Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"It isn't enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn't enough to believe in it. One must work at it." - Eleanor Roosevelt

“You can’t go back and change the beginning, but you can start where you are and change the ending.”

- C.S. Lewis

"It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, by rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but to make one’s self invincible.”

- Sun Tzu

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2023

2. Top Republican calls out "geopolitical malpractice" on Russia and China threats

3. ‘When China Attacks’ – and the US goes down to defeat

4. Where Putin and Xi don’t see eye to eye

5. The Korean Model for Taiwan

6. Opinion | Centcom gets a tech disruptor

7. When Weapons Fall Silent: Lessons for NATO from the First Year of the Ukraine War

8. Army to use Pacific Pathways to test assumptions about 'contested logistics,' prepositioned stocks

9. Diplomats in Robes? The Supreme Court’s Unwelcome Forays Into Foreign Policy

10. China Has Been Waging a Decades-Long, All-Out Spy War

11. Biden’s State Department Needs a Reset

12. War Books: The Iraq War

13. BRICS Are Developing a New Currency: State Duma Deputy Chair

14. Philippine, US armies in live-fire drills in northern Philippines

15. US, UK and German tanks not built for Ukraine war

16. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) tests new prototype glider

17. Conor Grennan Dean of Students, NYU Stern School of Business - "I use ChatGPT all day, every day."

18. War of the drones: How Russia and Ukraine have utilised modern UAV technology against one another since Putin's invasion… and how their unmanned fleet compares

19. Japan Breaks With U.S. Allies, Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap

20. Putin's school of sexpionage: Book reveals how they trained at academy

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources observed that the Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 31.
Growing Russian speculation about Russian military command changes likely indicates that Russia may soon reshuffle its senior military command due to the failed winter offensive.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian forces continued to build defenses in occupied southern Ukraine.
Russia began its semi-annual conscription on April 1, the largest conscription call-up since 2016.
Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under rest-and-rehabilitation schemes.
Russian nationalist figures criticized Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for failing to pursue the Union State between Russia and Belarus efforts since mid-1990s.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 1, 2023

Apr 1, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 1, 9 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources observed on April 1 that the Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by March 31. Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov had announced on December 22 that Russian forces were focusing most of their efforts on seizing Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces launched their winter offensive operation in early February along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna-Lyman line and on select frontlines in western Donetsk Oblast.[1] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) observed that Gerasimov has failed to extend Russian control over Donbas during his appointment as the theater commander in Ukraine and has achieved only marginal gains by expending mobilized personnel.[2] Ukrainian intelligence representative Andriy Yusov stated that Gerasimov missed the Kremlin’s deadline to capture Donbas by March 31.[3]

Russian milbloggers fretted that Russian forces must finish their offensive operations in Bakhmut and Avdiivka to prepare for the Ukrainian counteroffensives they expect between Orthodox Easter on April 16 and Soviet Labor Day on May 9.[4] Milbloggers highlighted their disappointment that there have not been any decisive battles throughout the winter and observed that Russia will not be capable of continuing a large-scale offensive operation if it is unable to secure Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the coming weeks. Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) in occupied Donetsk Oblast Alexander Khodakovsky stated that he agrees with former theater commander Army General Sergey Surovikin that Russia needs to shift to defensive positions.[5] (ISW is not aware of any publicly reported statement Surovikin has made along these lines.) Khodakovsky noted that failures during the offensive cause manpower losses and spark negative sentiments among the personnel, and argued that unnamed actors may be attempting to continue the offensive for personal reasons rather than taking a rational approach to the issue. Khodakovsky’s comment likely implies that Gerasimov is pursuing personal interest in sustaining the offensive in order to retain favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Khodakovsky’s recent appointment on March 30 as regional Rosgvardia deputy head and the return of Surovikin (at least by proxy) to the information space may indicate that Gerasimov’s unsuccessful theater-wide offensive may already be costing him favor with Putin.

Khodakovsky’s and milbloggers’ requests for Russian forces to prioritize defensive operations are not unreasonable and indicate that nationalist groups are sensible to the changing dynamics on the frontlines. ISW had long assessed that the Russian winter offensive is unlikely to be successful due to persistent failures of the Russian command to comprehend the time and space relationships involved in such a campaign.[6] ISW also assessed that Russia would lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and ongoing recruitment campaigns in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories may indicate that Russia is preparing for reserve shortages.[7]

Growing Russian speculation about Russian military command changes likely indicates that Russia may soon reshuffle its senior military command due to the failed winter offensive. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recalled Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky from leave on March 30 after the Russian MoD reportedly replaced him with Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich on January 13.[8] The Russian MoD never confirmed Teplinsky’s dismissal, and it is likely that the MoD placed him on leave so it could recall him to command the VDV whenever it deemed necessary. Russian milbloggers claimed that Teplinsky immediately flew to the Russian Joint Grouping Headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar Krai to assume command of the VDV and that he is already planning future operations.[9] One milblogger claimed that Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and former Central Military District (CMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin flew with Teplinsky to the Joint Grouping Headquarters.[10] The Russian MoD replaced Lapin with Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev as CMD commander officially on February 17 following intense public criticism of Lapin for his management of the Svatove-Kreminna line in the fall of 2022.[11] It remains to be seen if Lapin will regain a role commanding forces in Ukraine, however. Russian sources speculated starting on March 27 that the Russian MoD has also recently dismissed Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in response to intense criticism of his command over significant losses in offensive operations near Vuhledar in early 2023.[12] ISW has previously observed that intensified Russian speculation about changes in military command has corresponded with real changes in Russian commanders, although not necessarily following the exact claims of Russian sources.

Key Takeaways

Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources observed that the Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 31.
Growing Russian speculation about Russian military command changes likely indicates that Russia may soon reshuffle its senior military command due to the failed winter offensive.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian forces continued to build defenses in occupied southern Ukraine.
Russia began its semi-annual conscription on April 1, the largest conscription call-up since 2016.
Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under rest-and-rehabilitation schemes.
Russian nationalist figures criticized Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for failing to pursue the Union State between Russia and Belarus efforts since mid-1990s.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna; within 21km northwest of Kremina near Chervonopopivka and Makiivka; and within 20km south of Kreminna near Dibrova, Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, and Verkhnokamyanske.[13] Geolocated footage published on March 31 and April 1 indicated that Ukrainian forces made limited advances west of Chervonopopivka and northeast of Verkhnokamyanske.[14] The Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated that the most intense fighting occurred near Bilohorivka.[15] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction are mostly composed of mobilized personnel in airborne and motorized rifle units and 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps units.[16] Footage published on March 31 allegedly shows the 24th Guards SPETSNAZ Brigade operating in Makiivka.[17] A Russian news aggregator published an interview on April 1 purportedly showing BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) elements operating near Kreminna.[18] Footage published allegedly show the LNR-affiliated ”Prizrak” Battalion striking Ukrainian positions in the Siversk direction.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut on April 1. The Bakhmut area recently received heavy snowfall and weather conditions may have slowed Russian advances in the city.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults on Bakhmut itself and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[21] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperon Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were 25 combat clashes in the Bakhmut area, and that the tempo of Russian assaults continues to decrease compared to two weeks ago.[22] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are continuing to regroup in the Bakhmut area, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may decide to recommit personnel and resources after regrouping to increase the tempo of offensives in and around Bakhmut.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters conducted assault operations in the southern and northern parts of Bakhmut and are gradually breaking through Ukrainian defenses in the southern and southwestern parts of the city.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters continued to advance into the center of Bakhmut and hold positions 200-250m away from the Bakhmut city administration building.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in Bakhmut have become apathetic to the deaths of their comrades.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 1. Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely made marginal gains northeast of Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Novobakhmutivka (14km northwest of Avdiivka), and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Marinka.[29] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults operations near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and Keramik (14km north of Avdiivka) on April 1, and that Russian forces continued offensives south and southwest of Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) on March 31.[30] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on April 1 purporting to show the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 58th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (formerly the 3rd Separate Special Purpose Brigade) of the 1st Army Corps striking Ukrainian positions north of Vodyane.[31] A Russian source claimed on March 31 that Russian forces occupied the Marinka administration building (27km southwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[32]

Russian forces’ focus on offensive operations on Marinka may be compromising Russian offensives elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces conducted about 20 assaults in the Marinka area out of the roughly 70 that they conducted in all of Ukraine.[33] The relatively high tempo of Russian offensives operations around Marinka is likely diverting manpower and resources that Russian forces otherwise could commit to their recent attempts to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area. Russian forces likely diverted some personnel and resources away from Bakhmut and likely decided not to resume offensive operations on Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) in order to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area in hopes of encircling the settlement.[34] Russian offensive operations in the Marinka area do not support the Russian effort to encircle Avdiivka, however, and Russian forces would have to advance far beyond Marinka for the offensives to result in operationally or even tactically significant gains. Russian forces have been attempting to capture Marinka since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have only advanced roughly two kilometers into the settlement since then.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 1. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Aleksandr Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast.[35] Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows Russian forces firing incendiary munitions at Vuhledar.[36]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to build defenses in occupied southern Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov published footage on April 1 purportedly showing engineering and sapper units mining areas in the Zaporizhia direction.[37] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty-associated investigative outlets Krym Realii and Skhemy published satellite imagery showing that Russian forces have constructed new fortifications in Crimea since the start of 2023. The images show that Russian forces constructed defenses behind the administrative border near the Armyansk checkpoint, on the Perekop Isthmus, on the Yevpatoria beaches, and along the E97 and E105 highways.[38] Satellite imagery published on April 1 shows that Russian forces fortified the Berdyansk airport with trenches and ”dragon’s teeth,” and have constructed defenses along the road leading to the airport since the start of 2023.[39] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces continue to build defenses in rear areas of the frontline suggesting that Russian forces may be concerned over their ability to hold occupied territory in southern Ukraine.[40]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on April 1.[41]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia began its semi-annual conscription on April 1the largest conscription call-up since 2016.[42] The Kremlin may be attempting to make up for unfulfilled conscription quotas from the previous fall 2022 conscription cycle. The Crimean Human Rights Group reported that 10 of Crimea’s occupation military recruitment offices did not conscript the expected number of men during the previous conscription cycle, inducting 1,932 Crimeans or 78.8% of the required quota.[43] Crimean occupation officials also deployed 47 men for contract service. Documents signed by the acting Crimean occupation military recruitment official, Yevgeny Kutuzov, stated that Crimea was unable to meet conscription quota due to the delayed start and the shortening of the fall 2022 conscription cycle by one month. Russian President Vladimir Putin postponed the fall 2022 conscription from October 1 to November 1 to accommodate partial mobilization.[44] Kutuzov also noted that the massive ”outflow of citizens” from Crimea, employee and funding shortages within military recruitment centers, and “sabotage of conscription events by citizens of the Crimean Tatar nationality” led to the failure of the fall conscription cycle. Kutuzov also noted that many medical facilities in Crimea lack equipment and specialists certified under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to administer physical examinations for conscription. The September 2022 mobilization likely overwhelmed the Russian military recruitment centers and negatively affected the postponed fall conscription cycle.

The Kremlin continues its efforts to expand the defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on March 31 to establish a plant for the repair of rocket and artillery systems.[45] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reportedly met with deputy defense minsters regarding the provision of troops with ammunition.[46] Shoigu noted that the Russian MoD and Government are controlling all supplies to Russian armed formations and are undertaking all necessary measures to expand the DIB. Shoigu claimed that the expansion of the DIB has already increased Russian production of conventional and high-precision weapons in accordance with Putin’s orders. Shoigu also discussed efforts to improve the efficiency of the Russian logistics system. Shoigu’s recent public appearances in relation to the Russian DIB may be an informational attempt to convince Putin and the Russian public that the Russian MoD is attempting to promptly restore Russia’s military industrial capacities. Former Russian officer and avid critic of the Kremlin, Igor Girkin, criticized Shoigu’s announcement for its vagueness and expressed doubt that the Russian MoD significantly improved the DIB.[47] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Shoigu’s announcement indicated that Russia will soon be able to increase its shell usage to the same levels seen during early phases of the war.[48]

Russia continues to face shortages of trainers necessary to prepare its forces for combat. A Russian milblogger agreed with other milbloggers that Russia is not offering sufficient sapper training to mobilized personnel.[49] The milblogger proposed that the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) should train mobilized personnel elementary sapper skills.

Wagner Group continues to recruit mercenaries across Russia. A Wagner employment account posted a recruitment ad seeking contract servicemen, signals personnel, systems and drone operators, and medical staff.[50] A Russian milblogger also amplified a purported Wagner recruitment ad on an adult entertainment site.[51]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under rest-and-rehabilitation schemes. Advisor to the head of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Rodion Miroshnik claimed on April 1 that an additional 100 children and mothers from occupied territories in Ukraine will soon depart to the Klyazma sanatorium in Moscow Oblast as part of the “We Help Our Own” project’s effort to send Ukrainian children and mothers to sanatoriums in Russia.[52] Miroshnik claimed that 20 residents from occupied Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast are currently at the Klyazma sanitorium in Moscow Oblast.[53]

Russian forces deported more than 2,500 Ukrainian prisoners from Kherson Oblast to Russia while withdrawing from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in autumn 2022. The New York Times reported on April 1 that Russian forces deported more the 2,500 prisoners from local penitentiaries on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and distributed them to prison colonies throughout Russia, primarily in southern Russia.[54] Ukrainian prisoners reportedly faced beatings at detention facilities in occupied Crimea immediately following their deportation from Kherson Oblast.[55] The Ukrainian prisoners reported that Wagner representatives did not attempt to recruit them as part of Wagner’s autumn 2022 prison recruitment campaign in Russian prisons.[56] The prisoners also reported that they faced re-arrest and fines upon release from Russian prisons for supposedly violating Russian immigration laws.[57] It is not clear how many of these Ukrainian prisoners from Kherson Oblast remain in Russia.

A Russian occupation official acknowledged the negative impact of Russian military field fortifications on agricultural activities in occupied Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo acknowledged on April 1 that extensive Russian field fortifications from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to the border with occupied Crimea pass through sown agricultural plots and that this inconveniences the spring field work season in Kherson Oblast.[58] Saldo asserted that farmers in Kherson Oblast have adapted to the situation and that agricultural machinery operates next to Russian military field fortifications.[59]

Russian Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova met with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow on March 31 to discuss efforts for creating social benefits for the children of Russian military chaplains serving in occupied territories.[60]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian nationalist figures criticized Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for avoiding the implementation of the Union State between Russia and Belarus efforts since mid-1990s. A former Russian State Duma parliamentarian Viktor Alksnis stated that he is alarmed by Lukashenko’s efforts to suppress pro-Russian organizations and sentiments.[61] Alksnis criticized Lukashenko’s March 31 speech stating that all Lukashenko’s statements are ambiguous about his allegiance to Russia. Former Russian officer and avid Kremlin critic, Igor Girkin, stated that Lukashenko appears to be more level-headed than Russian President Vladimir Putin because he understands the depth of the military and economic crisis resulting from the “special military operation” in Ukraine.[62]

Belarusian forces continue to conduct exercises. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 1 that the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Guards Airborne Brigade completed brigade tactical exercises at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk Oblast and the 11th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade departed for a planned field exercise.[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[2] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1642054869447049216

[3] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/plan-putina-shchodo-donbasu-provalyvsia.html

[4] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20369; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11180 ;...

[5] https://t.me/strelkovii/4370 ; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2646

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012023 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/8251 ; htt...

[9] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8727 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46464 ...

[10] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46464

[11] https://ria dot ru/20230217/komanduyuschie-1852680114 dot html;

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iuVENqYbPWYsmDuE8G...

[14] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1642210840043462664?s=20 ; https://t.me/btr80/5940 ; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1642205395505631284?s=20; https://w... ; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1641871752346099734?s=20 ; https://t.me/k_2_54/75

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9588

[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/01/na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-zastosovuye-rizni-typy-artyleriyi-sergij-cherevatyj/

[17] https://t.me/kremlinprachka/23767; https://t.me/kommunist/16723

[18] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20371; https://t.me/readovkanews/55916

[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81948

[20] https://t.me/z_arhiv/19971 ;https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023...

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fXEjWdYehd5ZG1wm7bs...

[22] power https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/01/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-vorog-prodovzhuye-zaznavaty-znachnyh-vtrat-sergij-cherevatyj/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/11707 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81945

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81945

[26] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20368

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/11707

[28] https://twitter.com/operativno_ZSU/status/1642164369021706240?s=20 ; h...

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iuVENqYbPWYsmDuE8G...

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/11707 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/463 ; https://t...

[31] https://t.me/astrahandm/7919; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23821

[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/55900

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fXEjWdYehd5ZG1wm7bs...

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/25284

[36] https://t.me/HelpTheBrave/252 ; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/sta...

[37] https://t.me/vrogov/8466

[38] https://t.me/cxemu/3294

[39] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1642183788930138114

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iuVENqYbPWYsmDuE8G...

[42] https://t.me/bazabazon/16679

[43] https://crimeahrg.org/ru/v-krymu-sorvali-osennij-prizyv-v-armiyu-rf/

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[45] https://t.me/readovkanews/55893

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/25285

[47] https://t.me/strelkovii/4376

[48] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7473

[49] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20361 ; https://t.me/rosgvardeez/746

[50] https://t.me/wagner_employment/34

[51] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22170

[52] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10890

[53] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10890

[54] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/world/europe/ukraine-convicts-russian...

[55] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/world/europe/ukraine-convicts-russian...

[56] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/world/europe/ukraine-convicts-russian...

[57] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/world/europe/ukraine-convicts-russian...

[58] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/620

[59] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/620

[60] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1273

[61] https://t.me/blackcolonel2020/832

[62] https://t.me/strelkovii/4368

[63] https://t.me/modmilby/25039; https://t.me/modmilby/25049; https://t.me...

Top Republican calls out "geopolitical malpractice" on Russia and China threats

Axios · by Zachary Basu · March 29, 2023

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chair of the new House China select committee, told Axios that it would be "geopolitical malpractice" to separate the threats to the U.S. posed by Russia and China.

Why it matters: The Republican Party is divided on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with some — including former President Trump and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis — viewing the war as a "territorial dispute" and a distraction from the real threat posed by the Chinese government.

Driving the news: Gallagher told Axios' Alexi McCammond at the second annual What's Next Summit that he hopes to use the new select committee to "explore the depths of the 'no limits' partnership" that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced before last year's Beijing Olympics.

"Lot of people downplayed it, but everything we've seen since suggests that Putin is Xi's junior partner in a de facto alliance or new Cold War," Gallagher said.
Referring to Putin as Xi's "tethered goat" and "agent of chaos" in Europe, Gallagher stressed that the U.S. must be able to project power in multiple theaters — dismissing arguments from populists like Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) that sending aid to Ukraine is draining resources and attention from Taiwan.

"The lesson from Ukraine is that you need to arm your friends and partners before the shooting starts," Gallagher said, calling for the U.S. to "take advantage of this moment to replenish" weapons stockpiles for a potential conflict with China.

The intrigue: Gallagher, whom some Republicans have encouraged to run for Senate, told Axios he stands by what he has previously said about not supporting Trump due to Jan. 6 — even if he's the 2024 GOP nominee. "I have a 'No Boomer' policy," Gallagher joked.

Editor's note: This story has been updated to clarify Gallagher's position on not supporting Trump in 2024.

Axios · by Zachary Basu · March 29, 2023

3. ‘When China Attacks’ – and the US goes down to defeat

Excerpts:

Newsham’s views are clearly and forcefully expressed. This writer has only one quibble with the book, namely over the US defense budget. Newsham argues that US $850 billion is not much. An experienced military officer, he knows more about the cost of deterrence than I do.

But as a financial and industry analyst, I would note that at $20 billion a pop, that’s more than 40 new semiconductor factories per year. Might the US not be doing to itself what it did to the Soviet Union, i.e. bankrupting itself by pushing military spending into the stratosphere while neglecting serious economic and social problems at home?

The contradiction is in raising the specter of Chinese drone and missile attacks on the US West Coast and then presenting Taiwan as the stopper in the bottle that denies China access to the wider Pacific.

In February, the Philippines granted the US military access to four new bases in addition to the five already available for joint exercises and pre-positioning of supplies under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Japan and Australia are also stepping up their military cooperation with the Philippines. It seems unlikely that the US and its Pacific allies would simply quit and go home if China were to take Taiwan.

‘When China Attacks’ – and the US goes down to defeat

Colonel Grant Newsham’s new book lays out an alarmingly dire scenario for American power and influence in the Pacific

asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · March 27, 2023

“It’s a year or two from now” and here’s what we see: explosions at Pearl Harbor and nearby Hickam Air Force Base, a drone attack at Naval Base San Diego, the collision of a Chinese-crewed fishing vessel with a US oil tanker departing Hawaii for the Western Pacific. Meanwhile, “the People’s Liberation Army is ashore on Taiwan in large numbers.”

Its internet and other communications down, Taiwan is cut off from the world. The US government is caught flat-footed. The Marines never make it to Taiwan and US Navy ships on their way from Singapore, Guam and even West Coast ports are hit by missiles before they have time to react. Chinese special forces launch attacks in Hawaii, Guam and Japan.

“Taiwan realizes no help is coming. It sues for terms and gives up. Immediately, the rest of Asia gets the message.” The reputation of the US has been shredded. Its First Island Chain of defense in the Western Pacific is broken. China can no longer be contained and it will not stop at Taiwan.

This fictional “informed speculation” kicks off Grant Newsham’s new book “When China Attacks: A Warning to America.” It is a wake-up call for anyone who thinks the dispute between the US and China can be solved by reasonable discussion.

Newsham is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies. His career has spanned intelligence and liaison roles in the US Marines, counterinsurgency and commercial positions as a US Foreign Service Officer and a business career in Tokyo with an investment bank and in the high-tech industry. His writings have appeared in many publications, including Asia Times.

Having grabbed the reader’s attention, Newsham shifts gears to present an extensively researched comparison of America with its decline and loss of resolve versus China with its coherent strategy and clear objectives.

The topics are familiar: In the US, they include social decay and economic weakness brought about by the loss of manufacturing, the corruption of academic, financial, corporate and political elites hooked on Chinese money and the debilitating impact of America’s woke cultural revolution pitting national self-criticism against the Fourth of July. In China, there is the single-minded focus of a one-party state on comprehensive national power.

Newsham describes China’s:

use of psychological warfare,
manipulation of international legal frameworks (“lawfare”),
capture of international organizations,
exploitation of Covid and involvement in American addiction to fentanyl
undercutting of American industry and the US dollar, and
extraordinarily widespread hacking of IT infrastructure.

He reviews the US government’s acquiescence in China’s de facto takeover of the South China Sea and the military possibilities of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

It is impressive and useful to have all this information in one book.

The US and international order it created after World War II have been under attack for many years. Americans hoping to reach a profitable compromise with China just haven’t wanted to reach that logical conclusion. Their wishful thinking is supported by a mindset that draws a line between kinetic and non-kinetic warfare.

It is important to keep in mind,” Newsham writes, “that the Chinese Communist Party does not distinguish between peacetime and wartime like Americans do. To the communists, there is no distinction… Non-kinetic warfare measures and an actual shooting war are on the same spectrum…

“How do we know this? The Chinese told us.

“In 1999, two People’s Liberation Army colonels [Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui] published their book Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America. They call for economic warfare, attacks on key infrastructure, propaganda and influence efforts to weaken and tear apart an opponent’s society and political system, and any number of lines of attack.”

The Chinese have also told us (again and again) that one way or another – by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary – Taiwan will be reunited with the mainland. And now, after a military build-up of unprecedented scale and speed, they are ready to enforce that demand.

“Analysts differ,” Newsham writes, “but in my opinion, the People’s Liberation Army is capable of launching a full-scale invasion. Having learned from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine, the Chinese will move suddenly, with overwhelming force, and quickly take the island.

“Once they have done so, they will have open access to the Pacific. This will enable them to surround Japan and position themselves between America and Australia. US dominance as we have known it will be gone. Military and economic containment of China will be rolled back.”

A simulated invasion of Taiwan. Both the US and China would incur heavy losses in a conflict. Image: Facebook

How can this scenario be avoided? Newsham believes that the United States “needs its own political warfare strategy that systematically combines diplomacy, propaganda and economic, financial, and technological strengths with military power and alliances, thus forming a proper campaign plan.”

A lot more money must be spent to make sure the US military has the weapons it needs to defeat any enemy, including China, and with that spending there must be accountability, the author argues.

Poor performance as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan and the shortages of missiles, ammunition and other materiel revealed by the war in Ukraine cannot be tolerated. Professionalism must take priority. Wokeness in the military must end.

Most of all, the US needs the will to fight. “We must realize that there is presently no deal to be cut with the Chinese Communist Party,” writes Newsham. Investment in China must be stopped. Nothing of importance should be imported from China. The ruthless totalitarian nature of communism and the Chinese regime must be explained to the American people at every opportunity.

“If we lose the war with China, it will be because we want to lose,” he concludes.

“And if we want to lose, it will be because the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and its proxies and fellow travelers have gotten into our heads and have made us forget what it is to be American. What it means to be free.”

Newsham’s views are clearly and forcefully expressed. This writer has only one quibble with the book, namely over the US defense budget. Newsham argues that US $850 billion is not much. An experienced military officer, he knows more about the cost of deterrence than I do.

But as a financial and industry analyst, I would note that at $20 billion a pop, that’s more than 40 new semiconductor factories per year. Might the US not be doing to itself what it did to the Soviet Union, i.e. bankrupting itself by pushing military spending into the stratosphere while neglecting serious economic and social problems at home?

The contradiction is in raising the specter of Chinese drone and missile attacks on the US West Coast and then presenting Taiwan as the stopper in the bottle that denies China access to the wider Pacific.

In February, the Philippines granted the US military access to four new bases in addition to the five already available for joint exercises and pre-positioning of supplies under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Japan and Australia are also stepping up their military cooperation with the Philippines. It seems unlikely that the US and its Pacific allies would simply quit and go home if China were to take Taiwan.

When China Attacks: A Warning to America is scheduled for release on March 28. It can be ordered on Amazon here.

Follow Scott Foster on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · March 27, 2023

4. Where Putin and Xi don’t see eye to eye

Excerpts:

Russia’s war with Ukraine has brought economic benefits to China. Chinese exports to Russia have doubled in the past year. China purchases Russian fossil fuel at cut-rate prices; China has replaced Germany as the largest importer of Russian energy last year.

Putin seems to expect the relationship to last, whatever bumps emerge on the diplomatic road. On March 31, he issued a 42-page foreign policy manifesto that laid out plans to boost ties with countries that oppose Western “dominance.”

He identified China, as well as India, as key potential partners. Rejecting sanctions, India also buys Russian petroleum at a discount and has abstained in United Nations votes to condemn Russia’s invasion. Last year, India increased its oil imports from Russia tenfold.

Putin’s stated goal: “The Russian Federation intends to give priority to the elimination of vestiges of the dominance of the United States and other unfriendly countries in world politics,” the document read.

On those grounds, China has already signed up.

Where Putin and Xi don’t see eye to eye

Putin quickly backtracks on pledge to Xi against deploying nuclear weapons abroad but no new Sino-Soviet split is in sight

asiatimes.com · by More by Daniel Williams · April 1, 2023

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin met in Moscow last month, China sent a cautionary rebuke to Russia about nuclear threats against Ukraine in a clear message to avoid nuclear war.

Putin, who on several occasions had threatened to launch atomic weapons in retaliation against various battlefield escalations, signed onto a no use of nuclear weapons statement in a joint communique.

Or at least he did for a few hours. Among the pledges listed, China and Russia agreed that “All nuclear-weapon states should refrain from deploying nuclear weapons abroad.”

But no sooner had Xi left Moscow than Putin ignored the accord and announced plans to place tactical nuclear arms in Belarus, a neighboring country that could be a staging ground for Russian invasion forces.

China responded quickly. “Under the current circumstances, all sides should focus on diplomatic efforts for a peaceful of the Ukraine crisis and work together for de-escalation,” Mao Ning, a foreign ministry spokesperson, told reporters in Beijing on March 27.

It was an unusually vivid sample of the dissonance underlying aspects of Russia and China’s apparent agreement over Ukraine policy. China, despite its hefty economic and propaganda support for Russia, wants to be seen as a peacemaker, not as a warmonger.

Putin, on the other hand, has declared Ukraine an existential threat to Russia that must be crushed.

In effect, Xi sometimes finds himself walking a tightrope when partnering with Putin. He simultaneously extolls the tightness of the two sides’ “no limits” relations—a welcome diplomatic boost during a war that’s not going Russia’s way – while wanting to keep it within the bounds of his core foreign policies.

In the case of Ukraine, though, even China sometimes has to give in. Take the issue of respect for sovereignty, a cornerstone of China’s expressed foreign policy.

Ukrainian artillery firing away. There is no peace in sight on the battlefield. Photo: Defense of Ukraine

A month before the Moscow summit, China’s foreign ministry issued a 12-point peace plan for Ukraine. In particular, the statement declared that “The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld.”

In Moscow, neither Xi nor Putin spoke of respect for sovereignty; it was a word also missing from their published joint statements.

Consider also Putin’s overall response to China’s peace outline. He publicly indicated that some of the plan was unacceptable, though he didn’t specify which aspects.

“Many of the provisions of the peace plan put forward by China are consonant with Russian approaches and could form a basis for a peaceful settlement,” Putin said.

The Russian leader then added a kind of emergency exit from having to decide: the West and Kiev had to sign on first. (Both Washington and Kiev reject the plan because it doesn’t require the total removal of Russian forces from Ukraine.)

Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely such differences will lead to a China-Russia break-up. Beijing has certainly not prepared the public for such a dramatic change. Its media is full of critiques blaming American hegemony and bullying for causing the war, as do Chinese leaders in their public statements.

“No matter how the US and Europe try to convince China otherwise, in Beijing’s view, the convergence of Chinese and Russian interests in countering the US will outweigh their dig interests, such as the competition for regional leadership and sphere of influence,” wrote Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, a foreign policy think tank in Washington.

Prior to the Sino-Russian summit, outsiders predicted it would focus on Ukraine. The US government expressed concern that China would announce a willingness to supply arms to Russia at the meeting.

As it turned out, those expectations were wrong. In official accounts, the Ukraine conflict was treated as a second-tier issue.

In opening remarks on March 21, the first day of the summit, Xi made a mention of the crisis, saying China was against “adding fuel to the fire” (a coded reference to the United States) and would continue to seek a “political settlement.”

In a nine-paragraph Chinese Foreign Ministry summary of a press conference on March 24, Ukraine was mentioned only once. Xi said that China had taken an “objective and impartial position” on the issue. Instead, Xi focused on trade, industrial cooperation and “people-to-people” contacts.

Putin said nothing about Ukraine, though the Chinese said he “welcomes China’s willingness to play a constructive role.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin share a toast, March 21, 2023. Image: Screengrab / SCMP video / Youtube

Some observers surmised that Xi is in no hurry to press for the war’s end. The conflict has sapped American military resources—already both the US and Europe are discovering they lack enough ammunition to supply Ukraine – while imposing higher fuel costs on Western economies as China receives Russian oil at below-market, friendship rates.

Moreover, in almost every Western country, some political voices oppose involvement—notably among them, members of the US Republican Party and minority parties in France and Italy.

If China simply sits tight, any outcome—either a disaster for Russia or a Kremlin victory over Ukraine – would likely favor Beijing, wrote Martin Sebena, a researcher for the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, located in Slovakia.

“China can only gain from the war in Ukraine,” Sebena said.

He surmised that a Russian victory would strengthen a China ally “at the expense of the West,” while defeat would leave Russia economically weakened and “tied to China.”

Russia’s war with Ukraine has brought economic benefits to China. Chinese exports to Russia have doubled in the past year. China purchases Russian fossil fuel at cut-rate prices; China has replaced Germany as the largest importer of Russian energy last year.

Putin seems to expect the relationship to last, whatever bumps emerge on the diplomatic road. On March 31, he issued a 42-page foreign policy manifesto that laid out plans to boost ties with countries that oppose Western “dominance.”

He identified China, as well as India, as key potential partners. Rejecting sanctions, India also buys Russian petroleum at a discount and has abstained in United Nations votes to condemn Russia’s invasion. Last year, India increased its oil imports from Russia tenfold.

Putin’s stated goal: “The Russian Federation intends to give priority to the elimination of vestiges of the dominance of the United States and other unfriendly countries in world politics,” the document read.

On those grounds, China has already signed up.

asiatimes.com · by More by Daniel Williams · April 1, 2023

5. The Korean Model for Taiwan

A fascinating Oped that should drive some discussion.

The Korean Model for Taiwan

In the 1990s, even Beijing abandoned its rejection of the ‘one country, two governments’ formulation.

By Hu Ping and Perry Link

March 29, 2023 4:16 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-korean-model-for-taiwan-one-country-two-governments-communique-china-ccp-beijing-strategic-ambiguity-c12270fa?page=1

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen is visiting the U.S., but under the odd diplomatic protocol that governs U.S.-Taiwan relations, she isn’t on a state visit or even a visit. Officials at the State Department and the White House are at pains to refer to it as a “transit.”

When Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger negotiated the 1972 Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué in Shanghai, Taiwan’s status was the most difficult issue. Beijing made some hard demands, which the American side neither accepted nor challenged, leaving room for “strategic ambiguity” in its support for Taiwan after the U.S. formally established relations with Beijing and broke with Taipei in 1979.

That approach was probably wise at the time, but stability would now be better served by an unambiguous American statement on the legality of the Taiwan government. The U.S. could recognize Taipei under a principle of “one country, two governments.” That would fall short of supporting Taiwan independence and wouldn’t abrogate the “one China” principle on which Beijing has insisted since 1972. Instead, it would follow the evolution of Beijing’s own approach to relations with Taipei.

In the Shanghai Communiqué, the Chinese side explicitly rejected “one China, two governments” in addition to these other formulas: “one China, one Taiwan,” “two Chinas” and “an independent Taiwan.” The Chinese Communist Party’s position remained the same until the mid-1990s, when subtle changes began appearing.

In a speech in January 1995, President Jiang Zemin expressed “resolute opposition” to “two Chinas” and to “one China, one Taiwan,” but notably made no mention of “one China, two governments.” A 1993 party white paper on Taiwan stated that China rejects the “two Germany” and “two Korea” solutions to the Taiwan issue, but another white paper, in 2000, maintained opposition to the two-Germany model but said nothing about opposing the two-Korea model. Since then, “one China, two governments” and “two Koreas” have been systematically missing from official speeches and documents. On a topic as sensitive as Taiwan, these minor shifts can’t have been inadvertent. They meant something.

The Germany and Korea models were different. The East German Constitution of 1974 conceived of East Germany as a separate country, distinct from West Germany. By contrast, the constitutions of both North and South Korea see their governments as ruling part of a single Korean motherland. That is the “one country, two governments” notion that Beijing in the late 1990s dropped from its “resolutely oppose” list.

For Taiwan, a “Korean solution” would be a major advance. North and South Korea both allow the other to have diplomatic relations with foreign countries, to join the United Nations and other international organizations, and to play as independent teams in the Olympics and the World Cup. Beijing itself has maintained diplomatic relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul since 1992.

To be sure, there would be objections on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwanese wouldn’t want to live under a “second” Chinese government because they don’t think of themselves as Chinese at all. But even for them, it would be hard to reject a “one country, two governments” arrangement because it would radically reduce the fearsome threat from Beijing that they live under.

The regime in Beijing has obvious reasons to insist on the illegitimacy of its counterpart in Taipei. The island is a vibrant democracy and has the world’s 21st-largest economy but is an embarrassment to the Chinese Communist Party as a living refutation of the claim that democracy and Chinese culture are incompatible. “Uniting the motherland” has been crucial to the party’s efforts to stimulate nationalism and to take credit as its champion.

Yet Beijing has shifted as practical needs have demanded. From the 1950s through 1970s, the regimes in Beijing and Taipei denounced each other as pseudo-governments; cross-straits commerce and movement were essentially zero. But beginning in the 1980s, increasing in the 1990s and mushrooming in the 2000s, exchange flourished, and so did problems that demanded joint efforts to address. The two sides have signed more than 20 agreements on investment, trade, exchange of personnel, fighting crime and other matters.

Such agreements normally are signed by governments, so cross-straits negotiations inevitably raised the thorny problem of how to do so while pretending not to. The answer—as with U.S.-Taiwan relations—was that each side launched a nongovernmental organization. On the mainland the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits was born; on Taiwan it was the Straits Exchange Foundation. In Chinese the two are called “white glove” organizations, but everyone knows whose hands are at work.

In practice “one country, two governments” is already in place. In 2005 and again in 2011, think-tank scholars in mainland China made this point overtly and weren’t punished for doing so.

In 2015 Xi Jinping himself did so. He agreed to meet in person with Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, as a nominally equal counterpart. The two met in Singapore as “Leader of Taiwan” and “Leader of Mainland China.” Both set aside official titles and addressed each other as xiansheng, or “mister.” That Mr. Xi agreed to these terms suggests that he initiated them. No one could have forced him. (Mr. Ma this week became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the mainland.)

Beijing would surely denounce a U.S. move to recognize Taiwan; the party doesn’t miss opportunities to bolster its prestige by stoking nationalism. But a more sober response could lie beneath the surface. It is hard to imagine that planners in Beijing have not anticipated the world’s responses to the way its stance toward Taiwan has gradually shifted. In real terms, the change wouldn’t alter the status quo so much as acknowledge it.

Mr. Hu is a Chinese dissident in exile and editor of Beijing Spring. Mr. Link is professor emeritus of East Asian Studies at Princeton.

WSJ Opinion: China and Russia Stand Together Against the West

Opinion | Centcom gets a tech disruptor

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 30, 2023

If you’re wondering how a hidebound U.S. military is going to compete against smart, aggressive adversaries in the future, consider the example of Schuyler C. Moore, the recently appointed, 30-year-old chief technology officer of U.S. Central Command.

Moore told me bluntly that in her new job of managing innovation at Centcom, 70 percent of the challenge is overcoming “bureaucratic processes, old ways of thinking and legacy systems.” She’s absolutely right. Those obstacles have frustrated would-be defense modernizers for decades. Now, it seems, Centcom may be empowering people to begin fixing them.

Moore’s résumé is a reminder of what makes America exceptional. She’s an Asian American from California who studied at Harvard and was a champion platform diver there. But following an injury, she took a leave and taught school in Afghanistan. After Harvard, she got a master’s in strategic studies at Georgetown, worked for a fancy defense consulting group, advised the Defense Innovation Board and worked for Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.), an Iraq vet and defense reform advocate.

Then Moore did something even more interesting. She joined the U.S. Navy Reserve as an intelligence officer. She was deployed to Bahrain last year as part of a new Centcom Navy unit called Task Force 59 that was experimenting with unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. After she served eight months there, Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, the Centcom commander, named her his chief technology officer.

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This process of fusing high-tech brainpower with the military (and other parts of the U.S. government) is among the most important challenges facing the country. Imagine the impact if Moore’s story was replicated widely — and a generation of smart, creative women and men from diverse backgrounds decided it was cool to work on complex national security and social problems.

Kurilla was the first regional combatant commander to name a CTO. He wanted to make Centcom a laboratory for innovation, after its frustrating decades of overseeing America’s “endless wars” in the Middle East. Necessity was the mother of invention at Centcom: As the United States reduced its footprint in the Middle East, Kurilla needed technology to replace some of the tens of thousands of troops and billions of dollars in weapons that had been part of America’s agonizing effort to police the region.

The Pentagon needs speed and agility as it moves to embrace new technology. Our existing military-industrial-congressional complex, as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) used to call it, excels at producing the aircraft carriers, fighter jets and submarines that are built by giant defense contractors. Smaller tech companies have some brilliant defense ideas, but often they can’t cross what’s known as the “valley of death” between innovation and production.

The challenge for Moore and other modernizers is to advance that transition. She gave me some practical examples. Task Force 59 had acquired an unmanned surface vessel that could race across the seas at 80 knots. Unfortunately, it used a kind of fuel that wasn’t available in the Centcom area of operations. The task force pressed the vessel’s manufacturer, and in 90 days it had switched to a different fuel system. “In the Defense Department, that speed of change is unheard of,” Moore rightly says.

Often, the military needs to exploit off-the-shelf technology from commercial companies. Moore says that’s what’s happening with a network of smart ocean sensors that were developed for the tuna-fishing industry by a Spanish company called Marine Instruments. These long-lived buoys can detect fish (or, with different programming, ships and subs) and using AI, can analyze the data and feed it back to a control center. The key, says Moore, is that commanders “have given us freedom to think outside the box.”

The harsh environment of the Middle East makes it an ideal test lab. “It is incredibly hot, sandy, salty, windy in ways that will push” new systems to the limit, she told reporters in December. Centcom operates what she calls a “capabilities sprint model” in which the command conducts exercises with advanced analytical, targeting and operating systems, finds the flaws, and conducts another exercise 90 days later with improved software and hardware.

This process of modernization is happening at other commands, too. I visited Fort Bragg in North Carolina in February, where Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue had just overseen an exercise called “Scarlet Dragon” to test AI and data-driven technologies for the 18th Airborne Corps, which includes some of the Army’s most elite units. Some of these technologies are being shared with the Ukrainian military to fight Russia and could help deter China from attacking Taiwan.

“We don’t have five or 10 years to wait for the perfect solution. We have to solve problems right now,” Moore tells me. That’s the spirit that animated America’s high-tech entrepreneurs, from Steve Jobs to Elon Musk. It’s good to see innovators disrupting the military, too.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 30, 2023

7. When Weapons Fall Silent: Lessons for NATO from the First Year of the Ukraine War

Conclusion:

The world is still watching how Ukraine, NATO, and the US respond to the next year of possible warfare in the region. This invasion is being used as a global example for countries like China and Serbia, who have threatened to invade territories they claim to be theirs, Taiwan and Kosovo, respectively. The response to Russia will be remembered by these regions and used in their future strategies to achieve their strategic objectives. If NATO and the West hope to avoid these conflicts in the future, it is imperative to work quickly to combat and hold Russia accountable for the conflict in Ukraine.

Through observation of the first year of the war, NATO and the West can learn from Ukraine's successes and lean further into them, focusing on time, technology, and leadership in the coming year to help as a catalyst to the end of the war. Despite valiant attempts to protect its borders and populations from ongoing war crimes, Ukraine cannot combat Russia alone. NATO and the West will need to find concrete ways to ensure ongoing negotiations and protect the Ukrainian people from further casualties and trauma through ensuring a timely response, excellent leadership, and the implementation of hybrid technology styles to collect intelligence and evidence of war crimes.

When Weapons Fall Silent: Lessons for NATO from the First Year of the Ukraine War — Atlantic Forum

atlantic-forum.com · April 1, 2023

By Shannon Welch

“It's a victory when the weapons fall silent, and people speak up,” Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview in 2019, long before the invasion in Ukraine, when tensions were rising along the Ukrainian borders over the ongoing Russian occupation of Crimea. Only six months in office, Zelensky quickly learned the difficulties in keeping peace with its largest neighbour, Russia, who had been committing boundary violations and human rights abuses in different regions throughout the south of the country, preparing him for the conflict that would define his presidency.

The Russian invasion Ukraine has passed its one-year anniversary, solidifying it as the most violent land war since WWII. According to the latest UN human rights office (OHCHR) data, at least 8,000 non-combatants have been confirmed killed—with nearly 13,300 injured—since the Russian invasion began. In 2022, the United States spent US $50 billion on Ukraine; in 2023, the war is anticipated to cost the German economy US $170 billion, or 4% of Germany's GDP. Despite the assistance from NATO, the EU, and the United States, the war continues without a probable end, complicating the strategy for the next possible year of the war.

Despite the difficulties for the region, this past year was full of successes for Ukraine and NATO, from securing Kyiv to US President Joe Biden's successful visit to the capital despite the soundings of air raid sirens and a war-torn horizon. Ukraine’s military and militias have fought hard to regain stolen land and protect the economy by remaining open and relying on new forms of income stimulation. The Ukrainians have been creative and resilient, allowing NATO and the West to pull from their successes observable and repeatable strategies to combat the Russian military structure.

Three significant strategy realms have been considered the most effective for Ukraine: time, leadership, and technology. Having been strong on all three fronts, which are often overlooked in hybrid wartime strategy, Ukraine has maintained a competitive edge against Russia, despite having fewer troops and artillery in its fight against a more extensive, robust military apparatus. By focusing on these three strategies, NATO and the West can improve their current policy concerning Russia for present and future conflict.

The Time Strategy

Time has been a complex tactical strategy used on both sides of the war. What was once thought to be a short war, over within weeks or months, has been drawn out into a long, ongoing conflict, with concessions from both sides on land and air power. Unfortunately, NATO, the US, and Ukraine do not have the luxury of maintaining the ongoing conflict at the same level in which it is being fought for another year. Decisive action will be critical for the US and NATO on the funding and weapons assistance it provides Ukraine in the coming months. At the same time, concern for the war is still a priority in their policy-making sectors.

Ukraine has utilized its ongoing preparedness for a Russian invasion, having its military trained since 2014 by US military forces, allowing for the most current military strategy to be shared and utilized. This military preparation allowed for better homeland defence when Russia invaded the country in February 2022 and for the quick push of Russian troops out of the capital, utilizing training exercises and methods practiced with the US and NATO over the past eight years.

In this conflict, time is a critical component of both sides’ strategies. Putin knows a protracted war will significantly erode popular support for the conflict and deplete several inadequate Ukrainian military stockpiles. President Zelensky has been adamant with NATO and the West on the importance of a timely response to Russia via funding and artillery to reduce the ability of Russia to wait out the war. Russia’s more extensive military infrastructure ensures its ability to withstand a more protracted battle, a luxury that Ukraine does not have without significant help from NATO.

An undefined approach to providing defence capacity will never give Ukraine the power to force Russia to negotiate or prevail in the conflict. Moving forward, NATO should focus on a two-pronged strategy regarding timelines: first, providing enough time and assistance to Ukraine to allow it to prevail against Russia capturing additional land or increasing mass casualties, and second, putting a negotiation timeline on Ukraine to be willing to negotiate with Russia in exchange for Western assistance. This will give Ukraine more opportunities to prepare for negotiations and have the resources they need to protect the remainder of the country.

The Leadership Strategy

In May 2022, US Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth made public several crucial lessons that her military has learned from the conflict in Ukraine. She believes that Russian failings on the battlefield demonstrate the significance of leadership, training, discipline, and logistics in lengthy warfare. In contrast, Zelensky has proven to be a true example of leadership throughout the war, reassuring his people and the global community in his competence and providing stability in a time of extreme stress and conflict.

Zelensky and his cabinet have gained almost a cult status on social and traditional media through their brave choices to remain in Kyiv through the invasion of the city, as well as their robust and transparent leadership strategy, openly sharing their needs, successes, and challenges with the population in daily updates, taking a relaxed and relatable posture often choosing to stand in front of war-torn landscapes, and using a relatable and accessible tone for all people watching. This relatability has reinforced his confident communication style that has resonated well with Ukrainians and the global community, helping to keep morale high.

After Zelensky’s conversations and appeals to the West for economic support, almost one thousand corporations withdrew from the Russian economy in 2022: not because they were obliged to or because of sanctions but because doing business in Russia became to be perceived negatively. This new type of geopolitical cancellation will have long-term effects on the Russian economy and how other nations see their economies and conflict. The relatability and support for Zelensky's leadership style have significantly impacted the Russian economy and perception of Russia as a whole.

Ukraine's leadership has been far more restrained in its use of sophisticated weaponry on the frontlines. Given the stakes, Ukrainian leaders have experimented with a mixture of innovative and rudimentary technology to gain a military edge, such as deploying deadly autonomous weapons in conflict or increasing reliance on artificial intelligence tools. This leadership posture, to hold back and be thoughtful about the use of technology and artillery due to necessity and strategy, have allowed Ukraine to continue innovation throughout a year of ongoing warfare.

The Technology (or lack of) Strategy

Ukraine has taken a twofold strategy to use technology on the battlefield, and the lack of technology to protect their signals intelligence and human resources. This strategy has formed over several attempts of trial and error, depicting a delicate balance between the proper times and regions to deploy different kinds of technology (UAVs, long-range and hypersonic missiles, combatting the Russian disinformation machine, etc.). The training and support from NATO and the West on these programmes have been imperative to Ukrainian success thus far.

In addition to Wormuth’s comments on Ukrainian military leadership, she emphasized that the Ukrainian Army must decrease electronic signals, particularly from cell phones, protect against advanced drones, and sustain weapons stocks and the defence industrial bases. This became a vital strategic tool for Ukraine, as low-end technology, often available to civilians off-the-shelf, has been a critical advantage. Items such as commercial quadcopter drones and Starlink satellite internet terminals have enabled the Ukrainian military to empower themselves with technologies that significantly enhance command and control, communications, and situational awareness.

Mid-tier drones modified for military usage give crucial real-time tracking and surveillance data for troops on the ground. Their aerial information gathering enables compact, mobile militias to make the best possible use of Ukraine’s limited and depleting high-tech weaponry. Ukraine has mastered the impressive integration and use of this assortment of technologies and capacities. It starkly contrasts Russia's technological usage or the traditional NATO models of hybrid warfare, often relying on their most advanced technologies, underutilizing more basic models that are not usually tracked by signals technology.

In addition to providing precise surveillance that can assist intelligence, the videos acquired by quadcopters could assist in assessing responsibility for war crimes following the conclusion of a conflict. "This is one of the first cases we have had where drones have collected so much applicable information for war crimes investigations against civilians," Faine Greenwood, a civilian drone researcher, has stated. Greenwood is an expert with small drones during wartime and has recorded and logged over 350 instances in Ukraine involving consumer drones, including video footage published on Twitter, Telegram, YouTube, and other social media platforms. These videos can be imperative in proving war crimes by Russia, evidence that has never been able to be placed before the international courts.

Conclusions

The world is still watching how Ukraine, NATO, and the US respond to the next year of possible warfare in the region. This invasion is being used as a global example for countries like China and Serbia, who have threatened to invade territories they claim to be theirs, Taiwan and Kosovo, respectively. The response to Russia will be remembered by these regions and used in their future strategies to achieve their strategic objectives. If NATO and the West hope to avoid these conflicts in the future, it is imperative to work quickly to combat and hold Russia accountable for the conflict in Ukraine.

Through observation of the first year of the war, NATO and the West can learn from Ukraine's successes and lean further into them, focusing on time, technology, and leadership in the coming year to help as a catalyst to the end of the war. Despite valiant attempts to protect its borders and populations from ongoing war crimes, Ukraine cannot combat Russia alone. NATO and the West will need to find concrete ways to ensure ongoing negotiations and protect the Ukrainian people from further casualties and trauma through ensuring a timely response, excellent leadership, and the implementation of hybrid technology styles to collect intelligence and evidence of war crimes.

About the Author

Shannon Welch provides governmental affairs and business operations support impacting areas of national security. Mrs. Welch specifically focuses on the anthropological study of the relationship between humans and digital-era technology. She is pursuing a PhD in Criminal Justice: Homeland Security from Liberty University and has a graduate degree in National Security and Cyber Intelligence from Daniel Morgan Graduate School as well as an undergraduate degree in Global Conflict, with a minor in Coastal Biology.

Mrs. Welch’s experience includes working with NGOs and private consulting firms, including NATO, DOD, DOJ, the Heritage Foundation, and DSPolitical. Her most recent accomplishments include receiving the International Climate Change Conference's Scholar Award (2021), the International Climate Change Conference's Emerging Scholar Award (2020), and the George C. Marshall Grand Strategy Fellow with the Heritage Foundation (2019). She has provided support in the digital targeting space for multiple political campaigns for the U.S. Senate, Gubernatorial elections, and state and local issues focusing on counterterrorism, cyber, elections, and foreign policy.

Notes

[i] Simon Shuster, “Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky Interview on Trump, Putin,” Time, December 2, 2019, https://time.com/5742108/ukraine-zelensky-interview-trump-putin-europe/.

[ii] Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights, “Türk Deplores Human Cost Of Russia's War Against Ukraine As Verified Civilian Casualties For Last Year Pass 21,000,” Ohchr (Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights), February 21, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/turk-deplores-human-cost-russias-war-against-ukraine-verified-civilian.

[iii] Eric Rosenbach, “Time Is a Crucial Element of Strategy,” Harvard Kennedy School, February 21, 2023, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/international-relations-security/lessons-year-war-ukraine.

[iv] NATO, “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” NATO, September 20, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

[v] Eric Rosenbach, “Time”.

[vi] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "The Other Big Lessons That the US Army Should Learn from Ukraine," War on the Rocks, June 27, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/the-other-big-lessons-that-the-u-s-army-should-learn-from-ukraine/.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Laura Jones, “Lesson from a Year at War: In Contrast to the Russians, Ukrainians Master a Mix of High- and Low-End Technology on the Battlefield,” The Conversation, February 22, 2023, https://theconversation.com/lesson-from-a-year-at-war-in-contrast-to-the-russians-ukrainians-master-a-mix-of-high-and-low-end-technology-on-the-battlefield-197853.

[x] Matt Burgess, “Small Drones Are Giving Ukraine an Unprecedented Edge,” Ars Technica, May 8, 2022, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/05/small-drones-are-giving-ukraine-an-unprecedented-edge/.

Image: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/zelenskyy-visits-front-line-as-ukraine-gears-up-for-counteroffensive

atlantic-forum.com · April 1, 2023

8. Army to use Pacific Pathways to test assumptions about 'contested logistics,' prepositioned stocks

The proverbial long pole in the tent is logistics.

If I were advising the US Army Pacific I would recommend requesting the services of General Paul Van Riper, USMC to lead an opposing force of naval and air power experts with Chinese expertise to "challenge" those assumptions.

Army to use Pacific Pathways to test assumptions about 'contested logistics,' prepositioned stocks - Breaking Defense

“We're already learning a ton about what the future of army prepositioned stock should look like,” said the Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command Brig. Gen. Jered Helwig.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 31, 2023

US Army soldiers from 1-1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion fire a patriot missile during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 on July 16, 2021, at Camp Growl located in Queensland, Australia. For this year’s exercise, the service is focusing on contested logistics. (US Army photo/Staff Sgt. Malcolm Cohens-Ashley)

Global Force 2023 — Army Futures Command’s recent announcement of a new cross functional team to focus exclusively on “contested logistics” is just the most recent example of the service’s investment in planning for a long-distance fight — like one that could take place across the Pacific.

While some of the key challenges, like the tyranny of distance, are well-known, the Army plans to use this year’s series of Pacific Pathways exercises with allies and partners to examine the service’s existing assumptions about prepositioned weapon stockpiles — including floating at sea — and what it will need to do to prepare for a military conflict in which traditional supply lines could become targets.

“When we look at the Indo-Pacific, we are really going to be focused on establishing and setting up, securing [and] staging bases for air and maritime forces,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday. “[For] contested logistics, the Army will play a huge role in terms of making sure that the joint force has the supplies that it needs, and many of the new air and missile defense systems that we’re developing are directly designed to deal with the anti-access/area denial threats that China poses.”

The service is now preparing to test out its skill at setting up and staging bases in that region when it participates in Talisman Sabre, a biennial exercise with Australia and billed as a cornerstone of Pacific Pathways. Although that event is now not set to occur until the July and August timeframe, during an interview with Breaking Defense on Tuesday, 8th Theater Sustainment Command Brig. Gen. Jered Helwig previewed plans and early observations.

“The scenario is going to be about building capability in austere conditions, so we’ll actually do joint logistics over-the-shore operations,” Helwig told Breaking Defense.

The operation centers around a combined, joint theater sustainment command run by Australian and US military joint force logisticians overseeing a host of activities.

For example, the US Army plans to test out its ability to deploy weapons, like rolling M1 Abrams tanks onto Australia’s sandy beaches and ensuring they don’t get stuck. The service is also eyeing a joint petroleum over-the-shore exercise where soldiers will lay five kilometers-worth (over three miles) of pipe to move fuel from the waterline up to an airfield.

“We’re already learning a ton about what the future of army prepositioned stock should look like,” Helwig said, as many of the assets involved will be pulled from equipment already held in the region, including some waiting in ships.

The Agricultural Hurdle

For Talisman Sabre, the service is pulling equipment from Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) 3, also known as an APS afloat, that consists of seven ships chock full of equipment for European, Indo-Pacific and Middle Eastern theaters. Those ships are continuously sailing around so that anyone outside the US military, “you never quite know quite where it is,” Helwig explained. These kinds of ships, the Army says, house “complete equipment sets, including spare parts, that are strategically placed across the globe, ready for use should the need arise.”

For the exercise, the plan is to use five unit sets worth of equipment, which is basically about a third of one ship.

But it’s not as easy as simply pulling the ship up to a pier offloading the weapons — for a fairly surprising reason: Australia’s strict agricultural inspection guidelines require the inspection of all military equipment entering the country for pests, meaning the service has been prepping for months.

When it comes to those US Army Abrams tanks and other equipment from APS 3, the service dropped those unit sets off in Hawaii more than four months ago and has been deep cleaning them ever since. They will then be loaded back onto the ship with an agricultural inspector onboard outfitted with pesticides standing guard until they arrive down under. It’s an ecological precaution for which there doesn’t seem to be an exception.

“If we went to war, would [Australia] really make us do it? And we [vehemently] think, ‘Yes.’ We’ve seen this in Europe,” the one-star general added.

But largely going through this process, he explained, could help the service decide the best way to adjust its stockpiles around the globe.

“We have to learn what it takes, and allow the Army to make decisions about APS,” he later added. “Do you keep it all afloat? Do you maybe look at leaving some of it in Australia because it’s so hard to get it in there in the first place?”

Army Getting In The Ship Business

In addition to testing out assumptions during global exercises, the Army wants to improve its process for drawing up requirements and acquiring new assets to help move weapons, troops and supplies around on the battlefield.

While it is not clear when the Army’s new contested logistics CFT will be up and running in Huntsville, Ala., the service’s evolving requirements and acquisition processes have enabled Helwig to push for two capabilities he views as key enablers in the Indo-Pacific region: a Maneuver Support Vessel-Light and a -Heavy to transport people and equipment over waters in the region.

Work on the smaller 117-foot RSV-L program is underway after Vigor, LLC, a marine fabrication facility in Vancouver, secured the 10-year contract in 2017 for vessel development and the production of up to 36 of the new watercraft.

“The MSV-L allows us to get into very austere locations… [but] they can’t self-deploy, they can’t move across the ocean by themselves,” Helwig said.

“But they give us a lot of good capabilities. For example, a place like Palau has [hundreds] of islands that make up the country. You don’t need a big ship [to move between the islands] and in fact, you don’t want a big ship because of the weight and the port infrastructure there,” he added. “So, the smaller boats give us those capabilities to do that.”

Although the smaller vessels are great for shorter distances he described, the Army is eyeing a competition for a MSV-H to replace legacy vessels like the Landing Craft Medium and Logistic support Vessel.

“We’re trying to replace… two different types of ships,” Helwig said. “They’re designed to go over the ocean, so they greatly expand our reach.”

Instead of traveling shorter distances between Palau’s islands, the MSV-H is envisioned for the open waters and moving from Guam to Palau.

Helwig said that he and other stakeholders were able to use the Army’s Project Convergence 2022 to make the case for the MSV-H by showing service leaders what current vessels could and could not do.

“That’s part of the requirements generation, we work hand in hand with [the Combined Arms Support Command] on describing the requirements we have in the field, both in terms of port depth [and] speed we think that the vessel needs to go to be effective, given the distances we have to travel in our region,” he explained.

Wolfgang Petermann, the project manager for transportation systems within the program executive officer for Combat Support & Combat Service Support, told reporters in early March that that larger vessel may be up to 400 feet in length, reach a speed of 18 knots while carrying up to 175 soldiers and their equipment payloads right up to shore. If the Army’s plan is approved, he noted that the service may issue a white paper between July and September this year. Then, based on feedback, in early 2024 select three shipyards to participate in a virtual prototyping competition.

Although Helwig is not on the acquisition side of the house, he made one additional suggestion: get a buy-in from Australians on this program.

“We’ve talked to Australia, who’s also looking to build a boat. How do we partner and make this more interoperable, so that maybe we’re able to maintain each other’s boats?” he said. “From a user perspective, this is very attractive to us, to not have to build our own supply chain.”

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 31, 2023

9. Diplomats in Robes? The Supreme Court’s Unwelcome Forays Into Foreign Policy

Excerpts:

None of this is to suggest that the Supreme Court should mechanically defer to presidential foreign affairs prerogatives or lose sight of its responsibility to resolve major legal disputes impartially. But many judges and lawyers from various corners of the jurisprudential spectrum have long supported a tradition of restrained judicial action when it impinges upon the country’s foreign policy. This tradition takes on even greater importance at a time when the Court has shown a penchant for acting boldly and bucking precedent.

Policymakers must become savvier at anticipating the possibility that court decisions about the authority of government agencies could upend major cross-border initiatives such as elements of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the Biden administration’s plan for economic engagement with numerous Asian countries, or the United States-Europe Trade and Technology Dialogue, a program undertaken with the EU to better align policies on trade and technology. Getting state and city governments to buttress such efforts, for example, could help ensure that some degree of international cooperation and harmonization remains possible even if the interventionist Court blocks federal involvement in an initiative.

The present conjunction of great-power competition and an accelerating climate emergency is a dangerous one. U.S. diplomats will face these challenges while also contending with a more aggressive Supreme Court all too willing to buck precedent in the name of orthodoxy and leave less room for prudence in foreign affairs. U.S. policymakers already have enough on their plates. A reckless Court’s shadow foreign ministry only makes a challenging world harder for the United States to navigate.

Diplomats in Robes?

The Supreme Court’s Unwelcome Forays Into Foreign Policy

By Aziz Huq and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

March 30, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Aziz Huq and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar · March 30, 2023

Last December, U.S. President Joe Biden sought to end a controversial immigration program put in place by his predecessor, Donald Trump. That scheme, known as Title 42, relied on an old public health statute to expel more than 2.4 million migrants, including thousands of unaccompanied minors, at the southern border. But before Biden could end Title 42, a coalition of Republican-led states petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to step in and block the federal government from winding down the expulsions. Without any hearing, and despite grave doubts about whether these states even had the legal right to lodge such a challenge, the Court summarily agreed: it forced Biden to continue the Trump-era program, which remains in place to this day.

The Court’s ruling reflected a growing judicial habit of embracing aggressive legal interpretations to issue decisions that could significantly limit what the United States can and cannot do in the world. Led by the U.S. Supreme Court, domestic courts are poised to reshape the implementation of a vast array of laws and regulations critical to U.S. foreign policy, affecting migration, the treatment of people detained on terrorism-related grounds, and the authority of government agencies crucial to diplomatic initiatives related to health, environmental, and technology policy. This legal activism comes at a time when Congress has largely withdrawn from foreign policy and when the country’s polarization has made it difficult for federal lawmakers to approve new international agreements, especially Senate-ratified treaties, or major statutory changes. As a result, the Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities depend ever more on whether executive branch initiatives invite the scrutiny of an emboldened and antagonistic judiciary.

These developments are at odds with the traditional view of the Supreme Court, which plays up its role as an adjudicator of specific disputes, not as a major driver of foreign affairs. Responsibility for that domain is thought to lie with the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Department of Homeland Security—entities to which the Supreme Court has historically deferred. But in a few short years, the Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has carved out a new, muscular role in foreign policy that goes well beyond immigration. In the last year alone, it has taken cases that affect transnational security cooperation, the regulation of financial risk, the legal responsibilities of social media companies that operate across borders, and U.S. leadership on climate change. It has done so in ways that buck precedent and stretch the power of the Court beyond its familiar bounds. In effect, the Supreme Court is not just the highest court in the land—it is well on its way to becoming a shadow ministry of foreign affairs.

SHADOW COURT

The Supreme Court has always had a role to play in disputes about federal power. But since the appointment of three new justices under Trump, the Court’s actions have often appeared to have an especially sharp partisan tilt. Many of the cases that have reached the court in recent years began as litigation filed by Republican state attorneys general or by organizations closely affiliated to Republican coalitions. When an opinion eventually comes out, the justices defer to experts in the executive branch only when it suits them and only erratically recognize judicial precedent. Their interventions cast a wide net. Opinions issued by the Roberts Court routinely take up legal and policy questions that are not raised in the litigation. Such judgments do not change policy directly, but they shift who has power. This shadow ministry in effect decides not just what policy should be but also how policy should be made.

Consider the Court’s June 2022 decision eliminating the Environmental Protection Agency’s power to regulate carbon emissions through the Clean Power Plan, a 2015 rule that limited emissions from power plants. Although federal legislation plainly gave the EPA requisite legal authority to implement the plan, the Court said that the agency did not have the power to decide a “major question,” such as how the government might address climate change.

The decision highlighted a growing challenge in foreign affairs: the increasing entanglement between domestic and international regulatory problems. Americans may have among the highest per capita carbon emissions in the world, for example, but effective climate action requires policy changes in many other countries as well, given that the United States contributes only a fraction of global emissions. What is more, slashing domestic emissions enhances a country’s influence on global climate policy by demonstrating its commitment to serious action, imbuing it with a measure of moral authority and encouraging financial and technological changes with spillover effects for the rest of the world. The Court not only delivered a blow to Biden’s domestic environmental agenda but also undermined the administration’s ability to lead globally.

The Court’s June 2022 ruling in effect prohibited the government from using all its available tools to set climate -change policy without further action in Congress. If this check on the administration’s power simply inserted friction (not outright obstruction) into the process, it might induce helpful deliberation. But a divided Congress will not deliver such support any time soon. Instead, the ruling imposes serious limits on U.S. action at home and abroad. The United States’ global partners and antagonists, no less than domestic observers, see how the Court has rendered the country incapable of effective leadership. The combination of a paralyzed Congress and a muscular Court threaten to trap the United States in a dangerous geopolitical inertia.

The Supreme Court is on its way to becoming a shadow ministry of foreign affairs.

The EPA case is not the only one with international dimensions that the Court has faced. When the Court heard oral arguments in February on whether the social media giants Facebook and Twitter enjoy immunity from federal civil suits, it pondered a decision with wide-ranging repercussions for the transnational public sphere. Similarly, the Roberts Court has heard several challenges to the constitutionality of agencies responsible for financial regulation, such as the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although rulings in these cases have so far been limited, litigation in the pipeline could derail major regulatory agencies in ways that could send shock waves through the U.S. (and hence the global) financial system.

Supreme Court decisions regarding the authority of federal agencies over export controls, international domestic investment, and antitrust regulations all have global consequences. A relatively flexible, open-ended interpretation of the Sherman Act, the country’s core antitrust statute, for example, can afford the executive branch a great deal of leeway in using antitrust law to rein in the activities of U.S. technology companies abroad. In past decades, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to curtail the power of the president to impose economic sanctions or restrict exports, but the current judiciary is wedded to a narrow, even baroque, conception of the limited scope of executive power. It could chip away at or even destroy the long-standing mechanisms available to the federal government in conducting economic statecraft in an interdependent world.

Courts in previous eras have struggled to reconcile urgent foreign policy with domestic law. After World War II, the Vinson Court set limits on how presidents could seize control of industry on national security grounds when it grappled with President Harry Truman’s mobilization for the Korean War. More often, courts reviewing presidential foreign affairs actions in areas ranging from economic sanctions to immigration were generally deferential to the executive. But the current age of international interdependence—with countries bound together by financial markets, digital technology, concerns about climate change, and migration—makes the international implications of judicial action more inescapable and more consequential. The court’s customary caution when it came to reining in a president’s foreign policy is now clashing with an emboldened majority that seems bent on limiting the power of the federal government. An aggressive Supreme Court willing to closely police domestic policy will also become a bench with an outsize global footprint.

The climate change and Title 42 decisions, for instance, show a Court eager to flex its muscles. In its EPA decision, the Court abrogated to itself a dramatic and unclear new authority. Roberts’s opinion in the decision offers only vague guidance on what constitutes a “major question.” As a result, the opinion licenses the justices to invalidate policies in the future that they disagree with. Even in its infancy, this new theory of “major questions” has already been used to critique proposed rules from the SEC and Federal Trade Commission on climate change, privacy, and cybersecurity. All have major foreign policy dimensions.

THE BENCH TAKES CENTERSTAGE

The EPA decision showcases the Court’s swelling confidence in another way: To strike down the Clean Power Plan, the Court had to ignore much of its own precedent. Until 2022, the idea of a “major questions” exception to an agency’s statutory authority was reserved for once-in-a-generation cases. In 2022, the Court expanded the exception to apply whenever a regulation triggered political contention. This disregard for precedent matters immensely. Unlike any other governmental body, the Court is thought to have the last word on what the Constitution means. If it abandons the traditional habits of judicious caution and respect for precedent, it will have cast off all guardrails.

Fair-minded observers generally agree that the Roberts Court’s low regard for precedent is itself precedent-setting. So, too, is its marked willingness to wade, early and eagerly, into contested policy waters. It does so often without waiting for an issue to develop fully or for the ordinary process of litigation to unfold. The Title 42 litigation reflects an increasingly common Court practice of using emergency powers to change the status quo before a case is even heard.

Why has the Roberts Court changed so much and so quickly? The new, aggressive judicial posture embodies the success of conservative activists, such as Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society. These activists have been lobbying Republican presidents since the 1980s to appoint judges who would cater to their ideological fellow travelers rather than to the American public as a whole. Under Trump, they prevailed. A recent empirical study by Stephen Jessee and two co-authors in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that Trump’s appointments to the high court moved that body’s median views far from the preferences of the average American but close to those of the average Republican voter. The predictable result is a Republican-appointed bench that is openly and unabashedly hostile to the policy agenda of Democratic administrations.

This is no secret. Soon after the EPA decision, four conservative justices—Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—appeared at the annual dinner of the Federalist Society. They openly affiliated themselves with a plainly partisan ideological project that has connections to many of the litigants in their cases, including Republican attorneys general.

UNPRECEDENTED

In foreign policy, a Court willing to act in this way is all the more influential when other branches are incapable of action. Congress has become sclerotic when it comes to international matters. For instance, it has failed to renew the Generalized System of Preferences program and the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, both of which were relatively uncontroversial yet important trade-enabling measures that expired in 2020. The Court also uses tools such as the “major questions” doctrine to weaken the White House on policy initiatives the justices dislike. Thanks to its own interventions, the Court is often the only actor left standing.

Indeed, there are certain ways in which the Court, compared with Congress, has an oddly easier time influencing policy. The justices, after all, set their own agenda by picking from the broad menu of cases that litigants send their way. The Court, moreover, is not balkanized into functional silos as Congress and traditional bureaucracies are. Justices hear and vote on cases bearing on foreign policy whether they involve terrorism, immigration, antitrust policy, climate policy, or anything else. And federal judges, unlike presidents, don’t have to worry about winning re-election.

The Court’s new, aggressive posture embodies the success of conservative activists.

None of this is to suggest that the Supreme Court should mechanically defer to presidential foreign affairs prerogatives or lose sight of its responsibility to resolve major legal disputes impartially. But many judges and lawyers from various corners of the jurisprudential spectrum have long supported a tradition of restrained judicial action when it impinges upon the country’s foreign policy. This tradition takes on even greater importance at a time when the Court has shown a penchant for acting boldly and bucking precedent.

Policymakers must become savvier at anticipating the possibility that court decisions about the authority of government agencies could upend major cross-border initiatives such as elements of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the Biden administration’s plan for economic engagement with numerous Asian countries, or the United States-Europe Trade and Technology Dialogue, a program undertaken with the EU to better align policies on trade and technology. Getting state and city governments to buttress such efforts, for example, could help ensure that some degree of international cooperation and harmonization remains possible even if the interventionist Court blocks federal involvement in an initiative.

The present conjunction of great-power competition and an accelerating climate emergency is a dangerous one. U.S. diplomats will face these challenges while also contending with a more aggressive Supreme Court all too willing to buck precedent in the name of orthodoxy and leave less room for prudence in foreign affairs. U.S. policymakers already have enough on their plates. A reckless Court’s shadow foreign ministry only makes a challenging world harder for the United States to navigate.

AZIZ HUQ is Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former justice of the California Supreme Court.

Foreign Affairs · by Aziz Huq and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar · March 30, 2023

10. China Has Been Waging a Decades-Long, All-Out Spy War

Graphics at the link: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/28/china-has-been-waging-a-decades-long-all-out-spy-war/

Excerpts:

Chinese spies are real in the same way Soviet agents were real.

The Cold War offers two warnings. First, Chinese spies are real in the same way Soviet agents were real. An uncomfortable public policy conversation is urgently needed about the nature of Chinese students, academics, and businesspeople—some of whom may have malign intentions—as well as talent programs and cultural outreach programs in the United States. But that does not mean that Americans who happen to be of Chinese heritage are spies, any more so than left-leaning Americans were Soviet agents.

Second, sunlight is the best disinfectant. The U.S. government must be transparent about its knowledge of Chinese intelligence. If such information is not forthcoming—and scrutinized, debated, and challenged—there is a real prospect of another McCarthyite witch hunt. Today, Chinese Americans are often the victims of the Chinese government and its intelligence services. Finding the balance between security and civil liberties is our challenge ahead. China will continue to spy, using all means available—balloons, businesses, and bytes. We need to determine what trade-offs we are willing to put up with between security and civil liberties.

Now is a moment for nuance, not grandstanding. TikTok provides the Chinese government with a potential platform to collect intelligence on Americans, behind the endless videos posted on it. It also offers the Chinese government the opportunity to shape public opinion. So far, however, it has not been demonstrated in Congress that TikTok actually does either. TikTok should certainly be banned from phones carrying Western state secrets because of the potential for Chinese espionage, but its wholesale ban in the United States is so far not justified on national security grounds. Unless or until evidence emerges that TikTok constitutes more than a potential security threat at large, it is surely the right of Americans to post as many videos as they want online and potentially have their data mined in China if they wish.

China Has Been Waging a Decades-Long, All-Out Spy War

While the West was distracted, the Chinese government began an intelligence assault that never stopped.

MARCH 28, 2023, 6:00 AM

By Calder Walton, a historian at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Foreign Policy · by Calder Walton · March 28, 2023

One week ago, TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew was questioned by members of the U.S. Congress, before the world’s media, about whether the Chinese government uses the wildly popular video-sharing app to spy on Americans. His testimony came several weeks after the appearance of a Chinese spy balloon floating across the United States. What are we to make of these two stories, which are at their core both about Chinese espionage?

To borrow a phrase from Mission: Impossible: Relax, it’s much worse than you think. We are now witnessing some of the effects of a decision made years ago by China to use every means and medium of intelligence-gathering at its disposal against the West. Its strategy can be summarized in three words: collect, collect, collect. Most Westerners do not yet appreciate just how sweeping China’s intelligence onslaught directed at their countries is; for decades, their own governments likewise didn’t understand because their attention was largely directed elsewhere.

After 9/11, the U.S. intelligence community was overwhelmingly geared toward counterterrorism. U.S. spy chiefs followed priorities for this agenda set by decision-makers in Washington. The U.S. government’s strategic focus on combating terrorism took place at the expense of focusing on resurgent states such as China and Russia. As we pass the 20th anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, it is useful to understand how China’s intelligence and national security establishment reacted at the time.

The strategy that China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), its principal civilian intelligence service, took toward the United States after 9/11 followed a Chinese saying, ge an guan huo, which roughly translates as “watch the fires burn from the safety of the opposite river bank, which allows you to avoid entering the battle until your enemy is exhausted.” The MSS followed this saying to a T. Its long-term aim was to contain the United States, and then supplant it, in Southeast Asia. As the United States was mired in the Middle East, the gains being made by the MSS went by largely undetected or appreciated by U.S. intelligence.

Beginning in 2005, the MSS declared war on the U.S. intelligence community. From that point on, all of the service’s best resources and personnel were marshaled against U.S. intelligence—while the United States was pivoting to the global war on terrorism. According to one CIA official with deep expertise on China, with whom I had an exclusive interview on condition of anonymity, internal MSS deliberations from that time were marked with glee as the U.S. government was consumed, if not distracted, by the global war on terrorism.

Chinese intelligence was soon winning its war on U.S. spies. As previously reported in these pages, in 2010 the MSS dismantled a major CIA network being run from its station in Beijing. It reportedly led to the killing or imprisonment of more than a dozen CIA sources in China over more than two years. Details about how Chinese intelligence compromised the U.S. network remain murky. It seems, however, that the MSS hacked into the CIA’s supposedly secure communication channels. There are also whispers that the network may have been compromised by a human agent—a mole, to use John le Carré’s phrase—in the CIA. That person may have been Jerry Lee, a former CIA case officer working on Chinese affairs. After leaving the CIA, Lee sold U.S. secrets to Chinese intelligence. He was later caught—a U.S. counterintelligence success—and in 2019 was sentenced to 19 years in prison. There is little information in the public domain about what secrets Lee delivered to his Chinese handlers.

At this point, you might well say, fair enough—spies spy, just as robbers rob. Perhaps China has been doing what all states do, only better? This might be called the realist school of espionage in international affairs. Such a line of thought about China, usually said with a shrug, is misleading, however. China’s intelligence services operate in a fundamentally different way from those in the West—in nature, scope, and scale.

Unlike those in Western democracies, China’s intelligence services are not held to account by independent political bodies or the public, nor are they subject to the rule of law. Instead, the Chinese government fuses together a “whole of society” approach for collecting intelligence. This sets it apart from anything undertaken by Western governments. Chinese intelligence and commerce are integrated in ways without comparison in the West. Contrary to what may be thought, the U.S. government does not conduct industrial espionage to advantage U.S. businesses. In China, by contrast, thanks to successive national security legislation passed under President Xi Jinping, Chinese businesses are required to work with its intelligence services whenever requested to do so. They are effectively silent partners in Chinese commerce with the outside world. Another difference between Chinese intelligence and Western powers concerns what those in the spy world call ubiquitous technical surveillance. Facial recognition, phone apps, and CCTV all make China an infinitely harder target for Western agencies to collect intelligence on than Chinese services’ targets in open Western democracies. A fundamental asymmetry thus exists in the shadowy intelligence battles between China and the West.

China’s foreign intelligence offensive has reached new levels since Xi took power in 2012. Its purpose involves what all intelligence agencies do: to understand the intentions and capabilities of foreign adversaries. But China’s offensive goes much further: to steal as many scientific and technical secrets from Western powers, principally the United States, as possible to advance China’s position as a superpower—challenging and overtaking the United States on the world stage.

China’s unprecedented economic boom this century has been fueled by an equally unprecedented theft of Western science and technology.

China’s unprecedented economic boom this century has been fueled by an equally unprecedented theft of Western science and technology. Back in 2012, the director of the U.S. National Security Agency warned that cyber-espionage constituted the greatest transfer of wealth in history. China was—and remains—the greatest perpetrator. Beginning around 2013 or 2014, Chinese operatives carried out a massive hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which holds some of the most sensitive information in the U.S. federal government: information obtained during security clearances. This information is that which people often hide from their nearest and dearest—extramarital affairs and such. Chinese intelligence thus has millions of datapoints for potential blackmail, what the Russians call kompromat, to recruit agents with access to U.S. secrets. The OPM haul was followed, in 2017, by China’s hack of the credit rating bureau Equifax, which gave China sensitive data on approximately 150 million Americans. If you are an American, it is more likely than not that China has sensitive data about you.

Then there are Chinese businesspeople who in reality are undercover MSS operatives. Take the example of Yanjun Xu, an MSS officer (not just an agent) who posed as a businessman to steal U.S. aviation trade secrets. He was caught and is now in prison. Xu is hardly alone. A common tactic on the part of the MSS is to dangle a lucrative deal to U.S. businesses, obtain a target’s underlying intellectual property, scuttle the deal, but keep the IP and manufacture the product. In some cases, the Chinese intelligence front companies sell the product back to the original target market.

According to the FBI, in 2021 it was opening a China-related investigation every 12 hours. Even Britain’s traditionally secretive services—MI5, MI6, and GCHQ—have now come out of the shadows and publicly warned about the threat posed by Chinese espionage.

The above, then, is the real context for China’s spy balloon this year. Certainly, balloons seem so last century—or even the century before. But that should not fool us about their capabilities. According to Western signals intelligence officials with whom I have spoken, China’s balloon was equipped with state-of-the-art sensors capable of eavesdropping on electronic signals from near space that satellites could not.

Aerial reconnaissance has a proven track record. After World War II, as the Cold War set in, the newly founded CIA suffered a succession of human intelligence failures in heavily guarded police states behind the Iron Curtain. It was largely due to those failures that the CIA pioneered the use of overhead reconnaissance. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to develop a top-secret spy plane, the U-2. Subsequent U-2 flights allowed U.S. intelligence to peer inside the otherwise dark interior of the Soviet Union.

Aerial reconnaissance has a proven track record.

Papers held at the Eisenhower Presidential Library show the value of U-2 intelligence given to the small circle of those in Washington indoctrinated into its secrets. U-2 overflights of the Soviet bloc revealed that the “missile gap”—the claim that the United States trailed the Soviet Union in missile development—was erroneous. In May 1960, one of the CIA’s U-2s, flown by Francis Gary Powers, was shot down over the Soviet Union. Believing the pilot had been killed, Eisenhower authorized a cover story, similar to China’s recent claims about its balloon: that the U-2 plane was a U.S. weather-monitoring aircraft that had strayed off course. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev announced to the world that Powers was in fact alive, and in Soviet custody, Eisenhower was left scrambling. The CIA gave a closed briefing to Congress about the U-2 program. The CIA’s head, Allen Dulles, was surprised to receive a standing applause from the senators briefed. Eisenhower, however, chose not to reveal to Americans at large the nature of the U-2 program, not wanting to reveal U.S. intelligence sources and methods. That was understandable, but it was also a missed opportunity. It is likely that, if they had known about it, Americans would have rallied behind the U-2 program as Congress did.

The U-2 program continued after the shootdown, playing a major role during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Thereafter, both sides of the Cold War, East and West, threw increasing resources to collect intelligence from even higher overhead—space. Both sides of the Cold War relied on technical intelligence collection, from satellites and overflights, about each other’s arsenals. This made it possible for each side to verify the other’s compliance with arms reduction treaties in the later years of the Cold War. Without what was euphemistically called “national technical means”—a combination of signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and that gleaned from electronic emissions—such arms reduction treaties would have been impossible. Those treaties, backed by mutual Eastern and Western intelligence collection, helped to stabilize the Cold War.

The TikTok logo is displayed in front of a TikTok office in Culver City, California.

Is This TikTok’s Huawei Moment?

As bans of the video app pile up around the world, the question is how far the U.S.—and its allies—will go.

breach-us-china-xi-jinping-cold-war-data-zach-dorfman-joe-magee-illustration-foreign-policy

Beijing Ransacked Data as U.S. Sources Went Dark in China

As Xi consolidated power, U.S. officials struggled to read China’s new ruler.

breach-us-china-surveillane-private-tech-huawei-cold-war-data-zach-dorfman-joe-magee-illustration-foreign-policy

Tech Giants Are Giving China a Vital Edge in Espionage

U.S. officials say private Chinese firms have been enlisted to process stolen data for their country’s spy agencies.

We should not, therefore, be surprised in principle that China would be using overhead platforms to collect intelligence. The United States has done it in the past—and it proved useful. What is surprising is how relatively easy the U.S. government has made it for the Chinese government to steal secrets in key U.S. sectors.

You can’t blame a wolf for going after chickens in a coop—especially if the door is left open. A recent report by Strider Technologies, an open-source strategic intelligence start-up, has revealed how Chinese scientists were able to obtain valuable research and development (R&D) from Los Alamos, home to the U.S. government’s cutting-edge laboratories. The report—which also demonstrates the power of open-source intelligence in today’s digital world—reveals that Chinese scientists at Los Alamos brought R&D from there back to China, which the Chinese government then used in defense technologies such as hypersonics. In some instances, the Chinese scientists at Los Alamos had been funded by U.S. research grants. The United States was thus effectively funding its own competitive disadvantage with China in these sectors.

Cold wars tend to start before Western countries are prepared. Intelligence records reveal that in 1945 the Soviet government was effectively already engaged in a cold war with its Western counterparts. This was based on its long-term ideological opposition to capitalist powers and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s belief that he had to contain them. Before and during World War II, Soviet intelligence undertook an unprecedented espionage offensive against Western powers—including the Soviet Union’s wartime allies Britain and the United States—to collect political intelligence and steal as many scientific and technical secrets as possible. Soviet spy chiefs were pushing at an open door as their Western allies were distracted, if not consumed, by fighting the Axis powers. By the end of World War II, Soviet spies had acquired secrets of the nuclear bomb, whose later development would shape postwar international security. Soviet agents had also penetrated the most sensitive parts of Western governments. This allowed Stalin to calibrate his strategies toward his former wartime Western allies—who were never his allies in the sense they thought—based on secrets from the inside. Western powers were ill-equipped for a struggle they were already in by 1945.

History may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. There are rhymes with the Cold War and U.S.-China relations today. As in the Cold War, from the view of intelligence and national security, the United States is already in a cold war with China. Like the last century’s superpower conflict, Western intelligence agencies are again racing to recalibrate and catch up.

Chinese spies are real in the same way Soviet agents were real.

The Cold War offers two warnings. First, Chinese spies are real in the same way Soviet agents were real. An uncomfortable public policy conversation is urgently needed about the nature of Chinese students, academics, and businesspeople—some of whom may have malign intentions—as well as talent programs and cultural outreach programs in the United States. But that does not mean that Americans who happen to be of Chinese heritage are spies, any more so than left-leaning Americans were Soviet agents.

Second, sunlight is the best disinfectant. The U.S. government must be transparent about its knowledge of Chinese intelligence. If such information is not forthcoming—and scrutinized, debated, and challenged—there is a real prospect of another McCarthyite witch hunt. Today, Chinese Americans are often the victims of the Chinese government and its intelligence services. Finding the balance between security and civil liberties is our challenge ahead. China will continue to spy, using all means available—balloons, businesses, and bytes. We need to determine what trade-offs we are willing to put up with between security and civil liberties.

Now is a moment for nuance, not grandstanding. TikTok provides the Chinese government with a potential platform to collect intelligence on Americans, behind the endless videos posted on it. It also offers the Chinese government the opportunity to shape public opinion. So far, however, it has not been demonstrated in Congress that TikTok actually does either. TikTok should certainly be banned from phones carrying Western state secrets because of the potential for Chinese espionage, but its wholesale ban in the United States is so far not justified on national security grounds. Unless or until evidence emerges that TikTok constitutes more than a potential security threat at large, it is surely the right of Americans to post as many videos as they want online and potentially have their data mined in China if they wish.

Foreign Policy · by Calder Walton · March 28, 2023

11. Biden’s State Department Needs a Reset

I am always hesitant about sending something with an April 1st date.

Excerpts:

To be fair, the disappointing performance of the United States’ diplomats isn’t entirely their fault. Because America’s global ambitions are so vast, many problems won’t receive adequate attention, let alone command the time, energy, and commitment of the people at the very top. And the bigger and broader Washington’s goals, the harder it is to reconcile tradeoffs between them and maintain a clear and consistent set of priorities. This is one of the (many) reasons why some of us keep arguing for greater foreign-policy restraint: U.S. foreign policy would be more successful if it did less but did the vital things well.

Which brings me back to that Summit for Democracy. Even if one overlooks the inconsistent criteria for attendance and the peculiar optics of some troubled democracies (France, Israel, Brazil, India, the United States, etc.) getting together to extol democracy’s virtues, it’s not clear what will be gained from this effort. The first summit didn’t reverse the downward trends that have been underway for almost two decades, which makes one wonder what a second gathering will achieve. Assembling a bunch of powerful officials makes sense when there is something immediate and tangible that they can do together, which is why the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the Madrid Conference of 1991, or the 2015 Paris Climate Conference were worth doing. Similarly, the Obama administration’s four nuclear summits produced some tangible results—such as various agreements to improve custody over nuclear materials world-wide and reduce existing stockpiles of nuclear material—even if they did not reach every one of the administration’s initial objectives.

As near as I can tell, the democracy summits will fall well short of even those modest achievements. Democracy’s future is not going to be helped by more talkfests; it will depend on whether the world’s democracies can deliver better results for their citizens at home and abroad. Success will take a lot of work, and even the wealthiest democracies do not have infinite time or resources—which is why I hope the second Summit for Democracy is also the last.

Biden’s State Department Needs a Reset

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · April 1, 2023

It is a truth universally acknowledged that America’s diplomatic institutions—and especially the State Department—are under-resourced. This truth is especially evident when you compare the State Department or Agency for International Development budgets with the money allocated to the Defense Department or the intelligence services. It’s even more obvious when you take America’s lofty global ambitions into account. It’s also a truism that the president’s time—and that of top cabinet officials such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken—is the scarcest resource of all.

If this is the case, then why-oh-why did the Biden administration devote any time at all to a second Summit for Democracy? It’s not just the time that U.S. President Joe Biden, Blinken, and other senior officials devoted to this talkfest. Putting something like this together also burned up hundreds of hours of staff time that might have been used to address other problems.

I raise this issue because the Biden administration took office vowing to put diplomacy at the center of U.S. foreign policy, yet it has relatively few diplomatic achievements to show for its first two-plus years. On the plus side, U.S. allies are far more comfortable with Biden and Blinken than they were with former President Donald Trump and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and they’ve been willing to forgive some of the administration’s early blunders (such as the unnecessary snub of the French during the AUKUS submarine deal in 2021). But apart from improved optics, the administration’s diplomatic record is unimpressive.

Part of the problem is the “democracy vs. autocracy” framing that Biden & Co. have embraced. I like democracy as much as anyone and more than some, but this dichotomy causes more problems for U.S. diplomacy than it solves. It doesn’t help the United States work more effectively with the autocratic governments that outnumber the world’s democracies and whose help may be more valuable as great power rivalries intensify. It leaves the United States exposed to accusations of hypocrisy, and it doesn’t seem to motivate Washington’s democratic allies very much. Case in point: European leaders keep traveling to Beijing to safeguard their economic interests with (autocratic) China, behavior sharply at odds with the democracy vs. autocracy template. Similarly, the president of (mostly) democratic India, Narendra Modi, just held talks with one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s top national security advisors.

Meanwhile, other items on the administration’s agenda remain unfulfilled. Biden took office saying he’d rejoin the nuclear deal with Iran that his predecessor had foolishly left. But he dithered and delayed, Iran’s position hardened, and it is now clear that no new nuclear deal is forthcoming. The result? Iran is closer than ever to nuclear weapons capability, raising the risk of a Middle East war that neither the U.S. administration nor the world needs right now.

Making matters worse, Biden and Blinken have been repeatedly humiliated by their various Middle East allies. The Egyptian government routinely ignores U.S. human rights concerns while continuing to pocket U.S. economic aid. Biden reversed his campaign vow to make Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a pariah for the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but the fist bump “seen ‘round the world” didn’t convince the Saudis to help ease energy prices or persuade them to put any pressure on Moscow after its invasion of Ukraine. More ominously, the Saudis keep moving closer to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Just this week, Saudi Aramco announced two new oil-related investment deals with China (including building a refinery there); and it was China—not the United States—that helped broker the recent détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. I don’t blame either the Chinese or the Saudis for acting in their own interest, but it’s hard to see any of this as triumph of U.S. diplomacy.

Biden and Blinken aren’t directly responsible for the current crisis in U.S. relations with Israel—Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “judicial reform” proposal deserves most of the blame for that—but their indulgent attitude toward Israel probably made Netanyahu think he could get away with it. Biden and Blinken have love-bombed Israel from the start: They didn’t reverse Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, failed to fulfill repeated promises to reopen a consulate for Palestinians, and offered only the usual mild expressions of “concern” at Israel’s continuing efforts to colonize the West Bank. Instead of distancing the United States from Israel’s increasingly worrisome conduct, Biden and Blinken kept repeating the usual cliches about the “ironclad” U.S. commitment and expressing their continued belief in a mythical creature: the two-state solution. No wonder Netanyahu thought he could move ahead with his controversial assault on Israeli democracy without jeopardizing U.S. support. And when Biden finally voiced some mild criticisms earlier this week, Netanyahu quickly responded by saying Israel would make its own decisions. That’s the kind of diplomatic influence that unconditional support buys you.

Meanwhile, the United States seems to be ceding its role as a global peacemaker. The country that once made arms control a top priority and brokered the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Good Friday Agreement, and an end to the Balkan Wars is less interested in ending conflicts than in helping its preferred side win, even when the end result is more death and destruction and a continued risk of escalation. As the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi noted last week, “America appears to have given up on the virtues of honest peacemaking. … Today, our leaders mediate to help ‘our’ side in a conflict advance our position rather than to establish a lasting peace.”

U.S. diplomacy is falling short in dealing with China too. The administration’s mantra toward China, as expressed by Blinken in 2021, is that the United States “will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.” But the first and third items have taken center stage, and efforts to find common ground and manage an increasingly intense security rivalry have been few and far between. Some of the blame rests with Beijing, of course, but one sees few signs of creative thinking about how this critical bilateral relationship could be managed or improved.

It’s not all bad news: U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with existing Asian partners such as Japan and Australia have gone well, aided in no small part by China’s ill-considered assertiveness. But the Biden administration’s broader effort to weaken China by imposing export controls on advanced chips and subsidizing U.S. digital industries has also imposed significant costs on these same partners, while heightening Asian concerns about a future clash in their neighborhood. Nor has the Biden team been able to formulate an effective counter to China’s growing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. Biden’s not to blame for Trump’s ill-considered decision to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, but the administration’s substitute—the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which it finally rolled out last year—is widely and correctly seen as small potatoes by most of Asia.

One of the administration’s early diplomatic successes was Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s effort to negotiate a multilateral agreement for a global minimum tax on multinational corporations (thereby preventing them from avoiding taxes by declaring profits in low-tax offshore locations). Kudos for Yellen, but the measure now lies moribund in Congress and may never come into force. And the administration’s more successful domestic initiatives, most notably the Inflation Reduction Act, have created serious frictions with U.S allies that regard these measures as promoting U.S. industries at their expense.

“Hold on a minute,” I hear you say. What about the critical role that U.S. diplomacy played in organizing the Western response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, not to mention those lopsided United Nations General Assembly votes condemning Moscow’s actions? Doesn’t that prove that America is back and its diplomats are doing their jobs with consummate skill?

Yes and no. On one hand, Biden and his team have led a coordinated Western response to the invasion, and this hasn’t always been easy. But it ain’t over till it’s over, and the ultimate result of this effort is uncertain. The cruel reality is that a protracted war that ends with Russia in control of some or all of the Donbass and Ukraine depopulated and heavily damaged will not look like a grand foreign-policy achievement. We all hope that does not happen, but it is certainly not an outcome one can rule out.

The sad fact is that the Biden administration has done an excellent job of responding to a problem that was at least partly of its own making. The roots of the Ukraine war predate Biden’s inauguration, but neither Biden nor Blinken saw the war coming soon enough. They did not recognize that Russia saw the trends in Ukraine as an existential threat, nor did they do everything they could have to head the war off. U.S. officials (both past and present) have gone to great lengths to deny that U.S. or Western policy played any role whatsoever in causing this tragedy, but a dispassionate look at the evidence—such as the recent account by British historian Geoffrey Roberts in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies—shows otherwise. As I’ve put it before, “Putin is directly responsible for the war, but the West is not blameless.”

We will probably never know if the war could have been avoided had the United States and its European allies made a more serious and creative attempt to address Russia’s security concerns, and dropped their stubborn insistence that Ukraine would one day join NATO. I’m not letting Russia off the hook for starting a preventive war (an illegal act under international law) or for the way it has waged it. But when one thinks about the consequences of the war for the world—and for Ukraine most of all—the United States’ failure to do everything within reason to head it off deserves more critical scrutiny than it has received to date.

To be fair, the disappointing performance of the United States’ diplomats isn’t entirely their fault. Because America’s global ambitions are so vast, many problems won’t receive adequate attention, let alone command the time, energy, and commitment of the people at the very top. And the bigger and broader Washington’s goals, the harder it is to reconcile tradeoffs between them and maintain a clear and consistent set of priorities. This is one of the (many) reasons why some of us keep arguing for greater foreign-policy restraint: U.S. foreign policy would be more successful if it did less but did the vital things well.

Which brings me back to that Summit for Democracy. Even if one overlooks the inconsistent criteria for attendance and the peculiar optics of some troubled democracies (France, Israel, Brazil, India, the United States, etc.) getting together to extol democracy’s virtues, it’s not clear what will be gained from this effort. The first summit didn’t reverse the downward trends that have been underway for almost two decades, which makes one wonder what a second gathering will achieve. Assembling a bunch of powerful officials makes sense when there is something immediate and tangible that they can do together, which is why the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the Madrid Conference of 1991, or the 2015 Paris Climate Conference were worth doing. Similarly, the Obama administration’s four nuclear summits produced some tangible results—such as various agreements to improve custody over nuclear materials world-wide and reduce existing stockpiles of nuclear material—even if they did not reach every one of the administration’s initial objectives.

As near as I can tell, the democracy summits will fall well short of even those modest achievements. Democracy’s future is not going to be helped by more talkfests; it will depend on whether the world’s democracies can deliver better results for their citizens at home and abroad. Success will take a lot of work, and even the wealthiest democracies do not have infinite time or resources—which is why I hope the second Summit for Democracy is also the last.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · April 1, 2023

12. War Books: The Iraq War

War Books: The Iraq War - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Frank Sobchak · March 31, 2023

Editor’s note: We’re relaunching our long-running War Books series with a new installment every Friday! The premise is simple and straightforward. We ask an expert on a particular topic to recommend five books on that topic and tell us what sets each one apart. It’s a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

Almost exactly twenty years ago, the Battle of Baghdad gave control of the Iraqi capital to the US-led coalition. As an inflection point in the war, the battle punctuated what had been a remarkably successful conventional military campaign. And yet Iraq’s descent into sectarian civil war and insurgency was soon to follow. To mark the twenty-year anniversary of the beginning of the long war in Iraq, we invited Frank Sobchak to contribute this edition of War Books. A retired Army colonel who coedited the US Army’s official history of the Iraq War, we gave him the following prompt: What five books would you recommend for readers to better understand the Iraq War?

The Endgame: The Inside Story for the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor.

Michael Gordon is without a doubt the best author that one can read to understand the strategic level of the conflict in Iraq. His access to American and Iraqi leaders, in-depth research, sound judgment, and superb writing are simply unparalleled and all his books on Iraq (the others being Cobra II and Degrade and Destroy) belong on this list. The Endgame is his opus, and it carefully charts the period from the fall of Saddam through the Iraqi civil war, the surge of US troops, and their eventual withdrawal. Gordon’s work is the best single volume book on the conflict, and it painstakingly captures the tragic arc of failed American strategy.

Emma Sky is a British civilian who had worked extensively in nongovernmental organizations that focused on conflict resolution. She opposed the war but volunteered to serve as part of the Coalition Provisional Authority and later as the political advisor for General Ray Odierno during several tours to Iraq. As such, she had a unique insider’s perspective of the conflict that was neither American nor military and her writing is tremendously valuable. The Unraveling is a firsthand tragic telling of what could have been, which fairly and accurately highlights both the failures of the Bush administration in the period after the fall of Saddam and the missteps of the Obama administration’s attempts at war termination.

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume I and Volume II, edited by Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak with Jeanne Godfroy, Matthew Morton, James Powell, and Matthew Zais

Normally I would be extremely reluctant to include a work on which I had collaborated. That said, our team had unprecedented access because it was commissioned by General Odierno when he served as the Army chief of staff and supported by General Lloyd Austin, the commander of US Central Command. We conducted hundreds of interviews and declassified more than thirty thousand pages of handpicked documents, producing a two-volume set that weighs in at over 1,300 pages. Our focus was at the operational level, one that has been neglected by other histories of the conflict, and we covered the period from the end of Operation Desert Storm through the return of US forces to Iraq in 2014 to counter the Islamic State threat.

Bob Woodward is an American journalistic and literary institution, and his experience and gravitas gives him unparalleled access to sources that show in his work. His Plan of Attack covers the road to war, a topic that future strategists and planners should study carefully given the trail of mistaken assumptions and poor decisions made by the Bush administration. While some new information has become available that adds to his conclusions, Plan of Attack stands the test of time as the best single volume testament to the mistakes of that period.

As a professional Army officer, Black Hearts, which covers the Mahmudiya/Yusufiya war crime—one of the worst of the war—is difficult to read. But its unflinching tactical-level review is critical to read to understand how bad leadership, savage combat, and criminal brutality can combine to produce such a terrible and tragic event. Leaders at all levels should understand the events and pathway that led to the crime and learn what actions could have prevented it. Indeed, the Mahmudiya/Yusufiya war crime has been used as a case study in several different professional military education settings, and Frederick’s book provides an encompassing understanding of the crime and the pathway leading to it.

Retired Colonel Frank Sobchak is the chair of irregular warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point. A combat veteran of the Iraq War, he holds a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and coedited, along with retired Colonel Joel Rayburn, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.usma.edu · by Frank Sobchak · March 31, 2023

13. BRICS Are Developing a New Currency: State Duma Deputy Chair

BRICS Are Developing a New Currency: State Duma Deputy Chair

watcher.guru · by Lavina Daryanani · March 31, 2023

The State Duma’s Deputy Chairman, Alexander Babakov recently revealed that the BRICS countries are working on the development of a new form of currency. The nations involved may pitch ideas related to the objective during its upcoming summit in South Africa.

JUST IN: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are developing a new currency, State Duma Deputy Chairman says. pic.twitter.com/sClPcq4XOq

— Watcher.Guru (@WatcherGuru) March 31, 2023

There are odds of a single BRICS currency emerging

Talking on the sidelines of the Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership for Development and Growth Business Forum, Babakov said,

“I think that at the BRICS [leaders’ summit], the readiness to realize this project will be announced, such works are underway.”

That being said, the doors are currently open for a single BRICS currency to emerge. Alongside gold, this currency might also be backed by other commodities like rare-earth elements or soil, Babakov reportedly added. According to the Chairman,

“The transition to settlements in national currencies is the first step. The next one is to provide the circulation of digital or any other form of a fundamentally new currency in the nearest future.”

BRICS’ next summit is set to take place in August this year. Jim O’Neill recently indicated that a group of countries should expand and work to counter the dollar’s dominance. Notably, O’Neill has served as the former Chief Economist at Goldman Sachs and coined the acronym BRIC. Currently, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are a part of BRICS, but a host of other nations intend to join it.

In fact, even O’Neill has urged the bloc to expand. However, he opined that they should apply strict criteria to ensure the addition of new members continues to strengthen their collective goals. If the bloc expands to include other “emerging nations with persistent surpluses,” a globally fairer, multi-currency global system could emerge, O’Neill said. Furthermore, he urged the BRICS to focus on climate finance, improving healthcare, and boosting trade.

watcher.guru · by Lavina Daryanani · March 31, 2023

14. Philippine, US armies in live-fire drills in northern Philippines

HIMARS in the Philippines.

Philippine, US armies in live-fire drills in northern Philippines

benarnews.org

Filipino army troops on Friday got their first taste of how to use advanced weapons systems, including a rocket system that can hit a target 80 kilometers (49.7 miles) away and a modern anti-tank system seen as key to the Philippine infantry’s modernization plan.

Under the searing heat of the sun, they were taking part in live-fire drills and demonstrations with their American counterparts at a military base in the northern Philippines.

A busload of selected journalists was escorted into the normally closed Fort Magsaysay, an army camp in Nueva Ecija province, for a day-long program to showcase the armament training under joint U.S.-Philippine exercises called “Salaknib,” a local term meaning “shield.”

American soldiers fire a rocket launcher on a mock target during the Salaknib exercise at Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija province, Philippines, March 31, 2023. [Basilio Sepe/BenarNews]

Officially, the main purpose of the program is to “bolster interoperability between the two land forces,” though Fort Magsaysay is one of nine facilities where the Philippine government has granted the U.S. military access to build future facilities under an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Among the nine sites, four have yet to be named, although Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. this month said they would be “scattered around the Philippines,” despite persistent reports in the local press that they would be located in the northern island of Luzon, across the sea from Taiwan. Nueva Ecija is one of the provinces of Luzon, the most populous island in the Philippine archipelago.

The drills, which began on March 13 and go until April 4, are happening at a time when tensions are brewing in the Taiwan Strait. Filipino nationalist groups meanwhile have aired fears that the Philippines – a staunch U.S. ally in the Pacific – would be drawn into the conflict should American forces use the bases here to quickly aid Taiwan, if that island came under attack from mainland China.

Neither American nor Filipino military officials wanted to comment on these geopolitical matters Friday, but they acknowledged that the advanced High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) could be effective in stopping opposing forces from far away.

“HIMARS are highly usable advanced weapon systems in terms of the artillery, in the sense that a rocket artillery unit that’s wheeled instead of trucked, it gives you more mobility, it’s a little lighter, it gives you air mobility on certain fixed-wing platforms. It is a little bit more agile,” said Maj. Joe Roberts, an American operations officer.

“Today we demonstrated what it looks like to fire a HIMARS weapons system. Really in any combat situation, the HIMARS system is very useful.”

Lt. Col. Tar Cayton of the Philippine Army’s artillery regiment said the Filipinos appreciated the demonstration, which, she said, gave them an opportunity to try their hands on the new system. She said she hoped that part of the military’s modernization program to acquire HIMARS was on the top of the Philippine government’s list.

Filipino and American soldiers fire on mock enemy targets during a live-fire exercise at Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija province, Philippines, March 31, 2023. [Basilio Sepe/BenarNews]

After the HIMARS demonstration, Filipino troops joined live-fire exercises using the AT-4 84-mm anti-tank weapon system, the first time that both sides used the weapon in training.

They carried out the drills during a day when the outdoor temperature in Nueva Ecija was as hot as 38 degrees Celsius (100.4 degrees Fahrenheit), and with high humidity to boot.

More than 3,000 Filipino and U.S. forces are training in the ongoing exercises.

It’s a prelude to the annual Balikatan war games, which this year will be the biggest-ever military drills so far involving 17,600 troops from both sides. Those drills will take place from April 11 to 28, during which the allies, for the first time, will conduct live-fire exercises at sea.

Filipino infantry troops receive training in how to load and fire a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during joint training exercises between the Philippine and U.S. armies at Fort Magsaysay, northern Philippines, March 31, 2023. [Jason Gutierrez/BenarNews]

benarnews.org

15. US, UK and German tanks not built for Ukraine war

Huh??

Based on the headline (which is eye-catching) maybe this should have been published on April 1st.

But he makes some interesting points based on the fact that we are not sending our most effective equipment to fight in Ukraine.

Conclusion:

Unfortunately, we won’t see how properly equipped Western tanks might perform in the Ukraine war. And it is increasingly likely that plenty of the main battle tanks from Europe and the United States will go up in smoke, along with their crews.

US, UK and German tanks not built for Ukraine war

Abrams, Challengers and Leopard tanks are all likely to go up in smoke with their crews on Ukraine’s battlefields

asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · April 2, 2023

German, British and American main battle tanks either already have arrived in Ukraine or will soon be on their way. But these tanks have some well-known weaknesses and the Russians are likely ready for them. Worse still, none of them have active defense systems, a critically important way of protecting tanks and tank crews from modern antitank weapons.

The German-made tanks are known as Leopards. Two different series of Leopard tanks are being sent to Ukraine, older Leopard-1 A-5s and Leopard 2 A-4 and A-6 tanks. The Leopard 2 series is regarded as one of the best-designed main battle tanks, comparing favorably to the US M1 Abrams, the Russian T-90 and the Israeli Merkava.

Polish Leopard tanks arrive in Ukraine. Image: Substack

The US is refurbishing Abrams M-1 tanks for Ukraine. They should be arriving in the next two months, perhaps even sooner. The British have sent the first Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine. This behemoth weighs 69 tons, too heavy for many bridges in Ukraine and not suited to function on heavily mudded secondary roads.

None of the tanks being supplied are equipped with reactive armor. Instead, they rely on the built-in tank armor known as NERA (non-energetic reactive armor). The earliest form of NERA was known as Chobham armor because it was developed at the British Tank Research Center in Chobham, Surrey.

This type of armor combines steel plates with a non-steel material between two armor steel plates, sometimes with multiple levels and materials. The composite armor is designed to thwart shaped charge ammunition (like that found in HEAT tank ammunition) and against ammunition that uses a penetrator rod to essentially burn through armor.

These penetrator rods can be made out of hardened steel, tungsten (wolfram) or depleted uranium. Known as Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) rounds, British and US ammunition (M829A4) use depleted uranium for penetrator rods. The penetrators, sometimes called Darts, are 99% depleted uranium combined with other metals, together known as Stabilloy.

By contrast, German APFSDS ammunition uses tungsten penetrators because depleted uranium ammunition is banned in the EU. All the main guns for these European and American tanks are sized at 120mm with smooth bore barrels, originally designed by Rheinmetall in Germany. Russian tanks typically have a 125mm smoothbore main gun, entirely of Russian design.

A destroyed Abrams Tank in Iraq 2003. Image: Substack

Russia has both depleted uranium and tungsten dart ammunition in its inventory for its main battle tanks. These rounds have been produced for decades in different versions, such as differences in the length of APFSDS penetrators. Seemingly the Russians are not using depleted uranium ammunition in the Ukraine war.

In 1977 the Russians managed to steal the plans for Chobham armor and adapted it for Russian tanks. However, no Russian tank depends on this type of NERA armor for protection. Instead, the Russians put appliques of reactive (explosive, energetic) armor on the outside body of the tanks, typically on the front, on the turret and sides of the tank.

Russian reactive armor has evolved from a type known as Kontakt 1 to Kontakt 5. The Russians are now introducing a brand new type of reactive armor called Reklit which is designed to deal almost exclusively with APFSDS threats.

The basic idea of reactive, explosive armor is to explode when an incoming round strikes the tank. The explosion either redirects the actual incoming round, or damages it, making it ineffective.

The better forms of explosive reactive armor can either break or bend a penetrator, protecting the tank. Reactive armor has to be designed so that when it explodes it does not cause injury or death to nearby infantry or to other vehicles. (A similar consideration applies to hard-kill active defense systems – see below.)

The British, Germans and, especially the US long thought that their main battle tanks, designed in the 1970s and 1980s were good against most threats and did not require reactive (explosive) armor.

However, Iraq and Syria changed all that, as many Abrams tanks and Leopard tanks (especially those belonging to the Turkish army) were destroyed by Russian anti-tank weapons fired by ISIS irregulars.

If US and German armor could be knocked out with older ammunition using explosively formed penetrators (in the US best known as shaped charge weapons) and not DART ammunition, it was easy to see that Western tanks were at risk. The Russians immediately recognized the vulnerability of Leopard tanks to Russian antitank weapons.

Remains of a Turkish Leopard 2 A4 tank after the Battle of Al Bab. Image: Substack

Starting in 2017 the US army designed what it called Angled Tiles, a type of reactive armor designed to deflect an incoming threat, either upwards or downwards (depending on how the tiles are configured on installation). By 2019 the US Army started installing Angled Tiles on US Abrams tanks deployed in Europe, admitting that America’s top tank, despite its super secret armor, was deficient in protection.

This is especially significant since the newest US Abrams main battle tanks have a unique layered armor system that is said to include depleted uranium. The US decided not to provide this tank version with depleted uranium-enhanced armor to Ukraine fearing the Russians might copy it, but it is the most advanced version getting Layered Tiles. Ukraine is not getting layered tiles either.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the recently arriving Leopard tanks are being modified by the addition of external reactive armor. Lacking their own sources for reactive armor, the Ukrainians are pulling modules off of damaged or destroyed Russian tanks. So far at least, the modified Leopard 2 tanks are being fitted with Kontakt 1 reactive armor, at least a few generations behind the latest protective reactive armor systems.

Russian Kontakt 1 added to Leopard Tanks in Ukraine —Note also the steel caging (upper right) added to trip rocket propelled grenades fired at the tank turret). Image: Substack

The haste with which Ukraine is plastering its “new” Western tanks with reactive armor tells us something else: these new tanks are not much better than what they had before. And it tells us, furthermore, that even better ones held back by the Pentagon don’t cut it.

An Active Defense System is a system that destroys incoming mortars, rockets and shells before they hit a tank. The system works by detecting the incoming threat and neutralizing it by firing an explosively formed projectile.

An Active Defense System is at its best against antitank weapons and mortars. It is less capable against tank-fired ammunition because these rounds travel at supersonic (nearly Mach 3) speeds.

Thus proper tank defenses need to have top-quality armor, reactive armor and Active Defense Systems. Tanks with all three capabilities can potentially survive against even a well-equipped and heavily armed adversary.

There are a number of Active Defense Systems around, and some newer ones under development apparently will use lasers instead of explosively formed projectiles.

The Russians claim to have one or more active defense systems (one of them is called Arena), but not a single Russian tank in the Ukraine war is equipped with Active Defense. None of the tanks being delivered by Germany, the UK and the US are fitted with Active Defense.

The best of the currently-deployed systems is the Israeli Trophy (Rafael) and a newer type made in Israel called Iron First (Israel Military Industries). Trophy has been proven in combat and is fitted to Merkava tanks.

Part of the Trophy Active Defense System on a Merkava Tank. Image: Substack

Some 100 or so units have been sold to the Pentagon for the Abrams main battle tank, but that’s a drop in the bucket. Some Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles are being equipped with Iron Fist, but not those supplied to Ukraine.

Just as US forces have paltry air defenses because they refused to buy Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system, the same is true for US tanks, where only a small number of systems were purchased for trials. The Pentagon has long been rightly accused of suffering from the Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome.

Other Abrams tanks have been fitted with a so-called Soft-Kill Active Defense System that is supposed to jam the electronics of a threat. Since kinetic weapons fired by tanks or artillery guns don’t use much in the way of electronics, soft kills offer no help.

Soft kill may be effective against troop-operated antitank weapons. It is unlikely any soft kill system will be on the Abrams tanks delivered to Ukraine.

Unfortunately, we won’t see how properly equipped Western tanks might perform in the Ukraine war. And it is increasingly likely that plenty of the main battle tanks from Europe and the United States will go up in smoke, along with their crews.

This article first appeared on Stephen Bryen’s Substack page and is republished with kind permission of the author. Read the original here.

asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · April 2, 2023

16. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) tests new prototype glider

Yes, humans are more important than hardware, but this hardware could go a long way in taking care of humans. I hope this concept turns out to be feasible.

1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) tests new prototype glider

dvidshub.net

Photo By Sgt. Thoman Johnson | YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, Ariz. – Soldiers from 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)...... read more

Photo By Sgt. Thoman Johnson | YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, Ariz. – Soldiers from 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) recover the GD-2000 glider after its landing at Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz. On February 13, 2023. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) released the glider from the air multiple times over several days to test its aerial delivery capabilities. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is committed to innovation and enhancing the endurance of the warfighter. | View Image Page

YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, AZ, UNITED STATES

02.15.2023

Story by Sgt. Thoman Johnson

1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)

YUMA PROVING GROUND, Ariz. – In February 2023, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) successfully tested a new unmanned aerial delivery platform, the GD-2000 glider (glider disposable 2000 lbs.). This glider is an alternative to the current means of supply delivery into diverse environments. Implementation of the glider will result in enhanced capabilities of the Special Forces detachments deployed through varied, and often restrictive, terrain.

Timely and accurate resupply is imperative to the success of combat operations.

This success does not only lie with the operators on the ground but also with utilizing emerging technology. The GD-2000 is a glider platform that Special Operation Forces innovators hope will revolutionize aerial delivery to Green Berets in the field.

“It’s an autonomous aircraft that carries 1,500 pounds of payload,” said Chip Yates, CEO of Yates Electrospace, and the creator of the glider.

“It flies for 15 minutes, flares and lands where you want it,” he continued.

Traditional supply delivery systems can be more cumbersome and more detectable by the enemy when compared with the glider. It was birthed out of a request from the U.S. Marine Corps as an alternative to the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS). JPADS tend to be both larger in size and have limited ability to maneuver through the air, making them less accurate, especially over long distances or in high-wind conditions.

“What this glider does is give us a much greater [travel distance] and a much greater glide ratio into a target,” said a Special Forces detachment commander, whose team tested the glider.

The GD-2000 is a small aircraft designed to land at a precise location while being released from a greater distance than traditional supply drops. The glider can travel up to 40 miles once released and is completely disposable once on the ground, allowing it to be left in denied or contested territory without compromising the security of the Soldiers receiving the supplies or the technologies or techniques employed by the U.S. military.

“If we are able to get [the glider] up to 40,000 feet we’re looking at [travel distances] in excess of 25 to 30 miles. That’s a pretty unique capability and not matched by anything we currently have,” the commander said.

This would also allow for aerial delivery to remote islands that require a greater level of precision to reliably reach their destination. With some modifications, the designer of the glider claims it can also land and be recovered in a maritime environment, further enhancing resupply capabilities to the sort of small islands often found in the Indo-Pacific.

During the testing, the GD-2000 carried a 1,000-pound payload and was airdropped from a C-27J plane. During several drops, the glider landed within 30 meters of its intended target at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona. The hull of the aircraft was still intact and protected the cargo inside.

“[The glider] gives us the ability to drop this from a plane outside of controlled airspace into international air space and fly resupply in from an unmanned autonomous craft. It’s a huge enhancement to the mission” the commander said.

1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is committed to innovating beyond the status quo. Today’s tests and experiments are done to ensure that tomorrow’s problems do not catch us off-guard. Enhancing our capabilities fosters an environment of competency within the unit and allows for our Soldiers to continue the mission of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.

NEWS INFO

Date Taken: 02.15.2023 Date Posted: 03.30.2023 16:06 Story ID: 441506 Location: YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, AZ, US Web Views: 607 Downloads: 1

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17. Conor Grennan Dean of Students, NYU Stern School of Business - "I use ChatGPT all day, every day."

There is also a very interesting ChatGPT tutorial at this Linkedin Page: https://www.linkedin.com/learning/how-to-research-and-write-using-generative-ai-tools/how-to-work-with-ai?autoSkip=true&autoplay=true&resume=false&u=0

Conor Grennan Dean of Students, NYU Stern School of Business - "I use ChatGPT all day, every day."

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7047626780601442304/

Conor Grennan

• 2nd

| NY Times and #1 Int'l bestselling author | Founder Next Generation Nepal | TEDx Speaker

Dean of Students, NYU Stern School of Business | NY Times and #1 Int'l bestselling author | Founder Next Generation Nepal | TEDx Speaker

1d • Edited •

I use ChatGPT all day, every day. This is my hot-take: Non-tech people have a potentially HUGE advantage using ChatGPT (English majors stand UP). Five Practical Ways that Creatives should be using ChatGPT:

1.) Stop asking ChatGPT for information - start an actual conversation.

“What’s the population of Topeka?” Gah! ChatGPT isn’t Google. Google is Google. ChatGPT is a brilliant, patient thought partner.

EXAMPLE: Tell it *why* you want to know about Topeka. “I’m starting a consulting business in Topeka, I have $20k, two kids in middle school, I studied biology, I worked for McKinsey. What are ten reasons my business might succeed or fail?”

Feed it more and more detail about your work experience, family, etc. - that’s where the magic happens.

2.) Create actual characters to debate your Big Idea before presenting it.

Test your work ideas on ChatGPT, which will play the roles of colleagues.

EXAMPLE: Tell ChatGPT “Play 4 roles for me: Be my company’s CEO, CMO, CTO, and CFO. (Describe each person- Technical? Fiscally conservative? Passive aggressive?) Probe the following idea for weaknesses.”

A bit traumatic, right? Okay, Step Two: Tell ChatGPT “Now become a smarter version of all those executives and give counter-arguments as to why my idea is brilliant.”

Invite historical guests! Ask Steve Jobs to make a case for your idea! Or Einstein!

3.) ChatGPT is built for creatives. And it wants ALL the smoke.

ChatGPT isn’t a racehorse - it’s freakin’ Seabiscuit. It wants to show off. People give up because they pose a general question and get a general answer. Get specific!

EXAMPLE:

Don’t ask “What are strategies for handling an annoying co-worker?”

Instead, try “I work in a San Jose crayon factory in quality control. My colleague points out every crayon I’ve missed and asks gas-lighting questions. What are three indirect ways to stop his behavior and what is one direct thing I can say?” Ask follow up questions.

4.) Talk to it like a trusted, brilliant friend.

EXAMPLE: You call your brilliant friend and go “Hey Taylor, how does Walmart decide what to stock?” You don’t say: “Taylor, give four ways Walmart prioritizes items for display.” Taylor would think you’re being held hostage.

Don’t get me wrong - you *can* ask ChatGPT like that. But it undermines your strength - your EQ. Relax and talk to it like a friend. It will unlock your creativity.

5.) Don’t stop after your Crappy First Draft.

Writing is rewriting. Remember your college professor shouting that? ChatGPT will give different results as you tweak the wording. ChatGPT loves this stuff.

EXAMPLE: Different words elicit different responses. Try new command words, new adjectives, verb choices. Try more detail. (This is basically prompt engineering.) Don’t give up! Did 4 years at Vassar teach you nothing??

Anyway, here's an image I created in Midjourney.

#ChatGPT #AI #EQ #Englishmajors #teamwork #productivity #learning #professionalDevelopment #writing #promptengineering #nyustern

18. War of the drones: How Russia and Ukraine have utilised modern UAV technology against one another since Putin's invasion… and how their unmanned fleet compares

Graphics and photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11915963/Russia-Ukraine-war-sides-utilised-modern-drone-technology-Putins-invasion.html

War of the drones: How Russia and Ukraine have utilised modern UAV technology against one another since Putin's invasion… and how their unmanned fleet compares

Drones have capacity to locate soldiers, fire missiles and provide better visuals
In year since Russia invaded Ukraine, drones have become integral part of war

By RACHAEL BUNYAN FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 13:12 BST, 1 April 2023 | UPDATED: 13:15 BST, 1 April 2023

Daily Mail · by Rachael Bunyan For Mailonline · April 1, 2023

The constant buzzing of drones in the skies amid the roar of artillery fire has become part of daily life for soldiers on the front lines in Ukraine.

Drones - small in size and often cheap - have the capacity to locate soldiers and ammunition supplies, drop bombs and provide better visuals of what is happening on the battlefield.

And in the year since Russia invaded Ukraine they have become an integral part of the war, with both sides playing a game of 'cat and mouse' to see who can come up with the best technology and tactics.

While Russia has far greater resources - both in terms of soldiers and equipment - Kyiv believes drone innovation is one area where it can begin to catch up with Moscow.

For Dr David Jordan, Co-Director of the Freeman Air & Space Institute at King’s College London, Ukraine has gained a 'greater benefit' from drones compared to Russia as they have acted 'instantaneously' to real-time intelligence gained from the UAV's data.

And in the year since the Russia's invasion of Ukraine, drones have become an integral part of the war, with both sides playing a game of 'cat and mouse' to see who can come up with the best technology and tactics. Above: A graphic showing how different Ukrainian and Russian drones compare

'The Ukrainians have used drones much more tactically on the battlefield than the Russians have. They've been innovative and drones have been real force multipliers in terms of giving the Ukrainians options and the ability to track Russian targets and destroy them,' Dr Jordan tells MailOnline.

'Ukrainian forces have really evolved with the help of drones, particularly in terms of information gathering and surveillance. Drones have really bolstered Ukraine's war effort.'

Indeed, Krystyna Marcinek, of the American think tank RAND, says drones have allowed Ukrainian soldiers to have 'a situational awareness for multiple missions at the same time along the front line,' meaning they have been able to launch a series of attacks at once.

Dr Jordan and Marcinek also point to how important commercial drones - like Ukraine's DJI Mavic - have been in the war as they are cheap and expendable, meaning they are no huge loss if they are destroyed compared to expensive fighter jets.

Here MailOnline takes an in depth look at how the different Ukrainian and Russian drones compare.

Ukraine's UAVs

Bayraktar TB2

Ukraine has been using Turkey-made Bayraktar TB2 drones since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February last year.

The missile-equipped UAVs have been highly efficient at striking Russian targets, Ukraine's ambassador to Turkey, Vasyl Bodnar, said.

They have managed to destroy columns of Russia's tanks and armoured vehicles as well as a series of multiple launch rocket systems and anti-aircraft systems.

At least for a time, the Bayraktar TB2, which has a 12-metre wingspan and can soar to 25,000 feet before swooping down to destroy tanks and artillery with laser-guided armour-piercing bombs, has helped undermine Russia's overwhelming military superiority.

Indeed, a Bayraktar drone was used in the attack which sank the Russian warship Moskva in the Black Sea in April 2022.

Ukraine has been using Turkey-made Bayraktar TB2 drones (pictured) since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February last year

Ukrainian Armed Forces showing how Bayraktar TB2 is destroying the Russian equipment in March 2022

Such is the drone's renown that it became the subject of a patriotic expletive-strewn hit song in Ukraine that mocked Russian troops, with the chorus 'Bayraktar, Bayraktar'.

The drone is 6.5 metres long, has a maximum take-off weight of 650 kilograms - nearly half the weight of a missile - and can fly for almost 24 hours while equipped with cameras and up to four laser-guided bombs.

It can also be used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions - and its 24 hour battery means that it can be highly efficient in collecting data over a long period of time.

Turkey has sold Kyiv several batches of Bayraktar TB2 drones, which it had in the past deployed against Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine.

The designer of Bayraktar drones, Selcuk Bayraktar, who runs the Istanbul firm Baykar with his brother Haluk, said the drones had shown how technology was revolutionising modern warfare.

Turkey's decision to supply Ukraine with the Bayraktar TB2 drones has angered the Kremlin, with its spokesperson complaining the Turkish UAVs risked destabilising the situation in Ukraine - despite Russia launching the invasion in the first place.

Before being used in Ukraine, the drone was used in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan.

Soldiers push a Bayraktar TB2 UCAV at the Kulbakyne aerodrome during the Exercise Sea Breeze 2021, Mykolaiv, southern Ukraine

Aerorozvidka R18

The Ukrainian-made R18 'octocopter' drone is able to drop explosives weighing up to 5kg on its targets and has been able to destroy more than £130 million worth of Russian artillery since the war began more than a year ago.

It has a range of up to 4km and is designed for total visual stealth in the dark with thermal-imaging cameras, meaning that at night, Ukrainian forces are able to spot Russian troops and machinery without the drone being seen.

Ukraine's R18 drone is produced by Aerozvidka - an organisation that began eight years ago as a group of drone enthusiasts who saw potential for quadcopter technology in warfare. Now, the group works closely with Ukrainian forces.

Mykhaylo, a drone expert from Aerozvidka, told Radio Free Europe that their R18 drones have had a 'significant' impact on Ukraine's war efforts.

The R18 drone (pictured) has a range of up to 4km and is designed for total visual stealth in the dark with thermal-imaging cameras, meaning that at night, Ukrainian forces are able to spot Russian troops and machinery without the drone being seen

Russian tank explodes after being hit by bomb dropped from a drone in Ukraine

He told of how a group of drone operators sped towards Russian troops near Kyiv at the start of the war on quad bikes and dropped bombs from the UAVs and destroyed the Kremlin's tanks and military vehicles.

'We played a very important role in the Kyiv operation,' Mykhaylo said. He says that Aerorozvidka developed the R18 drone after Russian troops started using a Chinese tracking technology called Aeroscope. This technology allows Russian soldiers to detect the flight path of most DJI-branded drones and pinpoint where the UAV's operator is standing.

In response, the R18 was developed to evade the DJI sensor and avoid detection.

DJI Mavic

Both Russia and Ukraine have been using small and cheap commercial models of drones during the war - especially Kyiv with its DJI Mavic UAV, which costs about £1,700.

Scores of DJI Mavic drones, created by Chinese company DJI, have been donated by Ukrainians to be used by their military in the fight against Russia.

The Ukrainian military has been calling for citizens to donate their hobby drones and to volunteer as experienced pilots to operate them - and now the public have formed a volunteer drone force.

The DJI Mavic can be fitted with small bombs, but it is mainly used to track enemy troops with its front-loaded camera and to help Ukrainian forces on the ground to direct their attacks.

The drone is a quadcopter capable of carrying a Molotov cocktail horizontally before it is directed by the Ukrainian command to drop the explosive on its target.

Both Russia and Ukraine have been using small and cheap commercial models of drones during the war - especially Kyiv with its DJI Mavic UAV, which costs about £1,700. PIctured: Participants practice flying a drone, in this case to locate colleagues who were hiding and pretending to be enemy snipers, during a combat training day hosted by a local paramilitary civil formation called TSEL on February 22, 2023 in Lviv region, Ukraine

A participant practices flying a drone, in this case to locate colleagues who were hiding and pretending to be enemy snipers, during a combat training day hosted by a local paramilitary civil formation called TSEL on February 22, 2023 in Lviv region, Ukraine

The DJI Mavic's capabilities are not as good as its military counterparts as it can only fly a distance of 30 km and fly for a maximum of 46 minutes.

Indeed, unlike the much larger Turkish-built combat drones that Ukraine has in its arsenal, off-the-shelf consumer drones aren’t much use as weapons — but they can be powerful reconnaissance tools.

Civilians have been using the aerial cameras to track Russian convoys and then relay the images and GPS coordinates to Ukrainian troops. Some of the machines have night vision and heat sensors.

'Commercial drones, like the DJI Mavic, have become hugely important in the war. Ukraine has been incredibly skilled in the way they have used drone footage to show what is going on on the front lines,' Dr Jordan says.

'Drones have allowed Ukrainian forces to see what Russian soldiers are doing. They can fly around, hoovering up all sorts of information. The drones can work in conjunction with troops on the ground who can fire artillery at the correct targets.'

Dr Jordan adds: 'With drones, if Ukrainian forces have integrated that system with the ground forces - and they often have done - whereby troops have a drone and missiles, they can locate Russian troops and then fire at them almost instantaneously.'

ervicemen of the aerial reconnaissance unit of one of the Territorial Defence brigades learn to control drones, Zaporizhzhia Region, southeastern Ukraine, on March 7, 2023

But there’s a downside: DJI, the leading provider of consumer drones in Ukraine and around the world, provides a tool that can easily pinpoint the location of an inexperienced drone operator, and no one really knows what the Chinese firm or its customers might do with that data.

Ukraine has a thriving community of drone experts, some of whom were educated at the National Aviation University or the nearby Kyiv Polytechnic University and went on to found local drone and robotics startups.

Small civilian drones are no match against Russian combat power but will likely become increasingly important in a protracted war, leaving drone-makers no option to be completely neutral.

Switchblade 300

The United States has sent Ukraine around 700 Switchblade drones, which can circle above a battlefield before nose diving down onto their targets and exploding like a missile.

The killer Switchblade drones, made by American company AeroVironment, are relatively easy to use and could be highly effective in attacking Russian forces.

The drones, which have a range of 40 km (25 miles), can be used against vehicles including trucks, tanks and armored personnel carriers.

They are single-use weapons as they fly into their targets and detonate on impact.

While the US has said it is supplying Ukraine with 700 of the drones, it is not clear whether any of the Switchblades have been used yet.

The United States has sent Ukraine around 700 Switchblade drones, which can circle above a battlefield before nose diving down onto their targets and exploding like a missile.

A Loitering Munition UAV drone (Peer product:Switchblade 300) is displayed at National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) in Taichung City, central Taiwan

Russia's UAVS

Shahed-136 - rebranded as Geran-2 by Russia

Russian forces have used the Iranian-made Shahed drones - which Moscow has rebranded as Geran-2 - in the war.

While sophisticated drones have been used by Ukrainian forces that can launch missiles, such as the US-made Predator, the Geran-2 is far far cruder.

Packed with explosives, the Shahed UAVs can be preprogrammed with a target's GPS coordinates. They are known as suicide drones because they nosedive into targets and explode on impact like a missile.

Drones like the Shaheds are called loitering munitions by the military because when used at short range, they can hover over an area and then hit a target on an operator's command.

Russian forces have used the Iranian-made Shahed drones - which Moscow has rebranded as Geran-2 - in the war (pictured above Kyiv on October 17)

Astonishing images capture the moment a Shahed suicide drone dives towards the streets of Kyiv on October 17

A ball of smoke and flames rises over the streets of Kyiv as the city is bombarded by a swarm of Iranian-made kamikaze drones on October 17, 2022, hitting residential areas and energy infrastructure

According to Iranian data, the Shahed-136 has a wingspan of 2.5 metres, is 3.5 metres long and weighs approximately 200 kilograms. It's powered by a 50-horsepower engine with a top speed of 185 kph (114mph).

And while its range is about 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), drone expert Samuel Bendett with the CNA think tank, said the Shahed is being used in Ukraine at much shorter ranges. That's because its GPS guidance system - which is vulnerable to jamming - isn't very robust.

Shaheds are known to have been controlled via radio under the Iranians. Whether Russia is capable of the same in Ukraine is unclear, though Ukrainians have reported seeing the drones change direction, suggesting at least some remote control.

Because they are cheap - at £16,000 each - and there are a lot of them in supply, Russia has increasingly used Shahed UAVs in Ukraine. They have been used to target civilian infrastructure since the war began.

A security officer uses his rifle to try and take down a suicide drone attacking the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv on October 17, 2022

This undated photograph released by the Ukrainian military's Strategic Communications Directorate shows the wreckage of what Kyiv has described as an Iranian Shahed drone downed near Kupiansk, Ukraine

Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a residential building destroyed by a Russian drone strike, which local authorities consider to be Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Shahed-136, in central Kyiv on October 17, 2022

Their use lets Russia avoid putting sophisticated aircraft and pilots at risk and save its limited stock of expensive long-range precision missiles.

Fired from a truck launcher in rapid succession, the drones can fly low and slow, better able to avoid radar detection. They are launched in a quick succession in order to overwhelm Ukrainian defences.

Russia has managed to use the Shahed drones to effectively saturate targets, whether a fuel depot or infrastructure and utilities like power or water stations. They have done so by using them alongside intelligence drones.

But Ukraine has said they have managed to shoot down a vast majority of the drones - over 80 per cent - by using machine guns and portable anti-air missiles.

As the conflict essentially becomes one of attrition — who can withstand that human, material and financial burden the longest — finding cheaper but still potent weapons will be key.

And for Russia, the Shahed drones are a cheap version of Moscow's Kalibr cruise missiles which cost nearly £1million each.

Kronshtadt Orion

Russia's Orion UAV has been hailed by the Kremlin as their best strike drone due to its 'fighter-like' capabilities.

The Orion is a middle-altitude, long flight drone with a maximum flight altitude of about 25,000 feet and it can remain in the air for up to 24 hours.

It can travel at speeds of up to 120 miles per hour and can carry up to 250 kg of weaponry, which includes four aerial bombs and guided missiles in total.

The Orion also has a turret under the front of the drone which is equipped with electro-optical and infrared cameras as well as a laser which can lock down targets before launching a missile.

Russia's Orion UAV has been hailed by the Kremlin as their best strike drone due to its 'fighter-like' capabilities

Orlan-10

The Kremlin has claimed Russian forces have more than 1,000 small, versatile Orlan-10 drones that they use for reconnaissance, targeting, jamming and mobile phone interception.

The 'Sea Eagle' Orlan 10 UAV is a deceptive, relatively low-tech and cheap killer in Russia's arsenal.

It has directed many of the 20,000 artillery shells that Russia has fired daily on Ukrainian positions in 2022, killing up to 100 soldiers per day, according to Ukrainian commanders.

The drone entered the war early on and Russia has since used it to attack Ukrainian military assets and for aerial reconnaissance.

Russian units are pictured carrying an Orlan-10 drone

For aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions, Russian soldiers usually deploy the drones in groups of three.

The first drone is used to locate Ukrainian soldiers or their artillery at an altitude of around 5,000 feet, a second is used to attack the target by dropping shells on them while a third is often used to transmit surveillance information to the control centre.

The drone has a maximum speed of 90 miles per hour and a combat range of 80 miles. It can also remain in flight for a maximum of 16 hours.

But Dr Jordan says the Orlan-10 is 'relatively unsophisticated'. 'But Russia has been using these loitering munitions alongside other drones that will be used for reconnaissance and electronic warfare where they are trying to jam Ukrainian communications,' he explains.

The Orlan-10 is a reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) developed by the Special Technology Center (STC)

Eleron-3SV

Russia developed its Eleron-3SV drone in 2013 and it has been used in Ukraine to conduct reconnaissance missions in the day and night.

The drone, which costs around £130,000, has an operating range of 15 miles and can remain in the air for two hours at maximum altitude of three miles.

Since the war began, Ukrainian troops have claimed they have captured two of of the Eleron-3 drones.

In November, Ukraine released footage of an Eleron-3SV drone they had downed and it was reported specialists would disassemble the UAV and study its interior.

Russia developed its Eleron-3SV drone in 2013 and it has been used in Ukraine to conduct reconnaissance missions in the day and night

Ukrainian soldiers are on standby with a US made Stinger MANPAD (man-portable air-defense system) on the frontline on December 29, 2022 in Bakhmut, Ukraine

Daily Mail · by Rachael Bunyan For Mailonline · April 1, 2023

19. Japan Breaks With U.S. Allies, Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap

Oh no. A crack in the coalition?

Japan Breaks With U.S. Allies, Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap

Citing energy needs, Tokyo won exception to rules binding G-7 nations

https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-breaks-with-u-s-allies-buys-russian-oil-at-prices-above-cap-1395accb

By Peter LandersFollow

April 2, 2023 6:00 am ET

TOKYO—The U.S. has rallied its European allies behind a $60-a-barrel cap on purchases of Russian crude oil, but one of Washington’s closest allies in Asia is now buying oil at prices above the cap.

Japan got the U.S. to agree to the exception, saying it needed it to ensure access to Russian energy. The concession shows Japan’s reliance on Russia for fossil fuels, which analysts said contributed to a hesitancy in Tokyo to back Ukraine more fully in its war with Russia.

While many European countries have reduced their dependence on Russian energy supplies, Japan has stepped up its purchases of Russian natural gas over the past year. Japan is the only Group of Seven nation not to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was the last G-7 leader to visit Ukraine after Russia’s invasion.

Mr. Kishida has said the G-7 summit he is hosting this May in his hometown of Hiroshima will demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine. Tokyo has said it is committed to supporting Kyiv and can’t send weapons because of longstanding export restrictions the cabinet has imposed on itself.

“We absolutely will not allow Russia’s outrageous act, and we are imposing strict sanctions on Russia in order to stop Russia’s invasion as soon as possible,” said chief government spokesman Hirokazu Matsuno.

The oil purchases, while tiny and authorized by the U.S., represent a break in the unity of U.S.-led efforts to impose a global $60-a-barrel cap on purchases of Russian crude oil.

The cap works because oil-buying nations, even if they aren’t aligned with the U.S., generally need to use insurance and other services from companies based in the U.S. or one of its allies. The G-7, the European Union and Australia have agreed to rules forbidding those companies from furnishing services if a buyer of Russian oil is paying more than $60 a barrel.

The nations last year granted an exception to the cap through Sept. 30 for oil purchased by Japan from the Sakhalin-2 project in Russia’s Far East.

An official of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said Tokyo wanted to ensure access to Sakhalin-2’s main product, natural gas, which is liquefied and shipped to Japan. “We have done this with an eye toward having a stable supply of energy for Japan,” the official said.

He said a small quantity of crude oil is extracted alongside the natural gas at Sakhalin-2 and needs to be sold to ensure liquefied natural gas, or LNG, production continues. “The price is decided by negotiations between the two parties,” he said.

Russia accounts for nearly one-tenth of Japan’s natural-gas imports, most of it from Sakhalin-2, and the quantity bought by Japan last year was 4.6% greater than in the previous year.

That marks a contrast with Germany, which relied on Russia for 55% of its natural-gas imports before the war and survived a complete cutoff through a quick remodeling of its import infrastructure. Germany’s economy grew last year faster than Japan’s, bucking forecasts of a German recession triggered by the cutoff of Russian gas.

“It’s not as if Japan can’t manage without this. They can. They simply don’t want to,” said James Brown, a professor at Temple University’s Japan campus. Prof. Brown, who studies Russia-Japan relations, said Japan should move to withdraw from the Sakhalin projects eventually “if they’re really serious about supporting Ukraine.”

Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp., two Japanese companies, collectively own a 22.5% stake in Sakhalin-2 and successfully pushed to maintain the stake last year with backing from Tokyo when Russia’s government under President Vladimir Putin restructured the project and installed a new Russian operator.

In the first two months of this year, Japan bought about 748,000 barrels of Russian oil for a total of ¥6.9 billion, according to official trade statistics. At the current exchange rate, that translates to $52 million, or just under $70 a barrel. Russia exports millions of barrels of oil a day, making Japan’s purchases a minuscule share of total Russian output.

Japan has almost no fossil fuel of its own and relies on imported natural gas and coal for much of its electricity. Officials have said it would be self-defeating to give up access to the Russian liquefied natural gas because Russia could turn around and sell the LNG to China.

In addition to the price cap, the U.S. and many of its allies have largely banned the import of Russian oil into their own countries.

U.S. officials have said for months that the cap has been generally successful in pushing down Russia’s oil revenue while stabilizing global oil markets. Russia’s budget has suffered this year as the price of its crude has dropped, while global oil benchmarks have stabilized as Russian production has fallen only modestly. The U.S. and its allies have also placed two additional price caps on Russian petroleum products.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan has pursued energy links to Russia in part to advance its goal of recovering a group of northern islands seized by Soviet troops in 1945. The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met Mr. Putin more than two dozen times in hopes of reaching a territorial deal and a formal Japan-Russia peace agreement, which was never concluded after World War II.

Andrew Duehren in Washington and Chieko Tsuneoka in Tokyo contributed to this article.

Write to Peter Landers at Peter.Landers@wsj.com

20. Putin's school of sexpionage: Book reveals how they trained at academy

Again, I worried about a publication date of April 1st but apparently this is a legitimate book.

Putin's school of sexpionage: Book reveals how they trained at academy

Putin's school of sexpionage: History is littered with gullible men who fell prey to the seductive charms of the KGB's Mata Haris. Now a haunting new book reveals how they honed their dark arts at a secret academy near Moscow

In Cold War, British Embassy in Moscow was embodiment of political prestige

By MARK HOLLINGSWORTH

PUBLISHED: 22:45 BST, 1 April 2023 | UPDATED: 23:02 BST, 1 April 2023

Daily Mail · by Mark Hollingsworth · April 1, 2023

At the height of the Cold War, the British Embassy on the embankment of Saint Sophia in Moscow was the ornate, imposing embodiment of political and diplomatic prestige and status.

Built in the 1890s by a Russian sugar merchant, the entrance featured a heavily panelled Scottish baronial hallway and red-carpeted ornamental staircase.

The first floor was dominated by a vast white and gold ballroom with a fine parquet floor, used for flamboyant parties and balls reminiscent of a scene from Anna Karenina.

Across the river and facing the mansion was the Kremlin wall, punctuated by watchtowers.

No other embassy had such a clear view of the very heart of the Soviet empire, which is why an irritated Joseph Stalin used to rage as he looked across the red-brick wall at the capitalist enemy.

But when former KGB officer Vladimir Putin (pictured) came to power in late 1999, he swiftly installed his fellow ex-KGB comrades into all areas of Russian life

A recent example is Anna Chapman, the flame-haired 'sophisticated agent of Russia' who, after working for Barclays Bank, was unmasked in June 2010 in New York as being part of a ten-strong Russian spy ring

One of the final acts of his rule on Christmas Eve in 1952 was to order Britain to find another residence.

Three months later Stalin was dead, and the British refused the offer of a new embassy on a bigger site.

For the KGB, the British Embassy was a prime target for undermining, destabilising and disrupting UK interests.

There were no limits – bugging, arson, burglary, honeytrapping, spiking of drinks, blackmail, planting of drugs, relentless surveillance by car and on foot, telephone harassment and entrapment.

The aim was to obtain kompromat – compromising information, recordings and photographs that could be used as leverage to persuade an intelligence officer or diplomat to spy for the KGB or reveal secrets.

The incriminating material would be deployed at once or filed away for when the target became more powerful and influential.

Kompromat was a tool for political influence-peddling, to improve the outcome of negotiations and sway public opinion.

The Soviet Union had become a blackmail state. When it imploded in 1991, the paranoid world of the KGB was supposed to come to an end with it. Indeed, the organisation was wound up and replaced by a new security service, the FSB.

But when former KGB officer Vladimir Putin came to power in late 1999, he swiftly installed his fellow ex-KGB comrades into all areas of Russian life.

Today, the global charge sheet against Putin's Russia includes the state-sponsored assassination of scores of dissidents, including Alexander Litvinenko, the persecution of political opponents such as Alexei Navalny, the use of disinformation through social media and the use of honeytraps.

Like Putin, all of these methods bear the imprint of the old KGB.

Today, the global charge sheet against Putin's Russia includes the state-sponsored assassination of scores of dissidents, including Alexander Litvinenko, the persecution of political opponents such as Alexei Navalny (pictured), the use of disinformation through social media and the use of honeytraps

Like Putin, all of these methods bear the imprint of the old KGB. The former KGB officers installed by Putin – known as the 'siloviki' (strongmen) – controlled the key government ministries, law enforcement agencies and state-owned companies

The former KGB officers installed by Putin – known as the 'siloviki' (strongmen) – controlled the key government ministries, law enforcement agencies and state-owned companies.

In effect, Putin created a KGB state. He also revived the doctrine of 'active measures' as a weapon of foreign policy.

In KGB doctrine, everything is an extension of politics, including military operations, such as the invasion of Ukraine.

But, more commonly, active measures are covert intelligence operations, including the funding of politicians, the spreading of disinformation and recruiting agents as a means to exert influence.

And then there are the dirty tricks – forged documents, doctored photographs, blurry videos of illicit liaisons with prostitutes hired by the secret state, planted drugs, assassinations, smears using black propaganda techniques and blackmail.

Young girls were taught to approach foreigners in fake brothel

That is why British diplomats posted to Moscow have, for generations, received an MI6 security briefing warning them to be careful what they say as every apartment will be bugged.

Some are unnerved. Others have enjoyed making outrageous remarks to light fittings they assume to contain bugging devices. In fact, the KGB never expected sensitive state secrets to be divulged.

They listened in to find candidates for honeytraps: the lovesick, lonely secretary who has access to documents; the frustrated homosexual; the diplomat trapped in a miserable marriage; or the intelligence officer angry at being underpaid.

All were prey to young, beautiful women known as swallows, or charismatic, confident men known as ravens.

Young, impoverished girls were taught how to approach foreigners in clubs, hotel lobbies or even fake brothels called 'malinas' (Russian for raspberries) fitted with bugging devices and cameras (pictured: Anna Chapman)

The KGB trained hand-picked actresses, singers, dancers and teachers at a 'sexpionage' school in Kazan, east of Moscow.

Young, impoverished girls were taught how to approach foreigners in clubs, hotel lobbies or even fake brothels called 'malinas' (Russian for raspberries) fitted with bugging devices and cameras.

At a similar academy in East Germany, the HVA – effectively a subsidiary of the KGB – trained its so-called 'Romeos' as thoroughly as any pilot, with a syllabus focused on Marxism, loyalty, espionage and, most importantly, psychological manipulation.

The typical male spy was about 30, well-educated, confident, reliable and attentive, with a sense of humour and impeccable manners. They were not necessarily handsome or experienced lovers.

'More important to these women was the inner values of these men who made them think: 'Yes, I could share my life with him,' ' said former Stasi officer and Romeo spy Gerhard Bayer.

One secretary who worked in Bonn for West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer passed on secrets to her Romeo spy for 14 years.

A secretary at the US Embassy in Bonn handed over 1,500 classified documents over 22 years to her lover. Neither woman had any idea their boyfriends were East German intelligence officers until they were arrested and jailed for espionage.

Even male opera singers were auditioned and recruited to perform for the secret state. The KGB's most effective raven was a strikingly handsome singer called Konstantin Lapshin, who performed at the Moscow Operetta.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, his secret life involved seducing female officials and diplomats at the American embassy. His coup de grace was Annabelle Bucar, who worked for the US ambassador, General Walter Bedell Smith.

She was so smitten that she accepted the singer's proposal for a secret marriage – and then defected.

Kompromat gained from the sexual dark arts was often not used immediately, but dangled in front of an official, who must then choose between betraying his country or facing disgrace.

This happened in 1968, when the Winchester and Cambridge-educated British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, was recalled to London after admitting he had fallen for his buxom chambermaid and was being blackmailed to reveal secrets about dissidents in Czechoslovakia.

Four years later, a more successful KGB seduction operation trapped a 30-year-old married British diplomat who was seduced by his family's Russian maid.

This happened in 1968, when the Winchester and Cambridge-educated British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Geoffrey Harrison (pictured), was recalled to London after admitting he had fallen for his buxom chambermaid and was being blackmailed to reveal secrets about dissidents in Czechoslovakia

Another notorious honeytrap victim was John Vassall (pictured), an Admiralty clerk at the British Embassy, whose promiscuous homosexuality was soon spotted by the KGB

Codenamed Karev, his identity remains secret to this day. The swallow deployed a time-honoured tactic of pretending to be pregnant and persuaded him to disclose the names of MI6 officers working under diplomatic cover.

Another notorious honeytrap victim was John Vassall, an Admiralty clerk at the British Embassy, whose promiscuous homosexuality was soon spotted by the KGB.

He was seduced by a handsome young interpreter, plied with drink and photographed half-naked in bed.

On his return to London, the clerk resumed his duties at the Admiralty and spied for the Soviet Union for the next seven years, even after he was posted back to London, until he was arrested in 1962.

But the British security service was not without tricks of its own.

In a dimly-lit basement nightclub just off London's Regent Street, exotic, half-naked women in headdresses danced on a tiny stage while, in the crimson velvet-lined booths, hostesses smiled obligingly and poured champagne.

In one corner of the Eve Club was Earl Jellicoe, a former MI6 officer and later leader of the House of Lords. Other tables would have hosted MPs, businessman and foreign diplomats.

The club's membership included nine MPs, 12 ambassadors, 30 diplomats, five QCs and 70 titled Englishmen, including the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Rutland and the Duke of Norfolk.

Perhaps the most intriguing member was War Secretary John Profumo, who held his stag night at the club in December 1954.

As War Secretary, he later became embroiled in a notorious security scandal after having an affair with Christine Keeler, who was sleeping with a KGB officer at the same time.

In fact, the KGB and the Eastern Bloc allies were attracted to the Eve Club like bees to a honeypot. It provided them with the chance to meet important people and to enjoy decadent Western glamour.

Presiding over this unique den of political, sexual and espionage intrigue was the diminutive proprietor Helen O'Brien, who spoke fluent Russian, Romanian and French and was an MI5 informant.

Helen was born Elena Constantinescu into an aristocratic family in Romania, and escaped the advancing Red Army at the end of the Second World War by fleeing on one of the king's racehorses.

Blonde, glamorous and charismatic, she seemed the perfect hostess. But her parents were trapped behind the Iron Curtain and she bombarded the Romanian Embassy with letters pleading for exit visas for them. She even sent a telegram to President Ceausescu.

Perhaps the most intriguing member was War Secretary John Profumo (pictured), who held his stag night at the club in December 1954

As War Secretary, he later became embroiled in a notorious security scandal after having an affair with Christine Keeler (pictured), who was sleeping with a KGB officer at the same time. In fact, the KGB and the Eastern Bloc allies were attracted to the Eve Club like bees to a honeypot. It provided them with the chance to meet important people and to enjoy decadent Western glamour

On November 14, 1957, Colonel M. V. Gavrilovich, a Romanian military attaché, walked into the Eve Club and applied for membership.

A slow negotiation began. The colonel introduced her to a man who appeared to be Russian who said he could help her parents – as long as he could rely on her loyalty and co-operation.

An instinctive anti-Communist, Helen knew she was being courted by the KGB. So she was delighted to receive a letter from the Ministry of Defence.

'We believe that you have information of possible interest,' it said. 'Would you be so kind enough to come to the War Office for a talk?'

There, Helen was introduced to the formidable MI5 counter-intelligence officer Charles Elwell, who persuaded her to make the Eve Club a focal point for late-night eavesdropping on Russia's spies.

Helen and her Russian-speaking manager kept Communist diplomats and businessmen under surveillance and reported their names, addresses, financial details and habits to MI5.

She also identified Czech intelligence officers, passing on the name of a 43-year-old Czech club member, Josef Piskula, to Elwell.

My job was so boring the only way to relieve the tedium was sex

Piskula was usually accompanied by Josef Frolik, a handsome 37-year-old Czech counter-intelligence officer working undercover as a commercial attaché.

His main task was to handle Ernest Fernyhough, a Labour MP and parliamentary private secretary to the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.

Codenamed 'Koza', Fernyhough provided intelligence on the Prime Minister's private telephone conversations with US President Johnson on Vietnam and the devaluation of the pound until his handlers suspected he was working with the British secret services.

Afterwards, Frolik continued his visits to the Eve Club to seduce women he believed were connected to the government – his Czech spymasters gave him a monthly quota of ladies he was required to sleep with in order to obtain security secrets during pillow-talk.

In April 1973, a tip-off from Helen helped uncover another of Britain's most notorious security scandals.

The girl in question was Norma Levy (pictured), a prostitute who entertained Soviet spies, politicians and the criminal underworld at her flat in Maida Vale, London

Her husband, Colin Levy, was blackmailing her because her clients included the Conservative Defence Minister Lord Lambton, who had been paying her £10,000 a year and had bought her a flat

'Beautiful body, good showgirl but hard and mercenary,' Helen said of her. 'I had a sixth sense she might bring trouble and she really didn't have the requisite breeding' (pictured: Norma Levy with former husband Colin Levy)

She reported that one of the girls who had briefly worked as an Eve Club hostess was being blackmailed by her husband.

The girl in question was Norma Levy, a prostitute who entertained Soviet spies, politicians and the criminal underworld at her flat in Maida Vale, London.

'Beautiful body, good showgirl but hard and mercenary,' Helen said of her. 'I had a sixth sense she might bring trouble and she really didn't have the requisite breeding.'

Her husband, Colin Levy, was blackmailing her because her clients included the Conservative Defence Minister Lord Lambton, who had been paying her £10,000 a year and had bought her a flat.

When Lambton was asked by Elwell why he slept with prostitutes, he replied: 'My job at the Ministry of Defence was so boring the only way to relieve the tedium was sex and vigorous gardening.'

The purpose of the KGB's active measures overseas was often to find so-called 'agents of influence'. And the KGB preferred dealing with Conservatives.

One successful recruit was Conservative MP and Junior Minister Ray Mawby, who spied for the Czech security service for payment. He even handed over the floor plans of the Prime Minister's private office in the Commons.

Politically and diplomatically, the Soviets found that negotiating with Conservative Ministers was reassuring because there was political certainty.

This was in contrast to Labour regimes, who viewed Communism as a perversion of socialism, whereas Conservatives negotiated with autocracies.

The end of the Cold War was due partly to two successful KGB intelligence operations in the US.

When Gorbachev became President in March 1985, he realised that while Thatcher and Reagan's confrontational rhetoric was dangerous and provocative, they were not on the verge of launching thermonuclear war.

This was due mainly to intelligence and documents sold to the KGB by Aldrich Ames, who worked on Soviet operations at the CIA, and Robert Hanssen, an FBI officer who had access to secret US assessments on Gorbachev and the prospect of a nuclear conflict.

The material strengthened Gorbachev's conviction that there were no offensive Nato plans, and that Operation Ryan, the Soviets' military intelligence programme to anticipate a nuclear missile attack, was based on conspiracy thinking rather than reality.

The Cold War drew to a close not with a bang, but a whimper.

But none of the protagonists would have believed that a new Cold War using the same intelligence methods would return decades later.

Agents Of Influence, by Mark Hollingsworth, is published by Oneworld on April 13 at £20. To pre-order a copy for £18, go to mailshop.co.uk/books or call 020 3176 2937 before April 16. Free UK delivery on web orders over £20.

Daily Mail · by Mark Hollingsworth · April 1, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 1, 2023

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Putin's school of sexpionage: History is littered with gullible men who fell prey to the seductive charms of the KGB's Mata Haris. Now a haunting new book reveals how they honed their dark arts at a secret academy near Moscow