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1. China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war

2. China’s propagandists preach defiance in the trade war with America

3. New Pentagon chairman: U.S. lacks ability to deter adversaries

4. Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer rejoins the Marine Corps at 36

5. U.S. intelligence contradicts Trump’s justification for mass deportations

6. I was in the CIA. Here's how helping Myanmar can pay off for US against China. | Opinion

7. Communists Never Win a Fair Fight

8. U.S. Will Pause Ukraine Peace Efforts if No Progress, Rubio Warns

9. Russian missile attack on Kharkiv on Good Friday kills 1, injures 87

10. Defense One: State of the Services

11. There’s no more DEI at DOD, watchdog finds

12. Shuttering of State office leaves US largely defenseless against foreign influence warfare, officials say

13. The Trump White House and the New Opium Wars

14. Germany's Great Military Reboot Has Now Arrived

15. Gabbard declassifies Biden-era plan to counter domestic terrorism

16. US may soon force allies to take sides in trade war with China

17. Military families challenge Trump’s stricter federal voting rules

18. Reimagining Combat Power for Tomorrow’s Battlefield: The Enhanced Brigade Combat Team

19. The Department of Defense’s Breakthrough Nuclear Moment Risks Slipping Away

20. What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race

21. How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis

1. China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war

This appears to provide some inside baseball.

Excerpts:

None of this will ultimately decide Mr Trump’s China strategy. Judging by the past few weeks, that will depend largely on his own impulses, which can quickly change. But who manages relationships and policy day to day still matters. And if Mr Trump does seek a deal with China or if the trade war spills over into the security realm, the options presented to him and the capacity to predict China’s response will all be vital. Signalling weakness on Taiwan, for instance, has as much potential to trigger Chinese military action as being over-provocative. To engage China in a trade war without a coherent strategy is risky enough. Incoherence on the security front could be catastrophic.

China | Hawks v MAGA

China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war

“Restrainers” are taking over from “primacists”

https://www.economist.com/china/2025/04/15/china-hawks-are-losing-influence-in-trumpworld-despite-the-trade-war

Illustration: Ellie Foreman-Peck

Apr 15th 2025

Listen to this story

ven before Donald Trump’s tariff turmoil, it was hard to discern a clear China strategy. With decisions depending largely on presidential whim, his foreign-policy advisers seemed to have split into warring tribes. To use a shorthand common in Washington, the “primacists” seek to re-establish America’s dominance in the world, taking on all threats; the “prioritisers” think America can handle only China and should abandon Ukraine; and the “restrainers” want to focus on only the homeland, avoiding future wars. Since April 2nd Mr Trump’s trade war has sown further confusion. But whatever his own views, one thing seems increasingly clear: conventional China hawks, whether primacists or prioritisers, are losing ground in the battle for influence.

Though overshadowed by the trade drama, among the strongest indications of this trend was the firing or reassignment of six National Security Council (nsc) officials, which became public on April 3rd. That was apparently prompted by Laura Loomer, a right-wing conspiracy theorist who met Mr Trump a day earlier. Ms Loomer said the officials were “disloyal people” who helped to sabotage Mr Trump. Yet her demands seem to align closely with those of the restrainers (including Donald Trump junior) who want to root out those they see as “neocons” bent on provoking war with China.

One of those sacked was David Feith, the nsc’s senior director for technology. He was in some ways a symbolic target. His father, Douglas, was one of the original neocons. As a Pentagon official, he helped to plan the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But the younger Mr Feith was also among the White House’s most experienced China specialists, working in the State Department through Mr Trump’s first term and helping to create his Indo-Pacific Strategy, which advocated upgrading American alliances. As a think-tanker after that, he argued for tougher China policies.

On the nsc he handled issues that included American tech exports to China and the proposed sale of TikTok to a non-Chinese owner. In that role he appears to have built on many Biden-era initiatives, while also taking up new ones, including the America First Investment Policy. This identified Russia and China as “adversaries” and broadened curbs on investment in China. Whether his views on policy contributed to his sacking is unclear but, former colleagues say, it is a win for the isolationists and a loss of China expertise.

The future of two other China hawks—Ivan Kanapathy, the nsc’s senior director for Asia, and Alex Wong, the deputy national security adviser—is also now in doubt. Ms Loomer accused Mr Kanapathy of working previously with Trump critics, and attacked Mr Wong and his wife over their Chinese heritage and her previous work as a lawyer. Although both officials have kept their jobs, they have been weakened by the broadside and by the waning authority of their boss, Mike Waltz, the national security adviser (another wing-clipped China hawk).

Officials in China and Taiwan will be watching Mr Kanapathy closely, as he is seen as one of the island’s staunchest supporters in the White House. He served as military attaché to America’s representative office in Taiwan from 2014 to 2017, and contributed to a book on Taiwan’s defence in 2024 that was edited by Matt Pottinger, the nsc’s Asia chief in Mr Trump’s first term. Mr Kanapathy met Taiwan’s president last year with Mr Pottinger, who resigned over the attack on the Capitol on January 6th 2021 and has since called for tougher policies aimed at encouraging political change in China.

How this affects America’s dealings with China is unclear. Mr Trump has not expressed his preferences beyond trade, and may be unaware of the battles over policy among his staff. But one potential consequence is that it gets harder for China hawks to push things through without him noticing, as they did in his first term. Some see their fingerprints on recent changes, including firmer joint statements with allies opposing Chinese coercion of Taiwan and the removal from the State Department’s website of a commitment not to support the island’s independence.

Restrainer retrainer

The balance may be shifting in the Pentagon, too. Pete Hegseth, the inexperienced defence secretary, reassured America’s Asian allies by echoing many of President Joe Biden’s commitments during his first regional tour in March. But that was probably because the Trump administration has yet to work out its military priorities in Asia. Those could become clearer after the Senate’s confirmation on April 8th of Elbridge Colby as under-secretary of defence for policy, the Pentagon’s number-three post and one expected to play a critical role in guiding Mr Hegseth.

Mr Colby has been the most vocal advocate of prioritising China. Former colleagues say he is committed to that goal (including Taiwan’s defence) and well qualified for his new post. Though not a career China specialist, he worked in the Pentagon in Mr Trump’s first term, developing a National Defence Strategy which identified China and Russia as primary adversaries. He then founded a think-tank and wrote a book, both of which advocate combating Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Even so, he has sounded more like a restrainer of late, saying that Taiwan is not an “existential” issue for America and should increase its defence spending to (an unrealistic) 10% of gdp, from under 3% now. He has also argued that South Korea, an ally, should do more to defend itself. Such remarks have earned him public backing from Vice-President J.D. Vance and the junior Mr Trump, who said recently that Mr Colby supported the president’s desire to negotiate with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to avoid “poking the dragon in the eye unnecessarily” and to seek a “balance of power with China that avoids war”.

Mr Colby’s change of tune may have been politically savvy, but it has unnerved some in American and allied defence circles who hear echoes of Mr Trump’s views on Europe. They worry that the president, who has little personal regard for Taiwan, might be open to striking a deal with Mr Xi that compromises the island’s security in exchange for trade concessions from China and deference to other American interests in Asia. Others doubt Mr Trump can stick to any coherent China strategy, considering his tariffs on Asian allies and the recent redeployment of an aircraft-carrier and missile-defence systems from Asia to the Middle East.

The State Department seems to have a limited say on China despite the hawkish views of Marco Rubio, the secretary of state. Michael Anton, his policy-planning chief, has argued that America should not defend Taiwan. Some leading China hands recently retired early. And the nominee for the top post covering East Asia and the Pacific is Michael DeSombre, a lawyer whose only diplomatic experience was a year as ambassador to Thailand.

Such personnel changes have not gone unnoticed in China. Researchers there who study America and advise the leadership believe that the first Trump administration was strongly influenced by China hawks in the nsc, Pentagon and State Department. Hawks in the current administration are weak by comparison, said Meng Weizhan of Fudan University in a recent commentary. He expects it to become increasingly hardline on technology and trade, but less so on ideology and military matters as it focuses on domestic revival.

None of this will ultimately decide Mr Trump’s China strategy. Judging by the past few weeks, that will depend largely on his own impulses, which can quickly change. But who manages relationships and policy day to day still matters. And if Mr Trump does seek a deal with China or if the trade war spills over into the security realm, the options presented to him and the capacity to predict China’s response will all be vital. Signalling weakness on Taiwan, for instance, has as much potential to trigger Chinese military action as being over-provocative. To engage China in a trade war without a coherent strategy is risky enough. Incoherence on the security front could be catastrophic. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

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This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the headline “Clipped wings”

2. China’s propagandists preach defiance in the trade war with America

Excerpts:

Propagandists are also digging into China’s revolutionary past for inspiration. On social media officials shared a grainy video of Mao Zedong speaking in 1953, during the Korean war, when China’s armed forces fought America’s. In it Mao proclaims that “No matter how long this war is going to last, we’ll never yield. We’ll fight until we completely triumph.” State-run media are also quoting another fiery saying of Mao: “America is just a paper tiger. Don’t believe its bluff.”

China keeps tight control on public opinion surveys. But many Chinese do seem to support fighting a trade war. “We must let everyone know that we have a strong backbone and will never bow down,” proclaimed Zijin Gongzi, a blogger with 430,000 followers on Weibo, a social-media platform. Wuheqilin, a digital artist with 3.5m followers, created an iconic image (pictured), widely shared online, of a figure in red, representing China, standing defiantly before a grotesque Mr Trump, with the title “I am standing here!”

Some are trolling Mr Trump for wanting to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. They share ai-generated videos of overweight American workers clumsily trying to make iPhones. One video features Mr Trump himself in a factory, getting slapped by his supervisor.

Many Chinese people are worried as well, though. Users of Douyin, a video-sharing platform, are asking which goods Chinese people should start hoarding. Others look for tips about buying gold, perceived to be a haven for investors in times of turmoil. They are anxious, as well as defiant.

China | Standing up

China’s propagandists preach defiance in the trade war with America

The public seems on board, for now

https://www.economist.com/china/2025/04/16/chinas-propagandists-preach-defiance-in-the-trade-war-with-america

“I am standing here!”Photograph: Wuheqilin via Weibo

Apr 16th 2025|BEIJING

ven before getting embroiled in a trade war with America, China’s officials were struggling to keep up public morale. Many people were already fretting about a weak job market and a property downturn. Now, American levies on most Chinese goods have reached a staggering 145% and China’s levies on American imports are at 125%.

On April 14th China’s customs bureau tried to reassure, saying that “the sky won’t fall” because of tariffs. But officials are worried about consumer sentiment and, in the long run, social stability. So they are trying to convince the public that China’s defiant approach to America is the right one, and the pain will be bearable. “Believe in China. Believe in tomorrow,” gushed an editorial on April 11th on the front page of the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece. China is an “oasis of certainty” in a chaotic world, it argued, alongside a list of technological achievements, from ai to space travel. In America, meanwhile, there has been a shortage of eggs, state-run media reported.

Propagandists are also digging into China’s revolutionary past for inspiration. On social media officials shared a grainy video of Mao Zedong speaking in 1953, during the Korean war, when China’s armed forces fought America’s. In it Mao proclaims that “No matter how long this war is going to last, we’ll never yield. We’ll fight until we completely triumph.” State-run media are also quoting another fiery saying of Mao: “America is just a paper tiger. Don’t believe its bluff.”

China keeps tight control on public opinion surveys. But many Chinese do seem to support fighting a trade war. “We must let everyone know that we have a strong backbone and will never bow down,” proclaimed Zijin Gongzi, a blogger with 430,000 followers on Weibo, a social-media platform. Wuheqilin, a digital artist with 3.5m followers, created an iconic image (pictured), widely shared online, of a figure in red, representing China, standing defiantly before a grotesque Mr Trump, with the title “I am standing here!”

Some are trolling Mr Trump for wanting to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. They share ai-generated videos of overweight American workers clumsily trying to make iPhones. One video features Mr Trump himself in a factory, getting slapped by his supervisor.

Many Chinese people are worried as well, though. Users of Douyin, a video-sharing platform, are asking which goods Chinese people should start hoarding. Others look for tips about buying gold, perceived to be a haven for investors in times of turmoil. They are anxious, as well as defiant. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

3. New Pentagon chairman: U.S. lacks ability to deter adversaries

Excerpts:

China’s military remains a significant concern because of its rapid expansion and application of new weapons and technology, including nuclear and hypersonic missiles, he said.

Gen. Caine said China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, is deficient in leadership, long-distance logistics, urban warfare and modern warfare experience.

In the Indo-Pacific, Gen. Caine said, he opposes a congressionally mandated establishment of a joint force headquarters. He said the Navy’s Pacific Fleet would serve as a joint task force in the event of a conflict in the region.

Bolstering defenses on Guam will also be a priority in helping to effectively deter regional aggression, he said.

When asked about the federal government’s view that China poses the biggest threat to the U.S., Gen. Caine appeared to offer a softer view than other U.S. military commanders.

“Many of the Chinese Communist Party’s values and interests are at odds with those of the United States,” he said.

New Pentagon chairman: U.S. lacks ability to deter adversaries

Urgent reforms needed for weapons acquisition and defense industry, Gen. Caine says

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, April 15, 2025

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

The new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has warned that the U.S. military is unable to deter China and other adversaries and called for urgent defense reforms.

Gen. Dan Caine, sworn in as chairman on Monday, said in recent Senate testimony that the weaknesses include the military system’s inability to support and respond rapidly to a conflict.

“The U.S. does not have the throughput, responsiveness, or agility needed to deter our adversaries,” Gen. Caine stated in written answers to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The U.S. military is facing potential conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait. Adm. Sam Paparo, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has said China has been rehearsing for large-scale military operations against a key U.S. partner, Taiwan.

Adm. Paparo told a Senate hearing last week that China is engaged in “unprecedented aggression” against Taiwan.

He said U.S. forces can deter China and prevail in a conflict but warned that “the margin is eroding.”

The command needs “additional sustained investment” in long-range weapons and a strengthening of air and missile defenses with drones and artificial intelligence, Adm. Paparo said.

Other potential conflicts loom in the Middle East over efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear program and Tehran’s use of proxy forces in Yemen to stifle international shipping in the Red Sea.

Russia also poses a major threat. Moscow is stepping up military operations against Ukraine while turning down appeals from President Trump for a ceasefire and peace talks.

At another point in the written answers, Gen. Caine said that based on public reporting, he is confident the military has the materiel, equipment, training and personnel “to meet its current challenges.”

Those challenges include protecting U.S. territory, fulfilling U.S. alliance commitments and maintaining an advantage over potential adversaries.

The military’s main problem is an arms acquisition system and defense industrial base that are “not optimized for protracted conflict,” said the four-star Air Force general, who was promoted from retired three-star rank in the confirmation process.

During his Senate testimony this month, Gen. Caine said the United States faces an unprecedented and increasing risk from enemies worldwide.

“Our adversaries are advancing, global nuclear threats are on the rise and deterrence is paramount,” he said. “Our national defense requires urgent action and reform across the board. We must go faster. We must move with a sense of urgency. We can never forget that our number one job is to create peace through overwhelming strength.”

Mr. Trump announced last week that he plans to spend $1 trillion on defense in the next budget cycle.

A spokesman for Gen. Caine did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Pentagon’s top priority under the Trump administration is defending the American homeland and ensuring operational control over the U.S. southern border, he said.

Nuclear threats posed by China’s rapidly expanding arsenal of strategic missiles and bombers are major concerns for the chairman.

Gen. Caine said a priority as senior adviser to the president on military matters will be to continue the Pentagon’s multibillion-dollar nuclear modernization program.

Modernization includes building Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles, Columbia-class missile submarines and B-21 bombers. All three programs, however, are facing problems and delays.

Gen. Caine said during an April 1 committee hearing that much work needs to be done to keep U.S. nuclear forces credible.

U.S. shipbuilding also must be improved with the congressionally mandated goal of increasing the Navy fleet to 355 ships as soon possible and developing the capability to sustain and repair them, he said.

Gen. Caine said the military is too slow to integrate advanced technology into its weapons and other systems.

“It’s a huge problem. Technology is evolving so quickly that every time we field capabilities, they’re obsolete, oftentimes when they hit the force. And that’s not acceptable.”

He said the system used to acquire weapons and support systems needs great agility so they can be deployed more rapidly.

Improving the defense industry’s ability to respond will require a combination of the best startup companies and the Pentagon’s prime contractors, he said.

On U.S. nuclear modernization, Gen. Caine suggested in his written responses to the committee that he may recommend the United States increase a nuclear arsenal that is decades old.

“The current U.S. nuclear force was designed in a different security environment,” he stated, noting that a commission on strategic forces called the current program insufficient.

Gen. Caine said the president’s Golden Dome missile defense program is a priority.

The 44 long-range interceptor missiles based in Alaska and California must be expanded beyond their role of countering North Korean long-range missiles.

“My priority is to ensure the deployment of a next-generation missile shield to provide for the common defense of our citizens and the nation,” Gen. Caine said.

The new system will counter attacks from peer and near-peer adversaries and rogue states, he said.

“My second priority is to deter — and defend our citizens and critical infrastructure against — any foreign aerial attack on the homeland leveraging modern and future missile defense technology combined with a robust proliferated space-based architecture that provides early warning and missile tracking.”

The deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal has been weakened by China’s emergence as a major nuclear power and Russia’s continued development of advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal also has undermined a long-standing nuclear deterrence calculus based largely on the possibility of a confrontation between the U.S. and Russia.

Gen. Caine said the military imbalance between China and Taiwan is “stark” thanks to the growing ability of the Chinese military to project power across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait.

He has said he will review U.S. defense support for the island democracy.

When asked about military defense, Gen. Caine said he supports the current policy of opposing any unilateral changes in the fragile status quo between China and Taiwan and helping Taiwan bolster its defenses.

China’s military remains a significant concern because of its rapid expansion and application of new weapons and technology, including nuclear and hypersonic missiles, he said.

Gen. Caine said China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, is deficient in leadership, long-distance logistics, urban warfare and modern warfare experience.

In the Indo-Pacific, Gen. Caine said, he opposes a congressionally mandated establishment of a joint force headquarters. He said the Navy’s Pacific Fleet would serve as a joint task force in the event of a conflict in the region.

Bolstering defenses on Guam will also be a priority in helping to effectively deter regional aggression, he said.

When asked about the federal government’s view that China poses the biggest threat to the U.S., Gen. Caine appeared to offer a softer view than other U.S. military commanders.

“Many of the Chinese Communist Party’s values and interests are at odds with those of the United States,” he said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

4. Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer rejoins the Marine Corps at 36

Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer rejoins the Marine Corps at 36

The sergeant earned the nation’s top award for valor in combat for actions in Afghanistan in 2009. He says he wants no special treatment.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/dakota-meyer-medal-of-honor-reenlists/

April 17, 2025 at 7:01 p.m. EDTToday at 7:01 p.m. EDT

Sgt. Dakota Meyer shakes hands with retired Lt. Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a reenlistment ceremony at the Pentagon on Thursday. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)

By Dan Lamothe

Sgt. Dakota Meyer reenlisted in the Marine Corps on Thursday, taking the unusual step of rejoining the military 15 years after he left active duty. In doing so, he becomes one of only two current service members who have been recognized with the nation’s highest award for valor in combat, the Medal of Honor.

Meyer, wearing his dress blues and the award around his neck, took the oath of enlistment in the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth administered the oath of reenlistment with other senior U.S. officials present, including the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Lt. Gen Dan Caine, and the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard.

Meyer, 36, who recently worked as a firefighter and entrepreneur, had discussed reenlisting for about two years with senior Marine officials, said Sgt. Maj. Carlos A. Ruiz, the service’s top enlisted member, in a news conference with Meyer before the ceremony.

“I would say that there has probably not been a day that I’ve been out that I haven’t wanted to come back in,” Meyer told reporters. “I finally just got to a point where I felt like I would be an asset and I felt like I could come back in and contribute.”

The decision places one of the service’s highest profile and most outspoken ambassadors back in uniform, raising questions about how the Marine Corps will manage his service. Meyer has engaged with politics for years, recently voicing support for Hegseth and Gabbard through their Senate confirmation processes.

Meyer declined to detail how he plans to serve within the Marine Corps Reserve, which requires part-time service, but Hegseth suggested he will pursue an active operational role.

“He’s not signing up to be on a recruiting poster,” Hegseth said. “He’s signing up to do the real thing.”

Meyer in 2011 became the first Marine in nearly four decades to earn the Medal of Honor, with President Barack Obama approving the award. On Sept. 8, 2009, Meyer braved Taliban gunfire in an effort to save U.S. troops and Afghan forces from a hellacious ambush in the Afghan village of Ganjgal. Meyer left active duty as the service examined whether his actions rose to the level of being recognized with the Medal of Honor and as he struggled with the trauma of a battle that left five U.S. service members dead and others wounded, including Meyer.

He went on to become a best-selling author, writing of his upbringing, military service, and struggles with survivor’s guilt, including a suicide attempt. He was married for about two years to Bristol Palin, the daughter of former vice-presidential candidate and Alaska governor Sarah Palin, and has two children with her.

Meyer said he does not want special treatment from the Marine Corps and understands there are restrictions on political speech while in uniform.

“I will say right off the bat that I have not always gotten it right,” Meyer said. “But the great part about being in the reserves is that I’m still a citizen when I’m not on orders and I’m not in.”

The only other active service member with a Medal of Honor is Army Sgt. Maj. Matthew O. Williams, who was recognized in 2019 for his actions in a fierce firefight in Afghanistan in 2008. Other recipients for actions in the post-9/11 era, including Lt. Col. William D. Swenson, who was recognized for actions in the same battle as Meyer, have since left the military.

Hegseth said he wanted to highlight Meyer’s reenlistment ceremony and sought to make it “as big as we can.”

“This is a guy who has put it all on the line, done the most difficult things you can imagine, tested the human resolve, and yet after all of that he is standing before us today saying, ‘I want to do this,’” Hegseth said. “That’s an example.”

By Dan Lamothe

Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces since 2008, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan.follow on X@danlamothe

5. U.S. intelligence contradicts Trump’s justification for mass deportations

U.S. intelligence contradicts Trump’s justification for mass deportations

The determination is the most comprehensive assessment to date undercutting the president’s rationale for deporting suspected gang members without due process.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/us-intelligence-tren-de-aragua-deportations-trump/

April 17, 2025 at 7:24 p.m. EDTToday at 7:24 p.m. EDT

6 min

771

People in Caracas rally against the imprisonment of Venezuelans in a Salvadoran prison. (Juan Barreto/AFP/Getty Images)

By John Hudson and Warren P. Strobel

The National Intelligence Council, drawing on the acumen of the United States’ 18 intelligence agencies, determined in a secret assessment early this month that the Venezuelan government is not directing an invasion of the United States by the prison gang Tren de Aragua, a judgment that contradicts President Donald Trump’s public statements, according to people familiar with the matter.

The determination is the U.S. government’s most comprehensive assessment to date undercutting Trump’s rationale for deporting suspected gang members without due process under the Alien Enemies Act, the 1798 law last used during World War II that laid the foundation for the incarceration of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans.

Trump invoked the act in mid-March, proclaiming without evidence that Tren de Aragua is perpetrating an “invasion” of the United States “at the direction” of the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Under the Alien Enemies Act, the government sent planeloads of alleged gang members to El Salvador’s notorious megaprison despite a judge’s order to turn the planes around and afford the detainees an opportunity to challenge their removal through standard legal processes.

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The intelligence product found that although there are some low-level contacts between the Maduro government and Tren de Aragua, or TdA, the gang does not operate at the direction of Venezuela’s leader. The product builds on U.S. intelligence findings in February, first reported by the New York Times, that the gang is not controlled by Venezuela.

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The National Intelligence Council is the analytic hub of the U.S. intelligence community that reports to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. It is composed of veteran specialists in particular regions or topics, known as national intelligence officers, and produces classified assessments meant to represent the assessment of all U.S. spy agencies.

The people familiar with this assessment spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence matters.

When asked about the findings, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence dismissed it as the work of “deep state actors” working in conjunction with the media.

“President Trump took necessary and historic action to safeguard our nation when he deported these violent Tren de Aragua terrorists,” the statement said. “Now that America is safer without these terrorists in our cities, deep state actors have resorted to using their propaganda arm to attack the President’s successful policies.”

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The finding was nearly unanimous among the U.S. intelligence agencies with the exception of the FBI, which assessed a moderate level of cooperation between the gang and the Venezuelan government, two people familiar with the matter said.

The dispute over the group’s ties to Venezuela come amid a larger standoff between the Trump administration and the courts that has alarmed constitutional scholars, the president’s political opponents and some fellow Republicans as the administration challenges judges’ orders arising from this case and others.

The Alien Enemies Act empowers the executive branch to summarily remove foreigners whose home country is at war with the United States or waging a “predatory incursion” into U.S. territory. Legal experts believe the law requires that the invasion or incursion be linked to the actions of a foreign government.

Trump’s invocation of the act claims such a link: “TdA is undertaking hostile actions and conducting irregular warfare against the territory of the United States both directly and at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela.”

Two Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee, Rep. Jim Himes (Connecticut), the panel’s top member from his party, and Rep. Joaquin Castro (Texas), wrote to Gabbard on April 10 imploring her to declassify information on TdA’s alleged ties to the Venezuelan government, a committee spokesperson said. The pair asked her to do so “in keeping with her public commitment to greater transparency” from U.S. spy agencies. They have yet to receive a reply, the spokesperson said.

Castro asked Gabbard at an Intelligence Committee hearing in late March whether U.S. spy agencies assessed that the Maduro government is directing “any hostile actions against the United States.”

“There are varied assessments that came from different intelligence community elements,” Gabbard replied. She did not disclose that almost all U.S. intelligence agencies, with the exception of the FBI, did not see evidence of such links.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro speaks to a crowd in Caracas in January. (Pedro Mattey/AFP/Getty Images)

At the hearing, Castro also asked CIA Director John Ratcliffe whether U.S. spy agencies had an assessment that the United States is at war with, or being invaded by, Venezuela. “We have no assessment that says that,” Ratcliffe replied.

A former U.S. intelligence officer who served in South America, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity, said he knew of no evidence that TdA was directed by Maduro and his allies. That view is shared widely by regional analysts.

“The idea that Maduro is directing Tren de Aragua members and sending criminals to infiltrate the United States is ludicrous,” said Geoff Ramsey, a Venezuela expert at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank.

The group, which started as a prison gang in the Venezuelan state of Aragua in 2014, has expanded into a transnational gang that has carried out brazen crimes from Santiago, Chile, to New York City. But it does not operate with a clearly defined hierarchical structure, Ramsey said.

“Tren de Aragua has become more like a brand that any group of carjackers from Miami down to Argentina can invoke to further their criminal activity, but there’s really no clear sense of hierarchy,” he said. “And the reality is that Tren de Aragua has not always gotten along with the Maduro government: We saw just a few years ago, the military in 2023, stormed a prison that Tren de Aragua controlled and allegedly carried out extrajudicial executions.”

Trump’s standoff with the courts over his deportation orders has grown increasingly rancorous.

For weeks, Chief U.S. District Judge James E. Boasberg of D.C. has pressed the Justice Department on why the administration deposited more than 130 Venezuelan deportees in the Salvadoran megaprison without due process, hours after he ordered the administration not to do so and said any planes that had already taken off should be turned around and returned to the United States.

On Wednesday, he said he would launch proceedings to determine whether any Trump administration officials defied his order not to deport the migrants and should face criminal contempt charges.

“The Constitution does not tolerate willful disobedience of judicial orders — especially by officials of a coordinate branch who have sworn an oath to uphold it,” the judge said.

Allowing political leaders to defy court judgments would make “a solemn mockery” of “the constitution itself,” he said.

Administration officials have broadly maintained that they’ve complied with all court orders, even as they’ve repeatedly walked right up to the line of open defiance and publicly attacked Boasberg and other judges for seeking to restrain the president’s agenda.

Steven Cheung, White House communications director, said in an emailed statement, “The President is 100% committed to ensuring that terrorists and criminal illegal migrants are no longer a threat to Americans and their communities across the country.”

By John Hudson

John Hudson is a reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and national security. He was part of the team that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service for coverage of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has reported from dozens of countries, including Ukraine, China, Afghanistan, India and Belarus.follow on X@John_Hudson

By Warren P. Strobel

Warren P. Strobel is a reporter at The Washington Post covering U.S. intelligence. He has written about U.S. security policies under seven presidents. He received numerous awards, and was portrayed in the movie "Shock and Awe," for his skeptical reporting on the decision to invade Iraq. Send him secure tips on Signal at 202 744 1312follow on X@wstrobel

6. I was in the CIA. Here's how helping Myanmar can pay off for US against China. | Opinion

I have to call out my good friend Rollie on this point. Everything she explains here is of course accurate, but....

This is when past favors and public opinion ‒ carefully cultivated through soft power ‒ matters most. U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers working abroad often need to make hard asks. I know from personal experience that soft power advanced U.S. interests and paid off.

How can soft power advance American interests?

Indonesia is a great example of the effectiveness of soft power.

In 2003, only 15% of Indonesians held a favorable view of the United States, largely due to their opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A year later, after a catastrophic earthquake and tsunami hit, President George W. Bush pledged $350 million in aid and dispatched about 15,000 U.S. troops to support rescue and recovery operations in the region. By 2005, the U.S. favorability rating had more than doubled.

The Indonesian archipelago straddles critical shipping lanes in the South China Sea, and U.S.-Indonesia cooperation increased after the 2004 tsunami, particularly in the areas of maritime security, peacekeeping, disaster relief and counterterrorism.

In 2007 I was in the Philippines and had a conversation with CINCPAC. Since the 2004 Tsunami with the deployment of the USNS Mercy raised the favorability of the US, PACOM decided to deploy it again in 2006 to do another MEDCAP tour of Southeast Asia. And then in 2007 the USS Peleliu was deployed to conduct the same humanitarian mission (with doctors and engineers replacing combat forces). When CINCPAC met with senior Indonesian leadership they provided an interesting perspective. They said while everyone touts these humanitarian MEDCAP missions as benefits to the US, US leadership should be aware of another message that these missions send that undermines host nation legitimacy. The unspoken message these missions send is that the host nation is unable to care for its own population. and therefore the US comes in to do because they cannot. The leaders feel that these missions harm their government but they cannot say no to them because that would also undermine their legitimacy. So the lesson is while we assess these missions to be good for America's reputation they can do inadvertent damage to the host nation's legitimacy.

I was in the CIA. Here's how helping Myanmar can pay off for US against China. | Opinion

For both humanitarian reasons and our own national interest, now is the time for the United States to step up to help earthquake victims in Myanmar.

Carol “Rollie” FlynnOpinion contributor

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2025/04/16/thailand-myanmar-earthquake-humanitarian-aid-china/83042278007/

0:44

1:03

The 7.7 earthquake that has killed thousands in Myanmar and Thailand has exacerbated vulnerabilities and resulted in a complex humanitarian crisis and an urgent need for international aid to provide emergency relief services.

This natural disaster has also evoked debate on the value of international assistance, soft power, as a tool of foreign policy. The U.S.-led Marshall Plan in post-World War II Europe was an early example of soft power, and for decades this concept has been a credo of many Western liberal democracies as a tool more effective and humane ‒ and less costly than military force.

As a former CIA chief of station in Southeast Asia and Latin America, I've made middle-of-the-night phone calls to my host-country counterparts with a difficult ask. These hard requests can run the gamut from seeking sensitive information, say about terrorists transiting their country, to asking our counterparts to carry out covert tasks that, if exposed, could at a minimum embarrass them or in extreme cases put them, their country and citizens at great risk.

This is when past favors and public opinion ‒ carefully cultivated through soft power ‒ matters most. U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers working abroad often need to make hard asks. I know from personal experience that soft power advanced U.S. interests and paid off.

How can soft power advance American interests?

Indonesia is a great example of the effectiveness of soft power.

In 2003, only 15% of Indonesians held a favorable view of the United States, largely due to their opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A year later, after a catastrophic earthquake and tsunami hit, President George W. Bush pledged $350 million in aid and dispatched about 15,000 U.S. troops to support rescue and recovery operations in the region. By 2005, the U.S. favorability rating had more than doubled.

The Indonesian archipelago straddles critical shipping lanes in the South China Sea, and U.S.-Indonesia cooperation increased after the 2004 tsunami, particularly in the areas of maritime security, peacekeeping, disaster relief and counterterrorism.

In response to the latest regional earthquake, which had its epicenter on March 28 near Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, the United States has pledged $9 million in aid and sent a three-person team to do a needs assessment.

China, on the other hand, has been the lead donor of earthquake relief, pledging about $150 million and sending 600 personnel who included first responders, rescue teams, medical workers and earthquake experts as well as rescue dogs.

The U.S.-Myanmar relationship has focused almost exclusively on Myanmar’s human rights record and repression of its religious minorities and pro-democracy dissidents, including Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi. Military governments have led it since 1962, except from 2011 to 2021, when a civilian government came to power.

Does Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, matter to the United States?

Ask, instead, why Myanmar is important to China

Situated on the strategic Bay of Bengal, Myanmar is buttressed by two powerful neighbors, India and China, and exports petroleum gas and rare earths minerals, primarily to China.

Geographically, the Bay of Bengal is important to China as it is the closest large body of water to China's southern land-locked region. Bangladesh also ships natural gas exports through the bay to the Asia Pacific.

The United States has held many joint military exercises in the Bay of Bengal with countries such as Australia, India and Japan. Russia and India also hold an annual joint naval exercise in the bay.

Myanmar is not a key national security partner of the United States, but its strategic location and access could prove valuable in the future. There is also value in sowing the seeds of goodwill that may one day buy a critical favor only Myanmar can do because of its unique situation, geography or partnerships.

It would be impossible for America to respond to every humanitarian crisis everywhere. Nor can we realistically extend to other nations the level of assistance that we provide to our own citizens.

However, for both humanitarian reasons – and our own national interest – now is the time for the United States to step up to assist the people of Myanmar in their time of greatest need.

Carol “Rollie” Flynn, a former senior executive at the CIA, is president of The Arkin Group, a New York City-based international intelligence and investigative company, and president emerita of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

7. Communists Never Win a Fair Fight

Excepts:

I’m not suggesting Mr. Trump is another Reagan, or even that he knows what he’s trying to do with his trade war. He may not. But the thought does occur that the fullness of time isn’t always kind to the world’s Averell Harrimans.

For a decade at least, Americans have tried to ignore the panda in the room. China is coming for us. As we squabble at home about tax rates and trans kids, Beijing has been laying up hay—building ships, testing boundaries, growing powerful. Xi Jinping is going to take his shot at the title. The only question is when.

No, actually, there’s another question: What are we going to do about it? Nobody seems to have had any useful ideas. Both parties choked on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which might have isolated China a decade ago. There’s no appetite on either side of the aisle for a Reagan-style military buildup. Americans can’t seem to wean themselves off cheap Chinese sneakers and iPhones. Look how the idea of a TikTok ban went down.

The political class walks on eggshells when it comes to China, lest someone provoke World War III. Nobody wants to upset Beijing, even when it floats a spy balloon over St. Louis and admits to hacking our infrastructure. Best to sit back, wait and see. Maybe they’ll leave us alone and everyone will live in peace.

Communists Never Win a Fair Fight

Like Reagan, Trump is betting on the U.S. to leave its primary adversary in the dust.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/communists-never-win-a-fair-fight-trade-war-china-history-7f81dfc7?st=Q83cCJ&utm

By Matthew Hennessey

April 16, 2025 3:03 pm ET

Ronald Reagan speaks during a news conference at the White House in Washington, Oct. 19, 1983. Photo: AP

There are many negative things to say about President Trump’s tariffs and his ham-fisted approach to policy generally. Most have already been said, and by smarter people. So what’s left? Only the obvious: Nobody knows how all this mishegas is going to turn out.

History is contingent. Leaders who make bold and unconventional decisions usually know they are rolling the dice. Success will make them look brilliant. Failure turns them into a joke. As the boys in Spinal Tap pointed out, it’s a fine line between stupid and clever.

They called Reagan crazy too. When he started building up the American military in the 1980s, the smart people warned him to slow down—don’t do anything that might provoke the Soviets. One asked Reagan about his strategy. “We win, they lose.” Everyone at the New York Times and the Washington Post gasped in horror. This dolt has his finger on the button!

On New Year’s Day 1984, the Times published an op-ed by W. Averell Harriman titled “If the Reagan Pattern Continues, America May Face Nuclear War.” Harriman had served as New York’s governor, U.S. commerce secretary and ambassador to the Soviet Union—a distinguished expert on the world and how it works. “We must demand a new effort to prevent war, not to prepare for it,” he wrote. “To be silent in this situation is not patriotic but irresponsible.”

It’s no insult to Harriman’s legacy to point out that he was wrong. Completely and utterly. These things happen. Sometimes you miss the mark. We can guess that Harriman’s contempt for Reagan grew out of some combination of personal conviction and political rancor. But the scoreboard doesn’t lie: Reagan won, Harriman lost.

To be fair, it wasn’t only Democrats who thought Reagan was steering the country toward the final countdown. In 1987 he went to Berlin. The West German government, and even some of Reagan’s own advisers, urged him to take it easy—maybe take out this line telling Gorbachev to tear down the wall?

“I think we’ll leave it in,” Reagan answered. You can see the twinkle in his eye.

Again, Reagan was right. The Soviets said they would bury us. They turned out to be a paper tiger. They couldn’t keep up because their ideology was fundamentally, fatally flawed. This wasn’t an easy thing to see in real time, though some others did. Only in hindsight is it clear to everyone that accelerating the conflict was the way to go. Sure, things could have gone either way. But they didn’t.

I’m not suggesting Mr. Trump is another Reagan, or even that he knows what he’s trying to do with his trade war. He may not. But the thought does occur that the fullness of time isn’t always kind to the world’s Averell Harrimans.

For a decade at least, Americans have tried to ignore the panda in the room. China is coming for us. As we squabble at home about tax rates and trans kids, Beijing has been laying up hay—building ships, testing boundaries, growing powerful. Xi Jinping is going to take his shot at the title. The only question is when.

No, actually, there’s another question: What are we going to do about it? Nobody seems to have had any useful ideas. Both parties choked on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which might have isolated China a decade ago. There’s no appetite on either side of the aisle for a Reagan-style military buildup. Americans can’t seem to wean themselves off cheap Chinese sneakers and iPhones. Look how the idea of a TikTok ban went down.

The political class walks on eggshells when it comes to China, lest someone provoke World War III. Nobody wants to upset Beijing, even when it floats a spy balloon over St. Louis and admits to hacking our infrastructure. Best to sit back, wait and see. Maybe they’ll leave us alone and everyone will live in peace.

It could go that way. It might not.

Mr. Trump has decided to defy convention and fly toward the sun, laughing all the way. China is a communist country ruled by the same false, flawed ideology that the Soviets put their faith in. It has grown rich by stealing Western intellectual property and manipulating its currency. Perhaps Mr. Xi can drag his limping, hollow economy to victory in a trade war. Or perhaps accelerating the conflict will expose his system’s weaknesses and cause his regime to collapse. It’s a roll of the dice.

The U.S. probably isn’t heading into a “golden age,” as the president and his ardent defenders insist. But consider the possibility that it also isn’t the end of the world. The verdict of history is often the reverse of what today’s experts say.

Mr. Hennessey is the Journal’s deputy editorial features editor.

U.S. Will Pause Ukraine Peace Efforts if No Progress, Rubio Warns

The secretary of state said Washington had presented a framework for a deal to Russia and Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-willpause-ukraine-peace-efforts-if-no-progress-rubio-warns-d8298898?st=aPrLWx&utm

By Michael R. Gordon

in Paris and Jane Lytvynenko in Kyiv

April 18, 2025 5:11 am ET

Ukrainian soldiers train in the east of the country. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. would pause its efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine if progress isn’t made in the coming days, in an attempt to put pressure on Kyiv and Moscow to compromise.

“So we need to determine very quickly now, and I’m talking about a matter of days, whether or not this is doable in the next few weeks,” Rubio said after talks Thursday with European and Ukrainian officials. “If it is, we’re in. If it’s not, then we have other priorities to focus on.”

Rubio said the U.S. has presented a framework for a deal to the two sides and to Europeans on how the war might be ended, including a cease-fire, but hasn’t said publicly what it entails. Separately late Thursday, Ukraine and the U.S. took a step toward a broader economic agreement that has proved a major source of contention in relations by signing a memorandum.

Rubio’s warning comes as France has announced a meeting to be held in London next week with U.S., Ukrainian and European officials to try to advance the talks. Rubio said he was open to attending that session if it was clear that headway could be made.

Steve Witkoff , the Trump administration’s special envoy, has visited Russia three times for lengthy talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin about how to end the war. Thursday was the most intensive meeting that Witkoff, who has not visited Ukraine, has had with senior Ukrainian officials.

Keith Kellogg, the retired lieutenant general who serves as the Trump administration’s special envoy on Ukraine, was also at the Paris meetings.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio with French foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot, left. Photo: Christophe petit Tesson/Shutterstock

Ukraine said that it is prepared to impose a comprehensive cease-fire if Russia also agrees. The Kremlin has balked at accepting a cease-fire and has insisted that the “root causes” of the conflict be addressed.

Trump has warned periodically that he might apply economic pressure if Putin doesn’t yield. But so far the U.S. hasn’t taken any concrete steps to pressure Russia.

Other Western officials were more optimistic than Rubio about the fate of the talks, saying that Paris meetings had been productive and the U.S. indicated that he has developed a draft concept for how a comprehensive cease-fire might be monitored. Ukrainian officials also reaffirmed their willingness in Paris to observe a comprehensive cease-fire if Russia goes along.

Ukraine announced the online signing of the memorandum for an economic deal late Thursday, which called for the creation of a reconstruction investment fund. The memorandum, published on the Ukrainian government website, said that both sides were hoping to finalize a deal by April 26.

The text provided few further details on the plans for what Ukraine described as an “economic partnership” with the U.S.

Trump has sought to use a deal for U.S. access to Ukraine’s mineral deposits to recoup the billions in military and financial aid that the U.S. provided to sustain Kyiv’s resistance to Russia’s three-year invasion. He has put the figure at $350 billion, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said it is around $100 billion.

Negotiations have proved a major irritant in relations, underpinning the blowup in the White House between Trump and Vice President JD Vance on one side, and Zelensky on the other.

Damaged buildings close to the front line in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

A draft agreement sent to Ukraine in March proposed handing the U.S. sweeping powers over Ukraine’s economy, allowing it to draw profits from Ukrainian economic projects across metals, oil, gas, and other natural resources, as well as infrastructure projects including ports and pipelines.

Ukrainian officials have said that they won’t agree to any deal that signs away their country’s future prosperity or jeopardizes other international agreements, including attempts to join the European Union.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, who signed the memorandum with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, said it “demonstrates the constructive joint work of our teams and the intent to conclude an agreement that will be beneficial to both our peoples.”

Ahead of the signing, Zelensky told reporters that the document made sense for both countries. “Our intentions are positive and constructive. We’re demonstrating that,” he said.

President Trump said the minerals deal would be signed next Thursday.

“I assume they’re going to live up to the deal, so we’ll see,” Trump told reporters on Thursday.

Both sides said work was still needed to produce a final deal. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal will visit Washington next week to conclude technical talks, according to the memorandum.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

9. Russian missile attack on Kharkiv on Good Friday kills 1, injures 87

Russian missile attack on Kharkiv on Good Friday kills 1, injures 87

kyivindependent.com · by Sonya Bandouil · April 18, 2025

Editor's note: This is a developing story and is being updated.

A Russian missile strike on Kharkiv on the morning of April 18 killed one person and injured at least 87 others, including six children, authorities reported.

“According to preliminary information, the strikes on Kharkiv were carried out with ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions. That is why the affected areas are so extensive," Mayor Ihor Terekhov wrote.

The attack damaged at least 20 apartment buildings, 30 houses, and an educational institution. A fire broke out on the premises of an enterprise, covering an area of 450 square meters.

Kharkiv Oblast in Ukraine's northeast is a regular target of Russian missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks.

The attack came as Russia continues to reject a U.S.-mediated proposal for a full 30-day ceasefire. Kyiv reiterated that it would be ready to accept the truce if Moscow agreed to abide by the terms.

The aftermath of a Russian missile attack on Kharkiv, Ukraine, on April 18, 2025. (State Emergency Service/Telegram)

Russia ‘mocking’ US ceasefire efforts by attacks on Sumy, Kryvyi Rih, Polish FM says

“Ukraine unconditionally agreed to a ceasefire over a month ago. The heinous attacks on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy are Russia’s mocking answer,” Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said.

The Kyiv IndependentAnna Fratsyvir

kyivindependent.com · by Sonya Bandouil · April 18, 2025

10. Defense One: State of the Services

They seem to have overlooked the state of SOF but I guess that it is because it remains only "service-like." Despite Sec 922 directing ASD SO/LIC to establish a SOF secretariat to perform service functions, the full intent of Senators Nunn and Cohen and their amendment to Goldwater-Nichols has never been fully realized - i.e., to establish SOF as a service (which they could not do in their original legislation, thus "service like") and provide a single DOD entity with responsibility for low intensity conflict or what we call today, irregular warfare (though General Fenton did testify that US special operations forces are "…shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict by altering adversaries’ decision calculus asAmerica’s irregular warfare specialists.")

So here is one key point from the ASD SO/LIC/USSOCOM written posture statement so you can have something to complete the five "state of the services" below:

In the Indo-Pacific theater, our primary mission is to deter Chinese aggression. SOF leverage generational relationships to support and reassure partners and allies vulnerable to Chinese aggression. SOF form the core of joint training efforts that integrate civil and military resilience to deter, and if necessary, resist external aggression. Our persistent presence and partnerships in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and elsewhere, demonstrate that we stand ready to support and defend a free and open Indo-Pacific. Your SOF turn longstanding partnerships into warfighting capability and capacity. In these countries, we see “burden sharing” change to “burden owning."

(apologies for my bias)

Defense One: State of the Services

State of the Army 2025

The entire service is trying to transform “in contact.”

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/state-army-2025/404673/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

State of the Air Force 2025

The unveiling of a new, sixth-gen fighter jet bodes well for more air power investment, but readiness problems and funding questions persist.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/state-air-force-2025/404671/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

State of the Navy 2025

Could a new, more productive era in shipbuilding be on the horizon?

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/state-navy-2025/404675/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

State of the Marine Corps 2025

“Everything is in danger of slipping,” commandant says of Marine modernization.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/state-marine-corps-2025/404674/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

State of the Space Force 2025

As Trump envisions “our manifest destiny into the stars,” the Space Force is set to play a key role in America’s space ambitions.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/state-space-force-2025/404672/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

11. There’s no more DEI at DOD, watchdog finds

For the next investigation please ensure that ALL of our history is properly restored and represented across the services, the Joint Staff, and DOD. A statement from the SECDEF would be appropriate saying that history and the true facts are not DEI should never be hidden from the troops or the American public. The bottom line is that no history should ever have been or in the future ever should be removed because someone believes it is somehow associated with "DEI."

There’s no more DEI at DOD, watchdog finds

But most of the roles were eliminated last year by an act of Congress.

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

April 17, 2025 10:50 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

A Women's Equality Day event hosted by the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion council at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, Aug. 24, 2023. U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Breanna Diaz

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Policy

But most of the roles were eliminated last year by an act of Congress.

April 17, 2025 10:50 PM ET

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

April 17, 2025 10:50 PM ET

The Pentagon has officially eliminated all diversity, equity, and inclusion jobs, to comply with White House executive orders, according to a watchdog report. But Congress had already done the heavy lifting last year.

The Defense Department went from 115 to just 41 DEI jobs by July 2024 per a provision in the 2024 annual defense policy law, according to a Government Accountability Office in a report released Thursday.

The Defense Department “reduced its civilian workforce” after implementing section 1101 of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which put a cap on civilian personnel pay grades assigned for diversity, equity, and inclusion roles to that of a GS-10 or about $73,484 annual salary. The law also directed civilians in DEI roles—defined as having primary duties for developing and implementing DEI policy, objectives, education and training—be reassigned.

The remaining 41 jobs were not subject to the NDAA provision because “their pay rate was less than a General Schedule (GS)-10, they were military positions, or DOD determined that DEI was not the primary reason the position existed,” the report says.

Of those 41 DEI positions—which have now been eliminated or restructured—25 were held by military personnel, while 16 were held by civilians, the GAO wrote. The Air Force and Space Force had the most, with 19 jobs, followed by the Army, which had seven civilian-filled and five military positions.

The Defense Department is one of the United States’ major employers, with nearly 3 million personnel—about 1.3 million active duty, 800,000 in the National Guard and Reserve forces, and 811,000 civilians, according to a 2024 financial report.

Civilians comprise about a third of the total federal workforce and the Pentagon has previously struggled to make sure its demographics match that of the broader U.S. population.

A 2023 GAO report found that while the proportion of women and historically disadvantaged groups remained steady from 2012 to 2021, give or take about 1 percent, there were disparities when it came to promotions.

“Promotion outcomes were generally lower for historically disadvantaged groups than for white employees, and varied for women relative to men, based on GAO analysis of DOD data. For example, when controlling for factors such as occupation and education level, historically disadvantaged groups—particularly Black or African American employees—were less likely to be promoted in nearly all grades at or above GS-7,” the report states. “This analysis does not completely explain reasons for different promotion outcomes or establish causal relationships but can provide agencies additional insight.”

And while DOD had made strides to improve diversity, it lacked “clear policies for collecting barrier-related data, which may limit their utility,” the GAO wrote. “Without additional actions, DOD lacks reasonable assurance its many efforts will effectively contribute to achieving its goals.”

12.

Since we won't allow "big brother" to defend us against "foreign influence warfare," we must follow the direction of President Trump in his 2017 National Security Strategy and defend ourselves:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Shuttering of State office leaves US largely defenseless against foreign influence warfare, officials say

‘This is how we lose big wars,’ one former researcher said of the larger effort to eliminate or dismantle organizations that monitor and counter disinformation.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/04/shuttering-state-office-leaves-us-largely-defenseless-against-foreign-influence-warfare-officials-say/404670/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utmy

A small office in the State Department tasked with monitoring foreign disinformation threats was shuttered Wednesday by the Trump administration, the latest in a series of steps the White House has taken since January to dismantle entities that monitor foreign influence and information campaigns, or respond to them. As that effort continues, experts say, the United States and audiences around the world could be left virtually defenseless against increasing Chinese and Russian efforts to turn global populations against the United States.

But that’s not how the administration sees it. “Over the last decade, Americans have been slandered, fired, charged, and even jailed for simply voicing their opinions. That ends today,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio posted to X Wednesday in an announcement about the closure of the Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference hub, known as R/Fimi.

R/Fimi was a remnant of the Global Engagement Center, which was created in 2016 by the Obama administration to counter Russian disinformation efforts. Rubio said the GEC “actively silenced and censored the voices of Americans they were supposed to be serving,” a claim that officials at the Global Engagement Center have denied and for which there is no evidence.

The closure is only the latest move in a pattern that has been building for months. In February, Attorney General Pam Bondi ordered the dissolution of the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force—the unit dedicated to investigating foreign disinformation and influence campaigns (including election interference), claiming the closure would “free resources to address more pressing priorities, and end risks of further weaponization and abuses of prosecutorial discretion.” Trump himself often pushes the same narrative—that disinformation monitors unfairly target conservative voices in the United States. But former officials likened the move to taking a “cop off the beat.”

The same month, the White House cut the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to monitor foreign disinformation and protect election infrastructure, placing officials tasked with disinformation tracking and election security at CISA on administrative leave, despite widespread and well-documented foreign interference attempts in the 2024 election.

CISA will survive. But the closure of the GEC (and subsequently R/Fimi) could mean the permanent loss of U.S. capability to counter adversarial foreign influence campaigns targeting U.S. interests around the globe, including the U.S. military.

But GEC was an easy target.

Flawed from the start

Both parties—and the Obama administration that established it—deserve some of the blame for the GEC closing, according to two sources who were involved in getting it up and running.

President Barack Obama created the Global Engagement Center via an executive order in March 2016, at a time when the U.S. government was struggling to combat ISIS’s robust use of social media to find recruits and gain support online.

The following year, Congress voted to formally establish it as a permanent entity within the State Department. The year after that, in response to the Russian campaign to influence the 2016 election, Congress broadened the center’s mandate to include “counter[ing] foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts.”

A congressional staffer involved in the legislative effort to formalize the GEC and a former senior Defense Department official who also played a role in its formation told Defense One the decision to establish it within the State Department was a fatal error that hurt the center’s effectiveness.

Had it been established as part of the National Security Council, they said, at the White House level, it could have coordinated actions and resources to counter foreign influence across the government. But at State, at the relatively low assistant secretary level, the Center was an unloved stepchild, with no authority over any of the bureaus. So if the GEC wanted to support a campaign within a certain country, it had to get permission from one of the country teams, which have their own agendas and concerns.

“It was obviously being stood up at the end of the Obama administration, and then the Trump administration obviously was not at all interested in empowering or enabling an organization like that,” the congressional staffer said. And the Biden Administration did little to expand it, they said, keeping it primarily focused on things like research.

So the GEC was far less effective than it could have been, due to lack of authority to carry out its mission, lack of budget, and not being structured well, according to those who helped establish it.

However, Trump allies like Elon Musk characterize the GEC as a hugely powerful organization, “the worst offender” in censoring American speech.

There is no evidence to support claims that the organization puts pressure on social media companies to delete or suppress conservative speech. But the idea may have come from the GEC awarding grants to disinformation monitoring groups like Graphika, which writes reports on foreign actors pushing deceptive stories through social media, the staffer said.

The level of outrage at a disinformation monitoring office speaks to a fundamental change in American politics. Historically, both parties recognized the value of calling out foreign attempts to influence the U.S. public through disinformation. Consider the 2019 bi-partisan Senate Intelligence Committee report on Russian information tactics during the 2016 election, a report released under then-Committee Chair Rubio.

Russia has waged disinformation campaigns against both the American political left and the political right. But concerns about those efforts are no longer shared equally across party lines. Russian influence campaigning—including discredited conspiracies about bioweapons labs in Ukraine, false corruption accusations against members of the Biden family, the downplaying of Russian involvement in the 2016 election, and the discrediting of the legitimate results of the 2020 election—have found a new home on the right.

The Department of Justice in December found that Russia was paying several rightwing influencers who repeated many of the false claims—and members of the Trump administration, including President Trump himself, have repeated them as well. That has blurred the line between foreign information warfare and legitimate political speech, which, of course, is exactly what such campaigns are designed to do.

“We’ve allowed this transition where now the identification of misinformation is censorship,” the congressional staffer said.

What are the implications of this shift? A poll out this week from journalist watchdog group NewsGuard and survey company YouGov found that almost a third of Americans now believe at least one false claim directly attributed to Russian state media outlets.

The silencing of America’s voice

The Trump administration has also taken other steps that will allow Russian, Chinese and other information campaigns to gain market share and broader influence around the world, which could make operations more difficult for the U.S. military in places like Africa and South America.

In February, President Trump ordered USAID to be shut down, after a funding freeze. Staff were laid off or reassigned en masse and USAID’s functions were dismantled, under the guidance of Musk and the White House efficiency task force, DOGE.

The administration justified the rollback by alleging rampant waste and corruption in its programs.

The group Reporters Without Borders, citing an internal USAID memo, found that in 2023, the agency helped pay for the training of 6,200 journalists, helped fund 707 independent news outlets, and supported 279 civil society organizations focused on strengthening independent journalism. And government officials who spoke to Defense One in February said the beneficiaries of the U.S. retreat from funding independent media and journalism would be Russian and Chinese efforts globally to entrench themselves in local politics around the world.

U.S. military operations may also be adversely affected by China’s and Russia’s growing influence, as they were in Niger in 2023 when a Russian campaign helped install a new, anti-democratic government that expelled the U.S. from a key base, as AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley testified in March 2024.

Then, last month, Trump took direct aim at the U.S.-funded international broadcasters—including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia, signing an executive o rder to "reduce" the U.S. Agency for Global Media, the independent agency overseeing those outlets.

RFE/RL’s president condemned the cut as “a massive gift to America’s enemies,” noting that authoritarian regimes in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran would “celebrate the demise” of these outlets that had challenged their state propaganda for decades.

Indeed, Chinese and Russian state media openly cheered the news. The Chinese state-run Global Times crowed that VOA was “discarded by its own government like a dirty rag.” And RT’s editor exclaimed, “America did [to VOA/RFE] what we couldn’t do ourselves.”

Turning a blind eye to the world

The White House has not only shuttered groups and offices that track disinformation. They’ve also shut down Defense Department entities that collect and analyze information about populations around the globe, a critical component of influence campaigning.

Shortly after Pete Hegseth became secretary of defense, the Pentagon moved to eliminate its social science research programs. Chief among them is the Minerva Research Initiative, which is tasked with helping military leaders understand the “social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S.” In other words, what makes people globally more (or less) prone to conflict or amenable to U.S. diplomatic efforts.

In late February, the Pentagon notified academic grant recipients that Minerva-funded projects were being terminated mid-stream, and a planned new cycle of Minerva grants was canceled outright. A formal announcement came March 10, when the Pentagon confirmed it was scrapping 91 social science studies—including the entire Minerva Initiative—as part of a cost-saving purge. Hegseth explained the rationale in a post on X: “The Department of Defense does not do climate change crap. We do training and warfighting.”

But a researcher who worked with Minevera told Defense One that one effect of closing the initiative will be a less-informed U.S. national security apparatus. That will also have a direct effect on future U.S. efforts to persuade populations to trust U.S. military forces or the United States in general, and will mean further erosion of U.S. diplomatic efforts globally, the researcher said.

“There's a lot of ways of counteracting effective Russian and Chinese operations, but you need the social science to figure out what actually persuades people in this world.”

Without this view into the primary drivers of populations around the world, the United States is more likely to find itself again in drawn-out, less winnable conflicts due to flawed assumptions about the willingness to fight, or not fight, U.S. interests, the researcher said.

“This is the reason we lose big wars,” they said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

13. The Trump White House and the New Opium Wars

Certainly a provocative headline with some interesting analysis.

Conclusion:

There is an echo in America’s fentanyl crisis today, albeit in reverse: China makes the precursor chemicals that Mexican smugglers turn into the opium of the 21st century. Which prompts the question: As we begin our own trade war with China, it’s worth wondering which role America is playing in this story. Are we a rising power like the British at the end of the 18th century? Or are we like the Qing Dynasty, imposing and intimidating to outsiders, but hollowed out and corrupted within?

The Trump White House and the New Opium Wars

The unraveling of U.S.–China economic ties echoes a darker chapter of history, when a trade dispute between the East and the West escalated into the First Opium War.

https://www.thefp.com/p/history-of-trump-tariffs-china-opium-war

By Eli Lake

04.16.25 — Breaking History

Children of Chinese farmers between harvests of opium, 1920-30. (photo by Universal Images Group via Getty Images; illustration by The Free Press)

Today we’re bringing you the latest episode of Breaking History, the podcast where I go back in time, in order to make sense of the present. The last episode told the story of the intellectual godfather of today’s pro-Palestine protesters. This week, as the Trump administration ups the ante with Beijing, imposing vast tariffs on Chinese goods, I’m going back nearly 200 years, to the Opium War, to explain how economic wars can turn into something deadly. Listen to the episode, which features voices from both the past and present, here:

And, if you’re a paying subscriber, scroll down to read the companion essay, which tells the story of how China and Britain went to war over one very lucrative product. If you enjoy it, make sure to follow “Breaking History” on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts—and you’ll never miss an episode.

Subscribed

Two weeks ago, Donald Trump decided to implode the stock market, tariffing every nation with the economic precision of a coyote tommy-gunning a world map. We tariffed friends, we tariffed enemies, we tariffed uninhabited islands. And then, just as quickly, the president backed off and announced a pause on nearly all of the tariffs, with one major exception: China.

The tariffs on China, Trump said, were going to be even bigger than originally announced. This is a very big deal.

For the last 40 or so years, the American and Chinese economies have been integrating. Chinese workers sew our T-shirts and build our iPhones, then pay to see our superhero movies on the weekend. China’s banks purchase our debt, and Chinese billionaires and companies fund our universities and think tanks. Now, this era of Chimerica is coming to a close. America and China are at war; we’re just using numbers instead of bullets.

But could that change? Could this trade war lead to a real war?

When our economies were intertwined, there was a strong disincentive for outright war. Peace through trade was one of the foundational principles of neoliberalism. An internationalized market would reduce the possibility of war as everyone had a vested interest in, and a reliance on, doing business with other countries around the world. But those conventions are coming to an end and a new reality is dawning.

And China is certainly flexing its muscles. Just this month, its military began live fire exercises off the coast of Taiwan, a nation China covets and that America has been arming for more than 50 years.

To see how bad could this trade war get, it’s worth looking back 185 years to the last time that the world’s most populous country clashed with the world’s richest. In the 18th century, the ascendant nation was Britain. At that time, the sun truly never set on their empire: the Union Jack flew from Canada to India and Australia. Britain’s East India Company dominated global trade.

But the nation was on a collision course with one particularly powerful trading partner: China.

Britain’s economic relationship with the Chinese began in the 17th century, at the dawn of the Qing dynasty. The Chinese had introduced tea to the Brits, who quickly rearranged their afternoons around drinking the stuff—making tea leaves a staple of the British economy.

Britain saw China as a fellow empire, also experiencing a golden era of sorts. China’s population and wealth was booming, overseen by Emperor Qianlong, who ruled for 60 years, from 1735 to 1796. But China was not racing into the future as the European powers were so desperate to do. Here is how Adam Smith described China in his 1776 classic on free markets, The Wealth of Nations:

“China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous, countries in the world. It seems, however, to have been long stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it more than 500 years ago, describes its cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the same terms in which they are described by travelers in the present times.”

Smith was observant, but had no firsthand knowledge of the country; few Europeans did. This mystery was intentional. Emperor Qianlong projected strength through isolation, keeping foreign trade tightly regulated. Across the whole of China, there was only one port open for Chinese trade with Britain: Canton (now called Guangzhou). The empire had just the entity to exploit this vast yet restricted trading opportunity: the East India Company, the world’s first international corporation. The company looked after all British trade with China. And it was desperate to expand Chinese operations.

In Canton, the East India Company exchanged silver for tea. But silver was precious. It would be significantly preferable to ship a homegrown, renewable resource like wool to China, in exchange for all that tea—but in order to trade wool, the company would need access beyond the tropical Canton, and into the colder regions of China, where there was a market for winter clothing and blankets.

Hoping to loosen up trading rules in China, in 1759, the East India Company sent James Flint, possibly the only man in the British Empire who actually spoke Mandarin, on a mission to Beijing in the hopes of securing an audience with Emperor Qianlong. It didn’t go well. Flint was imprisoned for three years for having the audacity to actually enter mainland China.

But he got off lightly. What really angered the emperor was the fact that a European had managed to learn Mandarin in the first place. So the authorities found Flint’s Chinese teacher, and had him publicly executed.

For the next 34 years, the East India Company kept to Canton. But the British Empire still dreamed of more access to the Chinese market. In 1793, King George III got involved, sending Lord George Macartney to China in the hopes of accomplishing what James Flint did not. Macartney carried a letter from the king to the emperor, placed in a box encrusted with jewels. It read in part:

“To the Supreme Emperor of China . . . worthy to live tens of thousands and tens of thousands thousand years . . . Our ardent wish has been to become acquainted with those celebrated institutions of Your Majesty’s populous and extensive empire which have carried its prosperity to such a height as to be the admiration of all surrounding nations.”

Macartney’s mission to China was enormous. He brought his own marching band with him; there were servants, sailors, secretaries, and two huge ships filled with 600 crates of gifts for the emperor. He was there to request a permanent embassy and normal trade relations. In return, Britain would share their latest tech: telescopes, diving bells, and other gadgets. But the diplomatic mission was not prepared for what was about to happen.

In Stephen R. Platt’s great history of this period, Imperial Twilight, he recounts how a long negotiation between Macartney and emissaries from the emperor about the kowtow, a ritual in which a guest of the emperor got on his knees and bowed nine times. Macartney was not keen. First he offered to kowtow if the emperor would do the same in front of a portrait of King George, but of course this was a nonstarter. So, Macartney offered to go down on one knee and bow his head, as he would for his own king. The compromise was accepted, but Emperor Qianlong was offended.

Nevertheless, the British hoped to dazzle the emperor with their innovative science and engineering. In a pavilion outside of Beijing, Macartney’s retinue assembled a massive planetarium. He had brought along the inventor and astronomer James Dinwiddie, who planned to launch the very first hot air balloon in China, which he would personally pilot. Maybe witnessing man-powered flight would be enough to impress even the mighty Chinese emperor.

And yet, when Qianlong finally arrived at the exhibition, he examined the telescopes and other offerings, remarking, “Good enough to amuse children,” and left. In a few days, the emperor ordered the entire British entourage to pack up and leave Beijing. Macartney’s mission to China was a dud.

In a final kiss off, Emperor Qianlong wrote to King George III: “I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”

There would, however, be one British good that his subjects would soon not be able to do without: opium.

Opium comes from the poppy plant. It can be grown all over south and east Asia, and in the late 18th century it was heavily cultivated in British-ruled India. It was this geographic coincidence that gave the British the chance to make in-roads to China—and lay the groundwork for an explosive war that changed China’s path for a century.

In the 18th century, opium use was sweeping the planet. From London to Beijing, high-class dilettantes toyed with the drug in search of the ultimate high. Like any product, consumers understood that there were tiers of quality—and at that time the best opium in the world came from Calcutta, India. It even had its own brand name, Patna, which became a sought-after luxury, like aged scotch. Demand soared, especially in China.

This was very good news for the British East India Company. They controlled opium production in India and cornered the market. But there was a catch. The father and predecessor of Emperor Qianlong had banned opium in 1729, and the company didn’t want to jeopardize their ability to do business in the territory by mixing up their legal shipments with contraband drugs.

Instead of smuggling opium into the country, the intrepid East India Company found a workaround. They became opium wholesalers, auctioning off chest-loads of the drug to ambitious traders in Bombay and Calcutta, who would then sail the drugs to Lintin Island, about 61 miles offshore from Canton. The local Chinese officials were easily bribed and looked the other way as the ships unloaded the chests of opium to local Chinese smugglers.

By 1790, the company was shipping around 4,000 chests of opium to China a year. That would fetch between 400,000 and 800,000 pounds sterling, which is between $5 and $10 million today. Over the next 20 years, the exports would more than double, as the Chinese became increasingly addicted to opium, peaking in the late 1830s at 40,000 chests, netting between six and eight million pounds for the company. Britain was filling its pockets through the pain of Chinese opium addiction.

But the good times would not last. By 1830, a successor of Emperor Qianlong, Emperor Daoguang, was becoming increasingly agitated over the opium problem in his country. Officials were becoming accustomed to bribes, while the soldiers who were supposed to be policing the coast to stop the opium influx were becoming addicted to the stuff. The opium trade also reversed the old trade deficit. Now silver was not flowing into China, but instead out of the country and into the coffers of the East India Company. By the 1830s, the opium epidemic in China was not just a moral problem, it was also an economic crisis.

The situation was debated in the halls of Chinese power between two factions in the court of Emperor Daoguang. There were legalizers who counseled the emperor to tolerate the opium trade and tax it, thus solving the trade deficit, allowing the nation to focus on treating the addicts. Opposing them were the hard-liners, who were calling for an outright ban on opium and the opium trade.

Emperor Daoguang went with the hard-liners, launching the first war on drugs in modern history. The man he deputized to do it was known as perhaps the last honest man in China, Lin Zexu. He is still a legendary figure. “There is a statue of Lin Zexu in New York Chinatown, which has a plaque on it that says, ‘Pioneer of the War against Drugs,’ ” explains the historian, Stephen R. Platt. “Lin Zexu is sort of the famously incorruptible Confucian official who ultimately took on the British and the opium trade.”

At the time, an Englishman called Charles Elliot was the crown’s official minister in charge of all British trade in Canton—and in March 1839, he watched as Lin Zexu ordered the siege of the trading compound in Canton, effectively holding the entire British trading community hostage.

Here’s how Platt tells the story:

“He starts by cracking down on the Chinese side and rounds up dealers and corrupt officials. Then he turns his sights on the British in that little compound of buildings outside Canton and he surrounds the compound with troops and orders that the British have to surrender all of their opium stocks immediately. They then have to sign pledges agreeing that if they ever bring opium to China, again, they agree to be executed.”

Unless Elliot did something, the trade of tea, silk, and porcelain would stop. This would have been a disaster, both for the empire and for Elliot’s career.

In an era before the speedy communication of the telegraph, Elliot had no time to wait for instructions, so he improvised. He told the opium traders to hand over their drugs to Lin Zexu and in exchange, he promised that Her Majesty’s government would compensate them at fair market value. Sounds good, right? Lin Zexu gets to boast of the largest drug seizure in history, and the legitimate trade routes between China and Britain would reopen. Crisis averted.

But the plan didn’t go smoothly. Lin Zexu pressed his advantage. Elliot thought that after he promised to hand over the opium, the siege of the British compound would end. But Lin didn’t take Elliot at his word and instead announced that he would not lift the siege until at least three quarters of the precious Patna opium shipped from India were in his possession. This would take months because the opium dealers had shipped their stashes to safer ports out of Lin’s reach. Elliot, who had hoped to de-escalate tensions, was now thoroughly freaked out. He sent urgent messages back to London requesting backup from the world’s greatest navy. The situation was escalating.

Elliot didn’t trust Lin, so even after the siege was lifted and Lin began destroying the opium, he ordered everyone in the British compound to pack up and move to Macau, another designated trading zone the Chinese had created for the Portuguese empire. Elliot believed it was out of Lin’s jurisdiction. But he was wrong about that. In a terrible twist, just outside of Macau, drunken British and American sailors got into a bar fight, killing a Chinese national, who died the following day. Lin demanded that Elliot turn them over to the authorities. Elliot refused, and in response, Lin sent Chinese warships to Macau, ordered Chinese servants to end their work for British subjects, and banned British ships from the city’s harbor. Rumors even spread that the fresh water supply for the British ships had been poisoned.

Elliot ordered an evacuation of Macau to the sparsely populated island of Hong Kong. Lin got wind of this and ordered the people of Hong Kong to arm themselves and prepare for war against the British invaders. Then, on September 4, 1839, three merchant ships under Elliot’s command fired on a fleet of Chinese warships. This would go down as the first battle of the Opium Wars. It was the beginning of a catastrophe—for China.

The Chinese military was no match when England’s copper-bottomed frigates and warships arrived in 1840. The British would win the First Opium War by 1842. China was further weakened in 1850 when the worst civil war of the 19th century, known as the Taiping Rebellion, broke out. It was a bloodbath. The most conservative estimates suggest that 20 million Chinese perished. Then, from 1856 to 1860, Britain—this time alongside the French—clashed with China again in the Second Opium War. Once more, China lost.

These military defeats, and the harsh treaties the Qing emperor was forced to sign afterward, marked the beginning of what the Chinese would call “a century of humiliation.”

The Opium Wars revealed that the impressive Chinese Empire was rotting from the inside, but the roots of this disaster had been growing long beforehand. During Qianlong’s reign, the vast imperial bureaucracy had grown so corrupt that his own generals would routinely lie about phantom military successes against rebels in the countryside. The corruption was coupled with Qianlong’s fear of foreign influence, which led him to reject a deeper friendship with the British Empire at a time when the Brits had been willing to do just about anything to gain access to China’s vast market. For an example of what a bad policy this was, take the incident when Emperor Qianlong dismissed British telescopes as amusements for children. Well, it was in fact those very telescopes that made the accuracy of British cannons deadly to Chinese inland river forts during the Opium Wars.

Afterward, Europe’s perception of China changed. It was no longer seen as a splendid empire commanding respect, but as a paper tiger ripe for exploitation. China paid the price for rejecting trade collaboration and underestimating the will and capabilities of newcomers. At the same time, China’s elites suffered from an opium addiction that only compounded the corruption that was eating away at the empire from the inside.

There is an echo in America’s fentanyl crisis today, albeit in reverse: China makes the precursor chemicals that Mexican smugglers turn into the opium of the 21st century. Which prompts the question: As we begin our own trade war with China, it’s worth wondering which role America is playing in this story. Are we a rising power like the British at the end of the 18th century? Or are we like the Qing Dynasty, imposing and intimidating to outsiders, but hollowed out and corrupted within?

14. Germany's Great Military Reboot Has Now Arrived

Germany's Great Military Reboot Has Now Arrived

19fortyfive.com · by Caleb Larson · April 18, 2025

By Caleb Larson

Published

3 hours ago

German Air Force. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Summary and Key Points: Germany’s defense strategy is set for transformation under Chancellor-elect Friedrich Merz, who plans substantial and sustained investment.

-Chancellor Olaf Scholz previously established a one-off €100 billion defense fund in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet this measure was limited by constitutional debt restrictions.

-Merz’s new coalition has unveiled a massive €500 billion fund, significantly boosting military and infrastructure investment, with defense spending exempt from previous constitutional constraints.

-This reform promises not only a revitalized German military but also economic growth through enhanced productivity, technological advancements, and innovation—marking a strategic shift away from Germany’s longstanding defense austerity.

Goodbye Defense Austerity: How Germany Plans to Revive Its Military Might

By German standards, it was a shocking moment in 2022 when, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, center-left Social Democrat Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the Zeitenwende or turning point. In response to Moscow’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine, Berlin’s defense posture would shift to a war footing.

In addition to vast, far-reaching sanctions on the Russian banking, arms, and, most especially, energy sectors, Chancellor Scholz announced the creation of a special, one-off fund that would inject vast sums of money into defense by German standards.

Friends and Allies had long lambasted the German Bundeswehr. Critics stated the group was domestically inefficient at best and hopelessly ineffectual at defending the country at worst. But, the Chancellor explained, it would receive a €100 billion shot in the arm and the biggest rejuvenation since the end of the Cold War and subsequent military draw-down.

Though lambasted across the world at the beginning of the conflict for its hesitancy in supplying Ukraine with weapons and ammunition, Berlin would eventually, albeit slowly, become one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, which it remains today.

The German government continuously updates a complete list of its military aid to Ukraine, which can be seen here.

False Start

It was, in essence, a clever accounting trick that leveraged a loophole to circumvent Germany’s constitutionally mandated debt brake.

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tenure at the helm saw German lawmakers enshrine in law a debt brake, essentially a federal rule forbidding surplus spending in excess of 0.35 percent of GDP. Germany—one of the world’s most fiscally solid and financially responsible countries with a sterling credit rating to boot — essentially tied one hand behind its back by forbidding virtually any excess spending.

One exception that lifted the rule was for emergencies, put into practice most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the debt brake rule was suspended to combat the virus.

To the outside observer then, it was almost inexplicable that the largest, most brutal war in Europe in 80 years did not make the cut as an emergency. But there it was anyway, Chancellor Scholz’ Sondervermögen, the special one-off €100 billion, was passed in response to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine via constitutional amendment, and technically in adherence to Germany’s debt brake spending law.

As impressive as that sum was, it was not sustainable—Germany’s core defense spending levels had not risen, and once the fund was spent by 2026 or 2027, basic spending levels would remain the same.

Defense Spending and Growth: Spillover Effect

There are clear arguments to be made that an increase in German defense spending above and beyond the current levels, and sustainably into the future, will not be a drag on the economy but a generative force for economic growth—which becomes even more critical when considering the current economic uncertainty caused directly by the current American administration.

The Kiel Institute of the World Economy, a think tank, studied the issue of increased defense spending and reached some important conclusions.

“There is broad consensus that the economy expands to accommodate at least part of the increased defense spending, production, procurement, and employment. There is some disagreement on the magnitude of this expansion and whether military spending crowds out or stimulates the private sector. The effects will depend on the context, including the ECB’s response and the source of financing,” the report explains.

“A conservative estimate is that the Europe-wide GDP will grow by 0.9% to 1.5% if defense spending increases from 2% to 3.5% of GDP. This implies only a limited tradeoff between armament and private consumption in the short run in the short run.”

But one of the report’s most substantial findings is remarkable. It says that “the long-run productivity gains from military spending may be substantial. The best examples of public research and development are for military applications and there is evidence of spillovers to the private sector.”

Furthermore, “a transient 1% of GDP increase in military spending could increase long-run productivity by a quarter of percent both through learning-by-doing and R&D. The returns to public R&D are particularly high and may pay for themselves. R&D spending has been identified as one of the three main keys to addressing Europe’s lagging productivity in the Draghi report.”

Interestingly, the report bashed NATO’s percentage of GDP spent on defense metrics. “Setting percent-of-GDP targets for military spending is counterproductive. It may lead to procyclical macroeconomic policies and dis-incentivize efficient procurement.”

“Instead,” the report says, “one should conduct a long-run cost-benefit analysis of the materiel and personnel requirements against their expected fiscal cost and allow procurement to achieve the highest quality at lowest cost possible.”

The Newest Chancellor and the Defense Spending Reform—or Revolution

Chancellor Scholz’s days are numbered. In May, German lawmakers will meet to officially anoint the center-right Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz as the new Chancellor following the recent snap German federal elections. Merz’s defense spending plan is ambitious.

It dwarfs the previous one-off €100 billion fund in both scope and sustainability. In addition to increased military aid to Ukraine, the incoming Chancellor’s coalition negotiations yielded a €500 billion special fund tied to defense and infrastructure investment.

While a welcome boost to the Bundeswehr and German defense industry, perhaps more important is the future of defense spending—the Merz-led government amended the constitution. It exempted defense spending from the constitutionally enshrined debt brake. German defense spending will no longer be tied to minuscule percentages of GDP but allowed to increase as necessity arises.

What Happens Now for Germany’s Military?

So, while Germany’s newest Chancellor does not yet hold office, it is clear that Germany’s industrial might will soon be put to the test of reequipping and rearming the moribund German Bundeswehr. If it is enough to fend off Russia, should the United States cement itself in opposition to Europe, however, remains to be seen.

About the Author: Caleb Larson

Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.

Written By Caleb Larson

Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war's civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe.

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19fortyfive.com · by ByCaleb Larson · April 18, 2025

15. Gabbard declassifies Biden-era plan to counter domestic terrorism

Gabbard declassifies Biden-era plan to counter domestic terrorism - Washington Examiner

Washington Examiner · April 17, 2025

AFL wrote in a letter to Gabbard on April 2 about its concerns regarding the Biden administration’s “weaponization” of its power in the name of maintaining national security through “censoring disfavored speech on the Internet by labeling such speech ‘misinformation,’ ‘disinformation,’ ‘hate speech,’ ‘domestic terrorism.'”

Gabbard wrote on X on April 5 in response to the AFL letter thanking the group “for your work.”

“We are already on this, and look forward to declassifying this and other instances of the government being weaponized against Americans,” she wrote, vowing to “bring transparency and accountability to end the weaponization of our intelligence community.”

The 15-page declassified plan from June 2021 established four pillars it hoped to achieve: understand and share domestic terrorism-related information, prevent domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence, disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity, and confront long-term contributors to domestic terrorism.

The plan called to “drive other executive and legislative action, including banning assault weapons and high-capacity magazines,” a frequent effort from Democrats.

The Biden administration also called for sharing with “relevant technology and other private-industry companies” information concerning domestic terrorism.

The proposal also encouraged the “teaching and learning of civics education that provides students with the skill to fully participate in civic life,” including by promoting “literacy education for both children and adult learners and existing proven interventions to foster resiliency to disinformation.”

LIST: THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS, ACTIONS, AND PROCLAMATIONS TRUMP HAS MADE AS PRESIDENT

The plan also talked about “advancing inclusion in the nation’s COVID-19 response” and working to “increase voter participation and service as nonpartisan poll workers.”

Biden’s summer 2021 outline even garnered the criticism of the American Civil Liberties Union, which called it a reflection of the “ever-expanding authority to surveil and monitor American communities.”

Washington Examiner · April 17, 2025

16. US may soon force allies to take sides in trade war with China

A view from the UK.

Conclusion:

The UK is said to be close to sealing a deal with Washington, which would be good news. But not at any price. If this country is to retain the economic sovereignty secured by Brexit it should take its time and keep its options open.

US may soon force allies to take sides in trade war with China

If the Trump administration is serious about targeting its rival with tariffs, a host of unpleasant consequences for traditional partners like Britain will flowThe Times View

Wednesday April 16 2025, 9.25pm BST, The Times

thetimes.com · by The Times View

THE TIMES VIEW

The Times View

Wednesday April 16 2025, 9.25pm, The Times

President Trump is seeking to isolate and curtail the growth of a far more formidable rival through a constellation of bilateral trade pacts

KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS

The Trump administration is so erratic in its policy announcements that simply knowing if it really means what it says presents a considerable challenge. But if the government of the United States is indeed serious about conducting a protracted trade war against its principal geopolitical rival, China, a host of unpleasant consequences for traditional US allies like Britain will flow. The most severe scenario would be an attempt by the US to make allies choose between America and China as a trading partner. Worryingly, this “you’re with us or you’re against us” approach seems to be gaining traction in the White House.

Scott Bessent, the US treasury secretary, is reported to be in favour of using loyalty to Washington in its escalating trade war with Beijing as a condition for lowering tariffs imposed, and then temporarily suspended, earlier this month. Mr Bessent wants countries seeking trade deals with the US to ban Chinese companies from operating on their territory or shipping goods through their ports in order to evade Mr Trump’s tariff wall. If they refuse, tariffs suspended by the US administration until early July could be reimposed.

This takes US trade policy firmly into the geopolitical realm. Just as Truman and Eisenhower sought to contain the Soviet Union with a girdle of military alliances in Eurasia, so Trump is seeking to isolate and curtail the growth of a far more formidable rival through a constellation of bilateral trade pacts. The conditions demanded by US negotiators may vary depending on each country’s exposure to China but Vietnam, Thailand and other East Asian jumping-off points for Chinese exports will certainly be in the spotlight. However, the Americans may seek to up the pressure and demand that all countries wanting a deal on trade limit their imports of cheap Chinese products.

At this point Mr Trump’s claim to be interested only in restoring fairness in global trade and repatriating American manufacturing jobs would be shown to be a cover story for a new cold war aimed at preserving US dominance by crippling China’s export-led economy. This would present Britain with a choice: buckle to American pressure and reduce ties with China or go it alone and face punitive US tariffs. This is hardly an enticing prospect for a Labour government focused on growth.

So far, Sir Keir Starmer has acquitted himself well enough in fending off the worst excesses of Mr Trump’s infatuation with mercantilism. The decision not to retaliate has been wise. But the results are hardly invigorating. Jaguar Land Rover has had to pause shipments to the US following the levying of a global 25 per cent charge on vehicles, and Britain’s pharmaceutical industry is also at risk of a sectoral levy. The special relationship is proving to be anything but special. While diluting its military guarantee to Europe the US continues to demand economic exceptionalism.

The US remains a more important trading partner than China for Britain but Rachel Reeves, the chancellor, will be loath to give up the potential benefits of a reheated Sino-British relationship. British ministers and officials have been flooding east to cement ties with Beijing on green energy and in other sectors. Hopes are high.

The UK is said to be close to sealing a deal with Washington, which would be good news. But not at any price. If this country is to retain the economic sovereignty secured by Brexit it should take its time and keep its options open.

17. Military families challenge Trump’s stricter federal voting rules

The first time I voted in person was 1976. The next time I voted in person was in 2012. Between that time I voted absentee from around the country and around the world. It was a pretty simple process to request an absentee ballot from my home state, Connecticut, and then vote by mail. I always believed (and had confidence) that my ballot was counted.

Military families challenge Trump’s stricter federal voting rules

militarytimes.com · by Karen Jowers · April 17, 2025

A military family organization joined a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of President Donald Trump’s executive order imposing stricter voting requirements, arguing it would add barriers for troops and families who vote by absentee ballot.

And advocates say there are other ongoing efforts at the state level and in Congress that could also undermine the ability of service members and families, as well as overseas citizens, to vote absentee.

The executive order shortens absentee ballot receipt deadlines and requires documentary proof of citizenship, which military families say would disproportionately affect their ability to vote. It’s already logistically difficult to vote for some troops and families, especially given the frequency of military moves and deployments to remote locations.

The biggest effect on military voter participation is likely the new ballot return deadline, said Sarah Streyder, a military wife living overseas who serves as the executive director of the Secure Families Initiative. The executive order, issued March 25, requires absentee ballots to be received by Election Day.

The Secure Families Initiative is a plaintiff — along with United Latin American Citizens and Arizona Students’ Association — in the lawsuit filed March 31 against a number of administration officials. Related cases have been filed by the League of Women Voters Education Fund, the Democratic National Committee and others.

Trump’s executive order instructs the Attorney General to take action against states that count “validly cast absentee or mail-in ballots lawfully cast by Election Day but received after Election Day,” according to the lawsuit, which was filed in federal court for the District of Columbia.

States and Congress determine election rules. A number of states allow their local election officials to count absentee ballots from military and overseas citizen voters for a certain amount of days after Election Day. But 33 states do require absentee and mail-in ballots to be returned on or before Election Day, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.

Absentee voters often have to deal with mail delays, and the requirement that ballots be received by Election Day “is going in the opposite direction of where we want it to go,” Streyder said. “We want a uniform, across-the board expansion of that timeline.”

The president’s order, she said, “erases a state’s ability to have ballots continue to arrive and be counted.”

“We consider it a gold standard across all 50 states for absentee ballots to continue to arrive up to seven days after Election Day and be counted, as long as they are postmarked by Election Day,” Streyder added.

She noted that the late arrival was the top reason military ballots were rejected by local election officials in the 2020 election.

Military absentee ballots could have substantial impact on election, report says

Military absentee ballots should be counted before winner declared, report says.

The Secure Families Initiative decided to join the lawsuit out of concern for military voters.

“We want to make very clear we’re not doing this because of partisan reasons,” Streyder said, noting that the effort is an extension of their ongoing work to advocate for military voters. “We are a highly mobile voter, affected by delays and changing requirements, all of which are out of our control.”

Trump’s order, titled “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections,” notes that federal law establishes a uniform Election Day for federal elections.

“It is the policy of my Administration to enforce those statutes and require that votes be cast and received by the election date established in law,” the order states.

Among other things, the lawsuit challenging the order asks the court for a preliminary injunction and other action to prevent the Justice Department from taking any steps that would prohibit the counting of mail-in and absentee ballots that are “validly cast under state law.”

There is confusion about some of the provisions of the executive order as they apply to military voters and U.S. citizens overseas, Streyder said. While it appears to provide an exemption in one section related to military and overseas citizen voters, it’s not clear in other sections, the lawsuit alleges.

Military absentee voters, whether they’re voting from overseas or another location within the U.S. when they’re away from their voting residence, have certain protections under existing federal law.

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, commonly referred to as UOCAVA, applies to military members and their family members who are away from their voting residence, as well as U.S. citizens living overseas. Among other things, UOCAVA requires states to transmit absentee ballots to UOCAVA voters who have requested them no later than 45 days before a federal election.

The executive order’s narrow protection for UOCAVA ballots — to the extent that it exists — wouldn’t apply to all military and overseas citizen voters because many don’t use the UOCAVA processes to cast absentee ballots and wouldn’t be protected by any carveout, the lawsuit alleges.

Some military voters use the Federal Post Card Application to request absentee ballots, which makes apparent their UOCAVA status. However, a number of troops and families don’t use the FPCA to request their ballots from their local elections offices and wouldn’t be protected.

Trump claimed that Democrats would use military and overseas absentee ballots to 'cheat' in the election, but experts say the system makes that nearly impossible

Experts say widespread voter fraud in military and overseas citizens ballots would be very difficult, given the nature of the system.

In addition, the new requirement for “documentary proof of United States citizenship” can create unnecessary barriers for military voters, Streyder said. The executive order imposes narrow documentation parameters. Those living overseas may not have the necessary documentation readily available, even though they are clearly eligible to vote.

“States already have secure eligibility and verification processes,” and the executive order simply adds barriers, she said.

One of the documents the executive order cites as proof of eligibility is “an official military identification card that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.” But current military IDs don’t include that information.

It’s also unclear whether birth certificates would be sufficient documentation, whether the documentation would have to be presented in person, and whether proof of eligibility would need to be produced each time a voter asks for a Federal Post Card Application. The executive order mandates the Defense Department to update the FPCA to require proof of citizenship.

If the documentation requirement is put into effect, it would “seriously undermine the ease of use of the FPCA, which many of these voters use to register or request ballots, and already includes a citizenship attestation,” said Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat, president and CEO of the U.S. Vote Foundation. For example, she said, voters living abroad would have to find a way to make a copy of their passport and attach it to the FPCA.

“Sending personal ID documents around in post or online also carries with it a serious risk of identity theft,” Dzieduszycka-Suinat said. “To our knowledge, to this date, there is not one single known case of actual UOCAVA voter fraud by a UOCAVA voter.”

The government responded to the preliminary injunction this week, saying “it is telling” that none of the plaintiffs in these cases are individually named voters who claim they would be affected if the court doesn’t intervene. They also argued the organizations involved in the lawsuit haven’t identified by name any voters they say they represent.

In addition, the government states, the plaintiffs couldn’t point to any actions to implement the executive order that have caused harm.

The plaintiffs, including the military family organization, filed a response Wednesday, noting they had learned the executive director of the Election Assistance Commission had written to the states to begin implementing the executive order.

About Karen Jowers

Karen has covered military families, quality of life and consumer issues for Military Times for more than 30 years, and is co-author of a chapter on media coverage of military families in the book "A Battle Plan for Supporting Military Families." She previously worked for newspapers in Guam, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Fla., and Athens, Ga.

18. Reimagining Combat Power for Tomorrow’s Battlefield: The Enhanced Brigade Combat Team

Excerpt:

As the Army takes a hard look at the evolving threats it can expect to encounter on the modern battlefield, it needs to consider reorganizing its infantry and armor capabilities into lighter yet more effective brigade formations. ABCTs especially must adapt to the future threat if they want to maintain relevance. Not all BCT structure needs to change and the Army does not need to field EBCTs exclusively, but enough combat power should be organized along these lines to support the opening engagements in a conflict. In their current configuration, ABCTs are simply too heavy to be in position to factor into the calculus of deterrence or early engagement. However, a formation like the EBCT would leverage technology and apply the right mix of combined arms to enhance deterrence credibility and, in the event of a war, survivability and lethality.

Reimagining Combat Power for Tomorrow’s Battlefield: The Enhanced Brigade Combat Team - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joshua Suthoff · April 18, 2025

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Recent pictures of webs of fiber-optic cables draped on tree limbs on the front lines in Ukraine—cables from expended one-way attack drones—are reminiscent of the mounds of expended artillery casings in World War I. Both images of the detritus of war, separated by more than a century, are stark reminders of the continuous effort by belligerents to gain an upper hand through technology, tactics, and attrition. In the near future, the US Army could be called upon to project combat power into an operational environment defined by the current array of threats with little notice. In such a scenario, every logistical action to move brigade combat teams into position would be under threat, with moves constrained by limited sea and air assets. Every modal move counts in order to deliver the most credible combat formation and critical logistics to the conflict area. And once these brigades arrive they will face a myriad of enemy threats including robotics, rockets, and missiles, all designed to cheaply counter the US brigade combat team construct. The United States cannot enter a war of attrition—certainly not on these terms. Formations need to be agile and efficient to fight and exploit success in the opening engagements of a war all while relying on limited logistical resources. For the Army, there is a solution: reorganizing some of its armored brigade combat teams into enhanced brigade combat teams.

The current Army brigade combat team (BCT) designs (infantry, armor, and Stryker) vary in their ability to rapidly deploy to a combat zone and then survive. Their strengths and weaknesses are not balanced within the formation, but normally require task organization and teaming to meet mission requirements. Infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams (IBCTs and SBCTs) both have significant numbers of infantry, and both lack organic armor support. The M10 Booker mobile protected firepower platform is an attempt to improve IBCT lethality. However, an M10 is not a tank and units equipped with them are not organic to IBCTs. The reverse is true for armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs): They present large signatures, require significant logistics, and need more infantry.

The Army’s transformation in contact initiative is attempting to address evolving threats. It aims to drive change in IBCT design, and that is evident in the light and medium brigade combat team concepts. However, these types of brigades remain purely light infantry, equipped with Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISVs). The Army needs to consider a more ambitious approach at enhancing combined arms capability within the BCT design. BCTs must be optimized to quickly deploy with the appropriate infantry and armor to provide credible deterrence and on-order combat operations. Future brigades must be able to disperse and survive while conditions are set by division and joint forces and then transition into decisive operations. To do this, they must be enhanced with drones, missiles, infantry, and the appropriate level of armor to deal a decisive blow. The Army needs an enhanced brigade combat team.

In a resource-constrained environment and with the US military focusing on deterring China, the ABCT is a prime formation for adaptation to meet current and future threats. The ABCT was designed as the premiere ground-combat element in the European theater, but lessons from the war in Ukraine have shown that the armor force must change to maintain relevance and survivability. The M1 Abrams main battle tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles provided to Ukraine have shown their individual effectiveness, but the once dominant mass of their formation and employment has shown a concerning weakness. ABCTs rely on protection from US airpower and limited enemy surveillance to operate under their doctrinal template. These conditions are no longer guaranteed. The armor force is not irrelevant, but the formation and tactics must adapt to survive.

Leveling the Playing Field

Two primary battlefield adaptions demand a relook on how ABCTs are task organized: robotics and antitank missiles. Although not new, the proliferation and evolving use of these systems have given dismounted infantry—and both state and nonstate actors that cannot field and maintain an armored force—a degree of parity with militaries like that of the United States that field advanced armored capability. The relatively low cost of missiles and drones will ensure their continued presence on the battlefield. These systems, paired with ever-improving sensors and software technology. will only increase overall lethality. Antitank missiles like the US-produced Javelin and the UK-made NLAW showed their effectiveness in the opening months of the Ukrainian war and continue to prove their lethality.

US-provided armored vehicles have fared better than their Russian counterparts, but there is little doubt that missiles will continue to evolve with a primary focus on US vehicle defeat. Infantry entrenched in restrictive terrain, from a reinforced tree line overwatching a field in Europe to a high-rise in a city like Taipei, can tie down an armor force with devasting effect. Antitank threats are not new, but when layered and complemented by drones (ground or air) they create a formidable threat to any mounted formation. A deliberate, combined arms approach is key to fight through these threats.

Small drones—including first-person view quadcopters and one-way attack drones—account for most of the battle damage in Ukraine. Their range has extended the depth and breadth of battlefield observation and attack capability. Drones operate as another form of maneuver that transcends both the air and ground domain. An ABCT cannot risk gathering in tactical assembly areas due to the threat from one-way attack drones or artillery cued by reconnaissance drones. Likewise, the logistics tail that an ABCT requires must disperse and hide to survive. Counter-UAS and antitank protection systems continue to evolve to defeat the threat, but can they compete with the mass and cheapness of the attacking systems? These limited and expensive protection platforms and any electronic signals they emit will likely be at the top of the enemy target list. Russia and Ukraine have both set and met impressive drone production goals of over a million systems a year. Simply overwhelming protection systems is feasible and cost effective.

Primed for Adaptation

The current ABCT is not task organized or equipped to optimally fight on the modern battlefield. Consider the cavalry squadron within the brigade, the range and tempo of which is extremely limited by its fuel requirements. Consisting of Abrams, Bradleys, and supporting fuelers, these formations would be overt targets as they conduct reconnaissance and security missions and subsequent resupply along the forward line of troops. How would attacking US ABCTs have fared during the approach march to Baghdad in 2003 if the Iraqis were equipped with today’s drones and antitank systems? The ABCT must change—and the EBCT is the natural progression.

A reorganization built around existing platforms (Abrams, Bradleys, Bookers, and ISVs), paired with emergent technologies and trained to leverage joint force and division kill webs, would be powerful. Utilizing existing platforms would ensure the Army does not have to divest in order to invest in evolving formations. The EBCT provides US decision-makers with a more flexible, deployable, and survivable force that can counter a wider array of enemy capabilities.

The EBCT is designed around the current four-battalion set. Starting with reconnaissance and security (R&S) tasks the EBCT would utilize an ISV-equipped squadron with two human-machine integration troops and two traditional scout troops. This squadron provides the brigade commander with an organic all-weather R&S capability. As an ISV-equipped formation, it can maintain tempo, disperse, sustain, and hide as required. A small R&S squadron could be transported on a few military cargo aircraft to expand a lodgment for the inbound brigade main body. Forward arrayed with a complement of air and ground robots, the formation could shape and sense as the rest of the brigade either prepares to deploy or remains obscured and concealed until conditions are set for offensive operations.

The two infantry battalions would be equipped with ISVs, Bradleys, Abrams, and Bookers to provide them with the right of amount of infantry and armor to fight in various forms of restrictive terrain. Like the R&S squadron, each infantry battalion would have robots to sense and vehicles to ensure it can rapidly disperse and mass based on conditions. The battalion’s armor company consists of a mix of Bradley, Abrams, and Booker vehicles that can reinforce attacking infantry, defend against armor, or go on the offensive when conditions are set. With only one mechanized company, the fuel requirement would be significantly less than the traditional combined arms battalion.

The heavy battalion would serve in the more traditional role of a combined arms battalion and maintain most of the armored vehicles. This battalion could be used for reinforcement, as a mobile strike force, or for exploitation when conditions are set. Due to its size and logistical requirements it must remain dispersed far behind the forward line of troops and mass and attack as the rest of the brigade sets conditions. It would also be equipped with one human-machine integration company to provide local situational awareness in the defense and scout ahead during the attack. Finally, the heavy battalion would have one mechanized infantry company to ensure it can fight in a true combined arms manner. This battalion would be the decisive force of the EBCT.

The subordinate battalions of an EBCT would have the same indirect fire capabilities that exist in the ABCT’s like battalions today—infantry battalions with towed 120-millimeter mortars and heavy battalions with M113 mortar carries. By getting the mix right—retaining certain key capabilities while reconfiguring the overall task organization to meet the challenges of today’s battlefield—these subordinate battalions would give the EBCT both capability and flexibility. Crucially, Army divisions arranged in EBCT sets would not have to task organize because the teams are already set for initial engagements.

Right-Sized Combat Power

Adjusting the task organization of ABCTs would acknowledge the reality of how much force can be deployed in a contested logistics scenario. It is unlikely that any peer or near-peer adversary would allow the United States to build combat power as it did in the Gulf War or Operation Iraqi Freedom. The next fight, even if combat is restricted to a single theater, will require global logistics reach and the uncontested deployment of multiple ABCTs over months is unrealistic. Designing BCTs that have a lighter organic combined arms capability and are more deployable will save time and lives during conflict. More than ever, a creditable combat formation that can win the first fight is the best way to maintain or reestablish deterrence. Additionally, a redesign reduces the overall sustainment tail and logistics requirements for opening movements. This also translates into potentially more space and available capability in the Army Prepositioned Stocks program. The EBCT would have fewer armored vehicles—roughly two-third less than an ABCT— but overall more combat potential when the advantages of more infantry, drones, and missiles and a dedicated R&S force are weighed. A smaller number of vehicles reduces strategic lift requirements during a time of crisis. Building and training an EBCT before crisis buys down the risk of building a combat team or task force across multiple brigades and divisions on the fly. Organic command teams that have trained together and understand the strengths and weaknesses of the formation will better leverage the organization’s combat potential. Finally, as the Army fields new armored vehicles in the future, these can replace the M1 and M2, continuing to reduce overall weight with modernization.

The physical mass and signature of an ABCT are a disadvantage in the current threat environment. Reducing the overall size but integrating new technology not only shrinks this disadvantage but enhances capability. Theoretically, fewer armored vehicles will reduce operating costs for the Army. Sheer mass will not be the key factor on the battlefield of tomorrow that it was expected to be on that of yesterday, at least not initially in an engagement. Instead it will be the lethality of an agile combined arms force leveraging, and contributing to, the convergence of capabilities from across the joint force. Using the Pacific theater as an example, the terrain does not allow for an ABCT to spread out to avoid threats. The EBCT concept overcomes that challenge.

The Army need not convert all ABCTs—and in fact should not. But it should convert enough to support the expansion of a joint force lodgment at the start of offensive operations. Pure ABCTs could be used for follow-on forces or task organized as later missions require, and can be deployed once the joint force and land component headquarters have set conditions for success.

Big Enough to Fail

As the Army takes a hard look at the evolving threats it can expect to encounter on the modern battlefield, it needs to consider reorganizing its infantry and armor capabilities into lighter yet more effective brigade formations. ABCTs especially must adapt to the future threat if they want to maintain relevance. Not all BCT structure needs to change and the Army does not need to field EBCTs exclusively, but enough combat power should be organized along these lines to support the opening engagements in a conflict. In their current configuration, ABCTs are simply too heavy to be in position to factor into the calculus of deterrence or early engagement. However, a formation like the EBCT would leverage technology and apply the right mix of combined arms to enhance deterrence credibility and, in the event of a war, survivability and lethality.

Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Suthoff recently served as the commander of 3-4 Cavalry. He currently serves in Colorado with his wife and five children.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Mark Schaeuer, US Army Yuma Proving Ground

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joshua Suthoff · April 18, 2025

19. The Department of Defense’s Breakthrough Nuclear Moment Risks Slipping Away

Excerpts:

As the Trump administration works with Congress to identify efficiencies at the Department of Defense, realigning funds from Project Pele to the services’ installation nuclear power efforts would be a prudent choice. Project Pele has probably gone as far as physics will allow it to go. It has achieved remarkable technological milestones, to be sure, and BWX Technologies, the commercial developer, will be able to leverage lessons for its civilian microreactor. But it is inconceivable, without an extraordinary scientific breakthrough, that the program will achieve its goal of a deployable microreactor that meets the military’s requirements for rapid movement to a forward location.

That doesn’t mean Project Pele has failed — quite the opposite. The more than half a billion dollars that Congress has appropriated for it has propelled America’s next-generation nuclear capabilities and forged close collaboration between the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and its national labs, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that is critical to realizing this nuclear moment.

Shifting funds to the services’ nuclear power installation efforts now will help the Department of Defense continue its competitive process as it selects from multiple designs and starts prototyping a handful of reactors, with a goal of establishing an orderbook of reactors that meet America’s high standard for safety, security, and nonproliferation from which the services can select in the future. Getting there requires the Department of Defense to put loads of money up front to de-risk the technological development. That will buy down the long-term costs of a reactor while also helping to kickstart an advanced U.S. nuclear power industry. But it’s up to the Trump administration and Congress: Unless they act, the Department of Defense’s breakthrough nuclear moment may vanish before it really happens.

The Department of Defense’s Breakthrough Nuclear Moment Risks Slipping Away - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Will Rogers · April 18, 2025

The Department of Defense is on the verge of a breakthrough with advanced nuclear energy that promises to strengthen military readiness and revitalize a globally competitive U.S. commercial nuclear industry. But for that to happen, it needs to shelve the idea of a mobile microreactor that the military can bring on overseas deployments. Instead, the Department of Defense should prioritize fixed nuclear reactors at domestic U.S. military installations that will strengthen energy reliability for on-base critical missions and the surrounding defense communities that are essential to carrying out national defense.

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Not since Adm. Hyman G. Rickover ushered in the era of Navy nuclear propulsion has the U.S. military been in a position to harness nuclear power to bolster U.S. energy dominance. And a breakthrough could not come sooner, as the electrical grid serving 99 percent of U.S. military installations faces surging demand from AI data centers and semiconductor chip manufacturing. Increasingly extreme weather is also causing outages that exceed on-base backup power capability. The nature of a globally networked force where domestic military installations are increasingly tied to overseas missions — from drones to cyber operations — means that a power failure at home puts operators abroad at risk. That cannot happen.

Despite the need for more reliable electricity at U.S. military installations, the Department of Defense has focused considerable research and development on a mobile nuclear reactor. In 2019, the Strategic Capabilities Office launched the Project Pele demonstration reactor to serve the military’s operational energy needs. The idea sounds simple: use a nuclear reactor to generate electricity on the battlefield instead of hauling diesel fuel to power generators. It’s a worthy goal given that fuel lines are highly vulnerable to sabotage and attack.

Unfortunately, Project Pele is conceptually flawed as an energy solution for the modern and mobile U.S. military. Today’s servicemembers demand speed and agility — features that a mobile reactor cannot deliver. Because of the shielding required to protect people from radiation exposure, the Project Pele reactor takes three days to set up and seven days to take down. That is far too long for a forward-deployed force that may need to relocate swiftly — or is under fire — especially in a contested area. The National Academy of Sciences concluded the same in a 2021 study.

On the flip side, because of a fixation with transporting a reactor aboard a C-17 aircraft and the shielding needed to make that happen safely, the design is limited to one megawatt (it was originally proposed to be up to five megawatts). That is too small to meet the larger energy loads at overseas bases that consume a lot of power and depend on outside fuel sources that may be disrupted during a conflict. Nonetheless, an airlifted mobile reactor could still work: it just means employing multiple reactors, which adds more safety and security requirements in situations and environments that often demand simplicity. For these reasons and more, mobile microreactors seem a far distant reality.

And yet Project Pele has become synonymous with everything the Department of Defense is doing with microreactors and small modular reactors. Ask almost anyone about the military’s efforts in this space and you’re likely to get an answer mentioning Project Pele. This has only sowed confusion about what the Department of Defense needs, so much so that Congress continues to pour money into Project Pele instead of programs that have a real shot at developing advanced nuclear power as an option to supply reliable electricity to domestic military installations.

In 2020, at Congress’s direction, the Air Force began soliciting for a microreactor at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska (it announced an intent to award a contract in 2023 but it remains under protest). The Army, in 2024, launched its Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations program in partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit and the Air Force to explore using microreactors ranging from 3 to 10 megawatts to generate power for critical missions. Those missions usually represent a small portion of the total energy at an installation, but they can be isolated from the commercial electricity system with an on-base microgrid. That program recently announced eight companies that are eligible for demonstration contracts, a significant milestone. In contrast, the Navy announced its own effort in 2024 to look at small modular reactors for installation readiness. These reactors can range up to 300 megawatts and may deliver enough electricity for a base and the surrounding community, potentially helping to provide direct energy relief to the commercial grid.

These installation-focused efforts align with the Trump administration’s charge to “unleash American energy.” On Jan. 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that called on all federal agencies to quickly remove any hurdles to tapping domestic energy, “with particular attention to … nuclear energy resources.” Furthermore, the Trump administration is eyeing military installations to site energy-intensive commercial data centers and rare earth mineral refineries, in part to expedite the federal permitting process and get these critical facilities online quickly. Advanced nuclear power on military installations is an ideal candidate to ensure sufficient electricity for these commercial applications since they don’t shed load — they are either on or off, like nuclear power.

Fortunately, the Department of Defense is now coordinating these installation efforts and catalyzing momentum. That coordination is vital to help the services capitalize on earlier achievements and work together to demonstrate the safety and performance of advanced reactors. It also gives the Department of Defense a chance to leverage recent bipartisan reforms to expedite the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing process for advanced reactors and influence the domestic production of high-assay low-enriched uranium to fuel these reactors. But unlike Project Pele, these initiatives lack dedicated funding that is desperately needed for them to succeed.

As the Trump administration works with Congress to identify efficiencies at the Department of Defense, realigning funds from Project Pele to the services’ installation nuclear power efforts would be a prudent choice. Project Pele has probably gone as far as physics will allow it to go. It has achieved remarkable technological milestones, to be sure, and BWX Technologies, the commercial developer, will be able to leverage lessons for its civilian microreactor. But it is inconceivable, without an extraordinary scientific breakthrough, that the program will achieve its goal of a deployable microreactor that meets the military’s requirements for rapid movement to a forward location.

That doesn’t mean Project Pele has failed — quite the opposite. The more than half a billion dollars that Congress has appropriated for it has propelled America’s next-generation nuclear capabilities and forged close collaboration between the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and its national labs, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that is critical to realizing this nuclear moment.

Shifting funds to the services’ nuclear power installation efforts now will help the Department of Defense continue its competitive process as it selects from multiple designs and starts prototyping a handful of reactors, with a goal of establishing an orderbook of reactors that meet America’s high standard for safety, security, and nonproliferation from which the services can select in the future. Getting there requires the Department of Defense to put loads of money up front to de-risk the technological development. That will buy down the long-term costs of a reactor while also helping to kickstart an advanced U.S. nuclear power industry. But it’s up to the Trump administration and Congress: Unless they act, the Department of Defense’s breakthrough nuclear moment may vanish before it really happens.

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Will Rogers served as a senior advisor to the U.S. Army from 2022 to 2025. He is currently a principal at Converge Strategies, a consulting firm specializing in energy, resilience, and national security, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Image: Midjourney.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Will Rogers · April 18, 2025

20. What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race

Excerpts:

Simply having the leading AI models will not be enough.

The government can further accelerate the use of AI across the economy by prioritizing the rapid adoption of AI by its own agencies. By directing federal dollars toward AI technologies, major agencies such as the Department of Defense can signal to companies where to invest and to capital markets which technologies are likely to be in high demand. To have the greatest effect, agencies need to explain their priorities clearly, streamline procurement, and focus on delivering specific capabilities. It would help if Congress provided regular annual appropriations, rather than continuing resolutions, which generally do not allow new contracts.

Federal investment can also reassure businesses and consumers that AI tools are safe and reliable. US business adoption of generative AI is lagging behind initial investor expectations, in part due to risk aversion from industry, and polls suggest that the American public is wary of AI. Compare that to China, where some polling indicates that a majority of the public is excited about the promise of AI and both consumer and commercial adoption are moving faster. Public sector adoption would help put some of those fears to rest.

Even without a clear government strategy, U.S. companies continue to push forward the AI frontier, but it remains uncertain just how far ahead they are, and for how long they can keep that lead. Competition in general purpose technologies such as AI has always been fierce. DeepSeek’s success demonstrates that a U.S. lead is far from guaranteed and that there will be many fast followers for any breakthrough. Especially because it is unclear to what extent having the most advanced models will translate into economic gains, the competition for AI leadership is likely to end up being mostly about adoption. It is the adoption of AI in the U.S. military, government, and private sector—and the ability of U.S. firms to export AI technologies to the rest of the world—that will most clearly demonstrate U.S. strength in AI. To get there, the United States needs to cut through the red tape while accelerating the foundational investments, stronger energy grids, low-cost technologies, and strategic partnerships that will make possible the use of AI at scale.

What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael C. Horowitz · April 18, 2025

Winning Means Deploying, Not Just Developing, the Best Technology

April 18, 2025

Humanoid robots at an Agibot factory in Shanghai, March 2025 Nicoco Chan / Reuters

RADHA IYENGAR PLUMB is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Perry World House and a Senior Fellow at the Wharton Accountable AI Lab at the University of Pennsylvania. From 2024 to 2025, she served as Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer at the Department of Defense.

MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ is Senior Fellow for Technology and Innovation at the Council on Foreign Relations and Richard Perry Professor and Director of the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. From 2022 to 2024, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities.

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For several years now, the United States has been locked in an intensifying race with China to develop advanced artificial intelligence. Given the far-reaching consequences of AI for national security and defense, as well as for the economy, the stakes are high. But it is often hard to tell who is winning. Many answers focus on performance: which AI models exceed others in speed, reasoning, and accuracy. By those benchmarks, the United States has a clear, if not commanding, lead, enabled by the presence of world-class engineers, billions of dollars in data center investments, and export controls on the most advanced computing chips. That focus on performance at the frontier is why the release, in January, of a powerful new model, known as R1, by the Chinese company DeepSeek drove headlines and crashed markets around the world. DeepSeek’s success seemed to suggest that the U.S. advantage was not as comfortable as many had thought.

Yet focusing only on the technological frontier obscures the true nature of the race. Raw performance matters, but second-best models can offer significant value to users, especially if they are, like DeepSeek’s, cheap, open sourced, and widely used. The real lesson of DeepSeek’s success is that AI competition is not simply about which country develops the most advanced models, but also about which can adopt them faster across its economy and government. Military planners like to say that “amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics.” In AI, amateurs talk benchmarks; professionals talk adoption.

To preserve the U.S. lead in AI, then, the U.S. government needs to supercharge the adoption of AI across the military, federal agencies, and the wider economy. To get there, it should set rules of the road that focus on transparency and choice while boosting trust and enabling the development of cloud infrastructure and new sources of energy. It should also help the industry export U.S. AI products to the rest of the world to support U.S. companies, entrench democratic values, and forestall Chinese technological dominance. Only by winning the adoption race can the United States reap the true economic and military benefits of AI.

THE COMING WAVE

Talk of military AI often sparks fears of killer robots unleashing indiscriminate damage with no accountability for their actions. Yet in the military as elsewhere, most AI adoption will come through human-machine cooperation, in which AI tools accelerate and improve existing workflows. For the U.S. military, autonomous weapons—as opposed to uncrewed systems remotely piloted by humans—still require an accountable human to make the decision to use force.

In the national security context, this will primarily mean improving how, and how fast, militaries and intelligence agencies can use data and make decisions. AI will enable better threat detection, giving humans more time to react; let militaries conduct more detailed and realistic planning exercises; shorten crisis response times; and streamline essential backend processes like finance and logistics.

Militaries around the world are already developing and deploying AI tools. The war in Ukraine has given Russia the opportunity to rapidly integrate AI into a wide variety of military systems, such as increasingly autonomous weapons and systems that can translate sensor data into targeting information for human decision-makers. Iran and North Korea are both investing in AI tools to assist military operations, government surveillance, and cyber-activities. And in the United States, the Pentagon is adopting AI in a range of applications, including operational planning, predicting when critical platforms will need maintenance, and enabling greater autonomy in weapons systems. Each of these applications illustrates the importance of adoption at scale: there is a stark difference between a tool that lets a few commanders make decisions faster and the widespread use of that tool to accelerate operational activity throughout the military.

Likewise, in the economic realm, AI’s benefits will be driven by its reach. A 2023 report by the consulting firm McKinsey estimates that widespread AI adoption could bring trillions of dollars in productivity gains to the global economy. Advances in AI are driving innovation in science, medicine, advanced manufacturing, and more. But countries will not benefit if they cannot access AI systems. Rich countries are likely to incorporate AI first, so U.S. policymakers will need to help U.S. companies export AI technology to the global South. Doing so will not only advance key development goals, but also help contain China’s global influence, as the leading alternatives to U.S. suppliers are likely to be Chinese.

Here, as elsewhere, simply having the leading models will not be enough. Even if Chinese models fall short of their U.S. competitors, DeepSeek’s success shows that low-cost open-source technology, even if it is behind the cutting edge, can still provide plenty of value to users. For many ordinary applications, such as drafting legal contracts, assisting in commercial research, and triaging customer service queries, AI adoption does not require the best-performing models; it requires good-enough solutions that can be deployed quickly and at scale. Chinese models such as DeepSeek may appeal to countries seeking cheap and effective AI tools for a wide range of ordinary uses. The United States, meanwhile, has plenty of advantages—the most advanced chips, more cloud infrastructure, better foundational models, and more useful applications—but it needs a strategy to diffuse them.

Winning the AI diffusion race will shape the future of U.S. global leadership. Beijing uses its technological investments abroad to build spheres of influence that weaken U.S. interests and magnify Chinese political pressure. If U.S. AI systems are adopted around the world, then the values underlying those systems, including free expression, privacy, and lack of bias, will spread, too. If Chinese models win out, then censorship, surveillance, and bias are likely to be the result.

ADOPT, DON’T SHOP

Given the importance of adoption, the U.S. government cannot simply focus on preserving the lead in frontier models; it must foster lower-cost, more efficient models that can be widely deployed. For starters, that means being clear-eyed about what the United States can and can’t get from the export controls imposed by the Biden administration to bar Chinese access to advanced semiconductors and other AI technologies. Because AI is a general-purpose technology, policymakers should not expect export controls to prevent China from acquiring key AI technologies indefinitely. AI models are not like nuclear weapons, whose essential ingredients, including plutonium and uranium, are scarce enough that strict controls can prevent other countries from acquiring them. When it comes to AI, although hardware is essential, the models themselves are software, which can be easily copied and transferred. Governments will never be able to restrict computing power as tightly as nuclear material, because chips are used for so many other things. Ultimately, export controls are a limited tool. They can protect specific exquisite technologies for a limited time to help U.S. companies stay ahead of their Chinese competitors. But they cannot constrain development short of the frontier, and they will have inevitable unintended consequences, including encouraging foreign companies to find creative workarounds. The question, then, becomes what the United States does with the time it buys through export controls.

Policymakers in Washington should also design AI regulation to enable responsible technology diffusion. That will require the United States to offer a concrete alternative, one that is focused on transparency and choice, to more prescriptive regulations, such as the EU’s restrictions on AI applications that do not comply with extensive EU rules. Approaches such as the EU’s are responding to real risks, but they also stifle innovation, undermine efforts to make models more transparent, and encourage users to find alternative ways to access forbidden tools, especially if they are available as open-source applications. The DeepSeek app, for example, is available in the EU, even though it doesn’t comply with privacy requirements in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation or the safety and security provisions of the EU AI Act.

A better approach is to mitigate risks while encouraging rapid adoption of trusted tools. An AI governance framework should feature a mix of voluntary and regulatory approaches that reduce the likelihood of catastrophic risks, such as AI models that enable the development of weapons of mass destruction, while encouraging voluntary improvements in security and reliability. For example, model developers who adopt government-developed risk management tools or standards could be granted reduced liability for harm caused by their systems in return. U.S. regulation should also protect intellectual property rights and ensure data privacy, actions that would both protect U.S. industry and differentiate U.S. AI products from foreign competitors.

Focusing only on the technological frontier obscures the true nature of the AI race.

Such a framework will help drive the adoption of AI technologies developed in the United States. In the same way that better brakes enabled faster yet safer trains and cars, a clear, harmonized governance strategy, with transparent rules, user choice, and narrow restrictions can foster more effective, useful AI. Tools that enhance transparency will promote trust and make consumers and businesses more willing to use AI systems. In contrast, simply restricting the use of AI tools slows innovation and creates incentives for users to work around regulatory requirements and for AI developers to simply find other markets.

A regulatory framework for AI that better balances risks and tradeoffs could also persuade Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to more exclusively invest in U.S. data centers and AI technology. This means clarity on both what they need to avoid, such as sharing certain technology with U.S. adversaries, and on what they may get, such as access to advanced AI models within their own sovereign cloud data centers. Gulf countries have already demonstrated strong interest in U.S. AI technology; the trick will be facilitating their access while keeping the technology from spreading to China in a way that circumvents U.S. export controls. This requires enhanced processes in Gulf countries to validate that their technology companies and public-private partnerships can secure and protect U.S. technology might may otherwise flow to Chinese-controlled entities. By strengthening AI partnerships with the Gulf, Washington will encourage broader alignment by these countries with the United States and open up greater access to energy for U.S. industry. Working with the Gulf to enable trustworthy access will also help U.S. companies bring their AI services to the global South, through partnerships such as the one announced last year between Microsoft and the Emirati technology company G42 in Kenya, which aims to bring AI tools and cloud access to businesses there. If the U.S. government does not smooth the way for more of this kind of cooperation, competitors such as China’s Digital Silk Road initiative, which is designed to bring a suite of digital technologies such as 5G and cloud services to the developing world, will fill the gap.

To accelerate domestic adoption, the United States will need to make foundational investments in chip production, data centers, and energy. Just as cars were considerably less useful without roads, leading some World War I–era military analysts to doubt the impact of the combustion engine on warfare, AI technologies will not be able to realize their promise without new cloud environments, more accessible computing power, and useable data. The country, and the government in particular, needs sufficient computing power and energy to run AI models, along with trusted sources of chips. U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent announcement of a planned $500 billion in private sector data center investment is an important start. But news reports suggest that only $100 billion has been committed so far, and much of the work seems to have begun before the announcement.

Greater government investment could encourage additional commercial funds to enable adoption at scale. The federal government has already committed $50 billion to supporting the domestic production of semiconductors, including the leading-edge chips required for AI data centers. Those funds will help the United States produce the chips it needs to develop and deploy AI tools throughout the economy, but by themselves they will not be enough to ensure AI adoption. The government also needs to play a leading role in unlocking large-scale sources of energy to power AI data centers. Cloud service providers have invested in greater production, but the federal government will also need to expand and modernize transmission and delivery infrastructure so an upgraded electric grid can effectively expand local access and distribution. Getting power to energy-hungry new data centers and broader access at lower cost is critical to enabling the widespread use of AI.

Simply having the leading AI models will not be enough.

The government can further accelerate the use of AI across the economy by prioritizing the rapid adoption of AI by its own agencies. By directing federal dollars toward AI technologies, major agencies such as the Department of Defense can signal to companies where to invest and to capital markets which technologies are likely to be in high demand. To have the greatest effect, agencies need to explain their priorities clearly, streamline procurement, and focus on delivering specific capabilities. It would help if Congress provided regular annual appropriations, rather than continuing resolutions, which generally do not allow new contracts.

Federal investment can also reassure businesses and consumers that AI tools are safe and reliable. US business adoption of generative AI is lagging behind initial investor expectations, in part due to risk aversion from industry, and polls suggest that the American public is wary of AI. Compare that to China, where some polling indicates that a majority of the public is excited about the promise of AI and both consumer and commercial adoption are moving faster. Public sector adoption would help put some of those fears to rest.

Even without a clear government strategy, U.S. companies continue to push forward the AI frontier, but it remains uncertain just how far ahead they are, and for how long they can keep that lead. Competition in general purpose technologies such as AI has always been fierce. DeepSeek’s success demonstrates that a U.S. lead is far from guaranteed and that there will be many fast followers for any breakthrough. Especially because it is unclear to what extent having the most advanced models will translate into economic gains, the competition for AI leadership is likely to end up being mostly about adoption. It is the adoption of AI in the U.S. military, government, and private sector—and the ability of U.S. firms to export AI technologies to the rest of the world—that will most clearly demonstrate U.S. strength in AI. To get there, the United States needs to cut through the red tape while accelerating the foundational investments, stronger energy grids, low-cost technologies, and strategic partnerships that will make possible the use of AI at scale.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael C. Horowitz · April 18, 2025

21. How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis

The oath to support and defend the Constitution means that you accept and believe in rule of law and not "a system of personalized, arbitrary power." It means checks and balances and the separation of power among three equal branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial with different responsibilities and authorities to check the others. You either believe in that or you do not.

Excerpts:

Together, these guardrails can create enough space for business and the public to better judge the implications of what is actually happening, decide on suitable action, and participate in meaningful elections. They convey that the commitment to a rule-of-law based democracy that has long defined the United States is not just a set of values; it is built into the underlying structure of American society in a way that allows the country to continually improve and avoid its worst impulses. Prematurely assuming that the foundations of U.S. democracy are crumbling and that the edifice will collapse can make people run for cover at precisely the moment when they should instead be reinforcing them.

Courts, federalism, and the independent media will not alone protect the country in every circumstance. But they can enable crucial action to respond to a relentlessly power hungry administration. And they provide a toolbox to contain a presidential project that seeks to amass the kind of power that would have come in handy to Yoon in South Korea when he tried to declare martial law in December. The extent to which these guardrails can hold the line and ensure that American pluralist politics remain resilient will be an important factor in determining whether the United States finds one day that the rule of law has been replaced by a system of personalized, arbitrary power.

That the United States is a democracy based on the rule of law and not a monarchy is part of its founding premise. Under that premise, elections have consequences, which is why new presidents propose new legislation or lawful policy changes on important matters ranging from American military deployments to artificial intelligence. The system does not permit the president to undo the laws and institutions of the American republic by fiat. When a president operates outside the law, he can hurt millions of people by depriving them of medical care that the law says they should receive and make monetary policy and grant military contracts at his whim to reward his friends. Americans depend on an independent judiciary to serve as a forum for policing the limits of executive power and on independent state and local officials along with an independent media and ideas sector to create space for citizens to assess the country’s condition and understand its civic commitments.

But ultimately, these structures matter most because of what they enable. Over time, their resilience tends to erode when civic and business leaders or the public fail to make use of them, sapping the relevance of fair-minded readings of laws and procedures relative to frenzied dealmaking between individual organizations and an executive branch inclined to coercion. Courts can rule, the media and civil society can truthfully report and analyze, and federalism can offer sufficient respite for Americans of all views to deliberate and vote in elections to come. If the American public and critical elements of the business sector nonetheless view these fights over executive power with apathy or only through the lens of their most short-term interests, then a president acting in bad faith will get away with it.

How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar · April 18, 2025

The Three Guardrails That Can Save Democracy

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

April 18, 2025

The White House, Washington, D.C., February 2025 Brian Snyder / Reuters

MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was previously a justice on the California Supreme Court. He is the author of Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies.

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On December 3, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol attempted to seize control of the country by abruptly declaring martial law. What happened next reveals how democracies can unleash antibodies to resist dangerous threats to the body politic and defend their system of government. Although Yoon had sent military forces to surround the National Assembly and block legislators from taking an emergency vote rescinding his order, legislators rushed to the building and were able to enter. Meanwhile, the military officials and intelligence agencies that the president sought to enlist refused to cooperate, the courts refused to stand aside, and the media reported developments accurately. In the end, backed by overwhelming public support, the National Assembly voted unanimously to rescind the order, putting a stop to the president’s gambit.

Yet even though the South Korean episode ended successfully, it raises an unsettling question about the future of another democracy that happens to be the world’s most powerful country: the United States. What if Yoon had begun his attempted takeover just a touch more gradually—say, by purging the leadership and midlevel staff at security agencies and replacing them with his own loyalists; normalizing the forced removal of individuals from South Korea and defying court decisions over time even when the courts’ orders were clear; cracking down on law firms, former officials, and even members of his own party who challenged him or defied his wishes in order to uphold the law; and, aided by pliant legislators from his own party, progressively wresting control of government spending—including even money already allocated—from the legislature? As the second Trump administration vows to deny federal funds to states to bring their actions in line with the president’s views, pressures the country’s leading law firms into providing hundreds of millions of dollars of pro bono services for causes approved by the president, threatens to end the independence of agencies like the federal reserve, and moves ever closer to open defiance of court decisions, the problem of how to strengthen and even preserve law-bound democracy in the United States is drawing growing attention.

To approach this challenge coherently, it is crucial to understand how the constraints on executive overreach that are built into the American system operate in practice and which ones matter most. These constrains depend on more than just the courts. When judges rule on cases about the limits of presidential power or the rights enshrined in the First Amendment, they are operating in a larger democratic context. The contours and impact of their decisions are affected by multiple factors, including the attitudes and norms of the larger public as well as elites, the rules governing the behavior of states and institutions such as Congress, and the way the media covers the decisions themselves. In contrast to countries that rely on dedicated career tracks to staff their judiciary, judges in the United States tend to come to the bench with broader professional acumen. And their decisions can galvanize public attention and elite concern, including among the leaders of the state and local governments—the authorities that most directly affect the day-to-day life of American communities.

Alongside the courts, then, it is possible to discern two other elements of American democracy that are crucial in constraining the president: an information space that covers the facts of cases before the courts and the substance of judges’ decisions and a federal system in which states are constituted as independent sovereigns, with wide powers of their own to govern, conduct and oversee elections, and frustrate federal plans. Although the courts, the media, and the federal-state balance all buttress American democracy, they may also serve as potentially inviting targets for a power-hungry executive. In this regard, it is crucial to distinguish administration policies that are merely controversial from those that seek to undermine the courts, weaken the independence of state and local officials, or unlawfully target the media and the civil-society sector.

In its first few months in office, the Trump administration has undertaken a number dramatic but still constitutionally permissible policy changes such as reassessing the U.S. relationship with Ukraine and Russia, withdrawing from the World Health Organization, and halting U.S. participation in international efforts to address the stark threat of climate change. But these steps coexist with other rhetoric and actions that have begun to target the key pillars of American democracy, as when the administration refuses to comply with a federal judge’s order or threatens to use the federal bureaucracy to target states, private institutions, and individuals who oppose the president or fail to accede to the president’s demands.

Herein lies the central test facing the United States. Like its predecessors, the Trump administration has a legitimate prerogative to make major policy changes, even ones that many Americans may consider ill-advised. But it cannot legitimately assume arbitrary powers in violation of basic constitutional principles. The country’s democratic guardrails create space for people to speak, deliberate, organize, and litigate in response to questionable actions from the federal executive, allowing courts, states, and the media to enable civic action to further the country’s common interest in law-bound democracy. Even if the country’s democratic guardrails remain relatively strong at the moment, business and the public must recognize the growing danger the administration’s actions may pose to the country’s democratic foundations, and why defending these guardrails is a mission worthy of thoughtful Americans from any party or political persuasion. That defense would still leave the administration plenty of room for major policy changes—but within a framework protected by three of the guardrails that matter most.

THIS TIME IS HARDER

Democratic states are built on different histories and sometimes embrace different rules, but the experience of the United States broadly matches that of other law-bound democracies, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, and Poland: in each case, the ultimate constraints on executive power depend as much on practice as on moral principle. What usually matters most, in other words, is whether political representatives, key business leaders, career government officials, civil society, and the general public are prepared to act before an executive power grab saps them of influence.

For a variety of reasons, however, many of these traditional sources of constraint are unlikely to play a particularly important role in limiting the Trump administration. No meaningful challenge should be expected, for example, from the narrowly Republican-led Congress, given that members of the majority party can be disciplined through primary challenges supported by the president. By stocking federal law enforcement agencies with loyalists and taking tight control of federal personnel policy to ensure loyalty, the administration has increasingly preempted possible constraints to its power from within the federal bureaucracy. Similarly, much of the military is led by presidential appointees and under the command of the president, who has broadly worded statutory authority to deploy the military in a range of domestic situations.

A deported Venezuelan man arriving in San Luis Talpa, El Salvador, April 2025 Secretaria de Prensa de la Presidencia / Reuters

Of course, the general public, along with business leaders and major investors, has the potential to exert powerful and perhaps prohibitive costs on any effort by the leader of a democratic country to undertake a massive expansion of executive power. In Israel in 2023, for instance, months of large-scale public protests, and pressure from trade unions, business leaders and prominent economists, former officials, and even military reservists, induced the Israeli government to back away from much of a sweeping package of changes aimed at curbing the judiciary’s independence. In a market economy, major investors can also constrain executive power. In the United Kingdom in 2022, Prime Minister Liz Truss’s effort to push through fiscally risky reforms created an overwhelming backlash from the business sector, augmenting popular opposition and helping make her the shortest-serving prime minister in British history.

Yet even setting aside the extraordinary polarization of the U.S. electorate, which makes building broad coalitions more difficult, major investors and the general public tend to diverge on which executive actions constitute a serious enough threat to democracy and the rule of law to galvanize a strong response. Certain members of the public, for example, may be more concerned about arbitrary detention or denial of funds for the public education system, than executive orders that target law firms or the president’s assertions of emergency tariff powers, moves that may be worrisome to business because they upend economic stability. Although Americans may broadly agree that the president shouldn’t usurp Congress’s powers over federal spending, it may be difficult for the public to know—at least without a clear court judgment—when the administration has gone too far. And over time, an administration that is determined to squelch all opposition can leverage fear of government scrutiny, denial of funds, or adverse policy changes to silence business and civic leaders—even those who are ordinarily plucky—and dissuade not-for-profit groups, universities, and firms from challenging its authority and having their day in court.

Here is where the three key pillars of U.S. democracy can buttress the system. First, by issuing reasoned, carefully argued decisions that hold the executive to account for flouting legal norms, courts can help buy time for the public and the private sector and inform them how to confront a changing presidency. Yet the two other elements complementing the courts—the federal-state balance and the independent information sector—are equally important. Unlike South Korea, for example, the United States is designed as a union of federated states in which state and local officials control most of the country’s capacity to govern and use force in civilian settings. And an independent media, together with a vast ecosystem of nonprofit research institutions, think tanks, and scientific organizations, can generate ideas and analysis that challenge official administration narratives. By shining a light on government actions that ignore duly enacted laws or violate due process or the separation of powers, and by interpreting court decisions holding the administration to account, they can help guide an effective response.

SOURCES OF STRENGTH

The guardrails of the U.S. system are not all powerful. When Alexander Hamilton predicted in the Federalist Papers that federal courts would be the “least dangerous branch” because they lacked “sword” and “purse” to enforce their decisions, he was underscoring certain genuine limits to the extent of the judiciary’s power. Although their decisions can deny government or other parties the benefit of court enforcement and alert elites and the public about executive actions that trample basic rights or break core rules of U.S. democracy; yet judges lack dedicated armies and the power to directly levy taxes. Exacerbating these limitations is the tendency of some courts to occasionally disregard precedent or to avoid decisions that would bring them into outright conflict with the administration out of concern that their rulings might not be followed.

State and local officials and the independent media face their own limits to their ability to push back. Governors and mayors depend on federal dollars for their budgets and sometimes lead heavily divided jurisdictions. In turn, the traditional media lack the influence they once had. In the 1960s, televised images of police using water cannons and truncheons to beat civil rights protesters spurred Congress and the American president to enact civil rights laws; in the following decade, newspapers and the major television networks did much to shape public understanding of wronging by the Nixon administration during Watergate. Today, by contrast, independent newspapers and television networks have been increasingly displaced by partisan podcasts and social media, some of which loudly reinforce presidential assertions of power and amplify attacks on judges who rule against the administration.

But each of these three pillars also benefits from powerful advantages. Consider the judiciary: its strength reflects the long American tradition of employing judges who have a measure of professional accomplishment before they join the bench and of maintaining the rigorous independence on which businesses and civil society depend. Courts have the unambiguous power to block arbitrary criminal convictions, and in the unlikely event that a Congress sympathetic to the president cuts funding for federal courts or restricts their jurisdiction, state courts, which are quite autonomous from their federal counterparts, can independently enforce the federal Constitution.

It is one thing for Vice President J.D. Vance to publicly warn that “judges aren’t allowed to control the executive’s legitimate power” but quite another for the president to ignore an explicit, unambiguous decision from a court to avoid disclosure of the identities of FBI agents (the administration complied with a court order to that effect in a lawsuit in D.C. district court), preserve records of government communications (another example of compliance with the same court), or to cease cutting off benefits for millions of Americans (defiance of which would likely incur overwhelming pushback from the public and from members of both parties in Congress whose constituents would be directly effected).

Protesting the Trump administration’s firing of civil servants, Atlanta, Georgia, April 2025 Megan Varner / Reuters

The ability of state and local officials to stand up to the federal executive is buttressed by both the mechanics of the federal system and long-established doctrine. Successive conservative U.S. Supreme Court majorities have issued rulings protecting states from being commandeered by the federal government or coerced into action by the withholding of federal funds. Courts have also limited the federal government’s power to regulate local activities. The sheer scale of the country and the existing distribution of governing power make it virtually impossible for any federal scheme to impose full control over the continent-sized American federation: in practical terms, most daily functions of government take place in statehouses and municipalities, not Washington.

Consider public employees. State and local governments employ 19.6 million workers, accounting for 87 percent of all public civilian employees, dwarfing the federal government’s 2.9 million civilian employees; this ratio will skew even more to state and local governments in the wake of the administration’s massive cuts to the federal workforce. In law enforcement, the situation is even more lopsided, with 91 percent of the country’s officers serving local and state administrations rather than the federal government. Federal investigations can obviously have an enormous impact on individuals and organizations, but the bulk of the country’s policing capacity remains a state and local affair—staffed by cops whose departmental priorities may not align with those of federal immigration agents and, particularly in urban regions, and who may be skeptical of cooperating with federal authorities.

For its part, the media and the ideas sector benefit from First Amendment protections and the bedrock tradition of press freedom. Even in a world in which Elon Musk has 210 million followers and CNN has fewer than 600,000 viewers in prime time, the business community, along with farmers, workers and the general public, demand accurate reporting of facts and the effects of decisions by courts and legal challenges to the federal government in order to make informed decisions. Widely available fact-based news and analysis can help enough of the public and the business community build a shared reality about what’s happening in courtrooms, cities and states around the country, and Washington.

In the 2010s, for example, when the water supply of Flint, Michigan, became contaminated following the city’s switch to a cheaper water source, investigative journalism galvanized national public attention on the crisis and helped drive policy changes. During the first Trump administration, widespread news coverage of travel restrictions targeting all travelers from seven Muslim majority countries led to nationwide protests, and along with legal action, seemed to force the administration to scale back its order.

These three fundamental features of American democracy can also reinforce one another: media coverage of court decisions, for instance, can explain in detail why a presidential move to fire independent commissioners from the National Labor Relations Board or the Federal Election Commission bodes ill for the Federal Reserve’s independence. Objective analyses from news sources or nonprofits can help states decide how to respond to unlawful federal encroachment on state prerogatives or attacks on civil society. And efforts by the president and close allies in Congress to limit the powers of federal courts—for example, by enacting limits on nationwide injunctions or imposing jurisdictional limits on where lawsuits can be filed —could provoke mass resistence by civil society as in Israel. Moreover, such limitations on the courts would be unable to stop state judges from fulfilling their oaths to protect federal constitutional rights, as they routinely do in criminal cases or disputes involving private property.

SLOWLY, THEN ALL AT ONCE

Although it is a primary source of democratic resilience, the nuanced interplay between the courts and other elements of the U.S. system also illuminates an important vulnerability. Whereas a dramatic confrontation between the president and another branch of government might rally immediate public opposition to executive overreach, more subtle efforts by the administration to erode institutional checks and balances pose greater challenges.

Consider a scenario in which the administration sets out to consolidate power more incrementally. It might begin by using legal channels to gradually neutralize constraints on executive power, building on, say, its use of the 1798 Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelan migrants to El Salvador. It could advance expansive interpretations of executive privilege or national security authority through actions that initially involve unpopular targets such as immigrants from countries considered dangerous or allegedly affiliated with violent gangs. Over time, the precedent of the swift removal of people—with limited if any judicial intervention—can be deployed more broadly to target immigrants, even lawful ones, espousing views disfavored by the administration. Delays, obfuscation, and bouts of merely technical compliance can hem in the courts’ influence.

Leveraging its discretion over regulatory and criminal investigations, the administration could also accelerate its efforts to target political opponents by using the legitimate powers of federal agencies in ways that create asymmetric burdens on critics and adversaries. While maintaining plausible deniability, the administration could continue to encourage both online and physical harassment of critics—from journalists to judges to state officials—through a combination of inflammatory rhetoric and selective inaction against supporters who engage in such harassment on its behalf. Each of these steps in itself might not trigger significant resistance, but taken together, they could achieve many of the same ends of unfettered executive power. And they could do so while avoiding, say, a direct confrontation with the Supreme Court—and the intense public backlash it might unleash—that the administration currently seems to fear.

The effectiveness of this kind of stepwise autocratization has been shown in countries such as Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used seemingly technical regulatory powers to progressively erode press freedom, for example, by pressuring news outlets into self-censorship or to undertake ownership changes. Over time, such tactics could conceivably alter the landscape of institutional constraints on executive power without ever forcing a full-blown constitutional crisis. Although this approach is not certain to succeed in the United States, the distinctive risks it poses arise from the special role played by the courts, the states, and the media in the U.S. system.

Democratic institutions and the courts operate on a complex chessboard of moves and counter moves. Whatever their partisan background, some actors in this system are motivated by principled commitments to democratic norms, while others pursue narrower partisan or personal agendas. This dynamic creates both costs and opportunities for presidential action, as different strategies may elicit varying levels of institutional and public response. Since democracies also depend on extra-constitutional norms that are now eroding, such as the assumption that key actors in the political system will avoid maximal use of existing powers, judicial decisions that police the hard constitutional limits on presidential prerogatives have become more important.

The U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C., June 2024 Kevin Mohatt / Reuters

The efficacy of courts when they confront efforts by the president to fire civil servants, impound budgets, coerce the media, or commandeer state officials depends in large measure on their willingness to live up to the country’s doctrinal commitments. These call for enforcing ample limits on presidential power while leaving plenty of room for principled executive action, whether concerning good-faith stewardship of statutory requirements or the handling of foreign affairs. As already reflected in several important rulings against the administration, U.S. judges are structurally empowered not to be chilled by external threats and know all too well why their decisions cannot be dictated by executive branch fulminations about refusing to comply with court rulings.

Yet such court-imposed constraints are not themselves sufficient to check an emboldened Trump administration. Never in history has the country faced such a massive, “flood the zone” strategy from a president who muses openly about a third term, implies that he can choose to impound funds previously appropriated by Congress, and does not appear to care about the Constitution as it has been established by court doctrine and understood by generations of legal scholars. Given the volume of legally dubious activity, some of the administration’s unlawful actions will inevitably advance before litigation can stop them. Judges can issue emergency injunctions and take other measures to halt egregious behavior by the executive, but adjudicating major cases to completion will take time and may be subject to uncertainty arising from procedural missteps or lack of plaintiff standing (as occurred in the case of the DOGE-linked efforts to execute a mass buyout plan for federal workers). Defenders of American democracy will need to constrain these actions through other mechanisms.

In this regard, the independent media and state and local officials are an essential complement to the courts: in a world in which some court cases aren’t getting brought, others are tied up in knots, and still others are being defied, independent reporting about the resulting mess is hugely important. But so is the practical constraint of actually governing a country in which most governing power lives at the state and local level—through police, firefighters, emergency responders, teachers, operators of electric grids, land use personnel, and others. Barring a radical expansion in the power of the federal government, if the president seeks to deploy federal law enforcement investigations against his enemies or particular groups such as certain categories of immigrants, for example, he can do only so much without the help of state and local law enforcement. Thus, if the administration decides to ignore court decisions ordering noninterference with the states or threatens to coerce state authority to do its bidding, state governments can respond in kind by ignoring lawless federal edicts and refusing to cooperate with federal enforcement efforts.

Indeed, even if the U.S. Supreme Court decides to fall in line behind the Trump administration’s power grabs, its project could well be frustrated by the many dozens of separate sovereigns who, in addition to filing countless lawsuits, have wide powers over actual daily governance and in many cases are supported by strong constituencies clamoring for them not to kowtow to the White House. When people are aggrieved by, for example, state-level officials working with the federal government, they can get their day in court before state judges who have taken an oath to defend the federal Constitution as well as their state constitutions. And Congress and the president have no legal power to stop state judges from enforcing the constitutional rights of ordinary Americans if they are subject to harassment from particular local police units working with federal law enforcement.

UNLAWFUL, NOT UNPOPULAR

If the courts, state governments, the media, and ultimately the business community and general publicthey are to provide an effective bulwark against executive overreach, they will need to keep their eyes on the ball. It is essential to distinguish between permissible policy changes, however disruptive, unpopular, or potentially harmful, from actual democratic backsliding. Ending U.S. support for Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s invasion may be troubling to many Americans, but the president is granted particular leeway in foreign affairs and Trump made clear in his campaign that he intended to make stark changes in the Kyiv-Washington relationship.

Moreover, not all transgressions of democratic norms carry equal weight. Plenty of legitimate arguments can be made about how Trump has upended longstanding practices in his selection of military leaders, his appointment of loyalists to head or remake major government institutions, or his micro-management of overhead costs for scientific grants. But unless such actions clearly violate the law, they should not be confused with efforts to dismantle core democratic guardrails. Only by focusing in a disciplined way on the latter will it be possible for Americans to build a strong and effective response to unlawful power grabs by the administration. Transgressions of norms may be relevant to judging the administration’s merits and intentions, but the effective defense of democracy—by both making use of and protecting the guardrails that matter most—depends on this distinction.

What the public needs to be concerned about are those presidential actions that materially undermine democratic institutions. Left unimpeded and ratcheted up over time, such actions risk dangerously weakening the critical feedback loop that links policy changes to widely debated consequences, adjudication of the law, and meaningful elections at the core of the American system. The integrity of federalism is at stake, for example, in the U.S. Justice Department's move to suspend charges against New York City Mayor Eric Adams as a way to induce his cooperation with administration efforts to crackdown on migrants—a move that prompted multiple resignations by career government lawyers. The same is true for the president’s threats to withhold duly appropriated federal monies to state and local governments that refuse to accept administration demands on matters such as college athletics or the administration's selectively-imposed restrictions on federal emergency response funds to states. Equally concerning are the president’s efforts to undermine major law firms that took cases against him or represented clients whom he regards as enemies.

U.S. President Donald Trump, Washington, D.C., April 2025 Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

On the question of the administration’s removal of people who are lawfully in the country—holders of immigrant green card visas, for example—the courts will need to balance the need to uphold constitutional rights with the president’s broad leeway to conduct foreign affairs. As lawyers and stakeholders have forcefully argued, by invoking the Alien Enemies Act to defend its actions—an act that has previously been used only in three wartime situations, in each of which Congress had declared war—the administration has cast aside precedent. Indeed, the administration’s legal positions risk implying that it can remove anyone to another country before or in spite of court review, even if that country will hold the person indefinitely with no criminal charges..

If the Trump administration moves from aggressive but symbolic criticisms of judges to openly flouting court rulings, judges, civic leaders, and the general public will have several tools with which to respond. For one thing, the more the administration plays games with the courts, the more it will spend down the scarce reservoirs of credibility it needs to prevail even on the cases that are within the zone of law and that it could conceivably win. “The executive will lose much from a public perception of its lawlessness,” wrote Circuit Judge Harvie Wilkinson in his April decision opinion concerning Kilmar Abrego Garcia, the Maryland resident whom the administration has wrongly deported to a Salvadoran prison. In many cases, parties challenging executive action will argue that the administration’s pattern of noncompliance should be taken into account, and trial courts will consider their full range of options. Courts can impose injunctions and special monitors or initiate contempt proceedings that can culminate in criminal or civil contempt (the latter of which remains beyond the reach of the presidential pardon power): Judge Boasberg has already done this in a case involving removal under the Alien Enemies Act.

Alongside action by the courts, high-profile former public officials and judges from across the spectrum could form panels organized by nonpartisan civil society groups to monitor administration compliance with court decisions in key cases. And the governors, mayors, and state attorneys general who constitute the heart of the federal system will determine their own responses to executive overreach against the backdrop of court judgments and media reports about actions that are contrary to law. Whatever the difficulty, steady and clear critiques of efforts to undo the guardrails of American democracy—guardrails that have been powerfully constructed over the years by conservative jurists and voices from civil society—are at least a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to give American citizens, investors, and businesses leaders the capacity to respond.

HOLDING THE LINE

In the first three months of his second term in office, Trump’s executive actions have gone well beyond the policy changes one might rightly expect in a rule-bound democracy. Yet Americans are not now living under an authoritarian regime. Although there has been plenty of troubling behavior from the administration, the three critical guardrails of the U.S. system remain in place and can continue to provide essential constraints on a lawless executive: courts are ruling, states are going about their functions, and the media and ideas sector are relentlessly explaining to a divided American public what the administration is doing and why it matters.

Together, these guardrails can create enough space for business and the public to better judge the implications of what is actually happening, decide on suitable action, and participate in meaningful elections. They convey that the commitment to a rule-of-law based democracy that has long defined the United States is not just a set of values; it is built into the underlying structure of American society in a way that allows the country to continually improve and avoid its worst impulses. Prematurely assuming that the foundations of U.S. democracy are crumbling and that the edifice will collapse can make people run for cover at precisely the moment when they should instead be reinforcing them.

Courts, federalism, and the independent media will not alone protect the country in every circumstance. But they can enable crucial action to respond to a relentlessly power hungry administration. And they provide a toolbox to contain a presidential project that seeks to amass the kind of power that would have come in handy to Yoon in South Korea when he tried to declare martial law in December. The extent to which these guardrails can hold the line and ensure that American pluralist politics remain resilient will be an important factor in determining whether the United States finds one day that the rule of law has been replaced by a system of personalized, arbitrary power.

That the United States is a democracy based on the rule of law and not a monarchy is part of its founding premise. Under that premise, elections have consequences, which is why new presidents propose new legislation or lawful policy changes on important matters ranging from American military deployments to artificial intelligence. The system does not permit the president to undo the laws and institutions of the American republic by fiat. When a president operates outside the law, he can hurt millions of people by depriving them of medical care that the law says they should receive and make monetary policy and grant military contracts at his whim to reward his friends. Americans depend on an independent judiciary to serve as a forum for policing the limits of executive power and on independent state and local officials along with an independent media and ideas sector to create space for citizens to assess the country’s condition and understand its civic commitments.

But ultimately, these structures matter most because of what they enable. Over time, their resilience tends to erode when civic and business leaders or the public fail to make use of them, sapping the relevance of fair-minded readings of laws and procedures relative to frenzied dealmaking between individual organizations and an executive branch inclined to coercion. Courts can rule, the media and civil society can truthfully report and analyze, and federalism can offer sufficient respite for Americans of all views to deliberate and vote in elections to come. If the American public and critical elements of the business sector nonetheless view these fights over executive power with apathy or only through the lens of their most short-term interests, then a president acting in bad faith will get away with it.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar · April 18, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com