Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The best people possess a feeling for beauty, the courage to take a rest, the discipline to tell the truth, the capacity for sacrifice. Ironically, their virtues make them vulnerable; they are often wounded, sometimes destroyed.”

- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms

"A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push."

- Ludwig Wittgenstein

"The best teachers are those who show you where to look, but don't tell you what to see."

- Alexandra K. Trenfor

1. US Can Handle China, Ukraine Missions Simultaneously, Top Pacific Admiral Says

2. SASC Hearing on INDOPACOM and Korea

3. What’s Perfectly Round, Made Of Metal, And Keeping Russia From Replacing the 2,000 Tanks It’s Lost In Ukraine?

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2023

5. US war game on Taiwan shows need for 'decisive action' to boost arms

6. Austin seeks to stem discord with allies over document leaks

7. Here are 3 future missiles INDOPACOM says it needs to challenge China

8. Special operation forces induct members into regiments at Fort Bragg. Here's who they are.

9. New special ops wing planned for Tucson’s Davis-Monthan base

10. ‘A new way of thinking’: US Army talks artillery strategy with allies in Poland

11. American Deterrence Is Failing

12. The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe

13. This general helped steer the Army’s post-Vietnam transformation

14. Sustaining Distributed Forces in a Conflict with China

15. America’s Military Is Unprepared for Our Age of Advanced Technology

16. US to focus on national security, not trade, in relations with China

17. Ukraine’s Spring Offensive Is Waiting on Weapons

18. NATO chief: Ukraine’s ‘rightful place’ is in the alliance

19. War Books: The Russian Military

20. The Next Intel Leak May Not Resemble the Most Recent One, Expert Warns

21. US Lawmakers See ‘Maximum Danger’ After Staging a China War Game

22. The Discord Leaker Was a Narcissist, Not an Ideologue

23. Pentagon moving to ensure human control so AI doesn't ‘make the decision for us’

1. US Can Handle China, Ukraine Missions Simultaneously, Top Pacific Admiral Says

But can we simultaneously handle Ukraine, China, and north Korea as well?

US Can Handle China, Ukraine Missions Simultaneously, Top Pacific Admiral Says

But do send more money, the leader of Indo-Pacific Command told lawmakers

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

U.S. forces need a lot of things to make sure China can’t conquer Taiwan, but they don’t need anything that’s going to Ukraine, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command told lawmakers on Thursday.

The notion that the United States can’t deter China while helping Ukraine has steadily gained traction among some key Republicans. Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., opposed the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, arguing that expanding security commitments in Europe would make it harder to keep the peace in Asia. Hawley, an election denier, is not alone. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, a likely presidential candidate, has also said that confronting China is a vital U.S. interest while supporting Ukraine is not. Even some within the Washington, D.C., foreign policy elite, most notably Elbridge Colby of the Marathon Initiative, have made similar arguments.

Twice during Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, INDOPACOM commander Adm. John Aquilino was asked whether he believed U.S. support for Ukraine was hurting his effort to deter China.

“I do not,” Aquilino said. “The United States is the only global force capable of managing multiple threats…I haven't been impacted at this point as it applies to my deterrence mission. So I do believe we can do both.”

For example, he said, the U.S. donation of munitions to Ukraine—such as Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rounds and 155mm howitzer shells—isn’t hurting his stockpiles.

“The fight that's ongoing between the Ukrainians and the Russians—the munitions that we are providing to Ukraine at this time—are not degrading capabilities that are necessary for the fight that might occur in Taiwan,” he said.

But that doesn’t mean that INDOPACOM has all it needs. In addition to the $9.1 billion that the Pentagon is asking lawmakers to give the command, it also lists $3.5 billion in “unfunded priorities” that didn’t make it into this year’s Pentagon budget request.

Top of the list of things that Aquilino says that he needs are more precision long-range missiles to be distributed across the services, such as Tomahawk land-attack missiles and funding for the Army’s Precision Strike Missile Increment II.

“Those are the capabilities that [the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces and Marine Littoral Regiment] forces need” for their missions, he said.

At one point Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, pointed out that China has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 5,500 kilometers. “How many ground-launched missiles of that range does the United States field?” she asked.

Aquilino responded, “None that I'm aware of at this time.”

But he also stressed the need for EC-37B electronic warfare jets as well as a new secure communications system for U.S. partners and allies in the region.

“Part of my unfunded list is something called a Mission Partner Environment to talk to those allies and partners. Right now, [that takes] 13 separate networks. That's costly. They're at risk. And what we are attempting to deliver is a single pane of glass that allows us to communicate securely in a cyber safe way with all of our partners across the region,” regardless of classification, he said.

The U.S. military has stressed a strategy in the INDOPACOM region sometimes described as “fewer bases, more places,” meaning more forces rotating through various locations and fewer fixed bases. That’s particularly important for partners like the Philippines, which have an interest in working with the United States but don’t necessarily want to be a permanent fixed base for U.S. forces.

But that’s more expensive. Aquilino said he needs “campaigning” funds so INDOPACOM can “pick up the force and move it forward into the theater in places where they can operate with our allies and partners and that money is not to do maintenance. It's not to do depo-level sustainment. It is for transportation costs to be able to move the force and sustain the force forward.”

But it’s not all just outlay. Taiwan has U.S. approval to buy $19 billion in arms from U.S. companies, but deliveries are coming slowly, he said.

“I can't tell you which specific ones are backlogged [in an unclassified setting] but if you think about anti-aircraft capability, you think about anti-ship capability in a variety of forms, whether they be missiles, mines, those capabilities would be critical,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

2. SASC Hearing on INDOPACOM and Korea

2 hour testimony can be viewed at this link: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-posture-of-united-states-indo-pacific-command-and-united-states-forces-korea-in-review-of-the-defense-authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2024-and-the-future-years-defense-program

Admiral Aquilino's 42 page statement can be accessed here: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023%20INDOPACOM%20Statement%20-%20OMB%20Approved.pdf. From a quick skim there does not appear to be anything significantly different than his HASC statement.

General LaCamera's 15 page statement can be accessed here: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/USFK%20FY24%20Posture%20Statement%20Final%20SASC%20(006).pdf It does not appear to have any differences from his HASC statement.

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

HEARING STATUSOPEN/CLOSED: HEARING TITLETO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Date: Thursday, April 20th, 2023

Time: 09:30am

Location: SD-G50

WITNESSES

Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN
Commander
United States Indo-Pacific Command
AQUILINO STATEMENT
General Paul J. LaCamera, USA
Commander
United States Forces Korea
LACAMERA STATEMENT

3. What’s Perfectly Round, Made Of Metal, And Keeping Russia From Replacing the 2,000 Tanks It’s Lost In Ukraine?

Isn't this why we bombed the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt in World War II?

What’s Perfectly Round, Made Of Metal, And Keeping Russia From Replacing the 2,000 Tanks It’s Lost In Ukraine?

Forbes · by David Axe · April 20, 2023

The Omsktransmash tank plant in Siberia.

Via social media

A shortage of modern optics is throttling Russia’s ability to manufacture new T-72BM3 and T-90M tanks, and restore older T-72s, T-80s and T-90s, to make good the thousands of tanks it’s lost its wider war on Ukraine.

But optics aren’t the only thing in short supply in the Russian armored vehicle industry. The Russians also are desperately short of ball-bearings, which they used to get from the United States and Europe before the United States and Europe tightened their sanctions on Russian industry.

A new study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. confirmed what independent analysts have been saying for months. Tanks and other modern armored vehicles need a lot of ball-bearings. And Russia doesn’t have enough bearings to maintain steady production of new vehicles.

Especially considering that the Russian war effort—indeed, the whole Russian economy—utterly depends on trains for transportation. And trains also need a lot of ball-bearings. The Russians have a choice. Build more tanks and let the rail system fall apart. Or keep the trains moving, and slow tank-production.

“Historically, Russia has imported most of its high-quality bearings from Western manufacturers,” CSIS analysts Max Bergmann, Maria Snegovaya, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton and Samuel Bendett noted. “In 2020, for instance, Russia imported over $419 million worth of ball bearings, around 55 percent of which originated in Europe and North America; Germany was Russia’s largest trading partner, taking up 17 percent of its total imports that year.”

That changed after Russian forces rolled into northern, eastern and southern Ukraine in February 2022, triggering a wider war that has killed tens of thousands of people on both sides. Kyiv’s foreign allies escalated their sanctions on Moscow’s strategic industries.

Ball-bearing imports were a top target. “Following the start of the invasion, major Western producers of bearings exited Russia and ended their sales there,” the CSIS analysts wrote.

The implications quickly were apparent. After just a few weeks, Russia’s main factories for building new tanks and restoring old tanks—respectively, Uralvagonzavod in Sverdlovsk Oblast and Omsktransmash in Siberia—temporarily froze production.

While work soon resumed, the tank industry’s longer-term prospects were dire. A new T-72BM3 or T-90M tank requires modern optics, and those optics normally come from France. When Paris tightened its sanctions, it deprived Russian industry of the components it needs for the new tanks’ Sosna-U digital sights.

The Kremlin has compensated for a shortage of Sosna-Us by swapping in locally-made analog 1PN96MT-02 sights that, while not as precise as Sosna-Us, at least give a Russian tank crew a fighting chance in a direct fight with Ukrainian crews.

The ball-bearing problem might be even harder for Moscow to solve. Even after trading Sosna-Us for 1PN96MT-02s, Uralvagonzavod and Omsktransmash still were at an impasse. Workers were building or restoring most of a tank, then running out of parts.

It’s for that reason that Russia has struggled to make good the 2,000 or more tanks it has lost in 14 months of hard fighting in Ukraine. Russian forces need at least 150 new or restored tanks a month just to maintain their front-line strength.

Yes, there were small stockpiles of ball-bearings in Russia when the wider war kicked off. But Russian rail-operators needed those bearings, too. If anything, the railways’ hunger for bearings grew as their 13,000 locomotives moved more and more replacement men and equipment to the Ukraine front.

Given a choice between building fewer tanks or freezing transport across Russia, Moscow did the smart thing—and chose the former.

Careful analysis of activity at Uralvagonzavod and Omsktransmash strongly hints the factories every month are shipping out just a few dozen modern-ish tanks: either new-build T-72BM3s or T-90Ms or reconditioned T-72s, T-80s and T-90s that technicians have pulled out of long-term storage.

Which is why the Russians are traveling back in time, technologically speaking, and reactivating 1960s-vintage T-62s and 1950s-vintage T-55s that have been moldering in storage since the 1980s.

The older tanks require fewer modern components and fewer ball-bearings. They’re hopelessly outmatched in a stand-up fight with better-equipped Ukrainian forces, but they at least slow down the Ukrainians. “The T-55 in this sense is a resource-saver and an opportunity to buy time,” a Kremlin source told Volya Media.

With hundreds of T-62s and T-55s temporarily plugging the hole in the Russian army’s force-structure, Russian industry has scrambled to find alternative sources of ball-bearings—and resume building modern tanks.

The obvious alternatives are China and Malaysia. But Chinese and Malaysian bearings generally are inferior to American or European bearings. And that lower quality comes at a cost, the CSIS team explained.

“While Moscow might be able to substitute the import of Western bearings and thus maintain the level of defense-sector production needed to continue its war effort, these bearings will most likely be of a lower quality, which could impact reliability.”

So maybe Russia eventually ramps up tank-production by swapping good bearings for bad bearings. Having also traded modern digital optics for inferior analog optics, these tanks no longer are state-of-the-art.

Sure, they might look like T-72BM3s or T-90Ms. But on the inside, where it really counts, they’re less capable and less durable.

Forbes · by David Axe · April 20, 2023

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2023

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet Sergei Avakyants amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. It is unclear if the Kremlin demoted Avakyants due to his poor performance in the ongoing rills or for other reasons.

A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces as frontline infantry in Ukraine.

The Russian State Duma adopted a law granting members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Militias veterans' status which could possibly cover PMC personnel but does not formally recognize PMC formations.

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint during a meeting with government officials, indicating continued Russian challenges integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine out of concern for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers.

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 20, 2023

Apr 20, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark

April 20, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet on April 19 amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev announced on April 19 the “appointment” of Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants to the headquarters overseeing Russia’s military sports training and patriotic education centers, a clear demotion for one of the seniormost commanding officers in the Russian Navy.[1] It is unclear why a Kremlin official initially announced Avakyants’ reappointment instead of the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Pacific Fleet reported on April 20 that Avankyants is changing position due to his reaching the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) age limit for military service (65 years).[2] However, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that its sources claimed that Avakyants’ demotion was not due to his old age.[3] Several Russian general officers – including current Russian theater commander in Ukraine and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces Oleg Salyukov – have served in the Russian armed forces beyond turning 65. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a surprise readiness check of the Pacific Fleet on April 14 that is still ongoing as of April 20.[4] Russian state wire TASS reported on April 20 that two sources close to the Russian Pacific Fleet’s management stated that current Commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet Admiral Viktor Liina may take command of the Pacific Fleet and that Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Vorobyov may command the Baltic Fleet.[5]

The Kremlin clearly demoted Avakyants from a senior operational commander to a military bureaucrat overseeing programmatic work, despite Russian officials’ framing of the shift as a new “appointment.” Avakyants’ demotion may be connected to the poor performance of Pacific Fleet naval infantry (such as the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades) around Vuhledar since early 2023. Avakyants alternatively may have failed in some manner to conduct large-scale drills in the Pacific. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin linked Avakyants’ dismissal to the Pacific Fleet drills and sarcastically questioned if someone could conduct drills within the Russian MoD, likely advocating for the dismissal of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[6] Another milblogger welcomed Avakyants’ dismissal, stating that Russia needs to appoint younger commanders like Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.[7]

A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s ineffective use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces in Ukraine. The milblogger argued on April 20 that Russian forces are relying on VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units to conduct ground attacks in Ukraine due to a lack of high-quality infantry, despite VDV and Spetsnaz units not initially being prepared for conducting combined arms operations.[8] The milblogger argued that VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units need to carry out their intended purposes and not serve as the Russian military’s elite infantry and assault groups in Ukraine.[9] The milblogger particularly criticized Spetsnaz units for not conducting enough sabotage and targeting operations and VDV units for being too large and requiring expensive specialized equipment that is not useful in the current tactical realities in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger asserted that the Russian military will not be able to normalize command, management, and planning for major operations until it establishes clear roles for VDV, naval infantry, and Spetsnaz units.[11] The milblogger additionally admitted that the Russian military has in practice formed light infantry units without transports for some time, despite the Russian military’s doctrinal focus on ”motorized rifle” (mechanized infantry) units. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s most elite forces – VDV and Spetsnaz – are diluting their combat effectiveness and doctrinal specialties with poorly trained mobilized personnel and volunteers due to high casualties sustained in Ukraine.[12] The milblogger’s criticism of the use of these elite forces further suggests that these units’ reputation as Russia’s elite fighting force in Ukraine is questionable.

The Russian State Duma adopted a law on April 20 that grants members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s (DNR and LNR) Militias veterans' status and could apply to select PMC or other irregular personnel but fails to explicitly address the status of PMC groups as legal entities.[13] The law (adopted in its third reading) provides veteran status to members of the DNR and LNR Militias who have fought since Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, as well as to personnel who served in unspecified organizations which “contribute to the tasks of the Russian Armed Forces” in Ukraine. This framing will likely allow the Kremlin to provide veteran status to select PMC personnel without recognizing the legality of PMCs like the Wagner Group, for which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long campaigned.[14] Prigozhin focused on the lack of recognition of the Wagner Group, though this law would have been an unusual way for the Kremlin to legally recognize Wagner. Prigozhin griped that unnamed Russian entities seek to “forever remove [Wagner] from the history of Russia.”[15] Prigozhin claimed that he is happy for the DNR and LNR militiamen and that he is okay not receiving recognition until authorities eventually punish the individuals who stole Wagner’s recognition.

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border during a meeting with government officials on April 19.[16] Putin claimed that he personally traveled through the Gukovo checkpoint, which connects Rostov and Luhansk oblasts, when returning from his recent trip to occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.[17] Putin stated that poor road conditions at the checkpoint caused a civilian backup and forced trucks delivering perishable goods to wait for hours before passing through, causing shipment delays and price increases in occupied territories.[18] Putin added that some trucks must bypass the checkpoint entirely as the roads are too narrow and practically nonexistent.[19] Putin called on Russian special services and law enforcement to increase the number of inspection complexes and employees at checkpoints and ordered Russian officials to improve roads around checkpoints and establish routes from Rostov-on-Don to Luhansk Oblast.[20]

Putin’s orders indicate that Russia intends to maintain customs checkpoints with the illegally annexed eastern regions out of security concerns. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers complained that Russian checkpoints at the international customs line significantly slowed down Russian deliveries of ammunition to the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast.[21] The Kremlin’s failure to implement meaningful integration policies and secure occupied Ukraine is likely undermining Russia’s ability to provision forces on the front line, as ISW has previously assessed.[22] Putin is likely attempting to remedy the delays by expanding staffing to speed up inspections at the checkpoints and is not entertaining the possibility of removing these obstructions. Russia previously intensified security measures and inspections around the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Kremlin likely continues to use these checkpoints for similar security reasons.[23] The Kremlin may also use these checkpoints to prevent the mass movement of men from occupied Ukraine escaping forced mobilization, to stop Russian mobilized personnel from fleeing to Russia, and to maintain Russian filtration measures. The existence of these checkpoints further highlights that Russian officials do not view the residents of occupied Ukraine as Russian nationals and are governing as the occupying power they are, despite ongoing claims the illegally annexed territories are part of Russia.

Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss announced his resignation on April 20, reportedly in response to an offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin to work at the federal level.[24] The reason for Uss’ promotion is currently unclear but may be part of Putin’s efforts to strengthen control over regional officials.

Key Takeaways

A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces as frontline infantry in Ukraine.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine out of concern for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers.

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions in the Kreminna area and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near the southern outskirts of Kreminna and near Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian sources reported battles near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces are operating near the settlement.[26] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that previous Russian claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Spirne (13 km south of Bilohorivka) were premature and that Ukrainian forces still control the settlement as of April 20.[27] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in the direction of Torske (15 km west of Kreminna), Terny (17 km northwest of Kreminna), and Nevske (17 km northwest of Kreminna).[28]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Tymikva, Kharkiv Oblast (32km northwest of Svatove) and Andriivka, Luhansk Oblast (15 west of Svatove).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued assault operations in Bakhmut and its vicinity on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 22 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut direction – specifically in Bakhmut city and in the area of Khromove (2km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian conventional forces attempted to advance towards Stupochky (about 14km southwest of Bakhmut) while Wagner Group forces continued to attack Ukrainian forces from central, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian source claimed that Wagner forces are changing the direction of the main attack against Bakhmut and are intensifying efforts to advance towards the O0506 highway that runs through Khromove into Bakhmut.[32] A milblogger claimed that Wagner forces attacked near Khromove and were able to advance to an unspecified highway - likely the O0506 - that Ukrainian forces use as a ground line of communication (GLOC) into Bakhmut.[33] Geolocated footage posted on April 20 showed Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions northwest of Khromove.[34] A Wagner-affiliated source published a video purportedly showing Wagner tank crews firing at Ukrainian forces in central Bakhmut using T-90 tanks.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner forces are ”confidently” holding positions in the area of the Bakhmut administration building and the central square forces while Ukrainians hold a ”relatively small” portion of the urban area.[36]

Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka; within 5km northeast of Avdiivka in Kamianka; and within 15km west of Avdiivka in Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled numerous Russian attacks on Marinka and Pobieda, 23km and 27km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces in Marinka and unsuccessfully resumed ground attacks near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[39] The milblogger claimed that a Russian assault on Sieverne from the direction of Vodyane forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from unspecified positions.[40] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to launch assaults on Marinka and Nevelske, and that fighting is ongoing in the vicinity of Novobakhmutivka (about 15km northwest of Avdiivka).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in the area of Krasnohorivka (about 9km north of Avdiivka), where fighting is currently ongoing.[42] Geolocated footage also showed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) artillery elements of the 14th “Kalmius” Artillery Brigade providing fire support to the 80th “Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion by striking Ukrainian positions north of Vodyane.[43] Elements of the DNR‘s “Pyatnyshka” Volunteer Battalion are operating in the Avdiivka direction.[44] The DNR‘s 5th Brigade of the 1st Army Corps continued operating in the Marinka direction.[45]

Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions southwest of Donetsk City on April 20 but did not make any territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Prechystivka and Vuhledar within 60km southwest of Donetsk City.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack in the direction of Prechystivka, and Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force near Pavlivka (about 48km southwest of Donetsk City).[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian “Grim” (“Thunder”) Tactical Group Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast are equipping defensive lines, looting, and transporting looted goods in cars, as Russian forces feel insecure about their positions.[48] Pletenchuk noted that discourse about the likely upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive is filling the Russian information space.[49] Pletenchuk stated that minefields actively inhibit Russian advances in an unspecified area in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces will transfer 400 conscripts from Izyumivka (14km northwest of Feodosia) to defensive positions in Volodymyrivka, Crimea (18km southwest of Yevpatoria).[50] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces operated a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system, normally a military district-level asset, near Novodanylivka (36km southwest of Hulyaipole) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, which could indicate a Russian prioritization to augment Russian defensive positions along this line.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Russian forces may have made marginal territorial gains to the south and southeast of Hulyaipole but caveated his report, stating that this information is unconfirmed.[52] Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on April 20.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing some formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an audio intercept on April 19 in which a Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) soldier claimed that unspecified Russian authorities cut off and shut down the BARS volunteer soldier program and terminated his contract.[54] The soldier stated that the Wagner Group PMC and the Russian MoD-operated Redut PMC are taking over the contracts of the former BARS soldiers.[55] Russian State Duma Deputy Fedot Tumusov claimed on April 19 that Wagner PMC and the “Veterany” PMC of the 3rd Army Corps forcibly enlisted six mobilized residents of the Sakha Republic.[56] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported on April 13 that the “Wolves” PMC – which likely has ties to the Wagner Group PMC – forced 100 mobilized soldiers in Stakhanov, Luhansk Oblast, to join its ranks.[57]

Russian volunteer formations have suffered major losses and likely have abysmal morale. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Russian volunteers of the “Nevsky” volunteer formation deployed in Donetsk Oblast experience low morale and psychological strain due to personnel losses, ammunition shortages, and uncertainty regarding potential reinforcements. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that an increasing number of Russian soldiers want to leave their units and return home.[58] Low morale among volunteer fighters decreases the effectiveness of Russian forces deployed on the front lines and intensifies the urgency and difficulty of the Kremlin’s ongoing aggressive campaigns to increase contract service recruitment.[59]

Major personnel losses continue to force Russian force structures to evolve. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) noted on April 20 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claimed visit to the Dnepr Group of Forces on April 18 is one of the first public references to the existence of the Dnepr Group of Forces organization. The UK MoD noted that the existence of this seemingly new group of forces indicates Russian forces’ structural adaptation from traditional Russian operational formations organized along Russian military districts, possibly due to heavy losses among Russia’s regular units.[60]

Russian authorities continue to respond to and prepare for the digitization of Russia’s conscription and mobilization processes. St. Petersburg authorities on April 20 joined Moscow authorities in conducting a trial period of issuing digital summons in preparation for the upcoming large-scale digitization of the conscription and mobilization process.[61] Sever.Reallii reported on April 20 that Russian authorities blocked the Russian opposition Yabloko Party’s St. Petersburg chapter from conducting a planned demonstration against the digital summonses law. The authorities claimed that the Yabloko protestors erroneously filed a permit application for a demonstration and that the application was submitted outside the formal 14-day advanced notice period.[62] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace analyst Mikhail Komin assessed on April 19 that Russian authorities are competing to control digitalization reforms and the database containing information on all residents eligible for military service. Komin noted that the timeline and complexity of the reforms further increase the low likelihood that the reforms will succeed.[63]

Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces received a new batch of Shahed drones from Iran.[64] Several Russian and Ukrainian sources reported a series of Shahed attacks across Ukraine on April 19 and 20.[65] Humenyuk stated that these attacks ended a temporary Russian pause in Shahed drone use in anticipation of new deliveries.[66]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 20 that the Coordination Council of the occupied Kherson Oblast branch of the Russian social group “Movement of the First” met for the first time with Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravstov. Saldo claimed that more than 200 young activists have traveled to youth camps in Russia for vacation and study since the regional Movement of the First group was established in February 2023. Saldo claimed that the group has established 58 primary organizations in occupied Kherson Oblast to help teachers promote Russian history and patriotism in the classroom.[67]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce their candidacy for highly performative preliminary elections in occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov announced on April 20 that he submitted his candidacy to participate in the All-Russian United Russia Party preliminary voting, which will take place from May 22-28.[68] Rogov urged residents to ensure that Zaporizhia Oblast flourishes by specifically supporting the Kremlin-backed United Russia Party.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continued conducting exercises as part of a Belarusian Command Staff exercise in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on April 20 that the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade completed its participation in the Belarusian command staff exercise at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.[70] Unspecified Belarusian chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN) elements participated in the Belarusian command staff exercise in an unspecified location on April 20.[71] Unspecified Belarusian tank elements participated in exercises at an unspecified training ground in Brest Oblast on April 20.[72]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/far-east/news/trutnev-soobshchil-chto-komandovavshiy-tof-admiral-avakyanc-vozglavit-shtab-centrov-voenno-sportivnoy-podgotovki-i-patrioticheskogo-vospitaniya; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/04/2023/644094d09a794771c7528072

[2]

https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/04/20/971760-tihookeanskii-flot-podtverdil-otstavku-komanduyuschego-avakyantsa

[3] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17568223; https://t.me/milinfolive/99535

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/25631; https://t.me/mod_russia/25804; https://t.me/mod_russia/25800; https://t.me/mod_russia/25791; https://t.me/mod_russia/25814

[5] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17568223; https://t.me/milinfolive/99535

[6] https://t.me/strelkovii/4583;

[7] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24523 ; https://t.me/akashevarova/6320

[8] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7545

[9] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7545

[10] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7545

[11] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7545

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041423

[13] https://t.me/readovkanews/57227; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2023/04/20/gd-priniala-zakonoproekt-nadeliaiushchii-statusom-veterana-boitsov-chvk-i-voennosluzhashchikh-iz-dnr-i-lnr-news; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/56937/

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/806

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70956

[17] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70956

[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70956

[19] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70956

[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70956

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/astrapress/25238 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/20/gubernator-krasnoyarskogo-kraya-aleksandr-uss-v-blizhayshie-dni-mozhet-uyti-v-otstavku-nedavno-ego-syn-sbezhal-iz-pod-domashnego-aresta-v-italii

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1...

[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/20/za-mynulyj-tyzhden-naczgvardijczi-znyshhyly-blyzko-300-okupantiv-vijskovu-tehniku-ta-sklad-z-boyeprypasamy-rf-mykola-urshalovych/ ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9948

[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83441

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/25810

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83420; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20481; https://t.me/milchronicles/1797; https://t.me/milinfolive/99547

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[34] https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1649043433548546048; https://twitter.com/Bodbe6/status/1649020090023550977

[35] https://t.me/basurin_e/911

[36] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20465

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1...

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46935

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83441

[43] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/16027; https://twitter.com/SyriaWar2/status/1648783184669163520

[44] https://t.me/ttambyl/2455; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1649049325463572481

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10234

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/12045

[48] https://suspilne Dot media/450939-ukraina-otrimae-novu-dopomogu-vid-ssa-sili-oboroni-vedut-kontrnastup-na-kilkoh-napramkah-421-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681996494&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps /; https://suspilne dot media/451605-voni-boatsa-i-namagautsa-ukripiti-liniu-frontu-presoficer-takticnoi-grupi-grim-pro-situaciu-na-hersonsini/

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

Assessment%2C%20March%2019%2C%202023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroun

der/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/25793

[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83441

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mdxkhnf6SUn7VTvWz1...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...; https://t.me/mod_russia/25810; https://t.me/hueviyherson/38200; https://t.me/epoddubny/15618; https://t.me/readovkanews/57202

[54] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nam-nado-ostrov-otbyt-my-na-ostrov-plavaem-razmynyruem-snymaem-myny.html

[55] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nam-nado-ostrov-otbyt-my-na-ostrov-plavaem-razmynyruem-snymaem-myny.html

[56] https://t.me/istories_media/2383; https://t.me/fedot_tumusov/3232

[57] https://t.me/astrapress/25124

[58]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[59] https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1649021440547598336?s=20; https://t.me/mod_russia/25792

[60] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1648926975145156608

[61] https://t.me/fontankaspb/38032; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/20/v-peterburge-nachali-rassylat-testovye-elektronnye-povestki-voenkom-moskvy-govoril-chto-dlya-etogo-nuzhno-otdelnoe-postanovlenie-pravitelstva; https://ura dot news/news/1052642808; https://rus.err dot ee/1608953923/v-peterburge-nachali-rassylat-jelektronnye-povestki; https://www.rbc dot ru/society/17/04/2023/643d59259a7947bec6526400

[62] https://t.me/severrealii/16186

[63] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89567; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/20/za-kontrol-nad-novym-reestrom-voennoobyazannyh-boryutsya-samye-vliyatelnye-gruppy-v-rossiyskoy-elite-pochemu-reforma-mozhet-provalitsya-iz-za-etogo

[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne dot media/450939-ukraina-otrimae-novu-dopomogu-vid-ssa-sili-oboroni-vedut-kontrnastup-na-kilkoh-napramkah-421-den-vijni-onlajn/

[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne dot media/450939-ukraina-otrimae-novu-dopomogu-vid-ssa-sili-oboroni-vedut-kontrnastup-na-kilkoh-napramkah-421-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24506; https://t.me/readovkanews/57180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...; https://t.me/milinfolive/99524; https://t.me/readovkanews/57191; https://www.facebook.com/reel/894385378521244/?s=single_unit

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne dot media/450939-ukraina-otrimae-novu-dopomogu-vid-ssa-sili-oboroni-vedut-kontrnastup-na-kilkoh-napramkah-421-den-vijni-onlajn/

[67] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/697

[68] https://t.me/vrogov/8838

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/8838

[70] https://t.me/modmilby/26045

[71] https://t.me/modmilby/26081

[72] https://t.me/modmilby/26029

US war game on Taiwan shows need for 'decisive action' to boost arms

Reuters · by Michael Martina

WASHINGTON, April 20 (Reuters) - A U.S. congressional war game simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan showed the need to arm the island "to the teeth," the chair of a committee on China said on Thursday, after the exercise indicated the U.S. must boost production of long-range missiles and businesses must brace for economic fallout.

The House of Representatives' Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, led by Republican Mike Gallagher, conducted the unusual tabletop exercise on Wednesday evening with Washington think tank the Center for a New American Security, the results showing U.S. resupply of the island would be impossible after a conflict begins.

"We are well within the window of maximum danger for a Chinese Communist Party invasion of Taiwan, and yesterday's war game stressed the need to take action to deter CCP aggression and arm Taiwan to the teeth before any crisis begins," Gallagher said in a statement.

The U.S. must clear a $19 billion weapons backlog to Taiwan, conduct enhanced joint military training and reinforce the U.S. military in the region, he said.

Anxiety about a possible conflict over Taiwan, the self-ruled island that China claims as its own, has become a rare bipartisan issue in Washington. U.S. officials say Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade the island by 2027, but acknowledge this does not mean China has decided to do so.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. The U.S. is Taiwan's most important arms supplier but the island has complained of delayed weapons deliveries.

Taiwan's de facto embassy in Washington did not respond immediately to a request for comment on the war game.

A person close to the committee outlined for Reuters the war game's conclusions, which included high U.S. losses if Washington did not shore up basing agreements with regional allies, rapid depletion of long-range missile stockpiles, and world markets in "absolute tatters."

"The business community is not taking the threat of a Taiwan crisis seriously enough," Gallagher said ahead of the game, warning such an attitude "verges on dereliction of fiduciary duty."

Reporting by Michael Martina Editing by Don Durfee and Josie Kao

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Michael Martina

6. Austin seeks to stem discord with allies over document leaks

Austin seeks to stem discord with allies over document leaks

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · April 21, 2023

RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany (AP) — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin sought Friday to tamp down any discord between the U.S. and its allies over the massive U.S. leak of classified documents, as he met with defense leaders from around the globe to coordinate additional military aid to Ukraine.

Acknowledging that the other nations have closely followed the issue, Austin hit the subject head on in his opening remarks to start the meeting. The move underscored the gravity of the situation, since many of the documents distributed online revealed details on the status of the war in Ukraine and the ongoing delivery of weapons and other equipment to Ukrainian forces in battle — intelligence matters the other defense officials are keenly involved in.

“I take this issue very seriously,” Austin said at the start of the daylong session at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. “And we will continue to work closely and respectfully with our deeply valued allies and partners. “

Austin said he’d spoken to allies and partners about the matter, and “I’ve been struck by your solidarity and your commitment to reject efforts to divide us. And we will not let anything fracture our unity.”

The meeting marks the one-year anniversary of the creation by Austin of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. This is the 11th time the defense leaders have met to coordinate aid to the invaded country. They have vowed to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian forces for as long as it takes. But the document leaks pose a multi-pronged concern.

Russia-Ukraine war

US to begin training Ukrainian troops on Abrams tank

Women's soccer team plays to keep Mariupol in spotlight

NATO chief: Ukraine’s ‘rightful place’ is in the alliance

AP image of Mariupol hospital attack wins World Press Photo

Some allies in the room may be more wary about sharing intelligence and other information with the U.S,. fearing it might spill out to the public. Others may worry that the U.S. will clamp down on its own dissemination of intelligence involving the war, leaving them less informed.

The unease comes at a crucial time. Ukrainian leaders are gearing up for the launch of a spring counteroffensive to try and take back territory gained by the Russians, hoping to give Kyiv a stronger position if the warring sides try to negotiate peace.

So far, Austin and others have insisted that the intelligence leak hasn’t driven a wedge between the U.S. and its allies and partners. But the stunning breach exposing closely held intelligence has sparked international concern and raised fresh questions about America’s ability to safeguard its secrets.

Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, has been charged under the Espionage Act with unauthorized retention and transmission of classified national defense information. He served as an information technology specialist and held a top secret security clearance, which gave him access to highly classified programs.

Teixeira, 21, is accused of sharing highly classified military documents about Russia’s war in Ukraine and other top national security issues in a chat room on Discord, a social media platform that started as a hangout for gamers.

U.S. Air Force leaders said earlier this week that they were investigating how a lone airman could access and distribute possibly hundreds of highly classified documents. The Air Force has also taken away the intelligence mission from the Air National Guard 102nd Intelligence Wing based in Cape Cod, where Teixeira served, pending further review.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · April 21, 2023

7. Here are 3 future missiles INDOPACOM says it needs to challenge China

Here are 3 future missiles INDOPACOM says it needs to challenge China - Breaking Defense

“The bottom line is the entire joint force is required to help deliver effects to both deter and fight and win,” said US Indo-Pacific Command head Navy Admiral John Aquilino.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · April 20, 2023

The Army’s PrSM weapon is seen during a test launch. (Lockheed Martin)

WASHINGTON — The United States military needs to speed up the development of a trio of enhanced missiles to prepare for any potential military conflict with China, according to the US commander in charge of the region.

US Indo-Pacific Command head Navy Admiral John Aquilino has been making his rounds on Capitol Hill this week to discuss his spending priorities with lawmakers and affirm that a war with China is “not inevitable.” However, his ongoing assessment of munitions needs for the theater has identified several deficiencies, he told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

“We always look at lessons learned [and] certainly one that came out of the Ukraine conflict was the ability to ensure that our stockpiles were correct, with the right number and the right types of weapons in capability,” the admiral explained.

“The bottom line is the entire joint force is required to help deliver effects to both deter and fight and win,” he later added.

More specifically, the Pentagon’s fiscal 2024 budget request includes $9.1 billion for “Pacific Deterrence,” but Aquilino has submitted an unfunded priority list that identifies a $3.5 billion gap.

In the hearing, Aquilino was asked specifically about three weapons on that list: the hypersonic SM-6 Block 1B, a a future iteration of the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM Increment 2).

While that first ship-launched missile, designed to use its own speed to potentially counter incoming hypersonic missiles, is aligned for the Navy, Aquilo said wants the second two for land forces. He indicated Marine Littoral Regiments should be outfitted ground-based Tomahawk launchers that can fire the future maritime variant, while Army soldiers within new multi-domain task force formations need the ship sinking PrSM Inc 2.

“Those are the capabilities that those forces need to bring… with them in the region to do the missions assigned,” Aquilino said. “So that’s why I’ve advocated for those right types and right numbers.”

Aquilino and other combatant commanders have been tasked with reviewing their munition needs, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm Christopher Grady said earlier this month during a Center for Strategic and International Studies event. While this review has been billed as an ongoing exercise, Pentagon leaders watching Ukraine forces run through munitions against Russian troops are placing an increased emphasis on ramping up munition production lines and weapon stockpiles that they deem critical to military conflict in the Indo-Pacific waters.

That calculus is driving Pentagon leaders to seek dollars for new multi-year procurement deals in FY24 for several weapons including the Naval Strike Missile, SM-6, AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER).

Aquilino told lawmakers that he also needs an influx of dollars to speed up the development of those three weapons, though it is not immediately clear if additional funds would make that happen.

For the SM-6 Block IB, Raytheon is developing the missile to strike targets at extended ranges by adding in a new second stage rocket motor. If missile development stays on track, the Navy anticipates having that weapon ready to deliver to its fleet in FY27, according to the annual Director, Operational Test and Evaluation report released in January.

The Navy is also working with Raytheon on the future Maritime Strike Tomahawk, or MST, to strike moving targets at sea from its fleet of Guided Missile Cruisers, Guided Missile Destroyers and Nuclear-Powered Fast Attack Submarines. The US Marine Corps is also developing a ground-based Tomahawk launcher that could be able to launch the new weapon.

Under the MST program, the all-up round missile is being upgraded along with the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System, and the Theater Mission Planning Center, according to FY24 budget justification documents. If MST development proceeds as planned, it will be ready for initial fielding at the start of FY25, the service noted.

Meanwhile, the Army and Lockheed Martin are preparing to field PrSM Inc 1 to replace the company’s MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and hit targets at least 500 kilometers away. The service is also eyeing a trio of follow up upgrades, including the aforementioned PrSM Inc 2 that Aquilino wants to see in the Indo-Pacific sooner rather than later.

Under that upgrade, the service is designing a multi-mode seeker, known as the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) seeker, that will enable the weapon to also strike ships. Right now, though, the Army anticipates having an PrSM Inc 2 “early operational capability” ready in FY27, according to recent budget justification documents.

For this land-based weapon, though, it is not yet clear which countries will greenlight the US Army to station the weapon on their soil. On Monday, a senior US defense official told reporters that the Biden administration is having “ongoing discussions with allies and partners” about where capabilities like PrSM and land-based hypersonic weapons can be eventually placed.

“[Those] ongoing discussions [are] about making sure that we have the optimal force posture in the region and that’s focused on making sure we have the right mix of capabilities to strengthen deterrence,” the official said.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · April 20, 2023

8. Special operation forces induct members into regiments at Fort Bragg. Here's who they are.

Some great Americans. Photos at the link: https://www.fayobserver.com/story/news/military/2023/04/21/special-operation-forces-induct-notable-veterans-at-fort-bragg/70123826007/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

Special operation forces induct members into regiments at Fort Bragg. Here's who they are.

fayobserver.com · by Rachael Riley

The Fayetteville Observer

Thirteen veterans and civilians were named as distinguished and honorary members Thursday to the regiments of the Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs community.

The inductees were honored during a ceremony that coincides with the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Heritage Week to celebrate 71 years of training and education in Army special operation forces.

Among the inductees are a Medal of Honor recipient, a former acting secretary of defense and ambassadors.

Each of the inductees has contributed to the legacy and history of their respective regiments and the nation in and out of uniform, said Brig. Gen. Guillaume “Will” Beaurpere, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School.

“The stories of physical and intellectual capabilities and adaptability of our inductees remind us that once we set our minds to an objective and a mission and commit our energies, there is very little we as Americans can not accomplish,” Beaurpere said.

Psychological Operations

Retired Col. Rick Springett served in multiple roles within the psychological operations regiment including in the U.S. Special Operations Command.

As chief of the Military Information Support Operations Branch, he was responsible for four trans-regional programs supporting the geographic combatant commands and theatre special operations commands. The programs included strategic military information support operations “directed against Al Qaida, their affiliates, and violent extremism.”

Between 2004 to 2008, Springett worked with others to establish policies and procedures for the initial assessment of psychological operations and civil affairs officers.

After his retirement in 2014, Springett was a senior civilian plans analyst under SOCOM’s Sensitive Activities Division until 2021, deploying to Afghanistan and Southwest Asia in the role.

First Lt. Daniel J. Edelman entered the Army as a public relations specialist during World War II under the 5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Co., 100th Infantry Division.

His time at the Office of War Information “allowed him to counter German propaganda and disinformation” through publishing “Der Speigel,” a German magazine, and polling Germans to determine their attitudes toward the occupation and the Nuremberg Trials.

Edelman founded his own public relations firm in 1952, which counts a campaign to increase support for the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in its portfolio. Edelman dedicated his time to nonprofits like the American Red Cross and Save the Children until his death in 2013.

Special Forces

Maj. John J. Duffy was presented the Medal of Honor on July 5, by President Joe Biden for his 1972 actions in Vietnam.

According to Duffy’s citation, he served as a senior enlisted advisor to the 11th Airborne Battalion, 2d Brigade, Airborne Division. After his commander was killed during an attack that wounded Duffy twice, Duffy refused to be evacuated.

Duffy directed defense around a support base on April 14, 1972, and moved close to enemy positions to call in airstrikes, becoming wounded again.

After the enemy attacked the base, Duffy ensured wounded friendly foreign soldiers were moved to safety and maintained his position during indirect enemy fire. He was the last man to leave the base during a withdrawal.

When the acting battalion commander was wounded, he assumed command of the evacuation and maintained communication with the available air support to direct fire on the enemy.

The following morning, Duffy organized defensive positions when the enemy ambushed the battalion and led the wounded to an evacuation area.

Retired Maj. Gen. David A. Morris was a charter member of Charlie Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group Combatant Commanders, which is now known as the Critical Threats Advisory Co.

During his career, he conducted foreign internal defense in support of the El Salvadorian government during two tours and received presidential approval for his recommendation to overcome the insurgents' advantage.

Near the end of his first decade of service, Morris was selected to assume responsibility for Phase I training of the Special Forces Qualification Course at Camp Mackall.

His career included developing a program with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to use artificial intelligence to guide the mission planning of U.S. special operations forces and helped develop a program that later became the Defense Threat Database System.

In 1989, he wrote a paper that provided support to special operations forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff at the time, approved Morris’ classified plan for creating the Army Special Mission Unit.

In retirement, he has served as chairman of the Green Beret Foundation and serves with veteran nonprofit organizations.

Retired Col. Ronald D. Johnson enlisted in the National Guard in 1971 and graduated from the Special Forces Officers Course in 1977, while assigned to the 20th Special Forces Group. In 1984, he entered active-duty service as the detachment commander with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group in Panama.

He would serve in a wide variety of roles, including being selected as the first Special Forces officer to attend the Army War College fellowship at the Central Intelligence Agency.

Johnson spent most of his military career in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility and led combat operations in El Salvador as one of the authorized 55 military advisors during the civil war there in the 1980s.

He also deployed to the Balkans in the 1990s as the senior military officer of an integrated team made up of members of the CIA, National Security Agency and Special Mission Unit to apprehend people indicted for war crimes.

After leaving military service, Johnson worked with the CIA and participated in worldwide operational and combat experiences with special mission units. He also served as the senior representative for directors of National Intelligence and the CIA at the U.S. Southern Command and as the science and technology liaison to the U.S. Special Operations Command for the Central Intelligence Agency.

In 2019, he was appointed and served as the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador until his retirement in 2021.

Retired Col. Christopher C. Miller served as an enlisted infantryman in the U.S. Army Reserves and as a military policeman in the Washington, D.C., National Guard during his 27 years of military service.

In 1993, he transferred to U.S. Army Special Forces, serving in numerous command and staff positions within the 5th Special Forces Group.

He is credited for being a “key player” during numerous worldwide deployments and contributing to the planning and participation of the 5th Special Forces Group's initial combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Miller served in numerous special operations organizations and as deputy commander of the Specialized Joint Unit, U.S. Special Operations Southern Command.

After retiring in 2014, he worked as a defense contractor, a special assistant to the president at the National Security Council, assistant secretary of defense for special operations low-intensity conflict and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.

Miller served as the acting secretary of defense from Nov. 9, 2020, to Jan. 20, 2021.

Retired Col. Mark E. Mitchell commissioned in 1987 as an infantry officer and served in the 24th Infantry Division, including in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

He graduated from the Special Forces qualification course in 1993 and served as a detachment commander, company commander, battalion operations officer, and battalion commander with the 5th Special Forces Group during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Mitchell spent a significant portion of his military career in the Central Command Area of Responsibility, leading combat operations in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

He was director of plans at the U.S. Special Operations Command Central; director of operations for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula and was also commander of the 5th Special Forces Group and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force at the Arabian Peninsula.

He has also served as director for Counterterrorism on the National Security Council and after his military retirement, served as principal deputy and acting assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

Retired Lt. Col. Roger D. Carstens commanded a platoon in the 75th Rangers, including a combat jump into Panama during Operation Just Cause.

He graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1991 and was a detachment commander and company executive officer and battalion executive officer with the 10th Special Forces Group in Germany.

He’s also commanded Company A, 4th Battalion and Company F, 1st Battalion under the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, training soldiers in unconventional warfare skills including the final Robin Sage exercise.

Carstens served as legislative liaison for U.S. Special Operations Command and as an advisor to the National Counter Terror Bureau during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

After his military career, Carstens has served as a special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, which negotiates the release of American citizens wrongfully detained abroad or taken hostage by terrorists and was designated as an ambassador by the president.

He also served as senior counterinsurgency and security force assistance advisor in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Sgt. 1st Class Riley E. Lott Jr. was of several Green Berets of Native American descent.

Lott altered his birth certificate at the age of 16 in 1960 to join the Army as a medic. After basic training personnel discovered his age, he was sent home and rejoined the military the next year.

Lott spent five of his nine years of military service in Vietnam as a combat medic.

He began his education in jungle medicine at Long An, Vietnam, treating those affected by the siege of the Special Forces team as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group revolted against U.S. forces.

In Don Phuoc, he lived with, fought alongside, trained and treated Cambodian strikers who made up the Mobile Strike Force Command

Lott worked with the Cambodian forces to rebuild the abandoned Special Forces camp at To Chau and clear areas surrounding Special Forces camps at Cai Cai and My Dien II.

Lott left the Army at the age of 26 but continued to help family members, veterans and strangers in need, taking veterans to hospice care and hosting weekly veteran lunches.

He died Aug. 29, 2021.

Azadeh Aryana was born in Tehran and fled Iran during the Islamic Revolution of 1979 with her 3-year-old son. Pregnant at the time and fleeing under diplomatic immunity, she arrived in California.

While awaiting the arrival of her husband who was still in Iran, Aryana, with limited English, worked as a janitor at a fast-food restaurant.

She first rose through the ranks at the restaurant, before rising in the ranks and becoming security director of Cisco Systems, a multinational digital communications conglomerate.

Aryana then opened her own security firm providing personal security to clients in the San Francisco area.

After putting her children through college, she retired and devoted her time to American service members after a family member joined Special Forces.

Over the past 17 years, she has personally shipped more than 10,000 care packages to deployed active and reserve Special Forces soldiers.

Additionally, Aryana serves as a Special Forces goodwill ambassador, consistently attending military homecomings across California and has participated as a patriot motorcycle rider.

Civil Affairs

Born in Peru and raised in Arizona, retired Col. Ernesto L. Sirvas commissioned to serve in the field artillery branch from 1987 to 1996. He then joined the Civil Affairs branch from 1996 to 2015.

At the beginning of his Civil Affairs career with the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Sirvas served four years in various roles including as a team leader, operations officer, company executive officer, company commander and logistics staff officer.

Sirvas' next assignment took him to Special Operations Command South in Puerto Rico for four years, where he served as a Civil Affairs planner and command group executive officer.

Sirvas continued his career by commanding the U.S. Army Forces Battalion in support of Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and returned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade as deputy commander.

In 2010, Sirvas was assigned to Regional Command West, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. There, he coordinated and synchronized U.S. support to stability and governance efforts in the Afghan provinces of Herat, Rarah, Badghis, and Ghor, and advised the commander and staff on matters pertaining to stability and governance.

He also worked with Spanish, Lithuanian, Italian, and U.S. governments and agencies to implement programs supporting International Security Force Assistance joint command lines of effort in western Afghanistan.

Sirvas returned to Fort Bragg to serve as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command chief of Concepts, Experimentation, and Science and Technology.

He also directed the creation of a cross-organization planning team to review and develop recommendations to redesign the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs structure to enhance the soldiers' career paths and their ability to support the conventional maneuver force commander. Furthermore, he directed the implementation of a Reserve Component Civil Affairs Captains' Career Course.

After 28 years of Army service, Sirvas retired and continues to be of service to the military community through volunteer work, providing scholarships to military family members, donating to family readiness groups and assisting Civil Affairs soldiers and families after traumatic events.

Donald C. Barton first enlisted in the Army from 1974-1981 as an air defense artillery vulcan gunner and other positions. In 1981, he reenlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve and served at the 307 Psychological Operations Company in roles of increasing leadership until 1993. In 1993, Barton returned to active duty and served until his retirement in 2006.

After 20 years of active service and 12 years of reserve service, Barton authored and coauthored several documents that established or revised more than seven Civil Affairs military occupational specialties.

He's also provided analysis during the Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assessment.

Barton is currently a Fayetteville resident.

Spencer Meredith IlI serves as a professor of National Security Strategy at the National Defense University, College of International Security Affairs.

He has spent more than half that time mentoring, advising, and educating the operational and institutional special operations forces.

He provides regional expertise on Eastern Europe, Russian, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern politics, and their roles throughout the special operations community.

He also serves as a subject-matter expert for several geographic combatant commands, the intelligence community, and joint special operations and frequently advises the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and subordinate units at Fort Bragg.

Meredith also has articles appearing in professional publications such as Strategy Bridge, Small Wars Journal, InterAgency Journal and Foreign Policy Journal.

Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.

Military and crime editor F.T. Norton contributed to this report.

fayobserver.com · by Rachael Riley

9. New special ops wing planned for Tucson’s Davis-Monthan base

New special ops wing planned for Tucson’s Davis-Monthan base

Stars and Stripes · by David Wichner · April 20, 2023

A U.S. Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II prepares to take off at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., July 12, 2017. The A-10 has provided close air support in worldwide operations for the past three decades. (Airman 1st Class Mya Crosby/U.S. Air Force)

TUCSON, Ariz. (Tribune News Service) — Tucson’s Davis-Monthan Air Force Base will become home to a new special-operations wing as its A-10 “Warthog” ground-support jets are finally retired over the next few years, under a new Air Force plan.

Local officials were recently briefed on the plan, which would establish a new “power projection wing” under the Air Force Special Operations Command at D-M, joining the base’s related combat search and rescue mission.

Tucson-area leaders have been anxious about what will happen to D-M as the Air Force looks to retire its biggest flying mission — three squadrons of A-10 Thunderbolt II jets — by the end of the decade with no clear replacement mission in sight.

Now, a new mission is in the works.

At the urging of Arizona Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Tucson) and other Arizona lawmakers, Air Force officials recently briefed local government officials and D-M supporters on a plan to establish a new wing of the Air Force Special Operations Command at D-M.

The Pentagon’s proposed fiscal 2024 budget includes $5 million in funding for an Environmental Impact Statement and an area development plan to establish the “492nd Power Projection Wing” at Davis-Monthan. The Air Force also plans to increase combat search and rescue operations at the base.

An Air Force “Site Activation Task Force“ has already begun work to determine requirements and plan the transition for the new wing.

The head of the DM50, a Tucson support group for the base, said the new mission helps ensure the future of D-M and its billion-dollar contribution to the local economy for decades to come.

“We’re very optimistic about the future of D-M,” DM50 chairwoman Linda Morales said. “From what we’ve been told it’s an enduring, 30-year-plus mission for D-M, and it’s no loss of personnel, so it maintains the personnel levels, the economic impact that we’ve enjoyed.”

The last economic impact study on D-M in 2017 found the base had a $2.6 billion overall annual impact on the Tucson economy, including about $1 billion in direct impacts.

‘Good fit’

The Special Operations and search and rescue units also will have less impact on the community than replacing the A-10s at D-M with F-16s or F-35s, which are both significantly louder than the A-10 and other aircraft based at D-M.

D-M has been passed over as a base for the F-35, most recently in 2020 when it was a finalist to host an Air Force Reserve squadron of the fifth-generation fighter jet.

An Air Force environmental study showed that under one scenario, an estimated 1,506 people living near D-M would experience increased average noise levels of 65 decibels or more — a threshold the Air Force says can make an area incompatible for residential use.

The Air Force Special Operations Command’s flying units operate fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including the CV-22B Osprey “tiltrotor” aircraft; various versions of the Hercules transport including AC-130 gunships, the EC-130 Commando Solo broadcast platform and MC-130 variants; as well as smaller reconnaissance and operations planes and the MQ-9 Reaper drone.

“I think it’s a good fit for Tucson, and I think it’s going to be a pretty seamless adjustment because it’s not the louder fighter jets,” Morales said.

Morales said Air Force officials have said they also plan to follow through with earlier plans to move some combat search and rescue units to D-M from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Michael Guymon, president and CEO of the Tucson Metro Chamber of Commerce, said the local economy is heavily reliant on aerospace and defense, and D-M is part of that.

“Any new operation, any new expansion of activities at the base is good for Tucson and good for Southern Arizona,” said Guymon, who is a D-M “honorary commander” and sits with Morales on the board of the Southern Arizona Defense Alliance.

Lobbying effort

In early April, Kelly and Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, Reps. Ruben Gallego and Rep. Juan Ciscomani wrote to Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall, urging him to work closely with the Arizona congressional delegation and the Tucson community to secure the long-term future of D-M.

“Given the advantages the base offers to the Air Force, from its very favorable year-round flying conditions and considerable range space to its proximity to leading defense industry partners, it should and must maintain a critical role in our national defense,” the letter said.

The Air Force has been trying to retire the A-10 since at least 2015, when it floated a plan to replace three squadrons of A-10s at D-M with F-16 fighters by 2019, arguing the slow-flying, 1970s-era Warthog would not survive in the contested airspace of potential future conflicts.

But lawmakers led by the late Sen. John McCain and former Sen. Martha McSally, a former A-10 pilot, blocked those retirement plans year after year, arguing that there was no ready replacement for the A-10 for its dedicated task of close air support of ground troops and pressing the Pentagon to complete a needed A-10 wing-replacement program.

Shifting plans

In 2021, members of Congress led by Kelly blocked an Air Force plan to retire 42 A-10s, including 35 at D-M, as part of a larger plan to create a center of excellence for combat search and rescue at the Tucson base, which already hosts a search-and-rescue group.

But the Air Force said that plan was conditioned on being able to start retiring D-M’s A-10s, so the deal was off, dismaying some local officials who saw the new search-and-rescue center as a way to guarantee D-M’s long-term future.

Last year, Congress as part of the fiscal 2023 Pentagon budget allowed the Air Force to move ahead with a plan to retire 21 A-10s. Those will come from an Air National Guard base in Fort Wayne, Indiana, which will get an equal number of F-16 fighters.

The Pentagon in its fiscal 2024 budget has asked to retire 42 more A-10s, including 35 at D-M, among more than 300 older aircraft it wants to mothball.

The Air Force wants to free up funding to buy more F-35s and F15-EX fighters, as well as new tankers, utility helicopters and airborne communications planes.

The planned cuts would winnow the A-10 fleet down to 218 planes, and while wing replacements could keep many of those remaining A-10s flying into the 2030s, a top Air Force official recently said the service will move to accelerate retirements to eliminate the entire fleet in five or six years.

D-M hosts one active-duty combat A-10 squadron, the 354th Fighter Squadron, as well as an active-duty A-10 training squadron and an Air Force Reserve A-10 training squadron.

D-M’s 355th Wing also hosts the 563rd Rescue Group, which includes two HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter squadrons, two EC-130H Compass Call jamming plane squadrons, two squadrons of pararescue specialists, known as PJs; and related maintenance and support units.

The rescue units often train with A-10s, who have long provided close air support to rescue missions.

Based at Hurlburt Field in the Florida Panhandle, the Air Force Special Operations Command often trains with combat rescue units, and it commanded all of the continental Air Force search-and-rescue units from 2003 to 2006, as part of a realignment related to the Global War on Terror.

Those units including the 563rd Rescue Group are now under the Air Combat Command, operating at D-M as a “geographically separated unit” under the 23rd Wing at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia.

Multi-mission base

D-M, which won the prestigious Commander in Chief’s Installation Excellence Award in 2012 and 2018, also hosts the 55th Electronic Warfare Group; the headquarters of the 12th Air Force; and the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group, the Air Force’s main “boneyard” for retired aircraft.

D-M also supports Border Patrol aviation and Air National Guard drone, homeland security and training missions.

The 55th Electronic Warfare Group, which was continuously deployed during the conflicts in the Middle East, has up to now conducted aerial surveillance and jamming using about a dozen EC-130H Compass Call planes — converted versions of the workhorse Hercules transport.

The Air Force is in the process of transitioning the group to use converted Gulfstream 550 business jets known as EC-37Bs, the first of which are set to enter service later this year as the 55th Electronic Warfare Group is expected to stay at D-M.

dwichner@tucson.com

Visit at www.tucson.com

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by David Wichner · April 20, 2023

10. ‘A new way of thinking’: US Army talks artillery strategy with allies in Poland

‘A new way of thinking’: US Army talks artillery strategy with allies in Poland

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · April 20, 2023

U.S. and NATO military leaders receive a tour of the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System during a three-day summit in Torun, Poland, April 18, 2023. (John Schoebel/U.S. Army National Guard)

The U.S. Army held an “artillery summit” this week with allies in Poland, where commanders strategized how to better incorporate a much-lauded rocket system into their fighting formations.

V Corps, at a Polish base in the north-central city of Torun, brought senior leaders together for the European High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Initiative.

The Corps headquarters described it as a “pathbreaking” effort to enhance how allies fight together with long-range firepower.

“We see this as the underpinning of an expanded ability to fight with joint fires in support of large-scale combat operations,” V Corps commander Lt. Gen. John S. Kolasheski said in a statement Wednesday.

Lt. Gen. John S. Kolasheski, commander of V Corps, speaks with Army leaders during the European Rocket Artillery Summit in Torun, Poland, April 18, 2023. (John Schoebel/U.S. Army National Guard)

The HIMARS system has received added attention ever since Ukraine put the weaponry to effective use against Russian units, a factor that helped Ukraine’s smaller military push back a larger Russian force.

The three-day summit in Poland, which concluded Wednesday, marked a milestone for V Corps’ new HIMARS initiative, which eventually will bring allied troops together with American units for an apprenticeship program.

The effort focuses on countries that either have HIMARS or are in the pipeline to acquire the system.

“We take their officers and noncommissioned officers and embed them into our HIMARS or [Multiple Launch Rocket System] battalions, where they get an opportunity to learn what it takes to effectively man, train, maintain and sustain the system,” Kolasheski said.

The U.S. military over the past year also has made the HIMARS system a focal point during training events across Europe, showcasing how the rockets can be boarded on military aircraft for quick reaction operations.

U.S. and Polish troops prepare their equipment displays for the European Rocket Artillery Summit in Torun, Poland, April 18, 2023. (John Schoebel/U.S. Army National Guard)

Col. Wil Hsu, commander of the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, based out of Grafenwoehr, said the system enables commanders to reach targets “that are really far out.”

“The HIMARS can go on C-130 and C-17 (cargo planes) and be transported around the European theater and make a big impact,” he said in the statement.

Maj. Gen. Greg Anderson, whose 10th Mountain Division headquarters is now deployed to Europe, said the summit served as a forum for allies to stitch together an array of components so that allied and divisions and corps can fight as one.

“We’re training each other — iron sharpens iron,” Anderson said.

Lt. Gen. Wieslaw Kukula, commander of the Polish Territorial Defense Forces, said the effort amounted to a “new way of thinking” about how “we create a shared mental picture.”

John Vandiver

John covers U.S. military activities across Europe and Africa. Based in Stuttgart, Germany, he previously worked for newspapers in New Jersey, North Carolina and Maryland. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · April 20, 2023

11. American Deterrence Is Failing

Conclusion:

What is clear is that the base truism of deterrence theory remains the same: for deterrence to work in any domain our adversaries must believe we have both the will and the capability to prevent them from achieving their objectives or risking unacceptable pain. The re-building of Western defense forces over the past decade has been dramatic, but regrettably has also been frequently mitigated by strategic paralysis and equivocation. Declaring we have the will or declaring red lines will not suffice, and have already shown themselves to be inadequate. Words must be matched by deeds and actions. For Russia or China to believe in our deterrent we must break the cycle of reacting to their provocations and be prepared to be resolute in our intention to inflict some real pain in retaliation. This entails risk, but without taking some risk there will be no change in our adversaries’ behavior, and the persistent probes for our weak spots and the attacks on our vulnerabilities will be never-ending. Every strategic act entails some risk but so does no action. And no action, we know, is no deterrent at all.

American Deterrence Is Failing

U.S. adversaries—principally Russia and China—do not seem cowed, either by the risk of failure to achieve their objectives or by the fear of retaliation.

by John R. Allen Michael Miklaucic

The National Interest · by John R. Allen · April 18, 2023

There is a problem with deterrence; it’s not working. Not that we are about to descend into nuclear armageddon. But aside from nuclear wars, the United States’ deterrence paradigm does not seem to be deterring much recently. Our adversaries—principally Russia and China—do not seem cowed, either by the risk of failure to achieve their objectives or by the fear of retaliation. Both have been seizing the initiative with aggressive behavior ranging from information warfare, through the full range of gray zone tactics, all the way to the illegal military invasion and occupation of a sovereign neighboring state. Either the theory of deterrence is wrong, or the West is doing deterrence wrong.

The litany of Russian aggression in recent years includes the massive 2007 cyber-attack against NATO ally Estonia, the 2008 Russian seizure of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (15 percent of Georgia’s territory), the 2014 occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea, and the 2015 intervention in Syria. Russia’s actions in Crimea sent shockwaves through the West, yet Russia’s main objectives, attained through well-planned cross-domain operations, were achieved at little real cost. In February 2022, confident in his impunity despite threats and warnings from Western powers, Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a full-fledged aggressive war against Ukraine. At the time of this writing, the war still rages in that beleaguered country as the death toll approaches half million.

Meanwhile, China—dubbed our so-called pacing threat—has been relentlessly and unapologetically stealing Western intellectual property for years at next to no cost in what was described by former National Security Agency director Keith Alexander as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” China has militarized the South China Sea, weaponized atolls in disputed waters, and bullied, threatened, and coerced neighbors and extra-regional countries that have dared to defy its strategic demands. The brutal repression of the Uyghurs and the brazen abrogation of the Hong Kong agreement and guarantees were met with loud protests from the West as well as limited economic sanctions, but nothing sufficient to deter China’s aggression.

Real deterrence depends on our will and our capability to inflict unacceptable costs on an adversary. If our adversaries believe that our intervention will prevent them from achieving their objectives, or that they will suffer unacceptable retaliation and consequences, they will be deterred. But deterrence requires credibility, and that is where the West in general, and the United States in particular, come up short. Who can forget President Barack Obama’s red line warning to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in August 2012 against the use of chemical weapons? Clearly, Russia and China haven’t. President Joe Biden took the military option for defending Ukraine off the table and has refused Ukraine permission to use U.S. weapons for retaliatory strikes on Russian territory. Our failure to demonstrate both the will and the capability to retaliate that undergird deterrence undermines deterrence.

Our fear of escalating the conflict in Ukraine has created an atmosphere of self-deterrence. We fear that any retaliatory action will exacerbate the situation and unleash an escalatory upward spiral, perhaps approaching or even crossing the nuclear threshold. While understandable, this mindset acts powerfully to restrain any credible demonstration of our capability and will. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue their persistent, multi-domain campaign against U.S. and Western security interests capitalizing, as they see it, on our paralysis. As the devastation of Ukraine drags on as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jung-un, and the Ayatollahs of Iran watch carefully and study. Indeed, Ukrainian cities are now routinely attacked by Iranian drones, sold to and deployed by the Russians. And soon, if not already, Ukrainian cities and troops will be bombarded by North Korean artillery shells traded to the Russians for food, by Kim. Neither of these odious regimes are deterred from actively, perhaps even enthusiastically, participating in the destruction of Ukraine and the murder of its people.

The lack of credibility has emboldened our adversaries who will inevitably push against and probe our environment of self-restraint, seeking to measure and understand where America’s will to act matches the need to defend its vital interests. For the moment, our adversaries believe our will to act is not aligned with our interests. As such, the persistent probing continues across a wide frontage and across multiple domains, especially in the cyber domain. Using an old metaphor, our enemies are pushing in the pin—globally—and carefully measuring when, where, and how they will strike an American nerve, and then how the United States will react. Understanding and anticipating the U.S. reaction will form the basis for their challenges against the U.S. and our allies. The lower the American threshold for either symmetrical or asymmetrical reaction to these now nearly constant probes, the greater the credibility of our deterrent. Conversely, the higher the threshold of American reaction, the more emboldened our adversaries become and the more risk we must absorb.

The Russian war in Ukraine exemplifies this situation clearly. Our fear of escalation has kept the West from taking the steps necessary to end the war. Putin has shown us he will not be deterred by economic sanctions. By now we should have learned that economic sanctions—regardless of how good they may make us feel, or even despite the harm they may cause to our adversaries—do not deter a determined foe. Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, as well as Russia and China, have been resistant to, and in some cases completely undeterred by, economic sanctions. If Putin is willing to sacrifice 200,000 soldiers, he is unlikely to be deterred by lower gas and oil revenues. By contrast, consider how effectively Putin has used the specter of nuclear escalation to deter an effective counter-offensive in Ukraine by nuclear saber-rattling. The debates about providing Ukraine with tanks; long-range, precision-guided missiles, F-16s, and other weapons, have been heavily influenced, and sadly, lengthened, by a strong sense of self-deterrence.

Western fixation on preventing escalation is compounded by an anachronistic interpretation of the laws of armed conflict which require any retaliatory operation to be proportional to the provocation, militarily necessary, and limited to military targets. These principles make sense in the context of conventional warfare, but contemporary conflict has metastasized far beyond the conventional sphere and now includes never-ending sub-threshold attacks, probes, and all the ambiguity of the so-called gray zone. These aggressions frequently defy rapid and unequivocal attribution and are often perpetrated by non-military agents.

It is noteworthy that the Western binary notion of war and peace is not shared by our principal adversaries. Both Russia and China perceive international relations as a constant and permanent struggle to create “positional” advantage to achieve strategic objectives that are in direct conflict with our values and interests. Given the persistent multidimensional threats we face, to which specific act of aggression would or should we respond? How can we determine if the act was perpetrated by a military or a non-military agent? Was it government-sanctioned, or just government-tolerated? This ambiguity converts the principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality into competitive handcuffs.

These observations beg the question: can there be any comprehensive theory of deterrence in the twenty-first century with so many incongruities and discontinuities? What does deterrence look like when dealing with a nuclear-armed opponent? What deters Al Qaeda, ISIS, or transnational criminal networks? What about cyber deterrence, and the real likelihood that we’ll soon encounter AI-powered, lethal autonomous systems? What deters attacks on our orbital constellation and our undersea fiber optic cabling by any entity capable of disrupting or disabling them? Witness the confusion over the damage to Nordstream II. Is there a single, master, comprehensive deterrent narrative that can simultaneously and concurrently work for us across all these domains and against all these state and non-state actors?

What is clear is that the base truism of deterrence theory remains the same: for deterrence to work in any domain our adversaries must believe we have both the will and the capability to prevent them from achieving their objectives or risking unacceptable pain. The re-building of Western defense forces over the past decade has been dramatic, but regrettably has also been frequently mitigated by strategic paralysis and equivocation. Declaring we have the will or declaring red lines will not suffice, and have already shown themselves to be inadequate. Words must be matched by deeds and actions. For Russia or China to believe in our deterrent we must break the cycle of reacting to their provocations and be prepared to be resolute in our intention to inflict some real pain in retaliation. This entails risk, but without taking some risk there will be no change in our adversaries’ behavior, and the persistent probes for our weak spots and the attacks on our vulnerabilities will be never-ending. Every strategic act entails some risk but so does no action. And no action, we know, is no deterrent at all.

General John R. Allen (USMC ret.) is a former President of the Brookings Institution, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Commander of ISAF.

Michael Miklaucic is a Senior Fellow at National Defense University and the Editor-in-Chief of PRISM.

The views presented are those of the authors and are not statements of policy or official views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or National Defense University.

Image: Shutterstock.

12. The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe

The 21 page report from the Irregular Warfare Center can be downloaded here. https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Conceptualization-of-Irregular-Warfare-in-Europe.pdf

Some excellent insights from a European perspective. We can learn a lot from our friends, partners, and allies.

The most important contribution from this report are the various definitions of irregular warfare excerpted here.

Netherlands:

Definition of irregular warfare

The definition of irregular warfare that the War Studies Research Centre uses is dynamic. The department largely bases its definition of irregular warfare on U.S. conceptions of the topic. Key faculty members of the WSRC credit this decision to both the partnership between the Netherlands and the United States and the influence of U.S. doctrine and literature on the Western irregular warfare research community. Specifically, the conceptualization of irregular warfare relies on the thoughts of American scholar James Kiras and the 2010 Joint Operating Concept of Irregular Warfare from the U.S. Department of Defense. With this in mind, the respondent notes that the conceptualization of irregular warfare reflects a U.S. vantage point and is not reflective of ideas and views that are specific to Europe. The respondent notes that, in the short term, it is crucial to construct a common understanding of irregular warfare; in the long term, it is crucial that Europe and its allies use a common understanding in their efforts related to irregular warfare.

The full definition of irregular warfare provided by the respondent is from the work of Martijn Kitzen, the chair of the Irregular Warfare and Special Operations at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The definition reads:

“…a violent struggle involving non-state actors (including violent armed groups acting as state proxies) and states with the purpose of establishing power, control, and legitimacy over relevant populations. Due to military asymmetry and the political nature of the struggle, the use of force mostly takes unconventional or unorthodox forms and is typically combined with other, non- kinetic, activities. As such, irregular warfare favors an indirect approach that does not focus on military defeat, but on winning the population(s) at stake and eroding the opponent’s will… .”7

Norway:

Definition of irregular warfare

FFI defines irregular warfare in its simplest form as the type of actions that results from tasks that conventional forces cannot effectively accomplish, requiring the deployment of special forces. Specifically, irregular warfare is a military or paramilitary operation that is conducted in a hostile or politically sensitive environment to achieve objectives that require the use of capabilities for which there is no conventional need. Major distinctions between irregular warfare and conventional operations can be seen in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, the method of application used, the degree of independence of friendly support, and the degree of dependence on detailed intelligence and local advantages.

FFI characterizes irregular warfare as a complex issue with many qualifications that are not all definite. In some cases, irregular warfare is an activity between conventional forces and intelligence forces. In other scenarios, irregular warfare is the use of state represented forces to subdue non-state actors, or the use of state represented forces to support smaller resistance forces to “disturb” an adversary and prepare for the use of conventional forces. Indirect and asymmetric approaches to warfare that are used to erode an opponent’s will, power, strength, or influence are also categorized as irregular warfare. With a broad approach to the topic, the respondent warns that irregular warfare is often confused with unconventional warfare, stabilization, military assistance, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency practices. FFI characterizes irregular warfare as a joint capability, not a unique, stand-alone one. Leaders at FFI view irregular warfare as existing along a continuum, with some situations calling for more irregular tactics and other situations calling for more conventional tactics. To FFI, special forces are key to irregular warfare practices, and the combination of conventional forces and special forces is key to a successful military operation. The Norwegian concept of irregular warfare is primarily focused on countering Russian activities.

Sweden:

Definition of irregular warfare

CSOR does not utilize one definition of irregular warfare. This is primarily due to the fact that leaders of CSOR have not identified a definition in use that does not include foreign internal defense, which is not as applicable to small European states. The respondent does see utility in developing a more specialized definition of irregular warfare for small states, especially in the shadow of Russian and Chinese activities within Europe.

Identified irregular threats

Threats meet the threshold of irregular warfare when conventional forces are unable or unprepared to counter the threat posed. There is no prioritized list due to CSOR’s dynamic view of irregular warfare. Because irregular threats are those that are unexpected, the ability to react and think quickly would be lost, should a prioritized list be made.

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

Irregular warfare is taught on a practical level and through a special operations lens at the Swedish Defence University. The example provided by the respondent was one in which students studied theory and then applied learned principles through a field trip to the sabotage trail at a heavy water factory in Norway. Questions for student thought and study revolve around how the same mission could be accomplished today with the technological advances made.

The Swedish Defence University does publish on the topic of irregular warfare. Perhaps the most notable publication was the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), published jointly by the Swedish Defence University and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). The Swedish Defence University has also published articles on resistance and the definition of “threshold.”

The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats:

Definition of irregular warfare

The term irregular warfare exists primarily in the realm of military action and is typically coupled with concepts related to counterinsurgency. In particular, irregular warfare is normally associated with NATO military missions occurring beyond the territory of NATO members because of Europe’s relative security until 2014.

Hybrid CoE classifies irregular warfare as the use of military tools under the threshold of open conventional military confrontation. However, Hybrid CoE conceptualizes irregular warfare as a subset of hybrid warfare, which is noted as the antithesis of the western concept of war. Hybrid CoE distinguishes hybrid warfare and irregular warfare through the scope of actions that are classified under each term. The nature of hybrid warfare is broader in that hybrid warfare encapsulates attacks on decision-making processes and uses leaders as targets. On the other hand, irregular warfare focuses on population-centered attacks. The incentive to use hybrid warfare stems primarily from an objective to degrade or disturb democratic societies. Because of this asymmetric connotation of hybrid warfare, and thus irregular warfare, the respondent noted that democracies do not typically use hybrid warfare outside of the scope of an acute conflict.

In terms of conceptualizing hybrid warfare and countering the threats it poses, Hybrid CoE’s approach reaches beyond the multi-domain or even broader state-driven conceptualization. Instead, Hybrid CoE adds a societal approach in opposition to the use of only the military realm to think about such topics. A societal approach to conceptualize irregular warfare is useful to Hybrid CoE because of the diversity in European strategic culture and because of the strong divide between internal and external security affairs. This division causes military vocabulary like “warfare” to be excluded from describing security events happening internally, therefore limiting the applications of countering hybrid warfare when only using a military lens to assess possible solutions.

Lithuania:

Definition of irregular warfare

Rather than use the term irregular warfare, the respondent used hybrid warfare. Neither Lithuania as a state nor the Lithuanian national defense system has a single, unified definition of hybrid warfare or the threats associated with it. However, the Military Academy of Lithuania recognizes activities existing below the threshold of conventional military confrontation as hybrid warfare. Though not officially endorsed by the Lithuanian defense system’s legal staff and not included in national strategic level documents, there is a working definition of hybrid warfare used by those who study the topic. The guidelines set by the European Union and NATO are the prevailing concepts adopted by the Military Academy of Lithuania since memberships, concepts, and activities of these institutions dictate activities of the Military Academy of Lithuania. NATO’s conception of hybrid warfare rests on the idea that hybrid methods are deployed to blur the lines between war and peace and target citizens to sow doubt surrounding the target government. Hybrid threats typically combine military and non-military action through covert and overt means. Examples provided by “NATO’s response to hybrid threats” include disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups, and the use of conventional military forces.26 Additionally, the aforementioned concept of irregular and hybrid threats developed by Hybrid CoE significantly influences the Military Academy of Lithuania’s thinking on the topic.

The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe – Irregular Warfare Center

irregularwarfarecenter.org

April 20, 2023

The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe

Authors: Dr. Sandor Fabian and Gabrielle Kennedy

Download the PDF by clicking the button to the right.

Table of Contents

Preface

This report is the first in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allies and partners. This initial volume compares and contrasts this conceptualization among five European academic institutions: the Netherlands Defence Academy, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the Swedish Defence University, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and the Military Academy of Lithuania. Each of these institutions replied to surveys the IWC designed, assessing how these institutions individually conceptualize and teach irregular warfare and related concepts.

This report should be of interest to defense and foreign policy decision makers, practitioners and scholars in the United States and allied and partner nations, the media, defense industry representatives and non-governmental organizations, and others concerned about the challenges associated with irregular warfare. As irregular warfare becomes institutionalized “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict,” in accordance with the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2020 National Defense Strategy, the IWC’s role in U.S. national security solidifies.1 The annex notes that though the United States has conducted continuous irregular warfare against violent extremists on a global scale, the current primary national security challenge, which the annex calls strategic competition, requires mastery of irregular warfare at a different level. The annex calls for innovative ideas and new means of employing existing capabilities, as well as improving interagency and international cooperation. A clear avenue for IWC’s utility is in the international cooperation and information sharing that will yield success in countering irregular warfare.

In the current international system, the United States and its allies and partners face similar irregular threats, making the IWC’s involvement in the international dialogue on irregular warfare a major part of its mission. A current challenge in such conversation is that U.S. allied and partner nations hold their own set of ideas regarding the definition of irregular warfare, current irregular threats that require the most attention, and appropriate reaction to such irregular threats. Understanding and potentially bridging the gaps between the conceptualization of irregular warfare on the part of the United States and allied and partner nations is a key first step to future cooperation and greater resiliency in the face of irregular threats. This report serves as the IWC’s first offering on international collaboration aimed at understanding the differences and potential points of cooperation in conceptualizations of irregular warfare.

Executive Summary

As the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2020 National Defense Strategy suggests, the character and form of war are constantly changing. The requirement for mastery of irregular warfare persists. To maintain critical competencies, develop new capabilities, and improve interoperability, continued study of irregular warfare must remain a high priority. This study is a precursory step to cooperation needed to meet such competency requirements. Its goal is to highlight areas of commonality and difference in the conceptualization of irregular warfare in European institutions. This is an instrumental first step in identifying a baseline knowledge of how certain institutions of interest think of irregular warfare, solidifying areas of potential cooperation on issues relevant to irregular warfare.

The report finds that there is no overarching or consistent definition used among surveyed institutions in Europe. This trend trails through other findings, such as the lack of codified threats, the lack of institutionalized education on irregular warfare, and limited publicly available research on relevant topics. Most of the participating institutions are tied to special operations research or preparation, displaying the broader link between special operations forces and irregular warfare curriculum. This linkage is bolstered by the idea that these forces are considered as either the primary tool of irregular warfare or a major component in the practice.

On a more granular level, the report finds that geography impacts conceptualization of irregular warfare. Proximity to Russia correlates with the use of the term hybrid warfare in the place of the term irregular warfare. Institutions located in countries closer to Russia seem to prefer more defensive conceptualization and tend to focus on countering Russian malign activities. The geographical, institutional, and general definitional trends found through this study allow this study an application broader than the institutions studied.

13. This general helped steer the Army’s post-Vietnam transformation

Who will be the next General Thurman, General Starry, LTG Holder, BG Wass de Czege, et el... and give us the equivalent of a 21st century AirLand Battle - Is multi domain operations on the same level as ALB?

This general helped steer the Army’s post-Vietnam transformation

militarytimes.com · by Professor Emeritus Col. James Martin (ret.) · April 20, 2023

In December 2022, the Army announced its plan to market for new recruits with an old slogan–”Be All You Can Be.” This slogan was successfully used in Army advertising from about 1981 to 2001. Developed under the auspices of Gen. Maxwell Reid Thurman, history has not fully recognized Thurman’s numerous accomplishments, including his role as the principal architect of the all-volunteer Army.

On February 18, 2023, the Army Heritage & Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the nation’s premier resource for the study of the Army’s heritage, hosted an important documents transfer ceremony intended to help further the understanding and recognition of Thurman’s military career and his many accomplishments across a wide array of critical staff and command assignments.

The document transfer included more than 500 pages of interview transcripts and the 17 original tape recordings from interviews conducted by Dr. Faris Russell Kirkland with Thurman sometime between late 1993 to shortly before the general’s death in late 1995.

How embracing ‘Be all you can be’ resurrected Army marketing

The rebrand is the latest move in a series of service-wide efforts that may reduce recent years’ recruiting struggles.

Known by the nickname “Mad Max,” due to his image as a workaholic, Thurman was considered an exceptional senior leader and had a widespread reputation as a brilliant conceptual thinker, master organizer, and strategic systems manager. His Army legacy is defined by his important contributions during the 1970s and 1980s in shaping and establishing a sea change in the Army’s notion of training, leadership/leader development, and procurement/logistics.

The recruiting slogan “Be all you can be” is but one hallmark of Thurman’s career and service to his country.

Kirkland was a military social historian working at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C., and a lead investigator in the early 1990s for a study of the human dimension aspects of the establishment of the Army’s first light infantry division at Fort Ord, California.

Thurman had a keen interest in many of the institute’s research activities, including the study of the fielding of the light infantry division. While the specific details remain unclear, Thurman agreed to participate in a series of interviews with Kirkland. These interviews were intended to capture Thurman’s perspectives on leadership through the lens of his career experiences as an Army Officer. The fact that both Thurman and Kirkland shared a background as field artillery officers enriched their relationship.

The existence of these taped interviews was not generally known until immediately prior to Kirkland’s death in 2000. In late 1999 Kirkland had asked a former colleague at the research institute, Linette Sparacino, to be his literary executrix. In this role, Sparacino was to make all final determinations regarding the content and disposition of Kirkland’s unfinished research projects and unpublished writings.

With the consent of the Kirkland family and the support of a number of colleagues who contributed to the auditing and organization of the original taped materials, these rich interviews have been transcribed and made available as public documents in the holdings of the Army Heritage & Education Center.

The intent is that they will be useful for military scholars and others interested in various aspects of military leadership and military affairs. To this end, David Kieran, the Col. Richard Hallock Distinguished Chair in Military History at Columbus State University, Columbus, Georgia is making use of these transcripts for his upcoming book, “How the Army Saved Itself: Maxwell R. Thurman and the Army’s Post-Vietnam Metamorphosis.”

To access both the Preface (document explaining the origin and context of these interviews) and the Interviews themselves, go to https://www.armyheritage.org/programs/research.

James (Jim) Martin is a Professor Emeritus of Social Work and Social Research and a retired Licensed Independent Clinical Social Worker.. His scholarship and public service focus on the well-being of individuals, families and communities, and his research and civic engagement address military and Veteran populations. A retired colonel in the Army Medical Department, Jim’s distinguished military career included a wide array of clinical, research, as well as senior program management (command) and policy assignments. Jim served as the senior Social Work Officer in the Combat Theater during the First Gulf War.

These views are solely those of the author, and do not purport to be the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Have an opinion?

This article is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please email us.

14. Sustaining Distributed Forces in a Conflict with China

Excerpts:

The systems exist to make this vision of dynamic maritime sustainment a reality. The next step involves the necessary exercises and training. By leveraging existing Pacific exercises, the joint force can rapidly demonstrate this concept, enhance interoperability with other navies, and show off the strength of America’s logistics enterprise. These exercises should be done not as part of a long-term predictable schedule, but rather as “snap exercises.” Fleet marine forces should be able to quickly activate a node, operate from a maritime platform, pull equipment and supplies out of global positioning or prepositioning stocks, and move out to execute a task. Dynamic maritime sustainment can provide marines and naval forces with a consistent and frequent exercise cycle with the coalition and joint maritime team to learn, gain efficiencies, and refine their procedures so they can work through some of the friction points associated with forward-deployed operations. Additionally, these rehearsals create new distribution innovations and “spokes” for the global positioning network.

The dynamic maritime sustainment concept is more than just a flexible network for the Navy and Marine Corps. It serves as a strategic insurance policy that enhances maritime maneuvers and increases options for sustaining forces ashore and afloat. In this way, dynamic maritime sustainment mitigates against the critical vulnerabilities of distance and time. Without survivable logistics, no strategy or operational concept is effective or feasible.

Sustaining Distributed Forces in a Conflict with China - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by John Sattely · April 21, 2023

Headquarters Pacific Fleet just sent out an alert after recent days of observing a few Chinese Type 075 amphibious assault ships amassing in the China Sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps launched an unannounced brigade-level landing exercise near Taiwan, in order to practice amphibious landings. A total of six Luyang III destroyers also participated, launching multiple surface-to-air missiles to demonstrate their capacity for fire support. Concurrently, as part of exercise STEEL DRAGON, U.S. Navy ships launched over two dozen amphibious assault vehicles and assault boats carrying U.S. marines and Japanese soldiers headed towards the target area while helicopters conducted reconnaissance and raids on key terrain. The proximity of the Chinese to U.S. and Japanese training exercises had leadership in Taiwan nervous about what this meant for defense of their sovereignty. As tensions continued to escalate in the area, Pacific Fleet ordered all Navy ships to pull back to avoid any miscalculation. The U.S. Marine Corps’ stand-in forces, as well as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, currently distributed around several key areas for training and counter-reconnaissance missions, have been left to sustain themselves for an undetermined amount of time.

How are the United States and partner nations preparing for this potential scenario? The United States can no longer count on primacy in all warfighting domains during a near-peer conflict, making freedom of movement increasingly challenging. The People’s Republic of China has a number of options to contest U.S. movement, ranging from missile defense systems radiating into the air domain to degradation and disruption of sea lines of communication through a naval blockade under the guise of an integrated naval exercise. As a result, forward-deployed forces both ashore and afloat, as well as extended lines of communication in the air and sea, will be increasingly vulnerable.

Become a Member

In response, Washington should embrace global positioning to achieve logistics endurance that will better sustain forces in a highly distributed and undeveloped theater. This means rethinking how equipment and supplies are positioned to support operating forces and incorporating the air, land, and maritime domains. Currently, most of the equipment and supplies needed to support operating forces are either co-located at the home station of the unit or afloat on a prepositioned vessel. This model places a tremendous amount of stress on strategic lift platforms during a crisis when the joint force collectively will require these assets to position strategic deterrence capabilities. Global positioning would expand relationships with allies and partners to place equipment and supplies ashore and afloat, and drastically reduce the force closure window.

To realize this goal, we propose a new concept: dynamic maritime sustainment. This concept would bring together the Marine Corps and Navy in utilizing existing capabilities and expanding the network to include partner nations like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. Specifically, dynamic maritime sustainment calls for a fresh logistics concept for the naval fleet to effectively integrate distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced basing operations while simultaneously sustaining the remainder of the fleet. These operational concepts are a form of expeditionary warfare that involve the employment of rapid, mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces in austere and temporary locations ashore or inshore within contested maritime environments for the purpose of conducting sea denial and reconnaissance. These efforts all serve as part of a larger naval campaign intended to help deter or influence an adversary’s decision calculus — logistics as deterrence.

Dynamic Maritime Sustainment

Perhaps the biggest challenge to realizing dynamic maritime sustainment is the lack of ready-to-issue logistics sustainment to support the distributed stand-in force units at the point of need. Moreover, in a contested environment, the traditional logistics support required will be forced to recede back to a protected area within the region and will likely be too far from the forces they are tasked to sustain. This makes traditional approaches obsolete in any future conflicts with a near-peer adversary. The distributed maritime sustainment concept is an operational approach through an expanded and flexible distribution architecture that can better sustain forces in both uncontested and contested environments as indicators and warnings elevate and the main fleet begins to pull back.

While stand-in forces operate within the weapons engagement zone, they operate with limited organic sustainment and lack endurance once the region becomes contested. Currently, there is no combined joint theater sustainment plan designed to sustain forces inside the weapons engagement zone in a contested maritime environment. The initial basis of dynamic maritime sustainment starts with the Marine Corps’ foundational concept of the global positioning network that connects with the joint theater sustainment concept. The global positioning network consists of joint, overt, and covert land sites and afloat sea bases that are all connected through manned and unmanned aerial and maritime platforms. This network should not be developed in service isolation — rather, it should be developed jointly and multi-nationally to gain economies between the services and allies and partners and support the joint requirement.

It is possible to think of dynamic maritime sustainment in terms of three pillars: An ashore prepositioning network, an afloat sea-basing network, and the maritime and aviation connectors to keep logistics functioning until conditions are set for a more robust sustainment architecture inside the theater.

Image: Mr. Perry Smith

Ashore Network

First and foremost, each theater should designate a regional logistics hub ashore where it can maintain prepositioned equipment and supplies in a “ready-to-issue” status. The competition continuum and compressed timelines no longer allow for the slow-moving force build-up normally associated with the force-closure phase of an operation. This means we won’t see the six-month military buildup that occurred in the Middle East before the liberation of Kuwait or the invasion of Iraq, where just the Marine Corps offloaded 11 large roll-on, roll-off maritime vessels that require access to a deep-water port.

As a result, the naval force cannot afford to continue with an incomplete sustainment concept like Care of Supplies in Storage and therefore should maintain equipment in a ready-to-issue status. This model requires logistics sustainment comprised of uniformed personnel and a combined civilian and contractor workforce to accomplish high states of readiness for forward stocks. Equipment and supplies should be and can be used for training, operations, and support as needed to meet the requirements for naval campaigning.

In addition to the designated regional logistics hub, there should be several overt and covert contingency locations throughout the area of responsibility, possibly including those newly agreed upon during the secretary of defense’s 2023 visit to the Pacific. These sites can be comprised of something as simple as low-signature commercial warehouses that store equipment and supplies under a contract. Marine Corps Logistics Command can schedule and coordinate the rotation of stocks and equipment as necessary to sustain high levels of readiness.

Additionally, the ashore network could have “cold” sites that are designated for commercial terminals at seaports and airports but are ready to activate with military equipment and supplies as required in a contingency. Moreover, each logistics terminal location could harbor warehouses for equipment and supplies that are ready-to-issue as part of an overall global positioning network to have resources arrayed in many locations that are able to increase resiliency.

Afloat Network

Maritime shipping is the lifeblood of sustainment in the Pacific and the cornerstone of the dynamic maritime sustainment concept. The concept employs a layered approach to delivering sustainment from a deep-sea base to the stand-in forces. At the deep-sea base, the maritime prepositioning ship provides a logistics mothership for sustainment operating outside the weapons engagement zone. Here, it would operate as a selectively configured vessel with all classes of supply and an embarked force capable of conducting limited supply, maintenance, and landing support activities. This would include transferring supplies and equipment to a fleet of both manned and unmanned surrogate maritime sustainment vessels or unmanned aerial vehicles that will penetrate the weapons engagement zone with their deliveries. From there, a fleet of smaller connectors deliver the sustainment to the stand-in forces operating in the contact layer. The transfer of supplies and equipment can be conducted through surface or aerial platforms. This provides for a lily-pad network that gives maximum flexibility for the delivery of sustainment while also protecting the large sustainment vessels.

The strength of the dynamic maritime sustainment concept is interoperability between the combat logistics fleet, merchant marine fleets, and additional connectors described in the next section. The budgetary decisions facing naval vessels necessitate utilizing existing platforms and creatively employing them. The littoral combat ship, with its impressive speed, a flight deck, and an extendable hydraulic boom crane off the stern offers one intriguing opportunity, particularly in conjunction with unmanned surface and aerial logistics delivery systems. Incorporating expeditionary sea-base ships like the USNS Puller, which offer helicopter flight decks and large sustainment decks, would provide redundancy to the network. Although these ships do not historically deploy together and have not been designed to interoperate, they could still serve as a critical, maneuverable part of a larger network of naval platforms. What’s more, expanding interoperability to include allied and partner vessels would only make the sustainment network more robust.

Connectors

All these various ships and ashore sites laid out in a vast maritime basing architecture in the region can only become a global positioning network if they are connected by smaller manned and unmanned watercraft and aircraft. Manned watercraft, such as the commercial offshore support vessel, serve as today’s functioning version of the Marine Corps’ proposed landing ship medium or the Army’s proposed maneuver support vessel. Offshore support vessels contain many of the same load characteristics of the landing ship medium, while also having a low draft hull to allow for better ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore mobility.

The Navy and Marine Corps should rethink the improved navy lighterage system and warping tug that are loaded on maritime prepositioning ships to move equipment and supplies during in-stream operations. Currently being employed as a ship-to-shore connector, the lighterage is modularized and can serve as either forward arming and refueling point afloat or a logistics hub to operate as a lily pad for sustainment of forces ashore. Another asset or capability on maritime prepositioning ships that could be additive to the connector portfolio is the roll/on and roll/off discharge facility. This capability serves as a barge to conduct afloat transfers for equipment and supplies between ships. Ships such as the joint high-speed vessel can connect to the roll/on and roll/off discharge facility and take selective equipment items or supplies to be delivered to an ashore location or afloat.

The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that unmanned surface vessels can provide a kinetic capability and will have a role in future conflict. Future roles should include sustainment missions and these vessels offer tremendous opportunity within the dynamic maritime sustainment concept. The Navy has even recently established a command focused on unmanned surface vessels — Unmanned Surface Division One. Although originally created to provide electronic warfare, countermine, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, they could be built as small or medium-sized unmanned distribution platforms going from ship to ship or shore to shore delivering sustainment to landing forces. Unmanned aerial vehicles are another capability that should be incorporated into the dynamic maritime sustainment concept. As technology improves, these systems will likely be able to operate in vast open water environments and replace the need for manned logistics delivery equipment.

Dynamic Maritime Sustainment in Action

It’s 0340 and 7th Fleet’s Maritime Operating Center receives a report that a Chinese-flagged fishing vessel has collided with a Taiwanese frigate, alongside intelligence reports of dozens of Chinese amphibious vessels being embarked along China’s eastern coast. The six Luyang III destroyers have positioned for a blockade along the northern and southern coastlines of Taiwan. Sensing an escalation of conflict, the commander for the Marine Littoral Regiment requests an immediate increase in supplies and critical repair parts for his forces. The regiment’s logistics officer promptly submits a supply request. The afloat USNS Dahl receives the request, and the embarked marines immediately begin loading supplies into the 35’ unmanned surface vessels on the weather deck. Six hours later, an offshore support vessel pulls alongside the USNS Dahl, which transfers over the loaded unmanned surface vessel with its organic cranes. The offshore support vessel immediately transits east toward the Marine Littoral Regiment. Approximately 400 nautical miles from their operating site, the offshore support vessel uses its organic crane to deploy the unmanned surface vessel into the water, and it proceeds to a beach where the regiment receives the supplies. The unmanned surface vessel then returns to a predetermined rendezvous site at sea where it is recovered by the offshore support vessel. Two days later, the offshore support vessel links up with the USNS Dahl, which recovers the unmanned surface vessel and resupplies it for another future mission.

The systems exist to make this vision of dynamic maritime sustainment a reality. The next step involves the necessary exercises and training. By leveraging existing Pacific exercises, the joint force can rapidly demonstrate this concept, enhance interoperability with other navies, and show off the strength of America’s logistics enterprise. These exercises should be done not as part of a long-term predictable schedule, but rather as “snap exercises.” Fleet marine forces should be able to quickly activate a node, operate from a maritime platform, pull equipment and supplies out of global positioning or prepositioning stocks, and move out to execute a task. Dynamic maritime sustainment can provide marines and naval forces with a consistent and frequent exercise cycle with the coalition and joint maritime team to learn, gain efficiencies, and refine their procedures so they can work through some of the friction points associated with forward-deployed operations. Additionally, these rehearsals create new distribution innovations and “spokes” for the global positioning network.

The dynamic maritime sustainment concept is more than just a flexible network for the Navy and Marine Corps. It serves as a strategic insurance policy that enhances maritime maneuvers and increases options for sustaining forces ashore and afloat. In this way, dynamic maritime sustainment mitigates against the critical vulnerabilities of distance and time. Without survivable logistics, no strategy or operational concept is effective or feasible.

Become a Member

John Sattely is an active-duty colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps who is currently the commanding officer at Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL. He has previously served in headquarters, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, II Marine Expeditionary Forces, 4th Marine Logistics Group, Headquarters Marine Forces Europe and Africa, and U.S. Central Command, and has previously held command at 2nd Transportation Support Battalion. He is also a 2019 graduate of the Naval War College.

Jesse Johnson is an active-duty lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps who is currently the director of operations at Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL. He has previously served in 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion, Headquarters Marine Forces Pacific, Combat Logistics Regiment 27, Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group, and Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group. He is a 2015 graduate of the Marine Corps Command & Staff College.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by John Sattely · April 21, 2023

15. America’s Military Is Unprepared for Our Age of Advanced Technology

Excerpts:

We are not the first to call for reform. Countless studies and recommendations for change have flowed from the Pentagon and Congress in recent decades. But few of these reforms have materialized because a weak oversight structure and a military-industrial culture that often continues to invest in outmoded systems with the encouraging support of Congress. The Department of Defense is currently spending billions on a comprehensive audit of its vast bureaucracy, which we can hope sets the stage for a realistic and lasting plan to shed duplicative and unnecessary programs.

True reform, representing new and smarter ways of thinking, organizing and spending will allow America’s military decision-makers to create the right priorities, improve efficiency and effectively defend our country against the increasingly complex threats of the future.

America’s Military Is Unprepared for Our Age of Advanced Technology

BY WILLIAM OWENS AND JOHN R. KASICH APRIL 19, 2023 6:00 AM EDT

Admiral Owens (retired) served for 34 years in the U.S. Navy and was third vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996

Kasich served a governor of the state of Ohio from 2011-2019, and served as a member of congress from 1983-2001.

TIME · by William Owens · April 19, 2023

President Joe Biden’s proposed $886 billion defense budget sets a U.S. record for peacetime military spending. It’s a new record, perhaps, but also an old story. America’s military forces, defense industries, and a supportive Congress have spent many decades and trillions of dollars preparing to defend our nation against a multitude of threats across the globe. Unfortunately, far too much of this effort has served only to prepare us for facing the threats of yesterday. This is a failure of vision distorted by support for favorite, outworn systems and strategic mindsets that are of declining use against the fast-changing threats we face today, much less those we will face tomorrow.

Complicating attempts to address this challenge is the fact that our defense establishment is likely the most complicated business enterprise in the world. It is a convoluted, cross-threaded system, driven in part by a “military-industrial complex” that is far too influenced by outside factors, constituency pressures and inefficient acquisition systems to allow for a truly effective approach to defending the nation. Even worse, there are very few people who truly understand the system’s complexities well enough to make it work.

While artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, machine learning, quantum computing, and other advanced technologies have transformed the way business and industry are conducted throughout the world, the Department of Defense and its supply-chain industries have yet to fully incorporate these tools to better defend our county. In the face of these systemic shortcomings, Americans have every good reason to scrutinize our military expenditures and ask fundamental questions about the effectiveness of our military’s defense systems.

To be clear: our purpose in this discussion is not to argue, as some do, for indiscriminate defense-spending cuts solely to reduce the federal budget or to chip away at the national debt. These are worthy goals, but our imperative in this discussion is for a smarter defense budget, one that reflects the latest technologies and acquisition systems needed to enhance our security and protect our future. And yes, a smarter defense budget should also eliminate much waste and inefficiency, but that is not its primary goal.

The necessary reforms aren’t easy. From our years of experience with military spending and procurement, we’ve seen how reluctant the Department of Defense, the armed forces and Congress have been to embrace new technologies or to adapt to uncomfortable change. We know how they prefer to make do with trusted methods, redundant facilities, and outdated systems. Inevitably, this preference for the status quo is matched with an appetite for increased spending, a craving that congressional appropriators are quick to feed.

In large part, this is due to the political pressures that drive military spending and force continued funding of programs, facilities, and industries that have long outlived their relevance. Priority is granted to the needs of particular congressional districts and industries, allowing them to continue draining the federal budget and weakening military preparedness.

We must change this culture and prioritize the incorporation of new technologies into our military systems. This will require a fundamental shift in the way all parties involved approach defense spending and military decision-making, placing their stress on national security priorities rather than political considerations. And this will further require the Pentagon to initiate these reforms from within, embedding them into every aspect of its operations.

Reform must begin with congressional support for a defense system focused on rapid deployment and implementation of advanced technologies that have so quickly revolutionized other sectors of the economy. By aggressively utilizing these tools to their fullest extent, our military will better manage logistics and personnel, analyze vast amounts of data and improve the effectiveness of combat operations.

To support these reforms, the Department of Defense needs to take better advantage of opportunities already available. Long-ago reforms by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) have stood the test of time by building lasting coordination between the Army, Navy, and Air Force in mobilizing and going to war. This level of cooperation needs to be extended to the support areas of weapons acquisition, people systems and logistics, where it’s been sorely missing. Technological advances and data must be leveraged to gain more visibility over the battlefield and streamline supply, personnel and logistics.

The 40-year-old Nunn-McCurdy Amendment created ways allowing Congress and the Pentagon to get their arms around the cost of weapons systems. It’s time to renew and expand the spirit of this legislation, which entails an after-the-act assessment of spending, by making it a before-the fact-analysis – with enforcement teeth. This would require our defense culture to better evaluate the future strategic relevance of our weapons systems and capabilities vis-à-vis the existing and emerging threats from our adversaries. Another urgent need is a streamlined approach to acquisition testing and evaluation that would get these capabilities into the hands of our commanders in time to be relevant.

U.S. forces are facing significant military threats – land, sea, air, space and cyber – in an era of unceasing technological change. This makes it essential that our military industry, with the support of its congressional oversight, adapt and incorporate new technologies in order to better protect our country and ensure the safety of our troops. These include a need to embrace new technologies in stand-off systems, advanced drones, missiles and autonomous vehicles, battlefield-domain awareness, data analysis and cyber-attack technologies. These are the tools our adversaries are working to master and we will face in the near future as “asymmetric threats.”

We are not the first to call for reform. Countless studies and recommendations for change have flowed from the Pentagon and Congress in recent decades. But few of these reforms have materialized because a weak oversight structure and a military-industrial culture that often continues to invest in outmoded systems with the encouraging support of Congress. The Department of Defense is currently spending billions on a comprehensive audit of its vast bureaucracy, which we can hope sets the stage for a realistic and lasting plan to shed duplicative and unnecessary programs.

True reform, representing new and smarter ways of thinking, organizing and spending will allow America’s military decision-makers to create the right priorities, improve efficiency and effectively defend our country against the increasingly complex threats of the future.

TIME · by William Owens · April 19, 2023

16. US to focus on national security, not trade, in relations with China

US to focus on national security, not trade, in relations with China

Stars and Stripes · by David J. Lynch · April 20, 2023

Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen testifies during a Senate Finance Committee hearing on March 16. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

The United States will prioritize the protection of national security in its economic relationship with China, according to Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen.

In a Washington speech, Yellen said that Biden administration policies are not aimed at slowing China's economic growth — only limiting its ability to threaten the U.S. militarily.

Yellen's comments, billed as the most comprehensive account of the administration's approach to relations with the world's second-largest economy, made official what has been clear for some time: An era of enthusiastic engagement with China, predicated on mutually beneficial commerce, is all but over.

Her appearance at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies came as the administration is finalizing new restrictions on U.S. investment in Chinese technology ventures. In October, the Commerce Department barred exports to China of the most advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to make them, which have commercial as well as military applications.

"Even as our targeted actions may have economic impacts, they are motivated solely by our concerns about our security and values. Our goal is not to use these tools to gain competitive economic advantage," Yellen said, adding that the United States seeks a "constructive and fair economic relationship with China."

Yellen spoke with U.S.-China relations at their lowest point since President Richard M. Nixon's historic 1971 opening to Beijing. Both nations are emphasizing greater economic self-sufficiency, and there are mounting concerns in Washington over Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategic intentions.

On Capitol Hill, sentiment toward China is almost uniformly negative.

The Biden administration has encouraged the relocation of some manufacturing supply chains from China to U.S. allies. But Yellen insisted that Washington wants to avoid an open rupture with Beijing and said she believes the two countries can prosper in tandem.

"We do not seek to 'decouple' our economy from China's. A full separation of our economies would be disastrous for both countries. It would be destabilizing for the rest of the world," she said.

Once-routine communications between American and Chinese diplomats have dwindled under the Biden administration, raising the risk of a costly misunderstanding.

At November's Group of 20 summit in Bali, President Biden agreed with Xi to resume high-level talks between the two nations. But Secretary of State Antony Blinken canceled plans to visit Beijing after a suspected Chinese spy balloon appeared over the United States in February.

Chinese officials initially apologized for what they called a rogue weather balloon, but later bristled and accused Washington of overreacting when U.S. warplanes shot down the craft off the coast of South Carolina.

Chinese officials blame the United States for the erosion in ties and have rebuffed efforts to reschedule Blinken's visit or to set a date for Yellen to meet her counterpart in Beijing.

The treasury secretary also disputed a widespread Chinese view that the United States is a declining power, politically divided and erratic on the world stage.

Despite such sentiments, which she acknowledged some Americans share, the U.S. economy posted the strongest recovery from the covid recession and boasts a jobless rate near its all-time low. The average American's income is more than five times that of the typical Chinese person, she said. And U.S. democracy, while imperfect, protects the rule of law and free speech.

"It's important to know this: Pronouncements of U.S. decline have been around for decades. But they have always been proven wrong," Yellen said. "The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to adapt and reinvent to face new challenges. This time will be no different — and the economic statistics show why."

Yellen also called for the two nations to work together on shared problems, such as climate change and debt distress in the developing world.

Such collaboration, she said, should occur "not as a favor to us, but out of our joint duty and obligation to the world."

Yellen said China in recent years has abandoned market-oriented reforms in favor of a state-centric economic model. And she reiterated years of American complaints about Chinese trade policies, saying that Beijing used subsidies and other preferential policies to give its companies an unfair edge over foreign firms.

"This strategy has been coupled with aggressive efforts to acquire new technological know-how and intellectual property — including through IP theft and other illicit means," she said.

Yellen urged China to accept healthy competition between the two nations.

For decades, even as some analysts warned the United States and China were fated to clash, they built a strong economic relationship. Two-way merchandise trade, despite escalating security fears, approached $700 billion last year.

But American companies have grown increasingly worried about the political risks associated with relying on China as an export base. Xi for months has promoted a "dual circulation" economic strategy aimed at reducing China's dependence upon foreign suppliers while increasing the rest of the world's need for Chinese goods.

Stars and Stripes · by David J. Lynch · April 20, 2023

17. Ukraine’s Spring Offensive Is Waiting on Weapons

I am reminded of Capt Williard in Apocalypse Now:

Saigon. Shit. I'm still only in Saigon. Every time I think I'm gonna wake up back in the jungle. ..... I'm here a week now, waiting for a mission, getting softer. Every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker, and every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger. Each time I looked around the walls moved in a little tighter.

Ukraine’s Spring Offensive Is Waiting on Weapons

Every day Kyiv waits, the Russians dig deeper trenches.

By Jack Detsch

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Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · April 20, 2023

The snow is melting in eastern Ukraine, and for a brief moment in a year of full-scale war with Russia, things have felt oddly normal. Over the weekend, Ukrainians painted Easter eggs, baked sweet bread, and dressed up in traditional embroidered vyshyvanka shirts.

But in the West, the eerie calm across much of Ukraine’s frozen battlefield, apart from the meat grinder of Bakhmut, has brought a sense of unease. Many are wondering: What’s the holdup for an offensive? For weeks, top Ukrainian officials—from President Volodymyr Zelensky on down—have been telegraphing that they will not start another major military onslaught on Russian lines without more weapons from the United States and the West.

In late March, Zelensky said in a message on his Telegram that Ukraine could not begin its renewed counteroffensive until Western nations sent more weapons, including artillery, tanks, and high mobility rocket artillery. Western officials have also, to date, rebuffed Ukrainian requests for F-16 fighter jets and long-range rocket artillery that can reach Russian lines, which have moved out of the 40-plus mile range of U.S.-provided guided multiple launch rockets that the Pentagon began sending to Ukraine last summer.

“We are waiting for ammunition to arrive from our partners,” Zelensky said in an interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in late March.

The Ukrainian leader added that the counteroffensive “can’t start yet—we can’t send our brave soldiers to the front line without tanks, artillery, and long-range rockets.”

And the call from Kyiv is growing louder. Echoing the frustration in Kyiv, Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, told The Associated Press in an interview on Tuesday that Ukraine was frustrated with some allies that “promise one thing and do a completely different one.” Even though he said Ukraine’s allies are working to build up Kyiv’s military to the level of capability needed to take the fight to Russian lines, he added that if Ukraine isn’t ready, “nobody will start unprepared.”

The spring thaw has brought top-of-the-line German Leopard tanks to Ukraine and the promise of U.S.-provided Abrams tanks arriving in their wake. But in the corridors of Kyiv, there is concern that it’s too little, too late. U.S. officials will admit—on the record, even—that Abrams tanks are months away from arriving as the Pentagon looks at its stocks to see what it can send. And worse yet, the Leopard tanks arriving from eight different countries fire different rounds, meaning that Ukrainians can’t buy munitions for their newly tricked-out ground forces in bulk. Until the cavalry arrives, Ukraine remains a paper Leopard.

Sasha Ustinova, a Ukrainian lawmaker, told Foreign Policy that the U.S. military delivered far less than what Valeriy Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top general, has asked for from the Pentagon. But U.S. military aid is only coming in dribs and drabs, with the Biden administration nearing the end of funding for weapons left that it can pull off of Pentagon shelves to give to the Ukrainians. Ustinova said that Ukraine hoped to begin the offensive in April, but the lack of weapons has pushed the launch date back indefinitely.

“We, as a military, want to have all the weapons now, but of course it’s impossible in the current situation,” said one Ukrainian military official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Of course we need the jets, but it’s not a question of the coming months, to be honest.”

The United States is set to announce on Thursday plans to send Ukraine $325 million in additional ammo and anti-armor weapons at a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Germany, Politico first reported. The prospects of F-16 fighter jets and long-range U.S. Army Tactical Missile Systems are still tied down in internal debates, leading to frustration on Capitol Hill.

“It is beyond time that this administration, along with our allies, provide Ukraine with the weapons they need to win,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul said at a hearing earlier on Wednesday. “We need to do more than just give Ukraine enough for survival.” Some Western officials, concerned about the long lead time for training Ukrainian pilots and maintaining jets, have hinted that F-16s could be provided to Ukraine in a post-invasion scenario as a long-term deterrent.

But Ukraine is fighting a war that’s measured in days and weeks, not months and years. It aims to claw back as much territory as possible from Russian occupiers in the Donbas and southern Ukraine. After an autumn push, Ukrainian forces drove Russian troops across the Dnipro River and recaptured Kherson, just north of the Crimean Peninsula. That’s the big target. A further spring offensive could see Ukraine try to push south—though it would face fortified Russian defenders across the river—or try to push east into Russian-occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia province before pushing to slash supply lines into Crimea, avoiding a risky amphibious assault.

But as the wait draws longer, Ukrainian officials are worried that the Russians have finally begun adapting their tactics enough to make a difference. Equipped with longer-range missiles, Russian ships are firing precision munitions at urban areas from as far away as the Caspian Sea, said Ustinova, the Ukrainian lawmaker, making it impossible for Ukraine to counterattack. And longer-range Su-35s, Russia’s fourth-generation fighter, can also fire from Russian airspace.

“The Russians are using more precise weapons and causing a lot of damage,” she said. “Ukraine has old weapons.” Ukraine only has enough air defense to cover a few cities and has been trying to stopgap the arrival of U.S.-made Patriot batteries, which began arriving this week, with Soviet-era Buk missiles and the medium-range Hawk missile system, which the U.S. Army stopped using in the 1990s and arrived in Ukraine without radars.

With the Ukrainian military taking hundreds of casualties every week in the Donbas region, former U.S. officials believe that each day Kyiv waits to start an offensive, its military strength is being sapped by the ongoing fight over towns such as the resource-rich Bakhmut.

“Each day that goes by, we just attrit and the Russians just reinforce,” said Jim Townsend, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for NATO and Europe. “It builds the case for this offensive getting started sooner rather than later.”

Others are convinced that the offensive is worth the wait. “I think the longer Ukraine waits the better the overall odds of success,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military with the Virginia-based think tank CNA.Kofman said that Ukraine likely has short supplies of tools other than weapons to help it take the fight to the Russians, such breaching, mine-clearing, bridging, and logistics equipment.

The Russian military in occupied areas of Ukraine has already started battening the hatches for the coming counteroffensive. In the city of Berdyansk, on the northern shore of the Azov Sea, Russian troops have begun fortifying the airport with trenches and pyramidal anti-tank obstacles known as ‘dragon’s teeth.’ Occupation troops have also started digging defensive fortifications in Crimea, including at the port of Sevastopol and Belbek Air Base, which has already been hit with blasts since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began more than a year ago. The invaders have been digging in, not advancing. What’s missing are the tools to root them out.

“We think the intensity of their offensive operation is decreasing,” said Yehor Cherniev, a Ukrainian lawmaker who heads the nation’s delegation to NATO’s parliamentary authority. “This is a great window for our counteroffensive.”

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · April 20, 2023

18. NATO chief: Ukraine’s ‘rightful place’ is in the alliance

NATO chief: Ukraine’s ‘rightful place’ is in the alliance

Defense News · by Ap Reports · April 20, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine — NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg defiantly declared Thursday that Ukraine’s “rightful place” is in the military alliance and pledged more support for the country on his first visit to Kyiv since Russia’s invasion just over a year ago.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged Stoltenberg, who has been instrumental in marshaling support from NATO members, to push for even more from them, including warplanes, artillery and armored equipment.

The Kremlin has given various justifications for going to war, but repeated Thursday that preventing Ukraine from joining NATO is still a key goal of its invasion, arguing that Kyiv’s membership in the alliance would pose an existential threat to Russia.

NATO leaders said in 2008 that Ukraine would join the alliance one day, and Stoltenberg has repeated that promise throughout the war, though the organization has established no pathway or timetable for membership.

“Let me be clear, Ukraine’s rightful place is in the Euro-Atlantic family,” Stoltenberg told a news conference. “Ukraine’s rightful place is in NATO.”

Zelenskyy said he was grateful for an invitation to a NATO summit in July in Vilnius, Lithuania, but said his country needs a roadmap for becoming a member.

“The time has come for the (alliance’s) leaders to define the prospects of Ukraine’s acquisition of NATO membership, to define the algorithm of Ukraine’s movement towards this goal, and to define security guarantees for our state for the period of such movement — that is, for the period before NATO membership,” he said.

Stoltenberg said he and Zelenskyy discussed a NATO support program for Ukraine.

“This will help you transition from Soviet-era equipment and doctrines to NATO standards and ensure full interoperability with the alliance,” Stoltenberg said. “NATO stands with you today, tomorrow and for as long as it takes.”

He noted an announcement Thursday by Denmark and the Netherlands that they plan to provide Ukraine with at least another 14 refurbished Leopard 2 battle tanks by early 2024.

He added that he expected countries to “make new announcements of concrete military support to Ukraine” at a meeting Friday in Germany.

The fighting in recent months has become a war of attrition, with neither side able to gain momentum. But Ukraine has recently received sophisticated weapons from its Western allies and is expected to launch a counteroffensive in coming weeks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that Moscow could use “all means available” — a phrase some see as a threat to use nuclear weapons — in response to an attack on its territory if Ukraine attempts to recapture Moscow-occupied areas.

NATO has no official presence in Ukraine and provides only nonlethal support to Kyiv, but Stoltenberg has been the strong voice of the alliance throughout the war.

A procession of international leaders has made the journey to Kyiv over the last year, and the former Norwegian prime minister is one of the last major Western figures to do so.

NATO, formed to counter the Soviet Union, has long feared being dragged into a wide war with nuclear-armed Russia. But as the West has moved from hesitantly providing helmets and uniforms to tanks, warplanes and advanced missile systems, high-level visits have become routine.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Thursday that preventing Ukraine from joining NATO remains one of the goals of what Moscow calls its “special military operation.” Speaking in a conference call with reporters, Peskov said that Ukraine’s accession would pose a “serious, significant threat to our country, to our country’s security.”

Earlier this month, Finland joined the alliance, setting aside decades of neutrality in a historic realignment of Europe’s post-Cold War security landscape. While NATO says it poses no threat to Russia, the Nordic country’s accession dealt a major political blow to Putin.

Finland’s membership doubles Russia’s border with the world’s biggest security alliance. Neighboring Sweden is expected to join in coming months, too, possibly by the time U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO counterparts meet in Vilnius in July.

The alliance has focused on bolstering defenses on its own territory to dissuade Putin from attacking any member country. Under NATO’s collective security guarantee, an attack on one member country is considered an attack on all of them.

On Friday, Stoltenberg will attend a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The group is the main international forum for drumming up military support for Ukraine.

In other developments, the Ukraine Space Agency said Thursday that a bright flash of light in the night sky over the country the previous day was probably a meteor entering the atmosphere. Residents of the capital and several cities in Belarus saw the flash of light, which lingered for a couple of seconds, and an explosion was heard in the Kyiv region. It triggered an air raid alarm in Kyiv.

Cook reported from Brussels.

19. War Books: The Russian Military

War Books: The Russian Military - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Katherine Kjellström Elgin · April 21, 2023

Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We ask an expert on a particular topic to recommend five books on that topic and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has revealed a lot about the Russian military and what the world can expect from modern-day large-scale combat operations. However, an important distinction for lessons learned will be what insights can be generalized to other nations and which remain particular to the Russian military. That’s why we asked Katherine Kjellström Elgin, an MWI research fellow, to contribute this edition of War Books. We gave her the following prompt: What five books would you recommend for readers to better understand Russia’s military and the Ukraine War?

Russia’s Military Revival, by Bettina Renz

Published in 2018, Renz provides a comprehensive analysis of the Russian military’s resurgence under Vladimir Putin by examining the history and organization of the Russian military and developments in Russian military thinking. In so doing, she works to contextualize the Russian military’s reform efforts under Putin within Russia’s broader foreign policy objectives and argues that while the Russian military improved greatly from the 1990s, it does not yet rival the West’s capabilities. Her book is a particularly interesting read in light of the war in Ukraine, which, among other issues, begs the question of the degree to which the Russian military was truly revived.

The Transformation of Russia’s Armed Forces: Twenty Lost Years, edited by Roger McDermott

This edited volume, based on a special issue of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, brings together several of the biggest names in Russian military analysis to discuss the challenges facing Russian policymakers as they tried to rebuild the Russian military. This collection highlights the considerations of and complications facing Russian leaders as they sought to build a military capable of defending Russian interests in the twenty-first century. Understanding how the Russian military became what it is today can help us understand where it might go after the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, by Mark Galeotti

Published in November 2022, just months after the Russian invasion, this book, tracing the history of the Russian military since the 1990s, provides a thorough (what one reviewer called “encyclopedic”) look at Russia’s hard power. Galeotti’s analysis is remarkably timely, but readers should consider how the war complicates some of his arguments. Nevertheless, this book provides readers with a remarkable level of detail of the Russian military and paints a picture of a political leadership seduced by the perceived success of its military.

Soviet military thinkers were among the first to recognize a revolution in military affairs (RMA) based upon the growth and spread of information technologies—and yet, the Soviet military struggled to implement the technological realities of the RMA. In analyzing how three countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel—perceived and adapted to the RMA, Adamsky demonstrates that culture impacts the ways in which countries innovate militarily. Adamsky’s theoretical contributions to the understanding of military innovation and culture are noteworthy, and even readers less familiar with academic theory will appreciate what his analysis tells us about the Russian military.

Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, by Michael Kofman, et al

Michael Kofman, a former MWI fellow, is one of the most prominent voices on analysis of the war in Ukraine. His work on the Russian military is well worth a read, and this monograph by his team at CNA is no exception. The report provides an in-depth look at the way in which Russian military leaders conceive of Russian military strategy, with a thorough overview of how the Russian military plans (or perhaps planned) to fight, focusing on military strategy and operational concepts. As readers may recall, many analysts were surprised that the Russian military did not follow prescribed doctrine during the early stages of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This report will help readers understand how many analysts expected the Russians to fight and how that differs from practice.

Dr. Katherine Kjellström Elgin is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. An expert on US and allied defense strategy, particularly with regard to Europe and Russia, she has held positions in both academic and policy organizations.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: mil.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

mwi.usma.edu · by Katherine Kjellström Elgin · April 21, 2023

20. The Next Intel Leak May Not Resemble the Most Recent One, Expert Warns

Excerpts:

While some have called for systems to monitor the printing of classified materials, there are still other ways to create and share classified information—all of those ways is part of what is straining the government’s current information security system.

PowerPoints, PDFs, Word documents, emails, video teleconferences, and chat messages can all be forms of secret or top secret records that must be marked with the appropriate classification level. Each new form of digital record also presents a challenge for how to protect it.

“We live in a world where technology has allowed for sharing of information in a much more robust way,” Beaghley said. “Technology has enabled a lot more national security secret-making and secret-sharing.”

All of these factors mean that even when the Air Force and the Department of Defense complete their current reviews of information security practices, they should continue to reevaluate their practices as technologies change, Beaghley said.

“There’s no silver bullet,” said Beaghley. “The next leak likely won’t look like this particular situation. … The government is evaluating options, learning from prior scenarios, but it’s really important to think about future scenarios and try to plan for and mitigate against the things that have not yet happened but could potentially in the future.”

The Next Intel Leak May Not Resemble the Most Recent One, Expert Warns

airandspaceforces.com · by David Roza · April 19, 2023

April 19, 2023 | By David Roza

As the Department of Defense begins a review of its policies and practices for handling classified information in the wake of a massive intelligence leak, a national security expert cautions that the next intel leak may not resemble the one that just happened—and so officials must try to be proactive in considering next steps.

“You don’t protect against just the last threat,” Sina Beaghley, a senior international and defense policy researcher at RAND, said in an interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine. “You have to address that, you have to close the gaps. But you also have to think about where technology, culture, all of those things are leading and then posture the government to be able to react to it, both in the recruiting world and in terms of trust, vetting, and mitigation.”

The question of how the military handles security clearances and classified information has been hotly debated ever since a trove of classified information on the war in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and Middle East military theaters, and other sensitive subjects were leaked in an online group chat. Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira was arrested April 13 in connection with the leak, and, in the days since, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III and Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall directed separate reviews of their departments’ security practices.

On the Air Force side, the corrective action includes a review of the Massachusetts Air National Guard’s 102nd Intelligence Wing, Teixeira’s unit; a headquarters-level appraisal of Air Force policies; and a stand-down within the next 30 days for all Air Force and Space Force units to review their security practices and conduct training as necessary.

Approximately 700,000 people in the Department of the Air Force have security clearances, an Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine. While the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency does not break down the average timelines to obtain a security clearance by military branch, it takes an average of 57 days to secure an initial secret clearance and 51 days to undergo a secret periodic reinvestigation. It takes an average of 94 days to obtain an initial top secret clearance and 115 days to undergo a top secret periodic reinvestigation.

At a Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing and in a memo sent to the entire department, Kendall, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., and Chief of Space Operations B. Chance Saltzman stressed the importance of setting and following standards for who “needs to know” certain sensitive information.

“Enforcing the need-to-know requirement is a chain of command responsibility—these are important, conscious choices leaders must make at every level,” the three officials wrote.

But enforcing “need-to-know” may be easier said than done.

“Who makes that judgment?” Beaghley asked. “Need-to-know is partly a self-policed activity: I shouldn’t be searching something totally beyond what my mission is. But who knows exactly what my mission is? How do you determine what my permissions should be? Especially when job functions and tasks can be fluid in a national security environment.”

The U.S. government began sharing classified information more widely among authorized individuals after the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks, after criticism that national security agencies did not share information and coordination enough. Even now, officials call for even more info-sharing and cooperation across organizations.

The challenge in placing limits on that sharing would be deciding what information individuals need to do their job within the complex national security bureaucracy.

Access is one of several areas where the military and the government as a whole has to strike a balance between trusting individuals and protecting sensitive information.

Starting in 2018, the government launched Trusted Workforce 2.0, a multiyear effort intended to make the vetting process faster by implementing a single system. Instead of reviewing individuals with security clearances every five to 10 years, the new system continuously vets individuals via automated record checks of criminal, terrorism, and financial databases and public records. All Air Force and Space Force personnel with security clearances are subject to continuous security vetting, an Air Force spokesperson said.

But while Trusted Workforce 2.0 does improve the time it takes officials to get important information on security clearance holders, there are still instances when individuals don’t set off any triggers but still present a threat.

“When you have an individual who’s been cleared and been determined to by the government to be trustworthy at a certain level which, in this case, as I understand, is the highest level, what do you do when that person decides to not do what they said they would do as far as non-disclosure?” Beaghley asked. “How do you mitigate that?”

One commonly-suggested solution is to monitor a security clearance holder’s social media presence. There is policy for how government agencies can seek out information about a candidate’s public social media presence at the beginning of a security clearance investigation, and some agencies do so, Beaghley said. There have also been a few test programs that have gathered and analyzed information about individuals’ public activity on social media after they receive their security clearance, but reporting is mixed on how productive those programs were for the resources invested.

Even if there was a successful program that included public social media monitoring as part of a continuous vetting process, monitors are not currently allowed to access a private chat room like the one in which Teixeira allegedly leaked classified information, at least as part of a normal background investigation. It also may not be knowable under which social media profiles or handles a security clearance holder posts.

Beyond social media, the government has also directed employees to report on coworkers exhibiting suspicious behavior. Various federal government agencies also have insider threat programs that monitor employees’ computer activity for anomalous behavior.

Though all these systems complement each other, there are still possible blind spots that could allow for misuse of access. For example, if individuals with security clearances print out a classified document, they generally would not be inspected when they leave a classified facility, Beaghley said.

“In most cases, no one’s patting you down, looking through your bags. So here is the possibility that a trusted individual with access can print out classified material and quite literally walk out the door,” she explained.

While some have called for systems to monitor the printing of classified materials, there are still other ways to create and share classified information—all of those ways is part of what is straining the government’s current information security system.

PowerPoints, PDFs, Word documents, emails, video teleconferences, and chat messages can all be forms of secret or top secret records that must be marked with the appropriate classification level. Each new form of digital record also presents a challenge for how to protect it.

“We live in a world where technology has allowed for sharing of information in a much more robust way,” Beaghley said. “Technology has enabled a lot more national security secret-making and secret-sharing.”

All of these factors mean that even when the Air Force and the Department of Defense complete their current reviews of information security practices, they should continue to reevaluate their practices as technologies change, Beaghley said.

“There’s no silver bullet,” said Beaghley. “The next leak likely won’t look like this particular situation. … The government is evaluating options, learning from prior scenarios, but it’s really important to think about future scenarios and try to plan for and mitigate against the things that have not yet happened but could potentially in the future.”

National Security

airandspaceforces.com · by David Roza · April 19, 2023

21. US Lawmakers See ‘Maximum Danger’ After Staging a China War Game

US Lawmakers See ‘Maximum Danger’ After Staging a China War Game

Committee’s chairman calls for arming Taiwan ‘to the teeth’
An earlier war game concluded a Chinese invasion would founder

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-20/us-lawmakers-see-maximum-danger-after-staging-a-china-war-game?sref=hhjZtX76

ByAnna Edgerton

April 20, 2023 at 1:37 PM EDT

A group of US lawmakers gathered around maps spread out on tables in a committee room on Capitol Hill Wednesday night, pretending to advise the president after a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

The members of the House’s new China committee spent more than two hours gaming out possible scenarios, working through the first month of imagined fighting. Representative Mike Gallagher, the Wisconsin Republican who leads the committee, said the war game demonstrated “disastrous economic consequences” for the global economy if China attempts to seize the self-governed island by force.

Mike GallagherPhotographer: Anna Rose Layden/Bloomberg

“We are well within the window of maximum danger for a Chinese Communist Party invasion of Taiwan, and yesterday’s war game stressed the need to take action to deter CCP aggression and arm Taiwan to the teeth before any crisis begins,” Gallagher said in a statement. “Deterring war is the only path to peace and stability.”

The special committee on the Chinese Communist Party is dedicated to focusing on military and economic threats posed to the US by the world’s second-largest economy. A more dispassionate war game by a Washington think tank concluded in January that a hypothetical Chinese invasion “quickly founders” but exacts high costs on Taiwan and the US Navy.

Earlier: Taiwan-Invasion War Game by US Think Tank Sees a Fast China Flop

One of the main takeaways from the congressional committee’s exercise was the importance of deterrence, according to a person close to the committee who asked not to be named speaking about the closed event. The lawmakers concluded Taiwan needs to be supplied with whatever weapons it needs before any fighting breaks out, especially long-range missiles.

Another important conclusion was economic. In this war game, the person said, ship traffic in the region stops, supply chains crumble and global markets face almost unimaginable consequences.

Gallagher told his fellow committee members in an opening statement on Wednesday night that the “business community is not taking the threat of a Taiwan crisis seriously enough.” He warned that US companies that aren’t planning for Chinese aggression “verges on dereliction of fiduciary duty.”

22. The Discord Leaker Was a Narcissist, Not an Ideologue

The Discord Leaker Was a Narcissist, Not an Ideologue

Comparisons between Jack Teixeira and self-declared whistleblowers are misplaced.

By David V. Gioe, a British Academy Global Professor at the King’s College London Department of War Studies and a history fellow for the Army Cyber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy, and Joseph M. Hatfield, an assistant professor at the U. S. Naval Academy.

Foreign Policy · by David V. Gioe, Joseph M. Hatfield · April 20, 2023

Even before U.S. Air National Guard member Jack Teixeira was arrested on Thursday as the leaker of dozens of classified government documents that have made their way around the internet in recent weeks, the inevitable comparisons with Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden suggested that he was the latest in a long line of mass leakers of intelligence. As one journalist reported on the most generic of similarities, “Like Manning and Snowden, Teixeira has a military or intelligence tie as a member of the Massachusetts Air Force National Guard.”

Indeed, in the last decade, a new digital generation of insider threat has emerged to challenge secrecy in the U.S. intelligence community, a phenomenon that author James Bamford has described as a “uniquely postmodern breed of whistleblower.” That’s true as far as it goes, but Teixeira should not be thought of in this vein. It would be like saying a Yugo is like a Mercedes because they both have four wheels and an engine. Sure, everyone working in the U.S. Defense Department’s sprawling intelligence apparatus is part of that bureaucracy, but that’s a tautology. It would also be correct to observe that nearly every spy in American history has had a “military or intelligence tie” as well, but that doesn’t explain much in the Teixeira case.

The real but superficial comparisons to leakers like Snowden and Manning classify Teixeira as a mass leaker on a personal crusade. But this is incorrect. Snowden and Manning leaked classified documents to journalists and activists to help bring about the kind of world they wanted to live in—one of citizen-enforced governmental transparency where states have less power. While foolish and misguided, they were ideologically motivated in taking their reckless actions.

In contrast, it seems that Teixeira simply displayed terrible judgment and was showboating his access to privileged information to increase his street cred with pals on the internet. In that sense, he was more like an irresponsible teenager who took his parents’ Ferrari out joyriding with his gearhead friends. Teixeira isn’t a “new breed” of insider threat, and he certainly isn’t a whistleblower seeking to publicize some perceived wrong.

Snowden’s mass leaks in 2013 were not the first digital challenge to the U.S. intelligence community. Three years before, then-U.S. Army Private Manning provided 500,000 classified documents to WikiLeaks, which published them to great fanfare for transparency advocates and caused much consternation in Washington. These are not isolated cases; if anything, the tempo of such mass public disclosures seems to be increasing. In March 2017, the CIA fell victim to what is known as the “Vault 7” series, in which sensitive computer tools for digital surveillance and cyber operations were given to WikiLeaks and published online.

Disgruntled former CIA software engineer Joshua Schulte was found guilty of the breach (and also of possessing child pornography, again suggesting an anemic background investigation). Although Manning, Snowden, and Schulte represent the most significant mass leakers of classified information, others have played smaller roles. For instance, National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Reality Winner printed a sensitive document from the NSA computer system and sent it to the self-described publisher of “adversarial journalism,” the Intercept, run by journalist-activists originally linked to the Snowden leaks.

Yet treating Teixeira as another in an increasingly long and embarrassing line of leakers impedes the lessons that can and should be learned from this case, which is marked by social adherence to a gaming community more than a cause. What these leakers do have in common with Teixeira is that—as far as anyone has proven—not one of them carried out the intelligence breach acting as a recruited agent on behalf of a foreign power. They are thus not “spies” in the traditional sense of the word.

Instead, they are what we have described in our academic research as self-directed insider threats: intelligence professionals who chose to betray their oath to protect classified information and did so on their own initiative. Some acted on their political or ideological beliefs, others for disgruntlement, to show off, or even to win arguments in gaming chat rooms. As the Teixeira charging documents allege, his intent was to “discuss geopolitical affairs and current and historical wars.” It was not some kind of misguided protest about U.S. domestic or foreign policy. Washington is apparently not yet prepared to understand such a vector of counterintelligence vulnerability.

To be sure, Teixeira otherwise shares much in common with leakers such as Snowden and Manning. They were all young people of junior rank (despite Snowden’s ludicrous claims that he was some kind of “senior advisor”) in sensitive positions in the U.S. intelligence community who abused their access to classified information to share it with people who had no right nor reason to know it. They were all grandiose enough to think that they wouldn’t get caught (or, if they were, would be lionized enough to avoid criminal penalties), and none of them realized the broader geopolitical or diplomatic ramifications of their actions.

In practice, whatever the motivations, the damage is just as real as if they were spies. As long-serving Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles explained in 1963, providing secrets for public consumption has the same net effect as “betraying it to the Soviets just as clearly as if he secretly handed it to them,” and it is thus reasonable to charge Teixeira under the same criminal codes as the other mass leakers. But that’s where the similarities end.

Ideologically driven betrayal is a well-trodden path in the annals of espionage, from the communism-inspired “Cambridge Five” spy ring during the Cold War to the Cuban sympathies that motivated Ana Montes, who was recently released from prison after serving 20 years for spying for Cuba. Preventing those with divided loyalties from accessing state secrets has given rise to the modern system of periodic background checks, invasive polygraph testing, and the requirement that those with security clearances document any foreign travel or meaningful foreign associations. Yet very few of these measures seek even to identify, much less prevent, self-directed insider threats such as Winner, Manning, Snowden, and the like.

Effective frameworks for personnel security and counterintelligence require understanding the varied (and often multiple) motivations for insider threats. In this case, it seems that Teixeira’s access to classified systems far exceeded his professional remit. Further, it seems clear that the counterintelligence vetting process failed to pick up some rather radical and distasteful views, but these views do not seem to be his motivation for leaking. It seems more likely that Teixeira’s narcissism, bad judgment, and arrogance got the best of him, although some of these traits can be hard to uncover in a traditional background investigation that is often more concerned with blackmailable behaviors than judgment. The U.S. intelligence community will almost certainly conduct a thorough post-mortem of the Teixeira case for lessons learned, and it may be prudent to look beyond his recklessness to discern not only how he got a clearance and why he had such unfettered system access, but also why the government was unaware that its secrets were circulating around the dark corners of the internet for months before he was arrested. The task of counterintelligence trolling of the internet for loose secrets will doubtless require new protocols and legal authorities. In the meantime, the Band-Aid of “security refresher training” will be urgently added to the schedule for the hundreds of thousands of clearance holders—the vast majority of whom already understand the responsibility that comes with a clearance.

Such a post-Teixeira study may suggest that it is time to revisit the post-9/11 collaborative framework of “need to share” and revert to the Cold War’s stricter “need to know” principle. Perhaps the Defense Department will close off intelligence as an initial career thrust for the most junior personnel in the same way that certain specialties (such as working in embassies or in special operations) requires a higher rank and more professional experience. Could the intelligence community differentiate accesses to intelligence between those who need to use the information for their jobs and, on the other hand, those who just need to keep the systems running? For instance, while Manning, Winner, and Schulte had substantive roles dealing with classified intelligence as part of their jobs, Snowden and Teixeira were essentially system administrators. Further, might access to national secrets prudently require an age minimum, just as the Constitution requires for officeholders in the Senate or presidency? After all, the prefrontal cortex responsible for judgment and restraining impulses develops well into one’s mid-to-late 20s.

Or perhaps there is simply an irreducible minimum of bad apples and poor judgment in an enormous—by international comparison—U.S. intelligence community that is comprised, after all, of people. Important decisions will need be made about insider threat protocols, and further actions need to be taken in light of this event. It does no one any good to peddle in false comparisons, such as painting Teixeira as another crusading mass leaker. Only with clarity can the intelligence community hope to learn from this unfortunate event.

This is the analysis of the authors alone and represents no official U.S. Defense Department or government position.

Foreign Policy · by David V. Gioe, Joseph M. Hatfield · April 20, 2023

23. Pentagon moving to ensure human control so AI doesn't ‘make the decision for us’

Pentagon moving to ensure human control so AI doesn't ‘make the decision for us’

One official said CENTCOM sees AI as a 'light switch' to help illuminate the correct decision

foxnews.com · by Peter Kasperowicz | Fox News

Video

Former Israeli prime minister discusses the future of artificial intelligence

Naftali Bennett spoke exclusively with Fox News Digital about the benefits of AI and the need to set parameters for its use now.

The U.S. military is embracing artificial intelligence as a tool for quickly digesting data and helping leaders make the right decision – and not to make those decisions for the humans in charge, according to two top AI advisors in U.S. Central Command.

CENTCOM, which is tasked with safeguarding U.S. national security in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, just hired Dr. Andrew Moore as its first AI advisor. Moore is the former director of Google Cloud AI and former dean of the Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science, and he’ll be working with Schuyler Moore, CENTCOM’s chief technology officer.

In an interview with Fox News Digital, they both agreed that while some are imagining AI-driven weapons, the U.S. military aims to keep humans in the decision-making seat, and using AI to assess massive amounts of data that helps the people sitting in those seats.

"There’s huge amounts of concern, rightly so, about the consequences of autonomous weapons," Dr. Moore said. "One thing that I’ve been very well aware of in all my dealings with… the U.S. military: I’ve never once heard anyone from the U.S. military suggest that it would be a good idea to create autonomous weapons."

AI PAUSE CEDES POWER TO CHINA, HARMS DEVELOPMENT OF ‘DEMOCRATIC’ AI, EXPERTS WARN SENATE

U.S. Central Command, led by Army Gen. Michael Kurilla, has hired a top AI expert and is working with staff to harness AI's capacity to sift through data to help officials make better, faster military decisions. (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)

Schuyler Moore said the military sees AI as a "light switch" that helps people make sense of data and point them in the right direction. She stressed that the Pentagon believes that it "must and will always have a human in the loop making a final decision."

"Help us make a better decision, don’t make the decision for us," she said.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE AI COVERAGE FROM FOX NEWS DIGITAL

One example they discussed in CENTCOM’s sphere of influence is using AI to crack down on illegal weapons shipments around Iran. Ms. Moore said that officials believe AI can be used to help the military narrow the number of possibly suspicious shipments by understanding what "normal" shipping patterns look like and flagging those that fall outside the norm.

Once a subset of possibly suspicious ships on the water is identified, AI might also be used to quickly interpret pictures and videos and deliver interpretations and assessments to human military leaders.

"You can imagine thousands and thousands of hours of video feed or images that are being captured from an unmanned surface vessel that would normally take an analyst hours and hours and hours to go through," Ms. Moore said. "And when you apply computer vision algorithms, suddenly you can drop that time down to 45 minutes."

ALTERNATIVE INVENTOR? BIDEN AMIN OPENS DOOR TO NON-HUMAN, AI PATENT HOLDERS

Dr. Andrew Moore, now an advisor to CENTCOM on AI, pictured here in 2018 when he was Dean, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). (Screenshot from federal government DVIDS site)

Dr. Moore says that to get this kind of a system up and running, tons of data need to be crunched by an AI system so it knows what normal shipping patterns look like.

"There’s two big things going on when it comes to data, computing and networks within the combatant commands such as CENTCOM," he said. "The first one is getting hold of data. And the next one is, having computers which can understand and draw conclusions from that data."

In the example of monitoring shipments around Iran, Ms. Moore said the goal is to get AI to the point where it understands the "patterns of life" in that area of the world, so the U.S. can understand when those patterns are broken in ways that might threaten U.S. national security. She described the effort as a "crawl, walk, run" effort that will make U.S. military decisions sharper and faster.

BIDEN MAY REGULATE AI FOR ‘DISINFORMATION,’ ‘DISCRIMINATORY OUTCOMES’

"The crawl is, do I see anything at all? Do I have a sensor that can take a picture?" she said. "The walk is, can I tell what is in the picture? And then the run is, do I understand the context of what is in the picture? Do I know where it came from, do I know where it’s going and do I know if that’s normal."

Similar efforts will likely be made in areas such as air traffic, so the U.S. can interpret threatening patterns in the air more quickly than humans could understand what traffic is "normal" and what traffic is outside the norm.

U.S. Central Command Chief Technology Officer Schuyler Moore conducts a press briefing on artificial intelligence and unmanned systems at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Dec. 7, 2022. (Screenshot from federal government's DVIDS site)

Dr. Moore said his role is to help CENTCOM incorporate current AI capabilities into the military in these ways. He said some commercial products are able to predict things like how much inventory should be shipped to a certain store.

"The technology got very good at spotting and predicting, even very minor fluctuations," he said. "The thing that I hope to be able to do in this role… is to see if I can help make sure that some of these very clever methods being used in the commercial sector, we can also apply them to help with some of these big public facing issues in the military sector."

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Dr. Moore said he also believes the U.S. is in a race to create a more responsible AI system compared to those being developed by U.S. adversaries. He said some countries are getting "scarily good" at using AI to conduct illegal surveillance, and said, "We have to be ready to counter these kinds of aggressive surveillance techniques against the United States."

Ms. Moore said the U.S. hopes to lead the way in developing responsible AI applications. "That is something that we are able to positively influence, hopefully by demonstrating our own responsible use of it," she said.

Pete Kasperowicz is a politics editor at Fox News Digital.

foxnews.com · by Peter Kasperowicz | Fox News

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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US Can Handle China, Ukraine Missions Simultaneously, Top Pacific Admiral Says

What’s Perfectly Round, Made Of Metal, And Keeping Russia From Replacing the 2,000 Tanks It’s Lost In Ukraine?

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 20, 2023

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