Quotes of the Day:

"The person who follows the crowd will usually go no further than the crowd. The person who walks alone is likely to find himself in places no one has ever seen before." 

- Albert Einstein

“What if I told you your beliefs do not make you a free thinker. The ability to change your beliefs based on new information does.” 

- Unknown

"The golden way is to be friends with the world and to regard the whole human family as one." 

- Mahatma Gandhi

​1. Ukraine, China main focus as South Korean president visits White House

2. South Korea restores Japan on trade 'white list'

3. Opinion | Should South Korea go nuclear? That’s a decision for Seoul, not Washington.

4. Yoon says he cannot accept notion Japan 'must kneel because of our history 100 years ago'

5. Why Security Assistance Often Fails

6. U.S. calls on S. Korean firms to ensure exports to U.S. not involve Uyghur forced labor

7.  Pyongyang Gets Missile-Shaped Apartment Towers

8. U.S. to retaliate in case of N. Korean nuclear attack against the South

9. Questions about 'ironclad' commitment lead to impossible nuke solution

10. Seoul watching tensions in Taiwan Strait: Envoy

11. Biden urged to offer bold strategy against North Korean threats

12. Yoon eyes stronger alliance in security, tech during US visit

13.  [Editorial] Stipulate the deterrence in the document

14. Yoon begins US state visit to trumpet stronger alliance, resolve trade issues

1. Ukraine, China main focus as South Korean president visits White House

A useful overview of all the likely summit issues plus good background on President Yoon.

Ukraine, China main focus as South Korean president visits White House

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · April 24, 2023

SEOUL — President Biden and his South Korean counterpart, Yoon Suk Yeol, don’t have a whole lot in common.

They come from different ends of the political spectrum. Biden is liberal and a lifelong politician, while conservative Yoon first entered politics only two years ago to run for president. Being a father and grandfather is central to Biden’s identity; Yoon didn’t get married until he was 51 and has no children.

Yet the two men agree on one thing: The alliance between their two countries is more important than ever.

Biden will host Yoon at the White House this week for a state dinner to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the mutual defense treaty that bound together their security interests after the Korean War ended with a cease-fire. On Thursday, Yoon is scheduled to deliver a speech at a joint session of Congress, the first South Korean president in a decade to do so.

For Yoon, who is now 62 and has not spent much time in the United States, this week’s events will be a whirlwind opportunity to show he is serious about strengthening ties with the United States.

“The most important thing [for this week] is for it to be an opportunity for the people of both countries to properly recognize the historical significance of the … alliance and its achievements,” Yoon said in an interview with The Washington Post at his presidential office in Seoul, much of which was focused on his personal life and upcoming trip.

The alliance was forged in the aftermath of World War II, when the United States backed South Korea and the Soviet Union threw its communist weight behind North Korea and China.

“It is indeed the most successful alliance in history and, above all, an alliance based on values,” Yoon said.

Although Washington might quibble with the characterization, the security pacts with Japan and South Korea have become increasingly important as China has made clear its intent to challenge the United States’ global primacy economically and militarily.

Biden has emphasized the role of alliances in countering geopolitical challenges from East Asia to Eastern Europe.

Yoon can expect to come under pressure this week to follow suit with other democracies by supplying artillery shells to Ukraine, which is running critically low on ammunition.

Seoul is sitting on a vast ammunition stockpile but has refused to send any to Ukraine out of concern for its relations with Moscow. Last week, Yoon told Reuters that “it might be difficult” for South Korea to “insist only on humanitarian or financial support” if the situation worsens.

“Of course, Ukraine is under an illegal invasion, so it is appropriate to provide a range of aid, but when it comes to how and what we will supply, we cannot but consider many direct and indirect relationships between our country and the warring countries,” Yoon told The Post.

Other frictions remain in U.S.-South Korea relations, such as the repercussions of the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips Act on South Korean manufacturers, as well as a growing desire among South Koreans to acquire their own nuclear weapons despite the U.S. security guarantee.

Yoon said he expects to discuss a range of issues facing the alliance in Washington this week and beyond.

Official Washington has long believed that conservative South Korean presidents, who tend to hew closer to the United States than liberals, are easier to work with.

Indeed, Yoon has cleared several hurdles in the two countries’ alliance in his first year in office. He has resumed joint military exercises with the United States to prepare for a potential North Korean attack, worked with the United States to decrease global supply chain dependence on China, and most notably, he has taken a politically risky move to make amends with Japan after years of hostilities.

But Yoon, a political novice who squeaked into office just over a year ago, remains something of an enigma even to longtime Korea watchers in Washington. He closely guarded his ideological leanings during his career as a prosecutor, including two as prosecutor general — one of the most powerful positions in South Korea.

Forging his own path

To understand his thinking, it’s worth a rewind to his early career. In Korean, there’s a saying: If you fall seven times, you rise eight times.

Yet, it took Yoon — who graduated from one of South Korea’s most prestigious universities — nine tries to pass the national bar exam. South Korea’s national bar exam is notoriously difficult and was even more selective then, but nine years was still a long time.

That meant he didn’t start his career as prosecutor until the unusually late age of 33.

The son of an academic, he had a comfortable childhood. Some friends who were close to him then say Yoon marched to the beat of his own drum and on his own timeline to pursue what he believed was important.

“If he believed he was doing what was right, then he didn’t care much about how others viewed his actions, or how other people evaluated him,” said Lee Chul-kyu, an attorney and Yoon’s college friend. “Many of us from those days recall how decisive he was, rather than grappling with indecision.”

As prosecutor, Yoon continued in this vein.

Among the most dramatic moments of his prosecutorial career came in 2013, when he investigated alleged election interference by the National Intelligence Service to support Park Geun-hye, the conservative candidate and eventual victor.

During a tense National Assembly hearing at the time, Yoon revealed that he faced political pressure because of his investigation.

“I am not loyal to any person,” he said, an assertion of indignance that cemented his national image as a steely prosecutor upholding the law, which was only strengthened when he became the presidential candidate for the political bloc that Park once led.

But the 2013 investigation came at a professional cost. He was transferred to second-tier cities, effectively demoted and sidelined.

“I thought that if these institutions intervened even a little in the election and damaged people’s trust, it had to be corrected,” he recalled. “That’s why I carried out the investigation. If I were in that position again, I would probably do my work in that same way.”

Yoon’s uncompromising approach has been evident in his first year as president and has been met with mixed reviews.

Take his effort to improve relations with Japan. For nearly 80 years, the two countries have had a rocky relationship over unresolved historical disputes stemming from Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea in the first half of the 20th century.

He has poured political capital into resolving a controversial labor compensation dispute at the center of Seoul-Tokyo tensions — even though 60 percent of South Koreans disapprove of his proposal — and last month became the first South Korean leader to visit Japan in 12 years to show he wants to restore ties.

During the nearly 90-minute interview, Yoon spoke at length about his decision on Japan, saying he had been transparent about his intentions during his campaign. South Korea’s security concerns were too urgent to delay cooperation with Tokyo, he said, adding that some critics would never be convinced.

“Europe has experienced several wars for the past 100 years and despite that, warring countries have found ways to cooperate for the future,” he said. “I can’t accept the notion that because of what happened 100 years ago, something is absolutely impossible [to do] and that they [Japanese] must kneel [for forgiveness] because of our history 100 years ago. And this is an issue that requires decision. … In terms of persuasion, I believe I did my best.”

But his most polarizing moves have centered on gender. Yoon has drawn criticism for his proposal to eliminate the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and advocates say a dedicated pro-women and family agency is necessary given South Korea’s poor record on gender equality and its hostility toward the LGBTQ community.

The patriarchal system, combined with rising income inequality and a housing crisis, means younger Koreans are increasingly postponing or eschewing marriage and children.

Yoon himself married for the first time at 51 — something that is highly unusual in South Korea. His wife, Kim Keon Hee, 50, is a business executive who founded an art exhibition company. Yoon has said he and Kim connected over his casual interest in art history and art galleries.

“My happiest memory is finally meeting my wife and marrying her at a late age, in my 50s,” he said.

They have no human children, but they do have six dogs and five cats, mostly rescues. (Yoon shares this in common with Biden, who also has a rescue dog.)

In private, he is surprisingly unfiltered, according to those who met with him in closed-door meetings. He can be unpolished in public settings, too — and last year, it led to a viral hot-mic moment when he insulted lawmakers while at a global health event in New York City. Biden, who calls himself a “gaffe-machine,” could probably empathize.

Yoon said he has long been fascinated by the U.S. constitutional system and its global impact, and he enjoyed American songs and television shows growing up. Now, as president, he has a gift from Biden that he keeps on his desk — a copy of Harry S. Truman’s plaque that reads: “The buck stops here!”

Min Joo Kim contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · April 24, 2023

2. South Korea restores Japan on trade 'white list'

President Yoon will receive praise from the Biden administration for his efforts to improve relations with Japan. We should keep in mind that the 7th line of effort in the White House's INDOPACIFIC strategy is to improve trilateral cooperation among the ROK. Japan, and the US. President Yoon has been making a strong effort to accomplish this. Japan (PM Kishida) has been very tentative and not sufficiently bold and aggressive.

South Korea restores Japan on trade 'white list'

The Washington Post · by Kim Tong-Hyung | AP · April 24, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea formally restored Japan to its list of countries it gives preferential treatment in trade on Monday, three years after the neighbors downgraded each other’s trade status amid a diplomatic row fueled by historical grievances.

In announcing the move through a government gazette, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy also said Seoul will further restrict technology and industrial exports to Russia and its ally Belarus to support the U.S.-led pressure campaign against Moscow over the war in Ukraine.

After years of friction, Seoul and Tokyo are working to repair relations as they tighten their three-way security cooperation with Washington to counter the threat posed by North Korea. Pyongyang has used the distractions caused by the war to accelerate testing of nuclear-capable missiles.

South Korean officials expect Tokyo to restore Seoul as a favored trade partner too, but expect that step to take more time based on the procedures to revise Japan’s export regulations.

In September 2019, South Korea dropped Japan from its “white list” of countries receiving fast-track approvals in trade, reacting to a similar move by Tokyo. Japan had also tightened export controls on key chemicals South Korean companies use to make semiconductors and displays, prompting South Korea to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization.

Seoul accused Tokyo of weaponizing trade to retaliate against South Korean court rulings that ordered Japanese companies to offer reparations to South Koreans forced into slave labor before the end of World War II, when Japan had colonized the Korean Peninsula. The 2018 rulings irked Japan, which insists all compensation issues were settled by a 1965 treaty that normalized relations. Relations between the U.S. allies began to thaw in March when the government of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who took office in May 2022, announced plans to use South Korean funds to compensate the forced laborers without requiring Japanese contributions. Yoon traveled to Tokyo to meet with Japanese Prime Minster Fumio Kishida and they vowed to rebuild the countries’ security and economic ties.

Yoon’s push to mend ties with Tokyo has triggered criticism from some forced labor victims and from his political rivals. They have called for direct compensation from Japanese companies that employed the forced laborers. But Yoon has defended his decision, saying closer ties with Japan are essential for dealing with a slew of regional challenges, especially North Korea’s growing nuclear threat.

Following the Yoon-Kishida summit, South Korea withdrew its complaint at the WTO against Japan as Tokyo simultaneously confirmed its removal of export controls over a set of chemicals seen as vital to South Korea’s technology industry. The Japanese restrictions had covered fluorinated polyimides, which are used in organic light-emitting diode (OLED) screens for TVs and smartphones, and photoresist and hydrogen fluoride, used for making semiconductors. With Japan’s status restored, South Korea now provides preferential treatment to 29 countries –- including the United States, Britain and France –- over exports of sensitive “strategic” materials that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

South Korea divides its trade partners into two groups in managing export approvals of sensitive materials. The waiting period is usually five days for white-list nations, while other countries are required to go through case-by-case reviews that can take up to 15 days.

In announcing its new regulations over exports of strategic materials, the South Korean trade ministry also said the country will place hundreds more industrial products and components under its export restrictions against Russia and Belarus beginning this week.

Seoul’s controls so far have covered 57 items, including those related to electronics and shipbuilding, with authorities banning their shipments to Russia and Belarus unless the companies obtain special approvals. The list will increase to 798 items beginning Friday, including exports related to construction, machinery, steelmaking, automobiles, semiconductors and advanced computing.

“(We) plan to work with relevant ministries to strengthen crackdowns and enforcement to prevent (the restricted items) from reaching Russia or Belarus through third countries,” the ministry said in a statement.

The Washington Post · by Kim Tong-Hyung | AP · April 24, 2023

3. Opinion | Should South Korea go nuclear? That’s a decision for Seoul, not Washington.

As I have written, I think it would be a mistake for the South to go nuclear. I do not think they need to. However, I respect their right to do so and I respect the fact they are having the discussion. But what I really think we should focus on is that the discussion about nuclear weapons is an indication of how committed the ROK is to its self defense. There should be no doubt that the ROK is discussing whatever it takes to ensure deterrence and defense.

Opinion | Should South Korea go nuclear? That’s a decision for Seoul, not Washington.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · April 24, 2023

In early January, President Yoon Suk Yeol made news by suggesting that, with the North Korean nuclear threat rising, South Korea might want to build its own nuclear arsenal. After a domestic and foreign backlash, Yoon, who arrives in Washington this week, walked back that suggestion. But in March, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon — a prominent member of Yoon’s own party who is seen as a leading presidential candidate in 2027 — also raised the possibility of South Korea going nuclear. That option was backed, in a recent poll, by 77 percent of South Koreans.

Popular support for a South Korean nuclear deterrent, while strongly opposed by the Biden administration, is hardly surprising given the rapid expansion of the North Korean nuclear program. Any hopes that Pyongyang might give up or even freeze its nuclear stockpile were dashed by the failure of President Donald Trump’s talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019. Since then, the North has raced ahead with capabilities ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles that can hit the United States to tactical nuclear weapons that can saturate South Korea.

Every week seems to bring bloodcurdling new threats from Kim — the latest being the unveiling of an underwater drone supposedly capable of carrying a nuclear weapon and unleashing a “radioactive tsunami.” Kim has not only declared that he will never give up his nuclear weapons, but also claimed the right to use them preemptively if his regime feels threatened.

South Koreans are understandably worried and wonder if they can still count on the United States to defend them if, by doing so, it would put U.S. cities at risk of nuclear annihilation. Koreans are concerned that their country could meet the same fate as Ukraine — another nonnuclear state attacked by a nuclear-armed neighbor.

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South Korean leaders have been discussing ways to strengthen “extended deterrence,” such as redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea (they were withdrawn in 1991); replicating the nuclear-sharing agreement the United States has with NATO allies (European aircraft can deliver U.S. nuclear warheads in wartime); or even developing a domestic nuclear weapons capability.

The U.S. position is that having nuclear weapons permanently stationed in South Korea — whether American or, potentially, South Korean — is dangerous and unnecessary, because the United States could always destroy North Korea with nuclear weapons fired by distant submarines, bombers and missiles. The administration has been trying to assuage Seoul’s concerns by promising greater consultation about the use of nuclear weapons and more frequent visits by U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and warships. This will undoubtedly be near the top of the agenda when Yoon comes to the White House for a summit on Wednesday.

A senior administration official told me that it “is very profoundly troubling for us” to hear South Koreans discuss the possibility of building their own nuclear weapons. “We stand by the principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” this official told me. “We don’t want to see the spread of nuclear weapons. If they spread, they won’t just spread to countries in which we have confidence.”

The U.S. position is perfectly understandable. But it’s also easy to see why many Koreans are not reassured by U.S. security guarantees, given that Trump flirted with pulling U.S. troops out of South Korea if Seoul didn’t dramatically increase the amount of money it paid to subsidize them.

What if Trump or a Trump mini-me wins the presidency in 2024? Could South Korea count on an America First president to risk nuclear conflagration on behalf of a distant ally? The senior administration official told me that “our fundamental view is that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to the Republic of Korea are rock solid,” but, of course, the current administration cannot bind a successor.

We need to think carefully about whether our anti-proliferation assumptions still hold in a world where nuclear threats are growing, U.S. military dominance is fading and domestic support for U.S. global leadership is declining. The best guide I have seen to the arguments for and against South Korean nuclear weapons is a forthcoming article in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Occasional Papers series by Brookings Institution senior fellow Robert Einhorn, who served as the State Department’s senior adviser on non-proliferation during the Obama administration. (Einhorn provided me with an advance copy and walked me through his arguments.)

The article lists 10 reasons it could make sense for South Korea to go nuclear. These include the prospect that “it would strengthen deterrence against North Korea,” “force North Korea to deal with the Seoul government more seriously,” enhance South Korea’s “image as a strong, independent, successful player on the world stage” and reduce the risk of a North Korean nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland.

While some of these contentions are arguable, there is little disputing Einhorn’s assumption that “South Korea would be a responsible nuclear-armed state.” Moreover, South Korea has a right to withdraw from the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article X allows any signatory to leave if “extraordinary events … have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The North Korean nuclear program certainly qualifies.

Having presented the “pro” case, Einhorn then goes on to list nine compelling arguments against South Korea building its own nukes. He argues that, with 28,500 U.S. military personnel based in South Korea and the two nations bound by a defense treaty, South Korea can trust the “extended deterrence” provided by “U.S. strategic assets” that are “off-shore and mostly out of sight.”

Other arguments against South Korea going nuclear include the possibility that doing so could weaken the U.S. alliance, with American politicians wondering: Why do we need to risk our own troops to defend a nuclear-armed ally? It could damage the global non-proliferation regime. And it could limit South Korea’s access to the imported uranium it needs to run its nuclear power industry, which generates 27 percent of the country’s electricity.

Einhorn’s conclusion: “Acquiring an indigenous nuclear weapons capability is not the answer to South Korean security concerns.” But some other U.S. experts have reached a different conclusion. “It’s a real dilemma for responsible South Koreans,” Einhorn told me. “President Yoon and his advisers are clearly weighing all their options.”

For the moment, Yoon has made clear that he isn’t pursuing nuclear weapons capability and would prefer enhanced U.S. deterrence. But if, in the future, South Korea does decide to go nuclear, it should not be a game changer for the United States. The United States has long tolerated nuclear weapons owned by friendly states such as France, Britain, Israel, Pakistan and India, while opposing their acquisition by rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea. Having South Korea join the nuclear club wouldn’t change that.

Ultimately, it should be South Korea’s call. We should refrain from applying heavy-handed pressure and respect whatever decision our democratic ally makes. As Yoon and President Biden will affirm this week, both Washington and Seoul want the same thing: a secure and prosperous South Korea aligned with the West.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · April 24, 2023

4. Yoon says he cannot accept notion Japan 'must kneel because of our history 100 years ago'

A bold statement. President Yoon is accepting significant political risk. This is one reason why his poll numbers are so low. But many of us believe he is doing the right thing. Certainly from the US perspective we want to improve ROK-Japan relations. Of course when we say that the South Korean political opposition can exploit that to accuse the president of being a puppet of the US. 

(LEAD) Yoon says he cannot accept notion Japan 'must kneel because of our history 100 years ago' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 24, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with presidential office's statement in paras 7-10)

SEOUL, April 24 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol reaffirmed his commitment to moving relations with Japan forward, saying in an interview published Monday that he cannot accept the notion Japan "must kneel because of our history 100 years ago."

Yoon made the remark in an interview with The Washington Post, referring to Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of Korea during which a series of atrocities were committed, such as mobilization of Koreans as sex slaves and for forced labor.

"Europe has experienced several wars for the past 100 years and despite that, warring countries have found ways to cooperate for the future," Yoon was quoted as saying during the interview.

"I can't accept the notion that because of what happened 100 years ago, something is absolutely impossible (to do) and that they (Japanese) must kneel (for forgiveness) because of our history 100 years ago. And this is an issue that requires decision. ... In terms of persuasion, I believe I did my best," he said.

Yoon also said South Korea's security concerns were too urgent to delay cooperation with Tokyo, though some critics would never be convinced.

Yoon has aggressively sought to mend long-frayed relations with Japan, offering to compensate forced labor victims on South Korea's own without asking Japan for contributions, despite coming under heavy criticism in a nation where anti-Japanese sentiment still runs deep.

The presidential office said Yoon made the remarks over Japan to point out that a confrontational approach does not help future relations between the two countries.

"South Korea-Japan relations must be normalized, and that cannot be delayed," it said in a statement. "As countries in Europe cooperate for the future even after going through devastating wars, improving South Korea-Japan relations is a path toward the future that should be taken."

In a rare move, it also released additional remarks by Yoon that were not included in the interview article.

"Between countries that share values, past historical and current issues can be resolved through dialogue," it quoted Yoon as saying.

The interview was in time for Yoon's departure earlier Monday for a six-day state visit to the United States for talks with President Joe Biden, where a range of bilateral and global issues are expected to be discussed.

Yoon also talked about aid to Ukraine, after he signaled a shift in South Korea's policy of providing only non-lethal aid to Ukraine, saying in an interview with Reuters last week it might be difficult to insist only on humanitarian or financial assistance if Ukraine comes under a large-scale attack on civilians.

Russia has since warned that supplying military aid to Ukraine would mean Seoul "becoming involved in the conflict to a certain extent."

"Of course, Ukraine is under an illegal invasion, so it is appropriate to provide a range of aid, but when it comes to how and what we will supply, we cannot but consider many direct and indirect relationships between our country and the warring countries," Yoon told The Washington Post.

Yoon also said the South Korea-U.S. alliance is the "most successful" one in history.

"The most important thing (for this week) is for it to be an opportunity for the people of both countries to properly recognize the historical significance of the … alliance and its achievements," Yoon said of his state visit to Washington.

"It is indeed the most successful alliance in history and, above all, an alliance based on values," he said.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (R), alongside first lady Kim Keon Hee, waves at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, south of Seoul, on April 24, 2023, as he embarks on a six-day state visit to the United States. (Yonhap)

ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 24, 2023

5. Why Security Assistance Often Fails

KMAG in Korea is a useful model, There are still very useful lessons from it. There is useful monograph at this link: https://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/cmh/military_advisors_in_korea_kmag.pdf

While there are many positive lessons from the KMAG we need to look at the strategic failure of Security Assistance in Korea. That was the strategic failure by the US to not form and train a Korean military capable of conducting large scale combat operations designed to defend the ROK from an attack by the DPRK. Two assumptions contributed to this decision: the DPRK would continue to conduct "guerrilla-style" attacks so therefore the ROK needed a "constabulary force like military" to defend against these types of attacks. The second assumption was that if the ROK (and President Rhee) had a military capable of large conventional operations that the ROK would likely attack the north. While the first assumption proved to be wrong and the second one we can never know if it was accurate or erroneous, together both assumptions led to the strategic failure to develop a ROK military capable of defending its country.

Learn, adapt, and anticipate. We did not anticipate the north Korean attack.

Another coercive tool the author does not mention, though counterintive, is the Leahy Amendment. While most operators and planners do not like it, it has had a positive impact and moderating effect on some militaries that understand that if they violate human rights they will not receive US military support.

Excerpts:

My research also suggests that U.S. influence is more likely to fail when the United States relies entirely on teaching and persuasion, and more likely to succeed when the United States combines persuasion with conditionality to incentivize vital policy reforms. During the Korean War, for example, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advisers used their control of Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) supplies and personnel appointments to incentivize ROK Army officers to follow their direction. This approach had positive results and, as I wrote for the Modern War Institute, “[b]y 1952, the U.S. Eighth Army secured the almost full cooperation of ROK leadership with respect to the development of the ROK Army, and the ROK Army transformed into an effective fighting force by the summer of 1953.”

Finally, the findings suggest that the U.S. military is unlikely to change its approach to building partner militaries on its own. The Department of Defense—and often U.S. military advisers in theater—increasingly bears the lion’s share of the responsibility for the design and implementation of U.S. military-building efforts around the world. U.S. civilian leadership tends to defer to the U.S. military’s approach, even when it becomes abundantly clear that efforts are stalling. Absent civilian pressure, and with the funding for military-building projects flowing liberally, the U.S. military has no incentive to rethink its approach. U.S. efforts to strengthen other countries’ militaries are inherently political, and U.S. civilian leaders can and should play a more active role, both by working more directly with recipient leaders to incentivize reforms and by more actively overseeing and directing the U.S. military to do the same.

Why Security Assistance Often Fails

By Rachel Tecott Metz Sunday, April 23, 2023, 10:01 AM

lawfareblog.com · April 23, 2023

Editor’s Note: Around the world, the United States relies heavily on security assistance to gain influence and make its allies more formidable. When actual war breaks out, however, many long-time recipients of such assistance fight poorly or otherwise do not seem to have heeded the lessons that U.S. trainers tried to impart. The Naval War College’s Rachel Tecott Metz examines this track record, arguing that the United States relies too much on teaching and persuasion and should instead emphasize conditionality more.

Daniel Byman

***

The 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq has launched a set of reflections and recriminations over the decision to invade and subsequent bungling of the occupation. But another frustration with U.S. policy in Iraq deserves attention, as it has profound implications for U.S. policy today: the United States’ failure to build the Iraqi military. Building a competent Iraqi military was a pillar of the U.S. strategy to establish and maintain security in Iraq, which would enable U.S. forces to exit what was an increasingly unpopular war. Despite the centrality of the security assistance effort to U.S. foreign policy—the billions of dollars, eight years, and tens of thousands of personnel dedicated to the task—the Iraqi military never developed basic battlefield proficiency, and in the summer of 2014, less than three years after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division melted away in the face of small numbers of lightly armed Islamic State fighters. U.S. troops returned hastily to Iraq and continue to train, advise, and equip the Iraqi military today, 20 years after they began. The problem with building competent security forces is not limited to this particularly prominent case—it plagues U.S. and allied efforts around the world, and understanding what went wrong in Iraq may improve outcomes with other partners as well.

The Mixed Record of Security Assistance

Building competent partner militaries was central to the U.S. war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Today, the United States trains, equips, and advises the Armed Forces of Ukraine to fight Russia and the Taiwanese Armed Forces to fight China. Beyond the headline cases, the United States provides some form of security assistance to almost every country in the world. The record of these efforts, however, is mixed at best.

Security assistance is difficult because military effectiveness depends not only on what militaries have (or are given) in material terms and how troops are trained at the tactical level but also on patterns of decisions that leaders make. And leaders—especially those likeliest to receive security assistance from the United States, who may be facing societal upheaval, insurgency, and civil war—may prioritize preventing coups, consolidating political power, personal enrichment, or personal survival above the strength of their nation’s military. In practice, this means that leaders may promote loyal officers instead of competent ones, permit corruption, and neglect training. As I have written elsewhere, “They might welcome huge infusions of cash, equipment, and assistance from the United States, while simultaneously ignoring U.S. advice and implementing policies that keep their militaries weak.” Even in Ukraine, now a security assistance success story, Ukrainian leadership neglected to implement vital reforms of the corrupt procurement system until after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, leaving the Ukrainian military short of the Stugna anti-tank missiles they needed to fight the Russians.

The Challenge Is Influence

Fundamentally, then, the central challenge for those trying to build better militaries in partner states is influencing partner leadership. The United States builds better militaries when partner leaders implement the vital policy reforms the United States recommends, and U.S. security assistance fails when U.S. influence fails.

In research published recently in International Security, I conceptualize U.S. strategies of influence in security assistance as an influence escalation ladder with four rungs: teaching, persuasion, conditionality (incentives), and direct command. A teaching approach aims to influence recipient leaders by providing them with information they may need to improve the effectiveness of their militaries. Persuasion refers to several approaches advisers can take to shape recipient leader thinking and behavior: positive inducements, such as increases in assistance with no strings attached; good old-fashioned argument; demonstrating “what right looks like”; and rapport-building. Persuasion is essentially a theory of influence through personal diplomacy. A conditionality approach to influence aims to incentivize policy reforms by, for instance, promising recipient leaders increases in assistance and/or threatening to reduce assistance depending on the progress (or lack thereof) of their reforms. Whereas teaching, persuasion, and conditionality are indirect forms of influence, direct command (as the name implies) replaces partner decision-makers with U.S. ones in the partner chain of command.

Teaching, persuasion, conditionality, and direct command are not mutually exclusive. Advisers can rely entirely on teaching and persuasion, or they can combine teaching and persuasion with conditionality and/or direct command.

There is mounting evidence that conditionality is an important ingredient for effective influence and security assistance. There is also clear evidence that the United States relies almost entirely on teaching and persuasion, rarely using carrots and sticks to incentivize partners to implement the policy reforms necessary to strengthen their militaries.

The U.S. Reliance on Ineffective Strategies of Influence

The United States’ persistent reliance on ineffective strategies of influence in security assistance is puzzling. The conventional wisdom in the security assistance literature is that the United States rarely uses incentives because it lacks the monitoring capacity to detect when recipient leaders’ policies undermine their militaries, the bargaining power to motivate reforms, or both.

My research shows, in contrast, that U.S. military advisers are almost always acutely aware of when their counterparts disregard their advice and the implementation of policies that undermine the security assistance effort. Visibility is rarely—if ever—a limiting factor in security assistance. It also shows that the United States usually enjoys a great deal of bargaining power vis-a-vis its security assistance recipients. The puzzle is the United States’ consistent preference not to play its hand.

I present an alternative explanation, and demonstrate how the bureaucratic interests, ideologies, and standard operating procedures of the U.S. military organizations that design and implement U.S. security assistance programs lead them to rely, persistently, on strategies of influence that do not work.

The military organization responsible for the bulk of U.S. security assistance in Iraq, and a large portion of U.S. security assistance around the world, is the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army’s organizational essence is ground combat—despite rhetoric to the contrary, the U.S. Army does not consider security assistance to be a core mission. In conducting security assistance, the U.S. Army aims primarily to protect its combat mission, preserve its autonomy against civilian intrusion, and keep its standard operating procedures up and running with as little headache as possible. It puts these goals above the nominal aim of strengthening partner militaries.

The U.S. military relies on teaching and persuasion, and rarely uses incentives or direct command, because reliance on teaching and persuasion serves its bureaucratic objectives, whereas conditionality or direct command threatens them.

Within the Army, and across the services, an ideology has evolved to promote and perpetuate teaching and persuasion and discourage conditionality in advisory missions. This emphasis on persuasion consists of the normative beliefs that teaching and persuasion are “right” and conditionality and direct command “wrong.” Conditionality and direct command are denigrated as bullying, neo-colonial, or otherwise incompatible with the philosophy that advisers should win their advisees’ cooperation through their example, logic, or friendship. The ideology also promotes the causal myths that teaching and persuasion work while conditionality and direct command backfire.

In the International Security article, I show how these bureaucratic dynamics contributed to the United States’ failure to build the Iraqi military into an effective force. Many Iraqi political and military leaders—often for understandable reasons—prioritized coup-proofing, power consolidation, and parochial interests above strengthening the Iraqi military. U.S. general officers tasked with building the Iraqi military prioritized the combat mission above the advisory mission, optimized their advisory efforts for creating an appearance of progress over actual progress, and kept the bureaucratic gears of the advisory program turning smoothly even when they were turning toward failure. Senior officers continued to rely on teaching and persuasion and eschew incentives, and to espouse the normative and effective superiority of teaching and persuasion above conditionality and direct command, even as Iraqi leaders clearly and consistently ignored their advice, implementing policies that fatally undermined the Iraqi military.

Lessons for a Better Approach

It is vital to identify pathologies in the U.S. military’s approach to building a military in Iraq because security assistance has emerged as a central pillar of U.S. defense strategy, and much of the foundation for U.S. security assistance around the world today was laid in Iraq and Afghanistan. If current and future efforts, like those supporting Ukrainian and Taiwanese forces, are to be successful, they will need to learn from, not just replicate, the approach taken in those wars.

My research suggests several policy implications for U.S. security assistance. For one thing, it suggests that most of the policy reforms currently advocated by practitioners of security assistance are unlikely to succeed. Practitioners advocate for increased investments, longer advisory tours, and improvements in adviser training. But these reforms will have little effect on U.S. security assistance outcomes absent fundamental reform of the U.S. military’s basic approach to advising. At most, such changes could help on the margins, but they do not get to the root of the problems.

More than anything else, my research cautions humility. Security assistance is extremely difficult, and the odds of success depend largely on how motivated recipient leaders are to strengthen their militaries. Even the active war inside Ukraine’s borders from 2014 to 2022 was insufficient to motivate Ukrainian leadership to tackle corruption in defense procurement. It took the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and “the largest war on European soil since WWII to persuade Kyiv to embrace reform and maximize the value of U.S. assistance.”

My research also suggests that U.S. influence is more likely to fail when the United States relies entirely on teaching and persuasion, and more likely to succeed when the United States combines persuasion with conditionality to incentivize vital policy reforms. During the Korean War, for example, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advisers used their control of Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) supplies and personnel appointments to incentivize ROK Army officers to follow their direction. This approach had positive results and, as I wrote for the Modern War Institute, “[b]y 1952, the U.S. Eighth Army secured the almost full cooperation of ROK leadership with respect to the development of the ROK Army, and the ROK Army transformed into an effective fighting force by the summer of 1953.”

Finally, the findings suggest that the U.S. military is unlikely to change its approach to building partner militaries on its own. The Department of Defense—and often U.S. military advisers in theater—increasingly bears the lion’s share of the responsibility for the design and implementation of U.S. military-building efforts around the world. U.S. civilian leadership tends to defer to the U.S. military’s approach, even when it becomes abundantly clear that efforts are stalling. Absent civilian pressure, and with the funding for military-building projects flowing liberally, the U.S. military has no incentive to rethink its approach. U.S. efforts to strengthen other countries’ militaries are inherently political, and U.S. civilian leaders can and should play a more active role, both by working more directly with recipient leaders to incentivize reforms and by more actively overseeing and directing the U.S. military to do the same.

Rachel Tecott Metz is an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.

lawfareblog.com · April 23, 2023

6. U.S. calls on S. Korean firms to ensure exports to U.S. not involve Uyghur forced labor

And we need to call on all firms from all countries to do this.

U.S. calls on S. Korean firms to ensure exports to U.S. not involve Uyghur forced labor | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 24, 2023

SEOUL, April 24 (Yonhap) -- U.S. customs officials called on South Korean companies Monday for close monitoring of their supply chains to ensure their products exported to the United States do not involve China's Xinjiang region in light of a new U.S. law that bans products made there over forced labor concerns.

The officials from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection made the call during a seminar in Seoul as they explained details of the U.S. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which went into effect last year.

The law bans imports of goods made wholly or in part in the autonomous territory in northwest China, as it considers them as produced with forced labor.

During the seminar, Executive Assistant Commissioner AnnMarie Highsmith highlighted the importance of preventing products made with forced labor from entering the U.S.

She said the U.S. is making efforts to block such products using artificial intelligence-based analysis technology, but added that companies need to take responsibility and monitor their supply chains on their own.

Acting Deputy Executive Director Maya Kamar also said companies should trace back their supply chains over the use of forced labor and be aware of their products' place of origin.

South Korean and U.S. trade and customs officials pose for a photo as they attend a seminar jointly hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea and the Korea International Trade Association in southern Seoul on April 24, 2023. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 24, 2023

7. Pyongyang Gets Missile-Shaped Apartment Towers

Sigh... Photo at the link: https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/04/24/2023042401114.html

Pyongyang Gets Missile-Shaped Apartment Towers

english.chosun.com

April 24, 2023 11:00

North Korea has completed a block of apartment buildings shaped like the country's Hwasong intercontinental ballistic missiles in Pyongyang and residents have begun moving in, the official Rodong Sinmun daily reported last Saturday.

The newly built town northeast of Pyongyang where the apartments are located also takes its district name from the ICBMs.

Twin apartment buildings (center) resembling intercontinental ballistic missiles are seen in a newly built town in Pyongyang, in this photo from the Rodong Sinmun on April 22.

Rodong Sinmun quoted residents there as describing the new apartments as "resembling Hwasong missiles, our country's pride."

One source here said, "North Korea held a ceremony to mark the completion of the apartment complex attended by its leader Kim Jong-un at night, apparently as a way of boasting about its feat while maximizing its effects, as it does in military parades."

N.Korea Building High-Rise Apartments on Chinese Border

Pyongyang Apartment Prices Soar Amid Thaw

Pyongyang Becoming Rapidly Westernized

Kim Jong-un Opens Glitzy High-Rise Street in Pyongyang

Kim Jong-un Rushes Completion of Potemkin Village

How Pyongyang's Elite Live Now

Pyongyang Spruces up Subway

Pyongyang Booms at the Expense of the Rest of N.Korea

Pyongyang in Apartment Modernization Drive

• Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com

8. U.S. to retaliate in case of N. Korean nuclear attack against the South

Retaliate is the wrong word. We will fully support the defense of South Korea should Kim Jong Un attack the South and if Kim uses WMD the Kim family regime will cease to exist.

This sounds like a new agreement on extended deterrence. It will be interesting to see what comes out in the presidential joint statement.

U.S. to retaliate in case of N. Korean nuclear attack against the South

donga.com

Posted April. 24, 2023 07:55,

Updated April. 24, 2023 07:55

U.S. to retaliate in case of N. Korean nuclear attack against the South. April. 24, 2023 07:55. by Na-Ri Shin, Hyo-Ju Son journari@donga.com,hjson@donga.com.

South Korea and the U.S. have been working on a joint document that outlines the conditions for the U.S. to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on South Korean territory by North Korea or other countries before the summit meeting. This document is currently being coordinated by both countries and was requested by South Korea. If finalized, this would mark the first time that the U.S. promise of nuclear retaliation has been officially specified in a document. The two countries are reportedly working on a plan to enhance their joint planning and execution capabilities related to extended nuclear deterrence by setting up a separate ministerial-level permanent consultative body.

According to the Dong-A Ilbo coverage on Sunday, the South Korean government has reportedly conveyed its position that they hope the U.S. would respond with nuclear weapons if North Korea were to use them before the upcoming South Korea-U.S. summit in Washington on Wednesday (local time). North Korea’s nuclear attack against U.S. allies would result in the end of the Kim Jong Un regime and the U.S. would provide extended deterrence to South Korea using all categories of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, said a recent joint press release from the Korea-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Security Consultative Meeting and the South Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. A government insider said, “We wanted further clarification on the issue instead of ambiguous expressions or reiterations of previous announcements to ensure the public understands the U.S.' commitment to providing extended deterrence in the event of a nuclear attack on South Korea.”

There are ongoing discussions to include a provision in the joint document that would allow for the deployment of strategic nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula at the request of South Korea. This would not involve the direct deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean territory, but rather the systematic arrangement of U.S. strategic assets to be moved according to the needs of South Korea.

President Yoon Suk Yeol will begin a state visit to the U.S. on Monday for five nights and seven days. During this visit, which coincides with the 70th anniversary of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, he will present a blueprint for South Korea and the U.S. to move toward a “global comprehensive strategic alliance.” The plan includes practical extended deterrence, strengthened cooperation in advanced technology, and economic security.

한국어

donga.com

9. Questions about 'ironclad' commitment lead to impossible nuke solution

It pains me to think about the declining confidence in the US commitment to extended deference. Unfortunately the only to actually prove our will to honor our commitment is for Kim Jong Un to attack the ROK with a nuclear weapon. I believe we are committed but demonstrating that commitment to skeptics in South Korea is hard.

Monday

April 24, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Questions about 'ironclad' commitment lead to impossible nuke solution

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/04/24/national/defense/Korea-KoreaUS-alliance-nuclear-deterrence/20230424173040597.html

In light of North Korea's escalating military threats, South Korea and the United States agreed last year to increase the rotation of U.S. strategic assets deployed to the Korean Peninsula, such as the two B-1B supersonic bombers at the top of the formation in this photo. [REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE]

Alliance at year 70: Second in a four-part series 

In light of the shifting geopolitical situation and growing risk factors in the region, the alliance between South Korea and the United States has transformed and evolved over the past 70 years. The Korea-U.S. alliance now stands at a crossroads as it marks its 70th anniversary and the relationship advances into a more global and comprehensive partnership. In a four-part series, the Korea JoongAng Daily will examine the various challenges faced by the allies in terms of diplomatic, security, economic and people-to-people cooperation and discuss possible ways forward. – Ed.   

South Korean politicians have made headlines in recent months by calling for an independent nuclear deterrent in a shift that experts say is driven by questions about the reliability of Washington's “ironclad” commitment to defend Seoul.

These politicians include President Yoon Suk Yeol and Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who have publicly mused in recent months about the need for South Korea to bolster its security by means of developing an independent nuclear deterrent or persuading the United States to re-deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula that were withdrawn in 1991.

According to Goh Myong-hyun, a senior fellow at the Asan Institute’s Center for Foreign Policy and National Security, these calls reflect Seoul’s perception that the U.S. pledge to use all military capabilities, including nuclear, to deter a nuclear attack on South Korea — commonly known as the extended deterrence commitment — needs to adapt to advances in the nuclear threat emanating specifically from Pyongyang.

“Although the Korean Peninsula has always been a potential conflict flashpoint, the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea has not led to the adaptations in U.S. defensive strategy,” Goh said, noting that the U.S. nuclear weapons strategy remains “somewhat stuck in a Cold War-era framework that focuses on with other superpowers, and fails to consider secondary nuclear-armed actors.”

This concern was also voiced by Rep. Thae Yong-ho, a South Korean conservative lawmaker who formerly served as Pyongyang’s deputy ambassador to London before defecting, who warned in a March 31 interview with KBS Radio that the allies were at risk of underestimating the North’s advancing nuclear capabilities, pointing to a North Korean state media report in March revealing the existence of a new line of tactical nuclear warheads.

“The North Korean regime is not the kind of system where propagandists can ask leader Kim Jong-un and senior officials to play pretend as they examine fake weapons,” Thae said.

Thae added that a seventh nuclear test by the regime should make the South seriously consider developing nuclear weapons to “assure its own security.”

To signal its commitment to defending Seoul, Washington has upped the frequency of U.S. strategic assets on rotation around the peninsula, especially as the North conducted a record 95 missile launches last year and announced the frontline deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and a new preemptive nuclear strike doctrine in April and September.

Seoul’s lack of say in how nuclear weapons would be used

But the United States has thus far ruled out re-deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or setting up a nuclear sharing framework with South Korea similar to the one in place in some NATO states, such as Germany and Turkey, which participate in storing and planning the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of their own deterrent.

U.S. President Joe Biden in January shot down suggestions by Yoon that the two countries are planning joint nuclear weapons exercises, leaving South Korea without a codified say in the key question of how U.S. nuclear weapons could be employed in its defense.

It remains to be seen if decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons in a potential inter-Korean conflict will stay entirely in the hands of Washington.

According to a South Korean government official who spoke on condition of anonymity to the JoongAng Ilbo on March 27, “joint planning on how the U.S. extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella will be maintained in potential scenarios involving an armed conflict” is on the agenda of Yoon’s summit with Biden later this month.

South Koreans worry about future U.S. administrations

But the current lack of a voice in how U.S. nuclear weapons will be deployed in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not the only cause for South Korean concern regarding the alliance.

Concerns about how a future change of administration in Washington could affect U.S. extended deterrence are also not far from the minds of Seoul’s decision-makers, John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, says.

“South Korea's calls for nuclear weapons constitute a delayed response to the destabilizing effect of former U.S. President Donald Trump and the erratic nature of U.S. commitment under his presidency,” Delury said.

“South Koreans kept a stiff upper lip when Trump made almost mercenary demands for increased payments to maintain the U.S. troop presence, but the fact that Trump is still the de facto leader of the Republican Party makes the return of his approach to the alliance a future concern, and not a historical blip, from Seoul’s perspective.”

Considering it was Washington’s assurance to maintain troops in South Korea that persuaded South Korea to abandon a nascent military nuclear project started by President Park Chung Hee, doubts about the commitment of future U.S. administrations could make Seoul think twice about its reciprocal promise to eschew nuclear weapons.

Failure of diplomacy with Pyongyang

While all South Korean governments have committed themselves to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula since the 1990s, the failure of three inter-Korean summits, the Six-Party talks and even two U.S.-North Korea summits to yield denuclearization have dimmed expectations that Pyongyang might ever abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Delury also noted that “there’s greater fatalism among conservatives about North Korean denuclearization,” comparing the Yoon administration’s view of North Korea’s nuclear program to that of the previous Moon Jae-in government.

“Moon held onto hope that North Korea might be persuaded through dialogue to abandon nuclear weapons, and ironically with Trump, he had a U.S. president who was at least willing to meet and talk with a North Korean leader,” Delury said. “Moon believed that North Korean denuclearization, and by extension inter-Korean reconciliation, would be viable with U.S. support.” 

Yoon’s emphases on South Korea’s alliance with the United States and joint exercises “reflect not only the absence of an active framework for talks but also a lack of hope in diplomacy that could yield Pyongyang’s denuclearization,” Delury said.

Widespread pessimism regarding North Korean denuclearization, paired with perceptions of a deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula, is reflected in Asan Institute surveys of the South Korean public opinion showing higher public support for an independent nuclear deterrent, according to James Kim, a senior fellow at the think tank.

“While support for South Korean nuclear weapons has ranged between 50 and 70 percent since 2010, support has grown since North Korean weapons testing accelerated after the collapse of the 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi,” Kim said.

While Kim echoed Delury’s comments that South Korean public’s lower trust in U.S. extended deterrence was partially brought on by Trump’s “mercantile” treatment of the alliance, he cautioned that the public discourse on nuclear weapons development in South Korea did not yet factor in the economic damage from withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

“Support for developing nuclear weapons dropped by 10 percentage points when respondents were asked if they supported an independent deterrent given the possibility of sanctions resulting from NPT withdrawal, even without mentioning specific consequences,” Kim said, referring to the Asan Institute’s most recent survey on nuclear weapons development conducted in November last year.

In that study, 64.3 percent of respondents said they supported developing an independent nuclear deterrent, but that figure dropped to 54.7 percent when sanctions for violating the NPT were mentioned.

Only 58.7 percent of respondents in the same survey said they supported the deployment of additional U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) batteries, which Kim said suggested support for an independent nuclear deterrent would likely drop further once the potential economic impact becomes apparent.

The initial installation of a Thaad battery in 2017 elicited strong but unofficial punitive economic measures from China, which cost Seoul's economy $7 billion, according to South Korean lawmakers. 

But it remains to be seen if suggestions by South Korean leaders that the country should consider pursuing nuclear weapons, however, well they may be supported by the public, would actually come to fruition.

International deadlock

According to Goh, Yoon’s comments about South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons “is not only a response to international inaction regarding the North Korean threat but also an exploration of Seoul’s self-defense options against Pyongyang, rather than a concrete policy shift.”

The United Nations Security Council held 10 meetings last year to specifically discuss North Korea’s missile launches, but all ended without any new resolutions or sanctions being adopted due to opposition from China and Russia, both veto power-wielding permanent members of the Security Council.

The United States has accused the two countries of giving the North political cover on the international stage to continue firing missiles by blaming Washington and its allies for escalating tensions with joint exercises.

Goh said Beijing’s position that U.S. military pressure is adding fuel to Pyongyang’s illicit weapons program mirrors the broader context of worsening U.S.-China tensions, which he said is also reflected in South Korea’s harder-line approach to the North.

“The Yoon administration sees the North through the context of U.S.-China tensions and its alliance with the United States and is thus placing greater weight on cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the recent Freedom Shield exercise, to counter the North Korean threat,” he said.

Delury questioned whether the strength of the alliance could be measured in large joint exercises that have resumed under Yoon.

“Not only is it impossible for South Korea and the United States to do all the military exercises they want if they’re serious about reducing tensions and engaging in confidence-building with North Korea, but I would also argue there are many different ways the health of alliance could be reaffirmed without advertising or running large joint exercises,” Delury said.

Differing views of the role of the alliance regarding China

But all the experts agreed that the real test of Seoul’s alliance with Washington would come in the event of an armed conflict between the United States and China.

“The United States implicitly desires more South Korean engagement in issues concerning broader regional security, but South Korea remains focused on the North Korean nuclear program, which is just one of several issues where the United States is involved in East Asia,” Goh said, referring to Taiwan.

Kim agreed that the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan was looming, if less publicly discussed, source of insecurity in Seoul’s alliance with Washington.

“If U.S. strategic and conventional military assets were to be deployed in Taiwan’s defense, it could lend the appearance of U.S. protection of South Korea becoming sparse,” he said.

While Yoon has positioned himself as being “tough” on China, Delury said that even he or his conservative administration could not easily countenance the South Korea-U.S. alliance being oriented to counter China.

“Whereas the crux of the South Korea-U.S. security alliance is very comfortable in remaining united against North Korea, it becomes less stable where China is concerned. Even Korean conservatives are not comfortable with reorienting the alliance to counter China.”

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

10. Seoul watching tensions in Taiwan Strait: Envoy

Monday

April 24, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Seoul watching tensions in Taiwan Strait: Envoy

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/04/24/national/diplomacy/korea-china-taiwan/20230424160449689.html

Korean Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho, left, meets with Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong at the Foreign Ministry in Beijing on Feb. 14. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHINA]

Seoul is keeping an eye on escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Korean Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho told Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in a recent phone call.

Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is a matter of great importance to the region and the international community, Chung said in the call last Thursday according to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul, adding that Korea, along with the rest of the international community, was watching closely the escalating tensions in the Strait.

The call took place a day after President Yoon Suk Yeol’s interview with Reuters, which sparked protests from Beijing. 

Yoon in his interview with Reuters on Wednesday referred to “attempts to change the status quo by force” on Taiwan, stressing his resolve to "absolutely" oppose such a change "together with the international community."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry in releasing a statement about the call on Sunday repeated its position that it cannot accept Yoon's statement. 

Stressing the one-China policy, Sun was said to have reiterated that the “Taiwan issue is China's own affair, and no force will be allowed to interfere.”

Chung reportedly said in response that Korea maintains its respect for the one-China policy, and requested the Chinese Foreign Ministry address its spokesman’s remarks on Yoon’s comments.

Spokesman Wang Wengbin in a press briefing on Thursday seemingly rebuked Yoon, stressing that China does “not need to be told what should or should not be done” on the Taiwan issue.  

Calling Wang’s remarks a serious diplomatic gaffe, Chung said they were “not in line with the spirit of mutual respect between Korea and China."

Sun reportedly said the spokesman was not directly addressing Yoon’s comments in his briefing.  

The Foreign Ministry in Seoul in protest of Wang's comments had summoned the Chinese ambassador in Seoul on Thursday. 

China's state-run media Global Times on Sunday further criticized this decision, issuing an editorial piece that said, "The problem highly likely lies in South Korean diplomacy."

"These malicious articles in the Chinese media only further alienate China from the international community, and we do not believe the claims they made reflect the position of the Chinese government," said the Korean Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Monday. 

BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]

11. Biden urged to offer bold strategy against North Korean threats

We have offered our recommendations here:

"National Strategy for Countering North Korea"

https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/

 "The Biden-Yoon Summit: An Opportunity To Chart A New Alliance Course – It is time for the U.S. and its ally South Korea to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom."  https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/new-alliance-course-for-unified-korea/

"Yoon-Biden summit - onward toward unification"

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/03/137_348049.html

Some specific recommendations here:

70th Anniversary Alliance Recommendations

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS)

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

The Yoon and Biden administrations have an opportunity for a new approach to the Korean security challenge. The Alliance way ahead is an integrated deterrence strategy as part of the broader strategic competition that is taking place in the region. There is a need for a Korean “Plan B” strategy that rests on the foundation of combined ROK/U.S. defensive capabilities and includes political warfare, aggressive diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and information and influence activities, with a goal of denuclearization but ultimately the objective must be to solve the “Korea question” (e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north and an end to human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will only happen when the Korea question is resolved that leads to a free and unified Korea, otherwise known as a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

1. New Alliance Focus - Strategic Guidance in the joint statement

           Human rights upfront, influence campaign, pursuit of a free and unified Korea

2. Establish a “unification desk” in EAP or DRL to provide an MOU Counterpart

3. Create a “Korea Desk” at the GEC to coordinate influence activities.

           Overt information focus (less on covert)

           Massive quantities, practical knowledge, truth, understanding.

           Show the people (elite, 2d tier leaders, and people) they have options/choices.

Pursue penetrating technologies.

           Prepare the Korean people for unification.

4. Stress human rights in every statement in which we mention the nuclear and missile programs. – Korean people suffer because of Kim’s deliberate policy decisions. $650 million in missile tests in 2022

5. Empower US Army PSYOP Personnel to support their ROK counterparts in conducting PSYOP against the north.

           Direct the pursuit of technology from industry to penetrate nK

6. Establish a Korean Escapee Information Institute to harness the power of escapees.

           Key communicators, shape appropriate themes and messages, inspire those in the north.

Why an Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea:

1. Prevent War – establish policies for 2d tier military leadership - e.g., if you do not attack and maintain control of WMD and you and your family will have a place in a free and unified Korea. When faced with an order to attack – we want the 2d tier leadership to have a choice.

2. Pressure on KJU – from the elite, military leaders, and people – KJU responsible for failure – his policies cause suffering and will ultimate cause nK to fail. Long shot but the pressure from within could cause Kim to change or at least moderate his policies.

           Every time we must talk about nuclear weapons and missiles we need to emphasize the human rights abuses – and the $650 million wasted in 2022 on provocations.

3. Offer options to the Korean people. There is life outside of Juche and Songbun that they can reach and enjoy – show the success of escapees.

4. Support to potential emerging leadership who seek change – when they do act they must know they will be supported by the international community.

5. Prepare the Korean people in the north for unification. A long process of education to undo Juche and Songbun and learn about such things as land ownership and participatory politics and the rule of law versus the rule by law of the regime.

Biden urged to offer bold strategy against North Korean threats

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-24 17:58 | Politics · April 24, 2023

A U.S. honor guard holds up Korean and U.S. national flags in front of the White House in Washington, D.C., Sunday (local time), a day before President Yoon Suk Yeol's six-day state visit to the United States. While in the U.S., Yoon will hold a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and participate in various events to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Yonhap

By Lee Hyo-jin

Gaining clear reassurance from the U.S. on extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threats should be one of the top priorities for President Yoon Suk Yeol in his upcoming summit with U.S. President Joe Biden, according to overseas analysts, Monday.

Earlier in the day, Yoon departed for Washington for a six-day state visit marking the 70th anniversary of the alliance between the two nations. Yoon and Biden are scheduled to hold a summit at the White House on Wednesday (local time).

"President Yoon's mission is clear: to convince the Biden administration that trying to tackle the North Korean nuclear threat is worth the political risk and usage of little political capital beyond Ukraine in foreign affairs," Harry Kazianis, the president of Rogue States Project, a think tank, told The Korea Times.

"At the moment, beyond important military exercises and tough talk, Team Biden clearly does not want to try anything new on the DPRK front that would be considered politically risky or draw any headlines that could be used against him in the 2024 presidential race." The DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

In this regard, Kazianis viewed that Yoon should convince Biden to offer a much more comprehensive and bold strategy regarding Pyongyang, which will prove that the U.S.' commitment to South Korea's security remains ironclad.

Robert Manning, a distinguished senior fellow of the Stimson Center, echoed the sentiment. "President Yoon would want to go home with clearer reassurance on U.S. extended deterrence," he said.

As the summit comes amid high tensions on the Korean Peninsula spurred by Pyongyang's repeated missile provocations, talks between the two leaders are expected to focus on deepening extended deterrence, with South Korea possibly calling for an Asian version of a NATO nuclear planning group.

A billboard installed at COEX in southern Seoul's Gangnam District shows a message hoping for President Yoon Suk Yeol's successful state visit to Washington, D.C., Monday. Yonhap"It is realistic to think that South Korea could get a deal on extended nuclear deterrence in the coming months," said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London. "As for a NATO-style nuclear sharing agreement, it would be up to the U.S. to decide whether it wants to reach such a deal with South Korea."

On top of military cooperation, Yoon is also tasked with addressing South Korean firms' concerns regarding the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and CHIPS and Science Act. Though the two U.S. laws are aimed at reducing dependency on China, the "Buy American" provisions have risen as a major headache for South Korean businesses.

On his trip to the U.S., Yoon is accompanied by the chiefs of 122 local companies, including major conglomerates, highlighting the government's intention to discuss the U.S. protectionist provisions with its counterparts.

Manning advised that Yoon could use the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) as leverage in related talks. According to him, the EU and Japan are also affected by the provisions, but unlike the other two, South Korea has an FTA with the U.S. and is making major investments there, building both EVs and batteries.

"The U.S.-ROK economic partnership should arguably be cause to grant tax credit benefits similar to those enjoyed by U.S. firms," he said. ROK is an acronym for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

Pacheco Pardo, for his part, said that Yoon should make it clear to the U.S. it should not create economic friction with close allies like South Korea. Otherwise, these partners could think that it is not in their interests to side with Washington in its economic and tech competition with Beijing, he said.

The experts also anticipated additional support for Ukraine in its war against Russia to be included in the talks between the two leaders. Provision of military aid to Kyiv has risen as a hot button issue here after Yoon recently hinted at the possibility of offering lethal weapons depending on the situation in Ukraine.

According to Pacheco Pardo, however, if the Yoon administration decides to provide arms directly to Ukraine, it would be more of a political rather than a practical move.

"Moscow is already annoyed with the Yoon government due to South Korea being one of the few Asian countries clearly supporting Ukraine," he said, adding that continuing to provide weapons to third-party countries that can pass them on to Ukraine will help strengthen Seoul's relations with the United States and Europe.

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-24 17:58 | Politics · April 24, 2023

12.  Yoon eyes stronger alliance in security, tech during US visit

The alliance is in the best shape it has been in many years. I am hopeful for a very strong and comprehensive statement that will chart a way ahead at this likely inflection point.

Yoon eyes stronger alliance in security, tech during US visit

The Korea Times · April 24, 2023

President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, alongside his wife, Kim Keon Hee, board the presidential plane at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, south of Seoul, Monday, for his six-day trip to the United States, to hold a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden, and to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the bilateral alliance. Yonhap 

President embarks on six-day state visit for summit, 70th anniversary

By Nam Hyun-woo

President Yoon Suk Yeol kicked off his state visit to the United States, Monday, to hold a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and celebrate the 70th anniversary of the bilateral alliance.

Yoon will stay in the U.S. until April 29 and attend a slew of ceremonies commemorating the alliance and economic events that will further deepen the two countries' economic partnership.

He will be the first South Korean president since Lee Myung-bak in 2011 to pay a state visit to the U.S., and it will be Yoon's sixth meeting with Biden, following those in Seoul last May and then in Madrid, London, New York and Phnom Penh.

According to the presidential office, Yoon and Biden will hold a summit at the White House on April 26 after an official welcoming ceremony and before a state dinner where they will be joined by first ladies Kim Keon Hee and Jill Biden.

During his stay, Yoon is expected to focus on turning South Korea into a global strategic partner of the U.S. by strengthening their bilateral alliance not only in security, but also in artificial intelligence, space cooperation and advanced technology.

Specifically, the summit's agendas will include strengthening the two countries' joint defense posture, enhancing U.S. extended deterrence against North Korea, deeper and broader partnerships in supply chains and economic security, and cooperation in cybersecurity and space.

The summit will be an inflection point not only for South Korea-U.S. relations, but also for the entire Northeast Asian diplomatic dynamics, because Yoon and Biden are anticipated to make similar voices on the Ukraine War and tensions in the Taiwan Strait, which are issues to which Russia and China are showing sensitive reactions.

Yoon has drawn thorny responses from Beijing and Moscow, respectively, after expressing his view during a recent media interview that South Korea may provide military aid to Ukraine, and Seoul absolutely opposes attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force. Watchers say South Korea's relations with Russia and China could chill further depending on the content of the Yoon-Biden summit statement regarding the two issues.

A day before holding the summit, Yoon will attend forums and business roundtables joined by business leaders of the two countries and visit NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center.

On April 27, Yoon will deliver an address before a joint session of Congress and look back on the past 70 years of the bilateral alliance and suggest a future blue print for the relationship. He will then attend a luncheon hosted by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

After the luncheon, Yoon will receive a briefing from U.S. military leaders on the security status, which the South Korean presidential office said will be "a symbolic moment for deepening security cooperation between the two countries."

Later that day, Yoon will travel to Boston and hold discussions on April 28 with digital and bio scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He will also deliver an address at Harvard University the same day.

The Korea Times · April 24, 2023

13.  [Editorial] Stipulate the deterrence in the document

​

Haven't the words of the Minister and Secretary of Defense provided the strongest words of deterrence: If Kim Jong Un uses WMD the regime will cease to exist. 

Excerpts:

South Korea and America have been discussing effective measures to raise the trust in the extended deterrence until the summit on Wednesday. If our nuclear development, the redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons, and our reprocessing of the spent fuel are difficult to achieve, our president must find alternatives.

One of them is to stipulate a nuclear retaliation by the U.S. in case the North launches nuclear attacks on the South. That will be considerable progress from the past. The two sides are discussing the specification of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets like B-52 bombers and B-1B Lancers in the joint document if South Korea requests the deployment. We hope they present a tangible solution through close coordination till the last minute.

Monday

April 24, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

[Editorial] Stipulate the deterrence in the document

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/04/24/opinion/editorials/Yoon-Suk-Yeol-summit-US/20230424203042935.htm​w​l

President Yoon Suk Yeol has left Seoul for Washington for a seven-day state visit to the United States. His trip carries great significance as it marks the 70th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty our founding president Syngman Rhee struggled to strike with the U.S. in 1953 after the Korean War. But given the deepening security concerns about North Korean nuclear missiles coupled with the tense U.S.-China rivalry, the president must be heavy-shouldered.

Many events to celebrate the seven-decade alliance await President Yoon in the U.S., including a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and an address at the joint session of the U.S. Congress. But Yoon must bring at least one thing back home — reliable countermeasures to defend the country and people against the North’s missile attacks.

President Yoon must first clear growing suspicions over the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In a recent poll, 76.6 percent of South Koreans supported their own nuclear armaments, which reflects a critical lack of their trust in the nuclear deterrence.

Existing countermeasures against nuclear threats from North Korea can hardly ease the growing security concerns. North Korea’s nuclear capability has advanced to the level even U.S. security officials accept. China used coarse language after Yoon’s remarks about the Taiwan Strait and Russia blackmailed South Korea after Yoon’s comment about weapons support for Ukraine.

The 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between North Korea and China mandates an automatic intervention by either side if the other side is attacked. The Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the U.S. does not have such a clause. The intervention also requires a Congressional approval, which means that if North Korea launches a surprise attack, the allies could miss the timing to respond.

South Korea and America have been discussing effective measures to raise the trust in the extended deterrence until the summit on Wednesday. If our nuclear development, the redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons, and our reprocessing of the spent fuel are difficult to achieve, our president must find alternatives.

One of them is to stipulate a nuclear retaliation by the U.S. in case the North launches nuclear attacks on the South. That will be considerable progress from the past. The two sides are discussing the specification of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets like B-52 bombers and B-1B Lancers in the joint document if South Korea requests the deployment. We hope they present a tangible solution through close coordination till the last minute.

14. Yoon begins US state visit to trumpet stronger alliance, resolve trade issues

Extended deterrence is really going to have to be the foundation that underpins every aspect of national security, diplomacy, and economic engagement. We have to get that right.

Yoon begins US state visit to trumpet stronger alliance, resolve trade issues

Agenda to focus on level of bilateral agreement on extended deterrence

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · April 24, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on Monday began his five-day state visit to the US to mark the 70th anniversary of bilateral ties and to set a new direction for the alliance with US President Joe Biden, amid intensifying nuclear threats from North Korea and mounting trade issues.

The primary focus of the summit scheduled for Wednesday is on the level of bilateral agreement to be reached on extended deterrence as well as the extent of economic and security cooperation.

This will be Yoon's sixth meeting with Biden, with their previous meetings having taken place in Seoul, Madrid, London, New York and Phnom Penh. Yoon is the first South Korean president to pay a state visit to the US since Lee Myung-bak in 2011, and the second foreign leader to do so under the Biden administration.

An official arrival ceremony will take place before the summit, and a state dinner hosted by President Biden and first lady Jill Biden will follow. South Korean first lady Kim Keon Hee will accompany Yoon to the event. The full guest list was not released as of Monday.

Kim Tae-hyo, the first deputy director of Korea's National Security Office, told reporters Thursday the summit is expected to serve as an opportunity to further solidify the South Korea-US joint defense posture and to discuss extended deterrence between the two countries in more detail.

On extended deterrence, the two leaders are expected to clarify what the US' retaliatory actions will be if North Korea deploys nuclear weapons, according to Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

“The key is whether the US will employ nuclear weapons if North Korea attacks us. Extended deterrence is not legally binding, but rather a form of commitment, and thus it has certain structural limitations,” he said.

"To build trust in the US' extended deterrence, South Korea will also seek more clarity regarding the US' retaliatory actions in the event of North Korea's deployment of nuclear weapons."

Cho Nam-hoon, a senior research fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses’ North Korean military research division, echoed Park's analysis that South Korea will seek more room to collaborate with the US in specific areas such as information sharing, joint planning and joint drills.

He noted that the relocation of tactical nuclear weapons or the sharing of nuclear weapons are unlikely to be touched on during the summit, as it increases the possibility of South Korea becoming the primary target for Pyongyang. Cho also noted that in the event of an attack from the North, US Ohio-class submarines equipped with trident missiles would be deployed in the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula. He added that in this scenario, the speed of operation would be relatively similar, regardless of whether a nuclear weapon is stationed on the Korean Peninsula beforehand or not.

"In this case, as long as there is a guarantee that nuclear weapons can be employed when necessary, the location of the weapon, whether it is in Korea, the East Coast, or Guam, is not an issue," said Cho.

Economic security

Economic cooperation is another priority for Yoon as he attends a ceremony where US advanced tech firms will unveil their plans to invest in South Korea, as his first engagement in Washington. There will be a business roundtable with business leaders from the two countries.

Later on Tuesday, Yoon will visit the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center near Washington to discuss space cooperation between the two countries and meet with Korean scientists working at NASA.

The presidential couple will then return to the US capital to join the Bidens on a visit to the Korean War Veterans Memorial to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the alliance.

A day after the summit, Yoon will address a joint session of Congress on Thursday, touching upon the past 70 years of the alliance and its future. A lunch with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken will follow. There will be a briefing from US military leaders on the same day. On Friday, he is set to meet with digital and bio scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and deliver an address at Harvard University.

Accompanying Yoon on his state visit will be the leaders of South Korea's major conglomerates, including Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, LG and Lotte, as part of a 122-member business delegation. The focus is on whether Yoon can navigate a path forward for Korean companies that are at a crossroads due to US protectionist policies, such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act.

The Inflation Reduction Act seeks to provide tax credits in the form of subsidies exclusively for electric vehicles assembled in North America. Recently, Korean automakers, Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors, were considered not eligible for subsidies by the US government.

“As for the Inflation Reduction Act, it seems there is not much the president can do as Korean battery industries have become the beneficiaries and the US included leasing vehicles in IRA tax credits,” said Kim Pil-soo, a professor of automotive engineering at Daelim University.

“However, in the case of the CHIPS and Science Act, further discussion on the topic of semiconductors is expected due to issues surrounding the sharing of excess profits and the exposure of confidential business information.”

Samsung Electronics is planning to invest $17 billion to build a foundry plant in Taylor, Texas, and SK hynix is planning to invest $15 billion in advanced memory semiconductor packaging manufacturing facilities.

To qualify for subsidies from the US government, semiconductor companies are required to meet certain conditions such as allowing access to their facilities, sharing excess profits, submitting detailed accounting data, and restricting plant expansion in China. However, these requirements often involve sharing confidential business information with the US government.

Some have suggested that it may be better for semiconductor companies not to apply for subsidies under the US CHIPS and Science Act. However, there are concerns that not participating in the program may be seen as showing favoritism toward China, which could have negative consequences given the ongoing US-China confrontation.

The semiconductor industry is hopeful that the requirements for subsidies under the US CHIPS and Science Act may be relaxed to some extent, particularly as the heads of major conglomerates, such as Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong and SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won, accompany Yoon on his visit.

By Shin Ji-hye (shinjh@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · April 24, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com