Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 


I will be on the other side of the world through Wednesday so my message will be at off times. Due to my compressed schedule and travel days (without wifi on the airplane, I may miss a day.


Quotes of the Day:


"Give me liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."
-John Milton

"There will always be ricks in the road ahead of us. They will be stumbling blocks or stepping stones.; it all depends on how you use them."
- Friedrich Nietzsche

"You can never really understand an individual unless you also understand the society, historical time period in which they lived, personal troubles, and social issues."
- S. Wright Mills



1. Outside information can bring change to N. Korea's dire human rights conditions: S. Korean envoy

2. U.S. echoes Yoon's remarks on need to preserve peace in Taiwan Strait

3. S. Korea urges global cooperation on N.K. nuclear issue at NATO meeting

4. Kazakhstan sees S. Korea as ideal partner in pragmatic diplomacy

5. Transitioning Attitudes on North Korea: Perceived Threat and Preferred Response

6. S. Korean envoy meets U.S. assistant secretary of state to discuss Yoon-Biden summit

7. Yoon orders dispatch of naval unit to war-torn Sudan to protect Korean nationals

8. Leaked US documents offer insight (South Korea)

9. Biden to Pledge Steps to Deter Nuclear Attack on South Korea -Officials

10. South Korea Says Summit With Biden to Give Significant Attention to North Korea Rights

11. North Korean Solid-Fuel ICBM Increases U.S. Vulnerability

12. Prisoner escapes from North Korean detention center, shoots 4 officers

13. North Korean escapees learn about family deaths months later

14. North Korea’s 'Day of the Sun' canceled due to rain

15. For the Sake of Appearances: The Case of South Korean Authoritarian Image Management in the 1970s




1. Outside information can bring change to N. Korea's dire human rights conditions: S. Korean envoy


Ambassador Lee gets it. Here are my information recommendations:


Why an Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea:
 
1. Prevent War – establish polices for 2d tier military leadership - e.g., if you do not attack and maintain control of WMD and you and your family will have a place in a free and unified Korea. When faced with an order to attack – we want the 2d tier leadership to have a choice.
 
2. Pressure on KJU – from the elite, military leaders, and people – KJU responsible for failure – his policies cause suffering and will ultimate cause nK to fail. Long shot but the pressure from within could cause Kim to change or at least moderate his policies.
 
        Every time we must talk about nuclear weapons and missiles we need to emphasize the human rights abuses – and the $650 million wasted in 2022 on provocations.
 
3. Offer options to the Korean people. There is life outside of Juche and Songbun that they can reach and enjoy – show the success of escapees.
 
4. Support to potential emerging leadership who seek change – when they do act they must know they will be supported by the international community.


Recommendations.
 
Deterring war remains the overarching priority for the ROK/U.S. alliance. However, influence operations can play an effective role in both supporting the alliance’s priority while exerting pressure on Kim Jong Un like he has never felt. The alliance should execute a superior political warfare strategy that consists of three lines of effort: a human rights upfront approach, information and influence activities, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. The following are the highlights of what should be included as part of an overt information warfare campaign. 
 
·     Overarching narrative: Every response to the regime’s nuclear and missile activities must include a human rights response. For example, Kim Jong Un’s deliberate decision to prioritize nuclear and missile development is solely responsible for the suffering of the Korea people in the north.
 
·     Establish an alliance organization to plan and conduct combined political warfare with a supporting information warfare campaign.
 
·     Establish a Korean Escapee (Defector) Information Institute to harness the expertise of key communicators from the north to shape themes and messages and advise on all aspect of the information warfare campaign.
 
·     Harness the power of civil society, empower escapees from the north to continue their information work, and encourage free nations to provide information to the Korean people in the north.
 
·     Support proposed efforts by the ROK military to employ psychological warfare to respond to North Korean provocations.
 
·     Effectively employ the $40 million allocated in the 2023 NDAA  provided to the Korean Services of VOA and RFA to increase broadcasts to a level that optimizes access and coverage. Pursue technologies to achieve penetration in the north
 
·     Fully implement the information planning requirements in the “Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act of 2022.''
 
·     Design an overt information warfare campaign targeting the Korean people in the north based on Information, Knowledge, Truth, and Understanding
o  Information: massive quantities of information from entertainment to news;
o  Knowledge: practical information on how to effect change, best practices for agriculture and market activity, educational lessons without Juche influence;
o  Truth: the truth about the regime and the situation in north Korea and the outside world; and,
o  Understanding: help the Korean people in the north to understand the inalienable and universal rights that belong to all human beings.
 
The only way to end north Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, military threats, and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people in the north by the mafia-like crime cult known as the Kim family regime is through unification. A free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government would be a strong American ally in Asia. An information warfare campaign against north Korea will be the most important contribution to this outcome, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).


Outside information can bring change to N. Korea's dire human rights conditions: S. Korean envoy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 21, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, April 21 (Yonhap) -- Exposing North Koreans to outside information may be the key to bringing a much needed change to worsening human rights conditions in North Korea, South Korea's special envoy for North Korean human rights said Friday.

Lee Shin-hwa, ambassador-at-large for international cooperation on North Korean human rights, insisted North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his regime are one of the "worst" violators of human rights.

"There are still some places in the world where human rights are violated by dictators and authoritarian leaders, and North Korea is one of the worst," she said in a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.


South Korea's special envoy for North Korean human rights, Lee Shin-wha, is seen delivering opening remarks in a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington, on April 21, 2023, in this captured image. (Yonhap)

Lee noted that Pyongyang continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, while a United Nations report says over 41 percent of its entire population was malnourished between 2019 and 2021.

"North Korea fired some 100 missiles within less than two years, including 71 last year alone, which you can buy 1 million tons of rice, enough to cover annual food shortages even with some surpluses," she said.

Lee insisted that years of efforts to denuclearize North Korea have done little but to "embolden" and "spoil" the recalcitrant regime.

"That's why we have to mainstream human rights issues no matter what kind of foreign policy we are taking when it comes to North Korea," she told the forum in Washington.

The South Korean envoy pointed to new laws North Korea enacted recently to crack down on people who have access to outside information, including South Korean pop culture.

"The tight control imposed by these laws is clear evidence that capitalist culture is already deeply rooted in (the) North Korean society. It shows that the regime considers information flow to be the most serious security threat," Lee said.

She argued that the young generation of North Korea may have the power to voice their opinions and potentially change the way their dictatorial regime treats its people.

"We should recognize that a new generation is growing up and they can offer, once again, new ideas and full energy to take up long-standing issues, like freedom, democracy (and) human rights of North Korea," Lee said.

"These young people have the power to use their voice, and these people can have our future designed differently," she added.

Cho Hyun-dong, South Korea's ambassador to the United States, said Seoul will work to improve human rights conditions "everywhere" and "anywhere," including North Korea.

To this end, he stressed the importance of working with the international community to hold the North Korean regime accountable.

"If we are to hold the Pyongyang regime responsible and accountable for its actions, bring about substantive changes to its human rights practice and achieve our shared goal of complete denuclearization of the DPRK, it is imperative that we work together with the international community," he said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 21, 2023



2.  U.S. echoes Yoon's remarks on need to preserve peace in Taiwan Strait



It is good to see South Korea as the diplomatic and influence operations leader with the US providing supporting fires.



U.S. echoes Yoon's remarks on need to preserve peace in Taiwan Strait | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 22, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, April 21 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. state department spokesperson on Friday echoed South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's recent remarks against China changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force.

Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the state department, also said the United States will continue to work with its allies, including South Korea, to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

"We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in dialogue with Taiwan," the spokesperson told a daily press briefing.


Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the Department of State, is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on April 21, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

"The U.S. will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross strait issues, consistent with the wishes and interests of the people of Taiwan. And of course, we will go about this in coordination with our important allies and partners, of which, of course, the Republic of Korea is one of them," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name.

The South Korean president, in a recent interview with Reuters, said South Korea opposes any attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force.

Beijing reacted angrily with what Seoul has called "rude" comments about Yoon and his remarks.

The state department spokesperson reiterated that the U.S. will work with its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific to "advance what we believe is our shared prosperity and security values, including preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait."

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 22, 2023


3. S. Korea urges global cooperation on N.K. nuclear issue at NATO meeting




S. Korea urges global cooperation on N.K. nuclear issue at NATO meeting | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023

SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the Indo-Pacific partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) discussed expanding cooperation to counter North Korea's escalating provocations, Seoul's foreign ministry said Saturday.

The NATO-Indo Pacific Partners Conference in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Thursday and Friday, brought together senior officials from NATO member states and Asia-Pacific partners, including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

During the meeting, Park Yong-min, deputy foreign minister for multilateral and global affairs, stressed the need to take a "stern joint response" against the North's missiles and nuclear provocations, pointing out that it is a global issue threatening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Separately, Park also met Lithuanian Vice Foreign Minister Mantas Adomenas and pledged to continue providing support for the restoration of peace in Ukraine.


The foreign ministry building in Seoul (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023


4. Kazakhstan sees S. Korea as ideal partner in pragmatic diplomacy


Something that might be able to be exploitable in strategic competition. South Korea's President wants Korea to be a global pivotal state. Increasing ties with Kazakhstan could be a way to do that.


Are we connecting the dots and asking can we ask our ally to help Kazakhstan as a way to help protect itself from Russian and Chinese malign influence and activities?


Excerpt:


The war has brought changes to Kazakhstan, which had previously maintained a neutral stance and practiced pragmatic diplomacy, balancing its interests between Russia, China and the West amidst geopolitical tensions in the region.


Foreign Affairs

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/120_349512.html

Kazakhstan sees S. Korea as ideal partner in pragmatic diplomacy




Posted : 2023-04-22 09:00

Updated : 2023-04-22 09:46







Central Asian country seeks stronger ties with Seoul as it moves towards democracy


By Kwon Mee-yoo


ASTANA/SEOUL ― The March 19 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, the largest country in Central Asia, signifies another phase of the country's reforms under the slogan, "New Kazakhstan." As a result of the elections, a multiparty parliament has emerged in Kazakhstan, with six political parties obtaining seats in the Mazhilis, the lower chamber of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, as opposed to three in the previous term.


Roman Vassilenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, speaks after a media briefing in Astana, Kazakhstan, March 16. Korea Times photo by Kwon Mee-yooAs the country moves toward democracy under the reform led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan is ready to strengthen relations with East Asia, particularly South Korea, as a key trade partner and investor.


Roman Vassilenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, said East Asia has been a very important region for the country for over three decades.


"If we say about [South] Korea, I want to emphasize that Seoul was one of the first countries that recognized our country's independence and established diplomatic relations," Vassilenko told The Korea Times via a written interview, noting that presidents of South Korea visited Kazakhstan six times, while the presidents of Kazakhstan also visited South Korea six times.


According to Vassilenko, South Korea is a significant trade partner and one of the top-10 investors in Kazakhstan, having invested more than $8.1 billion (10.8 trillion won) over the last 17 years, and more than 700 companies with South Korean capital are operating in Kazakhstan including Samsung, Hyundai, POSCO and Lotte.


"I believe that Kazakhstan and [South] Korea still have many areas in the economic sphere where they can create a synergistic effect in the process of mutual exchange and cooperation," he said.


"The most priority areas of economic cooperation are energy, mining and metallurgy, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, transport infrastructure, education and tourism."


The vice minister highlighted that Kazakhstan and South Korea have a strong relationship based on mutual respect and understanding with similar views on many regional and international issues.


"We would like to note that we consider [South] Korea as one of the most reliable and important partners of our country. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to make efforts to further develop relations between the two counties," he said.


Deputy Minister Vassilenko also expresses strong concern over North Korea's nuclear program, emphasizing the need for a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue through full implementation of all relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions.


"Recently, cases with missile tests have become more frequent. As a staunch supporter of nuclear disarmament, we share Seoul's concerns regarding the situation on the Peninsula," Vassilenko said.


"We strongly deplore the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and express serious concern over its nuclear program and recent legislation adopted to transform DPRK into a nuclear power, which undermines the global non-proliferation regime. We continue to underline the need for a peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through full implementation of all relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions."


Impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine


As a country with the longest continuous international border in the world shared with Russia and considering Russia is its main trading partner, Kazakhstan, like the rest of the world, is also affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022.


The war has brought changes to Kazakhstan, which had previously maintained a neutral stance and practiced pragmatic diplomacy, balancing its interests between Russia, China and the West amidst geopolitical tensions in the region.


"For Kazakhstan, both Ukraine and Russia are two friendly states. In this regard, we are watching the events in Ukraine with particular concern. We are concerned about the numerous human casualties, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the unprecedented number of refugees. Based on the appeals of the Ukrainian side, we provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict," Vassilenko said.


"In general, in line with its principled position regarding any international problems, Kazakhstan consistently advocates finding an exclusively peaceful solution to the conflict. We are ready to provide a negotiating platform for peace talks if the opposing sides are interested in it."


Vassilenko added that the conflict in Ukraine has caused consequences for Kazakhstan's foreign trade and transit potential due to the rupture of established transport and logistics supply routes.


"The indirect consequences of large―scale anti-Russian sanctions should be mentioned separately since Russia is a key trade and economic partner of Kazakhstan both in a bilateral format and through integration associations," he said.


"Due to obvious political, economic and geographical reasons, we do not join Western sanctions, but we also do not intend to allow the deliberate use of our territory to circumvent them. This position is understood by both our Russian and Western partners."


Future of South Korea-Kazakhstan ties


Dulat Bakishev, former ambassador of Kazakhstan to South Korea who now teaches at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), noted that Kazakhstan is a young country that gained independence in 1991. He said that President Tokayev is trying to stabilize the country after unrest in 2022 by transitioning to a multiparty democratic system.


"We have this history under the Soviet regime, so our situation is not unique but understandable. We had this culture of having one leader for decades, but we are in the process of transition to a democratic system and a lot of events are happening at a very fast pace," Bakishev told The Korea Times via telephone interview, March 23.


"This is a process where people are stepping up to fight for their rights. It is difficult to say now, but we made steps forward and we have to see what this Mazhilis will do."


Professor Bakishev believes that Kazakhstan can benefit from learning how South Korea achieved its success as a democratic and developed country in a short period.


"For us, it is very important to learn how South Korea achieved its goals, how South Korea secured its security, how South Korea created alliances," he said.


He added that both countries can supplement each other economically by having more South Korean companies, technology and skilled South Korean workers in Kazakhstan's market.


"[South] Korea has a lot of people who have knowledge and experience, but some of them cannot apply their expertise here due to lack of resources. Maybe we could provide it since we have a developing economy and we need the expertise to develop."


Chu Young-min, a lecturer at the Department of Central Asia Studies at HUFS and expert on Kazakhstan, also views the early elections in Kazakhstan positively in terms of the legitimacy of the regime being secured through a more democratic process, even though the new parties that entered parliament have similar leanings to the pro-government Amanat Party.


"President Tokayev outlined an ambitious plan to hold early parliamentary elections in addition to presidential elections so that Kazakhstan would have a new president, parliament and government ministries to run the country by mid-2023," Chu said during an interview with The Korea Times.


"Once the new system is in place, he will be able to steadily implement the reforms he envisions to build a 'new' Kazakhstan."


According to Chu, as Kazakhstan is likely to maintain an ambiguous stance in its relations with certain big powers due to geopolitical influence, South Korea can be a good diplomatic partner for Kazakhstan as a relatively low-risk, pragmatic option in the current situation.


"South Korea and Kazakhstan do not have a particular history of hostility or threats to each other and even within the Kazakh leadership, there seems to be a tendency to view South Korea as a pragmatic partner rather than a member of a certain faction," Chu explained.


"In addition, the image of South Korea in Kazakh society is currently favorable, especially among the younger generation, as the Korean wave has continued unabated and has had a significant impact on the creation of the Q-pop culture among Kazakhstan's youth."


She believes that the soft power of South Korea can bridge the two countries together to find more areas of cooperation.


"As the two countries have already confirmed their friendship, it is necessary to continue this atmosphere and identify more specific and feasible areas of cooperation. Especially utilizing South Korea's soft power influence in Kazakhstan to promote cultural exchanges that can lead to public support and provide a foundation for cooperation in various fields," Chu said.



5. Transitioning Attitudes on North Korea: Perceived Threat and Preferred Response



Some interesting statistics but are they really useful?


You can download the 50 page report here:  http://en.asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=54077


Transitioning Attitudes on North Korea: Perceived Threat and Preferred Response

  • Issue/Region :
  • Nuclear Issues,Security/Korean Peninsula
  • Expert :
  • J. James Kim / Center for Regional Studies, Kang Chungku / Public Opinion Studies Team, Ham Geon Hee / Public Opinion Studies Team
  • zoom +
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[Asan Report] Transitioning Attitudes on North Korea.pdf

I. Introduction

 

There is no shortage of analysis about the evolving threat posed by the insufferable regime in North Korea; however, our understanding of the morphology of South Korean public attitudes on this subject still needs improvement. Most accounts of public opinion on the growing North Korean threat are episodic and limited in scope when the reality is more complex. Our review of the latest data on South Korean public opinion suggests many layers to the on-the-ground perspectives about North Korea.1

Some South Koreans support closer relations with Pyongyang while others see it as a growing threat. On some issues, South Korean public opinion looks quite robust and not prone to much change. Still, on other issues, we see wide swings and variations across time and demographic characteristics. In short, our findings show South Korean public opinion on North Korea is both sophisticated and complex. This report attempts to clarify and explain the intricacies of this reality.

While public opinion need not necessarily drive policy, established literature suggests political exigency influenced by popular sentiments can shape policy.2 To gather the most current South Korean public opinion on North Korea and deterrence, we conducted a survey in November 2022. Some questions in our survey are novel, but most of them are similar to the ones we have asked in the past. While the former will shed light on recent developments, the latter will prove helpful in tracking changes in sentiments over time.

 

Table of Contents

 

I. Introduction

 

II. Context Matters

III. Views on North Korea

  1. Image of North Korea

  2. North Korea as a Security Risk

IV. Threat Perception

  1. Perceptions about the North Korean Nuclear Threat

V. Responding to the North Korean Nuclear Threat

  1. U.S. Extended Deterrence

  2. Addressing the North Korea Security Challenge

  3. Nuclear Options and THAAD

VI. Conclusion

 

Survey Methodology

Appendix I: Asan Poll Questionnaire (November 2022)

Appendix II: Survey on Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Development

 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

  • 1.
  • J. James Kim, Kang Chungku, and Ham Geon Hee. Fundamentals of South Korean Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and National Security. Asan Report. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies. September 13, 2021; South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2022. Asan Poll. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
  • 2.
  • James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic Representation.” American Political Science Review, 89: 543-65; Paul Burstein. 2003. “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda.” Political Research Quarterly. 56(1): 29-40; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1993. “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.” American Political Science Review. 77: 175-90.

About Experts


J. James Kim

Center for Regional Studies

Dr. J. James KIM is the senior research fellow and director of the Center for Regional Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies (Seoul). He is also a lecturer in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Previously, Dr. Kim was an assistant professor of political science at the California State Polytechnic University (Pomona). He also served as a summer research associate at the RAND Corporation and as a statistical consultant for the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Planning at Columbia University. His primary research interests include national security, energy, public opinion, democracy, and methodology. Dr. Kim received a B.S. and M.S. in industrial and labor relations from Cornell University and an M.Phil. and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

more


Kang Chungku

Public Opinion Studies Team

Kang Chungku is a principal associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he was a research assistant at the Korea Dialogue Academy in Seoul. His research interests include quantitative research methods, survey design, and statistical data analysis. Mr. Kang received his B.A. in English and M.A. in Sociology at Korea University.

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Ham Geon Hee

Public Opinion Studies Team

Ham Geon Hee is a senior research associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he worked at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the Research Institute of Applied Statistics at Sungkyunkwan University. He received a B.S. in Information and Mathematics from Korea University and a M.S. in Statistics from Sungkyunkwan University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in Statistics at Sungkyunkwan University. His research interests include mixture models, incomplete data analysis, and methodology.

more






6. S. Korean envoy meets U.S. assistant secretary of state to discuss Yoon-Biden summit



A lot of work takes place before the summit. Action officers at MOFA and State and both NSCs are working hard on the joint statement.


S. Korean envoy meets U.S. assistant secretary of state to discuss Yoon-Biden summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023

WASHINGTON, April 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong met the U.S. State Department's point man on East Asia on Friday to discuss preparations for the upcoming Seoul-Washington summit and other pending issues.

During his meeting with Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Cho stressed that he will do his utmost to make the summit meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden a success.

Cho also said he will put in efforts to further strengthen the South Korea-U.S. relationship into a global comprehensive strategic alliance, according to his embassy.

Yoon is set to arrive in Washington on Monday for a state visit. He will be the first South Korean head of state to make such a visit to the U.S. in 12 years.

He will hold a bilateral summit with Biden on Wednesday, one day before he will address a joint session of U.S. Congress, becoming the first South Korean president to do so since 2013.


New South Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong (R) and Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, pose for a photo during their meeting on April 21, 2023, in this photo released by the South Korean Embassy in the U.S. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)


(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023



7. Yoon orders dispatch of naval unit to war-torn Sudan to protect Korean nationals


South Korea has global reach with global interests.


(LEAD) Yoon orders dispatch of naval unit to war-torn Sudan to protect Korean nationals | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS comments from PPP)

SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol on Saturday ordered the swift deployment of an anti-piracy naval unit to waters off Sudan to protect South Korean nationals, his spokesperson said.

Yoon made the order after he was briefed on the current fighting in Khartoum between the military and a rival paramilitary force, Lee Do-woon said in a written press briefing. The 304-strong Cheonghae Unit is currently docked at the Port of Salalah in Oman.

Earlier in the day, the presidential office held a meeting, chaired by Deputy National Security Adviser Lim Jong-deuk, with the relevant ministries on Sudan's conflict.


President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on April 18, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Meanwhile, the ruling People Power Party (PPP) urged the relevant authorities to put forth their utmost efforts and mobilize all resources possible to evacuate the South Korean nationals.

"The PPP will also do its best to provide full support (for the evacuation)," spokesperson Kim Min-soo said in a statement.

On Friday, South Korea's C-130J transport plane, carrying some 50 personnel, including security and medical staff, was dispatched to evacuate its nationals in Sudan.

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 22, 2023


8.  Leaked US documents offer insight (South Korea)


Excerpts:


What does the US stance mean on Russia and China mean for South Korea? The US endgame in Ukraine is to prevent Russia from conquering without a NATO-Russian confrontation. This means that it will continue to pressure allies, including South Korea, to step up their involvement as needed. It will also work to expand the list of allies by giving neutral countries incentives to pull away from Russia.
With China, by contrast, the US has no endgame because economic interdependency makes it difficult to define what an endgame would look like. Instead, the US will aim to “decouple” economically from China over the long term to prevent severe economic damage from a hot Cold War. For South Korea, which had already been working to reduce its dependence on China, this will mean more opportunities as developing countries compete more actively for post-China business.
The leaked documents are embarrassing for sure, but they offer South Korea valuable insight into the worldview of its closest ally.


[Robert J. Fouser] Leaked US documents offer insight

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · April 20, 2023

The recent leak of classified US intelligence documents shocked the military and diplomatic establishment in Washington. On April 13, the FBI arrested Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, who leaked the documents in a Discord chat room. Investigations are continuing into how a low-ranking national guardsman had access to the documents and how accessible such information should be moving forward.

The leaked documents showed that the US was spying on many countries, including close allies such as Britain, Canada, Israel and South Korea. The news stirred the most controversy in South Korea, as the documents suggested the US had picked up communication signals in the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan, central Seoul, which was thought to be impenetrable. Most South Koreans took the spying as a sign of distrust and an offense against national sovereignty. Later, the government stated that the information in some of the leaks was false and that security could not have been breached. President Yoon Suk Yeol, who is scheduled to hold a summit with President Joe Biden on Thursday, stated that the incident would not weaken the alliance with the US.

The negative reaction of the South Korea public is understandable, but reality is that allies spy on each other routinely because information is valuable. In a recent Associated Press article, Choi Jin, director of the Seoul-based Institute of Presidential Leadership, stated that “it’s also no secret that allies spy on each other, as well as their adversaries.”

The fullness of time will provide more detail on the reasons for the leak and the accuracy of the information. For now, the most interesting information in the documents is the degree of US involvement in supporting Ukraine in countering Russia's invasion. It echoes back to the Cold War when the US military and diplomatic establishment focused intently on containing the Soviet Union. This policy led the US to fight several wars directly, including the Korean War, as well as proxy wars through military aid and assistance. The Soviet Union, of course, did the same thing.

As in the first Cold War, the US is trying to pressure nations to take sides and support Ukraine. President Biden developed his world view at the peak of the Cold War. He wants to lead a large, united group of allies in support of Ukraine, but without triggering a wider war between NATO and Russia.

This explains why the leaked US documents focused on South Korea’s stance on supplying weapons to Ukraine. South Korea, which is a major arms producer, has a policy of not selling weapons to nations at war. In response to US pressure, the documents raised the idea that South Korea could sell weapons to Poland, which could then get them to Ukraine quickly. Such a move would deepen the country’s involvement in the war, which could raise tensions with Russia and China, which is moving closer to Russia.

The leaked documents also confirmed that the US views China as its most powerful long-term competitor. Unlike Russia, however, the US has yet to launch a full-scale Cold War against China. Both nations have sharpened their criticisms of each other, and the relationship has deteriorated greatly, but economic interdependency puts a floor under them -- for now. Biden wants to get reelected and he understands the degree to which the US economy is dependent on China. After years of harsh COVID-19 restrictions and growing demographic challenges, China has taken a renewed interest in economic growth and thus wants to limit the downward spiral.

What does the US stance mean on Russia and China mean for South Korea? The US endgame in Ukraine is to prevent Russia from conquering without a NATO-Russian confrontation. This means that it will continue to pressure allies, including South Korea, to step up their involvement as needed. It will also work to expand the list of allies by giving neutral countries incentives to pull away from Russia.

With China, by contrast, the US has no endgame because economic interdependency makes it difficult to define what an endgame would look like. Instead, the US will aim to “decouple” economically from China over the long term to prevent severe economic damage from a hot Cold War. For South Korea, which had already been working to reduce its dependence on China, this will mean more opportunities as developing countries compete more actively for post-China business.

The leaked documents are embarrassing for sure, but they offer South Korea valuable insight into the worldview of its closest ally.

Robert J. Fouser

Robert J. Fouser, a former associate professor of Korean language education at Seoul National University, writes on Korea from Providence, Rhode Island. He can be reached at robertjfouser@gmail.com. -- Ed.



By Korea Herald (khnews@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · April 20, 2023



9. Biden to Pledge Steps to Deter Nuclear Attack on South Korea -Officials


Certainly security will be a top issue at the Summit.


Biden to Pledge Steps to Deter Nuclear Attack on South Korea -Officials

By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report3 min

April 21, 2023

View Original


By Steve Holland and David Brunnstrom

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -At a summit next week with South Korean leader Yoon Suk Yeol U.S. President Joe Biden will pledge "substantial" steps to underscore the U.S. commitment to deter a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea, a senior U.S. official said on Friday.

"We are working extraordinarily and intensively with the South Koreans to take the necessary steps to buttress both public perception and the reality of our commitments," the official told Reuters ahead of Yoon's summit with Biden next Wednesday.

The official said it ranked as one of the greatest U.S. achievements that a number of Indo-Pacific countries that could have built nuclear weapons had chosen not to because of the protection of the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella.

"We have been very clear that our commitment to that nuclear deterrent stands, is ironclad for South Korea," said the official, who did not want to be identified by name.

"President Biden will ... be talking substantial steps to underscore that, to update it, to make clear that everyone has little doubt of our commitment to standing with South Korea, even in the face of provocation from North Korea, saber rattling from Russia, and frankly ambitions for a nuclear buildup on the part of China," he said.

Yoon's week-long state visit from Monday comes at a time when more South Koreans say their country should develop its nuclear arsenal to guard against attack by nuclear-armed North Korea and its expanding arsenal of missiles and bombs.

The official did not elaborate except to say the moves would involve "a variety of things from certain kinds of computations, more with respect to our actual activities, and some high-level engagements between the United States and South Korea."

In a poll released on April 6 by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, 64.3% of South Koreans supported developing nuclear weapons with 33.3% opposed.

The survey showed 52.9% of South Koreans were confident the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea. But the number dropped to 43.1% when respondents were asked if they thought the U.S. would risk its safety to defend South Korea, with 54.2% saying the U.S. would not take such risks.

A second official said the United States welcomed the role South Korea had played in supporting Ukraine and would "welcome additional steps (It) might be willing to take."

"But we also recognize like every country they have to make those decisions based on their own calculations," he said.

The official said North Korea's human rights situation, which Yoon has made a focus would likely be a subject of discussion at the summit.

Yoon, in an interview with Reuters on Tuesday, signaled for the first time a softening in his position on providing weapons to Ukraine, saying his government might not "insist only on humanitarian or financial support" in the event of a large-scale attack on civilians or a "situation the international community cannot condone".

The first official said the summit, only the second state visit under the Biden administration, reflected Biden's appreciation of Yoon's strong leadership and his rapprochement with Japan, the other key U.S. ally in northeast Asia.

Biden will also commend huge South Korean tech investment in the United States since he took office, which was now approaching $100 million, the official said.

(Reporting by David Brunnstrom, Steve Holland and Costas Pitas; Additional reporting by Choi Soo-hyang in Seoul Editing by David Gregorio)

Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.

Tags: South Korea, North Korea, United States



10. South Korea Says Summit With Biden to Give Significant Attention to North Korea Rights



Will the Summit give us a human rights upfront approach?


I am optimistic.


South Korea Says Summit With Biden to Give Significant Attention to North Korea Rights

By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report2 min

April 21, 2023

View Original


FILE PHOTO: South Korea's President Yoon Suk-yeol speaks in a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, during a NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, June 29, 2022. REUTERS/Jonathan ErnstReuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -South Korea's Washington ambassador Cho Hyun-dong said on Friday he was sure North Korean human rights would be given significant attention in summit talks between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden next week.

In a virtual address to the same event at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin said the "dire" rights situation in North Korea must not be forgotten and the world should work together to address it.

South Korean President Yoon is to meet with Biden on Wednesday during a weeklong state visit to the United States.

Yoon has sought to turn the spotlight on North Korean rights following a failed policy of engagement with Pyongyang pursued by his predecessor Moon Jae-in. He said last month the international community should have better knowledge about the situation.

"We should never allow ourselves to forget the suffering of the North Korean people," Park said. "For only by remembering and recounting the dire human rights situation on the ground can we bring about change."

South Korea's Washington envoy Cho Hyun-dong said that with Yoon's state visit just around the corner, he was "sure that our two presidents' discussion will afford significant attention to the critical issue of North Korea and human rights."

On a later panel, Jung Pak, the U.S. State Department’s deputy special representative for North Korea, declined to say whether the two sides would discuss practical action on rights at the summit, but added, "We've been pretty consistent about talking about these issues at all levels of the U.S. government."

U.N. human rights investigator Tomas Ojea-Quintana said last month that the world powers bear responsibility for ignoring crimes against humanity that may still be perpetrated in North Korea amid a focus on its nuclear program.

He said he had received information confirming the findings of a landmark 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry on extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, rape, forced abortion, sexual violence, political persecution and "the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation" in the isolated country.

Ojea-Quintana said the U.N. Security Council should refer grave North Korean violations to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.

(Reporting by David Brunnstrom and Simon Lewis; editing by Jonathan Oatis)

Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.

Tags: South Korea, United Nations, North Korea, United States, Japan



11. North Korean Solid-Fuel ICBM Increases U.S. Vulnerability



Yes, we need integrated missile defense, trilateral integration. It is north Korea that is driving improved trilateral cooperation. This is not something either north Korea or China want to see. But with every missile launch Kim drives the three nations closer together.


Excerpts:

As long as Pyongyang rejects all attempts by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan at resuming diplomatic dialogue, Washington and its allies must enhance their individual and collective missile defenses against the escalating North Korean threat. In 2022, the three countries resumed trilateral ballistic missile defense exercises after a four-year hiatus. Last November, the three leaders agreed to “share North Korean missile warning data in real time to improve each country’s ability to detect and assess the threat posed by incoming missiles.”
Missile defenses are most effective when systems are incorporated into a seamless and cohesive network. Linking South Korean, American, and Japanese sensors would enable more accurate interceptions by tracking attacking missiles from multiple angles and multiple points throughout the flight trajectory.
To date, South Korea has refused to integrate its Korea Air and Missile Defense system into the more comprehensive allied system due to lingering animosities arising from Japan’s 1910-45 occupation of the Korean Peninsula. However, President Yoon Suk Yeol’s recent bold move to mend relations with Japan has laid the foundation for enhanced military cooperation. Tokyo responded by lifting trade restrictions and resumed bilateral meetings of economic, business, and military cooperation.
President Joe Biden should raise the issue during Yoon’s forthcoming visit to Washington, as well as during a trilateral summit with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in May.



North Korean Solid-Fuel ICBM Increases U.S. Vulnerability

North Korea continued its inexorable march toward a more robust, diversified nuclear-capable missile force by successfully testing a solid-fueled ICBM.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · April 20, 2023

North Korea continued its inexorable march toward a more robust, diversified nuclear-capable missile force by successfully testing a solid-fueled ICBM. The new missile augments North Korea’s military threat to the United States since it can be launched more quickly than the regime’s existing liquid-fueled ICBMs. This makes it harder to detect and target.

But Pyongyang is up to even more. It is concurrently developing a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons and missile systems to further threaten America’s allies.

On April 13, North Korea conducted the inaugural launch of the three-stage Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM. It flew 1,000 kilometers on a lofted trajectory so as to not fly over Japan. The Hwasong-18’s full range is not known, but previous North Korean ICBMs were assessed as able to target the entire continental United States with nuclear weapons. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared the Hwasong-18 would “greatly reinforce” the country’s strategic deterrent, enhancing both its nuclear counterattack posture and its offensive nuclear strategy.

Liquid propellant, used in the existing Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17 ICBMS, is highly corrosive and cannot be maintained in a missile. Instead, it can only be loaded after deployment to the field and shortly before launch. The fueling itself is a lengthy, hours-long process.

By contrast, the Hwasong-18’s solid fuel is loaded during manufacture, leaving the missile able to launch quickly. This shortens the time the missile is exposed and vulnerable to detection and targeting by allied forces.

A solid-fueled missile does not require fuel and oxidizer trucks, which further reduces its observable signature to overhead satellites. It is also less delicate than a liquid-fueled missile, enabling it to be transported on its mobile launcher across a broader range of terrain.

North Korea first revealed the Hwasong-18—along with 12 liquid-fueled multi-warhead Hwasong-17 ICBMs—at its February 2023 military parade. Pyongyang likely tested the first stage of the Hwasong-18 in December 2022, announcing it had a thrust of 140 tons of force, which is greater than any U.S., Russian, or Chinese ICBM.

In January 2021, Kim Jong-un directed the development of a solid-fueled ICBM as part of an ambitious five-year plan of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. Other tasks assigned at the time were: developing smaller, tactical nuclear warheads; producing large nuclear warheads; improving the accuracy range of ICBMSs to 15,000 km; creating hypersonic gliding flight warheads; and developing a nuclear-powered submarine capable of launching nuclear strategic weapon under water.

Two years later, Kim directed development of an “ICBM system whose main mission is quick nuclear counterstrike.” This likely was a reference to the Hwasong-18.

The Hwasong-18 is the latest in a long list of new missiles of all ranges developed by North Korea during Kim Jong-un’s reign. The regime is producing a new generation of advanced missiles that are more accurate, more mobile, and more difficult to detect and target, with some having an enhanced ability to evade allied missile defenses.

In 2022, Pyongyang cumulatively launched a record-high 69 ballistic and six long-range cruise missiles. Some of the launches included salvo launches of multiple missiles simulating nuclear attacks on South Korean ports, airfields, and hardened military command targets. The regime has launched missiles from road-mobile transporters, railcars, submarines, and an underwater launch from a lake.

Pyongyang is attempting to gain tacit acceptance of its violations of UN resolutions (and, hence, prevent additional sanctions) through routinization of its missile launches and reliance on Chinese and Russian obstructionism at the UN Security Council. By depicting its military provocations as justified responses to the resumption of U.S. and South Korean military exercises, Pyongyang seeks to coerce the allies to curtail future drills.

Kim vowed North Korea would “exponentially increase” nuclear weapon production in 2023 to counter perceived threats from the U.S. and South Korea. Pyongyang has recently emphasized production of smaller tactical nuclear warheads for battlefield use. The regime is on its way to developing capabilities that go beyond deterrence to a viable offensive warfighting strategy.

In a few years, North Korea could have 100–200 nuclear warheads, dozens of mobile ICBMs, and hundreds of improved, survivable short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range missiles as well as submarine-launched missiles.

Last September, North Korea approved a new nuclear doctrine which lowered the threshold for its use of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang declared it would initiate a nuclear strike in response to, or preemptively if it perceived, allied preparations for conventional or nuclear attacks on regime leadership, nuclear command structure, or important strategic targets.

A more survivable North Korean nuclear force could create first-strike uncertainty for the United States as to whether it is able to target all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Greater North Korean nuclear capabilities could undermine the effectiveness of existing allied military plans.

The regime could feel emboldened to use nuclear threats to coerce Seoul into accepting regime demands and deter the United States from responding. Pyongyang might also assume that conditions for military action had become favorable if it believed the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee had been undermined.

As long as Pyongyang rejects all attempts by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan at resuming diplomatic dialogue, Washington and its allies must enhance their individual and collective missile defenses against the escalating North Korean threat. In 2022, the three countries resumed trilateral ballistic missile defense exercises after a four-year hiatus. Last November, the three leaders agreed to “share North Korean missile warning data in real time to improve each country’s ability to detect and assess the threat posed by incoming missiles.”

Missile defenses are most effective when systems are incorporated into a seamless and cohesive network. Linking South Korean, American, and Japanese sensors would enable more accurate interceptions by tracking attacking missiles from multiple angles and multiple points throughout the flight trajectory.

To date, South Korea has refused to integrate its Korea Air and Missile Defense system into the more comprehensive allied system due to lingering animosities arising from Japan’s 1910-45 occupation of the Korean Peninsula. However, President Yoon Suk Yeol’s recent bold move to mend relations with Japan has laid the foundation for enhanced military cooperation. Tokyo responded by lifting trade restrictions and resumed bilateral meetings of economic, business, and military cooperation.

President Joe Biden should raise the issue during Yoon’s forthcoming visit to Washington, as well as during a trilateral summit with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in May.

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor and former Deputy Division Chief for Korea at the CIA, Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · April 20, 2023


12. Prisoner escapes from North Korean detention center, shoots 4 officers



Quite unusual.  


Prisoner escapes from North Korean detention center, shoots 4 officers

The prisoner knocked out a guard with a hammer, then stole his handgun before fleeing.

By RFA Korean

2023.04.20

rfa.org

A North Korean prisoner escaped from a detention center after hitting a guard on the head with a hammer, then shot four police officers with a stolen handgun as he hid nearby in a warehouse and an apartment building, residents told Radio Free Asia.

The incident, which ended with the prisoner killing himself, is an unusual account of a mass shooting crime in North Korea, and a rare glimpse into the country’s system of detention centers.

The prisoner had been helping the guard while they worked on an electricity repair project, according to a resident of Chongjin City in North Hamgyong province. After striking the guard with the hammer, the prisoner then stole his handgun and ran from the detention center.

Because last month’s incident took place on a Sunday, most guards were resting in their bedrooms, the source said. The guard who had been hit – the only one on duty that day – eventually regained consciousness and reported the escape, the resident said.

“Immediately, the entire social security department and neighboring military units were mobilized for the operation to arrest the escaped prisoner,” she said.

The prisoner had been a military sniper at the Supreme Guard Command, a resident of North Hamgyong’s Orang County who was also familiar with the story, told RFA.

His older brother made a statement criticizing the system and was sent to a prison camp. The younger brother – the prisoner – was forcibly discharged from the military due to guilt-by-association, the second source said.

The younger brother became a vagrant, sometimes working unofficial jobs, and eventually committed a crime while he was unemployed. He was ordered sent to a labor camp, but was temporarily sent to the detention center while he underwent a preliminary investigation, the Orang County resident said.

Search operation

After escaping, he hid in the warehouse of an inn next to the social security department, the Chongjin City resident said.

Still wearing his prison uniform, he waited for nightfall. But when two social security agents tried to search the warehouse, he shot them, the Chongjin City resident said. He then fled to the basement of an apartment building, where he shot two more social security agents. He then fatally shot himself.

Travel and vehicle traffic were completely restricted for local residents during the search operation, the Chongjin City resident said.

“Residents have different opinions about the incident,” the Orang County resident said. “Most residents think he deserves to be punished given the nature of the crime.

“But acquaintances who know the family situation of the prisoner said that this would not have happened if he had not been forcibly discharged from the military.. The younger brother had nothing to do with the crime committed by the older brother.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org



13. North Korean escapees learn about family deaths months later



2d and 3d order effects of Kim's crackdown on information.  


Excerpts:

But recently, a clampdown by authorities on such cell phone brokers has led to reduced communication and long periods of silence, said Ji Seong-ho, an escapee who resettled in the South and was elected a lawmaker in 2020.
“It is not easy to get news of a death right away because of the situation” in North Korea, Ji said. “So, when you find out … six months or a year later, the heart breaks and it hurts more.”
Over the past year, many escapees who live in the South have been getting belated news that their relatives in the North have passed away, Seo Jae-Pyoung, secretary general of the Seoul-based Association of the North Korean Defectors, told RFA.

North Korean escapees learn about family deaths months later

Pandemic and crackdown on Chinese cell phone brokers has created long periods of silence

By Soram Cheon for RFA Korean

2023.04.21

rfa.org

Earlier this month, news that one of her family members in North Korea had died reached escapee Park So-yeon months after it had happened.

Park, who had resettled in the South several years ago, had heard only sporadically from her family north of the border in the past three years since the COVID-19 pandemic struck.

As news of food shortages, starvation and rumblings of another famine trickled out of the North, she could only hope for the best, so she was crushed when she learned of her loved one’s passing.

“A lot of times, we find out about deaths a long time after they happened,” Park – a pseudonym to protect her identity – told RFA’s Korean Service. "I couldn't believe the news. I still feel like it was not real."

Most of the time, such news comes via a North Korean broker who owns a Chinese cell phone and can make calls close to the border by using Chinese relay towers.

But recently, a clampdown by authorities on such cell phone brokers has led to reduced communication and long periods of silence, said Ji Seong-ho, an escapee who resettled in the South and was elected a lawmaker in 2020.

“It is not easy to get news of a death right away because of the situation” in North Korea, Ji said. “So, when you find out … six months or a year later, the heart breaks and it hurts more.”

Over the past year, many escapees who live in the South have been getting belated news that their relatives in the North have passed away, Seo Jae-Pyoung, secretary general of the Seoul-based Association of the North Korean Defectors, told RFA.

“Parents came to South Korea and settled here, but there are many cases in which their children died in North Korea,” said Seo. “The number of deaths has increased by two or three per neighborhood watch unit,” the typical community-level unit that meets once per week in North Korea.

“There are many people who could not prepare firewood during the winter, so their bodies became cold and their immunity decreased because they also were not eating well,” Seo said. “They were so vulnerable.”

Many North Korean escapees fall into depression upon learning of their family members’ death, Kim Dan Geum, another escapee who settled in the South, told RFA.

“I see many North Korean defectors suffering from depression, thinking about their families they left behind in North Korea,” said Kim. “They hear the news that their family members have died of starvation.”

Sending money – and fraud

The pandemic and crackdown on cell phone brokers has also made it difficult to send money to struggling family members in the North.

Brokers can arrange for money sent from South Korea to an intermediary in China to be delivered to intended recipients in North Korea, after taking a percentage for their services.

Authorities have increased punishments not only on the families of escapees who try to contact their family members in the South, they are also punishing brokers.

With each broker that the government punishes, families who had been using that particular broker lose contact with their escapee family members. They will have to find new brokers to try to get in contact with their relatives.

In the past year, many North Korean escapees in the South have been getting belated news that their relatives in the North have passed away, says Seo Jae-Pyoung, secretary general of the Seoul-based Association of the North Korean Defectors. Credit: Reuters file photo

Another problem that has risen out of the crackdown is that sometimes escapees in the South are contacted by people posing as brokers, saying they have a message from the family requesting money.

“They say, ‘The family will starve to death if you don’t send the money.’ But we can’t confirm whether that’s true or not. There is no way to confirm,” said Kim.

She said that brokers try to emotionally manipulate escapees in the South by describing hardships suffered by North Koreans, but when they send money, there is no way to know if it was delivered or if the broker kept it for himself.

“One lady I know said she keeps sending money, and the broker plays for her the recorded voices of the family saying ‘I got the money,’ or ‘I did not get the money,’” said Kim.

Seo said that there are frequent cases of brokers exploiting the situation in which direct communication with family members is impossible.

“Border control is now strict, so people from other provinces cannot get near the border. Still, brokers tell you to send money because they can deliver it,” he said.

“I myself got a call yesterday. The broker said my nephew’s name and told me to send money for him,” Seo said. "I can’t connect with my nephew so I can’t just keep sending money. I can’t even check whether the money I sent actually got to him or not.”

Seo said that the defectors association has posted warnings on its website urging escapees to be careful when trying to remit money to their relatives in the North, because of the large number of reported fraud cases since the beginning of the pandemic in 2020.

“Remittance brokers are using various fraudulent methods to scam senders by pretending that money has been delivered to their families, taking advantage of the difficulty of access to border areas due to the recent coronavirus crisis,” the warning read.

The inability to discern between actual requests for money and fraudulent ones can be deadly for people living in the North, Seo said.

“A defector I know had a younger brother living in Hyeryong, who called her in April last year requesting money, so she sent it to him. Two months later he called again … saying he had [liver disease],” said Seo.

“The sister said, ‘You don’t even drink alcohol. Don’t lie,’ and she hung up on him. A few months later news came that her younger brother had died. She began to wail, because what her brother said was true.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org



14. North Korea’s 'Day of the Sun' canceled due to rain



The Kim regime seems to be losing its luster if not its mythical power. It used to tbe the regime could make it snow in the summer or flowers bloom on January 1st. (note sarcasm) 


North Korea’s 'Day of the Sun' canceled due to rain

Celebration of the life of national founder Kim Il Sung is one of the country's most important holidays.

By Jieun Kim and Soyoung Kim for RFA Korean

2023.04.18

rfa.org

They prepared for almost a month, practicing for the “songs of loyalty” competition and massive choreographed dances, fixing food and decorating cities – only to have officials call off the “Day of the Sun,” arguably North Korea’s most important holiday, due to a forecast for rain.

The April 15th holiday marks the birthday of national founder Kim Il Sung, and festivities have never been canceled due to inclement weather since it was designated a holiday in 1997, sources in the country said.

Kim Il Sung, grandfather of the country’s current leader Kim Jong Un, is revered in North Korea for leading the country in its infancy, instilling the “juche” principle of self-reliance and for his exploits as a guerilla leader who fought against Japanese colonial rule before he came to power in 1948.

“They say it was all canceled on account of rain, but I’ve never experienced a cancellation of a national event like this before,” said a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong to RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “It’s even been held in the middle of the night in heavy snowfall in the middle of blizzards.”

In this April 16, 2013 photo, a man walks past portraits of late North Korean leaders Kim Jong-ll and Kim Il-sung at an exhibition celebrating the 101st birthday of founder Kim Il-sung, in Beijing. Credit: Jason Lee/Reuters

Citizens thought the cancellation was unusual and suspected that rain might not be the true cause, a source in the northern province of Ryanggang said.

“Some welcomed the opportunity to get some rest, but others think that maybe the foundations of the three-generation dynasty that started with Kim Il Sung could be crumbling,” he said.

Even with the cancellation, citizens still flocked to patriotic monuments to lay flowers in tribute, according to the first source.

The canceled events included the “songs of loyalty” contest, held in each province, public mass dances in town squares, sports competitions and street singing parades.

Residents were shocked by the decision, which erased a month’s work of preparation.

“The paper flags of our republic that had been raised on every street were lowered,” said the first source. “The square which was to be the center of the celebrations was eerily quiet.”

Empty streets

In northern Ryanggang, the Day of the Sun celebrations amounted to a single song performance at the entrance of a local university, the source there said.

“The streets were deserted,” he said. “The circle-shaped dance line marked on the town square by the Women’s League was clearly visible in such an empty space.”

Kim Jong Un usually makes a public appearance on the Day of the Sun at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, his grandfather’s final resting place as well as that of his father and predecessor Kim Jong Il.

But on the 16th, the state-run Korea Central News Agency and the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that he was not there and senior officials presented a floral basket in his name. Instead Kim attended a ceremony on the night of the 16th, celebrating the completion of the latest batch of 10,000 new homes in the capital Pyongyang, part of a widely publicized national project to build 50,000 new homes by the end of 2025.

In this Feb. 16, 2023 photo, people visit the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il to mark the birthday of Kim Jong Il, known as the "Day of the Shining Star", in Pyongyang. Credit: Kim Won Jin/AFP

The leader’s absence from Kumsusan was unusual but was not intended to emphasize his independence, so that he could escape the shadow of his forebears, said David Maxwell of the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“Secretary Kim is [always] trying to show the image of a strong leader who works hard for the people,” he said. “I think he's trying to show that he is a strong leader doing good things for the Korean people in the north. So I think that that’s real, and the focus is to generate his positive image and I think that's why we’re seeing these types of events highly publicized.”

The leader’s emphasis on promoting housing construction projects instead of worshiping his ancestors on the Day of the Sun indicates that North Korea is facing economic difficulties,” said former CIA analyst Soo Kim.

She said that Kim Jong Un was trying to convey to North Koreans that he understands their economic difficulties and is taking action.

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org



15. For the Sake of Appearances: The Case of South Korean Authoritarian Image Management in the 1970s


Some history for the hard core Korea watchers/scholars.


https://www.kjis.org/journal/view.html?pn=lastest&uid=288&vmd=Full



For the Sake of Appearances: The Case of South Korean Authoritarian Image Management in the 1970s

The Korean Journal of International Studies 21-1 (April 2023), 143-170

Published online April 30, 2023

© 2023 The Korean Association of International Studies.


Benjamin A. Engel [Bio-Data]

Received January 10, 2023; Revised February 21, 2023; Accepted March 27, 2023.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

The Koreagate scandal is largely remembered as a Congressional lobbying scheme. However, the South Korean attempts to lobby Congress ran parallel with a larger image management project that was also investigated by the US government in the 1970s. Congressional investigations at that time found that the Korean government sought to improve its image by interacting both with the US media and academia. In this regard, we have known since the 1970s that an image management campaign existed, but no scholarly attempt has been made to analyze the types of activities the Korean government engaged in and the degree to which they were successful. To conduct such an analysis, this article applies the theory of authoritarian image management to dissect the attempts of the South Korean government to develop a positive image of itself in the United States during the Yusin era. Using new documentation from the archives of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the original Congressional findings, it finds that the Korean government carried out both promotional and obstructive activities toward the US media and academia and also used South Korean honorary consuls in the United States in its image management campaign. The findings also suggest that despite well-developed plans, the South Korean government was not very successful in managing its image.

Keywords : authoritarian image management, South Korea, United States, Yusin era, Koreagate

INTRODUCTION

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

Despite its prominent position in US-South Korea relations in the late 1970s, the Koreagate scandal remains an understudied episode in the alliance. The allegation that members of the US Congress were receiving bribes from Korean officials and agents first surfaced in 1975 during hearings on the human rights situation in South Korea (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1975, 177-185). These accusations led to subsequent Congressional hearings on the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the US in 1976 (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1976). The scandal took on international importance following the Washington Post article entitled “Seoul Gave Millions to U.S. Officials” on the eve of the 1976 presidential election (Cheshire and Armstrong 1976). For the next two years, several Congressional committees investigated accusations that members of Congress accepted bribes from Korean embassy officials and KCIA agents, in particular Park Dong-seon (Tongsun Park), as well as the suspicion that the Korean government was engaging in nefarious activities to boost its image and silence critics in the US.1

Despite thousands of pages of spilled ink, however, the investigations netted very little. Only one member of Congress—Richard Hanna (D-CA)—received jail time for his wrongdoings. Very few members of Congress were found to have received substantial sums from Korean agents. And by 1978, the pages of the Washington Post instead argued that the scandal had been blown out of proportion by the media in the hopes of uncovering the next great political scandal after Watergate—from which “Koreagate” earned its moniker (Babcock 1978).

Perhaps as a result of the underwhelming conclusion to the investigations, Koreagate has not figured prominently in most scholarly inquiries of US-South Korea relations. Some scholars have situated it within the bilateral relationship and analyze its impact on the alliance alongside the troop withdrawal and human rights issues that plagued US-South Korea relations during the Carter administration (Nam 1986, 156-158; Cha 1999, 151; Work 2019, 353-379). Chae-Jin Lee (2006, 95-102) provides more detail than most, but again limits his focus to the period of the investigations (the late 1970s) rather than the years during which the influencing scheme was unfolding (the early 1970s). In other words, the fallout of the scandal has been investigated by scholars, but the actual implementation of the lobbying and influencing scheme has received little attention following Congressional hearings in the 1970s.

The absence of any in-depth study on Koreagate or the Korea influencing campaign of the 1970s is all the more curious given the extensive literature on other countries’ so-called “Lobbies” in the US. Research has shown that the “China Lobby,” meaning that of the Republic of China, first appeared in the 1930s (Park 2003; Blackwell 2010; Erskine 2018). Similar to the description offered below of the Korea influencing campaign of the 1970s, Koen (1960, 31) refers to the China Lobby as a “pressure group” as its activities expanded beyond Congress and the strict definition of “lobbying.” The “Japan Lobby” (re-)emerged immediately after Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War (Schonberger 1977; Angel 2001). Robert Angel (2000), while recognizing his own role in it, breaks down the Japan Lobby into various groups including the Japanese government, official lobbyists for Japan in the US, and, again similar to the below description of the Korea Lobby, a wider network of Japanese experts and those with interest in the country. Jeff Kingston (2019) argues that the Japan Lobby has been very active recently in using its networks to put forth its preferred view of twentieth century history issues in the US. Another well-known “Lobby” is that of Israel. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006) have argued that US policy towards Israel is decided in large part by the working of the lobby rather than based on US national interests.

This study seeks to move away from the well-worn story of Koreagate—namely, the Congressional lobbying scheme implemented by Park Dong-seon with the approval of the Park Chung Hee government—and in doing so investigates a severely understudied episode in US-South Korea relations while also contributing to the body of literature on foreign lobbies in the US. It turns the focus to the broader influencing campaign that was implemented alongside the Congressional lobbying efforts by the Korean government. The influencing campaign was originally investigated by the Subcommittee on International Organizations in the House of Representatives beginning with the above-mentioned hearings in 1976 and then again from 1977 to 1978. The later investigations culminated in a report entitled Investigation of Korean-American Relations. Aside from a long review of US-South Korea relations up through the mid-1970s, the report also digs into “educational, informational, and cultural activities” of the Korean government in the US. This portion of the report outlines how the Korean government “attempted to shape public opinion and improve the image” of South Korea in the US (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 259). In short, we know an image campaign existed, but no systematic analysis of it has been attempted. Thus two questions are important to answer: what types of activities did the Korean government implement and how successful were these efforts?

To answer these questions, this article applies the theory of “authoritarian image management” to the influencing campaign orchestrated by the Korean government (Dukalskis 2021). I argue that although this theory was built based on the actions of authoritarian governments in the post-Cold War era, it applies equally to the South Korean case in the 1970s. Moreover, rather than relying exclusively on the findings of Congress in the 1970s, this article uses archival materials from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to provide new evidence about the image management campaign. This article thus not only enlarges the scope of the authoritarian image management theory by expanding its applicability to a wider range of cases, but also sheds new light on the Korean government’s actions in the 1970s by showing its image management campaign included elements not uncovered or not publicly revealed by Congress in the late 1970s. Based on this new documentation, I argue that the Korean government’s image management scheme was mostly unsuccessful, and these past failures should be considered in scholarship analyzing contemporary authoritarian image management efforts.

To this end, the following section discusses the authoritarian image management theory and its applicability to the South Korean case. The subsequent sections discuss two key areas that Congress investigated in the 1970s—the American media and academia—as well as the role of South Korean honorary consuls in local communities the US which has not yet been covered in the literature.

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

The practice of states projecting an image of themselves to other states and their citizens has been researched under many names. “International public relations” is defined by Michael Kunczik (1997, 12) as “the planned and continuous distribution of interest-bound information by a state aimed (mostly) at improving the country’s image abroad.” A similar concept is that of “nation branding,” which Melissa Aronczyk (2013, 16) argues helps nation-states “compete for international capital in the areas such as tourism, foreign direct investment, import-export trade, higher education, and skilled labor” as well as convey an “image of legitimacy and authority in diplomatic arenas.” The drawback of these concepts is that they do not necessarily encapsulate the nefarious methods that authoritarian states may use to manage their image abroad. While authoritarian states may certainly project images through public relations firms or try to construct their own brand, scholars have shown how authoritarian states go beyond the passive projection of images to directly craft narratives about their state by laundering their reputation through institutions in other states (Cooley, Prelec, and Heathershaw 2022; Cohen and de Oliveira 2022), lobbying officials in target countries (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017, 77-78), or even repressing their citizens abroad (Glasius 2018).

For this reason, Alexander Dukalskis developed the concept of “authoritarian image management.” Dukalskis (2021, 36) argues the concept of authoritarian image management “comprises efforts by [authoritarian states] and/or [their] proxies to protect and/or enhance the legitimacy of the state’s political system outside its borders.” The distinction between authoritarian image management and other concepts described above such as “branding” or “public diplomacy” is necessary, Dukalskis (2021, 3-4) argues, because “they leave out deception and the harsh—even occasionally murderous—realities of authoritarian image management.” In developing his theory, Dukalskis (2021, 40) posits that authoritarian states’ image management activities may be classified in two dimensions. First, authoritarian states’ management strategies may be promotional or obstructive. Promotional activities attempt to project a positive image of the authoritarian state, while obstructive activities aim to silence critics and remove negative information. The second dimension outlines the target audience of the image management activities. Audiences can either be diffuse—targeting public opinion at large in the target state—or specific—targeting specific individuals, often political elites and opinion-shapers.

An important question to address at this point is why this theory is applicable to the Korean influencing campaign of the 1970s, especially given that Dukalskis mainly applies the concept to post-Cold War regimes. According to Dukalskis (2021, 21-22), in the contemporary era in which democracy has become largely viewed as the only legitimate political regime, authoritarian countries have struggled to legitimize their rule and face an existential threat in the form of democracy promotion. This has led authoritarian regimes to undertake these image management campaigns to justify their approaches in the court of public opinion which is increasing difficult to silence in the age of modern communication technologies. Interestingly, South Korea in the 1970s faced the same problem that contemporary dictatorships face today. As part of the “free world,” authoritarian US allies often sought to give the impression they were democratic, if only for the sake of appearances. Also, particularly from the 1970s on after a vigorous international human rights movement began in the US, authoritarian US allies faced increasing criticism from Congress and US civil society as well as robust democracy movements within their own countries that were often transnationally linked to groups in the US (Keys 2014; Snyder 2018). Increased concern about international human rights in the US coincided with Park Chung Hee’s decision to implement, and brutally suppress opposition to, the authoritarian Yusin system in South Korea. These divergent trends in the US and South Korea produced a context in which the Park regime was forced to undertake an authoritarian image management campaign.

Moreover, this approach is warranted given the differences with other countries “Lobbies” during the Cold War. The China Lobby’s main goal was to ensure continued support for the Nationalist government and assistance in defeating the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War, and then later demand help for the Nationalist government’s desire to retake mainland China (Koen 1960). The Japan Lobby’s initial goal was to secure American assistance for its rapid economic growth program in the post-war years (Angel 2001). The Israel Lobby likewise seeks continued US support for Israel’s security (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). The South Korea case is different in that a main goal of the influencing campaign was to ensure the survival of the Park Chung Hee regime which was faced with criticism for its human rights abuses. Moreover, descriptions of the other “Lobbies” often highlight the existence of American groups or organizations that were active in supporting the goals of the foreign lobby, such as the American Chinese Policy Association (Blackwell 2010) or the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). As we will see in the following, the Korean effort was initiated and driven by the Korean government with sporadic rather than well-organized assistance from groups of Americans.

The Korean government influencing campaign also differs from a more traditional case of “public diplomacy” which can be defined as “the means by which governments, private groups, and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions” (as quoted in Ayhan 2019, 65). Discussions in Congress and the US on the human rights repression in South Korea represented an existential crisis for the Park regime. The withdrawal of support for Park Chung Hee by the US government would have emboldened democratic forces or encouraged a military coup against him. The Park regime’s sensitivity to the possibility of US intervention in domestic Korean politics was on display when Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition party, was expelled from the Korean National Assembly when he made public remarks to the New York Times calling on the US to rebuke Park (Sohn 1989, 160-166). When discussing the possibility of military aid cuts allies in Congress, the Korean government stated that the loss of aid was of secondary importance to language that indicated the aid cut was because of the human rights abuses of the regime, demonstrating the existential nature of the human rights issue and the need for an influencing campaign.2 Although the Park regime during its influencing campaign claimed to be working for the national interest, as historian Hyung-A Kim (2004, 209) argues, Park was “convinced” that his “personal ambitions and the national good…could be achieved only through the [authoritarian] Yusin system.” Because of this, the influencing campaign was not purely designed to further Korean national interests by influencing the foreign policy of the US. It was foremost implemented to preserve the Park regime.

For these reasons, I argue the “authoritarian image management” concept developed by Dukalskis (2021) is a suitable framework for analyzing the Korean influencing scheme of the 1970s. In the following, the Korean image management campaign is described and analyzed based on the authoritarian image management concept in the areas of the US media, academia, and local communities. In describing the influencing campaign, Dukalskis’ conceptualization of the promotional-obstructive activities and diffuse-specific audience dimensions are employed to classify the various actions of the Korean government.

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

Although the origins of the Koreagate scandal have been traced back to the decision by the Nixon administration to withdraw 20,000 troops from South Korea in 1970, the wider authoritarian image management campaign that the Park Chung Hee regime implemented has its origins in the declaration of the Yusin Regime on October 17, 1972 (Boettcher 1980, 96). While it is easy to understand why Park Chung Hee may have deemed a lobbying campaign in Congress necessary in 1970 due to recognition that Congress would be the body authorizing the spending on the promised $1.5 billion military modernization package to compensate for the departing US troops, it was not a priority to wage a campaign against the US media. This changed, however, with the promulgation of the Yusin Constitution. Just weeks after the Yusin announcement on October 17, 1972, an editorial penned by Gregory Henderson (1972)—a former Foreign Service Officer who served in Korea and an influential American expert—entitled “South Korea: Witnessing the Rape of Democracy” appeared in the New York Times, foreshadowing the negative press the Park regime would receive in the coming years.

In the ensuing years, the South Korean government would use a variety of tactics to manage its image in the American media. These activities can be classified according to the framework outlined above and include both promotional and obstructive methods that targeted diffuse and specific audiences. Another way to conceive of the media’s place in the image management campaign of the Korean government would be that the media was both a target and a tool. That is, specific figures in the media were a target of the Korean government’s activities, but by targeting specific media figures it was hoped that the media would become a tool to engage in image management activities that targeted diffuse or other specific audiences.

A very clear picture of the targeted promotional and obstructive activities of the Korean government’s image management campaign emerges from documents from MoFA archives. Immediately following the Yusin proclamation, MoFA officials requested meetings with influential media outlets such as the New York Times.3 On October 19, MoFA officials were already meeting with a “general editor” from Newsweek to “explain the government’s position” on the Yusin proclamation, and “quarreled” with Newsweek Tokyo foreign correspondent Bernard Krisher who would become a specific target of the Park regime’s aggressive push to censor foreign media in 1974 (discussed below).4

By October 20, the South Korean embassy in Washington had produced a report entitled “Plans for Special Activities” (Teukbyeolhwaldong gyehoek).5 The main goals of the “special activities” were to improve understanding of the Yusin declaration and reconfirm the friendly ties between the US and South Korea. The targets of the activities included the Nixon administration, Congress, media, academia, and organizations related to economic relations between the two countries. The report even specified persons of interest and assigned these specific targets to ROK officials in the US including Ambassador Kim Dong-jo. The Korean official assigned to the media was Lee Jae-hyeon who, according to this report, had already contacted seventeen media figures from outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Reuters, and Associated Press, and planned to contact seven more. Additionally, the embassy in Washington distributed thousands of copies of promotional materials to media outlets as well as government officials, academics, and international organizations.

One interaction between Ambassador Kim Dong-jo and Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs William P. Bundy on November 2, 1970 provides clues about how many of these meetings likely progressed. Ambassador Kim began by explaining the Yusin measures and their necessity, and asked for advice from Bundy about “promoting” the new policies to “American academics and the opinion-forming elites.”6 Ambassador Kim also asked if Bundy would be interested in publishing an article in the name of President Park Chung Hee. Bundy replied that while Park is a well-known figure and the progress in inter-Korean relations in 1972 is of interest to his readers, the “recent domestic policies” make it temporarily difficult for his outlet to publish such an article. This interaction displays the multiple purposes of engaging with specific well-known media figures. Ambassador Kim Dong-jo hoped to explain the rationale for the Yusin proclamation and garner understanding for it specifically from Bundy as an influential media figure whose outlet in particular was influential in foreign policy making, use him to garner insight for successfully implementing an image management campaign, and utilize his platform in Foreign Affairs for targeting a more diffuse audience with image management content.

Although Ambassador Kim’s attempt to persuade Bundy failed, a report submitted on November 20, 1972 covered all the activities of Ambassador Kim regarding the Yusin announcement and indicate that he met with reporters or editors from Newsweek, United Press International, the Associated Press, Copley News (a now-defunct wire news service), the San Diego Evening Tribune, San Diego Union, and The Los Angeles Times. In several instances, these targeted approaches did allow the Korean government to then engage in image management activities toward a broader audience. In an undated report likely produced in mid-December 1972, the Korean embassy in Washington reported that it was able to submit four pro-Park government articles to the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Christian Science Monitor for publication, although only in one case was the editorial written with the byline of a Korean government official, allowing the Korean government to conceal their involvement.7 Christian Science Monitor also published an interview with Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil in February 1973.8 In this sense, the targeted promotional activities opened doors for diffuse promotional activities that targeted broader American public opinion via editorials and interviews.

However, the Park regime’s targeting of media outlets in its image management campaign at best secured some semblance of balanced coverage. If these meetings had the obstructive goal of dampening critical coverage of events in South Korea, then the attempts were a complete failure. A MoFA report form early 1974 compiled all the negative press the Park regime was receiving throughout the world and a special report was made that covered only negative press in the New York Times and Washington Post from October 1973 to January 1974.9 Bernard Krisher, Richard Halloran, and Don Oberdorfer ran stories of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) repression and student protests in Newsweek, the New York Times, and Washington Post, respectively.10 Piercing editorials by Korea and East Asia experts Jerome Cohen, Gregory Henderson, and Edwin Reischauer in the spring of 1974 were catalysts in Congress opening hearings on the human rights situation in South Korea in the summer of 1974 (Cohen and Henderson 1974; Reischauer 1974). Patrick Chung (2014, 1147) shows that the use of the word “dictator” to describe Park Chung Hee in the American media rose markedly in the six years after the Yusin announcement.

The Korean government responded in a variety of ways to these failures. Internally it sought a scapegoat. Lee Jae-hyeon, who was the Korean embassy official initially tasked with taming the American media, claimed that in 1973 he was blamed for the outpouring of negative press and accused of being pro-North Korea. He also asserted he was going to be forcefully returned to Seoul and thus decided to defect to the US (Hankyoreh 1996). The US government accepted his request and arranged for him to be moved to Illinois, after which he became a professor of journalism at Western Illinois University. The threats against Lee backfired spectacularly as two years later Lee would give his fateful testimony before the Fraser Committee, kicking off the Koreagate scandal (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1975, 177-185).

Despite the initial failures, the Korean government did not give up on its targeted promotional activities and increased the use of targeted obstructive tactics as well. MoFA officials argued for an approach toward the American media which emphasized persuasion. A June 1974 report entitled “Measures for Coping with Critical Foreign Media” (Oegugui bipanjeok eollone daehan daecheo bangan) produced by the American Affairs Bureau of MoFA called for critical reporters to be engaged in conversation and for them to be encouraged to visit Korea.11 An August 8, 1974 report stressed the point that reversing the critical trends in American media coverage of Korea could not be solved overnight. The report also added to the above suggested response measures by calling for hiring an American public relations firm, increasing foreign correspondents’ access to high-level Korean government officials so that their sources for news would not be limited to anti-government persons and inviting them to important government functions, and providing more press releases and reports to foreign media.12 Interestingly, a handwritten note on the cover page of this report blatantly acknowledged that the Korean government needed to engage in “image building.”13

Despite MoFA’s suggestions, it is also clear that other government officials and agencies were not willing to let the direction of foreign media reports rest solely on promotional activities. There is significant evidence that the Korean government also engaged in targeted obstructive tactics as well. Bernard Krisher of Newsweek had several run-ins with Korean government pressure. Krisher (2006, 137-138) stated that he was followed by the KCIA while in Seoul, had his hotel room phone bugged, and his stringer was interrogated. He reported on the KCIA’s activities in a series of articles in late 1973 and early 1974.14 For another article in late 1973, Krisher interviewed a famous Japanese fortuneteller who predicted something “terrible” would happen to Park Chung Hee in 1974. Krisher (2006, 138-140) asserts the South Korean embassy in Tokyo repeatedly asked him to retract his report about the fortuneteller, and the series of articles made Park Chung Hee so angry that he ordered Krisher’s visa to be revoked. However, internal recommendations from MoFA and external pressure from the US government eventually led to a reversal of this decision.15

The Krisher episode of early 1974 demonstrated the potential for blowback when the Park regime’s efforts to obstruct American media from publishing critical reports was direct and public. Based on this result and the suggestions of MoFA, the South Korean government adopted more subtle and indirect forms of obstruction. For example, when the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) decided to air a British Broadcasting Company (BBC) documentary on the so-called “People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) case,” the Korean government used an ally in Congress, Rep. Charles Wilson, to plead its case. Wilson wrote to ABC President William Sheehan, arguing that the documentary “gives an unfair, lopsided view” of South Korea and requested that time on the program be given to interview “persons who believe that the BBC film is inaccurate, misleading, and in some instances, a deliberate overstatement of the true situation in the Republic of Korea.”16 Following a critical editorial by Professor Jerome Cohen in the Los Angeles Times in September 1976, the Korean government relied on former Associated Press report O.H.P. King to write a rebuttal. This document also indicates that King, who had spent time reporting in Korea during the Korean War, was an official advisor to the South Korean Ministry of Culture and Information.17 The case of O.H.P. King illustrates how friendly American media figures could move beyond being targets and become tools in the image management campaign.

Despite a relaxed approach towards media obstruction in the late 1970s, obstructive targeting was more severe for Korean nationals working for American media outlets. Kim Myong Sik (2006, 165-166), a correspondent for Reuters in the 1970s, recounts a story of his colleague, Lee Si Ho, being detained for keeping a flyer he was handed by a dissident during a democracy protest. According to Kim, it took an appeal by Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer to get Lee released from interrogation. Shim Jae Hoon (2006, 195-196), who worked for the New York Times in the 1970s, was interrogated in early October 1979 for the infamous New York Times interview with Kim Young Sam, mentioned above, in which the opposition leader urged the US government to intervene on behalf of democracy protesters against Park Chung Hee. Shim believed that had Park not been assassinated later that month he would have been arrested alongside Kim Young Sam for subversion. Critical reports in the American media remained a problem for the Park regime throughout the 1970s. As we have seen in this section, the Korean government sought to alleviate this problem both through promotional and obstructive tactics. Specific media outlets and figures were targeted, but these meetings had the dual purpose of seeking to open media outlets to pro-Korea material that could then target a diffuse audience.

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

The case of academia in relation to the South Korean image management campaign is quite different from that of the media. For one, the Korean government had a different tool for engaging academics: funding. Moreover, it is interesting to note that many academics were eager to assist the Korean government in its image management campaign given their shared worldviews, although there is no evidence an organized effort to support the Korean government was made by American academics.

The use of funding to encourage academia to produce research or convey opinions favorable to the South Korean government is a subject that was covered heavily in the Congressional investigation by the Fraser Committee in the late 1970s. One example is that of Western Michigan University and Professor Andrew C. Nahm. The Fraser Committee investigation found that Nahm had accepted a $700 donation from Ambassdor Kim Dong-jo in November 1972, just after the Yusin proclamation, to support an academic conference on Korea. In return, Nahm published a “Letter to the Editors” in the New York Times which took a favorable view of the Yusin regime. Consequently, a large grant of $17,500 was given to the Center for Korean Studies at Western Michigan University in 1973 after a similar request in 1972 had been denied. The Congressional investigation found that in subsequent years, as Western Michigan University continued to receive funding from the Korean government, “Korean domestic political matters were generally avoided” in research and that “publications...did not contain any material critical of the government” (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 266-269).

A similar series of events unfolded at Harvard University. During the first round of Congressional hearings on the human rights situation in South Korea in 1974, the Korean government was able to ensure that Thomas J. Coolidge, IV was called to testify.18 Coolidge was the chairman of Bay Orient Enterprises and described as a prominent figure in US-Korea trade relations (The Harvard Crimson 1978). But more importantly he was also the chairman of a fundraising committee for Harvard University’s East Asian Research Center and spent many years living in Korea as part of his business dealings (Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Organizations and Movements 1974, 96). His statements during the hearing supported the Korean government’s position which was to argue against US troop withdrawal or aid cuts in response to human rights abuses (Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Organizations and Movements 1974, 96-98). While Coolidge’s remarks were not necessarily controversial, disturbingly, months after his testimony, Coolidge met with Kim Jeong-yeom, the Chief of Park Chung Hee’s Blue House Secretariat, and received a promise for a $1 million donation from the Korean government that would be funneled through the Korean Traders Association to Harvard (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 270-271). The Fraser Committee investigation found that the Korean government subsequently sought to limit the scope of the grant to research on the Korean economy, and that a Korean daily newspaper, the Joongang Ilbo, had reported that the Korean government hoped the donation would limit criticism from Harvard professors such as Jerome Cohen and Edwin Reischauer (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 272-274). In short, the Korean government was able to secure promotional testimony from Coolidge in Congress, and hoped its grant would serve a dual purpose of promoting research favorable to the Park regime and silencing critics at Harvard.

The Fraser Committee investigations also found that several academics were offered individual research grants by the Korean government during this time. For example, Lee Chong Sik of the University of Pennsylvania was offered $3,000 and Robert Scalapino of the University of California was offered $5,000 (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 287). However both declined the offers suspecting that the funds were indeed tied to a government effort to encourage research findings friendly to Korean government positions. It was also found that the Korean government worked closely with the Hudson Institute to hold academic conferences that took overall views friendly to the Korean government; the Korean government was also alleged to have had veto power over the conference’s speaker list (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 289-290). The Korean government even formed its own research institute, the Research Institute on Korean Affairs. The start-up funds for the institute were reportedly received directly from Park Chung Hee and subsequent funding was laundered so as to hide the Korean government’s involvement (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 290). Although these are only a few examples of the numerous noted in the Fraser Committee’s findings, we can see that the Korean government sought to utilize funding for academia to both promote Korean government positions on certain issues and obstruct critics.

A previously unknown aspect of the image management campaign, however, is the degree to which some American academics sought to actively assist the Korean government in its endeavor. The Fraser Committee was often quick to assert it was not suggesting American academics had compromised themselves by changing their views or bending to Korean pressure. For academics who assisted the Korean government this is also undoubtedly true. However, it is one thing to unknowingly become involved in a Korean government plot, and quite another to actively help with the plotting.

One figure stands out as an American academic who sought to actively assist the Korean government in its authoritarian image management campaign: Richard “Dixie” Walker. Walker is best known as the long-serving US ambassador to South Korea from 1981 to 1986. But in the 1970s, Walker was a professor at the University of South Carolina. The South Korean government contacted Walker ahead of the 1974 hearings and offered to pay for his trip to Washington (he was on sabbatical at the time in Hawaii), and even offered to then fly him to Seoul where he would visit as the “personal guest” of Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-jo.19 Walker, however, declined the Korean offer to pay for his trip to Washington, and when the Congress indicated that it would not cover his travel costs Walker opted to submit a written statement for the 1974 hearings rather than appear in person.20 Walker did testify before the committee directly in 1975, again at the request of the Korean government (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1975, 185-192).

However, as with Coolidge, testimony is not the end of Walker’s involvement with the Korean government. During a meeting with Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil in Seoul in 1974, Walker stated he would send the Korean government an “extensive and detailed proposal on activities for improving public opinion about Korea in the US and promoting cooperative relations between the US and Korea.”21 Walker was not alone in his efforts. The Korean government was also in late 1974 having discussions with Frank R. Barnett, the president of the National Strategy Information Center. This institution was funded by donations from Richard Mellon Scaife, who inherited the Mellon family fortune and was dubbed by the Washington Post in 1999 as the “most generous donor to conservative causes in American history” (Kaiser 1999). The goal of Barnett’s institution was to shape “public policy through educational activities,” and the Center for Strategic and International Studies founder David M. Abshire argued that Barnett “was the outside man to develop strategic consensus with colleges, universities, lawyers, and other professionals” (Michaels 2017, 88). In other words, if the Korean government was interested in shaping American public opinion via the political elite and opinion makers, Barnett was a good person to contact.

In a letter to Korean Ambassador to the US Ham Byeong-jun on October 22, 1974, Barnett states he and “our mutual friend Dr. Richard Walker” where happy Ham had been appointed Ambassador, argued a professional public relations firm would be a waste of money, and included a five-page proposal for a “non-profit Speaker’s Bureau that could reach 500 important American audiences in the next 3 years.”22 Barnett’s proposal argued that “the Government of the Republic of Korea is under attack, in the US and elsewhere, by (a) Communist propaganda and (b) various liberal, socialist and neutralist critics.” Barnett contended that “decisions in US foreign policy (and defense policy) are made by a relatively small percentage of the total American public” and that “to preserve a politico-military alliance demands PERSONAL INTERACTION rather than the projection of clever but superficial images.”23 Speakers for the bureau were to be recruited from business circles, academia (who would be recruited by Walker), the media, religious organizations, and retired military officials, “naturally no one hostile to Seoul.” Barnett, however, warned that the Korean government would have to accept a measure of criticism from some speakers as full-throated endorsement of all Korean government policies would not be credible.

In January 1975, Walker sent his own proposal to the Korean government. This proposal was made on behalf of MultiNational Consultants, Inc., the president of which was Robert H. Parsley.24 Parsley was also on the board of directors of Frank Barnett’s National Strategy Information Center, and the address for MultiNational Consultants was actually the same as the law firm Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook & Knapp where Parsley was employed (Committee on Foreign Relations 1984, 365). The proposal called for a one-year contract and the Korean government was to pay $150,000 for the company’s services.

The plan was to bring together an initial group of consultants who would then conduct several activities including an independent briefing operation which would circulate “briefing papers” to influential Americans concerned with Korea, a movement to contact national organizations in hopes of them considering Korea and Korean-American relations in their activities, an operation to hold “public affairs or academic” “Korea conferences,” and also a meeting between Korean officials and the consultants after which the consultants would write a paper for the Korean government suggesting projects that could “assist the political and psychological posture of the Republic of Korea.” As consultants, Walker proposed himself, Barnett, Frank N. Trager (New York University), Franz Michael (George Washington University), and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Foreign Policy Research Institute). Michael, like Walker, had submitted a statement to the Congressional hearings on human rights in South Korea in 1974 and testified in person in 1975; he was viewed by the Korean government as a “pro-Korea” witness. Trager worked with Barnett as a part of the National Strategy Information Center, and Barnett had a long relationship with Pfaltzgraff as well (Michaels 2017, 79, 89). In essence, Walker had taken Barnett’s proposal for a “speaker’s bureau” and dramatically enlarged the scope of this cooperation between American academics and the Korean government.

The proposals developed by Barnett and Walker indicate a desire on the part of the Korean government to engage with friendly American academics to promote their preferred image in American academia and to political elites. However, MoFA’s review of Barnett’s and Walker’s proposals indicate that they were concerned the efforts proposed would overlap with those being conducted by a public relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, which the Korean government had already decided to hire.25 Therefore it was decided that MoFA would request Walker rework his proposal to focus more exclusively on influencing American academics rather than broader audiences.26

Following this request, however, no available document shows any follow up by Walker nor any record of the project being implemented. Another proposal by Edwin Feulner—who at the time was the executive director of the Republican Study Committee in Congress, a founding trustee of the Heritage Foundation in 1973, and later the institution’s president beginning in 1977—proposed a project to the Korean government for visiting congressional staff members. Feulner’s document indicates he had knowledge of Walker’s proposal, but he refers to it as such which indicates that it was not in operation as of late 1975.27 Feulner’s project is also another example of collaboration between conservatives located on the precipice between policymaking and academia with the intention of improving the image of the Korean government in the eyes of the American political elite. But the ambiguity of the proposal in terms of exactly who in the US would manage such an effort makes it difficult to strictly categorize it as a collaboration between the Korean government and American academia.

It is difficult to appraise the impact of these collaborations between the Korean government and willing American academics, mainly because there is no clear evidence that these proposals were ever implemented. Here there are two possibilities. The most likely is that the proposals were never acted upon. With Lee Jae-hyeon’s testimony in the summer of 1975, which Walker witnessed in person as he was also testifying that day, it would have been a dangerous proposition for Walker and other American academics to become deeply involved with the Korean government. On the eve of the Koreagate scandal, image management may have appeared futile to many, and Walker, Barnett, and others may not have wanted their professional reputations openly associated with the brewing scandal.

The second but less likely possibility is that these proposals were put into action but related documents remain classified. There are reasons to speculate this may be the case. First, Korean government documents indicate that should Walker’s plan or something similar be put into motion, it should be carried out via a “private” Korean organization rather than a contract concluded directly between Walker (and associates) and the Korean government.28 If this is the case, documents about the implementation of the proposal may not be included in the MoFA archives. Second, Walker in his proposal demanded that the project be “treated with complete confidentiality” and that the American experts who work on the project not be “regarded as answerable agents or representatives of the Republic of Korea.”29 We can imagine that such language was included to exempt Walker and other American academics from having to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Therefore, given the dubious legal nature of the proposal, implementation of the project may have warranted greater secrecy and thus documents may remain classified.

The Korean government’s promotional and obstructive image management tactics activities that were uncovered via the Fraser Committee hearings undoubtedly backfired. It was the authoritarian repression of democracy activists that originally brought the Park Chung Hee regime to the attention of many Americans in the early 1970s. When it became known that their authoritarian tactics were being used in the US, this further tainted the regime’s image, mitigating any victory they may have achieved via promotional activities with American academics. But perhaps the most concerning part of the review here is the enthusiasm on the side of some American academics. Despite widelyreported human rights abuses occurring in South Korea, some conservative academics, including Richard “Dixie” Walker who would go on to represent the US in South Korea as ambassador, sought to assist the South Korean government in its image management campaign and profit from it financially.

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

As the efforts with the US media suggest, the Korean government was not content to only engage high-level American officials or opinion leaders, it wanted to impact American public opinion at large. In theory, if the American people were friendly towards South Korea, there would be less incentive for members of Congress to criticize South Korean human rights abuses or deny the country military aid. To further this effort to improve the average American’s view of Korea, the Korean government sought a mechanism for reaching out to people throughout the US.

In this vein, MoFA came up with the idea to use honorary consuls as agents in its authoritarian image management campaign. The plan seemed good in theory: the Korean government would appoint honorary consuls in major American cities throughout the country and use them as public diplomacy agents of sorts to improve the image of the Korean government. Moreover, although this differed in practice, honorary consuls were willing agents of the Korean government and thus did not need to be “convinced” of anything as academics or the media elite needed to be. Thus the Korean government could skip directly to using them as agents in its campaign. However, the contributions of the honorary consuls in the authoritarian image management campaign were less than impressive.

“Honorary consuls” are regulated by international law, mainly the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. According to Staszewski (2002, 138-139), honorary consuls are typically citizens of the host country rather than the sending country, do not receive fixed wages, are not trained by nor bound by contract with the represented country, and enjoy fewer privileges and immunity rights than professional consuls. These characteristics encapsulate well South Korea’s honorary consuls in the US in the 1970s: almost all were Americans not of Korean descent and they were provided little money by the Korean government to cover their expenses. A 1976 report indicates that South Korea began appointing honorary consuls in the US in 1968, and by 1976 had honorary consuls in nineteen US cities (including San Juan, Puerto Rico) and two in both Dallas and Portland.30 In this respect the honorary consuls were, in theory, well-positioned to positively impact American public opinion throughout the country.

Even before the Yushin declaration in October 1972, a MoFA report was already imagining honorary consuls as agents of public diplomacy. The Korean embassy in the US submitted a report in July 1972 entitled “Proposals by the Embassy in the United States for Strengthening Activities in Local Areas and Utilizing Honorary Consuls” (Jumi daesagwanui jibanghwaldong ganghwawa myeongyeyeongsa hwaryongbangan).31 The plan stipulated that honorary consuls in the United States should accomplish several goals including contributing to the advancement of diplomatic initiatives of South Korea in the US, widening the area of operations for the embassy, strengthening information activities in each region to boost the base of pro-Korean public sentiment throughout the country so that that sentiment is reflected in Congress, and to strengthen the market for Korean exports. A similar report in 1974 provided more specific plans including inviting some honorary consuls to Korea, hosting public relations events including at least one “Korea Night” event a year, having embassy officials meet with journalists in each honorary consul’s region, and producing promotional material about the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement) to garner assistance for its implementation.32 However, once the Korean government’s image began to be tarnished by the hearings on human rights in Congress, reports on response measures to the hearings suggested that honorary consuls be “persuaded to be involved in activities related to Congress and the media.”33 In this sense, honorary consuls were not seen as merely benign agents of public diplomacy by the Korean government; it was hoped they would actively cooperate in their broader image management program by promoting positive images of Korea in the US and by applying obstructive pressure against elements that were seen as oppositional to the Park regime.

Despite these ambitious plans, honorary consuls were not an effective tool in the Korean government’s image management plans and seem to have had little impact on American public opinion at large. According to a report entitled Honorary Consuls’ Activity Situation, 1976” (76nyeon myeongyeyeongsa hwaldong sanghwang), honorary consuls were not exceptionally active.34 One of the main markers of success was newspaper articles on Korea published by each honorary consul. In theory, contributions to local newspapers could further the Korean government’s goal of promoting a positive image of itself to the general American public. However, only five out of twelve honorary consuls covered in the report (meaning several were either not covered or had no output whatsoever) had an article published, with only one of these, Dwight Hamilton of Denver, having two published.

Achievements in the obstructive activity realm were even more sparse. Here the main goal was to write members of Congress to dissuade them from taking negative positions on South Korean human rights and military aid issues. Only Raymond Kell of Portland was active politically, with the report noting he had sent one letter to each of his representative and senator. But over the course of an entire year, the writing of two letters by all of the Korean honorary consuls would not seem to qualify as a success. It is possible this report was not completely comprehensive. For example, Donald Fraser kept a letter from South Korean Honorary Consul George Dayton of Minneapolis which criticized him for being pro-North Korea.35 But we should expect that the Korean officials compiling this report would have an incentive to be as comprehensive as possible to show the success of their image management activities, and the lack of material to report would not have reflected well on their performance.

To further assess the usefulness of honorary consuls in the Korean government’s image management activities, I conducted a search of newspaper databases using the honorary consuls’ names as keywords. The most common type of articles found were stories about the Korean ambassador, either Kim Dong-jo or Ham Byeong-jun depending on the year, visiting a city and holding an event with an honorary consul. The Korean ambassador would often sit down with local reporters in an attempt to garner favorable local press coverage.36 Sometimes local newspapers would do an exposé on an honorary consul given their prominence in the local community and would mention Korea (Denning 1974; Bean 1980). Some did discuss economic ventures with South Korea to the local press as well, which may have indirectly provided positive images of South Korea as a land of investment opportunity (Schwartz 1972; Arizona Republic 1973).

But not all press coverage of the honorary consuls was positive. Donald Clark, the honorary consul in Atlanta, was dragged through the mud by the media for his ties to South Korea after Griffin Bell was nominated by Jimmy Carter as Attorney General (Randolph and Coates 1977). Clark and Bell worked for the same law firm and the intention of the media was to insinuate that Bell may have ties to South Korea as well amid the burgeoning Koreagate scandal. Although not necessarily damaging politically for Korea, Raymond Kell was ridiculed in the local press for claiming his position as honorary consul entitled him to diplomatic immunity from a drunk driving charge, a preposterous legal argument that directly contradicts the above-mentioned Vienna Convention (Corvallis Gazette-Times 1977).

Why were honorary consuls so unhelpful in the image management campaign? One problem may have been that they were unwilling to become embroiled in a political campaign. Many were businessmen who would have limited motivations for becoming involved in political posturing. A second issue is some appear to have little knowledge of Korea. A severe case was Milo S. Smith, the honorary consul in Tampa, Florida who was appointed in 1975. According to a local newspaper report, Smith was “recommended for the job, which carries no salary, but he doesn’t know by whom” (Tampa Bay Times 1975). He went on to say that he “doesn’t speak Korean, has never been to Korea, and has no ties with the shipping industry,” indicating almost zero interest in Korea either politically or economically (Tampa Bay Times 1975). Smith’s comments also hint at a third factor: the lack of remuneration. The 1974 report on honorary consuls indicates that they received $1,000 USD a year to conduct their activities.37 When Donald Clark was questioned about his links to the South Korean government during Attorney General Bell’s confirmation hearings, he claimed he often had to spend his own money to carry out his duties as honorary consul (Randolph and Coates 1977). This suggests there was little financial incentive for honorary consuls to be vigorous in promoting the Korean government’s preferred image or be active in writing members of Congress on behalf of the Korean government.

Although the Korean government outlined an impressive plan for utilizing honorary consuls in both promotional and obstructive activities as part of their authoritarian image management campaign, the actual results were poor. The honorary consuls appear to have lacked a clear motivation for participating in the Korean government’s campaign. For the honorary consuls to be effective agents of the Korean government they would have had to been ideologues, and it appears the Korean government had few such people they could use.

CONCLUSION

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

This case study of the South Korean government’s authoritarian image management campaign has displayed two important points. First, the theoretical concepts developed by Dukalskis are valid not only for contemporary authoritarian governments, but also applicable to historical case studies. This study has shown how the Korean government sought to apply both promotional and obstructive image management methods to both specific and diffuse audiences. The Korean government actively engaged the American media in an effort to publish positive pieces about itself and promote a friendly image to the American people. The Korean government used funding to curry favor with American academics and colluded with some willing American scholars to consider further image management projects. And the Korean government hoped to use its honorary consuls in cities throughout the United States to both promote a positive image through favorable press coverage and cultural events as well as apply obstructive pressure on critics in government.

Second, although these activities of the South Korean government fit neatly within the theory developed by Dukalskis, it is interesting to note that they were mostly unsuccessful. The Korean government had minor successes—positive pieces did appear in the US media from time to time, it did find some allies in American academia, and at least some of its honorary consuls did engage occasionally in activities helpful to the South Korean government. However, these successes were largely overshadowed by the failures. The American media was on the whole critical of the Park Chung Hee regime in the 1970s (Chung 2014). The Korean government’s attempts to use funding with America academia became fodder for the Koreagate investigations and collaborations with friendly scholars do not seem to have been implemented. And the honorary consuls were fairly useless when it came to improving American public opinion of South Korea. When the US media broke the story of Tongsun Park and bribes to Congress in late 1976, the South Korean government at that point had no choice but to lay low and cease its image management efforts.

The findings of this article suggest multiple avenues for future research. The above comparison with the other “Lobbies” of US Cold War allies deserves to be studied further. The image of the China, Japan, and Israel Lobbies is one of success and power, which contrasts significantly with the findings here on Korea. In this vein, why was Korea uniquely bad at implementing its image management campaign? What successful elements did the other Lobbies include that South Korea did not?

The South Korean case may also prove to be continued fertile ground for research. First, there are many more accusations in the original Congressional investigations about the Korea influencing campaign that need to be pursued further. In particular, the KCIA’s actions remain a mystery, but the organization no doubt played an important role. For example, it was alleged that the KCIA sought to silence Korean critics in the US through harassment and intimidation (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1978, 93-96). Such research would undoubtedly strengthen the argument here that the 1970s Korea influencing campaign was an act of authoritarian image management. Second, although Park Chung Hee was assassinated in October 1979, he was eventually succeeded by another military government led by Chun Doo Hwan. Further research may inquire into the lessons the Korean government learned from the failures of image management in the 1970s and how those lessons were applied under the new regime in the 1980s.

Footnote

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

1 A concise summary of these investigations and their findings is provided in Boettcher (1980).

2 “Migugui daeoewonjobeop (sugwonbeop) je4gwon (V.2 1974.7-9)” [U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (Amendment) 4 Volumes (V.2 July-September 1974)], 1974.G-0035.05.162, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). To allow for easy location of the cited documents, materials from archives have been cited using footnotes (rather than in-text citations) per the normal convention of historians. Documents from MoFA are cited based on the document organization system of the MoFA Diplomatic Archives. First, I provide the Romanized file name (using the Revised Romanization of Korean system), followed by an English translation in brackets. Next is the year in which the document was produced, followed by the roll number, file number, and frame number of the specific document cited.

3 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.129, MoFA.

4 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.130, MoFA.

5 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.177-195, MoFA.

6 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.245-246, MoFA.

7 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.335-340, MoFA.

8 “Daetongnyeong teukbyeolseoneon (10wol yusin)” [Presidential Special Decree (October Yusin)], 1972.B-0016.03.348-352, MoFA.

9 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.003-047, 048-072, MoFA.

10 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.007-007, 020-023, MoFA.

11 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.213-215, MoFA.

12 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.247-261, MoFA.

13 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.247, MoFA. Emphasis in original.

14 Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.074-098, MoFA.

15 “Miguk eollonui banhangwangye gisa mit daechaek” [Anti-ROK American Media Reports and Responses], 1976.C-06-0097.14.138, MoFA; Krisher, “Flashbacks,” 138. Also see Embassy Seoul to Department of State, February 26, 1974, 1974SEOUL1255, RG59.

16 “Hanguk ingwonmunjewa gwallyeonhan je saan” [Issues related to the ROK’s Human Rights Problem], 1976.B-06-0026.08.357-359, MoFA.

17 “Juhanmigun cheolsu (gamchuk) munje, 1976” [US Forces Korea Withdrawal (Reduction) Problem, 1976], 1976.2021-0178.08.098, MoFA.

18 “Miguk hawon hangukgwangye cheongmunhoe, jeon6gwon (V.5)” [Hearings on Korea in the U.S. House of Representatives, Six Volumes (V.5)], 1974.C-0071.01.117, MoFA.

19 “Miguk hawon hangukgwangye cheongmunhoe, jeo6gwon (V.1)” [Hearings on Korea in the U.S. House of Representatives, Six Volumes (V.1)], 1974.C-0070.34.132-137, MoFA; “Miguk hawon hangukgwangye cheongmunhoe, jeo6gwon (V.1)” [Hearings on Korea in the U.S. House of Representatives, Six Volumes (V.1)], 1974.C-0070.34.047-048, MoFA.

20 “Miguk hawon hangukgwangye cheongmunhoe, jeo6gwon (V.1)” [Hearings on Korea in the U.S. House of Representatives, Six Volumes (V.1)], 1974.C-0070.34.166, MoFA.

21 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.007, MoFA.

22 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.010-016, MoFA.

23 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.010-016, MoFA. Emphasis in original.

24 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.035-058, MoFA.

25 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.061-063, MoFA.

26 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.083-084, MoFA.

27 “Miguk uihoeuiwon banghan, 1975. je2gwon (V.2 10-11wol)” [US Members of Congress Visit Korea, 1975. 2 Volumes (V.2 October-November), 1975.2020-0156.08.149-152, MoFA.

28 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.064, MoFA.

29 “Daemiguk teukbyeolhongbo hwaldonggyehoek” [Special Public Relations Activities Plans for the United States], 1975.L-0013.02.040-046, MoFA.

30 “1976nyeondo bungmijiyeong myeongyeyeongsa hwaldong hyeonhwang” [Status of Activities of Honorary Consuls in North America, 1976], 1976.A-06-0013.07.009, MoFA.

31 “Myeongyeyeongsa hyeonhwang” [Status of Honorary Consuls], 1972.A-0009.03.23-25, MoFA.

32 “1974nyeondo bungmijiyeong jujae myeongyeyeongsa hyeonhwang min hwaldong bangan” [Status and Plans for Activities for Honorary Consuls in North America, 1974], 1974.A-0011.16.006-008, MoFA.

33 “Daemiguk oegyosichaek mit eommugyehoek” [Foreign Policy Towards the United States and Work Plans], 1976.C-06-0094.03.006-007, MoFA.

34 “1976nyeondo bungmijiyeong myeongyeyeongsa hwaldong hyeonhwang” [Status of Activities of Honorary Consuls in North America, 1976], 1976.A-06-0013.07.013-016.

35 Donald M. Fraser Papers, Foreign Affairs/International Relations Committee Files, 151.H.3.5B, Korea, Folder 1.

36 Examples of these types of articles were sometimes sent back to Seoul by the Embassy in the United States; see “Ju Mobile(miguk) myeongyeyeongsagwan gaegwan” [Opening of Honorary Consulate in Mobile (United States)], 1972.A-0009.13.010, MoFA; “Thomas, James W. ju Dallas myeongyeyeongsa immyeong, 1972.7.4” [Appointment of James W. Thomas as Honorary Consul in Dallas, July 4, 1972], 1972.A-0009.16.017, MoFA. Other examples include Trolinger (1974) and Noland (1975).

37 “1974nyeondo bungmijiyeong jujae myeongyeyeongsa hyeonhwang min hwaldong bangan” [Status and Plans for Activities for Honorary Consuls in North America, 1974], 1974.A-0011.16.016-018, MoFA.



















References

Other Sections

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHORITARIAN IMAGE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

US MEDIA: USING PERSUASION AND COERCION TO ATTEMPT TO SPREAD THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED MESSAGE

ACADEMIA: THE USE OF FUNDING AND ATTEMPTS AT COLLABORATION

LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FAILED BID TO USE HONORARY CONSULS AS INSTRUMENTS OF IMAGE MANAGEMENT

CONCLUSION

Footnote

Reference

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  5. Ayhan, Kadir Jun. 2019. “The Boundaries of Public Diplomacy and Nonstate Actors: A Taxonomy of Perspectives.” International Studies Perspectives 20: 63-83. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/eky010.

  6. Babcock, Charles R. 1978. “Koreagate: Bringing Forth a Mouse, But an Honest One.” Washington Post (October 9).
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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 

De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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