Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“A paranoid is someone who knows a little of what's going on. A psychotic is a guy who's just found out what's going on.”

- William S. Burroughs

“Tyrants preserve themselves by showing fear and mistrust among the citizens, by means of spies, by distracting them with foreign wars, by eliminating men of spirit, who might lead a revolution, by humbling the people, and making them incapable of decisive action.”

- Aristotle

"Those who are able to see beyond the shadows and lies of their culture will never be understood, let alone believed by the masses."

- Plato

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

2. Analysis | Lawmakers will (literally) game out a Chinese attack on Taiwan

3. Taiwan's choice: China or the United States?

4. U.S. Defense Secretary Urges Swift NATO Membership for Sweden

5. Trudeau told NATO that Canada will never meet spending goal, Discord leak shows

6. World could face record temperatures in 2023 as El Nino returns

7. China's CCTV slams Western hype of its population decline

8. Decisive action needed at NATO’s Vilnius summit on Ukraine and the completion of Europe

9. To solve its recruiting crisis, the Army must again welcome immigrants

10. Essential reads on classified documents and the Espionage Act

11. New details emerge about Col. Chung, the suspended commander of 5th SFAB

12. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

13. Properly Arming Taiwan Key to Deterring Chinese Invasion, Pentagon Official Tells HASC

14. The Great Illusion of 2023

15. Domestic Investments Can Aid All Democracies

16. Bind Ukraine Closer to American Military Learning

17. Something Smells Fishy in Massachusetts

18. Local Partners Are Not Proxies: The Case for Rethinking Proxy War

19. 'Gobbledygook': Senators react to classified briefing on Pentagon leak

20. Ukraine could be looking at another Maidan

21. Why the Pentagon’s Response to the Discord Leaks Won’t Fix the Problem

22. U.S. Right-Wingers Keep Confusing Culture War With Actual War

23. Admiral defends non-binary officer against attacks from GOP lawmakers

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2023

Key Takeaways

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs.
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions.
Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service.
A State Duma deputy proposed a bill that would expand contract conditions for the OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 19, 2023

Apr 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 19, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Russian state-controlled outlet TASS reported on April 19 that the FSB and the Main Directorate of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) have been conducting mass checks at the Moscow Central District Internal Affairs Directorate and several Moscow district police offices for the past several weeks due to “the leakage of data from Russian security forces at the request of Ukrainian citizens.”[1] Another Russian source noted that the FSB and MVD have already detained police officers as part of this investigation.[2] Russian outlets reported that the suspected police officers leaked personal data on Russian security forces to external individuals, some of whom are Ukrainian citizens.[3] The reported FSB and MVD raids on the Moscow police departments are occurring against the backdrop of a series of arrests and dismissals of prominent members of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) leadership.[4] The Kremlin may be pushing for such arrests and investigations in order to conduct an overhaul of the domestic security apparatus to oust officials who have fallen out of Kremlin favor and consolidate further control internal security organs.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces will never preemptively announce when the counteroffensive starts and reiterated that Ukrainian forces aim to liberate all Ukrainian territory.[5] Malyar also reported that Russian forces are concentrating on offensives in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions and that Russian forces have concentrated weapons, equipment, and all professional units – including Wagner Group forces, Spetsnaz, and airborne forces (VDV) – around Bakhmut.[6] Malyar noted that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions will be both offensive and defensive in nature given the complex nature of the battlefield.

Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply. Russian forces launched 12 Shahed-131/136 drones at southern Ukraine from the Sea of Azov on the night of April 18 to 19, 10 of which Ukrainian air defense shot down.[7] Ukrainian United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces Head Nataliya Humenyuk noted on April 19 that the Shahed strike was a deliberate attempt to find and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems.[8] Russian milbloggers have recently discussed the importance of targeting Ukrainian air defense capabilities in advance of any potential Ukrainian counteroffensives, and the Shahed strikes were likely intended in part to set conditions to do so.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuri Ihnat noted that Russia has used almost all of its strategic missile stockpile since September 11, 2022, and that Ukrainian forces have shot down 750 of the total 850 missiles that Russian forces have launched at Ukrainian during this period.[10] Ihnat noted that Russian forces have switched to cheaper and shorter-range options such as guided aerial bombs and have removed Kh-50 type missiles from storage for restoration.[11] Ihnat was likely referring to Kh-55 Soviet-era air launched cruise missiles, as Russia is slated to begin production on newer Kh-50 cruise missiles in summer 2023.[12] Russia may be removing Kh-55 cruise missiles from storage to refit them for future strikes on Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs.
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions.
Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service.
A State Duma deputy proposed a bill that would expand contract conditions for the OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also attacked far north of Kreminna in the Kupyansk area near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and repelled Ukrainian forces near Kreminna.[14] Another milblogger published footage purportedly showing elements of the 76th Airborne Assault Division (VDV) operating near Kreminna.[15] The Russian Southern Group of Forces spokesperson Ivan Bigma claimed that Spetsnaz units of the Southern Military District and artillery of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps disrupted two Ukrainian troop rotations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[16] Some milbloggers amplified claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Spirne while others claimed that Ukrainian forces control Spirne and battles continue east of the settlement.[17] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that suggests that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Spirne.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that heavy fighting is ongoing within Bakhmut itself and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Stupochky (12km southwest of Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway).[18] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 34 combat clashes in Bakhmut over the past day.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian territorial defense brigade, Colonel Dmytro Zavorotnyuk, noted that Russia forces in Bakhmut are attacking in squad-sized assault groups of five to six people.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces made significant progress in urban areas in northwestern Bakhmut and have taken control of the area north of Vesela Street, including the territory of Bakhmut Hospital No. 2.[21] One milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters are storming Ukrainian positions as far west as Marshal Tolbukhina Street, which lies between western Bakhmut and eastern Khromove.[22] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) advisor Yan Gagin claimed that Russian forces control about 90% of Bakhmut.[23] ISW’s current control of terrain estimate shows that Russian assessed advances and claimed territory amount to about 87.9% of Bakhmut. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using FAB air-dropped bombs to destroy Ukrainian fortified areas in Bakhmut.[24]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the Avdiivka area towards Avdiivka itself; Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pobieda.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novobakhmutivka (12km north of Avdiivka) and near Keramik (13km northwest of Avdiivka) and made gains near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[26] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces are conducting positional battles and advancing along Druzhba Avenue in Marinka.[27] Russian sources continued to discuss operations of various DNR elements, including the 14th ”Kalmius” Brigade, ”Sparta” Battalion, and 1453rd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, on this sector of the front.[28]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Prechystivka (40km southwest of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[29] Russian milbloggers posted footage reportedly of 155th Naval Infantry Brigade elements shooting down a Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft near Vuhledar.[30] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Vuhledar area.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19 that Russian forces continue to conduct defensive actions in the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions.[32] Satellite images published on April 18 show Russian forces continuing to use a base that they constructed at the end of 2022 near Henicheska Hirka (180km southeast of Kherson City) in far southeastern Kherson Oblast in the Arabat Spit.[33] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 18 that Russian forces have built several echelons of defensive structures on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast that could repel Ukrainian forces in the upcoming counteroffensive.[34]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast on April 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian probing actions in the Zaporizhia direction.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that on April 18 Ukrainian forces attacked near Orikhiv and toward Rabotyne but did not specify the outcome of these attacks.[36]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[37]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on April 19 that Russian officials may send electronic summonses in a test mode during the ongoing conscription cycle but that Russian officials should duplicate them in existing formats, and clarified that electronic subpoenas will have no legal effect during the spring 2023 conscription cycle.[38] Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on April 14 on the creation of a digital register of Russian citizens eligible for military service that permits the sending of electronic conscription summonses.[39] The State Duma adopted a law on April 19 on mandatory fingerprinting of volunteers, likely in part to support efforts to create the digital registry.[40] A Russian source reported that medical facilities in Moscow are collecting extensive health information about men aged 18 to 64 because they are required to provide health information about potential recruits to enlistment offices under the digital registry law.[41] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin passed the legislation in order to utilize tools of digital authoritarianism to improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and to crack down on Russian draft dodgers.[42]

The Wagner Group continues to reportedly force mobilized personnel into service with Wagner. Independent Russian outlet Astra reported on April 19 that six mobilized personnel from the Republic of Sakha complained that Russian officials forcibly assigned the personnel to the Wagner Group and sent them to Bakhmut.[43] ISW previously assessed that the Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine.[44] Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the reports about the mobilized personnel from Sakha Republic on April 19 and stated that there has not been one case of forced miliary service in Wagner and that Wagner does not recruit active military personnel.[45]

A State Duma deputy proposed a bill on April 18 that would expand contract conditions for OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists.[46] Duma Information Policy Committee Chairman Alexander Khinshtein proposed a bill on April 18 allowing Russians to sign a contract with Rosgvardia OMON and SOBR units for up to a year ”to perform special tasks or tasks in special conditions” and removing existing age thresholds for admission to these units.[47] The bill would also assign Rosgvardia departments control over the mobilization of reservists and assign reservists to Rosgvardia units, subdivisions, and bodies in advance. [48] The bill would allow wounded Rosgvardia servicemen to continue serving.[49] The bill likely aims to set conditions for a rapid expansion of Rosgvardia, particularly its internal security elements, in the event of a wider domestic crackdown in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Rosgvardia also notably includes elements responsible for Russia’s domestic regime security.

Russian occupation officials continue measures to conduct conscription despite previous claims that the spring 2023 conscription cycle will not occur in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin signed a decree on April 19 creating a draft commission for conscription in 2023, although the decree stipulates that Russian officials will not conscript residents in Donetsk Oblast during the spring conscription cycle.[50] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[51] Russian occupation measures to conduct conscription contradict Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov’s March 30 claim that the current conscription cycle will not occur in occupied Ukraine.[52] Russian occupation officials may be setting conditions for the fall 2023 conscription cycle or may be creating conscription apparatuses to augment their ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) amid assessments that Russia is increasingly reliant on old stocks of equipment and weapons to continue the war in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited a military industrial enterprise in Kaluga Oblast that produces electronic warfare equipment on April 19 and met with the company’s management and other military officials to discuss increasing the production of such equipment.[53] The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report on April 14 assessing that Russia has enough stocks of older weapons and equipment to continue waging the war in Ukraine.[54] CSIS reported that Russian forces have lost 1,845 to 3,511 tanks in Ukraine but that it has 5,000 tanks in reserve.[55] CSIS assessed that Russian import substitution efforts have been unsuccessful causing Russian forces to use increasingly degraded weapons and equipment on the battlefield in Ukraine.[56] ISW has previously assessed that widespread equipment losses are constraining the Russian military’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare in Ukraine.[57]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system. The Russian State Duma adopted a draft law in the first reading on April 19 that would create a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on April 19 that he suggested that the Duma consider a single fixed tax for tax agreements with long-term investors during its second reading of the bills in an effort to promote stable growth and opportunities in occupied territories.[58]

Russian forces continue to seize civilian infrastructure and private property in occupied territories for military purposes. Kherson Obast occupation administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 19 that last week he had ordered occupation authorities to seize civilian boats and transfer them to Russian forces in occupied Kherson Oblast.[59] Saldo stated that Russian forces have since taken 30 private vessels from the port city of Henichesk and that owners can report their property as seized for compensation or the eventual return of their boats.[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19 that occupation authorities received an order to deploy a 40-bed military hospital in Kabychivka, Kherson Oblast, and that an unspecified number of Russian doctors are expected to arrive to the hospital by the end of week.[61]

Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities prevented a Ukrainian partisan attack in Crimea on April 19. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 19 that personnel of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained an individual on allegations that he planned to use an improvised explosive device (IED) to attack an energy infrastructure facility in Kerch, Crimea.[62] The milbloggers claimed that FSB officers found evidence that the individual, who holds both Russian and Ukrainian citizenship, had been communicating with the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU).[63]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to integrate occupied territories into the Russian administrative system. Russian President Vladimir Putin included DNR head Denis Pushilin Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik in the Russian Development of Local Self-Government Presidential Council on April 19.[64] Pushilin emphasized the importance of developing local governance as DNR officials are actively forming multiple municipalities.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue to conduct exercises in Belarus. An unspecified Belarusian tank battalion of Belarus’ Northwestern Operational Command participated in the ongoing Belarusian command staff exercises at a training ground near Borisov on April 19.[66]

The Belarusian military continues to exercise most services of its armed forces. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on April 19 that unspecified Belarusian air defense elements will conduct a tactical exercise including deploying to an unspecified area to defend airspace from April 19 – 22.[67]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17559435

[2] https://t.me/bazabazon/17012

[3] https://t.me/bazabazon/17012; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17559435; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/19/04/2023/643fd8b59a794730b513e320; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-prishla-s-proverkoy-v-moskovskuyu-politsiyu-ee-svyazyvayut-so-slivom-lichnyh-dannyh-rossiyskih-silovikov-grazhdanam-ukrainy

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040523; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032923

[5] https://suspilne dot media/449784-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-patriot-vid-nimeccini-polsa-rozblokue-tranzit-ukrainskogo-zerna-420-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681904121&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[6] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/rosiyany-vdayutsya-do-syrijskoyi-taktyky-ganna-malyar/

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[8] https://suspilne dot media/449784-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-patriot-vid-nimeccini-polsa-rozblokue-tranzit-ukrainskogo-zerna-420-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681897440&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[9] https://t.me/milchronicles/1792

[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/nashi-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-blyzko-750-krylatyh-raket-z-ponad-850-yaki-vorog-zastosuvav-proty-ukrayiny-yurij-ignat/

[11] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/nashi-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-blyzko-750-krylatyh-raket-z-ponad-850-yaki-vorog-zastosuvav-proty-ukrayiny-yurij-ignat/

[12] https://en.defence-ua dot com/industries/russia_is_about_to_start_the_kh_50_missile_production_but_what_news_do_they_have_with_another_kh_65_missile_project-6420.html; https://svidomi.in dot ua/en/page/russia-plans-to-start-mass-production-of-kh-50-cruise-missiles-in-june-general-staff#:~:text=%22The%20Kh%2D50%20is%20a,up%20to%20950%20km%2Fh.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[14] https://t.me/voenacher/43150; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83394; https:/...

[15] https://t.me/kommunist/16994

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/25779

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/18334; https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.m...

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[19] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/uprodovzh-doby-vorog-zdijsnyv-539-obstriliv-pozyczij-nashyh-vijsk-na-donechchyni-sergij-cherevatyj/

[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/u-bahmuti-vorog-atakuye-malymy-grupamy-ta-vstupaye-v-kontaktni-strileczki-boyi-polkovnyk-dmytro-zavorotnyuk/

[21] https://t.me/rybar/45977; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57809; https://t...

[22] https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[23] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36369

[24] https://t.me/milchronicles/1791

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[27] https://t.me/rybar/45977; https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/25779; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83336; https:...

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83344; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83349; http... https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46900

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.me/rybar/45977

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzY...

[33] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1648393522574131200

[34] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/683

[35] https://t.me/vrogov/8824; https://t.me/vrogov/8821

[36] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18337; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20445

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa... https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1648444226882129920?s=20; https://t...

[38] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/04/19/72233075/h; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/v-gosdume-zayavili-chto-v-vesenniy-prizyv-elektronnye-povestki-budut-rassylat-v-testovom-rezhime-oni-yakoby-ne-budut-imet-yuridicheskoy-sily ; https://t.me/severrealii/16158 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57146 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11258

[39] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11106; https://t.me/severrealii/16091; h... ru/Document/View/0001202304140051?index=55&rangeSize=1; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/14/putin-podpisal-zakon-ob-elektronnyh-povestkah-i-ogranicheniyah-dlya-uklonistov

[40] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17560961

[41] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11271

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041123

[43] https://t.me/astrapress/25190

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041623

[45] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/793; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/794

[46] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17553369 ; https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[47] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[48] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[49] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[50] https://tass dot ru/politika/17557755

[51] https://lug-info dot com/documents/ukaz-glavy-lnr-o-merah-po-obespecheniyu-prizyva-grazhdan-1996-2005-godov-rozhdeniya-na-voennuyu-sluzhbu-v-luganskoj-narodnoj-respublike-v-2023-godu; https://www.sovsekretno dot ru/news/v-lnr-proydyet-vesenniy-prizyv-vopreki-zayavleniyam-glavy-komiteta-gosdumy-po-oborone/; https://t.me/astrapress/24984; https://lnr-news dot ru/society/2023/04/14/167535.html; https://xn--80aafc4bdoy dot xn--p1ai/documents/bank/Ukaz_Glavi_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_%22Ob_utverzhdenii_Pravil_raspredeleniya_tarifnoi_kvoti_na_vivoz_s_territorii_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_za_predeli_territorii_Rossiiskoi_Federatsii_v_gosudarstva,_ne_yavlyayushchiesya_chlenami_Yevraziiskogo_ekonomicheskogo_soyuza,_pshenitsi_i_meslina_(kodi_1001_19_000_0,_______________________________________________________1001_99_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_yachmenya_(kod_1003_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_kukuruzi_(kod_1005_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_soevikh_bobov_(kod_1201_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_semyan_rapsa_______________________________________________________(kod_1205_10_900_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_dekabrya_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_semyan_podsolnechnika_(kod_1206_00_990_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_masla_podsolnechnogo_(kodi_1512_11_910_1,_1512_11_910_9,_1512_19_900_2,________________1512_19_900_9,_1517_90_910_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_podsolnechnogo_shrota_____________________________________________(kod_2306_30_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_avgusta_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_pomeshchaemikh_pod_tamozhennuyu_protseduru_eksporta%22?id=1242

[52] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/kartapolov-prizyvnikov-ne-napravyat-sluzhit-v-novye-subekty-rf?ysclid=lfuu925mnd764589320; https://t.me/astrapress/24984

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/25785

[54] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russi...

[55] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russi...

[56] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russi...

[57] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223

[58] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3355

[59] https://t.me/astrapress/25155; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/683

[60] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/686

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMa...

[62] https://t.me/readovkanews/57134 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57135 ; ... io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-otchitalas-o-zaderzhanii-grazhdanina-rossii-i-ukrany-podozrevaemogo-v-podgotovke-diversii-na-ob-ekte-energetiki-v-anneksirovannom-krymu; https://t.me/rybar/45990

[63] https://t.me/readovkanews/57134 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57135 ; ... io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-otchitalas-o-zaderzhanii-grazhdanina-rossii-i-ukrany-podozrevaemogo-v-podgotovke-diversii-na-ob-ekte-energetiki-v-anneksirovannom-krymu; https://t.me/rybar/45990

[64] https://t.me/basurin_e/879; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3354; http://pu... pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202304190001?index=0&rangeSize=1

[65] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3354

[66] https://t.me/modmilby/26014

[67] https://t.me/modmilby/25983

Analysis | Lawmakers will (literally) game out a Chinese attack on Taiwan

The Washington Post · by Olivier Knox · April 19, 2023

Welcome to The Daily 202! Tell your friends to sign up here. On this day in 1912, the Associated Press informs me, a special subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee opened hearings in New York into the sinking of the Titanic.

The big idea

Lawmakers will (literally) game out a Chinese attack on Taiwan

“Show, don’t tell.” This evening, the House Select Committee on China adapts that old journalism adage to their mission, holding a war game anchored on a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2027 and simulating an American military, diplomatic and economic response.

Most of the committee’s Republicans and Democrats are expected to gather at 7 p.m. eastern in the cavernous and perpetually freezing House Ways and Means Committee Room for a TTX (“tabletop exercise”) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The think tank has run these before.

Under the watchful eye of “game-master” Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the CNAS defense program, the lawmakers will play advisers to the president, a.k.a. the Blue Team.
Becca Wasser, who leads the CNAS gaming lab, and CNAS fellow Andrew Metrick will play Beijing, a.k.a. the Red Team.
The game will unfold in fictional three-day increments and is likely to have a real-world running time of between two and two and a half hours — far shorter than Pentagon war games that can run over several days.

Why would you do this?

Basically, to tease out shortcomings in American policymaking.

“Table-tops aren’t just for military planners — they can be used to game out trade policy, cyber defense and many other issues in Congress’ remit,” the panel’s chairman, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) said in a statement provided to The Daily 202. “As the military saying goes, ‘the enemy gets a vote.’ How do our policies do after they make contact with our competitor’s strategies?”

Wasser told The Daily 202 the TTX “is to help members look at different potential strategies in a potential future conflict over Taiwan and be able to test these out in a safe-to-fail setting” that may help them identify items that need “additional attention and potential advocacy.”

After a similar war game on the sidelines of the Republican issues conference in mid-March, Gallagher highlighted the need to ramp up munitions and weapons production and accelerate deliveries of arms to help Taiwan deter — or defend against — an attack by Beijing on democratically self-governed island.

A source close to the committee told The Daily 202 the war game was partly timed with the beginning of “NDAA season” — the National Defense Authorization Act, generally seen as must-pass legislation that lays out congressional national security priorities.

The scenario

The game is set in 2027. A political crisis flares up as China thinks Taiwan is edging closer to formally declaring independence.

Beijing, which sees Taiwan as part of its territory and has warned it may use military means to bring it under control, demands immediate unification negotiations. Taiwan refuses. The mainland steps up a pressure campaign.

But ultimately Chinese leader Xi Jinping decides to go to war.

In the game, the president has asked senior advisers for military options to defend Taiwan, Wasser said. Asked whether the scenario envisions an actual war, she replied: The president wants to use “all elements of American power,” and “all of it is going to be used.”

(The fact of the war game was first reported by Politico’s Nat Sec Daily.)

The context

After nearly two years of increasing tensions, President Biden and Xi seemed to take a step back when they met face-to-face in November. They agreed to keep talking. Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken each planned to visit China.

Then came the Chinese spy balloon flying over the United States, apparently peering at military installations. Blinken scotched his trip. It has yet to be rescheduled. The White House has been saying Biden wants to get Xi on the phone. The Chinese have shown they’re in no rush to make that happen.

Congress has been turning up the temperature. Over angry Chinese objections, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R) met with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in his home state of California. (House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had met with Tsai in Taiwan in August 2022.)

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul just wrapped up a visit to Taiwan, where he compared Xi to Adolf Hitler and told Taiwan America “will protect you” in case of Chinese attack. (Biden has said on four occasions the United States will defend Taiwan militarily, so the tradition of “strategic ambiguity” in which Washington doesn’t spell out exactly what it would do was already looking pretty threadbare.)

The way forward

On Monday, Bloomberg reported Taiwan will purchase up to 400 land-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles. It had previously acquired the ship-borne variety.

Bloomberg quoted Chinese Foreign Minister spokesman Wang Wenbin as warning the sale would “undermine China’s sovereignty and security interests” and saying the United States must “stop seeking to change the ‘status quo’” in the Taiwan Strait.

For now, hostility to China appears to be one of the few bipartisan rallying points in domestic U.S. politics. You can bet Beijing is gaming out the potential consequences.

3. Taiwan's choice: China or the United States?

Excerpts:

With the recent trips by Tsai and Ma helping to strengthen the confidence of DPP and KMT's political base, some experts say independent voters may become the decisive factor in the 2024 presidential election, and they are the group of people that both parties will try to win over.

"Independent voters are not really aligned with either the KMT or the DPP, and they are the group of people that the two parties will be fighting for narratively," said Lev Nachman, a political scientist at the National Chengchi University in Taipei.. "Both parties will accuse the other for bringing potential catastrophe to Taiwan and both are going to claim that they are the ones defending Taiwan's best interests."

And as the war in Ukraine continues, Chen from Soochow University told DW that the KMT and DPP will continue to amplify their competing narratives of "Taiwan should avoid upsetting major powers in the world" versus "Taiwan should keep strengthening defense because autocrats are irrational."

"The two mainstream arguments will continue, but it's hard to determine which narrative will have the upper hand right now," he said.

Taiwan's choice: China or the United States? – DW – 04/19/2023

William Yang in Taipei

23 hours ago

Following overseas trips by the current and former Taiwanese presidents, political parties are gearing up for Taiwan's 2024 election, with the slogan "war or peace" dominating the conversation.

Following two high-profile overseas trips by President Tsai Ing-wen and former leader Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's major political parties are gradually gearing up for the 2024 presidential election.

Branding his trip to mainland China as an attempt to restore peace across the Taiwan Strait, Ma — who is from the main opposition party Kuomintang (KMT) — said tension with China had escalated under Tsai's administration and Taiwan would have to choose between "peace and war."

On the other hand, Tsai — who recently met US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy — told journalists that leaders of Taiwan's two Central American allies, Guatemala and Belize, had reaffirmed their diplomatic ties with the democratic island.

She also pointed out that lawmakers from both parties in the United States also expressed solidarity with Taiwan.

Potential presidential candidates offer competing narratives

Some Taiwanese experts say the choice of destinations for Ma and Tsai's overseas trips represents the two different paths for Taiwan in international politics and the contrast reflects the competition between democracy and autocracy.

"Through the visits, the KMT and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can consolidate their political bases," said Fang-Yu Chen, a political scientist at Taiwan's Soochow University, adding that whether independent voters will buy into the narratives presented by each party remains to be seen.

Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen and her predecesor have both made recent high-profile overseas tripsImage: Kyodo/MAXPPP/dpa/picture alliance

Apart from Tsai and Ma's high-profile trips to China and the US, potential presidential candidates from each party have also been setting the tone for their own presidential campaigns.

'Democracy and authoritarianism' not 'peace and war'

William Lai, Taiwan's current Vice President, was formally named DPP's presidential candidate on April 12. During his first speech after accepting the nomination, Lai argued that the 2024 presidential election is a choice between "democracy and authoritarianism" rather than "peace and war."

"Former President Ma walked back into the framework of the 'One China' principle, whereas President Tsai is on the democratic path," he said.

"These will be the two completely different choices the country will face after 2024, so the 2024 election will decide Taiwan's direction — on the continuation of a democratic system, the next generation's happiness, as well as peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific," Lai added.

Chinese war games

Earlier in April, Terry Gou, the founder of Taiwanese tech giant Foxconn, announced his bid for the KMT presidential nomination.

During a press conference, Gou said Taiwan should avoid taking sides in the competition between China and the US.

He warned young voters about the potential danger of voting for the DPP because the party had "called for Taiwan independence and advocated hating and resisting China."

"Peace cannot be taken for granted. It requires the people to make the right decision," Gou said.

And after China launched another large-scale military exercise around Taiwan following Tsai's meeting with McCarthy, Chen believes the KMT will try to frame itself as the only party that can help achieve peace across the Taiwan Strait.

"Since China now sets some prerequisites for which Taiwanese politicians or political parties can interact with them, the KMT will keep doubling down on the claim that they are the only political party that can maintain exchanges with Beijing," Chen said.

"However, Tsai's trip has rekindled Taiwanese people's concerns about the confrontation between democracy and autocracy and offered them a reason to fall in line with the DPP. This may help the DPP to get a head start in the preparation for the 2024 presidential election," Chen concluded.

Why is Ma's visit to China stirring controversy at home?

Taiwanese people worry about cross-Strait peace and security

While some experts suggest the DPP's narrative of choosing between "democracy and autocracy" may resonate with more Taiwanese voters, some Taiwanese people told DW that they think the most important issue for them in the upcoming presidential election is peace across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's own security.

A survey examining Taiwanese people's view on the former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last August shows that a majority of Taiwanese respondents believe Pelosi's trip was detrimental to the island's security, and the surveys also suggest a considerable number of Taiwanese voters are concerned about entrapment by the US.

"A majority of KMT supporters and independents believed that Pelosi's visit had made Taiwan less secure, while a majority of DPP supporters felt the opposite was true," according to the authors of the survey, which was released by the American think-tank Brookings Institute on April 5.

Ma (center) helped complete a banner with a message of peace Image: Ma Ying-jeou Foundation

Competing narratives

With the recent trips by Tsai and Ma helping to strengthen the confidence of DPP and KMT's political base, some experts say independent voters may become the decisive factor in the 2024 presidential election, and they are the group of people that both parties will try to win over.

"Independent voters are not really aligned with either the KMT or the DPP, and they are the group of people that the two parties will be fighting for narratively," said Lev Nachman, a political scientist at the National Chengchi University in Taipei.. "Both parties will accuse the other for bringing potential catastrophe to Taiwan and both are going to claim that they are the ones defending Taiwan's best interests."

And as the war in Ukraine continues, Chen from Soochow University told DW that the KMT and DPP will continue to amplify their competing narratives of "Taiwan should avoid upsetting major powers in the world" versus "Taiwan should keep strengthening defense because autocrats are irrational."

"The two mainstream arguments will continue, but it's hard to determine which narrative will have the upper hand right now," he said.

US-Taiwanese talks violate 'One China' principle: Mao Ning, Chinese Foreign Ministry

Edited by: Keith Walker

4. U.S. Defense Secretary Urges Swift NATO Membership for Sweden

Excerpts:

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has objected to its membership, questioning Sweden’s commitment to fighting terrorism. Mr. Erdogan has called for Sweden to extradite figures he describes as terrorists, including Kurds and others he believes supported a 2016 coup attempt against him.

Hungary has its own grievances. Its government has been stung by Swedish criticism about the erosion of the rule of law under Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban. Mr. Orban is also an ally of Mr. Putin’s, and his country is dependent on Russia for energy.

On Wednesday, Mr. Austin urged the quick admission of Sweden into NATO. He said it was important that Turkey — considered the key to a resolution — decide to allow Sweden to join the alliance “sooner versus later.”

There was no immediate public response from Turkey or Hungary to Mr. Austin’s comments.

U.S. Defense Secretary Urges Swift NATO Membership for Sweden

The New York Times · by Helene Cooper · April 19, 2023

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, visiting Sweden, said he hoped that objections to adding the country to the alliance would be ironed out by midsummer, when member states meet in Lithuania.

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Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, at Musko Naval Base on Wednesday.Credit...Fredrik Sandberg/TT News Agency, via Reuters

April 19, 2023, 7:00 p.m. ET

MUSKO NAVAL BASE, Sweden — With Finland now officially in the fold of NATO, the Biden administration turned its attention on Wednesday to neighboring Sweden, another long-neutral nation that now wants to join the military alliance.

During the first visit to Sweden by an American defense secretary in 23 years, Lloyd J. Austin III promised to work for Stockholm’s “swift accession” to NATO and said he hoped that objections to the country’s NATO membership would be ironed out by midsummer, when members of the alliance meet in Lithuania.

“We’ll work hard to get that done before the summit,” Mr. Austin said.

Like Finland, Sweden decided to abandon its neutrality after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Before it can join the alliance, however, it must first win over two holdouts, Turkey and Hungary, since all NATO members have to agree to a nation’s inclusion.

Mr. Austin’s visit came as military officials in Washington announced that the United States was sending another weapons package to Ukraine to shore up its munitions and logistical supplies in advance of an expected counteroffensive.

The $325 million package includes ammunition for HIMARS rocket systems, artillery rounds, anti-armor weapon systems and antitank mines. Two weeks ago, the Biden administration announced a $2.6 billion package that included munitions for Ukraine’s air-defense systems.

The remains of thousands of artillery shells, missiles and rockets that have hit Kharkiv, Ukraine in an industrial field this week.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

Ukraine’s allies were also working on Wednesday to keep its supplies of grain, disrupted by the war, moving out to the world.

The State of the War

Dueling Trip: President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine visited the eastern town of Avdiivka and President Vladimir Putin of Russia traveled to occupied areas of Ukraine near the front line, as both leaders sought to display strength and rally their troops.
A Common Front: The foreign ministers of the Group of 7 nations closed a three-day meeting in Japan with a forceful statement of unity against new assertiveness by both Russia and China.
Evan Gershkovich: The Wall Street Journal reporter, who was arrested in Russia on suspicion of espionage, declared his innocence at a hearing in Moscow, in his first public appearance since his detention. The judge denied Gershkovich’s appeal to lift his pretrial detention.
Western Technology Imports: Banned technology goods are winding up in Russian missiles, raising questions about the efficacy of Western sanctions adopted in 2022.

The European Commission, the European Union’s executive arm, proposed a financial assistance package of 100 million euros, or about $110 million, for farmers affected by a glut of Ukrainian grain. The goal was to quell growing tensions after four eastern E.U. nations moved to block Ukrainian grain entirely in recent days.

Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission’s president, acknowledged that the shipments of Ukrainian grain had “unintended consequences” but said any economic pressure “should not erode our unwavering support for Ukraine.”

Russian officials have tried to cast their unprovoked attack on their neighbor as at heart a defense war, with President Vladimir V. Putin protesting NATO’s eastward expansion over the years. But the invasion, it appears, has boomeranged for the Kremlin, resulting in a NATO that, with the addition of Finland, is not only larger, but also closer.

Sweden’s application has proved more complicated.

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has objected to its membership, questioning Sweden’s commitment to fighting terrorism. Mr. Erdogan has called for Sweden to extradite figures he describes as terrorists, including Kurds and others he believes supported a 2016 coup attempt against him.

Hungary has its own grievances. Its government has been stung by Swedish criticism about the erosion of the rule of law under Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban. Mr. Orban is also an ally of Mr. Putin’s, and his country is dependent on Russia for energy.

On Wednesday, Mr. Austin urged the quick admission of Sweden into NATO. He said it was important that Turkey — considered the key to a resolution — decide to allow Sweden to join the alliance “sooner versus later.”

There was no immediate public response from Turkey or Hungary to Mr. Austin’s comments.

With its accession to NATO, Finland now falls under the protection of the alliance’s Article 5, which states that an attack on one member country is an attack on all. NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has said that he would expect the alliance to also defend Sweden — but that is far from certain.

Meeting with Mr. Austin, the Swedish defense minister, Pal Jonson, alluded to that uncertainty, though he noted that over the past year, American Marines have been in and out of Sweden, participating in military exercises. The United States has also sent a number of warships, including the enormous U.S.S. Kearsarge, which was moored in the middle of Stockholm’s harbor last summer as a potent symbol of U.S. support.

“You have, during this transition time into NATO, also provided the very important naval assets and aerial assets in a continuing basis, which has reassured us,” Mr. Jonson said.

After a visit to Musko Naval Base, near Stockholm, Mr. Austin boarded a warship, the H.M.S. Harnosand, for a tour of the Swedish archipelago, which consists of tens of thousands of mostly uninhabited islands in the Baltic Sea. The islands are important militarily, officials say, because should Sweden join the alliance, the Baltic Sea would be encircled by NATO countries, save for the Russian areas around Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.

Swedish Black Hawk helicopters during a military demonstration by the islands of the Swedish archipelago on Wednesday.Credit...Lolita Baldor/Associated Press

The Swedish military put on a show of power for the visiting defense secretary, with fighter jets buzzing Mr. Austin’s ship and helicopters roaring as marines launched amphibious assaults on an island nearby as gunfire echoed. A few minutes later, a submarine emerged from the water and warships circled the ship carrying Mr. Austin.

In Ukraine on Wednesday, President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the northwestern region of Volyn, which abuts Belarus, an ally of Moscow’s. Russian forces used Belarus as a staging ground for their initial assault on Ukraine last year, and since then Belarus has served as a launchpad for Russian aerial attacks.

Mr. Zelensky offered words of praise for the border security service.

“Keep the power, justice and fury we have in defending our state,” he said in comments published on the Telegram messaging app.

Matthew Mpoke Bigg contributed reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine.

The New York Times · by Helene Cooper · April 19, 2023

5. Trudeau told NATO that Canada will never meet spending goal, Discord leak shows

These leaks have revealed many different types of information.

Excerpt:

The document, which has not been previously reported on, says “enduring” defense shortfalls led the Canadian Armed Forces to assess in February that it “could not conduct a major operation while simultaneously maintaining its NATO battle group leadership [in Latvia] and aid to Ukraine” — and that the situation was not “likely” to change without a shift in public opinion.

Trudeau told NATO that Canada will never meet spending goal, Discord leak shows

Updated April 19, 2023 at 5:39 p.m. EDT|Published April 19, 2023 at 1:06 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Amanda Coletta · April 19, 2023

TORONTO — Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has told NATO officials privately that Canada will never meet the military alliance’s defense spending target, according to a leaked secret Pentagon assessment obtained by The Washington Post. The document’s anonymous authors say Canada’s “widespread” military deficiencies are harming ties with security partners and allies.

The document, which has not been previously reported on, says “enduring” defense shortfalls led the Canadian Armed Forces to assess in February that it “could not conduct a major operation while simultaneously maintaining its NATO battle group leadership [in Latvia] and aid to Ukraine” — and that the situation was not “likely” to change without a shift in public opinion.

The United States and Canada, neighbors and close NATO allies, share responsibility for defending the continent as partners in the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD. Washington has long pressed Ottawa to boost its spending on defense and hasten plans to upgrade military capabilities and infrastructure in the Arctic, where officials in both countries warn that Russia and China are being more assertive.

The Discord Leaks

Dozens of highly classified documents have been leaked online, revealing sensitive information intended for senior military and intelligence leaders. In an exclusive investigation, The Post also reviewed scores of additional secret documents, most of which have not been made public.

Who leaked the documents? Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested Thursday in the investigation into leaks of hundreds of pages of classified military intelligence. The Post reported that the individual who leaked the information shared documents with a small circle of online friends on the Discord chat platform.

What do the leaked documents reveal about Ukraine? The documents reveal profound concerns about the war’s trajectory and Kyiv’s capacity to wage a successful offensive against Russian forces. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment among the leaked documents, “Negotiations to end the conflict are unlikely during 2023.”

What else do they show? The files include summaries of human intelligence on high-level conversations between world leaders, as well as information about advanced satellite technology the United States uses to spy. They also include intelligence on both allies and adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, as well as Britain, Canada, South Korea and Israel.

What happens now? The leak has far-reaching implications for the United States and its allies. In addition to the Justice Department investigation, officials in several countries said they were assessing the damage from the leaks.

1/5

End of carousel

But the document, part of a trove of classified material leaked to the Discord messaging app, allegedly by a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, offers new insight into dissatisfaction and concern in the United States and beyond about Canadian defense policy and priorities.

“Widespread defense shortfalls hinder Canadian capabilities,” the document says, “while straining partner relationships and alliance contributions.”

The assessment, which bears the seal of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, says Germany is concerned about whether the Canadian Armed Forces can continue to aid Ukraine while meeting its NATO pledges. Turkey is “disappointed” by the Canadian military’s “refusal” to support the transport of humanitarian aid after February’s deadly earthquake, the document says, and Haiti is “frustrated” by Ottawa’s reluctance to lead a multinational security mission to that crisis-racked nation.

Since February 2022, Canada has provided Ukraine more than $1 billion of military aid, including armored vehicles, ammunition, a surface-to-air missile system that it sourced from the United States and eight German-made Leopard II tanks that it transferred to Poland for delivery to Ukraine. The Canadian Armed Forces has trained more than 36,000 Ukrainian military and security personnel since 2015 and leads a NATO battle group in Latvia.

But some NATO members are “concerned” that Canada has not increased the number of personnel deployed to Latvia, the document states, despite a pledge last year to do so. NORAD finds that the Canadian Armed Forces lacks “significant Arctic capabilities, and modernization plans have not materialized despite multiple public statements.”

A Pentagon spokesman declined to address the contents of the assessment. He told The Post that the “bond” between the two countries “remains close.”

“Canada is much more than an exemplary neighbor; it is a reliable friend and a steadfast ally,” said the spokesman, who commented on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter. “For more than a century, the United States and Canada have stood shoulder to shoulder protecting our homelands, building a secure and prosperous North America, upholding democracy and defending freedom around the world. We will continue to stand together in support of those values.”

The U.S. Northern Command did not respond to a request for comment.

Kerry Buck, a former Canadian ambassador to NATO, said Canada has long relied on the United States to be its security umbrella. She said Canadian diplomats and defense officials “are fully aware” of the impact that shortfalls have “on Canada’s international reputation and our reputation with our U.S. partners.”

“Whether that translates into government-wide action is a different question with a different answer,” Buck told The Post. “There has been underinvestment in defense and broader security for quite a while now in Canada, from my perspective, and through successive governments.”

The document contains markings indicating that at least some of the intelligence it contains was drawn from human sources and is not to be shared with foreign nationals. The date on which it was written is obscured, but the document includes references to events in February. Trudeau and President Biden discussed defense spending and NORAD modernization when they met in Ottawa March.

The assessment echoes long-standing criticisms and observations about Canada’s commitment to defense. In an open letter released Monday, the Canada-based Conference of Defense Associations Institute called on Ottawa to “radically accelerate the timelines for procurement and redress the poor state of our nation’s current defense capacity, capabilities and state of readiness.”

“Years of restraint, cost cutting, downsizing and deferred investment have meant that Canada’s defense capabilities have atrophied,” said 60 signatories, who included several former Canadian defense ministers, military commanders, and security and intelligence officials.

According to NATO, Canada spends an estimated 1.29 percent of its economic output on defense — well short of the 2 percent guideline that members agreed in 2014 they would aim to meet. In the midst of the war in Ukraine, which has mobilized Western allies, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said recently that a growing number of countries view the benchmark “as the floor, not the ceiling.”

Trudeau, in public, has been noncommittal when asked when Canada will meet the target. Privately, the document says, he has “told NATO officials that Canada will never reach 2% defense spending.” It notes that the military budget has been below 1.4 percent of gross domestic product for 26 years.

Trudeau has been prime minister for nearly eight of those years. Asked this week about the letter from the Conference of Defense Associations Institute, he blamed some military procurement issues on his predecessor. “Canada will continue to do its share,” he told reporters in Ottawa. But he added that “governments are challenged with a whole bunch of different priorities that we have to invest in and get the balance right on.”

Trudeau’s office referred requests for comment to the Ministry of Defense. A spokesman for Defense Minister Anita Anand told The Post that Canada’s “commitment to Euro-Atlantic and global security is ironclad — and we continue to make landmark investments to equip our Armed Forces.”

Spokesman Daniel Minden called the $19 billion purchase of 88 F-35 fighter jets in January the largest investment in the Royal Canadian Air Force in 30 years. Canada is spending $38.6 billion to “modernize its NORAD capabilities,” he said, and is “working diligently to surge the Canadian-led NATO battle group in Latvia to brigade level.”

Canada’s defense policy calls for defense spending to increase by more than 70 percent from 2017 to 2026, he said. But even if the country fulfills that aim, it will still fall short of the 2 percent baseline.

Gen. Wayne Eyre, Canada’s chief of the defense staff — the equivalent of the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff — has acknowledged problems in recruitment, retention and readiness. The government last year announced a review of defense policy. Critics say it must be sped up.

In October, Eyre ordered a halt to nonessential activities so commanders could focus on personnel shortages. One factor fueling the shortages, officials acknowledged, is a string of sexual misconduct allegations against top leaders. A government-commissioned report said the crisis “has caused as much damage as defeat in combat would have to demoralize the troops and shock Canadians.”

The document lists problems with what it categorizes as readiness, personnel, “political apathy” and procurement.

It says that nearly all of Canada’s 78 Leopard II tanks “require extensive maintenance and lack spare parts.” In one unit, only nine of 40 are fully or partially operational. The assessment says the military lacks half the pilots it requires and calls procurement decisions “politically motivated, constrained by limited staffing and not properly codified in budget items.”

Canadian military leaders, it says, “perceive that politicians do not care about supporting them and that senior politicians publicly misrepresent defense spending for political gain.”

The assessment notes Canada’s response to an unidentified aerial object that violated Canadian airspace in February.

Canadian and American fighter jets were scrambled, and an American F-22 fighter jet shot the object down in Canada’s Yukon territory on Feb. 11. At the time, Anand said that the process was “sound” and that the shoot-down was “NORAD doing what it supposed to do.”

But the document says the response of the Canadian CF-18 fighter jets “was delayed by 1 hour, necessitating U.S. assistance” — an example of a readiness issue.

Eyre told a parliamentary committee last month that the jets were “somewhat delayed” by freezing rain. He did not specify the length of the delay.

“Let me say up front that the shoot-down occurred in exactly the way we practice, exactly the way we train,” he told Canadian lawmakers. He said his communications with the commander of NORAD and other military and political leaders were “almost textbook.”

“That being said, there are some lessons that we are garnering from this,” Eyre said.

The Washington Post · by Amanda Coletta · April 19, 2023

6. World could face record temperatures in 2023 as El Nino returns

World could face record temperatures in 2023 as El Nino returns

Reuters · by Kate Abnett

BRUSSELS, April 20 (Reuters) - The world could breach a new average temperature record in 2023 or 2024, fuelled by climate change and the anticipated return of the El Nino weather phenomenon, climate scientists say.

Climate models suggest that after three years of the La Nina weather pattern in the Pacific Ocean, which generally lowers global temperatures slightly, the world will experience a return to El Nino, the warmer counterpart, later this year.

During El Nino, winds blowing west along the equator slow down, and warm water is pushed east, creating warmer surface ocean temperatures.

"El Nino is normally associated with record breaking temperatures at the global level. Whether this will happen in 2023 or 2024 is yet known, but it is, I think, more likely than not," said Carlo Buontempo, director of the EU's Copernicus Climate Change Service.

Climate models suggest a return to El Nino conditions in the late boreal summer, and the possibility of a strong El Nino developing towards the end of the year, Buontempo said.

The world's hottest year on record so far was 2016, coinciding with a strong El Nino - although climate change has fuelled extreme temperatures even in years without the phenomenon.

The last eight years were the world's eight hottest on record - reflecting the longer-term warming trend driven by greenhouse gas emissions.

Friederike Otto, senior lecturer at Imperial College London's Grantham Institute, said El Nino-fuelled temperatures could worsen the climate change impacts countries are already experiencing - including severe heatwaves, drought and wildfires.

"If El Niño does develop, there is a good chance 2023 will be even hotter than 2016 – considering the world has continued to warm as humans continue to burn fossil fuels," Otto said.

EU Copernicus scientists published a report on Thursday assessing the climate extremes the world experienced last year, its fifth-warmest year on record.

Europe experienced its hottest summer on record in 2022, while climate change-fuelled extreme rain caused disastrous flooding in Pakistan, and in February, Antarctic sea ice levels hit a record low.

The world's average global temperature is now 1.2C higher than in pre-industrial times, Copernicus said.

Despite most of the world's major emitters pledging to eventually slash their net emissions to zero, global CO2 emissions last year continued to rise.

Reporting by Kate Abnett, editing by Deepa Babington

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Kate Abnett

7. China's CCTV slams Western hype of its population decline

I saw this interesting graphic on social media.

China's CCTV slams Western hype of its population decline

Reuters · by Farah Master

HONG KONG, April 20 (Reuters) - Western media reports on China's population being overtaken by India deliberately ignores China's development, using the topic to "bad mouth" it and advocate decoupling, state broadcaster CCTV said on Thursday.

CCTV's sharply worded commentary said the subtext from Western media in recent years was that China's development was in "big trouble" and that when China's demographic dividend disappears, it would decline, and the global economy would also suffer.

"They slandered all the way and China has developed all the way, creating a miracle of sustainable and stable economic development with a huge population."

India is overtaking China as the world's most populous nation, and will have almost 3 million more people than its neighbour by the middle of this year, data released on Wednesday by the United Nations showed.

"The United States is stepping up efforts to contain China's development and advocate further decoupling and found new hype points from the United Nations report," CCTV said, adding that the West simply equated population size with development achievements.

"Such hype lacks a basic understanding of the law of population development. With the development of human society today, the decrease in birth rate and decline in willingness to bear children are common problems faced by the whole world," CCTV said, adding that Western developed countries generally faced problems such as labour shortages.

Last year, China's population fell for the first time in six decades, a historic turn expected to usher in a long period of decline in citizen numbers, with profound implications for its economy and the world.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said population dividends did not only depend on quantity but also on quality.

"Population is important but talents are also important...China has taken active measures to respond to population aging," Wang told reporters on Wednesday.

In Beijing's Guomao business district, Liu, a 40-year old working in finance, said it was an "inevitable phenomenon" that India's population has exceeded China but that his country's economic strength would dominate.

"Our economic strength will still exceed," he said adding that India's population growth "does not have any major impact on us. It doesn’t affect us much."

Reporting by Farah Master

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Farah Master

Thomson Reuters

Farah Master is a Senior Correspondent at Reuters where she focuses on health, demographics and the environment in China. She has worked for Reuters in London, Beijing and Shanghai before moving to Hong Kong in 2013. With a background spanning reporting in markets, companies, sports, political and general news, and economics, she was also part of a team named as a Pulitzer finalist in 2020 for investigative reports on the revolt of Hong Kong. Farah speaks English, Mandarin and Spanish. She has a Masters in Development Studies from the London School of Economics. Contact: +85296318262

Reuters · by Farah Master

8. Decisive action needed at NATO’s Vilnius summit on Ukraine and the completion of Europe

https://mailchi.mp/2222248c1526/ukrainian-courage-and-american-resolve-9215121?e=216e79c6ab

This July NATO’s summit will be held in Vilnius and there are emerging any number of articles and more addressing what might and/or should take place.

Two members of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN), Ian Brzezinski and Alexander Vershbow recently published a “Memo to NATO Leaders” as part of the Atlantic Council’s “Memo to …” series.

Their Memo is excellent and hopefully will be persuasive. It is time NATO embrace the country fighting for its own freedom and for the protection of the rest of the transatlantic community.

TO: NATO heads of state and government

From: Ian Brzezinski and Alexander Vershbow

Subject: Decisive action needed at NATO’s Vilnius summit on Ukraine and the completion of Europe

What do world leaders need to know? The Atlantic Council’s new “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: NATO’s upcoming Vilnius summit has to produce more than an articulation of transatlantic solidarity against Russian aggression and a rhetorical expression of support for Ukraine. Allied leaders must leverage the opportunity to drive forward a NATO defense and deterrence posture that substantially and materially reinforces European security and peace, underscores NATO’s resolve to support Ukraine, and begins the process of completing a Europe whole and free where Ukraine is fully integrated within the transatlantic community, including as a member of NATO.

Background: The high stakes of this summit center on Ukraine but extend far beyond it and the current war

The central issue at the NATO summit in Vilnius,Lithuania this July will be the Alliance’s response to the threat posed by Russia’s brutal and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its second, potentially decisive year.

In his public statements and in the draft treaties Russia presented to the United States and NATO before the invasion,Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear that his imperial ambitions go well beyond Ukraine. Today he remains convinced that time is still on his side despite the Russian military’s mediocre performance, and that the West willsoon tire of its support for Kyiv.

The United States and its allies need to take an unequivocal stand in Ukraine, where the courageous Ukrainian people are on the front lines fighting for their own freedom but also defending the values and security interests of the transatlantic community. If the United States and its allies don’t do enough to ensure that Ukraine prevails against Russia this year, they could face the need for direct and much costlier intervention in the future.

Much is at stake in the outcome of this nearly decade-long war that Russia launched against a democratic European state, first in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea and portions of eastern Ukraine, and which Putin escalated with his attempt to seize the entirety of Ukraine in February 2022:

Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence: The country’s status as a democratic, pluralistic, and diverse society is on the line. Moreover, Putin aspires not just to acquire territory but also to create a new version of the Russian Empire and avenge the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He seeks to erase by force the history and identity of the Ukrainian people and deny their very existence as a nation. To this end, Russia is committing atrocities on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II.
The international order’s endurance: If Putin is allowed to maintain control over Ukrainian territory, it will significantly weaken the rules and norms of the post-World War II order that have long served as the basis for international peace and prosperity. The world will once again be dominated by spheres of influence, military coercion, and the philosophy of might makes right. Other ex-Soviet states and even NATO members could be the next targets of Putin’s aggression, and other autocrats, including Chinese leader Xi Jinping, could be emboldened to follow the Russian example.

Nuclear coercion’s effectiveness: If Russian aggression is allowed to stand, it will be the result in part of Putin’s use of nuclear coercion to limit the scale and nature of international military support to Ukraine, including assistance from the United States and its NATO allies. If this precedent is set, it could encourage the Kremlin and other adversaries armed with nuclear weapons to engage in similar coercion elsewhere, and it will motivate other countries to introduce nuclear weapons into their military arsenals as well.

Russia’s evolution as a democracy and international actor: Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former US national security advisor (and Ian’s father), used to observe that Russia cannot be a democracy if it continues to be an empire. If Putin’s aggression is not fully reversed, Russia’s own prospects of evolving into a more constructive international actor will be severely diminished.

NATO’s credibility: What NATO does and does not do in support of Ukraine will shape the confidence that its member states have in the Alliance and the respect it garners among its adversaries. Thanks in large part to strong US leadership, NATO allies are united in opposing Russia’s war of aggression at a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War era.But allied support could erode if the war devolves into a protracted and costly stalemate.

Recommendations for actions to take in Vilnius

Russia’s aggression is not simply an attack on Ukraine. It is an attack on NATO’s core interests, one necessitating a more vigorous response by the Alliance to strengthen the security of all Europe’s democracies. That response must include the following steps:

Fortify NATO’s defenses along its eastern flank: Deterring Russian aggression requires more robust implementation of the Alliance’s pledge at its 2022 Madrid summit to “defend every inch” of NATO territory. In Madrid, allies decided to increase NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence deployments from battalion- to brigade-level formations, but only brigade-level headquarters are actually being deployed to front-line countries. Instead, full brigade units should be deployed to those countries along with essential intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; air and missile defense; long-range fires; and other necessary enabling capabilities so that there are sufficient forces in place to respond to any form of Russian aggression or land grab. Allies should deploy lead elements of these additional forces by the time of the Vilnius summit and set the goal of full deployment by year end. In confronting an aggressive Russia, allies should no longer be bound by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act’s constraints on permanent stationing of substantial combat forces or tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of countries that joined NATO after the Cold War.

Fully endorse Ukraine’s war aims: Ukraine and Ukraine alone must define its objectives in this Russian-launched war. In Vilnius, allies should signal their complete commitment to supporting Ukraine in its effort to achieve its definition of victory in this conflict. According to the terms set by Ukraine’s president and embraced by its parliament and citizens, that means the expulsion of all Russian forces from occupied parts of the country and the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders of 1991, including Crimea. This is the only outcome that would deny Russia the fruits of aggression and fully uphold the principles of the rules-based order. Any ambiguity regarding these goals on the part of allies before negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have even begun would undercut Ukraine and strengthen Putin’s confidence in ultimately realizing his maximalist ambitions.

Significantly expand economic sanctions on Russia: The transatlantic community must lead an effort to substantially increase the economic costs that the international community is imposing on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.The International Monetary Fund’s projection that the Russian economy will actually grow in 2023 is a prominent indicator of the inadequacy of the current sanctions regime. A more painful sanctions strategy will, as always, involve some economic blowback on allies’ economies. But a failure to fully exercise the West’s economic leverage risks prolonging this conflict by fueling Putin’s war machine and communicating a lack of determination that sustains Putin’s confidence. Increased US and EU sanctions should include additional actions to cut Russian revenue from its exports; intensified restrictions on exports to Russia, particularly of high tech; and broader sanctions on Russian enterprises, including those engaged in sanctions evasion.

Launch a NATO initiative to increase member state production of defense capabilities necessary to achieve victory in modern conventional war: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that NATO defense stocks and production capacity are not sufficient for possible contingencies involving major powers, including the requirement for prolonged weapons supply to Ukraine. At the Vilnius summit, allied leaders should approve a two- to three-year timeline for expanding production capacity for weapons systems and ammunition critical to NATO’s defense needs, to include providing Ukraine what it requires to prevail against Putin’s invasion and deter Russia from invading a third time.

Expand and institutionalize NATO’s military support to Ukraine: Allies have succeeded in helping Ukraine recover more than half of the territory Russia captured since its full-scale invasion while avoiding the war becoming a direct conflict between NATO and Russia. But this has come at the cost of allies appearing deterred by Russian nuclear threats from providing Ukraine everything it needs to prevail. At the Vilnius summit, NATO should:

Announce a new package of military assistance in support of Ukraine’s planned 2023 counteroffensive, which will likely be underway at the time of the summit. The package should lift allies’ self-imposed limits on offensive weapons and provide longer-range systems such as ATACMS that enable Ukraine to deny Russian forces a sanctuary for launching attacks on Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure. If the Russians can no longer strike with impunity from occupied Crimea or across the Russian border, they are less likely to escalate and more likely to get serious about negotiations. The package should encompass expanded training for Ukrainian forces in NATO countries, including training pilots on advanced Western fighter jets, and the deployment of NATO trainers at uncontested locations in western Ukraine.

Move beyond the ambiguous formula regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership enunciated at the 2008 Bucharest summit, which has proved destabilizing in Europe. InVilnius NATO leaders should assert clearly that, as former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has stated, Moscow’s aggression means that European security requires a Ukraine anchored to NATO. This means membership and interim steps toward that goal. Such steps could include:

Establish a new NATO-Ukraine Deterrence and Defense Partnership (DDP). Building on Ukraine’s status as a member of the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership program, the DDP would be aimed at building up Ukraine’s long-term capacity to defend itself and deter any future Russian aggression. Allies’ commitment to arm, train, and equip Ukrainian forces—backed, if possible, by NATO common funding—would serve as a post-war security guarantee for Ukraine until allies are ready to admit Ukraine as a full-fledged NATO member.
The partnership should be offered as an alternative to a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), but like a MAP its objective would be to facilitate Ukraine’s preparation for eventual membership in the Alliance. Such a program would open the door to direct accession by Ukraine as was offered to Finland and Sweden.
Ukraine should be invited now to participate in meetings of the North Atlantic Council in the same way that Sweden and Finland were pending their full accession; that would be a powerful signal of Alliance commitment.
Make permanent the 54-nation Ukraine Defense Contact Group as the vehicle for coordinating short-term military assistance to Ukraine while the war continues and for building Ukraine’s long-term deterrence posture under the DDP. The Contact Group could be reinforced by a steering group of the most active supporters of Ukraine committed to securing state-of-the-art technology for Kyiv.
With the United States in the lead, begin discussions among NATO allies on offering Ukraine an Article 5-like collective defense guarantee for all territory that it controls at the time hostilities with Russia end. This could be implemented initially by a coalition of the willing (for example. the United States, the United Kingdom,France, Germany, and Poland), but preferably by all allies since they would be sharing the same risks.

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9. To solve its recruiting crisis, the Army must again welcome immigrants

Immigration is a national security issue and immigrants are key to America's future.

We need sound policy and plans for recruiting immigrants and not another terrible program like MAVNI.

To solve its recruiting crisis, the Army must again welcome immigrants

Stars and Stripes · by Matt Sardo · April 18, 2023

The Army was 15,000 soldiers short of its 60,000 recruitment goal in 2022, a number the service raised to 65,000 this year. (Lara Poirrier/U.S. Army)

The U.S. Army has a recruiting problem. The Army only added 40% of the soldiers it needed in 2022 and the secretary of the Army made new enlistments her number one priority for 2023. Her sense of urgency is embodied in the resurrection of the “Be All You Can Be” campaign, which feels like a Hail Mary after years of lucrative marketing contracts.

The brand simply does not appeal to young Americans. Army leaders attribute their shortfalls to American obesity and declining aptitude and to the most challenging labor market since the Army became all-volunteer in 1973. This personnel crisis is poorly timed as expected troop cuts in Europe were reversed and the U.S. attempts to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

If the recruiting shortfall continues, the Army will eventually do what it has always done to fill its ranks. It will rely on immigrants.

In the buildup to World War II, for instance, Congress exempted non-citizen soldiers from most naturalization requirements, to include proof of lawful entry. And both Congress and the executive branch have a more recent record of naturalizing immigrants in return for military service. Over 150,000 non-citizens were naturalized after they volunteered to fight in the post-9/11 wars.

During these recent wars, the Army embraced an innovative program that recruited foreign doctors and those with critical language skills, as the Army had an unmet demand for these skill sets. The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, known as MAVNI, selected skilled non-citizen soldiers eager to fight for the American dream, including those without legal permanent residence.

In addition to filling critical jobs like a rifleman or driver, the cultural competencies of immigrants enhance the tactical Army and save American lives. I saw this firsthand while deployed on a counterterrorism mission in Africa.

A Nigerian-born American soldier opened doors for my Special Forces detachment in the Nigerian military’s hierarchy. Those doors were otherwise closed to me or any other white American officer. Our success was a result of having that soldier on our team. The Army can have that type of instant rapport anywhere in the world by enlisting non-citizen soldiers.

The Army has always been strengthened by immigrants. Immigrant volunteers are smart, fit and eager to fight, unlike so many of their contemporary American counterparts.

Despite all of this, divisive immigration politics have led the Pentagon to shoot itself in the foot by making the military unwelcoming to the immigrants it has long relied on, and now needs.

Previously, Pentagon polices were in place to protect its volunteers from draconian immigration laws with the shield of citizenship. For instance, prior to 2017 non-citizens who enlisted in the Army were greeted by a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services field office at Basic Training to process naturalization applications. But USCIS was abruptly removed from Basic Training in 2017 when the Pentagon caved to the Trump administration’s hard line on immigration. As a result, non-citizen soldiers often leave Basic Training without the citizenship their recruiters likely promised.

Moreover, the Department of Defense rescinded the MAVNI program, added a 180-day requirement before a soldier could apply for naturalization, and screened out soldiers with arbitrary justifications.

Even getting the simple certification of service required for expedited military naturalization has been deliberately obstructed. Now, a colonel’s signature is required. This is a needless rule. Certifying service is a straightforward matter that any unit administrative clerk can accomplish. Such seemingly innocuous clerical requirements have real consequences — in the wake of this policy, there was a whopping 78% drop in military naturalizations from 2017 to 2018.

To add insult to injury, soldiers who miss out on citizenship during their service, including those who served in combat, are too often deported. If there’s a greater disincentive to enlisting than the risk of being deported from the country you’ve risked your life for, I can’t think of one.

Instead of these bureaucratic barriers, the Army needs to support its immigrant soldiers in obtaining citizenship every step of the way.

And there are simple steps the Army can take now. It should start by bringing Basic Training naturalizations back, as the Navy has recently done. The Army should also request that USCIS accept an administrative certification of military service in lieu of the often unattainable brigade commander’s signature. Critically, the Army should advocate for the reinstitution of the MAVNI program, so that it can welcome all the qualified people it needs. Finally, the Army should protect its veterans from the tragic irony of deportation.

To be all it can be, the Army needs to fully open its doors to the immigrants eager to serve and deliver on its promise of citizenship. It’s not only the right thing to do — for the Army, it’s a matter of self-preservation.

Matt Sardo is a student in Berkeley Law’s Veterans Law Practicum at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also an Army ROTC instructor at the university and a board director for the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He served as an infantryman and a Green Beret before law school. He deployed to Afghanistan with the 10th Mountain Division and Northwest Africa with 3rd Special Forces Group. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army Reserve, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

Stars and Stripes · by Matt Sardo · April 18, 2023

10. Essential reads on classified documents and the Espionage Act

Highlights:

1. What are classified documents?

2. Violations of the Espionage Act

3. How to fight future leaking

Essential reads on classified documents and the Espionage Act

militarytimes.com · by Howard Manly, The Conversation · April 19, 2023

Editor’s note: This commentary was first published in The Conversation.

The stunning arrest of 21-year-old Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira on charges of illegally sharing U.S. intelligence has once again renewed questions on the handling of classified documents.

Since the discovery a decade ago of top-secret documents leaked by Edward Snowden, questions on the vulnerability of the nation’s most sensitive intelligence were only intensified after a variety of classified papers were found earlier this year in the possession of former U.S. President Donald Trump at his home at Mar-a-Lago in Florida.

Teixeira is accused of the “alleged unauthorized removal, retention and transmission of classified national defense information.” He has not entered a plea as yet to the charges involving the leaking of U.S. intelligence, including documents on Russian efforts in Ukraine and spying on U.S. allies.

The charges carry a maximum penalty of up to 15 years in prison.

Over the years, The Conversation U.S. has published numerous stories exploring the nature of classified documents – and how different motivations play a part in an individual’s decision to mishandle the nation’s secrets. Here are selections from those articles.

1. What are classified documents?

Before coming to academia, Jeffrey Fields worked for many years as an analyst at both the State Department and the Department of Defense.

In general, Fields writes, classified information is “the kind of material that the U.S. government or an agency deems sensitive enough to national security that access to it must be controlled and restricted.”

Of the three levels of classification, a “confidential” designation is the lowest and contains information whose release could damage U.S. national security, Fields explains.

The next level is “secret” and refers to information whose disclosure could cause “serious” damage to U.S. national security.

The most serious designation is “top secret” and means disclosure of the document could cause “exceptionally grave” damage to national security.

2. Violations of the Espionage Act

On April 14, 2023, U.S. prosecutors charged Teixeira in connection with violations of the Espionage Act.

Joseph Ferguson and Thomas A. Durkin are both attorneys who specialize in and teach national security law. They explain the Espionage Act.

Typically, violations of the act apply to the unauthorized gathering, possessing or transmitting of certain sensitive government information and fall under 18 U.S.C. section 793.

Ferguson and Durkin also urge patience before rendering judgment on any case involving violations of the Espionage Act, in part because of the classified nature of the potential evidence and the risk that further exposure would have on U.S. national security.

“The Espionage Act is serious and politically loaded business,” they write. “These cases are controversial and complicated in ways that counsel patience and caution before reaching conclusions.”

3. How to fight future leaking

Cassandra Burke Robertson is a scholar of legal ethics who has studied ethical decision-making in the political sphere.

She points out that criminal prosecutions alone may not be the only way to prevent the flow of classified information.

It all depends on an individual’s motivation.

But unlike Snowden, Reality Leigh Winner or Chelsea Manning, Teixeira does not appear to have wanted to right a perceived wrong or become what is known as a whistleblower.

In cases where the motive is unclear, Robertson suggests that a potential deterrent is establishing a workplace environment that encourages employees to bring potential ethical and legal violations to an internal authority for review.

Known as internal whistleblowing, such actions may prove effective in not only protecting classified information from reaching the public but also prevent another national security embarrassment.

11. New details emerge about Col. Chung, the suspended commander of 5th SFAB

Buried lede: this was his second brigade level command.

Did he go through the Army's new command selection/screening

New details emerge about Col. Chung, the suspended commander of 5th SFAB

Army Col. Jonathan Chung is described as a blunt and aggressive leader.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED APR 19, 2023 4:56 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 19, 2023

Army Col. Jonathan Chung is both loved and loathed by soldiers who served under him. Some of his former subordinates accuse Chung of being an abrasive leader, while other soldiers describe him as exactly the type of officer the Army needs: unafraid to hold others accountable, even at the risk of his career.

Now the Army must decide whether Chung’s leadership style is corrosive or motivating.

Chung was suspended as commander of the 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade earlier this month pending an administrative investigation. So far, Army Forces Command, or FORSCOM, has not publicly released the reason why Chung was suspended or the reason for the investigation.

“The status of the administrative investigation is ongoing,” FORSCOM spokesman Paul Boyce told Task & Purpose. “We cannot provide further details about ongoing administrative investigation.”

Military.com first reported on Tuesday that Chung sent an email to his colleagues explaining that he is facing allegations of being a counterproductive and toxic leader and that he has not been accused of committing any criminal, immoral, or unethical actions.

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Chung plans to respond to allegations of leadership issues that were brought up by an investigation that resulted in his temporary suspension as commander of the 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade, said his attorney, Jeremy Snyder.

“Col. Chung has fully cooperated in the investigation, and we will do everything we can to help him share his side of the story and to respond to the investigation in due time,” Snyder told Task & Purpose on Wednesday. “We believe in the importance of a fair and unbiased process. Everyone is entitled to due process, and we ask that any reporting on this matter be fair and accurate.”

Col. Jonathan Chung, commander of 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, speaks with governor of a fictional state during a Key Leader Engagement at National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California on September 2, 2019. (U.S. Army photo)

Task & Purpose spoke with several people who have worked for Chung, some of whom on condition of anonymity to protect them from possible retaliation. What emerged was a complicated portrait of an officer who sets high standards for his subordinates, which some feel are unnecessarily harsh.

One soldier said he would require people to remain at work long after their tasks were finished, and he also ran “best squad competitions” every Thursday – soldiers who did not perform well enough had to redo the competitions on Fridays.

“I spent four years in the Marines and have been in the Army for just over four years and overall he was the worst commander I have ever encountered,” the soldier said.

Another soldier said that when a unit was filming a public affairs video showing soldiers in full battle rattle, Chung made two soldiers return to the Central Issue Facility to get new gear because they had been issued tactical vests in an older camouflage pattern.

“Col Chung told them their gear wasn’t ‘high speed enough.’” the soldier recalled.

Tevin, an Army veteran who asked to only be identified by his first name, recalled how Chung required subordinates to listen to his podcast and then fill out a worksheet afterward answering questions about how the podcast helped them to become better soldiers and improve their leadership skills.

“My takeaway was that this guy liked to hear himself talk and enjoyed finding opportunities for soldiers to hear his voice,” Tevin told Task & Purpose.

However, another soldier who served under Chung said that the unit produced the podcast during the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic to have a conversation with soldiers. Although soldiers on staff duty for 24 hours had to listen to the podcast and answer questions afterward, some of those questions were meant to improve the podcast itself, including “What do you want us to do better” and “Who else would you like to see on the podcast,” the soldier said.

The soldier also said he saw Chung hold subordinates to high standards, but he never witnessed Chung belittling anyone.

There is no shortage of people who are speaking up in defense of Chung’s leadership style and character since he was suspended as commander of 5th SFAB. An Army officer, who submitted a letter of support for Chung that was obtained by Task & Purpose, wrote how Chung held accountable a lieutenant colonel who was sending her inappropriate messages and pictures, adding that marked “the first time I felt I could trust a leader.”

U.S. Amy soldier Col. Jonathan Chung, outgoing commander of 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, smiles and greets guests with his family after the change of command ceremony on North Fort Lewis, June 4, 2021. (U.S. Army photo)

Throughout his Army career, Chung has energetically tackled the most difficult problems facing the Army, including suicide, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, said retired Army Command Sergeant Maj. Mike Burke.

Chung’s efforts have included using public affairs officers and social media to share stories about soldiers who are making a difference, finding new ways to protect soldiers who report sexual assault and harassment, and empowering noncommissioned officers, said Burke, who served with Chung when he was a company commander for the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment as well as other assignments.

“He is trying new things – some of them work, some of them don’t,” Burke told Task & Purpose. “He’s getting feedback from his subordinates. He’s getting feedback from other peers and superiors and everybody else to try to solve some of these hardest things. And there’s not many leaders that are doing that in the Army.”

Burke also said that the allegations of “counterproductive leadership” against Chung are ridiculous.

“There’s no one who uses that word and talks about Jon Chung,” Burke said. “He’s got 24 years of service to back that up.”

Maj. William Shinego said that Chung pushed his subordinates but also trusted them when he led the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, or “Lancer Brigade.” Chung made serving in the brigade feel like soldiers were part of an elite unit, and Chung taught Shinego valuable command lessons that he has used throughout his Army career.

“I’d follow Jon Chung through the gates of hell,” Shinego said.

Col. Jonathan Chung, commander of 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, speaks with the Provincial Chief of Police and Department of State officials of a fictional country they’re deployed to during a Key Leader Engagement at National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Sgt. Nicole Branch/U.S. Army)

Many of Chung’s subordinates disliked him because he is a tough leader, but the high standards he set forced his soldiers – especially his officers – to show significant improvement in their leadership skills, said a soldier who had Chung as a battalion commander when he served with the 10th Mountain Division

As a result of Chung’s relentless efforts, the officers in that battalion became the best with whom this soldier has served during his 11-year Army career.

“While working for him I thought that his expectations were ridiculous, however looking back I can see that it was to better everyone under his command and it showed,” the soldier said. “We were the best unit at Fort Drum, and it was obvious when working with other battalions. Years later I still use the skills and knowledge I gained from working with him in my current unit and it has made me a better leader and soldier. Looking back and knowing what I know now, Col. Chung was the best battalion commander I’ve had and it’s not even close.”

Former Army Capt. Jason Eaves, who served with Chung in Afghanistan as part of the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, describes Chung as one of the top leaders he’s ever encountered, who was focused on taking care of his Rangers and making sure that enlisted soldiers and officers who were not performing as well as they should be showed improvement while under his command.

“Although sometimes intense, not only were you glad he is on our side, it gave you the feeling that you and the entire team are the best and are going to persevere and win, no matter what the situation is or becomes,” Eaves told Task & Purpose.

During that deployment to Afghanistan, Chung showed that he is a Type-A, inspiring, aggressive, and indefatigable leader who refused to tolerate mediocrity, Eaves said.

Maj. Gen. Scott Jackson, Commanding General, Security Force Assistance Command, hands the unit colors to Col. Jonathan Chung (left) during the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade Assumption of Command Ceremony, June 30, 2021 at Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington.

Eaves recalled how Chung told him the first time the two met that the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment is a wolf pack that will eat you up and leave you in the dust if you are weak or do not do your part.

“I will never forget that, and it set the tone for my time in [the Ranger] regiment and even carries on into today in the private sector,” Eaves said.

Chung is the “quintessential combat leader” who would never ask his subordinates to do something that he was unwilling to do himself, said retired Master Sgt. Jariko Denman, who served under Chung in the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

While Chung’s leadership style can inspire subordinates to rise to meet his expectations, it can also come across as meanness to others, Denman told Task & Purpose.

“As a leader, he is also plain talking,” Denman said. “He is rough around the edges. He speaks harshly. He’s like Patton: He gives it to you ugly, so you remember it. But that’s not to say he cannot articulate himself. He’s just a very matter of fact, here’s the deal, blunt leader.”

In Denman’s experience, Chung has never crossed the line from being a tough to an abusive leader.

“Col. Chung has always had a moral compass that is stronger than his professional compass,” Denman said. “So, dressing down a junior officer: Is it rough? Is it probably something that – oh, that could get you in trouble? Yes. Did he ever step over any line? Did he ever do anything that was outside of regulations? No. But, he could make enemies.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

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Taiwanese Air Force pilot’s ‘Winnie the Pooh patch’ causes international controversy

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 19, 2023

12. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

April 19, 2023 |×

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced critical new security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance with more ammunition for U.S.-provided HIMARS, artillery rounds, and anti-armor capabilities essential to strengthening Ukraine’s defenders on the battlefield valued at up to $325 million.

The Presidential Drawdown is the thirty-sixth such drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine that the Biden Administration has authorized since August 2021. The capabilities in this package include:

Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
AT-4 anti-armor weapon systems;
Anti-tank mines;
Demolition munitions for obstacle clearing;
Over 9 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
Four logistics support vehicles;
Precision aerial munitions;
Testing and diagnostic equipment to support vehicle maintenance and repair;
Port and harbor security equipment;
Spare parts and other field equipment.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements.

Publication: Ukraine Fact Sheet – April 19

Biden president ukraine response

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13. Properly Arming Taiwan Key to Deterring Chinese Invasion, Pentagon Official Tells HASC

Properly Arming Taiwan Key to Deterring Chinese Invasion, Pentagon Official Tells HASC - USNI News

news.usni.org · by John Grady · April 20, 2023

Taiwan’s indigenous fighter. CNA Photo

America wants to stop China “dead in its tracks” from a Taiwan invasion by ensuring Taipei has the right weapons and command and control systems, a senior defense official testified this week before the House Armed Service Committee.

Jedidah Royal, the Pentagon’s principal deputy assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, repeated several times during the Tuesday hearing that Washington’s policy toward Taipei remains unchanged after 40 years under the Taiwan Relations Act. The policy includes providing necessary weapons to defend the self-governing island from attack. On Monday, Bloomberg reported the U.S. will sell 400 Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Taipei, a sale Congress approved in 2020.

U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Adm. John Aquilino told the panel the goal remains “to convince [Chinese President Xi Jinping] it’s a bad choice” to try to take Taiwan by force.

“We need to deter today, tomorrow,” he said.

“I think we’re doing that.”

He declined to set a possible timeline on a Chinese military move, noting only that Xi said he wanted his armed forces to be prepared for any action by 2027.

“I think everybody’s guessing” on a date, but the threat is rising, Aquilino said.

The admiral pointed to the command’s robust theater posture with 60 percent of the American Navy committed to the Indo-Pacific and U.S. air and ground forces also persistently stationed forward as demonstrating Washington’s commitment. On the technological side, he added the United States maintains an edge over China.

The U.S. military in the region “exceeds anything China can deliver.” Aquilino said he wants the Pentagon to go faster in fielding hypersonic weapons.

Aquilino said the emerging AUKUS agreement that will eventually see Canberra deploy its own nuclear-powered submarine and exchange technological information was “a really large step forward” in deterrence.

He dismissed Beijing’s claims of the U.S. starting a nuclear arms race in the region with the signing of the agreement or Australia losing its sovereignty over its armed forces by entering the pact.

“Since August, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has normalized warship patrols around Taiwan and increased the number of military flights crossing into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone. They have in effect erased the unofficial Taiwan Strait centerline, a mutually observed boundary designed to avoid unintended friction, to pressurize the people on the island,” Aquilino said in his written testimony.

China also has test-fired missiles over Taiwan since former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in summer 2022.

Aquilino said “we challenge excessive claims” in conducting strait transits in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere. He added allies, partners and friends, like Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh, support these actions to maintain a free and open Pacific for international maritime commerce.

In all these activities, the United States is stressing “competition, not containment” of China, he said.

Aquilino would not say when the Indo-Pacific Command was going to conduct an operational exercise with the Taiwanese in an open meeting. He said current table-top exercises give participants “a broad view” of vulnerabilities and strengths.

For several years, Marines and special forces have been training the Taiwanese in insurgency tactics in case of an invasion.

Aquilino said in both oral and written testimony he didn’t believe conflict with China “was imminent and inevitable.”

As to whether U.S. allies and partners needed the administration to spell out more clearly the “what ifs” if Beijing launched an invasion, “we need to listen to them.” Listening is crucial since the United States would need host nation approval to operate against China if Taiwan were invaded. Aquilino pointed out allies and partners have seen the dangers of an increasingly aggressive China across the Indo-Pacific.

As an example, Royal and Aquilino cited the tighter security relationship that has developed with the Philippines in the last year. Both also mentioned the greatly expanded Balikatan 23 exercise with Australia also participating and Japan observing.

Royal said allies and partners, like India, are more actively participating in more and larger exercises with the United States. They are looking for increased interoperability and strengthening regional security arrangements and posture and providing a network of support.

“That [network} is the clarifying element” when it comes to Washington’s policy toward Taiwan, said Royal.

news.usni.org · by John Grady · April 20, 2023

14. The Great Illusion of 2023

A more sophisticated discussion than the "McDonald's theory" - e.g., no two countries that have McDonald's have ever fought a war. (NOT)

Norman Angell's legacy lives on. And of course it is so logical that the theory should hold but alas economic interdependence is trumped by fear, honor, and interest, and Clausewitz' passion, reason, and chance.

Excerpts:

... Mahan agreed with Angell that great powers “are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war,” but he noted that wars are fought for causes and reasons other than economics, including “ambition, self-respect, resentment of injustice, sympathy with the oppressed, hatred of oppression.” Globalization and economic interdependence do not eliminate these causes of war or others, such as the Thucydidean trilogy of fear, interest, and honor.

The Great Illusion of 2023 - The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · April 17, 2023

The Great Illusion of 2023

Has traditionally sober-minded Singapore gone a bit soft on China?

April 16, 2023, 10:48 PM

Then–Vice President Joe Biden meets with MP Lee Kuan Yew, in his private office at the Istana in Singapore, July 26, 2013 (Wikimedia Commons)

The statesmen of Singapore in the tradition of Lee Kuan Yew are known for their foreign-policy realism, and they know Asia much better than do Westerners. We should assess their geopolitical advice with that perspective in mind. Bilahari Kausikan, a former top official in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has written an essay in Foreign Affairs that for all of its eloquence and obeisance to history is nevertheless reminiscent of Norman Angell’s 1910 work The Great Illusion, which argued that the economic interdependence of great powers would lessen the chances of a major war — three years before the outbreak of World War I.

Kausikan rightly asserts that great powers have competed and, at times, collaborated throughout history. And sometimes competition turns into conflict. We live in such times now, he writes, but that doesn’t mean a great-power war is inevitable. Indeed, instead of heading into a cold war between China and the United States, he explains, “the world is returning to its natural state” in the aftermath of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War and America’s brief unipolar moment. “The war in Ukraine and the U.S.-China rivalry,” Kausikan writes, “conform to established patterns of state behavior.” If the great powers “remain calm and exercise reasonable prudence,” he suggests, “there is no reason why” war cannot be avoided, especially because it is in the material and economic interests of both China and the United States to do so.

Economic interdependence and globalization does not lessen the likelihood of war or the need to prepare for it.

Kausikan characterizes the portrayal of the China–U.S. rivalry as “a new Cold War” as “one of the most intellectually lazy tropes,” which “misrepresents the nature of the competition” and relies on a “historical analogy that is … altogether inappropriate.” “The United States and the Soviet Union,” he explains, were two “separate” and competing “systems,” whereas the China–U.S. rivalry plays out “within a single system.” What he means is that there exists a single economic system in which “China and the United States have been progressively and intimately enmeshed with each other and the rest of the world through supply chains of a density and complexity never before seen in history” — in a word, globalization. So, Kausikan concludes, China, while intent on replacing the United States as the leader of the world system, does not pose an existential threat to the United States because both powers are content to coexist in the same globalized system. Unlike the Cold War, this is not a “struggle between capitalism and communism.”

That, however, is not what Chinese President Xi Jinping has told his Communist Party colleagues since assuming power in 2012. Xi has called Karl Marx “the greatest thinker in human history.” Marxism, he said, will “change the destiny of human history.” He has urged CCP cadres to “struggle for communism our entire lives” so as to shape a “collectivized world.” CCP-approved texts in China state that the country’s “ideology and social system are fundamentally incompatible with the West” and note that “our struggle and contest with Western countries is irreconcilable.” According to Xi, therefore, the U.S.–China rivalry is a clash of two social systems just as in the first cold war.

But even if Kausikan is correct that the current great-power rivalry exists within a single system, economic interdependence and globalization does not lessen the likelihood of war or the need to prepare for it. That was what Angell believed when he wrote The Great Illusion, the publication of which produced a stinging rebuke from the American naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan agreed with Angell that great powers “are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war,” but he noted that wars are fought for causes and reasons other than economics, including “ambition, self-respect, resentment of injustice, sympathy with the oppressed, hatred of oppression.” Globalization and economic interdependence do not eliminate these causes of war or others, such as the Thucydidean trilogy of fear, interest, and honor.

Angell’s work, Mahan wrote, was “itself an illusion based on a profound misreading of human action” — “[t]o regard the world as governed by self-interest only is to live in a non-existent world” and to hew to an idea that “the concrete facts of history are against.” Mahan was right. The globalized world of 1910 drifted into that of the Great War. Kausikan is right to recommend prudence and an attention to history. Let us hope that his assessment of the dangers of great-power war does not suffer the same fate as Angell’s “great illusion.”

Domestic Investments Can Aid All Democracies

Newsweek · April 19, 2023

Last summer's Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was a huge win for America's "green" game, but it also provoked worries among U.S. allies about the protectionism underlying the domestic content and sourcing requirements of the act. While moving vulnerable and next-generation supply chains out of China and other authoritarian countries is critical, these provisions needlessly undermined the resurgent spirit of collaboration among the U.S. and its allies, sparked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rather than harness that growing alliance of democracies, the IRA risked alienating our global partners without creating a clear alternative to China's green technology dominance.

The act did include provisions that allowed sourcing from countries that support the open, rules-based international order—through features that included extending incentives to countries with which the U.S. had a free trade agreement. But it should have gone further. The U.S. could have bolstered the economic security of a democratic alliance of nations by swapping (as we argued before) "domestic" content provisions for "democratic" content provisions.

The Treasury Department and IRS recently released guidance interpreting some of the provisions of the act, including which electric vehicles will qualify for the clean-vehicle tax credit, based on where key materials are sourced, and where batteries and other components are manufactured. In so doing they sought to thread the needle between U.S. decision-makers like West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin (a key architect of the legislation), who want to push for exclusive domestic manufacturing, and U.S. friends and allies in Europe and elsewhere who don't want their companies and components boxed out of this growing U.S. market.

The guidance on the IRA leaves it somewhat ambiguous how free trading partners will ultimately be defined. Further interpretation of the legislation, as well as the CHIPS and Science Act and other significant domestic investment plays, provide excellent opportunities to enhance the ally-shoring potential of federal legislation by setting definitions and rules that allow the U.S. to continue to build global democratic supply chains while strategically cutting out China and other bad actors. Further rule-making around U.S. domestic investments can be turned into creative tools to strengthen democracy and undermine increasingly aggressive authoritarians that are seeking to replace the open, free, rules-based international order.

One such solution could be to tier the incentives for firms and consumers for buying electric vehicles, producing clean energy, and other "green" technologies—with the biggest rewards for those made at home, but significant rewards for any made in a genuine democracy.

The U.S. could also seek to reward companies and countries collaborating on sanctions against Russia or companies that exited Russia voluntarily after its invasion. Similarly, the U.S. could extend incentives to others willing to join Washington in blocking the export of highly sensitive technologies to China. Rewards could also be extended to countries that implement UN sanctions regimes or hold human rights abusers to account.

Ford Motor Company's electric F-150 Lightning on the production line at their Rouge Electric Vehicle Center in Dearborn, Michigan on September 8, 2022. JEFF KOWALSKY / AFP/Getty Images

The U.S. has gotten creative in its trade agreements before to accomplish other goals. For example, the United States-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA) includes provisions for 75 percent "regional" domestic content (meaning made in North America), as well as provisions requiring that more than 40 percent of an auto's content be made by workers earning at least $16 an hour.

There certainly is popular support and a good case to be made for more U.S. production of next-generation energy technology. There's also a legitimate argument that enhanced U.S. investment in domestic R&D, manufacturing, and job training to produce more semiconductors and electric vehicles is a good thing—creating new good-paying jobs in these emerging sectors and breaking over-reliance on any one overseas supplier.

But growth in these emerging industries will benefit from a selective deepening of strategic international alliances. Even if we wanted to "go it alone" on all fronts, it's simply not possible. For example, we do not have the domestic natural resources or processing capacity to meet the surging demand for lithium, an essential mineral in electric vehicle batteries. China controls more than 60 percent of lithium processing worldwide, creating a bottleneck dependency for the U.S. and many other countries that must rely on Chinese intermediaries to turn raw materials into usable products. Sourcing and processing enough lithium to meet demand offers an opportunity for deeper partnerships with Australia, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and potentially Mexico.

Tailoring the rules for implementing the IRA, the CHIPS and Science Act (which seeks to boost domestic semiconductor production), and any other economy-building legislation to do more ally-shoring offers a better path than "on-shoring" for the health of our economy, the economies of our allies, and for the long-term survival of democracies around the world.

It is also a better way to check China and other authoritarians' bad behavior by strengthening the economic and geopolitical hand of our friends and partners, who should increasingly work with us against our mutual adversaries.

The senseless invasion of Ukraine has rekindled global appreciation for the importance of preserving democracy and building alliances of democracies working together. An economic alliance of democracies is the logical next step—protecting America at home and supporting our values worldwide.

John Austin directs the Michigan Economic Center and is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Elaine Dezenski is Senior Director and Head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The views expressed in this article are the writers' own.

Newsweek · April 19, 2023

16. Bind Ukraine Closer to American Military Learning

Good to see Military Misfortunes referenced (learn, adapt, and anticipate).

Conclusion:

Wars are no doubt tragic. Yet they offer learning opportunities that can help preserve a more stable future peace. The Biden administration owes the American people a more vigorous, deliberate, and enterprising effort to extract lessons from this war that could help us all avoid or win the next one. I have identified some possible lines of effort here and there are others. To be sure, Ukraine and the Black Sea present a different geography and adversary than the vast stretches of the Indo-Pacific. But there remains in Ukraine lessons to learn, fixes to find, assumptions to question, and technologies and concepts to assess.

Such an effort would serve a political logic as well: As skeptics of American military assistance grow increasingly vocal and traditionally manufactured munitions stocks dwindle, the Biden administration would be wise to demonstrate that what it is doing for Ukraine serves broader U.S. interests elsewhere, to include the Indo-Pacific where the U.S. military likely has a great deal to learn to preserve stability, peace, and prosperity in the face of an increasingly belligerent People’s Republic of China.

In order to make all of this possible, the United States and Ukraine will need to improve the way they work together from a defense industrial perspective, especially when it comes to technology transfers, export restrictions, local production, and intellectual property concerns. Figuring out how to do this today with Ukraine could make it easier to do it tomorrow if another tragic war erupts in Asia or elsewhere. Finally, there is the issue of speed. One might think that Ukraine’s wartime military bureaucracies are working with great alacrity and velocity. Unfortunately, this is often not the case.

Bind Ukraine Closer to American Military Learning - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ryan Evans · April 20, 2023

Is the United States doing everything it can for itself in Ukraine? Unfortunately not. While American support for Ukraine is admirable and worthwhile, Washington ought to be bolder in using the ongoing war as a testbed for emerging technologies and operational concepts that could be of use to deter or, if necessary, defeat its adversaries on the battlefield. There are many ways in which the Biden administration could be more forward-learning in this regard, including experimenting with uncrewed systems, exploring new ways to produce munitions, and using battlefield observers. Readers may not agree with all of my suggestions — and that’s fine — but I hope to at least impress upon leaders the value of having a set of policies and programs that are more serious and deliberate about learning from what is happening in Ukraine.

A Preliminary Note on Learning

In the classic 1990 text Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch intone, “The failure to absorb readily accessible lessons from recent history is in many ways the most puzzling of all military misfortunes.” As someone who has long bemoaned the yawning chasm between “lessons identified” and “lessons learned,” I am sympathetic with this claim. However, the reality is far more complicated. While data is often readily accessible, the lessons are not. The picture is noisy and the process of turning data into analysis into lessons is fraught with pitfalls, diversions, and biases. The best militaries and analysts can usually hope for is what the late Michael Howard called a “doubtful fix.” The passage is worth quoting:

A soldier … in peacetime is like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning. You have left the terra firma of the last war and are extrapolating from the experiences of that war. The greater the distance from the last war, the greater become the chances of error in this extrapolation. Occasionally there is a break in the clouds: a small-scale conflict occurs somewhere and gives you a “fix” by showing whether certain weapons and techniques are effective or not; but it is always a doubtful fix.

To successfully learn, a military organization requires access, objectivity, interpretation, and generalizability. In short, access means being there and having good data. Objectivity is exactly what it sounds like and this is often where attempts to learn stumble. Interpretation requires the organization to understand what is happening and why. It also requires an understanding of how and whether events and developments are significant. Finally, generalizability happens if the observation can be transferred from its context to projected future scenarios. A future scenario need not involve a war proper. It could be the successful navigation of a crisis or confrontation with the aid of deterrence, for example. One thing is certain: America’s rivals are surely using the war to learn lessons of their own. And U.S. defense leaders ought to feel obligated to not fall behind on the learning curve.

Become a Member

Access and Battlefield Observers

There is only so much human beings can learn from afar, even in the age of satellites, instantaneous communication, and video streaming. (In fact, some of these newer communications technologies distort rather than clarify what is actually happening on a given battlefield, as Michael Kofman and I have discussed on the War on the Rocks podcast.) I have understood this viscerally since my time as a civil servant in Afghanistan and this lesson was only reinforced during a visit to southern Ukraine in late October of last year. As such, it is surprising that the U.S. Defense Department has not launched a formal battlefield observer program that would send military personnel from all the services and a variety of occupational specialties to learn as much as they can through direct observation and communication with Ukrainian forces where the war is happening. It would be worth sending them with civilian military analysts, such as the various teams that have already organized their own battlefield research. This is far beyond what the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Kyiv is currently resourced and authorized to do.

It only makes sense to send battlefield observers to Ukraine if U.S. military leaders are ready to hear what they have to convey in terms of both interpretation and data. Senior leaders often say they want to learn, but their enthusiasm sometimes dampens when reports call into question current efforts to develop the U.S. military’s means of imposing generalization via new doctrine, organizations, training, and technologies. Sometimes, new information cannot overcome the momentum of existing efforts, as my late friend Dave Johnson discussed in these pages last year. Lessons can be identified, but whether they are learned is a different matter. The U.S. Army dispatched observers to the battlefields of Europe during World War I before the United States entered the conflict. But their insights did not inform military doctrine. American soldiers and marines paid the butcher’s bill, dying in the thousands when employing outdated tactics that led them to charge en masse against German machine-gun units (and one could argue that the impact of machine-guns could have been learned well before World War I).

I can anticipate three major counterarguments: First, if U.S. servicemembers in Ukraine are killed, hurt, or captured, this could risk escalation into a major war against a nuclear-armed foe. This is no small matter. Any decision that puts American servicemembers into a war zone comes with great responsibility. But is there a plausible risk of escalation? Probably not. American volunteers have already been killed and captured by Russia, and yet World War III has not yet happened. And of all the wars to which the United States has dispatched battlefield observers, casualties have never been the cause — approximate or otherwise — of further U.S. involvement in that war. Relatedly, others will fear the risk of mission creep. They might say that battlefield observation will become advise-and-assist, which will then become direct U.S. military intervention against Russia. This concern should be taken seriously. Still, it can be guarded against with strong civilian control and congressional oversight focused on avoiding those things that create mission creep such as “task accretion,” “mission shift,” and “mission transition.”

Another objection will be that Ukrainian forces are too busy to babysit U.S. battlefield observers. I can assure you that — based on my conversations with Ukrainian military leaders in Ukraine last October — this is not the case. As I discussed with Michael Kofman, they are eager to share what they are learning on the battlefield in closer proximity and the Ukrainian support required to move observers around the battlespace would be minimal (speaking from personal experience).

Drones in the Skies and on the Seas

Ukraine is a useful proving ground for concepts and technologies that might be applied in future contingencies against peer and near-peer adversaries. While the war on and over land gets the most attention, this is — as B.J. Armstrong has reminded us — also a naval war. A company called Saildrone offers wind- and solar-powered surface drones equipped with impressive software. They look sort of like big surfboards with sails on them. Richard Jenkins, the founder of Saildrone, explained to me that they come sized from 23-feet long to 65-feet long and can be equipped with a variety of sensor packages that can detect everything from what’s passing by on the surface, to what’s lurking down below, and what’s flying overhead. They are capable of journeys of up 12,000 nautical miles and as long as six months without maintenance. One can easily imagine a number of use cases for Ukraine, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; mine and counter-mine warfare; and anti-submarine warfare. The United States and its allies could also use them to stand watch over undersea cables and pipelines and play key roles in sanctions monitoring and enforcement. Another company called Anduril offers a formidable submersible drone called Dive-LD. Why isn’t it lurking under the surface of the Black Sea conducting some of the same missions named above for Saildrone? These are all missions that Anduril’s submarine can do.

These are stated Navy requirements, after all. In the Middle East and now South America, the U.S. military has made much of its efforts to use uncrewed vessels in maritime environments. Navy leaders have tied these investments to learning lessons to counter aggressive Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific.

What about the war in the skies? Enter the MQ-9 Reaper: a multi-mission uncrewed aircraft that the Air Force plans to divest, with 48 Block 1 models scheduled for retirement already. And the manufacturer, General Atomics, wants to gift two Reapers to Ukraine. The Biden administration insists the MQ-9 would be of limited use to Ukraine. It hasn’t even approved the manufacturer’s attempted gift. This is the wrong call. Not only could it be useful for Ukraine, it could also be useful for the United States to learn from how Ukraine could employ the MQ-9.

The most common objection I hear to the provision of the Reaper is they will simply not survive the skies over Ukraine, and the example of the TB-2 Bayraktar is then referenced. These Turkish-manufactured drones were heralded by many early in the war, but they were shot down in droves. The MQ-9 would suffer the same fate if tasked with hunting for and striking ground targets in contested environments. If MQ-9s are used differently, back from the front lines, and focused on specific tactics and problems, they could be more effective. There may also be concerns about datalinks and encryption technologies that cannot be shared with Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Sorting these things out is always tricky, but I am confident there is a way to mitigate these concerns and sufficiently protect sensitive technologies. And it would be advantageous to figure out procedures for such problems today, well in advance of future conflicts and crises, such as one involving Taiwan.

What does the United States have to learn here? This is an opportunity to test various concepts for re-establishing localized air superiority in contested airspace and defending airspace without sufficient numbers of crewed aircraft. The Reaper could be armed with AIM-9X missiles — which are “imaging” infrared missiles — to create dilemmas for the relatively limited number of Russian fighters sent into Ukrainian airspace and to protect against cruise missile strikes. Most cruise missiles are sub-sonic and travel at low altitude. And cruise missile routes are typically planned to avoid surface-to-air missiles that could shoot them down (although Russia’s targeting teams have not been impressive in this regard and others). Those routes could be covered by missile-armed Reapers, flying outside the range of Russian air defenses, to protect Ukrainian infrastructure and the civilian population. And with the right sensors, Reapers could cue other strikes on these missiles.

The Reaper could also be equipped with the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy and its jamming variant for protection against Russian integrated air defense systems. As another example, why not equip them with AI-navigation and targeting pods like Agile Condor or sensing systems offered by Metrea to test how drones could fly missions in communications-denied environments and under enemy radar? Or the digitization of close air support? There are also lessons to be learned about different ways of deconflicting ground-based fires, such as those from HIMARS, from air operations.

The Air Force could test some future-looking concepts as well. The Air Force has championed the idea of a “loyal wingman” and “collaborative combat aircraft.” These are related but distinct concepts, but they might involve the same aircraft. For the loyal wingman, the Air Force wants drones that can be “tethered” to crewed aircraft. The idea of the combat collaborative aircraft is meant to address the problem of mass – getting iron in the sky – in an era when crewed aircraft are exquisite and expensive: Combat collaborative aircraft would be “untethered” drones that could be put into the sky in large numbers and independently perform missions. The service is conducting modeling and simulation to support these aims and one of the generals in charge of this effort reported there are “100 mini-milestones this year” alone. (This family of capabilities is bundled as a part of “Next Generation Air Dominance” in the latest Air Force budget submission.) The MQ-9 is unlikely to be the solution of choice for either concept, but their employment in Ukraine could still be supportive of Air Force testing.

Munitions at Scale

If Ukraine’s efforts to retake the initiative in this war stumble, it will likely be because its Western backers cannot maintain an adequate supply of munitions — especially artillery munitions — for shell-hungry forces in the Donbass. This experience has laid bare challenges in replenishing traditional munitions manufacturing lines. It costs a lot of money and significant time to restart them. There are newer companies in the U.S. defense industrial base that are successfully using 3D printing to produce munitions at scale, such as Firestorm, which produces a loitering munition that can be manufactured in less than 24 hours and operationally ready one day later (this recalls the vision a group of authors from the U.S. Marine Corps laid out in 2018 in these pages). Ian Muceus, co-founder and chief technology officer of Firestorm, told me that his company can start printing 155-millimeter and various other artillery casing molds as soon as this summer in the United States, followed by portable munitions factories they are developing that could potentially be deployed forward in Europe.

These high-technology production methods offer major advantages. They can be activated quickly and at no additional cost by simply sending the software design to an industrial-grade printer for fabrication. There are hundreds of such printers in the United States. This makes production agile and scalable, able to expand or contract in a matter of days with minimal increases to cost and schedule. Contrast that with facilities that produce the workhorse of this war: the 155-millimeter artillery shell, which is produced in four government-owned facilities operated by defense companies.

The Pentagon should want the defense industrial base to be able to rapidly pivot to support a surge in production and then pivot to something else once stocks are refreshed or if a more urgent need arises. Why not give Firestorm, or another company that offer similar solutions, financial and bureaucratic support to see how fast they could spin up a 155-millimeter shell production line in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia? Part of this should involve producing with partners, not just in their territory. Defense is still usually a national business and protected industry that resists cost-effective cross-national coordination. This is due to bureaucracy, policy, technology restrictions, and concerns about risk. As such, making it easier for business to scale (read: multi-year procurement for munitions and “bulk buys”) and to co-produce and co-develop in a manner that keeps multiple factory lines open in multiple countries would be worth doing now. (As Paula Alvarez-Couceiro argues in these virtual pages, Washington should be more actively supportive of a stronger European defense industry.) Such real-world experiments could save American lives down the road while also strengthening Ukraine’s defense.

Conclusion

Wars are no doubt tragic. Yet they offer learning opportunities that can help preserve a more stable future peace. The Biden administration owes the American people a more vigorous, deliberate, and enterprising effort to extract lessons from this war that could help us all avoid or win the next one. I have identified some possible lines of effort here and there are others. To be sure, Ukraine and the Black Sea present a different geography and adversary than the vast stretches of the Indo-Pacific. But there remains in Ukraine lessons to learn, fixes to find, assumptions to question, and technologies and concepts to assess.

Such an effort would serve a political logic as well: As skeptics of American military assistance grow increasingly vocal and traditionally manufactured munitions stocks dwindle, the Biden administration would be wise to demonstrate that what it is doing for Ukraine serves broader U.S. interests elsewhere, to include the Indo-Pacific where the U.S. military likely has a great deal to learn to preserve stability, peace, and prosperity in the face of an increasingly belligerent People’s Republic of China.

In order to make all of this possible, the United States and Ukraine will need to improve the way they work together from a defense industrial perspective, especially when it comes to technology transfers, export restrictions, local production, and intellectual property concerns. Figuring out how to do this today with Ukraine could make it easier to do it tomorrow if another tragic war erupts in Asia or elsewhere. Finally, there is the issue of speed. One might think that Ukraine’s wartime military bureaucracies are working with great alacrity and velocity. Unfortunately, this is often not the case.

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Ryan Evans is the CEO of Metamorphic Media, the founder of War on the Rocks, and the CEO of Bedrock Learning.

Image: U.S. Air Force

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warontherocks.com · by Ryan Evans · April 20, 2023

17. The Top Secret Files – Something Smells Fishy in Massachusetts

The Top Secret Files

armedforces.press · by Darin Gaub · April 19, 2023

Something Smells Fishy in Massachusetts

Image by Josemavando93

By now most of America has heard about the young, enlisted U.S. Air National Guard member in Massachusetts who is the focus of the investigation concerning a leak of highly classified material. As someone who, at nineteen years old, was granted a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance with special access to the White House and other facilities I can say with certainty that the least concerning thing about this news is the Airman’s age or his job. What is concerning is what the documents exposed, that they were in public for so long, and that they probably came from much higher up.

This information was NOT simply something a junior enlisted Airman gained access to so he could show off to his friends. The clearance I was granted at nineteen I held for the next twenty-seven years. I have been in some of the most classified facilities on earth and can say with conviction that this information came from somewhere in the highest levels of the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community – intentionally.

The first hurdle to jump when it comes to gaining a security clearance is to be in a coded position that requires a clearance in the first place. This Airman appears to have had the job, and the clearance followed. There are people who spend years in the military and are never granted a clearance because their job does not require it. In addition to having TS/SCI clearance, there is also the need to know. This requires what is called a “read-on” where you are allowed to be a part of special access programs or to certain types of intelligence based on the source by which it is collected. That is the SCI part of TS/SCI, and I have had access to many.

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Classified information is highly partitioned and segregated at multiple levels. The information revealed in the latest leak is not something this Airman would have ever had access to without someone else first putting the information out into cyberspace. I am convinced that this information was released at the highest levels within the Department of Defense or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. How the Airman may have come by and shared the information from that point remains to be seen, but he is certainly not the source.

Our first response should not be to believe what any government agency says is true regarding this incident. The DoD and Intelligence Community have long since abdicated their credibility when speaking to the American people. The botched Afghanistan departure, for which Secretary Austin apparently has no regrets, is one example. A porous Southern Border with numerous migrants pouring across unchecked, the targeting of patriots, and many other examples are real-life demonstrations of incompetence and deceit. The concerning part is that failure of this magnitude can only be intentional, hence another reason I believe these documents were a controlled and coordinated release for a purpose.

But for what purpose? I can see a few possible reasons.

1. To provide the backdrop (excuse) to push the RESTRICT Act through Congress.1 To summarize, this bill is the Cyber Patriot Act designed to create a situation where all online activity is monitored and controlled in the United States ‘for our own national security and safety.’

2. To provide an excuse for the administration to unplug from the Ukraine conflict as the truth comes out about our taxpayer funds lining the pockets of Ukraine’s own oligarchs, the weakening of our own military due to shipping equipment to Ukraine, and potentially uncomfortable facts about the Nord Stream pipeline bombing. Not counting the fact that the timing conveniently took over the news cycle at the same time as the revelations about the money from China lining the pockets of the members of the Biden Crime Syndicate. The same Biden family who makes a habit out of scrapbooking classified documents and keeping them in a garage.

3. There is a patriot out there who wanted to get some of the truth out to the public concerning Ukraine, Israel, spy balloons, and more.

When asked if the U.S. needed to be ready for more information releases, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said, “We don’t know,”2 and though he may not yet know, somebody high up in this administration probably does, and their name is not Airman First Class Jack D. Teixeira of the Massachusetts Air National Guard.

Lt Col (ret), US Army, Darin Gaub is a Co-founder of Restore Liberty, an international military strategist, foreign policy analyst, executive leadership coach, ordained Bible minister, and serves on the boards of multiple volunteer national and state level organizations. The views presented are those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or its components. He can be contacted at [email protected]

Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology Act
https://www.cf.org/news/the-biggest-revelations-from-the-pentagons-leaked-intel-documents/

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armedforces.press · by Darin Gaub · April 19, 2023

18. Local Partners Are Not Proxies: The Case for Rethinking Proxy War

I am very much in agreement with Dr. Elias. I was at an event last week and I heard a retired general officer make the same assertion. Proxy is not a good term to use. Another phrase I have come to despise - "Put a (fill in the blank with the name of your partner force) face on the operation."

I one have one minor pet peeve. "By, with and through'' (or "with, by, and through or "through, by, and with") is a fundamental concept of Special Forces. The phrase was first "coined" by COL Mark Boyatt, but it has been "gifted" to the entire U.S military (which I think is a good thing). I would like to see COL Boyatt properly recognized for his contribution. (See his book here: https://www.amazon.com/Special-Forces-Unique-National-through/dp/1478770821)

Local Partners Are Not Proxies: The Case for Rethinking Proxy War - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Barbara Elias · April 20, 2023

Despite being a scholar of “proxy wars” in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, I rarely use the term. Here’s why.

Work on security partnerships is expanding in response to a shifting US defense posture emphasizing the benefits of working “by, with, and through” allies and partners. This research is essential, but it is worth reconsidering if we should call strategic military engagements fought in coordination with local forces “proxy wars.” While the term is pervasive, it is conceptually problematic, at least in the post-colonial era. Describing local partners as “proxies” minimizes complex coalition bargaining dynamics, risks overemphasizing the influence of US resources, and insufficiently accounts for US political dependencies.

This argument is not meant to discredit existing scholarship on proxy wars, much of it rigorous, important, and insightful. But it is worth collectively considering if the terms we tend to reach for in the proxy war literature are misleading. Are “proxies” really proxies, or do Americans just hope that’s what small local security forces partnered with the United States will be? Or if policymakers and academics rightly expect local partners to pursue their own interests and impose costs on sponsors, then why call local allies “proxies” if they aren’t? The term “strategic local partners” seems to better reflect the empirical record of small allies in direct and indirect interventions. The term “proxy” seems more aspirational than descriptive—it implies that small state or nonstate actors can be readily manipulated by the provision (or removal) of resources. But the degree to which local partners are faithful to the agendas of their foreign patrons is a multifaceted variable that changes across and within wars—it is not a defining constant in these strategic coalitions, and the language policymakers and academics employ to describe this category of strategic engagements should better reflect this variation to avoid oversimplifying complex partnerships or overestimating US control within coalitions.

While scholars disagree about the criteria and universe of “proxy wars,” there is general consensus that proxy war describes a sustained strategic relationship involving the provision of significant foreign military support for a local partner or agent, and the delegation of “some authority over the pursuit of strategic war aims to [this] proxy-agent.” Foreign resources are invested in local labor in the pursuit of a foreign patron’s political-military objective. According to current definitions, a local proxy is a “conduit” for foreign partners, “a subordinate charged with some task,” a local operator acting “on behalf of another.” Foreign resources are exchanged for local action. Proxies are thus often modeled as imperfect employees, commissioned for a set of important tasks as a cost saving measure for important foreigners. Political influence follows money, and academic research tends to largely focus on influence in one direction from foreign power to local proxy. Too often the agency of the proxy is minimized and patrons are assumed to hold the balance of power through their purse strings in these partnerships. Proxy war studies often imply that competent patrons can and should set and enforce the political agenda. This stands in contrast with more expansive studies on alliance politics which model coalition policymaking as a collective bargaining process that is not necessarily determined by the richest member.

Indeed, insightful research on proxy wars has repeatedly determined that getting proxies to implement patron agendas is consistently more complicated than patrons anticipate. Seyom Brown, for example, argues that policies of proxy war should be approached with utmost caution because they provide patrons with “illusions of flexibility and control” but often deliver neither. Geraint Hughes powerfully observes that what unites patrons engaging in proxy wars, whether “the USA or Libya, Pakistan or Rwanda is the flawed assumption on the part of policymakers that nonstate actors can be persuaded to fight and die for third parties’ interests…” as the patron-proxy “relationship becomes fundamentally a dysfunctional one when combat is subcontracted to a third party whose interests are often barely—if at all—compatible with those of its patron or patrons.” In other words, proxies often do not behave like proxies, and there are significant costs for sponsors that maintain overly optimistic expectations of how closely local agents will follow their instructions.

To solve the defiant proxy problem the literature on proxy war offers two main solutions for patrons to get their proxies in line: 1) manipulating resources to incentivize compliance and 2) pressing for greater interest alignment between patron and proxy. While logical, these methods are likely limited and overlook several important dynamics.

The Limits of Aid Conditionality and Interest Alignment

Often without explicitly acknowledging it, the scholarship on proxy war alliances tends to focus on resource asymmetries between foreign patrons (donors) and local clients (recipients) as the defining political dynamic embedded in these strategic partnerships. Local agents depend on foreign principals for cash, logistics, and training that are often vital to local force success or even group survival. Important studies have focused on ways patrons can leverage military aid to get compliance by threatening to reduce or withhold support. But the material dependency of local partners varies and is only one of many embedded asymmetric dynamics in these partnerships. In patron-proxy partnerships there are also often significant asymmetries in interests, willpower, and local knowledge which shape these coalitions. Often overlooked are patron dependencies on the local partner for key non-material factors, including local knowledge, action, and legitimacy. For example, the United States must work through local political partners to pass legislation or hand off security duties lest occupation continue indefinitely.

The dependencies of powerful patrons deepen when local partners cannot be readily replaced, which diminishes the credibility of patron threats to withhold aid as a way of pressuring proxies to comply with their demands. The 2014 US Counterinsurgency Field Manual observes that the “host nation is the primary actor… the conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people.” This description differs significantly from the idea of the host nation as “a subordinate charged with some task.” Dropping the idea that local partners are proxies may help empower analysts to better account for the dependencies and compromises that transpire within a coalition.

The second often-discussed method for patrons to get proxy compliance is working to ensure local interests align with the patron’s agenda. This has led many studies of proxy partnerships to suggest that the United States must be more discerning in its choice of partners, only investing when there is significant interest alignment that extends beyond combatting a shared enemy. But my research indicates this logic ignores how local partners, at least in high-commitment interventions like Iraq and Vietnam, often readily defied US policy requests. Even when US and local allied interests aligned, structural incentives allowed local allies to free-ride and benefit from US efforts without contributing their share. Interest alignment was only one of several variables motivating local action, and not in the linear ways predicted by many proxy war models which tend to suggest that interest alignment will lead to local cooperation. I observed that when the United States has unilateral capacity to implement a proposed policy, shared interest in that policy motivated local partners to defy its requests in the hopes that the United States would pick up the slack. This is not a surprising feature if we look to the literature on small allies and burden sharing in NATO from economics and political science. Analyses of strategic behaviors among NATO members does not presume that small states are the conduits for the agendas of larger members and has explicitly documented the “big influence of small allies” in coalitions. This is important to keep in mind as the Pentagon increasingly refers to integrated deterrence as a nimble and tailored approach to leverage a set of highly diverse and multifaceted military coalitions with local partners. Success will require a clear-eyed understanding of the shifting bargaining dynamics within strategic partnerships and an appreciation of the potential political influence local forces will have in coalitions.

A More Complete Picture: Resource-Deficient Allies

David Galula wrote that “in a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly.” While Galula was commenting on the contest between insurgent and counterinsurgent, foreign and local actors offer different assets and will each see their contributions (foreign resources or local capacity) as a source of leverage within the alliance. This bargaining is case-specific and goes both ways. David Baldwin cautioned that studies in international relations should avoid modeling power or influence as a possession of wealthy states, because this assumption fails to acknowledge the scope, domain, and context that can make wealth more or less persuasive. Influence cannot be estimated without specifying the conditions that make certain factors significant at any given time. As Baldwin noted, you cannot simply claim to have an excellent hand of cards without first knowing what game you are playing.

Instead of modeling local partners as “proxies” or conduits of larger states, a better approach considers local allies to be resource-deficient, but politically important, collaborators. This is similar to relevant work on economic statecraft, bargaining, alliances, military interventions, civil wars, small state politics, and coalition warfare. Scholars should not overlook material dependency but incorporate aid as one of several key variables. Vladimir Rauta smartly advocates that proxy war scholarship should better integrate other literatures and rethink constants as variables. But unlike Rauta, I hesitate to try to reinvigorate the field by relying on the term “proxy war,” because the term itself implies a constant hierarchy of political influence that is variable.

Depending on whether foreign forces are engaged in direct combat or not, “foreign military intervention” or “foreign military sponsorship” may be better classifications for the types of strategic engagements examined in proxy war scholarship. These terms create space for bargaining within coalitions, as opposed to “proxy war” which reflects the desired, but not necessarily established, subordinate political role of local partners. Recent US experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria demonstrate that local partnerships can fall seriously short of US expectations. It is worth considering if labels like “proxy war” contain entrenched assumptions that contribute to misunderstandings of the politics of coalition warfare with asymmetric partners. For practitioners, seeing local partners clearly as allies means being more clear-eyed from the outset about how much local partners will reform according to US wishes. For scholars, taking care to regard inter-alliance politics as an interactive bargaining process will better account for a wider variety of dependencies embedded in these partnerships, rather than a singular focus on material ones. In most contemporary cases, local partners are strategic actors, not foreign agents. We need to update our terminology and models to reflect this reality.

Barbara Elias is the Sarah & James Bowdoin Associate Professor of Government at Bowdoin College. She was a 2022 Nonresident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and the former Director of the Afghanistan/Pakistan/Taliban Project at The National Security Archive. Her 2020 book, Why Allies Rebel: Defiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars was awarded the 2022 “Best Book” prize by the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association, and named “Best International Security Book” 2021 by the American Political Science Association.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo credit: US Army National Guard.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Barbara Elias · April 20, 2023

19. 'Gobbledygook': Senators react to classified briefing on Pentagon leak

'Gobbledygook': Senators react to classified briefing on Pentagon leak

Senators from both parties said they left the briefing with unanswered questions almost a week after the FBI arrested a suspect in connection with the leak investigation.

NBC News · by Liz Brown-Kaiser and Zoë Richards

Senators in both parties expressed frustration after they received a classified briefing Wednesday afternoon about a Defense Department intelligence leak and its fallout.

“I would, by and large, typify it as bureaucratic gobbledygook,” Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., a member of the Homeland Security Committee, told reporters after he emerged from the basement of the Capitol, where senators were briefed about dozens of classified Pentagon documents that were leaked online.

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., used sharper language when he was asked about the briefing.

“It’s just a s---show,” he said.

"I didn’t get a very good explanation of how this could happen," he added. "I’m just as confused now as I was before the briefing.”

A Senate aide said Wednesday’s briefers included National Intelligence Director Avril Haines; Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks; the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security, Ronald Moultrie; the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Christopher Grady; and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman.

Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., at a rally, in Waukesha, Wis., on Oct. 25, 2022.Morry Gash / AP file

The briefing had been scheduled before federal authorities arrested Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira last week in connection with the investigation into classified documents that were leaked on the internet.

Classified Defense Department documents that first appeared online last month revealed details into U.S. spying on Russia’s war machine in Ukraine, confidential evaluations of Ukraine’s combat power and intelligence-gathering on American allies, including South Korea and Israel.

NBC News obtained more than 50 of the leaked documents, many of which were designated “Top Secret,” the highest level of classification.

In an interview before the briefing, Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Mark Warner, D-Va., said he expected to get answers about when the intelligence community discovered the documents had been leaked, in addition to details about when the documents started appearing on the internet.

Some of Warner's Democratic colleagues said the briefing failed to deliver on their expectations.

“I remain deeply unhappy and unsatisfied,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a Democratic member of the Homeland Security panel, told reporters. "My impression coming out of that meeting is too many people have too much access to too much information without safeguards or guardrails."

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., suggested that in spite of senators' frustrations, administration officials are taking the issue of leaked intelligence information "very, very seriously."

Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., added that administration officials were "very concerned about what happened, and they’re working."

Several lawmakers said the leaks prompted a need to examine reforms that could prevent future intelligence from being divulged publicly.

“I think we need to take a long, hard look, yes,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H. "And I think we need a lot more information than we currently have."

Asked whether access to classified information needs to be curbed, Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, responded, “I think there’s a very good case for that.”

Wednesday was not the first time senators have expressed exasperation after a closed-door meeting with Haines.

In January, lawmakers voiced concern over the government’s system for labeling and tracking thousands of classified documents after Haines refused to show them copies of classified documents found at Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida and Joe Biden’s former Washington office and Delaware home. A select group of senators and House members have since began receiving access to those documents.

NBC News · by Liz Brown-Kaiser and Zoë Richards

20. Ukraine could be looking at another Maidan

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s assurances don’t assuage some veteran observers of the country either. “We have not seen significant enough efforts to address corruption — although perhaps with one important exception,” said a former senior U.S. diplomat who has considerable experience in Ukraine. “I think they really are trying to prevent diversion of any of the massive Western assistance they’re receiving. I believe they do understand the risks, if there were to be a major scandal.”

But the former diplomat said that what struck him in recent meetings with opposition politicians and civil society leaders in Kyiv was how, “on the one hand, they truly appreciate Zelenskyy’s strength as a war leader,” but are “deeply worried also about corruption and his authoritarian style.”

“In their minds, there is going to be a reckoning as soon as the war ends,” he said. “And I think that’s probably going to be true.”

Ukraine could be looking at another Maidan

Politico · by Jamie Dettmer · April 18, 2023

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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.

KYIV — “I was on the streets for the Orange Revolution when I was in my last year at university in 2004, and I was on the streets again in 2014. So, the 10-year mark of when we tend to mount revolutions is approaching,” said Inna Sovsun, an opposition lawmaker for Ukraine’s liberal pro-European Holos party.

And she suspects there’s another political upheaval on its way.

Sat in a café overlooking Kyiv’s Independence Square, where nearly a decade ago hundreds of thousands of frustrated Ukrainians protested and toppled Viktor Yanukovych — Russian President Vladimir Putin’s satrap — the 38-year-old mother-of-one, whose partner is now serving as a combat doctor in Bakhmut, spoke about the the possibility of another Maidan.

The 2014 Maidan Revolution had unforeseen consequences, of course, setting in motion events that have led Ukraine to where it is today — defending itself against a Russian invasion ordered by a revanchist and resentful Putin. And much as that color revolution had repercussions, so will the war, which is forging a strong sense of nationhood and raising huge expectations of a better future — expectations that will be hard to meet.

Sovsun isn’t alone in seeing another upheaval on the horizon. A former Ukrainian cabinet minister told me matter-of-factly, “You know, Maidan could happen again.” Asking not to be named so he could discuss sensitive topics freely — like many other lawmakers, reformers and civil society leaders — he was circumspect in speaking out publicly for fear of undermining the war effort and providing propaganda fodder for Russia.

“This war has triggered great hopes, and people will be very impatient for change,” he said. “They will want money and justice and the completion of the reform they demanded back in 2014, and they will want them quickly.”

And while navigating the tempestuous postwar political waters would be difficult for any leader, according to the former minister, it will be especially so for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as he’s become part of the problem — a leader with autocratic tendencies.

That may sound surprising, looking in from the outside. After all, for a year now, Zelenskyy has been lauded as the embodiment of Ukrainian resistance, and even an icon of democracy. He’s still applauded for declining America’s offer for a ride out of Kyiv when Russian tanks were a menacing 60 kilometers from the capital, and his inspirational wartime rhetoric and spellbinding oratory have been instrumental in persuading the United States and Europe to back Ukraine in its existential hour of need.

Zelenskyy’s leadership, communication skills and indomitable spirit garner praise at home in Ukraine too. His poll numbers are sky high — only the army polls higher. But seasoned observers say his 84 percent approval rating is the result of a rally-round-the-flag sentiment, and they predict his numbers will plunge once the existential threat has gone — much as they did soon after the populist comedian-turned-president was elected by a landslide in 2019, having promised to defend the interests of the people against the rich and the ruling class.

Unfortunately, Zelenskyy was unable reprise his role as TV’s “president of the people” in real life, his support at one point plummeting to just 11 percent, after sacking a reform-minded prime minister, stacking his government with friends and former business partners, and getting nowhere with his anti-corruption drive. Instead, the Ukrainian president was accused of becoming increasingly autocratic and flouting laws by issuing presidential decrees to sanction foes, all in the name of battling Russian aggression — but, according to some critics, also with an eye toward disrupting his political opponents.

Four months before Russia invaded, Zelenskyy and two close associates were also implicated in offshore financial activity. Based on the Pandora Papers — a cache of documents revealing the offshore activities of political leaders and other prominent individuals worldwide — the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project disclosed that the Ukrainian leader had established offshore companies before becoming president but continued to profit from them after taking office. Zelenskyy, for his part, denied any money laundering or illegality with the funds.

A woman looks at a memorial dedicated to late Euromaidan activists along the Alley of the Heavenly Hundred Heroes | Chris McGrath/Getty Images

Reproach for his prewar record is not for now, political opponents say — but after the guns have gone silent, there will be questions regarding events leading up to the war, and why Zelenskyy ignored stark intelligence warnings from the West about the high probability of a Russian invasion and failed to put Ukraine on a war footing much earlier.

Now and again, however, those questions are raised even in the middle of the war — the issue last flared up in August, when a cascade of public criticism followed Zelenskyy’s remarks on why he downplayed the warnings of an imminent attack, claiming he had to because Ukrainians would otherwise panic, flee and trigger economic collapse.

Opposition politicians and civil society leaders interviewed by POLITICO said Zelenskyy will also be under the gun over how he and his tight-knit team of old pals and onetime business partners have governed during the war — in a way not dissimilar to how they did so before the invasion, trying to establish a “managed democracy” with one dominant party.

“Of course, we need to support the government, and we need to remain united,” said Mykola Knyazhytsky, an opposition lawmaker from the western city of Lviv. “But I worry about the future of democracy in my country. Even in wartime, there must be political opposition, the democratic process must continue, there must be parliamentary oversight,” he said.

Like others, Knyazhytsky noted that Zelenskyy’s taking advantage of presidential wartime authority and martial law to grab more power, to control the television media, to sideline parliament and to disregard legislative oversight on how government funds are being disbursed — and to whom — and whether its beneficiaries are business allies of the Ukrainian president or companies tied to members of his ruling party.

Some also fear the global adulation Zelenskyy’s now receiving is feeding a folie de grandeur. “He thinks he’s the number one politician in the world and that Joe Biden is way, way below him, and even further down [are] leaders like Macron and Scholz,” the former minister said, adding that it isn’t healthy and augurs badly. Like others, he mentioned that the Ukrainian leader seems to begrudge sharing the stage or the limelight, much like an actor wanting all the best lines, while a former Zelenskyy aide said his office is always scouring polling data to check no one is eclipsing him.

According to critics, this determination to be an undiminished protagonist may go some way in explaining why Zelenskyy is spurning calls to form a coalition government, or a government of all the talents in Ukraine, during the country’s hour of need.

But Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics who is also a former minister of economic development and an informal adviser to the government, dismisses the claim that Zelenskyy has an autocratic streak. “Fundamentally, Zelenskyy responds to what people want . . . In my view, Ukraine is very lucky to have him. I think previous presidents would have capitulated in the first few weeks of the war and negotiated,” he said.

According to Mylovanov, Zelenskyy is building a nation-state and thus has no choice but to bypass institutions because too often they’re captured by vested interests. “No one knows what bigger perspective Zelenskyy has in mind. I think he has changed his views over the last three years on the job as he learns and as he understands the broader perspective and the forces at play. I think, in many ways, he understands more than most of us,” he added.

And in January, during one of his nightly television addresses, Zelenskyy had indeed assured Ukrainians that “there will be no return to the way things used to be.”

But those remarks came in the middle of a corruption scandal surrounding illicit payments and over-inflated military contracts, which led to a string of resignations and dismissals of several senior Ukrainian officials — including five regional governors and four deputy ministers. The scandal came to light after an investigative journalist published details of fraudulent contracts when the government failed to act.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s assurances don’t assuage some veteran observers of the country either. “We have not seen significant enough efforts to address corruption — although perhaps with one important exception,” said a former senior U.S. diplomat who has considerable experience in Ukraine. “I think they really are trying to prevent diversion of any of the massive Western assistance they’re receiving. I believe they do understand the risks, if there were to be a major scandal.”

But the former diplomat said that what struck him in recent meetings with opposition politicians and civil society leaders in Kyiv was how, “on the one hand, they truly appreciate Zelenskyy’s strength as a war leader,” but are “deeply worried also about corruption and his authoritarian style.”

“In their minds, there is going to be a reckoning as soon as the war ends,” he said. “And I think that’s probably going to be true.”

Politico · by Jamie Dettmer · April 18, 2023

21. Why the Pentagon’s Response to the Discord Leaks Won’t Fix the Problem

Excerpts:

“This does happen and happens every few years. And that's kind of what you expect. That's what I found in the formula. Even if I made the parameters as favorable as possible to the secret keepers, if I made a simulation where they were better secret keepers than the NSA, even then, when you start involving thousands of people, or even hundreds of people, or even tens of people things would fail. And they fail a lot quicker than you might expect.”

That’s because every new link increases the potential of failed secret keeping exponentially. By applying a formula to pieces of information that the government wanted to keep secret and entering in the number of people who might have access to that secret information, it should be possible to simulate when “classification” will fail and, thus, whether or not the secret in question should be classified at all and for how long.

The official said that the Department currently employs no formula or data-driven approach to classifying documents.

He called the idea: “brilliant.”

Why the Pentagon’s Response to the Discord Leaks Won’t Fix the Problem

The Defense Department keeps too many secrets, uses old approaches to secret storage, and does not apply data-driven strategies to classification.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Some steps the Pentagon is taking in the wake of the recent leak of classified documents are missing the point.

In response to the unauthorized disclosure of hundreds of pages of sensitive and secret material on a private Discord server, Defense Department officials will add restrictions on classified material and allow fewer people to access it. But that response misses the core problems that drive unauthorized disclosure: the Pentagon classifies too many documents, limits its own ability to detect when leaks occur, and greatly overestimates how long classified information can stay secret according to a senior Defense Department official that works in insider threat detection.

On Monday, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Defense Department was “taking a close look at security protocols and procedures and assessing whether or not they need to be changed,” around classified information. Kirby said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, “has already restricted access to classified information” to fewer people. He added that U.S government protocols and practices “exist for a reason and they are never considered static. So if we need to implement changes, we will.”

One senior Defense Department official who has worked in insider threat detection told Defense One that so-called “unauthorized disclosures” of classified and sensitive information are incredibly common, though few of them make the press. That’s important because it shows that the government is failing to keep a lot of things secret, not just this case.

That’s partly because of the sheer number of secrets it has tasked itself with keeping. But the Pentagon also doesn’t have the right policies in place to allow for the rapid detection of unauthorized disclosures.

In recent years, Defense leaders have set up new systems and policies to predict who might be a leaker. But so-called continuous vetting only captures things like arrests, large purchases, suspicious trips or credit activity, and the like. It is unlikely to have spotted an IT guy who was posting secret documents for clout on a closed Discord messaging group.

What might have helped is monitoring social media. As the Pentagon’s recently leaked documents spread online, groups such as Bellingcat used public clues to identify the alleged leaker as Jack Teixeira. But DOD policy does not make clear how investigators and monitors should and should not scrutinize Americans’ social-media posts for hints of illegal behavior, the official said. The Pentagon has experimented with hiring surveillance companies to monitor public posts for hints of insider threats, but those pilots failed largely because DOD declined to give its contractors vital information, the official said. A clearer policy on the use of public information would be useful.

Another problem: the Defense Department isn’t using the most modern tools and techniques for managing classified data.

As an IT maintainer in the Air National Guard’s 102nd Intelligence Wing, Teixeira had the run of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, a Pentagon intranet for secrets. Think of JWICS as a hotel, the official said: just having a clearance will get you access to some of the shared spaces in the hotel, like the lobby or bar or pool. Access to individual rooms is handed out on a need-to-know basis. However, someone running maintenance would need to be able to access virtually any room.

The official called that a very old-fashioned approach to housing data. The Defense Department basically asks for virtual versions of its own data centers. The material is hosted in the cloud but doesn’t have all the benefits of cloud computing. If the Defense Department were to adopt cloud-native data storage and computing, that would allow it to build applications like virtual private containers where classified information could be shared with key participants for only short windows and where maintainers like Teixeira would not need to have access to all material in every room just to maintain things, said the official.

But a potentially larger issue is simply that the government classifies far too much information with no clear policy for eventually de-classifying things. That’s unsustainable and virtually assures more unauthorized disclosures.

In his press conference, Kirby said that “None of this material belongs in the public domain,” implying that its release, per classification regulations, might “harm national security.” But the more secrets you have, the harder they all are to keep, and the government isn’t doing a good job prioritizing them.

That reflects a phenomenon that many top military and intelligence leaders have complained about for years: the U.S. government greatly overclassifies material. Moreover, while more than 1.3 million people have top secret clearances, many of them are older or retirees. There remains a massive backlog of workers needing clearance to handle that information. That imbalance suggests a big problem: the government has too many people with clearances that aren’t the people that it needs to have them. Add that to the very large number of items that are classified–many without good reason, by leaders’ own acknowledgement–and lots of unauthorized disclosure becomes inevitable.

Consider this 2016 paper from David Grimes, a cancer researcher and author of the books The Irrational Ape and Good Thinking.

Grimes’ paper looked at conspiracy theories—specifically, the idea that climate change is a government hoax. He showed that such a conspiracy would be impossible to maintain because of the number of people who would need to be in on it and how long they would have to keep their mouths shut. He demonstrates that with just a few pieces of information, i.e. the number of people who know the secret and the amount of time they have to keep it, it’s possible to predict when any piece of clandestine information might leak out.

That same formula is relevant to the challenge of leaks and predicting when they might happen and it’s particularly relevant to the recent Pentagon leaks, Grimes said.

“This does happen and happens every few years. And that's kind of what you expect. That's what I found in the formula. Even if I made the parameters as favorable as possible to the secret keepers, if I made a simulation where they were better secret keepers than the NSA, even then, when you start involving thousands of people, or even hundreds of people, or even tens of people things would fail. And they fail a lot quicker than you might expect.”

That’s because every new link increases the potential of failed secret keeping exponentially. By applying a formula to pieces of information that the government wanted to keep secret and entering in the number of people who might have access to that secret information, it should be possible to simulate when “classification” will fail and, thus, whether or not the secret in question should be classified at all and for how long.

The official said that the Department currently employs no formula or data-driven approach to classifying documents.

He called the idea: “brilliant.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

22. U.S. Right-Wingers Keep Confusing Culture War With Actual War

Excerpts:

It may shock some to learn that many of the most vociferous critics of an inclusive military never elected to serve themselves. It is hard to imagine that individuals who feel so strongly about who serves in the military somehow never managed to find their way to a recruiting office during the past two decades of ongoing conflict. Instead, this chickenhawk caucus prefers to spend their taxpayer-funded time tweeting feverishly about how letting women and LGBTQ+ personnel serve their country has somehow made the United States weaker.

Not only is this approach a poor cultural critique, but it is also a facile argument that ignores empirical evidence. The fact is, a more inclusive U.S. military has made the United States better. A modern military defined not only by physical strength but also by technical acumen and mental agility—including a diversity of viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, and abilities—makes the United States’ all-volunteer force the deadliest military in the world. Elected officials should have more important things to deal with than fetishizing authoritarian militaries, but if they must do it, they should leave U.S. service members out of it.

If there is something making U.S. forces less ready, it is the lack of ready platforms and materiel needed to face a peer military challenger—an issue squarely within Congress’s remit to rectify. Politicians should spend more time thinking about real war and less about culture war.

U.S. Right-Wingers Keep Confusing Culture War With Actual War

Russian and Chinese videos about their so-called manly forces are silly propaganda.

By Blake Herzinger, a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre in Sydney. All opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. government or the U.S. Defense Department.

Foreign Policy · by Blake Herzinger · April 19, 2023

Some conservatives in the United States have recently developed a bizarre tendency to uncritically consume foreign military recruiting propaganda. In 2021, Sen. Ted Cruz circulated Russian propaganda in an attempt to malign U.S. military recruiting efforts, and Fox News host Tucker Carlson is on the record complaining that the U.S. military is “more feminine” in comparison to the Chinese military’s “more masculine” nature. Most recently, Sen. Marco Rubio picked out an officer’s brief participation in a shipboard spoken word event as evidence that the U.S. Navy’s internal priorities are misplaced while the People’s Liberation Army Navy trains for war.

In an attempt to score points in a culture war, a select group of pundits and politicians—very few of whom have served themselves—appear to be interpreting these propaganda videos as indicators of combat effectiveness. Whether the videos feature shirtless men doing pushups or glowering paratroopers dropping from the skies, there’s a desire to see the United States emulate these warped displays of apparent masculine prowess—but this would be a mistake.

Anyone consuming these videos needs to understand what they actually are: a farce. Much like the U.S. Marines who slew a lava monster and battled chess pieces in recruiting commercials in the 1980s and ’90s, the soldiers in these videos are almost certainly paid actors. The real Russian military is a mostly conscript force typified by abuse, sexual assault, and working conditions that would make Upton Sinclair faint. Meanwhile, its fellow authoritarian, “no limits” partner, China, has a military that is rife with corruption, hidebound with Communist Party-driven structures that preclude original thought or tactical creativity, and that hasn’t seen actual fighting since 1986—and no full-scale war since 1979. In combat, many of its soldiers will die for the simple reason that they are not allowed to think.

This is not license to ignore the threat posed by either military, but it should be clear that neither is an organization that any Western force should look to emulate. Whatever faults the U.S. military may have, its training is envied, sought after, and emulated (often poorly) around the world. China and Russia rely on scripted training with limited combat value. Much of their training is used to repress their own people.

For U.S. politicians to hold them up as superior is to favor political point-scoring in a facile culture war over U.S. military effectiveness. This not only is dangerous to U.S. national security but also actively undermines Americans who have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution and do so with dignity and respect for their fellow service members.

So-called emasculation features heavily in popular far-right criticisms of the U.S. military—in spite of the fact that women have served in and alongside the military since the founding of the United States, flown combat aircraft since 1993, and been formally allowed in ground combat roles since 2013. Thousands of women have earned Combat Action Badges during combat operations in America’s wars, and hundreds have been decorated for valor under fire.

I have personally served with women who flew into the hottest battles of Iraq to evacuate wounded Marines, tracked Chinese submarines in the Pacific Ocean, and conducted some of the most sensitive and dangerous intelligence missions in recent history. I have deployed with transgender shipmates who did their duty day in and day out in demanding and dangerous environments. I am not unique in knowing remarkable service members who are not heterosexual men; gay men, in particular, have been training and serving in the U.S. military since its founding.

The only time Russian forces have faced U.S. combat troops since 1920 was in a 2018 battle near the city of Deir Ezzor in Syria. A combined group of 500 soldiers, composed of Russian and Syrian combat troops and backed by tanks and three dozen other vehicles, advanced on a U.S. outpost containing less than one-tenth of their total strength. Over the course of a four-hour battle, which brought together the full spectrum of U.S. capabilities, from ground forces to electronic warfare and uncrewed weapons to combat aircraft, U.S. forces eliminated several hundred of the attackers without suffering a single loss of their own.

Strangely, the ability to do shirtless pushups or jump though flaming hoops did not decide the battle. Rather, professional and highly trained personnel of all states, communities, sexual orientations, and genders came together to form a devastatingly lethal response and kill their enemies.

We have seen this again in Ukraine, which has wisely taken in volunteers from all walks of life and diverse backgrounds to form a military capable of defending its interests. Again, some American observers elect to criticize the Ukrainians for releasing videos of young personnel dancing on social media while falling over themselves to praise the so-called manly Russian military and its cultural values. For starters, the idea that a force typified by mass crimes against humanity, including slaughtering mothers and infants in hospitals and waging campaigns of terror, rape, and murder in occupied zones, could be culturally admirable is shocking and should be rejected with disgust by every American.

In terms of combat effectiveness, Russia has again been shown to be shockingly inept. The Russian paratroopers slavered over by far-right pundits have suffered incredible losses in exchange for very few gains. The Russian government now deploying armor fit for a Cold War museum to fight against a diverse force of Ukrainian baristas, IT professionals, and poets who have embarrassed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s forces so completely as to shock the entire world. Neither heterosexuality nor the XY chromosome is an indicator of combat effectiveness or strategic acumen.

To recruit from a diverse population, the military needs to highlight that its culture accommodates and celebrates diversity. U.S. service members deserve to be proud of who they are. Their identities matter. We should not allow them to become embroiled in this absurd culture war, by either side. Politicians do not need to engage in saccharine “thank you for your service” hero worship, but they do owe those in uniform respect for their basic human dignity and for their willingness to serve.

Members of the military should not be held up as objects of derision, nor should they be singled out to highlight the imagined superiority of regimes actively pursuing genocidal campaigns against minorities and mass murder of noncombatants. Using the military like this is a gross abuse of power, taking advantage of the fact that active-duty personnel cannot publicly push back against this malign treatment by members of government.

It may shock some to learn that many of the most vociferous critics of an inclusive military never elected to serve themselves. It is hard to imagine that individuals who feel so strongly about who serves in the military somehow never managed to find their way to a recruiting office during the past two decades of ongoing conflict. Instead, this chickenhawk caucus prefers to spend their taxpayer-funded time tweeting feverishly about how letting women and LGBTQ+ personnel serve their country has somehow made the United States weaker.

Not only is this approach a poor cultural critique, but it is also a facile argument that ignores empirical evidence. The fact is, a more inclusive U.S. military has made the United States better. A modern military defined not only by physical strength but also by technical acumen and mental agility—including a diversity of viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, and abilities—makes the United States’ all-volunteer force the deadliest military in the world. Elected officials should have more important things to deal with than fetishizing authoritarian militaries, but if they must do it, they should leave U.S. service members out of it.

If there is something making U.S. forces less ready, it is the lack of ready platforms and materiel needed to face a peer military challenger—an issue squarely within Congress’s remit to rectify. Politicians should spend more time thinking about real war and less about culture war.

Foreign Policy · by Blake Herzinger · April 19, 2023

23. Admiral defends non-binary officer against attacks from GOP lawmakers

These culture wars have to stop.

Admiral defends non-binary officer against attacks from GOP lawmakers

navytimes.com · by Diana Correll · April 18, 2023

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday defended a non-binary Navy officer Tuesday against criticism from Republicans who have used a video of the officer describing their first deployment to question the sea service’s warfighting priorities.

In a video that the Navy Judge Advocate General Corps posted to its Instagram account earlier this month, Lt. j.g. Audrey Knutson described participating in an LGBTQ spoken-word night while deployed aboard the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford and sharing a personally written poem with the ship.

Knutson, who identified as non-binary in the video, called the experience the “culmination of the whole deployment.”

“I’ll tell you why I’m particularly proud of this sailor,” Gilday said. “Her grandfather served during World War II, and he was gay, and he was ostracized in the very institution that she not only joined and is proud to be a part of, but she volunteered to deploy on Ford. And she’ll likely deploy again next month when Ford goes back to sea.”

The video had prompted Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, who has never served in the military, to tweet Wednesday that, “While China prepares for war this is what they have our @USNavy focused on.”

View this post on Instagram

A post shared by U.S. Navy JAG Corps (@usnavyjagcorps)

Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville, a former college football coach from Alabama, weighed in on the matter during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday, claiming that he had “a lot of problems with this video” and how the junior officer described the spoken-word night and poetry reading as the highlight of the deployment.

“I hope we train our officers to prioritize their sailors, not themselves,” Tuberville told Gilday at the hearing. “Did it surprise you that a junior officer says the highlight of her deployment — her first and the ship’s first — was about herself and her own achievement?”

Neither Gilday nor Tuberville used “they/their” pronouns to describe Knutson, though a LinkedIn and Instagram account with the same name and photo similar to Knutson’s JAG post identified as they/their/them.

USS Gerald R Ford expected to deploy for first time in October

The carrier's strike group will focus on “innovation and interoperability” as the crew becomes better acquainted with the vessel’s new capabilities.

Gilday pushed back, explaining that the Navy asks people from all over the country and from all different backgrounds to serve. He said that it’s the responsibility of the commanding officer to “build a cohesive warfighting team that is going to follow the law, and the law requires that we be able to conduct prompt, sustained operations at sea.”

“That level of trust that a commanding officer develops across that unit has to be grounded on dignity and respect,” Gilday said. “And so, if that officer can lawfully join the United States Navy, is willing to serve, and willing to take the same oath that you and I took to put their life on the line, then I’m proud to serve beside them.”

Tuberville said he takes issue with the “obsession” with race, sex and gender because he claimed it is “focused on self, it’s not focused on team.”

“And to do a poem with all that, 8,000 other people on the ship and to focus on herself,” Tuberville said. “And don’t get me wrong, her uncle or whoever that fought – my dad died in the military. Okay. I’m all for that. But I’m all for building the machine. Our recruiting is suffering. We don’t need to have another Bud Light moment.”

Tuberville appeared to reference Bud Light’s recent sponsorship of TikTok influencer Dylan Mulvaney, a transgender woman and transgender activist, that has prompted a backlash against the beer by some Americans.

Tuberville’s father is a World War II veteran, and the recipient of five Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart, according to Tuberville’s official biography.

Rubio’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Navy Times on Gilday’s remarks.

In February, Rubio introduced legislation into the Senate called the Ensuring Military Readiness Act, which would bar most “persons who identify as transgender with a history of diagnosis of gender dysphoria” from serving in the military, with a few exceptions. Tuberville is an original co-sponsor of the measure, which was also introduced in the House by Republican Rep. Jim Banks of Indiana.

“The military has strict standards for who can and cannot qualify to serve. For example, under President Biden, you can’t serve with a peanut allergy,” Rubio said in a statement in February. “Biden has turned our military into a woke social experiment. It is a stupid way to go about protecting our nation. We need to spend more time thinking about how to counter threats like China, Russia, and North Korea and less time thinking about pronouns.”

Aircraft carrier Ford embarks with full air wing for first time

The ship will now operate with the full air wing during the Composite Unit Training Exercise ahead of a deployment later this year.

The Ford departed Naval Station Norfolk in October for a brief service-retained deployment that lasted just under two months, and included approximately 80 percent of a full carrier air wing. That deployment placed the carrier under the authority of Gilday instead of a geographic combatant commander, as is the standard. The carrier is slate to conduct a full-length deployment later this year.

Operations in the fall were designed to familiarize the crew with the vessel’s new technologies, as the strike group focused on air defense, anti-subsurface warfare, and distributed maritime operations. The operations also provided an opportunity to work with six other NATO allies.

The Ford, which was originally scheduled to deploy in 2018, wrapped up its Composite Training Unit Exercise required to deploy on April 2, where it worked to integrate carrier strike group elements as a cohesive force, according to the Navy. The exercise also marked the first time the carrier was embarked with a full carrier air wing.

The Ford has a crew of approximately 5,500 sailors, including those assigned to the ship, air wings and other staff members, according to the Navy.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 19, 2023

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