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Quotes of the Day:
“They must find it difficult, those who have taken authority as the truth, rather than truth as the authority.”
– Gerald Massey
“He felt that he was himself and did not wish to be anyone else. He only wished now to be better than he had been formerly.”
– Leo Tolstoy
“Remind yourself what you’ve been through and what you’ve had the strength to endure.”
– Marcus Aurelius
1. Russia used North Korean missile in deadly strike on Kyiv, Zelensky says
2. Bessent Sees US, Korea Trade ‘Understanding’ by Next Week
3. North Korean Leadership Transitions: A Strategic Revolving Door
4. North Korea lashes out at Air Force’s ‘Swan of Death’ bomber deployment in Japan
5. China, Japan, Korea sense Trump trade war weakness
6. Why the US should modernize nuke storage in ROK if North Korea rejects talks
7. How Lee Jae-myung’s adviser thinks Seoul can restart dialogue with North Korea
8. S. Korea, U.S. agree to seek 'July package' deal on tariff, other issues
9. S. Korea, U.S. hold tabletop exercise on integrating nuclear, conventional capabilities
10. U.S. Air Force to form 2nd 'Super Squadron' at Osan with F-16 relocation
11. S. Korea to 'prudently' decide whether to join Alaska LNG project after field inspection: minister
12. Ministry of Unification: “North Korea is sensitive to US strategic assets… a far-fetched claim that is counterproductive”
13. North Korean soldiers: Kim Jong-un praise lectures were ‘absurd’
14. N. Korean official arrested for erasing defector records in bribery scheme
15. Seoul demands removal of Chinese platforms in Yellow Sea; Beijing claims they're legal fish farms
16. More signs point to acting president entering June 3 election race
1. Russia used North Korean missile in deadly strike on Kyiv, Zelensky says
Russia used North Korean missile in deadly strike on Kyiv, Zelensky says
Ukrainian president calls strike evidence of ‘criminal’ Moscow-Pyongyang alliance, as Trump also condemns attack
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/russia-used-north-korean-missile-in-deadly-strike-on-kyiv-zelensky-says/
Jooheon Kim April 25, 2025
Devastation in Kyiv following the Russian attack | Image: Volodymyr Zelensky via X (April 25, 2025)
Russia likely used a North Korean ballistic missile in a deadly strike on Kyiv that killed at least 12 people on Wednesday night, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, condemning the “criminal” alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Zelensky stated on social media that “preliminary information” indicates Russia used a ballistic missile manufactured in North Korea during the assault, adding that special services are still “verifying all the details.”
While he did not name the specific model in his statement, investigators previously found that Russia used KN-23 or KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in past attacks on Ukraine, and media reports suggested the missile used in Wednesday’s attack was likely a KN-23 or variant.
The missile reportedly hit Kyiv’s Sviatoshynskyi district around 1 a.m., flattening residential buildings and trapping multiple residents under debris. Rescue operations were underway on Thursday (local time) as emergency crews searched for survivors beneath the rubble.
Zelensky condemned the strike as emblematic of the “criminal nature” of cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, accusing the two governments of working together to “kill people and torment lives.”
U.S. President Donald Trump criticized the “very bad” timing of the airstrike amid ongoing talks on ending the conflict, without referencing Russia’s alleged use of a North Korean missile.
“Vladimir, STOP! 5000 soldiers a week are dying. Lets get the Peace Deal DONE!” he wrote on social media, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Later that afternoon, Trump told reporters that Russia needs to return to peace talks and that he would change his approach after a deadline he has set, although he didn’t specify when this would be.
Zelensky stressed in his statement that Ukraine cannot face threats from Russia and North Korea alone, urging allies to impose stronger pressure on Moscow and to accelerate the delivery of air defense systems.
“There must be a full and unconditional halt to the strikes,” he said. “This war must be ended justly.”
In recent statements, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that both North Korean and Russian forces have launched KN-23 SRBMs, particularly from the Kursk and Bryansk regions near Ukraine’s borders. He added that DPRK troops continue to assist Russian forces by training them on the operation of these advanced weapon systems.
The DPRK has provided large quantities of ammunition and weapons in support of Russia’s invasion, and it has deployed thousands of troops to fight against Ukraine since last October.
Trump acknowledged North Korean participation in the war in February, noting that “a lot of [North] Koreans have been killed” in the conflict. The State Department also directly criticized Pyongyang for “perpetuating” the war in Ukraine through its involvement last month.
But experts previously told NK News that the DPRK’s role was unlikely to come up in the U.S.-led peace talks given that Pyongyang and Moscow continue to deny that North Korean troops are in Russia.
Edited by Bryan Betts
2. Bessent Sees US, Korea Trade ‘Understanding’ by Next Week
Some good news. I hope this stays on a positive track.
Bessent Sees US, Korea Trade ‘Understanding’ by Next Week
By Catherine Lucey and Hadriana Lowenkron
April 24, 2025 at 11:24 AM PDT
Updated on April 24, 2025 at 6:33 PM PDT
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-24/bessent-sees-us-south-korea-trade-understanding-by-next-week?utm
The US and South Korea could reach an “agreement of understanding” on trade as soon as next week, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Thursday, following talks between the two nations.
“We had a very successful bilateral meeting,” Bessent told reporters during an Oval Office meeting between President Donald Trump and the prime minister of Norway. “We may be moving faster than I thought, and we will be talking technical terms as early as next week as we reach an agreement on understanding as soon as next week.”
Bessent did not elaborate on what would be included in a so-called agreement of understanding with Seoul. Dozens of nations have appealed to the Trump administration for relief from higher tariffs that have been suspended 90 days to provide time for talks.
South Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok said the two sides are aiming for a deal by early July, before the reprieve ends. The meeting “has established the basic framework for further discussions by narrowing the scope of talks and forming a consensus on schedule,” Choi told reporters in Washington after talks with Bessent.
Trump is facing pressure to demonstrate progress on his trade agenda, with investors and business leaders expressing concern that the tumult unleashed by his April 2 tariff announcement could plunge the world economy into a recession.
US President Donald Trump, left, and Scott Bessent, US Treasury secretaryPhotographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg
Choi and Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun met with Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in Washington on Thursday. South Korea is among the first nations to sit down for face-to-face negotiations, following Japan’s meetings last week, and the talks will be closely followed by other countries seeking tariff relief.
Among the topics on the table were shipbuilding and energy cooperation as well as non-tariff measures and FX policy, Choi said. The South Korean Finance Ministry will soon have working-level talks with the Treasury Department to discuss currencies, he added.
South Korea, a key US ally, was slapped with a 25% across-the-board import tax that has been temporarily reduced to 10% for 90 days. As with other nations, South Korea also faces a 25% levy on shipments of cars, steel and aluminum.
It remains to be seen how far the interim government in Seoul can carry the negotiations when the country is preparing to elect a new leader on June 3. The main opposition party, whose candidate, Lee Jae-myung, is leading in polls, has voiced concerns that acting President Han Duck-soo is rushing to sign a deal.
Read more: Trump U-Turns on Powell, China Follow Dire Warnings on Economy
The high-stakes meetings come as markets have been rattled by Trump’s shifting rhetoric on tariffs and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. The US president has signaled interest in making deals with some key trading partners, but has not yet concluded any agreements.
Full trade agreements traditionally take years to conclude, and the White House is likely to reach deals that are far more limited in scope, or leave pivotal details still to be settled before the deadline for Trump’s higher tariffs to snap back into place.
What Bloomberg Economics Says...
“The South Korean delegation may have made a strong first impression, but this is just the opening move. The real test is whether today’s goodwill can survive the actual negotiations.”
by Adam Farrar, senior geoeconomics analyst
Click here to read more
Trump recently declared “big progress” with Japan, though Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has said his country won’t just keep conceding to US demands to reach a deal. Japan also intends to push back on US efforts to organize trading partners into a bloc against China, according to current and former Japanese officials.
Washington is also touting “significant progress” with India following talks between Vice President JD Vance and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The two sides finalized what it called a terms of reference for negotiation on a new trade pact, according to a White House statement during the vice president’s visit there.
Read more: Trump’s Trade War and the Economic Impact: Tariff Tracker
Trump earlier this month said he had a “great call” with South Korean acting President Han Duck-soo, which included discussions on tariffs, shipbuilding and military support.
“In any event, we have the confines and probability of a great DEAL for both countries. Their top TEAM is on a plane heading to the U.S., and things are looking good,” Trump posted April 8 on social media.
The government in Seoul has reviewed multiple packages to present to the Trump administration as it seeks to narrow its trade surplus with the US, which jumped about 25% in 2024 from a year ago to $55.7 billion.
Preliminary trade data from South Korea suggested US tariffs were already having an impact. Customs office information showed South Korea’s overall exports fell 5.2% from a year earlier in the first 20 days of this month.
— With assistance from Soo-Hyang Choi, Ben Baris, and Sam Kim (News)
(Updates with reference to upcoming South Korean election.)
3. North Korean Leadership Transitions: A Strategic Revolving Door
Excerpts:
Conclusion
Elite absences and reassignments, cabinet shuffles, and a renewed emphasis on discipline and anti-corruption all reflect Kim Jong Un’s efforts to adapt the regime’s decision-making structures to new challenges. These changes are driven by both internal imperatives, such as elite management and regime security, and external pressures, including evolving relations with Russia and the shifting international environment. As North Korea moves into 2025, the careful orchestration of personnel and policy underscores the regime’s enduring focus on stability, control, and strategic flexibility.
North Korean Leadership Transitions: A Strategic Revolving Door
https://www.38north.org/2025/04/north-korean-leadership-transitions-a-strategic-revolving-door/?utm
Tracking North Korean leadership changes is rarely straightforward; deriving meaning from them, even more so. Notwithstanding, leadership changes are important because they reflect Kim Jong Un’s policy priorities and possibly even regime stability. This article summarizes key observations and analysis made by Michael Madden, Nonresident Fellow with 38 North at the Stimson Center, on 38 North’s affiliate North Korean Leadership Watch (NKLW) blog, from January 2025 to date.[1]
North Korea is undergoing significant elite reshuffling, reflected in the absences from public view of key figures such as Ri Il Hwan, director of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), and Jo Yong Won, head of the WPK CC Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). Other notable changes include the appointment of Pak Thae Song, who is better-versed in external affairs than his predecessor Kim Tok Hun as cabinet premier, and the transition of former Minister and First Vice Minister of Defense Kim Jong Gwan as vice premier, a civilian post. Kim Jong Un’s strategy of rotating and disciplining top officials seems aimed at fighting corruption, reinforcing regime stability, adapting to external pressures, and maintaining Kim’s grip on power amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.
Notable Elite Absences and New Stars
The frequency of two high-level North Korean Party officials’ public appearances has dropped in recent months. Ri Il Hwan, the regime’s top propaganda official, has not been seen in public for more than 100 days. OGD Director Jo Yong Won has not been seen in public for over 50 days. These absences are unusual for officials of Ri’s and Jo’s rank and given how often they appeared in public in the past.
Ri Il Hwan’s lengthy absence suggests a disciplinary issue. If Ri had a medical issue and was in good standing with the Party, he would have at least attended the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session and/or the Secretariat meeting, both held in January. The length of his absence is currently outside the short-term course at the Higher Party School (six to eight weeks), making it probable that he has been sent away for more extensive revolutionary education.
During the first quarter of 2025, Jo Yong Won’s standing and profile in the regime has declined. Jo, like Ri Il Hwan, did not attend the SPA session in January. Jo’s unusual absence from public view might be ascribed to conducting off-the-record project inspections to ensure efficiency and progress from lower-level officials in the run-up to two major WPK upcoming anniversaries—the 80th founding anniversary of the Party in October and the Ninth Party Congress, presumably to be held in January 2026.
Just as Ri Il Hwan and Jo Yong Won faded from the public eye, Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong assumed greater public prominence, with Ri convening the Secretariat meeting in January and both Ri and Kim expanding their roles and importance among Kim Jong Un’s advisers. Ri Hi Yong was appointed as WPK Secretary for Cadres (personnel) Affairs and Central Inspection Commission (CIC) Chairman and Kim Jae Ryong as director of the WPK Discipline Inspection Department during a Party plenary meeting in December 2024.
It is possible that there is a division, even a rivalry, between Jo Yong Won against Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong. Neither Ri nor Kim lasted longer than two years working under or alongside Jo Yong Won in the OGD. Kim Jae Ryong was OGD director from August 2020 to June 2022, during which he overlapped with Jo Yong Won, who was working as WPK Secretary for Organization. Ri Hi Yong was a senior OGD deputy director from 2020 until 2024. After approximately 18 months with Jo as OGD director, Ri was removed from office and did not seem to hold an active position.
Both Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong currently hold positions in institutions intended to balance the OGD’s authority in the regime. With Ri and Kim leading those institutions, they seemed to be targeting administrative units and personnel directly under Jo’s OGD supervision.
Cabinet Reshuffles and Policy Priorities
North Korea conducted some notable shuffles in the Cabinet and ministries during the December 2024 Party plenary meeting. Pak Thae Song was appointed as DPRK cabinet premier. His appointment appears to be in part driven by the need for the cabinet premier to coordinate and manage North Korean cabinet ministries’ interactions with Russian counterparts. The DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership includes science and technology exchange with Russia. Pak has completed exchange and education agreements with foreign institutions and organizations in his prior capacity as WPK Secretary for Science and Education. The appointments of Kwon Song Hwan as minister of Natural Resources Development and Kim Yong Sik as Minister of Commerce were both likely connected to the treaty’s implementation.
The elevation of Kim Jong Gwan, former defense minister and first vice defense minister, to vice premier and alternate Political Bureau member, reflects a broader trend of senior military personnel migrating to civilian roles under Kim Jong Un’s reign. This migration serves both to reward loyal military figures and to tighten central control over key economic and infrastructure projects, including those with potential military applications.
Domestic and External Contexts
One persistent pattern in high-level North Korean personnel shuffles is Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on anti-corruption and discipline among elites. For example, it is likely that Ri Il Hwan was held responsible for the actions of his subordinates or social networks, even in the absence of direct involvement. This reflects a culture of collective responsibility and a willingness to use disciplinary measures both as punishment and as a tool for elite rotation.
The broader context suggests that high-level personnel shuffles are part of a deliberate strategy by Kim Jong Un to maintain elite cohesion and prevent the emergence of rival power centers. The ongoing transitions and the movement of military officials into civilian posts are intended to reinforce loyalty, ensure policy alignment, and adapt to changing external circumstances, including shifting relations with South Korea, the United States, and Russia.
It is also important to note that these personnel changes are taking place during a period of strategic uncertainty for North Korea. The external environment is in flux, with political instability in South Korea, a leadership transition in the United States, intensifying US-China strategic competition, and the future of the Russo-Ukraine war uncertain. As noted above, the DPRK-Russia partnership seems to be a key driver of some of the recent cabinet appointments, particularly in areas related to science, technology, and resource development.
Conclusion
Elite absences and reassignments, cabinet shuffles, and a renewed emphasis on discipline and anti-corruption all reflect Kim Jong Un’s efforts to adapt the regime’s decision-making structures to new challenges. These changes are driven by both internal imperatives, such as elite management and regime security, and external pressures, including evolving relations with Russia and the shifting international environment. As North Korea moves into 2025, the careful orchestration of personnel and policy underscores the regime’s enduring focus on stability, control, and strategic flexibility.
- [1]
-
These four articles are “Plenary Personnel,” January 4; “DID Cracks Down on Cadres,” February 10; “Ri Il Hwan, where you at?” February 12; and “Problem in the Control Tower,” April 15 (protected article).
4. North Korea lashes out at Air Force’s ‘Swan of Death’ bomber deployment in Japan
Because this scares Kim. he knows that he has no place to hide from this.
North Korea lashes out at Air Force’s ‘Swan of Death’ bomber deployment in Japan
Stars and Stripes · by Joseph Ditzler and Yoojin Lee · April 25, 2025
Senior Airman Christopher Collins marshals a B-1B Lancer at Misawa Air Base, Japan, April 18, 2025. (Emma Anderson/U.S. Air Force)
The official voice of North Korea’s authoritarian regime on Friday denounced the recent appearance of Air Force long-range bombers in Japan as a “vicious change” and a “threat to regional security.”
An unsigned commentary published by the Korean Central News Agency referred to the B-1B Lancer as the “notorious Swan of Death,” and Misawa Air Base, Japan, as its nest.
The Air Force announced April 17 that an undisclosed number of Lancers had arrived at Misawa as part of a rotational bomber task force mission. Air Force photographs posted online show at least two bombers had arrived in Japan.
The Air Force did not disclose how long the rotation, the first U.S. bomber deployment to Japan in recent memory, would last.
The Lancers, of the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, arrived to “train and operate” with U.S. allies and partners in the region, according to an Air Force news release Tuesday.
KCNA took issue with that claim, saying the Lancers’ presence increased the level of confrontation in the region.
“This is not a temporary deployment for joint exercise or to show force to neighbor countries, but a significant military move as it is a long-term deployment of the U.S. strategic asset in the center of the Asia-Pacific area,” the commentary said.
“Stationing the B-1B in Japan shows U.S.’ vicious change, since the launch base was usually in Guam using its armed force in the Asia-Pacific region,” it continued. “This a clear developmental threat to the regional security.”
Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific Ocean 1,891 miles south of Misawa, is a forward operating location for U.S. bombers such as the Lancer, B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress, although they are not permanently stationed there.
The Air Force since January 2018 has routinely flown its bombers around the world on task force missions from bases in the United States. The deployments have continued regularly since 2020.
Lancers have appeared over South Korea, mostly recently in an April 15 show of force by a pair of them escorted by South Korean F-35 and F-16 fighters and U.S. F-16s.
“The recent military move of the U.S. and [South Korea] is an open threat to the security of our state and a grave provocation that raises the military tension in the region to an extreme dangerous level,” an unidentified spokesperson for North Korea’s Defense Ministry said April 17 on KCNA.
The U.S. and South Korea often respond with airpower displays to North Korean acts such as ballistic missile tests. KCNA in turn describes the flyovers as hostile acts.
“For a long time, the U.S. has been crazy about pressuring regional countries and expanding military intervention, utilizing strategic bombers and other strategic assets in places like Japan and South Korea,” the news agency wrote Friday.
“This year alone, the U.S. launched B-1Bs three times over the Korean Peninsula and held joint aerial exercises, further escalating military confrontation into a more dangerous conflict situation,” the commentary said.
Joseph Ditzler
Joseph Ditzler
Joseph Ditzler is a Marine Corps veteran and the Pacific editor for Stars and Stripes. He’s a native of Pennsylvania and has written for newspapers and websites in Alaska, California, Florida, New Mexico, Oregon and Pennsylvania. He studied journalism at Penn State and international relations at the University of Oklahoma.
Yoojin Lee
Stars and Stripes · by Joseph Ditzler and Yoojin Lee · April 25, 2025
5. China, Japan, Korea sense Trump trade war weakness
Excerpts:
Amid historically free-falling markets and an Oval Office intervention by the CEOs of Walmart, Target and Home Depot, the US president is watering down a tariff policy, including a 145% levy on China, that’s already rocked the global economy.
It’s unclear whether the climbdown, where Trump said this week he would “substantially” pare back tariffs on China in a trade deal, is real or lasting. On Thursday, he blasted China anew on social media for canceling delivery of Boeing-made jets and its role in the continued flow of fentanyl into the US.
But as Trump flinches, it’s clear his inner circle is distressed by how catastrophically the tariff policy is going down with markets. Many are coming to the conclusion that the Trump White House’s standing will never be the same on Wall Street.
Asian leaders are right to smell blood in the water. In the short run, Japan and South Korea can take a beat as Trump World tries to rally fleeing global investors back around the dollar and US Treasuries.
China, Japan, Korea sense Trump trade war weakness - Asia Times
As ‘Tariff Man’ flinches on holding the trade war line, Asia’s biggest economies have incentive to hold out for better deals
asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · April 25, 2025
TOKYO – Asia is breathing somewhat easier as Donald Trump confronts the limits of his ability to self-immolate the US economy.
Amid historically free-falling markets and an Oval Office intervention by the CEOs of Walmart, Target and Home Depot, the US president is watering down a tariff policy, including a 145% levy on China, that’s already rocked the global economy.
It’s unclear whether the climbdown, where Trump said this week he would “substantially” pare back tariffs on China in a trade deal, is real or lasting. On Thursday, he blasted China anew on social media for canceling delivery of Boeing-made jets and its role in the continued flow of fentanyl into the US.
But as Trump flinches, it’s clear his inner circle is distressed by how catastrophically the tariff policy is going down with markets. Many are coming to the conclusion that the Trump White House’s standing will never be the same on Wall Street.
Asian leaders are right to smell blood in the water. In the short run, Japan and South Korea can take a beat as Trump World tries to rally fleeing global investors back around the dollar and US Treasuries.
For one thing, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo now understand just how badly Trump needs a win, any win, on the trade front. This gives two of North Asia’s biggest economies greater leverage in talks than they had just a week ago.
For another, Xi Jinping now knows that China’s decision to push back instead of bowing to Trump’s threats and demands is paying off spectacularly. So is President Xi’s free-trade charm offensive from East to West as Trump torches friend and foe alike with arbitrary tariffs and bullying rhetoric.
Asian leaders now have scope to take a breath and regroup as Trump’s tariffs — particularly his 145% tax on China — trigger what Wedbush Securities analyst Dan Ives calls an “Armageddon scenario” for the US.
Recent reports of dissension in Trump’s top ranks shed light on his apparent pivot on “Liberation Day” tariffs. They include clashes between anti-China trade advisor Peter Navarro and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent spilling out into the open on a near-daily basis.
Yet Trump “blinked” first in his trade war, says economist David Rosenberg, founder of Rosenberg Research. The same goes for Trump backing away from earlier threats to fire Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell for not lowering rates as recession risks flash red.
“The blinking that the president is busily doing on trade and Powell has unleashed a follow-through on the short-covering rally,” Rosenberg says.
Trump pivoting first contrasts markedly with what China is saying. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun puts it: “China’s attitude towards the tariff war launched by the US is quite clear: We don’t want to fight, but we are not afraid of it. If we fight, we will fight to the end; if we talk, the door is wide open.”
To be sure, Beijing is reportedly considering suspending its 125% tariff on some US imports to limit economic fallout. Bloomberg reported today (April 25) that Beijing may remove additional levies on US-made medical equipment and some industrial chemicals like ethane, as well as waive tariffs on plane leases.
But the last month has shown what it looks like when an unstoppable force like Trump meets an immovable object like Xi’s China. But Trump just demonstrated that his pain threshold for tariffs is Wall Street-dependent.
It was headlines about the many trillions of dollars in stock losses, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon being unhappy and Goldman Sachs talking recession that had the self-proclaimed “Tariff Man” changing his tune.
The only thing falling faster than the US dollar is Trump’s economic approval rating at home. A new Reuters/Ipsos poll puts it at 37% while roughly 75% of American adults worry recession is imminent.
Confidence is likely to fall even more precipitously as American households see their retirement account statements and feel tariffs boosting prices across the board. Market volatility also forced Trump to throttle back on plans to fire Powell, at least for now.
If you’re happy “just because Trump said he isn’t going to fire Powell in an era in which the independence of central banks is going to be called into question by the demands of realpolitik, or because he said something nice about China and tariffs for the nth time as the world starts to divide along geopolitical lines, well clearly you enjoy fairy tales,” says Michael Every, global strategist at Rabobank.
At a business forum this week, veteran investment strategist Jim Paulsen said that “almost every corporate CEO is revising down their outlook. The commentary warnings of the corporate sector have escalated.”
Some titans of finance think many peers are being too dramatic about what damage Trump 2.0 might do in the long run. As C S Venkatakrishnan, CEO of Barclays, tells Bloomberg: “It’s 100 years of dollar strength, so much so that important commodities — gold, oil — are denominated in dollars. I think undoing that will take a long, long time.”
Yet Wedbush’s Ives speaks for many when he says Trump’s tariffs, and the chaos surrounding their implementation, “will go down as the worst US policy mistake” since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which amplified the Great Depression.
China’s Commerce Ministry has been making a similar point, calling the US tariff moves “a mistake on top of a mistake.”
Then, after the US president vowed to ratchet up tariffs again this week, Beijing once again vowed to hold the line.
It has since clashed with Trump by insisting no trade talks are underway, which the US leader has insisted are happening behind the scenes without naming who was involved.
At a forum in Washington sponsored by Semafor this week, Citadel CEO and founder Ken Griffin warned that a Trump reversal might be too little, too late. Before the tariffs, “no brand compared” to US Treasurys, the dollar or the creditworthiness of the biggest economy. That’s now been “eroded” in short order.
“We put that brand at risk,” the billionaire hedge fund manager said. “It can be a lifetime to repair the damage that has been done.”
The financial dust cloud Trump leaves behind could play into Asia’s hands as trade negotiations are expected to heat up in coming weeks amid a 90-day pause on the imposition of his reciprocal tariffs on all global nations.
China now knows, for example, that the bond market can rattle Trump. The recent surge in yields clearly unnerved Trump’s inner circle.
And it put on display the extent to which the US is just as vulnerable as it’s perceived to be strong. Beijing holds some US$760 billion of US Treasuries.
Chinese state media regularly discusses the idea of selling, or scaling back purchases, as a retaliation tool some market watchers believe Beijing quietly did soon after Trump’s reciprocal tariff announcement.
It’s all making Trump desperate to change the narrative with a big trade deal win. The first opportunity on that front is Japan.
Of course, Team Trump is trying to put on a brave face. Asked on Wednesday whether Trump had unilaterally offered to de-escalate trade tensions with China, Treasury head Bessent claimed “not at all.”
“As I’ve said many times, I don’t think either side believes that the current tariff levels are sustainable, so I would not be surprised if they went down in a mutual way,” Bessent said.
One possible takeaway from Bessent’s comments is that they “underscored that the United States is not aiming to decouple from China,” says Thomas Lee, head of research at Fundstrat Global Advisors.
Lee points to Trump’s press secretary claiming there are “ongoing trade discussions with 34 countries and referencing President Trump’s optimistic outlook regarding a potential deal with China.”
Yet the lack of progress with Japan could be a warning sign for the White House.
Last week, Navarro tried to suggest a bilateral Japan deal was imminent. It was his Exhibit A for the argument that Trump’s “90 deals in 90 days” pledge remains operational.
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Yet Navarro was left holding only his ego when Tokyo reported that Economic Revitalization Minister Akazawa Ryosei was already back home with no deal in sight.
Seeing Trump caving this week, why wouldn’t Ishiba slow things down even further? This strategy worked well for former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2019. Back then, the late Abe signed a bilateral deal that Trump touted as “phenomenal.”
But, in reality, Japan gave up less on agriculture than it had as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multilateral free trade pact that Trump scrapped. Autos were excluded and everything from pharmaceuticals to financial services was left to a future date.
The end result was negligible in altering US-Japan trade dynamics and “was a poignant reminder of how much President Trump gave away when he turned his back on the TPP,” observed economist Matthew Goodman, who at the time was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
It’s also a timely reminder of how far Ishiba can get with some flattery and moving slowly. Presumably, Trump’s inner circle is aware that Japan outmaneuvered Trump 1.0, just as China is so far getting the better of Trump 2.0.
But Trump World also knows the illusion of pulling off the “art of the deal” with Japan could be packaged as a badly needed trade war win.
Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), after all, faces a tough national election in July. And with approval ratings around 26%, Ishiba can hardly appear to be getting fleeced by a Trump White House with no allies among major economies.
Any perception that Ishiba gave away too much to Trump could usher his LDP out of power a few months from now. Tokyo knows, too, that if they lather Trump with concessions, he’ll likely be back for more in short order.
South Korea’s negotiations could go a similar way. At the moment, Bessent is suggesting that US-Korea talks “may be moving faster than I thought, and we will be talking technical terms as early as next week.”
Perhaps. But just like China and Japan, South Korea has good reason to think its negotiating position is improving as Trump’s global standing and trade war credibility falls by the day.
Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
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asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · April 25, 2025
6. Why the US should modernize nuke storage in ROK if North Korea rejects talks
Can we make the assumption that something this relatively symbolic will have a deterrent effect on KJU? It is simply halting the "weapons buildup" now a measure of success?
I wonder how the anti-nuclear weapons protesters will react if these facilities are modernized. I am sure there will be continuous protests on a scale far greater than the THAAD protests. This will be a great target for subversive elements from China and north Korea to focus South Korean anti-American and anti-nuclear protests.
Why the US should modernize nuke storage in ROK if North Korea rejects talks
Bruce Bennett argues move would ramp up pressure on Kim Jong Un to halt weapons buildup amid growing risk of nuclear use
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/why-the-us-should-modernize-nuke-storage-in-rok-if-north-korea-rejects-talks/
Alannah Hill April 25, 2025
Kim Jong Un inspects nuclear warheads at the Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK. | Image: KCTV (March 28, 2023)
The U.S. should prepare to modernize its nuclear weapons storage facilities in South Korea as a signal of resolve and preparedness against North Korea’s evolving nuclear threat, according to Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.
In an interview with NK News, Bennett said Washington should consider publicly threatening to upgrade long-unused U.S. nuclear storage infrastructure on the Korean Peninsula if Pyongyang refuses to halt its weapons buildup or return to talks. Such a move, he suggested, could serve as a nonescalatory yet credible form of pressure on Kim Jong Un.
“The U.S. hasn’t stored nuclear weapons in South Korea since 1991,” the expert said. “But the facilities are still there. They haven’t been modernized. We’ve done that in Europe, but not here. Now’s the time.”
Bennett emphasized that this wouldn’t mean the immediate redeployment of nuclear weapons to the peninsula, but rather restoring the ability to do so rapidly should deterrence fail.
“It is saying we’re getting ready for possibly moving weapons in. And being able to do so in less than a day, if we ever had to.”
The expert argued that the likelihood of North Korean limited nuclear use is growing along with Kim Jong Un’s nuclear arsenal — a threat the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned of in an October 2024 report.
He also addressed potential backlash, acknowledging that even modest steps toward nuclear reintroduction could provoke political resistance in South Korea and China.
“I think we can turn to the Chinese and say this is your fault … You’re supposed to be a global power. You’re supposed to be a very powerful country. Why aren’t you controlling the growth of North Korean nuclear ovens? Because you know that this isn’t in your interest anymore than it is in ours. So you control them, and we won’t have to do this modernization.”
There has been growing talk in Seoul about the merits of going nuclear, with some suggesting that the U.S. could redeploy nuclear weapons to the peninsula as an alternative.
While the Biden administration pushed back against such proposals, it agreed to increase the visibility of strategic asset deployments to South Korea in an effort to reassure Seoul of the U.S. commitment to its defense.
Bennett floated an unconventional proposal to further strengthen deterrence: allow South Korea to fund the modernization of a limited number of aging U.S. nuclear bombs — such as the B61s — under a bilateral treaty limiting their potential use to the Korean Peninsula.
These weapons would remain stored in the U.S. but would be deployable at short notice, and he argued the arrangement could reassure Seoul without requiring full nuclear armament.
“South Korea would have a reservoir of nuclear weapons beyond the reach of North Korea, beyond the reach of North Korea to interdict in terms of production, and it would be a really great way to start with the appropriate kinds of treaty relationships.”
Bennett suggested the U.S. and South Korea are grappling with growing asymmetry in how they perceive the North Korean threat: While Washington increasingly views Pyongyang’s nuclear posture as a near-term danger, many in South Korea still struggle to accept the possibility of a limited nuclear strike.
“We need a new concept for if Kim does a limited nuclear attack, what do we do in response that one hurts him to the degree to which he hurt us, but two, is not so escalatory that we wind up with a general nuclear war.”
Amid rising regional tensions, Bennett also warned that North Korea appears to be learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine.
“I don’t think that the North Koreans think very much of the Russian forces tactically or operationally [but] you could learn from others’ mistakes perhaps.”
Ukraine and its allies say the DPRK has deployed thousands of troops to the war since last October, as well as large quantities of weapons and ammunition for Russia’s invasion. Pyongyang has reportedly earned an estimated $20 billion in economic benefits for this support.
Pyongyang’s deepening ties with Moscow suggest a shift away from traditional inter-Korean engagement in favor of a hardened, isolationist strategy, according to Bennett.
“I don’t think he’s [Kim Jong-un] is planning on an invasion … I think what Kim is thinking of is I want to seal my people in. I want to prevent outside access and then I want to be able to turn South Korea with a broken U.S.-ROK alliance and say, ‘Look, we’re militarily superior to you.’”
In that context, he argued, the U.S. and South Korea must get ahead of the threat.
“Why wait for them to come to the negotiating table? Why don’t we put out a proposal now? That tells Kim Jong-un, ‘We will do certain things if you close the uranium enrichment facility you showed last year.’”
Photos published in state media last October, as well as satellite imagery, suggest Kim visited a previously undeclared nuclear facility known as Kangson located west of the capital.
The photos appear to confirm the existence of a second uranium enrichment site beside one at the already disclosed Yongbyon nuclear complex, a revelation that fueled suspicions that North Korea can produce more fissile material than previously known.
Edited by Bryan Betts
7. How Lee Jae-myung’s adviser thinks Seoul can restart dialogue with North Korea
Laying the groundwork to try to tamp down fears of a Lee Jae Myung presidency?
Can't we learn the lesson from 2018 and the unilateral cancellation of training and the subsequent "toning down," postponing, and cancelling readiness training? We weakened readiness and thus deterrence and what did we get in return from Kim Jong Un? Only continued a hostile policy and actions.
Excerpts:
One practical formula might involve continuing joint drills but limiting their scale and refraining from deploying strategic assets unless absolutely necessary. If that can be coordinated with the U.S., and if a broader diplomatic context allows for engagement with North Korea, then reciprocal measures can be discussed. For example, North Korea could commit to a moratorium on nuclear tests or limit missile launches — such as refraining from launching projectiles with a range exceeding 100 km. These steps, while modest, could serve as early confidence-building measures.
… The Northern Limit Line remains a flashpoint for both Koreas. With North Korea’s recent constitutional changes suggest a new two-state framework and possible shifts in its claimed maritime boundaries, it’s unclear whether its position aligns with the traditional NLL or represents an entirely new demarcation. Given this uncertainty, South Korea must prepare for worst-case scenarios while also keeping space open for deescalation.
… The goal should be to stabilize deterrence rather than provoke confrontation. That means calibrating military exercises to reduce unnecessary friction, showing restraint in deploying strategic assets and encouraging reciprocal steps from the North through dialogue. At the same time, it’s essential to have clear communication channels between militaries to prevent miscalculations, and to stay prepared while exploring longer-term options like buffer zones.
This approach doesn’t weaken deterrence. It strengthens it by making it more stable and sustainable, and by keeping open the possibility of eventual peace.
How Lee Jae-myung’s adviser thinks Seoul can restart dialogue with North Korea
In interview, Yang Moo-jin suggests trilateral ties with US and Japan can promote peace, proposes toning down drills
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/how-lee-jae-myungs-adviser-thinks-seoul-can-restart-dialogue-with-north-korea/
Joon Ha Park April 25, 2025
Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, speaks to NK News at his office in Seoul’s Samcheong-dong | Image: NK News (April 17, 2025)
South Korea’s upcoming presidential election in June could bring major changes to ROK policy toward North Korea, with former opposition leader Lee Jae-myung the early favorite as parties finalize their candidates.
But while Lee once made inter-Korean peace a pillar of his political identity, his pivot toward the center has raised questions about how he will approach a dramatically reshaped security landscape — marked by Pyongyang’s increasingly hostile stance toward Seoul and deepening military ties with Moscow.
One of the voices who could shape Lee’s DPRK policy positions is Yang Moo-jin, president of the Seoul-based University of North Korean Studies and an adviser to the Democratic Party on inter-Korean issues.
Yang has served in roles in the unification ministry, Presidential Committee for Policy Planning and National Security Office, notably visiting Pyongyang as a member of the South Korean delegation to the historic 2000 inter-Korean summit. More recently, he contributed to a Democratic Party task force on inter-Korean crisis response and frequently advised Lee Jae-myung on DPRK policy during his tenure as party leader from 2022 to 2025.
He was also considered a top contender for unification minister under the progressive Moon Jae-in administration, advising Moon on inter-Korean policy during his presidential campaign, and he could be a candidate for the post again if Lee wins the upcoming election.
Yang sat down with NK News to discuss North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s abandonment of unification and the challenges facing Seoul in an era of heightened strategic competition.
He called for anchoring Seoul’s strategy in “pragmatic diplomacy” and moving away from zero-sum confrontation, suggesting that trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan could even promote the goal of restarting dialogue with North Korea.
He also suggested that Seoul and Washington should tone down their joint military drills as part of a confidence-building measure aimed at Pyongyang, arguing that the allies can strengthen deterrence without provoking confrontation.
The following interview has been edited for readability, clarity and style.
NK News: North Korea has constitutionally redefined itself as separate from South Korea. What should guide Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang now that it has abandoned the formerly shared goal of unification?
Yang Moo-jin: North Korea’s shift to a hostile two-state model marks a formal rejection of the traditional narrative of national unity. It no longer uses terms like “nation” or “unification,” instead emphasizing permanent separation. South Korea has never faced this kind of posture before, but an uncharted path doesn’t mean it’s a dead end.
A helpful precedent is East and West Germany in the 1970s. After the 1972 Basic Treaty, East Germany pushed a “two nations, two states” framework, even amending its constitution and party doctrine. Though it stopped short of rejecting shared ethnicity, the message was clear: East and West were separate. Yet West Germany maintained its position, acknowledging two states for practical purposes while continuing to treat inter-German ties as a “special relationship” within one nation.
South Korea should consider a similar approach. Even if North Korea insists on a hostile two-state model, Seoul can uphold unification as a long-term goal and frame inter-Korean relations as unique. This remains consistent with the ROK constitution and reflects a pragmatic, principled stance.
Implementing this won’t be easy. In situations where two sides adopt opposing frameworks, progress often relies on tit-for-tat dynamics or neutral mediation. If direct talks become impossible under current conditions, outside actors may be needed — trusted intermediaries like the U.N., or influential states such as the U.S., China or even Russia.
NK News: From your perspective, how did the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s North Korea policy influence inter-Korean cooperation and military tensions?
Yang: One of the Yoon administration’s key missteps, in my view, was the effective nullification of the Sept. 19 military agreement.
It reflected a broader pattern, where progressive South Korean governments tend to launch or restore inter-Korean agreements, while conservative ones often roll them back. We’ve seen it before: Kim Dae-jung opened Mt. Kumgang tourism, which Lee Myung-bak later suspended following an incident involving a South Korean tourist. Park Geun-hye shut down Kaesong after a North Korean nuclear test. Under Yoon, the military pact was undone.
To North Korea, this inconsistency breeds confusion and distrust. With South Korean presidents limited to five-year terms and frequent leadership changes in the U.S., Pyongyang sees agreements with these parties as temporary and unreliable.
Moon Jae-in tried to institutionalize agreements like the Panmunjom and Pyongyang Declarations through legislative ratification at the National Assembly, but those efforts fell short. Going forward, legal ratification is essential if agreements are to survive political shifts.
Any future administration, regardless of ideology, will eventually need to reengage with North Korea. High-level leadership is key — in both Koreas — since working-level talks often stall without top-down support. In North Korea, officials risk punishment for missteps, making lower-level negotiations particularly fragile.
If a new administration takes office in June, it will likely focus first on domestic priorities like economic recovery. An inter-Korean summit may not happen immediately, but the bare minimum should be restoring communication lines. Without that, no meaningful dialogue is possible. Reopening those channels could lay the groundwork for deeper engagement, and if a U.S.-North Korea summit takes place in early 2026, a corresponding inter-Korean summit is certainly plausible.
Former ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol delivers a speech at the 75th Armed Forces day on Oct. 1, 2023. | Image: ROK Presidential Office
NK News: The Russia-DPRK military alliance has evolved beyond conventional weapons transfers to include troop deployments. How should Seoul respond to this shift?
Yang: To properly assess the current landscape, we need to consider both immediate and broader geopolitical factors. The North Korea-Russia alignment has accelerated due to the Ukraine war, but the deeper driver is the emergence of a new Cold War-like structure: the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc versus the North Korea-China-Russia bloc.
North Korea and Russia have skillfully exploited this divide. From North Korea’s perspective, one key objective is to neutralize the impact of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions … In the current geopolitical alignment, both China and Russia are permanent UNSC members, giving North Korea an opening.
South Korea’s long-term strategy should rest on three core principles. First and foremost is the ROK Constitution’s commitment to peace. Second, the Korean people’s desire for reconciliation. Third, the economic reality. As a trade-dependent country lacking natural resources, South Korea’s prosperity depends on regional stability. Tensions hurt investor confidence and market performance as we often see the markets fluctuate with every spike in inter-Korean tensions.
NK News: The Democratic Party’s presidential frontrunner Lee Jae-myung supports strengthening trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, while also emphasizing the importance of securing “strategic autonomy” in policy toward North Korea. As the Trump administration shows interest in direct talks with Pyongyang, how might the next South Korean administration balance these priorities?
Yang: In my view, trilateral cooperation remains vital to regional security … While such cooperation can prompt caution or pushback from Beijing and Moscow, it can also motivate them to engage South Korea to actively mitigate and manage tensions.
That’s why it’s important not to frame these relationships in binary or adversarial terms. Rather, they should be viewed through the lens of national interest. While I can’t speak for Lee Jae-myung directly, I would assume that his view does not align with the notion that strengthening U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation must necessarily lead to a hardened North Korea-China-Russia axis. Instead, he likely sees it as a potential vehicle for promoting denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
There is historical precedent for this approach. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) helped align U.S., ROK and Japanese policy toward North Korea, leading to the Perry Process and the 2000 inter-Korean summit. The purpose of TCOG was to manage North Korea policy in a coordinated fashion and guide Pyongyang toward a “soft landing.”
If Seoul simply continues the Yoon government’s pressure-heavy, values-based approach, it will deepen bloc confrontation, raise tensions and harm South Korea’s economy.
… Lee’s emphasis on “pragmatic diplomacy” would maintain the U.S.-ROK alliance but also prioritize balanced ties with China and Russia. Trilateral cooperation would still be central, but its aim would shift. Instead of using it as a tool for pressuring North Korea or containing China, it would be geared toward reducing tensions, promoting peace and guiding North Korea toward gradual normalization.
NK News: What strategic options remain for South Korea to reestablish its relevance in peninsula affairs when Pyongyang seems determined to bypass inter-Korean channels?
Yang: There have been moments where this sidelining seemed to take shape. During his first term, President Donald Trump held direct summits with Kim Jong Un and began working-level negotiations, at times appearing to bypass then-President Moon Jae-in. Kim Jong Un mirrored this approach. Yet I believe such a model is unsustainable.
North Korea may initially continue a hostile two-state strategy, seeking direct engagement with the U.S. while isolating the South. Trump, for his part, may believe he doesn’t need Seoul’s mediation. But such a narrow, bilateral framework has clear limits. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot proceed without South Korea. The transition to a peace regime requires Seoul’s participation. And if Pyongyang seeks any form of economic reform or opening, it will ultimately need South Korea’s cooperation and support.
… Therefore, while Pyongyang may initially attempt to marginalize Seoul, sustained diplomatic progress is impossible without South Korean involvement. This is not just wishful thinking — it is a geopolitical and economic reality.
That’s why the next South Korean administration must proactively assert its role, not reactively wait for an invitation. It must develop its own strategic initiative, and advance it within the framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance, reaffirming itself as a central actor in the future of the Korean Peninsula.
Yang Moo-jin (far right) sits next to then-Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung during a party task force on inter-Korean crisis response in June 2024. | Image: Democratic Party lawmaker Jin Sung-joon’s Facebook
NK News: Institutional mechanisms like the North Korean Human Rights Foundation remain paralyzed due to a lack of bipartisan consensus on DPRK human rights. What specific policy changes could break this impasse while advancing Seoul’s human rights objectives?
Yang: The core problem lies in the lack of a shared understanding of what “human rights” means. North Korea regards criticism of its system or leadership as an intolerable affront to its dignity and sovereignty. Meanwhile, South Korea frames human rights as a universal value to which no country should be immune — what varies, in Seoul’s view, is not the principle but the pace and method of engagement.
There’s also debate within South Korea over what to prioritize. Should it be civil liberties like freedom from detention, or basic needs like food and health care?
… If a new South Korean administration emphasizes rights, it must first build inter-Korean consensus. Starting with subsistence issues like food security — where cooperation is more feasible — can lay groundwork for later tackling political issues like prison camps.
That said, government-led talks on human rights are tricky. Direct state-to-state discussions on sensitive issues like human rights can be politically explosive. That’s why civil society, NGOs and religious groups should lead, collecting data and advocating independently. The government can quietly support from behind the scenes … A gradual, trust-building approach — starting with basic rights and expanding from there — is the most realistic path forward.
NK News: What humanitarian initiatives are possible to help North Koreans that Pyongyang won’t reject as political maneuvering?
Yang: While humanitarian issues are non-political, in practice they’re deeply entangled with politics. During my time as secretary to the unification minister around the 2000 inter-Korean summit, I saw firsthand how efforts by religious groups, civil society and international agencies often ran into complications.
One major issue was monitoring. Early on, North Korean authorities and international organizations clashed over oversight mechanisms. Later, administrative costs became contentious: North Korea pushed back on the overhead charged by international agencies.
Even when cooperation was agreed upon, approvals were needed from outside actors like the U.S. or the U.N. Command. Deliveries of items like medical supplies or farm equipment across the Military Demarcation Line were often delayed or blocked due to these overlapping jurisdictions.
North Korea also rejects the framing of “humanitarian aid,” insisting instead on “cooperation.” For example, during the progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, food and fertilizer were structured as long-term loans to preserve North Korea’s dignity. No one expected repayment, but later conservative administrations demanded it anyway — more as a political message than a practical policy.
That’s why future humanitarian initiatives need a different approach. Any cooperation should involve close coordination with civil society, religious groups and international agencies from the start.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and top military officials arrive at tank drills on March 13, 2024. | Image: Rodong Sinmun
NK News: How can South Korea manage tensions at the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and Northern Limit Line (NLL) without triggering the escalatory dynamics that characterized parts of the Yoon administration’s approach?
Yang: What’s needed is a tension-reduction framework — one that maintains deterrence, but avoids provocation. Deterrence shouldn’t rely on tit-for-tat responses, which risk escalation. Instead, it needs to be paired with dialogue and cooperation. These approaches might seem at odds, but they can work in tandem.
As long as U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea, military exercises are a given. No military can maintain readiness without training. Still, the scale and nature of these exercises matter. Large drills — especially those simulating regime change scenarios — have repeatedly heightened tensions with the North. While it’s unreasonable to expect a sovereign country to halt its military training, it’s also important to acknowledge the signaling such exercises send.
One practical formula might involve continuing joint drills but limiting their scale and refraining from deploying strategic assets unless absolutely necessary. If that can be coordinated with the U.S., and if a broader diplomatic context allows for engagement with North Korea, then reciprocal measures can be discussed. For example, North Korea could commit to a moratorium on nuclear tests or limit missile launches — such as refraining from launching projectiles with a range exceeding 100 km. These steps, while modest, could serve as early confidence-building measures.
… The Northern Limit Line remains a flashpoint for both Koreas. With North Korea’s recent constitutional changes suggest a new two-state framework and possible shifts in its claimed maritime boundaries, it’s unclear whether its position aligns with the traditional NLL or represents an entirely new demarcation. Given this uncertainty, South Korea must prepare for worst-case scenarios while also keeping space open for deescalation.
… The goal should be to stabilize deterrence rather than provoke confrontation. That means calibrating military exercises to reduce unnecessary friction, showing restraint in deploying strategic assets and encouraging reciprocal steps from the North through dialogue. At the same time, it’s essential to have clear communication channels between militaries to prevent miscalculations, and to stay prepared while exploring longer-term options like buffer zones.
This approach doesn’t weaken deterrence. It strengthens it by making it more stable and sustainable, and by keeping open the possibility of eventual peace.
Edited by Bryan Betts
8. S. Korea, U.S. agree to seek 'July package' deal on tariff, other issues
(6th LD) S. Korea, U.S. agree to seek 'July package' deal on tariff, other issues | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more remarks, info in paras 7-8, 20)
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Han-joo
WASHINGTON/SEOUL, April 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States concurred Thursday on joint efforts to craft a "package" agreement on new U.S. tariffs, and economic and industrial cooperation issues by early July, Seoul's finance minister said, as the allies held high-level trade talks in Washington.
Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok told reporters that the two sides agreed to pursue the deal by July 8 -- when U.S. President Donald Trump's 90-day pause on "reciprocal" tariffs ends -- through talks focusing on four categories -- tariff- and non-tariff measures; economic security; investment cooperation; and currency policies.
Toward that end, Seoul's industry ministry and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) plan to start working-level talks next week, while USTR Jamieson Greer is set to visit South Korea for high-level talks on the margins of the ministerial Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation talks slated to kick off on May 15.
These broad agreements came as Choi and Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun met U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Greer for the "two-plus-two" trade consultations that took place at the Treasury Department for around 85 minutes.
"Our side assesses that the two sides have come to share an understanding that they will craft a 'July package' aimed at removing (U.S.) tariffs (on South Korea) by July 8 when the pause on reciprocal tariffs ends," Choi told Korean reporters at the South Korean Embassy.
This week's talks set a broad framework on how future bilateral talks on tariffs and other issues should proceed -- a departure from earlier discussions that were carried out in a somewhat disorganized manner, according to Seoul officials.
"Our assessment is that through the two-plus-two meeting today, which is a starting point for consultations, we established a basic framework by narrowing the scope of subjects for talks and reaching an understanding vis-a-vis the consultation schedule," Choi said.
"It is meaningful that the two countries were able to share the view toward conducting calm, orderly consultations without haste."
Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok (L) and Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun attend a press conference at the South Korean Embassy in Washington on April 24, 2025. (Yonhap)
The talks came after the Trump administration started imposing country-specific reciprocal tariffs, including 25 percent duties on South Korea, on April 9, only to pause them shortly afterward. Its 25 duties on automobiles went into effect on April 3 with the same-rate levies on some auto parts set to come no later than May 3.
The South Korean delegation requested exemptions of both reciprocal and sectoral tariffs that affect Asia's fourth-largest economy.
"We explained (South Korea's) concerns that the imposition of reciprocal and sectoral tariffs could negatively affect bilateral economic cooperation, and we conveyed our position that exemptions and exceptions from tariffs on Korea are needed," Choi said.
He added that the Korean delegation focused on the negative impact of the tariffs on automobiles during the talks, as the South Korean automotive industry is expected to be hit hard by the new auto tariffs.
On the currency policy front, the two sides agreed to task Seoul's finance ministry and the U.S. Treasury Department to conduct related consultations.
Choi pointed out that the South Korean delegation called for the U.S.' understanding on the need to consider various factors during the future talks, including South Korea's political schedule, domestic trade-related laws and the need to cooperate with its legislature on trade issues.
The request came amid expectations that an envisioned deal between the two countries might come after South Korea holds a presidential election on June 3. The election was set up following the recent ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his short-lived martial law imposition in December.
Earlier in the day, Bessent described trade talks with South Korea as "very successful."
"We had a very successful bilateral meeting with the Republic of Korea today. We may be moving faster than I thought," Bessent said during a press availability at the White House, referring to South Korea by its official name.
"We will be talking (about) technical terms as early as next week as we reach that agreement on understanding as soon as next week. So the South Koreans came early. They came with their A game, and we will see if they follow through on that," he added.
Regarding what Bessent called "A game," Ahn said that South Korea outlined a detailed vision for bilateral collaboration in the shipbuilding industry, including the U.S.' capacity building, South Korea's investment opportunities in the industry and technological cooperation.
Seoul prepared the presentation on the vision as the Trump administration has been striving to rebuild America's shipbuilding industry, with China known to have over 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the U.S.
During this week's talks, the two sides did not discuss defense cost-sharing issues although U.S. President Donald Trump has cast his negotiation approach as "one-stop shopping" -- a term that raised the prospects of the tariff meeting going beyond just trade issues.
South Korea's Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok (2nd from L), Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun (L), U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent (2nd from R) and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer pose for a photo prior to their trade talks in Washington on April 24, 2025, in this photo provided by Seoul's industry ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
9 S. Korea, U.S. hold tabletop exercise on integrating nuclear, conventional capabilities
.
S. Korea, U.S. hold tabletop exercise on integrating nuclear, conventional capabilities | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 25, 2025
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, April 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States on Friday concluded a tabletop military exercise aimed at better responding to North Korea's nuclear threats by integrating Seoul's conventional and Washington's nuclear capabilities, the South's military said.
Led by the South Korean military's Strategic Command and held in Seoul, the "Iron Mace" exercise wrapped up earlier in the day after a five-day run, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
It marked the second round of the tabletop exercise after it was first held in August last year.
Participants discussed ways to strengthen extended deterrence, such as joint planning procedures for South Korean conventional capabilities to support U.S. strategic operations in a contingency, the JCS said.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to defending an ally with the full-range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. South Korea has relied on the U.S. security commitment as it does not have nuclear weapons.
The two sides plan to hold another session of the Iron Mace exercise in the second half of the year, according to the JCS.
The latest exercise was conducted under the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) guidelines, a joint document signed by the allies last year.
South Korea and the U.S. launched the NCG following the April 2023 summit between former President Yoon Suk Yeol and former U.S. President Joe Biden to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment.
Prior to the exercise, participants also took part in the allies' first-ever "nuclear weapon effects" training session between April 15-16, aimed at enhancing capabilities to operate effectively in a nuclear environment.
This file photo shows Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Cho Chang-rae (R) and Vipin Narang, then acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, signing the two countries' nuclear deterrence guidelines in Washington on July 11, 2024, in this photo released by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 25, 2025
10. U.S. Air Force to form 2nd 'Super Squadron' at Osan with F-16 relocation
U.S. Air Force to form 2nd 'Super Squadron' at Osan with F-16 relocation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 25, 2025
SEOUL, April 25 (Yonhap) -- The 7th Air Force will temporarily assign 31 additional F-16 fighter jets to Osan Air Base starting October as part of its "Super Squadron" formation test aimed at enhancing combat effectiveness, the U.S. Air Force unit stationed in South Korea said Friday.
Under the yearlong plan, the 7th Air Force will transfer the assigned F-16 fighters as well as about 1,000 airmen to the air base in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, from Kunsan Air Base, the unit said in a release.
"The test examines 7th Air Force's ability to increase combat force generation and maximize capability by consolidating aircraft and personnel in a large Super Squadron," it said.
The move is expected to bring the number of F-16s at Osan Air Base to 62, following the first stage of the Super Squadron test, in which nine F-16s at Kunsan Air Base were relocated to Osan last year to form the first Super Squadron.
"The past months of data reveal that we're on the right track and the consolidated, larger unit has shown some increases in readiness and combat capability, while also exposing some challenges," Lt. Gen. David Iverson, 7th Air Force commander, was quoted as saying.
"With this success we're now expanding the scope ... to further determine if the super squadron construct is the right path for future airpower generation here in Korea," Iverson said.
The 7th Air Force said it remains committed to ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, stressing the test has "no impact" on its airpower ability to deter threats.
Two U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons, assigned to the 36th Fighter Squadron and participating in 7th Air Force's Super Squadron test, park next to each other on the flight line at Osan Air Base, in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on March 19, 2025, in this photo provided by the 7th Air Force. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 25, 2025
11. S. Korea to 'prudently' decide whether to join Alaska LNG project after field inspection: minister
I would think that in addition to the financial investment in this project there would also have to be a military commitment to contribute to the defense of the pipeline.
Excerpts:
Bessent earlier said South Korea brought its "A game" to the trade talks, noting the two sides may move faster than expected in their trade negotiations.
In the "2+2" meeting, the two countries agreed to work to craft a "package" deal by July 8, when U.S. President Donald Trump's 90-day pause on "reciprocal" tariffs will end, through talks that will focus on four categories -- tariff- and non-tariff measures, economic security, investment cooperation and currency policies, according to the Seoul government. South Korea was slapped with 25 percent reciprocal duties.
S. Korea to 'prudently' decide whether to join Alaska LNG project after field inspection: minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 25, 2025
By Kim Na-young
SEOUL, April 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will "prudently" decide whether to join the Alaska liquefied natural gas (LNG) project after conducting an on-site field inspection of the project, Seoul's industry minister said Friday.
Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said the government will approach the matter "prudently" as it is tied to the country's energy security.
He made the remark in a press briefing held after "2+2" trade consultations between South Korea and the United States in Washington on Thursday (U.S. time) on tariff and other economic issues, including industrial cooperation.
"We first have to conduct an on-site inspection and make detailed assessment of the plan regarding the Alaska issue," he told reporters, referring to the project aimed at building a 1,287-kilometer pipeline in Alaska and producing 20 million tons of natural gas annually, exporting them primarily to Asia.
The Alaska LNG project was considered one of prominent ways for South Korea to reduce its trade surplus with the U.S.
An official from Seoul's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said the country plans to soon dispatch a field inspection team to Alaska to assess the economic feasibility of the project.
South Korea and the U.S. also discussed the possible creation of a consultative body for the project, comprising major gas purchasers in Asia, including Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam, according to Ahn.
South Korean Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun (R) shakes hands with U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer at the USTR office in Washington on April 24, 2025 (U.S. time), in this photo provided by Ahn's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The "2+2 trade consultations" brought together Ahn and Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, along with their U.S. counterparts -- U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
Seoul said it has proposed to enhance bilateral cooperation in energy as part of efforts to address the U.S.' concerns over its trade deficit with South Korea, while also offering to help rebuild the U.S.' shipbuilding industry in their first high-level trade consultations aimed at reducing, if not removing, U.S. tariffs on South Korean products.
"I think we made a very good start," Ahn said, highlighting Bessent's earlier comments that the Washington meeting was "very successful."
Bessent earlier said South Korea brought its "A game" to the trade talks, noting the two sides may move faster than expected in their trade negotiations.
In the "2+2" meeting, the two countries agreed to work to craft a "package" deal by July 8, when U.S. President Donald Trump's 90-day pause on "reciprocal" tariffs will end, through talks that will focus on four categories -- tariff- and non-tariff measures, economic security, investment cooperation and currency policies, according to the Seoul government. South Korea was slapped with 25 percent reciprocal duties.
Toward that end, Seoul's industry ministry and the office of USTR plan to start working-level talks next week.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 25, 2025
12. Ministry of Unification: “North Korea is sensitive to US strategic assets… a far-fetched claim that is counterproductive”
Sensitive. Very sensitive. (meaning afraid).
A lot of information in this article.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
Ministry of Unification: “North Korea is sensitive to US strategic assets… a far-fetched claim that is counterproductive”
Seoul-Mokyongjae moky@rfa.org
2025.04.25
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/25/north-korea-asset-b-1b/
Anchor: South Korea's Unification Ministry has downplayed North Korea's criticism of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets as a far-fetched claim. It has also said that no unusual activity has been detected in relation to the founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. Reporter Mok Yong-jae reports from Seoul.
North Korea's state-run media, in a commentary on the 25th, mentioned the forward deployment of U.S. B-1B strategic bombers to Japan, claiming that "this is a development that is extremely harmful to regional security, as it shows that the U.S. military tone of using force is becoming more and more vicious."
He said, “The US’s maneuver to expand military threats to the Asia-Pacific region and destroy peace and stability will be met with a due counterattack from the local people.”
Recently, North Korea's state-run media has been criticizing joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets.
In response, the Ministry of Unification of South Korea assessed in a press briefing on the 25th that North Korea has been reacting sensitively to the recent joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, and has been repeating unreasonable claims.
These are the words of Kim In-ae, deputy spokesperson for the South Korean Ministry of Unification.
[Kim In-ae, Deputy Spokesperson for the Ministry of Unification] Recently, North Korea has been reacting sensitively to the ROK-US joint military exercises and the deployment of US strategic assets in various names and methods, and has been repeating unreasonable claims. I will not respond to or evaluate each and every one of North Korea’s cliche-like claims.
“The Irregular Anniversary of the Founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army... Events Held at the Same Level as Previous Years”
The Ministry of Unification stated that no unusual movements have been detected in relation to the founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, an anti-Japanese guerrilla group.
Previously, North Korea held a large-scale military parade late at night in April 2022 to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, an anti-Japanese guerrilla force, using various types of missiles, including tactical guided missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
At the time, General Secretary Kim Jong-un declared his intention to use nuclear weapons not only for the purpose of preventing war, but also when there is an attempt to infringe on the “fundamental interests of the country.”
It appears that large-scale events such as a military parade will not be held for this 93rd anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army.
According to the Ministry of Unification, North Korea held events similar to those of previous years to mark the 93rd anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, including a commemorative editorial, a meeting of civic groups, and a tour of revolutionary battle sites.
Deputy Spokesperson Kim In-ae evaluated, “During the 90th anniversary of the founding, a large-scale military parade was held, but this year, the 93rd anniversary of the founding, it is an irregular anniversary, so no large-scale event was held.”
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Meanwhile, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that South Korea and the United States conducted the 'Iron Mace 25-1', a nuclear-conventional integrated training exercise (CNI TTX), from the 21st to the 25th.
This exercise was conducted in line with the joint guidelines of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).
Participants discussed ways to strengthen extended deterrence, including joint planning procedures for supporting ROK conventional forces against U.S. nuclear operations in the event of a contingency.
Soldiers of the Tank Battalion TF of the Capital Mechanized Infantry Division of the Army disembark from armored vehicles and occupy the target area.
Soldiers of the Tank Battalion TF of the Capital Mechanized Infantry Division of the Army disembark from an armored vehicle and occupy the target (provided by the ROK Army)
South Korea and the United States plan to continue the 'Iron Mace' exercise in the second half of this year.
It has also been reported that South Korea and the US are planning to hold the 26th Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) meeting on the 1st and 2nd of next month.
According to South Korea's Yonhap News on the 25th, South Korea and the U.S. will discuss a wide range of pending issues in the South Korea-U.S. alliance through this meeting, including cooperation in suppressing and responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, reaffirming the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea, and strengthening the combined defense posture.
KIDD is a high-level meeting that began in 2011 and has been held once or twice a year, alternately by South Korea and the United States. This meeting is the first since the inauguration of the second Trump administration.
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense is also expected to announce specific news related to the holding of the ROK-US Integrated Defense Consultative Meeting next week.
This is Mok Yong-jae from RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
13. North Korean soldiers: Kim Jong-un praise lectures were ‘absurd’
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
North Korean soldiers: Kim Jong-un praise lectures were ‘absurd’
Seoul-Moon Seong-hui xallsl@rfa.org
2025.04.25
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/25/north-korea-lecture-army-praise/
Anchor: North Korean military authorities have been broadcasting recorded lectures praising Kim Jong-un to soldiers on the occasion of Chairman Kim Il-sung's birthday (April 15), but some soldiers reportedly responded that the content was ambiguous and unbelievable. Reporter Moon Seong-hui has the inside story from North Korea.
It has been reported that the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army produced a recorded lecture praising Kim Jong-un and distributed it to the Army, Navy, and Air Force units ahead of Chairman Kim Il-sung's birthday. Multiple sources in Yanggang Province said that such lectures are held every year as Chairman Kim Il-sung's birthday approaches.
A military source in Yanggang Province (requesting anonymity for safety reasons) reported on the 19th, “From the 8th to the 12th, when April 15th was just around the corner, recorded lectures were given by each unit of the People’s Army,” and “the title of the lectures was ‘Great Fatherland That Enshrines the Sun of Juche’s Songun Policy.’”
“This lecture, produced by the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, was 1 hour and 40 minutes long,” the source explained, adding, “Each company in the Korean People’s Army even held a study and appreciation meeting regarding the lecture content.”
The source added, “The theme of the lecture was ‘Because there is Kim Jong-un, there is the heroic Korean People’s Army, and there is our country, the greatest in the world,’” and “the plot was divided into four parts: ‘building a military power,’ ‘love for humanity,’ ‘incarnation of justice,’ and ‘a father the world looks up to. ’”
“The lecture was recorded with very magnificent music and gorgeous voices, but the content was very vague,” the source said. “For example, there was a part where Kim Jong-un visited a military unit’s sickroom, felt heartbroken after seeing the blankets of the soldiers, and immediately provided new blankets for them, but the exact name of the unit or the specific number of blankets was not provided.”
The source explained, “In particular, the content titled ‘Incarnation of Justice’ and ‘Father Whom the World Looks Up to’ consists of stories about how the world is praising Kim Jong-un’s strategy and guts in boldly crushing the pressure and isolationist schemes of imperialists,” adding, “Since it is impossible to confirm whether the content is true at all, it felt a bit absurd rather than moving.”
Why North Korea Bans Phones at Resident Lectures
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Chairman Kim Jong-un attending a banquet commemorating the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a banquet to mark the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, February 2024. (AP)
In relation to this, another military source in Yanggang Province (requesting anonymity due to personal safety) also said on the 22nd, “I listened to a recorded lecture organized by the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army ahead of April 15,” and “There was a similar lecture ahead of February 8, the founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, and there will be more lectures ahead of July 27 (Victory Day) and the party’s founding anniversary (October 10).”
“The General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army produces seven to eight recorded lectures a year for soldiers,” the source said. “Of these, four to five praise Kim Jong-un, and two to three expose lax discipline and violations of discipline within the Korean People’s Army.”
“The lecture held ahead of April 15th was similar in content to previous lectures praising Kim Jong-un,” the source said. “What was a little different was that when Kim Jong-un visited Russia (in September 2023), President Putin spread out an operational map and asked for advice,” the source said.
The source added, "The content was that Kim Jong-un immediately unblocked the chain of command after seeing the operational map that President Putin had laid out, and thanks to that, Putin was able to turn the difficult situation on the front lines around." He also added, "The content was that the U.S. is constantly watching our (North Korea) reactions in Northeast Asia and on the world stage, and cannot even practice war as it pleases."
The Border Guard and Coast Guard were excluded from the lecture.
However, the source added, “The Border Guard and Coast Guard were excluded from this recorded lecture,” and “In the past, there have been many cases of military secrets being leaked to the outside through the Border Guard and Coast Guard, and as a result, there have been occasional cases of them being excluded from sensitive lectures.”
This is Moon Sung-hui of RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
14. N. Korean official arrested for erasing defector records in bribery scheme
Rampant corruption among officials.
N. Korean official arrested for erasing defector records in bribery scheme - Daily NK English
In 2017, the official accepted $2,000 from a family to remove information from their residence registration documents that indicated one of their family members had defected
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 25, 2025
A photo taken of the North Korea - China border in 2014. (Lawrence Wang, Flickr, Creative Commons)
A residence registration guidance official in Ryanggang province is under investigation by provincial police for allegedly erasing information about defectors from official records.
According to a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province, the official, who works in residence registration at Pungso county’s police office, was transferred to provincial police custody on April 7.
In 2017, the official accepted $2,000 from a family to remove information from their residence registration documents that indicated one of their family members had defected. In North Korean rural communities, $2,000 represents an enormous sum, which the official pocketed after altering the official records. However, this act of corruption was discovered eight years later, leading to his arrest.
The family in question had pooled money with close relatives to bribe the official, fearing they would face career limitations and social discrimination for having a defector in their family.
With the defector’s record erased, family members and close relatives subsequently received job promotions and even secured positions in law enforcement without facing any social restrictions.
The situation unraveled during a background check on one of the family’s relatives when authorities received testimony that someone in the household had defected to South Korea.
During this investigation, officials discovered a discrepancy—a defector who wasn’t listed in the residence registration documents. When the county police office re-examined their records, they determined that the official had illegally removed information about the defector.
“In North Korea, a problematic family background prevents social advancement regardless of your abilities,” the source explained. “Particularly, having a defector in your family—even a third cousin—negatively impacts your status, which is why people pay substantial amounts to have defectors marked as deceased or to have their information erased from records. However, if discovered, both the official responsible and the entire family face punishment.”
Family members who participated in the bribery will likely lose their positions, while other relatives—including the one who triggered the background check—will face significant obstacles to future promotions due to their tainted background.
The official likely faces severe consequences, including expulsion from the party and dismissal from his position.
“This incident will ultimately have devastating consequences for everyone involved,” the source said. “People who have lived without issues will see everything they’ve built collapse, and they’ll be permanently labeled as individuals with political problems.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 25, 2025
15. Seoul demands removal of Chinese platforms in Yellow Sea; Beijing claims they're legal fish farms
Seoul demands removal of Chinese platforms in Yellow Sea; Beijing claims they're legal fish farms
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/04/25/WSYW3BGQGRDVNHZ52WFNNNGJI4/
By Roh Suk-jo,
Kim Dong-hyun
Published 2025.04.25. 17:45
This Feb. 26 photo, taken by the Onnuri research vessel, shows China’s fixed platform in the Yellow Sea’s Provisional Measures Zone. Claimed by Beijing as a “fish farm support facility,” the structure spans 100 by 80 meters and includes steel bridges and a helipad. /Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology
The South Korean government on Apr. 24 called on China to relocate three maritime structures recently installed in the Yellow Sea, warning they could “physically obstruct the navigation of South Korean fishing vessels and naval ships.” Seoul demanded the installations be moved outside the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ).
Beijing, however, reportedly rejected the demand, arguing the facilities were aquaculture sites established by a private operator and therefore not in violation of any agreements. Chinese officials are also said to have invited South Korea to “come and see for themselves,” according to diplomatic sources.
While China has resisted removing the structures, it has reportedly signaled that no further installations will be added—for now—amid growing domestic backlash in South Korea, including bipartisan calls in the National Assembly for a stronger response.
The issue was addressed during the third meeting of the Korea-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism, held in Seoul on Apr. 23. It marked the first director-general-level talks on maritime matters between the two countries since 2022.
Kang Young-shin, director-general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South Korea’s lead representative, conveyed Seoul’s strong concerns. He emphasized that “South Korea’s legitimate and lawful maritime rights must not be infringed upon,” and formally protested the installation of three large structures in the PMZ—one in May 2024 and two others later—despite repeated objections from Seoul. Kang also condemned China’s interference with a South Korean maritime research vessel in February, when Beijing blocked a planned site inspection.
Graphics by Yang In-sung
The PMZ, a disputed area where the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of South Korea and China overlap, is considered highly sensitive. Both countries have agreed to defer boundary demarcation claims in the zone. While fishing is permitted, existing agreements prohibit the construction of fixed structures and resource development activities such as oil drilling.
Nevertheless, China erected three large steel-frame structures along the western edge of the PMZ, describing them as salmon farming and aquaculture management facilities. A senior South Korean government source said the structures appear to have been intentionally positioned to straddle the boundary, interpreting the move as a calculated effort by Beijing to test Seoul’s response and gradually expand its maritime influence in the area.
China maintains that the installations do not violate any bilateral agreements. During a regular press briefing on Apr. 21, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the structures were consistent with the Korea-China Fisheries Agreement and urged Seoul to adopt a “rational and objective” stance.
At the Apr. 23 meeting, Hong Liang, director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the Chinese delegation, said the structures were “entirely for aquaculture purposes” and unrelated to territorial claims or maritime boundary disputes. He also offered to allow South Korean authorities to inspect the installations directly.
According to South Korean officials, China explained for the first time that two of the installations—Sheonran No. 1 and No. 2—are floating fish farms, while the third, resembling a decommissioned drilling platform, has been repurposed as an aquaculture management facility. While the management platform is fixed to the seabed using steel legs, Chinese officials reportedly said it is not permanently anchored.
China installed the fixed structure in 2022 without prior consultation or notification, and this marked the first time Beijing had officially briefed South Korea on the matter.
Graphics by Yang In-sung
Although Chinese officials reportedly told their South Korean counterparts that no additional facilities would be constructed, the joint press release issued after the talks did not include any such statement. A former South Korean vice foreign minister said China appeared to be responding to intensifying anti-China sentiment in South Korea and may have offered a temporary concession to ease tensions. A senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said both sides “agree that this issue should not hinder the overall trajectory of bilateral relations” and pledged to “maintain dialogue through all available channels.”
The third meeting of the Korea-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism was held in person on Apr. 23 at the Lotte Hotel in Seoul—the first face-to-face session since 2022. South Korea’s chief delegate Kang Young-shin (left), director-general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shakes hands with China’s chief delegate Hong Liang, director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. /South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The dispute has also drawn international attention. On Apr. 23, the U.S. Department of State criticized China’s maritime behavior, saying its “decades-long refusal to abide by international law, including the freedom of navigation, has destabilized the region.” Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun also weighed in, describing China’s use of maritime structures to assert territorial claims as a “typical tactic” and warning that Beijing may now be attempting to alter the status quo in the Yellow Sea. The newspaper cited precedents in the South China Sea, where China constructed artificial islands with airstrips and residential facilities to strengthen de facto control, as well as the East China Sea, where it installed gas extraction platforms and buoys that have sparked tensions with Japan.
16. More signs point to acting president entering June 3 election race
He seems to be a non-partisan servant of the nation serving under presidents from both sides of the political spectrum.
Han Duck-soo (Korean: 한덕수; born 18 June 1949) is a South Korean diplomat, economist, and politician who has served as the acting president of South Korea in December 2024 and since March 2025 and as the prime minister of South Korea since 2022, an office he previously held from 2007 to 2008.[c][1]
Born in Jeonju, Han is the fifth person to hold the prime minister's office twice,[2] having previously served in the office under President Roh Moo-hyun from 2007 to 2008. He also held office as the minister of economy and finance from 2005 to 2006, the ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2012, and the chairman of the Korea International Trade Association from 2012 to 2015.[3][4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Han_Duck-soo
More signs point to acting president entering June 3 election race
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250425/more-signs-point-to-acting-president-entering-s-koreas-june-3-election
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Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo hugs a bereaved family member during an event held to commemorate soldiers and police officers killed while on duty at Daejeon National Cemetery, Friday. Newsis
By Jung Min-ho
- Published Apr 25, 2025 5:05 pm KST
- Updated Apr 25, 2025 5:17 pm KST
Impact of Han's bid would be limited: experts
Speculation is growing that acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo may run in the upcoming presidential election, as his recent actions resemble those of a president preparing for a major political event.
On Thursday, Han gave a budget policy speech at the National Assembly ― the first by an acting head of state since 1979.
On Friday, he shed tears as he consoled the bereaved families of soldiers and police officers killed while on duty, during an event at the Daejon National Cemetery, where he also called for a strong defense posture against any North Korean provocation.
In recent weeks, he also visited automakers and shipbuilders, held an economic task force meeting with the heads of the nation's top conglomerates and visited the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, to emphasize the alliance.
Han has neither confirmed nor denied that he will run for president, despite continuous questions and speculation. Under the relevant election laws, if he is to join the race, he is required to resign from his current post by May 4.
Speaking to The Korea Times, experts said Han's recent political moves, including his accelerated efforts to secure a trade deal with Washington, are a clear indication that he is considering that option. But given his tarnished image as the No. 2 official in the impeached Yoon Suk Yeol government and his lack of a support base as a politician, the impact of his bid would be limited, they added.
“I think he is likely to announce his bid soon,” Hong Hyeong-sik, a political analyst who runs Hangil Research, a pollster, told The Korea Times. “If he does, Han would immediately seek a united opposition with whoever wins the People Power Party’s (PPP) nomination against the Democratic Party of Korea’s (DPK) candidate.”
Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, center, shakes hands with Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun of the conservative People Power Party, one of the lawmakers who strongly opposed the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol, at the National Assembly in Seoul, Thursday. Newsis
But the fundamental problem of Han’s potential candidacy is that he was and still is not free from the influence of Yoon and his acolytes, experts said.
“That’s because he has no faction of politicians who would firmly support him, given his lack of experience in politics. The only group that would back him is those who loyally supported Yoon,” Hong said, adding that a majority of voters, particularly swing voters, would not want that. “He may improve his image by promising, for example, politically-neutral bureaucrats like himself would lead his administration. But I doubt he would make such a move.”
It is also possible that Han may forgo a possible bid, according to Lee Joon-han, a professor of political science at Incheon National University.
“If Han thinks he would have a chance to win, he would definitely announce his bid. But for now, at least, that chance looks slim,” Lee said. “I think he would wait a little longer to see if it would be worthwhile.”
According to a poll released on Friday by Newsis and conducted from Wednesday to Thursday by Ace Research and Consulting, only 30.5 percent of the respondents said they would support Han’s decision to join the race, while 61.3 percent said they would not.
Among those who identified themselves as supporters of the conservative PPP, the rate was 60.4 percent. It was particularly high —71.7 percent — among supporters of Kim Moon-soo, who is considered the most hardline among the four contenders currently competing to secure the PPP's nomination.
In another survey released the same day, conducted from Tuesday to Thursday by Gallup Korea, in a hypothetical contest between Han and Lee Jae-myung, the leading DPK contender, only 38 percent of the respondents said they would support Han, while 53 percent said they would cast their ballots for Lee.
In a hypothetical three-way contest with Lee Jun-seok of the self-styled conservative Reform Party, 49 percent said they would support the DPK politician over Han (31 percent) and Lee Jun-seok (10 percent).
The polls have a 95-percent confidence level with a sampling error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. Details are available on the website of the National Election Commission's poll review committee.
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Jung Min-ho
Jung Min-ho has worked as a staff writer at The Korea Times since 2012, mostly covering social and political issues. He currently belongs to the Politics & City Desk where he covers topics such as health, labor and human rights. Prior to joining the team, he was responsible for covering North Korea and sports. His article about a biosecurity breach of Middle East respiratory syndrome won him an award from the Korea Science Journalists Association in 2016. He is also the co-author of the book, "Medical Pioneers of Korea" (2019). He served as the head of the international relations committee at the Journalists Association of Korea from 2021 to 2023.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
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