Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

 
 


Quotes of the Day:


"Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything."
- George Bernard Shaw

"To study is not to consume ideas, but to create and recreate them."
- Paulo Freire

“Most people are not even aware of their need to conform. They live under the illusion that they follow their own ideas and inclinations, that they are individualists, that they have arrived at their opinions as the result of their own thinking – and that it just happens that their ideas are the same as those of the majority.” 
- Erich Fromm


1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2023

2. Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension

3. U.S. Forces Evacuate Americans From Khartoum Embassy

4. Biden says US embassy evacuation in Sudan has been completed

5.  “Strategic Clarity” is a Dangerous Answer to the Taiwan Question

6. Why China Backtracked on Military Assistance to Russia and Why the Policy Will Stick

7. Special Operations Forces Evacuate U.S. Embassy Personnel From Sudan

8. Ukraine tightens rules on frontline reporting

9. Twitter once muzzled Russian and Chinese state propaganda. That's over now

10. Opinion | Fox News behaved egregiously, but the settlement was good for the law

11.Retired Navy Officer Takes on Florida’s Book-Ban ‘Fascism’

12. Chinese Censorship Is Quietly Rewriting the Covid-19 Story

13. These celebrities ‘subscribed to Twitter Blue.’ Except they’re dead.

14. Ukraine Gears Up to Hit Russians—and Show West It Can Win

15. Unprepared for long war, US Army under gun to make more ammo

16. US denies paramilitary group’s claim it helped evacuate Americans from Sudan

17. China’s proxy war against faith

18. China Prioritizes 3 Strategic Technologies in Its Great Power Competition

19. China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan: Signaling and War Scares

20. The Future of Social Media Is a Lot Less Social




1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2023


Maps:graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2023


Key Takeaways

  • Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.
  • The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but is unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin.
  • The continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin of its views.
  • Russian occupation authorities are continuing to oppress Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian religious institutions beyond the Kremlin’s control.
  • A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 21 with two FAB-500 bombs, one of which likely malfunctioned.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and near Siversk.
  • Russian forces continued to advance around Bakhmut on April 22, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front and conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian authorities have made headway in their attempts to compel international recognition of Russian ownership over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
  • Continued Russian efforts to block evacuations of wounded soldiers, likely to prevent soldiers from leaving the combat zone, have contributed to the deaths of some Russian soldiers.
  • Russian occupation officials are expanding patronage networks in occupied territories.


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 22, 2023

Apr 22, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF


Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 22, 9pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions. Geolocated footage published by a Russian milblogger on April 22 shows that Ukrainian forces have established positions on the Dnipro River bank north of Oleshky (7km southwest of Kherson City) and advanced up to the northern outskirts of the settlement on the E97 highway, as well as west of Dachi (10km south of Kherson City).[1] This footage also indicates that Russian forces may not control islands in the Kinka and Chaika rivers less than half a kilometer north of the geolocated Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 and 22 that Ukrainian forces have maintained positions in east bank Kherson Oblast for weeks, established stable supply lines to these positions, and regularly conduct sorties in the area—all indicating a lack of Russian control over the area.[2] Another milblogger’s battle map claimed that Russian forces do not control some Dnipro River delta islands southwest of Kherson City as of April 22, suggesting possible Ukrainian advances on these islands.[3] Some milbloggers complained that the slow rate of Russian artillery fire due to the over-centralization of the Russian military command allowed Ukrainian forces to land on the east bank.[4] Russian forces may be prioritizing maintaining defenses in urban areas such as Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka, leaving the islands in the Dnipro River delta unmanned. The extent and intent of these Ukrainian positions remain unclear, as does Ukraine’s ability and willingness to maintain sustained positions in this area. ISW is recoding territory on the east bank of the Dnipro River to Ukrainian-held only now because this is the first time ISW has observed reliable geolocated imagery of Ukrainian positions on the east bank along with multi-sourced Russian reports of an enduring Ukrainian presence there.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. Prigozhin argued on April 21 that Russia needs to “anchor itself in such a way that it is only possible to tear out [Russian forces from their positions] with the claws of the opponent.”[5] Prigozhin’s comment followed a discussion of the Ramstein meeting results, Western commitments to train more Ukrainian personnel and continuous military support for Ukraine. Prigozhin also noted that Ukraine will try to “tear” Russian forces apart and that Russia needs to resist such attacks. Prigozhin has been increasingly alarmist in his recent rhetoric and has made similar statements about the uncertain future of Russian offensive operations in Donbas.[6] Prigozhin’s calls for strengthening Russian defenses in occupied territories and frequent discussions of the prospects of Ukrainian counteroffensives are notable as they indicate that he is trying to amplify the discussion in the Russian domestic information space. Russia, however, continues to conduct offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Prigozhin is also advocating for Russia to focus on holding the current frontlines rather than seeking more gains so that Russian forces can regain their combat effectiveness for later offensive operations. Prigozhin is not arguing for Russia to end the war and negotiate with Ukraine and the West as some Russian and Western sources reported, as ISW previously observed, but is instead condemning the faction within the Kremlin that is hoping to end the war in negotiations.[7] Prigozhin is actually arguing that Russia needs to meet the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive at full strength and try to hold the current frontlines without ending the war or entering into peace negotiations.[8] He argues that a pause after the Ukrainian attack culminates would allow Russia to regain combat power and build nationalist support within the Russian society for renewing the fight even in the event of a defeat.[9] Prigozhin is also attempting to redefine and undermine some of Putin’s key maximalist goals in Ukraine—namely the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine—likely to minimize the informational impact that might result from going over to the defensive and abandoning efforts to gain more ground now.[10] Russian far-right paramilitary formation Rusich (Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group), which facilitates recruitment of Russian ultranationalist and irregular forces, echoed Prigozhin’s rejection of the “denazification” and “demilitarization” goals.[11] Rusich noted that Russia is fighting Ukraine to avenge Donbas, for living space, and for combat experience—rather than fighting claimed Ukrainian “fascism” and “Nazism.” By reframing Putin’s goals, Prigozhin and some factions within the ultranationalist community may be attempting to condition the Russian domestic information space for the prospect of frozen frontlines, potentially near the initial lines of February 23, 2022.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but may be unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin. Some ultranationalist figures argued that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled efforts to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen to ensure that Russia has enough military personnel to defend existing frontlines and to efficiently freeze the current frontlines in Ukraine.[12] The Russian military command is also reportedly transferring conscripts to hold Russian lines in Crimea and may be planning to prepare other resources to ensure that Russia can retain some lines once the potential Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates.[13] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov are likely sensible to the threat of the Ukrainian counteroffensive but are likely continuing to send contract servicemen to reinforce senseless offensive operations at Putin’s insistence.[14] Kremlin sources previously revealed that Putin favors loyalty over competence, and this sentiment likely prevents Shoigu and Gerasimov from focusing on setting optimal conditions for an efficient defense by refusing to expend Russian elite units in grinding attritional battles for marginal gains.[15] ISW previously observed that Shoigu and Gerasimov were likely unable to convince Putin to conduct mobilization in May 2022—despite the fact that Russia needed such a measure to reconstitute forces necessary to maintain offensive operations in Ukraine.[16]

The Russian military command may have partially repaired its strained relationship with Prigozhin to persuade Putin to halt offensive operations via the Russian information space. ISW has observed a sudden improvement in Prigozhin’s relations with the Russian MoD and the Kremlin since early April. The Russian MoD, for example, began to directly acknowledge Wagner forces in its daily situational reports and provided Wagner with ammunition and mobilized personnel as reinforcements in early April 2023.[17] Prigozhin and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers amplified claims that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s son Nikolai Peskov is reportedly serving with Wagner in Ukraine—likely an information operation to publicly mend the relationship and possibly elevate Prigozhin’s loyalty to the Kremlin.[18] Prigozhin had previously been able to impact Putin’s decision-making by engineering the appointment of Wagner-affiliated commanders and the dismissal of inept military officials and breaking through Putin’s close circle with his critiques of the progress of the war.[19] A Russian political expert observed that different Kremlin officials have historically voiced their plans and projects publicly to convince Putin to implement changes, and it is likely that Prigozhin follows the same model of influence.[20] The Russian military command and select Kremlin officials who are advocating for Putin to freeze the war may have reapproached Prigozhin to influence Putin one more time.

Putin’s continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin. Russian forces are continuing attritional offensives to capture Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka in Donetsk Oblast as well as limited offensive operations in Luhansk and western Donetsk Oblast, despite increasing Russian fears about the threat of a potential imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive.[21] The Russian winter offensive failed to achieve the Kremlin’s ambitious goals of seizing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by March 31, but it appears that Russian forces have not subsequently deemphasized their operational focus on tactical gains, no matter how marginal and costly those gains are.[22] Russian forces suffered significant manpower and equipment losses during the winter offensive campaign that are currently constraining their abilities to maintain offensive operations along more than one axis and that will likely limit the Russian military’s ability to respond to possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[23] Russian forces have not responded to these constraints by prioritizing one axis or by conducting an operational pause along any axis that would allow Russian forces to replenish and reconstitute for a decisive defensive effort. Russia forces are continuing to deploy contract servicemen and remaining combat-effective units to support offensive operations in eastern Ukraine instead of conserving this critical pool of combat power to respond to a Ukrainian counter-offensive.[24] Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka offer no significant operational benefits to Russian forces, and any marginal tactical gains along any axis are unlikely to improve the Russian military’s ability to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Putin may be hesitant to commit to a ceasefire due to the influence of select unknown pro-war figures or out of concern for the implications for his regime’s stability. The insistence on tactical gains suggests that the pro-war camp advocating for maintaining offensives at any cost is likely still influencing Putin’s decision-making for the war. A possible shift to preparing for defensive operations ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive would likely indicate that Putin had finally rejected the pro-war camp’s views in favor of the more pragmatic group’s. The possible success of the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive could determine the outcome of this struggle for influence over Putin’s decisions.

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to oppress Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian religious institutions beyond Moscow’s control. Head of the Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Viktoria Halitsina reported on April 22 that Russian forces seized the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in occupied Berdyansk.[25] Halitsina stated that Russian propagandists accused the clergy of hiding weapons and collaborating with Ukrainian forces because of their previous service as chaplains for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2015. ISW has also reported on two other instances of Russian occupation authorities persecuting Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine.[26] ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities’ weaponization of religion in occupied territories as part of an ongoing cultural genocide.[27]

Russian authorities continue to arrest personnel associated with the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) likely to justify crackdowns and further conceal DIB activities. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on April 22 that it arrested the deputy head of the testing laboratory at the Promtekhnologiya weapons plant in Moscow on suspicion of treason.[28] The FSB did not provide additional details about the alleged treasonous act. The Promtekhnologiya plant participates in the development and modernization of high-tech weapons. The Promtekhnologiya plant claimed that it had not employed the arrested employee since March 2021.[29] ISW has reported on other recent arrests that are part of an ongoing crackdown using the pretext of threats to Russia’s DIB.[30]

A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 21 with two FAB-500 bombs, one of which likely malfunctioned. Russian authorities announced on April 22 the presence of a second, undetonated bomb that landed in Belgorod.[31] Belgorod authorities evacuated 3,000 civilians from the city while sappers extracted and later detonated the bomb.[32] Russian authorities have so far provided no further explanation as to the cause of the accidental bombing. The Russian fighter bomber either intended to drop the bombs on a different target and one bomb failed to detonate, or the fighter bomber did not arm the bombs to drop them, and one bomb improperly detonated. 

Key Takeaways

  • Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.
  • The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but is unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin.
  • The continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin of its views.
  • Russian occupation authorities are continuing to oppress Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian religious institutions beyond the Kremlin’s control.
  • A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 21 with two FAB-500 bombs, one of which likely malfunctioned.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and near Siversk.
  • Russian forces continued to advance around Bakhmut on April 22, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front and conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian authorities have made headway in their attempts to compel international recognition of Russian ownership over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
  • Continued Russian efforts to block evacuations of wounded soldiers, likely to prevent soldiers from leaving the combat zone, have contributed to the deaths of some Russian soldiers.
  • Russian occupation officials are expanding patronage networks in occupied territories.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in the forest area near Kreminna.[34] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks towards Terny (16km west of Kreminna) and Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), and near Kuzymivka (13km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka.[35]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Siversk area on April 22. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Vasyukivka (14km southwest of Siversk), Rozdolivka (12km south of Siversk), Vesele (12km southeast of Siversk), and Spirne (11km southeast of Siversk).[36]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Kreminna. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and Dibrova (5km southwest of Krmeinna).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct periodic counterattacks near Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[38]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to advance around Bakhmut on April 22, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city. Geolocated footage published on April 21 indicates that Russian forces have advanced up to a section of the O0506 highway northwest of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters are conducting assaults along the road in the area but reiterated that Russian forces have not encircled Bakhmut as of April 22.[40] Russian and social media sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been using the O0506 highway for some time because Russian forces have been heavily interdicting the road.[41] Russian and social media sources claimed that Ukrainian forces rely on roads that pass through Ivanivske and on numerous field roads in the area to supply the Ukrainian grouping in Bakhmut.[42] One Russian milblogger claimed that heavy rains washed out Ukrainian controlled dirt roads into Bakhmut making withdrawals from the city impossible.[43] Another Russian milblogger continued to claim that heavy rains are preventing wheeled vehicles from using field roads but asserted that Ukrainian forces are able to use tracked vehicles along these roads into Bakhmut.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner assault detachments captured three blocks in western Bakhmut.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern and central Bakhmut as well as closer to the Olympic reserve school in western Bakhmut, although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of further Russian advances within the city.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove, and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[47]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on April 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novokalynove (13km north of Avdiivka) and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Marinka.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that the main battles in the Avdiivka area are occurring west and north of Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka) and that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 132nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted a positional attack on Ukrainian positions east of Novokalynove.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces thwarted Ukrainian attempts to regain lost positions west of Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) near the H-20 highway between Donetsk City and Kostyantynivka.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults northwest of Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) and near Paraskoviivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasing pressure on Marinka and have recently reinforced the area.[52] Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Tavriisk operational direction Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 22 that Russian forces have deployed poorly trained assault detachments to the Marinka area with orders not to retrieve wounded personnel from the battlefield or to keep track of the number of dead.[53]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on April 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations around Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that battles near Vuhledar are positional in nature.[55] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified location in western Donetsk Oblast.[56]

 


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian authorities have made headway in their attempts to compel international recognition of Russian ownership over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi stated on April 21 that maintenance at the ZNPP has suffered under occupation and noted that Rosenergoatom, the Russian state nuclear company that occupies the ZNPP, may undertake measures to perform maintenance tasks.[57] Grossi also stated that Ukraine has not repaired a ZNPP power line in Ukraine-held territory damaged in early March, while Russia is working to restore three powerlines connecting the ZNPP to Russian-held territory. The IAEA’s messaging resists formally acknowledging Russian ownership over the ZNPP while carving out space to acknowledge without complaint that Russian authorities are performing essential work for the ZNPP, work that Ukrainian authorities are unable to perform while Russia continues to occupy the plant. Grossi also noted damage to windows in the turbine hall of Reactor No. 4 at the ZNPP that is inconsistent with prior reports of landmine explosions.[58] Russian authorities used Grossi’s statements about the damage to claim on April 22 that a Ukrainian UAV attack damaged the turbine hall, implying that Russia is the only safe operator of the ZNPP.[59]

Ukrainian forces and likely partisans continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas in southern Ukraine. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down an unspecified weapon targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge, causing no damage to the bridge or any casualties.[60] Russian sources made conflicting claims whether the weapon was a Ukrainian UAV or a missile from a Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missile system, indicating that Russian authorities may not know or will not disclose the weapon type.[61] Russian occupation authorities also accused Ukrainian partisans of bombing a railway depot in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[62]

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson Oblast on April 22. Geolocated footage posted on April 21 shows that Russian forces made marginal advances south of Myrne (12km southwest of Hulyaipole).[63] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force near Dorozhnyanka (6km south of Hulyaipole).[64]



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Continued Russian efforts to block evacuations of wounded soldiers—likely in a blanket effort to prevent soldiers from leaving the combat zone—have reportedly contributed to the deaths of some Russian soldiers. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 22 that soldiers on the Russian border turned back a 14-truck medical evacuation convoy from Luhansk Oblast and that some soldiers died in transit (presumably to overflowing Luhansk Oblast hospitals) due to a lack of proper medical care.[65] ISW has previously observed Russian efforts to redeploy wounded soldiers and prevent their evacuation.[66] Russian command likely intends to prevent the significant number of demoralized soldiers from faking injury to escape combat and is not very concerned about soldiers’ fitness for combat, as many soldiers are used in human-wave style attacks. This reported incident at the Russian border is further notable because it suggests that there remains a clear set of checkpoints blocking traffic and dividing Russia from its “annexed” territories, undermining Russian claims that it has integrated occupied Ukrainian territories.

Several Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin critiqued on April 21 the recent creation of what he presented as a slew of Russian private military companies (PMCs), including Gazprom’s “Potok” PMC. Prigozhin claimed there now exists “a couple of them for each creature,” referring to several major Russian groups each launching its own PMC.[67] Russian milblogger Igor Girkin responded on April 22 that non-Wagner PMCs are not a new phenomenon. Girkin quipped that the other PMCs have much lower combat capabilities than the Wagner Group did before the Wagner Group began its assault on Bakhmut but that alternative PMC commanders are Prigozhin’s equals in all other aspects.[68]

Russian State Duma Parliamentarian Stanislav Naumov acknowledged on April 22 that Russian forces are struggling to supply soldiers with necessary components for equipment. Naumov stated that he would create a private military company (PMC) or an online “hypermarket” for military equipment to support Russian force provisioning if there were no restrictions on such activity.[69] Provisioning remains a major issue for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and soldiers often purchase elements of their own gear and medical supplies.[70] Milbloggers and volunteer groups frequently collect items such as basic equipment, vehicles, and component parts for Russian soldiers, indirectly demonstrating many shortcomings in official military logistics and supply efforts.[71]

Russian officials are likely struggling to fund benefits and support programs for Russian soldiers despite ongoing discussions about new ways to increase the appeal of military service. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published on April 21 an intercepted call from a Russian soldier in which the soldier claimed that the Russian command retroactively transfers soldiers to other units or files them as missing to avoid making cash payments for soldier injuries or deaths.[72] Russian opposition news source Mobilization News reported on April 22 that Russian recruiters removed mention of issuing microcredits from advertising booklets in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai.[73] A prominent Russian news aggregator claimed on April 21 that Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Sergey Kiriyenko met with the Defenders of the Fatherland Supervisory Board to discuss organizing social support and assistance for veterans and their families, however. The news aggregator claimed that the meeting emphasized that the fighters are the “new elite” of Russia.[74] This is likely a continuation of efforts to increase the appeal of military service and cater to the growing veteran electorate.

Russian authorities continue to illegally and indefinitely detain soldiers who refuse to fight in Ukraine. Russian opposition news sources ASTRA and Mobilization News reported on April 22 that authorities in Pakino, Vladimir Oblast are detaining 40 mobilized and contract soldiers in a military unit without a court order or initiated case.[75]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials are continuing to expand patronage networks in occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced that United Russia launched the “Our Control” project that will allow local occupation heads, representatives of public organizations, members of the LNR council, and residents to inspect infrastructure restored under patronage arrangements with Russian federal subjects.[76] Pasechnik stated that occupation officials have already carried out the first inspection in Markivskyi Raion east of Starobilsk with Voronezh Oblast specialists. The Kremlin is likely extending Russian-style corruption systems to occupied territories in Ukraine.

Russian occupation officials are continuing to announce plans for infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine. Chairman of the Kherson Oblast Occupation Government Andrey Alekseyenko claimed that Russia will start operating electric trains in May from Henichesk in southeastern Kherson Oblast to Dzhankoi in Crimea.[77] Occupation officials are reportedly planning to open additional train routes from Henichesk to Simferopol, and a railway line between Vadym station in Preobrazhenka, Kalanchak, Myrne, Armyansk, and Simferopol. Both claimed infrastructure projects are located along Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and are likely part of ongoing Russian efforts to reinstate railway connections in southern Ukraine—possibly to improve Russian logistics networks.

The Kremlin is reportedly allocating 410.7 billion rubles to sustain Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine.[78] Russian state-affiliated outlet RBK reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) will receive the largest subsidies of all occupied territories—more than 171 billion rubles.[79] Russian subsidies to DNR are larger than previous transfers to annexed Crimea in 2014.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 22 that Belarusian units that conducted training exercises in Russia on how to operate Russian-provided Iskander-M missile systems returned to Belarus.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/16128; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1649752759539728385

[2] https://t.me/rybar/46079; https://t.me/Separ13_13/10915;

[3] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?hl=ru&mid=1-_VTAZcilRrdZyF_05J8...

[4] https://t.me/RSaponkov/4860; https://t.me/DonbassYasinovatayanaliniiOgnia/38913

[5] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/822

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] https://telegra dot ph/Tolko-chestnyj-boj-nikakogo-dogovornyaka-04-14

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://t.me/dshrg2/819

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aNT3UFDtWSGYrtt6i8o...

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041623 ; https:...

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[18] https://t.me/sashakots/39423 ; https://t.me/rusbrief/111072 ; https:... ru/daily/27493.5/4752637/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[20] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/10/nachalo-voyny-raskololo-levoe-dvizhenie-v-rossii-odni-podderzhali-vtorzhenie-drugie-stali-partizanami

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr... https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223 ; https:...

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041623 ; https:...

[25] https://suspilne dot media/453363-u-timcasovo-okupovanomu-berdansku-rosiani-zahopili-rimo-katolickij-hram/

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[28] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17583783; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/04/22/72242768/ ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20524

[29] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17583783

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[31] https://t.me/readovkanews/57357 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57359 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57363 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57365 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57368 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57369; https://t.me/severrealii/16233

[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/57357 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57359 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57363 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57365 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57368 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57369; https://t.me/severrealii/16233

[33]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0214xe2LzyTEVoF4ZFrH...

[34] https://t.me/z_arhiv/20520; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83577

[35] https://t.me/wargonzo/12088; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/25840

[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[39] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1649494412118966272; https://...

[40] https://t.me/sashakots/39429 ; https://t.me/sashakots/39432 ; https:...

[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011; https://t.me/sashakots/39432 ; htt...

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011; https://t.me/sashakots/39432 ; htt...

[43] https://t.me/rusich_army/8503; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24575

[44] https://t.me/sashakots/39432

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/25840

[46] https://t.me/rybar/46115 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12088

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xtQRHCZJQX3RtFnr5...

[48]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xtQRHCZJQX3RtFnr5...

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[50] https://t.me/rybar/46137

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/12088 ; https://t.me/rybar/46137 ; https://t.m...

[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/22/okupantam-nakazuyut-ne-zabyraty-svoyih-poranenyh-iz-polya-boyu-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0214xe2LzyTEVoF4ZFrH...

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47011

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/25852

[57] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-154-iaea-director-g...

[58] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-154-iaea-director-g...

[59] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-154-iaea-director-g... https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17584671 ; https://t.me/rybar/46130; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47004; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83600

[60] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2399

[61] https://t.me/rybar/46135; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83610; https://t.m... https://t.me/readovkanews/57352; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47001; 

[62] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1012; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1012; https://t.me/vrogov/8869; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83615 

[63] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1649410463766020100; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1649801217806049280; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/16497736690804981801

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/12088

[65]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0214xe2LzyTEVoF4ZFrH...

[66] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ony-spetsyalno-delaiut-chtoby-vas-ne-vypuskat-rasskazhete-vse-chto-delaetsia-tam.html; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/6607; https://ria dot ru/20230328/voennosluzhaschie-1860941585.html; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1647061924058636294; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ne-znaiu-kuda-ykh-devat-etykh-500-potomu-chto-ykh-mnoho-seichas-von-hermanyia-velykobrytanyia-ssha-predostiaviat-tanky-y-p-pets.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?

[67]https://t.me/provokat0rka/285; https://t.me/rusbrief/111076; https://t... today/news/431904-evhenij-prihozhin-kurator-chvk-vahner-raskritikoval-minoborony-rossii.html; https://focus dot ua/uk/voennye-novosti/562209-posledniy-rezerv-prigozhin-pozhalovalsya-na-novye-chvk-v-rf-i-posetoval-o-situacii-v-vagnere

[68] https://t.me/strelkovii/4616

[69] https://t.me/stasnaumovdeputat/1157; https://m.ura dot news/news/1052643314

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[71] https://t.me/sibnovostikrsk/14244; https://t.me/Baikal_People/2210; ht... dot com/wall-210905283_14707; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1639529552329228288; https://t.me...

[72] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/on-pohyb-i-uzhe-mertvym-perevodyly-v-druhoe-podrazdelenye.html

[73] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11375

[74] https://t.me/readovkanews/57334; https://t.me/sashakots/39424

[75] https://t.me/astrapress/25330; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11354

[76] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1020

[77] https://t.me/aakherson/115

[78] https://t.me/bbcrussian/45052; https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/21/04/2023/6440f0559a7947983b98d930

[79] https://t.me/bbcrussian/45052

[80] https://t.me/modmilby/26281

 

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2. Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension


This starts with some "useful fiction," and then gets into the evolving concepts of cognitive warfare.


Excerpts:


Cognitive warfare’s underlying goal is not new. Advocates have invoked both Clausewitz’s emphasis on will as well as Sun Tzu’s praise for “winning without fighting” as early examples of the concept. What is new, however, is the specificity with which CW can be carried out.
...
Two evolving CW approaches that seem poised to integrate scale and precision are cognitive domain operations and coordinated chaos.
Cognitive domain operations (CDO) aim to use emerging and future technologies—particularly artificial intelligence (AI)—to advance battles into “the realm of the human mind.”9 Although the full scope of CDO is unclear, they appear to use neuroscience and psychology to maximize effectiveness.10 They also seem to include a supporting function: optimizing human-machine interactions to enable better decision-making.11 While the feasibility of leveraging AI to affect human cognition remains unknown, development is ongoing.
Coordinated chaos synchronizes cyber attacks and disinformation to manufacture crises and disrupt public responses.12 Its general approach is threefold: (1) long-term preparation identifies targetable individuals and networks, (2) cyber attacks raise tensions and inflame emotions, and (3) tailored messaging attempts to influence targeted individuals. Emerging research in cognitive psychology emphasizes the potential efficacy of this approach. One example is the recent discovery that feelings of confusion or frustration stimulate an individual’s curiosity while simultaneously reducing the scrutiny the person applies to new information.13 Thus, using a cyber attack to induce confusion ahead of a targeted disinformation campaign could increase disinformation consumption.
CDO and coordinated chaos each provides an adversary opportunities to generate compounding effects through multiple threat vectors. Broadly speaking, the U.S. military recognizes the growing threat these kinds of operations present, but thus far it has failed to develop an effective defensive posture. At best, the current U.S. response to CW is piecemeal, as multiple organizations and agencies pursue different approaches. Closing this gap requires reimagining the U.S. approach to cognitive warfare and understanding human cognition as offensive and defensive maneuver space—a task with which maneuver warfare can assist.


Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension

By Majors Andrew MacDonald and Ryan Ratcliffe, U.S. Marine Corps

April 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/4/1,442

usni.org · April 14, 2023

Okinawa, Japan

3 May 2025

It started when the lights went out.

The blackout began just after sunset in Naha then spread quickly throughout Okinawa. One by one, even the island’s U.S. military installations fell dark. As failures rippled through the power grid and threatened vital services, the overwhelming reaction was a mix of frustration and acceptance. Okinawans breathed a sigh of relief as the island regained power three days later, but just as normalcy seemed to be returning, residents found their digital landscape had been altered drastically.

Once connectivity was restored, trusted news websites were either inaccessible or hacked to display divisive propaganda. This discovery and mounting evidence in the power grid’s network eliminated all doubt: Okinawa was under attack. The attacker’s intended target was the U.S.-Okinawa relationship. Japanese and U.S. government officials quickly warned of the ongoing assault, but their attempt to blunt the attack inadvertently increased curiosity at a time when information was scarce. As individuals sought answers, the dearth of credible sources drove them to social media—where targeted disinformation was waiting.

In the years preceding this cyber onslaught, the attackers had studied Okinawa’s communities and human networks, attempting to “bin” residents into targetable groups to identify exploitable fissures. With this information in hand, they coordinated the blackout’s timing to induce confusion, frustration, and curiosity just as their digital offensive commenced. This multipronged attack created conditions ripe for incendiary messages to spread rapidly and reignite historical tensions.

Sensational posts quickly filled U.S. service members’ social media feeds, pushing a narrative that Okinawans resented their presence and that the island’s fragile infrastructure was unsuited to support them, their families, or their mission. In turn, Okinawans were bombarded with false reports that U.S. negligence was to blame for the outage, along with stories accusing U.S. Marines of atrocities during the blackout. Deepfake videos quickly joined the fray and drove both sides toward increasingly accusatory and aggressive postures. As this manufactured reality took hold, some targeted but unwitting individuals added to the narratives spontaneously, and social media algorithms began mixing real posts with the seemingly real. These actions all raised the volume of mis- and disinformation.

What followed was a meteoric rise in tensions that forced both Japanese and U.S. leaders to lower their expectations for the relationship: cooperation to address regional challenges slowed, dialogues to increase the number of U.S. service members in Okinawa were postponed, U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Force training schedules were reduced, and combined exercises were canceled.

What began as a seemingly benign power outage was, in fact, an integrated cyber and psychological campaign targeting a critical vulnerability in the U.S.-Japanese relationship: Okinawa. The high-water mark of relations receded as quickly as it had arrived, washing away opportunities to strengthen the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance.

Fact or Fiction?

This fictional crisis illustrates an increasing reality: To build enduring advantages, the United States must address threats and opportunities in the cognitive dimension.1 A 2022 Government Accountability Office report underscores this point. It notes that while U.S. competitors and adversaries are using technological advances to influence human cognition and offset traditional U.S. warfighting advantages, the U.S. military faces “a number of institutional challenges,” including “a lack of leadership emphasis, lack of resources, the implications of new technologies, and dated processes.”2

The United States is falling behind in confronting national security challenges at the intersection of technology and cognition. To catch up and address this emerging threat, the United States should develop and implement a concept that treats the cognitive dimension as offensive and defensive maneuver space. Doing so will require in-depth study and institutional commitment in three key areas:

• Establish a functional understanding of cognitive warfare and its potential effects.

• Explore approaches to cognitive warfare being developed by U.S. competitors and adversaries.

• Use the tenets of maneuver warfare as a framework for gaining the initiative in the cognitive dimension.

These areas are not all-encompassing, but they are crucial components of any effort to address this emerging threat. Undertaking this endeavor requires first considering what cognitive warfare is, along with how it is evolving.

Understanding Cognitive Warfare

Battlefields across the conflict continuum now reach beyond the physical and cyber domains: An individual’s cognition is now a target. Advances in cognitive psychology and information communication technology (ICT) enable actors to target individuals’ situational comprehension and will with precision.3 In light of these changes, cognitive warfare (CW) has emerged as a new war-fighting concept.

While cognitive warfare lacks a widely accepted definition, initial proposals contain at least one of three common themes:

• The intent to influence specific individuals and groups on political matters, understanding that war is a continuation of politics by other means4

• The explicit targeting of human cognition—how people perceive and interpret information to gain knowledge and understanding5

• The use of psychology and advanced technologies to target individuals or groups precisely6

To move forward, a more succinct definition of cognitive warfare may provide more precision and guide concept development: actions and activities that deliberately target individuals’ cognition to affect human will.

An Evolving Concept

Cognitive warfare’s underlying goal is not new. Advocates have invoked both Clausewitz’s emphasis on will as well as Sun Tzu’s praise for “winning without fighting” as early examples of the concept. What is new, however, is the specificity with which CW can be carried out.


An operation’s precision generally is limited to the smallest identifiable group that can be analyzed and targeted. Rudimentary capabilities previously limited CW-like operations to masses, nations, organizations, and occasionally high-priority leaders. Today, however, disruptive ICT has made identifying thousands—even millions—of specific individuals, analyzing their behaviors and traits, and targeting their cognition possible. For example, Russian actors used illegally acquired data on Americans to deploy targeted disinformation messaging and sow discord before the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This campaign offers insight into how CW is evolving: It sought to influence specific individuals within certain groups and stoke the growing divisions in American society.7 These tactics will almost certainly continue to mature.

Effective CW, however, achieves effects far beyond the scope of legacy influence operations. Actors worldwide recognize this changing landscape and are developing methods to capitalize on its opportunities. It is in this context that the United States must develop its approach to CW—defensively as well as offensively.

Manufacturing Reality

Cognitive warfare operations are growing rapidly in quantity, range, precision, and effectiveness, increasing their potential to achieve strategic success. As these capabilities grow, operations are increasingly able to evolve into complex attacks, with synchronized actions across domains achieving nonlinear effects. Current incidents demonstrate dangerous potential: Taiwan concluded China had effectively integrated disinformation and cyber attacks in response to U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.8

Two evolving CW approaches that seem poised to integrate scale and precision are cognitive domain operations and coordinated chaos.

Cognitive domain operations (CDO) aim to use emerging and future technologies—particularly artificial intelligence (AI)—to advance battles into “the realm of the human mind.”9 Although the full scope of CDO is unclear, they appear to use neuroscience and psychology to maximize effectiveness.10 They also seem to include a supporting function: optimizing human-machine interactions to enable better decision-making.11 While the feasibility of leveraging AI to affect human cognition remains unknown, development is ongoing.

Coordinated chaos synchronizes cyber attacks and disinformation to manufacture crises and disrupt public responses.12 Its general approach is threefold: (1) long-term preparation identifies targetable individuals and networks, (2) cyber attacks raise tensions and inflame emotions, and (3) tailored messaging attempts to influence targeted individuals. Emerging research in cognitive psychology emphasizes the potential efficacy of this approach. One example is the recent discovery that feelings of confusion or frustration stimulate an individual’s curiosity while simultaneously reducing the scrutiny the person applies to new information.13 Thus, using a cyber attack to induce confusion ahead of a targeted disinformation campaign could increase disinformation consumption.

CDO and coordinated chaos each provides an adversary opportunities to generate compounding effects through multiple threat vectors. Broadly speaking, the U.S. military recognizes the growing threat these kinds of operations present, but thus far it has failed to develop an effective defensive posture. At best, the current U.S. response to CW is piecemeal, as multiple organizations and agencies pursue different approaches. Closing this gap requires reimagining the U.S. approach to cognitive warfare and understanding human cognition as offensive and defensive maneuver space—a task with which maneuver warfare can assist.

Maneuver Warfare as a Framework

The Marine Corps’ seminal doctrinal publication, Warfighting, describes maneuver warfare as a warfighting philosophy that “seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion [and] create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.” To manufacture this situation, maneuver warfare synchronizes physical maneuver, fires, and mass across multiple domains while exploiting tempo.14

On the surface, this physical approach may seem incompatible with CW. In reality, maneuver warfare regards human will as the ultimate driver in war: It focuses first on creating conditions that destroy the enemy’s ability to function on the battlefield, while the ultimate goal is to shatter the enemy’s internal cohesion and will to fight. Aligning technologically advanced CW methods with the tenets of maneuver warfare enables these effects at the enemy’s base level—the individual—which degrades decision-making and the will to fight. Such an approach creates a cognitively disrupted enemy increasingly ripe for exploitation through physical maneuver.

While cognitive-enabled effects do not offer shortcuts to collapsing the enemy’s will, they are critical tools ready to be integrated with other effects in the U.S. arsenal. Through this lens, CW is another tool for conducting maneuver warfare; however, maneuver warfare also offers a framework for developing CW operations. CW is not simply targeting one group of individuals with one message. It is integrating the effects of multiple operations to create a cognitive battlespace within which the enemy cannot function or resist. As such, concepts for generating cognitive effects should look to traditional maneuver for guidance and must be thought of in similar terms: combined arms, integrating shaping, movement, deception, and mass.

The opening scenario highlights the potential efficacy of layering cognitive effects. By synchronizing the release of disinformation with the blackout, the attackers capitalized on their targets’ increased susceptibility to misinformation. But the timing also reduced U.S. and Japanese leaders’ maneuver space by denying them opportunities to reinforce their citizens’ cohesion and will. If the vignette had taken the story further, the attack could have escalated to low-level kinetic operations attributed to Okinawa opposition groups, followed by a full-scale “intervention” to restore peace on the island. Integrating cognitive maneuver with maneuver warfare has the potential to be extraordinarily effective—regardless of who holds the capabilities.

Cognitive warfare operations will take on many forms and unfold along varying timelines. Some may focus on reinforcing groups’ or individuals’ existing ideals, while others may seek to disrupt cohesion or accepted beliefs. The U.S. approach to CW, however, must uphold U.S. values. Such an approach should focus on methods that introduce truthful, impactful narratives to specific targets. This approach will be challenging, but it will be vital for the United States to preserve legitimacy in the global information space.

Seizing the Initiative

When the Marine Corps codified its maneuver warfare concept in 1989, it stated that no amount of technology or science would ever strip the human dimension from war. This remains true. While warfare has become more technologically advanced and societies more connected, the nature of war—and its dependence on human will—is steady. What has changed is the ability to target human cognition and exploit the “complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities” that characterize peoples’ behavior.15 The United States requires a concept that addresses the rapidly changing cognitive landscape. Maneuver warfare should provide the framework for that concept; however, maneuver warfare also must subsume elements of cognitive maneuver. Using these two complementary concepts, the United States will be able to employ critical emerging capabilities and develop methods to defend against them.

The time to apply the principles of maneuver warfare to the emerging concept of cognitive warfare is now—before the lights go out.

usni.org · April 14, 2023



3.  U.S. Forces Evacuate Americans From Khartoum Embassy




U.S. Forces Evacuate Americans From Khartoum Embassy

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

U.S. forces evacuated just under 100 American staff of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan yesterday, U.S. government officials said.

President Joe Biden gave the order to evacuate the embassy from the embattled country. A small number of allied diplomats were also evacuated, State Department officials said in a telephonic news conference.

The Defense Department had deployed troops and capabilities to Djibouti just in case there was an order to evacuate the embassy in Khartoum, said Army Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II, the Joint Staff's director of operations. "[Yesterday], the U.S. military evacuated those personnel in support of the State Department closing operations at the Embassy in Khartoum," Sims said. "[Yesterday] at 9 a.m. Eastern, a contingent of U.S. forces lifted off from Djibouti and landed in Ethiopia. The aircraft — including three MH-47 Chinooks refueled in Ethiopia before flying approximately three hours to Khartoum.

I am proud of the extraordinary commitment of our embassy staff, who performed their duties with courage and professionalism and embodied America's friendship and connection with the people of Sudan. I am grateful for the unmatched skill of our service members who successfully brought them to safety."

President Joe Biden

"The evacuation was conducted in one movement via rotary wing," Sims continued. "The operation was fast and clean, with service members spending less than an hour on the ground in Khartoum. As we speak, the evacuees are safe and secure."

Sims said there were just over 100 special operations personnel conducting the operation. The U.S. Marine Embassy guards were also evacuated.

"I am proud of the extraordinary commitment of our embassy staff, who performed their duties with courage and professionalism and embodied America's friendship and connection with the people of Sudan," Biden said in a written release. "I am grateful for the unmatched skill of our service members who successfully brought them to safety."

Biden also thanked the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia who aided the U.S. evacuation operation.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said the evacuation was under command of U.S. Africa Command and conducted in close coordination with the U.S. State Department. "I'm proud of our extraordinary service members who executed and supported this operation with outstanding precision and professionalism," he said.



Seal and Lectern

The Pentagon Press Briefing Room, April 1, 2020.

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Christopher Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity warfare, praised the Marines who protected and defended the embassy during the past week. "Our Marines who protect many of our embassies overseas do not often get the credit they deserve," he said. "Their courage under duress represents America as its best again in this instance."

Spotlight: U.S. Africa Command

There are still American citizens in Sudan. "In the coming days, we will continue to work with the State Department to help American citizens who may want to leave Sudan," Maier said. "One of those ways is to potentially make the overland routes out of Sudan potentially more viable. So, DOD is at present considering actions that may include use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be able to observe routes and detect threats."

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone


4. Biden says US embassy evacuation in Sudan has been completed


How will this play in Peoria?


Excerpt:


The U.S. said it had no current plans for a government-coordinated evacuation of an estimated 16,000 other Americans remaining in Sudan, calling the situation too dangerous.


Biden says US embassy evacuation in Sudan has been completed

AP · by MATTHEW LEE, TARA COPP and AAMER MADHANI · April 23, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — American forces carried out a precarious evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel in Sudan, President Joe Biden said late Saturday, calling for the end to “unconscionable” violence there as two rival leaders battled for power in the African country.

Biden thanked the U.S. troops who carried out the mission to extract American staffers in Sudan. With the last American embassy worker out, Washington shuttered the U.S. mission in Khartoum indefinitely.

The U.S. said it had no current plans for a government-coordinated evacuation of an estimated 16,000 other Americans remaining in Sudan, calling the situation too dangerous.

Biden said he was receiving regular reports from his team on efforts to assist those remaining Americans in Sudan “to the extent possible.”

The roughly 70 American staffers were airlifted from a landing zone at the embassy to an undisclosed location in Ethiopia, according to two U.S. officials familiar with the mission. U.S. troops carried out the operation as fighting between two armed Sudanese commanders —which has killed more than 400, put the nation at risk of collapse and could have consequences far beyond its borders—moved into a second week.

“I am proud of the extraordinary commitment of our Embassy staff, who performed their duties with courage and professionalism and embodied America’s friendship and connection with the people of Sudan,” Biden said in a statement. “I am grateful for the unmatched skill of our service members who successfully brought them to safety.”

Joe Biden

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Biden also thanked Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia for their help with the mission.

Biden ordered American troops to evacuate embassy personnel after receiving a recommendation earlier Saturday from his national security team with no end in sight to the fighting.

“This tragic violence in Sudan has already cost the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. It’s unconscionable and it must stop,” Biden said. “The belligerent parties must implement an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people of Sudan.”

The State Department has suspended operations at the embassy due to the dire security situation. It was not clear when the embassy might resume functioning.

“The widespread fighting has caused significant numbers of civilian deaths and injuries and damage to essential infrastructure and posed an unacceptable risk to our Embassy personnel,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement.

The fighting erupted April 15 between two factions whose leaders are vying for control over the country. The violence has included an unprovoked attack on an American diplomatic convoy and numerous incidents in which foreign diplomats and aid workers were killed, injured or assaulted.

An estimated 16,000 private U.S. citizens are registered with the embassy as being in Sudan.

Biden said he was receiving regular reports from his team on efforts to assist those remaining Americans in Sudan “to the extent possible.”

The embassy issued an alert earlier Saturday cautioning that “due to the uncertain security situation in Khartoum and closure of the airport, it is not currently safe to undertake a U.S. government-coordinated evacuation of private U.S. citizens.”

Fighting in Sudan between forces loyal to two top generals has put that nation at risk of collapse and could have consequences far beyond its borders.

The fighting, which began as Sudan attempted to transition to democracy, already has left millions trapped in urban areas, sheltering from gunfire, explosions and looters.

Army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan said Saturday he would facilitate the evacuation of American, British, Chinese and French citizens and diplomats from Sudan after speaking with the leaders of several countries that had requested help. The rival Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in a Twitter posting said it cooperated with U.S. forces.

The U.S. evacuation planning got underway in earnest on Monday after the embassy convoy was attacked in Khartoum. The Pentagon confirmed on Friday that U.S. troops were being moved to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti ahead of a possible evacuation.

Saudi Arabia announced the successful repatriation of some of its citizens on Saturday, sharing footage of Saudi nationals and other foreigners welcomed with chocolate and flowers as they stepped off an apparent evacuation ship at the Saudi port of Jeddah.

Embassy evacuations conducted by the U.S. military are relatively rare and usually take place only under extreme conditions.

When it orders an embassy to draw down staff or suspend operations, the State Department prefers to have its personnel leave on commercial transportation if that is an option. When the embassy in Kyiv temporarily closed just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022, staffers used commercial transport to leave.

However, in several other recent cases, notably in Afghanistan in 2021, conditions made commercial departures impossible or extremely hazardous. U.S. troops accompanied personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, in an overland convoy to Tunisia when they evacuated in 2014.

AP · by MATTHEW LEE, TARA COPP and AAMER MADHANI · April 23, 2023



5.  “Strategic Clarity” is a Dangerous Answer to the Taiwan Question


Excerpts:

Instead of high-profile diplomatic gestures, the United States can make Taiwan safer under current strategic ambiguity without risking conflict from highly provocative actions.
First, the United States should focus on providing Taiwan with defensive assets at a rate that keeps the PLA uncertain about its capability to invade Taiwan. These assets should be capable of reaching operational capacity in the next few years, not be easily targeted by PLA missiles, and should not be tied to airstrips or ports which will be PLA priority targets. This requires clearing existing backlogs, as well as signing deals on new smart naval mine-laying craft, smart artillery, and redundant, robust intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities across the whole range of battlespaces. Dispersing assets that mitigate missile effectiveness and Chinese intelligence gathering such as more anti-air defenses as well as shore-based anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare tools are also key parts of making Taiwan’s defense equation add up. The United States can build up credibility that it will come to Taiwan’s defense by posturing more forces capable of responding quickly and affecting conflict from outside the missile range of the Chinese mainland.
Second, there is no military solution that denies an invasion of Kinmen or Matsu. However, this has been the case for years. The islands remain Taiwanese because of astute diplomacy in maintaining the cross-strait status quo. The United States should pursue a diplomatic goal of motivating allies—particularly non-regional allies who may not otherwise willingly damage relations with the PRC—on board with sanctions against non-peaceful attempts to change the status quo. Sanctions can change the calculus of a potential invasion in a way the U.S. military power cannot.
The Taiwan Strait will remain a geopolitical flashpoint, and the United States will play a deciding factor in its direction. Sober diplomacy, smart military investment, and leadership of allies can maximize the security of Taiwan.


“Strategic Clarity” is a Dangerous Answer to the Taiwan Question

Strategic clarity is a rhetorical rather than a substantive change in U.S. policy—one which ultimately does not make Taiwan safer and may be dangerous enough to trigger a crisis by pushing the PRC to invade.

The National Interest · by Ike Barrash · April 17, 2023

The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s exercise surrounding Taiwan this past week, conducted in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, is only the latest development in an extended competition over Taiwan. The formation of the Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, and the CHIPS Act have brought to the fore a bipartisan appetite for supporting Taiwan and being tough on the PRC. Last year, the Taiwan Policy Act, reviewed by the Senate, would have provided unprecedented recognition by naming the island a “major non-NATO ally.” It is increasingly important to evaluate and discuss whether, after over forty years of intentionally ambiguous policy, an overt defense commitment—“strategic clarity”—would really make Taiwan safer.

Arguably, strategic clarity opens the door to unnecessary conflict because of two faulty assumptions. First is that, in the current status quo, Taiwan is at a high risk of being invaded. Second, that a explicit defense commitment to Taiwan will deter the PRC. The omitted possibility for fait-accompli missions targeting defenses beyond the main island of Taiwan demonstrates why strategic clarity has a high risk of destabilizing the fragile cross-strait status quo, and setting a dangerous trajectory for Sino-American relations into the future.

“Strategic Clarity” Will Not Be Clarifying

Central to understanding how strategic clarity would be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests is understanding the particular circumstances of Matsu and Kinmen islands, which lie just off the coast of the Chinese mainland but are governed by Taiwan. Their geographical location makes them a preliminary target in a PRC campaign to occupy Taiwan, and a critical factor in creating a cross-straits defense policy.


At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States found itself in a position similar to the present, with chances to clarify its security guarantees to Taiwan. The resulting 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty bound the United States to defend the main island and the Penghu (Pescadores) islands but did not clarify a position on Taiwan’s other smaller islands. When the PRC responded by attacking these, Taiwanese leadership asked for public guarantees on Kinmen and Matsu. Recognizing the calculus and context for defending these islands could easily change in the future, the United States denied these requests. Instead, private assurance was given that the United States would support the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. Three years later, the PRC’s campaign progressed with an amphibious invasion of Kinmen and Matsu, which America responded to by presenting a conventional façade, heavily reliant on the threat of nuclear escalation.

In short, while the main island stayed safe, China was undeterred by the treaty from attacking other Taiwanese holdings and bringing the world close to nuclear war, illustrating issues with clarifying the Taiwan issue. The PRC’s machinations for these islands remain and their capabilities have since substantially grown.

Since agreeing to the three joint communiqués with the PRC and the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has not taken a “clear” official position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, nor explicitly defined a policy to defend Taiwan. Switching to strategic clarity now, like in the 1950s, requires making an impossible choice over whether to include the Kinmen and Matsu islands or not. If defense commitments are clarified, but Kinmen and Matsu are not explicitly mentioned, then clarity is not achieved—this would bolster the PRC’s perception that the islands are fair game, yet an attack on the islands would still appear as a U.S. commitment failure if it did not intervene. On the other hand, including the islands in a defense commitment is even more dangerous. The Kinmen and Matsu islands remained under Taiwan in the 1950s only by the lack of PRC military capabilities—nuclear threats and deployment of the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait functioned as a checkmate which the PRC had no means of contesting. The balance of military power has since shifted dramatically.

Nuclear threats will not have the same effect against the PRC as then, especially with the latter having secured second-strike capabilities. The PRC has also ramped up production of both commercial dual-use means of transport and amphibious assault ships. Taiwan, meanwhile, has substantially reduced its forces on the islands. In a twenty-first-century crisis, conventional defense of the islands is impractical and increasingly unpopular. Kinmen and Matsu are now deep within the PRC’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) umbrella. In fact, the islands are so close that numerous drones, heavy artillery, and other short-range systems not usually evaluated as A2AD capabilities can cover the islands. In order to succeed, military operations under this umbrella require stealth, division of forces, missile defense, significant suppression of opposing fires and intelligence, and raw numbers. A lack of any of these elevates the need for others. An operation to defend Kinmen or Matsu would possess none.

Overall then, while an invasion of Taiwan would certainly be a costly endeavor for the PRC, there is no doubt even an opposed occupation of the Kinmen and Matsu islands could be achieved in short order.

Strategic Clarity Takes Peaceful Reunification off the Table

Despite the PRC’s recent sound and fury, peaceful reunification still plays a large and explicit role in PRC strategy according to President Xi Jinping. Strategically, the PRC’s current pursuit of peaceful reunification is sound. If there is a way diplomacy, propaganda, and/or coercion could still allow the PRC to peacefully unify with Taiwan, Xi would prefer to exhaust all other options in that direction before taking actions that irreversibly escalate the dispute which may lead to conflict with the United States.

To achieve peaceful unification, Kinmen and Matsu play a uniquely important role. The islands’ ties to the PRC, both economically and culturally, make them unusually close to the mainland. The PRC would rather these particularly pro-unification parts of Taiwan be leveraged as advocates for peaceful reunification, rather than crushing them by force. Invading the islands would not only deracinate the PRC connection into the Taiwanese political context, but it would also irreparably alienate the remaining Taiwanese by proving fears of CCP malintent correct. The CCP would be locked out of a peaceful strategy. Unification would remain an albatross around Xi’s neck, with the only solution being a risky full-scale invasion.

The prospects of peaceful reunification are thus predicated on the possibility that U.S. interest in Taiwan may falter, and that the PRC will be able to successfully convince Taiwan through isolation and dependency that unification is in its best interest. Partially because of this, U.S. deterrence policy has historically been tailored to deter a Taiwanese declaration of independence as much as a PRC invasion. Formal guarantees cement U.S. support, devastating the case for peaceful reunification and emboldening separatist factions in Taiwan. This would provide the PRC with its crisis justifying an invasion as per its Anti-Secession Law. The PRC’s pursuit of peaceful reunification would cease, precluding the continuation of the status quo détente.

The PRC is currently deterred from invading Kinmen and Matsu for good reason: aggression would undermine the effort and wealth the PRC has sunk toward curating an air of responsible leadership. This runs counter to a growing realization the PRC needs friends, even apologizing for interference abroad. Without a substantial shock to the system, the PRC does not have a good reason to face the serious and long-term costs of invading Kinmen or Matsu now: it would lose the possibility of peacefully reunifying, and face global condemnation even if it succeeded.

The PRC May Respond to Strategic Clarity by Invading Kinmen or Matsu

In this light, strategic clarity is dangerous because it necessitates an escalatory PRC response. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership closely follows any U.S. government move perceived as supporting Taiwanese independence and responds appropriately, with the magnitude and hostility of the response calibrated by how threatened the PRC leadership feels. One might believe it is likely PRC responses will remain in the form of signals short of war. However, the PRC has issued continual warnings that the status of Taiwan is a red line. Beyond a certain point, provocative actions taken by the United States would trigger a military response.

Worth noting is that the PRC uses crises to permanently alter the regional status quo in its favor; from expanding control in the South China Sea, to continuous patrolling of vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These actions seek to wear down and delegitimize the original threatening presence. Since the visit of a congressional delegation last August led by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi—seen by the PRC as threatening the One China policy—the PRC has taken action to intentionally weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty, commencing unprecedented military exercises around the island and continually crossing the Taiwan Strait median line with aircraft. A true change in U.S. commitment to Taiwanese sovereignty would force the PRC to take action to delegitimize that commitment. An assault on Kinmen or Matsu would be an extreme response to an extreme threat, but nonetheless consistent with PRC strategy and historical responses.

Bombastic foreign policy rhetoric obfuscates that the CCP’s greatest worries have always been internal threats. Among these, reunification is characterized as an internal issue and remains extremely salient in the mainland. In the face of slipping economic growth and unpopular zero-covid measures, the CCP was willing to emphasize Taiwan as a priority at the 20th Party Congress, positioning the issue as a goal on which leaders will be judged. A policy challenging CCP leadership would further polarize the issue, empowering hawkish voices within the Party.

There Will Be No Unprovoked Invasion of Taiwan Any Time Soon

Proponents of strategic clarity present a narrative where any day Xi Jinping may surprise the world with a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, or engage in such as a domestic diversion. It is because of this potentiality, they argue, that strategic clarity is necessary.

This position is untenable. While there are building internal frustrations, and Xi may wish he could easily invade Taiwan, the current diplomatic environment and strategy of the CCP undercuts any justification that Xi is gambling the continued existence of his government on an unprovoked and costly invasion.


Invading Taiwan would perhaps be the most difficult military operation ever. Sea conditions in the Taiwan Strait limit the window of large-scale invasion to only two small windows in April and October, and preparations for such would be transparent in the months leading up. Routes would be predictable and could be mined or ambushed by aircraft and submarines. The island itself is also highly defensible. Suitable landing areas are few and narrow, denying a massive amphibious landing necessary to leverage the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overwhelming numbers. Beaches are prone to becoming jammed with ships entering, exiting, and sinking. PLA’s massive arsenal of missiles would be severely limited by targets to attack. Moreover, Taiwan has significantly increased purchases of difficult-to-detect anti-armor, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles since 2017. The island’s mountainous and foliage-covered geography ensures that many positions would remain undetected and intact to repel incoming forces. This is to say nothing of the capabilities of the United States, Japan, and Australia, which have all indicated involvement in the event the PRC attempts an invasion, bringing the possibility of success far lower. And even if a limited or full invasion were successful, the PRC would face disastrous economic and diplomatic costs.

In short, Taiwan faces a low risk of being invaded. Only 10 percent of experts in a recent survey believed that an amphibious assault with the goal of taking Taipei was likely in the next ten years. This starkly contrasts with 64 percent of those polled believed that the PRC would respond “negatively and significantly, provoking a crisis” if the United States ended strategic ambiguity. Over 70 percent agreed that the PRC believes the United States is willing to bear at least substantial costs in a conflict over Taiwan. Current U.S. policy is already explicit: the Taiwan Relations Act contains language almost as strong as in U.S. defense treaties, and in the Three Communiques—from which the One China Policy is based—the United States exclusively ties Taiwan and peaceful settlement. In a separate poll, a majority of experts expressed that they do not approve of strategic clarity on Taiwan.

America’s position is already clear enough toward the audience that matters the most: the PRC. Why kill a policy which continues to work?

The United States Should Support Taiwan… Just Not through Strategic Clarity

Strategic clarity is a rhetorical rather than a substantive change in U.S. policy—one which ultimately does not make Taiwan safer and may be dangerous enough to trigger a crisis by pushing the PRC to invade either Kinmen, Matsu, or both. The inability of the United States to respond to a Kinmen or Matsu fait accompli—the very public idea of Taiwanese territory being captured by the PRC—would severely weaken not just Taiwan’s position, but also the perception that America can support its alliance commitments across the world.

Instead of high-profile diplomatic gestures, the United States can make Taiwan safer under current strategic ambiguity without risking conflict from highly provocative actions.

First, the United States should focus on providing Taiwan with defensive assets at a rate that keeps the PLA uncertain about its capability to invade Taiwan. These assets should be capable of reaching operational capacity in the next few years, not be easily targeted by PLA missiles, and should not be tied to airstrips or ports which will be PLA priority targets. This requires clearing existing backlogs, as well as signing deals on new smart naval mine-laying craft, smart artillery, and redundant, robust intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities across the whole range of battlespaces. Dispersing assets that mitigate missile effectiveness and Chinese intelligence gathering such as more anti-air defenses as well as shore-based anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare tools are also key parts of making Taiwan’s defense equation add up. The United States can build up credibility that it will come to Taiwan’s defense by posturing more forces capable of responding quickly and affecting conflict from outside the missile range of the Chinese mainland.

Second, there is no military solution that denies an invasion of Kinmen or Matsu. However, this has been the case for years. The islands remain Taiwanese because of astute diplomacy in maintaining the cross-strait status quo. The United States should pursue a diplomatic goal of motivating allies—particularly non-regional allies who may not otherwise willingly damage relations with the PRC—on board with sanctions against non-peaceful attempts to change the status quo. Sanctions can change the calculus of a potential invasion in a way the U.S. military power cannot.

The Taiwan Strait will remain a geopolitical flashpoint, and the United States will play a deciding factor in its direction. Sober diplomacy, smart military investment, and leadership of allies can maximize the security of Taiwan.

Ike Barrash is an independent consultant working with think tanks on Indo-Pacific security and technology. He has an MA in political science from Iowa State University and has been an intern at the Department of State, CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, and the Stimson Center’s Defense Strategy & Planning project.

Image:

The National Interest · by Ike Barrash · April 17, 2023



6. Why China Backtracked on Military Assistance to Russia and Why the Policy Will Stick


A view from New Zealand.


Excerpts:

On the issue of China’s provision of military aid to Russia, a policy of U.S. deterrence has succeeded: Beijing will continue its diplomatic and economic support for Russia, but exercise restraint on military support. The reasons for this policy continuation reflects a combination of factors: the dangers of a Chinese military commitment to Russia; a concern that military aid to Russia will trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington; and the imperative to improve China’s international image.
Short of an unlikely “fall of Putin” scenario, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military capabilities it requires. Russia, it seems, must make do with what it has.
This successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy is worth paying attention to.




Why China Backtracked on Military Assistance to Russia and Why the Policy Will Stick

This successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy is worth paying attention to.

The National Interest · by Nicholas Khoo · April 20, 2023

A major crisis in U.S.-China relations has just been averted. Speaking on April 14 at a news conference with the visiting German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang issued an assurance: “Regarding the export of military items, China adopts a prudent and responsible attitude. China will not provide weapons to relevant parties of the [Ukraine] conflict, and [will] manage and control the exports of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations.”

This episode is a textbook case of deterrence theory in action. It is a successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy to deter China from providing military aid to Russia. The Biden administration directly warned China on several occasions not to provide Russia with military assistance. And after careful and repeated consideration over slightly more than a year, China has weighed the costs and benefits and complied with the threat.

A Year of Warnings

This U.S. diplomatic success came close to failing. The recent alleged leaking of intercepted U.S. intelligence records by Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, has provided us with some insight. According to a February 23 U.S. intelligence summary of Russian “signals intelligence,” China’s Central Military Commission had “approved the incremental provision” of weapons and wanted it kept secret. Yet at some point between that date and April 14, Beijing changed its mind.


To best understand then why China opted not to arm Russia, it is necessary to highlight the critical role of a series of direct U.S. warnings to China that taken place for more than year.

The first warning occurred during National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting with Yang Jiechi, the then-Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission. According to Sullivan, “we are communicating directly, privately to Beijing that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them.”

The warning was repeated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to then-Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi at the United Nations in September 2022. A State Department readout for that meeting stated that Blinken “reiterated the United States’ condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and highlighted the implications if the PRC were to provide support to Moscow’s invasion of a sovereign state.”

A few months later, at the 2023 Munich Security Conference (taking place between February 17 and 19), Blinken repeated the message. A senior State Department official privy to the actual conversation briefed reporters that Blinken “was quite blunt in warning about the implications and consequences of China providing material support to Russia or assisting Russia with systematic sanctions evasion.”

In deterrence, threats need to be accompanied by credible assurances that, if the warning is adhered to, restraint will ensue. The readout for Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting “underscored the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between the United States and China.” Similarly, the readout of Blinken’s September 2022 meeting indicates that he conveyed to Wang that “the United States remains open to cooperating with the PRC where our interests intersect.” And at the February 18, 2023 meeting, the readout noted while “the United States will compete and will unapologetically stand up for our values and interests…we do not want conflict with the PRC and are not looking for a new Cold War. The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times.”

Observations of Chinese Behavior

Washington’s consistent warnings to Beijing seem to have worked. But will China stick with this policy? Before that can be addressed, it is worth noting two preliminary observations.

First, no embargo is watertight. A variety of factors—ranging from profit seeking by individuals employed by the Chinese state, the historically porous borders of the twenty-first century, and the role of third parties—suggest that the transfer of a non-outcome determining level of dual-use Chinese technology on the battlefield would eventually occur no matter what. Indeed, declassified information released by the Biden administration in late February 2023 demonstrates that dual-use Chinese navigation, radar, drone, and electronic communication jamming equipment has reached the Russian military. There may even be other transferred equipment, such as high-level semiconductors, which simply hasn’t been detected.

Second, China has reason to provide military aid. In Beijing’s eyes, the notion that the United States—whose own State Department figures register $35.8 billion in security aid (as of April 4, 2023) to Ukraine’s war efforts against Russia—should issue warnings to China against aiding a belligerent in a conflict that is (in Beijing’s view) of Washington’s creation is the height of hypocrisy. That said, however sympathetic Beijing may be to Moscow, Qin Gang’s statement underlines the point that China has even more compelling reasons to exercise restraint. Accordingly, as long at the Putin regime’s survival is not at stake, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military assistance necessary to turn the tide of the war.

China Will Keep Its Guns

Overall, China’s policy is determined by a political logic. As such, China’s restraint will likely continue. There are three specific political reasons for this.

First, Beijing understands the dangers of both escalation of the war in Ukraine and the risk of Chinese entanglement. Chinese policymakers are hard-headed realists who recognize the importance of balancing the competing imperatives of aiding Russia while avoiding getting involved in a conflict that attract the ire of the West and damage the pursuit of China’s own national interests.

Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine has generated highly critical internal commentary in China’s strategic studies community. Specifically, the January 12, 2023 issue of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, China’s leading official military periodical, contains rare direct criticism. That such appeared in a reputable and authoritative paper provides a window into internal Chinese views. The conclusion is clear: Chinese strategists understand that the provision of a politically untenable level of military support would be needed to change the military outcome in Ukraine in Moscow’s favour. They are also keenly aware that Chinese military support seriously risks drawing Beijing into a quagmire created by the U.S.-led NATO alliance. Accordingly, Beijing draws a clear distinction between diplomatic and economic support for Moscow on one hand, and a policy of military support on the other.

Second, providing outcome-determining military aid to Russia would inevitably trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington, jeopardizing China’s economic growth prospects. The CCP’s domestic political legitimacy, especially in the post-coronavirus pandemic era, rests on its ability to deliver a sustained return to robust economic growth, which will itself rely on continued trade with the EU and the United States. The EU and the United States were China’s top two trade partners in 2021, representing 13.7 percent and 12.5 percent of China’s trade, respectively.

But much more than trade volume is at stake. European technology is increasingly critical to the quality of China’s economic development. Following the drastic reduction in U.S. technology transfer after Washington’s move in 2017 from a policy of “engagement” to what is being called “strategic competition” with China, Beijing is depending on Europe as a reliable alternative source of technology. Military support for Moscow would jeopardize that access.

This reality explains the accommodating comments that Wang Yi—promoted to the post of Director of the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission in January 2023—made to the substantial constituency of European attendees at the Munich Security Conference in February this year. According to Wang, “we need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role Europe should play to manifest its strategic autonomy.”

Third and finally, China is intent on projecting a more positive image of itself in world politics, especially after the coronavirus pandemic. In February this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released two significant documents. The first was a systematic critique of U.S. hegemony, highlighting Washington’s alleged abuse of its power to maximize its political, military, economic, technological, and cultural interests. The second was more positive, outlining Beijing’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)—a Chinese alternative to the U.S. model of world politics. As things stand, a Chinese decision to provide military support to Russia would torpedo the GSI by causing many states to view Beijing as a facilitator of the very hegemonic behavior it critiques the United States of.

A Success for Washington

On the issue of China’s provision of military aid to Russia, a policy of U.S. deterrence has succeeded: Beijing will continue its diplomatic and economic support for Russia, but exercise restraint on military support. The reasons for this policy continuation reflects a combination of factors: the dangers of a Chinese military commitment to Russia; a concern that military aid to Russia will trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington; and the imperative to improve China’s international image.

Short of an unlikely “fall of Putin” scenario, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military capabilities it requires. Russia, it seems, must make do with what it has.

This successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy is worth paying attention to.

by

Nicholas Khoo is Associate Professor in the Politics program at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, and great power politics.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Nicholas Khoo · April 20, 2023



7. Special Operations Forces Evacuate U.S. Embassy Personnel From Sudan


Special Operations Forces Evacuate U.S. Embassy Personnel From Sudan

More than 100 troops evacuated about 70 embassy personnel and their dependents via a long-range helicopter mission due to fighting in Sudan.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

UPDATED APR 23, 2023 3:10 AM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · April 23, 2023

The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan was evacuated Saturday by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) as nine days of ongoing fighting between two rival factions presented increasing danger to the people working there and their dependents.

No one was injured in the rescue and the aircraft involved, including three Night Stalker MH-47 Chinook helicopters, took no fire either entering or leaving Khartoum, LTG D.A. Sims, Director of Operations, Joint Staff J3, told reporters, including from The War Zone, during a late night press briefing Saturday. The evacuation was ordered by U.S. President Joe Biden.

“As a result of the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the United States has temporarily suspended operations - and I want to stress temporarily suspended - operations at our embassy in Khartoum,” said Under Secretary of State for Management John Bass during a late Saturday night press conference. “The widespread fighting has caused significant civilian deaths and injuries. There’s been substantial damage to essential infrastructure, including, importantly the civilian airport in the heart of the city.”

As a result “of the intensity of the conflict, and the challenges that our diplomatic personnel were experiencing in conducting basic operations, and the uncertainty about the availability of key supplies, like fuel and food going forward, we reluctantly decided it was time to suspend operations and with tremendous support from our professional military colleagues at DOD,” said Bass. “We evacuated all of the U.S. personnel and dependents assigned to Embassy Khartoum.”

“Given that uncertain environment, the absence of any commercial air, the absence of any charter aircraft capabilities, and the absence of really feasible overland road routes to get out of the country, we concluded the only way we could do this safely for all of our diplomatic personnel was to rely on the capabilities of our military colleagues. We don't anticipate those security conditions are going to change in the near term, even though we're going to continue to do everything we can to bring this fighting to a conclusion.”

A view of the area as a fire broke out after a house was hit in the Lamab district during clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum, Sudan on April 20, 2023. (Photo by Omer Erdem/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

In all, more than 100 SOF troops took part in the rescue of fewer than 100 embassy personnel, Sims and Bass said. The Associated Press reported that about 70 people were evacuated in total. That included members of the Marine Corps Embassy Support Group Region 6, who had been guarding the embassy.

“I'd also like to take this opportunity to shine an especially appreciative light on the incredible duty carried out by the U.S. Marines who have been protecting and defending the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum,” said Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Chris Maier. “The Marines who protect many of our embassies overseas do not often get the credit they deserve. Their courage under duress represents America at its best again in this instance.”

The rescue began at 9 a.m. Eastern, when “a contingent of U.S. forces lifted off from Djibouti and landed in Ethiopia,” Sims said. “The aircraft, including three MH-47 Chinooks, refueled in Ethiopia before flying approximately three hours to Khartoum. The evacuation was conducted in one movement via rotary wing. The operation was fast and clean, with service members spending less than an hour on the ground in Khartoum. As we speak, the evacuees are safe and secure.”

The flight was about 800 miles each way, Sims said.

Though the rescue went smoothly, there was one problem, said Sims.

“We had a helicopter that was that had an issue trying to connect to fuel on the way back but they were able to remedy that and connected to the fuel with no issue and continued on,” said Sims. “We did not have one down.”

Neither Sims nor Maier said what other types of aircraft were involved in the rescue. Flight tracking sites showed that at least three U.S. Air Force MC-130s were flying over Khartoum. We reached out to the Pentagon and U.S. Air Forces in Europe-U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFE) for more details. We will update this story with any information provided.

Aircraft had been pouring into the sprawling Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for days now, with many transatlantic sorties of C-17s and special operations C-130s making their way to the outpost on the Horn of Africa where the U.S. stages many of its regional operations. With such a broad set of movements, an impending evacuation mission, or at least a major contingency force for such a mission being put into place, was abundantly clear. Any operation would have included a wide array of aerial assets beyond the MH-47s and MC-130s, including tactical platforms capable of kinetic strikes, such as fighter aircraft and AC-130 gunships, should things go awry. Many tankers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft would have also been overhead or in the general vicinity.

Though the embassy personnel were safely evacuated, many more U.S. citizens remain in Sudan as the paramilitary RSF clash with Sudanese SAF units loyal to Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s transitional governing Sovereign Council. The RSF leader, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, is also the deputy head of the Sovereign Council. With these two leaders sharing power, it had been planned that the RSF would merge with the regular army.

With those plans now in tatters, U.S. citizens remaining in the country are scrambling to leave.

To help facilitate their evacuation, the Pentagon is “considering actions that may include use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be able to observe and detect threats,” said Maier.

In addition, the Pentagon is also considering sending naval assets outside the Port of Sudan to potentially help Americans who arrived at the port, located about 415 miles northeast of Khartoum on the Red Sea. And the Pentagon is also establishing a “deconfliction cell” at the headquarters of U.S. Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany, to “focus primarily on the overland route,” Maier said.

The route from Khartoum to Port Sudan is about 415 miles. (Google Earth image)

However, getting Americans out of Sudan will be difficult.

“As a result of that uncertain security picture as a result of the unavailability of the civilian airport, we don't foresee coordinating a US government evacuation for our fellow citizens in Sudan at this time, or in the coming days,” said Bass. “However, although we we don't foresee coordinating that evacuation, we certainly continue to be in close touch with many American citizens resident in Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan, to give them our best assessment of the security environment, and to encourage them to take appropriate precautions, to the best of their ability in and around that environment.”

In a tweet earlier Saturday night, RSF claimed that “in coordination with the US forces mission consisting of 6 planes for the purpose of evacuating diplomats and their families,” it “supervised the necessary arrangements that preceded the evacuation process, confirming its full cooperation with all diplomatic missions, standing by them and providing the necessary means of protection to ensure their safe return to their countries.”

During the press conference, Bass denied that claim.

“They cooperated to the extent that they did not fire on our service members in the course of the operation,” he said. “I would submit that as much in their self interest as anything else.”

The fighting has already claimed more than 400 lives, according to The Associated Press. And, as we wrote about previously, RSF, recently claimed to have taken control of an airbase in the north of the country where Egypt has deployed MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum multirole fighter jets. Satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone shows at least one of these aircraft destroyed and it is likely that others are badly damaged or destroyed, as well.

With no end in sight to this fighting, we will monitor the situation and update this story when more developments unfold.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · April 23, 2023


8. Ukraine tightens rules on frontline reporting



Ukraine tightens rules on frontline reporting – DW – 04/21/2023

Igor Burdyga

04/21/2023April 21, 2023

Journalists covering Russia's war on Ukraine must now observe stricter rules. Media outlets say the changes violate press freedom.

DW

The Operational Commands (OC) East and South were the first in the Ukrainian army to declare the entire front line, as well as Ukraine's border a "red zone." New rules now govern the work of war reporters in these territories. They may only report freely in "green zones." "Red zones" are off limits to journalists. In "yellow zones" they are allowed to carry out their work when accompanied by an army press officer.

The exact situation in these zones is classified as "protected information" and only disclosed on a need-to-know basis. Furthermore, Ukraine wants to review all of the media accreditations it has issued over the past year. In the future, journalists who want to report on Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine will have to renew their credentials every six months.

Reporters warned about violations

The new rules were not put in place to hinder journalists, says Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for Ukraine's southern operational command. She says they were updated to ensure "proper work with respect to the security situation and the army's needs." Ukraine's army has promised to review zone status weekly, weighing the intensity of fighting and the media's desire to report on the situation on the ground.

Ilya Yevlash, head of press service for the Ukrainian army's "Khortytsia" troops — who are responsible for a large stretch of the front in Donbas — told DW that reporting from Bakhmut, for instance, is prohibited at the moment. In Kostiantynivka, some 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) away, journalists can operate, but must be accompanied by a military representative. For that reason, Yevlash says he would advise journalists to find out which cities fall into which zones.

When rules are violated the military can revoke media accreditation. That's what it did to journalists from international outlets CNN and Sky News, as well as the Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Hromadske last November. They had all reported from Kherson just after it was liberated, but did so without permission from the army's OC South. Their accreditation was later restored after foreign and domestic media organizations spoke up in protest.

The Donbas city of Bakhmut has been largely destroyed as Russia and Ukraine vie for controlImage: Adam Tactic Group/Handout/REUTERS

Criticism against new media rules at home and abroad

Ukraine's military emphasizes that media suggestions were taken into consideration when the new zone rules were drafted, and argues the new framework will "improve communication."

Still, Mediarukh (Media Movement), an association of Ukrainian and foreign news organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thinks the army's zoning concept is "too limiting" and has called on the military to "immediately normalize access for war coverage." Ukraine's National Union of Journalists (IFJ) as well as the international Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) have also called on Ukrainian authorities to rethink the new rules.

The NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) was also critical. "We find the rules exaggerated," explained RSF Germany's executive director, Christian Mihr. "They make it practically impossible to report from the front." RSF is demanding the Ukrainian government ensure journalists can continue to report on Russia's war against Ukraine firsthand.

Can Ukraine's new media rules be implemented?

A Ukrainian military source who spoke to DW on the condition of anonymity said it was unclear if the rules could even be implemented. In the yellow zones in Kherson and Mykolaiv the army did not have enough press officers to accompany journalists, said the source, so reporters have continued to work as usual there.

Spokeswoman Humeniuk emphasized that journalists in southern Ukraine could still access and report from the red zone. Yevlash, too, claimed that journalists in areas controlled by the Khortytsia troops were continuing to operate "largely as before."

War, conflict and crises put a strain on free media — at a time when they are needed most

But media representatives say that only applies to a limited number of news outlets. Now, 14 Ukrainian journalists writing for online publications and television teams on the front lines have published a statement. In it, they write that just days after learning about the plan to divide the area into different zones, they also got wind of a list of media outlets that authorities would continue to allow to report from the red zone.

Is Ukraine trying to control information?

Press liaisons from several Ukrainian army units told DW that the new media rules came from the president's office. The office, they said, wants to control communication between the military and media, especially when it comes to foreign journalists.

For its part, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has asked domestic journalists to practice restraint. "Strategic military planning and studies may only be published by three people: the president, the minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Others may only quote them. Publicly discussing the army's military plans is strictly forbidden," as Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar told Ukrainian media representatives.

The new rules came from the president's office and are an attempt to control the flow of information between the military and mediaImage: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service via REUTERS

Those who don't abide by the rules should be prepared to pay the consequences, as was the case for Anatoly Kosel. In an interview with the Washington Post, the Ukrainian battalion commander had bemoaned high death counts in his regiment and said that inexperience among recruits and lack of weapons had given him doubts in possible a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Kosel was swiftly transferred to an army training center after the article was published. The reason: He was not supposed to talk to journalists. "We are under martial law, and theoretically there should be a censor at every media outlet. The same goes for military personnel on the battlefield," said Minister for Culture and Information Policy Oleksandr Tkachenko.

DW reached out to the presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak for a statement on the Ukrainian army's communication policy. The request remains unanswered.

This article was originally written in Ukrainian

DW



9. Twitter once muzzled Russian and Chinese state propaganda. That's over now


NPR striking back over the blue check nonsense and being declared state media?


But the facts seem to be the facts below.


Graphics at the link: https://www.npr.org/2023/04/21/1171193551/twitter-once-muzzled-russian-and-chinese-state-propaganda-thats-over-now


Twitter once muzzled Russian and Chinese state propaganda. That's over now

NPR · by Dara Kerr · April 21, 2023


Under Twitter CEO Elon Musk, the company has stopped its previous practice of limiting the spread of tweets from Russian, Chinese and Iranian government media accounts. Samuel Corum/AFP via Getty Images

Dmitry Medvedev, a leading government official and former president of Russia, took to Twitter earlier this month to denigrate Ukraine in a post using language reminiscent of genocidal regimes.

And Twitter didn't stop him.

In his 645-word tweet titled, "WHY WILL UKRAINE DISAPPEAR? BECAUSE NOBODY NEEDS IT," Medvedev called Ukraine a "Nazi regime," "blood-sucking parasites" and "a threadbare quilt, torn, shaggy, and greasy."

The post garnered more than 7,000 retweets and 11,000 likes.

One response, though, asked Twitter CEO Elon Musk why he allowed Russian officials to broadcast tweets like this, especially when they used language often associated with genocide.

"All news is to some degree propaganda," Musk responded. "Let people decide for themselves."

Musk's stance of allowing Russian government posts to pop up freely on people's feeds has now become company procedure. And it's a radical departure from the so-called "shadow bans" — or in Twitter parlance "visibility filtering rules" — that were previously placed on those accounts.

NPR has confirmed this was a deliberate decision from within the company.

The previous guardrails on government accounts in Russia, China and Iran have now been removed, according to two former Twitter employees who spoke to NPR on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution.


"What I understand to have happened is, at Elon Musk's direction, Twitter's Trust and Safety Team, or what's left of it, took a chainsaw to the visibility filtering rules," said one of the former employees, who was an executive at the company.

The former executive said they learned this information by talking to current employees, former employees and people observing the situation.

Twitter applies "visibility filtering rules" to certain accounts to make sure less eyeballs see those accounts' tweets.

In the past, the company's Trust and Safety Team has used them for Russian government accounts and state-affiliated media accounts from countries "that limit access to free information." Medvedev's account was included in that cohort, according to the former employee.

Without visibility filtering, these accounts can now be more easily amplified and reach a much wider global audience. The implications could mean an increase of pro-government propaganda across Twitter and lead to real-life consequences for people who disagree with the authorities.

Taking the restraints off state-affiliated media accounts could also lead to more general disinformation on Twitter, said Sarah Cook, a senior advisor at the nonprofit Freedom House who researches China, Hong Kong and Taiwan and authored the report Beijing's Global Megaphone.


"It's not just about making the Chinese Communist Party look good. It's not just about making activists or Hong Kong-ers look bad," Cook said. "In some cases, it's also about spreading disinformation about COVID or sowing divisions within Taiwan or the United States."

Spike in engagement

Since Twitter removed the visibility filters on state-affiliated media, researchers have seen a sharp uptick in followers on many of these accounts.

The Atlantic Council, a U.S. think tank that focuses on international affairs, reviewed several accounts for NPR. In its findings, it recorded more followers and higher engagement on several government media accounts affiliated with Russia's RT (Russia Today), China's CGTN (China Global Television Network) and Iran's PressTV. Those accounts saw a marked surge starting around March 29.


Russia's English language RT account, @RT_com, saw a sharp increase in followers per day starting around March 28. The red line indicates that date. Atlantic Council

In the months prior, these accounts had been "hemorrhaging followers," the Atlantic Council said.

While not all accounts experienced a spike, the fact that several major ones from three separate governments simultaneously saw rapid gains "strongly suggests a platform-wide algorithmic change."

On April 6, several days after the uptick began, the group noticed the company's "Platform Use Guidelines" were quietly amended to remove a sentence saying "Twitter will not recommend or amplify" state-affiliated media accounts.

"This whole episode shows what happens when we cede public debate to tech companies," said Alyssa Kann, who works for the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab and reviewed the government accounts.

"When we have the public square in what is effectively one man's private billionaire playground, I think things like this can happen," she said.


China's CGTN America account, @CGTNAmerica, experienced an uptick of average followers per day beginning March 29, after a slow decline. The red line indicates that date. Atlantic Council


Iran's PressTV account, @presstv, saw a dramatic spike in followers starting March 29. The red line indicates that date. Atlantic Council

When NPR emailed Twitter for comment for this story, the company replied with its usual response to reporters—a poop emoji. Ella Irwin, Twitter's vice president of product for trust and safety, didn't respond to a request for comment.

Along with revoking the visibility filtering for government accounts, Twitter has also stopped its previous practice of letting researchers and developers freely access its data through a tool known as API. That means it's far more difficult for watchdogs to keep checks on the spread of government propaganda on the platform.


The Atlantic Council said it's now using third-party programs, but they're not as comprehensive or reliable.

Because of all the changes at Twitter, it said much of the research into state media and other government actors that had once been commonplace just isn't possible anymore.

"Until Twitter 2.0, this was kind of settled," said Graham Brookie, the Atlantic Council's vice president for tech programs. "And it was settled in a bunch of the places around the world where it really matters."

How it started... how it's going

When Twitter first launched its visibility filtering system for state-affiliated media accounts in 2020, the Trust and Safety Team consulted with various researchers and human rights groups. The way the filters worked was those accounts labeled state media wouldn't be recommended or amplified.

For example, if someone wasn't following RT and typed it into the search bar, the account wouldn't show up.

After running a controlled experiment, Twitter found the reach of Russian state media tweets decreased by 30% with the filtering. When the company began filtering Russian government accounts at the start of the Ukraine war, it saw engagement per tweet decrease by 25%.

Similarly, a 2021 report by the China Media Project found at least a 20% drop in engagement with Chinese state media accounts.

While government officials in Russia, China and Iran have Twitter accounts, access to the site is banned in those three countries. That means ordinary citizens aren't allowed to voice their opinions and experiences, which can create a lopsided flow of information where governments drown out regular people.

The visibility filtering was meant to fix some of that.

It's unclear exactly when Twitter stopped the visibility filtering, but, like the Atlantic Council, Voice of America reporter Wenhao Ma first noticed it at the end of March. He did some experiments and found Twitter was automatically recommending to him Chinese state-affiliated media accounts that he wasn't following.


Just a few days later, Twitter slapped the state-affiliated media label on NPR.

Twitter's previous policy on state-affiliated media said news organizations that receive state funding but have editorial independence "like the BBC in the UK or NPR in the US" would not be labeled. (NPR gets less than 1% of its funding from the government).

What ensued was a chaotic few days.

In an email exchange, Musk told NPR reporter Bobby Allyn that maybe that label wasn't accurate. Twitter then changed the label to "government-funded media" and also applied it to PBS and the BBC. As a result, NPR quit Twitter.

Around that time, Twitter adjusted its policy on how it defines "government-funded media" and linked to a Wikipedia page on public broadcasting as its source.

On Thursday night, that policy page disappeared from Twitter's website. As did the labels from NPR, PBS and the BBC's accounts.

Labels on Russian, Chinese and Iranian state-affiliated media also evaporated, along with the "Russia government official" label on Dmitry Medvedev's account.

"We talked to experts and researchers," said the former Twitter executive. "And now, these decisions get made because Elon Musk sees a tweet from Catturd and decides that's what Twitter is going to be like."

"It's disheartening to see labels that were built to inform people be used as a tactic to mislead," the former executive added.

Disclosure: This story was reported and written by NPR Tech Correspondent Dara Kerr and edited by Business Editor Lisa Lambert. NPR's Shannon Bond contributed to this report. Under NPR's protocol for reporting on itself, no corporate official or news executive reviewed this story before it was posted publicly.

NPR · by Dara Kerr · April 21, 2023


10. Opinion | Fox News behaved egregiously, but the settlement was good for the law


George WIll. The last of the real conservatives.


I do not want to get into the partian aspect of the case and decisions but George Will makes some important points.


Excerpts:

Tuesday’s decision by Fox News and Dominion Voting Systems to settle Dominion’s defamation suit was good for both parties. And for the law.
...
In the trial, few facts would have been in dispute, but national passions would have been engaged. It would not have been an ideal occasion for rethinking the law of defamation.



Opinion | Fox News behaved egregiously, but the settlement was good for the law

The Washington Post · by George F. Will · April 20, 2023

“I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and wouldn’t lose any voters.” — Donald Trump

Fox News could plop one of its prime time anchors at a desk in the middle of Sixth Avenue, in front of Fox’s headquarters, and the anchor could report that John Wilkes Booth killed Marilyn Monroe on the grassy knoll in Dallas’s Dealey Plaza. And Fox News would not lose its core viewers.

In recent months there has been an avalanche of evidence that Fox News thinks of its audience as akin to campus snowflakes easily triggered into trauma. And that Fox News should be their “safe space” where viewers will encounter nothing, such as news (e.g., there is no evidence for anything Trump said about 2020 voting irregularities), that might make them sad. Otherwise they might bolt to Newsmax or some other source of solace. Fox News’s robust ratings indicate that its viewers’ appetite for the preposterous exceeds their pride.

Tuesday’s decision by Fox News and Dominion Voting Systems to settle Dominion’s defamation suit was good for both parties. And for the law.

Before Fox News’s agreeing to pay Dominion $787.5 million, the voting machine company had received redundant, well-publicized vindications of its probity: Fox News never ventured onto the thin ice of arguing that it ever had even a smidgen of evidence to support what was said by the Dominion detractors — Trump lawyers and a pillow-hawking acolyte — to whom Fox News gave abundant airtime. (My Pillow’s Mike Lindell to Tucker Carlson, Jan. 26, 2021: “I have the evidence … I dare Dominion to sue me because then it will get out faster … they don’t want to talk about it.” Carlson: “No they don’t.”)

By settling, thereby avoiding a trial, Fox News was spared further dissemination of embarrassments. These include internal communications that prove two things:

First, pecuniary motives led Fox News to pander to Trump adorers who, furious that on election night the channel had correctly called Arizona for Joe Biden, were fleeing like lemmings to Newsmax, an unwavering defender of the indefensible. (Carlson to his producer: “We’re playing with fire, for real. With Trump behind it, an alternative like Newsmax could be devastating to us.”)

Second, when not toadying to Trump, some Fox News personnel were saying, in effect, that they wished that he, like the Wicked Witch of the West, would melt away. (Carlson: “I hate him passionately … He could easily destroy us if we play it wrong.”)

Fox News’s anticipated defense in a trial was to be: We were just neutrally reporting, not endorsing, newsworthy accusations of vast election fraud, accusations made by public figures. So, imagine the faces of the lawyers for Rupert Murdoch, chair of Fox Corp., when during a sworn deposition he said (as reported by the Wall Street Journal, a Murdoch property) that some of Fox News’s on-air personnel “endorsed” charges that the election had been stolen.

Earlier in his career, Murdoch said: “We’re not here to pass ourselves off as intellectuals. We’re here to give the public what they want.” Fox News, defending its practice of telling viewers what they wanted to hear about the 2020 election, could have argued: Journalistic entities do this constantly — e.g., saying particular extreme weather events are caused by climate change. Such conclusions please news consumers by ratifying their beliefs, but are scientifically indefensible. Some of Fox News’s journalistic despisers should be relieved that the trial did not occur.

In the trial, few facts would have been in dispute, but national passions would have been engaged. It would not have been an ideal occasion for rethinking the law of defamation.

It currently holds that defamation occurs when a person makes statements that show “reckless disregard” for the truth (a component of defamation), or “actual malice” (another component) in making statements known by the speaker to be false. What might look like reckless disregard for the truth might merely be indifference to it. And what might look like malice could be merely the breezy exuberance of entertainers. These distinctions (like the distinctions between “endorsing,” “amplifying,” “ratifying” and “promoting” falsehoods) are often not obvious.

Fox News could not have comfortably defended its on-air personnel as entertainers, not journalists, and innocent of defamation because they are anti-intellectual sociopaths. But any port in a storm.

Besides, Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was right: Everything is what it is, and not another thing. Regarding the election fraud claims, Fox News, citing Butler, could have argued that neither cupidity nor cowardice are synonyms for malice.

The Washington Post · by George F. Will · April 20, 2023



11. Retired Navy Officer Takes on Florida’s Book-Ban ‘Fascism’


I do not support book banning whatsoever. I also support parents' rights to choose what books their children read. However, in today's global information environment I think parents need to understand that they cannot hide their children from information that they do not like or that does not fit in with their views (or worse, the views they want their children to have)

Retired Navy Officer Takes on Florida’s Book-Ban ‘Fascism’

“I didn’t sacrifice 21 years of my life to stand idly by while religious fanatics and other fanatics try to impose fascism on my country.”

Michael Daly

Special Correspondent

Updated Apr. 22, 2023 1:25PM ET / Published Apr. 21, 2023 9:40PM ET 

The Daily Beast · April 22, 2023

Photo Illustration by Luis G. Rendon/YouTube/Getty

A retired Navy officer who was aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt on 9/11 was among the parents who spoke out against book banning at this week’s school board meeting in Martin County, Florida.

“Religious fanatics, who wouldn’t even let women be educated, flew planes into the World Trade Center and my Pentagon,” 54-year-old Wess Rexrode said. “I spent the last decade of my naval career fighting religious fascism abroad. I never thought I’d have to fight it right here in the United States of America.”

Rexrode was speaking specifically of those who used a new Florida law to have 92 books banned from the county’s public school classrooms and libraries. Books by Jodi Picoult and Toni Morrison were removed following an objection filed by a member of Moms for Liberty who had not even read them.

“I urge you to think about what a book ban means and use transparency,” Rexroad told the board on Tuesday.

As the father of a 14-year-old in middle school, he added, “I don’t need anyone else telling my son what he can and cannot read. I’m perfectly capable of doing that myself.”

He explained to the board that he had learned in his own childhood the importance of this particular freedom.

“I grew up in rural South Carolina, and books got me out of the trailer parks,” Rexrode said. “My parents trusted those educators and the librarians to let me read what I needed to read.”

Later, Rexrode told The Daily Beast that his mother had given him a set of encyclopedias for Christmas when he was 4.

“I think she paid in installments,” Rexrode said. “I just remember being happy, left alone with my encyclopedia. I was fortunate to be able to read early.”

His parents had parted ways, his father having returned from the Vietnam war what Rexrode describes as “broken.” His mother had struggled to raise him alone, managing to make the payments for the volumes that enabled her son to venture wherever his wonderings took him.

“That started a love of reading that I didn’t even know existed,” Rexrode recalled. “And then when I got into school, school was always easy for me.”

His mother remarried when he was 7 and he then had four stepsisters and stepbrothers who got him playing sports.

“Not that I was that good, but at least I played,” he recalled. “I still had my books. And I remember my mom’d drop me off at the library and leave me alone. Back then, they trusted teachers and they trusted librarians.”

He started out with books about sharks and snakes. He then ventured into fiction.

“And just that curiosity, learning new words,” he said. “And it sort of carried over into English and literature class.”

But he had not figured his life would take a trajectory other than that of a typical country boy.

“Back then, you just got outta high school and you went to work,” he recalled. “I go along and I’m in high school and I’m in the college prep classes, but it’s still not really registering with me that I was gonna go to college until I did very, very well on the SATs going into my senior year. And then I just started getting inundated by colleges. And I’m like, ‘Well, I guess I’ll go to college.’”

He added, “I didn’t really have any blueprint for how that was supposed to work, but I wound up getting pretty much a full scholarship to Clemson.”

When he arrived at Clemson, he told himself, “I’m outta my league… this is the big time.”

But, he said, “I did OK. I got an engineering degree and then that catapulted me into the nuclear navy. The Navy had a nuclear propulsion officer candidate program for, you know, science and technical majors with a certain GPA.”

“My philosophy is, ‘If something goes against my beliefs, I can’t do that.’ But increasingly we’ve seen a lot of, ‘If that goes against my beliefs, YOU can’t do that.’ And I’m sorry, but that’s not America.”

— Wess Rexrode

In the Navy, Rexrode began to add real life experiences to his virtual journeys through reading.

“You’re out of your comfort zone in your hometown where you’re surrounded by everybody and people,” he recalled. “There’s New Yorkers and there’s Californians and midwesterners and southerners and Alaskans and just everybody. And you learn to learn from different people’s backgrounds and different people’s perspectives. And you’re all sort of like in the same boat together. Literally.”

After 9/11, Rexrode was a supervisor for the crew that kept the US Theodore Roosevelt underway for 159 straight days, bringing the war to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The mission seemed to be shared by all of America.

“We were at least united then,” he recalled.

Nine years into our longest war, in January 2010, Rexrode retired. His son was 2 as Rexrode settled down in Florida and took a job in commercial nuclear power. He became a single dad after his marriage unraveled. He settled into a busy routine of work and picking his son up at school and making dinner. He read Goodnight Moon to his son at bedtime until the boy aged out of it. The boy then became more interested in gaming than in books.

“It’s a different era,” Rexrode said. “We didn’t have the internet. He has to follow his own path. I look at my job as a parent as putting up the guardrails. You can’t protect him from everything.”

Last month, Rexrode began hearing that a nationwide surge of book banning in the name of protecting children had reached Martin County.

“I started remembering what books meant to me and how they helped me,” he told The Daily Beast.

And the whole notion of deciding what other people’s kids can and cannot read seemed a manifestation of domestic fascism that is too much like what he had spent a decade combating.

“My philosophy is, ‘If something goes against my beliefs, I can’t do that,’” he said. “But increasingly we’ve seen a lot of, ‘If that goes against my beliefs, YOU can’t do that.’ And I’m sorry, but that’s not America.”

He had hoped to join other parents in speaking out against the book banning at a school board meeting on March 21, but he was delayed by his immediate parental duties. There was an overflow crowd by the time he got there.

On Tuesday, Rexrode arranged for a friend to pick up his son at school. And this time, Rexrode arrived in time to speak. He quoted Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was known as the father of the nuclear navy.

“Admiral Rickover said a questioning attitude was the key to success,” Rexrode said.

Rexrode continued, “I want my son exposed to different ideas and different viewpoints so that he can learn to think critically and not be force fed somebody else’s opinion. We’ve all been exposed to different opinions. It makes us better, makes us stronger.”

“Diversity has made me stronger. And I didn’t sacrifice 21 years of my life to stand idly by while religious fanatics and other fanatics try to impose fascism on my country,” he added.

He ended by saying “Remember the Little Rock 9,” referring to the nine Black teens who integrated an Arkansas high school in 1957.

“If those kids could endure a year of people spitting on them and hating them just to go to school, just to get an education, our kids can deal with a little uncomfortableness from Jodi Picoult or Toni Morrison.”

Rexrode allowed that he had been nervous when he stepped up to speak, although he had routinely given briefings in the Navy.

“You’re in front of a bunch of people you don’t know, but it was just like, ‘Well, if I don’t say it, who’s gonna say it?’” he said of the school board meeting.

Once he was done, he said, “I felt good. I’m like, ‘OK, I think they need to hear it.’ They had heard from a lot of teachers, obviously, and parents, but not from someone like me with my background and perspective.”

In these divided times, he had invoked the too brief unity following 9/11.

“I’m not right or left,” Rexrode told The Daily Beast. “I think for myself, and my oath was to the Constitution, not a political party. I just want what’s best for America.”

He added, “I think my patriotism and my intelligence and my work ethic and my bonafides, I guess sort of speak to themselves. So then people typically have to debate me on the facts, instead of attacking me personally, which too many times a lot of debate these days devolves into.”

But on that night, the busy life of a single dad did not allow him to stick around for any after-meeting discussion.

“I had to leave and come home and feed my kid,” he said.

The Daily Beast · April 22, 2023



12. Chinese Censorship Is Quietly Rewriting the Covid-19 Story


Not unexpected. Perhaps not difficult to do when you control all the levers of information in your country.


Recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack Chinese strategy.


This is one story exposing the strategy. There needs to be a lot more messaging on this (and related issues) to attack the strategy.



Chinese Censorship Is Quietly Rewriting the Covid-19 Story

The New York Times · by Benjamin Mueller · April 23, 2023

Under government pressure, Chinese scientists have retracted studies and withheld or deleted data. The censorship has stymied efforts to understand the virus.

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The shuttered Huanan market in Wuhan in 2021. Scientists say China has kept a tight rein on data from the market, where the first large cluster of coronavirus cases was found.Credit...Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times


By Mara Hvistendahl and

Mara Hvistendahl, an investigative reporter who has worked and reported on science inside China, and Benjamin Mueller, a health and science reporter, obtained previously unreported documents and interviewed scientists across several continents to piece together China’s censorship campaign.

April 23, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

Early in 2020, on the same day that a frightening new illness officially got the name Covid-19, a team of scientists from the United States and China released critical data showing how quickly the virus was spreading, and who was dying.

The study was cited in health warnings around the world and appeared to be a model of international collaboration in a moment of crisis.

Within days, though, the researchers quietly withdrew the paper, which was replaced online by a message telling scientists not to cite it. A few observers took note of the peculiar move, but the whole episode quickly faded amid the frenzy of the coronavirus pandemic.

What is now clear is that the study was not removed because of faulty research. Instead, it was withdrawn at the direction of Chinese health officials amid a crackdown on science. That effort kicked up a cloud of dust around the dates of early Covid cases, like those reported in the study.

“It was so hard to get any information out of China,” said one of the authors, Ira Longini, of the University of Florida, who described the back story of the removal publicly for the first time in a recent interview. “There was so much covered up, and so much hidden.”

That the Chinese government muzzled scientists, hindered international investigations and censored online discussion of the pandemic is well documented. But Beijing’s stranglehold on information goes far deeper than even many pandemic researchers are aware of. Its censorship campaign has targeted international journals and scientific databases, shaking the foundations of shared scientific knowledge, a New York Times investigation found.

Under pressure from their government, Chinese scientists have withheld data, withdrawn genetic sequences from public databases and altered crucial details in journal submissions. Western journal editors enabled those efforts by agreeing to those edits or withdrawing papers for murky reasons, a review by The Times of over a dozen retracted papers found.

Groups including the World Health Organization have given credence to muddled data and inaccurate timelines.

Checking on a man who collapsed near a hospital in Wuhan in January 2020. The chaotic early weeks of the pandemic are a focus for Chinese censors.

This scientific censorship has not universally succeeded: The original version of the February 2020 paper, for example, can still be found online with some digging. But the campaign starved doctors and policymakers of critical information about the virus at the moment the world needed it most. It bred mistrust of science in Europe and the United States, as health officials cited papers from China that were then retracted.

The crackdown continues to breed misinformation today and has hindered efforts to determine the origins of the virus.

Such censorship spilled into public view recently, when an international group of scientists discovered genetic sequence data that Chinese researchers had collected from a Wuhan market in January 2020 but withheld from foreign experts for three years — a delay that global health officials called “inexcusable.”

The sequences showed that raccoon dogs, a fox-like animal, had deposited genetic signatures in the same place that genetic material from the virus was left, a finding consistent with a scenario in which the virus spread to people from illegally traded market animals.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment. At a news conference this month, scientists from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention called such criticism “intolerable.”

It is impossible to ascribe a single motive to the crackdown. Beijing controls and shapes information as a matter of course, particularly in moments of crisis. But some of the censorship changed the timeline of early infections, a delicate topic as the government faced criticism over whether it responded to the outbreak quickly enough.

There is no evidence that the censorship is designed to conceal a specific scenario for the origins of the pandemic. Some scientists believe that Covid-19 spread naturally from animals to humans. Others argue that it may have spread from a Chinese laboratory. Both sides have pointed to censored data to support their theories.

Outside the Wuhan Institute of Virology while a World Health Organization team was visiting in February 2021. The agency’s relationship with China has drawn criticism. Credit...Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

But they have come to agree on one point: The Chinese government’s grip on science has stifled the search for truth.

“I think there’s a major political agenda that is impacting the science,” said Edward Holmes, a University of Sydney biologist who was part of the group that analyzed the sequences containing raccoon dog DNA.

Soon after the group alerted Chinese researchers to their findings, the genetic sequences temporarily disappeared from a global database. “It’s just pathetic that we’re in this stage where we’re having cloak-and-dagger conversations about deleted data,” Dr. Holmes said.

Ever-Changing Dates

For a brief moment, the coronavirus appeared to challenge China’s notoriously tough hold on information. On Feb. 6, 2020, when averting a pandemic still seemed possible, the Chinese internet lit up with the death of Li Wenliang, a Wuhan doctor who had been punished for warning about the outbreak before falling ill himself.

Anger boiled over. People sensed that officials had withheld lifesaving information. Across China, they asked: How many had caught the virus in December? Who had known? Why hadn’t more been done?

Around that time, researchers confirmed that the virus had been spreading for weeks from human to human, a fact that Chinese officials had initially dismissed.

The Chinese government reacted by tightening online censorship and wresting control of research. The censorship was piecemeal at first. The Ministry of Science and Technology told scientists to prioritize handling the outbreak, not publishing papers. One European scientist recalled his Chinese collaborators asking him to sign a nondisclosure agreement promising not to share data — on research that had already been published.

Soon, Chinese researchers were asking journals to retract their work. Journals can withdraw papers for a number of legitimate reasons, like flawed data. But a review of more than a dozen retracted papers from China shows a pattern of revising or suppressing research on early cases, conditions for medical workers and how widely the virus had spread — topics that could make the government look bad. The retracted papers reviewed by The Times had been flagged by Retraction Watch, a group that tracks withdrawn research.

Among them were a study that included infected children in southern China; a survey of depression and anxiety among Chinese medical workers who had been treating Covid-19 patients; and even a letter published in The Lancet Global Health by two nurses who described the desperation they felt while working in hospitals in Wuhan.

“Even experienced nurses may also cry,” they wrote.

Journals are typically slow to retract papers, even when they are shown to be fraudulent or unethical. But in China, the calculus is different, said Ivan Oransky, a founder of Retraction Watch. Journals that want to sell subscriptions in China or publish Chinese research often bend to the government’s demands. “Scientific publishers have really gone out of their way to placate the censorship requests,” he said.

As the virus spread, China formalized its controls. A government task force was put in charge of all coronavirus research. Officials in the eastern province of Zhejiang discussed “strengthening the management” of scientific results, records show.

Then on March 9, scientists from top Chinese laboratories published a paper about how the coronavirus might be mutating. The research appeared in Clinical Infectious Diseases, a prestigious journal published by Oxford University Press.

The topic was seemingly apolitical, but it relied on samples collected from patients in Wuhan starting in mid-December 2019. That added to evidence that the virus was spreading widely before the Chinese government took action.

In a hospital in Wuhan in January 2020. A letter about the stress of nursing in Wuhan was pulled from a scientific journal.

The paper landed just as the government formalized its censorship policy. The following day, China’s Ministry of Education ordered universities to submit research topics to the government task force for approval, according to a directive posted on a university’s website.

Those who did not vet their scientific projects or who caused “serious adverse social impacts” would be punished, the directive said.

The move sent a chill through Chinese science. Schools tightened restrictions on faculty media interviews and instructed professors to comply with the directive, university notices show.

The journal retractions continued, and for unusual reasons.

One group of authors noted that “our data is not perfect enough.” Another warned that its paper “cannot be used as the basis for the origin and evolution of SARS-CoV-2.” A third said its findings were “incomplete and not ready for publication.” Several scientists promised in retraction notices to update their findings but never did.

Because Chinese scientists have been muzzled, it is difficult to neatly distinguish between censored papers and those retracted for legitimate scientific reasons.

The censorship helped the government tell a story.

“China emerged from the pandemic as an early winner,” said Yanzhong Huang, a global health expert at Seton Hall University. “They started to present a new narrative on the outbreak, in terms of not just the origin, but also in terms of the government’s role in responding to the pandemic.”

Two months after posting the paper on coronavirus mutations, Clinical Infectious Diseases published an update. The new version said that the Wuhan samples were not collected in December after all, but weeks later, in January.

The paper’s corresponding author, Li Mingkun of the Beijing Institute of Genomics, did not respond to requests for comment.

After Jesse Bloom of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle tweeted about the discrepancy, the journal’s editors posted a third version of the paper, adding yet another timeline. This revision says the samples were collected between Dec. 30 and Jan. 1.

A correction merely says that the previous dates had been “unclear.”

In an email to The Times, the journal editors said the correction was “the most appropriate approach to clarify the scientific record.”

An Origin Mystery

Chinese scientists ignored requests for years to release information about swabs taken from surfaces at the Wuhan market. That refusal has hindered efforts to determine how the pandemic began.

Dr. Holmes, the University of Sydney biologist, said that as far back as two years ago, he stressed to Chinese researchers the importance of those samples. He even sent them a raccoon dog genome sequence, hoping they would compare it with samples from the market. The researchers did not make the data public until this year.

The World Health Organization, the supposed repository for reliable information about the virus, has only added to confusion about the pandemic’s origins. After errors were found in a major March 2021 report from the organization and China, an agency spokesman, Tarik Jasarevic, promised that officials would correct the mistakes.

Two years later, they have not. The flawed report remains online, painting an inaccurate timeline of the earliest known cases. Mr. Jasarevic now refers questions about the report to the scientists who prepared it.

“That’s a deep and in many ways unforgivable mystery, when the data were demonstrated to be false,” said Lawrence Gostin, the faculty director of Georgetown University’s O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law and a longtime W.H.O. adviser. “It either shows that W.H.O. wasn’t insistent enough with China, or that China simply didn’t cooperate.”

Some scientists have become similarly suspicious that China’s censorship has affected the genetic databases that underpin worldwide research.

Dr. Bloom, the Seattle evolutionary virologist, was poring over tables in a scientific paper in June 2021 when he discovered that dozens of gene sequences had been deleted from the Sequence Read Archive, a U.S. government database. The sequences, from early 2020, had been submitted by scientists from Wuhan University. But they had curiously vanished.

The U.S. government’s National Library of Medicine, which manages the database, said at the time that the Wuhan researchers had asked that the sequences be withdrawn — and implied that it was the only instance during the pandemic in which data was removed at the request of scientists in China.

But a March 2022 review by an outside consultant showed that the scientists withdrew another, unrelated sequence on the same day. After Dr. Bloom published a paper about the deleted Wuhan University sequences, they reappeared online — but most had been moved to a database affiliated with the Chinese government.

This controversy and the recent dust-up over the discovered-then-deleted-then-recovered raccoon dog DNA from a separate database have prompted calls for transparency from these genetic archives.

A building of Wuhan University in 2020. Chinese scientists have been urged to publish at home, rather than in international journals.Credit...Roman Pilipey/EPA, via Shutterstock

Virginie Courtier-Orgogozo, an evolutionary biologist at the French National Center for Scientific Research, said all pandemic-related sequences should be released to global health experts, particularly from early samples. “Among people who were sick in December, we have less than 20 sequences,” she said. (The National Library of Medicine said that sharing withdrawn data was against its policy.)

The Chinese government’s grip on science continues.

The laboratory of a Chinese scientist who studies the wildlife trade was recently shuttered while the authorities investigated unfounded concerns that its research related to the origins of the pandemic, according to a scientist outside China who collaborated on the work.

On April 1, Beijing limited foreign access to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure, an academic portal, curtailing insight into research there. Leaders have urged Chinese scientists to publish in domestic journals rather than international publications.

And this month, Chinese government scientists said it was time to start investigating outside China for the virus’s origins.

It was a nod to the widely refuted claim that the pandemic began somewhere else.

Vivian Wang contributed reporting from Beijing.

The New York Times · by Benjamin Mueller · April 23, 2023



13. These celebrities ‘subscribed to Twitter Blue.’ Except they’re dead.



Twitter. Such a credible platform and company now.


You can only shake your head and wonder about Elon Musk.


These celebrities ‘subscribed to Twitter Blue.’ Except they’re dead.

The Washington Post · by Annabelle Timsit · April 23, 2023

Chadwick Boseman, Kobe Bryant and Anthony Bourdain are the latest celebrities to be verified under Twitter Blue, the social media platform’s paid-subscription service that allows anyone to get a blue check mark by their display name if they pay $8 a month and confirm their phone number.

Except the actor, athlete and celebrity chef died years ago, before Twitter Blue even existed.

Their accounts — and those of at least a dozen other dead celebrities — now feature a blue check, which, if hovered over, displays the message: “This account is verified because they are subscribed to Twitter Blue and verified their phone number.”

Twitter Blue first launched in 2021 as an opt-in service providing special perks for users, like the ability to “undo” tweets, for about $3 a month. It has evolved since Elon Musk bought the company in October and was recently relaunched at a higher price point with new features.

It wasn’t clear whether someone paid for Twitter Blue on the celebrities’ behalf and gave a phone number. Many of the profiles haven’t been active since these people died, and others are being actively managed. Twitter did not respond to a request for comment early Sunday.

The platform began removing blue checks from “legacy” verified accounts on Thursday, in a bid to end what Musk has called the platform’s “lords & peasants system.” The check marks were previously given free to certain public figures and were meant to signal that Twitter had verified the authenticity of the account.

Now, the blue check marks are available to anyone for purchase. Twitter’s Help Center specifies that accounts that get the check mark as part of their Twitter Blue subscription “will not undergo review to confirm that they meet the active, notable and authentic criteria that was used in the previous process.” Experts have warned that this could increase the risk of impersonation and accelerate the spread of misinformation on Twitter.

The pivot to the new system has not been smooth. Some celebrities with large followings whose profiles still feature the check mark claimed they never paid for Twitter Blue. Musk said he personally paid for the subscriptions of at least three celebrities; one of them, the author Stephen King, later tweeted that Musk “should give my blue check to charity.”

Several high-profile people who said they had automatically gotten Twitter Blue complained that the check mark, previously a status symbol, now felt like a reprimand.

“wait I’m crying they’re giving them for punishment now !!?!!” tweeted model and television personality Chrissy Teigen. When Jon Favreau, co-host of the left-wing political podcast “Pod Save America,” bemoaned getting the emoji, Teigen advised him that changing his account handle would make the check mark disappear.

Among the deceased public figures listed Sunday as Twitter Blue subscribers were performers Michael Jackson, who died in 2009, and Malcolm James McCormick, known professionally as Mac Miller, who died in 2018, as well as John McCain, the Republican senator from Arizona who also died in 2018. Actress Kirstie Alley, TV news anchor Barbara Walters and Linkin Park singer Chester Bennington, all of whom have died, also had blue check marks.

Twitter users reacted with shock and anger, with some arguing that the platform bestowing the symbol on the accounts — if that is what happened — looked desperate and could be perceived as a tacit endorsement of the company from someone maintaining the account of a deceased celebrity. Some questioned whether the move could violate laws prohibiting the false insinuation that someone has endorsed a product or service.

The privately-held Twitter corporation is claiming that @chadwickboseman and @normmacdonald, who died in 2020 and 2021 respectively, have paid for the subscription check mark service and supplied their phone numbers. pic.twitter.com/fjCQEhf6O8
— southpaw (@nycsouthpaw) April 22, 2023

Many pointed to the blue check mark on the account of Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist who was assassinated in 2018, in what U.S. intelligence agencies say was a hit ordered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

“This is obscene,” said Mohamad Bazzi, an associate professor of journalism at New York University.

“Jamal Khashoggi deserves better,” said Manisha Ganguly, an investigations correspondent for the Guardian.

The Washington Post · by Annabelle Timsit · April 23, 2023




14. Ukraine Gears Up to Hit Russians—and Show West It Can Win




Ukraine Gears Up to Hit Russians—and Show West It Can Win

In looming offensive, Kyiv will want Western backers to see it can maintain pressure on Moscow’s forces


By Daniel MichaelsFollow

 and James MarsonFollow

April 23, 2023 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-gears-up-to-hit-russiansand-show-west-it-can-win-89c43105?mod=hp_lead_pos9



KYIV, Ukraine—Ukraine’s armed forces are preparing for one of the most daunting undertakings any military can attempt: dislodging an entrenched enemy.

Kyiv’s forces achieved that last fall, but haven’t advanced since. Now their challenge in attacking dug-in Russian forces is even greater because, given the pace of Western arms shipments, its troops are less well-armed than their leaders would like.


“The stakes are high,” said Mark Kimmitt, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general who commanded artillery units. “With little battlefield progress and declining attention worldwide, the Ukrainians must break out of the current stalemate or face increased calls for a cease-fire and negotiations.”

But if Ukraine’s army can beat back gains by Russia’s invasion forces and position itself for further advances, it will regain the initiative, boost civilian morale, and win further support and military assistance from the U.S. and its allies.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and others have talked extensively about the looming campaign to push Russian troops from the 18% of the country they control, but its timing, location and shape remain closely guarded secrets—and may even not have been decided yet. Strategists observing the preparations say they expect the push in May or June.

How the assault unrolls will be determined by a limited number of variables, say Ukrainian officials. “The counteroffensive is a concrete mathematical calculation,” said presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak in an interview.

Three factors dominate plans, he said: The availability of equipment and troops, and the destruction of Russian assets before a large-scale operation. “The main result is a breakthrough of the defensive line, in any of the directions” Ukrainian forces push, Mr. Podolyak said.


A Ukrainian service member in the front-line town of Bakhmut, in Donetsk region, Ukraine. Photo: Anna Kudriavtseva/REUTERS


A local resident walks pasts craters to his partially destroyed house in the town of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region. Photo: Anatolii Stepanov/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Ukraine’s supplies of equipment and troops are improving as deliveries of Western equipment increase and soldiers trained in Western Europe return home.

In recent days, Ukraine and its allies have posted images of newly arrived Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the U.S. and French AMX-10 infantry fighting vehicles. Others have announced additional commitments of equipment, including more German-made Leopard tanks.

But their numbers still fall short of what Mr. Zelensky and his team have requested for months.

Since Ukraine won’t have an overwhelmingly superior force in assaulting Russia’s defensive lines, it is likely to employ a mix of deception, complexity and speed, say strategists. The goal will be to undermine Russia’s ability to repel attacking Ukrainian forces.

“The Ukrainians have a lot of choices of when to attack, whether to go in one big bang or several punches, and on sequencing,” said Ben Barry, a former commander of a British armored infantry battalion now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in London. 

Ukrainians could also feint in one place and attack in another, as they did last summer when Kyiv talked up an assault on the occupied city of Kherson but then hit Russian troops on the other side of the country in the Kharkiv region, he said. Only later did they liberate Kherson.

“Surprise is the most important element,” said Mr. Kimmitt. “It is important to ensure Russians cannot mass a strong defense along the line of attack, nor quickly react to a Ukrainian penetration.”

Before Ukrainian military vehicles start rolling, Kyiv will seek to disrupt and destabilize Russian defenders in what planners call shaping operations. These can include long-range strikes on radar installations, antiaircraft batteries and logistics hubs, or potentially diversionary tactics to prompt Russia to shift assets.

Before D-Day in World War II, the Allies created a fake invasion force in southeast England, including inflatable tanks, to trick Nazi commanders into diverting defensive resources.


Lines of German-made Leopard 1 tanks and Austrian-made SK-105 Kuerassier light tanks at a hangar in Tournai, Belgium. Photo: Valeria Mongelli/Bloomberg News

Ukraine in recent weeks has ramped up attacks on Russian electronic-warfare and radar systems, according to open-source intelligence group Molfar. The group found that similar increases preceded Ukrainian pushes in September and last March.

Ivan Fedorov, the exiled Ukrainian mayor of occupied Melitopol, said earlier this month that strikes in and around the city had intensified in the past two weeks, hitting 15 military targets, including an airfield and a train depot.

When attacks begin, an initial question for Ukrainian commanders is where to strike. Russians are entrenched in the eastern Donbas region and along the southeast, in what Moscow calls a land bridge connecting its own territory to the Crimean Peninsula, which it seized from Ukraine in 2014.

Ukrainian forces could stage multiple attacks, which would offer greater chances of finding a weak spot in Russia’s defenses, but would require greater coordination of forces than a single, massed attack. Coordination will be vital because Kyiv has limited numbers of trained troops and equipment to deploy. It won’t want to spread them too thin along roughly 530 miles of active front line. 

Once Ukrainian ground troops start moving, they will attempt to breach Russian defenses. Russia has had almost a year in many places to dig trenches, erect barriers and fortify structures. In parts of Ukraine it has occupied since 2014, those defenses are even more extensive. Recent satellite imagery shows lines of physical defenses designed to slow or halt Kyiv’s troops.

If Ukrainian forces achieve an incursion, they will seek to quickly pull reinforcements behind them to secure the breach and fan out. The next step is to find and destroy Russian air defenses, radar installations, ammunition supplies and control centers, with the goal of controlling and retaking even more territory.

A big unknown is how well Russia will defend its lines. While it has invested heavily in obstacles and probably prepared secure firing positions from which to hit Ukrainian forces attempting crossings, nobody knows how resolutely the Russian forces will man those defenses under Ukrainian attack. 


Ukrainian soldiers at the front line near Bakhmut. Photo: Roman Chop/Associated Press


A Ukrainian rocket launcher fires toward Russian positions on the front line in Donetsk region. Photo: ANATOLII STEPANOV/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“Obstacles are not obstacles unless they’re covered by fire,” said Scott Boston, a senior defense analyst at Rand Corp. He noted that Russia’s mobilization of troops last year means it has a greater number of soldiers manning positions in Ukraine now than it did in Kharkiv.

“In Kharkiv, the Russians didn’t have sufficient forces and it became a rout,” he said. Now, “they may not be the best trained or coordinated troops, but they’re there.”

Kyiv will also likely hold a significant proportion of its forces in reserve to reinforce a breach or repel a Russian counterattack.

How Ukraine orchestrates local tactics to achieve its strategy of evicting Russian forces is a complex organizational undertaking known as operational art. Ukraine’s Western allies have been training its troops and commanders in large-formation maneuvers that they hope will allow them to outflank Russian forces, which have been slow to react throughout the war.

Britain’s Ministry of Defense recently posted footage of emotional farewells to Ukrainian troops that had trained there, part of 10,000 the U.K. is hastily preparing for battle. Others are undergoing high-speed instruction in Poland and Germany.

Nimbleness and coordination on the battlefield will also be vital because any initial Ukrainian success will need to be exploited quickly, before Russia can respond and before Ukraine’s own logistical limits impede progress.

“You’ve got to maintain momentum,” said Benjamin Jensen, a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Va.

In an operation involving dozens or hundreds of tanks and other vehicles, coordination isn’t the only challenge. Heavy military equipment needs frequent support and maintenance. “You’ve only got about 72 hours before they start breaking,” Mr. Jensen said.


Ukrainian military recruits during a training exercise conducted by Norwegian army personnel in the north of England. Photo: Hollie Adams/Bloomberg News

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com



15. Unprepared for long war, US Army under gun to make more ammo




Unprepared for long war, US Army under gun to make more ammo

BY MARC LEVY, ASSOCIATED PRESS - 04/23/23 1:03 AM ET

The Hill  · April 23, 2023

SCRANTON, Pa. (AP) — One of the most important munitions of the Ukraine war comes from a historic factory in this city built by coal barons, where tons of steel rods are brought in by train to be forged into the artillery shells Kyiv can’t get enough of — and that the U.S. can’t produce fast enough.

The Scranton Army Ammunition Plant is at the vanguard of a multibillion-dollar Pentagon plan to modernize and accelerate its production of ammunition and equipment not only to support Ukraine, but to be ready for a potential conflict with China.

But it is one of just two sites in the U.S. that make the steel bodies for the critical 155 mm howitzer rounds that the U.S. is rushing to Ukraine to help in its grinding fight to repel the Russian invasion in the largest-scale war in Europe since World War II.

The invasion of Ukraine revealed that the U.S. stockpile of 155 mm shells and those of European allies were unprepared to support a major and ongoing conventional land war, sending them scrambling to bolster production. The dwindling supply has alarmed U.S. military planners, and the Army now plans to spend billions on munitions plants around the country in what it calls its most significant transformation in 40 years.

It may not be easy to adapt: practically every square foot of the Scranton plant’s red brick factory buildings — first constructed more than a century ago as a locomotive repair depot — is in use as the Army clears space, expands production to private factories and assembles new supply chains.

There are some things that Army and plant officials in Scranton won’t reveal, including where they get the steel for the shells and exactly how many more rounds this factory can produce.

“That’s what Russia wants to know,” said Justine Barati of the U.S. Army’s Joint Munitions Command.

So far, the U.S. has provided more than $35 billion in weapons and equipment to Ukraine.

The 155 mm shell is one of the most often-requested and supplied items, which also include air defense systems, long-range missiles and tanks.

The rounds, used in howitzer systems, are critical to Ukraine’s fight because they allow the Ukrainians to hit Russian targets up to 20 miles (32 kilometers) away with a highly explosive munition.

“Unfortunately, we understand that the production is very limited and it’s been more than a year of war,” Ukraine parliamentary member Oleksandra Ustinova said at a German Marshall Fund media roundtable in Washington on Monday. “But unfortunately we are very dependent on 155.”

The Army is spending about $1.5 billion to ramp up production of 155 mm rounds from 14,000 a month before Russia invaded Ukraine to over 85,000 a month by 2028, U.S. Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo told a symposium last month.

Already, the U.S. military has given Ukraine more than 1.5 million rounds of 155 mm ammunition, according to Army figures.

But even with higher near-term production rates, the U.S. cannot replenish its stockpile or catch up to the usage pace in Ukraine, where officials estimate that the Ukrainian military is firing 6,000 to 8,000 shells per day. In other words, two days’ worth of shells fired by Ukraine equates to the United States’ monthly pre-war production figure.

“This could become a crisis. With the front line now mostly stationary, artillery has become the most important combat arm,” said a January report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Currently, the metal bodies for the 155 mm shells are made at the Army’s Scranton plant, operated by General Dynamics, and at a General Dynamics-owned plant in nearby Wilkes-Barre, officials say.

Together, the plants are under contract for 24,000 shells per month, with an additional $217 million Army task order to further boost production, although officials won’t say how many more 155 mm shells are sought by the task order.

The Russians are firing 40,000 shells per day, said Ustinova, who serves on Ukraine’s wartime oversight committee.

“So we’re doing five times less than they do and trying to keep it up. But if we don’t start the production lines, if you don’t warm it up, it is going to be a huge problem,” Ustinova said.

The obstacles the U.S. faces in ramping up production can be seen at the Scranton plant.

The factory — built for the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad just after 1900, when the city was a rising coal and railroad powerhouse — has produced large-caliber ammunition for the military going back to the Korean War.

But the buildings are on the National Historic Registry of Historic Places, limiting how the Army can alter the structures.

Inside, the floor is crowded with piles of shells, defunct equipment and production lines where robotic arms, saws, presses and other machines cut, heat, forge, temper, pressure test, wash and paint the shells.

The plant is in the midst of $120 million in modernization plans and the Army hopes to open a new production line there by 2025.

Still, clearing space for it has been a complicated task while the military adds newer machinery to make existing lines more efficient.

“There’s a lot going on,” said Richard Hansen, the Army commander’s representative at the plant.

Meanwhile, the Army is expanding supply chains for parts — metal shells, explosive fill, charges that shoot the shell and fuses — and buying the massive machines that do the work.

The Army has new contracts with plants in Texas and Canada to make 155 mm shells, said Douglas Bush, an assistant Army secretary and its chief weapons buyer. The U.S. is also looking overseas to allies to expand production, Bush said.

Once the shells are finished in Scranton, they are shipped to the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, where they are packed with explosives, fitted with fuses and packaged for final delivery.

The Scranton plant is ill-suited for that task: an accident with an explosive could be devastating.

“If we had a mishap here,” Hansen said, “we take half of the city with us.”

__

Associated Press writers Tara Copp and Nomaan Merchant in Washington contributed to this report.

___

Follow Marc Levy on Twitter: https://twitter.com/timelywriter

___

Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

The Hill · by Julia Shapero · April 23, 2023



16. US denies paramilitary group’s claim it helped evacuate Americans from Sudan


I am not familiar with the "RSF." 


Excerpt:


The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, which has been locked in intense fighting with the Sudanese military, said it helped coordinate the evacuation of U.S. personnel, a claim that the Department of State rejected.


US denies paramilitary group’s claim it helped evacuate Americans from Sudan

The Hill · by Stephen Neukam · April 23, 2023

The U.S. refuted a claim from the paramilitary group fighting the Sudanese military that it helped evacuate U.S. personnel from the country over the weekend, after Americans were airlifted from the capital city of Khartoum.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, which has been locked in intense fighting with the Sudanese military, said it helped coordinate the evacuation of U.S. personnel, a claim that the Department of State rejected.

“You may have seen some assertions in social media in recent hours, that the Rapid Security Forces somehow coordinated with us and supported this operation. That was not the case,” said Under Secretary of State for Management John Bass.

“They cooperated to the extent that they did not fire on our service members in the course of the operation,” Bass added.

The rebuttal comes after Secretary of State Antony Blinken said over the weekend that operations at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, the country’s capital, were being suspended. The decision to airlift American personnel out of the country comes as fighting between the RSF and the Sudanese military has killed over 400 people, including an American citizen, as the forces jockey for control of the city.

The two groups joined to orchestrate a coup of the government in 2021. Now, the once-allied sides have descended into battle.

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International partners, including the U.S., have called on the sides to stop the fighting immediately. There was a temporary three-day truce for the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, but the fighting appeared to have continued.

“We agreed it was essential for the parties to immediately end hostilities without pre-condition,” Blinken said in a statement last weekend after speaking with top diplomats from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two countries with considerable interests in Sudan.

French leadership also said Sunday it was planning the evacuation of its embassy staff, citizens and the citizens of its allies from Sudan.

The Hill · by Stephen Neukam · April 23, 2023



17. China’s proxy war against faith


More for potential themes and messages. Given our religious freedoms and our constitutional separation of church and state, Chinese leaders probably think it is too difficult for the US to compete in this space. But they would be wrong. We can, should, and must compete in this space.


Excerpts:


The CCP model removes religion from the lives of citizens. People of active faiths are viewed as obstacles to state control and the most significant internal threat to continued communist domination. If religious practices are to be allowed at all, they must be tightly monitored and reconfigured to support the government.
This isn’t freedom of religion—it is the worship of the state as the supreme being. We must sound the alarm to all people and, particularly, to people of faith around the world, that this is what Chinese Communist influenced leadership will look like in their own countries if they don’t start pushing back now.


China’s proxy war against faith

BY SAM BROWNBACK AND ERICA LIZZA, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 04/23/23 5:00 PM ET

The Hill · · April 23, 2023

China’s growing influence provides a model for those who seek to repress religious institutions

On March 24, Honduras became the latest Latin American country to switch its allegiance from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. Costa Rica ended its diplomatic ties with Taiwan back in 2007, while Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic all severed ties and entered relationships with China in 2017 and 2018. And Nicaragua, under the leadership of Daniel Ortega, has had an on and off relationship with China dating back to Ortega’s role on the governing Sandinista junta in the 1980s. Nicaragua officially broke ties with Taiwan and began its embrace of China in December 2021, shortly after Ortega was reelected to his fourth consecutive term in an election that was widely considered fraudulent. Most recently, the Ortega government has launched a campaign against the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, resulting in the abduction, sham trial, and imprisonment of Bishop Rolando Álvarez, the expulsion of the Missionaries of Charity and other Catholic organizations, and the closure of two Catholic universities. The government has also banned and repressed traditional public processions including the Way of the Cross and Los Cirineos, a tradition which commemorates the role of Simon the Cyrenian, who helped Jesus Christ carry the cross to Calvary.

Through strategic investment and infrastructure deals with developing nations including the Latin American examples listed, China has managed to sway Taiwanese allies, create a network of states reliant on Chinese funding, and has exported its model of authoritarian responses to dissent to wannabe dictators. China’s Belt and Road Initiative seeks to remake the old connections of the Silk Road under the Chinese empire with a modern network of global infrastructure that expands the People’s Republic of China’s commercial and geopolitical power. By funding projects such as railways, airports and energy pipelines, the Chinese government has expanded its geopolitical footprint, created special economic zones associated with the projects and established a network of developing countries which are economically indebted to it.

Much of the analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative has focused on its impacts in sub-Saharan Africa, where several countries have faced debt crises as a result of the infrastructure projects. But an underappreciated impact of the Belt and Road Initiative and significant economic ties with China is the potential for Chinese government influence in the human rights realm, including in regards to religious freedom.

China’s own track record of religious oppression and persecution remains one of the most abhorrent worldwide, with significant signs of deteriorating. While the Chinese Communist Party maintains official atheism, it recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. As detailed in the 2022 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Report, China engages in widespread persecution of various religious groups, most notably the genocide which has involved the detention, torture, and killings of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang province. Former detainees described experiencing widespread torture, sexual violence, and forced sterilization and abortion at the hands of camp officials. The atrocities committed against Uyghurs are just the most extreme example of the Chinese government’s compelled “sinicization” of minority religions, especially those associated with minority ethnic groups such as Uyghurs, Hui, or Tibetans.

Since the Chinese Communist Party’s takeover, Tibetan Buddhists have faced violent oppression of their religious heritage and practices, including the destruction of most monasteries, restrictions on monks and nuns and the exile of the Dalai Lama. Yet outside of Tibet, China has sought to redefine Buddhism as an inherently Chinese religion and increased its support for a sinicized, nationalized Buddhism under its government supervisory body, the Buddhist Association of China. Unrecognized Buddhist communities continue to suffer as the Chinese promotes its own version of Buddhism to make inroads with its southeast Asian neighbors.

Christians too face government oppression and co-optation. Chinese Christians are only permitted to join Christian organizations regulated by government supervisory entities, such as the Catholic Patriotic Church, China Christian Council, and the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement, all of which reinterpret religious beliefs in light of CCP doctrines and priorities. Due to this interference, a significant number of Christians in China belong to illegal underground churches. In the last year, the government demolished or closed several house churches and meeting sites, and a Catholic app was suspended in a push to eliminate online religious content.

Children in China are prohibited from entering houses of worship or being raised in a religion. In Wenzhou, which has a significant Christian population, parents of kindergarteners have recently been required to pledge not to hold or profess any religious beliefs or participate in religious activities.

The government has also continued to persecute and prosecute adherents of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement which fuses traditional Chinese practices and new age beliefs, under a statute characterizing unrecognized religions as cults. Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners have been subjected to a campaign of surveillance, arbitrary detention, and forced re-education programs. The labor camps and prisons which house them are alleged to have engaged in torture, extrajudicial killing, and organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners.

The Chinese government’s repression and restriction of religious groups is designed to quash potential opposition to the regime and to eliminate alternate sources of meaning beyond the CCP’s national communist agenda. As China expands its geopolitical and cultural Influence, it also has the potential to export its model of religious oppression to aspiring autocrats looking to eliminate dissent, as in the case of Nicaragua. Institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS have facilitated China’s power projection and economic influence. Notably, Chinese companies and their subsidiaries have also used these blocs to promote local demand for export of surveillance technology. This practice is ostensibly targeted at reducing crime and ensuring public safety in countries which receive surveillance technology, many of which are located in the Global South. Yet it serves not only to legitimate China’s own all-encompassing surveillance state but also to endow emerging states with an increased capacity for monitoring potential dissidents.

Through an increasing network of diplomatic recognition and economic partners, bad actors will become increasingly able to harness such technology against dissident religious actors, as the Ortega government in Nicaragua has already done using Russian surveillance technology. Increased technological surveillance capacity and the example of the Chinese model of repressing and co-opting religion has the capacity to reach worldwide.

Despite its problems, Xi’s China is a vast improvement from the past This banking crisis was preventable — and so is the next one

The CCP model removes religion from the lives of citizens. People of active faiths are viewed as obstacles to state control and the most significant internal threat to continued communist domination. If religious practices are to be allowed at all, they must be tightly monitored and reconfigured to support the government.

This isn’t freedom of religion—it is the worship of the state as the supreme being. We must sound the alarm to all people and, particularly, to people of faith around the world, that this is what Chinese Communist influenced leadership will look like in their own countries if they don’t start pushing back now.

Sam Brownback is the former U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom and co-chair of the IRF Summit. Erica Lizza is research assistant at the Religious Freedom Institute and an M.A. in Human Rights candidate at the Catholic University of America.

The Hill · by Lauren Sforza · April 23, 2023



18. China Prioritizes 3 Strategic Technologies in Its Great Power Competition



Excerpts:


So where is China today in terms of these three key strategic technologies?
Space
Artificial Intelligence
Quantum Communications and Computing


China Prioritizes 3 Strategic Technologies in Its Great Power Competition

Space, AI, and quantum computing and communication are China’s top technology priorities. How advanced are its capabilities in each? 

thediplomat.com · by Namrata Goswami · April 22, 2023

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China recently reconstituted its Ministry of Science and Technology and created a powerful Central Science and Technology Commission in order to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has more direct oversight over the ministry. This change, which was recommended by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, recognizes that technology competition with the United States requires direct supervision from the highest level of the party.

This reorganization was carried out during the “Two Sessions,” annual meetings of National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held in Beijing in March of this year. This is where policy direction of the CCP becomes clear as thousands of delegates ratify institutional and personnel changes, legislate, and endorse government budgets in rather ceremonial but important meetings. Dissent is hardly allowed.

The result of endorsing the dominant role of the CCP over China’s technology development in these sessions implies the importance China’s leaders place on the sector. During the Two Sessions, Xi indicated that “enhancing integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities” is key to China’s aim of becoming a global power. In this, the development of key strategic technologies plays a vital and consequent role.

By 2049, China aims to emerge as a global leader in three strategic technologies, identified by President Xi Jinping as critical for China’s national rejuvenation: space, AI, and quantum communications and computing.

In 2019, a white paper on defense, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” issued by the State Council, highlighted the critical importance of competing in key strategic technologies to emerge as a great power. Since then, these technologies have been described as China’s “new infrastructure” or critical infrastructure, to ensure China continues its national rejuvenation – and adds to its great power advantage vis-à-vis the United States.

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This is not entirely new; science and technology development was identified as key for China to emerge as a great power as per the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) concept developed under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. As Michael Pillsbury noted back in 2000, “CNP (zonghe guoli) refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas,” of which science and technology are perhaps amongst the top.

Given the international environment framed by the State Council as competitive, assuming leadership in these key strategic technologies has been identified as vital. Various strategies have been developed to advance China’s progress, including China’s innovation strategy, as well as “Made in China 2025” strategy. To support the development of strategic technologies, China made important changes to its Politburo and Central Committee during the 20th Party Congress last year as I have argued previously.

So where is China today in terms of these three key strategic technologies?

Space

China is a great power in space with its civilian programs. The country’s ambitious goals reflect this: China aims to establish a permanent base on the Moon by 2036, demonstrate a gigawatt-level power generation capability via its space-based solar power project by 2050, conduct a human Mars mission between 2033-2049, and an asteroid exploration mission by 2025.

China is also the only nation with its own independent Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space station, the Tiangong. Recently, China announced that they had successfully tested a 100 percent regeneration of oxygen supplies onboard the Tiangong space station. Bian Qiang, the director of the environmental control and life-support engineering office under the Astronaut Center of China, explained its significance, as paraphrased by China Daily: “the development reflects a fundamental transformation of the environmental control and life-support system for China’s manned spacecraft from ‘replenishment’ to ‘regeneration.’” More importantly, the system was able to regenerate 95 percent of its own water as well, which meant resupply to the space station from the ground via China’s Tianzhou cargo spacecraft would be reduced by 6 tonnes a year.

This development will also help China understand better how to develop a regenerative system for the Moon, since they have plans for a crewed mission to the Moon after 2036 and are looking to extract resources on the Moon like Helium 3 and water-ice.

China has its own independent BeiDou navigation system comprising 35 satellites; nearly 250 military satellites for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting; as well as both kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT capabilities.

In China’s 2021 white paper on its space activities, planetary defense was identified as a key mission. China’s planetary defense mission also includes the tracking of asteroids and meteorites and developing deflection technologies. Consequently, China has identified asteroid 2019 VL5, which is about 108 feet (33 meters) in diameter and orbits the Sun every 365 days, as the destination of a planetary defense mission, wherein China will launch both an observer and an impactor spacecraft in 2025. While one spacecraft will study the asteroid, the other spacecraft will collide with the asteroid to deflect it.

Wu Weiren, one of the chief scientists and architects of China’s space program, to include its lunar mission, explained that the impactor spacecraft will aim to deflect the asteroid 1 or 2 inches, which might increase to a distance of 620 miles in three months. The dual nature application is rather obvious; used for military purposes, the same technology can crash into satellites and “deflect” them.

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China is constructing a deep-space observation facility in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, which includes 25 radars with a 30-meter aperture, to detect asteroids over 10 million kilometers away. Called China Fuyan, this far-reaching radar system will build China’s planetary defense as well as space traffic management capabilities.

Artificial Intelligence

In 2021, the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology issued a white paper on “Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence,” which highlights the development of AI as a critical enabler of economic development. Envisioned AI-powered technologies include a social credit system, facial recognition tech, self-driving cars, autonomous drones and airplanes, additive manufacturing, and even orbital platforms in space that can make decisions on who is an adversary based on highly intelligent generative AI. China is projected to spend around $14.7 billion in AI this year, about 10 percent of the global investment. By 2026, that figure estimated to reach about $26 billion.

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The combination of AI with military technologies can add a lethal edge to China. Two examples stand out; one in space and the other underwater.

China recently announced the development of AI-enabled satellites that can avoid space debris. Called the “New Generation of Artificial Intelligence 2022 Major Program,” supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology, this project was launched by the State Key Laboratory of Astronautic Dynamics (ADL), affiliated with the Xi’an Satellite Control Center in Northwest China’s Shaanxi Province.

According to Li Hengnian, director of the ADL, “We will take the implementation of the project as an opportunity to actively align national strategic needs and cooperate with domestic competitive units to provide strong technical support for strengthening the nation’s space traffic management and contributing to China’s building of a space power.” The framing is important to notice here: Space traffic management is viewed from a space-power perspective.

Another project that China is working on that is enabled by AI is an orbital platform consisting of CubeSats. This platform, which will be enabled by AI decision making, can be utilized to defend against attacks on Chinese space assets. Besides defense, such a platform can be used for in orbit refueling and maintenance as well. AI can be utilized to direct mission planning, timing, and the release of CubeSats that could have non-kinetic ASAT technologies.

By 2025, China plans to develop a Jilin-1 constellation of 130 satellites that will be AI enabled to deflect U.S. ASAT capabilities. The Jilin-1 project is being developed by Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) State Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics, and Physics as part of China Geospatial-Intelligence Satellite Telescope (CGST) developed with a funding of $375 million. Chinese company Head Aerospace is involved with the project. Seventy of the 138 satellites are already in orbit. With help from the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), the Jilin satellites are enabled by AI to accurately track down moving objects that can be utilized for precision intelligence gathering and targeting. It covers certain areas of Earth between 17 and 20 times each day. AI is being used to monitor and precisely guess where a target is, in case a target becomes inaccessible.

AI is also enabling unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) built by China that can identify and target adversary submarines. Exercises conducted by China in the Taiwan Strait saw the utilization of UUVs 30 feet undersea that changed course, maneuvered and attacked a dummy submarine by utilizing AI decision cycles. Onboard sonars and sensors collected data that was then utilized by AI to make a decision to attack. A strategic mapping of these technologies becomes vital amid conflict escalation in the Taiwan Strait.

Recently, China’s newly re-constituted Ministry for Science and Technology and the National Natural Science Foundation of China established the “Artificial Intelligence for Science” project amid given the competition with the United States for leadership in these technologies. The idea is to utilize AI for a cumulative integration strategy as is witnessed in the additive power of AI in space and underwater, and thereby build CNP.

AI has been identified as a key technology and industry in China’s Made in China 2025 and innovation strategy. China aims to become the global leader in AI by 2030, seven years from the reconstitution of its science and technology institutional structure.

As per reports, China is edging ahead of the United States in AI technology thanks to these efforts. China already publishes the world largest number of peer reviewed papers in AI that result in patents.

Quantum Communications and Computing

China showcased to the world its lead in quantum communications in 2017, when Chinese scientists beamed entangled photons from the world’s first quantum communication satellite, Micius, that was launched in 2016.

In June 2020, in a paper published in Nature, Pan Jianwei, member of the National Committee of the CPPCC, academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and executive vice president of the University of Science and Technology of China, showcased a secure method of quantum messaging by utilizing Micius, which moved China closer to the goal of unhackable communication capability.

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There are plans afoot to develop a quantum communication network, as per Pan. This network will utilize encryption methods and ground stations, supported by quantum computing. Pan stated, “We are cooperating with the National Space Science Center to develop a medium-high orbit satellite. In the future, the combination of high-orbit satellites and low-orbit satellites will build a wide-area quantum communication network.”

It was Pan’s team that launched the first quantum satellite for China in 2016. Pan gives China about 15 years (2038) to realize fully functional quantum computing and communications, which will depend on quantum error correction. Given that quantum communication and computing has been recognized as key critical infrastructure by China, the likelihood of realizing this is high.

The combination of space, AI, and quantum computing and communications is developing China into a great technology power. Xi, at the 20th Party Congress, stated that the development of key strategic technologies will help China emerge as the leading nation in international relations in the 21st century and will foster new growth engines. This is a continuation in the grand strategic thinking of the studies on CNP commissioned by Deng Xiaoping, which identified the development of science and technology as a key factor in China’s emergence as a great power, and superseding the United States by the 2020s.

A competition is underway for relative power, if not absolute power, between a rising China and a declining United States. This will have direct strategic implications for how the international order is constituted in the long run. China’s progress in the three strategic technologies of space, AI, and quantum makes it evident that they are on the path to global preeminence.

Namrata Goswami

Dr. Namrata Goswami is an author, professor and consultant specializing in space policy, international relations, and ethnic identity. All views are her own.

thediplomat.com · by Namrata Goswami · April 22, 2023



19. China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan: Signaling and War Scares



Excepts:

Large-scale exercises are viewed as “an important way to implement strategic deterrence” in China’s military strategy. The Science of Military Strategy, one of China’s key publications on military strategy and doctrines, underscores the role of military exercises in creating confusion and uncertainty. It asserts that such exercises “demonstrate the military’s combat capabilities to the opponent, cause the opponent to doubt China’s intentions, and cause psychological panic to produce a deterrent effect.”
However, such actions could result in the opposite effect of provoking aggression rather than deterring it. Creating ambiguity is a dangerous move that can also increase the risk of miscalculating an opponent’s intent and resolve, especially in time of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. China’s military exercises may be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack, which could lead to an unintended escalation.
Beijing seems to be playing a dangerous game over Taiwan by flexing its muscles through conducting large-scale military exercises. Using military exercises as a signaling is a risky move as it necessitates the deployment of troops and equipment and could be interpreted as a prelude to actual military action. China’s signaling with military exercises is becoming increasingly threatening, with drills being conducted more frequently and with even more sophisticated weapons and technologies, indicating a more aggressive stance.

China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan: Signaling and War Scares

Beijing uses military exercises for a wide variety of reasons, from military training purposes to political and strategic ends

thediplomat.com · by Narantsatsral Enkhbat · April 22, 2023

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China today is rapidly building up its military, aiming to become strong enough to protect its interests, and presumably to surpass its biggest competitor – the United States. Chinese President Xi Jinping, soon after he took power, announced a drastic military reform program, modernizing weapons and technology and improving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s organization, training, and preparedness. The goal is to “basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military by 2035 and to fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.”

As part of the modernization plan to advance combat readiness and preparedness, the PLA has intensified and increased its military exercises. Beijing uses military exercises for a wide variety of reasons, from military training purposes (improving quality of military performances and testing new weapons) to political and strategic ends. However, the politico-strategic dimensions of Chinese military exercises are frequently overlooked, which can have far-reaching consequences for regional and global security.

In particular, China is employing military exercises as a tool to demonstrate its military might and signal its willingness and ability to “reunify” Taiwan. The use of military exercises by China to intimidate Taiwan through displays of military prowess is not a new phenomenon. Such exercises often serve as a scare tactic to remind Taiwan of the potential consequences of drawing closer to the United States. “Those who play with fire will perish by it,” Chinese President Xi Jinping warned during a telephone conversation with U.S. President Joe Biden last year. Such warnings often emphasize China’s determination to oppose any actions that could be interpreted as supporting Taiwanese independence as well as threatening China`s security.

The degree to which China perceives a certain action by the United States or Taiwan to be threatening can be inferred by the types of weapons employed in the military drills. Recently, the PLA conducted a live-fire drill, simulating strikes against Taiwan with the deployment of an aircraft carrier, long-range rockets, vessels, fighter jets, and conventional missiles in response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Moreover, in the summer of 2022, following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the PLA carried out a series of live-fire military drills, including the firing of the hypersonic DF-17 missile, also known as an “aircraft carrier killer.” This was the first time the PLA had fired conventional missiles into the waters around Taiwan since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. China’s signaling with military exercises has become increasingly threatening, with the deployment of advanced weapons and equipment such as aircraft carriers and missile systems.

Furthermore, China has increased the frequency of military exercises conducted around Taiwan. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the PLA held more than 100 sea drills in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea in just three months, in the summer of 2021, according to the Global Times. Beijing appears to use repeated military exercises around Taiwan as an instrument to deter U.S. actions with the pressure of imminent war.

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Large-scale exercises are viewed as “an important way to implement strategic deterrence” in China’s military strategy. The Science of Military Strategy, one of China’s key publications on military strategy and doctrines, underscores the role of military exercises in creating confusion and uncertainty. It asserts that such exercises “demonstrate the military’s combat capabilities to the opponent, cause the opponent to doubt China’s intentions, and cause psychological panic to produce a deterrent effect.”

However, such actions could result in the opposite effect of provoking aggression rather than deterring it. Creating ambiguity is a dangerous move that can also increase the risk of miscalculating an opponent’s intent and resolve, especially in time of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. China’s military exercises may be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack, which could lead to an unintended escalation.

Beijing seems to be playing a dangerous game over Taiwan by flexing its muscles through conducting large-scale military exercises. Using military exercises as a signaling is a risky move as it necessitates the deployment of troops and equipment and could be interpreted as a prelude to actual military action. China’s signaling with military exercises is becoming increasingly threatening, with drills being conducted more frequently and with even more sophisticated weapons and technologies, indicating a more aggressive stance.

Narantsatsral Enkhbat


Narantsatsral Enkhbat is a visiting scholar in Taipei, Taiwan. She holds a master’s degree in security studies from Kansas State University. Her research focus is China’s conflict behavior and she writes on the political-strategic dimensions of China’s military exercises.

thediplomat.com · by Narantsatsral Enkhbat · April 22, 2023



20. The Future of Social Media Is a Lot Less Social




The Future of Social Media Is a Lot Less Social

The New York Times · by Brian X. Chen · April 19, 2023

Tech Fix

Facebook, TikTok and Twitter seem to be increasingly connecting users with brands and influencers. To restore a sense of community, some users are trying smaller social networks.

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By

Brian X. Chen is the lead consumer technology writer and author of Tech Fix, a column about the social implications of the tech we use.

April 19, 2023

Nearly two decades ago, Facebook exploded on college campuses as a site for students to stay in touch. Then came Twitter, where people posted about what they had for breakfast, and Instagram, where friends shared photos to keep up with one another.

Today, Instagram and Facebook feeds are full of ads and sponsored posts. TikTok and Snapchat are stuffed with videos from influencers promoting dish soaps and dating apps. And soon, Twitter posts that gain the most visibility will come mostly from subscribers who pay for the exposure and other perks.

Social media is, in many ways, becoming less social. The kinds of posts where people update friends and family about their lives have become harder to see over the years as the biggest sites have become increasingly “corporatized.” Instead of seeing messages and photos from friends and relatives about their holidays or fancy dinners, users of Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, Twitter and Snapchat now often view professionalized content from brands, influencers and others that pay for placement.

The change has implications for large social networking companies and how people interact with one another digitally. But it also raises questions about a core idea: the online platform. For years, the notion of a platform — an all-in-one, public-facing site where people spent most of their time — reigned supreme. But as big social networks made connecting people with brands a priority over connecting them with other people, some users have started seeking community-oriented sites and apps devoted to specific hobbies and issues.

“Platforms as we knew them are over,” said Zizi Papacharissi, a communications professor at the University of Illinois-Chicago, who teaches courses on social media. “They have outlived their utility.”

The shift helps explain why some social networking companies, which continue to have billions of users and pull in billions of dollars in revenue, are now exploring new avenues of business. Twitter, which is owned by Elon Musk, has been pushing people and brands to pay $8 to $1,000 a month to become subscribers. Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, is moving into the immersive online world of the so-called metaverse.

For users, this means that instead of spending all their time on one or a few big social networks, some are gravitating toward smaller, more focused sites. These include Mastodon, which is essentially a Twitter clone sliced into communities; Nextdoor, a social network for neighbors to commiserate about quotidian issues like local potholes; and apps like Truth Social, which was started by former President Donald J. Trump and is viewed as a social network for conservatives.

“It’s not about choosing one network to rule them all — that is crazy Silicon Valley logic,” said Ethan Zuckerman, a professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. “The future is that you’re a member of dozens of different communities, because as human beings, that’s how we are.”

Twitter, which automatically responds to press inquiries with a poop emoji, did not have a comment about the evolution of social networking. Meta declined to comment, and TikTok did not respond to a request for comment. Snap, the maker of Snapchat, said that although its app had evolved, connecting people with their friends and family remained its primary function.

A shift to smaller, more focused networks was predicted years ago by some of social media’s biggest names, including Mark Zuckerberg, Meta’s chief executive, and Jack Dorsey, a founder of Twitter.

Mark Zuckerberg, left, Meta’s chief executive, and Jack Dorsey, a founder of Twitter, have talked about smaller, more focused networks.Credit...Left, Jason Henry for The New York Times; right, Anushree Fadnavis/Reuters

In 2019, Mr. Zuckerberg wrote in a Facebook post that private messaging and small groups were the fastest-growing areas of online communication. Mr. Dorsey, who stepped down as Twitter’s chief executive in 2021, has pushed for so-called decentralized social networks that give people control over the content they see and the communities they engage with. He has recently been posting on Nostr, a social media site based on this principle.

Over the last year, technologists and academics have also focused on smaller social networks. In a paper published last month and titled “The Three-Legged Stool: A Manifesto for a Smaller, Denser Internet,” Mr. Zuckerman and other academics outlined how future companies could run small networks at low costs.

They also suggested the creation of an app that essentially acts as a Swiss Army knife of social networks by allowing people to switch among the sites they use, including Twitter, Mastodon, Reddit and smaller networks. One such app, called Gobo and developed by MIT Media Lab and the University of Massachusetts Amherst, is set for release next month.

The tricky part for users is finding the newer, small networks because they are obscure. But broader social networks, like Mastodon or Reddit, often act as a gateway to smaller communities. When signing up for Mastodon, for example, people can choose a server from an extensive list, including those related to gaming, food and activism.

Eugen Rochko, Mastodon’s chief executive, said users were publishing over a billion posts a month across its communities and that there were no algorithms or ads altering people’s feeds.

One major benefit of small networks is that they create forums for specific communities, including people who are marginalized. Ahwaa, which was founded in 2011, is a social network for members of the L.G.B.T.Q. community in countries around the Persian Gulf where being gay is deemed illegal. Other small networks, like Letterboxd, an app for film enthusiasts to share their opinions on movies, are focused on special interests.

Smaller communities can also relieve some social pressure of using social media, especially for younger people. Over the last decade, stories have emerged — including in congressional hearings about the dangers of social media — about teenagers developing eating disorders after trying to live up to “Instagram perfect” photos and through watching videos on TikTok.

The idea that a new social media site might come along to be the one app for everyone appears unrealistic, experts say. When young people are done experimenting with a new network — such as BeReal, the photo-sharing app that was popular among teenagers last year but is now hemorrhaging millions of active users — they move on to the next one.

“They’re not going to be swayed by the first shiny platform that comes along,” Ms. Papacharissi said.

People’s online identities will become increasingly fragmented among multiple sites, she added. For talking about professional accomplishments, there’s LinkedIn. For playing video games with fellow gamers, there’s Discord. For discussing news stories, there’s Artifact.

“What we’re interested in is smaller groups of people who are communicating with each other about specific things,” Ms. Papacharissi said.

More small networks are likely on the horizon. Last year, Harvard University, where Mr. Zuckerberg founded Facebook in 2004 as a student, began a research program devoted to rebooting social media. The program helps students and others create and experiment with new networks together.

One app that emerged from the program, Minus, lets users publish only 100 posts on their timeline for life. The idea is to make people feel connected in an environment where their time together is treated as a precious and finite resource, unlike traditional social networks such as Facebook and Twitter that use infinite scrolling interfaces to keep users engaged for as long as possible.

“It’s a performance art experiment,” said Jonathan Zittrain, a professor of law and computer science at Harvard who started the research initiative. “It’s the kind of thing that as soon as you see it, it doesn’t have to be this way.”

The New York Times · by Brian X. Chen · April 19, 2023









De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."


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