​Quotes of the Day:

"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."

– James Madison

"I'm not concerned with your liking or disliking me... All I ask is that you respect me as a human being."

– Jackie Robinson

"History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, need not be lived again."

–​ Maya Angelou

1. Fighting in Ukraine Could Make North Korea's Military Stronger

2. Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

3. U.S. DOE official highlights S. Korea's role in Trump administration's energy strategy

4. Ex-DP leader Lee keeps strong lead in presidential election poll

5. South Korea’s Far Right Has Been Terrifyingly Radicalized

6.  Army holds nighttime firing drills in border county of Goseong

7. S. Korea's steel exports to U.S. shrink 19 pct in March on Trump tariffs

8. 7 military officers placed on compulsory leave over alleged martial law involvement

9. Inside Kim Jong Un's revolutionary history: Daily NK obtains rare N. Korean propaganda book

10. Acting defense chief unlikely to attend Shangri-La Dialogue next month

11. Canada to deploy patrol aircraft to monitor North Korea sanctions violations

12. North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project

13. Tragedy in Hoeryong: Mother left destitute after daughter sent to political prison camp

14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Counterfeit Money Flooding: NK Won, Chinese Yuan, and 'Donpyo' Vouchers Spreading Despite Major Crackdowns

15. South Korean government publishes new unification textbook...reflecting the 'two-nation theory' of the South and the North

1. Fighting in Ukraine Could Make North Korea's Military Stronger

Only if they can transfer lessons to large-scale training of the nKPA forces in the north.  

Otherwise on day one they may have 15,000 more combat experienced soldiers than the South. But on day two everyone will have combat experience. And then from that point on it is the best trained, the best supplied, and most importantly, the best led army will be victorious. 

Fighting in Ukraine Could Make North Korea's Military Stronger

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · April 16, 2025

Summary and Key Points:

-North Korea’s deployment of 15,000 troops to support Russia in Ukraine offers critical battlefield experience that could significantly enhance its military effectiveness.

-Though early engagements saw heavy casualties due to tactical missteps, North Korean soldiers quickly adapted to the drone-centric combat environment.

-Lessons learned on advanced tactics, drone warfare, and joint operations with Russian forces could potentially elevate North Korea’s conventional capabilities.

-However, effectively integrating these insights across the broader Korean People’s Army remains challenging.

-Ultimately, North Korea’s involvement strengthens ties with Russia, boosting long-term regime stability, and providing Pyongyang invaluable frontline experience unavailable through traditional training or military exercises.

North Korea and the Ukraine War

What can North Korea take away from its participation in the Russia-Ukraine War?

As Russia’s Kursk counter-offensive winds to a successful conclusion, it is as of yet unclear how North Korean forces will be used for the rest of the war.

A transfer to other parts of the front may be in the works, but fighting in the Donbass is of a more static character than fighting around Kursk, largely because of better Ukrainian logistics.

Elements of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) have been blooded (and bloodied) in Kursk, but they still may have lessons to learn in other sectors. This, in turn, could make the KPA a more lethal threat in Northeast Asia and elsewhere.

Large scale operations under the command of a foreign government or coalition are hardly unusual. In World War II Spain’s “Blue Division” served on the Eastern Front despite Spain’s official neutrality in the war. During the Vietnam Conflict South Korean troops operated alongside American and South Vietnamese forces. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars each saw a multitude of national contingents, each with its own ways of fighting. These deployments offer valuable experience to armies that don’t necessarily have the opportunities to develop expertise in combat on their own. In some cases, they can catalyze modernization in a fighting force, leading to widespread changes in tactics, doctrine, and the usage of technology.

What Did North Korea Learn?

But the long-term impact of the deployment on North Korean military effectiveness depends on the ability of the KPA to incorporate lessons learned during the fighting into its own systems of training and doctrine.

Incorporating foreign learning is a complicated process, because it usually involves taking the lessons learned from a small contingent and applying those to the force as a whole. This can run afoul of bureaucratic politics, established hierarchies, and relationships with other parts of the state. The KPA is thought to operate largely on the Soviet model of training and modernization, a model which often moves slowly but that nonetheless has historically been able to incorporate lessons learned during fighting.

North Korean conventional forces have often been overlooked in comparison to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities, largely because Pyongyang made a decision decades ago that it could not compete conventionally with the United States and South Korea. When the KPA does come up it is usually in reference to its large stock of artillery, which could devastate Seoul and provides a powerful deterrent to South Korea and the US. The North Korean economy probably cannot sustain a large-scale conventional military modernization program, but improvements in lethality are still worth tracking, especially as the promise of long-term Russian support for Pyongyang helps guarantee the regime’s survival prospects.

Performance Issues

The performance of North Korean soldiers in the early days of the deployment did not inspire confidence. Dismounted attacks across open ground in the presence of artillery and FPV drones resulted in high casualties.

But as time has gone on the North Korean performance has improved. North Korean soldiers appear to be fit, competent, and loyal to their commanders. Ukrainians at the front have reported that North Korean soldiers fight to the death and commit suicide in order to avoid capture.

The North Koreans have earned experience fighting on a drone-dominated battlefield, although it’s unclear whether any KPA units have actually incorporated drones into their tactics. The Russians have also improved cooperation with the KPA soldiers, better integrating the North Koreans into operations and providing air and drone support to North Korean attacks.

Perhaps 4000 of a total deployment of 15000 KPA soldiers have been killed or wounded thus far in the conflict. The deployed forces appear to be from elite units, and include personnel from across the North Korean military hierarchy.

This should provide ample grist for the distillation and implementation of lessons across the entire force. Moreover, there’s little reason to hope that the North Koreans are about to go home. Moscow and Pyongyang can easily find legal justification for the use of KPA troops in the Donbass, and despite the efforts of the Trump administration the war does not appear to be grinding to a close.

What Happens Next?

It’s possible to make too much of North Korea’s experience on the Russia-Ukraine front. It is, after all, unlikely that a second Korean War will be decided by the sophistication of North Korean infantry infiltration tactics. In the long run, winning the political, economic, and technological support of Russia is probably more important to the survival of the Pyongyang regime than an improvement in the effectiveness of its conventional military forces.

Still, North Korean troops fighting in Russia are directly learning valuable lessons about modern tactics and modern technologies, lessons that the South Koreans have to learn vicariously. As Pyongyang has seen fit to deploy its troops in one foreign war, it’s hardly impossible that Kim Jong Un will find other uses for his most elite soldiers.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · April 16, 2025

2. Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

​On the surface this appears to be useful political analysis. However, it only briefly touches on Lee legal issues and diminahess them with the idea that these are politically related prosecutions. It does not provide an explanation of the charges such as sending $8 million to north Korea (that the author barely mentions) which would be in violation of US sanctions and US law. That will be a dilemma for the US if he is elected. It does not sufficiently delve into his anti-American sentiment or his foreign policy views that are more pro-north Korea and pro-China. And it does not discuss either the Chinese or north Korean subversion activities as tey are working hard to undermine the legitimacy of the South Korean government as well as well to to divide the ROK/US alliance.

Cover Story

Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent without further deepening societal divisions – will pose a key test for South Korea’s democracy.

https://magazine.thediplomat.com/2025-04/will-lee-jae-myung-rise-from-south-koreas-political-chaos

By Steven Denney

South Korea is amid a high-stakes political moment, and Lee Jae-myung is front and center. President Yoon Suk-yeol faces potential removal from office by the Constitutional Court, which is deliberating impeachment charges stemming from his attempt to impose martial law in December 2024. The impeachment motion accuses Yoon of violating constitutional order, with the court’s pending decision set to determine his political fate. As of this writing, at the end of March 2025, the Constitutional Court still has not issued its ruling in Yoon’s impeachment case.

If the court upholds Yoon’s impeachment, thus removing him from office, there will be a snap presidential election. Lee, leader of the liberal opposition Democratic Party (DP), has positioned himself as the frontrunner to represent his party if such an election occurs. His supporters celebrate him as a defender of democracy, ready to take the presidency if Yoon is removed, while conservatives see him as a polarizing, ideological firebrand.

Lee enjoys substantial leads in hypothetical polling matchups against all likely opponents, strongly suggesting he would be the favorite to win a snap presidential election, but his overall appeal faces notable constraints due to intense negative partisanship and persistent unease among moderate voters.

How exactly did Lee reach this pivotal moment? Understanding his rise as the liberal frontrunner requires examining his formative background, political career, and especially his strategic consolidation of power following the 2022 election defeat.

Who Is Lee Jae-myung?

Born into poverty in Andong, Lee often emphasizes his humble beginnings, recounting childhood experiences of hardship as foundational to his political beliefs. After compulsory military service, Lee passed the notoriously difficult national bar exam entirely through self-study, subsequently gaining prominence as a lawyer advocating labor rights and social justice cases.

Lee’s trajectory closely parallels the careers of previous progressive presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in. Both rose from modest backgrounds, gained prominence by passing the bar exam without formal legal education, and built reputations as lawyers advocating for labor and human rights during South Korea’s democratization period.

Lee entered electoral politics as mayor of Seongnam City (2010–2018), pursuing progressive and populist policies such as youth welfare allowances and the expansion of public services. As governor of Gyeonggi Province (2018–2021), he further solidified his reputation as a pragmatic yet populist leader, launching initiatives such as universal basic income pilots and ambitious public housing programs.

However, Lee’s tenure as an executive leader was also marred by ethical controversies, most notably those surrounding alleged corruption in real estate development and football club sponsorship. Such accusations have persisted, significantly shaping negative public perceptions about his character.

Nevertheless, Lee’s early life experiences and legal career have reinforced his image as a populist champion of the disadvantaged, aligning him ideologically and personally with the lineage of progressive South Korean leaders. With that advantage, he secured the DP’s presidential nomination in 2022.

Lee After 2022: From Defeat to Dominance

Lee Jae-myung’s political trajectory since 2022 can be defined as one of rapid recovery and power consolidation. After his razor-thin defeat to Yoon in the presidential election, Lee worked stridently to remain politically relevant. He ran for and won a seat in the National Assembly just months later, giving him a parliamentary platform despite losing the presidency. By August 2022, he had leveraged his popularity within the party to win the DP’s chairmanship. Once at the helm, Lee moved to consolidate control and cement his preferred policy and political agenda as the party’s platform.

As party leader, Lee pursued a dual strategy: aggressively confronting the ruling conservatives in the legislature while promoting pragmatic and populist policies to the public. He initiated an economic agenda focused on people’s livelihoods, captured in the slogan “meoksanism” – derived from a Korean phrase concerning “eating and living” issues. The goal was to make practical concerns like jobs, housing, and social welfare – rather than abstract ideals or ideology – the party’s issues-based foundation and primary public focus. This emphasis on everyday economic matters aimed to broaden the DP’s appeal to moderate voters, even as Lee maintained a tough – and arguably ideological – stance against the Yoon administration in daily politics.

Lee’s takeover, however, was not without resistance. Many of the DP old guard, including former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, initially harbored doubts about him. In addition to clashes over control of the party’s direction, they warned that the swirl of corruption accusations around Lee – often dubbed the “Lee Jae-myung judicial risk” – could doom the DP’s fortunes. There were also ideological and stylistic splits: Lee’s left-leaning populism and combative style clashed with the more cautious, centrist approach preferred by some DP lawmakers.

These internal tensions came to a head in early 2023 when prosecutors, under Yoon’s direction, sought to jail Lee ahead of trial on corruption charges related to a development project in Seongnam City while Lee was mayor, and illegal remittances to North Korea when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. Typically, lawmakers are immune from arrest while parliament is in session, but prosecutors took the extraordinary step of requesting a pre-trial arrest warrant, forcing the National Assembly to vote on waiving Lee’s immunity.

In February 2023, DP lawmakers closed ranks and voted to shield their leader, although more than a few intra-party dissidents failed to reject the motion. By September 2023, however, the cracks in party unity widened: a significant number of DP members broke ranks and joined the ruling party in approving Lee’s arrest – a potentially devasting development brought about by Lee’s own caucus. Lee was on the brink of imprisonment, saved only when a judge threw out the warrant for lack of evidence.

The near-arrest was likely humbling for Lee, but ultimately, it strengthened his hold on the party. After the court’s reprieve, Lee and his backers swiftly marginalized those who opposed his control. Key dissenters were stripped of positions and effectively put on notice, making it clear that disloyalty would not be tolerated. By quashing the revolt within his party’s ranks, Lee solidified his position as the dominant figure in the DP.

Lee’s consolidation of power within the DP was also notably strengthened by the influence of highly engaged online party activists, whose digital presence and coordinated campaigns have disrupted traditional local-to-national hierarchies in shaping party agendas. One prominent example is the Gaeddal (from a combination of words for “reform” and “daughters”) group – young, predominantly female online supporters of Lee – whose intense online activism notably pressured DP lawmakers during critical party decisions. Heading into 2024, the intense intraparty dynamics meant the DP had effectively become Lee’s party, for better or worse.

Legal and Prosecution as Political Weapon

Consideration for the veracity and legality of legal charges notwithstanding, Lee has been beset by a litany of investigations and indictments since Yoon Suk-yeol took office. Lee insists these probes are a political conspiracy orchestrated by Yoon – a former chief prosecutor himself – to thwart the opposition. The overt politicization of prosecution is undoubtedly true, but the political effect – and perhaps intent – has been to keep Lee under a cloud of suspicion.

Several high-profile cases are pending against Lee Jae-myung. The most consequential involved his alleged violation of election law. In November 2024, the Seoul Central District Court found Lee guilty of spreading false information during a televised debate in 2021 and sentenced him to one year in prison, with the sentence suspended for two years. Lee appealed, and on March 26, 2025, the Seoul High Court overturned this conviction. Prosecutors from the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office have indicated they will appeal to the Supreme Court.

If the Supreme Court, which will have the final say on the matter, sides with prosecutors and reinstates Lee’s original conviction, it would immediately disqualify him from public office, barring him from the presidency for 10 years – if he is not yet president. This judicial uncertainty remains especially critical, as Lee could potentially be campaigning in a snap election if Yoon is removed from office by the Constitutional Court.

In practical terms, a final ruling might not arrive until after any early election – his defense team will undoubtedly seek to buy time. Still, the possibility looms that a court could abruptly disqualify the frontrunner in the middle of a presidential campaign. It is a wild card that haunts Lee’s camp.

Other cases add further political baggage, even if their legal resolution is some time away. In addition to the corruption charges that nearly jailed Lee in 2023, he is also implicated in a municipal football club sponsorship case. Although a judicial resolution remains unlikely in the short term, these unresolved cases lend ammunition to Lee’s opponents. Headlines regularly highlight developments in Lee’s court proceedings, bolstering conservative portrayals of the DP leader as inherently corrupt, while his supporters consistently denounce these investigations as politically motivated and representative of selective justice

Institutional Deadlock and Political Polarization

Lee’s story unfolds against a deeply polarized institutional struggle in Seoul. Since 2022, the South Korean government has been effectively gridlocked. Throughout that time, Lee’s DP has maintained a significant majority in the National Assembly, while Yoon’s conservative People Power Party (PPP) has controlled the presidency. This divide led to a form of political trench warfare between the legislature and the executive, with each side leveraging its power to undermine the other.

In the National Assembly, the opposition led by Lee utilized its majority to obstruct Yoon’s policy agenda and political priorities. Key administration initiatives – from business deregulation to labor law reforms – were stalled or voted down. The Assembly even took the unprecedented step of impeaching a Cabinet official appointed by Yoon. In February 2023, months after a tragic Halloween crowd crush in Seoul’s Itaewon district, which officials failed to prevent, the opposition impeached Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, a close ally of Yoon. Although the Constitutional Court later reversed the impeachment, ruling that the failures did not meet the “grave violation of law” threshold for removal, it marked the first impeachment of a minister in Korean political history – a dramatic display of the legislative power that the DP was willing to wield. Lee Sang-min was the first Korean minister to be impeached, but not the last; some 30 impeachment attempts followed.

Yoon, for his part, actively used his presidential powers to counter an opposition-dominated legislature. Facing gridlock, Yoon increasingly resorted to executive actions and the prosecutorial apparatus to advance his agenda and challenge opponents. His administration initiated audits of opposition-led local governments and filed lawsuits against labor unions protesting his policies. Most visibly, Yoon leveraged the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office – a powerful judicial body under his administration’s influence – to aggressively investigate Lee and other opposition politicians, prompting DP lawmakers to accuse him of governing through a “prosecutorial dictatorship.” Additionally, Yoon has exercised his veto power on 21 occasions since taking office in May 2022, a notably high number compared to his predecessors.

These maneuvers fueled a cycle of escalating political hostility. Lee’s supporters argue that Yoon’s reliance on the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and executive decrees recalls the authoritarian tactics of past regimes, warning that democracy is endangered when the executive bypasses legislative authority. Conversely, conservatives accuse the DP of manipulating party rules specifically to protect Lee – highlighting, for example, the controversial amendment of the party’s charter in June 2024, which allowed an indicted party leader to remain in office. Yoon’s allies have criticized this move, claiming the DP has devolved into “Lee Jae-myung’s bulletproof vest,” prioritizing his personal legal battles over normal party governance.

Each side has increasingly portrayed the other as an existential threat to the country’s democracy, eroding neutral ground in South Korea’s political discourse and causing even routine governance tasks, such as annual budget negotiations, to deteriorate into bitter confrontations.

South Korea’s constitutional design arguably magnifies these tensions. The president serves a single five-year term without the possibility of re-election, and mid-term legislative elections can result in a divided government. This structure often leads to a zero-sum power struggle, where the opposition is motivated to obstruct and wait out the presidency, while the president may be inclined to advance their agenda unilaterally before their term concludes. Impeachment, originally intended as a last resort, is increasingly employed as a political tool in this environment. Consequently, there is a growing consensus on the necessity of constitutional amendments to address these systemic issues. ​

The specter of political deadlock escalating into a constitutional crisis became a stark reality on December 3, 2024, when Yoon declared martial law, citing, among other things, opposition lawmakers’ “anti-state” obstruction. This unprecedented move was met with a relatively swift backlash from the National Assembly. Accusing Yoon of abusing presidential authority and undermining democratic norms, the Assembly voted to impeach him on December 14, marking the first presidential impeachment in South Korean history based on charges unrelated to corruption.​

Initially, conservative lawmakers from the PPP resisted the impeachment motion, viewing it as a politically motivated attack on the presidency. However, as public outcry intensified and concerns over democratic erosion grew, key conservative figures began to reconsider their positions.​ Notably, Han Dong-hoon, then the PPP’s party leader, shifted his stance to support the impeachment after learning that Yoon had ordered the arrest of prominent politicians, including Han himself, during the martial law period.

​In contrast, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon maintained his opposition to the impeachment, although both Oh and Han opposed the martial law declaration. Oh advocated for a transition to a responsible prime minister system to stabilize the government, emphasizing that impeachment was not the only solution.

Divergent positions among conservative leaders during this turbulent period highlight internal divisions within the PPP. Nevertheless, the PPP has demonstrated significantly greater internal cohesion than its predecessor, the Saenuri Party, did during President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal from office in 2017. Whereas Saenuri fractured under pressure and eventually collapsed, the PPP has maintained strategic party discipline despite some notable dissent from high-profile members.

Yoon’s impeachment has further divided the public, intensifying political polarization and sparking mass protests nationwide. In contrast to the bipartisan consensus that characterized the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, the politics of Yoon’s impeachment has unfolded along markedly partisan lines. Polls show the majority of the public (and a plurality of conservatives) supported Yoon’s impeachment due to the severity of his martial law declaration, but negative partisanship and general unfavorability toward Lee remains strong, significantly limiting the public consensus around the opposition’s actions.

The sustained resilience within conservative ranks heightens the risk of political backlash against the DP and specifically Lee. While the vast majority supported Yoon’s impeachment, conservative support has not collapsed, in part because centrist and undecided voters have expressed growing unease over the opposition’s aggressive tactics.

Public Opinion and the Path to an Electoral Comeback

Amid the political turmoil caused more immediately by Yoon, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party have been positioning themselves for a return to power. However, they are acutely aware that victory is not guaranteed, given the volatility of public sentiment.

By late 2024, widespread disillusionment with Yoon's administration was evident. His approval ratings plummeted to 13 percent, the lowest since his inauguration. This pervasive anti-incumbent sentiment was a significant factor in the DP’s landslide victory in the April 2024 National Assembly elections. The party secured 175 out of 300 seats, decisively retaining its parliamentary majority.

The election served as a mid-term referendum on Yoon’s performance, delivering a substantial blow to the conservatives and indicating that a significant portion of the electorate was ready to rebuke the ruling party and, perhaps, endorse – or at least tolerate – the leader of the opposition. While many voters are dissatisfied with Yoon’s leadership, negative sentiments toward Lee persist. This juxtaposition underscores the challenges Lee and the DP face in consolidating public support. As it stands, they risk being perceived as aggravating an already polarized political climate or, worse, mirroring the corruption associated with Yoon. While Lee and the DP have capitalized on the ruling party’s missteps, they must also address internal issues and public skepticism to ensure a sustainable path to governance.​

Indeed, Lee cannot rely solely on voter dissatisfaction with Yoon; he must also address significant public skepticism about his own political image. The cloud of scandals, relentless prosecutorial scrutiny, and aggressive rhetoric that have followed Lee since his narrow defeat in the 2022 presidential election have profoundly shaped his public image. Even some younger voters, who traditionally lean progressive, see Lee as a political figure burdened with ethical baggage – another typical politician rather than a genuine reformer. As one former DP youth member, who was ostracized from party involvement for being critical of Lee, pointed out, beyond the party’s loyal supporters, many young voters view Lee as corrupt. Since the last election in 2022, youth support for Lee has been mixed.

Lee’s core base, however, admires precisely his combative, resilient persona. He has consistently taken his opposition to the streets, notably leading large-scale protests against Yoon’s administration and engaging in a dramatic 24-day hunger strike in September 2023 to denounce what he called the president’s authoritarian drift and abuse of prosecutorial powers. Yet, while these tactics energize committed supporters, they risk alienating moderate voters who prioritize political stability and moderation over confrontation. Such polarizing strategies may consolidate Lee’s progressive core but simultaneously harden perceptions among centrists that his leadership could deepen political divisions rather than bridge them.

Aware of these vulnerabilities, Lee has consciously begun recalibrating his public image since late 2023 and with greater purpose lately in preparation for a presidential campaign. Recognizing that centrist, middle-class, and younger voters hold the key to victory, he has increasingly avoided partisan attacks, instead focusing on bread-and-butter and doubling down on meoksanism.

In a controversial rhetorical gambit in early 2025, Lee even described the DP as a “centrist-conservative” party – claiming the party has always balanced moderate and conservative values – in an effort to reassure voters outside the left-liberal orbit that he can represent them. Supporters called it a bold rebranding to broaden the DP’s appeal, while critics (and the PPP) derided it as a cynical ploy that “rewrites history.” The claim that the DP is “conservative” is certainly untrue, but there is a clear political logic to it.

Whether such maneuvers can overcome Lee’s polarizing reputation remains uncertain. What is clear is that Lee’s electoral strategy now involves a tightrope: He must keep his progressive base mobilized through anti-Yoon fervor and populist promises while also convincing skeptical centrists that the DP can govern responsibly despite the swirl of scandals surrounding its leader.

Striking the right balance is now the central focus of Lee’s electoral strategy. He will likely need to keep his progressive base energized – voters who want an all-out crusade against Yoon’s legacy and conservative policies – yet also reassure swing voters that a government led by him would focus on practical solutions, not revenge. The message the DP has honed in recent months reflects this tightrope act: tough on Yoon’s misrule, but not extreme; populist on economic pain points, but pledging responsible governance. So far, this calibrated approach seems to be working so that the needle on public opinion can be moved in a highly polarized environment. It carried the legislative election and has kept Lee atop presidential preference polls.

The ultimate test, however, will come if and when a presidential campaign kicks off in earnest and then, if the outcome is as polls indicate, when Lee is president.

Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for South Korea’s Democracy?

Whether Lee Jae-myung ultimately secures the presidency or not, the current political situation will dictate South Korea’s political trajectory. Lee’s rapid resurgence from electoral defeat in 2022 to frontrunner status amid scandal and an impeachment crisis underscores the volatility of South Korea’s political status quo. It also reveals deeper institutional problems, including prosecutorial authority wielded as a partisan weapon, impeachment employed as a political tactic rather than a measure of last resort, and a party system dominated by personality-driven leadership rather than coherent policy platforms. Collectively, these trends pose serious challenges to South Korean democracy’s long-term stability.

If Lee runs and wins in a snap election, South Korea would witness yet another dramatic power shift following an impeachment. This would repeat the 2017 experience and essentially complete a cycle that began with Yoon’s tenure. This could pave the way for reforms (the DP has vowed to curb prosecutorial overreach, for instance), but it might also tempt a triumphant Lee to settle scores, further entrenching the cycle of political retribution.

Alternatively, if the courts or the voters halt Lee’s rise – whether through a disqualifying verdict or an electoral upset – it would signal a different reckoning and another crisis. The conservatives would feel vindicated in portraying Lee as unfit, and the DP would face pressure to reinvent itself beyond its embattled figurehead. Or, worse, it would invite even greater political chaos and social unrest.

Regardless of the outcome, South Korea is at an inflection point. The coming weeks will reveal whether the country can steer itself toward more stable politics or if the Lee-versus-Yoon saga merely reflects a highly polarized and confrontational new normal. Politics in South Korea today suggest the latter is much more likely.

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent and overcome his legal battles without further deepening societal divisions – will likely be tested. Whether he succeeds or fails, the broader implications will extend far beyond Lee himself. The outcome will reverberate far beyond this one man’s career, shaping the health of South Korea’s democracy and society in the months and years to come.

The Authors

Steven Denney is an assistant professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at the Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University. He is also a senior editor at SinoNK.com, a senior fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna, and a non-resident fellow in the Innovation Policy Lab at the University of Toronto.

3. U.S. DOE official highlights S. Korea's role in Trump administration's energy strategy

​Good for our alliance.

(LEAD) U.S. DOE official highlights S. Korea's role in Trump administration's energy strategy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · April 18, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with comments from Alaska governor in paras 14-16; ADDS photo)

By Chang Dong-woo

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- A senior U.S. energy official on Friday underscored South Korea's growing significance in the Donald Trump administration's push to expand American energy exports and diversify global supply chains.

Speaking via video remarks at an energy forum hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) held in Seoul, Tommy Joyce, acting assistant secretary for international affairs at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), said Seoul remains a critical ally in Washington's energy agenda.

"South Korea and each of you in Seoul are absolutely essential allies in this pursuit," Joyce said in his remarks addressed to business representatives at a Seoul hotel. "South Korea plays an important role in unleashing American energy and supporting President Trump's vision of building supply chains independent of China."

His comments come as discussions continue over South Korea's potential participation in an envisioned liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure project in Alaska.

Recently highlighted by Trump, the project aims to develop a pipeline from the gas-rich North Slope to southern Alaska, where natural gas would be liquefied and exported, primarily to Asia.

This image, captured from the website of the U.S. Department of Energy, shows Tommy Joyce, acting assistant secretary for international affairs at the department. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Last week, South Korean acting President Han Duck-soo held a phone conversation with Trump, where they discussed the trade balance and tariff issues, as well as Seoul's "large scale purchase of U.S. LNG" and "payment for the big time military protection" provided by the U.S., according to Trump's social media post.

Alaska Gov. Mike Dunleavy met with senior South Korean officials and business representatives during his visit to Seoul last month to discuss ways to expand cooperation in the energy and other sectors.

"The Trump administration is committed to unlocking the 20 million tons per year of gas exports from Alaska and views this as a fantastic option to strengthen Asia's energy security," Joyce said.

The DOE official noted that South Korean firms have already shown strong interest in U.S. energy assets, citing Hanwha Group's acquisition of a 15-percent stake in Houston-based LNG company NextDecade and POSCO Holding's exploration of potential gas reserve acquisitions.

"Over the past four years, there has been a lack of investment in coal, oil and gas infrastructure that has set the world back and led to catastrophic consequences for energy affordability, reliability and security. We are now reversing this course," Joyce said.

He said the DOE has taken six LNG-related actions since Secretary Chris Wright's confirmation, including new export authorizations that will enable more than 7 billion cubic feet per day of LNG exports.

Joyce also pointed to his home state of Tennessee as an example of South Korea's growing economic footprint in the U.S., noting that Korean companies have invested over $4.5 billion and created nearly 3,500 jobs in the state.

"We are cutting bureaucracy and fast-tracking projects at breakneck speeds that South Korea and other folks like you that want a good return on investment look to the United States for," he said.

The Alaskan governor, who also spoke at the forum via video, said his state's LNG project "represents one of the most significant energy infrastructure efforts in North America."

"It will deliver clean, reliable natural gas from Alaska's North Slope to a new liquefaction facility in south central Alaska, there to markets like Korea and beyond for Asian allies," Dunleavy said.

The governor also emphasized the strong bilateral ties between the U.S. and South Korea, adding the envisioned LNG project will deepen the relationship "built on decades of mutual trust in shared values and economic cooperation."

Acting President Han Duck-soo (R) meets with Alaska Gov. Mike Dunleavy at the government complex in Seoul on March 25, 2025, in this photo provided by Han's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · April 18, 2025

4. Ex-DP leader Lee keeps strong lead in presidential election poll

Ex-DP leader Lee keeps strong lead in presidential election poll | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 18, 2025

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- Former Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung has a strong lead among potential candidates for the June 3 presidential election, a survey showed Friday.

In the poll conducted by Gallup Korea on 1,000 adults from Tuesday to Thursday, Lee garnered 38 percent support, marking his highest rating in Gallup polls this year.

Trailing behind at 7 percent were former Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo and former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), as well as Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who currently serves as the acting president.

Han has not declared his candidacy despite ongoing speculation about his possible bid.

Former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon came next with 6 percent, followed by Lee Jun-seok, a lawmaker of the minor opposition New Reform Party, at 2 percent.

Twenty-six percent of the respondents did not show support for a particular candidate.

By party, the DP received 42 percent support, outpacing the PPP at 34 percent.

The survey has a margin of error of plus and minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.

Lee Jae-myung, former leader of the liberal Democratic Party (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 18, 2025

5. South Korea’s Far Right Has Been Terrifyingly Radicalized

He is spinning things. ​Significantly. I have a different take. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/12/south-koreas-special-forces-and-the-preservation-of-democracy/

I was in Korea the week b​efore the incident ​and two weeks after. Park's take is not what I learned from talking to people on the ground. The real danger is Chinese and north Korean influence with the left and the person who is likely to be elected president in June, Lee Jae Myung. ​ Mr. Park makes no reference to the work of the Chinese United Front work Department or the north Korean United Front Department and Reconnaissance General Bureau in South Korea. (but he would dismiss this as conspiracy theories of the right).

Notes from a paper I am working on:

In South Korea, various individuals and organizations have been identified as having pro-North Korean affiliations or sympathies, often leading to legal scrutiny and political controversy. Notable examples include:

1. Rep. Youn Mee-hyang: In October 2024, Rep. Youn Mee-hyang, formerly associated with the Democratic Party of Korea, faced criticism for attending an event organized by a North Korea-affiliated group in Japan. Her participation led to an inquiry by the National Assembly's ethics committee and an investigation by the Ministry of Unification for potential violations of inter-Korean exchange laws. The ruling People Power Party called for her resignation, accusing her of failing to serve South Korea's best interests.

2. Southern Headquarters of the Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification (PKAR): Established in August 1990, the Southern Headquarters of PKAR was a civic group in South Korea dedicated to reunification, with counterparts in North Korea and overseas. The organization was reportedly directed by North Korea's United Front Department, responsible for propaganda and espionage. In February 2024, following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's decision to abandon unification efforts and designate South Korea as a hostile state, the Southern Headquarters dissolved itself, citing the collapse of inter-Korean relations and the disbandment of its northern counterpart. 

3. Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU): The KCTU has been involved in pro-North Korean and anti-American activities. In August 2022, during the "August 15 National Workers’ Mass Protest" in Seoul, the KCTU called for the dissolution of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The organization read solidarity remarks from North Korea's General Federation of Trade Unions, condemning U.S. actions without addressing North Korea's nuclear developments. Such activities raised concerns about potential violations of South Korea's National Security Act. 

4. Underground Organizations and Espionage Cases: South Korean authorities have uncovered clandestine groups allegedly operating under North Korean directives:

HGH (HanGilHoe or One Way Committee): Formed in Jeju Province, HGH was reportedly established after meetings between South Korean individuals and North Korean agents in Cambodia since 2017. Members pledged loyalty to the North Korean regime and received espionage training. The group engaged in activities opposing U.S.-South Korea military exercises and the deployment of advanced U.S. weaponry. 

People’s Vanguard for Independent Unification: In November 2022, multiple activists across South Korea were investigated for allegedly forming this underground organization under North Korean orders. They were accused of meeting North Korean agents abroad, receiving funds, and orchestrating anti-state activities, including protests against U.S. military presence and intelligence operations within South Korea. 

These instances highlight the complex and sensitive nature of pro-North Korean elements within South Korea, involving a mix of political figures, civic organizations, and clandestine groups. Their activities often lead to legal actions and intensify political tensions, reflecting the intricate dynamics of inter-Korean relations.

​....

China and North Korea have shown a sustained commitment to covert operations aimed at undermining South Korea’s democracy—and there is every reason to believe they will continue these efforts. China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) has been actively conducting clandestine influence operations in South Korea, aligning with Beijing’s broader strategy of “unrestricted warfare.”

Within South Korea, pro-North Korean elements—comprising political figures, civic organizations, and underground networks—play a significant role in advancing Pyongyang’s agenda. Their activities often trigger legal action and fuel political tensions, highlighting the complex nature of inter-Korean dynamics. These Chinese and North Korean efforts are not isolated; rather, they are mutually reinforcing and strategically aligned.

Both Beijing and Pyongyang seek to delegitimize South Korea’s democratic institutions. China views South Korea as a critical “stone” on the Go (Baduk) board—a piece to be influenced in its geopolitical contest with the United States. A weakened or destabilized South Korea would pose serious challenges to U.S. interests in terms of regional security and economic stability. North Korea, for its part, seeks to destabilize the South and fracture the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Ultimately, both China and North Korea aim to end the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the region and force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula and the broader Asian mainland.

Understanding these strategic objectives helps explain why both actors are likely to intensify their malign influence efforts in the lead-up to South Korea’s snap presidential election in June.

​And from an AI search:

Based on the search results, several specific front organizations in South Korea are connected to China's United Front activities:

1. Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会)

• This is a key organization directly subordinate to the CCP's United Front Work Department

1. Association of Overseas Chinese in Korea (中国在韩侨民协会总会)

• Established in 2002 to compete with older Chinese associations aligned with Taiwan

1. Korea Chinese Huaqiao Alliance Council (韩国华侨华人联合总会)
2. All-Korean Nationals of Chinese Descent Council (韩国全国韩籍华人总联合会)
3. HanGang Cultural Media / HG Culture Media

• Shares office space with China's CCTV in Seoul

1. Korea Xinhua News Agency (韩国新华报社)

• Established in 2005

1. Overseas Chinese Service Center (OCSC) in Korea

These organizations often have overlapping leadership and membership, indicating a high degree of centralization in United Front operations in South Korea. Many of them were founded or led by influential figures like Han Shenghao and Wang Haijun, who have played key roles in expanding China's influence networks in the country

​A​nd then there are  ​Lee Jae Myung's  crimes.  Lee Jae-myung, a prominent South Korean politician, has been accused of or indicted for several crimes:

Violating election law by making false claims during the 2022 presidential campaign.

Bribery charges related to an alleged scheme involving illegal transfer of funds to North Korea.

Violating the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act.

Violating the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.

Third-party bribery.

Perjury (acquitted).

Regarding the alleged illegal transfer of funds to North Korea, this action would likely violate U.S. laws. The U.S. maintains strict sanctions against North Korea, prohibiting most financial transactions with the country. Specifically, Lee is accused of orchestrating the transfer of $8 million to North Korea between 2019 and 2020. This action would likely violate U.S. sanctions laws, including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act and various Executive Orders that prohibit unauthorized financial transactions with North Korea.

It's important to note that Lee denies many of these charges and some cases are still ongoing or under appeal. The alleged crimes primarily violate South Korean laws, but the North Korea-related charges could potentially intersect with U.S. sanctions policies.

South Korea’s Far Right Has Been Terrifyingly Radicalized

The impeachment of martial law President Yoon Suk-yeol reveals how far the rot spread.

By S. Nathan Park, a Washington-based attorney and nonresident fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Foreign Policy · by S. Nathan Park

• Politics
• South Korea

April 14, 2025, 4:21 PM

On April 4, South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously voted to sustain Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment, removing him from the presidency for his illegal declaration of martial law and attempted autogolpe on Dec. 3, 2024. Yoon’s bizarre and short-circuited presidency displayed many of the antidemocratic trends emerging around the world. South Koreans’ response, in turn, offers an example of the way forward.

The Yoon administration was a strange one from the start. Having won on March 9, 2022—in the narrowest victory in South Korean presidential election history—by pandering to grievances about the rising cost of housing as well as young men’s toxic misogyny, Yoon’s first major initiative as the president was to relocate the presidential office from the Blue House—the presidential residence—to the Defense Ministry compound.

The move was supposedly done to make the presidency more approachable, but it only served to amplify the whispers about Yoon’s superstitions. Shamans—traditional Korean magical practitioners who have become closely associated with the right wing—have reportedly claimed that the Blue House was cursed.

Absence of good or even ordinary governance under Yoon caused mundane events to spiral into mass-casualty disasters. One of the disasters—the crowd-crush incident in the Itaewon district of Seoul that killed 159 in October 2022—partly stemmed from the Blue House move, as police officers later testified that they were stretched too thin protecting his new residence to provide proper crowd control.

During the 2022 monsoon season, the government no longer had easy access to the state-of-the-art National Crisis Management Center located in the Blue House’s underground bunker, where a South Korean president would normally oversee a disaster response. Instead, Yoon was trapped in his own home by the flood, and Interior Minister Lee Sang-min took hours to reach a backup location while dozens died.

Coupled with the wobbly economy, Yoon’s approval rating soon cratered as low as 23 percent, making him the least popular president in South Korean history. But rather than making compromises to enlarge his coalition, Yoon undermined his own base by axing allies whom he deemed insufficiently loyal.

Lee Jun-seok, a young conservative legislator who was crucial in forming the strategy to fuel the youth’s right-wing turn by stoking misogyny, was unceremoniously pushed out of the party leadership in July 2022—just a few months after the presidential election—in favor of the leadership that was more pliant to Yoon. Han Dong-hoon, Yoon’s justice minister and longtime capo who was presumed to be next in line for presidency, was cut off in 2024 after daring to suggest that Yoon’s wife should be investigated for numerous allegations of white-collar crimes, including schemes where her alleged co-conspirators had been found guilty.

In the legislative election in April 2024, Yoon and his People Power Party suffered a thumping defeat, leaving them with only 108 out of 300 seats. The opposition Democratic Party used its supermajority to great effect, passing a series of special prosecutor investigation bills, impeaching some of Yoon’s most loyal toadies in the bureaucracy (such as Lee Jin-suk, the chief of Korea Communications Commission, who acted as Yoon’s media enforcer), and slashing the budget for the presidential office’s discretionary fund.

In response, Yoon launched the self-coup, attempting to end democracy altogether.

The court decision sustaining Yoon’s impeachment should not obscure how close he was to success and the horror that would have followed if he did achieve martial law. The subsequent investigation revealed that Yoon and his government were planning to goad a North Korean attack to use an excuse to declare martial law. The fate of South Korea’s democracy hinged on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s restraint as Yoon’s Defense Ministry flew drones over Pyongyang skies, trying to start a war.

The Hankyoreh, a liberal newspaper based in Seoul, reported in mid-February that it had obtained a notebook found at the home of former Gen. Noh Sang-won, who has been arrested on charges of aiding the insurrection attempt. (Noh has denied the charges and any connection to Yoon.) The newspaper reported that the notebook detailed a terrifying plan—a “kill list” with the names of politicians, including Yoon’s former right-hand man Han, as well as judges, journalists, labor leaders, and clergy, totaling between 5,000 to 10,000 people, to be “disposed of.”

The Hankyoreh also reported that oh, who was previously the head of military intelligence but was running a fortune- telling service after being discharged in 2018, wrote that these individuals should be rounded up and killed in an incident that would be seen as accidental, for example by putting them on a boat that would self-destruct in the middle of the ocean.

The notebook also detailed a plan for Yoon to stay in power for at least three terms. Yoon and the military would establish an alternate legislature to replace the noncompliant National Assembly and install a new constitution that would allow Yoon to remain in power for several presidential cycles, modeled after Chinese and Russian election system.

Yoon’s presidency was emblematic of disturbing trends worldwide. Yoon himself, as well as his supporters, were completely beholden to an alternate reality constructed largely through far-right YouTube channels, which constantly blared paranoid and baseless claims that North Korea and China had infiltrated the South Korean government to rig the 2024 elections in favor of liberals.

In his coup attempt, Yoon directly acted on this conspiracy theory by sending a military detachment to the National Election Commission (NEC), seeming to be utterly confident that he would discover evidence of the supposed election fraud that would convince the country of the necessity for his martial law decree.

During the impeachment trial, the prosecution alleged that Noh, Yoon’s liaison with the country’s military community, had prepared cable ties and eye masks with which to kidnap the NEC officials, as well as possible torture devices such as baseball bats, hammers, and pliers. The NEC officials were to be taken to a military bunker, where they would be interrogated and tortured until they confessed the election fraud.

Yoon’s loyal followers were likewise radicalized—through digital platforms such as YouTube—into a total rejection of democracy. An in-depth study conducted in February by SisaIn magazine showed that approximately 40 percent of self-identified South Korean conservatives supported Yoon’s martial law and opposed his impeachment.

Within this group, 42 percent agreed with the statement that “a strong leader sometimes has to break the rules to achieve his goals,” 65 percent agreed that “a controversial ruling by a liberal judge does not have to be followed,” and 55 percent agreed that “violence is justified because Korean democracy is in crisis.”

A propensity for YouTube is directly correlated to antidemocratic attitudes in South Korea. Respondents who watched more than an hour a day of far-right YouTube content tended to agree that Yoon’s declaration of martial law was justified (68 percent), that Yoon should not be impeached (74 percent), that the mob attack on the Seoul Western District Court after Yoon’s arrest was a justified case of citizens exercising their right to resist (63 percent), that they would not accept a Constitutional Court decision removing Yoon from office (68 percent), that China had interfered with South Korean elections (66 percent), that a Supreme Court decision finding no evidence of Chinese interference should not be trusted (75 percent), and that a victory by Democratic Party in the next presidential election would lead to South Korea becoming communist (78 percent) and being colonized by China (73 percent).

This brain rot has gone global. Wealthy Korean Americans such as Annie Chan, a real estate magnate, have bankrolled far-right groups in both the United States and South Korea, fostering an international community of conspiracy theorists. Chan’s group, Korea Conservative Political Action Coalition, was a prominent presence in annual meeting of the Conservative Political Action Convention held in February 2025 near Washington, D.C., pleading Yoon’s case to the Nazi-saluting supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump. Matt Schlapp, a former White House political affairs director during Trump’s first term, was seen meeting with Yoon at the presidential residence in Seoul shortly after Yoon’s impeachment.

Nevertheless, the impeachment and removal of Yoon show that South Korean democracy persevered—a cause for hope. Although a narrow majority elected Yoon, the South Korean public decisively reacted against the former president’s attempt to subvert democracy, notwithstanding the loud minority that continued to support the impeached president.

The lasting images from this chapter of South Korean history will be those of Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the Democratic Party, and Woo Won-sik, the speaker of the National Assembly. On the night of Dec. 3, 2024, when Yoon declared martial law, Lee did not run and hide—although as the opposition leader, he knew that he could be the first to be arrested and disappeared. Instead, he rushed to the National Assembly Hall while using a live video feed to urge the public to join him through.

At the legislature building, Lee was joined by the 67-year-old Woo, who jumped a wall to enter the building to avoid the police and the military. In what some commentators have called “a reverse Jan. 6,” ordinary people answered Lee’s call, throwing their bodies in front of armored cars and forming a human wall around the National Assembly Hall as the lawmakers voted to dissolve the martial law decree.

Even as paratroopers began streaming into the building and the legislative aides fought back with fire extinguishers and cellphone flashes, Woo emphasized that proper parliamentary procedures must be followed to dissolve the martial law decree. After 12 agonizing minutes of typing up the bill and submitting it, the National Assembly voted to dissolve the martial law decree, eventually prompting the end of Yoon’s presidency on April 4.

Democracies around the world are facing a crisis. A “burn it all down” attitude is rampant—mostly among the far right, but also from many in the left—calling for revolutionary destruction of a system that appears to have abandoned ordinary people. Meanwhile, others simply tune out politics, thinking that it is no longer relevant to their lives and ceding the civil society to the shrill acrimony of the most radical voices.

South Korea’s response offers an alternative. The public has not given into apathy. In the face of dictatorship, the people participated directly by giving heroic resistance to the attempt to end democracy with guns.

Yet their action was intended not to destroy the system, but to preserve it—to allow the legislators to vote down the martial law and urge the justices to uphold the constitution.

The South Korean experience shows that a democracy need not choose between nihilistic destruction and listless anemia. A democracy can be based on norms, institutions, and procedures—all of which are energized by the people’s willingness to stand in front of guns and tanks.

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Foreign Policy · by S. Nathan Park

6.  Army holds nighttime firing drills in border county of Goseong

(LEAD) Army holds nighttime firing drills in border county of Goseong

en.yna.co.kr

(LEAD) Army holds nighttime firing drills in border county of Goseong | Yonhap News Agency

Lee Minji

All News 11:36 April 18, 2025

• (ATTN: ADDS details in paras 3-5, 8, byline)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- The Army conducted a nighttime firing exercise in the border county of Goseong earlier this week, the armed service said Friday, in efforts to bolster readiness against potential North Korean provocations.

About 300 troops from the Army's Third Corps took part in the exercise conducted Wednesday and Thursday in the coastal county of Goseong, some 160 kilometers northeast of Seoul, according to the Army.

It marked the first time that the Army has conducted such drills in a maritime buffer zone near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) since July last year.

The previous exercise took place a month after South Korea fully suspended the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement in June, in the wake of North Korea's trash balloon campaigns and attempts to disrupt GPS signals near border islands.

The suspension enabled South Korea to resume drills to bolster front-line defenses. Previously, artillery and naval drills, as well as regiment-level field maneuvers, were banned due to land and maritime buffer zones set up in the area. No-fly zones had also been designated near the border to prevent accidental aircraft clashes.

The Army conducts nighttime firing drills in the border county of Goseong, some 160 kilometers northeast of Seoul, on April 16-17, 2025, in this photo provided by the armed service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

This week's drills mobilized some 40 pieces of key equipment, including the K9A1 self-propelled howitzer, the Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher and surveillance equipment, such as a counter-battery radar and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), it added.

In the exercise, troops detected a simulated enemy provocation using the radar and fired in response. They then confirmed the outcome using a UAV and fired again in a show of swift firepower.

Some 600 rounds splashed into waters south of the NLL in the East Sea, an Army official said.

"The Army will strive to establish a military readiness posture to respond overwhelmingly to any enemy provocation through practical education and training at combat sites," it said.

The Army said safety guidelines were shared with the local community prior to the exercise and implemented during the drills in cooperation with the Coast Guard.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#Army #drills

HOME All News

en.yna.co.kr

7. S. Korea's steel exports to U.S. shrink 19 pct in March on Trump tariffs

​What are the 2d and 3d order effects on US manufacturers who might need that steel?

S. Korea's steel exports to U.S. shrink 19 pct in March on Trump tariffs | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 18, 2025

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's exports of steel products to the United States declined nearly 19 percent from a year earlier in March, data showed Friday, a possible outcome of heavy tariffs imposed by the Donald Trump administration on all steel imports starting last month.

Outbound shipments of steel products to the U.S. came to US$340 million in March, down 18.9 percent from the same month last year, according to the data compiled by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA).

The decrease came as the Trump administration began imposing 25 percent tariffs on all steel imports on March 12 (U.S. time) as part of its broader tariff scheme aimed at reducing America's trade deficits and bolstering local manufacturing.

Washington's duty-free quotas for steel imports from South Korea and other countries have also been abolished.

Industry watchers said it is difficult to assess the impact of U.S. tariffs on Seoul's steel exports as transactions are usually made months ahead, but that there may still have been some influence.

Korean steelmakers have been devising response measures to the U.S. tariffs, with some companies planning to increase their production in the U.S.

Hyundai Steel Co. plans to invest $5.8 billion to construct an electric arc furnace-based steel mill in Louisiana by 2029, its first overseas production facility.

Steel products are stacked at a port in Pyeongtaek, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on April 18, 2025. (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 18, 2025

8. 7 military officers placed on compulsory leave over alleged martial law involvement

​I have a different take on the actions of these Special Forces officers.

South Korea’s Special Forces and the Preservation of Democracy

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/12/south-koreas-special-forces-and-the-preservation-of-democracy/

7 military officers placed on compulsory leave over alleged martial law involvement | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 18, 2025

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- The head of the Army's 707th Special Mission Group and six other military officers have been placed on compulsory leave of absence over their alleged involvement in the Dec. 3 martial law imposition, the defense ministry said Friday.

The seven officers include Col. Kim Hyun-tae, head of the Army's 707th Special Mission Group; Brig. Gen. Lee Sang-hyun, commander of the 1st Special Forces Brigade; and Maj. Gen. Park Heon-su, head of the ministry's criminal investigation command, according to the ministry.

All of them have been indicted on charges of involvement in the botched martial law bid. Of them, Park has since been excluded from his duties, while the rest have been dismissed from their posts.

The latest decision retains the affected officers as servicemen, enabling the military to potentially take disciplinary measures in the event they are found guilty in court.

The ministry earlier placed key commanders, including former martial law commander Park An-su, on compulsory leave after they were indicted over their alleged involvement in the failed martial law bid.

Col. Kim Hyun-tae, head of the Army's 707th Special Mission Group, speaks in a plenary session of the parliamentary defense committee held at the National Assembly, in this Feb. 17, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 18, 2025

9. Inside Kim Jong Un's revolutionary history: Daily NK obtains rare N. Korean propaganda book

​An interesting spin on the Trump-Kim Singapore meeting (and other events). 

Inside Kim Jong Un's revolutionary history: Daily NK obtains rare N. Korean propaganda book - Daily NK English

Regarding the first U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore, the book describes it as "a historic meeting for the interests of the two countries and world peace and security, ending the extreme hostile relationship between North Korea and the United States"

By Mun Dong Hui - April 18, 2025

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 18, 2025

Daily NK has obtained the complete text of Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary history book published by the Workers’ Party of Korea Publishing House in 2020. The book covers the period from when Kim Jong Un first resolved to become the successor to the conclusion of the second North Korea-U.S. summit.

The book, titled “Revolutionary History of Respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un,” consists of 5 chapters divided into 33 sections.

North Korea produces biographical works of its supreme leaders such as “Revolutionary History of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung” and “Revolutionary History of Great Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il” as key propaganda materials to promote their cult of personality. These books aim to legitimize the three-generation hereditary succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, highlighting their achievements and revolutionary character to establish political authority.

Unlike the revolutionary histories of his predecessors, Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary history omits details about his birth. In Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s revolutionary histories, their respective births in Mangyongdae, Pyongyang in 1912 and the Baekdu Mountain secret camp in 1942 are mentioned in the very first sentences of Chapter 1, Section 1.

The absence of birth information in Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary history suggests that the North Korean authorities have not yet established an official narrative about this aspect. However, there remains a possibility that information about Kim Jong Un’s birth might be added in future expanded editions.

Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary history begins with the “Baekdu Mountain Pledge,” which describes how on October 1, 1998, he climbed Mount Baekdu with his father Kim Jong Il and his mother (presumed to be Ko Young Hee) and vowed to continue the revolution. Given that Kim Jong Un’s birth year is believed to be 1984, he would have been a 14-year-old teenager at the time.

Kim Jong Un is also known to have been studying in Bern, Switzerland around this time. The claim that he visited Mount Baekdu and made this pledge while studying abroad is a political fabrication to maximize his legitimacy as successor.

In fact, Kim Jong Il officially became the supreme leader through the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 5, 1998. The narrative that Kim Jong Un declared his intention to be the successor through the “Baekdu Mountain Pledge” immediately afterward suggests an effort to emphasize that Kim Jong Un began his succession training simultaneously with the establishment of Kim Jong Il’s regime. This appears to be part of a propaganda strategy to emphasize the legitimacy of hereditary succession and provide stability to the regime.

The book also contains content promoting Kim Jong Un’s superiority and exceptional abilities, particularly emphasizing his military expertise. Notable passages claim that “The Marshal (Kim Jong Un) has completely mastered all military branches including the army, navy, air and anti-air forces, as well as all military specialties and service branches” and that he “deeply acquired knowledge of numerous military tactics recorded in world war history, various weapons and equipment, and the latest military science and technology.”

Additionally, the book mentions that “he built extensive knowledge by thoroughly reading massive volumes of books covering various fields from basic sciences to computer engineering and modern science and technology, politics and economics, culture, history and geography, and even Juche farming methods.”

Claims that the supreme leader has “mastered” all fields encompassing politics, economics, and military affairs are commonly found in existing propaganda materials and are no more than North Korean rhetoric aimed at constructing the image of a deified leader.

The book also interestingly includes content about Kim Jong Un’s deep involvement in Kim Jong Il’s personal security. It states that on November 20, 2004, Kim Jong Un personally inspected event venues before Kim Jong Il’s on-site guidance visits and established countermeasures against enemy threats targeting the supreme leadership.

Earlier that year, on April 22, a train explosion at Ryongchon Station in North Pyongan province killed more than 150 people and injured about 1,300. Some interpret this as an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il, as his train had passed through that section just 30 minutes before the incident occurred after returning from a visit to China.

Considering these circumstances, the Ryongchon Station train explosion appears to have become the background for increased attention to personal security. The book also mentions that Kim Jong Un issued directives “to raise awareness about enemy sabotage activities and establish thorough countermeasures to detect and crush them” on several occasions, including August 2005.

U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shake hands during a meeting in Singapore on June 12, 2018. (Yonhap)

The book also covers the first and second North Korea-US summits held in 2018 and 2019.

Regarding the first summit in Singapore, the book describes it as “a historic meeting for the interests of the two countries and world peace and security, ending the extreme hostile relationship between North Korea and the United States” and “a demonstration of the Supreme Leader’s farsighted wisdom, outstanding political skills, high international authority, and excellent leadership.”

As for the failed second summit in Hanoi, the book states that “the United States created obstacles to the talks by clinging to completely unrealizable methods without having any clear direction or approach to improve North Korea-US relations and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula,” shifting blame to the United States.

The book praises Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic skills, claiming that “the respected Marshal firmly established autonomy at the meeting and did not make any concessions on issues that conflicted with our national interests, waging a principled struggle that cornered the US side.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 18, 2025

10. Acting defense chief unlikely to attend Shangri-La Dialogue next month

Acting defense chief unlikely to attend Shangri-La Dialogue next month | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 18, 2025

SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- Acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho is unlikely to attend a major security forum in Singapore next month as South Korea is set to hold a presidential election around then, a ministry official said Friday.

The annual Shangri-La Dialogue will take place in the city state from May 30 to June 1 this year, bringing together top defense officials from Asian and European nations, as well as the United States, for talks on security issues.

"There is a big possibility that he will not attend," the official told reporters. "It is right before the presidential election and considering various circumstances, (he) appears to have determined that it would be difficult to take part in it."

Kim reportedly considered attending the security conference but recently decided against traveling overseas right before the election.

South Korea will hold a presidential election on June 3 after the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol on April 4, removing him from office.

South Korea's defense minister has attended the annual security forum every year since 2004.

Acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho enters a Cabinet meeting at the government complex in central Seoul on April 14, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 18, 2025

11. Canada to deploy patrol aircraft to monitor North Korea sanctions violations

​International support is important if we are going to really wage a strategic strangulation campaign to cut off the regime from external resources through its illicit activities , one of which is the proliferation of weapons and training to conflict zones around the world.

Canada to deploy patrol aircraft to monitor North Korea sanctions violations

CP-140 Aurora will operate out of Japan from late April, after past surveillance led to confrontations with China

https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/canada-to-deploy-patrol-aircraft-to-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-violations/

Shreyas Reddy April 18, 2025

A CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft | Image: Government of Canada

Canada will deploy a patrol aircraft to Japan later this month to monitor North Korea’s illicit maritime activities aimed at circumventing U.N. sanctions, Tokyo’s foreign ministry announced on Thursday.

According to a ministry press release, a Royal Canadian Air Force CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft will operate out of the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa from late April to mid-May, carrying out surveillance of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels.

“Japan welcomes these activities from the viewpoint of ensuring effective implementation of the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions in solidarity with the international community toward the realization of North Korea’s dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner,” the press release said.

Tokyo also stated that it is continuing its own efforts and cooperating with international organizations and countries, including Canada, to gather information about ships suspected of violating sanctions.

This marks the 13th time since 2018 that Canada has deployed an aircraft under Operation Neon, its contribution to international efforts to enforce DPRK sanctions. It has also deployed naval vessels on 11 occasions as part of the same multilateral initiative.

However, such deployments have in the past sparked condemnations from Pyongyang, which frequently states that it does not recognize international sanctions and frames monitoring efforts as part of a U.S.-led effort to target the DPRK.

When Ottawa dispatched its CP-140 aircraft to Kadena last May, North Korea’s foreign ministry accused it of “scheming” to conduct surveillance and “blindly following the U.S.,” and warned it would take “necessary measures” to counter Washington and its allies.

Pyongyang similarly condemned Canada’s earlier CP-140 deployment in Oct. 2023 as an “act of wrecking peace and security” on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region.

On that occasion, Canada’s aerial surveillance operations over the Yellow Sea also faced resistance from China, as a People’s Liberation Army Air Force jet reportedly fired flares at the maritime patrol aircraft and flew as close as 16 feet (5 meters) to it.

Beijing justified its actions as “necessary measures” against an “illegal intrusion,” but Canada emphasized that its surveillance plane was flying over international waters and condemned China’s actions as “dangerous and reckless.”

Canada also previously accused the Chinese air force of harassing its patrol aircraft during an Operation Neon mission in June 2022, but China denied the accusations and accused Ottawa of carrying out “a provocation against a sovereign country” with its flyovers.

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project

​Per the ODNI ATA - an example of "adversarial cooperation."

North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project - The DONG-A ILBO

donga.com

North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project

Posted April. 18, 2025 07:33,   

Updated April. 18, 2025 07:33

North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project. April. 18, 2025 07:33. by Eun-A Cho achim@donga.com. Preparations for a road bridge over the Tumen River, agreed to during a North Korea-Russia summit in June 2024, appear to be gaining momentum. Claims have also emerged that North Korea may send troops not only to Russia’s Kursk region but also to mainland Ukraine, signaling closer military and economic cooperation between the two countries.“Beyond Parallel,” a North Korea-focused website operated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that satellite imagery taken in February and March indicates progress at the bridge construction site. A satellite image from Feb. 27 shows trees and shrubs cleared near the Russian side of the proposed bridge, with some terrain leveled.On the North Korean side, a small ready-mix concrete plant appears to have been installed about 500 meters west of the construction site. A 164-meter-long temporary bridge extending from the Russian side over the frozen Tumen River has also been spotted. The structure is believed to be used for transporting personnel and equipment.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to build the bridge during their June 2024 summit. Once completed, the bridge is expected to accelerate bilateral economic cooperation.

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Preparations for a road bridge over the Tumen River, agreed to during a North Korea-Russia summit in June 2024, appear to be gaining momentum. Claims have also emerged that North Korea may send troops not only to Russia’s Kursk region but also to mainland Ukraine, signaling closer military and economic cooperation between the two countries.“Beyond Parallel,” a North Korea-focused website operated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that satellite imagery taken in February and March indicates progress at the bridge construction site. A satellite image from Feb. 27 shows trees and shrubs cleared near the Russian side of the proposed bridge, with some terrain leveled.On the North Korean side, a small ready-mix concrete plant appears to have been installed about 500 meters west of the construction site. A 164-meter-long temporary bridge extending from the Russian side over the frozen Tumen River has also been spotted. The structure is believed to be used for transporting personnel and equipment.North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to build the bridge during their June 2024 summit. Once completed, the bridge is expected to accelerate bilateral economic cooperation.

Eun-A Cho achim@donga.com

donga.com

13. Tragedy in Hoeryong: Mother left destitute after daughter sent to political prison camp

​The brutality of the Kim family regime. So much evil.

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. 

Tragedy in Hoeryong: Mother left destitute after daughter sent to political prison camp - Daily NK English

The daughter was sent to a political prison camp in late 2023 for "anti-state activities" related to leaking internal information

By Lee Chae Eun - April 18, 2025

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 18, 2025

Image: DALL.E

A woman in her 50s from Hoeryong, North Hamgyong province, is traveling to various locations across North Korea where political prison camps are believed to exist, desperately searching for her daughter who was allegedly sent to one of these facilities.

According to a Daily NK source in the province recently, “A female resident in her 50s, identified as A, from Hoeryong is visiting all known prison camp locations in search of her daughter. She only knows that her daughter was transferred to a prison camp in late 2023, but doesn’t know which specific facility.”

The source explained that A was arrested by the Ministry of State Security in May 2023 after someone informed authorities about her activities as a money transfer broker. During the arrest, security officers searched her home and confiscated 200,000 Chinese yuan (around $27,500), but she had hidden her Chinese mobile phone elsewhere, preventing its seizure.

Following her mother’s arrest, A’s daughter, who is in her 20s, decided to engage in “information trading” to raise bribe money for the security department. In North Korea, there’s a saying that “with enough bribes, even murder charges can be resolved,” so the daughter was convinced that money was the only way to save her mother from custody, prompting her to take this dangerous risk.

Eventually, the daughter was also arrested by the security department, but ironically, A was released during this time. After her release, A sold her house and gathered all her assets, exhausting every possible method, but failed to secure her daughter’s release.

The daughter was sent to a political prison camp in late 2023 for “anti-state activities” related to leaking internal information.

“After learning that her daughter had been taken to a prison camp, A was bedridden for several months and subsequently began showing signs of mental instability,” the source said. “Since February this year, she has been visiting every known prison camp location in search of her daughter.”

Most people sent to political prison camps cannot even be confirmed dead or alive. Nevertheless, A continues to wander around areas where political prison camps are believed to exist, desperately hoping that her daughter is still alive, even though she knows her efforts may be futile.

“People around A are shaking their heads, saying what kind of tragedy is this where someone loses their child and becomes destitute overnight just for trying to make a living,” the source said. “As long as people are forced to engage in illegal activities to survive, and surveillance and crackdowns on such illegal activities continue, tragedies like what A’s family experienced will inevitably repeat.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 18, 2025

14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Counterfeit Money Flooding: NK Won, Chinese Yuan, and 'Donpyo' Vouchers Spreading Despite Major Crackdowns

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Counterfeit Money Flooding: NK Won, Chinese Yuan, and 'Donpyo' Vouchers Spreading Despite Major Crackdowns

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A female merchant giving change in Chinese 1 yuan notes. It is said that counterfeit Chinese yuan is now circulating as well. Photographed in Ryanggang Province in October 2013, ASIAPRESS

Sophisticated counterfeit bills are circulating in large quantities throughout North Korea. The counterfeits extend beyond North Korean won to include Chinese yuan and the 'money vouchers' known as donpyo. Despite authorities' vigorous crackdown efforts, the circulation continues unimpeded. This information was reported in mid-April by two reporting partners living in the northern region. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆Possession of Counterfeit Money Alone Warrants Punishment

According to a reporting partner from Hyesan in Ryanggang Province, counterfeit money has been circulating in large quantities in Pyongsong City, North Pyongan Province, and has spread to other regions causing disruption. Reportedly, North Korean 5,000 won notes, Chinese 20 yuan notes, and 'donpyo' money vouchers are particularly common among the counterfeits.

※Donpyo is a temporary monetary voucher issued by the Central Bank of North Korea as a relief measure during the severe economic crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic. It can be exchanged for regular currency of the same denomination, with the highest denomination being 50,000 won.

The reporting partner said: "Authorities have issued a directive through neighborhood units to 'thoroughly report fake money' because counterfeit bills are circulating in Pyongsong. Not only using counterfeit money but merely possessing it is considered a criminal offense, and even those who simply possess it will be punished."

In fact, the reporting partner says they unknowingly received counterfeit money. How did they handle it?

"I used it secretly without reporting it. If it's detected when it comes back to you, wouldn't you suffer a loss? So everyone is trying to pass it on to someone else without reporting it."

When counterfeit money is reported, authorities simply confiscate it without providing replacement bills. In other words, honest reporting results in personal loss. As a result, counterfeit money continues to circulate. Since the state also suffers losses when the counterfeits eventually enter the treasury, authorities are desperately focusing on enforcement measures.

People doing business in a back alley of the market. Counterfeit money seems to circulate frequently in places like this. Photographed from the Chinese side of Hyesan, Ryanggang Province in October 2024, ASIAPRESS

◆Large Quantities of Counterfeit Money Discovered Even in State-Owned Factories

Information about sophisticated counterfeit bills in circulation has been reported from various regions in northern North Korea since around November last year. However, authorities had not previously launched large-scale crackdowns like the current one.

According to the Hyesan reporting partner, an incident actually occurred where an accountant at a state-owned factory went to the bank to make a deposit.

"Among the money taken to the bank, 1.2 million won was counterfeit. The accountant was investigated by police and prosecutors, but this time it was determined that all the money had come through market transactions, so it seems they have issued a warning to the markets."

※As of early April, 1,000 North Korean won is approximately $0.0414. 1.2 million won is about $49.63.

It appears impossible to stop the circulation of counterfeit money. There are suggestions that for large transactions, bill sorting machines should be introduced or bank inspections should be conducted.

asiapress.org

​15. South Korean government publishes new unification textbook...reflecting the 'two-nation theory' of the South and the North

​I will be sending out the English translations when they are published. note Greg Scarlatoiu carrying our water on human rights and unification.

This is an Google translation of an RFA report.

South Korean government publishes new unification textbook...reflecting the 'two-nation theory' of the South and the North

Seoul-Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org

2025.04.18

On the 18th, the Ministry of Unification's National Institute for Unification Education published and distributed 'Understanding the Unification Issue in 2025' and 'Understanding North Korea in 2025' as basic unification education textbooks. (Yonhap)

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/18/korea-unification-textbook-2025-publish/

Anchor: The National Institute for Unification Education of the Ministry of Unification of Korea has published the 2025 basic textbook for unification education. It reflects recent issues such as the inauguration of the new U.S. administration and the close relationship between North Korea and Russia. Reporter Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul.

The National Institute for Unification Education of the Ministry of Unification of Korea published the basic unification education textbooks, 'Understanding North Korea 2025' and 'Understanding Unification Issues 2025' on the 18th.

The textbook reflects the situation in which the two countries are closely militarily engaged, including North Korea's dispatch of troops to Russia.

The textbook 'Understanding North Korea 2025' states that North Korea and Russia signed the so-called 'new treaty' last year, effectively elevating their relationship to an alliance, and that this has led to unprecedented levels of military cooperation, including large-scale arms support and troop dispatch to Russia.

He also reported that North Korea's military industry has recently become more active by expanding various types of transactions with Russia due to the war.

In particular, he explained that North Korea showed off various weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), hypersonic missiles, tanks, howitzers, drones, and space launch vehicles for launching reconnaissance satellites, at the 'Defense Development-2024' arms exhibition held at the end of last year.

The textbook 'Understanding the 2025 Unification Issue' includes changes in the unification environment due to the prolonged war between Russia and Ukraine, the so-called 'two hostile states theory' put forward by North Korea, and the launch of the second term of the Donald Trump administration in the United States.

Regarding the new U.S. administration’s North Korea policy, he said, “It has not been clearly revealed yet,” but conveyed the White House’s message that “President Trump will pursue complete denuclearization of North Korea, just as he did during his first term.”

The South Korean and U.S. governments have repeatedly stated that they are seeking the denuclearization of North Korea and have expressed their intention to cooperate to achieve this. These are the words of South Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lee Jae-woong on the 27th of last month.

[Lee Jae-woong, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (last month, 27th)] North Korea must clearly recognize that the international community will never tolerate North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and must immediately cease actions that threaten peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and return to denuclearization talks.

The textbook emphasized that amid the intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, it is necessary to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance while strategically managing relations with China in order to achieve North Korea's denuclearization.

It also detailed former South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol's North Korea policy, which was dismissed earlier this month, in 10 pages.

'Understanding the 2025 Unification Issue' presents a vision of realizing a 'Korean Peninsula of Denuclearization, Peace, and Prosperity' and a 'bold plan' for the denuclearization of North Korea, along with a detailed discussion of the 'August 15 Unification Doctrine' presented by former President Yoon on Liberation Day last year, with a separate subheading and diagram.

In the appendix, four pages are devoted to introducing the main contents of the ‘August 15 Unification Doctrine.’

The Ministry of Unification of South Korea explained, “It is a detailed introduction to the policies of the Yoon Seok-yeol government at the time the textbook was produced,” and “The textbook published during the previous regime change was the same.”

Related Articles

Ministry of Unification announces implementation plan for 'August 15 Unification Doctrine'

Korea's New Unification Textbook Emphasizes 'Liberal Democratic Unification'

The Ministry of Unification plans to produce 30,000 copies of “Understanding North Korea” and “Understanding Unification Issues” and distribute them to schools at all levels, city and provincial offices of education, public education and training institutions, and unification education organizations.

Unification Education Center, Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President, invited to special lecture and discussion

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Unification's National Institute for Unification Education invited Gregore Scarlatoiu, an expert in North Korean human rights and chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), to a special lecture and discussion from the 8th to the 16th.

Greg Scarlatoiu, chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), speaks at a lecture hosted by the Hanbaek Unification Foundation on the 11th.

Greg Scarlatoiu, chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), speaks at a lecture hosted by the Hanbaek Unification Foundation on the 11th. (provided by the National Institute for Unification Education, Ministry of Unification)

According to the Unification Education Institute, Chairman Scalatu said, “Although there are many difficulties due to the rapidly changing world situation, interest in and efforts to address North Korean human rights can be an important solution for the unification of the Korean Peninsula,” and called for continued interest and solidarity in this regard.

This special lecture was attended by university students, international students, experts on the Korean Peninsula and unification, organizations related to North Korean defectors, and many citizens interested in human rights in North Korea.

Participants who had the opportunity to share various perspectives on the North Korean human rights issue said, “At a time when interest in North Korean human rights is decreasing both domestically and internationally, attending the special lecture was an opportunity to recognize its importance once again.”

This is Hong Seung-wook of RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.

Editor Yang Seong-won

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com