist

11. Army Picked Pricier Black Hawk Replacement Over ‘Unacceptable’ Losing Bid, GAO Says

Army Picked Pricier Black Hawk Replacement Over ‘Unacceptable’ Losing Bid, GAO Says

The Army found Sikorsky-Boeing's offering too vague, a new GAO document says.

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

in this 2018 photo, a Bell V-280 tiltrotor flies at Bell Flight Research Center in Arlington, Texas. Bell

April 13, 2023 06:53 PM ET

By Marcus Weisgerber

Global Business Editor

April 13, 2023 06:53 PM ET

The Bell tiltrotor aircraft that will replace Army Black Hawks will cost at least $3.6 billion more than a Sikorsky-Boeing helicopter proposal rejected by service leaders as vague and “unacceptable,” according to a GAO document posted Thursday.

Bell’s “proposed approach to weapon system performance and design, architecture, and product supportability is more advantageous to the government than [Sikorsky], whose engineering design and development is unacceptable,” wrote an undisclosed Army official who chose the winner, according to the GAO document.

In December, the Army picked Bell’s V-280 over the Sikorsky-Boeing Defiant X for its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, or FLRAA, program, explaining tersely that Bell’s proposal was the “best value.” Last week, GAO announced that it had denied Sikorsky-Boeing’s protest, explaining in a short press release that the team “failed to provide the level of architectural detail required.” But the agency withheld its formal decision document until corporate secrets could be redacted.

On Thursday, GAO released a 38-page redacted version of its decision, which says the Sikorsky-Boeing bid was dismissed because the companies misinterpreted what the Army wanted.

“Sikorsky’s proposal provided something similar to a drawing of what the house looked like on the outside, a basic indication of the size and shape of the house,” the Army wrote, according to GAO. “Such a picture did not provide the functional detail that the Army required showing what the space would look like on the inside (i.e., how the system functions would be allocated to different areas of the system--for example, that food storage and preparation would be allocated to a space for the kitchen).”

The document does not appear to make a judgment about the radically different technology used on the two competing aircraft and which one would better benefit troops.

In an emailed statement, a Sikorsky spokesperson said, “We just received the GAO’s report and will take the time to review and determine our next steps. We remain confident the Lockheed Martin Sikorsky and Boeing team submitted the most capable, affordable and lowest-risk Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft solution.”

12. Swift Actions by JOs Prevented Warship Collision in San Diego Harbor, Investigation Finds

The report can be accessedat the link: https://news.usni.org/2023/04/13/swift-actions-by-jos-prevented-warship-collision-in-san-diego-harbor-investigation-finds?SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

Swift Actions by JOs Prevented Warship Collision in San Diego Harbor, Investigation Finds - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · April 14, 2023

USS Momsen (DDG-92) (l) and USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) (r) on Nov. 29, 2022. Photo via San Diego Web Cam used with permission

The quick thinking of two junior officers aboard an amphibious warship prevented a collision in San Diego Harbor in November, according to an investigation obtained by USNI News on Thursday.

The near-miss between USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) and guided-missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG-92) in the narrowest part of San Diego harbor was prevented in part by the officer of the deck and navigator on Harpers Ferry who, during a moment of leadership indecision, ordered a turn that moved the 17,000-ton ship out of the way of the smaller, more maneuverable destroyer.

The commander of Momsen ordered the destroyer to turn at the same time, preventing the two ships from colliding at a tight corner a little under three miles from the harbor entrance, according to the report.

Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener, the commander of Naval Surface Forces, endorsed the preliminary investigation in January.

“This near-miss collision between warships reminds us of the inherent risk present during operations at sea,” Kitchener wrote in his endorsement. “We must reduce and mitigate those risks through a diligent and focused performance during special evolutions or transits in restricted waters.”

While mistakes were made in the pilot house of both ships, Kitchener elected to take no administrative action against the sailors and leaders involved.

“The investigation findings focused on counseling and self-assessment of those involved in the incident, formalizing procedures and clarifying standing orders, and emphasizing continued professional growth of our command triads and bridge teams,” Navy spokesman Cmdr. Arlo Abrahamson told USNI News in a Thursday statement.

“It’s also important to note that some members of the bridge teams were lauded for their actions in preventing a collision,” he said. “As noted in the investigation findings, this inquiry was an opportunity to critically assess processes and implement lessons learned to ensure this type of incident does not occur again.”

Tight Turn

Harpers Ferry left its pier at Naval Base San Diego on the morning of Nov. 29, 2022, heading west before an almost 90-degree turn south toward the harbor channel exit. Meanwhile, destroyer Momsen was returning to the naval base from a period underway.

The channel for San Diego Harbor is shaped like a hook curving around North Island. Ships leaving Naval Base San Diego sail northwest on a path that curves about 140 degrees around Naval Air Base North Island before heading almost due south through the channel.

Shortly after 10 a.m. local time, Harpers Ferry passed USS Tripoli (LHA-7) returning from its first deployment and headed into a turn in one of the tightest parts of the harbor.

Ships heading back to the naval base make the same trip in reverse through the narrow channel with piers, shallows and other hazards on either side of the harbor.

At 10:18, Harpers Ferry began a turn to port near the top of the channel. Coming north in the opposite direction, Momsen was bringing a harbor pilot aboard from a small tug.

Due to confusion on the bridge of Harpers Ferry, the watchstanders were unclear where Momsen was going. Based on the orientation of the ship, the Harpers Ferry bridge team thought Momsen could be cutting across the channel to the navy fuel pier.

In reality, Momsen had deviated from its planned passage and couldn’t turn to starboard with the tug attached. After bringing the pilot aboard, Momsen began its turn to starboard later than planned. By that point, Harpers Ferry had little room to maneuver.

“[Momsen] showed a target angle while embarking the pilot for almost 1.5 minutes that indicated they would not be able to comply with the [port to port] passage,” reads the investigation.

Unclear what Momsen was doing, the amphib’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Eric Winn, ordered Harpers Ferry to slow down and then stop to buy more time, but that diminished the amphib’s maneuverability.

“These actions show that [the Harpers Ferry] CO struggled in that moment to arrive upon the right solution to get [Harpers Ferry] out of danger. The period of indecision lasted for almost one minute and the rate of closure was about 333 yards every minute,” reads the investigation.

On the bridge of the amphib, Winn, the officer of the deck and the navigator gave contradicting orders that confused the conning officer.

“Interviews show at this time there was disagreement and confusion on the Harper Ferry bridge,” reads the investigation.

“In the critical moment when [Winn], [officer of the deck], and [the navigator] were all giving direction to the CONN, it is clear that the situation overwhelmed the CONN and she was no longer able to effectively execute her duties,” the report said.

The officer of the deck on Harpers Ferry took over as the conning officer and directed the ship to make a hard turn to port. Typically, the combat information center’s additional radars and sailors could have helped to track contacts, but the sailors were not aware of the situation on the bridge.

Meanwhile, Momsen’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Eric Roberts, and the bridge team realized that Harpers Ferry wasn’t in position for the ships to pass on each other’s port side. Roberts ordered the destroyer to make its own hard turn to port, avoiding a collision in one of the narrowest parts of the channel.

The two ships both turned to port at the same time, matching rudder movements, avoiding the collision and continuing on their path.

“Three major events prevented this near miss from being a collision: 1) the decisive actions taken by the Momsen Commanding Officer (CO) to maneuver to port, 2) the Officer of the Deck (OOD) onboard Harpers Ferry assuming CONN (Conning Officer) and maneuvering to port when he felt the point of extremis was reached, and 3) the decision by both the Momsen CO and Harpers Ferry OOD to shift rudders at approximately the same time to complete,” reads the investigation.

Aftermath

The investigation singled out the Harpers Ferry officer of the deck and navigator for praise in avoiding a collision, citing the improved officer of the deck training the Navy implemented after navigation errors aboard USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John McCain (DDG-56) resulted in the death of 17 sailors.“The forceful backup provided by the [Harpers Ferry navigator and officer of the deck] was exactly the type of support they should have provided to their CO and is an affirmation of the Harpers Ferry bridge team’s emphasis on training and the robust changes made in Surface Navy OOD training since the events of Fitzgerald and John S. McCain,” reads the investigation.

Earlier this week, a USNI News article explored how the revamped navigation training for surface warfare officers has improved the basic skills of junior officers entering the fleet.

Following the investigation, the commanders of both ships were directed to provide an extensive after-action report on what they could have done to improve their performance, a Navy official told USNI News this week.

In his endorsement, SWO Boss Kitchener highlighted the incident as a learning tool.

“This preliminary inquiry is an opportunity to critically assess processes and implement lessons learned to ensure this type of incident does not occur again,” he wrote.

Harbor Views

Webcam at the Cabrillo National Monument. Chris Cavas Photo

The near-miss incident may have never become public if not for the local San Diego Web Cam network. Footage of the incident was broadcast across the country following the incident.

One of two webcams the group operates from the Cabrillo National Monument on National Park Service property caught the incident. The park is perched on a hill overlooking the harbor entrance just south of a densely packed residential neighborhood.

In the report, investigators cite the camera footage as a key tool used to analyze the incident, since there was no voice or video recording of the bridge. The Coast Guard has also used the camera to help with operations and to respond to incidents in the harbor.

This week, the National Park Service cut internet access to the two webcams that had been operating for more than ten years, San Diego webcam founder Barry Barhrami told USNI News on Thursday.

In a statement to USNI News, NCIS said regional agents informally discussed the cameras with the Park Service staff and that the Park Service made the decision to cut off internet access.

“NCIS expressed force protection concerns related to the private webcams and YouTube channel, which provided 24-hour webcam monitoring of vessels and equities located aboard Naval Air Station North Island, including aircraft hangers/flight lines, Naval Base Point Loma submarine assets, and the tracking of military personnel working aboard Naval Base Coronado,” spokesman Jeff Houston told USNI News in a statement on Thursday.

Barhrami told USNI News the monument is a popular tourist destination and already popular with photographers. Cutting off the cameras would do little to limit the visibility of landmarks like North Island and the Point Loma submarine base.

He said the cameras already voluntarily blocked views of the submarine base and the group took other measures to avoid endangering ships and aircraft underway. Nothing was preventing a private citizen from setting up their own cameras, Barhrami added.

“I guarantee you they won’t take the same steps to protect the forces,” Barhrami said.

news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · April 14, 2023

13. Can America sustain a volunteer military? Syracuse summit to look for answers

Can America sustain a volunteer military? Syracuse summit to look for answers

Stars and Stripes · by Mark Weiner · April 15, 2023

The new National Veterans Resource Center at Syracuse University. (Charlie Miller | cmiller@syracuse.com)

Washington (Tribune News Service) — Senior U.S. military officials will gather in Syracuse next week with about two dozen college presidents to discuss a shared problem between the military and higher education.

Both have struggled to meet recruitment and enrollment goals as the nation emerges from the pandemic and fewer people graduate from high school as a result of demographic changes.

For the military, it’s a critical problem that could endanger the future of the all-volunteer force.

To look for solutions, Syracuse University leaders came up with the idea for a summit on the 50th anniversary of America’s move from a military draft to the all-volunteer Armed Forces.

The two-day event at SU’s National Veterans Resource Center will explore ways that colleges and the federal government can work together to give veterans and military-connected students better access to higher education.

SU Chancellor Kent Syverud told syracuse.com | The Post-Standard that he views the summit as a chance for colleges and universities to step up and eliminate barriers for military service members and veterans.

“The focus of the summit is to ask what higher education can do for veterans and military in the current situation we’re facing, not what veterans and military can do for higher education,” Syverud said.

“That starts from a premise that higher education, and particularly elite higher education, hasn’t exactly been present and accounted for in serving those who have served in recent decades,” he said.

Veterans have often turned to what Syverud calls “lower-resource institutions” rather than big private schools for their college education.

SU has been one of the exceptions among private schools, with soaring veteran enrollment over the past decade since it established the Institute for Veterans and Military Families in 2011.

Vice Chancellor Mike Haynie said military or service-connected students now make up 6% of SU’s total enrollment of about 22,000, compared to about 1% at similar public and private universities.

On top of that, more than 20,000 students per year now graduate from IVMF programs for veterans and members of the military held worldwide, with many earning degrees in nontraditional settings.

Haynie said the institute has taken its program around the globe, educating 192,000 people at 68 military installations in the United States and eight installations overseas. Some SU programs are even offered on board ships at sea.

Other universities have noticed and visited SU to learn more about its programs for veterans and their families, Syverud said. One of those schools, the University of Tennessee, is co-sponsoring the summit Wednesday and Thursday.

“I think we realize we need to do more at Syracuse, but we can’t carry this alone as an obligation for the country,” Syverud said. “We need other universities to partner.”

Several senior officials at the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs plan to attend the summit, Haynie said.

Those officials include Ashish S. Vazirani, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Brynt Parmeter, who was hired this week as the first chief talent officer for the Department of Defense.

Journalist and author Sebastian Junger, who reported on the war in Afghanistan, will deliver a keynote address to the university presidents and military leaders on Wednesday.

Haynie said he hopes that ideas for new education programs targeting veterans and military families emerge from the summit.

SU has a history of encouraging veteran and military enrollment, dating back to World War I and the establishment of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. The military pays tuition for ROTC students while they go to college and train to become officers.

In 1944, former SU Chancellor William Tolley helped draft the G.I. Bill, which continues to provide tuition assistance for service members, veterans and their dependents.

Syverud said the need for university and military leaders to come up with new ideas is as urgent now as it has ever been.

In three years from 2019 through 2021, 579 colleges and universities closed or merged, according to the U.S. Department of Education.

This year, Cazenovia College announced it was closing its Central New York campus after nearly 200 years. The college blamed financial losses brought on by a 40 percent enrollment drop.

The U.S. military faces similar headwinds. The Army said it missed its fiscal 2022 recruitment goal by 25%, falling 15,000 soldiers short of its needs.

Syverud said the numbers are a sobering reminder of what’s at stake.

“It is an enrollment cliff that we’re facing, including in New York,” he said. “It’s one thing when that causes Cazenovia College to close. That’s a tragedy locally. But if it results in the Army not having soldiers, that’s a national security disaster for the whole country.”

Visit syracuse.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Mark Weiner · April 15, 2023

14. Notes from Central Taiwan: The Normandy Invasion trope

All warfare is based on deception. Certainly deception operations were an important part of the Normandy invasion. Perhaps the PLA /CCP are practicing deception operations in the modern era.

Mon, Apr 17, 2023 page13

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/04/17/2003798072

Notes from Central Taiwan: The Normandy Invasion trope

China’s simulated videos of beach assaults on Taiwan may be misdirection to conceal its true military strategy

By Michael Turton / Contributing Reporter
“There were no decisive battles in World War II,” begins Philips Payson O’Brien’s amazing work How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.
O’Brien, who demonstrates that the war was won by the Western allies over the skies of Europe and the waters of the Atlantic in the “air-sea space” in which the great mass of German equipment was destroyed (in 1944 over half of German production went to single-engine fighters), dismisses most histories of the war as too “battle-centric.”
Chinese troops are frequently shown in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) videos storming beaches. For example, a video released on Oct. 10, 2021 (Double Ten National Day) shows beach landing exercises. Another from May of that year showed beach landings and the use of helicopter carriers. The PLA has also released videos of mock-ups of their troops assaulting Taipei and Taiwan’s Presidential Office at the Zhurihe (朱日和) training base in Inner Mongolia.

Screenshot from a 2021 video released by Chinese state media shows the People’s Liberation Army simulating a beach invasion of Taiwan.

Photo: Taipei Times file
These videos are obvious propaganda (if the PLA reaches the point where it is assaulting the Presidential Office, the war is over), but their very obviousness could be a diversion: what if they are maskirovka, a form of military deception, meant to distort our perceptions of PLA intentions?
What if our conception of the invasion is too beach-centric?

Taiwanese military personnel simulate a Chinese beach invasion during Han Kuang military exercises in Pingtung County.

Photo: Tsai Tsung-hsien, Taipei Times
BLANKET OF ILLUSION
The trope of storming the beaches Normandy style is a comforting blanket of illusion. Countless articles explain the problems the PLA will encounter. Not only will much preparation time be required, but the losses suffered by the thousands of Chinese troops presenting themselves as targets as they storm the beaches even as PRC war machines loiter in the water and air, easy pickings for defenders, seem daunting and discouraging.
Managing all that complexity, we are reassured, is something the PLA has never done before. Seems like they might not do it, right? What has China learned from the Ukraine War? Some lessons are already taking shape. One important one: the war must begin before anyone, including Beijing, is “ready.” Russia gave notice much too early that it was going to invade, enabling a comprehensive response. Beijing is going to seek strategic, not just tactical and operation surprise, to blunt the US and Japanese response.

Screenshot from a 2015 video simulating a Chinese attack on Taiwan’s Presidential Office.

Photo: Taipei Times file
That is why the cycling of PLA military planes and ships off the coast is so dangerous. They are not merely normalizing a Chinese presence, but setting up conditions under which they can start a war at any moment, or can gradually be increased until war has been stealthily prepared. Further, if some provocation or accident, like lasering a foreign military ship, sparks a local conflict, China will ready to expand it.
To put this in perspective, in just three days last week, the PLA cycled over 200 aircraft around Taiwan. People say we will detect the invasion by satellite. Perfectly true, we will become used to detecting it every day with the aircraft intrusions and PLA navy vessels near Taiwan.
PORT INVASION?
The Allies knew that the Normandy invasion force needed to grab a port to enable resupply and expansion of the initial invasion force. What if the PLA skips the beach part, and opens the invasion with an assault on a port?
Consider US General Douglas MacArthur’s landing at Incheon to seize the port there. MacArthur began mulling such a move shortly after the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by the North. Serious planning began in August. The landings began on Sept. 16. Incheon was a nightmare, a tiny harbor with high sea walls and brutal tides, the highest tidal range in Asia, that would block reinforcements. A major misdirection campaign helped make the landing a total success.
I would argue that Incheon is a natural model for a PLA operation against Taiwan, but there are others. PLA military thinkers are certainly familiar with Soviet military writings, and they will have studied the Soviet amphibious landings in Korea and Japan in August 1945.
The Soviets did not hit Korean beaches, but instead seized three ports. Two of them, Rason and Sonbong, fell easily. The third operation, at Chongjin, met fierce Japanese counterattacks and was taken only when the Soviets drove off that most romantic of military weapons, a Japanese armored train that was defending the port, and when the Japanese laid down their arms on Aug. 15. At the same time, the Soviets were landing on Japan’s Sakhalin Island (it is now Russian). Again, they did not unload unto beaches, but directly seized two ports: Maoka (now Kholmsk) and Toro (now Shakhtyorsk). Resistance on Sakhalin was unexpectedly fierce, and few now remember that the fighting went into September, weeks after official surrender. The Japanese refusal to quit likely prevented a follow-on invasion of Hokkaido and a north-south division of Japan into competing Soviet and Allied zones.
In Taiwan, several west coast harbors would be ideal. Taichung harbor can handle large vessels, but artillery posted on Dadu Mountain (大肚山) could wreak havoc on the landings. However, Mailiao harbor (麥寮), the massive port constructed for the petrochemical complex in Yunlin County, can handle large oil tankers and has no natural defenses such as nearby hills.
POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE
The failure of the Russian decapitation strike on Kyiv in the first few days of the Ukraine War must have struck Chinese thinkers. Mailiao also offers a political alternative. First, troops based there would fan out into the pro-Taiwan heartland. Outside of the petrochemical complex, combat would wreck little of economic importance until the PLA reaches Changhua to the north and the Tainan Science Park to the south.
Second, as the PLA army advances northward, it would confront Taiwanese elites, who cluster in the most pro-China areas of Taiwan, with increasing pressure to surrender to at least preserve some of their wealth and the nation’s modern productive capacity, largely located in the north.
The Normandy trope also suggests the importance of weather in creating comfortable illusions. In his book The Chinese Invasion Threat, Ian Easton has a chapter on the weather problems confronting any invader. Annually, he observes, on average, “six typhoons will strike Taiwan, but some years see as many as nine typhoons.”
Anyone remember the last time a typhoon crossed the island of Taiwan or roared up the Taiwan Strait? As humans heat the earth, typhoons are staying away from Taiwan. The winter weather might be still be awful, but the summer is no longer the protection it once was. Luckily for Taiwan, recent Chinese scholarship (“Long-term variations of wind and wave conditions in the Taiwan Strait,” Regional Studies in Marine Science) shows that winds and waves in the strait are both increasing most strongly off the southwest of Taiwan.
The Normandy trope is wrong and misleading. Everything the PLA puts out showing beaches being stormed should be treated as misdirection.
At present, our beach defenses hide from the public. Perhaps a few weapons openly sited in ports, where tourists go in large numbers, might help shake public complacency.
Might even be useful too.
Notes from Central Taiwan is a column written by long-term resident Michael Turton, who provides incisive commentary informed by three decades of living in and writing about his adoptive country. The views expressed here are his own.

15. The Army Must Reward Smart Leaders, Not Just Strong Ones, if We Want to Win the Next War

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, the United States has an entrenched culture of anti-intellectualism. Minimal funding of public education, pop-culture stereotypes of intelligent people, and public disdain for scientists or "experts" by politicians, some media and the public are all evidence.

"The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way throughout political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that 'my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge,'" Isaac Asimov, a biochemistry professor who authored some of the most significant works of science fiction of the 20th century, wrote in 1980. This is as true today as it was then.

If we want to prepare our military for growing complexity, we must counteract this mindset. It doesn't mean sacrificing strong leaders to make way for smart ones; it means expecting all leaders to be both. The Army must start rewarding academic success as much as high fitness scores. A few simple policy changes will make major strides to that end.

The Army Must Reward Smart Leaders, Not Just Strong Ones, if We Want to Win the Next War

military.com · by 14 Apr 2023 Military.com | By Maj. Dan Dillenback · April 14, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Even before withdrawal from Afghanistan and the strategic pivot toward competition with China and Russia, military planners grappled with the challenge of preparing for future wars.

One of the greatest challenges they must conquer is the fire hose of information that is already confronting troops, a deluge that's only going to thicken the fog of war. The military needs smart leaders to overcome that challenge, an uphill battle against a national culture that at times mocks intelligence.

We can expect to lose the technological advantage the U.S. military enjoyed in the post-Cold War era. All communications will either allow troops to be located and targeted or decrypted. Artificial intelligence (AI) will rapidly develop enemy courses of action after intercepting messages. This isn't science fiction anymore. The technology already exists, is available commercially, and is approaching readiness for wartime use.

While the scale and speed of combat increase with technology, the fundamentals of war remain. The immense amount of information made available by technology will not increase clarity as once predicted. It will make things more uncertain by increasing the speed, volume and detail of intelligence. Without the right people to add analysis, intuition and experience, commanders will quickly be overwhelmed by the data.

How will we find, fix and finish the enemy in the future? What must we do now to prepare ourselves?

We must leverage our most potent advantage: our people. Technology and information are tools; they have no value until wielded by sharp minds and skilled hands. A rifle is useless when shouldered by an untrained soldier, just as an AI-linked intelligence network will be. We must ensure today that we are promoting leaders with the capacity and talent to out-think the enemy and maximize the effectiveness of future technology. We must change how we evaluate our intellectual talent to ensure our ability to win on the battlefield of the future.

Unfortunately, the United States has an entrenched culture of anti-intellectualism. Minimal funding of public education, pop-culture stereotypes of intelligent people, and public disdain for scientists or "experts" by politicians, some media and the public are all evidence.

"The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way throughout political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that 'my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge,'" Isaac Asimov, a biochemistry professor who authored some of the most significant works of science fiction of the 20th century, wrote in 1980. This is as true today as it was then.

If we want to prepare our military for growing complexity, we must counteract this mindset. It doesn't mean sacrificing strong leaders to make way for smart ones; it means expecting all leaders to be both. The Army must start rewarding academic success as much as high fitness scores. A few simple policy changes will make major strides to that end.

First, we must increase the importance of academic evaluation reports (AERs) for professional military education in assigning and promoting company-grade and noncommissioned officers. Motivated lieutenants who work hard and excel in the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) are not rewarded meaningfully. Captains who graduate at the top of their class enter the same queue for command positions as everyone else. One of the first lessons that young officers learn is that academics and intelligence are less important than being able to outrun your battalion commander.

An Army officer's first academic opportunity with tangible benefits is admission into the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), for which they become eligible 10 years into their career. SAMS sets them apart from their peers and positions them to excel rapidly. Being labeled a "SAMS Grad" immediately identifies the officer as a high performer and future commander. That's too late. Ten years in, many exceptional officers have already resigned in favor of civilian careers.

Increasing consideration of AERs in promotion selection boards creates a system that considers individual academic success in conjunction with job evaluation reports. This would not prioritize weak leaders of high intellect. Instead, it should differentiate the most qualified candidates by giving board members insight into the soldier's academic and intellectual prowess.

Second, soldiers should be able to add published professional works to their personnel files. Contributions to professional periodicals such as "Military Review" or branch magazines demonstrate a professional stewardship and should be considered during promotions and assignments. Voluntary writing and research demonstrate an aptitude for self-development, critical thinking and communication skills, all of which are critical for leaders and are ineffectively evaluated by the existing evaluation report. Officer and enlisted record briefs also should include a note showing the number of qualifying published works. If a soldier is prolific or has demonstrated expertise in an area, they should be prioritized for relevant assignments.

With these changes, the Army would face our future enemies with an experienced roster of leaders raised in a warrior-scholar culture that expects and cultivates both physical and intellectual capacity. War will always be a fundamentally human endeavor. No technology can replace human decision-making and risk analysis. In the battlefield of the future, technology will increase available information, but only sharp minds and skilled hands can bring that information to bear.

Maj. Dan Dillenback is a military strategist with the U.S. Army currently pursuing a master's degree in public administration at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

military.com · by 14 Apr 2023 Military.com | By Maj. Dan Dillenback · April 14, 2023

16. US warship sails through Taiwan Strait following China war games

US warship sails through Taiwan Strait following China war games

Reuters · by Reuters

TAIPEI, April 17 (Reuters) - The U.S. warship USS Milius sailed through the Taiwan Strait on Sunday, in what the U.S. Navy described on Monday as a "routine" transit, just days after China ended its latest war games around the island.

China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, officially ended its three days of exercises around Taiwan last Monday where it practiced precision strikes and blockading the island.

It staged the drills to express anger at Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's meeting with U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy, viewing it as an interference in China's internal affairs and U.S. support for Taiwan's separate identity from China.

The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet said the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Milius conducted a "routine Taiwan Strait transit" through waters "where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law".

The ship's transit demonstrates the United States' commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, it added.

Chinese military's Eastern Theatre Command said in a social media post on Monday it organised troops to follow and monitor the U.S. destroyer throughout its operation.

Taiwan's defence ministry said the ship sailed in a northerly direction through the strait and that during its transit the situation in the strait was "as normal".

The U.S. Navy sails warships through the strait around once a month, and also regularly conducts similar freedom of navigation missions in the disputed South China Sea.

Last week, the USS Milius sailed near one of the most important man-made and Chinese controlled islands in the South China Sea, Mischief Reef. Beijing denounced it as illegal.

China has continued its military activities around Taiwan since the drills ended, though on a reduced scale.

On Monday morning, Taiwan's defence ministry said it had spotted 18 Chinese military aircraft and four naval vessels operating around Taiwan in the previous 24 hour period.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring democratically governed Taiwan under its control.

Taiwan's government rejects China's territorial claims, and says only the island's people can decide their future.

Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Christopher Cushing

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

17. Russia struggling to cope with Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories

Buried lede: Russia has a "National Resistance Center?" Did they always have one or did they establish this solely for the Ukrainian resistance? Note the fear of Ukrainian resistance.

Excerpts:

The Russians are, in fact, trying to come up with new ways to put pressure on Ukrainian partisans. After all, existing measures are hardly proving to be effective.

Occupation administrations intend to increase responsibility for disseminating pro-Ukrainian information and identifying cells of the resistance movement, the National Resistance Center said. At its meetings, the Russian administration continues to discuss the occupation policy of the aggressor state, which is aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian identity and imposing the ideology of the "Russian world" on Ukrainian youth.

...

Russia’s Defense Ministry added that Russians are afraid of the Ukrainian resistance, which is why they are increasingly putting these issues on the agenda, especially at meetings of law enforcement agencies.

Russia struggling to cope with Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories

english.nv.ua

15 April, 06:20 PM

Russian military (Photo:Міноборони РФ/Telegram)

Russian authorities are planning to develop a new strategy to fight Ukrainian guerrillas in the temporarily occupied territories because the current measures are not producing the desired results, the "Sprotyv" National Resistance Centre reported on 15 April.

The Defense Ministry’s department notes that FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, ministers of the Russian security forces, and Russian General Staff chief Valery Gerasimov held a video conference to find new ways of putting pressure on the Ukrainian underground in the temporarily occupied territories.

Video of day

The stated purpose of the meeting was to improve counterterrorism activities in the field of education and youth, said the National Resistance Centre.

"What is more, the enemy intends to pay special attention to countering the so-called ‘ideology of terrorism and neo-Nazism’ among young people," the statement reads.

The Russians are, in fact, trying to come up with new ways to put pressure on Ukrainian partisans. After all, existing measures are hardly proving to be effective.

Occupation administrations intend to increase responsibility for disseminating pro-Ukrainian information and identifying cells of the resistance movement, the National Resistance Center said. At its meetings, the Russian administration continues to discuss the occupation policy of the aggressor state, which is aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian identity and imposing the ideology of the "Russian world" on Ukrainian youth.

Russia’s Defense Ministry added that Russians are afraid of the Ukrainian resistance, which is why they are increasingly putting these issues on the agenda, especially at meetings of law enforcement agencies.

18. More than a Hobby: Informal Security Assistance to Ukraine

Whole of society and nation versus whole of government.

Excerpts:

Finally, the U.S. can support concerted interagency efforts to integrate some non-governmental organizations and activists into long-term irregular statecraft strategies for Ukraine. Military planners could establish non-governmental organization coordination cells, providing them access to excess military airlift to help transport bulk goods and supplies. It would save volunteers thousands of dollars on international flights and excess baggage fees. Civil society and highly motivated volunteers bring substantial speed, power, and value in a crisis and should be accounted for in future irregular strategies.

Despite the entrepreneurial value of non-governmental organizations and volunteers — supplying frontlines units, collecting sensitive intelligence, and developing trusted sources and networks — several groups told us no U.S. government agency has reached out to them for information. As rising costs and fears of escalation continue to shape debates over military assistance to Ukraine, informal security assistance to Kyiv represents a long-term, low-cost irregular option to outcompete Russia and, more importantly, defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The fact that many view informal security assistance as little more than a hobby suggests the United States is missing a major opportunity.

More than a Hobby: Informal Security Assistance to Ukraine - War on the Rocks

JAHARA MATISEK, WILLIAM RENO, AND SAM ROSENBERG

APRIL 17, 2023

warontherocks.com · by Jahara Matisek · April 17, 2023

“We are where NATO should be,” says Rima Žiūraitienė, Managing Director of Blue/Yellow Ukraine. Her non-governmental organization communicates directly with combat units at the brigade level and uses trusted drivers to deliver much-needed equipment directly to units on the frontline, bypassing Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.

Debates about appropriate military equipment for Ukraine continue a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These arguments focus predominantly on state-to-state assistance. But they miss an important element of Kyiv’s battlefield performance: informal security assistance. Aid from domestic civil society, informal military networks, and foreign volunteers are bolstering the Armed Forces of Ukraine in real and meaningful ways.

While some may argue that the aid provided by non-state actors — relative to over $113 billion in global aid provided to Ukraine — is too small to make an impact, we believe the aid has had a tangible effect. Highly motivated groups are providing equipment with a comparative advantage in areas where formalized state aid cannot. Several Ukrainian soldiers told us that “It’s more common for the average Ukrainian unit to have 100 percent of its drones sourced from these non-governmental organizations [Prytula Foundation, Come Back Alive, and Monsters Corporation], not our Ministry of Defense…and these drones already come ‘modified’ so they’re ready for combat use when they arrive.”

Become a Member

These soldiers also told us that “Most Ukrainian units have half their vehicles coming from non-governmental organizations,” and that Come Back Alive arms all “Territorial defense units with ready fire support” by providing them “120-mm mortars with vehicles.” Volunteer organizations are providing night vision goggles and medical supplies, collecting and analyzing battlefield intelligence. Many international volunteers also serve a vital role with training simulators, delivering lethal aid, and buying and modifying simple drones to drop grenades.

Informal security aid reinforces a global narrative that Ukraine’s battle against Russian invaders is a just cause worthy of support. Third parties act with speed and initiative that risk-averse government bureaucracies lack and provide a low-profile and low-risk lever that Western governments can use to amplify the impacts of conventional assistance and strategic-level communications. Such hobbyists often work through important networks of people and trusted information sources beyond the reach of government agencies. Thus, private aid fits within the scope of irregular warfare.

Though barely mentioned in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy warns that “We must not — and will not — repeat the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict.” Non-governmental organizations have knowledge of soldiers’ specific needs in ways that state-led efforts do not. Engagement and active learning from these efforts should play a significant role in advancing these irregular warfare goals in contexts very different than wars of the past 20 years.

As the political winds shift in Western capitals, informal security assistance offers a way to bridge the gap in the “boom-bust” cycle that has typified Western military aid in past conflicts.

There are four ways the West can help Ukraine. First, the United States can continue to emphasize transparency. Volunteer groups that publish where and how they spend their resources engender public trust and broader, follow-on support. Second, U.S. officials can engage critical private companies, like SpaceX, and encourage more robust assistance to Ukraine’s defense. With privately sourced capabilities like Starlink playing decisive roles on the battlefield, such pressure will ensure Ukrainians receive energetic support from both the private and public sectors. Third, policymakers can revisit export laws to ensure that the U.S. government transfers key manuals and supporting information for Western equipment without violating export controls. Finally, the United States government can incorporate volunteer groups into a long-term, low-cost strategy for irregular warfare in Ukraine. Flexibility and responsiveness are important elements to strategically compete with the Kremlin without risking significant escalation or expending additional state-based resources.

Three types of Informal Security Assistance

Our Department of Defense Minerva team has interviewed dozens of American, NATO, and Ukrainian military personnel across Europe over the last two years. Through these visits, we have come to understand the value — both tactical and strategic — of informal security assistance in the Russo-Ukrainian War. This private aid comes in at least three forms: help from Ukraine’s civil society, unofficial support through informal professional networks (government, military, and private), and assistance from foreign volunteers.

Civil Society in Ukraine

Civil society has long played an important role in war. Dating back to the American Civil War through World War Two, and beyond, civic groups such as churches, clubs, and others have provided “care packages” to soldiers. In the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, this type of assistance responded to deficiencies. Some families dropped candy deliveries for more practical “care packages” such as mailing body armor.

Russia’s 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine inspired changes in how everyday Ukrainian citizens supported their military. Natalia Ricabal Kalmykova, whom we interviewed in Kyiv in 2021 while she worked at the Ukrainian organization Come Back Alive, said that “When Russia invaded, our government was too weak to do anything…so we formed our group to start providing our troops night vision goggles, thermal sights, drones, medical supplies, and anything else they requested.” She added that it was the strength of Ukrainian civil society that prevented Russia from making bigger gains in 2014–2015. Later as the conflict stabilized, her group began modifying drones for frontline use against Russian forces and invented a tripod-camera system for identifying Russian snipers. According to Ukrainian troops we met, these non-governmental organizations give them an edge against Russian troops.

A Ukrainian group, Aerorozvidka, has direct ties to the Ukrainian military. It has been operating since 2014 and created the R18 octocopter drone. Ukrainian troops use this drone to drop grenades on Russian forces. Drones are a major focus of funding drives. In July, citizens in both Poland and Lithuania raised over $5 million dollars in private donations to supply Ukraine with Bayraktar drones. The Polish campaign inspired the Turkish drone manufacturer to provide several for free and allocated the money raised to humanitarian aid organizations. At the same time, the crowdsourcing of Bayraktar drones, for example, creates a supply-side issue, pressuring the Ukrainian military to use them even though the money would be better spent on more critical demands on the front, like artillery and mortar rounds, according to several Ukrainian officers contacted.

Informal Military Networks

Informal advising between Western militaries and Ukrainian forces is growing too. This development is important because it allows government and military personnel to communicate instantly and with frontline tactical units through secure messaging apps.

Some Ukrainian troops noted that many of their weapons and ammo do not come with guides or firing tables. NATO personnel, according to Ukrainian sources we interviewed, have privately responded to such needs and acquired this information through unofficial channels, providing it directly to frontline units. In another case, Ukrainian soldiers told us that Western military officers have set up Facetime calls to teach their units how to use weapons, such as a recently acquired rocket-propelled grenade that did not have instructions. A different Ukrainian unit encountered problems related to mounting adapters for aiming sights on Western machine guns. The oversight caused a several-week delay but was eventually overcome with help from personal networks between Western special operations units. Most Ukrainian troops appreciate these informal solutions, but the United States and Europe could do a better job of ensuring future war matériel deliveries actually make sense for the Ukrainian military.

Foreign Volunteers

According to Ukrainian estimates earlier in the war, as many as 20,000 foreign fighters from 50 different countries answered Ukraine’s 2022 plea for help. The total number of foreign volunteers has since dropped to between 1,000 and 3,000 foreign fighters, with most serving in three International Legion battalions. While these numbers may seem small in comparison to the overall size of the Ukrainian military, their presence provides symbolic importance and facilitate important private donor networks.

For example, the founder and director of Anomaly, David Plaster (a former U.S. combat medic), told us that his Ukraine-based organization has supported the instruction of more than 100,000 Ukrainian personnel to help institutionalize NATO military training standards, veteran transition, and development of local communities since 2014. Anomaly has provided over 1,000 individual first aid kits, over 1 million units of life-saving hemostatic gauze (“quick clot”) and consulted the Ukrainian government on the proper filling of first aid kits according to NATO standards.

Not all foreign volunteers are interested in direct fighting. Some organizations, like Blue/Yellow Ukraine, are focused on raising funds for Ukraine’s war effort. They also provide non-lethal military aid to units on the battlefield. In the case of Blue/Yellow Ukraine, a Lithuanian and United States-based non-governmental organization, activists have raised over $40 million for non-lethal military aid. Jonas Oehman founded the group in 2014 during Russia’s initial invasion, and Blue/Yellow has been vital to delivering niche aid and supplies to the frontlines.

Since 2022, newer charitable organizations have been formed to aid, assist, and equip Ukraine. “NAFO Fellas” is an organic global civil society response to Russian trolls. NAFO has also enabled crowdsourcing efforts for Ukrainian naval drones via donations to UNITED24 (a 501c3 organization created by the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States), in exchange for getting a customized cartoon Shiba Inu dog. Razom has provided more than $38 million dollars in assistance, including $21 million in medical equipment alone. The Prytula Foundation has raised $85 million and provided over 3,000 drones and nearly 900 “hell ride” vehicles.

Flexible and Responsive Informal security assistance: Caution required

Informal security assistance can be more flexible and responsive than official aid. This informal assistance should be considered as part of a robust irregular strategy for the United States military. However, governments looking to utilize this irregular warfare approach with non-governmental organizations need to properly vet individuals running these groups to ensure appropriate alignment with U.S. interests and concepts of irregular warfare doctrine. The other danger is that countries such as Russia view these organizations and human rights activists as an “ecosystem of propaganda…in the interests of the West” that is waging hybrid warfare against Russia.

Balancing official and unofficial linkages between governments and non-governmental organizations is a nuanced juggling act of achieving similar interests in Ukraine while managing escalation with Russia. As part of our research, we spoke with individuals that since 2014 have organized and maintained a grassroots movement known as the “Red Dawn Project.” This Ukrainian diaspora-led organization leads guerilla operations against Russian forces, spray painting “Wolverines” graffiti on destroyed Russian armor. The Red Dawn Project consists of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian diaspora, and dozens of veterans from foreign militaries. Their aim is to convey the effectiveness of partisan units in a manner that creates uncertainty and frustrates the Russian adversary in the classic manner of irregular warfare.

Not all groups trying to help Ukrainian forces are reputable. According to Rima Žiūraitienė, “the number of unqualified people in Ukraine is a bit of a mess…people teaching and training under false credentials.” The New York Times identified this growing problem with some volunteer fighters and organizations doing paramilitary training with Ukrainians. For instance, the decision by the Mozart Group shutter its operations in Ukraine came amid growing scrutiny of its murky legal status, in-fighting, perceived fraud, and some troubling comments made by one of its founders Andy Milburn. In other cases, groups like Ripley’s Heroes blurred the line between helping and trying to profit from donors. The organization also allegedly broke export laws and is under federal investigation, underscoring the importance of appropriate vetting.

Building on a Foundation of Success

Informal security assistance scored successes in the first year of Russia’s renewed invasion in part due to three key factors. First, crowdfunding efforts and leading organizations emphasize transparency. They track and publish where and how they spend their resources. Transparency engenders donor trust and spurs follow-on support.

Second, when it comes to private citizens assisting Ukraine, smaller is often better. A smaller organization means less overhead when financing assistance. Organizations that are smaller on the ground tend to be more efficient and responsive — translating into higher quality assistance — according to our discussions with Blue/Yellow and Christian Borys and Evgen Vorobiov, the founders of St. Javelin. Instead of dealing with layers of bureaucracy and contractors, smaller groups are flexible and can quickly solve problems through personal networks.

Third, successful informal security assistance is built on years of close and continuous relationships. Many organizations conveyed the value and credibility built by being present in Ukraine before 2022, which enabled faster donor responses and mobilization of networks and resources. U.S. National Guardsmen who trained Ukrainian soldiers in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 intervention were instrumental in advising the Ukrainians in the first weeks of Putin’s full-scale invasion. Moreover, the California Air National Guard has advised the Ukrainian Air Force since 1993 through the State Partnership Program and is credited as an important relationship in keeping the Ukrainian Air Force highly adaptive and flying.

Improving Informal Security Assistance Efforts

Four policies are needed for the U.S. and Western governments to make informal security assistance more effective and cost-efficient.

First, policymakers can streamline International Traffic in Arms Regulations to prioritize groups sending assistance to Ukraine. Volunteers mentioned the State Department export process is mired in red tape and can cost them up to $2,500 per license, impeding the delivery of supplies to frontline Ukrainian forces. The State Department must place a “pause” and moratorium on certain export licenses and costs involving the movement of goods to Ukraine.

Second, the United States must leverage technology companies. Per our interview with Jonas Oehman, PayPal blocked electronic payments to Blue/Yellow in June 2022, because they “felt that we, at first were allowing friends/family payment types and then later we were told we were deemed a ‘risk’ because it looks like we supply weapons, but we don’t.” In January of 2023, the Russian government, according to Oehman, filed a complaint with Paychex and Amazon Web Services for “objectionable content” on the Blue/Yellow website to prevent donations. Such actions force them to seek alternative funding methods. The February 2023 announcement that Starlink was limiting the use of its systems for Ukrainian troops was not new. Several activists said SpaceX has been unresponsive to multiple repeated attempts to troubleshoot Starlink terminals for internet access near Russian frontlines since the summer of 2022, impeding Ukrainian communications. Concern about Elon Musk cultivating closer relations with Russia and advocating pro-Russian narratives gives many activists worries about Musk inhibiting pro-Ukrainian use of Twitter and Starlink. Congress should pressure companies to allow pro-Ukrainian groups to utilize vital services, and in the case of Space X, the White House should consider invoking the Defense Production Act to compel the provision of Starlink coverage.

Third, Congress and the Department of Defense — and many NATO allies — need to reform export laws concerning manuals and firing tables for certain weapon systems. In most cases, such information is not classified or top secret but is marked “Not for Export” or “Controlled Unclassified Information.” This creates a difficult dilemma for some NATO military members hamstrung by the laws of their own governments that limit their abilities to provide instructions to units using Western weapons and ammo. Weapon manuals come in many different languages, leaving Ukrainian units to translate them into Ukrainian or English. NATO could expedite translations or provide English manuals. Our team has identified the Ukrainian military using at least 18 western mortar and artillery systems (105mm, 120mm, and 155mm), over 28 unique projectiles, and 9 different propellants. Due to the unusual mix of Western weapons and mismatched rounds, more resources should be dedicated to model artillery and mortar distances at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center. This would save Ukrainian units resources by not having to develop their own trial-and-error firing tables and reduce the number of tubes damaged each week due to incompatibility.

Finally, the U.S. can support concerted interagency efforts to integrate some non-governmental organizations and activists into long-term irregular statecraft strategies for Ukraine. Military planners could establish non-governmental organization coordination cells, providing them access to excess military airlift to help transport bulk goods and supplies. It would save volunteers thousands of dollars on international flights and excess baggage fees. Civil society and highly motivated volunteers bring substantial speed, power, and value in a crisis and should be accounted for in future irregular strategies.

Despite the entrepreneurial value of non-governmental organizations and volunteers — supplying frontlines units, collecting sensitive intelligence, and developing trusted sources and networks — several groups told us no U.S. government agency has reached out to them for information. As rising costs and fears of escalation continue to shape debates over military assistance to Ukraine, informal security assistance to Kyiv represents a long-term, low-cost irregular option to outcompete Russia and, more importantly, defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The fact that many view informal security assistance as little more than a hobby suggests the United States is missing a major opportunity.

Become a Member

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, Ph.D., (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the U.S. Naval War College, a 2023 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative (joint production of Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point), and U.S. Department of Defense Minerva researcher. Lt. Col. Matisek has published over 80 articles and essays in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. A 2020 Bronze Star recipient for serving as the director of operations and commander of the 451st Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, he is a command pilot that previously served as a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute and associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the US Air Force Academy.

Dr. William Reno is a professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University. He has conducted fieldwork and interviews in conflict zones across Africa and the Middle East for over thirty years, having authored three books: Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Warlord Politics and African States, and Warfare in Independent Africa. Dr. Reno has published over one hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals, and policy-relevant periodicals, and edited volumes on civil wars, rebels, and military assistance. Finally, he is the principal investigator for the U.S. Department of Defense Minerva-funded program studying how the United States can improve foreign military training.

Lieutenant Colonel Sam Rosenberg (@SamR2508) is a Ph.D. student at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, serving as a Goodpaster Scholar through the Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program. His dissertation research focuses on U.S. efforts to build partner militaries for large-scale combat. Sam is an active-duty Army officer, serving most recently with United States Northern Command on the Commander’s Initiative’s Group and within the Strategy and Policy Directorate. He was commissioned in 2006 as an infantry officer and served in a variety of leadership positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, and Eastern Europe. He holds a bachelor’s degree in American Politics from West Point and a master’s degree in National Security Policy from Georgetown University, where he studied as a Downing Scholar.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jahara Matisek · April 17, 2023

19. Who's Tackling Classified AI?

Excerpts:

Many of these questions are easier to ask than to answer. Congress will find this true as well, especially because issues of classification make it impossible to discuss possible uses of AI publicly. One place to start, though, is to obtain the views of a wide range of national security experts who spend their working hours behind the veil of secrecy. Using tools that operate like Pol.is, the executive branch could first give all participants basic training in different types of AI, what AI systems can and cannot do, and how they have been used in the real world. The Executive could then pose a range of questions about possible uses of national security AI, including realistic hypotheticals, for relevant officials within the Departments of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the State Department, as well as the Intelligence Community, to wrestle with. Moderators could then try to work toward consensus positions on various potential uses (or non-uses) of AI and share their findings with senior national security policymakers.

One initial objection may be that this exercise would let the fox guard the henhouse. However, the national security bureaucracy is surprisingly diverse in terms of experience, perspective, political persuasion, and training. A career foreign service officer and a CIA field agent will not see issues identically. Nor will a Defense Department cyber specialist and a Justice Department lawyer in the National Security Division. Further, this would be a way to assemble a large number and wide range of views about classified uses of AI—something that is otherwise difficult to collect input on. Third, views of executive branch officials are not the only input worth obtaining: Congress and the Executive will surely hear views from technology companies, foreign allies, and non-governmental organizations. But gaining views from national security professionals—whether they be intelligence analysts, diplomats, computer scientists, or military operators—would be invaluable as we shape a collective national approach to AI.

Finally, as I have recently argued on these pages, the chance of obtaining consensus among leading AI states about particular uses of national security AI is very slim. This means that it is necessary and important for the United States to think clearly and critically—both in front of the curtain of classification and behind it—about what uses of these tools we want our government to use in our name.

Who's Tackling Classified AI?

By Ashley Deeks Monday, April 17, 2023, 8:01 AM

lawfareblog.com · April 17, 2023

On April 8, the Washington Post reported that members of Congress have “vowed to tackle AI.” The article describes the anxiety that is growing among lawmakers as they try to get a handle on what recent advances in AI portend. “Something is coming. We aren’t ready,” Senator Murphy tweeted.

It will be good news if members of Congress are able to get smarter about what AI tools are, what they can and can’t do, and what good and bad uses of AI will realistically look like. But the work shouldn’t stop with unclassified AI systems alone. Classified AI tools that U.S. national security agencies build and use should also be consistent with the basic values we expect of the U.S. government: legality, competence, effectiveness, and accountability. Innovations in the unclassified setting can provide ideas on how to do so.

Regulating in the Unclassified Space

Almost all of the discussion about what Congress—and the Biden administration—might do to regulate and de-risk AI is focused on domestic and unclassified manifestations of AI tools. Government actors are concerned about ways in which AI tools such as ChatGPT will help malicious actors commit fraud and spread propaganda and misinformation. They are also worried about the prospect that AI will replace people’s jobs. One set of responses to AI development could be legislative, informed by Congressional hearings and lobbying on Capitol Hill by companies that produce AI systems. Another could be technocratic, led by actors like the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. A third—and ambitious —approach, one proposed by Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), could be a combination of the first two: a Congressionally-created government commission to assess AI risks and potentially a new federal agency to oversee AI.

A fourth response, which could inform the substance of any of the first three approaches, would be to ask the public about how it wants the government to protect it against AI’s various risks and misuses. The Commerce Department just took a first step in that direction, putting out a “request for comment” on how Commerce could regulate AI systems to assure users that the systems are legal, effective, and safe. The idea of opening up the conversation to the public more broadly is appealing. These systems already affect all of us, and the public (which includes computer scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and policymakers, as well as victims of AI fraud or abuse) could usefully contribute examples of amazing or terrible uses of AI systems, insights about what types of regulations have worked well in comparable technologies or societies, and broader reflections about of the kind of society we do and don’t want to live in. Indeed, a recent opinion piece in the New York Times advocated for a broader public conversation about AI policy, arguing that “AI can fix democracy and democracy can fix AI.”

The United States would not be the first government to try this. Taiwan has developed systems called vTaiwan and Join that facilitate participatory governance. vTaiwan is an “online-offline” consultation process that brings together experts, government officials, scholars, business leaders, civil society groups, and citizens to deliberate, reach consensus, and craft legislation. And the Taiwanese government has agreed that it will use the opinions gathered through the process to shape legislation on the digital economy. The motivating idea behind vTiawan is that it is possible to develop consensus on deadlocked issues by breaking down topics into discrete propositions and identifying areas where different sides can find agreement. Using a system called Pol.is (which deploys machine learning), vTaiwan was able to reach consensus about how UberX was allowed to provide services in Taiwan (in light of strong opposition from local taxi drivers). It also drafted a proposed bill to regulate online alcohol sales.

The UberX process started with a Pol.is poll that helped identify areas of disagreement and consensus statements about a proposal. It then progressed to professionally facilitated face-to-face stakeholder conversations, with the goal of producing formalized consensus for presentation to the legislature. Pol.is allows people to post comments and up- or down-vote others’ comments, but not to reply to them. This minimizes users’ ability to troll. Further, the system uses the up and down votes to generate maps of those participating based on how people have voted. This map shows where there is consensus and where there are divides. People can then draft and refine comments to bridge those divides; if successful, those propositions will garner more upvotes and, hopefully, ultimate consensus.

Although Taiwan is comparatively small and homogeneous and, so, seems like a particularly conductive setting in which to deploy this process, France, Belgium, Mexico, Spain, and Iceland also have tested the use of “computational democracy” to improve the quality and legitimacy of legislation. A process that collects, parses, and clusters views from many thousands of people about discrete propositions and then moderates discussions to work toward consensus on specific topics is worth paying attention to as Congress and the Executive move forward on AI.

Regulating in the Classified Space

But collecting a wide range of perspectives about the costs and benefits of using various AI systems and working to identify consensus propositions should not happen only in the public setting. To date, Congress and the White House are largely focused on public uses of AI. But government leaders also must consider what is happening inside the national security agencies, behind the veil of classification. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, as well as agencies within the Intelligence Community, are undoubtedly asking themselves, just as the U.S. public is, how large language models will change their jobs, from both an offensive and defensive perspective. It’s possible that national security agencies are several steps ahead of the general public in terms of AI use, already developing their own versions of these tools and integrating AI into command and control systems, supply chain tracking, intelligence analysis and collection, and weapons.

But of course we don’t have detail about how these agencies are approaching AI because U.S. national security operations are generally a black box. That’s often by necessity: the leaks that came to light over the past week show why the government often must operate in secret to protect its military advantage and ensure trust among allies. But it means that we don’t have a nuanced understanding of where the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community are heading. To the credit of those agencies, they have released several AI policies that reflect basic values that are consistent with good government: reliability, safety, accountability, lack of bias, and so on. But those principles and policies are written at a pretty high level of generality. They won’t answer many of the hard questions that will arise (or maybe already have arisen) as these agencies consider what AI tools to use to defend the United States. Should the CIA be willing to use deep fakes to affect foreign elections? If the Defense Department decides to use ChatGPT-like tools to conduct deception operations against a set of foreign users, how will it ensure that those tools won’t spread and “blow back” into the United States? What level of large language model “hallucination” should U.S. national security agencies be willing to tolerate? Are there some uses of AI that these agencies should take off the table, even if we know that our adversaries won’t?

Many of these questions are easier to ask than to answer. Congress will find this true as well, especially because issues of classification make it impossible to discuss possible uses of AI publicly. One place to start, though, is to obtain the views of a wide range of national security experts who spend their working hours behind the veil of secrecy. Using tools that operate like Pol.is, the executive branch could first give all participants basic training in different types of AI, what AI systems can and cannot do, and how they have been used in the real world. The Executive could then pose a range of questions about possible uses of national security AI, including realistic hypotheticals, for relevant officials within the Departments of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the State Department, as well as the Intelligence Community, to wrestle with. Moderators could then try to work toward consensus positions on various potential uses (or non-uses) of AI and share their findings with senior national security policymakers.

One initial objection may be that this exercise would let the fox guard the henhouse. However, the national security bureaucracy is surprisingly diverse in terms of experience, perspective, political persuasion, and training. A career foreign service officer and a CIA field agent will not see issues identically. Nor will a Defense Department cyber specialist and a Justice Department lawyer in the National Security Division. Further, this would be a way to assemble a large number and wide range of views about classified uses of AI—something that is otherwise difficult to collect input on. Third, views of executive branch officials are not the only input worth obtaining: Congress and the Executive will surely hear views from technology companies, foreign allies, and non-governmental organizations. But gaining views from national security professionals—whether they be intelligence analysts, diplomats, computer scientists, or military operators—would be invaluable as we shape a collective national approach to AI.

Finally, as I have recently argued on these pages, the chance of obtaining consensus among leading AI states about particular uses of national security AI is very slim. This means that it is necessary and important for the United States to think clearly and critically—both in front of the curtain of classification and behind it—about what uses of these tools we want our government to use in our name.

Ashley Deeks is the Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law at the University of Virginia Law School and a Faculty Senior Fellow at the Miller Center. She serves on the State Department’s Advisory Committee on International Law. In 2021-22 she worked as the Deputy Legal Advisor at the National Security Council. She graduated from the University of Chicago Law School and clerked on the Third Circuit.

lawfareblog.com · April 17, 2023

20. Why America Still Needs Europe

We all have our pet agendas. " My region of focus is more important than yours.' (note sarcasm) But as a global power we have to be able to operate everywhere that it is necessary to protect our interests.

Excerpts:

The proposal to disengage the United States from Europe misreads the current strategic moment. Since World War II, the United States has made the case for its international role as the sponsor of a shared order of mutual benefit. After two decades of threats to U.S. standing—from Iraq to the financial crisis, “America first” to Afghanistan—coordinating responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine has reaffirmed the value of American leadership.

Stripping, or even significantly downgrading, the United States’ European commitments would demolish much of this accumulated legitimacy. It would validate the grim picture that China and Russia now paint of a United States that is pitilessly self-interested and transactional, and would severely undermine the United States’ painstaking attempts to build a reputation as that rare great power that offers something to the world other than naked ambition. The country’s chief competitive advantage in the contest with China is its dominant global network of friends and allies. Now is the time to strengthen those coveted ties—in Europe and elsewhere.

Why America Still Needs Europe

The False Promise of an “Asia First” Approach

By Michael J. Mazarr

April 17, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Michael J. Mazarr · April 17, 2023

The war in Ukraine has sparked a puzzling development in U.S. national security thinking. At the same time as U.S.-European cooperation has surged, an influential group of American scholars, analysts, and commentators have begun pressing the United States to prepare to radically scale back its commitment to Europe. The basic idea is not new: restraint-oriented realists such as Emma Ashford, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long called for the United States to rethink its security posture in Europe.

Now, however, they have been joined by an influential band of China hawks, led by former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby, who argue that the United States must curb its European commitments. The main contest, this group believes, is in the Indo-Pacific, against China—and Washington must focus all its resources on that confrontation.

The specific wishes of these realists and hawks are often vague, combining ill-defined cuts to U.S. forces in Europe with demands for Europe to step up its own security, although without necessarily calling on Washington to ditch NATO outright. But if the United States is to reduce its obligations to NATO, to go all-in on the China threat, as they argue it should, it will have to slash its forces in Europe and at least raise the possibility of pulling away from the alliance.

On a conceptual level, this idea is bold and thought-provoking. In theory, by empowering allies to take the lead in Europe and liberating U.S. resources for use in Asia, Washington can significantly bolster its Indo-Pacific posture. But a closer look at the dynamics in play shows how self-defeating such a shift would be in practice. Instead of strengthening Washington’s hand in Asia, the result could be to badly weaken the United States in its growing competition with China.

APPLES AND ORANGES

To begin with, the tradeoff between Europe and the Indo-Pacific is not nearly as great as some skeptics suggest. The military needs of the two regions are quite different. The Indo-Pacific, because of its vast distances and maritime orientation, primarily requires ships and airplanes, not ground forces of the sort that Europe needs. Both theaters do place demands on common capabilities, including air and missile defense, and advanced munitions, but the Defense Department is now buying more, and allies can help in these areas.

The long-standing charge that the United States needlessly lavishes resources on Europe is also mistaken. In 2018, for example, one estimate of the total cost of U.S. contributions to NATO budgets, U.S. forces in Europe, European Deterrence Initiative programs, and security assistance came to about $36 billion, which was less than six percent of the U.S. defense budget that year. With the Biden administration’s decision to deploy roughly 20,000 additional troops to Europe after February 2022, that bill has grown, but only temporarily. The 2024 defense budget is $842 billion, of which the United States’ European commitments represent only a small fraction.

Advocates of disengagement from Europe often ignore an uncomfortable fact. The only way to save significantly on European commitments would be for the United States to take the most extreme and risky step of leaving NATO—a step few if any of the Europe critics recommend. It would, however, be necessary: no other measure would lead to big reductions. If, for example, the United States were to seek merely to reduce its presence in Europe but stay in NATO, it would still need to maintain sufficient forces and capabilities to fulfill its NATO obligations. The U.S. defense bill would not shrink by much.

China is most likely to attack Taiwan if it becomes desperate.

U.S. interests preclude any complete separation from Europe. Consider what would happen if the United States were to leave NATO to focus on the Indo-Pacific, and then Russia decided to attack one of the Baltic countries or Poland. It is inconceivable that a U.S. president could sit by and do nothing as Europe fought for its life against a brutal autocrat. Such inaction would be particularly implausible if Russia were getting major help from China, the very power that the United States had pivoted to challenge. If a European war will almost certainly draw in the United States, then the best way to avoid massive cost and risk is not to penny-pinch on peacetime commitments. The most cost-effective option is to stay, strengthen existing alliances, and keep war from happening in the first place. Moreover, the growing partnership between Russia and China means that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are now inextricably linked. However much the United States may wish to prioritize one region over the other, backing off from Europe will empower Russia, China’s primary partner and ally, even as it feeds Beijing’s narratives about U.S. decline and the triumph of autocracy.

The proposal to move troops from Europe to reinforce the Indo-Pacific misreads the requirements for deterrence. China is most likely to attack Taiwan if it becomes desperate, believing it will lose any hope of unification if it fails to act. At such a moment, Beijing is unlikely to be deterred by modest additional capabilities shifted from Europe. Indeed, such a redeployment could easily spark Chinese escalation by signaling the beginning of a more determined phase of U.S. efforts to “contain” China. In other words, the dramatic demonstration of U.S. disengagement from Europe to reinforce its military presence in the Indo-Pacific could well induce war rather than deter it.

MEMBERSHIP HAS ITS PRIVILEGES

The United States also derives diverse benefits from NATO membership that contribute directly to its global military effectiveness, including in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s cooperation with European allies in areas including coordinated ballistic missile defense operations enhances capabilities that the United States can use to address threats beyond Europe. U.S. participation in NATO exercises—for example, training in Arctic areas with Finnish and Norwegian troops or practicing amphibious operations with Sweden—improves U.S. forces’ skills. NATO’s vigorous response to other kinds of threats, including disinformation campaigns, has generated insights that inform U.S. and partner responses elsewhere through intelligence sharing, joint planning and exercises, and combined analysis. NATO allies are also developing capabilities for joint intelligence and targeting in a shared battle space, an effort that is likely to offer critical lessons for similar initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, NATO has begun work on combating cyberwarfare, announcing a Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, forming Cyber Rapid Reaction teams, and building a Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia, to share intelligence, develop common plans and norms for cyberdefense, and engage in shared training and exercises.

The advantages that NATO offers Washington, then, are not confined to Europe. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that, in the event of a clash in the Indo-Pacific, the United States would call on NATO for assistance. Although it has often been assumed that the alliance would be a bystander to wars elsewhere, a major conflict with China will challenge those assumptions. As described by defense experts including Jeffrey Engstrom, Mark Cozad, and Tim Heath, Chinese military doctrine calls for paralyzing blows against an enemy’s military, social, and political systems at the outset of war. Such attacks could well reach into the continental United States, which would at least in theory provide grounds for NATO’s leaders to invoke Article 5, requiring the alliance’s other members to come to Washington’s assistance. Indeed, there is a precedent for such a request: NATO invoked Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

The general belief has been—and rightly remains—that European governments will be eager to steer clear of a U.S.-China conflict. This desire was made plain by French President Emmanuel Macron’s statement in early April that Europe should not get “caught up in crises that are not ours.” But a massive strike on U.S. forces or on the United States itself may leave European leaders with little choice but to help in some way. And over the last few years, America’s European allies have edged closer to open support for U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Several NATO members, including Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have sent ships to the Indo-Pacific. In 2021 alone, there were 21 such deployments. NATO has also been deepening its institutional partnerships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea in recognition of the Chinese threat. Not all of these deployments are surprising. France has long had a presence in the Indo-Pacific and still has over 7,000 troops there. The United Kingdom also has historic ties to the region, and its membership, with Australia and the United States, in the trilateral security pact AUKUS has bound it directly to Indo-Pacific security. Formal NATO strategy documents have been increasingly explicit in identifying China as a threat.

Washington cannot expect governments to place their trust in a nation that breaches its commitments.

These commitments remain highly conditional, and NATO members, with smaller navies and air forces and persistent European and Mediterranean responsibilities, could send only modest forces to the Indo-Pacific. Even in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, many European allies may well choose to restrict their help to noncombat roles. But such support can be critical in numerous ways: sharing intelligence; cooperating in cyberdefense; ramping up production of munitions; providing logistical, medical, and other support functions; and potentially deploying symbolic units to other Indo-Pacific countries. Such assistance could relieve the United States of other responsibilities, fill gaps, and send powerful signals about a unified response to any further aggression.

Close coordination with Europe is also critical to the United States’ efforts to oppose China’s campaign to dominate the norms, rules, and institutions of the international system. The United States cannot do this alone. European support on many emerging issues—from climate and cyber threats to artificial intelligence—will be essential to ensure that these norms are not set in ways that undermine shared interests. True some level of cooperation would continue were the United States to leave the alliance. But the injured prestige, feelings of abandonment, and political blowback that would erupt if Washington were perceived to be cutting Europe loose would make disenchanted European governments more determined to carve out a course independent of U.S. goals. Finally others will be watching any U.S. uncoupling from Europe, and drawing their own conclusions. Washington could hardly expect Indo-Pacific governments to place their trust in a nation that had breached its commitments to its staunchest allies. Beijing would doubt whether a United States that had deserted Europe would really make good on its pledge to defend Taiwan.

ME TOO, NOT ME FIRST

The proposal to disengage the United States from Europe misreads the current strategic moment. Since World War II, the United States has made the case for its international role as the sponsor of a shared order of mutual benefit. After two decades of threats to U.S. standing—from Iraq to the financial crisis, “America first” to Afghanistan—coordinating responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine has reaffirmed the value of American leadership.

Stripping, or even significantly downgrading, the United States’ European commitments would demolish much of this accumulated legitimacy. It would validate the grim picture that China and Russia now paint of a United States that is pitilessly self-interested and transactional, and would severely undermine the United States’ painstaking attempts to build a reputation as that rare great power that offers something to the world other than naked ambition. The country’s chief competitive advantage in the contest with China is its dominant global network of friends and allies. Now is the time to strengthen those coveted ties—in Europe and elsewhere.

MICHAEL J. MAZARR is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Foreign Affairs · by Michael J. Mazarr · April 17, 2023

21. Germany Still Hasn’t Stepped Up

An important critique.

Excerpts:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also taught Germany the importance of diversifying its supply chains and the danger of relying on authoritarian partners. That does not mean Berlin has been able to shift all its trade; the government has had trouble moving the German economy away from its tight ties to China. But Scholz has made a concerted effort to engage with and gain access to markets in the global South. While hosting the Group of Seven meeting last year, for example, Scholz invited a variety of developing countries to join, which leaders from Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa ultimately did. Scholz has traveled to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam to discuss trade and investment, in part to avoid being dependent on China. These trips also serve a valuable diplomatic purpose. By meeting with these countries, Scholz is making Germany into a credible interlocutor between the West and global South democracies.

The Zeitenwende, then, is clearly a significant inflection point for Germany. Yet so long as Berlin drags its feet on its military, the government will not be an effective transatlantic partner, preventing the United States from largely focusing on security in the Indo-Pacific. Scholz seems to recognize this, and he has admitted that his country needs “a new strategic culture” to complete the promised pivot. That make take a generation, but Scholz is laying the groundwork for Germany’s next epoch.

Germany Still Hasn’t Stepped Up

Until It Embraces Military Power, Berlin Cannot Lead Europe

By Sudha David-Wilp

April 17, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sudha David-Wilp · April 17, 2023

In late February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament and declared that Germany would undertake a Zeitenwende, or an epochal turning point. The war in Ukraine, Scholz declared, demanded that Berlin rethink its role in the world—and in particular, its aversion to using force, rooted in the country’s sense of guilt over its Nazi past. He promised new investments in the country’s underfunded military, calling for “airplanes that fly, ships that can set out to sea, and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions.” He argued that his country had an obligation to defend democracy. And he pledged that Germany, long Europe’s dominant economic power, would now become a true geopolitical force.

Among Germany’s allies, Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech was warmly received. For well over a decade, many of these countries have waited for Germany to lead Europe. But unfortunately, Scholz’s deeds have not matched his words. Despite his pledges, the German military remains underfunded. And although Berlin is one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters, Germany’s tepidness about arming Ukraine and its weariness about isolating Russia have tarnished its credibility.

In Berlin’s absence, other European states are trying to lead the continent. France is advocating for European autonomy from the United States, and Poland claims to be the new security power on the continent. But neither effort is receiving any traction. French President Emmanuel Macron has won himself few fans by suggesting Europe would ignore a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and the rest of the continent has no desire for the kind of joint European military Macron has suggested the EU needs.] Poland will remain on the continent’s political margins until it adheres to EU principles on the rule of law. As a result, the United States will be the de facto power best able to manage Europe’s security architecture for the foreseeable future.

But the Zeitenwende could eventually make Berlin a better partner for Washington, one that can help guarantee European security even if it continues to shy away from primary leadership. Indeed, the war has already undoubtedly pushed Germany out of its comfort zone. Berlin, for example, is quickly reworking its energy infrastructure after having spent years being dependent on Russia, and it is becoming a green energy power. It is striving to diversify its economy and strengthen its diplomatic ties with the developing world. Germany, however, will need to make good on its military pledges and better respond to the needs of its allies for its pivot to be a full success.

TALK IS CHEAP

Within the European Union, no state can match Germany’s might. It is the bloc’s most populous country, with roughly 15 million more people than France. It has, by far, the EU’s biggest economy. It possesses capabilities—such as its manufacturing base and its investments in science and research—that are unmatched by any of its peers. That is why so much of Europe, particularly the EU’s eastern states, were happy to hear about Scholz’s plans for a more globally assertive Berlin. It would mean Germany’s military weight would finally be commensurate with its economic weight.

But in the 14 months since Scholz spoke, it is apparent that the effort has come up short. As part of his speech, for example, Scholz pledged to create a $100 billion special fund for the German military, designed to help it modernize after years of neglect. But when Eva Högl, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, presented the commission’s annual report for 2022 in mid-March, she said not a cent of the fund had actually reached German soldiers. Thanks to bureaucratic inertia and lingering trauma over Germany’s role in World War II, only a third of it has been earmarked for projects. The money will only be disbursed when orders for F-35 fighter jets and Chinook helicopters are fulfilled, which will take time. Higher interest rates, meanwhile, have decreased the actual amount in the armed forces’ coffers. The result is that the Bundeswehr—the German military—remains threadbare.

The armed forces are struggling in other ways, as well. Scholz promised that Germany would spend the equivalent of at least two percent of its GDP on the military but has not yet met this target. The Bundeswehr may also have a hard time mustering 30,000 troops for NATO in a continued and high state of readiness by 2025, as Scholz promised Germany would. And although Berlin has started delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine, it did so only after months of cajoling from allies.

Germany has promoted its own interests in the guise of doing what’s best for the EU.

Part of the reason why Germany remains behind is that it is still heavily reliant on the United States. Take, for example, the controversy over providing Ukraine with battle tanks. Germany makes Leopard tanks, a piece of equipment that would be particularly useful to Ukraine not only for its fearsome firepower but also for its relatively large stock in Europe and easy maintenance. Yet Scholz spent weeks refusing to even allow other countries that own Leopards, such as Poland, to transfer them to Ukraine. (When selling arms to another country, Germany retains the right to forbid the buyer from transferring them to a third party.) It was not until Washington agreed to deliver its much more cumbersome Abrams tanks to Ukraine that Germany relented. Berlin ultimately needed American cover before it acted.

Although coordination with Washington is essential, this type of dependence is not pragmatic. During the Trump administration, the United States was erratic in how it treated Berlin and the rest of western Europe, prompting then Chancellor Angela Merkel to declare it was time for Europe to “take our fate into our own hands.” But Scholz’s Zeitenwende has done little to help Germany get the continent to bolster its conventional military capabilities. Indeed, it has done little to help Berlin lead Europe at all. Germany’s relationship with France is strained over Macron’s push for autonomy and France’s nuclear power industry, both of which Berlin opposes. Poland has rightly criticized Germany over ignoring its past security concerns in the past, but Warsaw also bashes Germany for not paying Poland World War II reparations.

Many European states are similarly hesitant to fully follow Berlin and for an understandable reason: Germany has often turned off partners by promoting its own interests in the guise of doing what’s best for the EU. Most recently, for example, Berlin overturned already agreed upon EU legislation that mandated members phase out fossil-fuel-driven cars, ostensibly because the policy was not technology friendly (since it discounted car fuels made from carbon-captured technology), but really to protect the German auto industry. Berlin also tried, and failed, to prevent the EU from classifying nuclear energy as sustainable. If Berlin really wants to strengthen Europe, it must learn to take other countries into account as it crafts its policies.

BREAKING THE HOLD

But Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech was not merely empty rhetoric. In several areas, Germany has indeed begun projecting power in ways that can help its allies. The country’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, may be behind on modernizing Germany’s military, but unlike his predecessors, he is clearly trying. Heading the German defense ministry is typically not a coveted post, but Pistorius has quickly established a rapport with the country’s troops and relishes wearing military gear and participating in military exercises. He has not been bashful about requesting more funds. And he understands that the military must coordinate more closely with Germany’s industrial base to refill stockpiles and adapt to today’s challenges.

If Pistorius can succeed in improving communication between the military and German manufacturers, he may be able to do more than just make the German armed forces formidable. He could also make Germany into a leading arms exporter for its allies in Asia and Europe. Berlin can further bolster its export potential by committing to longer-term purchases, along with other procurement reforms, that will give manufacturers more certainty. It can also help by providing allies with more leeway to transfer German equipment to a third party. Germany is one of the Western world’s leading exporters, so if it embraces its arms industry, it will have an impressive capacity to give its allies the weapons they need.

Berlin is already working to become an energy power. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Germany was able to erect liquified natural gas terminals at lightning speed, allowing it to wean itself off Russian supplies. The war has also hastened Germany’s drive toward renewable energy, where it had recently lost its edge to China. Now, Germany is poised to become a market leader in green hydrogen, which could also create climate-friendly links between Berlin and developing economies.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also taught Germany the importance of diversifying its supply chains and the danger of relying on authoritarian partners. That does not mean Berlin has been able to shift all its trade; the government has had trouble moving the German economy away from its tight ties to China. But Scholz has made a concerted effort to engage with and gain access to markets in the global South. While hosting the Group of Seven meeting last year, for example, Scholz invited a variety of developing countries to join, which leaders from Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa ultimately did. Scholz has traveled to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam to discuss trade and investment, in part to avoid being dependent on China. These trips also serve a valuable diplomatic purpose. By meeting with these countries, Scholz is making Germany into a credible interlocutor between the West and global South democracies.

The Zeitenwende, then, is clearly a significant inflection point for Germany. Yet so long as Berlin drags its feet on its military, the government will not be an effective transatlantic partner, preventing the United States from largely focusing on security in the Indo-Pacific. Scholz seems to recognize this, and he has admitted that his country needs “a new strategic culture” to complete the promised pivot. That make take a generation, but Scholz is laying the groundwork for Germany’s next epoch.

SUDHA DAVID-WILP is Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Regional Director of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Foreign Affairs · by Sudha David-Wilp · April 17, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Opinion | The U.S. needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world

A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

Notes & details behind my 8 minute presentation

2. Calls to Reconsider USIA Began within a Few Years

3. Misinformation and Disinformation Around the Smith-Mundt Act

4. Leadership Matters

Social-Media Account Overseen by Former Navy Noncommissioned Officer Helped Spread Secrets

An American administrator of the Donbas Girl blogger network uses a pro-Russian persona across online platforms

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 16, 2023

Tags

Wagner Boss Claims Russia’s Mission Accomplished in Ukraine

Opinion | TikTok is dangerously addictive. We should regulate it now.

America Needs Veterans to Serve in Public Offices - SOAA

The United States of America has a leadership problem.

We offer an alternative – continue to serve your country through civil service.

Leadership, accountability, and transparency cannot be separated.

Too many with access, too little vetting. Pentagon leaks were ‘a matter of time’

The Air Force Loves War Gamers Like Teixeira

The Discord leaks reveal a digital culture problem that more AI surveillance can’t solve

America’s economic outperformance is a marvel to behold

But the country could still undercut its own success

Fortunate sons

Big wheel keeps on turning

Come on the rising wind

Run through the jungle

Is the end coming soon?

Army Picked Pricier Black Hawk Replacement Over ‘Unacceptable’ Losing Bid, GAO Says

Swift Actions by JOs Prevented Warship Collision in San Diego Harbor, Investigation Finds - USNI News

Tight Turn

Aftermath

Harbor Views

Related

Can America sustain a volunteer military? Syracuse summit to look for answers

Notes from Central Taiwan: The Normandy Invasion trope

China’s simulated videos of beach assaults on Taiwan may be misdirection to conceal its true military strategy

Screenshot from a 2021 video released by Chinese state media shows the People’s Liberation Army simulating a beach invasion of Taiwan.

Taiwanese military personnel simulate a Chinese beach invasion during Han Kuang military exercises in Pingtung County.

Screenshot from a 2015 video simulating a Chinese attack on Taiwan’s Presidential Office.

The Army Must Reward Smart Leaders, Not Just Strong Ones, if We Want to Win the Next War

US warship sails through Taiwan Strait following China war games

Russia struggling to cope with Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories

More than a Hobby: Informal Security Assistance to Ukraine - War on the Rocks

Who's Tackling Classified AI?

Why America Still Needs Europe

The False Promise of an “Asia First” Approach

By Michael J. Mazarr

APPLES AND ORANGES

MEMBERSHIP HAS ITS PRIVILEGES

ME TOO, NOT ME FIRST

Germany Still Hasn’t Stepped Up

Until It Embraces Military Power, Berlin Cannot Lead Europe

By Sudha David-Wilp

TALK IS CHEAP

BREAKING THE HOLD