Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“They must find it difficult, those who have taken authority as the truth, rather than truth as the authority.”

– Gerald Massey

“He felt that he was himself and did not wish to be anyone else. He only wished now to be better than he had been formerly.”

– Leo Tolstoy

“Remind yourself what you’ve been through and what you’ve had the strength to endure.”

– Marcus Aurelius

1. Hegseth Recaps 100 Days of DOD Accomplishments During Speech at War College

2. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Army War College (As Delivered)

3. What’s secret? When is it secret? Well, that’s complicated

4. Could a Blobby enclave be sowing chaos at DoD?

5. Unifying Army Security Cooperation: How to Fix the Coordination Crisis

6. China Aims to Step Up Policy Support Amid Trade Uncertainty

7. Hegseth’s Personal Phone Use Created Vulnerabilities, Analysts Say

8. While Gutting USAID, Marco Rubio Quietly Saved Cuban Regime Change Programs

9. Rubio torpedoes the left’s anti-Israel stronghold inside the State Department

10. Friends with Limits: The Future of Russo-Indian Defense Ties

11. 'Sleazebag' reporter who exposed Signal scandal gets Trump White House invite for 'curious' reason

12. How the War in Gaza Drove Israel’s A.I. Experiments

13. Top Russian general killed in Moscow as U.S. envoy talks with Putin

14. Mobilization, Movement, and Major War: Lessons from Desert Shield for Today’s Total Army

15. Do Americans support Trump’s attitudes to Ukraine and Russia? Here’s what recent data shows

16. Will Xi Jinping start a war over Trump’s China tariffs?

17. The Once and Future China

18. A new media order is emerging – Journalism isn’t dead. It’s on Substack.

19. BBC launches satellite news channel in Myanmar after Trump silences VOA

20. DOD Senior Advisor Announcements

21. A Small Wars Journal Retrospective: Twenty Years of Crowd-Sourcing Irregular Warfare Studies

1. Hegseth Recaps 100 Days of DOD Accomplishments During Speech at War College

Hegseth Recaps 100 Days of DOD Accomplishments During Speech at War College

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4164270/hegseth-recaps-100-days-of-dod-accomplishments-during-speech-at-war-college/

April 23, 2025 | By Matthew Olay, DOD News |

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth summarized the Defense Department's accomplishments over the first 100 days of his tenure this morning as he addressed senior-level military student leaders at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

The students — all senior, field-grade officers and civilian equivalents — are in the final stretch of the college's 10-month strategic leadership resident program. Upon completion of the course, the graduates will be eligible for major command and civilian equivalent executive leadership positions.

"Fighting for you has been the privilege of a lifetime — a deployment of a lifetime," Hegseth told the students at the outset of his remarks.

"And from day one — and each 100 of those days — our overriding objectives have been clear: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military and reestablishing deterrence," he continued.

Stating that "everything starts and ends with warriors in training and on the battlefield," Hegseth said that the department is working to restore the warrior ethos by refocusing DOD on lethality, meritocracy, accountability, and standards and readiness.

On the latter of those topics, the secretary pointed out that the Pentagon is reviewing how the department has maintained standards over the past four years to see whether they have dropped.

"To be lethal, you have to trust that the warrior alongside you in battle, or the troops fighting in the units that many of you will lead, are capable — truly, physically capable — of doing what is necessary under fire," Hegseth said, adding that such a standard is especially applicable to leaders.

Some additional warrior ethos restoration topics he hit on included welcoming service members who were involuntarily separated during the COVID-19 pandemic back into uniform, reshaping DOD's civilian workforce, and a recent uptick in recruiting numbers.

"The enthusiasm of young Americans, in particular, is off the charts," Hegseth said.

He then addressed DOD's priority to rebuild the military.

"Our goal is to put the best systems in the hands of our warfighters and ensure that you, as leaders, will have the systems and support you need for maximum lethality," Hegseth said.

As a pair of examples of such systems, Hegseth pointed to the Golden Dome missile defense system that DOD has been tasked with developing, as well as the Air Force's F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet platform.

"Taken together, these programs mean that we will be able to strike anywhere, anytime, while our citizens at home will be protected from the worst that our enemies can throw at us," he said.

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In addition to developing new weapons systems, Hegseth said DOD is also rebuilding the military through a review of all 72 major defense acquisition programs, working to strengthen the defense industrial base, and rooting out fraud, waste and abuse through a partnership with the Department of Government Efficiency.

"We are prioritizing what works and cutting what doesn't," he said.

"When your adversaries know that your military is filled with warriors, that your logistics capabilities are robust [and] that your warfighters have the most advanced weapons systems known to man, they are far less likely to challenge you on the battlefield," he continued.

Regarding the third objective, reestablishing deterrence, Hegseth said the Defense Department is doing just that, both at home and abroad.

"Working with our partners at [the Department of Homeland Security], we have already seen a 97% decrease in illegal border crossings compared to the same period in 2024," he said, adding that monthly encounters at the southern border have dropped from 250,000 to 19,000.

Overseas, Hegseth noted that the U.S. has handed leadership of the multinational group that deals with Ukraine's security needs off to the United Kingdom and Germany and that the U.S. has obtained commitments from multiple European nations to boost their defense spending.

"The time of the United States … being the sole guarantor of European security has passed. It's long overdue," Hegseth said.

The secretary also spoke of U.S. deterrence in the Middle East, including support for Israel and the Defense Department's lethal operations against Houthi terrorists.

Additionally, Hegseth detailed the strong bonds being reaffirmed with numerous allied and partner countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

"At every step, we are carrying out our strategy of increasing deterrence against the Communist Chinese," he said.

"Under the leadership of President [Donald J.] Trump, the message to our adversaries … has been undeniably clear: America is back," he added.

Hegseth concluded his remarks by stating that America and its national defense have begun a new golden age and that the students about to graduate each represent the future of the military.

"You will set the standard," he told those in attendance.

"We're counting on you, and I know that you will deliver at each and every step with distinction."

2. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Army War College (As Delivered)

Speech

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Army War College (As Delivered)

https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4164715/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-the-army-war-college-as-deliver/

April 23, 2025

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETE HEGSETH: Who dialed up Thunderstruck? I didn't choose it, but I like it. Please take your seats. It might have to become SOP. Well, good morning warriors. Warriors in the profession of arms. Others chose to be doctors and lawyers and other honorable professions. You chose to be warriors, leaders of men, leaders of our best men and women.

It's an honor to stand before you today amongst so many distinguished guests, congressman, Brigadier General Scott Perry, a graduate of this course as well. Thank you for being here, sir. This is your district also. It's about so many senior leaders, so many accomplished warriors, so many people who have given so much to this great nation.

As was mentioned, the Army War College is one of the vital military institutions in our country, helping our leaders advance at the strategic level. I want to thank everyone here that's a part, the teachers and the staff, support staff, everyone that makes it work. The work here helps to forge the next generation of military senior leaders.

Carlisle doesn't run without all of you. And I know a lot of you are soon looking out for your next assignments, congratulations. I'm here today to mark the first 100 days of the Trump administration and share what we have accomplished so far at the Department of Defense.

When President Trump called me to take this job, he told me first — he told me two things. The first was, Pete, you're going to have to be tough as shit — tough. Boy, he was not kidding on that one. This job requires a steel spine and that's fine. We're doing the work of the American people and the American warfighter. But second, the president said to me, I want you to restore the warrior ethos of our military, full stop.

And so that is exactly what I have set about to do all 100 days. Fighting for you is the privilege of a lifetime, a deployment of a lifetime. And from day one, and each 100 of those days, our overriding objectives have been clear: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military and reestablishing deterrence.

Restoring the warrior ethos is one — is the most fundamental of those three. Everything starts and ends with warriors in training and on the battlefield. We are leaving wokeness and weakness behind. And refocusing on lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards and readiness.

One of the early actions we did was to commission a rapid force-wide review of military standards, fitness standards, training standards, physical standards, gender neutral standards for combat roles. To be the world's most lethal and effective fighting force, you have to set and maintain high standards for our men and women in uniform. High, equal and unwavering.

To be lethal, you have to trust that the warrior alongside you in battle or the troops fighting in the unit that many of you will lead are capable, truly physically capable of doing what is necessary under fire. You need to be fit not fat, sharp not shabby. Especially our leaders. And that's why we're reviewing how the department has maintained standards in the past, especially the last four years, and whether those standards have dropped formally or informally.

We're also welcoming back former service members who were wrongly forced to leave the military. More than 8,700 service members were involuntarily separated for not taking an experimental COVID-19 vaccine. Others were more informally pushed out or decided to get out. We are welcoming actively back those warriors of conscience.

We've sent letters out; we're seeking them out. We want them back. They never should have been forced back, and we hope they come back quickly. And our personnel and readiness department is working in real time to make that process more and more efficient, more and more direct every single day.

And as we welcome those warriors back, we're giving wokeness the boot. We've said goodbye to the harmful effects of woke culture and so-called diversity, equity and inclusion programs. We're removing DEI content, eliminating quotas, ensuring recruitment, retention and promotions are based on performance, not immutable characteristics. DEI is dead at DOD. We're building a merit-based culture that promotes and rewards individual initiative, excellence and hard work.

We're also working hard to protect command declining. We're going to be reviewing IG and EO processes that too often are weaponized against commanders in formations. I can't tell you how many men and women I hear from about to take battalion or brigade leadership or wing leadership, you name it, who feel like they're walking on eggshells because of processes that were put in place that undermine a commander's ability to lead. We are reviewing that all.

We're also optimizing the civilian workforce, ensuring that we have the right employees in the right roles, at the right time to support our warfighters. We're doing this by voluntary means, to the greatest extent possible, through offerings like voluntary early retirement and separation initiatives.

We're also ending low productivity telework and remote work culture. Teams work best when they work together in person, butts in seats, not on Zoom. We're making accountability and high performance the watchwords for the department. At all levels we expect employees to deliver results and respond to leadership needs. Their incentives and their performance plans, we believe, quickly and in real time will reflect that.

It's a lot of change very quickly. Now as you may have noticed, the media likes to call it chaos. We call it overdue. How are the men and women responding to this — to this call? Well, I can tell you personally it's going better than we could have ever expected. This department, and you know it, across the joint force is filled with patriots who want nothing more than to focus — be laser focused on serving their country. And that's why retention is rebounding as well, big time, in real time.

But one of the clearest metrics so far is actually coming from outside the military. The enthusiasm of young Americans in particular is off the charts. You know firsthand how challenging it has been to recruit in recent years. We faced a legitimate recruiting crisis where we couldn't recruit enough men and women into the military, so we lowered the amount required and still didn't meet the amount of people required in recruitment.

That's over. Over the last few months, the Army has had its best recruiting numbers since 2010. The Navy is on track to have its best recruiting year since 2002, before many of the newest recruits were even born.

I cannot tell you how many texts and calls I get, members of my staff get that get referred to me of people who had ruled out in their family military service and are now, because of President Trump and his leadership, enthusiastic about going to boot camp or OCS and serving their nation. The other branches are on track to well exceed their targets as well. It is a recruiting renaissance in America of America's best and brightest.

When our standards are high, when the mission is clear, when we prioritize warfighting over wokeness, that energizes the young men and women of our country, the very patriots over this American experiment we have always needed. They're proud of their country, they're proud of our military. And like generations before them, they will rise to the challenge set before us. As leaders, all of us, all we have to do is keep raising the bar and putting the mission and our people first. That's reviving the warrior ethos.

The second objective is rebuilding the military. You've all served long enough to see the downward trajectory of readiness in our forces. President Trump promised to reverse that decline and that reversal is well underway just 100 days in. He has declared and delivered on the beginnings of a generational investment in rebuilding our military, much like Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. Our goal is to put the best systems in the hands of warfighters to ensure that, as leaders, you have the systems that support what you need for maximum lethality. You should never be in a fair fight. That's our job.

First, we are rapidly moving to — moving ahead on one of the president's key campaign promises, which is a Golden Dome for America, a nationwide missile defense system to protect Americans from the threat of nuclear, hypersonic and conventional weapons here in our homeland.

Another incredibly exciting program is the newly announced and already launched F-47. It'll fly faster, further, more stealthy and more lethal than any fighter jet in the history of mankind. When the president signed that I was standing right next to him, I thought of my kids and my grandkids who will benefit from the projection of power that we're investing in right now. It sends a very clear message to our allies; we're not going anywhere. And to our enemies, we will be able to project power around the globe for decades to come.

These investments are not just in Golden Dome and F-47. Historic investments in the border, in hyper sonics, in long-range drones and shipbuilding, in modernization, you name it, we're investing in it. Taken together, these programs mean that we will be able to strike anywhere anytime while our citizens at home will be protected from the worst that our enemies could possibly throw at us, defending the homeland.

But it's not just these marquee programs. Over the past 100 days, we've been assessing the department from top to bottom to ensure that we're getting more, faster, better and more efficient. Last month, we published guidance to the acquisition workforce — sounds wonky but it's very important — reinforcing the software acquisition pathway as our preferred model. We have to be able to get what we need and when we need it.

And just this week we began reviewing all 72 active major defense acquisition programs. As President Trump outlined in his executive order on defense acquisition, we must have high performing mission aligned programs at every level. We're also strengthening our defense industrial base, which has sadly been neglected over the last four years.

We're establishing a new munitions war room, investing in expanding critical mineral production, including rare earth elements, heavy rare earth elements, light rare earth elements, all the things we need that need to be made at home or by our allies and partners. And President Trump has created an Office of Shipbuilding — not the Navy, not at the Defense Department, but in the White House, to restore our maritime industrial base.

We're also making our military more efficient, meeting the warfighters' needs in the most cost-effective manner and reallocating savings to our most mission critical areas. That's why we went through an exercise of finding 8 percent reductions across services. Of course, the media ran with it and called them cuts. No, this is how you plan and prioritize as you look where you can do more with less and you shift out old priorities and move in new maximum efficiency, focusing on what you need now and in the future.

Through our partnership with the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, earlier this month, we identified $5.1 billion in savings and that's just the beginning. We're ending contracts for business process consulting, enterprise cloud IT services and duplicative IT services — massive contracts that no one ever looks at, or people push a lot of paper and make a lot of PowerPoints and give a lot of consulting work, but it doesn't manifest into anything meaningful for the warfighters.

So, we can use that money for better health care and mission critical programs, from process to people, from consultants to corporals. The bottom line is this, we are rebuilding the world's greatest fighting force for the challenges ahead of us. We're prioritizing what works and cutting what does not. And yes, as the president announced from the Oval Office, we will have the first $1 trillion DOD budget.

What's the reason for that? Well, one, we're digging out of a big hole that the previous administration left, cratering our military and its capabilities and not investing properly — frankly, being reckless and irresponsible. Not just around the world with our image, but with what we invested in and did not invest in. But second, because we live in a dangerous world of growing threats.

It's not about a dollar amount and how much you spend; it's about ensuring what you spend matches the threats; that your capabilities match the threats. The president has charged me with doing that. Every single day through our budget process and our planning process that's what we're focused on. Working with INDOPACOM and our COCOM commanders at the tip of the spear to understand what they believe they need and delivering it.

When your adversaries know that your military is filled with warriors, and their logistics capabilities are robust, and your warfighters have the most advanced weapon systems known to man, they're less likely to challenge you on the battlefield, which is the point. Which leads to our third objective, reestablishing deterrence after four years of deferred maintenance under the Biden administration.

Most importantly, and you saw it from my first visit, you saw it from the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “Razin’” Caine, his first visit coming up on Saturday. As we are securing our borders first, after decades of securing other people's borders in far-off places, we are securing ours after a reckless invasion of over 20 million people and we have no idea who they are and why they're coming here has invaded our country. That ends.

From day one we have surged posture to control the border and update our military planning at DOD to protect the United States from cross border threats. Foreign terrorist organizations designated the cartels, drugs, human trafficking, violence, death — under the Trump administration it ends. Under this Defense Department, we get 100 percent operational control of our border. It was started on day one, will continue through day 100 all the way through the entirety of the Trump administration.

Working with our partners at DHS and CBP, we've already seen a — if you're being generous, 97 percent reduction. In reality it's a 99 percent reduction in illegal border crossings compared to the same period in 2024. Monthly encounters have dropped from 250,000 encounters, most of which are false asylum claims. You also have the known gotaways and the unknown gotaways. So, it's much higher than 250,000. You don't know where most of these people are coming from. Now to the trickle of a few thousands, all of which — most of which we're interdicting and engaging because of our force posture on the border in real time.

It starts with people; it moves to infrastructure and surveillance. And our American troops, you should see their morale on the border. It's incredible, when you're defending your own homeland with robust and sufficient assets, and you are able to interdict…it changes the whole game. We just designated a trial area for a new national defense area where our troops now, instead of just looking at the border with binoculars and wondering who that person is and hoping CBP interdicts them, they now temporarily take action to temporarily detain those folks and hand them over to CBP, because of that authorized zone.

It's a sea change from the open season that was the previous administration. But not just here at home. In three of the most strategically important regions in the world, we are increasing allied burden sharing while we increase deterrence. America First doesn't mean America alone. It means we expect our allies to step up to be true force multipliers for freedom. This approach ensures we achieve peace through strength.

First in Europe, our allies are finally, thanks to President Trump in the first administration and again in these first 100 days, following America's call for European leadership and ownership of continental security. We've transferred US leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to the UK and to Germany.

We've obtained commitments from Poland, one of many model allies, the Baltics to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense. We've made the same call to other allies. 2 percent is not enough considering the threats you face, 3 percent, 4 percent, 5 percent. And we've made progress with major European powers who are setting initial targets. Even to one I spoke to just this morning; to increase their defense spending.

The time of the United States — you're in Pennsylvania, you're in our beautiful country — being the sole guarantor of European security has passed. It's long overdue, Europe has to step up, fund its military and lead. NATO needs to step up.

Second, in the Middle East, we're pursuing stability and deterrence to the threats that exist there. President Trump has made it clear that America is fully committed to the security of our great allies in Israel. Just days after his inauguration, the DOD, under President Trump's leadership, released the shipment of 2,000 Mk 48 bombs to Israel. Critical munitions that the Biden administration had blocked. The Defense Department has also delivered three new F-35s to Israel with another three aircraft on the way to reinforce Israel's self-reliance and pursue President Trump's goal of achieving peace through strength.

In Yemen, the Defense Department is executing lethal operations against Houthi terrorists. Our forces have struck hundreds of targets and decimated Houthi leadership, substantially reducing their capabilities and the threat to U.S. ships in the Red Sea and across and through the BAM. We have demonstrated America's commitment to defending our interests and restoring freedom of navigation, which we will do and are doing quickly.

This is a clear, limited mission executed with ruthlessness, full stop. We will run our ships through that BAM. And our message to the Houthis has been clear from the beginning, allow us to sail our ships through and we'll stop shooting at you. Until then, you're going to feel the pain. And I'll tell you, the Houthis are feeling the pain.

We have demonstrated that any aggression against Americans will be met with decisive action, unlike what that region saw under the Biden administration. But this is not nation building; this is not land wars; this is not endless wars; this is not regime change. This is clear eyed American national interests executed decisively and overwhelmingly.

Third and most importantly, we are deterring Communist China in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. To deliver peace in this region we're delivering a more forward regional force posture. We're supporting allies and partners; allies and partners are our force multipliers as they strengthen their own capabilities, including in Taiwan.

We're also connecting US allies and partners to produce a stronger and more resilient and more capable network of partnerships. That's why you've seen our travel out there and there will be a lot more of it. In fact, in March, I took my first trip to the Indo-Pacific as Secretary, the first trip to Guam in 20 years from a Defense Secretary.

I traveled to the Philippines to meet with President Marcos and his Security Secretary of National Defense. We reaffirmed the long-standing strength of US-Philippines alliance, a key piece in our strategy to deter and counter the Communist Chinese.

We also traveled to Japan on that same trip, and later on a trip that a few of you may have seen, to Panama. At each stop we announced new bilateral exercises, increased cooperation, foreign military sales deals, and demonstrated our renewed commitment to President Trump's vision of peace through strength.

In the Philippines, we are deploying more advanced capabilities including NMESIS anti-ship missiles. In Japan, we announced Phase 1 of upgrading U.S. Forces Japan into a full-blown joint force's headquarters. In Panama we secured a framework for first and free of Panama Canal passage for U.S. military vessels and auxiliary vessels, as well as the additional presence of U.S. troops stationed through both sides of the Panama Canal.

As I said then and I will reaffirm today, the president pledged to take back the Panama Canal from Chinese influence, and with our partners we're doing just that right in our own backyard. At every step, we are carrying out our strategy to increase deterrence against the Communist Chinese.

As I've said before, in these places, when you meet with leaders who want to be with America, who believe in what America can do, have watched us when we're strong. They're making in many cases and in many places a binary choice. It is either by, with and through the Americans or with the communist Chinese. In the Indo-Pacific around the world, but specifically in the Indo-Pacific and in our hemisphere, you can see it. You can see it in the eyes of allies and partners.

You can see it in the influence underneath the surface. They want to be with us, but they need to see strength, and they need to see leadership. And that's what President Trump has provided in spades, not just in words, but in deeds, in action and in deterrence. So, as Europe shoulders more of the burden in continental security that frees up resources for us to focus on countering the malign influence of the Communist Chinese where it matters most.

Under the leadership of President Trump, the message to our adversaries in these first 100 days in office has been undeniably clear — America is back. At the Defense Department that means no more distractions, no more social engineering, no more climate change worship, no more electric tanks, no more gender confusion, no more pronouns, no more excuses, no more quotas, no more woke bullshit that undermines commanders and command climates.

We are laser focused on our mission of warfighting. We are color blind, and we are merit based. We're restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence, end, full stop. Enemy aggression will be met swiftly and harshly. We're beginning a new golden age of America and a golden age of national defense.

We have a bumper crop of new recruits, new planes, new missile defense systems on the way, allies increasing their defense spending and adversaries on their heels. Today, on this beautiful day, we have a brand-new class soon to be Army War College students about to graduate. You, all of you, are the future of our military.

You will lead these new recruits, eager, optimistic, young, ready and soon to be trained. They will look to you. You will lead the brigades, the ships, the groups; you will execute our tactical, operational and strategic objectives all around the globe. You will set the standard. We're counting on you, and I know that you will deliver at each and every step with distinction.

God bless you. God speed to all of our warriors and thank you for having me today.

3. What’s secret? When is it secret? Well, that’s complicated

Some useful objective analysis from "Signalgate."

Excerpts:

When diving into these matters, it often helps to turn the question around. Instead of asking ‘what is the effect if this leaks?’ ask ‘what are you trying to protect?’ It could be a capability, operation, intention or limitation, a set of factors commonly abbreviated as COIL. It is also worth asking: who are you trying to protect this from, and how long for? Striking the Houthi bases isn’t going to be a secret for long once the planes have taken off.

Asking these deeper questions should have a significant effect on your security posture, considerations and planned approach. These questions start getting to the heart of the issue and mitigating the systemic risks, which is a lot more important. In most cases, the classification of some information is the bluntest of instruments to protect what could be a person, a sensitive operation, a policy plan or your own reputation.

Applying blame for a breach in security essentially comes down to subjective judgements on the person and the error they made. In the case of SignalGate it was a pretty bad one, no matter the classification of the information.

What’s secret? When is it secret? Well, that’s complicated | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Kyle McCurdy · April 24, 2025

The argument over US officials’ misuse of secure but non-governmental messaging platform Signal falls into two camps. Either it is a gross error that undermines national security, or it is a bit of a blunder but no harm was done.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has twice used Signal for sensitive national security conversions, including once in which he and officials discussed planned military operations against Houthis in Yemen. When we consider the security implications of this, we see that classification systems are complicated, subjective and nuanced. Many people, even those who have worked within government for years, don’t understand them.

A classification is simply a label that the originator of the information attaches to it based on his or her perception of the damage that would happen if it became public. Information can be declassified by group consensus and through a proper process, but it is generally up to the originator to make a reasonable judgment at the time.

Only certain government systems are permitted to hold the most sensitive information, and these are highly protected and monitored. They are usually air gapped, meaning they are separated from other networks and not connected the internet. Still today, the most sensitive information is shared only on specific coloured paper that is destroyed after being read in a special room. In 2013, the Russians even bought up a stock of typewriters to make sure they were truly offline. The much discussed secure compartmented information facility (SCIF) is there to protect from physical attacks such as eavesdropping or covert cameras.

A classification is different to a handling caveat, which indicates to whom the information can be shared, and a nationality caveat (preceded in Britain with ‘Eyes Only’), indicating which country produced and which countries can read the information. These elements (plus some codewords others for more sensitive information) make up what we generally call a classification. It is technically possible to have unclassified information with other caveats. However, because classified information is for most practical purposes allowed only on particular systems, people tend to rely on classifications alone.

Technically, the person who first writes down the information is meant to classify it based on a set of guidelines. These definitions are very clear. In the British system, something is classified based on the effect if it is compromised. Top secret information, for instance, ‘could lead to loss of human life’ or damage military operations, international relations or prosperity. To avoid compromises, people tend to over-classify or add handling caveats that limit the people to whom the information may be distributed.

On one hand, it is possible to argue that the information in that Signal chat about the planned operation was not classified as the ‘accidental or deliberate compromise’ of the information did not result in anything ‘more than moderate, short-term damage to the operational effectiveness’. There is probably a longer conversation to be hard around causing ‘moderate damage to the work or reputation of the organisation’. Regardless, it is up to the person who writes the information down to classify it; so technically whatever Hegseth says goes.

To add to the complication, classifications mean nothing outside of government systems. Although some apps claim to have ‘government or military encryption’ they are not accredited to hold classified information; so, by definition, they don’t have classified information on them.

The more you think about the definition of a secret, the more things start to break down. Governments spend millions on sophisticated (and highly classified) cyber tools but then send them to people’s computers and phones to hack those devices. These tools bring back highly sensitive information from these devices over the internet; and only when they get back into a government system does the information become ‘classified’.

When does this information become ‘secret’? The answer is: when it sits on a government IT system.

Furthermore, people who meet agents around the world have highly classified conversations in coffee shops or in hotel rooms; hiding in obscurity. It only becomes ‘classified’ when it is written up on an IT system.

When diving into these matters, it often helps to turn the question around. Instead of asking ‘what is the effect if this leaks?’ ask ‘what are you trying to protect?’ It could be a capability, operation, intention or limitation, a set of factors commonly abbreviated as COIL. It is also worth asking: who are you trying to protect this from, and how long for? Striking the Houthi bases isn’t going to be a secret for long once the planes have taken off.

Asking these deeper questions should have a significant effect on your security posture, considerations and planned approach. These questions start getting to the heart of the issue and mitigating the systemic risks, which is a lot more important. In most cases, the classification of some information is the bluntest of instruments to protect what could be a person, a sensitive operation, a policy plan or your own reputation.

Applying blame for a breach in security essentially comes down to subjective judgements on the person and the error they made. In the case of SignalGate it was a pretty bad one, no matter the classification of the information.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Kyle McCurdy · April 24, 2025

4. Could a Blobby enclave be sowing chaos at DoD?

Does anyone really think the Defense Policy board of these people is orchestrating the chaos at the Pentagon? Is this why the SECDEF dissolved all the advisory boards?

The Quincy Institute article below seems like a hit job against some members of the Defense Policy board.

Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on the Conclusion of Service of DOD Advisory Committee Members

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4165731/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-on-the-conclusion-of-service/

Meet the Board

Janine Davidson (Chair)

Herman Bulls

Eric S. Edelman

Michèle Flournoy

Richard Fontaine

Jon M. Huntsman, Jr.

Colin Kahl

John "Jack" Keane

Anja Manuel

Michael O'Hanlon

BJ Penn

Susan Rice

Kori Schake

Dana Shell Smith

https://web.archive.org/web/20250422184247/https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/Defense-Policy-Board/

Could a Blobby enclave be sowing chaos at DoD?

In remarks to Tucker Carlson, Dan Caldwell suggested ‘established interests’ on Defense Policy Board are behind Pentagon turmoil

Analysis | Military Industrial Complex

military industrial complex pentagon

Stavroula Pabst Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Apr 23, 2025

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Stavroula Pabst · April 23, 2025

In remarks to Tucker Carlson, Dan Caldwell suggested ‘established interests’ on Defense Policy Board are behind Pentagon turmoil

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Apr 23, 2025

UPDATE 4/24, 5:15 PM: The Defense Policy Board website has been scrubbed, as reported by The Intercept. The list of DPB members can still be viewed on an archived version of the website.

Discussing alleged Pentagon leaks with Tucker Carlson on Monday, recently ousted DoD official and Iraq war veteran Dan Caldwell charged that there are a number of career staff in the Pentagon who oppose the current administration’s policies. He then took particular aim at the the Defense Policy Board as a potential source of ongoing leaks to the press.

Caldwell claimed “most of the [DoD] leaks” were probably coming from career staff “hostile to the secretary, to the president, vice president's worldview.” But, he also told Carlson that “there's a less obvious place” the leaks could come from: the Defense Policy Board, which advises the secretary of defense on matters related to defense policy.

There is no evidence to his claim about the leaks, nor has there been any insight into the investigation reportedly embroiling Caldwell and two others who were pushed out of the Pentagon last Friday. Statements by Caldwell, who was serving as senior adviser to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and others suggest the accusations against them are a setup. Caldwell’s interview with Carlson did little to shed light onto who specifically might be behind them, or why, though a Drop Site News report late yesterday underscored the fierce internal infighting that could have led to the present circumstances.

But the interview did draw fresh attention to the Defense Policy Board, which is quite unknown outside the Beltway, but does wield influence inside the Pentagon as a repository for former high level national security officials who are tasked with providing “independent, informed advice and opinions on matters of defense policy” to the E-Ring.

As Caldwell pointed out, today the current DPB is filled with Biden-era appointments like former Obama national security adviser Susan Rice, and Michele Flournoy, who also worked in the Pentagon during the Obama administration and is now a high-powered consultant working with the defense and tech industry.

It also includes Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings, an early, integral think tank supporter of the War in Iraq, and Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), an enthusiastic proponent of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign during the first Obama administration. He served in various national security roles during the wars, including as Sen. John McCain’s foreign policy advisor.

The board has likely not met since Trump’s inauguration and it would be no surprise if it’s entirely replaced, as the undersecretary for policy planning oversees the panel and Elbridge Colby was just confirmed to the post two weeks ago. Trump fired the board after he lost the 2020 election and Biden fired and replaced Trump’s replacements in 2021 with the current roster.

The faces, names and political affiliations may change, but members have largely reflected the same consensus thinking about using and sustaining U.S. power abroad, whether it be for maintaining the global liberal order or confronting great power conflict. Past members have included foreign policy luminaries such as Henry Kissinger and Madeline Albright, who once famously said, “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?”

Many have sailed through the revolving door between government, think tanks, academia, and the defense industry and have been integral to the failed policies that led to and prolonged U.S. wars and smaller interventions abroad since 9/11.

In addition to Washington mainstay Susan Rice, for example, DPB member Kori Schake is director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, which essentially served as the brain trust for the Iraq War. Today it is regularly pushing for further Pentagon budget increases. In a 2022 Foreign Affairs article, Schake herself called for a DoD budget exceeding $1 trillion.

Neoconservative and former U.S. Ambassador Eric Edelman, who had served in the Bush and Obama administrations, is also a long-time Washington war-hawk, previously pushing a hard line on Iran’s nuclear program and for U.S. intervention in the Syrian civil war.

Current DBP member Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, was a key figure in pushing President Bush to “surge” U.S. troops into Iraq in 2007 and was an aggressive cheerleader for the aforementioned COIN and pushing more troops into Afghanistan in 2009.

Notably, Keane subsequently served as executive chairman of military contractor AM General, which obtained a $459 million contract in 2017 to send more than 2,000 Humvees to Afghanistan — profiting from his previous policy recommendation to Congress.

A DoD representative told RS the DBP website is “up to date.” And yet, some members’ online profiles suggest it may not be : the official website says Flournoy is a member; her bios on Council on Foreign Relations and Center for a New American Security pages, however, say she is a former one.

For now, however, the DPB’s composition is representative of a Washington highly resistant to change, particularly to the “America First” approach that questions whether the policies of the past 30 years have made the U.S. any safer or more prosperous. Again, it is not clear how much access that DPB members, together or individually, have to the Pentagon today or whether they even have access to the type of inside information that's been allegedly leaked.

But musing that his restraint-minded foreign policy views played a role in his ouster, Caldwell alleged the old establishment’s entrenchment inside could have ruptured informational leaks helping throw the DoD into disarray — mere months into the new administration.

“We had people who had personal vendettas against us, and I think they weaponized the investigation against us. I think that’s part of what’s going on here,” Caldwell alleged on Carlson’s show. “And of course, I have some views about the role of America in the world, you know, as we discussed, [a] little controversial. All of us [who were fired] in our ways threatened really established interests.”

Stavroula Pabst

Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.

Top photo credit: Michael O’Hanlon (DoD Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. James K. McCann), Ret. General Jack Keane (White House photo) and Michele Flournoy (CNAS/Flickr)

Apr 23, 2025

Top photo credit: U.S. military forces walk toward their next coordination along the demarcation line outside Manbij, Syria, July 18, 2018. The U.S. and Turkish militaries conducted these patrols to help reinforce the safety and stability in Manbij. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy R. Koster)

5. Unifying Army Security Cooperation: How to Fix the Coordination Crisis

It might be worth looking at the history of the JFK Center for Military Assistance and later the Institute of Military Assistance.

Please see the descriptions below the article.

Unifying Army Security Cooperation: How to Fix the Coordination Crisis

irregularwarfare.org · by Anthony Messenger, Carey Hyde · April 24, 2025

Coordination can mean the difference between success and failure in any military operation. Operation Eagle Claw, the ill-fated 1980 hostage rescue mission in Iran, famously exposed the dangers of disjointed efforts between military services—leading to major reforms in how US special operations forces and the larger joint force operate together today. A similar problem is unfolding in Army Security Cooperation efforts right now with both conventional and irregular partner nation forces.

Despite having three complementary organizations (Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), and the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program (SPP)), these units often operate independently and miss opportunities to operate more efficiently and draw on their unique strengths. Imagine a situation where an SFAB team unknowingly conducted the same training in the same city as a State Partnership Program, while just across the border, an ARSOF detachment struggled with a logistics challenge the SFAB could have helped solve. This is not fiction, but one of many repetitive scenarios that both authors have observed in 50 years of experience across multiple combatant commands. If only this multitude of Security Cooperation efforts had been coordinated in advance across time, space, and purpose.

Centralized Security Cooperation coordination ideally occurs within the combatant commands’ campaign plan management construct, but this mechanism is often ineffective and lacks transparency between the Army service component commands (ASCC), theater special operations commands (TSOC), and National Guard SPP. This coordination deficiency prevents unified action to generate, employ, and sustain foreign security forces, thus inhibiting Army effectiveness towards achieving US national security objectives. The US Army must streamline its command and control structure and more efficiently synchronize activities within its different areas of operations. This article explores solutions to better integrate these efforts—because when it comes to building partnerships and strengthening deterrence, the Army can no longer afford to let its left hand operate without knowing what the right is doing.

A “3-2-1” Structural Dilemma

Traditional Army force structure and command and control relationships unnecessarily inhibit the Security Cooperation enterprise’s agility. The title (a “3-2-1” Structural Dilemma) refers to the reality that three distinct Army organizations—SFABs, ARSOF, and SPP—typically report through two different operational commands (ASCCs and TSOCs), each supporting a single geographic combatant command. Although there are similarities between SFABs, ARSOF, and SPP units—such as regional alignment and their role as advisors—their focus in execution differs across conventional forces and irregular forces. Security Cooperation is a broad umbrella that includes both Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). As the name implies, FID deals with support to host nation programs and activities to free and protect its society from internal, irregular threats—subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and terrorism. On the other hand, SFA typically focuses on external threats—for example, conventional military aggression by a neighboring country. While SFA is a subset of Security Cooperation, it is not a subset of FID, nor is FID a subset of SFA. Likewise, conventional Army units like the SFABs and SPP focus on SFA, while ARSOF specialize in FID.

Further confusing matters, the Army’s three operational organizations for Security Cooperation typically deploy in support of two different operational, sub-unified commands both supporting a given geographic combatant command. Here’s what this looks like. Army service component commands (like US Army Central) employ the SFABs while simultaneously monitoring deployed State Partnership Program units without directing them. Conversely, TSOCs (like US Special Operations Command Central) employ ARSOF units such as Special Forces detachments and Civil Affairs teams, which are rarely synchronized with counterpart units within the ASCCs in the same geographic area of responsibility. These units further suffer from receiving their requirements from disjointed channels which typically come to TSOCs and ASCCs from individual country team Security Cooperation Officers located in the US embassies and aligned with the State Department mission. While there are mechanisms in place to reconcile differences between US embassies and the geographic combatant commands, this process does not always unfold as planned, and the different Security Cooperation organizations operate in silos. The result is that the Army’s Security Cooperation units are not unified in purpose and limited resources fail to provide the greatest returns to both the foreign security forces and US joint forces.

The lack of synchronization between the combatant commands and country teams is unique and may come at an even higher level. A country team’s integrated country strategy may not necessarily align with the DoD’s National Defense Strategy or the combatant command’s campaign plans—or vice versa. Country teams and geographic combatant commands will certainly nest their campaigns with current national level strategies to legitimize their approach, but misalignment of priorities, redundancy, and inadvertent disruption of efforts are likely to ensue when the elements of the Security Cooperation enterprise operate independently and without full awareness of each other.

Under this arrangement, combatant commands have limited ability to develop or assess clearly defined Security Cooperation objectives against interagency or national-level strategies. Likewise, it becomes difficult to translate US approaches into bilateral or multinational exercises or develop cross-cutting measures of effectiveness for US efforts. For example, many combatant command campaign plans today aim to enhance their partner nations’ ability to resist Chinese and Russian predatory behaviors and integrate them for contingency planning. But if elements from the SFAB, ARSOF, and SPP are operating independently through country teams or stove piped component commands, there is no coherent way for combatant commands to have a true account of partner nations’ potential contributions or the effectiveness of US activities to date.

especially short of conflict where the operating environment and intended effects are not always so clear, and there are more actors at play than the military alone. The fact that adjacent units often lack a common operating picture makes the problem even worse. While many combatant commands hold cross-component meetings to discuss Security Cooperation activities, they are often more episodic exercises of process with performative meetings that give false hope of meaningful synchronization happening. This false sense of coordination is harmful and undermines real integration of Security Cooperation efforts that could actually lead to a strategic edge over adversaries. If unaddressed, the current construct will continue to frustrate progress even as new units and commanders come in with high hopes of enacting change.

Align the Campaign in the Land Domain

To address this structural problem, three potential solutions can improve synchronization in the Army’s Security Cooperation enterprise:

Establishing a regionally-aligned task force;
Appointing a sub-unified command as the coordinating authority for regional Security Cooperation efforts; and
Aligning the Security Force Assistance Command under US Army Special Operations Command as an ‘advisor division.’

A regionally aligned task force would provide the command and control relationship and strategic understanding to prioritize military training and assistance in ways that are responsive to partner needs and overall US national security goals. The closest example today is the Southern Europe Task Force Africa (SETAF-AF) under US Africa Command and US Army Europe and Africa. SETAF-AF is a standing conventional US Army headquarters that employs only conventional Army assets to meet theater Security Cooperation objectives across Africa. Empowering a similar task force to coordinate and synchronize Security Cooperation across SOF, SPP, and conventional forces in a critical region would enable the application of the Army’s existing Security Cooperation units to develop a campaign of integrated, coordinated, and sequenced efforts.

If establishing a regional task force is untenable, the next logical option is to use existing structures underneath the combatant commands. Determining whether the coordinating authority or supported command for Security Cooperation would be either the TSOC or ASCC depends on the combatant command but should be made consistent across all geographic commands. Accomplishing this change could be sub-regional or by country within a Combatant Command’s area of responsibility, allowing for a consistent regional focus to guide activities in support of the campaign plan, even if individual units still operate in their relative stovepipe. While there are existing structures within the combatant commands, generally in the J5, they are too far removed from the action on the ground and function more as a high-level planning team. Someone must be in charge of the complete package of SPP, SFAB, and SOF SC activities.

Lastly, from a US Army Title 10 force provider perspective, aligning the Security Force Assistance Command—currently a 2-star division-level command element within the US Army Forces Command—under the 3-star US Army Special Operations Command as an ‘advisor division’ could offer the combatant commands regionally aligned Army forces for Security Cooperation under the supported command or coordinating authority. This reorganization requires the Army to maintain the integrity of the conventional SFAB teams but would maintain a critical capability enabling the conventional force to focus on lethality and readiness. While SFAB teams have capabilities that are separate and distinct from the ARSOF elements, there is a natural overlap where capabilities are mutually supporting across externally focused SFA and internally focused FID.

An SFAB is comprised of maneuver, fires, engineer, and logistics teams with resident subject matter expertise. Imagine a situation where a TSOC’s irregular warfare campaign has a Special Forces team working with a partner nation’s elite force who happen to control artillery as a direct support asset. SFAB fires teams can train the partner fires battalion working with SOF to enhance the lethality of the elite force as well as the cannon unit. The SFAB logistics team can likewise assist with building the tooth to tail support required for sustained operations across echelons. SFAB maneuver teams are also ideal for working with higher level partner headquarters such as the creation of a combined command to conduct counterterrorism.

While the maneuver team focuses on building the headquarters, the SOF teams focus on building the unit of action. The maneuver team also has conventional maneuver leaders that can assist with tactical training of the conventional forces. If we layer on SPP quarterly engagements that focus on improving the collection management of the partner, we begin to realize the compounding benefits of coordination at the end user level with an assigned command. All these actions expand access and influence with our partners, which could prevent competitors from conducting similar engagements that ultimately damage US interests.

Instituting one of these three constructs or a hybrid of these options will synchronize the operations, activities, and investments of the disparate military organizations. This benefits the US by enabling states to secure themselves from internal and external threats and helps build relationships that may support long-term access, overflight, and posture in ways that asymmetrically set the theater through the human environment.

Hands Untied: Unleashing the Full Potential of Army Security Cooperation

Thriving in today’s operational environment requires a more comprehensive approach to the Army’s Security Cooperation that overcomes its disjointed approach to the complex realities of strategic competition. Modifying the US Army’s structural approach to Security Cooperation can improve operational effectiveness, optimize interoperability with partners, improve posture for crisis or conflict, and advance US national security objectives alongside interagency partners. Without addressing the Army’s structural limitations for implementing Security Cooperation, combatant commands are more likely to continue operating with one hand tied behind their backs—or without full awareness of the combined strengths of the components at its disposal.

LTC Messenger is an SF Officer, served in 5th SFG, SOCCENT and is currently in command of 3D SQDN, 2 SFAB.

CW5 Carey Hyde is an SF Warrant Officer and has served in 5th SFG or SOCCENT for the last 25 years.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade assists partner nations with live-fire exercise in Senegal (Sgt. Ricky Gavilan DVIDS)

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Main Objectives of the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance in the 1960s

Training and Education for Special Operations

The Institute’s primary mission was to recruit, assess, select, train, and educate U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations soldiers. This included developing expertise in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and military assistance to allied nations1 2 4.

Support to U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals

The Institute played a central role in advancing U.S. foreign policy by preparing personnel to provide military assistance to friendly nations. This supported the broader objectives of promoting U.S. security interests and the general welfare of the United States by strengthening allied and partner military capabilities3.

Key Objectives in Military Assistance:

Build up allied forces capable of maintaining internal security, particularly against communist-inspired insurgencies3.
Provide these forces with the capability to deter and repel external aggression, especially in the context of the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict3.
Develop sufficient strength in partner forces to resist attacks until broader “free world” military support could be mobilized3.

Specialized Operational Training

The Institute expanded its curriculum in the 1960s to include courses in counterinsurgency, infiltration and exfiltration techniques (such as military freefall and underwater operations), and unconventional warfare. This was in direct response to the operational demands of the Vietnam War and the need for highly trained military advisors and special operations personnel1 4.

Consolidation of Special Operations Disciplines

By the late 1960s, the Institute had integrated training for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations under one organizational umbrella, reflecting a holistic approach to military assistance and unconventional warfare1 4.

Summary Table of Main Objectives

Objective Area

Description

Special Operations Training

Prepare soldiers for unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and advisory roles1 2 4

Military Assistance

Equip and train allied forces to maintain security and resist communist threats3

Support U.S. Policy

Advance U.S. foreign policy and security interests through military partnerships3

Integration of Disciplines

Combine Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations training1 4

In summary, the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance in the 1960s focused on training elite soldiers for special operations, providing military assistance and advisory support to allied nations, and supporting U.S. strategic goals during the Cold War, especially in Southeast Asia1 2 3 4.

Citations:

Answer from Perplexity: pplx.ai/share

How the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance Addressed the Needs of Newly Developing Nations in the 1960s

Comprehensive Military Assistance and Training

The U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance (IMA), established in 1969 as part of the broader John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, addressed the needs of newly developing nations primarily through extensive military assistance, advisory programs, and specialized training. The IMA’s mission was to help these nations build and sustain their own military capabilities, focusing on both internal security and defense against external threats1 4.

Key Approaches:

Building Internal Security Forces:
The IMA and related U.S. military assistance programs focused on training local forces to maintain internal security, particularly against insurgencies and communist-inspired dissidents. This included instruction in counterinsurgency tactics, unconventional warfare, and the development of disciplined, self-reliant military units capable of responding to internal unrest1 4.
Enhancing Military Capabilities:
Newly developing nations received modern equipment, logistical support, and technical training to replace outdated or worn-out materiel. The IMA played a direct role in ensuring that local militaries could operate and maintain this equipment effectively, thereby strengthening their ability to deter or repel external aggression4.
Advisory and Mentorship Roles:
U.S. Army advisors, trained and deployed through the IMA, worked closely with partner nation forces at multiple levels—from high command to battalion and district units. Their role was to advise, mentor, and assist in the professionalization of indigenous armed forces, fostering self-sufficiency and operational competence2 3 4.
Specialized Training Programs:
The IMA consolidated and expanded training in areas such as psychological operations, civil affairs, and special forces. This comprehensive approach equipped partner nations not only for conventional defense but also for counterinsurgency, civic action, and psychological operations—crucial for stability in newly independent states facing complex security challenges1.
Support for Broader Development Goals:
U.S. policymakers recognized that military assistance was intertwined with economic progress and political stability. The IMA’s efforts were often coordinated with economic aid and nation-building initiatives, aiming to create the security environment necessary for development and to reinforce pro-Western governments5.

Impact in Practice:

In Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, the IMA and its predecessors helped organize, train, and equip national armies, police, and paramilitary forces. These efforts enabled local governments to stabilize conditions, resist insurgencies, and maintain independence during a period of rapid political change and external threat2 3 4.
The IMA’s programs also included sending officers from developing nations to the United States for advanced training, further enhancing their military professionalism and fostering long-term partnerships4.

Summary Table: IMA’s Approach to Newly Developing Nations

Objective

Method

Internal Security

Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare training

External Defense

Modern equipment, technical support, and operational training

Professionalization

Embedded advisors and mentorship at all command levels

Comprehensive Capability

Integration of civil affairs, psychological ops, and special forces

Support for Development

Coordination with economic and political aid for nation-building

In summary, the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance in the 1960s addressed the needs of newly developing nations by building their military capacity, supporting internal and external security, and integrating military aid with broader development objectives, all through a combination of direct training, advisory roles, and logistical support1 4 5.

Citations:

6. China Aims to Step Up Policy Support Amid Trade Uncertainty

China Aims to Step Up Policy Support Amid Trade Uncertainty

Beijing also pledges to maintain a stable and active capital market

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-aims-to-step-up-policy-support-amid-trade-uncertainty-479afb95

April 25, 2025 3:24 am ET

Chinese authorities will introduce new monetary instruments to support technological innovation, exports and consumption Photo: Cheng Xin/Getty Images

China aims to implement more growth-supporting measures amid rising challenges from hefty U.S. tariffs.

The government will seek to coordinate policy measures to support domestic economic aims amid external economic and trade struggles, state-run Xinhua News Agency said Friday, citing a readout of a meeting of the Politburo, the Chinese Communist Party’s top policymaking body.

The Politburo said China should counter uncertainty caused by dramatic shifts in the external environment with growth and development at home.

To achieve this, the government intends to cut interest rates and the amount of cash banks are required to set aside at the central bank, while making full and effective use of existing fiscal and monetary policies, the Politburo said.

Chinese authorities will also introduce new monetary instruments to support technological innovation, exports and consumption, and set up re-lending facilities to support services consumption and elderly care.

Companies significantly affected by tariffs could receive more funds from China’s unemployment insurance to support job retention, the Politburo said.

Authorities will carry out shantytown renovations in an orderly manner as part of efforts to buoy the struggling property sector.

China also pledged to maintain a stable and active capital market, which is seen as crucial to anchor confidence in the world’s second-largest economy.

The Politburo also said China should help more Chinese companies go abroad and “actively defend multilateralism and oppose unilateral bullying tactics with the international community,” according to Xinhua.

Write to Singapore Editors at singaporeeditors@dowjones.com

7. Hegseth’s Personal Phone Use Created Vulnerabilities, Analysts Say

Hegseth’s Personal Phone Use Created Vulnerabilities, Analysts Say

The phone number used in the Signal chat could also be found in a variety of places, including on social media and a fantasy sports site.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/25/us/politics/pete-hegseth-phone-signal.html

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Pete Hegseth during the Easter Egg Roll at the White House on Monday. His personal phone number could be found on the internet as recently as March.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

By Helene Cooper Julian E. Barnes Eric Schmitt and Christiaan Triebert

April 25, 2025

Updated 8:00 a.m. ET

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s personal phone number, the one used in a recent Signal chat, was easily accessible on the internet and public apps as recently as March, potentially exposing national security secrets to foreign adversaries.

The phone number could be found in a variety of places, including WhatsApp, Facebook and a fantasy sports site. It was the same number through which the defense secretary, using the Signal commercial messaging app, disclosed flight data for American strikes on the Houthi militia in Yemen.

Cybersecurity analysts said an American defense secretary’s communications device would usually be among the most protected national security assets.

“There’s zero percent chance that someone hasn’t tried to install Pegasus or some other spyware on his phone,” Mike Casey, the former director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, said in an interview. “He is one of the top five, probably, most targeted people in the world for espionage.”

Emily Harding, a defense and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, added: “You just don’t want the secretary of defense’s phone number to be out there and available to anyone.”

The chief Pentagon spokesman, Sean Parnell, did not respond to request for comment.

Mr. Hegseth’s use of Signal to convey details of military strikes in Yemen first surfaced last month when the editor of The Atlantic wrote an article that said he had been added, apparently accidentally, to an encrypted chat among senior U.S. government officials. The New York Times reported this week that Mr. Hegseth included sensitive information about the strikes in a Signal group chat he set up that included his wife and brother, among others.

Image

Mr. Hegseth with Mike Waltz, the national security adviser, at a luncheon at the White House on Thursday.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

Soon after the first Signal chat about Yemen became public in March, Der Spiegel, the German news publication, found the phone numbers of Mr. Hegseth and other senior Trump officials on the internet.

That Mr. Hegseth’s private cellphone number was easily available through commercial providers of contact information is not surprising, security experts said. After all, Mr. Hegseth was a private citizen until Donald J. Trump, who was then the president-elect, announced that he wanted the former National Guardsman and Fox News weekend anchor to run the Pentagon, an $849 billion-a-year enterprise with close to three million employees.

It has now become routine for government officials to keep their personal cellphones when they enter office, several defense and security officials said in interviews. But they are not supposed to use them for official business, as Mr. Hegseth did.

Even low-level government workers are instructed not to use their personal cellphones and laptops for work-related matters, according to current and former government officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information.

For senior national security officials, the directive is even more crucial, one former senior Pentagon official said.

Mr. Hegseth had a significant social media presence, a WhatsApp profile and a Facebook page, which he still has.

On Aug. 15, 2024, he used his personal phone number to join Sleeper.com, a fantasy football and sports betting site, using the username “PeteHegseth.” Less than two weeks later, a phone number associated with his wife, Jennifer, also joined the site. She was included in one of the two Signal chats about the strikes.

Image

Mr. Hegseth and his wife, Jennifer, at the Capitol last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

Mr. Hegseth also left other digital breadcrumbs, using his phone to register for Airbnb and Microsoft Teams, a video and communications program.

Mr. Hegseth’s number is also linked to an email address that is in turn linked to a Google Maps profile. Mr. Hegseth’s reviews on Google Maps include endorsements of a dentist (“The staff is amazing”), a plumber (“Fast, honest, and quality work”), a mural painter (“Painted 2 beautiful flags for us — spot on”) and other businesses. (Google Maps street view blurs out Mr. Hegseth’s former home.)

“If you use your phone for just ordinary daily activities, you are leaving a highly, highly visible digital pathway that even a moderately sophisticated person, let alone a nefarious actor, can follow,” said Glenn S. Gerstell, a former general counsel for the National Security Agency.

Government cellphones, by contrast, are far more secure because they are fitted with rigorous government controls meant to protect official communications.

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In using that same phone number on Signal to discuss the exact times that American fighter pilots would take off for strikes in Yemen and other sensitive matters, Mr. Hegseth opened himself — and, potentially the pilots — to foreign adversaries who have demonstrated their abilities to hack into accounts of American officials, encrypted or not, security experts said.

“Phone numbers are like the street address that tell you what house to break into,” said James A. Lewis, a cybersecurity expert. “Once you get the street address, you get to the house, and there might be locks on the doors, and you ask yourself, ‘Do I have the tools to bypass or break the locks?’”

China and Russia do, and Iran may as well, several cybersecurity experts said.

Image

An F/A-18 Super Hornet launching from an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea during operations against the Houthis last year. Mr. Hegseth discussed on Signal the exact times that American fighter pilots would take off for strikes in Yemen.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

Last year a series of revelations showed how a sophisticated Chinese intelligence group, called Salt Typhoon, penetrated deep into at least nine U.S. telecommunications firms. Investigators said that among the targets were the commercial, unencrypted phone lines used by Mr. Trump, Vice President JD Vance and top national security officials.

Mr. Gerstell said he had no knowledge of Mr. Hegseth’s phone or if it was subject to attack. But personal phones are typically far more vulnerable than government-issued phones.

“It would be possible, with moderate difficulty for someone to take over a phone in a surreptitious way once they had the number assuming you clicked on something malicious,” Mr. Gerstell said. “And when really sophisticated bad guys are involved, like Russia or China, phones can be infected even if you don’t click on anything.”

Cybersecurity experts said that more than 75 countries had acquired commercial spyware within the past decade. The most sophisticated spyware tools — like Pegasus — have “zero-click” technology, meaning they can stealthily and remotely extract everything from a target’s mobile phone, without the user having to click on a malicious link to give Pegasus remote access. They can turn the mobile phone into a tracking and secret recording device, allowing the phone to spy on its owner.

Signal is an encrypted app, and its security for a commercial messaging service is considered very good. But malware that installed a key logger or keystroke capture code on a phone would allow the hacker, or nation state, to read what someone types into a phone, even in an encrypted app, former officials said.

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NSO Group, based in Israel, has developed sophisticated spyware technology that can be placed on phones without a user having to click a malicious link.Credit...Amit Elkayam for The New York Times

In the case of Mr. Hegseth’s use of Signal to discuss the Yemen strike plans, spyware on his phone could potentially see what he was typing or reading before he hit “send,” because Signal is encrypted during the moments of sending and receiving, cybersecurity experts said.

One person familiar with the Signal conversation said that Mr. Hegseth’s aides warned him a day or two before the Yemen strikes on March 15 not to discuss such sensitive operational details in his group chat. That chat, while encrypted, was not considered as secure as government channels.

It was unclear how Mr. Hegseth responded to those warnings.

Mr. Hegseth also had Signal set up on a computer in his office at the Pentagon so that he could send and receive instant messages in a space where personal cellphones are not permitted, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. He has two computers in his office, one for personal use and one that is government-issued, one of the people with knowledge of the matter said.

“I guarantee you Russia and China are all over the secretary of defense’s cellphone,” Representative Don Bacon, Republican of Nebraska, who has suggested that Mr. Hegseth should be fired, told CNN this week.

Christiaan Triebert reported from New York. Greg Jaffe in Washington contributed reporting and Sheelagh McNeill contributed research.

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades.

Christiaan Triebert is a reporter working on the Visual Investigations team, a group that combines traditional reporting with digital sleuthing and analysis of visual evidence to verify and source facts from around the world.

8. While Gutting USAID, Marco Rubio Quietly Saved Cuban Regime Change Programs

I do not think most people realize the role USAID had in certain democracy programs.

While Gutting USAID, Marco Rubio Quietly Saved Cuban Regime Change Programs

The longtime anti-communist saw programs that support overthrowing the Cuban government restored after they were initially cut off.

https://prospect.org/world/2025-04-24-gutting-usaid-marco-rubio-saved-cuban-regime-change-programs/?utm

by Daniel Boguslaw April 24, 2025

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Nathan Howard/AP Photo

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with Jamaica’s Prime Minister Andrew Holness at the office of the prime minister in Kingston, Jamaica, March 26, 2025.

After firing thousands of U.S. Agency for International Development employees and gutting funding to programs across dozens of countries, this week Secretary of State and USAID administrator Marco Rubio set his sights on dismantling the State Department with the same hatchet-wielding fervor. On Tuesday, The Washington Post reported on a plan to scale back U.S.-based staff by 15 percent, and eliminate programs related to human rights, war crimes, and democracy-building. “Non-statutory programs that are misaligned with America’s core national interests will cease to exist,” Rubio tweeted on Tuesday.

But a review of USAID programs shows that, while following the DOGE playbook in public, the secretary of state has quietly safeguarded Cuban regime change programs aligned with the island’s exile base that has long powered his rise.

One of these programs is the anti-communist publication CubaNet, based out of Miami, which saw its nearly $2 million grant cut, then restored. “Our goal has always been to counteract the propaganda of the Castro regime. Without this funding, the government in Havana will have greater freedom to intensify its propaganda and repression,” the news site’s director Roberto Hechavarría Pilia said before the cash was turned back on.

Daniel Boguslaw

Daniel Boguslaw is an investigative reporter based in Brooklyn.

9. Rubio torpedoes the left’s anti-Israel stronghold inside the State Department

Excerpts:

Under Rubio’s plan, there will still be plenty of people at the State Department who will be tasked with monitoring human rights around the world and seeking to promote American values of liberty, including political and economic freedom. The administration will also preserve the office of the special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism. Reportedly, it will shift to a global Jewish affairs coordinator rather than the old division under the office of the undersecretary of civilian security, human rights and democracy—a section of Foggy Bottom that was a major part of the problem Rubio is trying to solve. The Office of International Religious Freedom will also still be there.

Will Rubio succeed in taming and redirecting the energy of the diplomatic bureaucracy away from toxic left-wing activism and toward efforts that will promote American interests and strengthen U.S. ties with Israel and other allies? Only time will tell, but as Trump has demonstrated on other issues, such as his efforts to reform or defund academic institutions that tolerate and encourage antisemitism, enacting such fundamental changes requires bold strokes and decisive leadership.

Rubio torpedoes the left’s anti-Israel stronghold inside the State Department

The administration isn’t abandoning the cause of human rights. A reorganization will stop bureaucratic ideologues from using the government to attack the Jewish state.

jns.org · by Jonathan S. Tobin · April 24, 2025

(April 24, 2025 / JNS)

For decades, a group of so-called “human rights” organizations—in particular, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—have been waging war on the State of Israel. As NGO Monitor, the authoritative source on the subject, has documented, these groups have conducted a multifaceted campaign involving support for boycotts across the board, smearing it as an “apartheid” state, and promoting its isolation and prosecution on the international stage.

In doing so, these non-governmental organizations and the liberal publications that continue to treat them as credible sources have succeeded in transforming human rights from a righteous cause into a movement that is a politically powerful, thinly veiled engine of 21st-century antisemitism.

Those who follow U.S. foreign policy have become all too aware of this development, especially since the Hamas-led Palestinian terrorist attacks and atrocities in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Since then, this bogus “human rights” lobby has stepped up its efforts to delegitimize Israel’s efforts to defend itself and acted as tacit advocates for Hamas in falsely depicting the war in Gaza and against other Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Yemen as acts of “genocide.”

Most Americans have been largely unaware that a band of activists with similar goals and beliefs to those at Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have been operating from a base inside the U.S. government. Thanks to a reorganization of the U.S. State Department, announced this week by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, that may now be coming to an end.

This is much to the dismay of liberal outlets like The New York Times, in addition to former Obama and Biden administration staffers who are horrified about what they consider to be a “blow to U.S. values.” According to the Times, the Trump administration is signaling that it “cares less about fundamental freedoms than it does about cutting deals with autocrats and tyrants.” In an article that largely consisted of quotes from foes of President Donald Trump and Rubio, the offices, such as the human-rights bureau, that are being pared down and stripped of their autonomy were described as “a sort of voice of conscience for policymakers as they balance America’s interests with its values.”

Opponents of Israel

Phrased in that manner, this sounds like something terrible—a scheme that would truly undermine American advocacy for freedom abroad. But the giveaway as to what’s really at stake in this controversy came in the next sentence of the article. As the newspaper put it: “During the Biden administration, it offered internal criticism of Israel, arguing that it was not doing enough to protect civilians in Gaza.”

In other words, these bureaus have acted as a powerful check on the ability of any president to advance the U.S.-Israel relationship as well as to promote a malicious and false narrative that, like those spewing from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, seeks to demonize Israel and any other targets of the political left. Though they are being portrayed in the liberal press as courageous truth-tellers working to spread freedom and democracy abroad, such officials have been acting in the grand tradition of State Department antisemites and Arabists who have sought to work against the interests of Israel and the Jewish people since the 1930s.

As Rubio explained in a government Substack post, for the past few decades, the State Department has operated several bureaus that, “provided a fertile environment for activists to redefine ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy,” to conform to the ideology of the same so-called “progressives” who have captured control of academia.

Often pursuing goals completely at odds with the foreign-policy objectives of the president and secretary of state, this growing band of biased bureaucratic ideologues has wielded considerable power and influence. To the frustration of those who understand the way that their agenda damages U.S. interests and allies, they’ve made a significant sector of the federal establishment into bastions of hostility to Israel and the governments of other nations that have been targets of the left, such as Hungary, Poland and Brazil. It also promoted policies that, as Rubio pointed out, “funneled millions of taxpayer dollars to international organizations and NGOs that facilitated mass migration around the world, including the invasion on our southern border.”

How could that be? And why has it taken so long for someone in authority to order changes like those that the current administration has put forward?

How rogue elements ruled

The answer to that question is fairly simple. Until now, no one in the White House or at the head of the State Department has tried to rein in what Rubio rightly termed “rogue” elements within the government.

They have operated with the impunity that comes with civil-service protections and the fact that past administrations either lacked the will or ability to restrain a powerful bureaucracy. As is true in almost all governmental departments and agencies, the permanent employees lean hard to the left. They also have managed to fend off any efforts to control them by manipulating the political appointees, who are supposed to be their bosses, treating them as incompetent amateurs who know little about how the government works in much the same manner as the characters in the classic British political comedy “Yes, Minister.”

It’s also true that, at least in principle, both the Obama and Biden administrations had no problem with this “human rights” lobby inside the State Department because they largely agreed with them.

Yet the inherent problem of having a portion of the government conducting an ideological foreign policy largely independent of the people at the top of the organizational flow chart became exposed in the last 16 months of Biden’s term in office. That’s because the anti-Israel bureaucrats, like the pro-Hamas mobs on college campuses, believed that the administration of President Joe Biden was insufficiently hostile to Israel after Oct. 7.

Biden’s civil war

As soon became apparent, the barbaric attack on Israeli civilians and the war to eradicate Hamas that followed had fomented nothing less than a civil war within the administration. Large portions of the permanent foreign-policy bureaucracy, as well as many of Biden’s political appointees ensconced in positions below the rank of cabinet and undersecretary rank, simply opposed the ambivalent Biden stand on the war, in which he publicly opposed Hamas but at the same time didn’t want Israel to succeed in defeating it. They wanted a complete cutoff of U.S. aid and an American-imposed ceasefire that would enable Hamas to both survive the war they started and even to win it.

While some officials, including members of the State Department’s human-rights bureau, resigned in protest over Biden’s half-hearted support of Israel, most remained in place. They continued working to undermine that stand and help fund projects that would hurt Israel and aid Palestinians fighting it, including, as one Middle East Forum study noted, indirectly financing anti-Israel terrorism. Indeed, as the City Journal reported in February, USAID was directing American taxpayer dollars to Hamas.

That is the context with which Rubio’s reorganization should be understood.

One aspect of the scheme is that it will eliminate redundancies and reduce costs in keeping with the mandate of Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), initially guided by billionaire Elon Musk.

Backing human rights

Rubio, who, as the Times noted, was an ardent supporter of human rights and encouraged using American power to advocate for freedom abroad during his 14 years in the U.S. Senate. Contrary to the assertions of his critics, he has not changed his mind about the importance of the issue. Rather, he is attempting to rescue the cause of human rights and democracy from activists who have turned it into a crusade against Israel and other governments, such as that of Hungary, which is falsely labeled as authoritarian because of its resistance to left-wing attempts to undermine its national identity.

Rubio’s plan involves a massive shift that he hopes will end the radical power base inside the State Department by stripping it of its autonomy and putting it inside existing regional bureaus, where it won’t be free to undermine Trump’s pro-Israel policy or fund groups working to promote policies and ideas antithetical to U.S. interests.

Under Rubio’s plan, there will still be plenty of people at the State Department who will be tasked with monitoring human rights around the world and seeking to promote American values of liberty, including political and economic freedom. The administration will also preserve the office of the special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism. Reportedly, it will shift to a global Jewish affairs coordinator rather than the old division under the office of the undersecretary of civilian security, human rights and democracy—a section of Foggy Bottom that was a major part of the problem Rubio is trying to solve. The Office of International Religious Freedom will also still be there.

Will Rubio succeed in taming and redirecting the energy of the diplomatic bureaucracy away from toxic left-wing activism and toward efforts that will promote American interests and strengthen U.S. ties with Israel and other allies? Only time will tell, but as Trump has demonstrated on other issues, such as his efforts to reform or defund academic institutions that tolerate and encourage antisemitism, enacting such fundamental changes requires bold strokes and decisive leadership.

For far too long, the administrative state, of which the left-wing elements in the State Department were a key part, ruled as an unelected and unaccountable fourth branch of the U.S. government that was dedicated to pursuing left-wing policies that no one had voted for. Trump and Rubio have rightly decided this has to end.

Their actions will provoke much consternation and pearl-clutching from the foreign-policy establishment and its liberal media cheerleaders. But their taking an axe to a portion of the State Department bureaucracy run by radicals is a victory for friends of Israel and American interests, and a clear defeat for their opponents who operate under the false flag of “human rights” advocacy.

Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of JNS (Jewish News Syndicate). Follow him: @jonathans_tobin.

jns.org · by Jonathan S. Tobin · April 24, 2025

10. Friends with Limits: The Future of Russo-Indian Defense Ties

Excerpts:

Between the floor and ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties is an important window for continued cooperation. India cannot afford to stop purchasing critical pieces of its arsenal from Russia, but neither can it afford to accentuate that dependence. Similarly, Russia has durable incentives to prove itself a reliable supplier, but neither can it risk crossing a line with Beijing.

U.S. policymakers need to appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian relations. Their ties are complex and reflect specific bilateral dynamics. They also reflect the emerging reality of a multipolar world in which states need not be “with or against” each other but may well be “with and against.” That Russia continues arming India is evidence. After all, Moscow is arming New Delhi against its “no limits” friend in Beijing. China and Russia will continue to deepen their relationship for the foreseeable future. All the while, China and India will remain bitter competitors. Despite the apparent contradictions, this triangle is durable. The three powers have found an equilibrium.

In an increasingly multipolar world, U.S. policymakers should also learn to keep multiple opposing ideas in their minds at the same time. Managing such contradictions is not only possible — it will be necessary.

Friends with Limits: The Future of Russo-Indian Defense Ties - War on the Rocks

Daniel Markey and David Brostoff

warontherocks.com · by Daniel Markey · April 25, 2025

Earlier this year, a Russian Su-57 fighter jet roared across Indian skies, capturing attention at the Aero India exhibition. The Kremlin’s aspirations for the showcase were transparent: Moscow offered to sell its fifth-generation fighter jet to New Delhi the next day.

This is nothing new. Defense ties between the two countries go back decades. For the Biden administration, those ties were both an irritant and a puzzle: an irritant because India’s purchases undercut U.S. sanctions after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and a puzzle because even as Moscow drew into a “no limits” friendship with Beijing and New Delhi took an obvious Westward-tilt, Russia never abandoned India to score points with China. Russia could have exacerbated India’s military vulnerabilities at a time of serious border tensions with China. It never did.

Fast forward to the present: The Trump administration now negotiates directly with Russia over Ukraine and a host of other issues and has softened its stance to the point of leaving Russia off its tariff target list. Clearly, weaning India off Russian arms purchases will be a lesser priority for the United States, even if the White House will undoubtedly seek more defense deals of its own with New Delhi. Does this mean that Russo-Indian defense ties are poised for takeoff, or will India continue to steer the relationship into “managed decline?”

Neither.

Instead, Russo-Indian defense ties are headed for a future of managed equilibrium. This is because the relationship is dictated mainly by the interests of these two countries themselves, which often lie beyond Washington’s influence. At its core, the relationship is resilient and durable. Foundational Russian and Indian interests set its floor and ceiling. The floor explains why India will not abandon Russia for the United States, as well as why Russia will not sell India out for China. The ceiling explains why certain types of bilateral defense cooperation are likely to be ruled out, even if a near-term uptick in defense ties is plausible.

The more U.S. policymakers appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties, the better they will be at anticipating the likely trajectory of this geopolitical pairing that is only likely to become more important in the decades to come.

Become a Member

The Current Baseline in Russo-Indian Arms Ties

Moscow and New Delhi’s military relationship is primarily defined by arms sales, and to a lesser extent, by co-production arrangements. Over the past twenty years, India purchased $60 billion of Russian arms, amounting to 65 percent of its total weapons imports. Over that same period, Indian purchases declined in relative terms as it diversified its suppliers. Russia remains India’s largest single arms supplier, but over the past five years, the United States, France, and Israel together provided India with 55 percent of its total weapons imports.

Yet, Russian systems are not just a Cold War legacy for India. Over the past decade, India’s navy, army, and air force have made major investments in Russian-built platforms and munitions that play vital roles in defending against existential threats and are almost certain to be in service for decades to come.

For its navy, India has agreed to purchase four stealth frigates from Russia, two as imports and two to be built by India’s Goa Shipyard Limited with Russian support. India commissioned the first Russian frigate in December 2024, with the second expected in 2025. India will build the last two between 2026 and 2027. India expects to add a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine by 2028, under a ten-year lease of the INS Chakra III. And India’s indigenously built ballistic missile submarines, which it sees as an essential piece of its nuclear deterrent, reportedly also required extensive Russian technology and technical assistance.

To defend its skies, India took delivery of three highly capable Russian-made S-400 air defense squadrons in 2023 and expects two more by 2025. India’s air force currently operates 259 Russian-designed Su-30 MKIs, and in 2024, New Delhi awarded Hindustan Aeronautics Limited a contract to produce twelve more.

On land, India’s main tank fleet is comprised of 2,400 Russian-made T-72 tanks. In 2025, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to a $248 million contract for new 1,000 horsepower engines to boost mobility and lethality. Indian troops increasingly use the Russian AK-203 assault rifle, built in India through a joint-production deal. By July 2024, that deal delivered 35,000 new assault rifles to the Indian Army.

One of India’s most capable missile systems, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, is the product of a joint venture with Russia. India equips its Su-30 MKI fighter jets with BrahMos missiles and deploys them along the disputed border with China. The missile is one of India’s few arms export success stories. In 2022, the Philippines signed a $375 million contract, with the first delivery taking place in 2024. Sales to Vietnam and Indonesia are also in the works.

Durable and Resilient Ties

Both India and Russia have clear interests in preserving bilateral defense ties. Their long history of cooperation engenders familiarity and trust. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided political, economic, and military aid to India. During the 1960s, Soviet arms accounted for about 70 percent of Indian weapons imports. In 1971, the two countries further strengthened their ties by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Historical memory and well-worn institutional ties are important foundations for the contemporary Russo-Indian relationship.

India’s immediate security concerns also keep it tethered to Russia. New Delhi faces a perpetually hostile Pakistan and an increasingly threatening China. India’s border tensions with China spiked in 2020, when forces clashed in the Galwan Valley, killing twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers. Across India’s neighborhood, China’s military presence is growing. Since 2008, China’s navy has deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions. In 2014, China’s navy sent its first submarines to the Indian Ocean, surfacing in Sri Lanka. A few years later, China established a military base in Djibouti. Indian strategists are concerned about Chinese access to ports throughout the region, including Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh. China justifies its growing military presence in the region by declaring: “the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean.”

Facing such immediate concerns, India does not have the luxury of time or resources to replace its Russian kit. Nor can it count on other suppliers for the most sensitive and technologically advanced platforms, such as nuclear submarines or missile defense systems. Moreover, India’s leaders pursue a “multi-alignment or multi-vector” strategy in which they build and maintain diverse relationships in an increasingly multipolar world order as a way to best preserve India’s autonomy and extract benefits. New Delhi anticipates that Russia will remain a great power in that order, so maintaining close ties with Moscow — while also strengthening cooperation with Washington — is a priority.

The Kremlin likewise recognizes its interests in preserving its relationship with India, especially after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Laboring under U.S. and European sanctions, Russia has turned to Chinese and Indian markets. In addition to India’s vastly increased oil purchases, Indian arms imports provide Russia with greater economic stability in the near term and a viable growth opportunity for the future. In that respect, Russia is also making a calculated bet on India’s rising power and wealth. “India should undoubtedly be added to the list of superpowers,” Putin said, “We are developing relations with India in all directions. India is a great country, now the largest in terms of population.”

At the same time, the Kremlin’s support for the Indian military reflects Russia’s firm determination to defend its autonomy even as it becomes more dependent on China. In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the two revolutionary states declared a “friendship” with “no limits.” Both countries continue to share an interest in undermining U.S. influence, but as the war in Ukraine grinds on, Beijing and Moscow’s relationship has become increasingly asymmetrical. Western sanctions have made Russia dependent on trade with China for economic stability. Attritional warfare also forced the Russian defense industrial base to rely on Chinese dual-use technologies and machine tools. Moscow is undeniably the weaker player in the relationship but is unlikely to be satisfied living in Beijing’s shadow. It hopes to preserve its freedom of action and to maintain independent relations with other world powers. With this aim in mind, Russia likely perceives its ties with India as a vital alternative and counterbalance to China over the long haul.

Finally, the Kremlin’s current slate of arms sales to India does not pose a serious threat to China. They do not alter the overall military balance of power, which remains heavily tilted in China’s favor. This asymmetry is especially visible along the contested Line of Actual Control, where Chinese infrastructure outpaces India’s by an estimated 25 years. This advantage allows China to station troops and deploy weapons systems more effectively, ensuring rapid mobilization along the border. Russia, therefore, can profit off sales to India, bet on its future, and symbolically protect its autonomy without posing a real threat to its more important friend in Beijing.

Friends with Limits

Despite the robust military ties between Russia and India, there are clear limitations to their relationship, both from New Delhi’s side and Moscow’s. India’s ceiling is largely driven by its desire to diversify its weapons sources. India’s goal of strategic autonomy requires access to a broad range of military partners as well as a more capable indigenous defense industry. India, therefore, is hesitant to tie itself too closely to any single source, especially one as troubled as Russia.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted other risks of over-reliance on Russian arms as well. Some prominent Indian analysts voiced concerns about the performance of Russian weaponry in the conflict. “How come the Patriots took down the Kinzhal missiles that were touted as invincible? How come Russian ships are becoming such easy targets from a country that does not have a navy? Its spy planes such as A-50s, and fighter jets such as Sukhois have been downed so effectively,” one Indian defense analyst noted. Moreover, deliveries to India appear to have been delayed due to COVID-19 supply chain disruptions and the war in Ukraine. Russia delayed production and delivery of its stealth frigates, nuclear-power attack submarine, S-400 regiments, and AK-203 assault rifles to India. In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, fearing plodding production, India also backed out of deals to purchase Mi-17 V5 helicopters and Kamov Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters.

Additionally, assuming India continues to seek a stronger strategic partnership with the United States, it will need to weigh any new ties to Moscow against Washington’s likely response. Under the Biden administration, India ran the risk of antagonizing a White House eager to put the screws to Russia and to defend Ukraine. Under the Trump administration, India runs a greater risk of disappointing a president who prioritizes trade balances and is keen on selling more U.S.-made arms to the world. Either way, India faces a tough balancing act.

Finally, purchasing new Russian systems could exacerbate problems of interoperability across the Indian armed forces where U.S. and European systems are also used, given their incompatible communications and software protocols. Similarly, Washington — already somewhat wary about sharing certain types of technology and intelligence with New Delhi because of its close ties with Moscow — will likely continue to restrict cooperation, especially if India doubles down on buying new Russian arms.

For Russia, the ceiling of its sales to India is set by the Kremlin’s relationship with China. Today, Beijing is Moscow’s most important strategic partner and the second-largest purchaser of Russian arms, including advanced capabilities such as the Sukhoi Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 air defense systems. Over the past 20 years, 30 percent of all Russian arms exports went to India, while 20 percent went to China. The story has remained fairly constant, even as China’s total arms imports have declined while its domestic arms industry has grown. Over the past five years, India’s share of total Russian arms exports rose to 34 percent, but China’s still amounted to 18 percent. Although Russia’s arms industry is most reliant on Indian purchases, it is also dependent on Chinese purchases. India is a significant buyer, but its resources are limited and cannot singlehandedly support Russia’s entire defense industry. This leaves Moscow vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure.

Russia will therefore likely remain cautious about entering into new defense deals with India that might antagonize China. So far, Beijing does not appear to have used its considerable leverage against Moscow to halt arms transfers to New Delhi. But Russia and India’s agreements for advanced capabilities all pre-date Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” friendship (the frigate deal was inked in 2016, the S-400s in 2018).

China could conceivably warn Russia against transferring more state-of-the-art technology. For instance, the sale of fifth-generation aircraft to India and the jointly developed BrahMos missile to South China Sea claimants could cross a red line, as these moves could limit Chinese ambitions across the Indo-Pacific. Under such circumstances, Russia would likely trim its plans for new deals with India, particularly avoiding large transactions at politically sensitive moments for Beijing. Fully aware of all these dynamics, India is likely to pursue only those deals with Russia that it anticipates won’t run too far afoul of China. In sum, while Moscow will continue to sell arms to New Delhi, both sides also appreciate the limitations of their relationship.

U.S. Policy in a Multipolar World

Between the floor and ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties is an important window for continued cooperation. India cannot afford to stop purchasing critical pieces of its arsenal from Russia, but neither can it afford to accentuate that dependence. Similarly, Russia has durable incentives to prove itself a reliable supplier, but neither can it risk crossing a line with Beijing.

U.S. policymakers need to appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian relations. Their ties are complex and reflect specific bilateral dynamics. They also reflect the emerging reality of a multipolar world in which states need not be “with or against” each other but may well be “with and against.” That Russia continues arming India is evidence. After all, Moscow is arming New Delhi against its “no limits” friend in Beijing. China and Russia will continue to deepen their relationship for the foreseeable future. All the while, China and India will remain bitter competitors. Despite the apparent contradictions, this triangle is durable. The three powers have found an equilibrium.

In an increasingly multipolar world, U.S. policymakers should also learn to keep multiple opposing ideas in their minds at the same time. Managing such contradictions is not only possible — it will be necessary.

Become a Member

Daniel S. Markey is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He was, until March 28, a senior advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

David Brostoff was, until March 28, a South Asia research analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Image: Ministry of Defence of India via Wikimedia Commons.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Daniel Markey · April 25, 2025

11. 'Sleazebag' reporter who exposed Signal scandal gets Trump White House invite for 'curious' reason

Excerpts:

Trump also invited a pair of other reporters from the publication who has ripped in the past.

'Jeffrey is bringing with him Michael Scherer and Ashley Parker, not exactly pro-Trump writers, either, to put it mildly!' Trump wrote.

'The story they are writing, they have told my representatives, will be entitled, “The Most Consequential President of this Century,” Trump posted, in a topic that could not be immediately confirmed.

Then he explained the unexpected reason he had even consented to the meeting.

'I am doing this interview out of curiosity, and as a competition with myself, just to see if it’s possible for The Atlantic to be “truthful.” Are they capable of writing a fair story on “TRUMP”? The way I look at it, what can be so bad – I WON!' he concluded.

'Sleazebag' reporter who exposed Signal scandal gets Trump White House invite for 'curious' reason

Goldberg got inadvertently included on group chat about military attack

By GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR

Published: 13:16 EDT, 24 April 2025 | Updated: 14:54 EDT, 24 April 2025

Daily Mail · by GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR · April 24, 2025

Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg is set to get a top White House briefing – on purpose, this time.

President Donald Trump, who is engaged in a feverish bid to sell his presidency as his 100th day in office approaches, revealed that he is sitting down with Goldberg, who he termed a 'sleazebag' after the journalist exposed the Signal group chat scandal.

'Later today I will be meeting with, of all people, Jeffrey Goldberg, the Editor of The Atlantic, and the person responsible for many fictional stories about me, including the made-up HOAX on “Suckers and Losers” and, SignalGate, something he was somewhat more “successful” with,' Trump wrote on his Truth Social site.

That last line acknowledged the impact of the story, which set off an internal White House probe as well as an IG investigation at the Pentagon, though both Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz have survived.

SignalGate refers to the encrypted group chat with top administration officials that Goldberg was inadvertently included on as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shared advance information about an attack on the Houthis in Yemen.

Goldberg published a story about it titled 'The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans' where he disclosed following the attack in real time from a store parking lot.

President Donald Trump says he is hosting Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg, who he previously slammed as a 'sleazebag.' Trump said the journalist had been more 'successful' with breaking the SignalGate story than with some other endeavors

The administration denied the chat included war plans and said the information wasn't classified, although officials were floored that top officials would discuss an imminent attack on an a private encrypted app.

Trump also invited a pair of other reporters from the publication who has ripped in the past.

'Jeffrey is bringing with him Michael Scherer and Ashley Parker, not exactly pro-Trump writers, either, to put it mildly!' Trump wrote.

'The story they are writing, they have told my representatives, will be entitled, “The Most Consequential President of this Century,” Trump posted, in a topic that could not be immediately confirmed.

Then he explained the unexpected reason he had even consented to the meeting.

'I am doing this interview out of curiosity, and as a competition with myself, just to see if it’s possible for The Atlantic to be “truthful.” Are they capable of writing a fair story on “TRUMP”? The way I look at it, what can be so bad – I WON!' he concluded.

Trump hits his 100-day mark next week, as his public approval rating has dropped to 44 percent in a new Fox news poll.

That puts Trump below all of his recent predecessors, and even a point behind his own first-term rating of 45 percent.

The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans'

Trump slammed the Fox polling unit in a Thursday post.

In the fury after the Signal story broke late last month, the Trump White House also attacked Goldberg over a 2020 story by Goldberg that reported Trump told senior staff that fallen soldiers were 'suckers' and 'losers.'

Trump denied the story at the time, although his former White House chief of staff John Kelly later confirmed elements of it in a statement.

Fox News star stunned on air after new Trump approval poll unveiled

There was concern in Trump's story after the Signal story broke about whether Waltz, who created the group chat, had been speaking to Goldberg.

But it was since reported that the snafu may have occurred because aid aide added Goldberg's information to another security staffer's name.

In addition to his media outreach, Trump has planned a trip to battleground Michigan next week in advance of his 100th day.

He flies to Rome Friday to attend the funeral for Pope Francis, and will have a press corps in tow as he confronts the war in Ukraine and the ongoing trade war.

Daily Mail · by GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR · April 24, 2025

12. How the War in Gaza Drove Israel’s A.I. Experiments

How the War in Gaza Drove Israel’s A.I. Experiments

Israel developed new artificial intelligence tools to gain an advantage in the war. The technologies have sometimes led to fatal consequences.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/25/technology/israel-gaza-ai.html

By Sheera Frenkel and Natan Odenheimer

Sheera Frenkel reported from San Francisco and Natan Odenheimer from Jerusalem.

April 25, 2025

In late 2023, Israel was aiming to assassinate Ibrahim Biari, a top Hamas commander in the northern Gaza Strip who had helped plan the Oct. 7 massacres. But Israeli intelligence could not find Mr. Biari, who they believed was hidden in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza.

So Israeli officers turned to a new military technology infused with artificial intelligence, three Israeli and American officials briefed on the events said. The technology was developed a decade earlier but had not been used in battle. Finding Mr. Biari provided new incentive to improve the tool, so engineers in Israel’s Unit 8200, the country’s equivalent of the National Security Agency, soon integrated A.I. into it, the people said.

Shortly thereafter, Israel listened to Mr. Biari’s calls and tested the A.I. audio tool, which gave an approximate location for where he was making his calls. Using that information, Israel ordered airstrikes to target the area on Oct. 31, 2023, killing Mr. Biari. More than 125 civilians also died in the attack, according to Airwars, a London-based conflict monitor.

Image

Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip on Oct. 31, 2023. Ibrahim Biari, a top Hamas commander, was killed in airstrikes that day.Credit...Avishag Shaar-Yashuv for The New York Times

The audio tool was just one example of how Israel has used the war in Gaza to rapidly test and deploy A.I.-backed military technologies to a degree that had not been seen before, according to interviews with nine American and Israeli defense officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the work is confidential.

In the past 18 months, Israel has also combined A.I. with facial recognition software to match partly obscured or injured faces to real identities, turned to A.I. to compile potential airstrike targets, and created an Arabic-language A.I. model to power a chatbot that could scan and analyze text messages, social media posts and other Arabic-language data, two people with knowledge of the programs said.

Many of these efforts were a partnership between enlisted soldiers in Unit 8200 and reserve soldiers who work at tech companies such as Google, Microsoft and Meta, three people with knowledge of the technologies said. Unit 8200 set up what became known as “The Studio,” an innovation hub and place to match experts with A.I. projects, the people said.

Yet even as Israel raced to develop the A.I. arsenal, deployment of the technologies sometimes led to mistaken identifications and arrests, as well as civilian deaths, the Israeli and American officials said. Some officials have struggled with the ethical implications of the A.I. tools, which could result in increased surveillance and other civilian killings.

No other nation has been as active as Israel in experimenting with A.I. tools in real-time battles, European and American defense officials said, giving a preview of how such technologies may be used in future wars — and how they might also go awry.

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“The urgent need to cope with the crisis accelerated innovation, much of it A.I.-powered,” said Hadas Lorber, the head of the Institute for Applied Research in Responsible A.I. at Israel’s Holon Institute of Technology and a former senior director at the Israeli National Security Council. “It led to game-changing technologies on the battlefield and advantages that proved critical in combat.”

But the technologies “also raise serious ethical questions,” Ms. Lorber said. She warned that A.I. needs checks and balances, adding that humans should make the final decisions.

A spokeswoman for Israel’s military said she could not comment on specific technologies because of their “confidential nature.” Israel “is committed to the lawful and responsible use of data technology tools,” she said, adding that the military was investigating the strike on Mr. Biari and was “unable to provide any further information until the investigation is complete.”

Meta and Microsoft declined to comment. Google said it has “employees who do reserve duty in various countries around the world. The work those employees do as reservists is not connected to Google.”

Israel previously used conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon to experiment with and advance tech tools for its military, such as drones, phone hacking tools and the Iron Dome defense system, which can help intercept short-range ballistic missiles.

After Hamas launched cross-border attacks into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, killing more than 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages, A.I. technologies were quickly cleared for deployment, four Israeli officials said. That led to the cooperation between Unit 8200 and reserve soldiers in “The Studio” to swiftly develop new A.I. capabilities, they said.

Avi Hasson, the chief executive of Startup Nation Central, an Israeli nonprofit that connects investors with companies, said reservists from Meta, Google and Microsoft had become crucial in driving innovation in drones and data integration.

“Reservists brought know-how and access to key technologies that weren’t available in the military,” he said.

Israel’s military soon used A.I. to enhance its drone fleet. Aviv Shapira, founder and chief executive of XTEND, a software and drone company that works with the Israeli military, said A.I.-powered algorithms were used to build drones to lock on and track targets from a distance.

“In the past, homing capabilities relied on zeroing in on to an image of the target,” he said. “Now A.I. can recognize and track the object itself — may it be a moving car, or a person — with deadly precision.”

Mr. Shapira said his main clients, the Israeli military and the U.S. Department of Defense, were aware of A.I.’s ethical implications in warfare and discussed responsible use of the technology.

One tool developed by “The Studio” was an Arabic-language A.I. model known as a large language model, three Israeli officers familiar with the program said. (The large language model was earlier reported by Plus 972, an Israeli-Palestinian news site.)

Developers previously struggled to create such a model because of a dearth of Arabic-language data to train the technology. When such data was available, it was mostly in standard written Arabic, which is more formal than the dozens of dialects used in spoken Arabic.

The Israeli military did not have that problem, the three officers said. The country had decades of intercepted text messages, transcribed phone calls and posts scraped from social media in spoken Arabic dialects. So Israeli officers created the large language model in the first few months of the war and built a chatbot to run queries in Arabic. They merged the tool with multimedia databases, allowing analysts to run complex searches across images and videos, four Israeli officials said.

When Israel assassinated the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September, the chatbot analyzed the responses across the Arabic-speaking world, three Israeli officers said. The technology differentiated among different dialects in Lebanon to gauge public reaction, helping Israel to assess if there was public pressure for a counterstrike.

Image

People raised placards bearing pictures of the slain Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, right, at a rally in Rabat in March.Credit...Abdel Majid Bziouat/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

At times, the chatbot could not identify some modern slang terms and words that were transliterated from English to Arabic, two officers said. That required Israeli intelligence officers with expertise in different dialects to review and correct its work, one of the officers said.

The chatbot also sometimes provided wrong answers — for instance, returning photos of pipes instead of guns — two Israeli intelligence officers said. Even so, the A.I. tool significantly accelerated research and analysis, they said.

At temporary checkpoints set up between the northern and southern Gaza Strip, Israel also began equipping cameras after the Oct. 7 attacks with the ability to scan and send high-resolution images of Palestinians to an A.I.-backed facial recognition program.

This system, too, sometimes had trouble identifying people whose faces were obscured. That led to arrests and interrogations of Palestinians who were mistakenly flagged by the facial recognition system, two Israeli intelligence officers said.

Israel also used A.I. to sift through data amassed by intelligence officials on Hamas members. Before the war, Israel built a machine-learning algorithm — code-named “Lavender” — that could quickly sort data to hunt for low-level militants. It was trained on a database of confirmed Hamas members and meant to predict who else might be part of the group. Though the system’s predictions were imperfect, Israel used it at the start of the war in Gaza to help choose attack targets.

Image

Destruction from the war in Gaza. The Israeli military’s machine-learning algorithm “Lavender” was used at the start of the war to help choose attack targets.Credit...Jehad Alshrafi/Associated Press

Few goals loomed larger than finding and eliminating Hamas’s senior leadership. Near the top of the list was Mr. Biari, the Hamas commander who Israeli officials believed played a central role in planning the Oct. 7 attacks.

Israel’s military intelligence quickly intercepted Mr. Biari’s calls with other Hamas members but could not pinpoint his location. So they turned to the A.I.-backed audio tool, which analyzed different sounds, such as sonic bombs and airstrikes.

After deducing an approximate location for where Mr. Biari was placing his calls, Israeli military officials were warned that the area, which included several apartment complexes, was densely populated, two intelligence officers said. An airstrike would need to target several buildings to ensure Mr. Biari was assassinated, they said. The operation was greenlit.

Since then, Israeli intelligence has also used the audio tool alongside maps and photos of Gaza’s underground tunnel maze to locate hostages. Over time, the tool was refined to more precisely find individuals, two Israeli officers said.

The War in Gaza

Israel Loosened Its Rules to Bomb Hamas Fighters, Killing Many More Civilians

Dec. 26, 2024

Israel Deploys Expansive Facial Recognition Program in Gaza

March 27, 2024

A Deadly Airstrike, and Gazans at the Breaking Point

Oct. 31, 2023

Sheera Frenkel is a reporter based in the San Francisco Bay Area, covering the ways technology impacts everyday lives with a focus on social media companies, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, YouTube, Telegram and WhatsApp.

13. Top Russian general killed in Moscow as U.S. envoy talks with Putin

Top Russian general killed in Moscow as U.S. envoy talks with Putin

Russia’s Foreign Ministry called it a “terrorist attack,” and surveillance footage showed a car exploding as Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik was approaching it in a Moscow suburb.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/25/russia-ukraine-witkoff-moskalik-general-killed/

A destroyed car in the courtyard of residential buildings following a blast in Balashikha, Moscow region on Friday. (Tatyana Makeyeva/AFP/Getty Images)

By Mary Ilyushina

A high-ranking Russian military official was killed Friday in an explosion in a suburb of Moscow, in what authorities are treating as a case of murder. The incident coincides with the meeting of President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, in Moscow for high-stakes talks with President Vladimir Putin.

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Russia’s Investigative Committee, its top policing body, has launched a criminal investigation into the death of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, who was killed when a vehicle rigged with an improvised explosive device packed with shrapnel detonated. Surveillance footage published from the scene suggested Moskalik was walking past the car at the time of the explosion.

Kommersant newspaper, citing sources close to the investigation, reported that the device was detonated remotely and that Moskalik had been under surveillance via a camera installed inside the vehicle.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called it a “terrorist attack.”

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Moskalik was part of the Russian delegation negotiating the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula in 2014 and its limited invasion of eastern Ukraine. He participated of a meeting in 2019 over the failed peace process that also included Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, according to Russian media.

Russian military bloggers who support the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have reacted strongly to Moskalik’s death. The influential Rybar channel, run by blogger Mikhail Zvinchuk who has close ties to the defense establishment, described him as “one of the most intelligent and demanding officers in the Main Directorate of the General Staff — not well-liked, because he demanded results and was relentlessly tough on his subordinates.”

“Given the high-profile nature of the target and the method of execution, there is little doubt Ukrainian special services were involved,” the blogger said of Moskalik’s death.

Ukrainian officials have not publicly commented on the incident.

Rybar compared it to the killing of Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Biological and Chemical Defense Forces, in December. The Investigative Committee at the time said Kirillov was killed by a remotely detonated explosive planted in a scooter parked outside a residential complex in Moscow.

Kirillov was the highest-ranking Russian military official to be killed outside combat since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Kirillov’s assistant was also killed. The SBU, Ukraine’s domestic security service, was responsible for the “special operation,” according to an agency official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter.

Ukrainian special services have also previously claimed responsibility for several attacks on high-ranking Russian military officials. In November, a senior Russian naval officer, Valery Trankovsky, was killed in a car bombing in Crimea.

An official in Ukraine’s security services told the Ukrainian Pravda outlet at the time that the agency had orchestrated the attack that killed Trankovsky, the chief of staff of the 41st Missile Brigade of the Black Sea fleet.

1:29

The Post’s Siobhán O'Grady reports from the site of a Russian missile strike in Kyiv on April 24 during peace talks. (Video: Zoeann Murphy, Siobhán O'Grady, Naomi Schanen/The Washington Post)

Witkoff is meeting Putin for the fourth time as peace talks have reached a critical juncture. Trump claimed Wednesday that Russia was ready for a deal, but that Zelensky was proving difficult.

Ukraine accepted a U.S. proposal for a full ceasefire in March, but Russia has not. The White House has since proposed increasingly generous terms for Russia, including U.S. recognition of Russian sovereignty in the strategic Crimean Peninsula. Zelensky has demanded a ceasefire before he will talk about concessions.

Trump issued a rare rebuke to Russia on Thursday after an attack on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities calling it “not necessary, and very bad timing.”

The strike, the latest in a devastating series of Russian attacks on civilians, comes amid growing pressure from the White House for Kyiv to accept a land-for-peace deal. With no firm security assurances on the table, the proposal is seen by many Ukrainians as a lopsided agreement that rewards aggression and undermines their sovereignty and long-term security.

Witkoff has recently presented European and Ukrainian officials in Paris a proposal meant to “represent the final offer from the United States to both sides,” a deal he is expected to negotiate with Putin.

The proposal floated U.S. recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Trump in a recent interview with Time magazine said that “Crimea will stay with Russia” as part of the negotiations. “And Zelensky understands that, and everybody understands that it’s been with them for a long time.”

U.S. recognition of Russia’s claim to Crimea would represent a major victory for Putin’s long-standing objective of sidelining Washington from its role as a global enforcer.

The deal Witkoff presented in Paris also suggests that sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 in relation to its aggression toward Ukraine would be lifted, which would pave way for the two countries to strike deals on energy and in other industrial sectors.

In Moscow, Witkoff also met with Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s business envoy in the talks, who has presented multiple economic proposals to Trump as part of broader negotiations through which the Kremlin aims to normalize relations with Washington.

What readers are saying

The comments largely express approval of the targeted killing of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, viewing it as a legitimate act of warfare against a military target. Many commenters criticize Russia's actions in Ukraine, highlighting the indiscriminate targeting of civilians by... Show more

This summary is AI-generated. AI can make mistakes and this summary is not a replacement for reading the comments.

War in Ukraine

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By Mary Ilyushina

Mary Ilyushina, a reporter on the Foreign Desk of The Washington Post, covers Russia and the region. She began her career in independent Russian media before joining CNN’s Moscow bureau as a field producer in 2017. She has been with The Post since 2021. She speaks Russian, English, Ukrainian and Arabic.follow on X@maryilyushina

14. Mobilization, Movement, and Major War: Lessons from Desert Shield for Today’s Total Army

Excerpts:

Across all three COMPOs, there is a delicate balance between readiness at both the individual and the collective level and the maintenance readiness of vehicles and equipment. Alternative means of training and exercise should be enabled, but only if it is an effective tool that enhances readiness. Distributed learning and mobile training teams can provide partial solutions. Maintenance readiness levels are an ongoing challenge across the Army, in both active and reserve components. Units may have overages of vehicles and equipment that, despite being on their property books, do not contribute to unit lethality or readiness to conduct mobilization and deployment. Disposing of excess or obsolete equipment is a course of action, but it must be done in a way that advances readiness.

Just two days after the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued its deployment order in early August 1990, the first US soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia. Five days later, the first ship carrying Army equipment was underway. In just six months, there were more US soldiers in Saudi Arabia than there were Americans living in Newark, New Jersey or Tampa, Florida, along with nearly 2.3 million tons of materiel. In the event of a major war, the Army could be called on repeat such a feat. But seeking to do so without learning the difficult lessons from Operation Desert Shield would be a grave mistake.

Mobilization, Movement, and Major War: Lessons from Desert Shield for Today’s Total Army - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Stewart W. Bentley · April 24, 2025

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At 8:50 pm on August 6, 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a deployment order. It was the first formal move in what would three days later be officially named Operation Desert Shield. The United States Army’s mobilization and deployment of the equivalent of three corps-sized units for the operation was a phenomenal logistical achievement. Like its sister services, the Army overcame significant planning and operational challenges move manpower, weapons, vehicles, and the other materiel necessary to respond to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Despite the passage of twenty-five years, the scope of the Desert Shield deployment offers lessons for today’s Army in the event of large-scale combat operations across its components—COMPO 1 (active Army), COMPO 2 (Army National Guard) and COMPO 3 (Army Reserve).

The Desert Storm Buildup

Due to the nature of the immediate threat of an Iraqi assault into Saudi Arabia following the occupation of Kuwait, the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready brigade was the first Army unit to land in country and was on the ground within thirty-one hours of alert (which included flight time). The brigade’s immediate mission was to secure airfields outside of Dammam for follow-on ground and US Air Force units. Simultaneously, Air Force aircraft were flying into theater and would have been vulnerable on the ground if an Iraqi air or missile attack had occurred. This necessitated the deployment of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade with its Patriot batteries. The following graphic depicts the deployment timeframe for XVIII Airborne Corps units.

As this graphic illustrates, the majority of deploying soldiers were airlifted into theater via either military or commercial airlift. Unit equipment was primarily shipped via sealift. Of note, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment initially moved their equipment via rail from their home station at Fort Cavazos (then Fort Hood), Texas to ports for sealift movement, followed by the movement of the units’ soldiers via airlift.

A report on the logistics of the buildup for Operation Desert Shield noted the magnitude of the undertaking:

The amount of Army equipment and supplies shipped to Saudi Arabia in six months totaled 2,280,000 tons, most of it by sealift. In a similar period 1,622,000 tons were shipped to Korea and 1,376,000 tons were shipped to Vietnam.

Over 15,400 flights were flown by military and civil aircraft under control of the Military Airlift Command throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm deployments. The flights carried more than 484,000 passengers and more than 524,000 tons of cargo.

In 1990, the Army was structured under what was the called the Total Army concept. Active duty divisions would optimally consist of two active duty brigades and one Army Reserve or National Guard brigade. The idea was to pair up units and permit them to train together and, if needed, fight together.

Source: “Ready to Serve? The 48th, 155th, and 256th Brigades and the Roundout Concept During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Major James T. Brady II (US Army Command and General Staff College)

On paper and in theory, this looked impressive. However, in practice and considering after-action reports, including congressional hearings, the structure had significant shortcomings.

There was initial (and to a degree, ongoing) controversy regarding the call-ups of three National Guard roundout brigades to support their assigned divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division’s roundout brigade was the 155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi Army National Guard). The 5th Mechanized Infantry Division was assigned the 256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana Army National Guard). The 24th Infantry Division had the 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia Army National Guard). In the end none of the three National Guard roundout brigades would deploy to the Middle East.

The rationale for not deploying these units was that President George H. W. Bush had only ordered a partial mobilization and that there were adequate active duty brigades available for deployment into theater. However, Army leaders at the time were apparently concerned about deficient leadership and training, maintenance, and individual soldier deployability. These concerns were amplified following a public relations disaster in which dozens of soldiers of the 256th Infantry Brigade went AWOL and complained about their poor deployment training conditions. Information that became available after the fact validated these concerns. In an evaluation of the three roundout brigades’ role during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, an Army officer put it succinctly: “Unit readiness, unrealistic requirements, and time all played their part in stopping the brigades from deploying.”

While the roundout brigade concept was not employed, the need for support and sustainment units from the Reserve and National Guard was critical.

During Operation Desert Shield, 297 National Guard units made up of 37,484 soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia with an additional 84 units and 10,132 soldiers deployed in the United States or in Europe or awaiting deployment orders.

Most of the National Guard units that deployed into theater were combat support and combat service support. These units filled multiple gaps within COMPO 1, notably transportation, military police, and intelligence functions. Anecdotal information indicates that these Guardsmen were better prepared to deploy because in some cases, their civilian occupation mirrored their military occupational specialties.

COMPO 1 military intelligence units, especially in the XVIII Airborne Corps, focused for years on potential threats and missions in Central and South America, had virtually no Arabic linguists for the all-important tasks of prisoner interrogation or communications intercepts. The same held true for VII Corps units, whose historical focus had been on the Europe and the Warsaw Pact. The shortfall was addressed with the deployment of 344 linguists from the 300th Military Intelligence Brigade of the Utah National Guard.

While there were two National Guard combat arms units (the142nd and the 196th Field Artillery Brigades) involved in Operation Desert Storm, the three mobilized roundout brigades had yet to complete the process of being validated for deployment. Only one of the three would achieve validation. Of note, nearly all of the active duty field artillery units from COMPO 1 were deployed—even from those corps that did not deploy. The others remained in the United States and Europe as reserves.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the efficacy of the National Guard roundout brigades compared to that of the active duty replacement brigades during Desert Shield is instructive and harsh. There were four major findings:

“Active brigade officers and noncommissioned officers were better trained to lead.” There was a wide disparity in the percentages of junior officers (below the rank of major) who had completed their respective branch basic courses and advanced courses. While most active duty officers had completed their professional education courses, many National Guard officers had not. For example, only slightly more than 50 percent of officers in two of the roundout brigades had completed the advanced course. Noncommissioned officer professional development course completion rates were very similar: In one of the National Guard brigades, only 28 percent of noncommissioned officers had completed the Primary Leadership Development Course, while in another the figure was 51 percent.
“Active brigade soldiers were more ready for deployment and better trained in individual job and crew skills.” There were significant manning shortages in the National Guard brigades, which had a negative impact on collective training and crew proficiency. In addition, the active brigades had significantly higher percentages of soldiers fully trained in their military occupational specialties than their Guard counterparts.
“More collective training opportunities resulted in active brigades that were more combat ready.” Collective unit training at the platoon through battalion levels occurred more frequently for the active brigades than it did for the Guard units. Unsurprisingly this resulted in better performance by active units having undergone not just local training exercises but also rotations at combat training centers, unlike their Guard counterparts.
“New equipment for replacement brigades did not pose difficulties,” but both active duty and National Guard brigade reported equipment shortages. Shortages of authorized equipment were present in both types of brigades. However, the GAO concluded that these shortages did not lead to an overall degradation of unit readiness. Of note, the specific shortages were related to nuclear, biological, and chemical equipment, communications equipment, and night-vision devices.

Lessons for Today

The mobilization for Operation Desert Shield was massive in its scale and its complexity, and the way it was conducted holds lessons for the Army today as it prepares for large-scale combat operations. In particular, the employment of forces across both active and reserve components—with widely varying degrees of success—is instructive across all three COMPOs.

Within COMPO 1, the challenges with the shift from brigade-centric expeditionary deployment to division and corps deployment are primarily ones of scale and scope. There is a cautionary note, though: While the Army prepares for large-scale combat operations against a near-peer pacing threat, the possibility exists that like Desert Shield, the United States is faced with a different threat in an unexpected theater.

In COMPO 2, the decision not to utilize the National Guard roundout brigades created significant morale and leadership challenges. The GAO report makes it clear that these units were not ready for deployment into a combat theater. This is far more an indictment of the condition of the National Guard at that time than of individual units—a conditions that did not lend itself toward soldier and unit readiness. Even with dramatically improved readiness, however, in the event of US involvement in large-scale combat operations, any mobilization and deployment period is going to require an extensive lead period to enable these units to prepare.

For COMPO 3, the activation, mobilization, and deployment of Army Reserve units differed from that of the National Guard. The majority of the 123,596 reservists activated and deployed were in combat support or combat service support missions. Records indicate that 25,138 mobilized reservists remained in the United States augmenting active duty forces, primarily at the airports and seaports. As of March 10, 1991, 13,170 soldiers had been recalled to active duty from the Individual Ready Reserve. As noted, those reservists whose civilian occupations were relevant to their military occupational specialties were better prepared for operations than those civilian jobs were not. This will also be the case in any future large-scale combat operations involving COMPO 3 units.

Across all three COMPOs, there is a delicate balance between readiness at both the individual and the collective level and the maintenance readiness of vehicles and equipment. Alternative means of training and exercise should be enabled, but only if it is an effective tool that enhances readiness. Distributed learning and mobile training teams can provide partial solutions. Maintenance readiness levels are an ongoing challenge across the Army, in both active and reserve components. Units may have overages of vehicles and equipment that, despite being on their property books, do not contribute to unit lethality or readiness to conduct mobilization and deployment. Disposing of excess or obsolete equipment is a course of action, but it must be done in a way that advances readiness.

Just two days after the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued its deployment order in early August 1990, the first US soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia. Five days later, the first ship carrying Army equipment was underway. In just six months, there were more US soldiers in Saudi Arabia than there were Americans living in Newark, New Jersey or Tampa, Florida, along with nearly 2.3 million tons of materiel. In the event of a major war, the Army could be called on repeat such a feat. But seeking to do so without learning the difficult lessons from Operation Desert Shield would be a grave mistake.

Dr. Stewart W. Bentley is a military analyst at the Deployment Process Modernization Officer at CASCOM, TRADOC. He is a former infantry and military intelligence officer with a master of science in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Renee L. Sitler, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Stewart W. Bentley · April 24, 2025

15. Do Americans support Trump’s attitudes to Ukraine and Russia? Here’s what recent data shows

Graphs at the link: https://theconversation.com/do-americans-support-trumps-attitudes-to-ukraine-and-russia-heres-what-recent-data-shows-255169

Do Americans support Trump’s attitudes to Ukraine and Russia? Here’s what recent data shows

theconversation.com · by Paul Whiteley

Donald Trump has threatened to walk away from the Ukraine peace talks if there is no progress soon. The implicit threat here is that the US will no longer get involved, perhaps withdrawing arms shipments and even humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

It is understood that the proposed plan the Trump team has been working on has involved Ukraine giving up territory including Crimea and giving up any possibility of joining Nato. The plan favours Russia’s recent demands and Trump has recently said he has found Russia much easier to deal with than Ukraine.

But which country do US voters feel closer to and which do they feel is more of an ally to their nation?

An Economist/YouGov poll conducted on March 17 asked Americans whether they thought Russia and Ukraine were allies or enemies. Some 2% thought Russia was an ally, compared with 46% who saw it as an enemy. In the case of Ukraine, the figures were 26% ally and 4% enemy. Given these figures, Trump’s Russia-friendly policy looks unpopular.

Meanwhile, the Cooperative Election Study data in the US has just been released. This project involves a large group of researchers who conducted a survey of 60,000 Americans at the time of the presidential election last year. This very large sample provides an accurate picture of US public opinion.

American attitudes to policy alternatives for dealing with the Ukraine war

Cooperative Election Survey, CC BY-SA

The survey included the following question: “As you may know Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. What should the U.S. do about the situation in Ukraine?” Respondents were asked to choose as many of the options shown in the above chart which they favoured, with some choosing one or two and others several.

This technique means that failing to choose an option does not mean they disagreed with it, since they may not have thought about it, were indifferent to it, or did not believe it would work.

It is clear from the chart that Americans do not want their troops to get involved in combat in the Ukraine, since only 5% chose this option. However, 22% agreed with the idea of sending military support staff, 33% agreed with sending military aid and 51% favoured sending humanitarian aid.

A key point is that only 23% said the US should not get involved. There is not much support among Americans for abandoning Ukraine.

Can President Trump abandon Ukraine?

This raises the question as to whether the US can simply walk away from the war as the president suggested. However, this could cause political problems for the Trump administration.

The US has already provided US$66.5 billion (£49.9 billion) of aid to the Ukraine. Abandoning the country would call into question Trump’s much vaunted negotiation skills and mean that achieving a peace deal, supported by 41% in the survey, had clearly failed.

When former president Joe Biden withdrew US forces from Afghanistan in 2021, he was heavily criticised by Republicans in the US Congress, despite the fact that the previous Trump administration had negotiated the agreement to withdraw. Rapid withdrawal now from Ukraine could attract even stronger criticisms in light of his earlier claims that he would settle conflict in 24 hours.

The chart below, based on questions in the survey, shows that American voters are not that reluctant to send troops abroad if they agree with the reasons for doing it. They were asked to choose as many of five policy alternatives relating to military interventions abroad.

Once again, different respondents chose different numbers of alternatives. The chart makes clear they are not enthusiastic about using military force to assist in the spread of democracy, or to ensure that the US has a regular supply of oil.

American support for using US military forces abroad

Cooperative Election Study, CC BY-SA

At the same time, it shows that 38% support using troops to prevent a genocide happening and 46% support using them to protect allies being attacked, or as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Finally, a majority support the idea of destroying a terrorist camp, a response probably influenced by the elimination of Osama Bin Laden by US special forces when Barack Obama was president in 2011.

There is no contradiction between a generalised willingness to use force in various circumstances and a reluctance to do this in Ukraine. Americans fighting in Ukraine would mean involvement in a war with Russia with all the risks that would entail.

But there was a strong willingness to support Ukraine prior to Trump’s second term and these attitudes suggest that if he tried to withdraw from Nato or continues to put forward a pro-Putin deal large numbers of American voters would be unhappy with this, and it could affect his support.

There has been global criticism of the Trump administration’s introduction of high tariffs and warnings of the consequences of these for the world economy. And what might be seen by many Americans as an abandonment for Ukraine would also alienate many international allies of the US, but so far Trump has not shown many signs of worrying about that.

theconversation.com · by Paul Whiteley

16. Will Xi Jinping start a war over Trump’s China tariffs?

Excerpts:

The US has never pressured China like this in the 53 years since Richard Nixon’s visit. There’s been a lot of talk but never much real pressure – except during Trump 1.0, which was only for a couple of years and never went for the jugular.

Xi might now count on the Americans losing interest and being placated and strung along with the promise of talks, and easing up.

But what if the Americans learned their lesson and realized China is already at war with the United States? The US didn’t start this war, but for the first time, it looks like it’s getting ready to fight.

Maybe Xi will figure now’s the time to shoot – or “go kinetic” in today’s jargon. A shooting war may not be how we would respond to tariffs. But we’re not Xi Jinping.

Will Xi Jinping start a war over Trump’s China tariffs? - Asia Times

Loath to be seen caving in, he might consider war against Taiwan or the Philippines well timed – as Trump would get the blame

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · April 24, 2025

What will China and in particular the Chinese Communist Party do now that President Donald Trump has slapped 145% tariffs on them? Most of the commentariat seems to think they’ll match the United States tit for tat on tariffs, complain mightily and then quietly put out feelers to cut a deal. And Trump has suggested they already are doing that.

Maybe so. That’s what we would do if we were Xi Jinping. But don’t expect Xi to respond the way America would.

Xi Jinping will let his own people absorb any amount of hardship. And he’s been telling them for years to get ready to “eat bitterness.” He’s also been sanctions-proofing the Chinese economy for years. While he’s not there yet, he’s not helpless, either.

Economic retaliation and narrative warfare

China has banned certain rare earth mineral exports, ordered Chinese companies not to buy Boeing aircraft, and placed 125% tariffs on American imports.

It has also enlisted US proxies, of whom there’s no shortage, to make the case that the American republic will collapse if Walmart’s everyday low prices go up.

Beijing will also use the American trade pressure to rally the public.

Xi can’t be seen caving in to the foreigners. If he does, his many domestic enemies might remove him, quite literally.

Even more fundamentally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in a battle to the death with the free world. The way the CCP sees things, only one of the two can survive – freedom is an existential threat to communism.

A strategic calculation

So, Xi (and his predecessors) have been preparing for war for years. Since at least 2019, state-linked media have said China is in a “people’s war” against the US.

Also, at his instruction, Xi’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is now competent enough to throw its weight around inside and beyond the first-island chain. Go about it right, and the PLA can even give the Americans a bloody nose.

So perhaps Xi Jinping thinks starting a shooting war is a reasonable option? He would have the advantage of surprise. The Americans don’t think he will (or don’t want to entertain the possibility).

It needn’t be against the US, with all that involves, but maybe against Taiwan or the Philippines? This would give the US and everyone else a massive jolt. A trade war and a potential nuclear war are two different things. There will be no end to people blaming President Trump, especially as Xi claims that “you Americans pushed me into it.”

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te (seated right) meets with US Senator Pete Ricketts (standing) at the Presidential Office in Taipei, April 18. Photo: Central News Agency

Out come the wolves

Every Democrat on Capitol Hill, for starters, and many RINOs (Republicans in Name Only) will blame Trump. As will all of Wall Street and most of America’s business class. Recall how many people fretted after 9/11 that the US somehow provoked Osama bin Laden into attacking: “Why do they hate us?”

It will be even easier when China (and Donald Trump) are involved. Such is Trump derangement syndrome.

But are the tariffs on the PRC, high as they are, enough to make war look like a good move for Xi?

It may not be the same as the oil and financial embargoes imposed on Imperial Japan in 1941. However, for the CCP, it’s bad enough in its own way. Especially if major or even smaller countries settle their disputes with the US, or refuse to absorb China’s rising exports, which could overwhelm their own domestic industries.

Need for hard currency

The Chinese can withstand punishment, but China’s Ponzi scheme economy depends on exports to earn hard currency. And also imports of American and Western technology.

The CCP hasn’t got half the foreign exchange it needs to meet its US dollar-denominated obligations. Or to buy what it needs: say, Australian iron ore to make steel to build PLAN ships. Nor does it have the US technology that, for example, went into the spy balloon that flew over America in 2023.

And Xi would prefer to keep people employed. China is still a place where 600 million people live on $5 a day, and many others live on less.

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It’s a volatile place. And maybe Trump has more than tariffs and readjusting the trade imbalance in mind. Perhaps this is building to a substantial decoupling from the Chinese market, thus creating free-world and “unfree world” trading blocs.

Even before the tariffs, the Trump administration’s America First Investment Policy was worrying China with its tightened restrictions on inward Chinese investment. And just as bad, clamping down on outbound American investment and tech transfers to the PRC.

Kinetic conflict?

The US has never pressured China like this in the 53 years since Richard Nixon’s visit. There’s been a lot of talk but never much real pressure – except during Trump 1.0, which was only for a couple of years and never went for the jugular.

Xi might now count on the Americans losing interest and being placated and strung along with the promise of talks, and easing up.

But what if the Americans learned their lesson and realized China is already at war with the United States? The US didn’t start this war, but for the first time, it looks like it’s getting ready to fight.

Maybe Xi will figure now’s the time to shoot – or “go kinetic” in today’s jargon. A shooting war may not be how we would respond to tariffs. But we’re not Xi Jinping.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America.

This article was originally published by Japan Forward and is republished with permission.

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asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · April 24, 2025

17. The Once and Future China

Excerpts:

China and the United States should both note that by the middle of the twenty-first century, the powers of the global South will be much stronger political, economic, and technological actors in their own right, not chess pieces in someone else’s game. The wider world is unlikely to take the West’s negative assessments of China as gospel; many outside the West will see the benefits of a China whose economic power, huge markets, and capacity to innovate in green energy and artificial intelligence is useful to them. But China’s military buildups and mercantilist economics will rebound on the country, reminding its partners that they should not become dependent on Beijing. A version of China that the world, including the global South, can live with would not have to be democratic or liberal. But it would need to be one that acknowledges its own errors, is much more transparent, and understands that any use of military or other coercive force (including in cyberspace) will fundamentally damage trust in its international relations.

China may well succeed in fulfilling the paired aspirations of the Qing era, the quest for geopolitical and economic power, along with the retention of a fundamental “Chinese essence.” But it will not do so if it chooses to start major military conflagrations in Asia. As long as a plausible case can be made that China is a military threat, Beijing gives the Western world an argument that can be used against it. By taking a less confrontational and militarist posture, however, China will give the West greater dilemmas to solve. Some Western countries may find Chinese-style welfarist authoritarianism attractive. Western policymakers and thinkers will have to determine whether a powerful state that is a geoeconomic and ideological challenge but not a military one still deserves to be treated as an existential danger.

A China that looks like the creator of a peaceful order in the 2040s will be much harder to argue against in the West and the wider world than its current confrontational incarnation. It is unclear whether China can really take that path. Still, over the past century, the least reliable way to predict what China will look like in 20 years has always been to extrapolate in a straight line from where it is now.

The Once and Future China

Foreign Affairs · by More by Rana Mitter · April 22, 2025

How Will Change Come to Beijing?

Rana Mitter

May/June 2025 Published on April 22, 2025

Yiran Jia

RANA MITTER is S. T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism.

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If you dropped in to China at any point in its modern history and tried to project 20 years into the future, you would almost certainly end up getting it wrong. In 1900, no one serving in the late Qing dynasty expected that in 20 years the country would be a republic feuded over by warlords. In 1940, as a fractious China staggered in the face of a massive Japanese invasion, few would have imagined that by 1960, it would be a giant communist state about to split with the Soviet Union. In 2000, the United States helped China over the finish line in joining the World Trade Organization, ushering the country into the liberal capitalist trading system with much fanfare. By 2020, China and the United States were at loggerheads and in the midst of a trade war.

Twenty years from now, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might still be in power in some fashion even into his 90s; Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978 to 1989, retained considerable influence until his death at 92, in 1997. Since taking the reins in 2012, Xi has pushed China in directions that have increasingly placed it at odds with its neighbors, regional powers, and the United States. At home, authorities are widening and deepening systems of surveillance and control, clamping down on ethnic minorities and narrowing the space for dissent. On its maritime borders, China engages in ever more confrontational acts that risk sparking conflicts not just with Taiwan but also with Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Farther afield, Beijing has tacitly supported Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and is widely believed to be responsible for major cyber-interference in Western infrastructure. This trend is hardly promising, and things could get even worse were China to take the bold step of starting a war over Taiwan, an operation for which the Chinese military has long been preparing.

And yet another China remains possible—one that would allow a degree of coexistence with the United States and its allies and partners without requiring the sacrifice of essential global interests or values. To be sure, China may never become the kind of country many Western optimists imagined in the early post–Cold War decades: a gradually more liberal and obliging member of the U.S.-led international order. That horse bolted the stable long ago. But in 20 years, a version of China could emerge with which the West and the wider world can coexist, as long as both China and Western governments avoid the policies that would make conflict inescapable.

That coexistence would not be especially warm, but it would have shed the kind of friction and animosity that loom over relations today. The generation of Chinese leaders after Xi, many of whom came of age during the modest openings of the 1980s, 1990s, and the first decade of this century, might well want to return the country to the promise of those periods. They may also realize that entanglement in any significant military or geoeconomic confrontation will prevent China from achieving its other aims, such as reviving the economy to achieve middle-class growth at home and spread the country’s influence abroad. Beijing cannot wage a big war and still attain economic security. Its aging society and the imperatives of greater regional economic integration to sustain its growth make it harder to endure the consequences of a major conflict—or even just a more confrontational regional and global posture.

But even if China avoids triggering immense conflicts with its neighbors and the West in the near future, it will not simply become a placid member of a steadily eroding liberal international order. Its global influence could grow significantly, in ways that will cause Western countries and liberal democracies considerable angst. The United States and its allies, however, will have to determine whether a China that is a softer incarnation of its current self should be regarded as a legitimate part of a changing global order—or still be treated as an existential threat.

THE RETURN OF THE QING

To understand where China might be going, it’s worth examining a much older pattern that underpins Chinese foreign policy. When the Qing dynasty, which ruled China from 1644 to 1912, had to grapple with European imperial powers in the late nineteenth century, prominent officials crafted two slogans that defined how China should deal with the Western challenge: fuguo qiangbing, or “rich country and strong army,” and zhongti xiyong, or “Chinese for essence, Western for usage.” The ideas behind these phrases have remained constant across the century and a half since they first came to prominence during the late imperial decline of the Qing.

The first drew from famous rhetoric during China’s Warring States period over two thousand years ago. The slogan distilled the country’s abiding material ambitions, its need to attain power through militarized national security and prosperity. In the last century, other great powers have deprioritized the quest for military strength, whether because of defeat in war (as was the case with Germany and Japan) or imperial decline (as with the United Kingdom, which went from being a great power at the start of the twentieth century to a middle power by its end). China has not.

The second phrase denoted the idea that a non-Western country could adopt some of the frameworks of Western modernity—such as particular kinds of military technology or constitutional and legal reforms—without sacrificing its authentic cultural self. In 1865, Qing officials discussed the opening in Shanghai of the Jiangnan arsenal, China’s first modern weapons factory, in this language. Many non-Western societies embraced similar views, including Japan, a country that modernized rapidly in the twentieth century to compete with Western states while still retaining a distinct sense of its own identity. The challenge they set for themselves was to achieve material progress and improve state capacity without becoming “Western.”

The Qing dynasty ended, but the debate about how to achieve these two national goals did not. The Chinese Communist Party always believed that forging a militarily strong and economically secure China was one of its fundamental objectives. By the 1990s, the CCP wondered whether it should follow the model of Singapore: a country that won global admiration while producing stable governance, a balance between consensus and coercion, and the ostensible adherence to what its longtime leader Lee Kuan Yew called the “Asian values” of deference to authority and communitarianism.

In 20 years, a version of China could emerge with which the West can coexist.

The dual aspirations of these slogans are visible today. China has long wanted to become a wealthy and strong country, but only in the present has it come close to achieving this goal; it now has the world’s second-biggest economy and its second-biggest military. Becoming a great power has coincided with the need to underline the indigenous sources of Chinese greatness. Since at least the 1980s, the CCP has nurtured a modernized, authoritarian version of Confucian culture, stressing the importance of “harmony” in public life, a quality very much at odds with the churning revolution of Mao’s rule from 1949 until his death in 1976. Under Xi, significant resources have been poured into initiatives such as the Confucian canon project, which reached a 20-year milestone in 2023 by classifying over 200 million characters’ worth of texts from China’s cultural traditions.

The core aim of fuguo qiangbing, of becoming wealthy and militarily strong, will define Chinese policy in the years and decades to come. But it could prove tricky for Beijing to attain. Unlike in the imperial age of the nineteenth century, the assertion of military strength in the interconnected twenty-first century can jeopardize the search for prosperity. Precisely because China is not an old-style empire, its growth largely depends on its expansion of supply chains, its investments in other countries, and its unceasing quest to embed itself in new markets. That economic ambition can easily be undone if China engages in alarming military actions. Irredentist adventurism, notably in pursuit of territorial claims in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and along the disputed border with India, could make current and potential partners wonder whether they can truly rely on China.

China may well become more confrontational in its approach to the world. Appeals to economic rationality won’t convince nationalists in the party or on social media who want to see the country assert itself on the international stage. But if China uses force to transform its regional geography, it will change the way that others see it. China might argue that its ambitions are limited, that Taiwan or the South China Sea are exceptions to its general policy of nonconfrontation. But neighbors would find it harder to trust a China that chooses to define its own boundaries and fails to demonstrate any constraints on its own power. China would not be isolated, but it would struggle to build trust and encourage other governments to accept the norms it wants to define the world: untrammeled state power and the subordination of civil rights and freedoms to economic and development goals.

DIRE STRAITS

China would struggle even more to chart a better path were it to choose to wage a war over Taiwan. Such a war would be motivated, in China, by a politics of identity that is largely impervious to economic rationality and other strategic considerations. Still, such a war would create a lose-lose scenario for everyone.

A violent seizure of Taiwan would be hard to accomplish, but China could probably pull it off. The aftermath of such aggression, however, would be deeply damaging for Beijing. The use of military force and the human and economic cost of violence would make all of Asia nervous about Chinese intentions regarding regional maritime routes and provoke many of these countries to ramp up security measures and reject opportunities for greater regional integration. Asian states will worry that China might decide—much as Russia has done since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—that some countries are more sovereign than others and that the domestic actions and preferences of neighboring states can somehow constitute a violation of sovereignty. Chinese officials may reject comparisons with Russian actions in Ukraine or the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but decision-makers in Southeast Asia will find it difficult to trust Beijing.

Even if the seizure of Taiwan does not lead to a wider regional confrontation, any number of powerful economic actors in the global North might impose sanctions that would hurt China, and Asia more broadly. Beijing’s ideological coercion or “reeducation” of a conquered island under a regime like that in place in Xinjiang or Tibet would destroy the high-tech, export-oriented economy of the island, which is highly dependent on extensive interactions with the wider world.

Xi at a meeting with foreign business leaders in Beijing, March 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters

The conquest of Taiwan would also deal a huge blow to Chinese soft power. In Asia, the story would take hold that Beijing was never able to peacefully persuade its compatriots to join a greater China. A China that can’t convince a culturally similar territory to join it will struggle to persuade others that it can create a meaningful wider “community of common destiny,” to use CCP terminology. In the region, East Asian and Southeast Asian countries would divert spending away from consumption to building up their militaries, and they would seek to disentangle their supply chains from China.

This post-conflict version of China would become increasingly ostracized. Sanctions from wealthy countries would disrupt the Chinese economy over the medium to long term. Russia was able to turn to China to limit the damage of sanctions after it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but China will not have any similar benefactor to provide new, lucrative supply chains or markets, even if it retains its access to much of the global South. Countries in wartime conditions that are cut off even partially from global flows often suffer significant inflation, as Russia has seen since 2022. Chinese policymakers in the 1990s who rejected the “shock therapy” visited on post-Soviet Russia remembered that hyperinflation under the predecessor Nationalist regime had helped usher in a Communist victory in 1949. In the 1980s, even more modest inflation of 20 to 30 percent led to widespread demonstrations and ultimately fueled the political protests that ended bloodily in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Were Beijing to attack Taiwan, it would risk another devastating inflationary period, with similar effects on social stability.

China will not abandon its claim to Taiwan, as Xi’s 2025 New Year message showed when he declared that “no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification.” The CCP’s close control over media and propaganda, however, means that it could easily choose to deprioritize the quest for unification. That action alone would have tremendous benefits for Beijing. Taiwan is important to Chinese citizens, but they care more about day-to-day issues such as the stability of the economy and jobs. Xi has built up forces on the mainland across from the island and ratcheted up rhetoric targeting Taipei. But China would bolster trust in its position in the region if it toned down its rhetoric and actions related to Taiwan and its maritime claims in the South China Sea, making it clear that these issues can be resolved at some point in the future. Lowering the temperature would go some way toward removing one of the most powerful causes for concern in the wider world about Chinese intentions.

GENERATIONAL SHIFT

Under Xi, China has become more authoritarian in its control of its citizens, more confrontational in its conduct with its neighbors, and more open in its desire to challenge U.S. supremacy. The next generation of Chinese leaders may pull the country in a different direction. In 20 years, the CCP officials now in their 40s will form the bulk of the leadership. Xi could still be in charge, but he will be in his early 90s and likely the only remaining leader whose teenage years were shaped by the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, an experience that seems to have given him an abiding desire for order above all. Instead, the remaining top leaders will be those who grew up in the 1990s and in the first decade of this century. The China of their youth was one where Chinese broadcasting and the press were significantly more open than they are now, where daring journalism was sometimes possible, and where there were still real debates about how China could reform its political system. Those who came of age in the early twenty-first century also experienced a decade of relatively free discussion on social media until that, too, was suppressed.

Just as the Cultural Revolution shaped the very top leaders today, the memories of a more open China will be powerful among leaders in the coming decades—not just high party officials but also figures in business, media, and the parastatal organizations, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, that substitute for civil society. Many of these leaders won’t be liberal in the Western sense of that term; if the wider world expects committed Americanophiles in the Chinese leadership, it will wait in vain. But some are likely to be far more open-minded than they would admit in public today. Indeed, in private, many people in the business, media, and think-tank worlds are frustrated with and despondent about the atmosphere in China. Like their elders, they will remain wary of the United States, but they may not, for instance, be as interested in partnering with Russia, a country they regard as offering no serious economic opportunities. Xi’s father loved Russia because of its cultural and political influence on the revolution that would drive the Communists to power in China in 1949, and many Chinese citizens today tolerate Russia because it is vigorously anti-Western. But the public does not have a strong bond with the country. One 2024 survey suggested that around 120,000 Chinese are learning Russian; over 300 million are learning English.

The transfer of power to this jiulinghou (post-1990s) generation could encourage decision-makers in China to recognize that less is more. The country need not change its goals in the coming decades: it will still want to be a global power with a strong army and to see the world in the communitarian, authoritarian terms that suit the CCP. But future leaders may see value in moderating China’s authoritarianism in ways that would make it more powerful. Beijing’s attempts to expand its influence have been damaged by its encroachment on others and its lack of transparency and prickliness in international diplomacy. In contrast, countries such as India, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have taken pains to project themselves as cooperative actors on the international stage even when their internal politics have moved in illiberal directions. These countries have frequently pursued goals not aligned with those of Western countries, such as India’s purchase of Russian oil and weapons, but the perception that they do not seek to reshape the world order to suit themselves has in fact magnified their influence.

Future Chinese leaders could well be nostalgic for the China of the late 1990s that was able to create a more favorable, global image for itself after the disaster of Tiananmen Square. This China would still strive for prosperity and strength, but it would assume that relative openness to the world is the best way to get to prosperity and strength. Even as it eschews any aspiration to be Western, it would be keen to acknowledge that Chinese identity has always been pluralistic and draws on many external influences. At home, it would recognize that would-be totalitarian surveillance states are never guaranteed survival—see, for instance, East Germany. It would relax the kinds of controls and systems of surveillance and censorship that it is now tightening, not just with the hope of producing greater social harmony and stability but also presenting a China that is more appealing to the world.

A more moderate but still authoritarian China will not be the pluralist democratic country once dreamed of by Western politicians, such as U.S. President Bill Clinton, and senior CCP figures from earlier eras, such as former Politburo members Li Rui and Zhao Ziyang. But it may be a realistic medium-term outcome. Such a China may also resemble much of the rest of the world, as the drift toward authoritarianism in global politics seems likely to continue into the 2030s and beyond. By that time, many countries in the West, never mind the rest of the world, may have adopted more illiberal policies at home, restricting personal freedoms and the movement of people. Few countries, not even the United States, will be in a rush to advance a global campaign for liberal democracy in the years to come. In that environment, a China under less sharp-edged leadership could very well seem more compatible with the future international system. A more illiberal global atmosphere, ironically, could allow China to loosen up in areas in which doing so might expand its global influence and in which it no longer feels vulnerable to liberal counterattacks.

A TALE TO TELL

In this scenario, China would still need to overcome immense global skepticism about its intentions. A 2023 Pew survey across a variety of countries concluded that, despite international concerns about U.S. interference, impressions of the United States were still much more favorable than those of China. During the Cold War, the United States managed to create a persuasive vision of itself as a leader of a liberal world order that ultimately triumphed over a rival Soviet order. China will need to conjure something similarly attractive if it wants to cement its global power and economic and political preeminence. It will want the world, particularly the countries of the global South, to see it as an economically robust and militarily strong country, one that remains rooted in its own core cultural identity while also serving as an exemplar for other societies seeking prosperity in difficult circumstances.

It would not be necessary for all of China’s ideological messages to be comprehensible across different cultures and societies. After all, it’s often said that the United States has a story that can resonate far beyond its shores, and that story helps create the country’s soft power, but in reality, the United States sells a highly particular version of itself abroad. Many aspects of American life—for instance, the view held by many Americans that freedom and the right to bear firearms are inextricable—do not resonate outside the United States. China’s internal debates, such as arguments about whether Communists or Nationalists were more instrumental in the defeat of Japan in World War II or reformulations of Marxist-Leninist theory (Xi calls himself a “twenty-first-century Marxist”), are of little interest to those outside the country. But China can still offer a vision of itself that appeals to the outside world.

There is a precedent. Modern China has produced a global ideology in the recent past: Maoism. It’s often forgotten how influential this strand of thinking was just over half a century ago. In India, in Peru, and on the streets of Paris, different rebel groups found the package of convictions that went under Mao’s name to be a potent source of ideological power. Many of the specifics of Mao’s thought were geared toward China’s own realities of peasant revolution and the search for a post-Qing political settlement. But Maoism seemed to fit a 1960s moment, when wealthy and developing countries alike were exploding in revolution against their existing systems. The vision of youthful rebellion against a calcified, aging system and of a revolutionary future anchored in the countryside offered more than enough for people outside China to use for their own purposes.

Of course, in the decades to come, China will not export a violent revolutionary cult. Instead, Beijing could succeed by offering a plausible story about itself in the turbulent 2030s, when liberal pluralist democracy may well have become a minority taste. By then, the majority of global political regimes could range from hybrid illiberal democracies to authoritarian states. As a stable, economically productive, and technologically innovative polity, China could comfort and even inspire elites and ordinary people in other countries. It already does so. As much as many Indians mistrust China’s intentions, for instance, many Indian political and business elites evince increasingly open admiration for the Chinese system and its undeniable material achievements. In selling its example and worldview, China could draw on Confucian ideas, including the notion that collective values are more meritorious than individualistic ones. China could champion “authoritarian welfarism,” in which governments combine coercive top-down control with significant social spending to provide public goods and reduce inequality—and in so doing, highlight the perceived failures of liberal free-market capitalism. Versions of this politics have already gained adherents in the United States, Europe, and Latin America in the past decade, as liberal individualism has been increasingly called into question. China could make the case that the endpoint for a prosperous and stable society looks like what is on offer in Beijing rather than in Paris and New York.

A portrait of Mao on the Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, March 2025 Go Nakamura / Reuters

China can give substance to its global appeal by concentrating on one key issue, the green energy transition, portraying itself as a leader when the United States has turned in another direction. In 20 years, China could reach the apex of its current strategy of becoming the world’s dominant player in facilitating the transition by continuing to export electric vehicles and the components to make green energy more widely available and by increasingly shifting to cleaner sources of energy production at home. By providing global public goods, it can link the values of collective striving embedded in “authoritarian welfarism” with the moral imperatives of energy transition. If the West is split, with Europe more interested in green technology than a United States still significantly committed to fossil fuels, China will find it easier to make pragmatic clean energy partnerships with European states. China would be both an exemplar and a provider for growing, energy-hungry countries elsewhere, too, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. China will find it much easier than liberal Western states to speak to the needs of people in large countries susceptible to mounting environmental disasters, such as Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan, whose large populations have rising consumer demands. It can frame its green offerings not just as a matter of practical necessity but also of justice, supplying what the Western countries principally responsible for this crisis cannot.

But to cast itself as such a savior, China will need to create a society that is at least broadly prosperous and stable and whose large armed forces are capable but seldom stray from the barracks or port. That sort of China could promote the idea that the country has a unique system of political and economic thinking and strategy (zhongti, “Chinese for essence”) that nonetheless can be used elsewhere by those who care to learn from it. As China courts middle powers with this narrative, the West could find it hard to push back.

China could also emerge as a hub for new technology by the 2030s, with considerable autonomy from the United States, should the trend toward technological and trade “decoupling” continue. Fewer Chinese young people will likely be studying in the West, and the already small number of Westerners who do so in China will remain limited. China and the United States will likely grow further apart as their ecologies of technology diverge further over time.

But even as China’s scientific development in fields such as artificial intelligence becomes more distinct from that of Western countries, tech developers and entrepreneurs will want to participate in both spheres. By the 2030s, technological norms might meet and compete in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South America, sometimes forming hybrid tech cultures that mix elements from China and the West. China will seek to draw more people into its tech orbit. Chinese universities and research institutes will host a growing number of students and researchers from Southeast Asia and beyond. Some of the most creative scientific work might well happen in third countries, where researchers and entrepreneurs are freer to mix and match what they learn. Decoupling, which would force scientific research and development into separate silos, would be bad for the Western and Chinese science bases but might be the making of several emerging middle powers.

CHINA IN THE CRYSTAL BALL

In 20 years, China could be a very different geopolitical actor than it is now. It could have moderated its authoritarianism, possess but not use military force, and be constrained as well as enabled by its major trade and technology links. This China would still be a country whose norms are different from those of the ever-shrinking liberal world, and its capabilities would still undoubtedly make neighbors and rivals nervous. But Western countries would find such a China manageable and also harder to posit as an existential geopolitical rival.

To reach that point, China will have to change. It will need to convince other countries that it does not seek to resolve issues through confrontation, whether through conventional military means or the use of cybertechnology. It will have to wean itself from its tendency to switch between saccharine rhetoric about its own place in the global order and, on the other hand, harsh screeds and coercive trade and military tactics when countries don’t fall in line. Such rhetoric works in the closed media environment at home: it has little global appeal, even among countries that profess some sympathy with China’s worldview.

Change is inevitable in China over the next 20 years, but external factors will likely be secondary in shaping that change. Instead, long-term domestic trends will define China’s future. These include the country’s need to care for an older and sicker population, the rise to maturity of a generation that did not grow up with the belief that the United States is China’s primary enemy, and the need to create stable higher-value jobs with a shrinking working-age population. The current downturn in domestic professional middle-class employment can be solved only by long-term solutions that involve China doing a lot more work to become a trusted and cooperative actor in the global economy.

By the 2030s, liberal pluralist democracy may be a minority taste.

China and the United States should both note that by the middle of the twenty-first century, the powers of the global South will be much stronger political, economic, and technological actors in their own right, not chess pieces in someone else’s game. The wider world is unlikely to take the West’s negative assessments of China as gospel; many outside the West will see the benefits of a China whose economic power, huge markets, and capacity to innovate in green energy and artificial intelligence is useful to them. But China’s military buildups and mercantilist economics will rebound on the country, reminding its partners that they should not become dependent on Beijing. A version of China that the world, including the global South, can live with would not have to be democratic or liberal. But it would need to be one that acknowledges its own errors, is much more transparent, and understands that any use of military or other coercive force (including in cyberspace) will fundamentally damage trust in its international relations.

China may well succeed in fulfilling the paired aspirations of the Qing era, the quest for geopolitical and economic power, along with the retention of a fundamental “Chinese essence.” But it will not do so if it chooses to start major military conflagrations in Asia. As long as a plausible case can be made that China is a military threat, Beijing gives the Western world an argument that can be used against it. By taking a less confrontational and militarist posture, however, China will give the West greater dilemmas to solve. Some Western countries may find Chinese-style welfarist authoritarianism attractive. Western policymakers and thinkers will have to determine whether a powerful state that is a geoeconomic and ideological challenge but not a military one still deserves to be treated as an existential danger.

A China that looks like the creator of a peaceful order in the 2040s will be much harder to argue against in the West and the wider world than its current confrontational incarnation. It is unclear whether China can really take that path. Still, over the past century, the least reliable way to predict what China will look like in 20 years has always been to extrapolate in a straight line from where it is now.

RANA MITTER is S. T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Rana Mitter · April 22, 2025

18. A new media order is emerging – Journalism isn’t dead. It’s on Substack.

I have been subscribing to a number of Substack sites.

A new media order is emerging

Journalism isn’t dead. It’s on Substack.

Hamish McKenzie

Apr 25, 2025

substack.com · by Hamish McKenzie

On Saturday, the White House Correspondents’ Dinner will take place against a backdrop of political tumult and media collapse. Once a marquee event for Washington’s political class, it now anchors a weekend of parties with a festival-like feel, where the nation’s power brokers gather to drink sponsored cocktails, gossip about industry trysts, and, ostensibly, celebrate the First Amendment.

Substack is hosting one such party—at the exact same time as the Correspondents’ Dinner, which will proceed this year without either its scheduled comedian, Amber Ruffin (whose criticisms of President Trump proved too controversial), or the president himself.

The president won’t be at our party either, but hundreds of other media people, Important Political Figures, and independent journalists will be. They come from different political persuasions, backgrounds, and convictions, but they are all on the front lines of a foundational shift in media—a reimagining of how we understand the world around us in this period of profound transition.

This year’s events come with a fair serving of discomfort. Traditional media institutions continue to contract, often locked in open hostility with the presidential administration. The social media feeds that dominate mindshare are pushing us to outrage and division more than ever. Public trust in the media has cratered to historic lows. It’s not clear that everyone who will be attending these parties even shares a common view of what “press freedom” means. Even the new wave of political influencers is not immune to this confusion. Some critics worry, reasonably enough, that the new voices are not so much uncovering truths as credulously shilling for their ideological teams while getting high on clicks.

But the people who will be at Substack’s party, in person and in spirit, are living proof that the reverse can be true. Many of the publishers who are thriving on Substack today cut their teeth in legacy media, and they are carrying forward those values and journalistic standards into this new space. Others come from outside that system, bringing fresh perspectives and insight to the political discourse, challenging authority and speaking truth to power. It is a sometimes cantankerous lot—argumentative and skeptical; prickly and proud. They’ll probably have fun in one another’s company on Saturday night and then be at each other’s throats the next day. And that’s as it should be. The strength of this place is in its free people. This contest of ideas—the dialogue and disagreement, the dissent and dispute—is what makes America great, and it’s what makes Substack great too.

We are all now part of an ecosystem that can usher in a new kind of order, where the power is distributed among the many instead of the few. We can take part in a discourse that unleashes expression rather than suppresses it, but that also demands substance—where success is built not on momentary clicks but on deeper connection. The people who will join us on Saturday night are the pioneers of this new order, refusing to bow to the cynicism of the current media moment and showing the way to something better.

And you are too. Your support of these independent voices is a vote not just for them but for a better media system—one that combines the quality of traditional media with the reach of social media. You are investing in a system that rewards integrity, that is powered by relationships instead of attention, that redistributes ownership and power. In this new order, we are all now the power brokers. That’s what we’ll be celebrating this weekend, and then for years to come.

substack.com · by Hamish McKenzie

19. BBC launches satellite news channel in Myanmar after Trump silences VOA

BBC is picking up the slack and filling a gap.

I am sure some of the administration people will argue this is a good thing (and it is) and that only by cancelling US support and outreach will other nations increase (or start making) contributions. That may be so but I do not believe VOA/RFA, etc will ever be sufficiently replaced by media capabilities from other countries. And commercial media does not fill the gap in denied areas under authoritarian regimes

BBC launches satellite news channel in Myanmar after Trump silences VOA

https://www.theguardian.com/media/2025/apr/24/bbc-launches-satellite-news-channel-myanmar-trump-silences-voa?utm

Corporation responds to ‘urgent need’ following earthquake by taking over Voice of America’s former channel

Michael Savage Media editor

Thu 24 Apr 2025 10.40 EDT

The BBC has stepped in to launch a news service in Myanmar after the devastating earthquake in the country, replacing a US service that Donald Trump has ceased to fund.

A direct-to-home satellite video channel delivering BBC News Burmese content will be launched to cater for what the corporation sees as an urgent “audience in need”.

It will take over a satellite video channel formerly used by Voice of America (VOA), the most prominent global broadcaster targeted by Trump.

VOA, which was set up during the second world war to counter Nazi propaganda and provided independent news to many of the world’s most repressed regimes, has fallen silent since mid-March, when the Trump administration ordered an end to its funding and that of its parent body.

His White House has described VOA as peddling “radical propaganda” and of being opposed to his presidency. Although a federal judge this week ordered the Trump administration to restore more than 1,000 jobs and funding for VOA, its status remains unclear and a government appeal is expected.

Broken and in the grip of civil war, can Myanmar rebuild after earthquake?

VOA’s satellite channel ceased broadcasts into Myanmar just weeks before a huge 7.7-magnitude earthquake hit the centre of the country. Its epicentre was about 11 miles from Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city.

More than 3,000 people are thought to have been killed. The digital reach of the BBC’s existing Burmese coverage spiked significantly as people searched for information.

Amid concerns about the lack of independent news being delivered to the country, the BBC has opted to intervene. In the coming months, the Thaicom 6 satellite, which covers Myanmar and the wider region, will deliver BBC News Burmese TV and audio programming. The channel will also provide a QR code linking to the BBC website’s Burmese content.

Jonathan Munro, the global director and deputy chief executive of BBC News, said the corporation believed it had to act swiftly to ensure a vulnerable audience were well served with independent information.

“In Myanmar, where press freedom is severely restricted and where a vicious conflict continues, we now have an audience also beset by a natural disaster,” he said.

“During the week of the disastrous earthquake, BBC News Burmese total digital reach quadrupled as people came to the BBC for trusted information.

“With the launch of this new satellite-based video service, featuring our TV, radio and online output in Burmese, we’ll be offering a critical information stream for an audience struggling to recover from the calamity which took so many lives.

“Aimed for an audience in need, this is yet another timely and much-needed initiative born from the commitment and expertise of the BBC teams.”

However, the move will be a further squeeze on the BBC’s World Service, which has come under huge financial pressure over recent years as the value of the licence fee has significantly diminished.

The BBC was forced to take on its costs from the Foreign Office in 2014 as part of the coalition government’s public spending cuts. BBC bosses want to see the current government take back those costs as part of negotiations over the renewal of the BBC charter.

Independent journalism is extremely challenging in Myanmar. It is ranked 171st out of 180 countries in a press freedom index compiled by Reporters Without Borders. The Myanmar journalist Sithu Aung Myint, a VOA contributor, is serving a 12-year sentence on anti-state and false news charges.

20. DOD Senior Advisor Announcements

The new inner circle?

Release

Immediate Release

DOD Senior Advisor Announcements

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4166222/dod-senior-advisor-announcements/

April 24, 2025 |

Pentagon Acting Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson provided the following statement:

Regular workforce adjustments are a feature of any highly efficient organization. Secretary Hegseth will continue to be proactive with personnel decisions and will work hard to ensure the Department of Defense has the right people in the right positions to execute President Trump’s agenda.

Today, we are announcing the following positions at the Pentagon:

Sean Parnell, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Senior Advisor

Justin Fulcher, Senior Advisor

Patrick Weaver, Senior Advisor

Ricky Buria, Senior Advisor

21. A Small Wars Journal Retrospective: Twenty Years of Crowd-Sourcing Irregular Warfare Studies

Retrospective| The Latest

A Small Wars Journal Retrospective: Twenty Years of Crowd-Sourcing Irregular Warfare Studies

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/04/25/a-small-wars-journal-retrospective/

04.25.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

It was twenty years ago this month that the late Dave Dilegge established Small War Journal (SWJ). His vision at the time was to create a modern virtual town square to allow for the timely exchange of ideas for everything related to “Small Wars” or what we call irregular warfare today. He found his inspiration in the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual first published in 1940 which to this day is arguably the most comprehensive manual for addressing all facets of warfare outside the traditional realm. Recall that this was before the explosion of social media platforms.

I met Dave Dilegge virtually in 2005 while I was serving in Korea after I had finished my final professional military education at the National War College the year before. We were in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism and I turned one of my war college essays into an article for the inaugural issue of Small Wars Magazine which was the first publication of Small Wars Journal titled “How do we Fight a War of Ideas.” It was an honor to be among the other plank holders: T.X. Hammes, Russell Glenn, Andrew Harvey, Steve Kluth, Ian Sullivan, Stephen Arata, Thomas Greco, and Adam Strickland. A number of us would contribute to Small Wars Journal and later other like-minded publications for the next two decades. Small Wars Journal provided us and so many others with the platform to express our ideas about small wars, irregular warfare, U.S. national security and the threats we face.

The Megaphone for Truth to Power

SWJ provided the megaphone for authors to speak truth to power especially about the most complex security problem the U.S. faced at the time: insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The very name that Dave Dilegge chose was in response to the desire by Secretary Rumsfeld to not describe the wars as “organized guerrilla warfare,” and insurgencies and align with his view that stability operations were not a core mission of the Department of Defense. Small Wars of course encompasses everything that happened in Iraq and Afghanistan including insurgency, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, resistance, low intensity conflict, terrorism, and stability operations to name a few of the many doctrinal and non-doctrinal terms. By 2006 he was acknowledging that terrorism was a war of ideas. Some of us long before believed that the war on terrorism was a counterinsurgency on a global scale. Others such as Robert Jones argued that the “Al Qaeda network [was used to] wage a regional unconventional warfare campaign to leverage many nationalist insurgent movements.”

These and many discussions and varied ideas and viewpoints helped to bring public understanding to the strategic dilemmas the U.S and the free world faced from the myriad threats at the beginning of the 21st Century. Additionally, many practitioners who were actually conducting operations were able to provide lessons learned and operational concepts in articles at SWJ that others could learn from and adapt for their own operations. SWJ served as the first platform for crowdsourcing ideas for addressing complex irregular warfare challenges.

Counterinsurgency Pro and Con

One of the most significant debates that took place in the first decade of Small Wars Journal was between the so-called “COINDINSTAS” and “COINTRAS” who argued the pros and cons of counterinsurgency, respectively. The leading figures who represented these positions were John Nagl and Gian Gentile who each provided compelling research in their books, Learning to Seat Soup with a Knife and Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency. Both provided dozens of articles to Small Wars Journal and later other publications as the intellectual “COIN space” grew. They also debated the merits of COIN in the comments sections and offered thought provoking and expert analysis based on their combat experiences.

The debates and discussions between John and Gian were powerful and surely influenced all who were struggling to understand the small wars and irregular warfare we faced in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. Despite the absolutely contrary positions they held, they conducted the most gentlemanly discussions culminating in a debate at the National War College in 2010 that I was fortunate to host. Members in the audience described it as the most enlightening debate on COIN anyone had heard. Their professionalism should be emulated.

Village Stability Operations, Special Forces Doctrine, and One Tribe at A Time

Another concept that was shaped and influenced by Small Wars Journal essays and discussions were Village Stability Operations and the associated concepts of Village Stability Platforms and Afghan Local Police. The most influential work was by Jim Gant in his 45 page essay, “One Tribe at A Time” in which he advocated tribal engagement as the fundamental method for conducting counterinsurgency. Although these concepts were being developed organically by many Special Forces personnel applying traditional Special Forces Doctrine (in particular the concept of Remote Area Operations), they were often stymied by leaders who had no experience in such work and did not have the patience that was required to achieve long term effects. They wanted Special Forces to focus exclusively on counterterrorism operations to capture and kill high value targets that would demonstrate immediate effects. In fact, Special Forces were actually applying this doctrine in the spring of 2002 as the logical continuation of the unconventional warfare campaign begun in 2001. Hy Rothstein noted this in his seminal work on Special Forces in Afghanistan: Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. However, with the introduction of JTF 180 in the summer of 2002, these Special Forces operations were halted as the main effort shifted to stability operations and counterinsurgency conducted by conventional forces. Despite the best efforts of those on the ground, it was Gant’s essay that influenced senior leaders to adopt a more traditional Special Forces approach of through, with, and by and tribal and population based approaches. In fact, when the Commander of USSOCOM read the essay, he changed Gant’s orders from Iraq to Afghanistan. He advocated among the senior leaders at CENTCOM and in Afghanistan to adopt these traditional Special Forces concepts. However, as it turned out it was too little and much too late.

Legacy and Expansion

Many other concepts were debated and discussed on Small Wars Journal. These influenced the “rediscovery” of irregular warfare in 2008 and the new concept of Security Forces Assistance Operations which has now been enshrined in the U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigade. This can find a direct link to John Nagl’s advocacy for an advisor corps in 2007, “It’s Time for an Army Advisor Corps.” However, by the second decade the discussions on SWJ expanded to include almost anything related to national security. While notable contributors have always provided important articles Small Wars Journal also provided a platform for many first time authors through the military and the rest of the U.S. government, from allies around the world, and from academia with many undergraduate and graduates students joining the academic debates.

Continuity and Future

In April 2020, Dave Dilegge suddenly passed away. He had long before established a Board of Directors with himself, Bill Nagle, Dan Kelly, and me. However, it was Dave who single handedly envisioned, developed, and kept SWJ publishing on a daily basis up until his death. The Board decided that SWJ should continue; however, none of us could dedicate the time and effort to match Dave’s work. Therefore, we worked to keep it functioning while we searched for a way to sustain SWJ permanently. I took over the publishing duties, but we could not keep up. I began publishing my daily National Security and Korea News and Commentary (which I have being doing since1996 in various forms) to continue to provide a service to readers and published as many articles as we could. We approached a number of different organizations: government, think tanks, and universities. One think tank described SWJ as a “distressed property” that had no future. None could commit to the two requirements: honor Dave Dilegge’s legacy and continue his philosophy of providing a platform to rapidly publish authentic voices to contribute to the intellectual debates surrounding small wars and national security.

In addition to Small Wars Journal Dave partnered with John Sullivan and Robert Bunker to create SWJ El Centro, or “downtown” in Spanish to focus on Small Wars in the Southern Hemisphere with a great team of fellows and authors. They have sustained their efforts without interruption. Theirs is a story worthy of a separate article altogether.

Finally in 2024, it was only the visionary Arizona State University (ASU) and its Future Security Initiative that recognized the value of Small Wars Journal. Led by Ryan Shaw and Jan (Ken) Gleiman the SWJ Board began the process of transferring the enterprise to ASU. Ken Gleiman worked with IT professionals to completely re-design and update the site and create the Small Wars Journal “2.0” we can now all use with ease.

Personally, SWJ has allowed me to write, publish, and most importantly learn from so many fellow thinkers and practitioners about all the subjects I am passionate about: irregular, unconventional, and political warfare, influence operations, national security strategy, East Asian and Korean security, and the future of Special Forces. I am grateful for the opportunity Dave Dilegge gave to me and so many others.

Today Ken Gleiman leads the work of SWJ as the editor-in-chief with Amos Fox as its managing editor. They have built an incredible editorial, communication, and production team at ASU. I am privileged to continue to support the enterprise as an editor-at-large and to honor Dave Dilegge while SWJ lives up to its new motto to provide “discourse at the speed of relevance.”

Tags: irregular warfare, Retrospective, small wars, Stability Operations, Unconventional Warfare, village stability operations

About The Author

David Maxwell
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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The Once and Future China

How Will Change Come to Beijing?

THE RETURN OF THE QING

DIRE STRAITS

GENERATIONAL SHIFT

A TALE TO TELL

CHINA IN THE CRYSTAL BALL

A new media order is emerging

BBC launches satellite news channel in Myanmar after Trump silences VOA

DOD Senior Advisor Announcements

A Small Wars Journal Retrospective: Twenty Years of Crowd-Sourcing Irregular Warfare Studies

Introduction

The Megaphone for Truth to Power

Counterinsurgency Pro and Con

Village Stability Operations, Special Forces Doctrine, and One Tribe at A Time

Legacy and Expansion

Continuity and Future

About The Author