Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Democracy does not guarantee equality of conditions - it only guarantees equality of opportunity."

– Irving Kristol

"People always say that I didn't give up my seat because I was tired, but that isn't true. I was not tired physically... No, the only tired I was, was tired of giving in."

– Rosa Parks

"My country is the world and my religion is to do good."

– Thomas Jefferson

1. World Central Kitchen Suspends Gaza Aid Operations After Workers Killed

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 1, 2024

4. The Beard Domain Is Absurd, but That Was the Point

5. Does the U.S. Need a 10,000-Strong Cyber Force? New Report Gives a Big Yes.

6. Are Beijing and Washington testing the dark forest hypothesis?

7. US defense official had 'Havana syndrome' symptoms during a 2023 NATO summit, the Pentagon confirms

8. Iran Says the Deadly Israeli Strike in Damascus Will Not Go Unanswered

9. What to know about U.S. military aid to Israel

10. China’s Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms

11. Army Budget Invests in Lessons from Ukraine with Focus on Deterring China - Defense Opinion

12. The Iranians Pay a Price in Syria

13. ISW: Intel Brief: March 2024 Newsletter

14. Indo-Pacific security hinges on cross-domain technology

15. Mine the Gap: How Washington and Canberra Can Improve Their Asymmetric Capabilities

16. Nothing "Great" About It: World War I, the Rise of the American National Security State, and the Espionage Act

17. What Japan’s Military Reorganization Means for US-Japanese Bilateral Operations

18. A Sea Change? U.S.-Philippine Irregular Statecraft in the South China Sea

19. China Is Still Rising

20. How to Take on Haiti’s Gangs

21. Russian Threat Perception and Nuclear Strategy in its Plans for War with China

1. World Central Kitchen Suspends Gaza Aid Operations After Workers Killed

World Central Kitchen Suspends Gaza Aid Operations After Workers Killed

Seven deaths, which the group blames on an Israeli airstrike, draw condemnation from Western capitals

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/world-central-kitchen-suspends-gaza-aid-operations-after-workers-killed-71ed846f?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Stephen KalinFollow

Updated April 2, 2024 5:42 am ET

World Central Kitchen, the biggest provider of food aid in the Gaza Strip after the United Nations, said Tuesday that it was pausing operations across the Middle East after seven of its workers including a U.S.-Canadian dual citizen were killed in what it said was an Israeli airstrike.

The group said its workers had coordinated their movements ahead of time with the Israeli military. Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military’s chief spokesman, expressed “sincere sorrow” and said it was reviewing the circumstances of the incident.

The pause threatens to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territory, with more aid groups expected to suspend their activities out of fear for their staff’s safety. More than one million people are estimated to be starving in Gaza as a result of the war Israel launched against Hamas in response to the Oct. 7 attacks, which Israeli authorities say killed 1,200 people, mostly civilians.

The aid workers’ deaths drew condemnation from Western capitals and risk further isolating Israel over its conduct in the war, which has killed about 33,000 Palestinians in Gaza, mostly women and children, according to health authorities in the territory. The numbers don’t distinguish between militants and civilians.

U.N. World Food Program Director Cindy McCain said she was shocked and heartbroken by the World Central Kitchen deaths. “This attack on our humanitarian community is unacceptable,” she tweeted. “The safety of aid workers is paramount, as is the safety of those who come to receive aid.”

Palestinians carry the body of a foreign World Central Kitchen worker. PHOTO: RAMADAN ABED/REUTERS

World Central Kitchen, which was founded by celebrity chef José Andrés, runs field kitchens that provide free hot meals during crises, such as earthquakes and floods. It first operated in a war zone in Ukraine.

In Gaza, the Washington-based group has ramped up operations since Oct. 7 to provide 300,000 meals a day, making deliveries by truck, airdrop and by sea through a maritime corridor that it pioneered with an initial shipment last month. President Biden said last month that the U.S. military would build a pier off the coast of Gaza to enable aid deliveries by sea, but the pier hasn’t been put in place yet.

In a war that poses unprecedented challenges for humanitarian organizations used to operating in the world’s toughest environments, World Central Kitchen has punched above its weight in Gaza. While the U.N. provides nearly 80% of humanitarian aid, World Central Kitchen accounts for more than half of non-U.N. deliveries, mostly food, according to Cogat, the Israeli military body coordinating aid there.

Palestinians inspect heavily damaged World Central Kitchen vehicles. PHOTO: OMAR ASHTAWY/ZUMA PRESS

Palestinian girls share a food ration in Rafah, southern Gaza. PHOTO: MOHAMMED ABED/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A second convoy of ships organized by World Central Kitchen that departed from Cyprus over the weekend arrived late Monday and began to unload some 400 tons of food. World Central Kitchen said its workers, who were traveling in two armored cars branded with the group’s logo and a soft-skin vehicle, were hit as they left a warehouse in the central Gaza city of Deir al-Balah where they had deposited food from the ships.

A spokeswoman for World Central Kitchen said the ships were sent back to Cyprus after the incident, having only unloaded a quarter of the food they were meant to deliver.

World Central Kitchen blamed the deaths on a targeted attack by the Israeli military.

“This is not only an attack against WCK, this is an attack on humanitarian organizations showing up in the most dire of situations where food is being used as a weapon of war,” said Chief Executive Erin Gore. “This is unforgivable.”

The victims included three British nationals, a U.S.-Canadian dual-citizen, one Palestinian, an Australian and a Polish citizen, according to World Central Kitchen.

Humanitarian aid is dropped over the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: -/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

White House national security spokeswoman Adrienne Watson tweeted that the U.S. was “deeply troubled” by the strike and called on Israel to investigate.

Poland’s Foreign Ministry condemned the death of Polish aid worker Damian Sobol. “Poland does not agree with the absence of compliance to international, humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, among them humanitarian workers,” it said on X. Deputy Justice Minister Arkadiusz Myrcha called for an investigation on state television.

The Australian aid worker was identified as Zomi Frankcom.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the strike “completely unacceptable.” He said he expected full accountability for the aid workers’ deaths and that the Foreign Ministry had requested a call with the Israeli ambassador to Canberra.

“This is beyond any reasonable circumstances—that someone going about providing aid and humanitarian assistance should lose their life,” he told reporters.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 1, 2024

Apr 1, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2024

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

April 1, 2024, 6:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on April 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A joint investigation by 60 Minutes, the Insider, and Der Spiegel strongly suggests that the Kremlin has waged a sustained kinetic campaign directly targeting US government personnel both in the United States and internationally for a decade, with the likely objective of physically incapacitating US government personnel. The investigation, which the outlets published on March 31, indicates that the infamous Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) Unit 29155 (the same unit whose operatives attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal with the Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom in 2018) may be using nonlethal directed energy or acoustic weapons to target a large number of US government personnel, each of whom has reported experiencing an “anomalous health incident” (also called “Havana Syndrome”) of varying severity between 2014 and as recently as 2023.[1] The investigation cites intercepted Russian intelligence documents, travel logs, call metadata, and eyewitness testimony that places GRU Unit 29155 operatives at many of the locations where US officials experienced Havana Syndrome, either shortly before or during each attack. The investigation suggested that GRU operatives conducted a directed energy attack against an FBI agent in Florida a few months after the agent interviewed detained undercover GRU officer Vitaliy Kovalev at some point between June and December 2020.[2] Other US government officials claimed they were attacked by the directed energy weapons while they were in the United States, including in Washington, DC. The joint investigation interviewed US Army Colonel Greg Edgreen, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)’s working group investigating Havana Syndrome, who believes that Russia is behind the Havana Syndrome incidents and that the incidents consistently have a “Russia nexus.”[3] Edgreen stated that the incidents all targeted the top five to ten percent “performing DIA officers” and that the victims were either experts on Russia or had otherwise worked to defend US national security interests against Russia. The investigation noted that many affected personnel were assigned to roles aimed at countering Russia following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine after these personnel had previously worked on other portfolios. The investigation reported that these incidents have affected senior US personnel, including a senior official in the National Security Council who served at some point in 2020-2024 and CIA Director Bill Burns’ then-deputy chief of staff who experienced an anomalous health incident in September 2021 in Delhi. Several of the US officials who experienced Havana Syndrome have severe life-altering and career-ending injuries. Many US officials’ spouses and children also experienced Havana Syndrome while deployed overseas.

Retired CIA officer Marc Polymeropolous, who experienced Havana Syndrome while in Moscow in December 2017 and ended his career as Chief of Operation for the CIA’s Europe and Eurasia Mission Center, stated that if the investigation’s attribution of the attacks to Russia’s GRU is true, then the attacks fit a pattern of the Kremlin “seeking retribution for events” for which it believes the United States is responsible.[4] Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed that a senior unnamed Department of Defense official at the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023 experienced similar symptoms to other anomalous health incidents.[5] Senior US intelligence officials have previously publicly stated that the intelligence community cannot attribute a foreign adversary to any of the anomalous health incidents, and White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre reiterated in response to the joint investigation on April 1 that the intelligence community “has not concluded” that Russian military intelligence was involved in the incidents.[6] If the Russian GRU is confirmed to be responsible for numerous attacks against US military, diplomatic, and intelligence personnel and their families, however, then this would amount to a significant sustained Russian campaign of kinetic attacks against the United States designed to degrade US intelligence capabilities against Russia to which the United States has not publicly responded.

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is intensifying efforts to falsely implicate Ukraine in the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack while denying any Islamic State (IS) responsibility or involvement in the attack. The SVR baselessly claimed on April 1 that the United States is attempting to cover up Ukraine’s alleged responsibility for the Crocus City Hall attack, including by blaming the attack on the Islamic State’s Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K).[7] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently demanded that Ukrainian authorities arrest and extradite people allegedly involved in the Crocus City Hall attack and a wider set of alleged “terrorist” attacks in Russia.[8] ISW continues to assess with high confidence that IS conducted the Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or aided the attack.[9] The Kremlin likely intends to capitalize on domestic fear and anger about the attack and hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack and wider alleged “terrorist” attacks in Russia will increase Russian domestic support for the war in Ukraine.[10]

Reuters reported on April 1 that Iran warned Russia about a possible “major terrorist operation” at an unspecified date prior to the Crocus City Hall attack, according to “three sources familiar with the matter.”[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Presidential Representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov denied the report that Iran warned Russia of a terrorist attack.[12] The Russian government will likely continue to deny any reports that the Kremlin received a warning of a potential terrorist attack before the Crocus City Hall attack to deflect blame from Russia’s law enforcement and intelligence failure and divert accusations towards Ukraine.

The Russian MFA announced on April 1 that it is working to remove the Taliban’s status as a designated terrorist organization in Russia and announced that Russia invited the Taliban to participate in the May 14-19 Russia-Islamic World Forum in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic.[13] The Kremlin’s hyper fixation on pinning the blame for the attack on Ukraine, as opposed to addressing very real and necessary terrorist threats, will likely continue to pose a security threat to Russia in the long term.

Russian authorities are taking measures to further crackdown against migrant communities in Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated on April 1 that it is preparing a bill that introduces various measures tightening Russia’s migration policy.[14] The proposed bill includes requirements that all foreigners undergo mandatory fingerprinting and photographing upon entering Russia; the creation of a government system containing the digital profiles of foreigners; requirements that all foreigners receive a new identification document confirming their right to live and work in Russia; reductions on the limits on how long foreigners can temporarily stay in Russia from 90 days per every six months to 90 days per year; and authorizations for courts and certain federal executive bodies outside of courts to deport foreigners who “pose a security threat.” The MVD’s proposals to tighten the government's tracking of and control over migrants in Russia will also likely make it easier for authorities to target and coerce migrants into the Russian military as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts, as such efforts will build out a database of personal information that makes migrant communities more immediately identifiable.[15] Kremlin newswire TASS also reported on April 1 that Russian authorities detained the tenth person allegedly complicit in the Crocus City Hall attack and that Russian authorities detained him as part of an ongoing Russian operation, called Operation “Illegal,” which Russian authorities have reportedly regularly conducted in previous years.[16] Russian human rights project First Department reported on March 29 that Russian authorities launched “Operation Anti-Migrant,” a large-scale operation to identify and deport migrants, in St. Petersburg, and Russian authorities are likely increasing their searches on migrants in the wake of the Crocus City Hall attack.[17] It is unclear if Operation “Illegal” and “Operation Anti-Migrant” are related programs.

The Kremlin is reportedly taking steps to directly strengthen its control over government bodies that oversee migration policy. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on April 1 that sources close to the Russian presidential administration and government stated that Russian authorities are considering creating a new department to oversee interethnic and migration policy and that the department will be directly subordinated to the Russian president.[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated in response that there are no official decisions about creating a department for interethnic and migration policy yet.[19] Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during his annual “Direct Line” speech in December 2023 that Russia needs a “special organ, not just the Ministry of Internal Affairs” to address Russia’s migration issues.[20] Putin may scapegoat certain MVD personnel for Russia’s recent migration issues. A Russian insider source claimed on April 1 that Putin is expected to attend the MVD’s extended board meeting on April 2 which will summarize the MVD’s 2023 activities.[21] The insider source claimed that the meeting will include discussions of migration issues and that unspecified actors will “attack” the head of the MVD‘s Main Directorate for Migration Affairs, Valentina Kazakova, and her “curator” MVD Deputy Minister Alexander Gorovoy, likely due to their perceived inaction and inefficacy. The insider source claimed that the Kremlin will likely dismiss MVD leaders, including Internal Affairs Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, after Putin’s inauguration on May 7 and that the Kremlin offered the minister position to the head of the Economic Security Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Sergei Alpatov.

Key Takeaways:

A joint investigation by 60 Minutes, the Insider, and Der Spiegel strongly suggests that the Kremlin has waged a sustained kinetic campaign directly targeting US government personnel both in the United States and internationally for a decade, with the likely objective of physically incapacitating US government personnel.
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is intensifying efforts to falsely implicate Ukraine in the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack while denying any Islamic State (IS) responsibility or involvement in the attack.
Russian authorities are taking measures to further crack down against migrant communities in Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on April 1.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to reassure the Russian public that Russian military conscripts will not deploy to most of occupied Ukraine nor participate in combat operations in Ukraine amid the start of the spring semi-annual military conscription call-up that started on April 1.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued near Kreminna on April 1, but there were no confirmed changes on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Positional fighting continued west of Kreminna near Terny and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[22] Ukrainian “Steel Border” border detachment Spokesperson Ivan Shevtsov stated that Russian forces have not conducted an attack in the Kupyansk direction since March 29 and are generally conducting fewer assaults in this direction while they rest and reconstitute, whereas Russian forces have conducted up to 16 assaults per day in the Lyman direction in the past week.[23] ISW has previously observed that Russian forces undulate between attacking in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions in order to maintain constant offensive pressure against defending Ukrainian units along this line.[24] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Several Russian sources claimed on April 1 that elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division have advanced towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) through forested areas in the Stupky-Holobovskiy-2 nature reserve and are now between 650 meters and one kilometer from the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[26] ISW has only collected data to confirm that Russian forces are about 1.5 kilometers from the eastern outskirt of Chasiv Yar at the furthest point of their confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on April 1 shows the aftermath of an unsuccessful Russian armored vehicle attack on Ivanivske (between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have lost five or six armored vehicles in attacks near Ivanivske in recent days.[27] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional fighting continued west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; and southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[28]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southwest and west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) have advanced along Haharin Street in Vodyane (southwest of Avdiivka) and have reached the western outskirts of the settlement.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces completely control Vodyane, which will allow them to develop new attacks towards Pervomaiske (directly south of Vodyane).[30] Geolocated footage published between March 30 and April 1 confirms that Russian forces attempted additional marginal advances west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) during the failed Russian battalion-sized mechanized attack near Tonenke on March 30.[31] Forbes characterized the failed Russian attack as a “tank massacre” and reported that Russian forces lost a total of 12 tanks of the 36 deployed during the attempted assault.[32] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional fighting northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[33] A prominent Russian milblogger complained that Russian advances the Avdiivka area have been hindered by incompetent tactical-level Russian commanders who are more interested in advancing their careers than protecting their men.[34]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are making tactical advances within Novomykhailivka and that heavy fighting is ongoing in and around the settlement.[35] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[36] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC), 68th AC (Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating in this area.[37]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting east of Vodyane (near Vuhledar); near Velyka Novosilka; and near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] The Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD) reportedly conducted a guided glide bomb strike on a bridge in Hulyaipole (45km southwest of Velyka Novosilka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast).[39] Elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[41] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.[42] Elements of the Russian “Viking” Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, amid continued positional engagements near Krynky. Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kozachi Laheri (3km from the Dnipro River in the east bank of Kherson Oblast), although not likely within the past day.[44] Russian and Ukrainian forces reported continued fighting in Krynky.[45]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin appointed Vladislav Isaev as the General Director of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast on April 1.[46] Russian forces have occupied the ZNPP since March 2022, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly called for withdrawal of all Russian unauthorized military and other personnel from the ZNPP and the return of the ZNPP to full Ukrainian control.[47]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched three Shahed 136/131 drones at Ukraine on April 1, two of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[48] Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command additionally reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Kh-59 missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office stated that Russian forces launched two D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPD) guided glide bombs at Kharkiv City overnight from March 31 to April 1.[50] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast officials noted that recent continuous Russian strikes on Kharkiv City have destroyed all critical energy infrastructure and severely damaged residential and private infrastructure in the city, causing an energy deficit in Kharkiv Oblast.[51]

Russian opposition outlet ASTRA reported on April 1 that Russian planes accidentally dropped two more FAB-500 guided glide bombs on Belgorod Oblast on March 31, making this the sixteenth case of such accidents in the last two weeks alone.[52]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD continues to reassure the Russian public that Russian military conscripts will not deploy to most of occupied Ukraine nor participate in combat operations in Ukraine amid the start of the spring semi-annual military conscription call-up that started on April 1. Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky emphasized the upcoming conscription cycle is “in no way connected” with the war in Ukraine and stated that conscripts will not go to military deployment points in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, although notably did not exclude occupied Crimea.[53] Tsimlyansky stated that the majority of conscripts will complete training within five months and then enter military units in accordance with their acquired skills. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains unlikely to deploy conscripts to participate in combat operations in Ukraine due to concerns that conscript causalities may cause societal discontent within Russia, although Russia may expand its crypto-mobilization efforts during the spring 2024 conscription cycle by attempting to recruit conscripts to sign Russian military contracts.[54] The Kremlin will likely continue using conscripts to cover the international border between Ukraine and Russia.[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces continue efforts to improve drone operation and production capabilities. The Kremlin ordered the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade to assist the Russian Dome JSC in producing systems to detect and suppress drones and emphasized the need to increase the number of domestically produced electronic components in each system.[56] Russian Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions General Director Dmitry Kuzyakin told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 1 that Russian specialists designed the “Pik” drone tower, a long-range digital communication system, that will increase the operating range of first-person view (FPV) drones.[57] Kuzyakin stated that Russian forces will install the Pik drone tower on airfield control towers and on ships’ masts to increase FPV drone operation ranges.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

The US is taking steps to increase its domestic production of artillery shells to support Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on March 27 that the US and Turkey are discussing American purchases of Turkish explosives to increase US artillery shell production.[58] Bloomberg reported that the Pentagon contracted US defense company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems to build three 155mm artillery shell metal parts production lines in Texas with Turkish subcontracts and that one Texan plant is scheduled to start production in June 2024. US Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Doug Bush stated on February 5 that the US Army aims to double the US monthly production of 155mm shells from 28,000 shells per month in October 2023 to about 60,000 shells per month in October 2024 should the proposed Congressional supplemental appropriations bill pass, but noted that US shell production in part depends on US domestic production of explosive materials.[59] US imports of Turkish explosives will likely help boost domestic US artillery ammunition production.

Ukraine’s European and Asian partners continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid while ramping up their own defense industrial capacities. Germany announced on March 28 a new aid package for Ukraine, including ammunition for Leopard tanks, 40mm and 155mm artillery ammunition, and reconnaissance drones.[60] Belgian Defense Minister Ludivine Dedonder announced on March 29 that Belgium approved a military aid package for Ukraine that will allocate 100 million euros (about $107 million) to maintain and support the future Ukrainian fleet of F-16 fighter jets.[61] German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall stated on March 25 that the European Union (EU) allocated over 130 million euros (about $139 million) to Rheinmetall to increase its production of ammunition as part of the Act of Support in Ammunition Production (ASAP).[62] The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance stated on April 1 that Japan allocated $118 million to Ukraine as part of World Bank projects aimed at restoring Ukraine’s healthcare system and residential infrastructure.[63] The Japanese government also eased its defense equipment transfer regulations on March 26, which will allow the export of fighter jets that Japan is set to jointly develop with the UK and Italy and aims to deploy by 2035.[64] The updated Japanese regulations state that Japan can export the trilaterally developed fighter jets to third countries, but not to countries where there are ongoing hostilities. Japan previously revised its export policy to backfill US stockpiles of Patriot missiles in December 2023, allowing the US to send more Patriot missiles to Ukraine.[65]

European countries continue efforts to provide Ukraine with critical artillery ammunition, including through the Czech-led initiative to source artillery ammunition for Ukraine from outside the EU. Italian outlet Corriere della Sera reported on March 28 that unspecified sources stated that the Czech-led initiative concluded contracts worth about 1.8 billion euros (about $1.93 billion) for one million artillery shells for Ukraine and that Ukraine will begin receiving the shells in April 2024.[66] Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski stated on March 29 that the Czech-led initiative is already organizing the transportation of artillery ammunition to Ukraine.[67] Sikorski also announced that Poland would “double” its contribution to the initiative but did not offer specifics. The head of the German Ministry of Defense’s situation center for Ukraine, Major General Christian Freuding, stated on March 27 that Germany will transfer 10,000 artillery shells from German arsenals to Ukraine in the coming days.[68] Freuding stated that Germany will also support the Czech-led artillery ammunition coalition and purchase 180,000 shells, which Ukraine will receive in the second half of 2024. Freuding stated that Germany agreed to supply Ukraine with another 100,000 shells at the end of 2024 as part of a bilateral agreement with an unspecified third country. Iceland announced on March 25 that it will join the Czech-led initiative to procure artillery ammunition.[69]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Pro-Russia channels are circulating a propaganda video about mobilization in Ukraine designed to undermine Ukrainian trust in the Ukrainian government.[70] This propaganda video features high production value and cinematic sophistication, suggesting it is a product of a concerted and well-resourced information operation. Russian opposition outlets Agenstvo and Mediazona reported that the actors featured in the video are professional Russian actors who have previously featured in Russian television shows.[71] One actor refused to discuss his participation in the video, claiming he only acts in films, not commercials.[72] The Kremlin has previously used high production value propaganda videos as part of centrally directed information operations before, and this recent video’s characteristics suggest that the video supports a broader Kremlin effort to erode Ukrainian trust in government, undermine Ukrainian mobilization efforts, and sow domestic discontent.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russia and Belarus are reportedly increasing joint production of critical technical equipment, likely as part of Russian sanctions evasion schemes. Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Viktor Evtukhov stated on March 31 that Belarus and Russia are developing joint projects to manufacture microelectronics, radio electronics, and machine tools.[74] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Russian Governor of Oryol Oblast Andrei Klychkov on April 1 and discussed cooperation in microelectronics production.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 1, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iran in the Region: An Israeli airstrike targeted a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing senior IRGC Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.
Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi.
Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node.
Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.
Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force.
Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat, southern Israel, on March 31.
Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 1, 2024

Apr 1, 2024 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, April 1, 2024

Nicholas Carl, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

The Axis of Resistance is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction while others are militias over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria in an airstrike on April 1.[1] Israel struck a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.[2] Zahedi was a highly influential and well-connected individual within the Iranian security establishment, having held several key positions throughout his career.[3] Zahedi most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[4] Zahedi almost certainly therefore played a prominent role in managing how Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have escalated against the United States and Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began. Zahedi beforehand commanded the IRGC’s ground and air services and served as the operations deputy at the IRGC’s joint staff.[5] He was also part of an extraordinarily influential and tightly knit circle of senior IRGC officers who met one another during the Iran-Iraq War and have periodically come together in the intervening decades to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[6] Other members of this informal fraternity include Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who the United States killed in January 2020, and his successor and current Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani.

Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.[7] Israel has conducted several strikes targeting Iranian and Iranian-backed positions in Syria in recent months to this end, including killing IRGC Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi outside Damascus in December 2023.[8] Mousavi was one of Zahedi’s subordinates and responsible for moving military assets and equipment through Syria. Zahedi is now the senior-most Iranian officer that Israel has killed in its air campaign.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi. The Iranian regime has vowed publicly to avenge Zahedi and is creating a domestic expectation that it will take some dramatic action.[9] Iranian state media celebrated Zahedi’s prominence in the Axis of Resistance, publishing photos of him standing next to Qassem Soleimani and Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Iranian state media also emphasized that the April 1 Israeli airstrike hit a building that was part of the Iranian embassy and argued that the airstrike thus constitutes an attack on Iranian territory.[11] Iranian and Iranian-backed forces could time part of their retaliation around Quds Day, which is the annual anti-Israel holiday that Iran and its Axis of Resistance promote, on April 5.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. Israeli forces returned to re-clear the area on March 18 after receiving intelligence that Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and-control center.[12] Israeli forces killed a total of over 200 Palestinian fighters, some of whom had barricaded themselves inside the hospital.[13] The IDF also detained over 500 Palestinian fighters from near the hospital and seized intelligence documents and weapons.[14] The IDF said on April 1 that it “completed” the mission and that Israeli forces left the hospital area.[15] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on April 1 that “the terrorist base in Shifa has been eliminated.”[16] The IDF confirmed that Israeli forces will continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and "wherever terrorism rears its head."[17] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, confirmed that the IDF withdrew from al Shifa Hospital on April 1.[18]

The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node. The IDF raid sought to disrupt this node. Hamas and other Palestinian militias condemned the IDF for destroying buildings near the hospital complex during the operation.[19] Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.[20] Palestinian fighters also conducted at least 85 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital over a two-week period. Many of the 85 attacks were indirect mortar and rocket-propelled grenades aimed at areas near the complex, including its front gate.[21] Three Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces at the hospital before the IDF concluded operations there on the morning of April 1.[22] Palestinian fighters also targeted Israeli forces from inside the hospital wards.[23]

Key Takeaways:

Iran in the Region: An Israeli airstrike targeted a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing senior IRGC Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.
Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi.
Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node.
Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.
Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force.
Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat, southern Israel, on March 31.
Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Hamas reported that its fighters mortared an Israeli command-and-control center west of Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City on March 31.[24] Hamas has claimed almost daily attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa since March 24.[25]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 1. The Nahal Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a Hamas military structure filled with explosives and a Palestinian militia observation post in the central Gaza Strip.[26]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on April 1. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and Givati Brigade (162nd Division) are operating in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[27] The brigades engaged Palestinian fighters and raided militia infrastructure.[28] The forces also detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons, including explosives.[29] The IDF Air Force struck two vehicles filled with Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli ground forces in Khan Younis.[30]

Two Palestinian militias claimed that they ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City on April 1. Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force. The Hamas fighters first engaged the APC and dismounts before using unspecified “heavy weapons” targeting the quick reaction force.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed separately that it ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.[32] Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that the attacks killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF has not acknowledged casualties from the attacks at the time of writing.

Al Jazeera reported on April 1 that the Israeli negotiating delegation in Cairo amended its stance on the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip.[33] Israeli negotiators proposed a gradual, month-long return of 60,000 people into the northern Gaza Strip at a rate of 2,000 people per day.[34] The 60,000 returned Gazans would be housed in tents and not return to their homes.[35] Israel stipulated that fighting aged men are prevented from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[36] Hamas has made the return of all displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip a major point in its hostage negotiation demands, along with a comprehensive permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip, and adequate humanitarian relief.[37] The new Israeli stance reportedly did not lead to a breakthrough in negotiations, but an unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media on April 1 that negotiators are making ”some progress” in Cairo.[38]

Senior US and Israeli officials held a secure video conference to discuss the Biden administration’s “alternative proposals” to a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah on April 1.[39] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer chaired the meeting.[40] Hanegbi and Dermer were originally expected to visit Washington in person on March 25, but Tel Aviv rescheduled the meeting.[41] The joint statement released by the White House said that the meeting on Rafah was constructive and that both parties want to see Hamas defeated in Rafah. Israeli and US officials will hold follow up discussions ”as early as next week.”[42]

Hamas’ internal security said on March 31 that Hamas detained ten security officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip.[43] Hamas claimed that the PA sent security forces to the Gaza Strip to protect aid trucks and that the PA’s intelligence chief supervised the operation.[44] The group added that the individuals had ”coordinated [their] operations entirely with [Israel].”[45] An unspecified PA official denied Hamas’ claims.[46] Hamas killed the leader of a local clan in the Gaza Strip on March 13 for stealing humanitarian aid and collaborating with Israel.[47] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the individuals Hamas detained are associated with the PA.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 1.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 31.[48] The al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades fired small arms at Israeli forces and detonated IEDs targeting these forces during an Israeli operation in the area.[49]

A Palestinian attacker wounded three Israeli civilians in a stabbing attack in Gan Yavne, east of Ashdod, on March 31. Israeli forces killed the attacker. Israeli media reported that the attacker is from the town of Dura near Hebron and was in Israel without a permit.[50] Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack.[51] Israeli security forces searched the home of the attacker in Dura overnight on March 31 and the IDF said that it will question suspects in the area.[52]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 31.[53]

The head of Israel’s National Emergency Management Authority said on April 1 that Israel has stockpiled fuel, food, and medical supplies in recent months in preparation for a wider conflict with Hezbollah.[54] Brigadier General Yoram Laredo said that Israel has invested over $500 million to boost these stockpiles to prepare for an ”all-out war” with Hezbollah. An official in an Israeli government-owned electricity company said that a conflict with Hezbollah would cause major disruptions to Israel’s supply of natural gas and electricity.[55]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat on March 31.[56] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari acknowledged the strike and stated that the drone "was made in Iran” and that the attack was "directed by Iran.”[57] An Israeli journalist and western analyst posted videos that showed the drone impacting a hanger next to an Israeli warship.[58] Israeli media reported that three attacks have penetrated IDF air defenses around Eilat since October 7: an Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attack on November 9, 2023, a Houthi cruise missile attack on March 17, 2024, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack on March 31.[59] Hagari stated separately that the IDF was investigating how the March 31 drone was able to penetrate IDF air defenses.[60]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.[61] Abdollahian praised the unity of the Palestinian resistance groups and said that the arrival of Palestinian militia leaders in Tehran ahead of Quds Day—an annual anti-Israel holiday on April 5—sends an “important message” to the region and the world about the Axis of Resistance.[62] Haniyeh and Nakhalah both arrived in Tehran on March 26 and have since met with other senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader.[63] The simultaneous visits of both Haniyeh and Nakhalah are noteworthy, as Iranian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for greater cohesion among Palestinian militias fighting Israel.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called on unspecified “Muslim countries” to work together to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 31.[64] Raisi also condemned purported Israeli violations of international law and called for greater economic cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly pressured Muslim countries, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, to sever economic and political ties with Israel since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[65] ICTP-ISW has previously assessed that the Iranian regime is exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to politically isolate Israel in the Middle East.[66]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it destroyed two Houthi drones on March 30. CENTCOM destroyed one drone over the Red Sea and a second in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[67]

Houthi-affiliated media also claimed that the US conducted airstrikes against an unspecified target near Hudaydah on April 1.[68]

4. The Beard Domain Is Absurd, but That Was the Point

:-)

Kudos to Major Rose. We do need this reminder (and more satire).

Conclusion:

Satire revels in the absurd. Hopefully, my article helped uncover the ridiculousness of the ban on beards, the misuse of history, and the shortfalls of a capabilities-based doctrine that can only account for intangibles through a beard domain.

The Beard Domain Is Absurd, but That Was the Point - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · April 2, 2024

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Of course facial hair doesn’t constitute a warfighting domain. Of course cherry-picked historical examples that suggest a correlation between beards and military victory does not prove a causal relationship. And maybe, 300 wasn’t quite historically accurate. So why did I spend 1,708 words arguing for something so absurd? Because absurdity can help reveal ridiculousness elsewhere. In this case, the beard domain illustrated the problems with current, capability-focused military thinking.

When I was serving as an opposing force commander, I often wondered why we dominated the training unit even though they greatly outnumbered us and had access to superior intelligence, artillery, and aviation capabilities than us. The beards were an obvious physical difference, but the reasons for our victories were more intangible and difficult to quantify. The paratroopers of Geronimo acted with an initiative not apparent in the training units. I never felt that training units got into our decision-making cycle and exploited our vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, Geronimo conducted bottom-up reconnaissance. The unit’s soldiers identified enemy vulnerabilities and rapidly exploited them. They understood the value of seizing the initiative in the attack and continuously disrupting the enemy to prevent a coordinated response.

As with World War I German infiltration tactics, Geronimo bypassed enemy strongpoints and moved with such tempo that its forces were overrunning command posts, seizing confused fuelers, and shooting sleeping aviators upset that their crew rest was being violated. There are few sights more miserable than seeing a battalion commander, in the middle of his unit’s Super Bowl, being captured in his command post after having not even received a report that his defense had been breached. He must have had a taste of how French commanders felt in 1940.

Much of our doctrine echoes French methodical battle: the focus on convergence, the emphasis on centralized fires, the belief in the lethality of technology. The French had a scientifically grounded doctrine, tested in war games, but it failed to account for their need to fight a more mobile, open battle as they rushed into Belgium while conducting an economy-of-force action in their center. It was a unique context that they foresaw but did not adjust their doctrine to fight.

Today, we know the context of possible conflicts with Russia and China: defending against a rapid fait accompli in either the Baltic or Taiwan in a limited war that does not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. But, instead of focusing on those problem sets, commentators use historic allusions to the island-hopping campaign of World War II that are as much of a misuse of history as I employ in “Clipping Convergence.” I explore the importance of context more seriously in a recent Military Review article, “Returning Context to Our Doctrine.”

Without context, our doctrine becomes overly capabilities focused. Instead of just talking about new capabilities, commentators trying to sound erudite will often refer to the changing character of war. But war does not have an all-encompassing character. It is almost as absurd a thought as the beard domain. Even individual conflicts do not have a single character. In Ukraine, the character of the war was different in 2022, 2023, and 2024. It was different in the steppes of the south and the woods north of Kyiv. Thinking in terms of the character of the war ignores these differences and prioritizes technological capabilities. This is a form of thinking that is so dominant that maybe it takes the absurd notion of the beard domain to reveal its ridiculousness.

For the capability minded, the beard domain provides a measurable metric to account for the intangibles ignored in multidomain operations. To see how intangibles matter, look back at a previous doctrine that was grounded in context. AirLand Battle, the Army’s doctrine published in 1982, was not simply combining air and land capabilities. Its key idea was seizing the initiative through the interdiction of deep fires and taking rapid action to destroy the Soviets’ second-echelon forces. The 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations presented a chart showing the time horizons for action of US echelons. It was based on estimated times that would exploit the tempo of Soviet actions. It allowed units to understand how quickly they would need to act to seize the initiative from the Soviets. 2022’s Field Manual 3-0, Operations replicated that chart, but it was not based on the tempo of contemporary Russian or Chinese forces. It does not help guide units in how to train to seize the initiative in combat.

Geronimo understood how rotational units would fight. It could predict how they would deploy screens, where they would jump artillery firing points, and when defending forces would still be in the middle of digging in. This understanding, an aggressive mindset, and trusting paratroopers to fight with initiative allowed Geronimo to win, not their beards (well, maybe beards helped a little).

Satire revels in the absurd. Hopefully, my article helped uncover the ridiculousness of the ban on beards, the misuse of history, and the shortfalls of a capabilities-based doctrine that can only account for intangibles through a beard domain.

Maj. Robert G. Rose, US Army, serves as the commander for Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Harvard University and, as a Gates Scholar, from Cambridge University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · April 2, 2024

5. Does the U.S. Need a 10,000-Strong Cyber Force? New Report Gives a Big Yes.

Excerpts:

Though a Cyber Force remains hypothetical, there is the opinion that perhaps it is looking at the problem incorrectly, as well as a possible solution.

Instead of a 10,000-strong force, technology industry analyst Rob Enderle of the Enderle Group told ClearanceJobs, “While it is clear we need a much stronger Cyber Force, the focus, given the timing, should be on spinning up AI-driven defenses not people. People just can’t react quickly enough to modern threats without substantial AI support and more people, without adequate AI assistance, would likely just get in each other’s way and not provide better protection.”

The fact also remains that enterprises can barely fill the current cybersecurity openings, so creating and then growing a Cyber Force could present challenges. The result could be exactly what the FDD reports said should be avoided.

“This should be a quality over quantity effort and even finding 10,000 qualified people would be problematic in the current market let alone 10 tech folks who work well with others and like doing security work,” added Enderle. “So, I agree, we need a much stronger cyber force, but I think much of it should be staffed by AIs, and AI human teams, otherwise it will be incapable of doing what needs to be done. “

Does the U.S. Need a 10,000-Strong Cyber Force? New Report Gives a Big Yes.

news.clearancejobs.com · by Peter Suciu · April 1, 2024

Move over United States Space Force, there are now calls for a sizable cyber force to protect the online infrastructure of the nation. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies last month warned there is a shortage of qualified personnel at the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), which is currently responsible for both the offensive and defense aspects of military cyber operations.

Even worse, the FDD suggested that those in charge at the command may lack the necessary skills to lead the force of cyber warriors.

“In the U.S. military, an officer who had never fired a rifle would never command an infantry unit. Yet officers with no experience behind a keyboard are commanding cyber warfare units. This mismatch stems from the U.S. military’s failure to recruit, train, promote, and retain talented cyber warriors,” wrote retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery and Dr. Erica Lonergan from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs in the FDD report.

It called for the creation of a new independent armed service — a U.S. Cyber Force — alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force. Such a force doesn’t need to be as sizable as the U.S. Army or States Navy, at least not initially. Instead, it could begin as a far leaner force, akin to the United States Marine Corps or United States Space Force, about 10,000 strong.

“As the Space Force has shown, a smaller service can be more selective and agile in recruiting skilled personnel,” the FDD report further explained.

The Army Could Lead the Way

In their report, Montgomery and Lonergan also called for placing any new Cyber Force within the Department of the Army – much like how the U.S. Marine Corps is in the Department of the Navy, while the U.S. Space Force is in the Department of the Air Force.

Once established, this would see that each military department would lead two service branches – as the U.S. Coast Guard is now within the Department of Homeland Security and outside the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) larger umbrella.

One issue might be that any Cyber Force billets would draw from the 133 teams currently spread across all the services that conduct everyday cyberspace operations. Moreover, the authors noted that a CYBERCOM could be treated much more like the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which also draws forces from across the services and has some of its own acquisition authorities. But they also addressed the fact that SOCOM and CYBERCOM have stark differences.

“In the SOCOM model, each of the services provides the force employer — SOCOM — with expert personnel who possess skills suited to their particular domain. For instance, an Army Ranger trains for special operations on land, while Navy SEALs possess skills tailored to maritime special operations. Rangers and SEALs are not interchangeable. The Army cannot train SEALS, nor the Navy Rangers. Thus, SOCOM actually gains strength from this one-of-a-kind distributed force-generation model,” the report noted.

Citing a U.S. Navy captain, the authors suggested that SOCOM’s “Success is achieved by allowing each of the service-specific commands to specialize in discrete types of warfare, technologies, and operational environments” while “Cyberattacks will not be, nor are they currently, service-specific nor sector-specific, so it does not make sense to have created service-specific mission teams, different designators, MOSs, etc., to respond to the broad scale of cyberattacks.”

Addressing the Cyber Threat

The cyber threat isn’t going to go away, and just as Space Force will serve to protect the domain of outer space, a Cyber Force could protect cyberspace.

“Headlines are filled with vulnerabilities to our infrastructure and power grids – as well as security breaches or ransom attacks,” said Susan Schreiner, analyst at C4 Trends. “While the call for a cyber force sounds like Star Wars – it may not be that far-fetched.”

That could be true given that a few years ago, Space Force may have sounded like something out of Star Trek.

“With AI, it’s also likely that more nefarious actors will emerge, and take a wrecking ball to our personal data as well as adversaries, resulting in unfathomable damage and destruction,” Schreiner told ClearanceJobs. “Science fiction might be paving the way for companies, regions, and countries to think more expansively, cooperatively, and differently as new tools and approaches need to be developed to tackle, and more effectively manage the threats posed by the increasing complexity and multi-facets to our security, privacy and safety.”

AI Not People Focused

Though a Cyber Force remains hypothetical, there is the opinion that perhaps it is looking at the problem incorrectly, as well as a possible solution.

Instead of a 10,000-strong force, technology industry analyst Rob Enderle of the Enderle Group told ClearanceJobs, “While it is clear we need a much stronger Cyber Force, the focus, given the timing, should be on spinning up AI-driven defenses not people. People just can’t react quickly enough to modern threats without substantial AI support and more people, without adequate AI assistance, would likely just get in each other’s way and not provide better protection.”

The fact also remains that enterprises can barely fill the current cybersecurity openings, so creating and then growing a Cyber Force could present challenges. The result could be exactly what the FDD reports said should be avoided.

“This should be a quality over quantity effort and even finding 10,000 qualified people would be problematic in the current market let alone 10 tech folks who work well with others and like doing security work,” added Enderle. “So, I agree, we need a much stronger cyber force, but I think much of it should be staffed by AIs, and AI human teams, otherwise it will be incapable of doing what needs to be done. “

Peter Suciu is a freelance writer who covers business technology and cyber security. He currently lives in Michigan and can be reached at petersuciu@gmail.com. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

news.clearancejobs.com · by Peter Suciu · April 1, 2024

6. Are Beijing and Washington testing the dark forest hypothesis?

Not being a big sci-fi reader, I was not not interested in watching this drama on Netflix or reading the book series. But perhaps after this article I will consider it.

Excerpts:

Understanding has not managed to bring about trust between the two superpowers; in fact, understanding may even be pushing the two apart.

The Three-Body Problem has been frequently used as a metaphor for relations between China and the West. In the book series, Earth is faced with an invasion by the technologically superior alien Trisolarans. Many see Earth as corresponding to Indigenous peoples, specifically pre-Opium War China, and Trisolarans representing Western countries that conquered the world, first through advanced arms, later through pervasive cultural influence.

The analogy extends beyond just a colonialist reading: the books also raise the “dark forest hypothesis”, which says that the universe is like a forest in which cosmic distances obscure others’ intentions, forcing people to adopt a “shoot first, ask questions later” posture to ensure their own survival. This has been specifically compared to the chronic mistrust between China and America.

Are Beijing and Washington testing the dark forest hypothesis? | Lowy Institute

A TV spin-off may explain why China and the US have

chosen not to shoot first and ask questions later.

lowyinstitute.org · by Jersey Lee

Last week, Netflix released Three-Body Problem, its widely anticipated TV adaptation of the acclaimed novels by science fiction author Liu Cixin. While met with broadly positive responses from US viewers, Chinese audiences took a much less favourable stance, with some accusing Netflix of hyping up the Cultural Revolution to make China look bad, or “white-washing” the cast for nefarious purposes. Its rating on the Chinese review site Douban stands at 6.8, with one in five voters giving it only one or two stars out of five.

This is but a microcosm of the increased disconnect and cultural friction between China and the West. Hollywood films have now almost completely lost the Chinese market, and after the controversy over the live-action Mulan film, there’s an increased sense in Hollywood that catering to Chinese audiences might be more trouble than it’s worth. Meanwhile, many Chinese no longer trust Western studios to tell stories concerning China, believing that the filmmakers might manipulate the content to score geopolitical points.

Understanding has not managed to bring about trust between the two superpowers; in fact, understanding may even be pushing the two apart.

The Three-Body Problem has been frequently used as a metaphor for relations between China and the West. In the book series, Earth is faced with an invasion by the technologically superior alien Trisolarans. Many see Earth as corresponding to Indigenous peoples, specifically pre-Opium War China, and Trisolarans representing Western countries that conquered the world, first through advanced arms, later through pervasive cultural influence.

The analogy extends beyond just a colonialist reading: the books also raise the “dark forest hypothesis”, which says that the universe is like a forest in which cosmic distances obscure others’ intentions, forcing people to adopt a “shoot first, ask questions later” posture to ensure their own survival. This has been specifically compared to the chronic mistrust between China and America.

In the books, the hypothesis was used as a justification for civilisations keeping their existence secret from the outside world. China and America are not separated by light years and are well aware of one another after decades of dialogue, and as such, have chosen not to take that first shot. However, understanding has not managed to bring about trust between the two superpowers; in fact, understanding may even be pushing the two apart.

China believes that America’s strategy is to contain it, and perhaps even to instigate a colour revolution within China. This is something that America has indeed done to adversaries, and even allies. The 1980–90s democracy wave was global in nature, partly because the United States stopped propping up unsavoury allies, sometimes even helping civil society forces overthrow their old friends. Even if the US government, out of self-interest, does not act against friendly dictatorships, NGOs based in and/or staffed by Americans would surely spring to action. Should the opportunity arise, there would likely be American elite and public support for regime change in China. Short of a radical change in America’s ideology and self-perception then, there’s nothing America could do to allay China’s doubts.

Meanwhile, to counter America’s insinuations, China has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of seeking hegemony. However, there is no way for America to know if this is what China really thinks, or merely what China wants it to think; elite discussions there are closed to outsiders, especially after recent drives for greater security. The lack of Chinese action against Russia for geopolitical expediency, despite Russia violating another country’s territorial integrity – the protection of which is one of the clearest principles of Chinese foreign policy – certainly exacerbated American mistrust of anything China says.

Unless China deliberately allows America to wiretap their leadership, or engages in an unprecedented program of political reforms, there’s nothing China could do to allay America’s doubts. The Chinese government actually better reflects the assumptions of the “dark forest hypothesis”: Trying to know what the Chinese leadership really thinks is like trying to figure out what Trisolarans are thinking.

Thus, the basis for distrust between China and America is not trivial, but fundamental to their respective political systems, and therefore unlikely to abate so long as America remains America, and China remains China. Each country will have cause to view the actions of the other with great suspicion. Assuming that the leadership of both countries knows their counterparts well, they also know that the other side has ample reason (as detailed above) to harbour distrust, which only exacerbates the vicious cycle.

Perhaps both countries can take lessons from the Three-Body Problem. The war between Trisolarans and Earthers ends with the destruction of both star systems; the only people to escape travel through the Milky Way to settle on another planet. Perhaps everyone’s excess energies can be directed to exploring and exploiting the vast resources of the universe, instead of feuding here on Earth; the only conclusion to the latter course of action, as in the books, would be mutually assured destruction. While the “dark forest hypothesis” does raise the point that resources are finite and eventual competition is inevitable, John Maynard Keynes may have the answer to that: in the long run, we are all dead; time has a way of solving many problems.

Main image courtesy of Unsplash user Jr Korpa

lowyinstitute.org · by Jersey Lee

7. US defense official had 'Havana syndrome' symptoms during a 2023 NATO summit, the Pentagon confirms

US defense official had 'Havana syndrome' symptoms during a 2023 NATO summit, the Pentagon confirms

AP · April 1, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — A senior Defense Department official who attended last year’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, had symptoms similar to those reported by U.S. officials who have experienced “Havana syndrome,” the Pentagon confirmed Monday.

Havana syndrome is still under investigation but includes a string of health problems dating back to 2016, when officials working at the U.S. Embassy in Havana reported sudden unexplained head pressure, head or ear pain, or dizziness.

The injuries to U.S. government personnel or their families were part of a “60 Minutes” report Sunday that suggested Russia is behind the incidents, one of which took place during the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius.

“I can confirm that a senior DOD official experienced symptoms similar to those reported in anomalous health incidents,” deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters Monday. Singh referred questions on whether Russia had a role to the intelligence community, which is still investigating.

The official, who was not identified, was not part of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s official traveling delegation to Vilnius, Singh said, but was there “separately, attending meetings that were part of the NATO summit.”

Singh did not say whether the affected defense official had to seek further medical care, retire or cease performing duties, citing medical privacy.

In February the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in its 2024 threat assessment found that it was “unlikely” that a foreign adversary was responsible for causing the mysterious ailments but noted that U.S. intelligence agencies had varying levels of confidence in that assessment.

State Department spokesman Matthew Miller told reporters on Monday the department has confidence in that assessment.

“It has been the broad conclusion of the intelligence community since March 2023 that is unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible for these anomalous health incidents,” Miller said. “It’s something that the intelligence community has investigated extensively and continues to look at. We will look at new information as it comes in and make assessments inside the State Department and with our intelligence community.”

The foremost Cuba-based researcher of the incidents, Mitchell Valdés-Sosa, told The Associated Press that the “60 Minutes” report had failed to provide any scientific basis to substantiate the existence of the Havana syndrome. Valdés-Sosa, director of Cuba’s Center for Neuroscience, is the de facto spokesperson on the issue for the Cuban health ministry, which arranged the interview.

“I think that this journalistic investigation does not provide serious elements, especially that there is a new illness caused by a mysterious energy,” he said. “The symptoms are very varied: balance problems, sleep problems, dizziness, difficulties concentrating, and many diseases can cause them.”

In the past, Valdés-Sosa hasn’t disputed that diplomats become ill, but suggested that many of the cases consisted of ordinary illnesses that were erroneously blamed on the supposed phenomenon due to the high degree of public attention.

The Pentagon’s health care system has established a registry for employees or dependents to report such incidents. In March, however, a five-year study by the National Institutes of Health found no brain injuries or degeneration among U.S. diplomats and other government employees who had Havana syndrome symptoms.

—-

Andrea Rodriguez contributed from Havana and AP Diplomatic Writer Matthew Lee contributed from Washington.

AP · April 1, 2024

8. Iran Says the Deadly Israeli Strike in Damascus Will Not Go Unanswered

Iran Says the Deadly Israeli Strike in Damascus Will Not Go Unanswered

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, said Israel would be punished for the strike, which killed three top commanders.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/02/world/middleeast/israel-iran-damascus-strike.html

Protesters on Monday in Palestine Square in Tehran condemned the Israeli strike that killed Iranian commanders in Damascus, Syria.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

By Farnaz Fassihi and Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Published April 1, 2024
Updated April 2, 2024, 7:07 a.m. ET

Iranian leaders said on Tuesday that Israel’s airstrikes on an Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, which killed three top Iranian commanders, would not go unanswered. Government supporters took to the streets and called for retaliation against Israel.

The strike, on part of the Iranian Embassy complex in Damascus, killed three generals in Iran’s Quds Force and four other officers, making it one of the deadliest attacks of the yearslong shadow war between Israel and Iran.

In a statement, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, vowed that Israel would be “punished by the hands of our brave men.”

President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran said the attack was an “inhumane assault in brazen violation of international law,” in comments reported by Tasnim, a semiofficial news agency. He added that it would not go unanswered, but gave no details of how Iran might respond.

Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, said in an earlier post on the social media site X that Iran had summoned the Swiss ambassador after midnight local time and asked that an important message be delivered to Washington: That as Israel’s ally, the “U.S. must answer” for Israel’s actions. Switzerland acts as the United States’ representative in the absence of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington.

The spokesman for the leadership of Iran’s Parliament, Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi, told Iranian state media that “an appropriate response is a national request by the people of Iran.”

In Washington, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, Adrienne Watson, said that “the United States had no involvement in the strike” and “did not know about it ahead of time.”

A U.S. official, who requested anonymity to discuss private communication, said that the statement had been communicated directly to Iran.

In several cities across Iran, including the capital, Tehran, as well as Tabriz and Isfahan, large crowds gathered waving Palestinian and Iranian flags and demanding revenge “Death to Israel” and “Death to America” chanted the crowds in Iran, fists in the air, warning that if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared jihad against Israel, then “no army can hold us back.

The strikes in Damascus on Monday coincided with two major holidays in Iran, a religious Shia holiday commemorating the killing of Imam Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad and Shia Islam’s founder; and a national day of nature, celebrated by going outdoors on the 13th day of Norouz, the Iranian New Year.

Some opponents of the government gathered in parks in northern Tehran at night to carry on with the nature celebrations, which include picnics, dancing and singing, until security forces dispersed them, videos on social media and on BBC Persian showed.

The United Nations Security Council will hold an emergency meeting on Tuesday afternoon to discuss Israel’s attack. Russia, a close ally of Iran, requested the meeting.

Iran’s U.N. ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, said in a letter to the world body that the attack on diplomatic buildings was a violation of international law and the U.N. charter, and was a threat to the peace and stability of the region.

It remained unclear what steps Iran would take in response to Israel’s strikes: Whether it would target Israel directly in a military attack, risking a broader war with Israel and the United States, or if it would continue with its strategy of fighting through its militants it supports in the region.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia backed by Iran, said in a statement, according to Iran state media, that “without doubt, this crime will not go without punishment and revenge against the enemy.”

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

Farnaz Fassihi is a reporter for The New York Times based in New York. Previously she was a senior writer and war correspondent for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years based in the Middle East. More about Farnaz Fassihi

Matthew Mpoke Bigg is a correspondent covering international news. He previously worked as a reporter, editor and bureau chief for Reuters and did postings in Nairobi, Abidjan, Atlanta, Jakarta and Accra. More about Matthew Mpoke Bigg

9. What to know about U.S. military aid to Israel

Graphics and photos at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/02/us-military-aid-israel-gaza-biden/

What to know about U.S. military aid to Israel

By Adam Taylor

April 2, 2024 at 4:00 a.m. EDT

Smoke rises following an Israeli airstrike in the central Gaza Strip on March 22. (Abdel Kareem Hana/AP)

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Israel has received more U.S. military aid — and more U.S. aid of any type — than any other country since World War II.

That assistance has long been a matter of ironclad, bipartisan near-consensus. But in recent months, it has come under mounting scrutiny, including from some Democratic legislators, amid the emergence of rifts between the United States and Israel over Israel’s conduct in its war in Gaza — in which U.S.-provided weapons are in widespread use.

Israel has been waging war in Gaza since Oct. 7, when Hamas, the Palestinian group that has long controlled the territory, led a cross-border attack that left 1,200 people dead. The Israeli assault on Gaza has left the Strip in ruins, and has left at least 32,000 Gazans dead, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, which does not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.

The United States has supplied Israel with weapons since the war began. While President Biden has pushed for Israel to allow more aid into the enclave to avert famine and has resisted Israeli plans to invade the southern Gaza city of Rafah, where displaced Palestinians are densely packed, military aid has remained untouched.

Here is what to know about U.S. military aid to Israel.

WHAT TO KNOW

What weapons has the U.S. provided to Israel since Oct. 7?

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An Israeli soldier carries a tank shell near the Gaza border on Oct. 14. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

Since Oct. 7, the Biden administration has made public two major military sales to Israel.

In December, the administration approved the sale of nearly 14,000 tank ammunition cartridges and equipment to Israel, worth $106.5 million, and the sale of 155mm artillery shells and related equipment worth $147.5 million. The White House bypassed congressional approval for both sales by invoking emergency authority.

These transfers represent only a small portion of total aid. U.S. officials have briefed Congress on more than 100 other transactions that fell under a set dollar amount required for notification. Among the weapons sold were precision-guided munitions, small-diameter bombs, bunker-buster rockets and other lethal aid, people with knowledge of the briefings told The Washington Post in March.

U.S.-made weapons have been used widely in Gaza since Oct. 7, though it is not clear when they were purchased or delivered. Independent analysts have said that many of the weapons used in Gaza appear to be 1,000- or 2,000-pound bombs such as the Mark 84, which can be retrofitted with Boeing-manufactured JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) kits to become precision weapons.

In March, the Biden administration authorized the transfer of 1,800 MK84 2,000-pound bombs and 500 MK82 500-pound bombs. The transfers had been approved by Congress several years ago but had not been fulfilled. The State Department has also authorized the transfer of 25 F-35A fighter jets and engines, U.S. officials told The Post last week.

The United States has maintained a stockpile of weapons in Israel, known as the War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Israel, since the 1990s. The U.S. military pulled 155mm shells out of the stockpile to send to U.S. reserves in Europe after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Defense officials told reporters in late October, following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, that many of the stockpiled shells had been redirected: to the Israel Defense Forces.

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What is the history of U.S. military aid to Israel?

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During the 1970s, Washington provided significant surges in military aid to Israel as the country rebuilt its forces after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which a coalition of Arab nations, led by Egypt and Syria, launched an attack on Israel.

Since then, military aid has remained largely steady if adjusted for inflation, with the stated aim of helping Israel maintain a “qualitative military edge” over its neighbors.

In recent years, funding has been outlined in 10-year memorandums of understanding. In the most recent memorandum, signed in 2016, Washington pledged $38 billion in military assistance between the 2019 and 2028 fiscal years.

Most U.S. military aid to Israel falls under the Foreign Military Financing program, which provides grants that Israel uses to purchase U.S. military goods and services. The United States also contributes about $500 million annually for joint missile defense systems. Since 2009, the United States has contributed $3.4 billion to missile defense funding, including $1.3 billion for the Iron Dome, which stops short-range rockets, the State Department said last year.

Israel has been granted access to some of the most coveted U.S. military technology. It was the first international operator of the F-35 fighter jet and used the craft in combat for the first time in 2018.

U.S. support, and industrial cooperation between U.S. and Israeli defense companies, has helped Israel build up its defense industry: The country is one of the world’s top arms exporters.

After the Oct. 7 attacks, the Biden administration requested a further $14 billion in military aid to Israel, to include money for missile defense. The funding request passed the Senate but has stalled in the House.

Why is U.S. military aid to Israel under increased debate?

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Muhammad al-Durra, 41, who was displaced from Gaza City, prepares for iftar, the fast-breaking evening meal during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, with his children in a destroyed house in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on March 19. (Haitham Imad/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

The high impact of Israel’s Gaza offensive on civilians has led to renewed debate about U.S. military aid. Biden has called Israel’s bombing campaign “indiscriminate.”

U.S. laws govern the transfer of military equipment to foreign governments. Among them, the Leahy Law prohibits transferring military aid to foreign governments or groups that commit gross human rights violations. On Feb. 8, Biden issued a national security memorandum detailing these rules and adding a new requirement that the administration submit an annual report to Congress about whether recipients are meeting the standards.

To make that assessment, the State Department requested written assurances from countries receiving U.S. weapons that they are abiding by existing U.S. standards, including requirements related to the protection of civilians. The U.S. memorandum says recipient countries must “facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict, or otherwise impede, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance” or U.S.-supported international efforts to provide aid.

The State Department received Israel’s written assurances ahead of a March 24 deadline. It now has until early May to formally assess whether these assurances are credible and to report to Congress. State Department spokesman Matt Miller said on March 25 that there were no indications of legal violations.

Humanitarian groups have called on the Biden administration to not accept Israel’s assurances at face value. They say Israel, despite its insistence otherwise, is impeding the flow of aid into Gaza by truck, through long inspections at checkpoints and by refusing to open new ones. “Given ongoing hostilities in Gaza, the Israeli government’s assurances to the Biden administration that it is meeting U.S. legal requirements are not credible,” Sarah Yager, Washington director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement.

In a letter to the Biden administration released on March 22, 17 Democratic senators said that acceptance of assurances from the Netanyahu government would be “inconsistent with the letter and spirit” of Biden’s national security memorandum, and would set an “unacceptable precedent” for “other situations around the world.”

By Adam Taylor

Adam Taylor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. Originally from London, he studied at the University of Manchester and Columbia University. Twitter

10. China’s Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms

Here is an excerpt from Unrestricted Warfare. Surely China/CCP sees opportunities in creating political problems (conflict) in the US and other democratic countries because the conditions are ripe for conflict..

And we have seen the effects of foreign influence through social media on elections beginning in ernet with Russian attempts to influence social media in 2016 and multiple countries in 2020.

From Unrestricted Warfare (Chapter 4, page 120)

Xiaomohan Malike [transliteration as printed 1420 5459 3352 7456 0448 0344] of Australia pointed out that the seven tendencies which will influence national security during the 21st century are: globalized economy; the globalized spread of technology; the globalized tide of democracy; polarized international politics; changes in the nature of international systems; changes in security concepts; and changes in the focal points of conflicts. The combined effects of these tendencies form the sources of the two categories of conflict threatening security in the Asian-Pacific Region. The first category is the source of traditional conflicts: the struggle for hegemony by large nations; the expansion of nationalism by successful nations; disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests; economic competition; and the proliferation of large-scale destructive weapons. The second category is the new sources of future conflicts: nationalism (racism) in declining nations; conflicts in cultural religious beliefs; the spread of lethal light weapons; disputes over petroleum, fishing, and water resources; the tide of refugees and population flows; ecological disasters; and terrorism. All of these pose multiple threats to nations in the 21st century. The view of this Australian regarding national security is slightly higher than that of the American officials. (See the United States' Comparative Strategies, 1997, No. 16, for details.)

China’s Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms

China has adopted some of the same misinformation tactics that Russia used ahead of the 2016 election, researchers and government officials say.

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Credit...Alice Lagarde

By Tiffany Hsu and Steven Lee Myers

April 1, 2024

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Covert Chinese accounts are masquerading online as American supporters of former President Donald J. Trump, promoting conspiracy theories, stoking domestic divisions and attacking President Biden ahead of the election in November, according to researchers and government officials.

The accounts signal a potential tactical shift in how Beijing aims to influence American politics, with more of a willingness to target specific candidates and parties, including Mr. Biden.

In an echo of Russia’s influence campaign before the 2016 election, China appears to be trying to harness partisan divisions to undermine the Biden administration’s policies, despite recent efforts by the two countries to lower the temperature in their relations.

Some of the Chinese accounts impersonate fervent Trump fans, including one on X that purported to be “a father, husband and son” who was “MAGA all the way!!” The accounts mocked Mr. Biden’s age and shared fake images of him in a prison jumpsuit, or claimed that Mr. Biden was a Satanist pedophile while promoting Mr. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan.

“I’ve never seen anything along those lines at all before,” said Elise Thomas, a senior analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a nonprofit research organization that uncovered a small group of the fake accounts posing as Trump supporters.

Ms. Thomas and other researchers have linked the new activity to a long-running network of accounts connected with the Chinese government known as Spamouflage. Several of the accounts they detailed previously posted pro-Beijing content in Mandarin — only to resurface in recent months under the guise of real Americans writing in English.

In a separate project, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a research organization in Washington, identified 170 inauthentic pages and accounts on Facebook that have also pushed anti-American messages, including pointed attacks on Mr. Biden.

The effort has more successfully attracted actual users’ attention and become more difficult for researchers to identify than previous Chinese efforts to influence public opinion in the United States. Though researchers say the overall political tilt of the campaign remains unclear, it has raised the possibility that China’s government is calculating that a second Trump presidency, despite his sometimes hostile statements against the country, might be preferable to a second Biden term.

China’s activity has already raised alarms inside the American government.

In February, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that China was expanding its influence campaigns to “sow doubts about U.S. leadership, undermine democracy and extend Beijing’s influence.” The report expressed concern that Beijing could use increasingly sophisticated methods to try to influence the American election “to sideline critics of China.”

Liu Pengyu, the spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that the presidential election was “the domestic affair of the United States” and that “China is committed to the principle of noninterference.”

More on China

An Effusive Welcome: As tensions fester between China and Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, a former president of the island democracy, is receiving warm treatment from Beijing during a rare trip to the mainland.
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‘A Price I Have to Accept’: The filmmaker Wang Xiaoshuai is among the few Chinese artists who refuse to bend to state limitations on the subjects they explore, despite the wrath of censors.
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“Claims about China influencing U.S. presidential elections are completely fabricated,” he added.

Ms. Thomas, who has studied China’s information operations for years, said the new effort suggested a more subtle and sophisticated approach than previous campaigns. It was the first time, she said, that she had encountered Chinese accounts posing so persuasively as Trump-supporting Americans while managing to attract genuine engagement.

“The worry has always been, what if one day they wake up and are effective?” she said. “Potentially, this could be the beginning of them waking up and being effective.”

Online disinformation experts are looking ahead to the months before the November election with growing anxiety.

Intelligence assessments show Russia using increasingly subtle influence tactics in the United States to spread its case for isolationism as its war against Ukraine continues. Mock news sites are targeting Americans with Russian propaganda.

Efforts to beat back false narratives and conspiracy theories — already a difficult task — must now also contend with waning moderation efforts at social media platforms, political pushback, fast-advancing artificial intelligence technology and broad information fatigue.

Until now, China’s efforts to advance its ideology in the West struggled to gain traction, first as it pushed its official propaganda about the superiority of its culture and economy and later as it began denigrating democracy and stoking anti-American sentiment.

In the 2022 midterm elections, the cybersecurity firm Mandiant reported that Dragonbridge, an influence campaign linked to China, tried to discourage Americans from voting while highlighting U.S. political polarization. That campaign, which experimented with fake American personas posting content in the first person, was poorly executed and largely overlooked online, researchers said.

The recent campaigns connected to China have sought to exploit the divisions already apparent in American politics, joining the divisive debate over issues such as gay rights, immigration and crime mainly from a right-wing perspective.

In February, according to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a Chinese-linked account on X calling itself a Western name alongside a “MAGA 2024” reference shared a video from RT, the Russian television network controlled by the Kremlin, to claim that Mr. Biden and the Central Intelligence Agency had sent a neo-Nazi gangster to fight in Ukraine. (That narrative was debunked by the investigative group Bellingcat.)

The next day the post received an enormous boost when Alex Jones, the podcaster known for spreading false claims and conspiracy theories, shared it on the platform with his 2.2 million followers.

The account with the “MAGA 2024” reference had taken steps to appear authentic, describing itself as being run by a 43-year-old Trump supporter in Los Angeles. But it used a profile photo lifted from a Danish man’s travel blog, the institute’s report on the accounts said. Although the account opened 14 years ago, its first publicly visible post was last April. In that post, the account attempted, without evidence, to link Mr. Biden to Jeffrey Epstein, the disgraced financier and registered sex offender.

At least four other similar accounts are also operating, Ms. Thomas said, all of them with ties to China. One account paid for a subscription on X, which offers perks like better promotion and a blue check mark that was, before Elon Musk bought the platform, a sign of verification conferred to users whose identities had been verified. Like the other accounts, it shared pro-Trump and anti-Biden claims, including the QAnon conspiracy theory and baseless election fraud accusations.

The posts included exhortations to “be strong ourselves, not smear China and create rumors,” awkward phrases like “how dare?” instead of “how dare you?” and signs that the user’s web browser had been set to Mandarin.

One of the accounts seemed to slip up in May when it responded to another post in Mandarin; another was posting primarily in Mandarin until last spring, when it briefly went silent before resurfacing with all-English content. The accounts denounced efforts by American lawmakers to ban the popular TikTok app, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, as a form of “true authoritarianism” orchestrated by Israel and as a tool for Mr. Biden to undermine China.

The accounts sometimes amplified or repeated content from the Chinese influence campaign Spamouflage, which was first identified in 2019 and linked to an arm of the Ministry of Public Security. It once posted content almost exclusively in Chinese to attack the Communist Party’s critics and protesters in Hong Kong.

It has pivoted in recent years to focus on the United States, portraying the country as overwhelmed by chaos. By 2020, it was posting in English and criticizing American foreign policy, as well as domestic issues in the United States, including its response to Covid-19 and natural disasters, like the wildfires in Hawaii last year.

China, which has denied interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, now appears to be building a network of accounts across many platforms to put to use in November. “This is reminiscent of Russia’s style of operations, but the difference is more the intensity of this operation,” said Margot Fulde-Hardy, a former analyst at Viginum, the government agency in France that combats disinformation online.

In the past, many Spamouflage accounts followed one another, posted sloppily in several languages and simultaneously blitzed social media users with identical messages across multiple platforms.

The newer accounts are trickier to find because they are trying to build an organic following and appear to be controlled by humans rather than automated bots. One of the accounts on X also had linked profiles on Instagram and Threads, creating an appearance of authenticity.

Meta, which owns Instagram and Threads, last year removed thousands of inauthentic accounts linked to Spamouflage on Facebook and others on Instagram. It called one network it had removed “the largest known cross-platform influence operation to date.” Hundreds of related accounts remained on other platforms, including TikTok, X, LiveJournal and Blogspot, Meta said.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies documented a new coordinated group of Chinese accounts linked to a Facebook page with 3,000 followers called the War of Somethings. The report underscores the persistence of China’s efforts despite Meta’s repeated efforts to take down Spamouflage accounts.

“What we’re seeing,” said Max Lesser, a senior analyst with the foundation, “is the campaign just continues, undeterred.”

Tiffany Hsu reports on misinformation and disinformation and its origins, movement and consequences. She has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Tiffany Hsu

Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.” More about Steven Lee Myers

A version of this article appears in print on April 2, 2024, Section B, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: China’s Advancing Efforts To Influence U.S. Election. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

11. Army Budget Invests in Lessons from Ukraine with Focus on Deterring China - Defense Opinion

Excepts:

In any possible showdown with China, the Army in the Pacific will operate with naval forces, airpower, space operations and cyberattacks. However, munitions, air defense, the right mix of armored vehicles, and most of all, dominance in deep sensing will make the difference for victory, whether that comes via deterrence or confrontation.

One more major lesson from Ukraine is that soldiers matter. Driven in part by recruiting concerns, the Army’s 2025 spending on soldier quality of life, including $935 million for new barracks, a 325% increase over the previous year, is a reminder that the skill of America’s soldiers is the most precious edge of all.

Army Budget Invests in Lessons from Ukraine with Focus on Deterring China - Defense Opinion

defenseopinion.com · by Rebecca Grant, Ph.D. · April 1, 2024

As Ukraine’s valiant fight against Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion enters its third year, the U.S. Army’s newly released fiscal 2025 budget incorporates the top lessons from combat in Ukraine and sends a powerful message as a deterrent against possible conflict with China.

Here are four key insights about the budget starting with munitions, air defense and armored vehicles and culminating with the rising dominance of deep sensing, which is the collection of data to support targeting, situational awareness and decision-making.

Surging munitions, replenishing stockpiles

The first lesson out of Ukraine was to surge munitions for the U.S. arsenal and to provide a hedge against any possible move by China against Taiwan. The Army moved fast to stimulate new U.S. production, using supplemental funding for a jump start. In fiscal 2025, the Army budget deepens this commitment. Manufacturing capacity for 155 mm caliber shells is growing from under 20,000 rounds per month before the war to 72,000 rounds per month at the end of FY25 and upward to 102,000 rounds per month in 2026.

The Army is also boosting missile procurement from $5 billion in 2024 to a hefty $6.2 billion in 2025. This budget funds over $1 billion dollars of procurement for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) alone. No surprise, given that GMLRS is a go-to munition enabling Ukraine to carry out deep strikes on Russian military targets in the field. The increase beefs up “critical shooters,” according to Army Maj. Gen. Mark Bennett, director for Army budget, who spoke at an AUSA forum on March 18.

Another immediate lesson was to prioritize air defense. Russia’s missile barrages on Kyiv and other targets haven’t stopped. In fact, Russia launched 150 missiles against Ukraine overnight on Mar. 22, the single biggest attack of the war. Ukraine intercepted over 90 of the missiles but suffered significant damage to its electricity grid.

As the Army recognizes, sustained operations in any China scenario will tax air defenses at an order of magnitude beyond the activity in Ukraine. Hence, the Army funds a multi-year buy for Patriot PAC 3.

The fiscal 2025 budget is also serious about better cruise missile defense. Russia’s attacks in Ukraine have been bad enough, and China’s possible attacks against Taiwan could be much worse. The Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) launches maneuvering AIM-9X missiles at enemy cruise missiles, and with fiscal 2025 money the Army is funding four more IFPC battalions and working on a second interceptor.

Ukraine underscores U.S. need for armor

The Ukraine war continues to demonstrate that it takes armored vehicles to counter what one analyst called “chronic Russian aggression.” That’s why Poland has 250 new M1 Abrams and 116 retired M1s on order. The Army’s 2025 budget responds with investment in the M1E3 Abrams modernization. “The war in Ukraine has highlighted a critical need for integrated protections for soldiers, built from within instead of adding on,” U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean, program executive officer for ground combat systems, said at the M1E3 Abrams announcement last year.

The war in Ukraine also adds to the need for lighter armored vehicles. The 2025 budget procures 33 new M10 Booker armored vehicles plus more across a five-year plan. The XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle prototypes are also funded as competition progresses.

A growing requirement for “deep sensing”

According to the Wall Street Journal, a Ukrainian assault team last August guided an unmanned, armored vehicle to sneak up on a group of Russian soldiers over two miles away and fire 300 bullets at them. While the Army has led the development of manned-unmanned teaming for years, combat confirms the requirement.

As the vignette shows, deep sensing is a priority straight out of the Ukraine war. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said on Mar. 7 that the Army Futures Command will next create a cross-functional team focused on deep sensing capabilities.

Of course, deep sensing (under different nomenclature) is not new. The Army Air Forces employed it against German units behind the Normandy beachheads. Cold War doctrine in Europe relied on sensing and precision strike of second echelon areas, and so did the roll up of Iraqi forces in the four-day ground war of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

However, the lessons from Ukraine are stark, and have played no small part in the decision to set up a dedicated deep sensing team. Ukraine has cobbled together a mesh of unmanned systems that reach from three miles to 45 miles beyond the front lines. This type of deep sensing is at the core of Ukraine’s ability to look and strike deep against Russian troops and logistics. Deep sensing enabled Ukraine’s three major campaign success in 2022: stopping Russia in the Donbass, retaking Kharkiv, and pressuring Russia’s Dnieper River bridgehead at Kherson, leading to a Russian withdrawal, according to a 2023 Army War College study.

For the U.S. Army, of course, deep sensing will roam farther, especially in the Pacific region. Once it is launched, the Army’s new deep sensing cross-functional team working at Army Futures Command can seek out platforms ranging from high-altitude balloons to solar-powered aircraft to host sensor payloads. It is no coincidence that the Army’s Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System gained funding from reinvestment after the February cancellation of Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Deep sensing is a job for unmanned systems.

In any possible showdown with China, the Army in the Pacific will operate with naval forces, airpower, space operations and cyberattacks. However, munitions, air defense, the right mix of armored vehicles, and most of all, dominance in deep sensing will make the difference for victory, whether that comes via deterrence or confrontation.

One more major lesson from Ukraine is that soldiers matter. Driven in part by recruiting concerns, the Army’s 2025 spending on soldier quality of life, including $935 million for new barracks, a 325% increase over the previous year, is a reminder that the skill of America’s soldiers is the most precious edge of all.

defenseopinion.com · by Rebecca Grant, Ph.D. · April 1, 2024

12. The Iranians Pay a Price in Syria

The Iranians Pay a Price in Syria

Israel targets the generals orchestrating Tehran’s terror war.

By The Editorial Board

April 1, 2024 5:14 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-strike-syria-iran-mohammad-reza-zahedi-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-biden-administration-78778704?mod=world_trendingnow_opn_pos1

Iran paid the first real price Monday for its proxy warfare in the Middle East after Israel killed the leading Iranians sowing chaos in the region. “The most significant assassination since Soleimani” is how the missile strike in Damascus is being reported in Israel. That’s a reference to the January 2020 U.S. strike on Qassem Soleimani, the longtime mastermind of Iran’s foreign terrorism and proxy-war strategy.

Monday’s strike killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Iran’s top Quds Force commander in Lebanon and Syria, as well as his deputy commander and his chief of general staff. Israel doesn’t claim responsibility for such attacks, but its Army Radio and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have confirmed the kills. The IRGC announced seven dead members.

As regional chief of the Quds Force, Zahedi was point man in Iran’s war on Israel. He was the boss of Hezbollah, the Iranian proxy that has fired more than 3,500 rockets, unprovoked, on Israel’s north since Oct. 7, and he gave orders to Syria’s Assad regime as well. Zahedi was responsible for Iran’s weapons transfers to Hezbollah and was believed to be in daily contact with its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

The attack was carried out with precision on a building next to Iran’s embassy that reportedly served as the IRGC military headquarters. Much hemming and hawing will turn on whether this building was a diplomatic or military site. The IRGC and its Quds Force are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations that plot and execute Iran’s strategy of regional subversion and expansion. These are men with rivers of blood on their hands.

Monday’s strike is in contrast to the U.S. response after Iranian proxies killed three Americans near the Syrian border in January. The Biden Administration leaked news of its retaliation in advance, giving Iranian commanders in Syria ample time to flee. Not this time.

Iran has threatened a harsh response, but it can’t say it didn’t ask for escalation. Overnight on Sunday, before the strike on Damascus, an Iranian drone fired from Iraq hit an Israeli naval base in Eilat. This follows Israel’s most successful operation in Gaza, a surprise raid that killed 200 terrorists and arrested more than 500, including senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, hiding at Al-Shifa Hospital.

The front to watch is now to Israel’s north, where Iran could order Hezbollah to respond with some of its 200,000 rockets and other munitions, including ballistic missiles. Other proxies could also step up the fight against Israel and the U.S.

The stakes, as Iran considers its options, are high. Tehran needs to hear a clear message from the White House. Not criticism to undermine the Israeli government but steadfast support that makes the Ayatollahs think twice before giving an order they would come to regret.

Appeared in the April 2, 2024, print edition as 'The Iranians Pay a Price in Syria'.

13. ISW: Intel Brief: March 2024 Newsletter

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: ISW Publications

Date: Tue, Apr 2, 2024 at 8:01 AM

Subject: Intel Brief: March 2024 Newsletter

To:

The Intel Brief

March 2024

Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the March installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

This Month's Highlights:

A new essay "Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success," by ISW Russia Fellow Nataliya Bugayova and CTP Director Fred Kagan with ISW Russia Deputy Team Lead Kateryna Stepanenko, explores how the Russian strategy that matters most is not Moscow’s warfighting strategy, but rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as it wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated alternative reality that will allow Russia to win in the real world.

An analysis of the Taliban's governance of Afghanistan by Peter Mills examines the internal dynamics of the Taliban's rule, including their approach to girls' education, economic policies, and security challenges. Additionally, the paper outlines three potential scenarios regarding the future of Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada's power and discusses the implications for US policy.

A new war studies occasional paper series that explores salient issues in military history and the character of contemporary and future war. Our first essay explores the concept of positional warfare, offered by Soviet military theorist Alexander Svechin in his 1926 work, Strategy and how it relates to the war in Ukraine.

A new report from ISW's Johanna Moore and Annika Ganzeveld from AEI’s Critical Threats Project on Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi state security service that Iran has infiltrated and uses to wield significant influence in Iraq.

Ukraine

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.

This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22. Russian authorities reported that three to five attackers in camouflage opened fire with automatic weapons and detonated explosives during an event at the “Crocus City Hall” concert venue in Krasnogorsk on the northwestern outskirts of Moscow City, killing at least 139 and injuring at least 180. The Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency published footage on March 23 purportedly filmed from the perspective of the attackers involved in the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. The footage further supports ISW’s assessment that IS is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack, despite continued efforts by Kremlin officials and Russian state media to baselessly tie Ukraine to the attack.

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command choose to intensify or initiate operations anywhere along the line almost at will.

Black Sea

Ukrainian forces struck a Black Sea Fleet (BSF) communications center in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and reportedly struck an oil depot and at least partially damaged two BSF landing ships on the night of March 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the BSF’s Yamal and Azov Ropucha–class landing ships, a BSF communications center, and several unspecified BSF infrastructure facilities in Sevastopol. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched over 40 Storm Shadow and Neptune missiles, ADM-160 decoy missiles, and drones during the strike. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets caused the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in Sevastopol and hampered its ability to operate in the western part of the Black Sea. The latest Ukrainian strikes targeting BSF ships, regardless of the extent of the damage caused, will likely continue to deter Russian forces from redeploying ships to Sevastopol and the western Black Sea and complicate the BSF’s ability to maximize its combat capabilities.

In a Briefing Room video on March 8, Russia Deputy Team Lead and Analyst Kateryna Stepanenko explained the Kremlin's recent changes to prisoner recruitment schemes aimed at keeping convicts fighting in Ukraine for longer periods of time.

China-Taiwan

The Kuomintang initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party. KMT-aligned independent legislator May Chin convened the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Affairs Committee on March 4, summoning Coast Guard and government officials to testify regarding the law enforcement process and subsequent handling of the incident. Chin favors closer relations with the PRC and has a history of meeting with CPP officials, prompting accusations from DPP members that she is under the CCP’s influence.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.

The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and the West Bank since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7. PRC MFA envoy Wang Kejian met with the head of Hamas’ political bureau Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar on March 17. This was the first meeting between PRC and Hamas officials that the PRC has publicly acknowledged since the war in Gaza began in October 2023. Hamas claimed that Wang called Hamas “part of the Palestinian national fabric” and said the PRC is “keen on relations with it.” The PRC readout simply said Wang and Haniyeh “exchanged views on the Gaza conflict.” The PRC has not publicly criticized Hamas since the war began. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian said on March 19 that the PRC supports the Palestinian Authority in governing all Palestinian territories and called for “internal reconciliation” among all political factions in Palestine, however.

Middle East Security Project

Israel–Hamas War

A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. Iran and the Axis of Resistance use periodic meetings between senior officials to coordinate responses to new developments in the region. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani spent much of October 2023 in Beirut for meetings with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to help coordinate “a possible broader confrontation with Israel,” for example. The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.

Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City. The IDF said on March 24 that it confirmed 480 of the 800 detainees it detained at al Shifa Hospital are linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Hamas. The IDF 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces seized weapons, destroyed militia infrastructure, and engaged Palestinian fighters in the al Shifa Hospital area over the past 24 hours. Palestinian militias conducted at least nine attacks targeting Israeli armor and infantry near al Shifa Hospital. Hamas targeted three Israeli tanks with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and rocket-propelled grenades south of al Shifa Hospital on March 23.

We appreciate your continued support and enthusiasm for the Institute for the Study of War.

Best regards,

Adam Grace

ISW Media and Publishing Associate

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14. Indo-Pacific security hinges on cross-domain technology

Excerpts:

Ideally, data sharing should be able to happen at the tactical edge as well. Sensors continue get more sophisticated and collect larger amounts of data at multiple security levels. This makes it unrealistic for everything to be pushed back to a centralized location for cross-domain transfer and processing, as doing so clogs networks and hurts latency. When multilevel devices, such as Commercial Solutions for Classified enabled laptops, are equipped with cross-domain technology, users can access multiple coalition environments and networks simultaneously from a single terminal or laptop. This gives agencies the flexibility to quickly connect to new coalition networks and tear down others.

Finally, cross-domain technology’s ability to bring data together across classification levels and mission partners is also crucial for enabling the use of artificial intelligence. Algorithms can’t make decisions based on data from a single source or classification level. Instead, data must be fused and brought together from multiple security levels to form data repositories. The more data AI has access to, the more effective it will be.

As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks explained recently, “investments in AI can greatly improve the speed, quality and accuracy with which commanders make decisions, giving them a decisive advantage in deterring conflict and winning a fight.”

The bottom line is that the Indo-Pacific region is of extreme strategic importance to the U.S. and its 30+ partners. For CJADC2 to reach its full potential, the DoD must implement trusted cross-domain technology that allows for the seamless exchange of information not just between classification levels, but also partner environments. Doing so is the only way for the U.S. to connect the unconnectable and remain secure while operating in challenging territories like the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific security hinges on cross-domain technology

c4isrnet.com · by George Kamis · April 1, 2024

The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing significant geopolitical shifts, including China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces and increased provocations. The U.S. is committed to deterrence, though, and is supported by a long list of allies, the majority of whom have deepened their ties to Washington in recent years.

The U.S. Department of Defense has voiced its commitment to delivering a U.S. presence in the region that is “mobile, distributed, resilient, and lethal,” while President Joe Biden has declared that the future of the world hinges on a free and open Indo-Pacific.

However, collaboration with allies in the region poses unique challenges for U.S. agencies. The sheer number of partners working together in the Indo-Pacific can make rapid, secure communication difficult. From a technical standpoint, the region’s diverse environments, from open oceans to densely populated areas, also pose challenges.

As the DoD works to limit conflict, and with $1.4 billion in funding set aside to support Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) efforts in 2024, agencies must invest in technology that enables real-time intelligence-sharing to ensure security in the region.

Success in the Indo-Pacific

In any tactical environment, success and security hinge on the ability of the military and its partners to quickly understand and respond to changes on the battlefield. The addition of the “C” for “Combined” in the newly renamed CJADC2 underscores the importance of collaborative warfare and the need for command-and-control capabilities that can support communication not just between branches, but between allied mission partners.

The Pentagon’s CJADC2 efforts are a signal to China, experts say, especially as China pursues its own version known as Multi-Domain Precision Warfare. While the DoD has achieved a basic form of JADC2, additional challenges arise when it comes to implementing partner collaboration. According to a top general in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), the network environment across nations is not currently “agile, targetable, robust, or secure.” At times, information-sharing is done manually, he said: “[the process] is literally someone reading a chat and writing on another keyboard to transfer that data from one partner to the other.”

For the U.S. and its partners to be successful in the Indo-Pacific region, such manual processes must be eliminated. Authenticated users must be able to access information across multiple networks seamlessly and quickly—without the need for separate workstations or network connectivity for each classification level. The DoD already uses cross-domain technology like data guards and diodes for the internal transfer of information—i.e. taking information gathered at the intelligence level and moving it to the U.S. secret level. It must do the same for information shared with Indo-Pacific mission partners.

The benefits of connectivity

When information is shared between classification levels and mission partners, it ensures all units are acting on intel that is consistent and in-sync. But such data sharing must be done without divulging sensitive assets and capabilities. To that end, deep data inspection and validation must take place. If intel is downgraded and transferred from a U.S. classified network to a mission partner environment, for instance, sensitive details must be stripped out, so the partner only receives the most pertinent information, such as the coordinates of an adversary.

Ideally, data sharing should be able to happen at the tactical edge as well. Sensors continue get more sophisticated and collect larger amounts of data at multiple security levels. This makes it unrealistic for everything to be pushed back to a centralized location for cross-domain transfer and processing, as doing so clogs networks and hurts latency. When multilevel devices, such as Commercial Solutions for Classified enabled laptops, are equipped with cross-domain technology, users can access multiple coalition environments and networks simultaneously from a single terminal or laptop. This gives agencies the flexibility to quickly connect to new coalition networks and tear down others.

Finally, cross-domain technology’s ability to bring data together across classification levels and mission partners is also crucial for enabling the use of artificial intelligence. Algorithms can’t make decisions based on data from a single source or classification level. Instead, data must be fused and brought together from multiple security levels to form data repositories. The more data AI has access to, the more effective it will be.

As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks explained recently, “investments in AI can greatly improve the speed, quality and accuracy with which commanders make decisions, giving them a decisive advantage in deterring conflict and winning a fight.”

The bottom line is that the Indo-Pacific region is of extreme strategic importance to the U.S. and its 30+ partners. For CJADC2 to reach its full potential, the DoD must implement trusted cross-domain technology that allows for the seamless exchange of information not just between classification levels, but also partner environments. Doing so is the only way for the U.S. to connect the unconnectable and remain secure while operating in challenging territories like the Indo-Pacific.

George Kamis is Chief Technology Officer at Everfox

15. Mine the Gap: How Washington and Canberra Can Improve Their Asymmetric Capabilities

Conclusion:

The United States is faced with mounting, but not insurmountable, challenges in the Indo-Pacific. If security throughout the region is to be maintained, then the United States should pay greater heed to the asymmetric capabilities of its armed forces. Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems, autonomous vehicles, and mine warfare not only offer the best return on investment but would also align the security interests of the United States and Australia. This opens avenues for increased cooperation under AUKUS pillar two that would be foolish to pass up. Deterrence through denial will play to the strengths of America’s regional allies and mitigate the numerical advantage of Chinese forces.

Mine the Gap: How Washington and Canberra Can Improve Their Asymmetric Capabilities - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Eric Lies · April 2, 2024

As a new surface warfare officer, your time is split between running a division and getting qualified. While much of qualifying means opening every publication and tactical handbook you can find and learning it cold, a great deal of your oral examination is based on “gouge,” which is informal information about the board and the questions you’ll be asked. I clearly remember my gouge: “Don’t worry about mine stuff, we’ll never do it. Focus on missile detect-to-engage sequences for the bigger ships, that’s the real threat. Subs? Leave that to submarines.” I wasn’t going to argue with senior officers at the time. But looking back, it was as if I was told to ignore the biggest threats to allied naval vessels.

Over nine years as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy, I spent most of my time in the Pacific and repeatedly saw firsthand how the United States and its allies in the region were falling behind with respect to nonconventional tactics, planning, and procurement. In order to preserve the deterrent capability of the U.S. Navy within the Indo-Pacific, a greater emphasis should be placed on building out asymmetric and non-conventional capacities within the armed forces.

The AUKUS agreement between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom that was signed in 2021 offers a unique chance to address these shortfalls. At its core, AUKUS is a technology sharing and development agreement divided between two “pillars” encompassing different lines of effort. Pillar one covers the transfer of U.S nuclear-powered attack submarines and the required training to Australia. Pillar two focuses on joint research and development of critical military technology such as hypersonic missiles, AI, and electronic warfare. Australia’s focus on asymmetric anti-access/area denial operations provides an opportunity to address both American and Australian strategic visions synergistically under AUKUS’ pillar two. To do so, Washington and Canberra should devote greater energy toward developing more capable Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems, autonomous vehicles, and mine warfare.

Become a Member

Tracking the Unseen Enemy

With China’s large lead with respect to sea mines and rapidly modernizing and expanding submarine fleet, the United States and its allies face a daunting strategic challenge detecting and tracking so many undersea contacts over an immense area. This is compounded by the manning issues plaguing the U.S. Navy, which has been suffering from retention and recruitment shortfalls and perpetually undermanned ships. Without improved Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems capacity, the United States is at risk of giving China nearly complete freedom of maneuver under the waves and jeopardizing surfaces vessels and combatants.

While the geographic scale and manning issues are steep with respect to Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems, they also offer an opportunity for great leaps forward regarding the integration of U.S. Navy and Royal Australian Navy forces with new technology. I have written about several opportunities for greater joint integration that will be key to eliminating the learning curve of both forces as they move forward, but the equipment for this still needs to be procured or developed. With the Royal Australian Navy’s purchase of modular towed array platforms (based on current U.S. Navy and Japanese Self Defense Force systems), there has been some progress. But more is needed.

One of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s senior analysts, Dr. Malcolm Davis, has well articulated that what is needed is greater integration of autonomous vehicles and AI processing. The U.K.’s burgeoning AI expertisecould be vital in supplementing these developments. There have been exercises focused on testing next generation autonomous vehicles within the AUKUS framework, and these should certainly continue. But this still fails to address the near-term challenges facing the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. Cooperation could be further strengthened by expanding access to AUKUS pillar two to other regional allies, forming a robust “AUKUS+” network of technological exchange and cooperation.

The judicious use of currently available technology will help fill the short-term Integrated Undersea Surveillance System capacity gap as these next generation systems come online. Currently available AI has proven its ability to process massive amounts of data, identify patterns and trends, and generate reports that human analysts can utilize for rapid decision-making. Utilizing AI would dramatically lower the number of analysts required to search for and track undersea contacts. This should be taken a step further — to address not only the manning but also the geographic challenges. The deployment of large arrays of hydrophones, the acoustic sensors used for Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, with built-in AI data processing would allow for monitoring large swaths of the Indo-Pacific remotely. These hydrophones could be fixed sensors or designed for mobility by attaching them to recoverable buoys. These systems are already in widespread use within the U.S. Navy and Royal Australian Navy. Upgrading them with AI would be cost effective, making them ready for delivery far sooner than next generation systems will be. Working within the auspices of AUKUS while developing these systems would share the costs, improve interoperability from the start, and give more range for scaling up Integrated Undersea Surveillance System operations to counter the increasing undersea threats in the region.

Human versus Machine

Ships operated by the U.S. Navy and its allies are some of the most advanced vessels afloat and outperform competitors on a one-to-one basis. China, seeing this, has outbuilt the United States in order to counter this capability gap. Based on current projections, the Chinese fleet will outnumber the U.S. Navy by well over 100 ships within the decade. Given the more regional focus of Chinese forces, the United States will face this force with far less than its full navy at the outset of any conflict. This will lead to costly losses in the initial salvos, severely hamstring any efforts to resolve a conflict to America’s satisfaction. There is the planned expansion of U.S. shipbuilding, but this won’t fill the near-term needs of the U.S. Navy fast enough to offset the quantity differential.

Autonomous vehicles will play a pivotal role in mitigating the disparity in quantities faced by the U.S. and its allies. But this requires integrating these assets into current force structures. Creative deployment, such as using currently operational amphibious vessels as “drone carriers” and launching swarms from well decks, will allow the United States and its allies to leverage existing platforms in novel ways. As Air Commodore Ross Bender of the Royal Australian Airforce told the Hudson Institute: “[W]hen you talk about integration it might be… send[ing] a chat message from one vehicle to another, that might be success.” I would push this argument and say, “the simpler, the better.” Having hundreds of simple vessels that can perform rudimentary operations in a joint task force would offset the numerical advantage the Chinese have. Collaborating on getting commercially available tools in the hands of the sailors in the Royal Australian Navy and U.S. Navy now will allow rapid innovation. The sailors know what problems they have better than anyone, they live them.

Mine the Gap

Mine warfare has been neglected terribly by the U.S. Navy and most of its allies for decades. Whether it’s due to a preference for flashier tools of war, strategic oversight, an aversion to the time-intensive nature of disposal, or some combination of these factors, this neglect has left U.S. forces vulnerable and trailing potential competitors. The primary counter-mine warfare platform for the U.S. Navy is the Avenger class mine countermeasure ships designed and purchased in the 1980s. Chronically underfunded and undermanned, they were always the last ships picked at ship selection for both the Naval Academy and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Moreover, there are only eight active in the fleet now. This imbalance in numbers means that even if the U.S. Navy were faced with lightly mined waters, it would have trouble responding rapidly. Offensively, the U.S. Navy took 40 years to begin updating its own mines and has no current plans to expand stockpiles or capacity. This means that the U.S. Navy must rely primarily on crewed surface and subsurface vessels to conduct anti-access/area denial operations and deter malicious actors at sea, stretching the fleet as noted above.

Mine warfare operations can play both offensive and defensive roles, and can be carried out at scale for what would amount to pocket change for the U.S. military budget. The very same autonomous vehicles that are being developed could serve as mine clearance or mine delivery vehicles, allowing for safer operations. The ability to threaten freedom of navigation for Chinese vessels would also help mitigate their greater numbers, potentially forcing them to operate in closer proximity to each other while they conduct counter-mine warfare and making them easier to track, target, and engage. Developing these capabilities alongside the Royal Australian Navy, with a focus on autonomous mine delivery units, would give the United States and Australia another valuable tool to counter China. While both navies should also build more counter-mine warfare vessels, developing a modular system that would allow for the integration of drones into vessels of opportunity should take priority. Explosive ordinance disposal is inherently dangerous and is best left to unmanned vessels. Cooperation between the United States and Australia should proceed along both the offensive and defensive lines of effort.

Fair Winds and Open Seas

While AUKUS also includes the United Kingdom, there has been relatively little discussion within the United Kingdom itself about AUKUS. The United Kingdom is taking the lead on designing the AUKUS class submarine, and its navy is central to the development of pillar one of the agreement. But besides this, Britain’s policy debate and implementation is lagging behind its counterparts. To maximize the benefits of joint innovation and development, all three partners should fully engage one another, identify barriers to collaboration, and leverage their unique strengths. Finally, as the AUKUS relationships mature, members should consider the expansion of partner countries within pillar two. The eventual development of an “AUKUS+” for pillar two would greatly boost the depth of talent available to conduct research and development, bring greater economies of scale to bear, and vastly improve allied regional interoperability. There has already been some movement on this front: Japan seems set to be the first country brought into the pillar two agreement.

The United States is faced with mounting, but not insurmountable, challenges in the Indo-Pacific. If security throughout the region is to be maintained, then the United States should pay greater heed to the asymmetric capabilities of its armed forces. Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems, autonomous vehicles, and mine warfare not only offer the best return on investment but would also align the security interests of the United States and Australia. This opens avenues for increased cooperation under AUKUS pillar two that would be foolish to pass up. Deterrence through denial will play to the strengths of America’s regional allies and mitigate the numerical advantage of Chinese forces.

Become a Member

Eric Lies is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Washington, D.C. office, specializing in security strategy and military affairs. He previously served in the U.S. Navy as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer and holds bachelor’s of science with a major in international affairs from the U.S. Naval Academy and a master’s in international service from American University.

Image: Seaman Brian Stone

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Eric Lies · April 2, 2024

16. Nothing "Great" About It: World War I, the Rise of the American National Security State, and the Espionage Act

There are few who write more consistently and passionately about liberties versus government activities than Patrick Eddington.

Excerpts:

But before Albury or Snowden, there was Chelsea Manning and Julian Assange.

While an Army Intelligence enlisted member, Manning provided Wikileaks and Assange with, among other things, clear video and related evidence of U.S. military war crimes in Iraq during the Bush 43 administration, specifically the murder of civilians and journalists working for Reuters by U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The incident, captured on the video Manning gave to Wikileaks, became known as the "Collateral Murder" video.

Manning also released to Wikileaks over 90,000 pages of Army Afghan war logs, 400,000 American military reports from the Iraq war, and a quarter of a million State Department cables. The U.S. national security bureaucracy all but lost its mind over those leaks, but as Lebovic notes (pp. 336-337), "a 2011 Pentagon task force on Wikileaks concluded that no one had suffered physical harm as a result of the leak, and no such instance has come to light in the decade since." Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates also conceded that the document dumps were "embarrassing" and "awkward" but could point to no lasting damage to U.S. credibility or influence with its allies.

It was a back-handed admission that more often than not, the U.S. document classification system is used to hide government ineptitude, bungling, or criminal conduct.

....

No U.S. government employee--civilian or military--has ever been charged in connection with the "Collateral Murder" incident. No FBI employee has, to the author's knowledge, ever been fired for engaging in the kind of surveillance or related activity exposed by Albury. And instead of ending the warrantless electronic dragnet surveillance exposed by Snowden, federal officials have succeeded in making the practice all but permanent.

Indeed, even though a long-standing executive order prohibits misusing the classification system to hide waste, fraud, abuse, mismanagement, or even criminal conduct, there is no statute that actually bans the practice. Until that changes, and until we have real and effective whistleblower protection law in place (like this proposal), federal officials will continue to misuse the classification system to hide their misconduct...and the Espionage Act will remain their shield and sword against those who try to expose the government's crimes.

Nothing "Great" About It: World War I, the Rise of the American National Security State, and the Espionage Act

The "Great War" ushered in the modern national security apparatus, and with it, a secrecy law as draconian as it is ineffective at protecting real secrets

https://www.republic-sentinel.com/p/nothing-great-about-it-world-war?utm=

PATRICK EDDINGTON

APR 01, 2024

(Source: Library of Congress)

This coming Saturday, April 6, will mark the 107th anniversary of America's entry into what at the time was known as "The Great War"--what we know today as World War I. Many inventions of war we take for granted today--the machine gun, the airplane, the submarine, chemical weapons--got their first real-world tests at scale in a conflict that would ultimately claim lives of more than 30 million combatants alone. Something else emerged from the conflict that also got its first tests during the war and many times since--the Espionage Act.

Last year, Basic Books published the first major account on the history of the now-infamous law by George Mason history professor Sam Lebovic. In State of Silence: The Espionage Act and the Rise of America's Secrecy Regime, Lebovic notes (p. 6) that the key sections of the Espionage Act were "largely copied from an earlier Defense Secrets Act, itself rushed through Congress six years before." The most dubious part of the Espionage Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 793) is the one that's actually been used to go after newspaper publishers (Victor Berger of the Milwaukee Leader in World War I, also the first socialist elected to Congress) and government officials who leak classified information to newspapers (the late Daniel Ellsberg being the most famous).

(Source: Congressional Bioguide)

The government ultimately lost both of those cases, but it's been successful in others. Most Espionage Act cases have been brought against individuals even when no actual espionage against the U.S. was involved. That was the case with Berger and Ellsberg and it has also been true in more recent cases involving Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, former FBI Agent Terry Albury, and former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Instead, the charging of the individuals in question appears linked to their exposure of U.S. government misconduct or outright criminality.

In Albury's case, it was for exposing the FBI's dirty laundry with respect to its pattern and practice of engaging in racial or religious targeting of Arab or Muslim Americans in bogus terrorism-related investigations. The 11 stories The Intercept published that relied on Albury's disclosures revealed an FBI every bit as out of control as it was during J. Edgar Hoover's tenure. But instead of FBI officials being impeached, fired, or prosecuted for their misconduct, it was Albury who was prosecuted under the Espionage Act. He took a plea deal in 2018 and served about two years of a four-year sentence.

Edward Snowden of course has also been charged under the Espionage Act. His "crime" was exposing, among other things, the massive telephone metadata dragnet run by the NSA with the help of telecommunications companies like Verizon that encompassed the phone traffic of millions of Americans. Snowden's actions would also lead Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials to kill a similar program they'd been running since at least 1992, one even some DEA lawyers and FBI agents thought was likely unconstitutional--though the public would not learn about that until years after Snowden's initial revelations. Snowden remains in exile in Russia to this day.

But before Albury or Snowden, there was Chelsea Manning and Julian Assange.

While an Army Intelligence enlisted member, Manning provided Wikileaks and Assange with, among other things, clear video and related evidence of U.S. military war crimes in Iraq during the Bush 43 administration, specifically the murder of civilians and journalists working for Reuters by U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The incident, captured on the video Manning gave to Wikileaks, became known as the "Collateral Murder" video.

Manning also released to Wikileaks over 90,000 pages of Army Afghan war logs, 400,000 American military reports from the Iraq war, and a quarter of a million State Department cables. The U.S. national security bureaucracy all but lost its mind over those leaks, but as Lebovic notes (pp. 336-337), "a 2011 Pentagon task force on Wikileaks concluded that no one had suffered physical harm as a result of the leak, and no such instance has come to light in the decade since." Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates also conceded that the document dumps were "embarrassing" and "awkward" but could point to no lasting damage to U.S. credibility or influence with its allies.

It was a back-handed admission that more often than not, the U.S. document classification system is used to hide government ineptitude, bungling, or criminal conduct.

Manning was betrayed by a fellow hacker, Adrian Lamo, and charged under the Espionage Act. Starting in 2013, she began serving what was originally a 35-year sentence for being found guilty of multiple Espionage Act violations. A small but vocal advocacy campaign on her behalf, and perhaps also the revelations about her two suicide attempts in 2016, may have had some role in President Obama's decision to commute her sentence in 2017.

Assange was also charged by the U.S. government under the Espionage Act, and as I write these lines is making what could be his last legal stand in England, trying to avoid extradition to the United States to face trial. I've never considered Assange to be a particularly sympathetic figure, but the reality is that his case and the others I've discussed represent what can only be considered a pattern and practice by the U.S. government of waging "lawfare" against those intent on exposing the government's own crimes.

No U.S. government employee--civilian or military--has ever been charged in connection with the "Collateral Murder" incident. No FBI employee has, to the author's knowledge, ever been fired for engaging in the kind of surveillance or related activity exposed by Albury. And instead of ending the warrantless electronic dragnet surveillance exposed by Snowden, federal officials have succeeded in making the practice all but permanent.

Indeed, even though a long-standing executive order prohibits misusing the classification system to hide waste, fraud, abuse, mismanagement, or even criminal conduct, there is no statute that actually bans the practice. Until that changes, and until we have real and effective whistleblower protection law in place (like this proposal), federal officials will continue to misuse the classification system to hide their misconduct...and the Espionage Act will remain their shield and sword against those who try to expose the government's crimes.

Thanks for reading the Sentinel. If you're not currently a subscriber, please consider becoming one. Also, if there's a particular topic or issue you'd like to see me cover, just let me know via the comment section.

17. What Japan’s Military Reorganization Means for US-Japanese Bilateral Operations

We should revisit this article when the new defense relationships between Japan and the US are released this month. What has been rumored is that the Japanese are seeking a higher level uS presence in Japan (e.g., a 4 star).

Excerpts:

The creation of the joint commander position, then, will not only lessen the burden on General Yoshida but allow Japan’s top military officer to focus more on broader issues related to Japan’s overarching defense interests and objectives. Currently, General Yoshida receives orders from Defense Minister Kihara and instructs the three service chiefs on specific JSDF operations. What is more, General Yoshida advises Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara on how the JSDF should operate. Under the new framework provided in the three strategic documents, the joint commander will have the authority to command specific operations of JSDF units. The National Defense Strategy notes that “to reinforce effectiveness of joint operational posture, Japan will establish a permanent Joint Headquarters which can unify command of [the three services] by reviewing the existing organization.”

Establishing a PJHQ will allow its commander to centrally control the JSDF units in peacetime, national disaster emergencies, and wartime. A PJHQ will also bolster the ability to directly coordinate with US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). As chief of staff of the Joint Staff, General Yoshida’s US counterpart is General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This means Japan presently does not have a senior military official to directly engage with Admiral John Aquilino, the USINDOPACOM commander, on a routine basis. After March 2025, the joint commander will be the sole counterpart of the USINDOPACOM commander, resolving command-and-control synchronization concerns within joint and bilateral operations. A PJHQ will allow General Yoshida to consult with General Brown on shared military and national defense issues while letting the joint commander work with the USINDOPACOM commander on bilateral operations and responses between the JSDF and the US forces.

What Japan’s Military Reorganization Means for US-Japanese Bilateral Operations - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Christopher Lee · April 2, 2024

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In December 2022, the government of Japan, led by its National Security Council and the Diet, approved three strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. With this approval, the government vowed to create and reinforce the joint operational posture of its three Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) services. A permanent joint headquarters (PJHQ) will allow Japan to “build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each [J]SDF service.” Many of the significant changes within the strategic documents are driven by the transformed Indo-Pacific region’s operational environment—specifically, changes directly caused by the strategic orientation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Japan’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that it will establish the new PJHQ by the end of its fiscal year 2024 (March 2025) and requested a budget for 240 members to initially staff it. The ministry also approved the PJHQ to be located at Ichigaya, Tokyo and revealed that a four-star general or flag officer—which is the same rank as the chiefs of staff of each of the three JSDF services—will command the PJHQ. The headquarters will primarily oversee the three services to prepare for any conceivable emergencies. A reading of the strategic documents makes clear that these changes reflect an appreciation on Japan’s part of, specifically, the dangers and implications of threatening PRC activities—including the prospect of an invasion of Taiwan.

For the past few years, Japan has fulfilled its pledge and created paths to strengthen its fundamental defense and develop counterstrike capabilities to solidify its national security objectives. These steps notwithstanding, the JSDF lacks organic integration within its three services to conduct complex and sustainable joint operations. The establishment of a PJHQ will fill this gap. Currently, the chief of staff of the Joint Staff, General Yoshihide Yoshida, is in charge of the entire JSDF. However, according to the Ministry of Defense, General Yoshida is not a commander, but an advisor who assists Defense Minister Minoru Kihara in his daily decision-making regarding the operation of the JSDF.

The creation of the joint commander position, then, will not only lessen the burden on General Yoshida but allow Japan’s top military officer to focus more on broader issues related to Japan’s overarching defense interests and objectives. Currently, General Yoshida receives orders from Defense Minister Kihara and instructs the three service chiefs on specific JSDF operations. What is more, General Yoshida advises Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara on how the JSDF should operate. Under the new framework provided in the three strategic documents, the joint commander will have the authority to command specific operations of JSDF units. The National Defense Strategy notes that “to reinforce effectiveness of joint operational posture, Japan will establish a permanent Joint Headquarters which can unify command of [the three services] by reviewing the existing organization.”

Establishing a PJHQ will allow its commander to centrally control the JSDF units in peacetime, national disaster emergencies, and wartime. A PJHQ will also bolster the ability to directly coordinate with US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). As chief of staff of the Joint Staff, General Yoshida’s US counterpart is General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This means Japan presently does not have a senior military official to directly engage with Admiral John Aquilino, the USINDOPACOM commander, on a routine basis. After March 2025, the joint commander will be the sole counterpart of the USINDOPACOM commander, resolving command-and-control synchronization concerns within joint and bilateral operations. A PJHQ will allow General Yoshida to consult with General Brown on shared military and national defense issues while letting the joint commander work with the USINDOPACOM commander on bilateral operations and responses between the JSDF and the US forces.

Figure 1: Potential COMREL with the US Forces after PJHQ

The plan to establish a PJHQ shows that Japan has taken necessary steps to properly respond to one of the most dangerous and complex security environments in the modern era. This also suggests that Japan recognizes the fluidity and fragility of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, especially with the PRC’s continual aggressive tactics and presence in the Ryukyu Islands. Given that context, it is more important than ever to maintain strategic dialogue between Japan and the United States.

The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act ordered the US military to develop a new construct for operational command in the Western part of Indo-Pacific region. The concept is a joint force headquarters that can serve as an operational command to integrate “joint all domain command and control effects chains and mission command and control, including in conflicts that arise with minimal warning.” As Japan establishes its PJHQ and the US its own new joint headquarters in the region, there is a tremendous opportunity to further enhance integration for joint and bilateral operations—integration that will play a vital role in deterring future conflicts and other destabilizing activities by the PRC in the Ryukyu Islands or Taiwan.

Christopher Lee is an active duty lieutenant colonel in the US Army. He holds a BS from West Point, an MA from Columbia University, and an MBA from UCLA. He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer and is currently serving as a foreign area officer for the Northeast Asia region.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Mary Katzenberger, US Army Japan

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Christopher Lee · April 2, 2024

18. A Sea Change? U.S.-Philippine Irregular Statecraft in the South China Sea

Names have meaning. Long live the West Philippine Sea. :-)

Excerpts:

To resist China’s antagonistic behavior in the South China Sea and violations of the Philippines’ EEZ, the Marcos administration has adopted an “assertive transparency” strategy executed through a name-and-shame approach. The tactic rests on deterring and defeating Chinese gray zone actions by strengthening national resilience, building international support, and imposing reputational costs on China. The naming and shaming element of this approach rests on quickly sharing information about incidents in the South China Sea as part of a broader “battle of narratives” against China regarding the framing of its behavior in the region. For instance, Commodore Jay Tarriela, the spokesperson for the Philippine Coast Guard on the South China Sea, regularly tweets photos and videos of Chinese vessels conducting dangerous maneuvers against Filipino fishermen and Philippine military vessels, in apparent violation of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. The Philippines has also brought international and local media on patrol and resupply missions to the Sierra Madre to document Chinese provocations. The Sierra Madre even has its own Twitter account to document Chinese provocations of Philippine resupply boats like the one mentioned above to oppose Chinese influence operations in the region.

...

By supporting the Philippines’ assertive transparency strategy to manage risk and counter an increasingly provocative China, the United States can bolster its position as a strategic enabler in the region. Having mutually shared interests in countering China in the South China Sea as part of its broader FOIP efforts, the United States has the opportunity to take the Philippines’ approach to the next level by providing technical, strategic, and operational support alongside irregular statecraft efforts. Similarly, the United States has an opportunity to observe Philippine actions while testing various irregular statecraft concepts to assess their effectiveness in countering China. If successful, an irregular statecraft template could be developed to use elsewhere as a way of strategically competing in a de-escalatory fashion and with the help of willing allies and partners.

With a properly crafted irregular statecraft strategy for the South China Sea, the United States can enable and empower its frontline ally to confidently deter and counter Chinese gray-zone actions while minimizing escalation—not only between the Philippines and China, but also between the United States and China.

A Sea Change? U.S.-Philippine Irregular Statecraft in the South China Sea - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Amparo Pamela Fabe, Jahara Matisek · April 2, 2024

“Stop calling it the South China Sea. It’s the West Philippine Sea – calling it the South China Sea only empowers Beijing to claim the whole region.”

– Philippines Navy Commander, April 2023 interview by Jahara Matisek

The South China Sea has long been a source of strained relations between Beijing and Manila. Tensions, however, have started to boil over. China has routinely ignored a 2016 arbitral tribunal decision finding several of its territorial sea claims, including its “nine-dash line,” as unlawful and infringing on the Philippines’ sovereign rights. As recently as February 17, 2024, the Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources accused Chinese fishermen of using cyanide to intentionally destroy the Scarborough Shoal—a contested territory between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea—to prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing there.

Beijing claims “indisputable sovereignty” over nearly all of the 1.3 million square mile South China Sea and most of the islands within it. China’s coast guard, navy, and maritime militia vessels routinely harass Philippine patrol and supply boats. While Philippine officials have publicly denounced such tactics as irresponsible, dangerous, and illegal, China counters that its behavior is “reasonable, lawful, and professional” and has accused Philippine boats of unsafe behavior. The United States, considering the Philippines a critical regional ally, has, for its part, voiced its support for the Philippines and called on China to respect Philippine territorial claims and freedom of navigation.

Increased Chinese provocations and Philippine resistance have turned the South China Sea into a key battleground in the United States’ strategic contest with China, offering a chance to counter Beijing’s gray-zone tactics. The United States should expand its existing defense cooperation and integrated strategy with the Philippines to include a more robust irregular statecraft approach that builds on the Philippines’ motivation, capabilities, irregular tactics, and maritime domain awareness to strengthen a regional alliance against illegal Chinese activities in the region.

A Slow Boil: Chinese Aggression in the South China Sea

Although China has repeatedly engaged in aggressive encounters with neighbors in the South China Sea since 1974, it was not until 1992 that China claimed the entirety of the sea through a reimagination of history. Since then, China has employed a “salami slicing” approach of systematically legitimizing its increasingly aggressive actions in the region without generating a robust opposition.

In 2012, China placed a three-hundred-meter-long ball-buoy barrier policed by its coastguard between Chinese and Philippine forces near the Scarborough Shoal. The incident proved to be a precursor to China’s massive fake island building campaign. China has also illegally built up military infrastructure and deployed fishing boats across the region that conduct illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its neighbors’ EEZs. Some fishing vessels, usually operating with their transponders turned off, also double as China’s maritime militia. Known in the Philippines as “little blue men,” they harass commercial ships, coast guard boats, and naval vessels by blasting water cannons, bumping and ramming, shining blinding lasers, and employing dangerous maneuvers.

The Philippines has pushed back against such tactics with its own creative methods. The case of the BRP Sierra Madre provides an important example. In 1999, the Philippines’ navy intentionally shipwrecked the ship on the Second Thomas Shoal, turning it into a de facto Philippine base. Despite years of Chinese harassment, the Philippines continues to man the Sierra Madre as a defensive outpost to “resist any attempt by China to forcefully remove” it from the shoal. However, the Philippines recognizes the ship as sovereign territory covered by the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), posing a potential flashpoint that may implicate U.S. interests.

The Philippines’ efforts notwithstanding, China’s violations of international laws and rules of the sea have only grown increasingly boisterous. On March 5, the Philippines summoned China’s deputy chief of mission to the country in protest against what it saw as “aggressive actions” by Chinese naval forces attempting to block the Philippines’ resupply mission to the Sierra Madre, a confrontation that resulted in four Philippine injuries and damage to two Philippine vessels.

Washington-Manila Relations Punctuated by Beijing

Bolstering collaboration between the United States and the Philippines, particularly through an irregular statecraft approach, would cement regional cooperation in countering an increasingly assertive China. For decades, Manila has balanced its enduring security pact with Washington in tandem with growing economic cooperation with Beijing. While former President Rodrigo Duterte promoted pro-Chinese policies and regularly questioned the 1951 MDT, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., elected in 2022, ran on a pro-American platform, reviving the 2014 U.S.-Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement upon assuming office. This recommitment to the U.S.-Philippine alliance led the United States to announce four new bases in the Philippines and joint U.S.-Philippine patrols in November 2023—a first for the region.

To resist China’s antagonistic behavior in the South China Sea and violations of the Philippines’ EEZ, the Marcos administration has adopted an “assertive transparency” strategy executed through a name-and-shame approach. The tactic rests on deterring and defeating Chinese gray zone actions by strengthening national resilience, building international support, and imposing reputational costs on China. The naming and shaming element of this approach rests on quickly sharing information about incidents in the South China Sea as part of a broader “battle of narratives” against China regarding the framing of its behavior in the region. For instance, Commodore Jay Tarriela, the spokesperson for the Philippine Coast Guard on the South China Sea, regularly tweets photos and videos of Chinese vessels conducting dangerous maneuvers against Filipino fishermen and Philippine military vessels, in apparent violation of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. The Philippines has also brought international and local media on patrol and resupply missions to the Sierra Madre to document Chinese provocations. The Sierra Madre even has its own Twitter account to document Chinese provocations of Philippine resupply boats like the one mentioned above to oppose Chinese influence operations in the region.

Irregular Statecraft for Countering Chinese Aggression

The Philippines’ increased readiness to assert its maritime claims against China has created an opportunity for the United States to advance its own irregular strategy, exploiting Beijing’s reckless behavior throughout the Indo-Pacific. Traditionally viewed as an asymmetrical advantage, Beijing’s gray-zone and hybrid actions across the region could be made into exploitable liabilities by doubling down on Manila’s name-and-shame approach and efforts to increase transparency by casting a spotlight on such activities. Fortified U.S.-Philippines collaboration across militaries and agencies empowers the Philippines to be a strong defensive node along (and beyond) the First Island Chain.

In order to achieve the concomitant U.S. goals of countering growing Chinese regional aggression while avoiding military escalation, the United States should look to non-military ways of contesting Chinese objectives in the South China Sea. Such an approach would emphasize confronting Chinese manipulation of historical narratives and misinformation. That is where the promise of irregular statecraft, which focuses on employing means short of war to erode adversaries’ influence, comes in.

Incorporating irregular statecraft into the existing U.S. toolkit in the South China Sea would allow the United States to more effectively build on and support the work the Philippines is already doing to resist Chinese aggression. Supporting the Philippines’ strategy of naming and shaming bellicose Chinese conduct would be a particularly worthwhile U.S. investment because regional cooperation in non-dispute related maritime matters, such as fishing, is a critical part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s maritime strategy for improving China’s international image. Furthermore, U.S. support of assertive transparency is unlikely to provoke a bigger security issue in the South China Sea because China’s projection of sea power also includes diplomatic negotiation, maritime law enforcement, and global maritime governance.

In terms of implementing such support, U.S. forces and interagency personnel can complement the Philippine defense forces’ operational awareness of the South China Sea with well-funded resources and new technologies. The United States could, for example, augment a Philippine coast guard monitoring base at Thitu Island with more and higher-quality resources, surveillance assets, and interagency personnel to deter further Chinese rule-breaking by using recorded offenses to name and shame the country. Similar efforts at other Philippine outposts around the South China Sea could facilitate the creation of a “common maritime operating picture,” enabling rapid allied responses against illegal Chinese activities and providing credible information about China’s operations to dispel misinformation.

An expansive U.S.-Philippines partnership would also facilitate coalition building among like-minded neighbors in a whole-of-region campaign alongside the 2021 U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. American credibility and legitimacy in promoting FOIP rests on its ability to reassure allies in the region that laws and norms will be upheld in the face of Chinese threats. Thus, creating a so-called FOIP coalition would signal an important collective willingness to resist and counter China across all domains in the Indo-Pacific by checking, documenting, recording, and highlighting China’s predatory actions to a global audience. With American support and Western diplomatic backing, such collective action by neighboring countries would demonstrate a collaborative consensus to counter illegal Chinese actions in contested EEZs.

Countering China’s contrived narrative about its South China Sea claims requires proactive and transparent policies across governments, militaries, and civil societies to release information about Chinese deception. The U.S. government should thus consider sending National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) vessels on scientific missions alongside Philippine vessels and those of other neighboring countries in the South China Sea to show the American flag. Unbeknownst to many, the NOAA is a uniformed service, falling under the U.S. Department of Commerce. Under 33 U.S.C. § 3063, NOAA vessels placed within the South China Sea could assist the Philippines with surveilling and mapping activities as part of an integrated influence operation to expose Chinese aggression. Finally, through the use of § 1202 authorities in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, the United States could build, train, and support unconventional maritime partner forces from neighboring South China Sea countries to confront Chinese vessels.

In the face of persistent Chinese misinformation, the United States can assist the Philippines in implementing a coordinated international and multi-stakeholder effort of strategic communication to showcase how the United States abides by laws and norms in contrast with China. Moreover, the United States can dedicate interagency personnel to train Philippine cyber forces and civil society groups to conduct their own irregular information operations. Washington and Manila could also pursue irregular diplomatic efforts by changing the naming convention for the South China Sea, which gives symbolic legitimacy to China’s illegal claims to the region, and instead, promoting the area’s renaming as the “Southeast Asia Sea.”

A successful long-term approach on the part of the United States will be defined by three features. First, it will build an enduring foreign policy architecture that promotes democracy, rule of law, and economic prosperity. Second, it will reduce the number of Chinese fishing vessels purposefully anchored year-round near other countries’ territorial claims in the South China Sea and used as a pretext for the presence of Chinese coast guard vessels. Finally, it will be limited to a supporting role aimed at reinforcing other countries’ efforts to lawfully defend their legally defined territorial claims without directly provoking Beijing. Such U.S. irregular statecraft cooperation with the Philippines will enable leaders in Manila to confidently confront and negotiate with Beijing, while promoting dialogue as a primary course of action for resolving future South China Sea disputes.

Conclusion

By supporting the Philippines’ assertive transparency strategy to manage risk and counter an increasingly provocative China, the United States can bolster its position as a strategic enabler in the region. Having mutually shared interests in countering China in the South China Sea as part of its broader FOIP efforts, the United States has the opportunity to take the Philippines’ approach to the next level by providing technical, strategic, and operational support alongside irregular statecraft efforts. Similarly, the United States has an opportunity to observe Philippine actions while testing various irregular statecraft concepts to assess their effectiveness in countering China. If successful, an irregular statecraft template could be developed to use elsewhere as a way of strategically competing in a de-escalatory fashion and with the help of willing allies and partners.

With a properly crafted irregular statecraft strategy for the South China Sea, the United States can enable and empower its frontline ally to confidently deter and counter Chinese gray-zone actions while minimizing escalation—not only between the Philippines and China, but also between the United States and China.

Amparo Pamela Fabe is a Professor of Financial Terrorism, National Police College, Philippines. She is a 2023 Irregular Warfare Initiative Fellow and a Fellow of the Brute Krulak Center for 2024-2026. She has over 50 publications, books, and journal articles, in defense and security. She has been interviewed by the Voice of America Chinese, Foreign Policy, Straits Times, Benarnews and South China Morning Post. Her writings appear in stratsea.com, GNET, and Geopolitical Monitor.

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, 2023 Irregular Warfare Initiative Fellow, and U.S. Department of Defense Minerva co-principal investigator for improving American security assistance. Lt. Col. Matisek has published over 100 articles and essays in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. He is a command pilot that previously served as a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute and associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

Main Photo: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III is welcomed to Zamboanga, Philippines, Feb. 1, 2023. Austin is traveling to Asia to meet with senior government and military leaders in Korea and the Philippines to advance regional stability, further strengthen the defense partnerships and reaffirm the deep commitment of the United States to work in concert with allies and partners in support of the shared vision of preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific. (DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley)

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Philippines, US Naval War College, US Air Force, Department of Defense, or US Government. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.

19. China Is Still Rising

Excerpts:

Although China is beset by many problems, including those resulting from Xi’s efforts to exert greater control over the economy, exaggerating these problems serves no one. It could even lead to complacency in the face of the very real challenges that China presents to the West.

That is particularly true for the United States. China will likely continue to contribute about a third of the world’s economic growth while increasing its economic footprint, particularly in Asia. If U.S. policymakers underappreciate this, they are likely to overestimate their own ability to sustain the deepening of economic and security ties with Asian partners.

China Is Still Rising

Don’t Underestimate the World’s Second-Biggest Economy

By Nicholas R. Lardy

April 2, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Nicholas R. Lardy · April 2, 2024

For over two decades, China’s phenomenal economic performance impressed and alarmed much of the world, including the United States, its top trading partner. But since 2019, China’s sluggish growth has led many observers to conclude that China has already peaked as an economic power. President Joe Biden said as much in his State of the Union address in March: “For years, I’ve heard many of my Republican and Democratic friends say that China is on the rise and America is falling behind. They’ve got it backwards.”

Those who doubt that China’s rise will continue point to the country’s weak household spending, its declining private investment, and its entrenched deflation. Sooner than overtake the United States, they argue, China would likely enter a long recession, perhaps even a lost decade.

But this dismissive view of the country underestimates the resilience of its economy. Yes, China faces several well documented headwinds, including a housing market slump, restrictions imposed by the United States on access to some advanced technologies, and a shrinking working-age population. But China overcame even greater challenges when it started on the path of economic reform in the late 1970s. While its growth has slowed in recent years, China is likely to expand at twice the rate of the United States in the years ahead.

MISREADING THE DATA

Several misconceptions undergird the pessimism about China’s economic potential. Take the widely held misconception that the Chinese economy’s progress in converging with the size of the U.S. economy has stalled. It is true that from 2021 to 2023, China’s GDP fell from 76 percent of U.S. GDP to 67 percent. Yet it is also true that by 2023, China’s GDP was 20 percent bigger than it had been in 2019, the eve of the global pandemic, while the United States’ was only 8 percent bigger.

This apparent paradox can be explained by two factors. First, over the last few years, inflation has been lower in China than it has been in the United States. Last year, China’s nominal GDP grew by 4.6 percent, less than the 5.2 percent that its GDP grew in real terms. In contrast, because of high inflation, U.S. nominal GDP in 2023 grew by 6.3 percent, while real GDP grew by only 2.5 percent.

Moreover, the U.S. Federal Reserve has raised interest rates by over five percentage points since March 2022, from 0.25 percent to 5.5 percent, making dollar-denominated assets more attractive to global investors and boosting the value of the dollar relative to alternative currencies. Meanwhile, China’s central bank cut its base interest rate from 3.70 percent to 3.45 percent. The growing gap between Chinese and U.S. interest rates reversed what had been a large inflow of foreign capital into China, ultimately depressing the value of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar by 10 percent. Converting a smaller nominal GDP to dollars at a weakened exchange rate results in a decline in the value of China’s GDP when measured in dollars relative to U.S. GDP.

But these two factors are likely to be transitory. U.S. interest rates are now declining relative to rates in China, reducing the incentive of investors to convert renminbi into dollar-denominated assets. As a result, the depreciation of the Chinese currency has begun to reverse. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that Chinese prices will pick up this year, which would boost China’s GDP measured in renminbi. Its nominal GDP measured in U.S. dollars will almost certainly resume converging toward that of the United States this year and is likely to surpass it in about a decade.

A second misconception is that household income, spending, and consumer confidence in China is weak. The data do not support this view. Last year, real per capita income rose by 6 percent, more than double the growth rate in 2022, when the country was in lockdown, and per capita consumption climbed by 9 percent. If consumer confidence were weak, households would curtail consumption, building up their savings instead. But Chinese households did just the opposite last year: consumption grew more than income, which is possible only if households reduced the share of their income going to savings.

China will likely continue to contribute about a third of the world’s economic growth while increasing its economic footprint.

A third misconception is that price deflation has become entrenched in China, putting the country on course toward recession. Yes, consumer prices rose only 0.2 percent last year, which gave rise to the fear that households would reduce consumption in anticipation of still lower prices—thereby reducing demand and slowing growth. This has not happened because core consumer prices (meaning those for goods and services besides food and energy) actually increased by 0.7 percent.

The prices of tools and raw materials used to produce other goods did fall in 2023, reflecting global declines in the price of energy and other internationally traded commodities as well as relatively weak demand in China for some industrial goods, potentially undermining the incentive for firms to invest in expanding their productive capacity. Rather than pump money into their businesses, the thinking went, companies would use their declining profits to pay down debt.But here, too, the very opposite came to pass: Chinese corporations ramped up borrowing, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP. And investment in manufacturing, mining, utilities, and services increased. No recession appears on the horizon.

Another misconception concerns the potential for a collapse in property investment. These fears are not entirely misplaced; they are supported by data on housing starts, the number of new buildings on which construction has begun, which in 2023 was half of what it was in 2021. But one has to look at the context. In that same two-year period, real estate investment fell by only 20 percent, as developers allocated a greater share of such outlays to completing housing projects they had started in earlier years. Completions expanded to 7.8 billion square feet in 2023, eclipsing housing starts for the first time. It helped that government policy encouraged banks to lend specifically to housing projects that were almost finished; a general easing of such constraints on bank loans to property developers would have compounded the property glut.

Finally, there is the misconception that Chinese entrepreneurs are discouraged and moving their money out of the country. Undoubtedly, the government crackdown that began in late 2020 on large private companies, notably Alibaba, did not help matters. From the beginning of economic reform in 1978 through the mid-2010s, private investment in China grew more rapidly than investment by state-owned firms. By 2014, private investment comprised almost 60 percent of all investment—up from virtually zero percent in 1978. As private investment is generally more productive than that of state companies, its expanding share of total investment was critical to China’s rapid growth over this period. This trend went into reverse after 2014 when Xi Jinping, having just assumed the top leadership position, aggressively redirected resources to the state sector. The slowdown was modest at first, but by 2023, private investment accounted for only 50 percent of total investment. Xi had undermined investor confidence; entrepreneurs no longer saw the government as a dependable steward of the economy. So long as Xi is in power, runs a common argument, entrepreneurs will continue to hold back on investing in China, opting instead to funnel their wealth out of the country.

But here again, the pessimism is not supported by the data. First, almost all the decline in the private share of total investment after 2014 resulted from a correction in the property market, which is dominated by private companies. When real estate is excluded, private investment rose by almost 10 percent in 2023. Although some prominent Chinese entrepreneurs have left the country, more than 30 million private companies remain and continue to invest. Moreover, the number of family businesses, which are not officially classified as companies, expanded by 23 million in 2023, reaching a total of 124 million enterprises employing about 300 million people.

REAL CHALLENGES AHEAD

Although China is beset by many problems, including those resulting from Xi’s efforts to exert greater control over the economy, exaggerating these problems serves no one. It could even lead to complacency in the face of the very real challenges that China presents to the West.

That is particularly true for the United States. China will likely continue to contribute about a third of the world’s economic growth while increasing its economic footprint, particularly in Asia. If U.S. policymakers underappreciate this, they are likely to overestimate their own ability to sustain the deepening of economic and security ties with Asian partners.

NICHOLAS R. LARDY is a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Foreign Affairs · by Nicholas R. Lardy · April 2, 2024

20. How to Take on Haiti’s Gangs

Everyone wants us to do everything everywhere. But could US diplomacy make a difference here and now?

Excerpts:

But this opportunity can be realized only if the United States, which has long had a deciding role in Haitian politics, works with Haitian democrats carefully and constructively, and avoids repeating the mistakes it has made in the past. That means not getting into bed with criminals and not backing corrupt leaders. The United States has ceded the role of broker in negotiations to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional trading bloc. But the current process risks putting in power people with deep ties to the gangs. The United States should take a more forceful and prominent role to support Haitian leaders on the presidential council and ensure that the prime minister and cabinet ministers who take charge in the new government are people of integrity, capacity, and skill who have no ties to armed gangs. An international security force may be necessary to install the transitional government and confront gang control of the capital. The gang leaders cannot be allowed to write the next chapter for Haiti.

...

Now, Haiti has another opportunity at building a transition government that could give the country a fighting chance at a democratic future. CARICOM-brokered talks in Jamaica and over Zoom yielded a presidential council that includes democracy advocates as well as political parties affiliated with the gangs—uneasy bedfellows. Now, as this new leadership selects a prime minister and a full slate of cabinet ministers, the power sharing must stop.

...

If the United States and the CARICOM do not get this next chapter right—and stand by leaders who are credible, are legitimate, and have the bureaucratic experience to put the Haitian state back on track—the cycle of violence and dysfunction will not end.

For several years, U.S. officials said they stuck with Henry to avoid instability. Civil society leaders kept saying that Henry’s illegitimate and gang-enabling rule was the very thing promoting that instability. After years of backing corrupt and undemocratic leaders, the U.S. government has a chance to back Haitians promoting democracy and the rule of law. If it does so, the United States can help Haiti exit this hellscape at last.

How to Take on Haiti’s Gangs

America Can Do More to Create Stability and Foster Democracy

By Pierre Espérance

April 2, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Pierre Espérance · April 2, 2024

Haiti is finally addressing its profound crisis in leadership. For more than a dozen years, Haiti’s leaders have dismantled democratic institutions and relied on corruption and gangs to maintain their control. After President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in 2021, Ariel Henry, who was deeply unpopular among Haitians, became prime minister with the help of international support. His tenuous hold on power led to increasingly brazen acts of sabotage and violence by astonishingly well-armed and increasingly independent street gangs jockeying for territory and dominance.

In early March, the gangs united to declare war on the state, attacking the airport, police stations, and government buildings. On March 11, Henry announced he would resign after gangs shut down the main airport and blocked him from returning to Haiti after a trip to Kenya. Now, the gangs are stepping in to fill the power vacuum. They claim they represent the people, but the reality on the ground tells a different story. In at least one neighborhood of the capital, Port-au-Prince, gangs fighting the police have gone house to house telling people to unlock their gates so that gang members can, at any moment, run inside and use the residents as human shields.

Across Port-au-Prince, armed groups are looting businesses and burning down houses. Their violence touches anything within reach. As well as government buildings, gangs have also destroyed or severely damaged a center for children with disabilities, pharmacies, and medical clinics. In most of the capital, banks are closed, so people cannot get money; hospitals are not operational, so people cannot receive treatment; and police officers are not patrolling the streets, so there is no one to call for help. According to the United Nations, famine is a step away for 1.6 million of Haiti’s 11 million people.

Yet this could also be a moment of transformative change in Haiti. Since Henry stepped down, feverish negotiations have been underway among Haitian leaders to ‌determine the parameters and makeup of a transition government. After years of frustration and despair, there is hope that Haiti could finally create a government that is committed to the country’s democratic future.

But this opportunity can be realized only if the United States, which has long had a deciding role in Haitian politics, works with Haitian democrats carefully and constructively, and avoids repeating the mistakes it has made in the past. That means not getting into bed with criminals and not backing corrupt leaders. The United States has ceded the role of broker in negotiations to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional trading bloc. But the current process risks putting in power people with deep ties to the gangs. The United States should take a more forceful and prominent role to support Haitian leaders on the presidential council and ensure that the prime minister and cabinet ministers who take charge in the new government are people of integrity, capacity, and skill who have no ties to armed gangs. An international security force may be necessary to install the transitional government and confront gang control of the capital. The gang leaders cannot be allowed to write the next chapter for Haiti.

OUT OF THE ASHES

Henry came to power after the shocking assassination of Moïse in July 2021. After his murder, many Haitians pushed for a neutral transition government to guide their country to free and fair elections. But international support brought Henry—who had been named prime minister by Moïse shortly before his death but not sworn in—to office. He promised to hold new presidential elections and to create a more representative governing structure—but accomplished neither. The U.S. government stood by him, however, resisting the call from civil society for a more broadly based government committed to cleaning up institutions, confronting gangs, and mounting fair elections.

Haiti has had successful transition governments twice in the past 40 years. The first was in 1990, after a series of military leaders failed to hold elections. The transition was led by Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a justice of the Haitian Supreme Court. The second was led by Boniface Alexandre, another Supreme Court justice, who stepped in after Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted from power in 2004. Alexandre served as president until 2006. Both times, the transition governments were made up of unifying figures who could stabilize the country. They mounted elections that inspired popular participation and produced uncontested results. But U.S. policymakers, who helped guide these governments, never focused on the long-term institution-building that would prevent political collapse. Instead, they prioritized attracting foreign investment to Haiti and supporting the programs of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—most of which eventually failed, along with the Haitian state.

Now, Haiti has another opportunity at building a transition government that could give the country a fighting chance at a democratic future. CARICOM-brokered talks in Jamaica and over Zoom yielded a presidential council that includes democracy advocates as well as political parties affiliated with the gangs—uneasy bedfellows. Now, as this new leadership selects a prime minister and a full slate of cabinet ministers, the power sharing must stop.

CRIMINALS NEED NOT APPLY

Candidates for prime ministerial and cabinet posts must be people of integrity who represent Haitian society. Such a requirement might ‌seem obvious, but it would be a new direction for Haiti, whose government has become entwined with criminality. The United States and Canada—which has also played a substantial role in Haitian politics—have both sanctioned a long list of Haitians for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and material support for gangs. That list includes two former Haitian presidents, three former prime ministers, four senators, and various other top officials. No one on an international sanctions list deserves a seat at the table.

A September 2023 report to the UN Security Council found that Michel Martelly, Moïse’s predecessor and still a major player in Haitian politics, created one gang and funded and armed others while in office in order to expand his control and power. And according to a report by Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, top aides to Moïse participated in gang massacres in 2018 and 2019 in opposition neighborhoods planning protests against government corruption. Henry has also empowered leaders affiliated with gangs, including a police chief, two government ministers, and a customs official.

With politicians in their corner, gangs expanded their control in Port-au-Prince in 2023. According to a January UN report, the number of people killed by gangs more than doubled from 2022 to 2023, increasing from roughly 2,000 to almost 5,000 victims. This is not random violence, but politics by deadly means.

Gang leaders cannot be allowed to write the next chapter for Haiti.

The same bandits that have committed crimes against fellow Haitians are now angling for power in the transition. Gang leader Jimmy Chérizier, widely known as Barbecue, who is responsible for civilian massacres, has held multiple press conferences over the past several weeks to establish himself as a legitimate political revolutionary leader. Guy Philippe, freshly released from a U.S. prison for money laundering related to drug trafficking, has amassed a small group of armed forces and has gained limited political support. These criminals and their deputies cannot be allowed any role in governance.

Needless to say, it will be difficult to dislodge the gangs from the territory they control. The Haitian police force has collapsed and cannot confront gangs alone. Haiti needs immediate interim international security support to confront the gangs and help install the transitional government. This force could quickly end gang control of the airport, the roads surrounding Port-au-Prince, and key state buildings. It could buy time for the Haitian police to reconstitute. A functional police force and judicial system, with independent vetting of officers and officials with ties to corruption and gangs, will be critical to ending gang control long term. In the medium term, if gangs are no longer protected by politicians, they will lose power. If the state becomes more functional, and provides services, jobs, and community policing for poor neighborhoods, young people will have options beyond gang membership and will develop more respect for state authority. Years of impunity enabled the gangs’ crimes against humanity. At this moment, while gang members are currently committing atrocities, talking about amnesty would encourage further crimes—and would be an insult to their victims.

Some observers worry that Haitians are so desperate after years of being terrorized that they will tolerate any leader—including a gang leader—who promises to stop the violence and restore some order. This is simply not true. The danger in the streets has made it impossible for citizens to gather to demand peace and democracy. But a vigilante movement has been one clear expression of Haitians’ revulsion for gangs. Some of its methods are abhorrent: people have executed gang members and even burned them alive. Yet these are acts of retaliation for a collective sense of an abominable injustice committed with impunity. Today, across the capital, regular citizens are building barriers to prevent gang members from moving through the city and entering their neighborhoods. This is not popular support for gangs—this is popular defense against them.

NEW BLOOD

The CARICOM negotiations have so far yielded an agreement for a transition government led by a prime minister and a presidential council with seven voting members along with two observers. The voting members of the council include a democracy advocate, a private-sector representative, a representative of a long-standing political party—and leaders of assorted discredited political parties that have held power over the past dozen years and helped run Haiti into the ground. There is a danger that the appointment of this motley group has already alienated the talented, honest, and apolitical Haitians the country needs most to work for this transition government.

Given the unwieldy seven-person presidential council, the prime minister must be carefully selected, as that person will name the cabinet and execute decisions. Whoever the presidential council chooses must be an experienced professional without any criminal history or affiliation. The ideal person would be a neutral technocrat, highly skilled at building consensus and able to initiate unpopular actions.

The new government’s first priority will be security. In October, Kenya agreed to lead a multinational security force and send 1,000 police officers to Haiti to help restore law and order. The Kenyan government has said the force will not deploy until a transition government takes office. In any case, the Kenyan-led force is only a tourniquet and obviously cannot be the answer for Haiti’s long-term security. For that, the country needs a strong, well-equipped police force without ties to corrupt politicians and gang leaders. Currently, rank-and-file police officers are revolting against the chief, who they say is tied to gangs. The police force needs new leadership to function effectively and collaborate with international forces. Haiti also requires a functional judiciary that can try and prosecute gang members, as well as secure ports to stop the flow of arms.

Famine is a step away for 1.6 million of Haiti’s 11 million people.

Previous transition governments in Haiti served as effective‌ temporary course correctors. But they did not create sustainable change. To avoid yet another downward spiral, the United States must be invested in Haiti’s long-term democratic processes. That means rebuilding key state institutions, including the justice system; it may take a generation to achieve full functionality, but that must be the central goal of U.S. efforts. It also means avoiding the standard practices of relying on the U.S. Agency for International Development and big, international NGOs and instead investing in the development of locally based NGOs, professional associations, and unions.

If the United States and the CARICOM do not get this next chapter right—and stand by leaders who are credible, are legitimate, and have the bureaucratic experience to put the Haitian state back on track—the cycle of violence and dysfunction will not end.

For several years, U.S. officials said they stuck with Henry to avoid instability. Civil society leaders kept saying that Henry’s illegitimate and gang-enabling rule was the very thing promoting that instability. After years of backing corrupt and undemocratic leaders, the U.S. government has a chance to back Haitians promoting democracy and the rule of law. If it does so, the United States can help Haiti exit this hellscape at last.

PIERRE ESPÉRANCE is Executive Director of the National Human Rights Defense Network in Haiti.

Foreign Affairs · by Pierre Espérance · April 2, 2024

21. Russian Threat Perception and Nuclear Strategy in its Plans for War with China

Excerpts:

Conclusion

Russian plans for a war with China are consistent with Russia’s historical perception of a Chinese threat. While Beijing and Moscow currently enjoy a strong partnership, the Sino-Russian relationship is marked by a history of interstate rivalry and periodic wars along their shared periphery. Russia and China may enjoy this partnership well into the future, but this is not guaranteed. Areas of potential tension, including Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, could erode the current partnership and renew the rivalry between China and Russia.

Nuclear use is not guaranteed, but a Russian limited nuclear strike is possible if a renewed Sino-Russian rivalry devolved into war. Limited nuclear strikes against Chinese military forces or critical infrastructure would be consistent with Russian thought on escalation management.

Going nuclear would pose significant risks for Russia. Russian leaders could miscalculate a strike’s effectiveness or incorrectly assess the risk of a Chinese nuclear response. The decision to employ nuclear weapons would be a political one. Russian leaders would weigh the expected risks and rewards of a strike, as well as those of a non-nuclear response, and select what they perceive as the best option.

Russian Threat Perception and Nuclear Strategy in its Plans for War with China - War on the Rocks

JOHN STANKO AND SPENSER WARREN

warontherocks.com · by John Stanko · April 2, 2024

Even as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping a were forming “a new epoch in relations” between their two countries, Russia was still planning for the possibility of nuclear war against China as late as 2014. Recently leaked Russian documents reveal contingencies for such a war against China in Siberia, including potential scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons against China.

Russian planning for a nuclear war with China may seem surprising in hindsight. After all, this was just two years before the two countries increased their number of joint military exercises, as part of a larger pattern of closer defense cooperation, and eight years before Beijing and Moscow announced their friendship had “no limits.” However, such plans are perfectly consistent with Russian threat perception and nuclear doctrine. Beijing and Moscow are historical rivals, with geopolitical competition between Russian and Chinese polities dating back to the 17th century. The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China fought a border war in 1969, and Beijing later cooperated with Washington at the expense of Moscow from 1972 through the end of the Cold War. Members of the Russian foreign policy elite continued to perceive China as a potential threat into the 21st century, as these war plans indicate.

Moscow’s desire to maintain a nuclear option against China is consistent with its strategy. Russia faced a significant conventional inferiority vis-à-vis China, especially in the Russian Far East. Deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons to Russia’s Eastern Military District, where they could reach Chinese military targets but not military or political targets in the United States or Europe, gave the Russian military credible options for blunting a Chinese invasion. Launching a limited nuclear strike to quickly degrade Chinese capabilities in an effort to terminate a war on terms favorable to Russia is consistent with Russian strategic thought on escalation management, which scholars typically studyas an aspect of Russian strategy in Europe.

In this article, we discuss Russia’s perception of a Chinese threat and strategies to neutralize it. Our analysis provides insights into under-researched and under-reported elements of Russian grand strategy and foreign policy. We start with a short but detailed description of the Russia-China rivalry, including its origins in the Russian Far East and its future prospects. We then outline potential Russian responses to a hypothetical Chinese invasion, explaining why Russia would want to consider a nuclear option, discussing potential conventional strategic options that provide the Russian military with an alternative response, and then tying these considerations to broader Russian nuclear doctrine.

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The Sino-Russian Rivalry

Today, Russia and China describe their partnership as having “no limits.” However, the current partnership between Russia and China is a deviation from past relations. The two countries have engaged in competition and even fierce rivalry for centuries. This rivalry spans multiple polities and different regime types, including the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, several imperial Chinese dynasties, and today’s party-state.

Sino-Russian relations began with military conflict over tributary privileges in areas around the Amur River, culminating in battles centered on the Albazin fortress in 1685–1686 and the death of hundreds of combatants on each side. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 between Ming China and Romanov Russia marked the start of nonmilitary engagement. This relationship was based primarily on trading rights and agreements, without what we would describe today as formal diplomatic recognition. Russian envoys to China were considered tributary missions in official Ming records in accordance with the Sino-centric tributary system of international relations in place in East Asia at the time. Russia acquired large swaths of territory from China via the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) during the Century of Humiliation, when several Western imperial powers coerced China to sign predatory treaties.

A period of closer ties between China and the Soviet Union following World War II gradually eroded due to a combination of strategic, ideological, and status factors. By 1969, the Sino-Soviet split erupted into a border war along the Ussuri River between Manchuria and the Russian Far East. The Chinese eventually sided with the United States during several of the late Cold War’s significant events, including aiding American support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.

Relations between Moscow and Beijing improved after the Cold War. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov viewed China as critical to developing a balancing coalition against the United States. Mutual interest in combatting terrorism, resolving border disputes in Central Asia, and developing a multipolar world led to the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001. Like many other post-Soviet intergovernmental organizations, however, the organization did not represent a binding commitment for its members.

Despite these growing ties, the Sino-Russian relationship was not as close as it is today. Moscow’s long-held mistrust of political and security elites from the Cold War, historical claims to territory in the Far East, and competing interests in Central Asia contributed to its suspicion of Beijing. Mutual mistrust, in particular, represented a major barrier to deepening cooperation, and both sides have actively sought to prevent similar issues from derailing the current partnership.

The coalescence of a Russia-China partnership largely occurred in the 2010s. Xi and Putin’s interpersonal relationship and shared interests in regime stability contributed to the partnership following Xi becoming general secretary and Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012. In contrast to Beijing’s refusal to support Russia’s actions in Ossetia in 2008, as most of the Western world has ostracized Russia over Ukraine, China and Russia have expanded cooperation, in part because of Xi’s personal respect for Putin. Western sanctions against Russia after it annexed Crimea in 2014 drove Russia and China closer politically and economically, a phenomenon repeated after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sino-Russian military cooperation also broadened after 2014, although the partnership lacks many of the advanced military cooperation practices of the United States and its European and Asian allies.

Will the Rivalry Ever Be Renewed?

The partnership is not guaranteed to endure. Russian leaders felt the threat of a Sino-Russian split was enough to warrant war planning even as relations improved following the Cold War. Several areas produced tension in the Russian-Chinese relationship before the emergence of the current partnership. These same areas could lead to the partnership’s eventual undoing. Specifically, fears of Chinese designs on the Russian Far East, competing claims for influence in Central Asia, and increasing Chinese interest in Arctic development could unravel the friendship without limits.

Several factors could erode the currently stable equilibrium in the Russian Far East. The region contains much of Russia’s mineral wealth and provides the basis for a significant amount of Sino-Russian trade, including a major pipeline. Beyond the potential for direct Chinese irredentism stemming from the effort to regain territory lost in the 19th century, continued Chinese in-migration into the region creates a source of tension.

Concerns about Chinese investment and land ownership prompted residents of the Irkutsk Oblast to start a petition in 2018 seeking to ban the purchase of land around Lake Baikal by Chinese investors. While the official stance of the Russian government is to downplay any possibility of conflict with China in the Russian Far East, this sparsely populated region has been the location where all past Sino-Russian confrontations have taken place. Russia’s territorial proximity to China in the region and their generally approximate power and status are among the risk factors for war that international relations scholars have identified.

Farther west, Russia and China are vying for influence in Central Asia. The former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are strategically important for Moscow and Beijing. Both want access to the region’s energy reserves and mineral deposits. The region also has significant security implications. Moscow and Beijing worry that regional groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant could recruit from oppressed Muslim minorities in China and Russia.

Russia and China have avoided the most severe competition for influence over the past couple of decades, with Russia focusing on security influence and China on economic influence. However, future economic and security needs could erode this division of influence. Moreover, some have argued that Russia is a junior partner in the regional Sino-Russian relationship, creating tensions. Among the potential causes of war described in the Russian wargames were competition for natural resources, economic opportunities, and energy reserves in Central Asia.

Finally, China is increasing its investment in Arctic development and its military footprint in a region vital to Russian security. While the threat of competition in the Arctic is significantly lower than the potential for conflict in the Russian Far East and Central Asia, it still exists. Additionally, minor disagreements over the Arctic could exacerbate more serious tensions elsewhere.

Why Go Nuclear?

If relations collapsed and Russia and China found themselves on the warpath, Russia would face a conventional inferiority that is especially pronounced along the Sino-Russian land border. Russia deploys most of its military in the West, where forces can reach the front in Ukraine, react to a possible NATO intervention or invasion, and deal with the threat of separatist groups in the North Caucasus.

For the Kremlin, employing battlefield nuclear weapons offers a potential equalizer in the Far East. Russia could augment its defense by striking Chinese troops amassing in Manchuria. Russia could also strike vital transportation, communications, and energy hubs to degrade Chinese warfighting capabilities or force China to de-escalate the conflict.

China’s options to respond are limited. While China may have shorter-range weapons to strike strategic targets in the Pacific, it does not possess the low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons necessary to match a limited Russian nuclear strike. Instead, it could attempt further conventional strikes — potentially against continued Russian battlefield nuclear weapons use — or could escalate by striking Russia with its strategic nuclear forces. The latter would likely draw a strategic nuclear response from Moscow. Chinese strategic thought would suggest a strategic conventional strike as the most likely response, as Chinese doctrine historically eschews limited nuclear strikes due to a belief that escalation control is nearly impossible in nuclear conflict. However, China’s nuclear posture and arsenal have changed significantly over the past decade. Such nuclear restraint was consistent with Chinese strategy at the time of the wargames, but Chinese doctrine may be changing to one more open to limited nuclear war.

China’s limitations may make the use of battlefield nuclear weapons more likely. Russian leaders may perceive Russian escalation dominance, low-yield nuclear superiority, and conventional inferiority. The combination would incentivize limited nuclear use, as the Kremlin may see it as both effective and necessary.

Limited Strikes and Russian Nuclear Doctrine

According to a report in the Financial Times, Russian wargames planned for a potential Chinese invasion in the Russian Far East. These wargames included Chinese attacks in the Russian Far East and occasionally Chinese strikes through Kazakhstan against targets in Western Siberia and the Urals. Even during the latter scenarios, Russian military leaders seem to have expected the primary Chinese goal to be an invasion of the Russian Far East as an act of imperialist expansion to provide living space for China’s expanding population, satisfy nationalist irredentism, or create resource colonies to fuel an overheating Chinese economy. The third goal was of particular concern for Russian strategists, with some wargames focusing on an invasion after Russia refused Chinese demands for energy resources at a sharp discount.

At the onset of violence in the Russian Far East, wargame scenarios had China sending fake protesters to clash with Russian police, followed by saboteurs using the chaos to strike at critical security infrastructure. During the ensuing crackdown, China accused Russia of committing genocide against ethnic Chinese residents of the Russian Far East and increased defense production and deployments along the border in preparation for a larger invasion.

The authors of the Financial Times article noted that the Chinese tactics used in these scenarios resembled Russian tactics during its 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, concerns about Chinese expansion for living space reflect Russian experiences in World War II, when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in its quest for Lebensraum — living space for Germans taken from the Slavic and Jewish populations of Eastern Europe.

While Chinese tactics and motivations differed in various scenarios the Russian military considered, most involved some kind of quick Chinese strike into Siberia or the Far East and the threat of a larger Chinese invasion. Russia considered nuclear use to prevent this follow-on attack.

Nothing in known Russian nuclear doctrine states that Russia will use nuclear weapons when facing invasion from a conventionally superior opponent. But maintaining the option to use nuclear weapons if Russian political leaders believe it is strategically beneficial is a critical component of Russian doctrine.

Russian declaratory policy states that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russian strategic thought generally considers nuclear weapons potential tools for defeating a large invasion, such as the follow-on invasion from China that is the subject of leaked Russian plans. Writings in Russian professional military journals, where current and retired Russian officers, strategists, and security officials discuss and debate strategic issues, also discuss the possibility of using limited nuclear strikes when an adversary’s conventional forces pose a significant threat to Russian territorial integrity or the survival of the regime.

Should Russia decide to use nuclear weapons, the primary goal of a nuclear strike would be to blunt a Chinese invasion and potentially force China to end the war on terms favorable to Russia. Chinese military capabilities, including troops massing in Manchuria, naval assets, and air forces, are likely targets. Degrading these capabilities would reduce the extent of Russia’s conventional inferiority and improve the likelihood of the Russian military defeating the Chinese invasion.

Other targets could include critical Chinese infrastructure near the invasion area. Russia may use a limited nuclear strike to destroy important transportation networks, weapons storage, energy resources, communications systems, or other pieces of infrastructure needed for a successful Chinese invasion.

This use of a limited nuclear strike is consistent with Russian strategic thought on escalation management. Some experts and policymakers refer to the concept of escalation management as escalate to de-escalate, although there is significant debate in scholarly circles about the accuracy and appropriateness of the term.

Russian strategists consider a quick limited nuclear strike as a potential tool to contain escalation by degrading an enemy’s ability to increase violence and deterring vertical or horizontal escalation through the threat of further strikes. Russian leaders see such escalation management strikes as necessary for keeping conflicts at a level of violence that is too low to threaten Russian sovereignty or to terminate a war quickly on terms favorable to Russia.

Similar strategies have been noted as a potential Russian response to a war with NATO in the West. Russia has several weapons that it could choose for these missions, including Iskanders stationed near Russia’s border, nuclear-capable bombers in Siberia and the Far East, or low-yield sea-based nuclear weapons deployed with the Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Conventional precision strike capabilities provide Russia with a non-nuclear alternative for such a strike. Russian strategic thought includes strong considerations for using precision strikes against critical infrastructure to blunt an enemy invasion. Either limited nuclear use or a series of conventional precision strikes would be consistent with Russian doctrine. The ultimate decision to go nuclear or stay conventional lies with Russia’s political leadership and their beliefs, whether correct or not, about which option gives them the greatest chance of maintaining Russian territorial integrity.

Conclusion

Russian plans for a war with China are consistent with Russia’s historical perception of a Chinese threat. While Beijing and Moscow currently enjoy a strong partnership, the Sino-Russian relationship is marked by a history of interstate rivalry and periodic wars along their shared periphery. Russia and China may enjoy this partnership well into the future, but this is not guaranteed. Areas of potential tension, including Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, could erode the current partnership and renew the rivalry between China and Russia.

Nuclear use is not guaranteed, but a Russian limited nuclear strike is possible if a renewed Sino-Russian rivalry devolved into war. Limited nuclear strikes against Chinese military forces or critical infrastructure would be consistent with Russian thought on escalation management.

Going nuclear would pose significant risks for Russia. Russian leaders could miscalculate a strike’s effectiveness or incorrectly assess the risk of a Chinese nuclear response. The decision to employ nuclear weapons would be a political one. Russian leaders would weigh the expected risks and rewards of a strike, as well as those of a non-nuclear response, and select what they perceive as the best option.

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John C. Stanko is a doctoral candidate in political science at Indiana University. Thon primarily engages in foreign policy analysis of highly centralized states, with a focus on Eurasia, broadly defined.

Spenser A. Warren is a postdoctoral fellow in technology and security at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University Bloomington.

Image: Wikimedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by John Stanko · April 2, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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