Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"When in this world a man comes forward with a thought, a deed, a vision, we ask not how does he look, but what is his message?...."

- W.E.B Du Bois

"Destroy my desires, eradicate my ideals, show me something better, and I will follow you."

- Fyodor Dosteyevsky

"Every man is guilty of all the good he did not do."

Voltaire

1. Biden taps Army vice chief to be service’s top officer

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2023

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

4. Special Operations Bumps R&D Budget

5. Russia Is Betraying Former Allies. Joe Biden Must Take Advantage

6. The 'Angry Patriots' Who Could Give Putin Problems

7. Toward a More Constructive Conversation between Policymakers and Intelligence Analysts

8. The Myth of Multipolarity - American Power’s Staying Power

9. U.S. Envoy Confronts Russian Diplomat on Evan Gershkovich Detention at U.N.

10. World military expenditure reaches new record high as European spending surges | SIPRI

11. Why NATO Must Admit Ukraine

12. The US dollar’s imminent death is greatly exaggerated13.

13. As Carlson and Lemon Exit, a Chapter Closes on Cable’s Trump War

14. Opinion | I Was General Counsel of the N.S.A. America Has a Problem With Secrets.

15. Why the US Military’s Messages Are Falling on Deaf Middle Eastern Ears

16. A Satellite Phone That Works Anywhere? The U.S.-China Rivalry Makes That Harder.

17. Knowing why is far more important learning how

18. A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

19. Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one

20. Why is Facebook censoring Sy Hersh’s NordStream report?

21. Philippine Crossroads: US Militarization Over Chinese Development – OpEd

22. A civilian US ‘Joint Chiefs’ for economic competition with China?

23. The potential end of China’s 'Period of Strategic Opportunity,' and what it means militarily

24. China Tries to Limit Damage From Diplomat’s Comments That Riled Europe

1. Biden taps Army vice chief to be service’s top officer

Biden taps Army vice chief to be service’s top officer

Defense News · by Jen Judson · April 24, 2023

This story was updated to include a comment from Gen. George’s spokesperson.

WASHINGTON — President Joe Biden has nominated the U.S. Army’s vice chief of staff to be the service’s next chief, according to the congressional register.

Gen. Randy George, if confirmed by the Senate, would succeed Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, who will retire this summer.

George “is a combat proven leader who is the right person at the right time and will guide the Army into the future,” McConville said in a statement to Defense News today.

“Gen. George is honored to be considered and will wait for the results of the confirmation process before commenting on the nomination publicly,” Army spokesperson, Lt. Col. Loni Ayers, told Defense News in a statement.

The Senate received George’s nomination late last week; it was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The four-star general began his career as an infantry officer, graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1988. He served in Desert Storm as a lieutenant in the 101st Airborne Division.

George deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as deputy commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy, and deployed again to Iraq as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment.

Lt. Gen. Randy A. George, I Corps Commanding General at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, speaks with Army medical Soldiers, while maintaining a six-foot distance during his visit to the Task Force West Army mobile hospital at the Seattle Event Center, Washington, April 7, 2020. (Pfc. Laurie Ellen Schubert/Army)

George deployed to Afghanistan in 2008 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as the commander of the 4th Infantry Division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team.

After stints as an executive officer for both the 33rd Army vice chief and the U.S. Central Command commander, he took command of the 4th Infantry Division in charge of maneuver.

George’s Pentagon experience includes serving as the director of force management for the Army G-3/5/7 and deputy director for regional operations and force management on the Joint Staff.

“While George’s combat experience over the course of his career are assets for leading the Army, it’s the depth of his experience in Force Management — both on the Army Staff and on the Joint Staff — that sets him apart for the job [of chief of staff],” said Kate Kuzminski, director of the Military, Veterans & Society program at the Center For a New American Security.

The expert said such experience “is often overlooked…but effective force management is the integration of every system, process, and mechanism that makes the Army function,” adding that “George’s history of Army institutional management will serve it well.

The head of the conservative-leaning Heritage Foundation’s national defense program, Thomas Spoehr, also pointed at George’s force management experience as part of his “great mix of operational and institutional knowledge.”

Spoehr, a retired Army three-star who served alongside George in multiple roles, said the general “has built an excellent reputation and will do well as the 41st CSA.”

Before becoming the Army’s vice chief of staff on August 5, 2022, George was commander of I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state and then served as the senior military assistant to the secretary of defense.

If confirmed, George will take command of a challenged Army. The service has struggled in recent years to meet recruiting goals and, as a result, has dropped its end-strength numbers at a time when Army officials want to see the force grow.

War still rages on in Ukraine as Russian continues its invasion into a second year. The Army continues to send weapons and equipment to the Ukrainians in large numbers and is fighting to rapidly replenish stock.

And the Army is pushing hard to successfully modernize the force, investing billions in over 35 new programs meant to help the service be able to fight near peer adversaries around the globe across all domains. This modernization initiative follows years of struggle to develop and procure new weapon systems and could face headwinds due to projected flat budgets and rising inflation costs in the future.

About Jen Judson and Davis Winkie

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs).
Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers, likely in an attempt to incentivize military service.
Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.
Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20.
Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains south of Kreminna as of April 24 and continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Some Russian sources denied claims from other Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces established enduring positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
The Kremlin continues crypto-mobilization efforts likely in an attempt to avoid a second wave of formal mobilization.
The Wagner Group may be attempting to fill law enforcement roles in occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 24, 2023

Apr 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 24, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Putin signed a decree on April 20 about a series of military command changes and formally dismissed Commander of the Eastern Military District Colonel General Rustam Muradov.[1] The milblogger noted that Muradov’s dismissal likely resulted from his disastrous offensive on Vuhledar that resulted in many casualties among Russian personnel and the loss of much military equipment. The milblogger added that the decree also forced Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov — who reportedly commanded Russian forces in Ukraine in April 2022 — to retire. The milblogger claimed that Putin forced former commander of the Western Military District Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlyov into retirement alongside other unnamed commanders as well. The milblogger claimed that the Kremlin is now relying on newly reappointed Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to achieve decisive results.

These reports about command changes and dismissals follow the Kremlin’s reported dismissal of Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants on April 19.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Avakyants was not fired as a result of poor performance during military drills in the Pacific, but that he will be forming a new “organization” under the rumored control of the “gas sector.”[3] It is unclear if this was an intentionally vague reference to the reports about Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom‘s formation of a private security company. The milblogger noted that he is not sure if the organization will cooperate with the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) or the Young Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya). ISW previously reported that Russian state gas companies — namely Gazprom — are forming new military formations and that DOSAAF has been proactive in Russian military recruitment efforts.[4]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs). Prigozhin claimed to visit the positions of “Potok” and the “Alexander Nevsky” units - which Prigozhin characterized as “micro-PMCs” - and harshly criticized the poor condition of these units on April 24.[5] The Potok battalion is reportedly one of three volunteer detachments of the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom and is analogous to the Russian State Combat Reserve (BARS).[6]The Potok battalion is reportedly subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense PMC Redut.[7] Prigozhin claimed that these units are supposed to cover Wagner‘s flanks and asked how these units can conduct combat operations if they lack the proper supplies and weapons. Prigozhin also criticized the general proliferation of such PMCs, which likely suggests that Prigozhin views these new entities as Wagner’s competition.

Wagner-affiliated sources claimed on April 24 that Wagner forces tasked Potok with defending unspecified newly captured positions to allow Wagner to regroup, but that Potok abandoned these positions and allowed Ukrainian forces to recapture the area.[8] Alleged personnel of the Potok unit posted a video message on April 24, blaming the leadership of Gazprom and PMC Redut for failing to provide Potok with proper weapons and supplies as well as blaming Wagner for forbidding the Potok personnel from leaving their positions.[9] Some milbloggers — including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers — criticized the Potok unit for blaming leadership and instead attributed their poor combat performance to their status as volunteers.[10] The milbloggers’ and Prigozhin’s reports indicate that Wagner has authority over Russian MoD-owned entities, which in turn indicates that Prigozhin has regained some favor with the Kremlin.

Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers likely in an attempt to incentivize military service. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak on April 24 to discuss initiatives to provide benefits to Russian military personnel. Putin expressed support for Turchak’s proposal to equalize the salary of “all participants” of the war in Ukraine.[11] Turchak claimed that mobilized personnel currently receive 195,000 rubles (about $2,400) monthly no matter where they serve, whereas contract soldiers receive the same amount only when serving on the frontlines. Turchak claimed that contract soldiers serving in the rear are receiving salaries “several times less” than those received by soldiers in the same role on the front line. Turchak also proposed to implement other social benefits including: setting an admission quota at Russian universities for veterans, for those awarded Hero of Russia of three Orders of Courage, and for children of participants in the war; reducing or canceling the commission fees for withdrawing or transferring money; and extending or canceling loans for parents, spouses, and children of veterans in the event of death or severe disability. ISW previously reported on conflicts between different groups of Russian servicemen regarding unequal payments and social benefits, and the Kremlin is likely attempting to appear to resolve these discrepancies to encourage enlistment.[12]

The Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut. Gulagu.net founder Vladimir Osechkin reported on April 24 that the Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee arrested Wagner commander Azamat Uldarov, who detailed Wagner’s practice of killing children in Bakhmut and the group’s treatment of prisoners of war on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s orders (which Prigozhin denied).[13] Osechkin stated that four other Wagner mercenaries accompanied the Investigate Committee and threatened Uldarov with death for his testimony against Prigozhin.[14] Wagner’s cooperation with local investigative authorities indicates that Wagner and Prigozhin are able to influence certain local authorities and security organs. This anecdote further suggests that Wagner is deeply invested in encouraging participation in atrocities in order to build social cohesion among the group and indicates that Wagner uses the threat of retribution to discourage dissenting voices that expose Prigozhin to discredit the wider group.[15]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24. Geolocated footage shows a likely Ukrainian naval drone detonating in the port of Sevastopol reportedly around 3:30am on April 24.[16] The extent of damage from the strike is unclear. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on April 24 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack the BSF base in Sevastopol with three unmanned surface vehicles and claimed that Russian forces destroyed all three vehicles.[17] Russian occupation governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev reported that of the two of the three unmanned surface vehicles entered Striletskyi Bay and that one of them detonated on its own, damaging four residential buildings.[18] Razvozhaev reported that the attack did not damage any military infrastructure.[19] Ukrainian forces have likely targeted the Russian BSF before: the Ukrainian forces likely attacked a Grigorovich-class frigate of the BSF near Sevastopol with unmanned surface vehicles on October 29, 2022.[20]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[21] Lavrov led a session on April 24 entitled “maintenance of international peace and security” and was met with widespread condemnation by other members of the session.[22] ISW has previously assessed that Russia uses its position at the UNSC as a method of power projection and forecasted that Russia would likely exploit its one-month UNSC presidency to amplify Kremlin talking points about the war in Ukraine.[23]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.[24] The WSJ, citing unnamed Middle Eastern officials, stated that cargo ships have carried over 300,000 artillery shells and a million ammunition rounds from Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea over the past six months. The unnamed officials reportedly said that the last known shipment left Iran for Astrakhan in early March and carried 1,000 containers with 2,000 artillery shells. The WSJ noted that the Iranian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has a contract with Russian state-owned joint stock company Rosobronexport for the sale of 74,000 artillery shells at a price of $1.7 million. A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the report and claimed that he has not yet seen the arrival of this ammunition on the front despite continued Russian–Iranian defense cooperation.[25]

Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20. Senchenko reportedly left Russia over a year ago and actively criticized the war, earning himself a fine in January for “discrediting the army.”[26] Uss reportedly resigned following an offer by Russian President Vladimir Putin to work on the federal level.[27] Senchenko’s and Uss’s resignations may signal discontent with Kremlin leadership on more regional levels of Russian government.

Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs).
Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers, likely in an attempt to incentivize military service.
Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.
Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20.
Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains south of Kreminna as of April 24 and continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Some Russian sources denied claims from other Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces established enduring positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
The Kremlin continues crypto-mobilization efforts likely in an attempt to avoid a second wave of formal mobilization.
The Wagner Group may be attempting to fill law enforcement roles in occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains south of Kreminna as of April 24. Geolocated footage posted on April 24 shows that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances northeast of Verkhnokamianske (18km south of Kreminna) and southeast of Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) on unspecified dates.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces recaptured unspecified positions near Bilohorivka and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive actions along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 23 and 24.[30] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 24 that Russian forces are conducting unsuccessful assaults in the Lyman direction, however.[31] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Military Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported on April 23 that Russian forces are building fortifications around Severodonetsk and other large cities and roads in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[32]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast. Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against Alchevsk (over 50km from the front line on the T0504 highway) on April 22.[33] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (over 100 kilometers from the front line at the T1320 and T1322 intersection).[34] Geolocated footage shows firefighters struggling to put out a fire in Rovenky.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and did not make any confirmed territorial gains in the city on April 23 and 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued attacking in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Novomarkove (12km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove (immediately northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (immediately southwest of Bakhmut) on April 23 and 24.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 23 that Wagner Group forces captured two unspecified blocks in western Bakhmut.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue fighting to push Russian forces back from the Khromove-Chasiv Yar road, along which one milblogger claimed Wagner forces advanced, and that Russian forces conducted positional battles northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[38] The milbloggers also claimed that Wagner Group forces advanced in northern and western Bakhmut, including near the rail station, on April 23 and 24.[39] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner’s job is to wear down Ukrainian forces ahead of a possible counteroffensive, as the fall of Bakhmut will not change Russia’s operational situation on the Donetsk Oblast axis.[40]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City) on April 23 and 24.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vodyane (6km southwest of Avdiivka) and conducted ground attacks near Krasnohorivka (4km north of Avdiivka) and Novobakhmutivka (8km northwest of Avdiivka).[42] A milblogger claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced near Nevelske and attacked near Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka).[43] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 24 that Russian forces deployed an unspecified tank brigade to the Avdiivka area.[44]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 23 and 24 that Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[45] Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 23 that Russian forces conducted a large airstrike series against Vuhledar, and warned on April 23 and 24 that recent increases in indirect fire against Vuhledar indicate that Russian forces may be preparing for another offensive push in the area.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses near Velyka Novosilka (32km northwest of Vuhledar) and attacked Vuhledar on April 23.[47] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces likely lack the combat strength necessary to sustain any meaningful offensive in the Vuhledar direction, particularly while the battle for Bakhmut is ongoing.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Some Russian sources denied claims from other Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces established enduring positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces have not established a bridgehead across the Dnipro River, instead claiming that Ukrainian forces only conduct periodic raids which Russian forces repel.[49] Saldo emphasized his claim that Russian forces are in full control of east bank Kherson Oblast. Some prominent, including Kremlin-affiliated, Russian milbloggers also denied the presence of a Ukrainian bridgehead across the Dnipro River on April 24.[50] Other milbloggers criticized Saldo for falsely portraying the operational situation in Kherson Oblast to Russian authorities, criticisms reminiscent of those levied after the fall of Kherson City in November 2022.[51] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to establish a foothold on Velyki Potemkin Island (immediately southwest of Kherson City).[52] ISW does not assess that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead across the Dnipro River as of April 24. ISW assessed on April 22 that Ukrainian forces have established an enduring presence in certain areas of east bank Kherson Oblast but not a bridgehead.[53]

Russian forces continue to conduct defensive actions in Zaporizhia Oblast. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Tavriisk operational direction Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 23 that Russian forces continue to build fortifications, establish anti-tank measures, and mine positions in the Novopavlivka and Orikhiv directions.[54] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment of the Caspian Sea Flotilla operating near Dorozhnianka in Zaporizhia Oblast.[55] Footage published on April 23 shows elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[56] Russian forces conducted routine shelling west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[57]

Russian milbloggers expressed continued concern over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline on April 23 and 24. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating in the Zaporizhia Oblast and are preparing to strike toward Orikhiv (50km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), Rabotyne (14km south of Orikhiv), and Ocheretuvate (29km southeast of Orikhiv).[58] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating near Hulyaipole and actively deploying equipment along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[59] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces may attempt to cross the Kakhovka Reservoir to take Enerhodar or reach the Sea of Azov and take the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) after a successful counteroffensive.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues crypto-mobilization efforts likely in an attempt to avoid a second wave of formal mobilization. A Russian milblogger claimed that mobile contract service recruitment centers operate in many cities across Russia.[60] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 24 that the Kremlin plans to mobilize migrants from Central Asia by threatening to deport them and revoke their Russian citizenship if they do not fight in the war and by promising a faster path to citizenship in exchange for military service to those that want Russian citizenship.[61] Russian authorities likely are targeting Central Asian migrants for conscription due to ongoing complaints from mobilized Russian personnel and their relatives over lack of payment and poor treatment and little protest from Central Asian governments over their citizens fighting in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to shift the financial burden of the war onto regional authorities. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on April 23 purportedly showing the 94th Operational Regiment of the 46th Separate Operational Brigade of the North Caucasus District National Guard (Rosgvardia) departing Chechnya for Ukraine.[62] Kadyrov claimed that Khasmagomed Magomadov commands the 94th Operational Regiment and that the Akhmat-Haji Kadyrov Regional Public Fund provided equipment and support for the regiment.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Wagner Group may be attempting to fill law enforcement roles in occupied territories. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on April 22 that Wagner forces arrived on the east (left) bank in Kherson Oblast in an effort to control the civilian population and are looting private property at an accelerated pace.[63] ISW has previously reported on Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s efforts to import Chechen elements to Ukraine for similar purposes.[64]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian children in an effort to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on April 24 that occupied Luhansk Oblast is holding a "Knowledge First” federal educational marathon and will host famous personalities of Donbas and Russia who will inform Ukrainian children of opportunities and projects available to them under Russian occupation.[65] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 24 that Russian occupation authorities and “Movement of the First” representatives are encouraging children in occupied territories to write reports denouncing their parents.[66]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian forces continued combat readiness checks in Belarus on April 23 and 24.[67]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47032

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7553

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[5] https://t.me/brussinf/5885; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/821; ht... ru/obshhestvo/nichto-inoe-kak-genotsid-evgenij-prigozhin-rezko-vy-skazalsya-o-problemah-mikro-chvk-1096270.html

[6] https://t.me/grey_zone/18415

[7] https://t.me/grey_zone/18415

[8] https://t.me/z_arhiv/20608;

[9] https://topwar dot ru/215573-bojcy-dobrovolcheskogo-batalona-potok-chvk-gazprom-pokinuli-pozicii-ogoliv-flangi-chvk-vagner.html

[10] https://t.me/grey_zone/18415; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20608; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23325

[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70975

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723

[14] https://t.me/NetGulagu/4891

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723

[16] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1650412137045544961?s=20; https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1650332066632876034?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Dmojavensis/status/1650387934799974400 ; https://twitter.com/Dmojavensis/status/1650319989436731394 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83741

[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83754

[18] https://t.me/razvozhaev/2619; https://t.me/basurin_e/997; https://t.me/readovkanews/57434; https://t.me/readovkanews/57446; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83748; https://t.me/rybar/46188; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9104; https://t.me/sashakots/39459

[19] https://t.me/razvozhaev/2619; https://t.me/basurin_e/997; https://t.me/readovkanews/57434; https://t.me/readovkanews/57446; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83748; https://t.me/rybar/46188; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9104; https://t.me/sashakots/39459

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[21] https://ria dot ru/20230424/lavrov-1867246772.html

[22] https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/europe/russia-lavrov-un-meeting-intl/inde...

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123

[24] https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-ships-ammunition-to-russia-by-caspian-...

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83756

[26] https://t.me/sotaproject/57670

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042023

[28] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKU1YGLE4Hg; https://twitter.com/GeoCon... https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1650470485275078658 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15680 ; https://t.me/kommunist/17056; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20626

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/12135

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NvLxNmEnT5P5eNBssoo...

[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/24/my-aktyvno-kontratakuyemo-oleksandr-syrskyj-pro-sytuacziyu-u-bahmuti/

[32] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10019

[33] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/16897; https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8195; https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8195; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1649776866742489092; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11158; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11165 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15659

[34] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11179; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11180

[35] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1650399994736680963?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Arvelleg1/status/1650401543768645632?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1650390503056195585?s=20; https://t.me/rybar/46193

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5fPoxj8Hcjnj6XDyN... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oZuPpTpVNvLThHEpUk...

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/25876

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/12135; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83690

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/12135; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83690; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20604; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20608; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23325

[40] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/838; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/839

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5fPoxj8Hcjnj6XDyN...

[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/12101; https://t.me/readovkanews/57433

[43] https://t.me/readovkanews/57433

[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/24/okupaczijni-vijska-zbilshyly-kilkist-artobstriliv-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NvLxNmEnT5P5eNBssoo... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oZuPpTpVNvLThHEpUk...

[46] https://suspilne dot media/453891-obstril-harkova-u-rf-stvorili-tabori-dla-utrimanna-ukrainskih-ditej-424-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/24/okupaczijni-vijska-zbilshyly-kilkist-artobstriliv-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/12101; https://t.me/wargonzo/12101; https://t.me/readovkanews/57433

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[49] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/711

[50] https://t.me/RSaponkov/4870; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83740; https://t.me/RSaponkov/4870; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83740; https://t.me/RSaponkov/4870; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83740

[51] https://t.me/grey_zone/18430; https://t.me/grey_zone/18430

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/12120

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/23/uroky-hersona-dlya-okupantiv-ne-mynuly-daremno-vony-panichno-boyatsya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[55] https://t.me/AmanatSolo/126; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1650436479766745089

[56] https://t.me/kommunist/17048

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NvLxNmEnT5P5eNBssoo... dot media/454605-armia-rf-aktivizuvalas-i-silno-obstrilue-hersonsinu-ova/; https://t.me/hueviyherson/38378 ; https://twitter.com/TeeterSweeper/status/1650493316041957378?s=20; http...

[58] https://t.me/rybar/46199; https://t.me/epoddubny/15676; https://t.me/smotri_z/13916; https://t.me/sashakots/39463

[59] https://t.me/vrogov/8870; https://t.me/vrogov/8882

[60] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9106

[61] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/04/23/rosiyany-planuyut-mobilizovuvaty-migrantiv-z-czentralnoyi-aziyi/

[62] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3566

[63] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02atvKYWTFT8RmsKPQHRKTn...

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[65] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1026

[66] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/04/24/na-tot-rosiyany-vymagayut-vid-ditej-pysaty-donosy-na-batkiv/

[67] https://t.me/modmilby/26315; https://t.me/modmilby/26330

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, APRIL 24, 2023

Apr 24, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Roy Eakin, and Virginia Wang of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. This update covers developments through April 21 at Noon Eastern Time.

Key Takeaways

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try to create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security.
Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Geopolitical Initiatives

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may view the tenth anniversary on March 23 of Xi Jinping’s announcement of a “community with a shared future for mankind” as an opportunity to redouble efforts to focus international governance discussions on economic development. Xi’s speech laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives, which aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architecture towards Beijing.[1] Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang used the anniversary to publish a report about Sino-Russian relations that argued against viewing the world in a democracy versus autocracy framework but rather as a “struggle between development and [the] containment of development.”[2] The report builds on Xi’s 2013 speech, which laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives that aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architectures towards Beijing. Such programs include the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives.

Qin Gang’s report is also part of the CCP’s effort to gain “discourse power” by focusing international governance discussions on economic development rather than governance models. “Discourse power” refers to CCP efforts to shape international public opinion about sensitive subjects for the party, such as human rights, in service of setting international norms for discussing such issues. [3] The term is part of Xi’s aim to have CCP narratives gain substantial traction in the global information space as alternatives to those produced in democratic countries. China can use advances in “discourse power” in conjunction with economic engagement to strengthen its ideological appeal amid a larger US–China competition in regions like the Global South. “Discourse power” advances can also encourage these states to support Chinese initiatives in international organizations like the United Nations.

CCP Leadership Activity

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security. Xi stated his intent for the PRC to achieve technological self-reliance and obtain the “two must-haves" of a secure food supply and strong domestic manufacturing industry on March 5.[4] Xi primarily aims for China to develop strong domestic manufacturing in areas relevant to manufacturing high-tech products including computers, robots, and planes.[5] CCP leaders have tried to develop strong domestic manufacturing since the Reform and Opening Up period began in 1978. Xi aims for manufacturing to work in tandem with technological innovation toward self-reliance to insulate China from US sanctions and technological export bans. Xi aims to keep the threat of Western sanctions from limiting his policy options due to the prospect of facing economic downturn like Russia. The CCP aggressively sought foreign investment prior to the pandemic and will now redouble those efforts going forward to achieve Xi’s stated must-haves.[6]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin from March 20 to 22 shows Xi attempts to balance the need to incorporate Russia into its international economic and strategic architecture while avoiding Western sanctions. Xi aims to utilize Russia as part of his strategy to develop alternatives such as Chinese-led international organizations like the Global Security and the Global Development Initiatives that aim to reorient the international development and security architecture towards Beijing. Putin claimed that Sino-Russian relations are stronger than the Cold War era military-political alliance between the two countries and that the relationship is “without leaders and followers” in a Chinese state-controlled media piece titled “Russia and China: A Partnership Looking to the Future.”[7] Chinese agreement to include the phrase “without leaders and followers” indicates the CCP’s desire to portray Sino–Russian relations as ostensibly aligning with Beijing’s often repeated mantra of providing “win-win cooperation” with partner states as equals. However, China clearly remains the more powerful country in the relationship. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang displayed the limits to the Sino–Russian relationship by stating on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to either side in the Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The PRC simultaneously funds Russia’s war effort by purchasing vast quantities of oil from the country while disregarding G7 price caps.[9]

Other

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try and create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace. The Shandong aircraft carrier operated east of Taiwan during the exercise, which indicates China aims to create a sense of inevitability that the PLA can isolate the island at will and prevent foreign intervention. The April exercises included tactical-level firsts, such as PLA J-15s launched from the Shandong entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) from the east of the island. These firsts do not reflect new PLA operational-level capabilities, however. China demonstrated it could fly tens of aircraft around Taiwan on a daily basis in August 2022.[10] The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning also previously sailed well east of Taiwan in December 2022 and could operate where the Shandong did in April if ordered.[11] The Chinese Fujian Maritime Safety Administration’s April 5 announcement that it would embark on a three day “special joint patrol and inspection operation” in the central and southern Taiwan Strait indicates the CCP may interfere in future Taiwan Strait shipping in conjunction with military activity to isolate the island.[12] The exercises were China’s response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meeting with US officials in the United States and in Taiwan between April 5 and April 8. Taiwanese political figures routinely visit the United States and meet with American political figures without the trappings of a state visit.[13] The April exercises also helped increase sales in Taiwan of a clothing patch showing a Formosan black bear punching Winnie the Pooh, a symbol for Xi Jinping that Chinese social media censors.[14] This example demonstrates the potential difficulty PLA exercises around Taiwan will have inducing fear among the Taiwanese populace.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024, and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears. Lai became the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential nominee on April 12.[15] Lai's cross-strait policy approach does not promote Taiwan independence, despite previously declaring himself a ”political worker for Taiwan independence” in 2017 and 2018.[16] Lai defended Taiwan’s de facto independence through the Republic of China (ROC) framework after becoming the DPP nominee by emphasizing that there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence because Taiwan is “already a sovereign and independent country."[17] This position aligns with the views of Tsai Ing-wen.[18] Lai further displayed his support for Tsai’s approach by saying that he supports Tsai's "four persistences" policy, which consists of adhering to democracy and freedom, emphasizing that the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China are not affiliated with each other, emphasizing that sovereignty is not compatible with annexation, and to confirm that the Taiwanese people will determine the future of Taiwan.[19] Lai also said he would follow Tsai's "road of democracy" and attempted to reframe the election debate away from discussions involving unification and independence by emphasizing a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.[20] This rhetoric incorporates defending the existing status quo from Chinese military and political threats against Taiwan. Lai's rhetoric portraying himself as a defender of the existing status quo may make it difficult for the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) to portray him as a pro-independence radical that will endanger Taiwan. This approach may also undercut the KMT's attempts to portray itself as the sole traditional defender of the Taiwan Strait status quo and ROC framework.[21] Lai will likely maintain this rhetoric unless "deep green" pro-independence elements within the DPP force Lai to signal support for Taiwan independence rhetoric.

Lai’s rhetorical advances occurred as former KMT Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou redoubled support for cultural and political unity between China and Taiwan. Ma explicitly called for the “revitalization” of zhonghua during a visit to China from March 27-April 7.[22] He also emphasized his belief that Mainland China and Taiwan belong to one-China under the ROC constitution.[23] Zhonghua is a term that refers to China in a cultural sense while not being bound by the physical borders of China. The KMT defended Ma’s comments by reiterating support for Ma’s “one China” approach and accusing the DPP of “lack[ing] the determination to defend the Republic of China.”[24] Ma retains substantial influence in the KMT as the party’s last leader in government. Ma’s repetition of this terminology likely means that the KMT has not rethought its CCP-friendly cross-strait policy emphasizing one-China with different interpretations despite its unpopularity with the Taiwanese electorate.[25] Their formulation encourages political, cultural, and economic engagement across the strait while maintaining ROC autonomy from the PRC. An emphasis on cross-strait cultural and political unity may make the KMT appear out of touch with public opinion if William Lai successfully frames himself as a pragmatic defender of the status quo and Republic of China (Taiwan) autonomy. [26] Early polling shows that Lai is narrowly leading in the election despite the fact that the KMT have not yet selected their presidential election nominee.[27] While Lai still leads in the polls, April polling data showed a small decline in support for Lai.[28] This is likely tied to undecided voters’ reactions to Lai officially becoming the nominee. Eventual 2020 Taiwanese presidential election winner Tsai Ing-wen also trailed in April 2019 presidential election polls.[29] Lai’s pragmatic rhetoric may gain appeal as the importance of the cross-strait issue grows with the nearing of the election. This appeal will likely gain strength if the KMT refuses to rethink its current cross-strait approach.

[1] http://hk.ocmfa dot gov.cn/eng/jbwzlm/xwdt/zt/xzxcf/201304/t20130419_10095330.htm

[2] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/202303/t20230322_11047407.shtml?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[3] https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/discourse-power/

The characters for discourse power are 话语权.

[4] The characters for two-must haves are 两个必保.

http://paper.people dot com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/06/nw.D110000renmrb_20230306_3-01.htm?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

https://english.news dot cn/20230306/525a0fe0e9e54811869d54133590dc00/c.html

[5] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/content/1164852.shtml

[6] http://www.gov dot cn/guowuyuan/2023-03/27/content_5748493.htm

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202303/1288066.shtml

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/china-s-new-premier-r...

http://www.gov dot cn/guowuyuan/2023-03/26/content_5748362.htm

[7] http://paper.people dot com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/20/nw.D110000renmrb_20230320_2-03.htm

[8] https://apnews dot com/article/china-taiwan-weapons-germany-ukraine-2a51d2c64c12fca75683d20fbafba475

[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-china-snap-up-russian-oil-...

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-march-imports-russian-oil...

[10] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555197565372895232

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555575042402324481

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555888160273739781

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1556284247853629440

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1556621069569884160

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1557030771931885569

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1557319212280197120

[11] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2022/p20221228_01.pdf

[12] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/4856713

https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=A0203DA639EB1169

[13] President Tsai previously transited through the United States six times since taking office in 2016. https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/transit-of-taiwan-...

[14] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202304100017

[15] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4268468

[16] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2018/04/16/2003691399

[17] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7094031?from=udn-catebreaknews_ch2

[18] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2020/01/16/2003729328

[19] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4246962

[20] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4246962

[21] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[22] The characters for zhonghua are 中华.

https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202303280014

https://taiwan.huanqiu dot com/article/4CGEO4dwevg

https://udn dot com/news/story/123435/7079265?from=udn-catelistnews_ch2

[23] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259770

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259909

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259951

[24] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[25] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/4866215

https://www.tpof dot org/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e9%97%9c%e4%bf%82/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e6%94%bf%e6%b2%bb/2023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8817%e6%97%a5%e3%80%8c%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e3%80%8c%e4%b9%9d%e4%ba%8c%e5%85%b1%e8%ad%98%e3%80%8d%e7%9b%b8%e9%97%9c%e5%95%8f%e9%a1%8c%e7%9a%84%e6%85%8b%e5%ba%a6/

[26] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[27] https://www dot tpof.org/%e7%b2%be%e9%81%b8%e6%96%87%e7%ab%a0/2023%e5%b9%b43%e6%9c%88%e3%80%8c%e5%9c%8b%e9%9a%9b%e6%83%85%e5%8b%a2%e3%80%81%e6%94%bf%e9%bb%a8%e7%ab%b6%e7%88%ad%e8%88%872024%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e5%a4%a7%e9%81%b8%e3%80%8denglish-excerpt/

https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/2024%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e6%b0%91%e7%9a%84%e6%94%af%e6%8c%81%e5%82%be%e5%90%91%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8818%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[28] https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/2024%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e6%b0%91%e7%9a%84%e6%94%af%e6%8c%81%e5%82%be%e5%90%91%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8818%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[29] http://www dot my-formosa.com/DOC_145194.htm

https://www dot upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=24&SerialNo=61850

Special Operations Bumps R&D Budget

Collaborative autonomy and better contested communications top the wish list, while supply-chain risk becomes a top concern.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

U.S. Special Forces Soldiers, attached to Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, alongside Afghan agents from the National Interdiction Unit, NIU, prepare to load onto CH-47 Chinook Helicopters prior to an operation in the Ghorak district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Sept. 12, 2016. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Connor Mendez/

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Policy

Collaborative autonomy and better contested communications top the wish list, while supply-chain risk becomes a top concern.

April 24, 2023 07:12 PM ET

Special Operations

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

April 24, 2023 07:12 PM ET

Special Operations

A 20 percent bump to its research-and-development budget will help U.S. Special Operations Command foster autonomous drones, battlefield comms, and other gear and weapons to help pivot from counterterrorism to great-power competition, the command’s chief acquisitions executive said. SOCOM is also grappling with new attacks on supply chains and networks, James Smith told reporters last week.

SOCOM is asking for an increase of about one-fifth from last year’s request of $696 million. The proposed uptick is an about-face for the command; last year, it requested 14 percent less for R&D than the $813 million it received in 2021.

Smith said this year’s increase ask reflects an understanding of the growing role for autonomous drones and other unmanned systems working with operators in high-stakes operations.

SOCOM’s commander, Gen. Brian Fenton, “has really focused on collaborative autonomy,” Smith said. “So he wants to lead the department in terms of how we have a systems-of-systems approach to unmanned aerial systems, being able to interoperate not only with each other in a collaborative fashion but also with with ground systems and maritime systems, all unmanned, to be able to have effects at the edge.”

For example, SOCOM’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise project seeks to allow a single operator to direct a swarm of Reaper drones. It’s pioneering work that—like other weapons and gear speedily developed in small batches by the relatively small command—may eventually find its way into use by other commands and service branches.

That structure enabled SOCOM to speed new pieces of equipment to field faster in the Middle East, against adversaries that were dangerous and difficult to detect but didn’t have highly advanced technology. But in the competition with China and Russia, the command must also ensure that their new tech isn’t compromised by enemy parts or software.

“Everyone knows about the microchip issue,” Smith said. “But it's more about are there malign actors in our supply chain? Are there malign dollars? Malign leadership, etc. in our supply chain, and what do we do about that? How well do our industry partners understand the rest of their cybersecurity backbone? Because, you know, protecting their information on their internet is really important to us.”

Smith spoke ahead of Global SOF’s “Sofweek” conference in Tampa next month. The conference is expected to attract participants from around the world and more vendors than ever, organizers told reporters.

5. Russia Is Betraying Former Allies. Joe Biden Must Take Advantage

Excerpts:

Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden each have failed to stand by American allies, allowing first Russia and then China to pluck them out of the Western camp. It is time to return the favor. As Russia betrays its former allies, it is time for the United States to make its move and stand more firmly behind both the world’s largest democracy and, since Armenia’s 2018 revolution, one of its newest.

It is time to show the world beyond India and Armenia that an alliance with the United States means something, as Russia shows its partners that it cannot be trusted.

Russia Is Betraying Former Allies. Joe Biden Must Take Advantage

Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden each have failed to stand by American allies, allowing first Russia and then China to pluck them out of the Western camp. It is time to return the favor.

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · April 24, 2023

Russia is betraying former Allies: Time for the US to Seize Advantage: In 2018, India purchased Russia’s S-400 Triumf air defense system for $5.4 billion, a contract Russia promised to fulfill in five deliveries. India also relies on Russia for spare parts and other support for its Sukhoi Su-30MKI and MiG-29 fighter jets, which are the mainstays of the Indian Air Force. Yet, last month, the Indian Air Force acknowledged to India’s parliament that Russia had informed it that it would be unable to fulfill its contracts because of Russia’s military needs in Ukraine.

The U.S.-India renaissance is over two decades old and transcends both Democratic and Republic administrations. Still, essential obstacles remain. The Pentagon remains uncomfortable with India’s Russian contracts because they impact interoperability as the United States and India grow more strategically aligned and because Washington remains concerned about technology leakage, though India compartmentalizes such systems strictly and has never made any platform available to the rivals of its origin country.

At the same time, India’s military continues to suffer specific deficits that Russia cannot address, especially concerning gas turbines and jet engines. Should the United States provide India with substitutions for Russian platforms, it might not only help fill an immediate strategic need for a country on the frontline with China, but also enable a generational partnership.

The same is also true with Armenia. Since its independence in 1991 until now, the tiny country has been under persistent threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Both countries have blockaded their tiny neighbor. Even prior to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijani snipers launched hundreds of attacks across the international border. President Ilham Aliyev, who rules Azerbaijan with an iron fist and as a family enterprise, has repeatedly threatened to conquer Armenia in its entirety.

Because of this threat, Armenia has generally welcomed a Russian troop presence in Gyumri, a town about 75 miles north of capital. Russian forces provided a tripwire to deter external aggression, much like U.S. forces in Poland or Romania. While culturally Armenians orient to the West, a sense of necessity and national survival shaped Yerevan’s ties to Moscow.

Whether or not Russia (or, for that matter, the United States) was aware in advance of Azerbaijan’s September 2020 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh remains a subject for speculation across the South Caucasus. What was certain was that Russian President Vladimir Putin enhanced Russia’s strategic position by imposing a ceasefire that inserted Russian peacekeeping into the region.

Those Russian peacekeepers now fail at their jobs. As Russia diverts men and munitions to Ukraine, Azerbaijan has increased both the quantity and quality of its challenges to the peacekeepers. For five months, it has blockaded a corridor meant to be a lifeline to the self-declared ethnic Armenian republic in Nagorno-Karabakh, putting more than 115,000 ethnic Armenians at risk of starvation. On April 23, 2023, an increasingly exacerbated Armenian Foreign Ministry called on Russia to fulfill its responsibility under the trilateral statement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war to keep the Lachin corridor open.

While some in Washington argue that Armenia and the ethnic Armenian “Artsakh Republic” in Nagorno-Karabakh are Russian satrapies, such an accusation is simplistic and inaccurate. Even if it were true, however, there is a difference between strategy and twitter polemics. If Russian peacekeeping fails, why not send in Western peacekeepers?

The Kremlin could complain little about unilateralism, given the unilateralism of their own mission. As Minsk Group co-chairs, both the United States and France have as much legitimacy as Russia did. Azerbaijan would not fire on American forces.

A better alternative might be Sweden, a country from which the Minsk Group was considering soliciting peacekeepers prior to the Azerbaijani invasion. Indeed, a Swedish deployment to protect Armenians against Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts at Genocide version 2.0 could be the ultimate retort to Turkey’s veto of Sweden’s NATO membership. Certainly, it would be better than Sweden’s cringe-worthy efforts to appease Turkey by deporting asylum-seekers to rape and torture if not death in a Turkish prison.

Most important, however, is such a mission would show Armenia that they have alternatives to Russia’s security umbrella. Just as President Richard Nixon flipped Egypt from the Soviet camp to the Western one during the Cold War, so too is Armenia ripe for flipping, if only the White House and State Department were more strategically minded.

Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden each have failed to stand by American allies, allowing first Russia and then China to pluck them out of the Western camp. It is time to return the favor. As Russia betrays its former allies, it is time for the United States to make its move and stand more firmly behind both the world’s largest democracy and, since Armenia’s 2018 revolution, one of its newest.

It is time to show the world beyond India and Armenia that an alliance with the United States means something, as Russia shows its partners that it cannot be trusted.

Author Biography and Expertise

Dr. Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · April 24, 2023

6. The 'Angry Patriots' Who Could Give Putin Problems

Excerpts:

Ironically, just as the Patriots see doom and gloom for Russia, Western policymakers and analysts are increasingly wont to see doom and gloom for Ukraine. I put my money on Girkin’s merry band of angry patriots. As insiders, they understand the current condition of Russia’s politics and war effort better than analysts and policymakers in the West.

The Patriots are right to be angry. Putin and his Russia are in serious trouble, and there may be no way out of the dead end into which the country and its people have been led. What Girkin and Co. fail to see is that they too offer no solution to the multiple crises afflicting Mother Russia.

The 'Angry Patriots' Who Could Give Putin Problems

The Patriots are right to be angry. Putin and his Russia are in serious trouble, and there may be no way out of the dead end into which the country and its people have been led.

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · April 24, 2023

The name sounds like an April Fool’s joke, but it isn’t.

The Club of Angry Patriots was established on April 1 by none other than convicted Russian war criminal Igor Girkin, the man a Dutch court held responsible for the intentional downing of Flight MH17 in August 2014. Several other distinguished reactionaries are among the Club’s founding members: Pavel Gubarev, Vladimir Grubnik, Viktor Alksnis, Maxim Kalashnikov, Maxim Klimov, Mikhail Aksel, and Yevgeny Mikhailov.

The Patriots are angry because of Russian strongman Vladimir Putin’s painfully obvious mishandling of the invasion of Ukraine. Importantly, they don’t hide their anger or refrain from pointing fingers at the powers that be. Although their views may not be typical for most Russians, they do reflect the beliefs of influential hardliners and Putin critics in and out of government. At the same time, the fact that the Patriots call themselves a club, and not a party or movement, clearly suggests that they are aware of the limited nature of their appeal.

Their founding manifesto, published on Telegram on April 17, is worth reading, as their analysis is spot on.

“Our country is waging a serious war,” say the Patriots, “but this war is being waged incompetently.” Exactly.

“Defeat in the war will lead Russia to catastrophic consequences.” True again.

“The country in its present state cannot inflict on the enemy that crushing defeat that will force the enemy to accept peace terms acceptable to us.” Ditto.

Alas, say the Patriots, “the military-political leadership of Russia does not realize the gravity of the situation.… Everything is very similar to the Russo-Japanese or the First World War. What’s next?” An excellent comparison. And you know what happened after both wars: revolution.

But, not to worry, caution the Patriots, they won’t rock the boat: “We understand that now is not the time to continue the confrontation between the reds and whites of a hundred years ago. In a most dangerous war, such disputes can be seriously conducted either by fools or by agents of the enemy.” Did they have former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who regularly shoots off at the mouth, in mind for the first category? As to the second category, as always in Russia, it’s the traitors who are responsible for Russia’s troubles. Who might they be? The oligarchs! The Club is taking on the oligarchs! Good luck with that, fellas.

“Those who have transferred their capital and their loyalty to the West continue to remain in power and big business. They are ready for sabotage, as well as for direct collusion with the enemy and, therefore, betrayal. We do not rule out that they are preparing a pro-Western coup, capitulation and, consequently, the dismemberment of Russia.”

Rest assured, though, that “we will counter this scenario with all available means. We are ready to cooperate with all the healthy forces of society, with all those who do not want Russia to lose.” Nota bene that the Club doesn’t specify who these healthy forces are.

Ironically, just as the Patriots see doom and gloom for Russia, Western policymakers and analysts are increasingly wont to see doom and gloom for Ukraine. I put my money on Girkin’s merry band of angry patriots. As insiders, they understand the current condition of Russia’s politics and war effort better than analysts and policymakers in the West.

The Patriots are right to be angry. Putin and his Russia are in serious trouble, and there may be no way out of the dead end into which the country and its people have been led. What Girkin and Co. fail to see is that they too offer no solution to the multiple crises afflicting Mother Russia.

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · April 24, 2023

7. Toward a More Constructive Conversation between Policymakers and Intelligence Analysts

Conclusion:

So why should you take notice of these things, particularly when you have so much on your plate already? In short, because the relationship we have with you is crucial and will affect intelligence community staffing and, by extension, the quality of support we can provide to you in the years to come. More than 20 years after 9/11, the intelligence community (and its policy customers) has endured successive crises: Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab Spring, South Sudan, Syria, and most recently Russia, to name a few. For career intelligence professionals, this has implications for burnout and lingering questions about the impact of their work. We do not need you to coddle us with praise. Instead, we ultimately seek to manage your expectations about our role and the limits of intelligence, and educate you about our capabilities, so that we can continue to serve you and advance U.S. national security as a close team.

Toward a More Constructive Conversation between Policymakers and Intelligence Analysts - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by John Mohr · April 25, 2023

Dear policymaker, if an intelligence analyst had the chance to offer you candid feedback about your relationship, what would they say? This question is largely hypothetical because intelligence analysts like me are primed to be deferential to policymakers. It is not in our nature to challenge you or critique your consumption of intelligence. And we recognize that the intelligence business is a customer-service one. Without policymaking and military clients, there is scant need for our services — whether providing warning of a military invasion or offering unique insight to shape a bilateral meeting with a foreign leader.

Sometimes this customer-support role is frustrating or even creates conflict. Consumers often offer insufficient feedback or, worse, sometimes place unwarranted blame on intelligence community when bad things happen. The purpose of this article, then, is not to vent, but to encourage a constructive conversation about the relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers.

My reflections mostly apply to intelligence relationships with national-level policymakers in Washington and other senior-level intelligence consumers, such as military combatant commanders. Those who have supported tactical military or law enforcement operations, however, will likely see some familiar themes. I can recall several instances when I offered tactical intelligence briefings to Air Force pilots who were not particularly interested in what I had to say — an early career lesson on the importance of zeroing in on relevance to my client.

Become a Member

Beyond simply my own experiences as a long-time member of the intelligence community, I’ve drawn on seminal works by scholars as well. In 2008, Richard Betts argued that policymakers are sometimes dissatisfied with the intelligence they receive and intelligence analysts are sometimes frustrated by the apparent misuse or disuse of intelligence. The late Robert Jervis went a step further in 2010 and argued that conflict between policymakers and intelligence officers is guaranteed because they have different needs and perspectives. Finally, my reflections are in the same spirit as Brian Katz’s clever intelligence guide for policymakers and Martin Petersen’s timeless piece on the things he learned over his 40-year career as an intelligence professional.

With that, here are the things I want to tell policymakers but am too afraid to say. In short, we have a different role than you do, we will inevitably make mistakes, and we still need your trust.

We’re Not Here to Agree With You

It’s not our job to agree with you, help you acquire more funding, or justify your policy position. Sometimes our analysis will achieve those things, but that is not our purpose. Intelligence is supposed to provide you with insight, decision advantage, or warning. The result, then, is that we are on the same team but play different positions — a framework intelligence pioneer Sherman Kent perfectly called the thinkers and doers.

We cannot tilt intelligence to your policy goal because we operate according to a set of analytic standards that ensure we don’t drift into your decision-making lane. Intelligence Community Directive 203, which outlines these standards, says our analysis must be objective and independent of any political consideration. These analytic standards afford intelligence professionals a degree of independence and help to keep our analysis dispassionate. If our analysis run counter to your policy goals, we promise it’s not because we are out to get you. This point is crucial because it can lead to considerable tension in our relationship. I once had a mid-level military officer in a combatant command tell me we needed to “sing from the same sheet of music,” which was his oblique way of suggesting that our intelligence analysis needed to conform to his objectives. I politely pushed back.

We also know that the intelligence community is sometimes a convenient scapegoat. One common example is in 2009, when an al-Qaeda-linked man nearly detonated a bomb on an airplane over Detroit. According to critics, the intelligence community didn’t connect the dots about the man’s terrorism ties. But this grossly oversimplifies the complex intelligence process and ignores the functions of the broader national security apparatus. It’s of course your prerogative to scapegoat us, but please first understand the challenges and complexity of our work. We ultimately don’t seek the spotlight or expect you to recognize us when we get things right.

Getting Things Wrong Is Inherent to the Process

We will miss the mark more than you would like. Missing the mark can mean a lot of things, from an assessment delivered too late to a so-called intelligence failure. Intelligence failure is a tricky term but is generally invoked in cases where the intelligence community cannot provide detailed warning or delivers an inaccurate assessment. The causes of these shortfalls vary and often include breakdowns in the cognitive process. When these failures occur, which some say are inevitable in this business, we break down the film to identify what went wrong. Robert Clark argues that intelligence analysts learn more from their failures than they do from successes. This is also why I wrote in 2020 that analysts must have humility to understand the limits of their knowledge. When we miss the mark, we conduct a thorough lessons-learned process. The intelligence community has institutionalized this through the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence that provides a space for scholarship on intelligence, including lessons learned from past activities. The Defense Intelligence Agency recently established its own lessons-learned program.

Another reason we get things wrong is that our resources are spread thin as we seek to maintain global coverage and be responsive to your requirements. This global coverage seeks to allocate finite resources to cover the highest-priority targets and use the residual capacity for lower-priority ones, all while being nimble enough to shift to surprise pop-up issues. You can help by being more selective in what questions you ask us. We want you to ask us questions. We will answer nearly any question you pose to us, but these may create tradeoffs that distract us from answering more important questions because many questions take us hours to answer. By the same token, we really shouldn’t serve as research librarians. Our job is not to count how many times a terrorist group has attacked a location or to calculate the volume of narcotics seized at a border post. And some questions we cannot answer because they drift into the policy realm or because we simply lack the data.

Figuring out how often we must get things right is a topic of debate. 100 percent accuracy is not feasible, but 30 percent — the batting average of a successful baseball hitter — is arguably too low. We need to ultimately manage your expectations about what we can provide and the reasons why we sometimes fall short. Betts writes that one of these reasons is that intelligence entails a fight against cunning outside enemies who are seeking to circumvent our efforts. And perhaps no-one has better reframed the goal of intelligence better than intelligence veteran Jack Davis, who said the purpose of intelligence is not to be right, but to narrow the range of uncertainty for decisions that must be made.

Give us the opportunity to help you to understand the intelligence discipline and its limitations. We know, 18 agencies are a lot, and you may not be familiar with more than the CIA. This can be intimidating and tricky to navigate. Now you understand how we feel about understanding the State Department’s bureaus. Moreover, our craft is a bit nebulous to outsiders. You hear us talk about things like “tradecraft,” “INTs,” and something called the “intelligence cycle.” Professor and former analyst John Gentry says policymakers should develop a better understanding about what intelligence can and cannot do in order to establish realistic expectations about intelligence. We would relish the opportunity to talk through some of the intricacies of our profession. The next time you interact with an intelligence professional, consider asking them one thing about their profession that goes beyond the intelligence topic of the day.

We can also help you understand the language of intelligence and why it sometimes seems wishy-washy. Uncertainty is ubiquitous in the intelligence business and entails things like incomplete, contradictory, and false information. This uncertainty shapes how we communicate with you, including our use of probabilistic words, such as “likely,” to be clear when we are making an assessment. Sometimes we will offer you an alternative explanation of an issue, not because we want to cover our rears, but because we want to give you additional perspectives. And we understand that it can be frustrating when you see that one intelligence agency does not agree with the assessment of another. This can be frustrating to us too, but this lack of agreement, which manifests in the form of a dissent, stems from the incredibly complex issues we cover. We learned some tough lessons after the Iraq weapons of mass destruction debacle that involved “flimsy, dated intelligence and flawed analysis,” according to intelligence veteran Mark Lowenthal. We take the analytic tradecraft standards seriously. And Congress mandates that we use them.

We Are Working to Earn Your Trust

We crave your trust and are constantly working to earn it. This may seem obvious, especially after acknowledging our shortfalls. We know we don’t have a monopoly on information and that we must compete against other sources of insight you have. Our insight is unique because it is underpinned by rigor, collaboration, standards, and sound processes. We know trust takes time to earn and work diligently to pursue it. By the same token, our officers need opportunities to demonstrate that trust to you and we work hard to prepare them for those moments. We also need more feedback.

One way we earn your trust is to go to painstaking lengths and rigor to publish assessments and prepare briefings. We know you pull late hours in the office and rarely have time to read. And we begrudgingly understand intelligence may be “optional equipment” for you. Many intelligence analysts arrive at work before sunrise to scour the overnight intelligence or update talking points for the morning briefing to ensure currency. Some were in the office late the night before to finish edits on an intelligence assessment that published the next day. These are not reasons to consume our work, but testify to our thorough, rigorous processes to produce structured analysis that include multiple safeguards aimed to maximize quality. This also speaks to the seriousness that we place in our work and our obsession with timeliness.

One final strength we offer is deep expertise that we hope you will see as an asset to help you to understand the complex challenges facing our country. Many of our analysts will serve decades-long careers that will transcend the duration of your term or tour. This tenure means that our officers are very smart on their portfolios, with many having studied their target area for a decade or more and spent time in the region they cover. Most analysts also have the luxury of specializing in a region or functional area. This long-term expertise — a key reason that the United States has an intelligence capability — means intelligence analysts provide continuity that bridges administrations and political appointments. Beyond expertise, we are committed to continuing education through a robust catalogue of courses and graduate studies available to intelligence analysts.

Conclusion

So why should you take notice of these things, particularly when you have so much on your plate already? In short, because the relationship we have with you is crucial and will affect intelligence community staffing and, by extension, the quality of support we can provide to you in the years to come. More than 20 years after 9/11, the intelligence community (and its policy customers) has endured successive crises: Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab Spring, South Sudan, Syria, and most recently Russia, to name a few. For career intelligence professionals, this has implications for burnout and lingering questions about the impact of their work. We do not need you to coddle us with praise. Instead, we ultimately seek to manage your expectations about our role and the limits of intelligence, and educate you about our capabilities, so that we can continue to serve you and advance U.S. national security as a close team.

Become a Member

John Mohr is a former Air Force officer and a 19-year veteran of the intelligence community who previously served a tour as a director on the National Security Council staff. He also teaches Intelligence Studies at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs.

The views in this article do not reflect any official position or opinions of the Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the University of Colorado.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by John Mohr · April 25, 2023

8. The Myth of Multipolarity - American Power’s Staying Power

Excerpts:

The United States must also resist the temptation to use its military to change the status quo. The 20-year nation-building exercise in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq were self-inflicted wounds. The lesson should be easy enough to remember: no occupations ever again. Any proposal to use U.S. military force outside Asia and Europe should be deeply interrogated, and the default response should be “no.” Preventing China and Russia from changing the status quo in Asia and Europe was once relatively easy, but now it is a full-time job. That is where the U.S. military’s focus should lie.

Ultimately, the world in the age of partial unipolarity retains many of the characteristics it exhibited in the age of total unipolarity, just in modified form. International norms and institutions still constrain revisionists, but these states are more willing to challenge them. The United States still has command of the commons and a unique capacity to project military power across the globe, but China has created a fiercely contested zone near its shores. The United States still possesses vast economic leverage, but it has a greater need to act in concert with its allies to make sanctions effective. It still has a unique leadership capacity for promoting cooperation, but its scope for unilateral action is reduced. Yes, America faces limits it did not face right after the Soviet Union’s collapse. But the myth of multipolarity obscures just how much power it still has.

The Myth of Multipolarity

American Power’s Staying Power

By Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth

May/June 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth · April 18, 2023

In the 1990s and the early years of this century, the United States’ global dominance could scarcely be questioned. No matter which metric of power one looked at, it showed a dramatic American lead. Never since the birth of the modern state system in the mid-seventeenth century had any country been so far ahead in the military, economic, and technological realms simultaneously. Allied with the United States, meanwhile, were the vast majority of the world’s richest countries, and they were tied together by a set of international institutions that Washington had played the lead role in constructing. The United States could conduct its foreign policy under fewer external constraints than any leading state in modern history. And as dissatisfied as China, Russia, and other aspiring powers were with their status in the system, they realized they could do nothing to overturn it.

That was then. Now, American power seems much diminished. In the intervening two decades, the United States has suffered costly, failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a devastating financial crisis, deepening political polarization, and, in Donald Trump, four years of a president with isolationist impulses. All the while, China continued its remarkable economic ascent and grew more assertive than ever. To many, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine sounded the death knell for U.S. primacy, a sign that the United States could no longer hold back the forces of revisionism and enforce the international order it had built.

According to most observers, the unipolar moment has come to a definitive end. Pointing to the size of China’s economy, many analysts have declared the world bipolar. But most go even further, arguing that the world is on the verge of transitioning to multipolarity or has already done so. China, Iran, and Russia all endorse this view, one in which they, the leading anti-American revisionists, finally have the power to shape the system to their liking. India and many other countries in the global South have reached the same conclusion, contending that after decades of superpower dominance, they are at last free to chart their own course. Even many Americans take it for granted that the world is now multipolar. Successive reports from the U.S. National Intelligence Council have proclaimed as much, as have figures on the left and right who favor a more modest U.S. foreign policy. There is perhaps no more widely accepted truth about the world today than the idea that it is no longer unipolar.

But this view is wrong. The world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, and it is not about to become either. Yes, the United States has become less dominant over the past 20 years, but it remains at the top of the global power hierarchy—safely above China and far, far above every other country. No longer can one pick any metric to see this reality, but it becomes clear when the right ones are used. And the persistence of unipolarity becomes even more evident when one considers that the world is still largely devoid of a force that shaped great-power politics in times of multipolarity and bipolarity, from the beginning of the modern state system through the Cold War: balancing. Other countries simply cannot match the power of the United States by joining alliances or building up their militaries.

American power still casts a large shadow across the globe, but it is admittedly smaller than before. Yet this development should be put in perspective. What is at issue is only the nature of unipolarity—not its existence.

MINOR THIRD

During the Cold War, the world was undeniably bipolar, defined above all by the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world turned unipolar, with the United States clearly standing alone at the top. Many who proclaim multipolarity seem to think of power as influence—that is, the ability to get others to do what you want. Since the United States could not pacify Afghanistan or Iraq and cannot solve many other global problems, the argument runs, the world must be multipolar. But polarity centers on a different meaning of power, one that is measurable: power as resources, especially military might and economic heft. And indeed, at the root of most multipolarity talk these days is the idea that scholarly pioneers of the concept had in mind: that international politics works differently depending on how resources are distributed among the biggest states.

For the system to be multipolar, however, its workings must be shaped largely by the three or more roughly matched states at the top. The United States and China are undoubtedly the two most powerful countries, but at least one more country must be roughly in their league for multipolarity to exist. This is where claims of multipolarity fall apart. Every country that could plausibly rank third—France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom—is in no way a rough peer of the United States or China.

That is true no matter which metric one uses. Polarity is often still measured using the indicators fashionable in the mid-twentieth century, chiefly military outlays and economic output. Even by those crude measures, however, the system is not multipolar, and it is a sure bet that it won’t be for many decades. A simple tabulation makes this clear: barring an outright collapse of either the United States or China, the gap between those countries and any of the also-rans will not close anytime soon. All but India are too small in population to ever be in the same league, while India is too poor; it cannot possibly attain this status until much later in this century.

These stark differences between today’s material realities and a reasonable understanding of multipolarity point to another problem with any talk of its return: the equally stark contrast between today’s international politics and the workings of the multipolar systems in centuries past. Before 1945, multipolarity was the norm. International politics featured constantly shifting alliances among roughly matched great powers. The alliance game was played mainly among the great powers, not between them and lesser states. Coalition arithmetic was the lodestar of statecraft: shifts in alliances could upset the balance of power overnight, as the gain or loss of a great power in an alliance dwarfed what any one state could do internally to augment its own power in the short run. In 1801, for example, the Russian emperor Paul I seriously contemplated allying with rather than against Napoleon, heightening fears in the United Kingdom about the prospect of French hegemony in Europe—worries that may have, according to some historians, led the British to play a role in Paul’s assassination that same year.

Today, almost all the world’s real alliances (the ones that entail security guarantees) bind smaller states to Washington, and the main dynamic is the expansion of that alliance system. Because the United States still has the most material power and so many allies, unless it abrogates its own alliances wholesale, the fate of great-power politics does not hinge on any country’s choice of partners.

In multipolar eras, the relatively equal distribution of capabilities meant that states were often surpassing one another in power, leading to long periods of transition in which many powers claimed to be number one, and it wasn’t clear which deserved the title. Immediately before World War I, for example, the United Kingdom could claim to be number one on the basis of its global navy and massive colonial holdings, yet its economy and army were smaller than those of Germany, which itself had a smaller army than Russia—and all three countries’ economies were dwarfed by that of the United States. The easily replicable nature of technology, meanwhile, made it possible for one great power to quickly close the gap with a superior rival by imitating its advantages. Thus, in the early twentieth century, when Germany’s leaders sought to take the United Kingdom down a peg, they had little trouble rapidly building a fleet that was technologically competitive with the Royal Navy. The situation today is very different. For one thing, there is one clear leader and one clear aspirant. For another, the nature of military technology and the structure of the global economy slow the process of the aspirant overtaking the leader. The most powerful weapons today are formidably complex, and the United States and its allies control many of the technologies needed to produce them.

The multipolar world was an ugly world. Great-power wars broke out constantly—more than once a decade from 1500 to 1945. With frightening regularity, all or most of the strongest states would fight one another in horrific, all-consuming conflicts: the Thirty Years’ War, the Wars of Louis XIV, the Seven Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. The shifting, hugely consequential, and decidedly uncertain alliance politics of multipolarity contributed to these conflicts. So did the system’s frequent power transitions and the fleeting nature of leading states’ grasp on their status. Fraught though the current international environment may be compared with the halcyon days of the 1990s, it lacks these inducements to conflict and so bears no meaningful resemblance to the age of multipolarity.

DON’T BET ON BIPOLARITY

Using GDP and military spending, some analysts might make a plausible case for an emergent bipolarity. But that argument dissolves when one uses metrics that properly account for the profound changes in the sources of state power wrought by multiple technological revolutions. More accurate measures suggest that the United States and China remain in fundamentally different categories and will stay there for a long time, especially in the military and technological realms.

No metric is invoked more frequently by the heralds of a polarity shift than GDP, but analysts in and outside China have long questioned the country’s official economic data. Using satellite-collected data about the intensity of lights at night—electricity use correlates with economic activity—the economist Luis Martinez has estimated that Chinese GDP growth in recent decades has been about one-third lower than the officially reported statistics. According to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, in 2007, Li Keqiang, a provincial official who would go on to become China’s premier, told the U.S. ambassador to China that he himself did not trust his country’s “man-made” GDP figures. Instead, he relied on proxies, such as electricity use. Since Xi took power, reliable data on the Chinese economy has gotten even harder to come by because the Chinese government has ceased publishing tens of thousands of economic statistics that were once used to estimate China’s true GDP.

But some indicators cannot be faked. To evaluate China’s economic capacity, for example, consider the proportion of worldwide profits in a given industry that one country’s firms account for. Building on the work of the political economist Sean Starrs, research by one of us (Brooks) has found that of the top 2,000 corporations in the world, U.S. firms are ranked first in global profit shares in 74 percent of sectors, whereas Chinese firms are ranked first in just 11 percent of sectors. The data on high-tech sectors is even more telling: U.S. firms now have a 53 percent profit share in these crucial industries, and every other country with a significant high-tech sector has a profit share in the single digits. (Japan comes in second at seven percent, China comes in third at six percent, and Taiwan comes in fourth at five percent.)

The best way to measure technological capacity is to look at payments for the use of intellectual property—technology so valuable that others are willing to spend money on it. This data shows that China’s extensive R & D investments over the past decade are bearing fruit, with Chinese patent royalties having grown from less than $1 billion in 2014 to almost $12 billion in 2021. But even now, China still receives less than a tenth of what the United States does each year ($125 billion), and it even lags far behind Germany ($59 billion) and Japan ($47 billion).

Russian President Vladimir Putin talking with Xi, Moscow, December 2022

Mikhail Kuravlev / Sputnik / Kremlin

Militarily, meanwhile, most analysts still see China as far from being a global peer of the United States, despite the rapid modernization of Chinese forces. How significant and lasting is the U.S. advantage? Consider the capabilities that give the United States what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, the open sea, and space. Command of the commons is what makes the United States a true global military power. Until China can contest the United States’ dominance in this domain, it will remain merely a regional military power. We have counted 13 categories of systems as underlying this ability—everything from nuclear submarines to satellites to aircraft carriers to heavy transport planes—and China is below 20 percent of the U.S. level in all but five of these capabilities, and in only two areas (cruisers and destroyers; military satellites) does China have more than a third of the U.S. capability. The United States remains so far ahead because it has devoted immense resources to developing these systems over many decades; closing these gaps would also require decades of effort. The disparity becomes even greater when one moves beyond a raw count and factors in quality. The United States’ 68 nuclear submarines, for example, are too quiet for China to track, whereas China’s 12 nuclear submarines remain noisy enough for the U.S. Navy’s advanced antisubmarine warfare sensors to track them in deep water.

A comparison with the Soviet Union is instructive. The Red Army was a real peer of the U.S. military during the Cold War in a way that the Chinese military is not. The Soviets enjoyed three advantages that China lacks. First was favorable geography: with the conquest of Eastern Europe in World War II, the Soviets could base massive military force in the heart of Europe, a region that comprised a huge chunk of the world’s economic output. Second was a large commitment to guns over butter in a command economy geared toward the production of military power: the percentage of GDP that Moscow devoted to defense remained in the double digits throughout the Cold War, an unprecedented share for a modern great power in peacetime. Third was the relatively uncomplicated nature of military technology: for most of the Cold War, the Soviets could command their comparatively weak economy to swiftly match the United States’ nuclear and missile capability and arguably outmatch its conventional forces. Only in the last decade of the Cold War did the Soviets run into the same problem that China faces today: how to produce complex weapons that are competitive with those emerging from a technologically dynamic America with a huge military R & D budget (now $140 billion a year).

Bipolarity arose from unusual circumstances. World War II left the Soviet Union in a position to dominate Eurasia, and with all the other major powers save the United States battered from World War II, only Washington had the wherewithal to assemble a balancing coalition to contain Moscow. Hence the intense rivalry of the Cold War: the arms race, the ceaseless competition in the Third World, the periodic superpower crises around the globe from Berlin to Cuba. Compared with multipolarity, it was a simpler system, with only one pair of states at the top and so only one potential power transition worth worrying about.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, the system transformed from one historically unprecedented situation to another. Now, there is one dominant power and one dominant alliance system, not two. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has not already conquered key territory crucial to the global balance. Nor has Xi shown the same willingness as Soviet leaders to trade butter for guns (with China long devoting a steady two percent of GDP to military spending). Nor can he command his economy to match U.S. military power in a matter of years, given the complexity of modern weaponry.

PARTIALLY UNIPOLAR

To argue that today’s system is not multipolar or bipolar is not to deny that power relations have changed. China has risen, especially in the economic realm, and great-power competition has returned after a post–Cold War lull. Gone are the days when the United States’ across-the-board primacy was unambiguous. But the world’s largest-ever power gap will take a long time to close, and not all elements of this gap will narrow at the same rate. China has indeed done a lot to shrink the gap in the economic realm, but it has done far less when it comes to military capacity and especially technology.

As a result, the distribution of power today remains closer to unipolarity than to either bipolarity or multipolarity. Because the world has never experienced unipolarity before the current spell, no terminology exists to describe changes to such a world, which is perhaps why many have inappropriately latched on to the concept of multipolarity to convey their sense of a smaller American lead. Narrowed though it is, that lead is still substantial, which is why the distribution of power today is best described as “partial unipolarity,” as compared with the “total unipolarity” that existed after the Cold War.

The end of total unipolarity explains why Beijing, Moscow, and other dissatisfied powers are now more willing to act on their dissatisfaction, accepting some risk of attracting the focused enmity of the United States. But their efforts show that the world remains sufficiently unipolar that the prospect of being balanced against is a far stiffer constraint on the United States’ rivals than it is on the United States itself.

Ukraine is a case in point. In going to war, Russia showed a willingness to test its revisionist potential. But the very fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin felt the need to invade is itself a sign of weakness. In the 1990s, if you had told his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, that in 2023, Russia would be fighting a war to sustain its sphere of influence over Ukraine, which Russian officials back then assumed would end up as a reliable ally, he would scarcely have believed that Moscow could sink so low. It is ironic that now, when unipolarity’s end is so frequently declared, Russia is struggling to try to get something it thought it already had when U.S. primacy was at its peak. And if you had told Yeltsin that Russia would not be winning that war against a country with an economy one-tenth the size of Russia’s, he would have been all the more incredulous. The misadventure in Ukraine, moreover, has greatly undermined Russia’s long-term economic prospects, thanks to the massive wave of sanctions the West has unleashed.

But even if Russia had swiftly captured Kyiv and installed a pro-Russian government, as Putin expected, that would have had little bearing on the global distribution of power. There is no denying that the outcome of the war in Ukraine matters greatly for the future of that country’s sovereignty and the strength of the global norm against forceful land grabs. But in the narrow, cold-hearted calculus of global material power, Ukraine’s small economy—about the same size as that of Kansas—means that it ultimately matters little whether Ukraine is aligned with NATO, Russia, or neither side. Further, Ukraine is not in fact a U.S. ally. Russia would be very unlikely to dare attack one of those. Given how the United States has reacted when Russia attacked a country that is not a U.S. ally—funneling arms, aid, and intelligence to the Ukrainians and imposing stiff sanctions—the Kremlin surely knows that the Americans would do much more to protect an actual ally.

A UN Security Council meeting, New York City, March 2022

Brendan McDermid / Reuters

China’s revisionism is backed up by much more overall capability, but as with Russia, its successes are astonishingly modest in the broad sweep of history. So far, China has altered the territorial status quo only in the South China Sea, where it has built some artificial islands. But these small and exposed possessions could easily be rendered inoperative in wartime by the U.S. military. And even if China could secure all the contested portions of the South China Sea for itself, the overall economic significance of the resources there—mainly fish—is tiny. Most of the oil and gas resources in the South China Sea lie in uncontested areas close to various countries’ shorelines.

Unless the U.S. Navy withdraws from Asia, China’s revisionist ambitions can currently extend no farther than the first island chain—the string of Pacific archipelagoes that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. That cannot change anytime soon: it would take decades, not years, for China to develop the full range of capabilities needed to contest the U.S. military’s command of the commons. Also, China may not even bother to seek such a capacity. However aggravating Chinese policymakers find their rival’s behavior, U.S. foreign policy is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated the costly development of Washington’s global power-projection capability during the Cold War.

For now, there is effectively only one place where China could scratch its revisionist itch: in Taiwan. China’s interest in the island is clearly growing, with Xi having declared in 2022 that “the complete reunification of the motherland must be achieved.” The prospect of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is indeed a real change from the heyday of total unipolarity, when China was too weak for anyone to worry about this scenario. But it is important to keep in mind that Beijing’s yearnings for Taiwan are a far cry from revisionist challenges of the past, such as those mounted by Japan and Germany in the first half of the twentieth century or the Soviet Union in the second; each of those countries conquered and occupied vast territory across great distances. And if China did manage to put Taiwan in its column, even the strongest proponents of the island’s strategic significance do not see it as so valuable that changing its alignment would generate a dramatic swing in the distribution of power of the kind that made multipolarity so dangerous.

What about the flourishing partnership between China and Russia? It definitely matters; it creates problems for Washington and its allies. But it holds no promise of a systemic power shift. When the aim is to balance against a superpower whose leadership and extensive alliances are deeply embedded in the status quo, the counteralliance needs to be similarly significant. On that score, Chinese-Russian relations fail the test. There is a reason the two parties do not call it a formal alliance. Apart from purchasing oil, China did little to help Russia in Ukraine during the first year of the conflict. A truly consequential partnership would involve sustained cooperation across a wide variety of areas, not shallow cooperation largely born of convenience. And even if China and Russia upgraded their relations, each is still merely a regional military power. Putting together two powers capable of regional balancing does not equate to global balancing. Achieving that would require military capabilities that Russia and China individually and collectively do not have—and cannot have anytime soon.

ROUGH TIMES FOR REVISIONISM

All this might seem cold comfort, given that even the limited revisionist quests of China and Russia could still spark a great-power war, with its frightening potential to go nuclear. But it is important to put the system’s stability in historical perspective. During the Cold War, each superpower feared that if all of Germany fell to the other, the global balance of power would shift decisively. (And with good reason: in 1970, West Germany’s economy was about one-quarter the size of the United States’ and two-thirds the size of the Soviet Union’s.) Because each superpower was so close to such an economically valuable object, and because the prize was literally split between them, the result was an intense security competition in which each based hundreds of thousands of troops in their half of Germany. The prospect of brinkmanship crises over Germany’s fate loomed in the background and occasionally came to the foreground, as in the 1961 crisis over the status of Berlin.

Or compare the present situation to the multipolar 1930s, when, in less than a decade, Germany went from being a disarmed, constrained power to nearly conquering all of Eurasia. But Germany was able to do so thanks to two advantages that do not exist today. First, a great power could build up substantial military projection power in only a few years back then, since the weapons systems of the day were relatively uncomplicated. Second, Germany had a geographically and economically viable option to augment its power by conquering neighboring countries. In 1939, the Nazis first added the economic resources of Czechoslovakia (around ten percent the size of Germany’s) and then Poland (17 percent). They used these victories as a springboard for more conquests in 1940, including Belgium (11 percent), the Netherlands (ten percent), and France (51 percent). China doesn’t have anything like the same opportunity. For one thing, Taiwan’s GDP is less than five percent of China’s. For another, the island is separated from the mainland by a formidable expanse of water. As the MIT research scientist Owen Cote has underscored, because China lacks command of the sea surface, it simply “cannot safeguard a properly sized, seaborne invasion force and the follow-on shipping necessary to support it during multiple transits across the 100-plus mile-wide Taiwan Straits.” Consider that the English Channel was a fifth of the width but still enough of a barrier to stop the Nazis from conquering the United Kingdom.

Japan and South Korea are the only other large economic prizes nearby, but Beijing is in no position to take a run at them militarily, either. And because Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have economies that are knowledge-based and highly integrated with the global economy, their wealth cannot be effectively extracted through conquest. The Nazis could, for example, commandeer the Czech arms manufacturer Skoda Works to enhance the German war machine, but China could not so easily exploit the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Its operation depends on employees with specialized knowledge who could flee in the event of an invasion and on a pipeline of inputs from around the globe that war would cut off.

If America came home from Europe or Asia, a more dangerous, unstable world would emerge.

Today’s revisionists face another obstacle: while they are confined to regional balancing, the United States can hit back globally. For instance, the United States is not meeting Russia directly on the battlefield but is instead using its global position to punish the country through a set of devastating economic sanctions and a massive flow of conventional weaponry, intelligence, and other forms of military assistance to Kyiv. The United States could likewise “go global” if China tried to take Taiwan, imposing a comprehensive naval blockade far from China’s shores to curtail its access to the global economy. Such a blockade would ravage the country’s economy (which relies greatly on technological imports and largely plays an assembly role in global production chains) while harming the U.S. economy far less.

Because the United States has so much influence in the global economy, it can use economic levers to punish other countries without worrying much about what they might do in response. If China tried to conquer Taiwan, and the United States imposed a distant blockade on China, Beijing would certainly try to retaliate economically. But the strongest economic arrow in its quiver wouldn’t do much damage. China could, as many have feared, sell some or all of its massive holdings of U.S. Treasury securities in an attempt to raise borrowing costs in the United States. Yet the U.S. Federal Reserve could just purchase all the securities. As the economist Brad Setser has put it, “The U.S. ultimately holds the high cards here: the Fed is the one actor in the world that can buy more than China can ever sell.”

Today’s international norms also hinder revisionists. That is no accident, since many of these standards of behavior were created by the United States and its allies after World War II. For example, Washington promulgated the proscription against the use of force to alter international boundaries not only to prevent major conflicts but also to lock in place the postwar status quo from which it benefited. Russia has experienced such strong pushback for invading Ukraine in part because it has so blatantly violated this norm. In norms as in other areas, the global landscape is favorable terrain for the United States and rough for revisionists.

AMERICA’S CHOICE

The political scientist Kenneth Waltz distinguished between the truly systemic feature of the distribution of capabilities, on the one hand, and the alliances that states form, on the other. Although countries could not choose how much power they had, he argued, they could pick their team. The U.S.-centric alliance system that defines so much of international politics, now entering its eighth decade, has attained something of a structural character, but Waltz’s distinction still holds. The current international order emerged not from power alone but also from choices made by the United States and its allies—to cooperate deeply in the economic and security realms, first to contain the Soviet Union and then to advance a global order that made it easier to trade and cooperate. Their choices still matter. If they make the right ones, then bipolarity or multipolarity will remain a distant eventuality, and the partial unipolar system of today will last for decades to come.

Most consequentially, the United States should not step back from its alliances and security commitments in Europe or Asia. The United States derives significant benefits from its security leadership in these regions. If America came home, a more dangerous, unstable world would emerge. There would also be less cooperation on the global economy and other important issues that Washington cannot solve on its own.

Indeed, in the era of partial unipolarity, alliances are all the more valuable. Revisionism demands punishment, and with fewer unilateral options on the table, there is a greater need for the United States to respond in concert with its allies. Yet Washington still has substantial power to shape such cooperation. Cooperation among self-interested states can emerge without leadership, but it is more likely to do so when Washington guides the process. And American proposals frequently become the focal point around which its partners rally.

Keeping U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe intact hardly means that Washington should sign a blank check: its friends can and should do more to properly defend themselves. Not only will they need to spend more; they will need to spend more wisely, too. U.S. allies in Europe should increase their capacity for territorial defense in areas where the United States can do less while not trying to duplicate areas of U.S. strength. In practice, this means focusing on the simple task of fielding more ground troops. In Asia, U.S. allies would be wise to prioritize defensive systems and strategies, especially with respect to Taiwan. Fortunately, after more than a decade of ignoring calls to prioritize a defensive strategy for securing the island—turning it into a difficult-to-swallow “porcupine”—Taipei appears to have finally awakened to this need, thanks to Ukraine.

Russian and Chinese frigates in Richards Bay, South Africa, February 2023

Rogan Ward / Reuters

In economic policy, Washington should resist the temptation to always drive the hardest bargain with its allies. The best leaders have willing followers, not ones that must be coaxed or coerced. At the heart of today’s international order is an implicit pledge that has served the United States well: although the country gains certain unique benefits from its dominance of the system, it doesn’t abuse its position to extract undue returns from its allies. Maintaining this arrangement requires policies that are less protectionist than the ones pursued by either the Trump or the Biden administration. When it comes to trade, instead of thinking just about what it wants, Washington should also consider what its allies want. For most, the answer is simple: access to the U.S. market. Accordingly, the United States should put real trade deals on the table for its partners in Asia and Europe that would lower trade barriers. Done properly, market access can be improved in ways that not only please U.S. allies but also create enough benefits for Americans that politicians can overcome political constraints.

The United States must also resist the temptation to use its military to change the status quo. The 20-year nation-building exercise in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq were self-inflicted wounds. The lesson should be easy enough to remember: no occupations ever again. Any proposal to use U.S. military force outside Asia and Europe should be deeply interrogated, and the default response should be “no.” Preventing China and Russia from changing the status quo in Asia and Europe was once relatively easy, but now it is a full-time job. That is where the U.S. military’s focus should lie.

Ultimately, the world in the age of partial unipolarity retains many of the characteristics it exhibited in the age of total unipolarity, just in modified form. International norms and institutions still constrain revisionists, but these states are more willing to challenge them. The United States still has command of the commons and a unique capacity to project military power across the globe, but China has created a fiercely contested zone near its shores. The United States still possesses vast economic leverage, but it has a greater need to act in concert with its allies to make sanctions effective. It still has a unique leadership capacity for promoting cooperation, but its scope for unilateral action is reduced. Yes, America faces limits it did not face right after the Soviet Union’s collapse. But the myth of multipolarity obscures just how much power it still has.

STEPHEN G. BROOKS is a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and a Guest Professor at Stockholm University.

Foreign Affairs · by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth · April 18, 2023

9. U.S. Envoy Confronts Russian Diplomat on Evan Gershkovich Detention at U.N.

U.S. Envoy Confronts Russian Diplomat on Evan Gershkovich Detention at U.N.

At a meeting led by Russia’s Lavrov, Thomas-Greenfield calls for release of Wall Street Journal reporter

By William Mauldin

Updated April 24, 2023 3:03 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-envoy-confronts-russian-diplomat-on-evan-gershkovich-detention-at-u-n-36df2b7d?mod=hp_featst_pos3

UNITED NATIONS—A senior U.S. diplomat demanded Moscow free Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and another detained American at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council led by her Russian counterpart.

The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, invited Elizabeth Whelan, the sister of detained American Paul Whelan, to attend a Security Council meeting presided over by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The U.S. diplomat said Moscow was using Messrs. Whelan and Gershkovich as “bargaining chips, human pawns.”

Russia holds the rotating presidency of the Security Council in April, culminating in two meetings this week led by Mr. Lavrov himself rather than a subordinate Russian diplomat. Security Council meetings are rare venues where senior U.S. and Russian envoys come face to face.

“I am calling on you, right now, to release Paul Whelan, Evan Gershkovich immediately, to let Paul and Evan come home and to cease this barbaric practice once and for all,” Ms. Thomas-Greenfield told the 15-member council meeting led by Mr. Lavrov. Calling attention to Ms. Whelan, Ms. Thomas-Greenfield said, “I want Minister Lavrov to look into her eyes and see her suffering.”

Mr. Lavrov lifted his left hand briefly after Ms. Thomas-Greenfield’s appeal but passed much of her remarks looking at papers.

“As a courteous president, I cannot but thank the representative of the United States,” he said when she concluded, and then recognized the next speaker. Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for Mr. Lavrov, said Mr. Lavrov might address the detainees issue in a future news conference.

The reporter in Russia, Mr. Gershkovich, 31 years old, was detained on March 29 by Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, while he was on a reporting trip in the city of Yekaterinburg and held on an allegation of espionage that the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny.

He was confined the following day in a prison in Moscow run by the FSB. On April 18, he appeared before a judge, who denied his appeal to lift his pretrial detention.

Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich appearing in a Moscow court last week. PHOTO: NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Russian authorities haven’t publicly provided evidence to support the allegation. The U.S. government has designated Mr. Gershkovich as wrongfully detained. Western governments, global news organizations, press-freedom advocates and human rights groups around the world have joined the Journal and the U.S. administration in demanding the journalist’s immediate release. The U.S. has said Mr. Gershkovich isn’t a spy and has never worked for the government.

Russia has said that it is acting in accordance with its own laws.

The U.S. also considers Mr. Whelan to be wrongfully detained and his espionage conviction to be bogus. Ms. Thomas-Greenfield said Russia hasn’t accepted a U.S. offer aimed at freeing the 53-year-old corporate security executive and former U.S. Marine.

Ms. Whelan told journalists at the U.N. before the meeting that her brother and Mr. Gershkovich are part of an “escalating series of wrongful detentions” that Russia is using to extract concessions from Washington.

Elizabeth Whelan, the sister of Paul Whelan, who the U.S. considers to be wrongfully detained in Russia, at the U.N. PHOTO: BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERS

Mr. Lavrov didn’t speak to reporters before entering the council chamber for a meeting aimed at airing Russia’s views on multilateralism. In his remarks at the meeting, he criticized Washington for not granting visas to Russian journalists who sought to travel with him to New York.

The State Department says the statuses of individual visas are confidential. Russian media outlets employ journalists based in the U.S. who can attend U.N. meetings in New York.

On Monday, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan described Ms. Whelan as “an incredible voice for all of us who are outraged by the practice of wrongful detention.”

“We’ll keep working until we’ve brought Paul home and we will keep working until we’ve brought Evan home and all Americans globally who are wrongfully detained,” he told reporters.

Ken Thomas in Washington contributed to this article

10. World military expenditure reaches new record high as European spending surges | SIPRI

World military expenditure reaches new record high as European spending surges | SIPRI

sipri.org

(Stockholm, 24 April 2023) Total global military expenditure increased by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022, to reach a new high of $2240 billion. Military expenditure in Europe saw its steepest year-on-year increase in at least 30 years. The three largest spenders in 2022—the United States, China and Russia—accounted for 56 per cent of the world total, according to new data on global military spending published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Read this press release in Catalan (PDF), French (PDF), Spanish (PDF) or Swedish (PDF).

Invasion of Ukraine and tensions in East Asia drive increased spending

World military spending grew for the eighth consecutive year in 2022 to an all-time high of $2240 billion. By far the sharpest rise in spending (+13 per cent) was seen in Europe and was largely accounted for by Russian and Ukrainian spending. However, military aid to Ukraine and concerns about a heightened threat from Russia strongly influenced many other states’ spending decisions, as did tensions in East Asia.

‘The continuous rise in global military expenditure in recent years is a sign that we are living in an increasingly insecure world,’ said Dr Nan Tian, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘States are bolstering military strength in response to a deteriorating security environment, which they do not foresee improving in the near future.’

Cold war levels of military expenditure return to Central and Western Europe

Military expenditure by states in Central and Western Europe totalled $345 billion in 2022. In real terms, spending by these states for the first time surpassed that in 1989, as the cold war was ending, and was 30 per cent higher than in 2013. Several states significantly increased their military spending following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while others announced plans to raise spending levels over periods of up to a decade.

‘The invasion of Ukraine had an immediate impact on military spending decisions in Central and Western Europe. This included multi-year plans to boost spending from several governments,’ said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘As a result, we can reasonably expect military expenditure in Central and Western Europe to keep rising in the years ahead.’

Some of the sharpest increases were seen in Finland (+36 per cent), Lithuania (+27 per cent), Sweden (+12 per cent) and Poland (+11 per cent).

‘While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 certainly affected military spending decisions in 2022, concerns about Russian aggression have been building for much longer,’ said Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘Many former Eastern bloc states have more than doubled their military spending since 2014, the year when Russia annexed Crimea.’

Russia and Ukraine raise military spending as war rages on

Russian military spending grew by an estimated 9.2 per cent in 2022, to around $86.4 billion. This was equivalent to 4.1 per cent of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022, up from 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2021.

Figures released by Russia in late 2022 show that spending on national defence, the largest component of Russian military expenditure, was already 34 per cent higher, in nominal terms, than in budgetary plans drawn up in 2021.

‘The difference between Russia’s budgetary plans and its actual military spending in 2022 suggests the invasion of Ukraine has cost Russia far more than it anticipated,’ said Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Ukraine’s military spending reached $44.0 billion in 2022. At 640 per cent, this was the highest single-year increase in a country’s military expenditure ever recorded in SIPRI data. As a result of the increase and the war-related damage to Ukraine’s economy, the military burden (military spending as a share of GDP) shot up to 34 per cent of GDP in 2022, from 3.2 per cent in 2021.

US spending rises despite high inflation

The United States remains by far the world’s biggest military spender. US military spending reached $877 billion in 2022, which was 39 per cent of total global military spending and three times more than the amount spent by China, the world’s second largest spender. The 0.7 per cent real-terms increase in US spending in 2022 would have been even greater had it not been for the highest levels of inflation since 1981.

‘The increase in the USA’s military spending in 2022 was largely accounted for by the unprecedented level of financial military aid it provided to Ukraine,’ said Dr Nan Tian, SIPRI Senior Researcher. ‘Given the scale of US spending, even a minor increase in percentage terms has a significant impact on the level of global military expenditure.’

US financial military aid to Ukraine totalled $19.9 billion in 2022. Although this was the largest amount of military aid given by any country to a single beneficiary in any year since the cold war, it represented only 2.3 per cent of total US military spending. In 2022 the USA allocated $295 billion to military operations and maintenance, $264 billion to procurement and research and development, and $167 billion to military personnel.

China and Japan lead continued spending increase in Asia and Oceania

The combined military expenditure of countries in Asia and Oceania was $575 billion. This was 2.7 per cent more than in 2021 and 45 per cent more than in 2013, continuing an uninterrupted upward trend dating back to at least 1989.

China remained the world’s second largest military spender, allocating an estimated $292 billion in 2022. This was 4.2 per cent more than in 2021 and 63 per cent more than in 2013. China’s military expenditure has increased for 28 consecutive years.

Japan’s military spending increased by 5.9 per cent between 2021 and 2022, reaching $46.0 billion, or 1.1 per cent of GDP. This was the highest level of Japanese military spending since 1960. A new national security strategy published in 2022 sets out ambitious plans to increase Japan’s military capability over the coming decade in response to perceived growing threats from China, North Korea and Russia.

‘Japan is undergoing a profound shift in its military policy,’ said Xiao Liang, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘The post-war restraints Japan imposed on its military spending and military capabilities seem to be loosening.’

Other notable developments

The real-terms increase in world military spending in 2022 was slowed by the effects of inflation, which in many countries soared to levels not seen for decades. In nominal terms (i.e. in current prices without adjusting for inflation), the global total increased by 6.5 per cent.
India’s military spending of $81.4 billion was the fourth highest in the world. It was 6.0 per cent more than in 2021.
In 2022 military spending by Saudi Arabia, the fifth biggest military spender, rose by 16 per cent to reach an estimated $75.0 billion, its first increase since 2018.
Nigeria’s military spending fell by 38 per cent to $3.1 billion, after a 56 per cent increase in spending in 2021.
Military spending by NATO members totalled $1232 billion in 2022, which was 0.9 per cent higher than in 2021.
The United Kingdom had the highest military spending in Central and Western Europe at $68.5 billion, of which an estimated $2.5 billion (3.6 per cent) was financial military aid to Ukraine.
In 2022 Türkiye’s military spending fell for the third year in a row, reaching $10.6 billion—a decrease of 26 per cent from 2021.
Ethiopia’s military spending rose by 88 per cent in 2022, to reach $1.0 billion. The increase coincided with a renewed government offensive against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in the north of the country.

For editors

SIPRI monitors developments in military expenditure worldwide and maintains the most consistent and extensive publicly available data source on military expenditure. The comprehensive annual update of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database is accessible from today at www.sipri.org.

All percentage changes are expressed in real terms (constant 2021 prices). Military expenditure refers to all government spending on current military forces and activities, including salaries and benefits, operational expenses, arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, and central administration, command and support. It also includes military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). SIPRI therefore discourages the use of terms such as ‘arms spending’ when referring to military expenditure, as spending on armaments is usually only a minority of the total.

Media contacts

For information or interview requests contact Stephanie Blenckner (blenckner@sipri.org , +46 708 655 360) or Amelie Lutz (amelie.lutz@sipri.org., +46 766 286 133)

sipri.org

11. Why NATO Must Admit Ukraine

Excerpts:

Ukraine has much to gain from NATO, but it also has much to offer in return. Ukraine is defending NATO’s entire eastern flank and sharing what it learns with alliance members. For instance, the Ukrainian military has shown that although the NATO principle of decentralization—which delegates decision-making authority to subordinates—works well with small units of professional soldiers and contractors, it is ill suited to a full-scale war in which drafted soldiers make up as much as 70 percent of units. Ukraine’s experience has also shown that, contrary to NATO practices, the commanders who train units should be the same commanders who lead those units into battle. Other lessons that Ukraine has taught NATO include the value of innovation, ingenuity, local initiative, civilian support for the military, and civil defense.

During the course of the war, Ukraine has helped strengthen NATO’s rules, standards, and procedures, improving the alliance’s ability to fight modern, high-intensity wars. Ukraine also possesses unparalleled experience in countering hybrid threats, conducting information warfare, and ensuring the resilience of state institutions and critical infrastructure. Today, millions of Ukrainians are honing their skills in Europe’s bloodiest war of the twenty-first century. Tomorrow, they will use those skills to bolster NATO’s collective security.

The best way to ensure Euro-Atlantic security is to welcome Ukraine into NATO. Politicians, diplomats, and analysts can always be counted on to come up with new arguments for keeping Ukraine outside the alliance, as they have been doing for years now. The good news is that each new argument is weaker than the last. The bad news is that constantly having to disprove them wastes precious time at the expense of people’s security. Ukraine needs NATO, and NATO needs Ukraine.

Why NATO Must Admit Ukraine

Kyiv Needs the Alliance and the Alliance Needs Kyiv

By Dmytro Kuleba

April 25, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Dmytro Kuleba · April 25, 2023

On April 4, I sat at the great round table inside NATO’s headquarters in Brussels and applauded as Finland was formally admitted to the alliance. I am happy for my Finnish friends, and I welcome this shift in the tectonic plates of European security. But my country, Ukraine, is not yet a NATO member, and this shift will not be complete until it is. Luckily for us, the wheels of history are turning, and there is nothing anyone can do to stop them.

Russia’s war on Ukraine is about more than killing Ukrainians and stealing our land. President Vladimir Putin is trying to destroy the very foundations of the European security order formed after 1945. This is why the stakes are so high, not only for Ukraine but for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Ukraine did not choose this battle. Nor did the United States and its NATO allies. Russia started this war. But it falls to Ukraine and its Western partners to bring the conflict to an end, winning a just victory that guarantees peace and stability in Europe for generations to come.

Doing so requires accepting the inevitable: that Ukraine will become a NATO member, and sooner rather than later. It is time for the alliance to stop making excuses and start the process that leads to Ukraine’s eventual accession, showing Putin that he has already failed and forcing him to temper his ambitions. Throughout the course of this war, we have demonstrated that we are more than ready for membership and that we have much to offer the alliance. What we need is a clear written statement from the allies laying out a path to accession.

EXCUSES, EXCUSES

As the most successful defensive alliance in history, NATO is both a guarantor of security and an expression of a shared political future. But the alliance’s strength derives from the political will of its members, which has been sorely lacking when it comes to admitting Ukraine.

At NATO’s 2008 summit in Bucharest, members agreed to make Ukrainian membership an objective but spent more time signaling to Russia that this would not happen (at least at any point in the foreseeable future) than taking practical steps to make it a reality. The alliance expressed its will to keep the door to membership open, in other words, but only on the assumption that Ukraine would not darken NATO’s doorstep any time soon. Three wars later—in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine in 2014, and now again in Ukraine—it is clear that ambiguity is Putin’s best ally.

In the 15 years since the Bucharest summit, Ukraine has heard many arguments about why it cannot join NATO. Alliance members have claimed that admitting new members that share a border with Russia might provoke Moscow. This argument was always wrong, but repeating it now is laughable. At the time Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, Ukraine was officially a non-aligned country with no ambition to join NATO. In 2022, when Russia started its terrible all-out invasion, NATO still had not opened a real path for Ukrainian membership. As I write these lines, an air raid siren is sounding in Kyiv, and Russia is in the midst of a months-long assault on the city of Bakhmut. Moscow is also preparing to repel a series of Ukraine’s counteroffensives. So I have a simple response to anyone who argues that admitting Ukraine to NATO would provoke Russia: Are you serious?

Fear has clouded NATO’s judgment.

Amazingly, opponents of Ukrainian membership have continued to make this argument even after more than a year of all-out war. Yet Finland’s accession demonstrates once and for all why it doesn’t hold water. Russia responded to NATO’s latest enlargement—which puts a member directly on Russia’s border—not by lashing out at Finland but by downplaying the significance of the country’s accession, presumably to avoid highlighting its own failure to keep Helsinki out of the alliance.

Those who oppose Ukrainian accession have also argued that Ukraine itself is divided over whether to join NATO. In the past this was true, but no longer. Ukrainians have grown steadily more supportive of joining the alliance since 2014, when Russia illegally seized Crimea and ignited a war in the Donbas. In 2019, Ukraine formally amended its constitution to enshrine its commitment to join NATO. The vast majority of Ukrainians—82 percent, according to a February 2023 poll by the International Republican Institute—now support joining. And there is no longer a regional divide on the issue: a majority of Ukrainians are pro-NATO in all parts of the country.

The residents of NATO countries increasingly see Ukraine as part of their broader community. According to an EU-wide survey conducted in February 2023, 68 percent of EU citizens consider Russia’s attack on Ukraine an attack on Europe as a whole. This is the view of 80 percent of Poles and Spaniards, 70 percent of Dutch people, and 65 percent of Germans and the French. Both the leaders of most NATO countries and their publics view Ukraine as an integral part of Western security architecture. It is time to act on these beliefs.

Leaving Ukraine exposed will only lead to further Russian aggression.

The newest argument against Ukrainian accession is that the issue divides the alliance. But in Europe, this same objection was raised by those seeking to block Ukraine’s path toward membership in the European Union. A little more than a year ago, we were told that the EU was divided over whether to grant Ukraine candidate status. In June 2022, however, all 27 EU member states supported granting Ukraine this status, giving the bloc a new sense of unity, purpose, and strength. The same will happen to NATO when a decision on Ukraine’s path to membership is taken.

Russian aggression against Ukraine has reinvigorated the alliance and given it a new raison d’être. Finland joined after resolving its differences with NATO countries. Sweden will follow suit, and Ukraine can, too. It’s just a matter of political will. If we focus on division, we will be divided. But if we look for practical solutions, NATO will be stronger and more unified. It’s time to drop this excuse and finally accept that there is no alternative to admitting Ukraine if NATO’s goal is to ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic community.

I am not questioning NATO’s current commitment to Ukraine. Alliance members have delivered vital assistance to Kyiv since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. But I am questioning NATO’s strategy when it comes to Ukraine and the long-term security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Fear has clouded the alliance’s judgment, leading it to adopt an overly cautious strategy that has had grave consequences for thousands of Ukrainians who have been kidnapped, raped, tortured, displaced, or killed. NATO’s flawed strategy has also allowed Russia to undermine the security of the West with cyberattacks, espionage, and political interference.

The current leaders of NATO countries did not make the misguided decisions that brought us here, but they can make the bold decision to expand the alliance and thereby safeguard the Euro-Atlantic. Leaving Ukraine exposed will only lead to further instability and Russian aggression.

BEYOND BUCHAREST

Ukraine seeks NATO membership and with it the protection of Article 5, which requires members to treat an armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America as an attack against them all, and “to take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Who in our position would not seek such protections? But we are realists. We are not seeking to drag the United States or other NATO countries into a war. This is our war, and we are fighting it successfully with the generous support of our partners and allies.

We have never asked anyone else to put boots on the ground, and we do not intend to make such a request. We don’t seek a magic wand that will miraculously end the war and eliminate the need to win it on the battlefield. What we are asking for is a concrete timetable for Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

At the alliance’s upcoming summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, NATO members should send a written signal to Russia that the game is over: Ukraine is part of the West, it is on NATO’s doorstep, and it will soon walk through the door. To avoid any misunderstandings, we in Ukraine are not talking about immediate membership at the Vilnius summit but about NATO allies taking a historic step toward admitting the country.

NATO should send a written signal to Russia that the game is over.

There is no need for a membership action plan that would set out certain benchmarks for the country to meet prior to accession; Finland and Sweden have shown that such programs are unnecessary and Ukraine is more than qualified to join. The time has come to offer clarity instead of reiterating the open-door policy and letting Putin exploit its ambiguity. NATO must resist the temptation to make additional demands of Ukraine that would further delay its membership.

Instead, NATO should make a political decision to put forward a timetable for Ukraine’s accession, either at the Vilnius summit or by the end of 2023. Accession will be a process, and achieving the ultimate goal of Ukrainian membership in the alliance will depend on the security situation, but this process needs to start without delay.

It would be reasonable for NATO members to decide what kinds of security guarantees they wish to offer Ukraine right now, pending the accession, and which of these guarantees will continue to apply after Ukraine becomes a NATO ally (in addition to those enshrined in the NATO treaty). If NATO fails to act at the Vilnius summit, however, it will continue to carry the shame of Bucharest. The time to act is now.

AN ASSET, NOT A LIABILITY

Ukraine has much to gain from NATO, but it also has much to offer in return. Ukraine is defending NATO’s entire eastern flank and sharing what it learns with alliance members. For instance, the Ukrainian military has shown that although the NATO principle of decentralization—which delegates decision-making authority to subordinates—works well with small units of professional soldiers and contractors, it is ill suited to a full-scale war in which drafted soldiers make up as much as 70 percent of units. Ukraine’s experience has also shown that, contrary to NATO practices, the commanders who train units should be the same commanders who lead those units into battle. Other lessons that Ukraine has taught NATO include the value of innovation, ingenuity, local initiative, civilian support for the military, and civil defense.

During the course of the war, Ukraine has helped strengthen NATO’s rules, standards, and procedures, improving the alliance’s ability to fight modern, high-intensity wars. Ukraine also possesses unparalleled experience in countering hybrid threats, conducting information warfare, and ensuring the resilience of state institutions and critical infrastructure. Today, millions of Ukrainians are honing their skills in Europe’s bloodiest war of the twenty-first century. Tomorrow, they will use those skills to bolster NATO’s collective security.

The best way to ensure Euro-Atlantic security is to welcome Ukraine into NATO. Politicians, diplomats, and analysts can always be counted on to come up with new arguments for keeping Ukraine outside the alliance, as they have been doing for years now. The good news is that each new argument is weaker than the last. The bad news is that constantly having to disprove them wastes precious time at the expense of people’s security. Ukraine needs NATO, and NATO needs Ukraine.

DMYTRO KULEBA is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs · by Dmytro Kuleba · April 25, 2023

12. The US dollar’s imminent death is greatly exaggerated

Excerpts:

Any chance the Chinese currency will become fully convertible any time soon is highly remote now that we have the clearest of signs its bubble has started to deflate and its economy is on a low-growth trajectory.

All this is not to say the US dollar’s position as the world’s dominant currency is impregnable and US policymakers do not need to pursue sounder economic policies than they have been to ensure the dollar’s long-run enviable status.

After all, until World War II, the pound sterling was the world’s dominant currency — only to be eclipsed by the US dollar.

But it is to say that with the world’s other major currencies in such a sorry state, there is little risk we will see the dollar’s sudden demise.

There is also every prospect that in the event of a global recession later this year, the dollar will receive a strong bid as investors flee to safety.

The US dollar’s imminent death is greatly exaggerated

By Desmond Lachman

https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-us-dollars-imminent-death-is-greatly-exaggerated/

April 23, 2023

Some alarmist warnings never seem to go away no matter how often they prove mistaken.

One is that the US dollar is bound to lose its position soon as the world’s dominant international reserve currency, with all the benefits such status affords the US economy.

Judging by a chorus of dollar pessimists including Yale’s Stephen Roach and former Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Jen, it seems the idea the dollar will be dethroned is back in vogue.

Even Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva says, “Every night I ask myself: Why should every country have to be tied to the US dollar for trade?’’

Despite many such warnings over the past two decades, the US dollar remains by far the top dog amongst the world’s currencies.

While the dollar has lost some share in the past decade, the International Monetary Fund says the world’s central banks still hold close to 60% of their international reserves in dollars.

Meanwhile, per the Bank for International Settlements, almost 90% of international trade continues to be transacted in dollars.

Several factors are prompting the latest round of dollar doom-mongering. Among these are the recent fears about US regional banks’ health in the wake of the Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank failures.

Also causing dollar angst is the looming debt-ceiling showdown that’s raising the specter of a US debt default, the growing worry of some central banks that America is weaponizing the dollar as underlined by its Iranian and Russian sanctions and the Federal Reserve’s recent policy mismanagement that spawned the highest US inflation in 40 years.

Before working ourselves into a lather about the dollar’s imminent eclipse, it is well to recall Paul Volcker’s observations on previous occasions the dollar’s continued dominance was questioned.

Volcker noted that for the dollar to be replaced as the world’s leading currency, it had to be replaced by another currency.

With all the dollar’s apparent weaknesses, were the euro, the Chinese renminbi and the Japanese yen really more stable currencies?

Volcker’s skepticism about the world’s other major currencies’ ability to knock the US dollar from its lofty perch are as pertinent today as they were at the century’s start.

Take the euro, the world’s second-most-important currency.

Never before has the eurozone’s economic periphery, including most notably Italy, been as indebted as it is today. Never since the eurozone’s 1999 launch has its inflation been as high as it is today.

This has to raise the prospect of another round of eurozone sovereign-debt crisis as the European Central Bank has been forced to slam on the monetary brakes and switch from a policy of massive bond buying to one of balance-sheet reduction.

Any such crisis would summon serious questions about the euro’s long-term viability, especially given that a new round of eurozone sovereign-debt crisis would be centered on Italy, whose economy is some 10 times the size of Greece’s.

China’s long-term prospects of replacing the dollar as the world’s top currency seem even dimmer.

Over the past decade, China experienced a property and credit market bubble that exceeded the ones that preceded Japan’s lost economic decade in the 1990s and the US housing and credit-market bubble that preceded the 2008-2009 Great Recession.

This has given rise to a year of declining housing prices and a wave of defaults by Chinese property developers, including most notably Evergrande.

Compounding China’s economic woes was President Xi Jinping’s economically disastrous zero-COVID policy that last year caused the second-slowest growth in half a century.

Any chance the Chinese currency will become fully convertible any time soon is highly remote now that we have the clearest of signs its bubble has started to deflate and its economy is on a low-growth trajectory.

All this is not to say the US dollar’s position as the world’s dominant currency is impregnable and US policymakers do not need to pursue sounder economic policies than they have been to ensure the dollar’s long-run enviable status.

After all, until World War II, the pound sterling was the world’s dominant currency — only to be eclipsed by the US dollar.

But it is to say that with the world’s other major currencies in such a sorry state, there is little risk we will see the dollar’s sudden demise.

There is also every prospect that in the event of a global recession later this year, the dollar will receive a strong bid as investors flee to safety.

13. As Carlson and Lemon Exit, a Chapter Closes on Cable’s Trump War

I do not want to get in the mud on this except to ask did FOX and CNN coordinate their actions? This surely seems like quite a coincidence. Did they jettison their two "extremists?" Is this a sign they both want to move toward more objective news reporting?

As Carlson and Lemon Exit, a Chapter Closes on Cable’s Trump War

The New York Times · by Jim Rutenberg · April 25, 2023

News analysis

The two hosts took very different approaches, but the decisions by Fox News and CNN to shed the stars marks at least a temporary shift in the excesses of Trump-era coverage.

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Tucker Carlson drew big ratings playing to Donald Trump with white nationalist and false conspiracy content. Credit...Rebecca Noble for The New York Times

April 25, 2023, 4:57 a.m. ET

They were on very different networks and did very different things to draw very different ratings.

But the synchronous exits of Tucker Carlson and Don Lemon from the cable news landscape on Monday represented the end of an era for their industry — the most combative and partisan since Ted Turner introduced the concept of 24-hour news to television more than 40 years ago.

No equivalence can be drawn between the two hosts. Mr. Carlson often led in the ratings by running wild at Fox News with white nationalist and false conspiracy stories that put him in a class by himself. Mr. Lemon became known for his anti-Trump broadsides that were tame in comparison — and drew much smaller ratings — yet could come off as plenty hot by the standards of CNN.

But in their most recent incarnations, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Lemon were both products of the Trump years — set-top-box combatants who often made headlines themselves by giving their audiences generous helpings of indignation and outrage.

Now, in different ways, their ousters represent at least a temporary pulling back from the excesses of the media coverage that the Trump election, presidency and post-presidency spawned.

“On a lot of the mainstream channels, there was a race to be first to condemn Trump to celebrate his problems,” said Stephen F. Hayes, a founder of the conservative site The Dispatch. “And on Fox, in prime time especially, there was this over-the-top effort to defend him and amplify his lies.’’

Mr. Hayes, who left his job as a Fox analyst over Mr. Carlson’s promotion of conspiracy theories about the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, said optimistically, “We can hope that this signals some kind of broader institutional change.”

Questions remain about the particulars of both exits, and both situations involved factors other than their general editorial approaches.

Mr. Carlson had become an embarrassing figure through the ample material that was produced in the defamation lawsuit Dominion Voting Systems brought against Fox, which settled last week at the eleventh hour for $787.5 million.

Emails and text messages produced ahead of trial showed Mr. Carlson mocking Mr. Trump even while hailing him on his program, and using crude and misogynistic language about a lawyer pushing the election conspiracies about Dominion’s voting machines, Sidney Powell. In another lawsuit pending in Delaware, the former head of booking for Carlson’s show, Abby Grossberg, accuses Mr. Carlson and his staff of using similarly coarse language about women. That behavior — which Ms. Grossberg alleges created a toxic work environment — appears to have been a factor in his ouster as much as anything else.

Don Lemon, after becoming a prime-time face of CNN’s critical coverage of Trump, faced a new environment with a new boss who wanted to steer CNN away from what he saw as the political extremes.

Mr. Lemon’s ouster came after he made a sexist and ageist remark on a CNN morning program that the Republican presidential aspirant Nikki Haley wasn’t “in her prime” because, as he put it, “a woman is considered to be in prime in her 20s and 30s and maybe 40s.” The statement was deeply offensive by just about any measure. But in television terms, it also strayed into cardinal sin territory — it threatened to alienate an important ratings demographic. Though Mr. Lemon apologized, the network finally concluded that his future had become untenable.

But neither situation can be viewed outside of where the men stood on the shifting plates of the cable news terra firma.

Mr. Lemon was operating in a new environment at CNN, where a new network president, Chris Licht, made it clear he wanted to shave down what he views as the more partisan edges that emerged in the Trump years. As Mr. Licht told advertisers last June, “At a time where extremes are dominating cable news, we will seek to go a different way.” Sending CNN down that middle way also happens to be the priority of David Zaslav, the chief executive of CNN’s parent company, Warner Bros. Discovery, even though it means lower ratings and therefore less revenue. “Ratings be damned,” he has said.

It was in no small part because of this shift that Mr. Licht moved Mr. Lemon from his 10 p.m. show last year and assigned him as a co-host of a new CNN breakfast program. “CNN This Morning” was positioned as a lighter, more conversational — and less edgy — program than the one from which Mr. Lemon was being vacated.

Yet it didn’t quite take. “Don Lemon is a lightning rod because he really came to prominence during an era where that was celebrated and encouraged in prime time,” Mr. Licht conceded at a media conference held by Semafor earlier this month. “CNN has moved on from that and Don has moved on from that.” Now, CNN has moved on from Don.

The signal is a little less clear from Fox News. The network and its leaders Lachlan and Rupert Murdoch had stood by Mr. Carlson for years as he drew wide condemnation for airing false and racist conspiracies that won him such cachet with so many of the Trump faithful.

They seemed to do so for a basic reason — the large ratings and considerable revenues he gained as he did so. Even as the Dominion lawsuit appeared to be heading full steam to trial, Mr. Carlson doubled down by running reports falsely portraying the Jan. 6 attack as a mostly peaceful event. It sent a signal that even under the threat of a huge lawsuit, ratings trumped all at Fox.

Following its settlement with Dominion last week, Fox was met with the unanswered question of whether the experience of the case was singeing enough to make Fox News pull back from airing the sort of unbridled, false conspiracy content that gave Dominion such a strong hand at court.

The abrupt end of Mr. Carlson’s run at Fox News may not telegraph some broader pullback in the offing — indeed, there are various indications to the contrary. But his removal from Fox’s prime time is a pullback all on its own, and a pretty major one at that.

Then again, over the course of the past 40 years, cable news, in its perpetual hunt for ratings and relevance, has inexorably moved toward ever more strident programming and personalities. Mr. Carlson’s and Mr. Lemon's exits may be the end of one era in cable news. But if Fox and CNN are unable to resist the siren call of Mr. Trump’s attention-grabbing bag of tricks in the pursuit of ratings, who is to say what the next one will truly look like?

The New York Times · by Jim Rutenberg · April 25, 2023

14. Opinion | I Was General Counsel of the N.S.A. America Has a Problem With Secrets.

Excerpts:

One critical private sector concept that the government could adapt to the handling of classified materials is to follow an increasingly popular business model to deal with cybersecurity risks. The private sector is shifting from a system dependent on a network firewall to one based on independently verifying every cybertransaction. The federal government is also moving to this so-called zero trust architecture, with both the intelligence community and the Defense Department embracing the concept for cybersecurity purposes. The new idea would be to apply the same concept to our system of handling classified documents: It would explicitly implement the principle — to which we claim adherence but don’t apply in practice — that access to information is afforded only on a need-to-know basis if it’s relevant to your particular job.

As a presidentially appointed reform group suggested after the Snowden leaks a decade ago, shouldn’t a tech support worker (like Mr. Teixeira) merely have administrative access to the network, but not the right to see or print out substantive intelligence reports? Today, we have a perimeter-based system: If you pass a security test, then you are mostly allowed access to classified documents, albeit with some categories of documents being in special “compartments” requiring additional approvals. But that’s far from a zero trust system, with layers of automated controls applicable to the access of each document. This could also be combined with a system where levels of details of a report were made available only as necessary, moving away from our binary, all-or-nothing approach.

There are many other private sector techniques and innovations the government could exploit, but we need to adopt and implement them in an integrated and coherent way. That’s not going to come about through the government awarding individual contracts for solutions. Instead, Congress or the Biden administration should appoint a small task force of government officials and the best and brightest from the private sector to overhaul our dissemination and protection systems. We need to start treating the protective end of the intelligence process like it’s as important as the collection part.

Implementing that will be expensive. The alternative, however, is to keep taking disjointed and incremental steps — but one day, that might yield even more costly intelligence or military losses.

Opinion | I Was General Counsel of the N.S.A. America Has a Problem With Secrets.

The New York Times · by Glenn S. Gerstell · April 24, 2023

Guest Essay

I Was General Counsel of the N.S.A. America Has a Problem With Secrets.

April 24, 2023

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Mr. Gerstell served as general counsel of the National Security Agency from 2015 to 2020 and is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

America’s secrets aren’t sufficiently protected. The recent posting of apparently classified government documents to internet chat rooms allegedly by the Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira reminds us that intelligence reporting is subject to a dilemma: Either we clamp down to prevent leaks, or we share information broadly within government to prevent harm to our nation and our troops.

There is a way out of this predicament, but it entails fundamental and expensive changes.

The first step in this effort will require us to admit that we aren’t investing the right way in preventing leaks. This isn’t any one administration’s failure. When Congress allocates funds to spy agencies, they are more likely to spend them on new spying techniques that might produce richer intelligence, rather than on protective measures that lower the risk of compromise.

Even so, we do spend billions on protection, but it’s heavily geared toward stopping potentially devastating intrusions by another country, such as China or Russia, and less aimed at insiders. That’s the right choice: Imagine the consequences if the 2019 SolarWinds intrusion into federal civilian departments had instead occurred in the Pentagon’s classified networks. While there have been embarrassing compromises of parts of the military’s network, we appear to have been successful at keeping foreign adversaries out of our top-secret defense and intelligence systems, at least.

Yet we still have a problem: The most serious document compromises of the past decade or so have been caused by employees with authorized access, such as Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, Reality Winner and, apparently, Jack Teixeira. That’s a disturbing pattern of leaks by 20-something contractors or members of the military — not longtime employees of the C.I.A. or the N.S.A. Perhaps the vulnerability is greater in the military, whose recruiting is less selective than that of the intelligence agencies. Maybe the problems are more prevalent among members of Generation Z and millennials — especially those obsessed with online gaming — as they might be more disaffected, less inclined to follow rules and more interested in building clout on social media.

When inside leaks occur, the typical and understandable response of the intelligence and military communities is to cut back on access in some way. But no sooner are stricter procedures implemented than they inevitably erode because the evolving nature of threats and technology demands new intelligence and greater sharing. Another response, from the Moynihan Commission in 1997 to the current examination by the director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, is to wrestle with the problem of overclassification, on the theory that the larger the number of classified documents, the more difficult they are to manage. There’s some truth to that, but overclassification doesn’t itself cause leaks. To combat leaks, we instead must focus on dissemination and protection.

Determined individuals will inevitably find a way to get around any defensive measures. But rather than adopting one-off, backward-looking solutions aimed at preventing another leak, we need an integrated approach to disseminating and protecting national security information. Fortunately, both the government and the private sector have potential solutions in hand.

The government can create a sense of mission and public service, and it can vet and monitor, in a legally appropriate way, employee behavior. Even with the best policies and procedures for our system of handling classified documents, we must ultimately rely on a culture of trust and compliance. Most of the individuals with top-secret clearances know that the lives of their fellow members of the military, intelligence and diplomatic communities could be endangered by an unauthorized disclosure. Nonetheless, we need a greatly reinforced effort to restore a sense of public mission and inculcate the appreciation of the fact that our national security is at stake. This might be even more essential in the case of recruits for the military and intelligence agencies coming from Generation Z.

The principal way we currently train employees with security clearances is by making them periodically take an online course on the proper handling of classified documents. This mechanical approach won’t yield a work force that truly appreciates the need for security, especially in the younger generation. Requiring everyone applying for a top-secret clearance to undergo a psychological exam and polygraph (now done only for employees of certain agencies) would not only weed out problematic candidates but might also build cohesion among employees who feel they are part of a select group. And that type of vetting needs to be done continuously, not just at the time of hiring. Again, this could be a more acute issue among, say, impressionable 18-year-old military recruits whose views might well change in just a few years.

Of course, a trusted work force isn’t itself sufficient; there will always be temptations, and a certain percentage of people will deviate. Technology must fill the gap, and there, the government has much to learn from the private sector’s innovation. From pharmaceutical companies to defense contractors working on the cutting edge of the digital revolution, private companies deploy technology in an effort to prevent theft of industrial secrets so that samples, models and blueprints don’t walk out the door. The government could emulate the private sector, picking out the most effective solutions — perhaps installing paper-thin R.F.I.D. tags on documents and binders (triggering an alarm on exit, much like the system retail stores use to protect against shoplifting) or stepping up the use of artificial intelligence to catch anomalous behavior (such as someone printing out an atypical document). If every A.T.M. can have a camera, why not every top-secret printer? The government has been slow to adopt robust private sector techniques because they are costly and time-consuming to implement, and Congress demands quick fixes.

One critical private sector concept that the government could adapt to the handling of classified materials is to follow an increasingly popular business model to deal with cybersecurity risks. The private sector is shifting from a system dependent on a network firewall to one based on independently verifying every cybertransaction. The federal government is also moving to this so-called zero trust architecture, with both the intelligence community and the Defense Department embracing the concept for cybersecurity purposes. The new idea would be to apply the same concept to our system of handling classified documents: It would explicitly implement the principle — to which we claim adherence but don’t apply in practice — that access to information is afforded only on a need-to-know basis if it’s relevant to your particular job.

As a presidentially appointed reform group suggested after the Snowden leaks a decade ago, shouldn’t a tech support worker (like Mr. Teixeira) merely have administrative access to the network, but not the right to see or print out substantive intelligence reports? Today, we have a perimeter-based system: If you pass a security test, then you are mostly allowed access to classified documents, albeit with some categories of documents being in special “compartments” requiring additional approvals. But that’s far from a zero trust system, with layers of automated controls applicable to the access of each document. This could also be combined with a system where levels of details of a report were made available only as necessary, moving away from our binary, all-or-nothing approach.

There are many other private sector techniques and innovations the government could exploit, but we need to adopt and implement them in an integrated and coherent way. That’s not going to come about through the government awarding individual contracts for solutions. Instead, Congress or the Biden administration should appoint a small task force of government officials and the best and brightest from the private sector to overhaul our dissemination and protection systems. We need to start treating the protective end of the intelligence process like it’s as important as the collection part.

Implementing that will be expensive. The alternative, however, is to keep taking disjointed and incremental steps — but one day, that might yield even more costly intelligence or military losses.

Glenn S. Gerstell served as general counsel of the National Security Agency from 2015 to 2020 and is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by Glenn S. Gerstell · April 24, 2023

15. Why the US Military’s Messages Are Falling on Deaf Middle Eastern Ears

Excerpts:

It is hard to imagine how the U.S. military can sustain a long-term strategy toward the Middle East that doesn’t have political support. Given the openness of U.S. politics, it is difficult to imagine that Middle Eastern governments will fail to notice that U.S. political support for close security ties to the Middle East is diminishing. The Pentagon may feel it needs to keep up appearances of intimacy, but partners will not, and that will drive politicians in precisely the direction that the Pentagon doesn’t want. The Pentagon sees its principal targets being governments in the Middle East, but if it wants to sustain close ties in the region, winning support from politicians at home is both more urgent and more important.

Middle Eastern governments will doubt the value of any policy the U.S. military pursues without strong and durable political backing. They will look to supplement it with other relationships, even if the U.S. military trumpets its fealty, and they wouldn’t be wrong for doing so.

Why the US Military’s Messages Are Falling on Deaf Middle Eastern Ears

Its timeworn approach is out of step with the region, and with America

defenseone.com · by Jon B. Alterman

Almost 40 years ago, a glam-rock band from California named Autograph released “My Girlfriend’s Boyfriend Isn’t Me.” The lead singer wails that despite his devotion, “Her mind is stuck on wait and see.” Needless to say, the song doesn’t end well for him.

U.S. military officials spend a lot of time messaging their deep relations with allies and partners in the Middle East, but Middle Eastern rulers aren’t returning the love. The problem isn’t only that they see important opportunities elsewhere, or that they have been hearing for more than a decade that the United States is seeking to diminish its focus on them and concentrate on East Asia. They also see the White House, Congress, and the American public being persistently skeptical about their security needs. Not unreasonably seeing American support as a potentially volatile variable, they are increasingly investing in more diverse relationships and preparing to live in a more multipolar world.

Much as the U.S. military tries to ignore that inconvenient fact, it needs an approach that is step with the region’s worldview, and in step with U.S. politics. If not, the whole enterprise will come crashing down.

The military starts from the premise that the pax americana that U.S. dollars and U.S. soldiers helped secure has kept the region from tipping into chaos, and they offer more of the same. But many governments in the region think that the region has already tipped into chaos, and that the United States has been a central part of the problem. They look at places like Iraq, and they argue that the United States has both abetted conflict and opened the door to Iranian domination. They look at Iran’s regional behavior and its proliferation activities, and they wonder whether the United States is too weak or too uninterested—or both—to do anything about them. When Iranian missiles and drones attacked Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019, taking half of the country’s oil production off-line, President Donald Trump said, “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us.” The reaction did not do much to reassure the Saudis.

Finally, these governments believe the biggest threats to their security are internal rather than external. They are unsettled by U.S. leaders’ calls for liberalization and democratization, and well remember the Obama administration’s quick abandonment of President Hosni Mubarak after almost 30 years of U.S.-Egyptian partnership.

The Ukraine war has made this tension worse. Few of these states ever bought into the Cold War paradigm of countries bound by a higher purpose, but to them, the rise of U.S. language calling to unite democracies to fight autocracy sounds vaguely threatening.

China is another issue. The Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy emphasizes the importance of U.S. strategic competition with China, and it has a chapter whose title advises “anchoring our strategy in regional allies and partners.” Yet the report glosses over an irony: many of the most important U.S. partners in the Middle East—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates—have also signed “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” agreements with China. How does the United States intend to square that circle? What does it mean to be partnered with the United States, and in particular, what does partnering with the United States mean for a country that also seeks to partner with China? It is a question no one really wants to confront squarely.

China and Russia offer quick solutions to regional states’ immediate problems, unencumbered by legislative oversight or human rights concerns. Weapons, surveillance equipment, nuclear reactors, and the like are all on offer, and sweetening the pot is the Russian and Chinese argument that they seek to help countries preserve their unique values, not remake them. This is a dog whistle to authoritarianism and homophobia, intended to build Middle Eastern societies’ resentment to the West, and it works. Further, they argue there is no need to pick sides, undermining precisely the sort of close security ties that the U.S. military is trying to promote.

But the biggest challenge the U.S. military faces in the Middle East isn’t overseas, it’s at home, where the White House and the Congress aren’t behind them. Middle Eastern rulers have the leeway to defy their publics, and when their publics’ approval ratings of the United States are in the low double digits, it need not shape the bilateral relationship. But both the White House and Congress have grown sharply critical of many Middle Eastern governments and critical of seemingly endless U.S. military commitments to the region. While many Gulf governments find the Biden White House especially skeptical, it was President Trump who said U.S. engagement in the Middle East “was the single biggest mistake made in the history of our country.”

The U.S. public’s view is more complicated. Some polls suggest sustained support for a U.S. troop commitment to the region in the abstract. When presented with specific issues, such as defending Saudi Arabia from Iranian attack or protecting Syrian enclaves from the depredations of Bashar al-Assad, that support quickly withers.

Seeing this, the military is still going full speed ahead. It makes promises the rest of the U.S. government doesn’t want to keep, and it warns countries away from engaging militarily with China and Russia while arguing for understanding when they do. Pentagon officials speak privately of doing the maximum without Congressional approval, given Congressional skepticism. The CENTCOM Commander, Gen. Erik Kurilla, can talk about how the U.S.-Saudi relationship “underpins our strategy in the Middle East,” but President Biden previewed his own trip to the Kingdom, describing “a strategic partnership going forward that's based on mutual interests and responsibilities, while also holding true to fundamental American values.” It is hard to ignore the implicit ranking in Kurilla’s statement that was absent in Biden’s.

Middle Eastern governments see the space between the military and the rest of the U.S. government, and they hedge. That pushes the military to attempt an even tighter embrace. Yet, the hedge creates greater distrust in Congress and the White House, and the gap widens.

It is hard to imagine how the U.S. military can sustain a long-term strategy toward the Middle East that doesn’t have political support. Given the openness of U.S. politics, it is difficult to imagine that Middle Eastern governments will fail to notice that U.S. political support for close security ties to the Middle East is diminishing. The Pentagon may feel it needs to keep up appearances of intimacy, but partners will not, and that will drive politicians in precisely the direction that the Pentagon doesn’t want. The Pentagon sees its principal targets being governments in the Middle East, but if it wants to sustain close ties in the region, winning support from politicians at home is both more urgent and more important.

Middle Eastern governments will doubt the value of any policy the U.S. military pursues without strong and durable political backing. They will look to supplement it with other relationships, even if the U.S. military trumpets its fealty, and they wouldn’t be wrong for doing so.

defenseone.com · by Jon B. Alterman

16. A Satellite Phone That Works Anywhere? The U.S.-China Rivalry Makes That Harder.

Just imagine when we mass produce these and drop them into north Korea.

A Satellite Phone That Works Anywhere? The U.S.-China Rivalry Makes That Harder.

Both countries want to dominate the technology, and that makes having one system that works in both countries tricky

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-us-technology-satellite-phones-2fd2bb22

By Yang JieFollow

April 24, 2023 10:00 am ET

Building an affordable service that works everywhere on the planet has been the dream of mobile telephony since its early days. Companies in the U.S. and China are among those getting closer to delivering that service through satellite technology.

But there is a problem. Both of the superpowers are determined to dominate the technology, and each has the ability to tarnish the dream for the other. Each can wield regulations to prevent the other’s satellite services from being used within its own borders.

Anyone watching U.S.-China relations recently knows that kind of lose-lose outcome is all too plausible. It may be a long time before Elon Musk can achieve his promise last year of “eliminating dead zones worldwide.” Mr. Musk’s rocket and satellite company, Space Exploration Technologies Corp., or SpaceX, is expanding its services for customers around the globe—but not in China.

How to Use the iPhone 14’s Satellite SOS If You’re in an Emergency

From the sea

The new services work through networks of satellites orbiting the Earth. Phones can link up to one of these satellites even from the middle of a desert or ocean where there are no cell towers or base stations nearby.

While specialized satphones have been around for decades, recent services offered by the likes of Apple Inc. bring the satellite technology to regular smartphones. IPhone users with Apple’s latest operating system can beam short distress messages from places off the cellular grid.

The technology pays no heed to national boundaries. Not so with the regulation of the technology: Each country has the authority to decide whether to allow satellite signals to transmit within its territory, similar to current regulations covering Earthbound cellphone networks.

“Getting such permission could become a major challenge,” says Brady Wang, an analyst at Counterpoint Research.

After decades of negotiations by telecommunications companies, cellphone users can generally get roaming service when they travel abroad. That includes Americans traveling to China.

Such negotiations are just beginning over satellite service. That is why Apple’s service was initially available only in the U.S. and Canada, and more recently has expanded to parts of Europe.

Several days before Apple announced its service, Huawei Technologies Co., the Chinese telecommunications-equipment maker that has been sanctioned by the U.S. government, introduced a similar service designed for stranded users in an emergency. It works only within China.

Chinese services aren’t likely to be permitted in the U.S. or closely allied countries, says Larry Press, professor of information systems at California State University, Dominguez Hills.

SpaceX’s plans

The Starlink service from SpaceX, which requires a special antenna, is available in parts of the U.S. as well as most of Europe, Japan, Australia and elsewhere. A map online shows plans to cover most of the globe eventually, with the exception of China and Russia.

SpaceX has teamed up with T-Mobile US Inc. so that T-Mobile users with regular smartphones could tap into the SpaceX satellite network for basic service when they are off the cellphone grid. That service will be available in most parts of the U.S.

U.S. and Chinese companies are also moving on separate tracks in building the satellite systems behind the new services, raising the prospect of a world bifurcated between a pro-China zone using Chinese-made devices and satellites and a pro-U. S. zone using devices built from components of largely American, European, Japanese and Korean origins.

Already, the U.S. and China are sometimes clashing over access to the heavens where thousands of satellites now vie for real estate. In one instance, China filed a complaint to the United Nations that said astronauts aboard the country’s space station had to take emergency action to avoid colliding with SpaceX satellites.

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Industry analysts say the U.S. holds a significant advantage in the competition. Major U.S. tech firms and startups are participating in the race. A SpaceX executive recently said it has launched more than 4,000 satellites.

In orbit

Most of the satellites that talk to mobile devices on the ground are deployed in low Earth orbit, or LEO, which under one definition refers to satellites less than 1,200 miles from the Earth. In general, those satellites cost less to launch and offer better transmission.

Huawei’s service uses China’s self-developed Beidou satellite network, in which the satellites are more than 10,000 miles from Earth. Huawei users can’t receive texts.

Beijing has its own plans for LEO broadband with state funding, which it wants to roll out in China and in developing nations that Beijing would like to make part of its sphere of influence, according to a report published by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies in December.

Through 2020, China submitted to the International Telecommunication Union plans to launch 12,992 low-Earth-orbit broadband internet satellites. It doesn’t have the capacity to launch all of those satellites today, says Mr. Press, the Cal State professor.

A Chinese official said in March that a state-owned aerospace company planned to build a constellation of satellites that are only 90 to 180 miles from Earth. The first launch is set for September.

“China is steadily progressing toward its goal of becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045,” said the 2023 annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, released in March. “Even by 2030, China probably will achieve world-class status in all but a few space technology areas,” the report said.

Ms. Yang is a Wall Street Journal tech reporter based in Japan. She can be reached at jie.yang@wsj.com.

17. Knowing why is far more important learning how

A very important critique of Robert Gates' recent article on influence. When Matt Armstrong speaks, I listen. (or when he writes, I read)

Please read the entire essay but this excerpt really jumped out to me:

The second severe defect in this essay is a stunning silence on the need for significant integration of policy with global engagement programs. Yes, there is an easily missed glancing reference to policy, specifically the “diplomatic strategies” of one agency relative to another, but this is in the spirit of coordinating information rather than policy. The absence of even a reference to a frequent “say-do” policy gap and the need for policies that need informational components to assist rather than to change the subject is stark. This gap can also be explained as “reputational security,” as Nick Cull describes it.

I’ll offer one last quote here to emphasize the need to connect our non-military programs and related efforts to our national security requirements that may hit home for some. The context is the need to not just deliver aid abroad, but to make sure it is linked with our national security interests by, at the very least, denying a free hand of adversarial disinformation and exploitation of misinformation and the lack of information:

We may help avert starvation in Europe and aid in producing a generation of healthy, physically fit individuals whose bodies, are strong but whose minds are poisoned against America and whose loyalties are attached to the red star of Russia. If we permit this to eventuate it will be clear that the generosity of America is excelled only by our own stupidity.

Knowing why is far more important learning how

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/knowing-why-is-far-more-important?r=7i07&utm_source=pocket_saves

The issue is not that the US forgot how to "tell its story to the world," but why

MATT ARMSTRONG

APR 24, 2023

It is not a new reality that the success of United States foreign policies rely, in no small part, on awareness, perceptions, and attitudes about the US and what it is actually doing abroad and why. Social media and other technologies that reduce the cost and time to move information and people reflect only the latest iterations of Dr. F.C. Bartlett’s 1940 statement that, “People, the elements of culture, the media of economic existence, ideas—all these can move with a freedom never before matched in history.”

1In this interconnected world, if you do not tell your story, someone else will, and they may not have your best interests in mind when they do. Communications supporting foreign relations should not be regarded as an afterthought, something to avoid, or reserved for adversarial situations. International engagement is essential whether relations between nations are at peace, war, or in the “twilight zone”

2 between war and peace. Such is true across commercial, economic, political, societal, and other security interests. Such was the argument of the political scientist Dr. Arthur MacMahon in his report for the State Department in July 1945 on the need for a peacetime post-war information program as a matter of course before any sense of the then-upcoming “contest” of the cold war:The adequacy with which the United States as a society is portrayed to the other peoples of the world is a matter of concern to the American people and their Government… Modern international relations lie between peoples, not merely governments… International information activities are integral to the conduct of foreign policy.

3

In a Washington Post essay titled “The US needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world” published recently, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote about the need to relearn that telling our story abroad is essential to our foreign policies with a “starter set” list of recommended actions to “strengthen this critical instrument of American power.” On the surface, Gates’s essay appears to be a refreshingly sober take on the US government’s need for “global engagement” that avoids using “information” and “information war” that also sets aside repeated calls to resurrect the US Information Agency.

It is worth noting this essay appeared virtually alongside an article published at The Hill, written by a staff writer there: Robert Gates: US needs to stress strategic communications to advance national security interests. The timing suggests this essay and write-up is part of a public press coming from the Robert M. Gates Global Policy Center, which has been recently active around this topic with working papers, a conference, and a subsequent December 2022 report called “Competitive Global Engagement: Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy for the New Era.”

Gates’s opinion piece in the Washington Post is better than many previous articles on this subject, but the bar for comparison is stunningly low. It is refreshing to see a former senior leader – and contemporary influencer – include specifics and not just call for an increased volume and tenor in the hurling of nouns and verbs abroad. Tools for “telling our story to the world” that are typically ignored in similar pieces but included here include penetrating information bubbles abroad, exchanges, and the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

4It was also refreshing to see the responsibility for so many of the recommendations placed squarely – and accurately – on the executive branch. Gates could have been blunter, though. “Many of [these recommendations] the president could implement immediately, while others would require congressional action” understates the President’s opportunities and responsibilities. But, Gates is a diplomat, and I am not. And, to be clear, the critiques and recommendations are not restricted to the present administration, but go back decades.

The article should be appreciated for its intentions and details. It is likely to have more impact than most owing to the gravitas of its author. However, there are numerous problems with it and, not being a diplomat myself (at least presently, I’ve twice held jobs granting me a Diplomatic passport, though I do not mean to imply I’ve ever been diplomatic), I will be blunt.

Before diving into the critique, I want to separate the essay’s title from the essay. It is common practice for titles to be selected by an editor and not the author. Considering this title does not accurately reflect the spirit of the essay, I suspect that’s the case here. Rather than be a reflection on the author, the title – “The US needs to relearn how to tell its story to the world” – suggests to my jaded eye evidence of the ignorant undercurrent flowing beneath this broad subject. The fundamental issue Gates is trying to draw attention to is not the need to relearn how to engage abroad but rather to relearn why we must engage abroad. Many elements of how to engage are listed, not to describe misuse but rather to emphasize the need to prioritize, support, integrate, coordinate, and lead these efforts toward a purpose. Focusing on why is the correct approach, and is a welcome evolution in the argument.

There are two significant defects in this essay. The first is the opening sentence that screams that nothing that follows is really important: “In the long contest ahead with Russia and China, U.S. military power will be of greatest importance, but non-military instruments of power will be essential to our ability to compete and win as well.” We know the “other instruments of power,” as Gates writes later in the essay, have been “seriously neglected,” which is, after all, the reason for this piece, but this is quite the opening. It is also symptomatic of the problem he is trying to remedy. That US defense spending far exceeds every other nation and that the US ability to deliver military force – whether warheads or combat troops – anywhere in the world also far exceeds the potential of any other nation suggests US military is not actually of the greatest importance. The demand signal that brought about this piece and the burgeoning cottage industries around the “gray zone,” “hybrid warfare,” and even the Gates Global Policy Center also suggests US military power is also not of the greatest importance.

Military deterrence only works when the political will to employ conventional, or nuclear, force at least matches the capabilities. Recent history is replete with examples of the limits of our military power in the “contest.” Our restrained responses are based on fears of retaliation and escalation from an aggressor rather than on our principles and interests. This gap is exploited in this contest, and it is a gap made more pronounced by our persistent failure to engage effectively abroad to deny Russian and Chinese narratives, for example, that twist public opinion against us and our allies virtually without contest. This is an underlying point of Gates’s essay, but it is massively undermined by his staunch opening.

That opening brought to mind a quote that speaks to the limits of conventual military dissuasion and nuclear deterrence, both of which have thresholds for use that are readily, and increasingly, manipulated and exploited by our adversaries.

So long as we remain amateurs in the critical field of political warfare, the billions of dollars we annually spend on defense and foreign aid will provide us with a diminishing measure of protection.

5

A better and more comprehensive conceptual framework for what seems to be Gates’s intent could be the following paragraph. Though the language is dated – it was written over a century ago – it is from the same organization Gates led:

It is necessary to remember, in the first place, that this war is not one that is being fought by the military forces alone. There are economic, psychologic, social, political and even literary forces engaged, and it is necessary for us in order to defeat the enemy, to understand fully the strength of each. Nor can the investigation stop with the forces of the enemy: it must extend to each country in the world and to every people. The question of winning the war is far too complicated and far too delicate to be answered by a study of only the powers and resources of the nations in arms.

6

While military might is important as a tool of dissuasion, and sometimes persuasion, the non-military tools of policy are of equal if not superior value to our national security and, more broadly, our foreign policy. We can look at the current exercises by Russia, but mostly China, to realize this.

The second severe defect in this essay is a stunning silence on the need for significant integration of policy with global engagement programs. Yes, there is an easily missed glancing reference to policy, specifically the “diplomatic strategies” of one agency relative to another, but this is in the spirit of coordinating information rather than policy. The absence of even a reference to a frequent “say-do” policy gap and the need for policies that need informational components to assist rather than to change the subject is stark. This gap can also be explained as “reputational security,” as Nick Cull describes it.

I’ll offer one last quote here to emphasize the need to connect our non-military programs and related efforts to our national security requirements that may hit home for some. The context is the need to not just deliver aid abroad, but to make sure it is linked with our national security interests by, at the very least, denying a free hand of adversarial disinformation and exploitation of misinformation and the lack of information:

We may help avert starvation in Europe and aid in producing a generation of healthy, physically fit individuals whose bodies, are strong but whose minds are poisoned against America and whose loyalties are attached to the red star of Russia. If we permit this to eventuate it will be clear that the generosity of America is excelled only by our own stupidity.

7

Moving on from that significant omission, the following are mere problems with the essay that need additional details to fix or clarify. To start, Gates considers a lack of operational leadership to be the result of a lack of authority.

U.S. strategic communications and public diplomacy are fragmented among 14 agencies and 48 commissions. Yet, the State Department, which ought to be driving this train, lacks not just necessary resources in dollars and people but also, importantly, the authority to coordinate, integrate and synchronize these disparate and unfocused efforts. Further, there is no government-wide international communications and engagement strategy, and certainly no sense of urgency…

The president should empower the secretary and, specifically, this undersecretary of state to synchronize the foreign strategic engagement efforts of all elements of the executive branch — including the Defense Department, which spends many times more on these programs than the State Department but is disconnected from our diplomatic strategies.

8

I appreciate Gates is not distracted by symptoms to arrive at causal factors of a lack of strategy, no sense of urgency, and the absence of a coordinating entity. And, I appreciate he does not call for consolidation into one monolith with his comment “The solution is not to re-create the USIA — the world has moved on.” What he may not realize is he is ultimately calling for a resurrection of USIA’s predecessor, or at least what USIA was supposed to be based on the recommendations from 1953. Certainly, those who continue to ignorantly sing the “bring back USIA” chorus have little to no idea what USIA did, especially since they completely ignore the real value of USIA – its operations on the ground abroad – and that USIA was the result of fragmenting a far more integrated, comprehensive, and larger agency with greater authorities and seats at the policy and coordination tables they pretend USIA had but did not.

9 Share

While it is not clear from the essay, it seems the authorities Gates says are necessary are not, to my knowledge from extensive conversations recently and going back over a decade, based on statutory authorities to be granted by Congress. Instead, they are authorities to be granted and supported directly and (relatively) immediately by the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and other Cabinet officials. Of course, that requires an official to wield the apparently new authorities. This leads to the next problem with the essay.

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy was created in 1999 as the successor to the US Information Agency Director. It is worth noting that this undersecretary wields less authority, manages a smaller portfolio of programs, and is structurally less engaged, as a matter of practice, within the department and with interagency efforts than the USIA Director, which also wielded less authority, managed a smaller portfolio, and exercised less leadership with the State Department and interagency partners than its predecessor, the Administrator of the State Department’s semi-autonomous International Information Administration.

So, about this undersecretary. In the essay, Gates used weird numbers to show the persistent failure to have a confirmed Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, writing “the undersecretary position in the State Department charged with overseeing these efforts has not had a Senate-confirmed occupant 40 percent of the time since it was created in 1999 and 90 percent of the time under Donald Trump and President Biden.” These figures are not just wrong, but odd. I have been tracking the absence since I was the executive director of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in 2011, with periodic updates. The January 2023 update was known to the Gates project as it was referenced in at least one report that contributed to the Competitive Global Engagement project. The reality is worse than the essay states. The undersecretary position has not had a Senate-confirmed occupant 46% of the time since the first person took office in 1999.

10 In the Trump administration, the vacancy was 93%, and continues to be 100% in the Biden administration. Combined, this is 95%. Rounding introduced by an overzealous editor? Maybe, but 46% is closer to 50% than 40%, and 95% is worse than ninety percent for the Trump-Biden years. While this office should be held by a person confirmed to it, it seems clear the reason the office has not been charged with the necessary departmental and interagency leadership responsibilities, provided the required resources, given the required support by senior leadership, or held accountable is the persistent lack of interest across administrations and Secretaries of State. Gates’s call for the Senate to confirm the present nominee seems to ignore this, or perhaps he is diplomatic in his hope change will come. I’m not so diplomatic nor so sure.

First, the President and Secretary of State could have, during the past two years, made clear the acting undersecretary has their backing to do all the things Gates is calling for. That has not happened. There were rumors of a pending nomination to this office for a while, and then there weren’t. (If these rumors were true, did they back out because the role was too fuzzy, responsibilities too diluted, or promised support from above too unclear?) The argument that the undersecretary must have a preexisting personal relationship with the president is a prerequisite that reinforces the sheer absence of respect for the utility of this office and the experience and skills necessary to successfully support our foreign policies and not merely our explicit national security policies. While the current nominee has been serving as the acting undersecretary since April 2022, which some might argue means she’s had time to get a strong handle on the job, she replaced a Foreign Service Officer who spent their career in the State Department’s public diplomacy operations and held the acting undersecretary gig for 435 days, or longer than since last April. Besides the gaps between USIA Directors not being nearly as long as confirmed Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy, two Foreign Service Officers served as USIA Director while no Foreign Service Officer has been confirmed to the undersecretary position.

11Subscribe

As I noted earlier, it was nice to see exchanges included in this discussion, including that it was viewed more broadly than simply sending university-level folks back and forth. The reference was, however, tossed in and separated from the undersecretary discussion. That’s fine, but I do wonder if the separation suggests the severe limits on discretionary options around exchanges imposed by Congress are not realized as the impediments they are.

And then there was the reference to “digital communications firewalls” with an inferable connection to the Global Engagement Center. Perhaps this, too, is an artifact of the editing process and the relationship was not intended. However, there is no indication that such efforts have for decades been a major line of effort of the US Agency for Global Media, formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors (note: I served on this board 2013-2017). I would not be surprised if Gates and his team were unaware of this role of USAGM, just as I have not been entirely surprised by Defense Department personnel who “established” a radio in an African region for a wargame as they were completely unaware of Voice of America or its position as the dominant news media organization in the region the (not public & not involve people on the ground) wargame took place. (I was eventually also inured to questions like “VOA still operates?” when speaking with Members of Congress on committees overseeing the then-BBG when I was a Governor.)

Gates argues the State Department “ought to be driving this train” but that it lacks the “authority” needed. I ardently agree with the first point as I have long argued the undersecretary should be viewed as the chief international information operations officer for our foreign policy, but I also ardently disagree with the framing of the second point. It is not authority, per se, but the absence of necessary vision, support, and leadership from within the department that is coupled with an equivalent absence of vision, support, and leadership from above in the White House and the National Security Council. They must start appointing people with the right skills, support them with words, actions, and resources, while also holding them accountable. Too often, the “accountability” manifested in tuning out and ignoring undersecretaries, which has significantly contributed to the problems Gates is calling to redress.

While there are other details in the piece worthy of discussion, like the long-ignored point of reciprocity with China (and Russia) – I tip my hat to Gates for raising this important point!

12 – you’ve suffered long enough reading to this point.I’m interested in your thoughts on the essay.

Frederic C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1940), p2.

Army War College, The Proper Relationship Between the Army and the Press in War (Washington: Govt. Print Off., 1915), p10. The idea of a “gray zone” between peace and war is not a new concept to the US military, even if it has been ignored and forgotten.

Arthur MacMahon, Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States (July 5, 1945) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pSummary-1. This report was initiated in January 1945 by Archibald MacLeish as the new Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations, a position established in December 1944. The office was renamed by MacLeish’s successor William Benton as the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in 1946. The report was the result of extensive inquiries led by MacMahon within the department, with other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. It was the roadmap for the Office of War Information’s recommendations to President Truman, delivered on August 17 per the President’s request, on the disposition of OWI’s programs, including the international information programs. The MacMahon report was the basis of Truman’s executive order of August 31 sending the international information programs of the Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs to the State Department. It was also the template for the State Department’s approach to establishing their post-war international information program and thus also elements of the Bloom bill starting in October 1945. It’s hard to understate the importance of this report to the structure of US international information programs then and today. There are two editions of this report. The original July edition was 241 pages. In December 1945, in an effort to build Congressional support for the pending Bloom bill (originally known as the Mundt bill and later known again as the Mundt bill but today, since it became law, referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act), Benton distributed about a 100 copies a reformatted report. This 135-page version had a new introductory memo by Benton prepended, appearing before MacLeish’s introductory memo, and the final chapter of the original report was removed as it had become irrelevant (the subject was transitional issues related to budgets, appropriations, and changing requirements into the new fiscal year related to continued activities in the Pacific, needs of the “occupational government on one and then on two continents for the defeated enemy countries,” and “emergency requirements in liberated areas” (p225 of the July 1945 edition).

Gates called this office the “Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy” though the name remains the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Since the Bureau of Public Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) were merged during the Trump administration into the Bureau of Global Public Affairs, it is logical to drop “and public affairs” from the undersecretary’s title.

See https://mountainrunner.substack.com/i/86755327/q

Military Intelligence Division of the US Army General Staff, The Functions of the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff (Washington: Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, 1918), p6. I could have used a shorter line here from an Army War College report published in April 1918: “…in the ‘strategic equation’ of war there are four factors — combat, economic, political, and psychologic — and that the last of these is coequal with the others.”

Mundt, Karl E., “We Are Losing the War of Words in Europe.” New York Times, 1947.

Gates added the fragmentation spanned “48 commissions.” I don’t know about most of these commissions, but it seems the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is the potentially most important and relevant, as it has been for most of the decades since it was established in 1948. For the past dozen years, however, it had failed to provide meaningful, relevant, timely, or actionable advice to Congress, the White House, and the Secretary of State as had been its job. Three of the seven seats are filled, two of whom were first appointed in 2011, and the third was first appointed to the commission in 1990 and has yet to be considered relevant to these discussions. They are virtually invisible to those in Congress and the executive branch interested in addressing the challenges of strategic communication and public diplomacy. I have an idea of the potential of this body, not just from the historical record, but from my service as the executive director of this commission in 2011.

Let me be clear on a point that I think is lost in my criticisms of the “bring back USIA” chants: though USIA was never the agency it was supposed to be or what most (all?) today imagine to have been, it was a good agency, it did good stuff, it had an impact. We have, however, surrounded it with gauzy mythologies and shallow analysis in terms of budgets, staffing, relationship to policy making and execution, roles, training, support, and politicization, even as many of its successes and lines of effort are ignored.

The percentage is 45.7 if you don’t want to round off. There has been a confirmed undersecretary for 4,655 days versus 3,934 days without (as of 21 April 2023). Equally remarkable is the average tenure of this undersecretary (through the end of the Obama administration) is 19 months while the median tenure is 17 months. This is a very short time in office compared to probably every other undersecretary and assistant secretary position at State and Defense. Consider, too, what the lack of a confirmed officeholder means to bureaucracies and how they respond.

It is worth noting that the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is considered the highest position a Foreign Service Officer can reach. Why are the selection criteria and possibility of appointment not the same for public diplomacy FSOs and the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position? Because, I argue, gross misconceptions of what is needed for success in the office, as demonstrated repeatedly by the resumes of prior appointments.

I’ve raised this many times, officially and in other settings. As a BBG Governor, I met with senior Chinese PRC propaganda ministry officials about their unfulfilled promises to allow VOA to open a second bureau in China, in Shanghai. VOA had been, and probably still is, restricted to two reporters and one bureau. When I raised the point that CCTV, RCI, and other Chinese organizations in the US have massive footprints across the US, the retort by PRC officials as they included US commercial media reporters when considering the number of BBG reporters (Radio Free Asia was barred from operating in China, by the way). As far as I know, over the past fifteen or so years in official engagement with Chinese officials, President Obama raised the reciprocity issue once while First Lady Obama raised it twice. That’s it. This makes Gates’s mention more meaningful, at least to me.

18. A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

An important history and critique of USIA. We hear calls for a re-establishment of USIA. Those who call for that should read this article.

A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/a-look-at-the-good-the-bad-and-the?utm_source=pocket_saves

Notes & details behind my 8 minute presentation

MATT ARMSTRONG

APR 15, 2023

I spoke at the #Connexions Conference on Global Media in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy this past Monday. The event was held at the University of Texas at Austin, and while I was remote, Dr. Nick Cull, the discussant, and Jeff Trimble, the moderator, were both in-person.

The conference keynote was given by Ukrainian Ambassador to the US Oksana Markarova. The Ambassador’s comments are worth your time.

Our panel was titled “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Historical Look at the Politics of US Information Warfare.” We immediately followed the Ambassador’s keynote to provide a kind of scene-setter (at the 1hr mark at the above link). That was the hopeful intent to try to push conversations into either accurate and meaningful invocations of history in support of their arguments or leave aside the history they misread, don’t understand, or invent. One subsequent presentation, for example, checked all three boxes quickly, even as the presenter could have left out their (inaccurate) historical narrative without affecting anything.

As Nick noted at the start of his presentation following my 8-minute opener, our panel was in agreement. Rather than contention, we built upon each other’s statements. Jeff was a superb moderator with his context, pulling from outside statements, and teeing up questions. The only problem with the panel was its length: it was too short at 60 minutes, even after our brief opening comments, to allow for an extended question and answer, which, for me, is the real value and why I decided to participate in this event. I’m more interested in the conversation where I get to know and speak to the issues and concerns of the audience rather than just projecting stuff at the audience.

As Ambassador Markarova commented that Russian activities today are not new but can be traced back centuries, I preceded my planned remarks by supporting her accurate assessment by reflecting that another Ukrainian said the same thing nearly six decades ago. In 1964, Dr. Lev Dobriansky, then chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and a professor at Georgetown, offered this in a prepared statement before a Congressional committee:

Careful analyses along these and primarily substantive lines would reveal that what we classify today as Moscow's cold war techniques and methods are essentially traditional to totalitarian Russian empire-building. Contrary to general opinion, they are not the created products of so-called Communist ideology and tactics. Except for accidental refinements and considerable technologic improvements, many of the techniques manipulated by the rulers of the present Russian empire, and also applied by their Red Chinese competitors, can be systematically traced as far back as the 16th century. Indeed, over a half century before Marx, the Russian ambassadors of Catherine the Great utilized class-division techniques to prepare for the partitions of Poland. Countless other examples of striking comparative worth and value can be cited.

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While technologies change, there is remarkable consistency in the basic methods and desired outcomes across time. We periodically rediscover that our adversaries don’t wish to or cannot confront us directly in combat, and we complain about it. However, an examination of our organizational and policy history reveals that while we periodically accept such a reality, we also consistently disregard it in favor of tangible military-based dissuasion, which, perhaps ironically, naturally encourages our adversaries to continue to operate below our fuzzy thresholds to employ the combat might we have invested in so heavily instead of prioritizing the non-military avenues they encroach upon and exploit. These ambiguous thresholds, shaped by our domestic politics and the White House’s willingness to act in some way at any given moment, are manipulated and exploited by the same or similar capabilities we implicitly, if not explicitly, push our adversaries to use. While this was not the explicit focus of my comments, it is foundational to understanding “the good, the bad, the ugly” of the US’s history around the politics of information warfare.

Based on the pre-meetings, my opening focused on four points. What follows is not a transcript of my remarks but an expanded discussion of my 8 minutes.

1. Unfulfilled Promises of USIA

My first point was the criteria in all of the recommendations supporting the establishment of the US Information Agency were never met. Yet, these same criteria are often heard today in calls to bring back USIA, whether on “steroids” or not. This fact increasingly feels like waving at windmills, but I’ll keep at it. If you want to recite history, know the history. More on that is below.

In other words, the US Information Agency (USIA) never was or became what it was supposed to be. It replaced an agency with a seat at the various tables, usually as the chair of the departmental and inter-agency committees. Beyond being embedded in the making and conducting foreign policy, this predecessor agency had greater authorities across a broader portfolio of efforts. This predecessor was the International Information Administration and, as a semi-autonomous unit in the State Department, had under it 50% of the Department's personnel and commanded 40% of the Department’s budget.

2What was USIA supposed to be? Three major reports in 1953 that recommended establishing an independent agency outside of the State Department had overlapping views.

The Advisory Commission on Information’s recommendation of February 1953

3 was clear on several points, the most relevant point here being:That the International Information Administration (IIA) be separated from the Department of State and placed in a new agency of Cabinet level in which there is vested authority to formulate psychological strategy and to coordinate information policies of all Government agencies and consolidate all overseas information programs.

The commission also commented on the paperwork reduction language

4 in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 that led to the “on request” phrase appearing in the legislation that subsequently became a barrier to access:That Congress authorize IIA to release domestically, without request, information concerning its programs.

It should be noted here the commission was not suggesting IIA, as it existed or would exist should it be separated into a new Cabinet-level agency, disseminate these materials. There is a difference between being available and active distribution. For example, imagine going to a library and being told you can access anything but can’t see the card catalog or enter the stacks. How are you supposed to know what is there? Now put this in terms of oversight and awareness. More on that later.

It should also be noted that in its reports of 1951 and 1952, the commission repeatedly stated it saw no reason or value to move the operations out of the State Department. Below is from the commission’s April 1951 report, which it recalled in its July 1952 (“Our position today is as it was in April of 1951”):

This Commision has no vested interest in the placement of the information program. We are only concerned with its maximum effectiveness. If we were persuaded that it could Function more effectively outside the State Department, we would feel obligated to say so. But our experience has led us to have grave doubts that the program in the hands of a separate agency would operate as well as it does now. We believe the subject requires very careful study.

The President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, also known as the Rockefeller Committee, recommended in April 1953 that a new information agency be established “in which would be consolidated the most important foreign information programs and cultural and educational exchange programs now carried on by the United States International Information Administration” and other agencies. Keeping the cultural and educational exchange programs together was also part of the Advisory Commission on Information’s recommendation. However, the Rockefeller Committee did not suggest a Cabinet seat. Instead, it advised:

The new agency would be established under the National Security Council under arrangements paralleling those set forth in the National Security Act for the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The third report came from the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, also called the Jackson Committee after its chairman, former Deputy Director of the CIA, William H. Jackson.

6 This group landed on three scenarios: alignment with the Rockefeller Committee by making IIA an independent agency under the NSC; splitting the baby and keeping some exchange programs in State and creating a new agency responsible for information programs; or retaining IIA inside the State Department but with increased autonomy and a higher rank for the IIA chief. The Jackson Committee favored the third option – keeping IIA inside of State while increasing its authorities – as did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was pondering the subject.John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, did not want an operational role for the Department, let alone this IIA thing. So it was, he would say, a few years later, in 1957, when asked to consider reintegrating USIA into the State Department, a distraction to him and the Department from their core business of diplomacy.

Two of these reports were largely ignored, while the third bent to the wishes of a Secretary of State. The result was the segregation of information from policy. In a further rejection of calls for greater consolidation, it bifurcated various engagement and exchange programs from information and general policy discussions.

2. Calls to Reconsider USIA Began within a Few Years

My second point is briefer. I pondered how many people calling for a new USIA realize not just the failure to adhere to the several well-thought-out recommendations in 1952 but that within a few years, there were calls to replace or reintegrate USIA into the State Department.

In 1957, the Eisenhower Administration questioned whether USIA should be reintegrated into the State Department (Secretary of State Dulles, as noted above, said no).

In 1959, Senator Karl Mundt, formerly Representative Mundt, proposed a Department of International Public Relations responsible for international information policies.

7 Responding to Mundt's call, the chairman of the Advisory Commission on Information, Mark May, reminded Mundt the commission "had a similar idea" when it recommended "IIA be lifted out of the Department of State and placed in a new agency of Cabinet level" back on 1953.8Also, in 1959, the Brookings Institute analyzed the foreign policy apparatus at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It recommended establishing an overarching Department of Foreign Affairs with three cabinet-level departments. A Department of Information and Cultural Affairs would be co-equal to the other sub-departments: the Department of State and the Department of Foreign Economic Operations.

In 1960, another Eisenhower committee looked at the organization, which was led by Mansfield Sprague and included the USIA Director George Allen, CIA Director Allen Dulles, National Security Advisor Gordon Gray, Advisory Commission on Information Member Philip D. Reed, and others. Their January 1961 report did support keeping USIA and recommended increasing training, increasing activities, and “cease the continuous reorganization and review of USIA.” Also in 1960, the Advisory Commission on Information stated, “the time has come for the United States to consolidate all the foreign cultural, educational, and information programs in one agency of cabinet status.”

9The Kennedy administration in 1961 saw three more studies of USIA. One of these was part of the administration’s review of foreign policy machinery, with the USIA review led by Dr. Lloyd Free

10 from the President and two in-house USIA reports. All of these did maintain USIA should remain independent. Still, they all recommended substantial changes, including the USIA Director's participation in the National Security Council and an increased role for the USIA in making US foreign policy. Other recommendations included some of the consolidation recommended in 1953 that never happened.In 1968, the Advisory Commission on Information raised questions about USIA. Acknowledging USIA’s successes, it restated its call of 1960 (which it repeated in 1961) with added emphasis:

The continued separation of the exchange programs into United States Information Service (USIS) administration abroad and Department of State administration in Washington has become an anachronism, an anomaly leading co ineffectiveness, excessive bureaucracy and to an unfortunate diminution in funds for this imperative segment of long-range communications effort overseas. We believe that division should end; that it is time to draw together into a restructured USIA, or into a new independent agency, the reins leading to our now fractionalized public affairs programs overseas.

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Five years later, in 1973, the commission reiterated the need for a serious study of USIA:

The Commission believes that the need for an overall review of USIA, including its position in the overall structure of the government’s foreign affairs community, remains necessary. After 25 years of experience, it is time for a reexamination and an appraisal of its accomplishments, its role and its future potential.

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There continued to be recommendations for severe evaluation and change. Some argued that if USIA did not gain greater authority and a seat at the policy-making table, it should cease being an independent agency.

3. Misinformation and Disinformation Around the Smith-Mundt Act

I don’t want to spend too much time on the misinformation and disinformation

14 around the Smith-Mundt Act. Suffice it to say the perversions of the Smith-Mundt Act by Senator Fulbright in 1972, part of his years-long campaign to shutter USIA and to handicap if not shut the "Radios" (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty), further segregated information from policy while also tainting our views of what we say abroad as "propaganda" unfit for Americans, which is quite the statement.

4. Leadership Matters

My fourth point was that, ultimately, leadership matters. Each organizational iteration following IIA, portfolios shrank: USIA had less than the IIA, while the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, established in 1999, enjoyed substantially fewer authorities and actual capabilities than the USIA Director, and arguably even less now considering reorganizations and leadership vacuums. Considering the under secretary position has been vacant nearly 46% of days in the last twenty-four years, with gaps unheard of in the time of USIA or with any other leadership office, how does an organization and line of effort function, and what does it say about leadership’s view of the position and value?

One last point, as this note has gotten quite long. Mark Pomar, in a statement-question at the end, asserted USIA’s role in foreign policy in the 1980s with his comment he gave a two-hour brief to the NSC (I recommend his book). I noted earlier that people looking at USIA's “glory days” should consider the period they refer to. For example, the cold war of the late-1940s through the 1960s was remarkably similar to today, while the cold war of the 1980s was very unlike today. Pomar’s comment reflected a temporary high-level interest in the White House, an exception proving the rule over USIA's long haul.

That’s it for now. Congratulations on making it this far.

Hearings Relating to H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, and H.R. 11718, Providing for Creation of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964), p1281.

See the article last year (July 6, 2022) by my friend Chris Paul and me that the mythology around USIA distracts us from recognizing our problems and thus also potential solutions: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-irony-of-misinformation-usia-myths-block-enduring-solutions/.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Seventh Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1953).

The Congress’s intent in 1947 was that all information produced for foreign audiences would be immediately available in English and without restriction in the US for review—the reason: additional and immediate oversight. The Smith-Mundt bill passed by the House on June 24, 1947, included a floor amendment offered by Reps. Richard M. Simpson (R-PA) and Clarence J. Brown, Sr. (R-OH) requiring “All such press releases and radio scripts shall in the English language be made available to press associations, newspapermen, radio systems, and stations in the United States and to Members of the Congress of the United States upon request, within 15 days after release as information abroad.” In the Senate, the State Department raised a concern about the practical impact of what several anticipated would be blanket requests.

Here is a part of an exchange on this matter during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Smith-Mundt bill on July 3, 1947:

Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM): Now, what Mr. Benton would like to have clarified a little bit is, if some newspaper shotdd ask to have all radio scrips translated throughout the year.

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton: Which somebody will.

Hatch: These foreign-language broadcasts alone total 1,200,000 words a week. Would it be wise to include in the committee’s report that this language is intended to cover only representative samples of this material?

Benton: I do not take any exception to the intent, but you have a potential expense here of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, with rooms full of translators and mimeograph machines doing nothing but translating all this radio material.

We have gone through this kind of legitimate request with [Rep. John Taber (R-NY), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee] many times. He will say, “Give me every script of yesterday.” He will then want a sample. We will put translators to work. We will translate every script of yesterday and, of course, we will furnish it to him. But he doesn't ask for every script, every day, for a year.

Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ). Are not all these things prepared m English first, so that you have the English version before they are put in the foreign language?

Benton: No.

Two weeks later, on July 16, during an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to review the Smith-Mundt bill, Sen. Smith, the “Smith” in Smith-Mundt, suggested the following language to address the State Department’s concern about blanket requests:

On request, representative samples or specific individual press releases and radio scripts shall be made available in the English language for examination at the Department of State by representatives of press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems and stations, and be made available to Members of Congress, within 15 days after release as information abroad.

The committee accepted this. Subsequent wordsmithing, including removing the 15-day requirement, resulted in the text below as found in Public Law 80-402, the Smith-Mundt Act, signed by Truman on January 27, 1948:

Any such press release or radio script, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Department of State, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination by representatives of United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and, on request, shall be made available to Members of Congress.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d326

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/comp4

Mundt published this proposal in the Public Relations Journal and republished in various newspapers around the country.

Letter from Mark A. May to Sen. Karl Mundt, dated September 8, 1959.

See HR 3628, introduced by Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) on June 29, 1945, in the 79th Congress. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) supported the effort from the other chamber, including with the article “A Department of Peace for the American Government” in the September 1945 issue of Free World magazine. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the bill on November 8, 1945. The idea of this Department of Peace emerged as Congress and the State Department were working on the Bloom bill, which was then called but introduced originally by Rep. Karl Mundt (R-SD) in January 1945. In practical terms, the Department of Peace would initially have a subset of the Mundt/Bloom bill mission and authorities. (The explicit international information operations would not be added to the Mundt/Bloom bill, later known as the Smith-Mundt Act, until October 1945.) Two weeks after the Department of Peace hearing, the Secretary of State wrote to Sol Bloom (D-NY), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to say that while the Department of Peace was welcome, it overlapped with the existing Mundt/Bloom bill (then HR 4368 as an amendment to existing legislation, but soon to be rewritten as a stand-alone bill in December as HR 4982) and could create problems: “The Department believes it essential that such a program of relations between peoples, if supported by government funds, should be planned and integrated to assure conformity with the basic foreign policies of the United States Government, as provided in H. R. 4368, and that this can best be accomplished by centralizing responsibility for such a program in the Department of State, not in a new Department of Peace outside of the Department of State.”

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Fifteenth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1960), p30. The commission repeated this call in its subsequent report, the 16th, issued in January 1961.

Free’s bio is worth a look:

Dr. Lloyd A. Free is the president of The Institute for International Social Research. His educational experience includes Princeton University, Stanford University Law School, Yenching University, and The George Washington University. Early in his career he practiced law, was a Fellow with the Rockefeller Foundation, and then affiliated with Princeton University as a lecturer in the School of Public and International Affairs and later served as Associate Director, Princeton Public Opinion Project.

Dr. Free joined the Government in 1941 as the first Director of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. He subsequently served Government in numerous senior positions, some of which were Acting Director, Office of International Information of the State Department; Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs in Rome; Consultant to President Eisenhower on psychological aspects of American foreign policy; and Cochairman, Task Force on USIA to advise President Kennedy.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-third Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1968), p12-13.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-sixth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1973), p34.

See, for example, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, “Twenty-sixth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information,” (1973), p19-20.

My primary reason for using “disinformation” here is what I have come to view as willful malpractice by some academics, primarily, who falsely and without evidence make specific claims about the original or evolved nature of the Smith-Mundt Act. This is particularly true of academics and lawyers who accept Sen. Fulbright’s narrative of USIA and the “Radios” in 1967-1972 and work backward, imposing a revised history onto the past while taking his claim he rectified an oversight, all while not reading the whole transcripts they cite or seeing his transparent motivations. Moreover, these same authors never seem to discuss the difference in legislative discussions between the broadcast and other information operations vis a vis USIA and the State Department. Nor do they discuss, let alone mention, the narrow application of the Smith-Mundt Act to only the USIA and later some of the State Department (and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, now the US Agency for Global Media). See, for example, this:

Arming for the War We're In

No, the Smith-Mundt Act doesn't apply to the Defense Department

The misinformation around the Smith-Mundt Act is fantastic. Unfortunately, at some point, much of it, including public legal analyses and especially internal legal and other guidance, seems bent on earning the label of disinformation. I had not planned on publishing here for another week as I am focused on a more critical writing effort, but I was, I’ll…

2 months ago · 4 likes · 1 comment · Matt Armstrong

19. Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one

Excerpts:

All this suggests that Mr Putin should be able to maintain the war effort for some time to come. Expanding it, however, is another matter. Some on the right are calling for Mr Putin to spend more than a few percentage points of GDP on the invasion. After all, Russia has embraced total war before—including in 1942 and 1943, when it spent an astonishing 60% of its GDP on the military, according to “Accounting for War”, a book by Mark Harrison published in 1996.

But it is hard to see how Mr Putin could do that while maintaining economic stability and preserving living standards. The first problem would be raising money fast. Not all the sovereign-wealth fund’s assets are liquid. Printing money would spur inflation, causing the rouble to lose value and eroding the living standards the government has worked so hard to preserve. Loading up banks with huge amounts of public debt overnight might have a similar effect, stirring doubts about how soundly the economy was being managed. Tax rises or a big shift in public expenditure towards defence would also eat into personal incomes. And any of these measures would undermine the air of calm, control and stability that Mr Putin is at pains to maintain. “Of course, national defence is the top priority,” he said recently, “but in resolving strategic tasks in this area, we should not repeat the mistakes of the past and should not destroy our own economy.”

It’s unclear that spending vastly more money would achieve the desired results anyway. Russia’s economy has become more centralised, but it is not the planned, command-and-control apparatus of the Soviet times. Converting a budgetary bazooka into weapons of a more conventional sort would thus, at best, take time. The effort would exacerbate the bottlenecks that are already constricting Russia’s military output, in machinery subject to sanctions, for example, and in skilled workers. Much would depend on the continued assistance of China, the Gulf states and other countries through which Russian capital and imports flow–and they might be nervous about abetting a big Russian escalation.

Throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine therefore looks out of the question. “Considering Russia’s existing capabilities and limitations, it will likely opt for a slower-paced attritional campaign in Ukraine,” asserts the CSIS report. Mr Putin has succeeded in insulating the Russian economy from the worst effects of war and sanctions–but in a way that makes the war hard to win.

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one

Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far

The Economist

A WEEK AFTER Russia invaded Ukraine last year, Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, crowed, “The value of the ruble has plummeted; the Russian stockmarket closed as fear of capital flight rose; interest rates more than doubled; Russia’s credit rating has been cut to junk status.” American authorities clearly hoped that the “massive, unprecedented consequences” they and their allies had imposed on Russia, including “severe and lasting economic costs”, would help impede its war machine. Yet over the following year, despite the repeated tightening of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy recovered its poise. The IMF expects it to grow by 0.7% this year—on a par with France, and even as the British and German economies shrink. The hope that the state of Russia’s economy will provide any sort of constraint on the war has faded.

Such despair, however, is as misguided as Mr Blinken’s initial euphoria. By the admission of none other than Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, “The illegitimate restrictions imposed on the Russian economy in the medium term may indeed have a negative impact on it.” The question is not so much whether Russia can endure an even longer war of attrition (it can), but whether it can support the sort of intensification of the conflict Russia will probably need to transform its prospects on the battlefield. That looks almost impossible.

Russia’s bureaucracy has achieved three feats over the past 14 months. It has found ways to withstand the fusillade of sanctions that Mr Blinken heralded. It has supplied enough men and materiel to propel Russia’s invasion. And all this has been done without a sharp decline in living standards, which might prompt popular unrest. But any attempt to escalate the conflict would inevitably undo these successes.

Russia is having to cope with the broadest array of sanctions ever imposed on a big country, including on individuals associated with the war, on financial transactions involving Russian entities, on exports of certain goods to Russia and on imports of most goods from Russia. Yet this economic assault has yielded disappointing results, in part because there were always big holes in the sanctions regime and in part because Russia has found ways around some of the restrictions that did initially hem it in.

Some of the showiest measures have targeted oligarchs and other cronies of Mr Putin’s regime. World-Check, a data firm, reckons that 2,215 individuals with close ties to the government can no longer travel to some or all Western countries, or gain access to their possessions there, or both. Some wealthy Russians have complained about their lost social standing. A few have left Russia and renounced their citizenship.

Despite the reports of impounded superyachts, however, most oligarchs are still putting caviar on the table. Foreign governments have frozen about $100bn-worth of private Russian assets—only about a quarter of the $400bn that Russian households have abroad. The biggest imposition on many rich Russians relates to their holidays. The French Riviera is off limits; Dubai and Antalya are the main substitutes. Sanctions, perversely, may pave the way for the creation of a new generation of oligarchs. With Western firms leaving the country en masse, there are hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of assets up for grabs. If the intention behind the measures was to cause discomfort among Mr Putin’s inner circle, there is little sign of it.

Financial sanctions, too, have had a limited effect. After Russia invaded Ukraine, ten Russian lenders were kicked out of SWIFT, which more than 11,000 banks around the world use for cross-border payments. Close to two-thirds of Russia’s banking system can no longer process transactions in euros or dollars.

But Western countries have not cut off Russian banks entirely, as they need to pay for the Russian oil and gas they continue to import. Gazprombank, which processes these payments, remains a member of SWIFT. What is more, new financial pipes are being built to replace Western ones. Average daily transactions using CIPS, China’s alternative to SWIFT, have increased by 50% since the invasion began. This past December 16% of Russia’s exports were paid for in yuan, up from almost none before the war. The narrow gap between the price at which Russian banks sell their customers yuan and the price at which they buy yuan suggests a liquid market. Some international transactions are also settled, with difficulty, in Indian rupees and Emirati dirhams.

Restrictions on exports of certain goods to Russia have also disappointed. America and its allies have banned sales to Russia of thousands of high-tech items, while many Western firms that used to operate in Russia have voluntarily pulled out. Of about 3,000 global firms with a Russian presence tracked by the KSE Institute at the Kyiv School of Economics, roughly half have curtailed operations there in some way. Last year the stock of foreign direct investment in Russia fell by a quarter.

Yet Russia continues to import almost as much as it did before the invasion. New trading partners have sprung up to replace the West. China now sells twice as much to Russia as it did in 2019. “Parallel” imports—unauthorised sales from the West to Russia via a third country of everything from fizzy drinks to computer chips—have soared. In 2022 imports from the EU to Armenia mysteriously doubled, even as Armenian exports to Russia tripled. Serbia’s exports of phones to Russia rose from $8,518 in 2021 to $37m in 2022. Shipments of washing machines from Kazakhstan to Russia rose from zero in 2021 to nearly 100,000 units last year.

These arrangements have drawbacks. Russia’s economic hubs are nearer to Brussels than to Beijing. Higher transport costs mean higher prices. People also have less choice than before (one Muscovite complains about the difficulty of finding mortadella). According to a recent survey by Romir, a Russian market-research firm, two-thirds of Russians reckon the quality of the products they buy is deteriorating.

What is more, not all goods can be obtained in sufficient quantities through backchannels. Many Russian-made medications, which depend on imported raw materials, are in short supply. The car industry, meanwhile, is struggling with a shortage of imported semiconductors. Production was down 70% in January-February, compared with the same period a year before.

Yet even if Russia cannot make as many cars any more, it can still import them. After Lada, a Soviet stalwart, the most popular brand in Russia is now Haval, a mid-range Chinese marque. Its monthly sales have increased 331% over the past year.

Russia also seems to be getting hold of the parts it needs to keep its civilian planes airborne, somehow. Hackers have been stealing updates of aircraft software that Russian firms can no longer buy. Crashes, although frequent by Western standards, have not increased.

The impact of sanctions on Russia’s exports has been bigger–but Western countries always shied away from making them too severe for fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels. The EU’s imports of Russian gas have fallen dramatically. Russia has limited capacity to divert the exports to China, since the pipeline linking the two countries is small. Shipping more by sea requires new liquefaction plants which take time to build and need sophisticated tech. Rystad Energy, a consultancy, forecasts that Russia’s gas sales will dwindle to 136bn cubic metres (bcm) in 2023 from 241bcm in 2021.

Oil, however, is more fungible. In December the EU, which in 2021 bought more than 40% of Russia’s crude exports, imposed an import ban. It also forbade its shipping firms, insurers and financiers from facilitating the sale of Russian crude to buyers in other countries unless the price per barrel was below $60. In February a similar package of sanctions came into force on Russia’s refined oil, a smaller but profitable export, much of which also went to Europe before the war.

But Asian buyers have been happy to absorb the oil that Europe is spurning. In March nearly 90% of Russia’s total crude exports went to China and India, estimates Reid I’Anson of Kpler, a data firm, up from a quarter before the war. That month Russia shipped 3.7m barrels a day (b/d) on average, more than it did in 2021. March was also a strong month for sales of refined products such as diesel. A new ecosystem of shadow traders and shippers, largely based in Hong Kong and Dubai, has emerged to help ferry the embargoed barrels to their new destinations, often with the help of Russian lenders and insurers. These new buyers, plus high commodity prices brought about in part by the war, helped push Russia’s current-account surplus to a record $227bn—10% of GDP.

But it is unlikely to see another bumper year. The price of a barrel of Brent, an oil benchmark, has fallen below $85 from an average of $100 in 2022 (see chart 1). Urals, Russia’s main grade, now sells at a steep discount at Russian ports—below $50 on average in January and February, according to the ministry of finance, compared with $76 on average in 2022. Russia would need a price of well over $100 a barrel to balance its budget, analysts estimate. The International Energy Agency, a watchdog, reckons Russia’s oil revenues were 43% lower in March than a year earlier. Economists expect the country’s current-account surplus to fall to 3-4% of GDP this year, in line with the average of the 2010s.

Lower hydrocarbon sales mean lower government revenues. In 2022 the Russian government ran a deficit of about 3trn roubles ($37bn), or 2% of GDP. This year it is planning something similar, but actual spending and taxation data so far this year make that look optimistic. A deficit in the range of at least 10trn roubles, as much as 5% of GDP, looks likelier—high by Russian standards.

All the same, the Russian state has plenty of options to fund itself. Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund still has about $150bn (about 10% of GDP), even after being drained of about $30bn last year. The government could also issue more debt. Last year’s bumper exports have left big Russian energy firms with lots of cash they must stash somewhere. Those firms, which are largely state-owned anyway, could also be hit with a windfall tax, as they were last year. And Russian financial institutions hold sufficient assets to cover 10trn-rouble deficits for 25 years–a huge resource the government might seek to tap in some way. Richard Connolly, an expert on the Russian economy at RUSI, a think-tank, says, “The government can always fund itself by taking money from big companies.”

Money, in other words, will not be a severe constraint on the war effort. Demands on the budget for this purpose are in any case modest. Our best guess, based on comparing actual spending figures with what was budgeted before the war, is that Russia’s assault on Ukraine is currently costing it about 5trn roubles a year, or 3% of GDP–less than America spent on the Korean war.

But replacing damaged weapons and spent munitions is not simply a question of money. Russia has churned through military equipment on a vast scale. Estimates of the number of armoured vehicles destroyed during the war, for example, range between 8,000 and 16,000, according to a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think-tank. Russia has also lost lots of aircraft, drones and artillery systems.

One solution is to fall back on existing stocks, although many of these are old and in poor repair. Another is to redirect weapons intended for export to the front line. Siemon Wezeman of SIPRI, a Swedish think-tank, reckons Russia’s arms exports plummeted from $50bn in 2021 to $11bn or less last year. He points out that unusual T-90 tanks—perhaps demonstration models, or units originally destined for Algeria—have been spotted on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Russia is also trying to make more weapons. Dmitri Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s security council, recently said the country would produce 1,500 modern tanks in 2023. Officials have also said they want drones to be manufactured en masse in Russia. Some factories are working around the clock. The government is lending lavishly to arms manufacturers, or ordering banks to do so. In January and February production of “finished metal goods” was 20% higher than the year before, according to official statistics.

The problem is that, to manufacture advanced weapons, it needs access to Western-made, high-end “dual-use” components, from engines to microchips, that are hard to obtain because of Western sanctions. Desperately needed parts can always be diverted to their most urgent use. Thus in February the government temporarily stopped accepting applications for biometric passports to save microchips. High-end washing machines are also being imported in large numbers to be stripped of their chips, presumably for use in guided missiles and other military kit. Ukraine’s military intelligence recently reported that every month Russia manages to make around 30 Kh-101s and 20 Kalibrs, its two main types of guided missile, presumably thanks to such ruses.

But the volumes of advanced weaponry produced is nowhere near what Russia needs to replace its depleting stocks. Ukrainian and Western military officials believe that Russia has used most of its stocks of its most accurate guided missiles. Serial numbers found in the wreckage of spent missiles suggest it is now using new ones, made during the war. Insiders say the army is asking for ten times more tanks than Russia’s factories can produce. A lack of software and technical equipment also seems to be preventing Russia’s production of drones from taking off.

What Russia lacks in quality, however, it may partly compensate for in quantity—by gussying up Soviet-era weapons. It is modernising perhaps 90 old tanks a month by equipping them with new electronics and communication systems. It is refurbishing old missiles that are less accurate but difficult to intercept and repurposing nuclear delivery systems to launch them. It is cannibalising civilian planes to repair fighter jets.

Russia is also getting military supplies from allies. Some artillery shells appear to be arriving from China, via Belarus. Russia is also buying (ostensibly civilian) drones from its eastern neighbour, as well as artillery shells from North Korea. It reportedly also traded 60 Su-35 aircraft with Iran in exchange for several thousand kamikaze drones. In short, the quality of Russian weapons is declining, but it has found ways to avoid running out.

More rhetoric than rotors

Finding enough people to keep the war effort going is another challenge. Many have been killed in action; many more have emigrated. In the year to December 2022 the number of employed Russians under the age of 35 fell by 1.3m, according to FinExpertiza, an auditor. Shortages of workers are common. In December the central bank said that half of firms surveyed were struggling to find enough staff. There are 2.5 vacancies for every unemployed person, making the Russian labour market twice as tight as America’s. Wages are growing fast. Specialists, such as IT engineers and lawyers, are especially scarce. At a recent meeting of Russia’s entrepreneurs union, the labour shortage was the main topic of conversation.

The labour shortage makes life difficult for military recruiters, too. The army is now sending conscription and mobilisation notices by email, in addition to physical copies, to make it harder for people to pretend they have not seen them. Draftees are not allowed to leave the country. With enough coercion, though, Russia should have no trouble filling its ranks. The country is not about to run out of young men: before the war there were about 17m of them. But more people on the frontline means fewer people in offices and factories. And the more widespread conscription becomes in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the greater the chance of popular unrest.

The government’s third economic achievement has been to maintain living standards. Last year it spent an extra 3% of GDP to stimulate the economy. Aside from higher spending on the military, support is coming in the form of economic aid to civilian companies: direct handouts to firms, subsidised loans, joint investments and so on. Spending on the budget category that subsumes many of these items, “national economy”, rose by 20% in 2022, to 4.3trn roubles. Between January and mid-March it increased by another 45% compared with the same period last year. Banks are being asked to give indebted firms breathing room. In 2022 business failures fell to a seven-year low.

Last year “social” spending also rose, from 6trn to 7trn roubles (4.5% of GDP). However, says Vladimir Milov, a former deputy minister of energy, the federal government accounts for only part of overall social spending. The pension fund—a nominally independent agency recently renamed the Social Fund—is also doling out cash to retirees, mothers, the disabled and more, as are regional governments. Allowances towards constituencies important to Mr Putin, such as families with more than one child, the poor and the elderly, are growing, notes Maria Snegovaya of CSIS. Outside Moscow, payments to the families of dead conscripts can be enough to buy a flat.

All this may explain why the war has not affected Russian living standards all that much. Consumer prices did rise by 12% last year, in large part because of a depreciation of the rouble in the spring. Average pay at medium-sized and large companies, which include many state-owned entities, rose marginally last year even after accounting for inflation. The value of people’s savings has fallen only slightly, central-bank statistics suggest. Inflation fell back to 3.5% in March.

Overall, the Russian economy has proved resilient. Real GDP fell by only 2-3% last year—far less than the 10-15% decline that many economists had predicted. A “current activity indicator” compiled by Goldman Sachs, a bank, which correlated closely with official GDP numbers before the war, shows that Russia emerged from recession about a year ago. Most forecasters believe the economy will grow this year (see chart 2).

All this suggests that Mr Putin should be able to maintain the war effort for some time to come. Expanding it, however, is another matter. Some on the right are calling for Mr Putin to spend more than a few percentage points of GDP on the invasion. After all, Russia has embraced total war before—including in 1942 and 1943, when it spent an astonishing 60% of its GDP on the military, according to “Accounting for War”, a book by Mark Harrison published in 1996.

But it is hard to see how Mr Putin could do that while maintaining economic stability and preserving living standards. The first problem would be raising money fast. Not all the sovereign-wealth fund’s assets are liquid. Printing money would spur inflation, causing the rouble to lose value and eroding the living standards the government has worked so hard to preserve. Loading up banks with huge amounts of public debt overnight might have a similar effect, stirring doubts about how soundly the economy was being managed. Tax rises or a big shift in public expenditure towards defence would also eat into personal incomes. And any of these measures would undermine the air of calm, control and stability that Mr Putin is at pains to maintain. “Of course, national defence is the top priority,” he said recently, “but in resolving strategic tasks in this area, we should not repeat the mistakes of the past and should not destroy our own economy.”

It’s unclear that spending vastly more money would achieve the desired results anyway. Russia’s economy has become more centralised, but it is not the planned, command-and-control apparatus of the Soviet times. Converting a budgetary bazooka into weapons of a more conventional sort would thus, at best, take time. The effort would exacerbate the bottlenecks that are already constricting Russia’s military output, in machinery subject to sanctions, for example, and in skilled workers. Much would depend on the continued assistance of China, the Gulf states and other countries through which Russian capital and imports flow–and they might be nervous about abetting a big Russian escalation.

Throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine therefore looks out of the question. “Considering Russia’s existing capabilities and limitations, it will likely opt for a slower-paced attritional campaign in Ukraine,” asserts the CSIS report. Mr Putin has succeeded in insulating the Russian economy from the worst effects of war and sanctions–but in a way that makes the war hard to win. ■

The Economist

20. Why is Facebook censoring Sy Hersh’s NordStream report?

The Quincy Institute defends Seymour Hersh.

Why is Facebook censoring Sy Hersh’s NordStream report?

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/04/21/why-is-facebook-censoring-sy-hershs-nordstream-report/?utm_source=pocket_saves

The social media giant says his piece on US responsibility for blowing up the pipeline is false, allows other stories with proven dubious claims.

APRIL 21, 2023

Written by

Branko Marcetic

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Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. policy toward the conflict has inter-mingled uneasily with the U.S. government’s growing convergence with the social media platforms that make up today’s digital public square.

Tech companies have selectively relaxed their bans on violent and hate speech to align with Ukraine’s war effort, shuttered the accounts of media outlets critical of the war and U.S. policy to it, and seen a vast army of bots push content supporting Ukraine and its NATO partners. And now, Facebook is actively censoring and discouraging the sharing of Seymour Hersh’s reporting on the alleged U.S. role in the attack on the Nordstream pipelines.

As of Thursday, if you try to share on Facebook the February 8 Substack post in which Hersh first laid out the anonymously sourced charge, you’ll first be met with a prompt informing you about “additional reporting” on the subject in the form of Norwegian fact-checking website Faktisk, and warning you that “pages and websites that repeatedly publish or share false news will see their overall distribution reduced and be restricted in other ways.”

If you decide to “share anyway,” Hersh’s piece is posted but blurred out, and labeled “false information” by the social media platform. (It’s since been unblurred and labeled “partly false information”). The phenomenon was first pointed out by Michael Shellenberger, and has since been replicated by others, including myself.

Besides labeling the post as false, Facebook also sent me a notification roughly 10 hours later informing me about the notice they’d added and that I had shared something that “includes information that independent fact-checkers said was partly false.” Facebook cautions that “people who repeatedly share false information might have their posts moved lower in News Feed,” suggesting that if I go on to share any other reporting that’s been challenged by fact-checkers, I’ll be punished by having my account’s reach throttled.

Yet the fact-check in question from Faktisk — Norwegian for “Actually” — leans heavily on open source intelligence whose reliability has itself been recently challenged. Hersh has previously fended off criticism that his reporting doesn’t match up with public data about ship movements by arguing this information can be manipulated. Indeed, in a piece putting forward its own, alternate theory to Hersh’s, the New York Times itself noted that the pipelines weren’t closely monitored by commercial or government sensors, and that there were roughly 45 “ghost ships” whose location transponders weren’t on.

Of course, Hersh’s story is yet to be corroborated, and it’s entirely possible that, even if it’s ever proven true in the broad strokes, it ends up wrong on specific details. But while the story’s veracity is far from certain, it’s hard to see how it can be unequivocally declared “false” — to the point of threatening to throttle the accounts of those sharing it — given the admitted flaws in open source intelligence, and given the circumstantial evidence backing the central claim of Hersh’s high-level anonymous source: that the attack was a U.S. operation. Western officials have now told the press there’s little enthusiasm for finding out the truth, fearing it could be a friendly government.

It’s also vastly different to the treatment Facebook metes out to theories that are at least equally dubious, but have been disseminated through legacy news outlets instead of Substack. The New York Times’ alternate theory of a “pro-Ukrainian group” unconnected to any government being behind the attack can be posted on Facebook without issue, as can the Die Zeit report alleging that this pro-Ukrainian group was made up of six people who used a rented yacht.

Yet both stories have been challenged since publication. Swedish investigators have reaffirmed that they believe a state actor is the most likely culprit, and law enforcement officials told the Washington Post they’re skeptical about the veracity of the German report, doubting both the claims that a yacht was used or that a six-person crew could have pulled off the operation, including laying the explosives by hand. There were doubts about the Times’ theory to begin with, given that the U.S. officials promulgating it loaded it up with qualifiers, and stressed there were “no firm conclusions” while refusing to discuss the evidence they based it on.

Mainstream stories alleging that Russia destroyed its own pipeline also don’t meet any pushback from the platform. That includes this Bloomberg piece about a German official blaming Moscow, this Insider piece that cites “Russia experts” who argue the attack was a “‘warning shot’ from Russian president Vladimir Putin to the West,” and this Telegraph piece that purports to explain “why Putin would want to blow up Nord Stream 2, and the advantages it gives him,” asserting that it’s “ripped straight from [his] playbook of panic, escalation and misdirection.”

This is despite the fact that such accusations clash with the now-official narrative of a pro-Ukrainian, non-state group, and that even Western officials now openly doubt Russia’s culpability for attacking its own pipeline, which could cost half a billion dollars to repair by one estimate.

This attempt to hobble the spread of Hersh’s story on Facebook is a small taste of the alarming implications of when tech censorship combines with government pressure, and suggests how easily independent reporting can be throttled while allowing official misinformation to proliferate. By stifling open, public debate about an issue of such grave and urgent importance, the result is not just threatening to a free press, but to U.S. democracy more broadly.

Written by

Branko Marcetic

21. Philippine Crossroads: US Militarization Over Chinese Development – OpEd

Conclusion:

The Philippine choice was never between the US and China. It is between lethal geopolitics, which would derail the much-anticipated Asian Century, and economic development, which is very much in the long-term interest of the Philippines, China and the United States.

Philippine Crossroads: US Militarization Over Chinese Development – OpEd

April 24, 2023 Dan Steinbock 0 Comments

By Dan Steinbock

eurasiareview.com · by Dan Steinbock · April 24, 2023

Manila is facing an existential crossroads, as evidenced by new challenges of militarization and uncertainty in overseas work, tourism, trade and investment.

After a wargame exercise on Wednesday night by the House Select Committee on China, its chairman warned stressed the need to take action to “arm Taiwan to the teeth before any crisis begins.”

As reported by The Hill on Thursday, the key lesson is “the importance of coordination among allies and partners in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, to allow for U.S. military access to key jumping-off points, but also to prepare to put into action a coalition of like-minded states to oppose Chinese aggression.”

Launched first a year ago by the Center for New American Security (“CNAS plans for Asia,” TMT, Aug 1, 2022), the game depicted the Philippines as a vital logistical base to US response in Taiwan.

Taiwan wargames for $19B military sales

Along with its prime funders, Pentagon and the Big Defense, the CNAS, which is closely tied with the Biden administration (“The Centre of International Insecurity,” The World Financial Review, Jun. 10, 2022), is pushing for the White House to urgently deliver on a “backlog of $19 billion in military sales to Taiwan.”

Meanwhile, Philippine authorities pledged that the EDCA sites would have no military role in a potential Taiwan conflict. The vows contradicted fully the EDCA statements by their US counterparts, the Biden administration – and the CNAS wargamers.

That’s the confusing backdrop to President Biden’s meeting with President Marcos Jr. in the White House on May 1.

Preceded by the US secretaries of Defense and State meeting with their Philippine counterparts in Washington, the meeting announcement came right after the largest-ever joint US-Philippine military exercises in the South China Sea. These ensued days after the US gained greater military access into the Philippines.

Two months ago, I suggested that that the militarization could erode the economic futures of the Philippines and the ASEAN (TMT, Feb 20, 2023). The early signs do not bode well.

Geopolitics: rising military uncertainty

Last week, Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo pledged to the Senate EDCA inquiry that the Philippines will not be allowing the US to stockpile weapons for use in operations in Taiwan at the EDCA sites.

Senator Imee Marcos, chair of the Senate foreign affairs panel, pointed to the possibility of the US caching weapons at EDCA sites. She made note of a provision in the 2023 US National Defense Authorization Act, which allowed for the creation of a contingency stockpile in Taiwan.

Pressed further by Marcos, Manalo added that the Philippines will not allow US troops to refuel, repair and reload at EDCA sites.

Marcos also told Defense chief Carlito Galvez Jr. that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) seemed to be ignoring military modernization: “We are just relying on foreigners to defend us while the armed forces remain rotten, old, under-armed and completely abject in the face of external threats?”

The bilateral ties with the US rest on the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, 1951), and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA, 2014). In March 2016, the two countries agreed on the five locations of military bases for the American troops. In 2021 followed the renewed Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA); and earlier this year, the new four EDCA sites.

The Biden administration is in a hurry to integrate Philippine military alignments before the ASEAN and China finalize a code of conduct (COC) for the SCS.

Filipino futures in the region

In a recent address, Chinese Ambassador in Manila Huang Xilian said that “some tried to find excuse for the new EDCA sites by citing the safety of the 150,000 [overseas Filipino workers] in Taiwan, while China is the last country that wishes to see conflict over the Strait because people on both sides are Chinese.”

Oddly, in much of the Philippine media, particularly foreign-owned outlets, Huang’s remarks were framed as a “veiled threat” against Filipino OWFs in Taiwan.

In effect, the debate on the Filipinos and OFWs misses the regional big picture. In addition to Taiwan, Filipinos constitute the largest ethnic minority in Hong Kong, numbering over 190,000. According to ex-labor secretary Silvestre Bello III, in 2016 there were also up to 200,000 undocumented Filipinos working on the Chinese mainland as domestic workers. Recent official figures have not been released.

More importantly, many of the old and new EDCA sites are in proximity to major Philippine urban hubs. When their populations are added to more than half a million Filipinos in Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China, the final figure soars to millions.

And should nuclear weapons be mobilized in the region, as prepared by the US-UK-Australia trilateral AUKUS pact, which Manila has officially welcomed, the final tally could soar to tens of millions.

Tourism: self-imposed visa quotas, $2.5B lost?

With the new EDCA sites and increasing militarization, I argued two months ago, the anticipated inflows of Chinese mass tourism will not materialize. In 2019, there were more than 1.7 million arrivals from China, making up 22% of total arrivals to the Philippines. This translated to about 2.3 PHP billion in tourism receipts. Hence, the urgent need for visa reforms to address “tourism bottlenecks,” as Tourism Secretary Christina Frasco recently said.

The Department of Tourism (DOT) aims to have 2 million Chinese visit the Philippines this year. That would require 6,818 visas to be issued per day. Yet, according to Franco and reports from airlines, Philippine consular posts in China have issued advisories “limiting the acceptance of visa applications per day from only around 60 to 100.” Like Franco, Roberto Zozobrado, chief of the Philippine Tourism Congress, believes the hurdle to getting more Chinese back is the visa quota implemented by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

Based on data by the Philippine News Agency and the country’s leading media in late March, the current inflow of Chinese tourists would amount to just 1.5% of the official aim. The gross discrepancy between official targets and actual realities is stunning, especially if it is self-induced.

According to the DOT, revenue losses could amount to $2.5 billion “if the difficulties in obtaining visas is not immediately addressed.”

Trade: $8B in missed opportunity costs, another $12B at stake?

Recently, the Senate finally ratified the largest trade bloc in history, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Ex-President Duterte initiated the deal in September 2021. Without a timely ratification, Philippines has already lost billions of dollars and the strategic early-mover advantages.

In the early 2020s, the RCEP accounted for some 50% of Philippine exports and 68% of Philippine import sources, as estimated by Dr Henry Lim Son Liong, President of the Filipino-Chinese Chamber.

In terms of its impact, the RCEP could increase the Philippine GDP by up to 2 percent, according to some analysts. Since the country’s nominal GDP was $402 billion in 2022 and is estimated at around $425 billion for 2023, that could amount to up to 8.3 billion – in missed opportunity costs.

Nonetheless, with further militarization and EDCA sites, Philippines’ largest trading partner and largest source of imports could fade into history. And so could the country’s second-largest export market. What’s at stake annually is almost $12 billion in total trade.

Investment: $23B at stake

On Saturday, Foreign Affairs Secretary Manalo met his Chinese counterpart Qin Gan. The two said they seek to increase collaboration and elevate the bilateral relations. Manalo hoped for “the early realization of the $22.8 billion business and investment pledges made during the state visit of President Marcos to Beijing.”

In the past decade, the total bilateral trade did triple, thanks mainly to the Duterte government. As long as president Marcos builds on those policies, the expansion will prevail. But the reverse applies as well.

The first signals came last week when NEDA chief, Socioeconomic Planning Secretary Arsenio Balisacan allayed concerns that Philippine infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be stalled due to the geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

In other major ASEAN countries, which shun militarization and push development, the BRI ties are thriving. By contrast, those emerging economies that align themselves with the ailing Western economies will face more inflationary, monetary and currency pressures in the near future (“Is Philippines sleepwalking into economic and geopolitical minefield,” TMT, Mar. 20, 2022).

The Philippine choice was never between the US and China. It is between lethal geopolitics, which would derail the much-anticipated Asian Century, and economic development, which is very much in the long-term interest of the Philippines, China and the United States.

eurasiareview.com · by Dan Steinbock · April 24, 2023

22. A civilian US ‘Joint Chiefs’ for economic competition with China?

Now there is some disruptive thinking.

A civilian US ‘Joint Chiefs’ for economic competition with China?

BY BARRY PAVEL AND DANIEL EGEL, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 04/23/23 9:30 AM ET

The Hill · · April 23, 2023

America is at the beginning of a new era in history. China’s aggressive activities are presenting the greatest sustained challenge to the rules-based international order since the end of World War II. While military capabilities and posture will remain essential — as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded the world — the geopolitical milestones of this new era will be shaped by the intensive and growing economic and technological rivalry between the United States and China.

In order to posture for success in this new era, the United States could create a civilian equivalent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a mandate to effectively and efficiently manage the expanding role of U.S. civilian departments in geopolitical and economic competition.

In 1947, at the outset of the last comparable inflection point in history, the United States implemented a series of major structural reforms which President Harry Truman urged as the “best means of keeping the peace.” The 1947 National Security Act formalized Truman’s vision and established the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and structures to ensure the “coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was one of the coordinating structures formalized in 1947 that would help lay the foundation for a Cold War victory decades later. Though the JCS was initially established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor, the 1947 National Security Act gave this body a formal peacetime mandate. Over the next four decades, the JCS would function as a “corporate advisory board” in advising the president on military matters and provide, in President Truman’s words, “coordination and unified command … [to prevent] future aggression against world peace.”

A civilian JCS — which could include at least the secretaries of Commerce, State, and Treasury — could be patterned after the vision that President Truman had for the JCS after World War II. He articulated this vision in a 1946 letter to the U.S. Congress, stating that the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was:

“To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs, to make recommendations for integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the United States military forces.”

Today’s civilian cabinet leaders have highlighted the need for just such a new approach. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo concluded that the United States is “operating in a fundamentally different strategic environment” that is “forcing us to defend our businesses and workers — and those of our allies and partners.” Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has highlighted the need to “sustain and expand our economic and technological influence” to “compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.” And Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen has indicated that “it will be increasingly difficult to separate economic issues from broader considerations of national interest, including national security.”

This new civilian “Economic JCS” (E-JCS) could provide an effective mechanism to — as our RAND colleague Ambassador (retired) Charles Ries has characterized it — “increase the vision, efficiency, and effectiveness with which [the United States] uses the instruments of national power.” And it could enable the National Economic Council (NEC) in the same way the military JCS helps the National Security Council: The NEC would retain its broader mandate for “U.S. and global economic policy” while the E-JCS would be focused exclusively on competition.

The central task of this new E-JCS would be to strengthen the internal integration and external effectiveness of actions taken by what are the leading U.S. civilian departments in today’s geopolitical rivalry. These departments could be better positioned, postured, and supported if they are to successfully undertake their essential new roles. This could require the development of coherent, strategic plans that can inform necessary organizational adaptations, effective allocation of significant amounts of new funding, and recruitment and onboarding of new staff necessary for these departments’ expanded roles.

The U.S. Congress — cognizant of the growing threat posed by China — has already committed hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade via the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 and the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 in support of the U.S. pivot toward this new form of geopolitical competition. If the Cold War is any indication, this type of spending will remain robust and will prove a central factor in U.S. strategic success. Currently, the United States lacks the necessary coordinating structures to ensure that this massive infusion of new funding is allocated in a manner that is both efficient and effective for advancing the U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China.

International engagement would be a critical element of the E-JCS. The United States and like-minded allies may need to expand their ever-closer synchronization of the use of economic and technology tools, the potency of which was demonstrated by the recent U.S. agreement with Japan and the Netherlands to restrict technological exports to China.

The United States finds itself today in a geopolitical landscape that gives priority to the effective and coordinated use of economic and technological tools in order to protect U.S. national security and advance shared democratic values against an aggressive, expansionist authoritarian power that already has global reach.

The United States, despite a series of useful policy initiatives, is not yet postured for success in the new and very different landscape of this emergent era.

Jordan’s retreat from China on 5G could signal a growing distance Russia and China are waging a propaganda war against the US — why are we silent?

As in previous eras, the United States could realign its government structures and processes to compete effectively. A new civilian E-JCS featuring the secretaries of Commerce, State, and Treasury, supported and resourced on a sustained basis, could prove to be critically important to ensuring that the geopolitical outcomes of the current era are more favorable for the American way of life and less so for the authoritarians.

Barry Pavel is vice president of the RAND National Security Research Division at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Daniel Egel is a senior economist at RAND, a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and RAND’s Department of State portfolio manager.

The Hill · by Alex Gangitano · April 23, 2023

23. The potential end of China’s 'Period of Strategic Opportunity,' and what it means militarily

Excerpts:

As the West, from Beijing’s perspective, becomes ever more hostile, and increasingly challenges all of China’s core interests, the “period of strategic opportunity” would appear to be coming to a close. Far from a generally benign atmosphere, Beijing may well see the future as increasingly challenging. This is exacerbated by broader trends, such as China’s demographic situation (with fewer working age people joining the work force, China’s competitive advantage in labor costs is evaporating), and offshoring of various companies as supply chains are reexamined.

Moreover, the PLA’s needs are becoming more expensive. As the PLA has continued to focus on securing information dominance in preparation for future wars, it has emphasized the development of information warfare forces. There are now more electronic warfare and intelligence gathering platforms in the PLA than ever before. China’s expanding space capabilities make it a true peer of the United States in outer space, able to seriously challenge American dominance in event of a conflict. But such systems are typically extremely expensive; the PLA long ago shifted its emphasis from focusing on quantity to achieving technological parity with advanced western militaries.

In such an environment, PLA spending may continue to be accorded higher priority than in the past, especially if Beijing feels the need to coerce its neighbors into not cooperating with American efforts at containment. What should be sobering is that, if China can develop two stealth fighter programs (and field so many that there are now more J-20s than there are F-22s), undertake its own carrier development program, and field a peer-level space program while limiting its defense expenditures, what could a more militarized China field in three, five or 10 years?

The potential end of China’s 'Period of Strategic Opportunity,' and what it means militarily - Breaking Defense

2023 will mark the second year in a row that China's defense budget is slated to increase at a faster rate than the general economy, a potentially worrisome trend for Beijing, writes analyst Dean Cheng.

breakingdefense.com · by Dean Cheng · April 24, 2023

Chinese President Xi Jinping is applauded as he waves to senior members of the government upon arrival at the Opening Ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at The Great Hall of People on October 16, 2022 in Beijing. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

For the second year in a row, China is poised to increase its defense budget at a higher rate than its national economy is expected to grow. That is an obvious reason for concern if you are one of the many nations worried about China’s global footprint, but it also raises important questions about the strategic thinking in Beijing. In a new analysis below, Dean Cheng, an expert on the Chinese military, picks apart just what is happening in Beijing and what it might mean for China’s many neighbors.

Why has China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping appeared to be increasingly bellicose? Some believe this reflects an increasing sense of vulnerability, whether due to the COVID-19 protests or a slowing Chinese economy. But what if it’s deeper? What if China’s fundamental strategic outlook has shifted? This has happened before, with significant impact on Chinese strategy and policy.

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was led by the “Great Helmsman” Mao Zedong in the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC was on a constant war footing. Mao believed in “early war, major war, nuclear war,” that the struggle between socialism and capitalism would lead to a global war involving nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, Mao’s China was also cripplingly poor.

When Deng Xiaoping took over leadership of the PRC in the late 1970s, he fundamentally altered the Chinese perception of the world. Deng declared that the tenor of the times was not that of imminent war, but of “Peace and Development,” using that to justify the vast economic reforms that ensued. If the nation did not face the likelihood of imminent, global thermonuclear war, then the PRC could afford to redirect its economic efforts from manufacturing tanks and combat aircraft to consumer goods and light industry. If the PRC was not about to go to war with the West, then it could afford to trade with the West, even become an integral supplier as well as customer.

In 2002, Jiang Zemin, Deng’s designated successor, observed that China was in a “period of strategic opportunity (zhanlue jiyu qi; 战略机遇期).” The PRC was still not confronting fundamental threats to its national survival and was benefiting mightily from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, the 9/11 attacks on the United States meant that Washington’s focus was on countering global terrorism, rather than great power competition. Consequently, the PRC could improve all the facets of comprehensive national power (which includes not only military and economic power but diplomatic standing, level of science and technology, and cultural security) at relatively low risk.

This view that China was in a “period of strategic opportunity” was sustained during the reign of Hu Jintao, the designated successor to Jiang Zemin. This is not to say that the Chinese did not modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Indeed, throughout Hu’s leadership, the PLA steadily gained resources, fielding ever more modern naval combatants, fighter jets, and main battle tanks. Moreover, beginning in Hu’s second term (2008-2012), the PRC began to become increasingly assertive. Incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious, as well as increasingly strident claims to the South China Sea began to emerge. In 2010, after an incident involving a Chinese fishing vessel and a Japanese Coast Guard cutter, China suspended the sale of rare earth minerals to Japan, demonstrating its strong position as a major supplier.

But, having observed the USSR’s collapse under the weight of excessive military spending, and given the assessment of reduced risk, the PLA did not get priority for economic resources as it had under Mao. And Hu continued to adhere to Deng’s admonishment on foreign policy: “Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”

Then came the accession of Xi Jinping to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretaryship and national presidency in 2012. The Chinese approach fundamentally shifted. Under Xi, the PRC increasingly prepared to assume a higher profile, as befitted the world’s second largest economy. Just as important, Xi cast off the strictures about avoiding attention. China began to build artificial islands in the South China Sea to support its claims under the “Nine-Dash Line,” ran down Vietnamese fishing boats and laid claim to the disputed Scarborough Shoal.

In his second term (2017-2022), having elevated Yang Jiechi of the PRC foreign policy establishment to the CCP Politburo, China’s diplomats became “wolf warriors,” openly rebutting criticism by other countries and lashing out at any country deemed “unfriendly” to China. At one notable Davos speech, Xi repeatedly cast himself in direct opposition to then US President Donald Trump, arguing for sustaining a globalized economy in the face of Trump’s isolationist approach.

Xi’s shift might be attributed to a range of factors. He owed little to Deng for his rise. Deng had designated both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as his successors so neither could fundamentally diverge from Deng’s positions without undermining their own legitimacy. Xi’s rise, while occurring during Deng, Jiang, and Hu’s reigns, was much more through his own efforts, allowing him to alter, or even reject, Deng’s precepts.

As important, by the time Xi rose to the top leadership position, the PRC was the world’s second largest economy, with many predicting that it would eclipse the United States in sheer economic capacity by the 2020s. This is in sharp contrast to China’s position when Deng enunciated his admonition to bide one’s time. It should not be surprising if various elements of the Chinese power structure were chafing at maintaining a low profile, when the PRC had made such great strides.

Xi’s speeches and policies also suggest that he has a fundamentally different view of the state of international relations than did Deng and his successors. Upon taking power, Xi apparently undertook a “southern tour.” The phrase refers to Deng’s tour of the southern provinces in 1992 to build support for sustaining economic reform in the face of a conservative backlash within the CCP. In Xi’s case, however, far from embracing renewed reform, he signaled a commitment to renewing CCP ideology. His 2012 “southern tour” included speeches where he decried the collapse of the USSR, and criticized Mikhail Gorbachev for failing to do what was necessary to keep the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in power. In the intervening decade, Xi has placed far more public emphasis on ideological training and justification.

This combination of Chinese trends has led to growing blowback, both from Western nations and in China’s backyard. Xi’s policies, including “Made in China 2025,” essentially propounding mercantilism with Chinese characteristics, military-civil fusion, and pursuit of the military aspect of his “China dream” have all led, in turn, to economic and military steps against Beijing by most of its neighbors.

Under President Barack Obama, the United States began to undertake an “Asian pivot,” shifting more national security resources to the Asia-Pacific region, all of it clearly aimed at Beijing. It was also during the Obama administration that substantially more resources were devoted to space security, countering advances in Chinese (and Russian) counter-space capabilities. Similarly, even before Trump imposed a variety of tariffs on Chinese goods and services, there were efforts to limit Chinese access to cutting edge technologies in such areas as microchips and aerospace. These efforts were redoubled during the Trump administration, including open threats to Huawei and ZTE, China’s flagship companies in the information and communications technology realm.

From Beijing’s perspective, such efforts are a clear challenge to Chinese “core interests.” In particular, efforts at economic and technological isolation of the PRC strike at China’s ability to sustain economic development.

In short, the conditions underpinning the belief that the PRC was enjoying a “period of strategic opportunity” have eroded. Beijing may well believe that the period of strategic cooperation with the West, when there was little likelihood of war and resources could be focused on broad national development, is coming to an end.

PRC Defense Budget Grows Faster Than The Economy

This shift in view may explain the recently announced increase in the Chinese defense budget, even as the country’s economy slows down. At the recent National People’s Congress, China’s leadership announced that for 2023, the PLA would enjoy a 7.2% increase from their 2022 expenditures, tied to a GDP growth target of 5.5% for the year. This is the second time under Xi that the defense budget has increased at a faster rate than the general economy. The first was in 2022, when Beijing announced a GDP growth rate of 5%, while approving a defense budget increase of 7.1%.

Year PLA Percent Increase 2023 7.2 2022 7.1 2021 6.8 2020 6.6 2019 7.5

From CSIS, Reuters news reports

A drop in nation spending in 2020 is widely assessed as reflecting the nation’s reduced economic activity in the face of COVID and the associated lockdowns. Yet, China maintained a policy of COVID lockdowns for the next two years, and steadily increased its defense budget.

A defense budget that outpaces national economic growth suggests a potentially worrisome trend in PLA and broader CCP thinking. The “period of strategic opportunity” meant military spending could be safely constrained, relative to broader economic development. Beginning with Deng;s “Four Modernizations,” military spending was tempered by the need to improve China’s overall economic and technological state. Under Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, military demands were secondary to these latter demands.

As the West, from Beijing’s perspective, becomes ever more hostile, and increasingly challenges all of China’s core interests, the “period of strategic opportunity” would appear to be coming to a close. Far from a generally benign atmosphere, Beijing may well see the future as increasingly challenging. This is exacerbated by broader trends, such as China’s demographic situation (with fewer working age people joining the work force, China’s competitive advantage in labor costs is evaporating), and offshoring of various companies as supply chains are reexamined.

Moreover, the PLA’s needs are becoming more expensive. As the PLA has continued to focus on securing information dominance in preparation for future wars, it has emphasized the development of information warfare forces. There are now more electronic warfare and intelligence gathering platforms in the PLA than ever before. China’s expanding space capabilities make it a true peer of the United States in outer space, able to seriously challenge American dominance in event of a conflict. But such systems are typically extremely expensive; the PLA long ago shifted its emphasis from focusing on quantity to achieving technological parity with advanced western militaries.

In such an environment, PLA spending may continue to be accorded higher priority than in the past, especially if Beijing feels the need to coerce its neighbors into not cooperating with American efforts at containment. What should be sobering is that, if China can develop two stealth fighter programs (and field so many that there are now more J-20s than there are F-22s), undertake its own carrier development program, and field a peer-level space program while limiting its defense expenditures, what could a more militarized China field in three, five or 10 years?

Dean Cheng, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a senior advisor on China at the United States Institute of Peace.

breakingdefense.com · by Dean Cheng · April 24, 2023

24. China Tries to Limit Damage From Diplomat’s Comments That Riled Europe

Wolf diplomacy went a little too far?

China Tries to Limit Damage From Diplomat’s Comments That Riled Europe

The New York Times · by Steven Erlanger · April 25, 2023

Remarks by China’s ambassador to France questioning the sovereignty of ex-Soviet states threatened to upset China’s efforts to balance courting Europe with supporting Russia.

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Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, in 2019. On French television on Friday, he said post-Soviet nations “do not have an effective status in international law.”Credit...Sebastien Nogier/EPA, via Shutterstock

April 24, 2023

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BRUSSELS — China moved on Monday to limit damage to its relations with Europe, repudiating comments made by Beijing’s ambassador in Paris, who had questioned the sovereignty of post-Soviet nations like Ukraine in a televised interview.

The comments by Lu Shaye on Friday caused a diplomatic firestorm over the weekend among European foreign ministers and lawmakers, with several countries summoning China’s envoys for an explanation. His remarks threatened to harm China’s ongoing efforts to balance courting European leaders with trade while supporting Russia, with which it has declared a “no limits” partnership.

The war in Ukraine has put Beijing in an awkward position: It has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion while also promising not to help Russia militarily in its war. China’s Foreign Ministry tried to stem the fallout from Mr. Lu’s remarks on Monday, insisting that it recognized the sovereignty of all the former Soviet republics that have declared independence, including Ukraine.

“China respects the sovereign status of former Soviet republics after the Soviet Union’s dissolution,” said the ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, speaking at a news briefing in Beijing.

Asked if Mr. Lu’s comments on Friday represented official policy, Ms. Mao responded, “I can tell you what I stated just now represents the official position of the Chinese government.”

The scuffle over his remarks came as Russian forces intensified their bombardment of the southern Kherson region on Sunday, killing at least two. The region is expected to be the focal point of a Ukrainian counterattack in the coming weeks or months, and the Russian occupation authorities appeared to be on high alert: On Monday, they said they shot down a drone that was trying to attack the port of Sevastopol, in Crimea.

A question about Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014, began the diplomatic dispute in European capitals over Mr. Lu’s remarks. Responding to a question from the French television station, TF1, about whether Crimea was part of Ukraine under international law, he said that Crimea was historically Russian and had been handed over to Ukraine; then he added, “Even these countries of the former Soviet Union do not have an effective status in international law, since there is no international agreement that would specify their status as sovereign countries.”

After the Chinese Foreign Ministry briefing on Monday, the Chinese Embassy in Paris issued a statement rejecting Mr. Lu’s remarks. His comments “were not a political declaration but an expression of personal points of view during a televised debate,” the statement said, and “should not be subject to over-interpretation.”

China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, during a daily briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing on Monday.Credit...Andy Wong/Associated Press

But the issue has not gone away. France, expressing “consternation,” summoned Mr. Lu on Monday to the Quai d’Orsay, the foreign ministry, to explain his comments. The three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, said that they would do the same.

Mr. Lu’s remarks have provoked special anger in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe that were under Soviet rule or occupation. The Baltic nations, which were annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II, are particularly sensitive to any suggestion that their sovereignty is under question.

At a meeting of E.U. foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, Lithuania’s foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, said that the Chinese ambassadors would be asked to explain whether the “Chinese position has changed on independence and to remind them that we’re not post-Soviet countries, but we’re the countries that were illegally occupied by Soviet Union.”

His Estonian counterpart, Margus Tsahkna, said that he wanted to know “why China has such a position or comments about the Baltic States,” which are all members of the European Union and NATO. Ms. Mao’s comments were not sufficient, he said, adding: “I hope that there will be an explanation. We are not satisfied with that announcement.”

On Monday, Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, said that E.U.-China policy would be on the official agenda of the next meeting in June. The Europeans are beginning to work on a new China strategy paper, to replace the one written in 2018.

The declaration just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine of a “no limits” partnership between the presidents of China and Russia, Xi Jinping and Vladimir V. Putin, had already shaken Europeans, who retain major economic dependencies on China even as they have endeavored to lessen their reliance on Russian energy.

“This will only deepen concerns about China in Europe and reinforce anxiety about whether China can and will play a constructive role in the Ukraine crisis,” said Noah Barkin, a China specialist based in Berlin with the Rhodium Group, a research firm. “We’ve seen a flurry of visits by European leaders to Beijing, pushing Xi to lean on Putin, but all the signals have been in the other direction — that China is deepening its relationship with Russia.”

“At the European level the damage is done and won’t be undone easily,” said François Godement, a scholar of China with the Institut Montaigne in Paris. He said he would not be surprised if Mr. Lu were withdrawn as ambassador, given the importance of the French-Chinese relationship and the speed at which Beijing disavowed his comments.

The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, was flanked by his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, and the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, in Beijing earlier this month.Credit...Pool photo by Ludovic Marin

“Tension is building in Europe about China, with people paying keen attention to how Beijing is behaving,” said Theresa Fallon, director of the Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels. There has already been a backlash, she noted, about this month’s visit by President Emmanuel Macron of France to Beijing, his suggestion that Taiwan was a relatively unimportant issue for Europe and his remarks about European independence from Washington, especially given the vital role the United States is playing in Ukraine in the name of European security.

Europeans, Ms. Fallon said, will listen to Mr. Lu’s comments “and think, this is how the Chinese and Russians talk among themselves,” about a world divided into spheres of influence — China over Taiwan and the Pacific, and Russia over Ukraine and its former empire.

This latest episode will “put Beijing on the back foot for a while,” she said. “For a long time, Europeans saw what they wanted to see, and now it’s harder to continue with the pantomime, that if we can get Xi to push Putin we can end the war.”

In remarks that contrasted with Mr. Lu’s, Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the European Union, told The New York Times in an interview this month that China did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or of parts of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, instead recognizing Ukraine within its internationally accepted borders, in line with Ms. Mao’s remarks on Monday.

But Mr. Fu also said that Beijing had not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it understood Russia’s claims about waging a defensive war against NATO encroachment, and because his government believes “the root causes are more complicated” than Western leaders say.

Mr. Lu, 58, has been China’s ambassador to France for nearly four years and has earned a reputation as a fierce, sometimes caustic representative of Beijing. He is considered one of the prime exponents of what has been called “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” named after two ultrapatriotic Chinese films featuring the evil plots and fiery demise of American-led foreign mercenaries.

Mr. Lu has responded aggressively to criticism of China over its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is believed to have begun in Wuhan, the city in central China where he was once a deputy mayor. He became well known in France near the start of the pandemic, in April 2020, when an anonymous Chinese diplomat on the embassy website accused nurses in French care homes of having “abandoned their posts overnight” and “leaving their residents to die of hunger and disease.”

That outburst brought Mr. Lu’s first summons to the French foreign ministry. It was the first time a Chinese ambassador had been summoned there since the crackdown on democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

David Pierson contributed reporting from Singapore, and Christopher Buckley from Taipei, Taiwan. Olivia Wang contributed research.

The New York Times · by Steven Erlanger · April 25, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

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Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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Philippine Crossroads: US Militarization Over Chinese Development – OpEd

Taiwan wargames for $19B military sales

Geopolitics: rising military uncertainty

Filipino futures in the region

Tourism: self-imposed visa quotas, $2.5B lost?

Trade: $8B in missed opportunity costs, another $12B at stake?

Investment: $23B at stake

A civilian US ‘Joint Chiefs’ for economic competition with China?

The potential end of China’s 'Period of Strategic Opportunity,' and what it means militarily - Breaking Defense

2023 will mark the second year in a row that China's defense budget is slated to increase at a faster rate than the general economy, a potentially worrisome trend for Beijing, writes analyst Dean Cheng.

China Tries to Limit Damage From Diplomat’s Comments That Riled Europe