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1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023
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1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations are at the link: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on April 23:
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner Group personnel not to capture Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) but instead only kill Ukrainian personnel on the battlefield.[169]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 23.[170] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported that Russian forces are building fortifications around Severdonetsk and other large cities in Luhansk Oblast.[171]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian servicemen and Wagner personnel engaged in a shootout in Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk Oblast following a dispute about responsibility for tactical miscalculations and losses.[172]
- Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[173] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported on April 23 that Russian forces concentrated most of their efforts in the Avdiivka direction and conducted 28 assaults in the Donetsk direction.[174]
- Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas northwest of Oleshky on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[175] Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo denied that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead on the east (left) bank as of April 23.[176]
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 23 that Russian forces are planning to mobilize migrants from Central Asia by threating to deport migrants and revoke their Russian citizenship if they do not fight in the war.[177]
- Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on April 22 that Wagner Group fighters are helping Russian occupation officials assert control over the civilian population on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[178]
- A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.[179]
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 23, 2023
Apr 23, 2023 - Press ISW
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023
Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 23, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 23. This report outlines the current Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, assesses the offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian force groupings along the front, and discusses major factors that may complicate Russian defensive operations in the event of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
This report is based on a number of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW does not, as a matter of policy, attempt to assess or report on. It assumes, in particular, that Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated multi-brigade mechanized offensive operation making full use of the reported nine brigades being prepared for that operation. That task is daunting and larger than any offensive effort Ukraine has hitherto attempted (four Ukrainian brigades were reportedly used in the Kharkiv counter-offensive, for example). It also assumes that Ukraine will have integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various sorts into its units to support extended mechanized maneuver, that Ukrainian mechanized units will have sufficient ammunition of all sorts including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to conduct long-range precision strikes with HIMARS and other similar systems integrated with and supporting maneuver operations as it has done before. It further assumes that Ukrainian forces will have the mine-clearing and bridging capabilities needed to move relatively rapidly through prepared defensive positions. ISW sees no reason to question any of these assumptions given the intensity with which Ukraine has reportedly been preparing for this operation and the time it has taken to do so, as well as the equipment reportedly delivered to Ukrainian forces by Western countries. If any significant number of these assumptions prove invalid, however, then some of the assessments and observations below will also be invalid, and the Russians’ prospects for holding their lines will be better than presented below. ISW offers no assessment of or evidence for these assumptions, and thus offers no specific forecast for the nature, scale, location, duration, or outcome of the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive. Ukraine has attractive options for offensive operations all along the line, and ISW does not assess that the information presented in this report or any observations ISW has made below lead obviously to the conclusion that Ukrainian forces will attack in one area or another.
Russian forces in Ukraine are operating in decentralized and largely degraded formations throughout the theater, and the current pattern of deployment suggests that most available units are already online and engaged in either offensive or defensive operations. ISW assesses that Russian forces are currently operating along seven axes: Kupyansk; Luhansk Oblast; Bakhmut; Avdiivka-Donetsk City; western Donetsk/eastern Zaporizhia; western Zaporizhia; and Kherson Oblast. Russian forces are pursuing active offensive operations on at least five of these axes (Kupyansk, Luhansk, Bakhmut, Avdiivka-Donetsk City, and western Donetsk/eastern Zaporizhia) and predominantly pursuing defensive operations on the western Zaporizhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast axes. The forces currently committed to both offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine are both regular (doctrinally consistent based on Russian pre-war units) and irregular (non-standard and non-doctrinal) forces, and it is highly likely that the majority of Russian elements throughout Ukraine are substantially below full strength due to losses taken during previous phases of the war. This report will discuss “elements” of certain units and formations deployed to certain areas, but it should not be assumed that any of these units or formations are operating at full strength.
Kupyansk Axis (Northeastern Kharkiv Oblast)
Russia has committed elements of previously damaged Western Military District (WMD) formations to the Kupyansk area. Russian forces have been pursuing limited offensive operations on the Kupyansk axis in the first few months of 2023, but have failed to make operationally significant gains towards Kupyansk and have made only occasional and localized tactical gains. ISW has observed mentions of unknown units of unspecified echelon of the 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA)’s 47th Tank Division operating in the Kupyansk direction.[1] The 1st GTA notably suffered major manpower and equipment losses during the Russian offensive in Chernihiv Oblast early in the war in 2022, and then once again during Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive in fall 2022.[2] The 1st GTA’s 4th Tank Division, particularly its 12th and 13th Tank Regiments, lost nearly 100 tanks in a few days in September 2022, so any constituent elements of the 1st GTA that are currently operating near Kupyansk are likely short of tanks and other critical systems.[3] The commitment of damaged and understrength 1st GTA elements to this line likely suggests that the Russian military command is not immediately prioritizing this as an axis of advance or defense. Geolocated footage from February 2023 additionally shows that the WMD’s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has committed unknown units of unspecified echelon near the Fyholivka-Novomlynsk area, about 19km directly north of Kupyansk.[4] A Russian milblogger additionally indicated that elements of the 6th CAA’s 138th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in Kharkiv Oblast, likely near Kupyansk.
Based on the pattern of deployment of WMD formations on the Kupyansk and Luhansk axes, the WMD’s 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st GTA) has likely deployed toward along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border. ISW has previously noted that it has not yet observed explicit confirmation that the 2nd MRD has come online but considering that unnamed 1st GTA elements are deployed near Kupyansk and that it is highly unlikely that Russia can afford to hold a division in reserve while trying to pursue offensive and defensive operations, the 2nd MRD has likely deployed near Kupyansk.[5]
Observed elements:
o 47th Tank Division [7]
- 6th Combined Arms Army [8]
o 138th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [9]
Svatove/Kreminna line
Russia has committed elements of two military districts and two airborne (VDV) divisions to an unsuccessful offensive in Luhansk Oblast that has operationally culminated. ISW assessed in February that WMD elements had been committed to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in Luhansk Oblast but forecasted that this offensive was extraordinarily unlikely to achieve meaningful gains. This offensive has now operationally culminated and has made only a few localized tactical gains. Elements of the WMD’s 20th Combined Arms Army (20th CAA); the Central Military District (CMD)’s 41st Combined Arms Army (41st CAA); VDV forces; the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU); forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), and various ad hoc irregular formations have been fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna line since early 2023. ISW has observed a heavy commitment of the 20th CAA’s 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Divisions (MRDs) along the Svatove-Kreminna line, including all three of the 144th MRD’s constituent regiments (the 254th and 488th Guards Motor Rifle regiments and the 59th Guards Tank Regiment) and two of the 3rd MRD’s motorized rifle regiments (the 752nd and 252ndMotorized Rifle Regiments).[10] Considering that most of these elements have been actively engaged in offensive operations along an active front for the greater part of four months they are likely exhausted and substantially degraded.
Russia has also committed elements of the CMD to the Svatove-Kreminna line, particularly in the area west of Kreminna. Geolocated footage posted in late February shows that elements of the 35th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army (41st CAA) conducted a failed vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against Ukrainian positions near Chervonopopivka, 6km north of Kreminna.[11] The 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division is likely also engaged near Svatove, and a Russian milblogger noted in early January that mobilized servicemen of this regiment have been fighting in this area without rotation since October 2022, which suggests that the CMD largely lacks other forces with which to conduct necessary troops rotations.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) additionally refers to the “Central Group of Forces” (another name for the CMD grouping in Ukraine) operating in the Lyman direction west of Kreminna in its daily situation reports.[13] The CMD under Colonel General Alexander Lapin was responsible for the major Russian operational defeat following the Ukrainian liberation of Lyman on October 1, 2022.[14] CMD elements were likely severely degraded during the fall of Lyman and subsequent Ukrainian counteroffensive pushes, and the current CMD grouping near Kreminna is therefore likely comprised of partially reconstituted remnants of the October withdrawal. The exact hierarchy of command and control on this sector of the front is unclear-- Lapin was dismissed following the fall of Lyman but then apparently reappointed as commander of the Luhansk axis as of April 18.[15]
VDV forces are also actively engaged near Kreminna. ISW has observed mentions of the 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment of the 76th VDV Division and the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th VDV Division operating in the forested area to the west and southwest of Kreminna.[16] The Russian military command notably appears to be increasing the prominence of VDV forces, and the Russian MoD reported on April 3 that VDV units received TOS-1A “Solntsepek” thermobaric artillery systems for the first time in history.[17] Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have used TOS-1A systems near Kreminna as recently as April 1.[18] TOS-1A systems are military district-level assets that are not tied to specific formations, so their use around Kreminna by VDV elements is noteworthy and suggests that the Russian military command may be trying to empower VDV units to conduct further offensive operations on this front. However, the commitment of a single type of artillery asset is unlikely to lend VDV forces a decisive offensive edge on this axis and does not replace the core requirement for better (and more) Russian infantry capabilities, as ISW has previously assessed.[19]
The Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) has also deployed limited special forces (Spetsnaz) elements along the Svatove-Kreminna line, likely to offset the lack of needed infantry capabilities. Russian milbloggers have posted footage claiming that the 24th Separate Special Purpose Brigade and 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade are operating near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) and around Kreminna itself.[20] The Russian military continues to use Spetsnaz units to conduct ground attacks and infantry maneuvers instead of for their primary sabotage and targeting missions, as ISW has previously observed.[21] The apparent increased prominence of Spetsnaz units in this area is likely part of the Russian military command’s effort to mitigate losses to ground assault elements by committing elite formations that traditionally have different functions to regular combat missions.[22]
Several irregular Russian formations have additionally been playing a supplementary role along the Svatove-Kreminna line. LNR, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve), Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz, and the “Don” Cossack Regiment appear to be participating in hostilities in this area, albeit to a much more limited extent than more conventional units.[23] ISW has observed two BARS detachments—BARS “Kaskad” and BARS-13—engaged near Kreminna, and the 4th LNR Brigade and 3rd LNR Battalion additionally have been fighting alongside Chechen “Akhmat” elements south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[24]
Russian forces have failed to make meaningful advances in Luhansk Oblast in 2023, despite the heavy commitment of elements of at least three armies of two military districts, elements of two VDV divisions, and the support of numerous irregular formations. The forces that have been fighting along this line for at the better part of four months are likely exhausted and substantially degraded. They have continued to attack, have not rotated to rest and refit, and do not appear to have prepared themselves to receive a Ukrainian offensive.
Observed elements:
o 24th Separate Special Purpose Brigade [25]
o 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade [26]
o 76th VDV Division
§ 237th Air Assault Regiment [27]
o 98th VDV Division [28]
§ 331st Airborne Regiment [29]
o 144th Motor Rifle Division [30]
§ 254th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment [31]
§ 488th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment [32]
§ 59th Guards Tank Regiment [33]
o 3rd Motor Rifle Division [34]
§ 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment [35]
§ 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment [36]
- Central Military District
o 41st Combined Arms Army
§ 35th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade [37]
§ 90th Tank Division
§ 6th Tank Regiment [38]
o Other unspecified echelons in the Lyman direction
- 2nd Luhansk Army Corps elements
o 4th Brigade [39]
§ TF SURRICATS anti-drone unit [40]
o 3rd Battalion [41]
o BARS
§ BARS-13 [42]
§ BARS “Kaskad” [43]
o Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz [44]
o Don Cossacks [45]
Bakhmut
The current Russian pattern of commitment around Bakhmut suggests that the Russian military leadership is increasingly prioritizing the completion of the capture of the city before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive if possible. The Wagner Group continues to take heavy losses. It may well be able to complete the seizure of the city at some point. Sustaining Wagner’s advance beyond its culmination required the Russian MoD to commit VDV formations to allow Wagner to concentrate almost entirely on the urban fight. Wagner financier and chief Yevgeny Prigozhin ceded the northern and southwestern flanks to the Russian MoD and confirmed that VDV elements are supporting the Wagner main effort in Bakhmut in this way. VDV support in this area will likely enable Wagner to make more gains within the city and may persuade Ukrainian forces to withdraw. VDV units near Bakhmut are likely further removed from direct, highly attritional urban combat than Wagner elements, and will thus likely emerge from the battle for Bakhmut in substantially better shape than Wagner.
Russian milbloggers have noted that elements of the 106th VDV Division are defending the line near Yakovlivka, about 17km northeast of Bakhmut.[46] The announcement of Wagner and the VDV working together around Bakhmut suggests that the Russian military leadership is seeking to cooperate with Prigozhin despite previously growing frictions in order to expedite the capture of Bakhmut. The Russian MoD’s apparent desire to reduce friction with Wagner over Bakhmut is also evidenced by the apparent reappointment of former VDV commander and Wagner affiliate Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to an unspecified but “major” role in Ukraine after alleged previous disagreements with the MoD and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[47] These efforts on the command level are additionally having tactical impacts--Russian milbloggers noted that Wagner is now operating T-90 tanks in Bakhmut, which suggests that the Russian military leadership has allocated more modern assets to Wagner in an attempt to expedite the capture of the city.
Certain irregular Russian formations are also engaged near Bakhmut, although in a notably much more limited capacity than Wagner. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 25 that around 200 Chechen “Akhmat” special purpose police arrived in Bakhmut to combat desertion and sabotage by other Russian forces in the area.[48] “Akhmat” forces are unlikely to have engaged in actual combat, however. The “Lystan” volunteer detachment, part of the “Don” Cossack” formation, claimed to be fighting near Bakhmut as of March 18.[49]
Observed elements:
- Wagner [ISW does not attempt to maintain a detailed order of battle of Wagner forces]
o 11th Reconnaissance and Assault detachment [50]
o 106th VDV Division [51]
- Irregulars/ volunteer battalions
o Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz for military law enforcement within Bakhmut [52]
o Lystan volunteer battalion [53]
Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis
The Russian military command has heavily committed a variety of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) elements to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline, alongside some Southern Military District (SMD) and Northern Fleet units. These elements have made no operationally significant progress on this axis in 2023 beyond marginal tactical advances around Avdiivka and within Marinka. DNR forces have notably been active along this axis since 2014, and the current frontline in this area is within kilometers of the line that has held for eight years.
DNR elements in this area have particularly suffered from poor and abusive command culture, which has been greatly exacerbated by the Russian MoD’s recent campaign to officially integrate and formalize DNR forces within the Russian military. The Russian military formally integrated and acknowledged control of the existing 1st and 2nd Army Corps (forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively), and these formations are now officially operationally subordinated to the 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District).[54] This official subordination has caused widespread issues for DNR forces, however. Russian sources have circulated reports that the DNR command is sending mobilized servicemen from throughout Russia to fill out DNR units with minimal training and that DNR commanders badly mistreat mobilized servicemen and force them into attritional assaults with no preparation.[55] The Russian MoD’s desire to rapidly integrate DNR and Russian forces by staffing DNR units with Russian mobilized personnel has likely degraded the combat capabilities of forces on this front.[56]
DNR brigades, regiments, battalions, and other constituent elements notably are not manned or equipped in accord with normal Russian tables of organization and equipment. DNR forces initially started as militia-style proxy forces in 2014 and have maintained much of that irregularity within their formations despite their formal integration into the 8th CAA. The DNR calls certain formations “brigades,” “regiments,” or “battalions,” but these elements are not equivalent to Russian formations with the same echelon designation.
ISW has observed numerous DNR elements near Avdiivka and on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. The DNR has heavily committed all eight of its known “brigades”—the 1stSlavic, 3rd Horlivka, 5th, 9th, 14thKalmius, 100th, 114th, and 132nd—to the area north and northwest of Donetsk City.[57] The 56th and 58th Separate Special Purpose Battalions, 10thTank Battalion, as well as the “Sparta” Separate Guards Reconnaissance Battalion and “Somalia” Separate Guards Assault Battalion have been prominent in DNR operations around Avdiivka and in the Vodyane area just southwest of Avdiivka.[58] A number of other DNR regiments are additionally engaged in this sector of the front.[59]
The SMD’s 8thCombined Arms army (8th CAA) has committed elements of both of its two motorized rifle divisions to operations in the Marinka area on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. The 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s two tank regiments (68th and 163rd) and the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division’s 255th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment have been fighting in Marinka since at least February 2023.[60] Mobilized servicemen from Krasnodar Krai posted a video appeal on March 9 in which they reported that they are serving in the 2nd Motorized Rifle Company (1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, 255th Motor Rifle Regiment) and that their command threw them into attritional assaults near Donetsk City (likely near Marinka) in late February.[61]
Elements of the Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps were also active in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area but have likely withdrawn further into the rear due to high combat losses. Russian milbloggers claimed on March 22 that the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) attacked Ukrainian positions near Tonenke, 7km west of Avdiivka.[62] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, however, reported on April 3 that the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade withdrew from the frontline in order to refit and recover.[63]
Several volunteer battalions are also reportedly fighting on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis. Russian sources have reported that the Perm Oblast “Molot” Tank Battalion, the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Battalion, and the “Nevsky” volunteer detachment are fighting near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk City area.[64] Dmytrashkivskyi noted on March 5 that the “Steppe” Cossack Battalion arrived at an unspecified area in the Donetsk City direction but reported that the “Steppe” Battalion was very distrustful of command and in panic.[65] Former Russian proxy commander and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin revealed on April 7 that the “Nevsky” volunteer detachment, which he enthusiastically advertised on his Telegram account, is essentially a sham that threw recruits into attritional assaults with no training or equipment and that its total complement is 1,186 despite the fact that it was advertised as a brigade (typically numbering approximately 3,200 to 3,600 personnel) .[66] Reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources on irregular Russian formations operating in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area suggest that these units are faced with pervasive issues of morale, organization, and command and are likely not particularly combat effective.
A reportedly captured Russian military manual offers insight into how 8th CAA and DNR forces are utilizing company-sized units in urban combat to mitigate limitations on the combat effectiveness of these formations as they fight along the Donetsk City line. A Ukrainian reserve officer released a captured Russian manual on April 6 that details the formation of “Storm Z” companies, which are staffed with recruits and created within elements of the 8th CAA and DNR.[67] These ”Storm Z” companies are staffed with 100 personnel (divided into four capture squads, four fire support squads, a command element, a combat engineering group, reconnaissance group, medevac group, and UAV crew) and are created outside the conventional army unit structure and attached to existing regiments and brigades.[68] These formations are meant to conduct urban combat operations or operations in challenging geographic areas with the intent of capturing strategic objects and are likely being employed in urban combat in highly fortified small settlements near Donetsk City. Their existence suggests that 8th CAA and DNR elements are so badly damaged that they need this sort of irregular tactical arrangement. Such ad hoc tactical formations integrated into already disorganized units are unlikely to lend Russian forces on this axis a significant offensive advantage.[69]
Observed elements:
- 1st Donetsk Army Corps elements
o 1st Slavic Brigade [70]
§ 1453rd Regiment [71]
§ 1439th Regiment [72]
o 3rd (Horlivka) Brigade [73]
o 9th Brigade [74]
§ 6th Rifle Battalion [75]
o 5th Brigade [76]
o 14th “Kalmius” Brigade [77]
o 110th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [78]
§ 2nd Battalion [79]
§ Pyatnashka Battalion [80]
o 132nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [81]
o 9th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment [82]
o 10th Tank Battalion [83]
o 114th Brigade (formerly 11th Regiment) [84]
o 87th Regiment (formerly 9th Regiment) [85]
o 1454th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment [86]
o 23rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Division [87]
o “Somalia” battalion [88]
o “Sparta battalion”[89]
o 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion [90]
o 58th Special Purpose Battalion (previously 3rdSeparate DNR Special Purpose Brigade) [91]
o Unspecified DNR Spetsnaz elements [92]
- Southern Military District
o 8th Combined Arms Army
§ 150th Motorized Rifle Division [93]
§ 68th Tank Regiment [94]
§ 163rd Tank Regiment [95]
§ 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division
§ 255th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment [96]
§ 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion [97]
o 14th Army Corps
§ 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade [98]
o 3rd Army Corps
§ 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [99]
o Volunteer battalions
§ Perm “Molot” Tank Battalion [100]
§ 1st Sabotage and Reconnaissance Battalion “Wolves” [101]
§ Nevsky Volunteer Detachment [102]
§ Steppe Cossack Battalion [103]
Southern Donetsk/Eastern Zaporizhia axis
Eastern Military District (EMD) elements have been committed to western Donetsk Oblast near Vuhledar since fall 2022 and have suffered continued losses during repeated failed attempts to take Vuhledar. The EMD’s 29th and 36th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and Pacific Fleet have been pursuing offensives towards Vuhledar over the course of the first few months of 2023.[104] An obituary posted on March 23 indicates that the 36th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) fought in Mykilske, 4km southeast of Vuhledar.[105] Geolocated footage shows that a 36th CAA unit of unspecified echelon actively stormed Ukrainian positions near Mykilske in late February.[106] The 36th CAA’s 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade are also likely operating near Vuhledar.[107] Pacific Fleet elements, particularly the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades, have been the most actively engaged in this area since fall 2022.[108]
EMD elements in the Vuhledar area have been restaffed in various iterations with poorly trained and disciplined mobilized personnel to compensate for overall unit degradation. Following another notorious failed offensive on Vuhledar in early February 2023, Dmytrashkivskyi reported that naval infantry elements were losing 150 to 300 personnel per day and that the 155thBrigade therefore needed to be entirely restaffed for a third time.[109] Ukrainian intelligence also noted that elements of the 98th VDV Division arrived to support the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade around Vuhledar, further highlighting the destruction of this formation.[110] The failures of EMD units in this area have additionally been reflected on the strategic level—Russian sources speculated in late March that the Russian MoD dismissed EMD Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov for command failures leading to operational disaster in western Donetsk Oblast.[111]
Limited DNR elements, a GRU brigade, several volunteer battalions, and a BARS detachment are also operating near Vuhledar. The “Kaskad” operational-combat tactical formation, comprised of DNR internal ministry and law enforcement personnel, has claimed that it is active in the Vuhledar direction.[112] A Russian milblogger posted a picture purportedly of a fighter from the GRU’s 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade near Vuhledar.[113] The “Hispaniola,” “Alga,” and “Steppe/Tigr” battalions and BARS-23 detachment are also fighting in the area.[114] The “Hispaniola” Battalion is notably comprised of Russian sports fans and reportedly has been coordinating with the DNR “Vostok” Battalion, a militant formation formed in 2014 under the command of Alexander Khodakovsky.[115] “Alga” Battalion volunteers reported that they were charged with desertion after trying to leave the Vuhledar area upon the completion of their contracts, and the Ukrainian General Staff similarly reported that the Russian command has “lost control” over the “Steppe/Tigr” detachment near Vuhledar.[116] These reports suggest that volunteer elements near Vuhledar are likely poorly disciplined and are therefore combat ineffective.
Observed elements:
- Eastern Military District
o 29th Combined Arms Army [117]
§ 36th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [118]
o 36th Combined Arms Army [119]
§ 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [120]
§ 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade [121]
o Pacific Fleet
§ 40th Naval Infantry Brigade [122]
§ 155th Naval Infantry Brigade [123]
o VDV
§ 98th VDV Division [124]
o 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade [125]
o OBTF “Kaskad” [126]
o Volunteer battalions
§ “Hispaniola” sports fans [127]
§ “Alga” battalion [128]
§ “Steppe/Tigr” Cossack battalion [129]
o BARS elements
§ BARS-23 [130]
Zaporizhia Oblast
Russia has committed SMD elements and several irregular formations to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia axis. Russian sources claimed that elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA)’s 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division—specifically its 70th and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments—repelled a series of Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Zaporizhia direction on March 19.[131] A Russian milblogger noted that elements of the 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, including its 2nd Battalion, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, about 55km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[132] Geolocated footage posted on March 20 confirms that a 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment tank moved through Robotyne towards the frontline.[133] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of GRU’s 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade also defended against Ukrainian attacks on this sector of the front alongside 58th CAA elements, likely also near Robotyne.[134] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an audio intercept on February 24 in which a Russian serviceman of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment says that his command ordered his unit to attack Shcherbaky, 33km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[135] Russian milbloggers have also highlighted the operations of the Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade in the Zaporizhia direction.[136] One milblogger claimed that the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (EMD) is also active in this area.[137] However, the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade became the 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) in 2019, and it is unclear if the milblogger erroneously referred to the 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment as the 60th Brigade. The presence of EMD elements on this sector of the front is therefore low confidence.[138]
Numerous irregular formations are also present in Zaporizhia Oblast but are mainly engaged in defensive actions further in the rear. ISW has observed discussions about at least three volunteer battalions in the Zaporizhia direction. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky has notably formed his own “Sudoplatov” volunteer battalion, mainly comprised of foreign volunteers and individuals forcibly mobilized from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[139] The “Sudoplatov” battalion is active in Zaporizhia Oblast, but likely operating deeper in the rear. Russian sources have also claimed that the “Crimea” Battalion and the Ossetian “Storm” Battalion are active in the Zaporizhia direction.[140] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated on April 2 that personnel of the Chechen “South-Akhmat” Battalion are using UAVs to conduct reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[141] A Russian milblogger reportedly visited a Bashkort mobilized regiment conducting defensive preparations in Zaporizhia Oblast on March 14 and claimed that the regiment had already built 37km of trenches in the rear.[142]
Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely less exhausted and degraded than forces elsewhere on the front due to the largely defensive nature of operations on this front so far in 2023.
While limited SMD and GRU elements have reportedly seen some active combat, most Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are preparing for defense in depth. These troops are predominantly comprised of mobilized recruits and volunteers and are therefore likely to face some problems with poor training and discipline. They have, however, had more time on whole to rest and reconstitute following Ukraine’s 2022 southern counteroffensive.
Observed elements
- Southern Military District
o 58th Combined Arms Army
§ 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
§ 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment [143]
§ 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment [144]
§ 2nd Battalion[145]
§ 19th Motorized Rifle Division
§ 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment [146]
o Black Sea Fleet
§ 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade [147]
- Eastern Military District
o 5th Combined Arms Army
§ 127th Motorized Rifle Division
§ 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment (formerly the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade)[148]
o 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade[149]
o Volunteer battalions
§ Yevgeny Balitsky’s “Sudoplatov” battalion [150]
§ “Crimea” battalion [151]
§ Ossetian “Storm” battalion [152]
o Random Wagner personnel[153]
o Chechen “Akhmat” forces [154]
Kherson axis
The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely the most disorganized and undermanned in the entire theater. Prior to the Russian withdrawal from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 9-11, 2022, elements of the 76th and 106th VDV Divisions and 22nd Army Corps were committed to the area.[155] These elements have since been reconstituted and redeployed to other areas of the front. It is highly likely that the remaining grouping on the east (left) bank is mainly comprised of badly understrength remnants of mainly mobilized units. These elements have been removed from combat since the withdrawal in fall 2022, so they may be slightly fresher than elements elsewhere on the frontline. However, morale issues and poor training and discipline are likely common in this area, especially since more competent conventional elements are engaged elsewhere.
The information space in Kherson Oblast is notably very opaque, largely because this sector of the front has been mostly static since the Russian withdrawal from west bank Kherson in November 2022. The corps of military correspondents who report on frontline activities are elsewhere in Ukraine, so available information on the Russian grouping here is substantially limited. ISW has observed the presence of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet’s 22nd Army Corps near Velykyi Potemkin Island in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City.[156] Geolocated footage from February 18 additionally confirms that the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, SMD) was operating in Nova Kakhovka.[157] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov’s 300-person Wagner Group-affiliated “Convoy” private military company is also reportedly operating somewhere in Kherson Oblast.[158] It appears that the SMD has general responsibility for the Kherson sector of the front, but is less engaged here than it is in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian troops in Kherson Oblast, as in western Zaporizhia, are likely relatively less exhausted than forces elsewhere in theater and instead are preparing for defense in depth. However, the Russian grouping in Kherson is evidently scattered and undermanned.
Observed elements:
o 22nd Army Corps
§ 126th Coastal Defense Brigade [159]
- Southern Military District
o 49th Combined Arms Army
§ 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [geolocated to Nova Kakhovka] [160]
Black Sea Fleet Naval Capabilities
The Russian military command may commit ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to supporting Russian troops attempting to defend in southern Ukraine, especially as operations move toward the coast. The BSF is unlikely to make a material difference in ground operations, however. Ukrainian forces have damaged all three Admiral Grigorovich-class BSF frigates: “Admiral Grigorovich, “Admiral Essen,” and “Admiral Makarov,” and the immediate status of the “Essen” and “Grigorivich” is unclear.[161] Satellite imagery from February 10, 2023, may suggest that the “Grigorovich” sailed to Sevastopol.[162] Krivak-class patrol ships “Ladnyi” and “Pytlivyi” have been participating in exercises in the Black Sea in 2023.[163] The BSF’s 197th Assault Ship Brigade is comprised of two Alligator-class, three Ropucha-I, and one Ropucha-II landing ships, all of which have been reported as active as of summer 2022.[164] These landing ships are the most relevant asset in terms of direct strike capabilities because they carry ground attack missile systems. The BSF also has an assortment of corvettes, minesweepers, antisubmarine ships, missile boats and landing ships in the Black Sea. These ships are unlikely to provide Russia a substantial defensive edge against any future Ukrainian counteroffensives into southern Ukraine, however, as they would likely need to move close enough to the coastline that they would make themselves attractive targets. Russian ships are primarily focused on anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine missions, moreover, and generally do not carry many munitions appropriate for defending against mechanized counter-offensive operations.
The Russian obsession with continuing small-scale tactical offensive operations past the point of operational culmination has left Russian forces ill-prepared to respond to a large-scale mechanized counter-offensive. Russian forces have been prioritizing small-scale frontal assaults in order to make incremental tactical gains and reinforce small-scale tactical successes on limited areas of the front. These small-scale attacks do not require particularly involved command and control capabilities as local commanders can likely choose particular units or groups of individuals for attacks at times and places of their choosing and then focus their attention on those localized operations. Defensive maneuvers against a large-scale counter-offensive are much more complicated and will require involved and careful exercise of command and control over large units and large areas. Attacking Ukrainian forces will determine the times and places at which fighting occurs and will likely press across much wider areas than the attack sectors Russian commanders have typically focused on. Russian commanders will likely have to rely on all their units and sub-units fighting, not a chosen few, and will likely have to coordinate the defensive operations of all their units at the same time, rather than concentrating on a sector of their choice. The experience of combat that most Russian tactical and even operational commanders have is thus unlikely to prepare them well for the challenges they are likely to face.
The majority of the Russian units in important sectors of the front have been filled out with mobilized servicemen who were called up following Ukraine’s successful Kherson and Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensives and have not had experience defending against or withdrawing from a mechanized, multi-brigade advance, moreover. They are unlikely to be emotionally or intellectually prepared to respond to such an assault regardless of combat experience they have gained in the offensive operations of which they have hitherto been part. Sound defense and retrograded withdrawal will also likely be complicated by pervasive and endemic issues with morale and discipline of Russian forces. ISW has reported on many previous instances of servicemen in different areas of the front complaining about conditions within their units, abuse at the hands of commanders, dismissive command attitudes towards casualties, and desertion.[165] These factors are detrimental to unit cohesion and will likely further degrade overall Russian defensive capabilities.
The array of Russian fortifications throughout the theater is indicative of the defensive maneuvers Russian forces may have prepared to conduct. Russian forces have constructed a hard line of fortifications along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast line at a distance of between 5 and 20 kilometers behind the front line with the bulk of Russian combat power deployed forward of its fortification lines all along the front. This array suggests that Russian forces intend to withdraw from the frontline to the fortification line and defend there in case of a Ukrainian breakthrough. Similarly, the lines of fortifications in the Bakhmut and Donetsk City area are 5 to 20 kilometers behind the current line of contact, in principle leaving Russian forces space to withdraw through a buffer zone and man a system of defenses behind the line. Defensive lines in southern Ukraine, however, look very different. Russian forces in southern Ukraine have ostensibly prepared for defense in depth, with multiple lines of fortifications that go further into the rear. These defensive lines are mostly likely not all heavily manned—Russian forces simply do not have the personnel to properly man fortifications in areas far removed from the frontline at force densities sufficient to withstand a determined mechanized attack. Successful Russian defense in depth will likely require that Russian forces instead coordinate multiple retrograde maneuvers to fall back on each subsequent line of defense, which will require a high level of motivation and discipline among troops and sound command and control to oversee the complex and dangerous operation. Russian forces also suffer from significantly degraded mechanized maneuver capabilities and would likely be retrograding to secondary defensive lines largely by foot in the face of any potential mechanized Ukrainian counteroffensive push.
The current Russian ORBAT in Ukraine suggests that there are very few Russian units that are not actively online in the theater and emphasizes the widespread losses that Russian conventional elements have suffered throughout the war so far. The Russian military has 12 combined arms armies. ISW has observed reports of elements of all but two armies in operations so far in 2023—the EMD’s 35th CAA and the CMD’s 2nd CAA. Russian milbloggers reported that the 35th CAA was essentially completely destroyed by Ukrainian forces near Izyum in June 2022, and remnants of the 35th CAA reportedly deployed to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the summer of 2022.[166] It is therefore likely that remnants of the 35th CAA are scattered throughout southern Ukraine (particularly in rear Kherson Oblast and around critical areas in rear Zaporizhia Oblast) or even elsewhere in the theater and have likely been deployed in formations that are neither doctrinal nor at effective combat capability. The 2nd CAA has likely suffered losses similar to those of the 35th CAA. Ukrainian sources reported in April 2022 that elements of the 2nd CAA redeployed to Russia following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast.[167] Elements of the 2nd CAA thereafter deployed in more piecemeal formations to the Izyum area in Kharkiv Oblast and likely suffered substantial losses during Ukraine’s autumn 20222 Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive and around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, in early October.[168] The Russian MoD’s daily situation reports mention CMD formations in the Lyman direction, which may mean that elements of the 2nd CAA and other CMD units are operating in this area but are so understrength that they cannot be counted as formal elements.
The pattern of Russian deployments throughout Ukraine strongly suggests that most of the available maneuver elements of all military districts, as well as major surviving Airborne forces, are already committed to either active offensive or defensive operations in Ukraine. Russia will need to commit significant reserves to any discrete axis in order to conduct effective offensive operations, and the generally exhausted condition of troops and the apparently disorganized and fragmented deployment pattern in some areas will likely pose significant obstacles to Russia’s prospects for defending critical sectors of the frontline.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on April 23:
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner Group personnel not to capture Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) but instead only kill Ukrainian personnel on the battlefield.[169]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 23.[170] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported that Russian forces are building fortifications around Severdonetsk and other large cities in Luhansk Oblast.[171]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian servicemen and Wagner personnel engaged in a shootout in Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk Oblast following a dispute about responsibility for tactical miscalculations and losses.[172]
- Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[173] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported on April 23 that Russian forces concentrated most of their efforts in the Avdiivka direction and conducted 28 assaults in the Donetsk direction.[174]
- Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas northwest of Oleshky on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[175] Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo denied that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead on the east (left) bank as of April 23.[176]
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 23 that Russian forces are planning to mobilize migrants from Central Asia by threating to deport migrants and revoke their Russian citizenship if they do not fight in the war.[177]
- Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on April 22 that Wagner Group fighters are helping Russian occupation officials assert control over the civilian population on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[178]
- A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.[179]
2. Special Operations News Update - April 24, 2023 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - April 24, 2023 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · April 24, 2023
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Green Berets conduct RAPIDS operations from a CH-47 Chinook Helicopter during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation 23-2 in Alaska, Mar. 29, 2023. RAPIDS is a tactic utilized for quickly inserting and removing personnel in and out of an area. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Steven E. Lopez)
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SOF News
‘The Bolduc Brief’. Retired Brigadier General Don Bolduc has provided his perspective on toxic leadership in the U.S. military. “A Special Forces General Discusses Today’s Toxic Leadership Crisis”, SOFREP, Apr 18, 2023.
Rep. Gaetz Visits AFSOC Unit. Congressman Matt Gaetz, from Florida’s First District, visited the 919th Special Operations Wing to see firsthand the wide range of mission sets and capabilities Airmen provide to the nation. “Congressman Gaetz visits Duke Field”, 919th SOW, April 18, 2023.
Polymer Ammo – Not Just for SOF Anymore. The Special Operations Command uses a variety of ammunition that comes in with a polymer design – reducing the weight of the ammo and increases accuracy. Now that ‘special’ ammo will be making its way to the other military services. “Special Ops Ammo Spreads to Other Services”, National Defense Magazine, April 18, 2023.
Refueling the 352nd SOW. There is a close working relationship between the 352nd Special Operations Wing and the 100th Air Refueling Wing that are based at Royal Air Force Mildenhall, UK. One area of coordination is the setting up of FARPs. “Refueling the flight in the air, on land, on demand”, DVIDS, April 19, 2023.
SEAL Training and Change. How does completing arduous NSW training change a person? A study published in Physiology and Behavior explores the psychological and physiological changes associated with training to become a Navy SEAL. (PsyPost, Apr 21, 2023).
‘MARSOC 3’ Trials. The legal situation of one of the defendants in the case of the retired Green Beret and defense contractor who was killed in Iraq in 2019 is still unresolved. The saga of three current members of the Marine Corps’ elite special operations community has been in the limelight and has attracted the attention of some members of Congress. “3rd ‘MARSOC 3’ defendant’s case goes before top military appeals court”, Marine Corps Times, April 19, 2023.
SOF History
Colonel Nick Rowe. On April 21, 1989, Col James N. “Nick” Rowe was assassinated in the Manila, Philippines. He was an American prisoner of war that escaped captivity during the Vietnam War after being held for five years. He helped establish the US Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training program at Fort Bragg. He was killed by a unit of the New People’s Army in the Philippines.
Operation Eagle Claw. On the night of April 24-25, 1980 a Navy carrier was at sea carrying eight Navy helicopters that had Marine crews. Something was going on but the vast majority of the ship’s crew were unaware that history was in the making. “Night of Nights”, by Colonel Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (Retired), Small Wars Journal, April 23, 2023.
SF UW Tactics in Vietnam. An article delves into the history of Special Forces in Vietnam and how they utilized their unique skills to fight a guerrilla war. “Unconventional Green Beret tactics in Vietnam”, by Jessica Evans, We Are the Mighty, April 20, 2023.
ANZAC Day is observed on April 25, 2023. This day recognizes the Australians and New Zealanders who have served and died in wars, conflicts, and peacekeeping operations around the world. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anzac_Day
Sudan Conflict and Evacuation
Sudan in Chaos. The current Sudan conflict began on more than a week ago on Saturday, April 15th when two opposing factions began fighting. The country is in chaos with hundreds dead, thousands wounded, shortages of food, water, electricity, and medical services. Read more in “Crisis in Sudan”, SOF News, April 21, 2023.
U.S. Embassy Evacuation. On early Sunday morning (Sudan time) U.S. special operations forces conducted a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) for U.S. personnel who worked in the U.S. Embassy. Read about the evac opn in “U.S. Embassy Staff Evacuated from Khartoum”, SOF News, April 22, 2023.
War Powers Act. On Sunday President Biden sent a letter to Congress in accordance declaring his intention to use U.S. military forces to protect U.S. personnel and interests in Sudan. (White House, Apr 23, 2023).
Sudan Conflict Update. For news about the Sudan conflict and evacuation efforts of foreigners check out the Sudan Daily Updates – a running log of events that is provided each day and updated as major events or news occurs throughout the day. Not sure where Sudan is? Check out Maps of Sudan.
Sudan Task Force. The U.S. Department of State has established a Sudan Military Conflict Task Force to oversee the Department’s planning, management, and logistics related to events in Sudan. “US State Department Sets Up Special Task Force for Crisis in Sudan”, Voice of America, April 19, 2023.
Wagner Group – Picking Sides. The Russian paramilitary organization has offered weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – including surface-to-air missiles. “United States Says Wagner Has Quietly Picked Sides in Sudan”, The New York Times, April 23, 2023. (subscription)
Commentary
Finland’s Military Service. According to the Finnish Constitution every Finnish citizen is obligated to participate or assist in national defense. The Conscription Act states that every male Finnish citizen is liable for military service beginning at the age of 18. Finland’s long border with Russia and its small population (5.5 million) forces it to require widespread military training. The military training and experience provides the Finnish population with a mindset that enables the country to feel confident of its ability to defend itself against aggressor nations. Antti Ruokonen describes his training and experience in the Finnish Army and the effect it has had on his life – and on the people of his nation. “The Mentality That Finland’s Mandatory Military Service Brings to NATO”, Lawfare Blog, April 19, 2023.
Security Assistance – Not Always a Win. Rachel Tecott Metz, an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, examines the track record of U.S. security assistance to allies. She finds that when actual war breaks out, many long-time recipients of SA fight poorly or otherwise have not heeded the lessons that U.S. trainers try to impart. She argues that the U.S. relies too much on teaching and persuasion and should instead emphasize conditionality more. “Why Security Assistance Often Fails”, Lawfare, April 23, 2023.
Security Cooperation in Lower Priority Theaters. The current U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies China and Russia as the primary threats and North Korea and Iran as persistent threats. Other areas of the world have a lower priority for U.S. military resources. However, building partner capacity in these less resourced areas is still possible and necessary. “Campaigning Through (Security) Cooperation: A Roadmap for Implementing the National Defense Strategy in Lower Priority Theaters”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, April 18, 2023.
National Security
Sweden and NATO. Now that Finland has become a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the eyes of Europe are on Sweden. The admission of Sweden to NATO, possibly as soon as mid-summer, will greatly enhance the NATO alliance. It has a highly professional military and has invested a lot in modernization over the past several years. It has also been participating in numerous NATO exercises as well; to include Exercise Defender 23, which takes place across much of Europe.
Russia Expands in Arctic. The Rogachevo Air Base will become the latest military installation in the Russian high north to receive an extended runway and new facilities for personnel and equipment. The site is around 800 km from Kirkenes in North Norway. “Russia to Expand Rogachevo Air Base to Accomodate Long-range Aircraft”, High North News, April 2023.
Another Helicopter Raid in Syria. U.S. Central Command announced on April 17, 2023, that another raid took place that targeted a senior ISIS Syria leader. He was responsible for planning terror attacks in the Middle East and Europe. The target was killed during the attack along with two other ISIS operatives. It seems the raids are taking place about once a week, if not more.
RAF Drones Busy in Middle East. The Royal Air Force currently has about 10 Reaper drones flying missions over Iraq and Syria. The crew controlling the UAVs are thousands of miles away at the RAF Waddington Ground Control Station. “The Reaper drone and the analyst behind the RAF’s lethal unmanned aerial weapon”, Forces.net, April 21, 2023.
Wagner Group. A ‘confederation’ of anti-Western states in Africa is being established by a Russian paramilitary organization. This is expanding the influence of Russia in Africa while it diminishes American influence. Over a six-year stretch the mercenary outfit has gained strategic footholds in at least eight African countries. After the Cold War the U.S. seemed to have disengaged from Africa – other than to promote democracy and provide humanitarian assistance. This vacuum was filled by Russia – through its paramilitary organization. “Wagner Group surges in Africa as U.S. influence fades, leak reveals”, The Washington Post, April 23, 2023. (subscription)
Afghanistan – A Terrorist Haven. Less than two years after President Biden withdrew U.S. personnel the country has become a significant coordination site for the Islamic State. ISIS is planning attacks across Europe and Asia, and conducts “aspirational plotting” against the United States, according to a classified Pentagon assessment that portrays the threat as a growing security concern. “Afghanistan has become a terrorism staging ground again, leak reveals”, The Washington Post, April 22, 2023. (subscription)
Upcoming Events
May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida
SOF Week
USSOCOM
May 16-18, 2023. Fort Bragg, NC and via Zoom
Geostrategic Symposium 2023
USASOC
May 22-26, 2023. Indianapolis, Indiana
Special Forces Association Convention
May 31, 2023. Ijamsville, MD
6th Annual Golf Tournament
Three Rangers Foundation
June 21-22, 2023
Warrior East
ADS
August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida
Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion
CDF
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.
Books, Videos, and Podcasts
Book Review – At Sea. A new novel set on Martha’s Vineyard, an island off Cape Cod, is about a woman who falls in love with a Special Forces soldier. She is a newly graduate of college (art degree) and he is charismatic, handsome, funny, mercurial, and he has a special skill. He can breathe underwater . . . for a long time. And he disappears for extended periods of time on ‘deployments’. However, everything is not quite as it seems and the romance turns sour and dark. “First Love, then Loss”, Martha’s Vineyard Times, April 19, 2023.
Video – Interview with SOF Leaders at Balikatan 23. Sam Colon with the Indo-Pacific Defense Forum Magazine interviews Philippine Army Col. Rannie Sevilla PA (MNSA), the deputy commander of the Special Operations Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and U.S. Army Lt. Col. Vince Enriquez, battalion commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), about their experiences with Balikatan throughout the years and how it strengthens their partnership going forward. DVIDS, April 11, 2023, 19 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/879432/interview-with-sof-leaders-balikatan-23
Video – The Homeland Security Cost of the Biden Administration’s Catastrophic Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives, YouTube, April 18, 2023. link
Video – What’s in the Kit of a Nigerien Special Forces Soldier? Video by SHAPE Public Affairs Office, April 18, 2023, one minute. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SFKW_3zHOQ
Podcast – Warrior Health. Kevin Mains, a clinical psychotherapist, enters the G Base to discuss the challenges facing the military today. The mission of the warrior has not changed, but the leadership challenges have never been greater. If America’s warriors are going to be successful meeting our enemies, foreign and domestic, we’re going to have to be able to bring our A Game, physically, mentally, and socially. The Pinelander, April 21, 2023, one hour.
Podcast – A Conversation With Lieutenant General Sami Sadat. H. R. McMaster chats with a former high-ranking Afghan general about the events that contributed to the fall of Afghanistan, the flawed assumptions that led to US withdrawal, and how the US government and Afghan resistance can jointly support both the Afghan state and, in turn, global security. Battlegrounds, Hoover Institution, April 19, 2023, one hour.
Podcasts
SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command
https://linktr.ee/sofcast
The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing
https://www.thepinelander.com/
The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command
https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA
Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385
sof.news · by SOF News · April 24, 2023
3. Night of Nights – Operation Eagle Claw 24-25 April 1980
Sun, 04/23/2023 - 5:58pm
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/night-nights
Night of Nights
Operation Eagle Claw 24-25 April 1980
By Colonel Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (Retired)
The carrier crew was never informed as to the real purpose of the helicopters or the sudden appearance of the primarily Marine crew. But they understood something important was happening in their presence and they were part of it.
THE AUDIENCE
As night descends on the ship and the artificial lights begin to take effect, they start gathering. First in individual movements, later in small groups, they begin appearing. They move to places on the hangar deck and stand against the bulkheads watching, hoping they won’t be spotted as being too obvious and being asked to leave. Some find places on the stairwells and ladders overlooking the hangar deck where they can see but not be seen. Their focus is on the eight helicopters which are being slowly wheeled from their anchor points to the elevator hoist.
The eyes follow each move of the aircraft and observe each move of the pilots and crew as they walk around their craft and climb aboard. The observers say nothing but watch intently as if they were for the first time ushered into a church service mid- ceremony.
They have come from all over the ship to watch from the galleys in mid meal so they wouldn’t not miss this from their bunks deep within the ship from the reactor spaces far below the waterline and from their relatively comfortable accommodations in Officer Country. Until a very short while ago, they had no conception of what these helicopters, these space users, would do. As if by some unseen messenger, the carrier crew has individually received notice as to what is happening, and each man wants to be a part of this moment. Sailors stand with hands over their mouths and anxious eyes. Little human sound is heard. Only the ceaseless vibrations of the ship itself and the whir and clank of machinery that is making things happen. Much is thought, but little is said. All sense something important is about to happen.
As the eight helicopters are aligned on the flight deck, the audience moves slowly to gain a vantage point. However, on topside, controls are much more stringent. Most still remain standing on the hangar deck and search for vantage point up the elevator frame to the deck opening. Only ingenious placement or those with a job can directly see the task at hand. Two sailors squat behind a fire extinguisher between two large horizontal antennas, hoping they will be obscured from critical view.
One by one, the helicopters launch into the darkening sky, turn perpendicular to the flow of the ship, and slide off into invisibility. The audience stands transfixed through the last launch. When the final dark shape recedes beyond vision, they move slowly to their normal places. No one is talking. Only thinking.
About the Author(s)
Keith Nightingale
COL Nightingale is a retired Army Colonel who served two tours in Vietnam with Airborne and Ranger (American and Vietnamese) units. He commanded airborne battalions in both the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 82nd Airborne Division. He later commanded both the 1/75th Rangers and the 1st Ranger Training Brigade.
4. Podcast on AUKUS, China, and Special Operations
My latest podcast on AUKUS, China, and SOF recorded in January. Thanks to Andrew Blyth for hosting me and to Security and Defence PLuS for putting the podcast series together. It is an interesting and unique organization that will be useful in advancing AUKUS.
https://soundcloud.com/security_defence_plus/col-david-maxwell-retd-editor-in-chief-of-small-wars-journal?si=beb6836dfa044090b33b1c732ce7361d&utm_source=clipboard&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=social_sharing
Thirty years in one organisation is no easy feat; particularly when it is with the United States Army. Colonel David Maxwell lives up to his reputation of warrior-scholar by outlining his concerns for the use of malign activities and proposes an AUKUS Special Operations Forces (SOF) working group be stood up.
Not one to bite his tongue, Maxwell contends China is a threat to the Indo-Pacific, democratic nations around the world, and the rules-based international order. AUKUS needs the ability to lead with proactive influence, and AUKUS SOF can support the diplomatic and informational instruments of power.
5. Why China might attack Taiwan
Excerpts:
We can’t know Beijing’s intent for sure. We do know it covets reunification with Taiwan as the centrepiece of its declared project to restore full Chinese nationhood and create a Sino-Centric world order. A cross-Strait crisis, mixing blockade and invasion, is the main contingency for which it prepares.
The notion that if only the west shows resolve, China won’t risk its prosperity, or will postpone aggression indefinitely, is a liberal daydream
It would be imprudent to assume that this belligerence is just theatre, and dangerously wishful to trust that China can easily be deterred from striking at its most valued object. Yet this is precisely what some optimistic observers do. They claim the world’s democracies can readily deter China, by brandishing threats of economic coercion and military intervention, with Ukraine as a precedent. Even robust policies like AUKUS assume a luxurious timescale for western capabilities to strengthen.
Why China might attack Taiwan
The Spectator · by Patrick Porter · April 23, 2023
- Coffee House
Patrick Porter
(Getty)
China may well attack Taiwan. According to the CIA, President Xi Jinping has instructed his armed forces to be able to strike by 2027. Nothing is certain, and there are no signs of mobilisation for an imminent attack. But beyond that, Beijing’s behaviour is consistent with Xi’s orders. It builds up its assault forces. It strengthens its nuclear arsenal. It steps up its military drills. It increasingly molests Taiwan across the board. And it makes its economy more resilient to sanctions.
We can’t know Beijing’s intent for sure. We do know it covets reunification with Taiwan as the centrepiece of its declared project to restore full Chinese nationhood and create a Sino-Centric world order. A cross-Strait crisis, mixing blockade and invasion, is the main contingency for which it prepares.
The notion that if only the west shows resolve, China won’t risk its prosperity, or will postpone aggression indefinitely, is a liberal daydream
It would be imprudent to assume that this belligerence is just theatre, and dangerously wishful to trust that China can easily be deterred from striking at its most valued object. Yet this is precisely what some optimistic observers do. They claim the world’s democracies can readily deter China, by brandishing threats of economic coercion and military intervention, with Ukraine as a precedent. Even robust policies like AUKUS assume a luxurious timescale for western capabilities to strengthen.
Since attacking Taiwan would induce an economic crisis, the argument goes, Beijing will surely stand down. And allegedly, the example of Ukraine’s western-backed resistance also shows that armed adventurism will not stand.
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This is all too convenient. Confidence that China won’t risk it echoes the forecasts voiced before February 2022. Recall assurances during Russia’s buildup that Putin would not invade because he shouldn’t. Only this time, the adversary is ten times larger. Its target, Taiwan, is harder to help with measures short of war, given islands can be cut off by sea and air. Now, the U.S. is already engaged in another theatre, where Washington has partially re-pivoted.
The notion that if only the west shows resolve, China won’t risk its prosperity, or will postpone aggression indefinitely, is a liberal daydream. It regards great powers not so much as countries as risk-averse economies. Historically, great powers do not exclusively focus on economic prosperity in isolation from power politics. At times they gamble, to forestall threats and strengthen their hand.
Capable states at times willingly induce crises if they sense time is against them, choosing risky escalation over a threatening status quo. Preventive fears drove the Kaiser’s Germany to gamble in 1914, Mao’s China in 1950, John F. Kennedy’s United States in 1962, and Levi Eshkol’s Israel in 1967. Necessity, actual or perceived, is a powerful logic.
Like other anxious powers, China fears the future. It assesses the risks of things not just as they are, but as they might develop. Washington recently legislated to kneecap China’s microchip imports, a blow at Beijing’s vitals. China gazes at Taiwan not as a discrete question, but as part of an intensifying contest for primacy in Asia. The hostile reaction of Asian states suggests this a case of self-encirclement. Yet the rivalry still escalates. For Beijing, reunification with Taiwan and preventing it slipping into the western orbit is a first-order issue.
Neither is Ukraine a reliable deterrent warning. Because of Ukraine, western appetite for further serious sanctions against another enemy is reduced. European powers, as France signals, are reluctant to wage economic war on Russia and China at the same time. Militarily, America’s forces are depleted and split, raising a better-now-than-later temptation. Like Russia, China may calculate it can ride out international reaction. Before invading Ukraine, Moscow amassed currency reserves, and is economically still on the board. Many markets remain open.
Since China prizes Taiwan, it will plan to succeed where Putin failed, hitting fast to seize a fait accompli, isolate the islands and place the burden of escalation on the west. Given China’s greater stakes in Taiwan, it may reckon it can force the U.S. to back off a less-than-core commitment, sure that for America even victory would taste of ashes.
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China’s adversary, the United States, also fears the future and adverse trends. As China rises, Washington may continue to erode the One China Policy, the ambiguity that helped keep the peace. The scene is set for a tragic collision between rivals who both fear time is against them, both betting they can make the other back off.
An attack may fail badly. But wars happen because of miscalculations. However rational, great powers are not reasonable, especially when tides turn against them, and haste intrudes. Fearing the consequences of inaction, China may decide it ‘must’ strike, and therefore assume it can. Reckless? Perhaps, but real. Hypothetical? Yes. Just as World War One was hypothetical before 1914, when Britain’s forces were preoccupied with the North-West Frontier. China’s rulers act and speak as though they mean it. We should believe them.
6. China’s Plan For Taiwan Invasion Is Not A Secret
An interesting assessment here for what happens after the initial invasion:
I’ve been to Taiwan many times and have met Tsai and her senior officials, and I believe they would fight. She showed her mettle recently by increasing the mandatory period of conscription for young men to a full year, up from four months — and nearly three-quarters of the population supported the change.
Another reason the PLA would temporarily hold back is to assess the extent of the damage to the island’s infrastructure — after all, the objective would be to gain full control over Taiwan, not to destroy it.
However, the biggest reason for a pause in the invasion is that China would be watching the world’s reaction, particularly that of the US. Would Washington decide to provide full military support to Taipei — including not only the massive level of diplomatic, economic and military assistance now going to Kyiv, but also the direct firepower of the US Navy and Air Force? Given the long-standing US policy of strategic ambiguity, nobody can predict how the US would respond.
China’s Plan For Taiwan Invasion Is Not A Secret
BloombergTotal Views: 4917
April 22, 2023
by James Stavridis (Bloomberg)
gcaptain.com · by Bloomberg · April 22, 2023
Chinese Navy multi-role frigate Hengshui (572) steams in close formation as one of 40 ships and submarines representing 13 international partner nations during RIMPAC exercise in 2016 (U.S. Navy photo by Ace Rheaume)
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Total Views: 4917
April 22, 2023
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by James Stavridis (Bloomberg) As increasing tensions between China and the US roil international relations, I am often asked a deceptively simple question: “What would a war over Taiwan look like?”
Frankly, we don’t have to guess much, because two recent sets of Chinese military exercises around the island gave us a pretty good idea of Beijing’s well-formulated battle plan.
The first of China’s major exercises was conducted after former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi went to Taipei in 2022; the second came after Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, met with current Speaker Kevin McCarthy this month. The People’s Liberation Army was clearly trying to demonstrate its ability to wage multi-domain war, and show China’s ire over increased diplomatic and military cooperation between the US and Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a “rogue province.”
Based on these exercises, China would likely begin with a ring of combatant warships around the island, with three purposes: cut Taiwan’s economic lifeline by scaring away commercial shipping; demonstrate to the US and the world that it controls the strategically vital South China Sea; and prepare for a Chinese invasion fleet aimed at Taiwan’s shores.
Related Book: To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision by Admiral James Stavridis
If China succeeded in creating a de facto blockade, it would use long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to devastate the island’s air defenses. This assault would likely target the military’s command-and-control nodes to decapitate the government. Other probable targets would be military airfields, air-defense systems, electronic-warfare centers, fuel-storage areas and ammunition depots.
In the two recent military exercises, China showed the ability to conduct a significant wave of these missile attacks, which could come from warships, aircraft and, of course, the massive unsinkable aircraft carrier 100 miles from Taiwan: the Chinese mainland. Recent news accounts of apparently leaked Pentagon intelligence documents allege that US officials feel Taiwanese air defenses would be overwhelmed by such an assault, and China would rapidly achieve air superiority.
A third element of the attack would be invisible but perhaps most devastating of all: a major cyberattack against every military target on the island. China could also use cyberwar against key civilian facilities to terrify the general population: lights would go out; drinking water and gas for cooking would be shut off; bank accounts and credit cards would be wiped out, rendering normal commerce impossible; and public transportation would face major disruptions.
At that point, however, things might get tricky for Beijing: It would probably need to pause and assess. One big variable is whether Taiwan’s people would rally to protect their shores from a manned invasion. It might seem like a long shot, but we’ve seen how Russia’s invasion only enraged and rallied the Ukrainian population behind the charismatic leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
I’ve been to Taiwan many times and have met Tsai and her senior officials, and I believe they would fight. She showed her mettle recently by increasing the mandatory period of conscription for young men to a full year, up from four months — and nearly three-quarters of the population supported the change.
Another reason the PLA would temporarily hold back is to assess the extent of the damage to the island’s infrastructure — after all, the objective would be to gain full control over Taiwan, not to destroy it.
However, the biggest reason for a pause in the invasion is that China would be watching the world’s reaction, particularly that of the US. Would Washington decide to provide full military support to Taipei — including not only the massive level of diplomatic, economic and military assistance now going to Kyiv, but also the direct firepower of the US Navy and Air Force? Given the long-standing US policy of strategic ambiguity, nobody can predict how the US would respond.
What we can see happening right now is the increasing number of sophisticated weapons sold by the US and other democratic powers to Taiwan; the robust economic integration with the bustling Taiwanese economy; and increased diplomatic support globally. All this should help make Taiwan more of a “porcupine,” an indigestible target.
The right kinds of defensive weapons systems to sell Taiwan — in addition to improving its questionable air-defense capability — would include sophisticated fighter aircraft, unmanned air- and seagoing vehicles, “smart” underwater mines, and cybersecurity training. Every new sale of US arms to Taiwan increases the uncertainty in the minds of Chinese strategists as to whether they could easily win a war for the island.
Related Article: Logistics Wins Wars: A Deep Dive Into War In The Pacific
Weapons aren’t everything. The US is working with allies and partners in the region on a coalition strategic response, working primarily with Japan, South Korea and Australia. The Japanese plan to double defense spending by 2027, are acquiring 400 American Tomahawk cruise missiles, and are rapidly moving away from their post-World War II pacifism. The Philippines recently committed to allowing the US to use military facilities on the island of Luzon, very close to Taiwan.
China has made no secret of what its military game plan would look like. It is well thought out — and has the potential to spiral into a full-blown conflict. The key to staving off a Chinese invasion is deterrence through military strength, and China’s recent exercises demonstrate how much the US and Taiwan need to do to achieve it.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is the author most recently of “To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision.” @stavridisj 3© 2023 Bloomberg L.P.
7. Pentagon 2022 Freedom of Navigation Report
The report can be accessed here: https://news.usni.org/2023/04/21/pentagon-2022-freedom-of-navigation-report?mc_cid=b35d8481cd&mc_eid=70bf478f36
Pentagon 2022 Freedom of Navigation Report - USNI News
news.usni.org · April 21, 2023
The following is the Fiscal Year 2022 summary of the Department of Defense’s freedom of navigation operations.
From the report
DoD releases an annual unclassified report identifying the excessive maritime claims that U.S. forces operationally challenged over the last fiscal year.
Below is a summary of excessive maritime claims that DoD challenged during the period of October 1,
2021, through September 30, 2022, to preserve the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations by international law. In sum, the United States challenged 22 excessive maritime claims of 15 claimants. The report cites each claimant’s specific laws, regulations, and other proclamations articulating the excessive maritime claims in brackets. To maintain the operational security of U.S. military forces, DoD Annual FON Reports include only general geographic information on the location of operational challenges and do not specify the precise number of challenges to each excessive maritime claim.
For the most up-to-date list of all excessive maritime claims made around the world, as well as the years U.S. forces operationally challenged those claims under the FON Program, see the DoD Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM), available online at www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm. The MCRM currently tracks the maritime claims of 155 claimants. Individual entry updates occur continually to keep pace with current coastal State claims. The MCRM also contains U.S. information regarding diplomatic protests of excessive claims made by the DOS. For an authoritative treatment of U.S. diplomatic communications on freedom of navigation matters, see the Digest of United States Practice in International Law at http://www.state.gov/digest-of-united-states-practice-in international-law/. The DOS Office of the Legal Adviser publishes this digest to provide the public with a historical record of the views and practice of the Government of the United States in public and private international law.
Download the document here.
Related
news.usni.org · April 21, 2023
8. Why Security Assistance Often Fails
KMAG in Korea is a useful model, There are still very useful lessons from it. There is useful monograph at this link: https://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/cmh/military_advisors_in_korea_kmag.pdf
While there are many positive lessons from the KMAG we need to look at the strategic failure of Security Assistance in Korea. That was the strategic failure by the US to not form and train a Korean military capable of conducting large scale combat operations designed to defend the ROK from an attack by the DPRK. Two assumptions contributed to this decision: the DPRK would continue to conduct "guerrilla-style" attacks so therefore the ROK needed a "constabulary force like military" to defend against these types of attacks. The second assumption was that if the ROK (and President Rhee) had a military capable of large conventional operations that the ROK would likely attack the north. While the first assumption proved to be wrong and the second one we can never know if it was accurate or erroneous, together both assumptions led to the strategic failure to develop a ROK military capable of defending its country.
Learn, adapt, and anticipate. We did not anticipate the north Korean attack.
Another coercive tool the author does not mention, though counterintive, is the Leahy Amendment. While most operators and planners do not like it, it has had a positive impact and moderating effect on some militaries that understand that if they violate human rights they will not receive US military support.
Excerpts:
My research also suggests that U.S. influence is more likely to fail when the United States relies entirely on teaching and persuasion, and more likely to succeed when the United States combines persuasion with conditionality to incentivize vital policy reforms. During the Korean War, for example, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advisers used their control of Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) supplies and personnel appointments to incentivize ROK Army officers to follow their direction. This approach had positive results and, as I wrote for the Modern War Institute, “[b]y 1952, the U.S. Eighth Army secured the almost full cooperation of ROK leadership with respect to the development of the ROK Army, and the ROK Army transformed into an effective fighting force by the summer of 1953.”
Finally, the findings suggest that the U.S. military is unlikely to change its approach to building partner militaries on its own. The Department of Defense—and often U.S. military advisers in theater—increasingly bears the lion’s share of the responsibility for the design and implementation of U.S. military-building efforts around the world. U.S. civilian leadership tends to defer to the U.S. military’s approach, even when it becomes abundantly clear that efforts are stalling. Absent civilian pressure, and with the funding for military-building projects flowing liberally, the U.S. military has no incentive to rethink its approach. U.S. efforts to strengthen other countries’ militaries are inherently political, and U.S. civilian leaders can and should play a more active role, both by working more directly with recipient leaders to incentivize reforms and by more actively overseeing and directing the U.S. military to do the same.
Why Security Assistance Often Fails
By Rachel Tecott Metz Sunday, April 23, 2023, 10:01 AM
lawfareblog.com · April 23, 2023
Editor’s Note: Around the world, the United States relies heavily on security assistance to gain influence and make its allies more formidable. When actual war breaks out, however, many long-time recipients of such assistance fight poorly or otherwise do not seem to have heeded the lessons that U.S. trainers tried to impart. The Naval War College’s Rachel Tecott Metz examines this track record, arguing that the United States relies too much on teaching and persuasion and should instead emphasize conditionality more.
Daniel Byman
***
The 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq has launched a set of reflections and recriminations over the decision to invade and subsequent bungling of the occupation. But another frustration with U.S. policy in Iraq deserves attention, as it has profound implications for U.S. policy today: the United States’ failure to build the Iraqi military. Building a competent Iraqi military was a pillar of the U.S. strategy to establish and maintain security in Iraq, which would enable U.S. forces to exit what was an increasingly unpopular war. Despite the centrality of the security assistance effort to U.S. foreign policy—the billions of dollars, eight years, and tens of thousands of personnel dedicated to the task—the Iraqi military never developed basic battlefield proficiency, and in the summer of 2014, less than three years after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division melted away in the face of small numbers of lightly armed Islamic State fighters. U.S. troops returned hastily to Iraq and continue to train, advise, and equip the Iraqi military today, 20 years after they began. The problem with building competent security forces is not limited to this particularly prominent case—it plagues U.S. and allied efforts around the world, and understanding what went wrong in Iraq may improve outcomes with other partners as well.
The Mixed Record of Security Assistance
Building competent partner militaries was central to the U.S. war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Today, the United States trains, equips, and advises the Armed Forces of Ukraine to fight Russia and the Taiwanese Armed Forces to fight China. Beyond the headline cases, the United States provides some form of security assistance to almost every country in the world. The record of these efforts, however, is mixed at best.
Security assistance is difficult because military effectiveness depends not only on what militaries have (or are given) in material terms and how troops are trained at the tactical level but also on patterns of decisions that leaders make. And leaders—especially those likeliest to receive security assistance from the United States, who may be facing societal upheaval, insurgency, and civil war—may prioritize preventing coups, consolidating political power, personal enrichment, or personal survival above the strength of their nation’s military. In practice, this means that leaders may promote loyal officers instead of competent ones, permit corruption, and neglect training. As I have written elsewhere, “They might welcome huge infusions of cash, equipment, and assistance from the United States, while simultaneously ignoring U.S. advice and implementing policies that keep their militaries weak.” Even in Ukraine, now a security assistance success story, Ukrainian leadership neglected to implement vital reforms of the corrupt procurement system until after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, leaving the Ukrainian military short of the Stugna anti-tank missiles they needed to fight the Russians.
The Challenge Is Influence
Fundamentally, then, the central challenge for those trying to build better militaries in partner states is influencing partner leadership. The United States builds better militaries when partner leaders implement the vital policy reforms the United States recommends, and U.S. security assistance fails when U.S. influence fails.
In research published recently in International Security, I conceptualize U.S. strategies of influence in security assistance as an influence escalation ladder with four rungs: teaching, persuasion, conditionality (incentives), and direct command. A teaching approach aims to influence recipient leaders by providing them with information they may need to improve the effectiveness of their militaries. Persuasion refers to several approaches advisers can take to shape recipient leader thinking and behavior: positive inducements, such as increases in assistance with no strings attached; good old-fashioned argument; demonstrating “what right looks like”; and rapport-building. Persuasion is essentially a theory of influence through personal diplomacy. A conditionality approach to influence aims to incentivize policy reforms by, for instance, promising recipient leaders increases in assistance and/or threatening to reduce assistance depending on the progress (or lack thereof) of their reforms. Whereas teaching, persuasion, and conditionality are indirect forms of influence, direct command (as the name implies) replaces partner decision-makers with U.S. ones in the partner chain of command.
Teaching, persuasion, conditionality, and direct command are not mutually exclusive. Advisers can rely entirely on teaching and persuasion, or they can combine teaching and persuasion with conditionality and/or direct command.
There is mounting evidence that conditionality is an important ingredient for effective influence and security assistance. There is also clear evidence that the United States relies almost entirely on teaching and persuasion, rarely using carrots and sticks to incentivize partners to implement the policy reforms necessary to strengthen their militaries.
The U.S. Reliance on Ineffective Strategies of Influence
The United States’ persistent reliance on ineffective strategies of influence in security assistance is puzzling. The conventional wisdom in the security assistance literature is that the United States rarely uses incentives because it lacks the monitoring capacity to detect when recipient leaders’ policies undermine their militaries, the bargaining power to motivate reforms, or both.
My research shows, in contrast, that U.S. military advisers are almost always acutely aware of when their counterparts disregard their advice and the implementation of policies that undermine the security assistance effort. Visibility is rarely—if ever—a limiting factor in security assistance. It also shows that the United States usually enjoys a great deal of bargaining power vis-a-vis its security assistance recipients. The puzzle is the United States’ consistent preference not to play its hand.
I present an alternative explanation, and demonstrate how the bureaucratic interests, ideologies, and standard operating procedures of the U.S. military organizations that design and implement U.S. security assistance programs lead them to rely, persistently, on strategies of influence that do not work.
The military organization responsible for the bulk of U.S. security assistance in Iraq, and a large portion of U.S. security assistance around the world, is the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army’s organizational essence is ground combat—despite rhetoric to the contrary, the U.S. Army does not consider security assistance to be a core mission. In conducting security assistance, the U.S. Army aims primarily to protect its combat mission, preserve its autonomy against civilian intrusion, and keep its standard operating procedures up and running with as little headache as possible. It puts these goals above the nominal aim of strengthening partner militaries.
The U.S. military relies on teaching and persuasion, and rarely uses incentives or direct command, because reliance on teaching and persuasion serves its bureaucratic objectives, whereas conditionality or direct command threatens them.
Within the Army, and across the services, an ideology has evolved to promote and perpetuate teaching and persuasion and discourage conditionality in advisory missions. This emphasis on persuasion consists of the normative beliefs that teaching and persuasion are “right” and conditionality and direct command “wrong.” Conditionality and direct command are denigrated as bullying, neo-colonial, or otherwise incompatible with the philosophy that advisers should win their advisees’ cooperation through their example, logic, or friendship. The ideology also promotes the causal myths that teaching and persuasion work while conditionality and direct command backfire.
In the International Security article, I show how these bureaucratic dynamics contributed to the United States’ failure to build the Iraqi military into an effective force. Many Iraqi political and military leaders—often for understandable reasons—prioritized coup-proofing, power consolidation, and parochial interests above strengthening the Iraqi military. U.S. general officers tasked with building the Iraqi military prioritized the combat mission above the advisory mission, optimized their advisory efforts for creating an appearance of progress over actual progress, and kept the bureaucratic gears of the advisory program turning smoothly even when they were turning toward failure. Senior officers continued to rely on teaching and persuasion and eschew incentives, and to espouse the normative and effective superiority of teaching and persuasion above conditionality and direct command, even as Iraqi leaders clearly and consistently ignored their advice, implementing policies that fatally undermined the Iraqi military.
Lessons for a Better Approach
It is vital to identify pathologies in the U.S. military’s approach to building a military in Iraq because security assistance has emerged as a central pillar of U.S. defense strategy, and much of the foundation for U.S. security assistance around the world today was laid in Iraq and Afghanistan. If current and future efforts, like those supporting Ukrainian and Taiwanese forces, are to be successful, they will need to learn from, not just replicate, the approach taken in those wars.
My research suggests several policy implications for U.S. security assistance. For one thing, it suggests that most of the policy reforms currently advocated by practitioners of security assistance are unlikely to succeed. Practitioners advocate for increased investments, longer advisory tours, and improvements in adviser training. But these reforms will have little effect on U.S. security assistance outcomes absent fundamental reform of the U.S. military’s basic approach to advising. At most, such changes could help on the margins, but they do not get to the root of the problems.
More than anything else, my research cautions humility. Security assistance is extremely difficult, and the odds of success depend largely on how motivated recipient leaders are to strengthen their militaries. Even the active war inside Ukraine’s borders from 2014 to 2022 was insufficient to motivate Ukrainian leadership to tackle corruption in defense procurement. It took the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and “the largest war on European soil since WWII to persuade Kyiv to embrace reform and maximize the value of U.S. assistance.”
My research also suggests that U.S. influence is more likely to fail when the United States relies entirely on teaching and persuasion, and more likely to succeed when the United States combines persuasion with conditionality to incentivize vital policy reforms. During the Korean War, for example, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advisers used their control of Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) supplies and personnel appointments to incentivize ROK Army officers to follow their direction. This approach had positive results and, as I wrote for the Modern War Institute, “[b]y 1952, the U.S. Eighth Army secured the almost full cooperation of ROK leadership with respect to the development of the ROK Army, and the ROK Army transformed into an effective fighting force by the summer of 1953.”
Finally, the findings suggest that the U.S. military is unlikely to change its approach to building partner militaries on its own. The Department of Defense—and often U.S. military advisers in theater—increasingly bears the lion’s share of the responsibility for the design and implementation of U.S. military-building efforts around the world. U.S. civilian leadership tends to defer to the U.S. military’s approach, even when it becomes abundantly clear that efforts are stalling. Absent civilian pressure, and with the funding for military-building projects flowing liberally, the U.S. military has no incentive to rethink its approach. U.S. efforts to strengthen other countries’ militaries are inherently political, and U.S. civilian leaders can and should play a more active role, both by working more directly with recipient leaders to incentivize reforms and by more actively overseeing and directing the U.S. military to do the same.
Rachel Tecott Metz is an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.
lawfareblog.com · April 23, 2023
9. Special forces swiftly evacuate US embassy staff from Sudan
Special forces swiftly evacuate US embassy staff from Sudan
militarytimes.com · by Matthew Lee, The Associated Press · April 23, 2023
U.S. special operations forces carried out a precarious evacuation of the American embassy in warring Sudan on Sunday, sweeping in and out of the capital, Khartoum, with helicopters on the ground for less than an hour. No shots were fired and no major casualties were reported.
With the last U.S. employee of the embassy out, Washington shuttered the U.S. mission in Khartoum indefinitely. Left behind were thousands of private American citizens remaining in the east African country.
U.S. officials said it would be too dangerous to carry out a broader evacuation mission. Battles between two rival Sudanese commanders entered their ninth day Sunday, forcing continued closing of the main international airport and leaving roads out of the country in control of armed men. Fighting has killed more than 400 people.
In a statement thanking the troops, President Joe Biden said he was receiving regular reports from his team on efforts to assist remaining Americans in Sudan “to the extent possible.”
He also called for the end to “unconscionable” violence there.
About 100 U.S. troops in three MH-47 helicopters carried out the operation. They airlifted all of roughly 70 remaining American employees from a landing zone at the embassy to an undisclosed location in Ethiopia. Ethiopia also provided overflight and refueling support, said Molly Phee, assistant secretary of state for African affairs.
Biden said Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia also assisted with the evacuation.
“I am proud of the extraordinary commitment of our Embassy staff, who performed their duties with courage and professionalism and embodied America’s friendship and connection with the people of Sudan,” Biden said in a statement. “I am grateful for the unmatched skill of our service members who successfully brought them to safety.”
U.S. Africa Command and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley were in contact with both warring factions before and during the operation to ensure that U.S. forces would have safe passage to conduct the evacuation. However, John Bass, a U.S. undersecretary of state, denied claims by one faction, Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Security Forces, that it assisted in the U.S. evacuation.
“They cooperated to the extent that they did not fire on our service members in the course of the operation,” Bass said.
Biden had ordered American troops to evacuate embassy personnel after receiving a recommendation from his national security team, with no end in sight to the fighting.
“This tragic violence in Sudan has already cost the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. It’s unconscionable and it must stop,” Biden said. “The belligerent parties must implement an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people of Sudan.”
Sudan’s fighting broke out April 15 between two commanders who just 18 months earlier jointly orchestrated a military coup to derail the nation’s transition to democracy.
The ongoing power struggle now between the armed forces chief, Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, and the head of the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group, Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, has millions of Sudanese cowering inside their homes, hiding from explosions, gunfire and looting.
The violence has included an unprovoked attack on an American diplomatic convoy and numerous incidents in which foreign diplomats and aid workers were killed, injured or assaulted.
An estimated 16,000 private U.S. citizens are registered with the embassy as being in Sudan. The figure is rough because not all Americans register with embassy or say when they depart.
The embassy issued an alert earlier Saturday cautioning that “due to the uncertain security situation in Khartoum and closure of the airport, it is not currently safe to undertake a U.S. government-coordinated evacuation of private U.S. citizens.”
The U.S. evacuation planning for American employees of the embassy got underway in earnest on Monday after the embassy convoy was attacked in Khartoum. The Pentagon confirmed on Friday that U.S. troops were being moved to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti ahead of a possible evacuation.
Saudi Arabia announced the successful repatriation of some of its citizens on Saturday, sharing footage of Saudi nationals and other foreigners welcomed with chocolate and flowers as they stepped off an apparent evacuation ship at the Saudi port of Jeddah.
Embassy evacuations conducted by the U.S. military are relatively rare and usually take place only under extreme conditions.
When it orders an embassy to draw down staff or suspend operations, the State Department prefers to have its personnel leave on commercial transportation if that is an option.
When the embassy in Kyiv temporarily closed just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022, staffers used commercial transport to leave.
However, in several other recent cases, notably in Afghanistan in 2021, conditions made commercial departures impossible or extremely hazardous. U.S. troops accompanied personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, in an overland convoy to Tunisia when they evacuated in 2014.
10. Why the 155mm round is so critical to the war in Ukraine
Why the 155mm round is so critical to the war in Ukraine
militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp, AP · April 23, 2023
The 155mm howitzer round is one of the most requested artillery munitions of the war in Ukraine. Already the U.S. has shipped more than 1.5 million rounds to Ukraine, but Kyiv is still seeking more.
A look at why this particular munition is so commonly used, and why it’s been so critical to the war in Ukraine.
What is the 155mm?
Essentially, the 155mm round is a very big bullet, made up of four parts: the detonating fuse, projectile, propellant and primer.
Each round is about 2 feet (60 centimeters) long, weighs about 100 pounds (45 kilograms), and is 155mm, or 6.1 inches, in diameter. They are used in howitzer systems, which are towed large guns that are identified by the range of the angle of fire that their barrels can be set to.
The 155mm shells can be configured in many ways: They can be packed with highly explosive material, use precision guided systems, pierce armor or produce high fragmentation.
Past variants have included smoke rounds to obscure troop movement and illumination rounds to expose an enemy’s position.
“The 155mm round and the similar Soviet-era 152mm rounds are so popular because they provide a good balance between range and warhead size,” said Ryan Brobst, a research analyst at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “If you have too small a shell, it won’t do enough damage and go as far. If you have a larger shell, you can’t necessarily fire it as far. This is the most common middle ground, and that’s why it’s so widely used.”
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155mm history
The French first developed the 155mm round to respond to World War I’s extensive trench warfare, and early versions included gas shells, Keri Pleasant, historian for the Army’s Joint Munitions Command, said in a statement to The Associated Press.
As World War I continued, the 155mm gun became the most common artillery piece used by the Allies, Pleasant said, and the U.S. Army later adopted it as its standard field heavy artillery piece.
The U.S. military fielded its own version, the M1, for World War II. After the war, the new NATO alliance adopted the 155mm as its artillery standard.
By the Korean War, the round had been modified again, with a cluster munition variant. “The round contained 88 submunitions, which were dispersed over a wide area to destroy vehicles, equipment, and personnel,” Pleasant said.
Its use in Ukraine
Howitzer fires can strike targets up to 15 to 20 miles (24 to 32 kilometers) away, depending on what type of round and firing system is used, which makes them highly valued by ground forces to take out enemy targets from a protected distance.
“Adversaries don’t have much warning of it coming. And it’s harder to hide from incoming rounds that are arcing in from the top, which makes it highly lethal,” Brobst said.
In Ukraine, 155mm rounds are being fired at a rate of 6,000 to 8,000 a day, said Ukrainian parliamentary member Oleksandra Ustinova, who serves on Ukraine’s wartime oversight committee. They are eclipsed by the estimated 40,000 Russian variant howitzer rounds fired at them, she told reporters at a recent Washington event sponsored by the German Marshall Fund.
The Pentagon previously had said how many rounds it was providing in each of the security assistance packages being sent about every two weeks to keep weapons and ammunition flowing into Ukraine. But it stopped specifying the number of 155mm rounds shipped in each package in February, citing operational security.
However, in its overall count of assistance provided to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February 2022, the Pentagon says it has sent more than 160 155mm howitzers, more than 1.5 million 155mm rounds, more than 6,500 precision-guided 155mm rounds and more than 14,000 155mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems — essentially a 155mm shell packed with four mines that scatter on the ground and can take out a Russian tank if it drives over them.
Other countries have also provided howitzers, but Kyiv has continually asked for more. As of last year Ukrainian officials were requesting as many as 1,000 howitzer systems to push Russian forces back.
Spring offensive
As Ukraine prepares for an intense counteroffensive this spring, it will likely need to fire 7,000 to 9,000 155mm shells a day, said Yehor Cherniev, a member of Ukraine’s parliament who spoke to reporters at the German Marshall Fund event.
In recent months, the Biden administration has been using presidential drawdown authority to send ammunition directly from U.S. military stockpiles to Ukraine, instead of having to wait and buy rounds from defense firms, so they can get there in time for the anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.
The U.S. has also been training Ukrainian troops in Germany on how to better use the 155mm rounds in combined arms tactics — coordinating strikes with targeting information provided by forward-based troops and other armored systems to maximize damage and reduce the number of rounds needed to take out a target.
Associated Press writer Nomaan Merchant contributed to this story.
11. ANZAC Day - United States Department of State
ANZAC Day - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...ANZAC Day
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ANZAC Day
Press Statement
April 24, 2023
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I am honored to join the people of Australia and New Zealand in commemorating ANZAC Day on April 25.
On this day, we remember the brave members of the defense forces of Australia and New Zealand who heroically fought in World War I to preserve our freedom and democracy. We also honor the men and women currently serving in the defense forces as they continue to courageously defend our shared values and stand up for our freedom.
The United States proudly stands with our partners in Australia and New Zealand as we work to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The bonds of our relationship, including those forged in the trenches and battlefields of the first World War, will continue to strengthen as we remain united to face our shared challenges.
We join our friends in Australia and New Zealand in solemnly reflecting on the sacrifice our brave service members made in World War I and all the conflicts that followed. We recognize the peace and freedom we enjoy today is built on their courage and sacrifice.
On this ANZAC Day, we send our deepest gratitude for the sacrifices of the past and for the enduring friendship between our great nations.
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
12. TikTok Ban Divides Young and Old, Democrats and Republicans, WSJ Poll Finds
Graphic at the link.
TikTok Ban Divides Young and Old, Democrats and Republicans, WSJ Poll Finds
Majority of GOP voters support banning Chinese-owned app, compared with 33% of Democrats
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-ban-divides-young-and-old-democrats-and-republicans-wsj-poll-finds-b34eac11
By John D. McKinnonFollow
April 24, 2023 5:30 am ET
WASHINGTON—Nearly half of U.S. voters support banning the Chinese-owned TikTok video app, according to a new Wall Street Journal poll, but there are sharp divisions along partisan, age and even racial lines.
Most voters view the app as a national-security risk and favor forcing its sale to non-Chinese owners, the poll found. But younger voters and Democrats are far less likely to support a ban than older voters and Republicans.
Overall, 46% of respondents support a nationwide ban and 35% oppose it. By party, 62% of Republicans favor a ban on TikTok, while just 33% of Democrats do. By age group, 59% of people age 65 and over favor banning TikTok, while 37% of those 18-34 favor a ban, with 48% opposing.
The findings reflect TikTok’s user base—most of whom are under 30, an age group that typically favors Democrats by wide margins.
Nearly half of white voters, or 48%, favor a ban, as do 42% of Hispanic voters. But just 35% of Black voters say they support banning the app.
Overall, the poll points to an electorate that is still making up its mind about the risks around the Chinese-owned app, said pollster Tony Fabrizio, whose firm conducted the Journal survey along with that of pollster John Anzalone.
While a majority thinks the app poses a security risk, so far “it’s kind of a soft sense,” Mr. Fabrizio said. He noted that only one-third of respondents view it as a major risk, while another quarter view it as a minor risk.
However, a significant chunk of the electorate—around 25%—hasn’t made up its mind yet. Uncertainty was particularly high among Democrats and independents. That means “there’s room for that narrative to grow,” Mr. Fabrizio said.
The U.S. contends that TikTok, owned by Beijing-based ByteDance Ltd., poses a threat because China’s authoritarian government could demand access to data on U.S. users and influence content on the app. The Biden administration has raised the prospect of a ban if the ownership remains in Chinese hands, but any effort to do so would face legal challenges on First Amendment and other grounds.
TikTok, which says it is implementing a $1.5 billion plan to secure its data, didn’t respond to a request for comment on the poll results.
The poll of 1,500 voters was conducted April 11-17 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points.
Support for a ban is driven heavily by the 58% of voters who say they have never used TikTok, the survey found. Among that group, 57% support banning the app from operating in the U.S.
By contrast, only 12% of people who use the app weekly or more favor a ban. People who say they have tried that app but use it less than weekly held views that aligned with the nonusers, with 48% favoring a ban.
Most respondents—56%—said the app poses at least some risk, and 52% would favor a sale to U.S. owners. But fully one quarter aren’t sure yet whether it poses a risk.
Spurred by national-security concerns over TikTok and other apps controlled by companies based in China and other potentially hostile countries, a number of lawmakers recently have offered proposals to ban or restrict foreign apps.
The Biden administration has thrown its support behind a bill offered by Sens. Mark Warner (D., Va.) and John Thune (R., S.D.) that would shore up the president’s legal authority to ban or restrict risky apps. The bill builds on executive orders issued by former President Donald Trump and President Biden. It could lead to a ban or other restrictions on TikTok.
In a statement to the Journal on Friday, the two senators underscored the need for their new legislation, which has run into some headwinds from the left and the right.
“TikTok is a national security threat, but it isn’t the only threat posed by foreign adversary technology,” they said. “Our country needs a rules-based process to identify and mitigate these foreign threats while providing as much information as possible to the American people about the threats that these applications present.”
Security concerns about TikTok have proved difficult to address for legal and political reasons. A Trump administration move to force a sale of TikTok in 2020 was blocked by the courts on grounds that it violated TikTok’s rights under U.S. law.
Meanwhile, the platform’s user base in the U.S. has grown recently to 150 million, according to TikTok, making its popularity another hurdle for critics.
In addition, Democratic strategists have come to view TikTok as a valuable campaign tool for reaching younger voters, further complicating the political equation for critics in Washington who view TikTok as a national-security threat.
Participants in the WSJ poll often said they have concerns about national-security risks from the app.
“From what I’ve heard from news media, I think it has potential to be a threat,” said Charles Sikes of Greensboro, N.C. He said he supports state and local efforts to ban it from government devices. “I don’t have any problem with it being banned on a national basis either,” he added.
Others were skeptical.
Watch: TikTok CEO Faces Off With Lawmakers Over Security Concerns
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“I think it’s been sensationalized,” said Kenneth Staup of Blissfield, Mich.
Even some who worry about TikTok’s national-security risks stop short of supporting a nationwide ban.
“The American people have to wake up and smell the coffee,” said Eugene Giacomini, who lives in New York. “It being from China, I’m suspicious.”
But he added, “I don’t like the government banning anything—this isn’t communist China.”
Aaron Zitner contributed to this article.
Write to John D. McKinnon at John.McKinnon@wsj.com
13. The Human Element: The Army’s Competitive Advantage in the Age of Innovation
Conclusion:
Above all else, developing innovative officers is of paramount importance. We do not know when the next conflict will come. However, we know that innovation, driven by the thinking officer, is critical to fighting and winning the nation’s future wars. With the mental flexibility gained by their education at West Point, graduates will be able to contribute to the changes that the Army needs to face the evolving battlefield. Alone on an island or in a remote forest with their platoon or company, these officers should be comfortable in the ambiguity and uncertainty of modern combat, ready to find the solutions to unforeseen problems.
This is why the U.S. Military Academy is fully committed to providing the education necessary to developing innovative leaders. As the historian John Keegan wrote, “what battles have in common is human” and this is perhaps the greatest advantage of the U.S. Army — its people. The human element of the U.S. Army will remain its most essential strength, and it is the promotion of innovative thinking at places like West Point that will enable officers to succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow.
The Human Element: The Army’s Competitive Advantage in the Age of Innovation - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Brig. Gen. Shane R. Reeves · April 24, 2023
Innovation has become a buzzword almost to the point of cliché inside the U.S. Army. One need only to scan a few of the articles on this website to find a range of opinions, even contradictory ones, about innovation. The arguments include how defense innovation is falling short, how to fix it, how innovation is not actually the problem, how the U.S. military should innovate like insurgents, and how best to lead innovation.
What these arguments are missing, however, is the role of leadership in innovation — the human element that is essential to meet the challenges of future warfare. This type of battlefield will likely require dispersed formations led by junior leaders in austere environments. These leaders will be forced, by the necessities of combat, to solve the tactical challenges of drone warfare, automated sensors, AI, and more. Their innovations, enabled by mission command and the mental flexibility to innovate, will be decisive in any modern conflict.
Become a Member
The U.S. Military Academy at West Point is leading the way in developing this kind of creative, entrepreneurial, and adaptive officer. Through its academic program, led by world-class faculty with a focus on projects-based learning, West Point seeks to create exactly the type of officer who can drive technological, organizational, and doctrinal innovation at both the tactical and strategic level. It is these kinds of leaders — curious, creative, open to risk, and willing to challenge assumptions — who will succeed in contemporary warfare.
The Army’s Innovation Challenge
Clearly, there is a strong sense in the Army and the Department of Defense that change is not only necessary but long overdue. While “innovation” may have become a catch-all for that intuition across the Department of Defense, the challenges facing the U.S. military indicate this feeling is correct. An increasingly bellicose China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the rising importance of emerging technologies in military operations highlight a rapidly evolving competitive environment. However, recruiting issues, difficult economic conditions, and the persistent threat posed by non-state actors make change exceedingly difficult. It is no wonder that “innovation” has become the magic bullet to solve seemingly intractable problems and tensions. The need to adapt in the face of change is a recurring theme in military history, and innovation is a broad enough term to capture this necessity.
Yet what is innovation, and how does it happen in an organization, especially in one as large and somewhat calcified as the military? Is it simply the acquisition and incorporation of emerging technology? Is it about new strategy and doctrine? Or is innovation more about organizational change, so that innovation is encouraged, accepted, and becomes an integral part of military culture?
Innovation is not merely technological change or shifts in organizational culture. It is both and more. Innovation is about inventing, incubating, and implementing the necessary changes in the conduct of warfare so the Army can fight and win the nation’s wars. It is a process by which new tactics, technology, and organizations are invented, elevated to a level of status, accepted, and then implemented top-down across the force. Only then can systematic and meaningful innovation take place.
The Human Element
However, this definition is missing the most critical element of the Army’s innovation process: leadership. The “Army People Strategy” confirms that getting innovation right, before any successful technological adaptation or doctrinal invention, first requires having innovative leaders. In other words, military innovation like war, is a human endeavor and, similarly, success requires a particular type of officer. Adam Grant in Think Again: The Power of Knowing What You Don’t Know, notes that solving “Complex problems … call on us to stay mentally flexible. In the face of any number of unknown and evolving threats, humility, doubt, and curiosity are vital to discovery. Bold, persistent experimentation might be our best tool for rethinking.” The traits that Grant portrays — modesty, imagination, a willingness to experiment, acceptance of mitigated risks, and critical thinking skills — describe well the officers needed to power the Army’s innovation efforts.
For this reason, the U.S. Military Academy’s academic program strives to create an environment where these attributes are encouraged and from which innovative officers emerge. It does so by remaining committed, despite trends in higher education in the opposite direction, to a cadet’s broad liberal arts education. Covering a myriad of academic fields — ranging from science, technology, engineering, and math, to the social sciences and the humanities — the core curriculum at the Military Academy is designed to create officers who, beyond any specific knowledge in a subject, can think critically, communicate successfully, and problem-solve in any setting. As David Epstein argues in Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World, “… that is what a rapidly changing, wicked world demands — conceptual reasoning skills that can connect new ideas and work across contexts.”
Complementing this core curriculum, and equally important to developing an innovative mindset amongst future officers, is a cadet’s academic major. In a seminal study entitled Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray notes that “one of the important components in successful innovation in the interwar period had to do with the ability of officers to use their imaginations in examining potential innovations.” For this reason, cadets, in their major, are allowed to study a subject of their choice and pursue independent scholarly endeavors. This allows each cadet to spot issues, experiment, and craft creative solutions. More importantly, this stimulates their natural curiosity and the intellectual imagination necessary for innovation.
Stewarding the academic program is a world-class military and civilian faculty. The faculty are subject-matter experts with real-world experience who educate the cadets in small classroom settings, many times through project-based learning. These faculty are often returning from assignments where they have seen firsthand the challenges facing the Army, and they will return to their formations better equipped from having taught and led the type of interdisciplinary, innovative thinking that is equally beneficial to cadets and to the broader Army. For example, ongoing testing of new capabilities in high-energy lasers, conducted jointly by cadets, faculty, and external partners, is not done with a myopic focus on only technical issues. Instead, the breadth of the academic program results in an ongoing legal, ethical, and historic analysis coupled with serious thought on how best to implement this technology into the operating force.
West Point’s robust curriculum and dedicated faculty, working together, foster a dynamic environment that results in innovative officers. Each graduate, equipped with the appropriate intellectual foundation, will have the attributes necessary to develop the technological, organizational, and doctrinal innovations necessitated by today’s threats. These officers, more than any other component of the innovation ecosystem, are critical to helping the U.S. Army successfully navigate the complexities and uncertainties of the contemporary battlefield.
Conclusion
Above all else, developing innovative officers is of paramount importance. We do not know when the next conflict will come. However, we know that innovation, driven by the thinking officer, is critical to fighting and winning the nation’s future wars. With the mental flexibility gained by their education at West Point, graduates will be able to contribute to the changes that the Army needs to face the evolving battlefield. Alone on an island or in a remote forest with their platoon or company, these officers should be comfortable in the ambiguity and uncertainty of modern combat, ready to find the solutions to unforeseen problems.
This is why the U.S. Military Academy is fully committed to providing the education necessary to developing innovative leaders. As the historian John Keegan wrote, “what battles have in common is human” and this is perhaps the greatest advantage of the U.S. Army — its people. The human element of the U.S. Army will remain its most essential strength, and it is the promotion of innovative thinking at places like West Point that will enable officers to succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow.
Become a Member
Shane R. Reeves is a brigadier general in the U.S. Army currently serving as the dean of the academic board at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Adam T. Barsuhn is a major in the U.S. Army currently serving as the executive officer to the dean of the academic board at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Brig. Gen. Shane R. Reeves · April 24, 2023
14. Weapons Makers Can’t Hire Enough Workers as Ukraine War Drives Demand
Weapons Makers Can’t Hire Enough Workers as Ukraine War Drives Demand
Rising geopolitical tensions have boosted military spending, prompting an industrywide hiring spree
By Alistair MacDonald and Doug Cameron
Updated April 24, 2023 7:46 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/weapons-makers-cant-hire-enough-workers-as-ukraine-war-drives-demand-d1b74bee?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1
Most companies didn’t hit their recruitment targets and attrition levels remain high, but they say hiring has improved in recent months.
Hiring pressures could be more acute in Europe, analysts say. European governments have increased military spending amid concerns about Russia, spurring arms makers—long overshadowed by U.S. peers—to initiate huge recruitment drives. That is particularly the case in munitions as companies boost production of artillery shells and missiles that have played a key role in the war.
Europe’s largest defense company, BAE Systems PLC, is hiring 2,600 this year for its apprentice and graduate training programs, and several thousand more for other roles. Missile maker MBDA wants to add 2,000 workers, equivalent to more than 15% of its workforce. Others including Saab AB, the Swedish maker of the Gripen jet fighter, and Rheinmetall AG, the German company that helps make the Leopard tank, also plan to hire thousands of new workers.
“Defense companies are worried at the moment about recruitment,” said Aimie Stone, chief economist at ADS Group, a U.K.-based trade association, citing competition for talent among arms makers as well as from a rebounding civil aerospace sector and emerging space industry.
Ukrainian soldiers fire at Russian positions with a U.S.-supplied howitzer. Photo: LIBKOS/Associated Press
Arms makers were already struggling to fill vacancies before the latest round of hiring, Ms. Stone said, noting that ADS members had 10,000 open vacancies at the end of last year.
Weapons makers have always been hard to recruit for, said Kieran Slaughter, a U.K.-based recruiter who specializes in the defense industry at Mane Contract Services. Auto makers and airplane manufacturers competing for the same talent tend to pay more and don’t require the same security vetting, he said.
Security clearance in Europe can take anywhere from two weeks in low-level jobs to eight weeks for the most senior roles, and usually months in the U.S. “Some candidates don’t want to wait around,” Mr. Slaughter said.
Many jobs in defense are also highly specialized. MBDA, for instance, is currently looking for a warhead engineer, while Rheinmetall is recruiting experts in virtual reality.
While there are multiple applicants for blue-collar roles, candidates for more specialized positions are a “rare commodity,” said Colin McClean, managing director of Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land, a U.K.-based maker of tanks and armored vehicles.
In the U.S., shipbuilding was one of the sectors hit hardest by pandemic retirements. General Dynamics Corp., a large U.S. Navy shipbuilder, hired 24,000 staff last year, yet attrition and retirements left its net head count up only 3,400 at 106,500.
Chris Kastner, chief executive of Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., which also makes Navy ships and submarines, said the company is focusing on recruiting from apprentice schools and community colleges rather than advertising jobs more widely.
“If people choose the career, they stay,” he said. “There’s the high chance of attrition now with walk-in individuals.”
In munitions manufacturing, factories are often located in remote areas because of environmental and safety concerns, which can put off some potential applicants.
“It’s a tough place sometimes to recruit people to,” Paula Hartley, vice president, enterprise performance at Lockheed Martin Corp., said of the company’s facility in Camden, Ark., around 100 miles from state capital, Little Rock, in the heart of the southeast U.S. forestry belt.
Lockheed has around 1,000 staff at the plant and plans to hire another 200. It still has open postings from January for engineering positions, where it assembles Javelin missiles and Himars rocket launchers.
The company has held jobs fairs and recruited farther afield, doling out midcycle pay raises and signing-on bonuses.
Artillery shells are packed for shipping in Scranton, Pa. Photo: BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERS
In Europe, Saab recently launched a multipronged campaign across Sweden to find the right talent. That included recruitment posters on billboards, online advertising, a social-media campaign and regular visits to student job fairs, a spokesman said.
BAE said it visits around 420 schools a year to get young people interested in the defense sector. The theme of BAE’s school visits this year is space—an area defense executives say they are using to lure more engineering talent into the broader industry.
The company said it had seen a rise in applications from the tech sector after recent layoffs, and hopes to lure more talent from that industry at a time when it says general perceptions of the defense business have improved.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the West’s supplying Kyiv with weapons has put the industry in a more positive light, said Tania Gandamihardja, BAE’s group human-resources director. “People are suddenly realizing that the defense industry is one of the solutions to help,” she said.
Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com and Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com
15. Opinion | How to outsmart ChatGPT? Think like a poet.
One of the most important skills of the future will be English.
Excerpts:
As AI proliferates, this lack of originality in our daily language is what will render so many of our jobs irrelevant. But this is where I become optimistic. Because to me, it’s clear that one of our best defenses against the rise of the writing machines might be to learn how to think like a poet.
Sure, I’m biased, but consider what the making of a poem — that small (or large) artifact William Carlos Williams famously called a “machine made of words” — can teach us.
Diametrically opposed to cliche, poets are trained to invent and reinvent language to arrive at fresh expressions of our angst, joy, anguish and wonder.
Opinion | How to outsmart ChatGPT? Think like a poet.
The Washington Post · by Jaswinder Bolina · April 20, 2023
Opinion How to outsmart ChatGPT? Think like a poet.
By
April 20, 2023 at 10:27 a.m. EDT
Jaswinder Bolina’s “English as Second Language and Other Poems” is forthcoming from Copper Canyon Press.
And so we’ve come to the end of the world again, and this time, it will be death by a thousand chattering bots. But apocalypse aside, most striking to me about ChatGPT and other large-language-model artificial intelligence systems is what their chatter reveals about us — specifically, our language, education, work and the grimly redundant human condition.
I happen to be a poet and teacher of poetry, so language, education and the grim human condition take up most of my Outlook calendar. In thinking about AI, I’ve become preoccupied with — and weirdly heartened by — its utter banality.
AI bots aren’t so much artificially “intelligent” as they are opportunistically efficient at learning from the bland patterns in our language. Entire industries have been built around cliched and predictable writing and thinking, from adspeak to clickbait media to the formulaic pop songs, movies and television that suck up our free time. There is so much blase filler for AI to mine, and every sentence, paragraph and document on ChatGPT’s kill list is another example of human expression so devoid of personality that the person is rendered superfluous.
As AI proliferates, this lack of originality in our daily language is what will render so many of our jobs irrelevant. But this is where I become optimistic. Because to me, it’s clear that one of our best defenses against the rise of the writing machines might be to learn how to think like a poet.
Sure, I’m biased, but consider what the making of a poem — that small (or large) artifact William Carlos Williams famously called a “machine made of words” — can teach us.
Diametrically opposed to cliche, poets are trained to invent and reinvent language to arrive at fresh expressions of our angst, joy, anguish and wonder.
Tracy K. Smith: “The universe is expanding. Look: postcards / And panties, bottles with lipstick on the rim, / Orphan socks and napkins dried into knots.”
Though poets do focus on our gnarly existential predicaments, the poet’s first job is to keep language from stagnating or, worse, from boring us to death.
Ross Gay: “… and thank you, too, this knuckleheaded heart, this pelican heart, / this gap-toothed heart flinging open its gaudy maw.”
Sometimes manic, sometimes depressive, poetry might indulge in bouts of narcissism and embellishment, but most of all, it must be earnest, singular and unpredictable.
David Berman: “… and if the apocalypse turns out / to be a world-wide nervous breakdown, / if our five billion minds collapse at once, / well I’d call that a surprise ending / and this hill would still be beautiful, / a place I wouldn’t mind dying / alone or with you.”
In a word, it must be human.
Despite the laudable achievements of our science, technology and engineering, it’s funny how language, not mathematics, could be the hill humanity dies on.
So, here we stand even as our algorithms whiff on their AP English exams, as they crank out bad jokes, lousy fiction and crappy poems:
“I am but a vessel, / floating on the sea of time, / Drifting on the winds of change, / A soul in search of rhyme.”
This, ChaptGPT3’s response when prompted to write a poem in the style of Jaswinder Bolina, goes on for eight unremarkable stanzas before culminating in its hackneyed conclusion:
“Let us embrace the journey, / And all its twists and turns, / For in the end, we shall find, / That every step we take, in life, we learn.”
While I appreciate its optimism, this jejune algorithm might be using the word “we” a little too loosely. This is because, even if it could convincingly mimic the highly selective diction and syntax in my or anyone’s poetry, it has no access to our idiosyncratic interiority.
It can’t remember the faces of the people I’ve loved or pained, the names of those who have hurt or needed me. It never felt the humidity breezing in through a summer window, the taut urgency of awaiting a call from the oncologist, grill smoke in the bleachers, or the melody of my mother calling me down to roti.
Here is ChatGPT’s ultimate weakness laid bare. It knows nothing of life except what it learns from us, and to learn, it needs our language. But where that language model is small, unusual and unpatterned, the machines can’t ape us.
There is a lesson in this, especially if you’re worried about your or your kids’ employment prospects. I’m not going to suggest that you tear down the walls of your cubicle and join me in the local hipster cafe. But I am going to suggest that the workers of the world, like poets, become more attentive to sensations and ideas no disembodied algorithm can experience or invent.
This means expressing experience in words and sentences that are tactile, empathetic and original. It means learning to do some of this by taking classes in creative writing, music, theater, painting and dance, by studying and making literature and art, those allegedly pointless pursuits that our culture and our universities have increasingly neglected. It means applying the lessons learned in creative enterprise to other industries, to invent new and more humane ways of using technology to answer human concerns and solve human crises.
Now, when the ability to distinguish between rote and original thinking will matter more than ever, focusing on so-called STEM and other professional fields alone — the clarion call of career counselors and university administrators — will not be enough.
After all, AI is coming for our doctors, coders, engineers and lawyers, too. Even in these fields, the career paths that wind into the yellow wood of our AI-enhanced future will belong to those inventive enough to use technology in ways no algorithm can emulate or predict.
So, let the bots inherit our dead language, dull thinking and workplace drudgery. Let the rest belong to us. Whatever we make in that real and surreal future will have to be inimitable, human and true — which is to say, it will have to be something like a poem.
The Washington Post · by Jaswinder Bolina · April 20, 2023
16. Our classified leaks conundrum: ‘Need to know’ became ‘a need to share’
Our classified leaks conundrum: ‘Need to know’ became ‘a need to share’
BY RONALD A. MARKS, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/23/23 10:30 AM ET
The Hill · · April 23, 2023
One of my colleagues during my time at CIA was Aldrich Ames. We knew him as Rick. I was never that fond of him. He seemed a bit of an arrogant, know-it-all jerk, unhappy with his position and not “recognized” for his brilliance. But, if they fired everyone with that character in D.C., the place would revert to being a steamy swamp.
When Ames was caught as a Russian spy, I thought of a dear friend in the counterintelligence field who said they were “never surprised, only disappointed.” Counterintelligence is not a field filled with optimists — nor should it be.
When Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira was arrested last week, I thought, ‘Here we go again — the latest in a long line of arrogant, unhappy people leaking information for political purposes.’ It appears in this case, I was wrong. And in being wrong, I think we may be starting to see a troubling pattern to come.
‘Need to know’ becomes the need to share
It has been over 20 years since Sept. 11 turned this country upside down. The reaction to the murder of 3,000 of our fellow citizens put the military and intelligence organizations of our country on overdrive. We’d been caught out short. It was never going to happen again.
The separation of foreign and domestic intelligence issues went away. There were no borders or boundaries in the war on terror. What happened in Bagram, Afghanistan, could be linked to potential events in Bellingham, Wash., or Key West, Fla.
And so, the Cold War concept of “need to know” went out the window.
“Need To Share” was the new mantra. And as we tied together the FBI, DOD, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 17,900-plus state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement authorities to protect us — the ability to access classified information to inform and analyze vastly expanded.
The number of people who have Top Secret clearances exceeds 1 million according to the Director of National Intelligence; even more have lower-level clearances.
Legislating against stupid
There are a number of reasons leaks of classified information occur. Some — like Aldrich Ames — are doing it deliberately to inflict damage on a system and for personal gain. Others — like Cuban spy Anna Montes — are doing it for ideology. Then there are the leakers who oppose a policy and feel frustrated or simply damn the system they are in, and put the material online or leak to the press.
Then, we have Jack Teixeira who, for all intents and purposes, seemed to do it, apparently, to show off to his friends in a chat room. No doubt, by my experience, he had been lectured by security on the dangers of leaking such information. He no doubt signed a legal commitment to protect the information. And, it seems, he viewed this as perfunctory paperwork that you need to get a job where you had access to “cool stuff.”
And to this last point, I am reminded of a late senator I worked with who said to me one late legislative night, “It is hard to legislate against stupid.”
Do we need to share?
The usual post-massive leak Congressional wailing and rending of garments is already taking place. The letters are being sent out to the DOD and IC demanding answers and hearings by the appropriate committees. Task forces are no doubt being formed within the executive to see what can be done in the future to prevent such things. And they will provide reports and potential scapegoats for the process.
And, in my opinion, we will be no further ahead than we were before.
I know we don’t wish to be wrong on terrorist activities. In fact, whether we know it or not, we’ve declared a zero tolerance for it. And to enforce that, we spend more than $50 billion per year on Homeland Security (and rising) and billions more in Defense and Intelligence to boot — for over 20 plus years. And, of course, it involved millions of people.
But, in the final analysis, I think it is time to look carefully at the “need to share” and why we need that many people with clearances. Can this be done more efficiently? And, going back to an old concept — Who really needs to know?
Frankly, we need to come to grips with the third decade of the 21st century and how information is viewed and handled by a new generation. The vast amounts of information available on the internet have, in some young minds, devalued classified information. In my day, it was treated like written nitroglycerine. Now, it is simply part of the furniture — and old, brown, “grandma” furniture at that.
A bit more education in that arena might have some effect — sources and methods still matter and do mean lives. And a few more dollars spent in internal document tracking and external surveillance of “non-traditional” venues (read gamer sites, etc.) might help somewhat.
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But, finally, it is hard to legislate against stupid.
And given the sheer volume of classified information, the large-scale access to it, and the mistaken devaluation of it by younger people, I am afraid we are in for more of these leaks going forward than anyone will like.
Ronald A. Marks is a former CIA officer who served as Senate liaison for five CIA Directors and intelligence counsel to two Senate Majority Leaders. He currently is a non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center at The Atlantic Council and visiting professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Follow him on Twitter @ronamarks
The Hill · · April 23, 2023
17. Leak of Government Secrets Adds Pressure to Overhaul Security Clearances
Leak of Government Secrets Adds Pressure to Overhaul Security Clearances
New U.S. government report warns inconsistent vetting procedures, backlogs are among factors that hobble security-clearance system
https://www.wsj.com/articles/leak-of-government-secrets-adds-pressure-to-overhaul-security-clearances-4c6d86f6?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
By Ben KeslingFollow
and Dustin VolzFollow
April 23, 2023 5:30 am ET
How the U.S. government clears personnel to see and share its secrets is coming under new pressure after the alleged leak of classified information by Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira, according to federal reviews of the process and lawmakers.
The widespread number of both government and civilian jobs requiring access to classified information make the system that provides security clearances to millions of people hard to run effectively, those who study it say. Additionally, an explosion of the amount of classified material produced by the government—estimated to be in the billions of records annually—has eroded the significance of classification levels and complicated efforts to create walls around what is truly sensitive, say former officials and outside analysts who study the system.
“Do we have to go through every part of the military and every part of the intel community and have a leak at each of these entities before we put into place best practices?” asked Sen. Mark Warner (D., Va.) in an interview. Mr. Warner has for years, alongside Republican senators, pressed for changes to the classification system and is currently working on bipartisan legislation to centralize the classification system and standardize the clearance process.
Airman Teixeira is accused of posting highly classified information to internet chat rooms—unauthorized disclosures that have revealed America’s surveillance of its own allies as well as Ukraine’s war secrets as it gears up for a spring counteroffensive against Russian forces.
Airman Teixeira is expected to reappear in court on Thursday as part of a detention hearing. He hasn’t yet entered a plea.
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Approximately 4.2 million people in the U.S. hold security clearances, including government and civilians, according to a 2020 report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Uniformed military personnel and government employees aren’t the only ones with access to secrets—more than a million of that total number are contractors working for private companies.
The U.S. government also grapples with hiring enough IT and cybersecurity employees as it struggles to compete with high salaries of the private sector, according to Evan Lesser, president of ClearanceJobs.com, a website that connects employers with potential employees who have clearances.
“There’s a small number of people with DoD clearance no matter what people say,” Mr. Lesser said. His site has about 75,000 jobs that require security clearances and about 65% to 70% of those are in information technology or engineering, he said.
“There are really more jobs than people who are qualified and have a clearance,” he said. “Employers are in a fierce battle for talent.”
The security-clearance process has been plagued with deficiencies for many years. In 2013, a contractor working for the National Security Agency, Edward Snowden, leaked a trove of highly classified documents to journalists. Like Airman Teixeira, Mr. Snowden worked in tech support.
A report released April 20 from the Government Accountability Office, a nonpartisan investigative agency that works for Congress, said the security system lags behind in a number of areas—even after changes in recent years that promised to improve and modernize it. Inconsistent vetting procedures, backlogs and a lack of measurable effectiveness of the system have all been cited as factors that leave the system vulnerable, according to the GAO and others.
Sen. Mark Warner has for years pressed for changes to the classification system. Photo: Amanda Andrade-Rhoades/Associated Press
Despite sporadic efforts to overhaul how the system operates, progress has stalled, according to Alissa Czyz, a GAO director who is involved in looking at the clearance issue. The clearance system was put on GAO’s high-risk list in 2018, Ms. Czyz said, a term the agency uses for parts of government that are vulnerable to issues such as waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement.
That year, the executive branch launched a new initiative called Trusted Workforce 2.0 and continuous vetting. Under this system, people applying for a clearance would have a more streamlined application and then once they received the clearance, automated systems would constantly monitor more than a half-dozen issues—from credit checks to arrest records—to monitor red flags that might signal a person was no longer trustworthy.
As part of the adoption of the Trusted Workforce system, the Pentagon in 2021 said that all of the then-3.6 million people in the department with clearances were undergoing continuous vetting. But GAO has expressed concerns about the system in large part because there is no reliable data to show how well the system is working in identifying people who shouldn’t hold clearances, officials said.
The automated system can be overly sensitive, flagging things that consume the time of human investigators.
“It has the potential to speed things up, be more efficient and provide more oversight of the people who have clearances,” Ms. Czyz said of the new system, but it “is not fully implemented yet.”
—Daniella Cheslow contributed to this article.
Write to Ben Kesling at ben.kesling@wsj.com and Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com
Appeared in the April 24, 2023, print edition as 'Leak Spurs Look at Clearance Process'.
18.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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