|
Apologies for my tardiness. The only drawback of flying on Korean Air is that it has no inflight Wifi so I had to wait until I got home to do my daily news analysis.
Quotes of the Day:
“But few literary works in our time have demonstrated so triumphantly the power of ideas in the face of cold steel and brute force, and few have spoken so reassuringly to so many people of different countries and cultures. Against the fiercest assault on freedom during this century, John Steinbeck calmly reaffirmed in The Moon Is Down the bedrock principles of democracy: the worth of the individual, and the power deriving from free citizens sharing common commitments.”
- Donald V. Coers, introduction to The Moon Is Down by John Steinbeck
“Men of power have no time to read, yet the men who do not read are unfit for power.”
- Michael Foot
“The highest activity a human being can attain is learning for understanding, because to understand is to be free.”
- Baruch Spinoza
1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2023
2. What Socrates’ ‘know nothing’ wisdom can teach a polarized America
3. Marines Look to Get Closer to Special Operations Teams While Practicing Extractions
4. When a Wolf Warrior Howls
5. Beijing says it ‘respects’ sovereign ex-Soviet states after furore caused by China envoy
6. Beyond ship counts: Training, readiness and capabilities ‘count’ too
7. It's Time for an East Asian NATO.
8. ‘There Is No More Ukraine Here.’ ‘That’s Where You’re Wrong’: A Village Rises After Russian Occupation
9. After 60 years of foreign policy blunders, U.S. should rethink China strategy
10. The Government has an Espionage Problem. Open Source should be part of the Solution.
11. How China Could Save Putin’s War in Ukraine
12. How Tucker Carlson Helped Turn Americans Against the Military
13. Female Army commander faces wild claims she forcefully kissed, groped male troops
14. ‘Good riddance’: Pentagon officials cheer Tucker Carlson’s ouster
15. The Last Frontier(10th SFG)
16. Zeroed Out: How JSOC’s Omega teams enabled the CIA’s Afghan militias
1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2023
Key Takeaways
- Senior US and EU officials assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin would remain unwilling to negotiate in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- A Ukrainian military official claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian forces are achieving “impressive results” in counter-battery combat against Russian forces on the Russian-occupied eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied ISW’s April 22 assessment about limited improvements in Wagner’s relations with the Russian military command ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- Russian ultranationalists continue to advocate for the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist repression measures.
- The Kremlin continues to avoid adopting overtly repressive measures likely out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime.
- Russian civil rights groups OVD-Info, Memorial, and Rus Sidyashchaya (Russia Behind Bars) issued a legal challenge to the Russian censorship law against discrediting the Russian military on April 25.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kremmina line.
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
- Russian milbloggers continued to issue vehement denials that Ukrainian forces established sustained positions on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to financially incentivize Russian prisoners to fight in Ukraine, offering them compensation equivalent to that of Russian volunteers.
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian partisans detonated a Russian military checkpoint near Oleshky.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25, 2023
Apr 25, 2023 - Press ISW
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 25, 7pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Senior US and EU officials assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin would remain unwilling to negotiate in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive. The New York Times (NYT) reported on April 24 that a senior European official stated that the chances of Putin “backing down” in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive are “less than zero.”[1] The official stated that Putin would likely mobilize more soldiers to fight in Ukraine. US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said that there is “very little evidence” to suggest that Putin would alter his strategic goal of subjugating Ukraine “politically, if not fully militarily.” US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby told Voice of America on April 25 that the US is increasing security assistance to Ukraine because the US expects that Russia will attempt to go on the offensive as the weather improves.[2]
A Ukrainian military official claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian forces are achieving “impressive results” in counter-battery combat against Russian forces on the Russian-occupied eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[3] Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Southern Operational Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces hit and destroyed Russian artillery systems, tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. Humenyuk added that Ukrainian forces are working to clear the frontline on the east bank in a “counter-battery mode.” Humenyuk added that Russian forces are evacuating civilians from the Dnipro River bank area to move in Russian units, which is simplifying Ukrainian operations.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied ISW’s April 22 assessment about limited improvements in Wagner’s relations with the Russian military command ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may have partially repaired its strained relationship with Prigozhin to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to halt offensive operations ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] ISW had also observed a dramatic change in the nature of Prigozhin’s public interactions with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin as early as beginning of April.[5] Prigozhin stated that ISW’s assessment is a “fake,” noting that he would not “exchange ammunition for [his] guys even for friendship with God.”[6]
Prigozhin’s continued instance on his distaste for the Russian military leadership contradicts the change in Prigozhin’s rhetoric as well as the sudden influx of artillery ammunition after months of reported shell hunger in Bakhmut.[7] Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) also reported that Prigozhin’s companies earned a record amount of income in 2022 from their contracts with the Russian MoD despite his feud with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu.[8] Prigozhin has repeatedly acknowledged cooperation with troops subordinated to the Russian MoD and is receiving mobilized personnel to reinforce his flanks. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that his eldest son fought in the war with Wagner, which ISW assessed to be an information operation to mend the relationship and possibly increase or demonstrate Prigozhin’s loyalty to the Kremlin.[9] All these factors indicate that Prigozhin – despite his claimed independence and pride – needs to retain the favor and support of the Kremlin and the Russian MoD to sustain his operations.
Russian ultranationalists are continuing to advocate for the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist repression measures. Russian State Duma Parliamentarian Andrey Gurulyov – a prominent Russian ultranationalist figure within the ruling United Russia Party – stated that Russia needs to reintroduce the concept of the “enemy of the people.”[10] This concept designated all the late Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s opposition figures as the enemies of society. Gurulyov frequently shares extreme opinions on Russian state television but the rhetoric among the ultranationalists is increasingly emphasizing the need for the targeting and elimination of Russia’s internal enemies. Former Russian officer Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin often echo similar calls to prosecute Russian officials who are hoping to end the war via negotiations with the West. Such attitudes indicate that the ultranationalist communities are expecting Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand repression and fully commit to the war.
The Kremlin continues to avoid adopting overtly repressive measures likely out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime. The Russian government withdrew a bill from the Russian State Duma that would have increased taxes from 13 to 30 percent for Russians who have fled the country.[11] Russian ultranationalists have repeatedly called on the Kremlin to nationalize property belonging to Russians who had “betrayed” the country by fleeing, but the Kremlin appears to remain hesitant to introduce such unpopular measures. Unnamed sources told Russian independent outlet Verska that the Russian presidential administration does not support the return of capital punishments in Russia – another issue that recently reemerged in Russian policy discussions.[12] The Kremlin could use the threat of the death penalty to scare Russians into supporting the war effort (or remaining passively resistant to it), but Putin likely remains hesitant to destroy his image as a diplomatic and tolerant tsar. ISW previously assessed that Putin relies on controlling the information space to safeguard his regime much more than the kind of massive oppression apparatus of the Soviet Union and that Putin has never rebuilt an internal repression apparatus equivalent to the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, and the Red Army.[13]
Russian civil rights groups OVD-Info, Memorial, and Rus Sidyashchaya (Russia Behind Bars) issued a legal challenge to the Russian censorship law against discrediting the Russian military on April 25. OVD-Info announced that its lawyers filed 10 of 20 planned complaints against the law to the Russian Constitutional Court in hopes that the court will rule the law unconstitutional.[14] The complaints centered around individual cases of alleged discreditation, including one case wherein authorities fined a man 50,000 rubles (about $612) for holding a sign calling for peace.[15] A fringe group of at least 20, mostly smaller, pro-war Russian milbloggers amplified a call for the Russian government to repeal the censorship laws on April 11 following the prosecution of a Russian medic for telling battlefield truths.[16] OVD-Info and other human rights organizations are most likely to face prosecution under Russian censorship laws. The Russian government is unlikely to repeal or strike down these laws without direction from the Kremlin, but challenges like OVD-Info's demonstrate continued resistance to domestic censorship and repression.
Key Takeaways
- Senior US and EU officials assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin would remain unwilling to negotiate in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- A Ukrainian military official claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian forces are achieving “impressive results” in counter-battery combat against Russian forces on the Russian-occupied eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied ISW’s April 22 assessment about limited improvements in Wagner’s relations with the Russian military command ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- Russian ultranationalists continue to advocate for the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist repression measures.
- The Kremlin continues to avoid adopting overtly repressive measures likely out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime.
- Russian civil rights groups OVD-Info, Memorial, and Rus Sidyashchaya (Russia Behind Bars) issued a legal challenge to the Russian censorship law against discrediting the Russian military on April 25.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kremmina line.
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
- Russian milbloggers continued to issue vehement denials that Ukrainian forces established sustained positions on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to financially incentivize Russian prisoners to fight in Ukraine, offering them compensation equivalent to that of Russian volunteers.
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian partisans detonated a Russian military checkpoint near Oleshky.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 25. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced toward Nevske (17km northwest of Kreminna), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) and east of Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to fortify positions in the Kupyansk direction and did not conduct ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[18] Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces likely captured Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) on an unspecified date.[19] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on April 25 that Russian forces are attempting to push Ukrainians forces out of their positions in the Serebrianska forest area (11km south of Kreminna) in order to set conditions for further attacks in the Lyman direction.[20] Syrskyi also reported that Russian forces in eastern Ukraine formed “Storm” infantry units from each brigade or regiment reinforced with tanks, thermobaric artillery, and mortars and anti-tank units.[21]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 24. Geolocated footage posted on April 24 shows that Wagner Group forces made marginal advances southwest of the Bakhmut-2 rail station in western Bakhmut.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces advanced in southern and western Bakhmut, where the fighting is heaviest.[23] Some milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces advanced further west from the Bakhmut-2 rail station.[24] One milblogger claimed that fighting is intensifying northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest) and Novomarkove (12km northwest).[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in Bakhmut, and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Novomarkove, Khromove (immediately northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (5km south of Bakhmut).[26] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Wagner Group forces can no longer conduct combat operations without support from Russian Airborne (VDV) and special purposes units, which Cherevaty characterized as becoming increasingly active in the Bakhmut area.[27]
Ukrainian forces conducted a localized counterattack northwest of Bakhmut, likely to alleviate pressure against the logistics line passing through Khromove. Geolocated footage posted on April 25 shows Ukrainian forces overtaking Russian positions north of the O0504 Khromove-Chasiv Yar highway.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian counterattack was unsuccessful, however.[29]
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 25. Geolocated footage from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia on April 21 shows that Russian forces advanced east towards Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Novokalynove (9km north of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[31] A Russian milblogger’s battle map claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kamianka (4km north of Avdiivka) and south of Vesele (5km north of Avdiivka) as of April 25.[32] Geolocated footage from the DNR People’s Militia shows the DNR 1st Slavic and 110th Motorized Rifle brigades (1st Army Corps) operating south of Sieverne and near Nevelske, respectively.[33]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 25.[34] Ukrainian Tavriisk Direction Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reappeared in the Vuhledar area, implying that the brigade left the front line on an unspecified date to rest and reconstitute.[35] Dmytrashkivskyi assessed that the 155th is likely not at full combat strength.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian milbloggers continued to issue vehement denials on April 25 that Ukrainian forces established sustained positions on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. The milbloggers amplified textual reports and video claims from Russian military personnel claiming that Ukrainian forces are not on east bank Kherson Oblast and that the situation is under control.[36] One such video features personnel from the Union of Donbas Volunteers, which is affiliated with Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov.[37] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized many of the Dnipro River delta islands, however.[38] Russian milbloggers also seized the chance to amplify claimed Russian military successes, including that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian Su-25 that had supported Ukrainian raids across the Dnipro River.[39] The milbloggers also claimed that Russian air strikes, particularly with modified guided FAB-500 bombs, improved Russian forces’ ability to repel Ukrainian forces from east bank Kherson Oblast.[40]
A Russian occupation official claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating a Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missile system in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian forces deployed a new Hrim-2 missile system to Zaporizhzhia City.[41] The Hrim-2 reportedly has a maximum range of 400-500 kilometers.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge with a Hrim-2 missile on April 22.[43]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to financially incentivize Russian prisoners to fight in Ukraine by offering them compensation equivalent to that of Russian volunteers. Perm Oblast human rights activist Oksana Asaulenko reported that the Russian MoD representatives visited a prison in Gubakha, Perm Oblast, and offered prisoners the option to serve in Ukraine for a six-month term.[44] The Russian MoD reportedly offered prisoners a monthly salary of 205,000 rubles (about $2,510). The Russian MoD is also reportedly offering prisoners compensation of three million rubles (about $36,720) if they are injured or five million rubles (about $61,200) to prisoners’ families if they are killed on the battlefield. Wagner Group servicemen revealed to a Russian opposition outlet that many Wagner convicts died within the first three weeks on the frontline and that it is unclear if their families ever received compensation for their deaths.[45] The MoD’s efforts to financially incentivize prisoner recruitment indicates that the Russian MoD cannot lure prisoners to war solely with pardon promises. ISW previously reported that pay discrepancies among Russian volunteers and mobilized servicemen have sparked conflicts, and payments to convicts serving on the frontlines may further aggravate the tensions among the members of Russian conventional and irregular forces.[46]
A Wagner Group convict told the New York Times that Wagner recruited prisoners by offering them HIV treatments. An HIV-positive Wagner mercenary revealed to the New York Times that Russian prisons treat HIV-positive prisoners with ineffective drugs, which prompted him to sign up for military service with Wagner in December 2022.[47] The convict claimed that Wagner promised him a pardon and effective HIV treatments and claimed that quick death on the battlefield was more appealing than a slow death in prison. He added that he did not have prior military experience and witnessed most of his unit die during an attack near Bakhmut. Head of the independent Russian human rights organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” (Russia Behind Bars) Olga Romanova claimed that approximately 10 percent of all Russian prisoners have HIV – and that Russian recruitment officials likely use the promise of medical treatment as a recruitment incentive.
Russian federal subjects, private military companies (PMCs), and proxy military formations are continuing to advertise contract service and form new military units. Bashkortostan Administration official Maxim Zabelin announced that the republic formed a new medical company that will support regional volunteer battalions.[48] The company is currently training in Patriot Park in Kubinka, Moscow Oblast before deploying to Ukraine. A Russian milblogger amplified a series of recruitment ads including: Wagner recruiting men for a six-month contract in Ukraine or a 9 to 14-month service in Africa; Moscow City recruitment of contract servicemen; and the 60th “Veterany” Separate Air Assault Brigade recruiting volunteers to fill its fourth volunteer battalion.[49] The Republic of Tatarstan is allocating approximately 18 million rubles (about $220,300) to organize military-patriotic camps to train children ages 11 to 16 on basic military and survival skills.[50]
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Russian daily casualty rates decreased by over 30 percent in April after Russian forces suffered heavy casualties between January and March.[51] The UK MoD analyzed casualty rates from Ukrainian General Staff’s calculations, which ISW cannot independently confirm. The UK MoD assessed that Russian forces are preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives, which is likely leading to fewer casualties.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 24 that Ukrainian partisans targeted a Russian military checkpoint in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack near Oleshky, Kherson Oblast. The center reported that partisans from the Atesh movement blew up a Russian military checkpoint located near military infrastructure, killing an unspecified number of Rosgvardia servicemen and destroying military equipment on the evening of April 23.[52]
The Kremlin continues to integrate Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine into the Russian healthcare system. Russian Heath Minster Mikhail Murashko claimed that Russian authorities are restoring 172 healthcare facilities in occupied Ukraine – 80 of which are already operating – and that Russian doctors will complete performing “preventative examinations” of children in Russian occupied Ukraine in the coming weeks.[53] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed that that Russian doctors have already examined over 200,000 children.[54] ISW has previously reported on Russian efforts to integrate occupied regions of Ukraine through health care initiatives.[55]
Russian forces continue to use children’s facilities for military purposes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 25 that Russian forces continue to establish military facilities in educational facilities turning children and teachers into “human shields.”[56] The Ukrainian General staff reported that up to 200 Russian mobilized personnel occupy a children’s camp in Urzuf in Mariupol Raion.
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.
Russian forces maintain a presence along Ukraine’s northern border in Belarus and Russia. Ukrainian Commander of the Joint Forces Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on April 25 that 17,000 Russian forces divided into two formations are deployed along the southern border of Belarus and along the border in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts.[57] Nayev reported that about 2,800 Russian forces are at unspecified training grounds in Belarus.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-spring...
[2] https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/rosiya-ukraina-kontrnastup/7063822.html
[3] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-04-25-2...
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[6] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/845
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[8] https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/15165
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[10] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23363
[11] https://www.severreal.org/a/pravitelstvo-otozvalo-zakonoproekt-o-povyshe...
[12] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1818; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/13/gosduma-reshila-vernut-zakonoproekt-ob-isklyuchenii-smertnoy-kazni-iz-ugolovnogo-kodeksa-sredi-ego-avtorov-nemtsov-i-gaydar
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[14] https://t.me/ovdinfo/17984; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/25/yuristy-ovd-info-podali-20-zhalob-v-konstitutsionnyy-sud-rossii-oni-trebuyut-otmenit-statyu-o-diskreditatsii-armii
[15] https://t.me/ovdinfo/17984
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47058; ht...
[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G9xJGHPrLXB9HdHRAQi...
[19] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1650794664478363648; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1650791297320472576
[20] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/25/vorog-nastupaye-na-shodi-odnochasno-na-dekilkoh-napryamkah-oleksandr-syrskyj/
[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/25/u-kozhnij-brygadi-polku-voroga-sformovano-shturmovi-zagony-shtorm/
[22] https://twitter.com/emilkastehelmi/status/1650795382043992065 ; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1650821869337997313 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/200679
[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/12140
[24] https://t.me/rybar/46226; https://t.me/orchestra_w/6302; https://t.me/brussinf/5891
[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47058
[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GFdgApe8cZWwYs3eikm...
[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/25/bahmut-stav-kinczevym-rubezhem-dlya-zlochynnogo-ugrupovannya-vagner-sergij-cherevatyj/
[28] https://twitter.com/Bodbe6/status/1650869820886228992?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Bodbe6/status/1650870356687613953?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1650892961679376384?s=20
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/12140
[30] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10238 ; https://t.me/btr80/6484 ; https://twitter.com/kors_nick/status/1650803091380269057?s=20
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GFdgApe8cZWwYs3eikm...
[32] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?hl=ru&mid=1-_VTAZcilRrdZyF_05J8...
[33] https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1650783762056110080?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/SyriaWar2/status/1650790275290214400?s=20 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10253; https://t.me/btr80/6521 ; https://twitter.com/kors_nick/status/1650798112426848256?s=20 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10246
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GFdgApe8cZWwYs3eikm... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G9xJGHPrLXB9HdHRAQi...
[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/25/oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj-rozpoviv-pro-zminy-taktyky-voroga-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku/
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47058; ht... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83840; https://t.me/sashakots/39481
[37] https://t.me/sddonbassa/22823; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47068; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...
[38] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23361
[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47065; https://t.me/rybar/46250; https://t.me/grey_zone/18448; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20647
[40] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36416; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1650825294654197760 ; https://t.me/sashakots/39479; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20653 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15696; https://t.me/epoddubny/15698
[41] https://t.me/vrogov/8887
[42] https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/ukraine-expands-its-missile-capabilities/
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[44] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11449
[45] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11449
[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/21/world/europe/russia-wagner-group-hiv-... media/455586-vazni-z-rf-infikovani-vil-pogodzuutsa-vouvati-proti-ukraini-v-obmin-na-likuvanna/
[48] https://t.me/idelrealii/26866
[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83782
[50] https://t.me/idelrealii/26879
[51] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1650739501927395331?s=20; https://...
[52] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/04/24/partyzany-pidirvaly-blok-post-rosiyan-bilya-oleshok/
[53] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8874
[54] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8879
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GFdgApe8cZWwYs3eikm...
[57] https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid02Apfph75wmKS6...
Tags
Ukraine Project
File Attachments:
DraftUkraineCoTApril25,2023.png
Bakhmut Battle Map Draft April 25,2023.png
Donetsk Battle Map Draft April 25,2023.png
Kharkiv Battle Map Draft April 25,2023 .png
Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 25,2023.png
Zaporizhia Battle Map April 25,2023.png
2. What Socrates’ ‘know nothing’ wisdom can teach a polarized America
I think this is worthy of reflection. We should all have intellectual humility.
Excerpts:
So why is intellectual humility in such scarce supply? Of course, the quickest answer might be the right one: that humility runs against most people’s fear of being mistaken, and the zero-sum view that being right means someone else has to be totally wrong.
But we think that the problem is more complex and perhaps more interesting. We believe epistemic humility presents something of a twofold danger that makes being humble frightening – and has, ever since Socrates first put it at the heart of Western philosophy.
...
This is the birth of “epistemic humility” in Western philosophy: the acknowledgment that one’s blind spots and shortcomings are an invitation for ongoing intellectual investigation and growth.
...
Socrates taught that being humble about one’s own views was a necessary step in searching for truth – perhaps the most essential one. That was and perhaps still is a revolutionary view, because it forces us to challenge preconceived ideas about what we believe, what we worship and where we tap meaning. He placed himself in the middle of Athenians’ sharply polarized debates about what truth and goodness were, and he was the one who got hit.
“Humility like darkness,” wrote American philosopher Henry David Thoreau, “reveals the heavenly lights.” Put another way, humility about the verity, accuracy and wisdom of one’s ideas can reveal the fact that others have understandable reasons for thinking as they do — as long as you try to see the world as they are seeing it. In contrast, arrogance tends to extinguish the “heavenly light” about what we still don’t fully understand.
Being humble about one’s position in the world is not an invitation for a post-truth, anything-goes opinion free-for-all. Truth – the idea of truth – matters. And we can pursue it together, if we are always open to being wrong.
What Socrates’ ‘know nothing’ wisdom can teach a polarized America
theconversation.com · by J. W. Traphagan
A common complaint in America today is that politics and even society as a whole are broken. Critics point out endless lists of what should be fixed: the complexity of the tax code, or immigration reform, or the inefficiency of government.
But each dilemma usually comes down to polarized deadlock between two competing visions and everyone’s conviction that theirs is the right one. Perhaps this white-knuckled insistence on being right is the root cause of the societal fissure – why everything seems so irreparably wrong.
As religion and philosophy scholars, we would argue that our apparent national impasse points to a lack of “epistemic humility,” or intellectual humility – that is, an inability to acknowledge, empathize with and ultimately compromise with opinions and perspectives different from one’s own. In other words, Americans have stopped listening.
So why is intellectual humility in such scarce supply? Of course, the quickest answer might be the right one: that humility runs against most people’s fear of being mistaken, and the zero-sum view that being right means someone else has to be totally wrong.
But we think that the problem is more complex and perhaps more interesting. We believe epistemic humility presents something of a twofold danger that makes being humble frightening – and has, ever since Socrates first put it at the heart of Western philosophy.
Knowing you don’t know
If your best friend told you that you were the wisest of all human beings, perhaps you would be inclined to smile in agreement and take the dear friend for a beer. But when the ancient Athenian Socrates was delivered this news, he responded with sincere and utter disbelief – even though his friend had confirmed it with the Delphic oracle, the fortune-telling authority of the ancient world.
This nascent humility – “No, get out of here, I’m definitely not the wisest” – helped spark what became arguably the greatest philosophical life of all time. Despite relative old age, Socrates immediately embarked on a journey to find someone wiser than himself and spent many days seeking out the sages of the ancient world, a quest Plato recounts in his “Apology of Socrates.”
The problem? He discovered that the sages thought they knew more than they actually did. Eventually, Socrates concluded that he himself was, in fact, the wisest of all men, because at least he “knew that he didn’t know.”
This is not to say that Socrates knew nothing: He demonstrates time and again that he knows a lot and routinely demonstrated good judgment. Rather, he acknowledged there were definite limitations to the knowledge he could claim.
This is the birth of “epistemic humility” in Western philosophy: the acknowledgment that one’s blind spots and shortcomings are an invitation for ongoing intellectual investigation and growth.
Reminder to self: Keep it humble. tumsasedgars/iStock via Getty Images Plus
Provoking the powerful
But this mindset can feel dangerous to other people – especially if they feel absolutely certain in their convictions.
In ancient Athens, as much as in the U.S. today, being perceived as right translated into money and power. The city-state’s culture was dominated by the Sophists, who taught rhetoric to nobles and politicians, and the Poets, ancient playwrights. Greek theater and epic poetry were closely related to religion, and their creators were treated as mouthpieces for aesthetic and moral truth.
What’s more, theater and poetry were also major moneymakers, which motivated artists to adopt a mentality of “fail fast, fail better,” with an eye to eventually proving correct and getting paid.
By critically interrogating the idols and polarized views of his culture, Socrates threatened the power holders of his city. A constantly questioning figure is a direct threat to individuals who spend their lives defending unquestioned belief – whether it’s belief in themselves, their superiors or their gods.
Take Euthyphro, for example, one of Socrates’ principal interlocutors. Euthyphro is so sure that he knows the difference between right and wrong that he is bringing his own father to trial. Socrates quickly disabuses him of his certainty, famously debating him about the true meaning of piety.
Or take Meletus, the man who eventually brought Socrates to trial on accusations of corrupting youth. In Plato’s account of the trial, it takes Socrates no time to show this “good patriot,” as Meletus calls himself, that he does not understand what patriotism truly means. Without any pretensions to knowing the absolute truth, Socrates is able to shed light on the underlying assumptions around him.
It’s frustrating to read the Platonic dialogues, the works of philosophy that recount Socrates’ life and teaching, in part because Socrates rarely claims the final word on any subject. In short, he gives more questions than answers. But what remains constant is his openness to uncertainty that keeps his inquiry on the move, pushing his inquiries further and deeper.
Paying the price
The second danger of epistemic humility is now probably in view. It’s the danger that Socrates faced when he was brought to trial for corrupting Athens’ youth – the danger to the humble skeptics themselves.
He is brought up on two very serious charges. The first was an accusation that he taught students to make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger – which is actually what the Sophists did, not Socrates. The second was that he had invented new gods – again, he didn’t do that; poets and playwrights did.
What was he really guilty of? Perhaps only this: Socrates criticized the arrogant self-assertion of his culture’s influencers, and they brought him to trial, which concluded in his death sentence.
He asked the big questions, and he paid a price. Roland Gerth/The Image Bank via Getty Images
Socrates taught that being humble about one’s own views was a necessary step in searching for truth – perhaps the most essential one. That was and perhaps still is a revolutionary view, because it forces us to challenge preconceived ideas about what we believe, what we worship and where we tap meaning. He placed himself in the middle of Athenians’ sharply polarized debates about what truth and goodness were, and he was the one who got hit.
“Humility like darkness,” wrote American philosopher Henry David Thoreau, “reveals the heavenly lights.” Put another way, humility about the verity, accuracy and wisdom of one’s ideas can reveal the fact that others have understandable reasons for thinking as they do — as long as you try to see the world as they are seeing it. In contrast, arrogance tends to extinguish the “heavenly light” about what we still don’t fully understand.
Being humble about one’s position in the world is not an invitation for a post-truth, anything-goes opinion free-for-all. Truth – the idea of truth – matters. And we can pursue it together, if we are always open to being wrong.
theconversation.com · by J. W. Traphagan
3. Marines Look to Get Closer to Special Operations Teams While Practicing Extractions
Marines Look to Get Closer to Special Operations Teams While Practicing Extractions
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · April 25, 2023
Just hours after helicopters finished bringing 70 employees out of the American embassy in Sudan, halfway across the world, the Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) started practicing for the same type of mission.
The exercise, held at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and aboard a trio of Navy ships off the coast, was not only an opportunity for Marines to practice extracting noncombatants from dangerous situations, it also foreshadows a growing partnership between the maritime branch and special operations forces.
"Certainly, we're watching [the] real world, and you can look at Sudan. ... Here are things that are germane to what we're doing," Col. Dennis Sampson, the commander of the MEU, told a group of reporters aboard the USS Bataan on Monday.
Reporters were invited to observe two days of operations with the Navy and Marine Corps. The trip featured an at-sea portion aboard the Bataan, an amphibious assault ship, as well as some time at Camp Lejeune, where the Marine Corps was using an office building to simulate a besieged consulate in a fictitious country.
Sampson, as well as other Marine Corps and State Department officials, said that they made an effort to include more training with members of the Navy SEALs -- the same command that, according to The New York Times, pulled off the extraction in Sudan -- as part of these trainings.
"What is unique for us, is we've actually attached them to the MEU," Sampson explained before noting that this "makes us more relevant when you get into a theater and there's a crisis." The colonel also explained that the extra training decreases the amount of time the units would need to start providing support to special forces.
"I think the MEU is just truly a natural partner with [special operations forces]," Sampson said.
The closer cooperation is partly out of practicality. Lt. Col. Josef Wiese, the second in command of the MEU, said that the "reality is [the SEALs are] going to be there, and they're probably there before the Marine Corps gets there."
But, Jonathan Berger, a State Department adviser to Marine Corps Special Operations Command, also noted that the level of cooperation between the agency that runs embassies and consulates and special operations units "is increasing."
"We've got a team now embedded in the embassy in Jakarta, for example. ... We've got folks working in Taiwan," Berger said, before naming other locations in the Philippines as well.
One aspect of these extraction trainings that is less clear is whether there were any lessons learned from the last major removal of noncombatants from a hostile area -- the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Reporters asked several State Department officials to explain what changes or improvements have been made to procedures following the massive but deadly and chaotic extraction of more than 120,000 people from Hamid Karzai International Airport in August 2021, but with little response. Officials often cited the unique, inland, location of that evacuation as making any comparison challenging.
On the Marine side, Sampson did say that some in his unit went to learning sessions with Brig. Gen. Farrell Sullivan, who was involved in the Kabul extraction, "and certainly I've talked to other folks involved."
A review conducted by President Joe Biden's White House largely laid the blame for the messy withdrawal at the feet of his predecessor -- President Donald Trump. A 12-page summary of the results that was released in April argued that Biden was "severely constrained" by Trump's decisions.
Sampson said that, broadly, he is looking to make his MEU a more relevant "crisis response force."
-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · April 25, 2023
4. When a Wolf Warrior Howls
Excerpts:
So, how did Lu make such a slip-up? The ambassador has a record of aggressive nationalist comments. Last year, Lu referred to the need to subject the Taiwanese public to “reeducation” after a hypothetical Chinese conquest; he also accused “foreign forces” of being behind the mass protests that eventually helped end China’s strict zero-COVID policy. In 2019, while he was ambassador to Canada, Lu accused Canada of “white supremacy” for detaining Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition request.
Lu has openly boasted about his so-called wolf warrior status, and so far the aggressive posturing seems to have boosted his career. After all, he landed the cushy post in France. But unlike some instances of wolf warrior diplomacy, Lu’s recent statement doesn’t align with any Chinese goal. He may have intended to say something more moderate, such as that post-Soviet territorial disputes are not fully resolved.
When a Wolf Warrior Howls
The Chinese ambassador to France went off message, and Beijing can’t apologize.
Palmer-James-foreign-policy-columnist20
James Palmer
By James Palmer, a deputy editor at Foreign Policy.
Foreign Policy · by James Palmer · April 25, 2023
The highlights this week: China grapples with fallout from questionable comments by its ambassador to France, Malaysian fugitive Jho Low could be sent home in a rumored backroom deal between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur, and a liberal-leaning Chinese newspaper columnist faces espionage charges.
Chinese Diplomat Goes Off Message
This week, China is dealing with the diplomatic fallout from ill-judged comments made by its ambassador to France, Lu Shaye. During a TV interview last Friday, Lu seemed to question the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Ukraine. “Even these ex-Soviet countries don’t have an effective status in international law because there was no international agreement to materialize their status as sovereign countries,” he said. The remark prompted immediate outrage, especially among the Baltic states.
European politicians already skeptical of China seized on Lu’s comments. Despite French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent red-carpet visit to Beijing, China’s relationship with much of Europe has declined since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic—and even more so since Russia invaded Ukraine last year. A stalled trade deal between China and the European Union now appears dead. Beijing’s reputation has especially suffered in Eastern Europe, thanks in part to its attempt to bully Lithuania over its relations with Taiwan.
Yet Lu’s remarks diverge from China’s official position: Beijing has never questioned the legitimacy of former Soviet states and has enjoyed relatively good relationships with them for much of the last three decades. When asked about Lu’s comments on Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said, “China respects the status of the former Soviet republics as sovereign countries after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.” The Chinese Embassy in Paris removed the online transcript of Lu’s comments and said he spoke in a private capacity.
So, how did Lu make such a slip-up? The ambassador has a record of aggressive nationalist comments. Last year, Lu referred to the need to subject the Taiwanese public to “reeducation” after a hypothetical Chinese conquest; he also accused “foreign forces” of being behind the mass protests that eventually helped end China’s strict zero-COVID policy. In 2019, while he was ambassador to Canada, Lu accused Canada of “white supremacy” for detaining Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition request.
Lu has openly boasted about his so-called wolf warrior status, and so far the aggressive posturing seems to have boosted his career. After all, he landed the cushy post in France. But unlike some instances of wolf warrior diplomacy, Lu’s recent statement doesn’t align with any Chinese goal. He may have intended to say something more moderate, such as that post-Soviet territorial disputes are not fully resolved.
Russia’s war in Ukraine puts China in an awkward position. Beijing supports Moscow both because of their long-standing near-alliance and shared anti-Western sentiment, while its diplomatic language has stressed sovereignty and self-determination. However, China defines sovereignty on its own terms; its conception has never included Taiwan or Tibet. (It also sees the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a cautionary tale.) It’s possible some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials see the sovereignty of post-Soviet states as not fully determined—an idea that Lu could have repeated.
Ultimately, leaders in Beijing—and particularly Chinese President Xi Jinping—remain responsible for appointing figures such as Lu to key positions. (Last week, China faced backlash after its ambassador to the Philippines implied that Filipino workers in Taiwan might be at risk amid rising tensions.) Although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to disavow Lu’s statement, it hasn’t apologized—and it almost never does to foreigners.
Beijing may be institutionally incapable of fully walking back the comments since it could be seen as humiliating and would likely require approval from the very top. That’s a big problem when the government is sending wolf warriors such as Lu out to howl.
What We’re Following
A backroom deal over Jho Low? Malaysian financier Jho Low, the alleged mastermind of the 1MDB scandal that saw more than $4 billion stolen from Malaysian state investment funds, has been widely believed to be taking refuge in China for years. Beijing denies it is harboring Low, but he may be returned to his home country as part of a rumored backroom deal following Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s March visit to China. (In 2018, the 1MDB scandal led to the fall of then-Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak.)
Any deal between China and Malaysia would likely restrict the questions Low is publicly asked about his connections to the Chinese state. Low appears to have acted as a Chinese agent, particularly in helping to establish an influence network in the United States that allegedly included casino magnate Steve Wynn and Republican financier Elliott Broidy, who was pardoned by former U.S. President Donald Trump. Low aimed to persuade Trump to return fugitive Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui to Beijing; Guo is charged with fraud in a separate case.
Meanwhile, one of Low’s contacts, founding Fugees member Pras Michel, is on trial facing 10 charges associated with his alleged work as an unregistered agent for Low and China. Michel was reportedly paid more than $100 million to lobby for the release of Guo; in this case, Low seems to have mistaken the rapper’s moderate connections to the Obama campaign for wider influence.
Newspaper columnist charged with spying. This week, reports emerged that liberal Chinese commentator Dong Yuyu faces charges of espionage and has been in detention for more than a year. Dong, a well-known columnist for a CCP newspaper, was sidelined for his relatively liberal views during the Xi era; his detention appears to be the result of his regular meetings with foreign diplomats and journalists—a routine part of any informed pundit’s job.
Paranoia about espionage within the party has risen under Xi, with any meeting with foreigners viewed as potentially dangerous. That makes any investigative work in China, such as corporate due diligence, especially risky. Western diplomats, academics, and journalists have seen their Chinese colleagues reduce contact or convey that they have to report any meeting to state security agents.
FP’s Most Read This Week
• Ukraine’s Longest Day by Franz-Stefan Gady
• The West Is Preparing for Russia’s Disintegration by Anchal Vohra
• In Sudan, U.S. Policies Paved the Way for War by Justin Lynch
Tech and Business
Propaganda gets a boost on Twitter. Last week, Twitter dropped the “state-affiliated” label and algorithmic restrictions previously imposed on Chinese state outlets, among others. Twitter is banned within China, but the site introduced the label in 2020 in an attempt to prevent the spread of disinformation on the site. Its removal appears to have followed new Twitter owner Elon Musk’s disagreement with NPR, which led him to incorrectly label the U.S. outlet as state-affiliated.
Chinese and Russian propaganda outlets had already benefited from an apparently purchased boost in visibility in recent weeks, according to a DFRLab report. This could be part of Musk’s strategy to prop up Twitter’s diminishing finances, but it’s worth noting that Musk has promoted conspiracy theories and pro-Russian propaganda on his own Twitter account.
Guizhou struggles with debt. As Chinese provincial governments face a long-running financial crisis, richer and more connected provinces are better positioned to receive aid from the central government. By contrast, the isolated province of Guizhou in China’s mountainous southwest is struggling so badly that it put out a public appeal for assistance. This week, Guizhou signed an agreement with a major state-backed manager of distressed assets to dispatch a team to help.
Guizhou has a population of 38 million, but it remains economically marginal within China. Unlike neighboring provinces, it hasn’t capitalized on its ethnic diversity and natural beauty for tourism. Once China’s poorest province in terms of per capita GDP, Guizhou overtook three others in the last decade thanks to Xi’s anti-poverty push in the 2010s—although that data should be taken with the usual grain of salt. But those boom years were also an era of bad loans, bad assets, and rising debt.
- Create an FP account to save articles to read later and in the FP mobile app.
- Sign Up
- ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER?
Foreign Policy · by James Palmer · April 25, 2023
5. Beijing says it ‘respects’ sovereign ex-Soviet states after furore caused by China envoy
The damage is done.(to China) They can't walk it back.
Chinese Ambassador Lu Shaye esaid the quiet part out loud. Now we should exploit this as part of our influence operations.
You haven’t highlighted anything yet
When y
Beijing says it ‘respects’ sovereign ex-Soviet states after furore caused by China envoy
By CUE The Straits Times2 min
April 24, 2023
View Original
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said China “respects the status of the former Soviet republics as sovereign countries”. PHOTO: REUTERS
BEIJING – China said it “respects” the independence of the former Soviet Union states and that its position is “unchanged”, after its diplomat to France sparked a firestorm in Europe by questioning their sovereignty.
“China respects the status of the former Soviet republics as sovereign countries after the Soviet Union’s dissolution,” Ms Mao Ning, the foreign ministry’s spokesman, said on Monday at a regular news briefing in Beijing.
Her remarks came days after Chinese Ambassador Lu Shaye told French network LCI that ex-Soviet states do not have sovereign status as independent nations – a statement that ignored internationally recognised borders, and which caused anger among Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and others in Europe.
Those three nations said they would summon Chinese diplomats in their capitals to explain the remarks. Top EU diplomat Josep Borrell called the comments “unacceptable”.
The Chinese Embassy in France posted a transcript of the interview on its official WeChat account on Monday morning, but by midday had removed it.
Ms Mao said China has developed “friendly and cooperative bilateral relations” with the former Soviet nations since establishing diplomatic ties with them, adding that some media outlets are “misrepresenting” China’s position on Ukraine – though she did not name any in particular.
She said the country stands by Mr Lu.
Mr Lu appeared to contradict China’s official stance, which recognised the independence of the Baltic states in 1991.
President Xi Jinping has also reaffirmed their status, writing before a visit to Kazakhstan in 2022 that the two nations supported their “respective sovereignty”. He also cited Uzbekistan’s “independence” in another statement around the same time.
Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang said in a speech in Shanghai that “China sees defending the authority of the United Nations and upholding the post-war international order as its solemn duty”.
He added that his nation suffered “among the heaviest casualties in the world” during World War II.
The controversy threatens to undermine Beijing’s efforts to be seen as a peacemaker for Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially given how much China already has touted its ties with Moscow.
Mr Xi seemed to have been making inroads on the peace efforts. He held a visit earlier in April with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has pushed for establishing a framework that could be used as a basis for future negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow.
6. Beyond ship counts: Training, readiness and capabilities ‘count’ too
People count.
Beyond ship counts: Training, readiness and capabilities ‘count’ too
Defense News · by Andrew Mara · April 25, 2023
The national fixation on U.S. Navy ship numbers is not contributing to national security. Last week’s release of the Navy’s “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024″ — better known as the shipbuilding plan — will set off a predictable debate centered on two numbers: how many ships the Navy should buy in the coming year, and the proper total size of the fleet.
Congress, the White House, the media and the Pentagon itself are repeatedly preoccupied with the question of whether the United States needs a 355-ship, 372-ship or even a 500-ship Navy.
The shipbuilding plan is the most comprehensive official, unclassified statement on the Navy’s plans and goals for both the near and far term. As such, it tends to drive the public debate around the size and shape of the Navy. While procurement numbers and fleet size are important, they are not a proxy for assessing warfighting prowess. The focus needs to shift to metrics that are more relevant to actual capabilities.
As an example, take three naval incidents from the past decade:
- Oct. 1, 2016: The United Arab Emirates’ HSV-2 Swift, a ship formerly operated by the U.S. Navy, was reportedly seriously damaged by a decades-old missile launched by untrained Houthi rebels. The ship, which had no self-defense system, had to be towed back to port.
-
April 21, 2021: The Indonesian submarine Nanggala was lost at sea. While the exact cause remains unknown, maintenance issues appear to be the primary suspect.
-
April 13, 2022: The Russian guided-missile cruiser Moskva, reportedly struck by two Ukrainian cruise missiles, sank in the Black Sea despite having significant air defense capabilities. Public reports suggest maintenance or training deficits contributed to the sinking.
All three of these ships would be counted as a single ship in public discourse around fleet size, but none of them could have been “counted” upon to generate naval power. Unfortunately, in public shipbuilding debates here in the U.S., we often fall prey to the same misconception.
For example, a $250 million, 1,500-ton expeditionary fast transport with limited warfighting capability “counts” just as much as a $3 billion, 10,000-ton attack submarine — the Navy’s most survivable and lethal platform. They are each one ship. A strategy of ramping up expeditionary fast transport buys would do wonders for the Navy’s ship count, but it is highly unlikely to turn the tide of power in a conflict with a near-peer competitor.
Even a more nuanced approach that explores the inventory of each ship class leaves much to be desired, as the ships themselves are a single part of the equation. Ships need to be outfitted with the right equipment, have trained crews and be properly maintained. If not, they add little to the Navy’s ability to project power, and they risk suffering a fate similar to that of the Swift, Nanggala or Moskva — a serious casualty in the face of a limited threat, or no threat at all.
This satellite image shows the Russian cruiser Moskva in a port in Crimea, Ukraine, on April 7, 2022. (Maxar Technologies via AP)
The U.S. Navy is the most capable and well-trained maritime force on Earth, and a far more useful debate would focus on a wider variety of metrics that account for these capabilities, based on mission effectiveness. Such metrics could include the number of vertical launching system cells (surface and undersea); torpedo capacity; munitions inventories; sortie generation; lift; fleet distribution; communications capacities; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting; and force flows into theaters of interest.
Why does this matter? The shipbuilding plan is the only unclassified, public statement on the Navy’s stated needs and plan for fleet size and mix. It features prominently in public discussions — and congressional funding decisions — on Navy size, shape and capability. A myopic focus on fleet size at the expense of effectiveness will chart an incorrect course, suggesting victory could be at hand by buying more vessels.
Ships themselves, without the key enabling capabilities, training, maintenance and munitions, unfortunately come to dominate public debate. They become empty numbers in an op-ed, speech or talking point.
A comprehensive shipbuilding plan is not an easy thing to produce. It requires robustly funded enabling capabilities, and must wrestle with the unpredictability of the challenges the Navy may face 10, 20 or 30 years from now. As former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.” The future is uncertain, with wide potential variance in the scale and scope of potential conflicts; the geopolitical operating environment; and both U.S. and potential adversary capabilities, capacities and concepts of operations.
It is precisely this opacity that drives the need to explore a vast trade space of platforms, capabilities and the concept of operations when debating the future Navy. Doing so requires insight, discussion and analysis around far more than ship count.
These broader discussions on fleet effectiveness informed by a more robust set of metrics are critical for improving budgetary trade-off discussions. As Congress and others debate how many and which ships to buy, it can’t simply be a calculus of “more is better.” The debate should explore where the next marginal shipbuilding dollar should go: To surface ships that have more vertical launch cells but also more survivability challenges? To submarines with less vertical launch but added survivability? To amphibious ships that provide entirely different capabilities?
The debate must also balance shipbuilding versus other investments, like steaming days, flight hours, manpower and weapons. While these discussions occur in the bowels of the Pentagon, in fleet-concentration areas, and in the text of the shipbuilding plan itself, they are largely absent from the public discourse. That discussion needs to begin.
Do we need a larger Navy? The answer is almost certainly yes, but that can’t come at the expense of making the fleet we have today and in the future as lethal and effective as possible. Only with the correct capabilities, training and maintenance will the ships that the Navy is counting be ships the Navy can count upon. It is time to move beyond ship counts.
Andrew Mara is the executive vice president of the Center for Naval Analyses and a former deputy director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office at the U.S. Defense Department. Gordon Jaquith is vice president of the Systems, Tactics and Force Development Division at CNA and a former director of the naval forces division at CAPE. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Department nor the U.S. government.
7. It's Time for an East Asian NATO
Excerpts:
Such a successful alliance of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States can serve as a model and gradually expand to include the entire democratic world. A values-based "economic NATO" is necessary and imperative if peace, prosperity, freedom, and stability are to be protected and promoted in East Asia and throughout the world.
It's Time for an East Asian NATO
JIANLI YANG AND YONGHUN KIM
ON 4/26/23 AT 9:46 AM EDT
Newsweek · April 26, 2023
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol arrived in Washington this week for his first state visit to the United States. He met with President Joe Biden, is to deliver a speech at Harvard University, and address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. Although he will be one of America's most well-received world leaders, the trip will be a difficult test for Yoon.
More than at any time in recent history, the specter of a nuclear exchange hangs over humanity. South Korea depends on the United States as its main security ally against a de facto nuclear North Korea. To complicate matters, the South also relies on China as its largest trading partner. China, in turn, is not only North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's main enabler; it has become increasingly aggressive and coercive toward its democratic neighbors.
Over the past two decades, many countries have tried to follow the formula of "security dependence on the United States" and "economic dependence on China," struggling to maneuver between these two superpowers. But as China has become more proactive in using its economic power to bend the world to its will, the formula has become increasingly untenable. Yoon's presidency heralds a shift in policy. During Biden's visit to Seoul last May, Yoon described the U.S.–South Korean partnership as an "economic security" alliance, emphasizing that "the economy is security, and security is the economy."
President Joe Biden, first lady Jill Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and first lady Kim Keon Hee, visit the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, on April 25. JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has at least partially confirmed Yoon's prescience. It is abundantly clear that several economic factors have made the democratic world vulnerable to a burgeoning Russia-China alliance, including Europe's overdependence on Russian oil, gas, and grain and China's unprincipled trade tactics. All together, these factors encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to invade its democratic neighbor.
The war in Ukraine has shattered many rosy predictions about potential conflicts in East Asia. It has proven foolish to believe that strong economic ties with China, along with military links to Washington will protect you. Taiwan is more vulnerable to China than ever, and such ties will not protect Seoul or Tokyo from North Korean nuclear missiles. The reality is much worse than many would like to believe. The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula are the world's most dangerous flashpoints, and the eruption of either could plunge the entire world into an economic and humanitarian disaster. Even more frightening, the two hotspots are so inextricably linked that the eruption of one would almost certainly trigger the eruption of the other. For this reason alone, getting ahead of the risk curve in East Asia is not only necessary but imperative.
The harsh reality is that there is no effective community of democratic countries in the region to coordinate efforts to deter or mitigate such risks. There is no NATO or European Union that can take collective action as has happened in the West over Ukraine, however unsatisfactory the results have been. Given the commendable détente between South Korea and Japan and the urgent need to expand cooperation in various fields in the face of rising global tensions, it is time for these nations to join Taiwan and the United States in an "economic NATO" based on democratic values.
An "economic NATO" would perform the following functions:
First, it would establish mechanisms for applying NATO's Article 5 principle of mutual defense to the economic sphere. Whenever China uses economic coercion to bully a member of the alliance, especially on values-related issues, others should automatically and immediately ease the economic pain of the bullied member.
Second, an "economic NATO" would establish mechanisms for economic security among these four democratic nations, including but not limited to joint efforts to strengthen the resilience of supply chains and to develop and safeguard high technology.
There is a bit of a paradox, unfortunately. The overdependence of these economies on China both makes these allies reluctant to establish the mechanisms proposed above, while showing why they are urgently needed. For example, U.S. export controls that prevent chipmakers from exporting advanced equipment into China pose a serious conundrum for South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix. Both companies depend on China as a key market and manufacturing base for their memory chips.
This leads to the third function that an "economic NATO" in East Asia should perform.
The alliance would need to design and implement concrete measures to help build alternative economic power centers in the region and around the globe.
On his state visit to the U.S., Yoon will be accompanied by more than 120 senior executives from top companies such as Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor Company. Part of their mission is to help supply chains to become less dependent on China for semiconductors. This is an important step.
The fourth provision of an "economic NATO" would be to encourage and support the liberalization and democratization of autocratic countries, pushing for greater liberalism and a strengthened rules-based order in East Asia.
Such a successful alliance of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States can serve as a model and gradually expand to include the entire democratic world. A values-based "economic NATO" is necessary and imperative if peace, prosperity, freedom, and stability are to be protected and promoted in East Asia and throughout the world.
Jianli Yang is the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and the author of For Us, the Living: A Journey to Shine the Light on Truth.
Yonghun Kim, a Korean American, is a senior advisor at the Center for Civic Culture Studies.
Newsweek · April 26, 2023
8. ‘There Is No More Ukraine Here.’ ‘That’s Where You’re Wrong’: A Village Rises After Russian Occupation
‘There Is No More Ukraine Here.’ ‘That’s Where You’re Wrong’: A Village Rises After Russian Occupation
Kyiv Post joins a humanitarian initiative – run by a local military unit – as it visits Novy Burluk, a rural town in the Kharkiv region, occupied by Russian forces for seven months.
by Pete Shmigel | April 26, 2023, 9:27 am
kyivpost.com
After the Russian soldiers burned the flag flying from the village’s administrative office, Irena Blokha, the town manager, gathered up its ashes in a glass jar. She now stores that jar in a secret location until Ukraine has prevailed and Novy Burluk, some 25 kilometers from the official border with Russia, is fully safe again.
Today, Blokha’s task is to help with the distribution of aid to the village’s approximately 325 current residents. An olive drab van, with shrapnel holes down one side, has arrived with some 40 boxes and 50 bags of free food provided by the Kharkiv Humanitarian Centre and the humanitarian program of Kraken, a special operations force that has operated in the district east of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city.
The volunteers proceed to distribute some 500 kilos of food stuffs to 109 of the village’s 149 households.
From occupation to liberation
“It’s good to see the village coming back to life,” Blokha says. “We had 502 people before the full-scale war and many people fled when, in May, there was a ‘green corridor’ during the occupation [which lasted from Feb. 24 to Sept. 12, 2022]. Now, people are coming back and we’re planning for the future.”
As the weeks of occupation wore on, the commander would wander the village at night, drunken and firing his revolver at cats and cans. Two residents were killed during the occupation and the school was destroyed.
A local cat guarding supplies. PHOTO: Kyiv Post
At one point, the occupiers collected all the residents’ mobile phones. They scrolled through each phone’s content for patriotic Ukrainian symbols or songs, or evidence of Ukrainian military service. Men who had fought in the Donbas were then beaten up.
“They came to ‘liberate’ us. The only thing the Russians ‘liberated’ here was our washing machines,” Blokha says.
She apologizes for tearing up as she tells the story to Andriy Rudenko, the Kraken soldier who runs the Kharkiv Humanitarian Center that works in the region’s recently de-occupied settlements.
The soldier who tends to those he protects
Nearly every day, staring before 8 a.m., Rudenko and the Center's volunteers pack up vehicles in Kharkiv with donations from some 26 countries of the world. Then, they drive down roads ripped up by tank treads and past some villages that have been completely levelled. Once at their destination, they distribute items such as food, hygiene products, knitted hats and batteries to locals.
Today’s products have been donated by the Canadian Ukrainian Foundation, a diaspora organization, and the Ukrainian Federation of Foodbanks, which redistributes excess items from supermarket chains.
Andriy Rudenko, Kraken soldier who runs a humanitarian program, gives a thumbs-up. PHOTO: Kyiv Post
“We want to show that as Ukrainian soldiers, we are nothing like the Russians. In that sense, it’s about ‘hearts and minds,’ but it’s also just important to help where we can,” Rudenko, 36, says. “These people have suffered. Their incomes have been destroyed because many fields are mined and can’t be planted now.”
Although Rudenko claims that “we can keep feeding them forever, and we will if we have to,” he also acknowledges that “it’s not the answer.” The Kharkiv native is clear about what needs to be done: “The only real solution is to win the war as fast as possible and make life safe for them again.”
Rudenko asks Blokha what her biggest challenges going forward are. She says that restoring and reopening the damaged school, which the occupiers used as one of their bases, is her first priority, but that the village will not be able to do so on its own.
Irena Blokha, Novy Burluk town manager, and Andriy Rudenko, Kraken humanitarian program, PHOTO: Kyiv Post
On the drive back to the city, past hundreds of structures destroyed by tank or artillery fire, Rudenko considers what NGO support and funding options may be available to Novy Burluk. It’s not a regular assignment for a soldier.
“They will be alright in the end. That’s a town founded by free Cossacks in 1702. They survived not just this occupation, but the Holodomor [artificial famine imposed on Ukraine by Stalin]. It’s another stage in our history of fighting for independence,” Rudenko says.
Where some 200 Russian vehicles – armored personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery pieces mostly manned by crews from far-flung Buryatia, near Mongolia – stood at the top of the town on the first days of its occupation, there is an old monument. It is partly dedicated to Andriy Movchan, who founded the first Communist collective farm in the village in the 1920s. The plaques on the monument say that in 1930 he was apparently “murdered by white-bandits and kulaks,” presumably Ukrainian farmers who would not become part of the Soviet Russian system of control.
Victoria Saray, 29, and her friend, Tetiana Redko, 28, stand in the line for the food distribution. They have lived in Novy Burluk all their lives. Both have married there and between them have 4 children under 11. With their children, they fled the village in the May 'green corridor' and returned after Ukrainian forces took it back without firing a shot in its vicinity.
Victoria Saray and Tetiana Redko of Novy Burluk. PHOTO: Kyiv Post
“We believe everything will be okay because we have to,” Saray said. “It’s impossible to live if you don’t believe that. For now, we pay for the internet for the kids’ education and we get on with our lives.”
Back at the Kharkiv Humanitarian Center’s small warehouse, it’s now 10 p.m. Another group of volunteers is there packing up goods for distribution tomorrow in the Izyum district. They’re busy making 100 bags of kasha, green beans, toothpaste, energy bars and sundry other items.
Rudenko makes himself his fourth or fifth coffee for the day.
“Of course, I’m tired. And I probably have PTS too. I almost got short with some guys on the metro who were talking shit about our positions. It’s impossible to come under an artillery assault and stay the same. The work, though, just becomes ‘automatic.’ You get in the routine and you keep pressing ahead. Damn, I've got friends being shot at. If they can keep going...” Rudenko said.
One of the volunteers says they’re about to run out of plastic shopping bags. A discussion starts about where to get some more before the official curfew.
kyivpost.com
9. After 60 years of foreign policy blunders, U.S. should rethink China strategy
Excerpts:
China may be a clear and present danger. Stealing intellectual property, intimidating neighbors and promising to seize Taiwan are hostile acts. But are China's threats well enough defined to serve as the basis for an effective strategy?
Moreover, if the United States is committed to a permanent strategic competition with China, what is the best possible outcome to be expected? What are the metrics for assessing success and failure? And do other options exist? The United States frets that China will win the artificial intelligence race. What does that mean? Numerically, China may have the largest navy in the world. Would anyone trade it for the U.S. Navy?
Will China invade Taiwan? Is that possible or likely, given the level of military capability required to launch a Normandy-level invasion of Taiwan? Or is this invasion threat equivalent to nonexistent Iraqi WMD and invented North Vietnamese PT-boat attacks? Does the U.S. government know?
Since 2015, one consistent U.S. strategic aim has been to deter China. But from what is China (or Russia) being deterred? And if China is not deterred, what then? If the actual threats China poses cannot be well defined and deterrence is not working, is it time to reconsider strategy?
Given this historical record, will a deeply politically divided United States be able to undertake a thorough and timely review of its China policies or on any other issue? The answer is likely to be no.
After 60 years of foreign policy blunders, U.S. should rethink China strategy - UPI.com
By Harlan Ullman, Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist
upi.com
Given that many in the U.S. Congress regard China as an "existential threat," will failure become endemic to U.S. China policy? File Photo by Mark R. Cristino/EPA-EFE
The record of American interventions into Vietnam in 1964, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 is one of failure.
Given that many in the U.S. Congress regard China as an "existential threat," is the United States at risk of making similar errors and mistakes in judgment extending across several administrations that will end in future failure? Bluntly put, will failure become endemic to U.S. China policy?
Advertisement
The major reasons for these three failures were remarkably consistent. The United States was flagrantly deficient in basic knowledge and understanding about each country. And, another culprit was at work -- groupthink that excused successive governments from challenging basic assumptions before acting.
The investigation of the August 2021 evacuation from Kabul airport is a stark reminder of how four successive administrations caused the Afghan debacle. U.S. President Joe Biden was rightfully criticized for mishandling the withdrawal. But culpability and responsibility must also heavily rest on the accumulated actions and policies of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump that, over 20 years, would return Afghanistan to medieval Taliban rule.
Advertisement
In Afghanistan, the kill or capture mission failed when U.S. operational incompetence allowed Osama bin Laden to escape into Pakistan in December 2001. The mission then metastasized into nation building, overlaying a Western-style democracy and constitution onto a tribal society to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist haven again.
The secret 2020 Trump negotiations with the Taliban, deliberately excluding the Afghan government, committed the United States to withdrawal and disaster.
In Vietnam, the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution was provoked by a second North Vietnamese PT boat attack that never occurred. The Domino Theory to stop the global spread of monolithic godless communism in Vietnam rationalized intervention. And the Johnson administration's groupthink wrongly concluded that gradual escalation and U.S. military superiority would force Hanoi to surrender.
Groupthink was certain that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in 2003. And George W. Bush's invention of an "axis of evil" consisting of traditional enemies Iran and Iraq and North Korea was, frankly, absurd. Few challenged these assessments. Are we repeating similar errors with China?
The China policies of George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations assumed that a more economically viable China would produce a more open society. That, too, did not happen. As China's economy grew, so did its military power.
Advertisement
In 2011, this combination drove the Obama administration to announce a "strategic pivot" to Asia. The 2015 release of the Obama National Security and Defense Strategies, largely retained by Trump and Biden, reinforced this pivot. The NSS's aim was to "contain, deter and if war arose, defeat" five potential adversaries topped by China and Russia. Had Chinese and Russian strategy held the same aims against the United States, what would the reactions have been in Washington?
The Trump administration exacerbated relations by imposing tariffs on China to correct the $400 billion annual trade imbalance while ignoring China's favorable $2 trillion-$3 trillion investment balance in U.S. equities, bonds and real estate. Under Biden, the rhetoric has grown harsher, reflected in the president declaring the battle between democracy and autocracy as the major struggle of our time.
China may be a clear and present danger. Stealing intellectual property, intimidating neighbors and promising to seize Taiwan are hostile acts. But are China's threats well enough defined to serve as the basis for an effective strategy?
Moreover, if the United States is committed to a permanent strategic competition with China, what is the best possible outcome to be expected? What are the metrics for assessing success and failure? And do other options exist? The United States frets that China will win the artificial intelligence race. What does that mean? Numerically, China may have the largest navy in the world. Would anyone trade it for the U.S. Navy?
Will China invade Taiwan? Is that possible or likely, given the level of military capability required to launch a Normandy-level invasion of Taiwan? Or is this invasion threat equivalent to nonexistent Iraqi WMD and invented North Vietnamese PT-boat attacks? Does the U.S. government know?
Since 2015, one consistent U.S. strategic aim has been to deter China. But from what is China (or Russia) being deterred? And if China is not deterred, what then? If the actual threats China poses cannot be well defined and deterrence is not working, is it time to reconsider strategy?
Given this historical record, will a deeply politically divided United States be able to undertake a thorough and timely review of its China policies or on any other issue? The answer is likely to be no.
Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, the prime author of "shock and awe" and author of "The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large." Follow him @harlankullman.
The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.
upi.com
10. The Government has an Espionage Problem. Open Source should be part of the Solution.
I am a great beleiver in open source information.
The Government has an Espionage Problem. Open Source should be part of the Solution.
thecipherbrief.com
Alternative Perspectives
April 24th, 2023 by Brian Drake, |
Brian Drake is the Federal Chief Technology Officer of Accrete.AI Government. He is also President and CEO of the Defense Intelligence Memorial Foundation. He served as DIA’s first Director of Artificial Intelligence overseeing a $20+ million AI investment portfolio. His last assignment was leading the intelligence briefing team for the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, the Undersecretary for Policy, and other “E Ring” principals.
View all articles by Brian Drake
OPINION — The unauthorized release of classified information and the subsequent arrest of Jack Teixeira has raised important questions. Why does the Air National Guard have staff with Top Secret clearances? If he is found guilty, was Teixeira’s ego really the cause of the leak? And what can be done about preventing these leaks in the future?
While these are all good questions, they do not address the central flaw in the American security apparatus: The U.S. government is not assessing security risk with the right data sources at scale.
Today, the security vetting process involves filling out a lengthy form, a series of suitability interviews, a credit check, and for certain clearance types, a polygraph. Prior to 2008, every employee was reinvestigated every five to ten years. Now, under the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP), the government performs a thorough background check once and relies on automated ingests of terrorism watch lists, foreign travel, financial, criminal, credit, public records, and prior clearance eligibility determinations. All of this data is processed manually by threat analysts across the constellation of national security agencies.
There are two problems with the design of this system.
First, the CEP’s data sources are necessary, but not sufficient to detect security threat insider activity. Today’s insider threats broadcast their aims on anonymous discussion forums on the deep and dark web, build fake social media personas, and use encrypted communication platforms to complete clandestine information transfers. Unlike the spies of old, their payment preferences rely heavily on the secrecy of vice, the formal banking system. Also unlike their predecessors, these insiders want to be found by adoring audiences, paying foreign intelligence services, criminal enterprises, or corporate espionage agents. These are known threat venues and they are not considered worthy of ingestion by the CEP.
Second, it is unrealistic to expect analysts to go through this volume of information with enough fidelity to detect actionable threats. In response to the CEP’s overwhelming amount of information, most agencies rely on tips and activity-based monitoring only on government networks. Our most famous spies; Robert Hansen, Aldrich Ames, and Ana Montes, did not communicate with their handlers on government systems and neither do today’s spies. The government is experiencing decision paralysis because the size of the open source challenge is daunting and with 3 million people holding some level of clearance, they see their familiar manual review processes failing.
It’s not just for the President anymore. Cipher Brief Subscriber+Members have access to their own Open Source Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.
Some have argued that widening the detection net would impinge on civil liberties and privacy. We must be clear eyed on this point. Holding a security clearance is a privilege, not a right. It is also a condition of employment. Every security clearance holder consents to having their life constantly and closely examined. Moreover, with the creation of the CEP, the government is empowered to scrutinize every element of personnel security risk. Now, with the arrest of Mr. Teixeira, we must acknowledge the imperative to evaluate the rich mosaic of open data and communications from people in positions of trust.
Congress should legislate the inclusion of open sources to the CEP, reduce the federal government’s reliance on cleared positions by emphasizing open source intelligence, and apply artificial intelligence (AI) tools to the mass data curation and analysis challenge.
First, as argued by others, an agency, separate from the Intelligence Community, with a laser-like focus on open source analysis cures many ills. If the agency included an open source insider threat detection program, it could look beyond “perimeter security” and more toward the dark corners of the Internet where insiders thrive.
Second, this agency can reduce the cleared person attack space by shifting missions toward open source intelligence. The Air National Guard of Massachusetts cleared Mr. Teixeira because the systems that support our military personnel are grounded in classified processing. The open source information environment offers capabilities that rival or exceed many national technical means. It is beyond time to jettison our dependence on over-classified products and drive down demand for cleared personnel.
Looking for a way to get ahead of the week in cyber and tech? Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter to quickly get up to speed on the biggest cyber and tech headlines and be ready for the week ahead. Sign up today
Lastly, true continuous and comprehensive security clearance evaluation demands the application of AI. Manual processes have limits. Three million cleared people have family, friends, have lived in different places, traveled to foreign countries, and used multiple active Internet devices over the years. These all represent risk vectors that cannot be ignored and given the government’s existing clearance backlog, it’s time to adopt AI-powered analytics that can identify aberrant behavior at scale. Not adopting AI for the background check and insider threat detection missions admits defeat and makes future leaks appear more likely.
We owe assurances to trusted employees that the person sitting next to them is not working for our adversaries or seeking fleeting fame on a fanboy website. It would be irresponsible to continue resourcing a system designed to examine sub-optimal data at sub-optimal scales.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
11. How China Could Save Putin’s War in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Whatever the risks of China’s joining the war might be, Xi will not be persuaded of anything he does not already believe about Russia and Ukraine. Western rhetoric will not deflect China from its three core interests in the war, and Xi is well aware that he will face sanctions should he cross Western redlines by giving Russia lethal aid. U.S. and European officials still need to drive this message in tandem, emphasizing that the United States and Europe will forge a comprehensive Western response to any Chinese entry into the war. Together with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, they will present a united front.
The Europeans in particular must communicate to China that their rejection of any Chinese deliveries of lethal weapons to Russia is a fundamentally European position and not merely the rhetoric of governments taking their cues from the United States. It should be stated repeatedly that the war in Ukraine is existential for Europeans, and impeding Chinese intervention is a fundamental European interest. By wading into the conflict, China would lose Europe. For their part, U.S. officials must impress on Beijing the United States’ patience and steely resolve in supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Demonstrating this fortitude and commitment to Ukraine’s cause should help Beijing see more starkly the risks of widening the war.
How China Could Save Putin’s War in Ukraine
The Logic—and Consequences—of Chinese Military Support for Russia
April 26, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · April 26, 2023
Over the past year, China has made the best of Russia’s war against Ukraine, emerging as one of the conflict’s few beneficiaries. It has styled itself as a measured peacemaker while gaining substantial leverage over Russia. Beijing has been Moscow’s most conspicuous and consequential backer in the war, pledging a “no limits” partnership with Russia shortly before the February 2022 invasion and helping keep Russia’s wartime economy afloat. Moscow’s growing reliance on China has been lucrative and useful for Beijing—and this economic dependence will likely continue and deepen. China’s rhetorical commitment to “multipolarity” in geopolitics has encouraged many countries in the global South to remain aloof from the war, unwilling to rally to Ukraine’s cause. After crowing about its reconciliation of Iran and Saudi Arabia, China is now promoting its “peace plan” for Ukraine, an entirely unrealistic proposal that caters almost exclusively to Russia’s interests. (Notably, the plan includes no requirement for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.) Whatever the flaws of this plan, it has still allowed Chinese leader Xi Jinping to present himself as a diplomatic mediator and to position China to play a part in Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.
And yet for all it has gained as a putative bystander, China may not be willing to stay on the sidelines indefinitely. A defeated Russia is not in China’s interest. The Kremlin is Beijing’s most important partner in its opposition to the U.S.-led international order. Despite their many differences, China and Russia have joined forces to advance an alternative order with its own rules of war and peace, its own financial centers, and its own multilateral institutions. “Change is coming that hasn’t happened in 100 years,” Xi declared in April, at the end of a visit to Moscow. “And we are driving this change together.” A Russian humiliation in Ukraine would undermine this narrative, giving the United States greater latitude to focus its energies and resources on competing with China.
To prevent this outcome, China could opt to throw Russia a lifeline beyond economic and moral support and supply its partner with lethal military aid. It could do so to prolong the war, to stave off a Russian defeat, or to speed some kind of Russian victory. Chinese aid could be covert—designed, that is, not to be discovered by U.S. intelligence. Indeed, China’s delivery to Russia of goods such as so-called hunting rifles, which have both civilian and military uses, arguably already constitutes such support. Or Beijing’s involvement could be overt. The public announcement of weapons deliveries would signal a formal alliance with Russia, and China’s entry into the war would open a new chapter in international affairs, turning the conflict in Ukraine into a truly global one and inaugurating a far more adversarial relationship between China and the West.
The United States, which is accustomed to watching China closely, has described the provisioning of lethal aid to Russia as a redline. Washington has threatened severe repercussions (probably in the form of significant economic sanctions) should Beijing cross this line. U.S. officials should be firm and consistent in warning their Chinese counterparts against such a dangerous course of action. But they should also recognize that China will not be easily cowed by words or by the threat of further U.S. sanctions.
In addition to the U.S. response, Europe has an important role to play in deterring a more concerted Chinese intervention in the war. Despite the optics of French President Emmanuel Macron’s deferential visit to Beijing in April, China’s desire for access to the European economy remains a major source of leverage for EU states. Even if China is convinced that it cannot repair relations with a hostile United States, it knows that it has a lot to lose in Europe. To succeed, Europeans will have to make clear to China that any military support for Russia will incur a severe and united response from Europe. The United States and Europe should remind China that its participation in the war will not decrease Western support for Ukraine. Far from it, a Chinese entry will only spur further aid from the West, raising the costs and the stakes for all.
THE CHINESE CALCULUS
China has three broad interests regarding the war in Ukraine. The first is preventing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s downfall. Russia with Putin at the helm is a valuable asset for China. It figures in China’s Cold War–style rivalry with the United States. It provides cheap energy and sizable markets for China. Beijing does not want Putin to be replaced by a less friendly leader, nor does it want to see domestic instability in Russia induced by a lost war in Ukraine. The worst-case scenario, the fragmentation of the Russian state, could bring chaos to China’s borders, impeding China’s ability to trade with Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe. Although Putin and Xi probably do not agree on how the war in Ukraine should end, they do agree that a clear Russian defeat would be intolerable.
China also understands that the war in Ukraine has ramifications for international order. Were the war to conclude on Western terms with a clear Ukrainian victory, the United States would define the war as a triumph for its international order, its rules, its power, and its diplomatic acumen. This would deal a blow to China’s aspirations for a new global order with Chinese (or Chinese-Russian) characteristics. But if, by contrast, the war were to drag on and continue to contribute to inflation and food insecurity around the world, China could frame the conflict as evidence of the failings of the preexisting U.S.-led international order. Thirty years of American hegemony have led us to this impasse, China could argue, while casting itself as a responsible stakeholder in its own alternative international order. More prosaically, China is happy for the war to carry on in so far as it keeps U.S. attention and resources pinned to Europe, far away from the Indo-Pacific.
China’s third interest, which may not be completely compatible with its second interest, is to have a meaningful stake in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Beijing is largely content to let Russia, Ukraine, and the West exhaust themselves in the fighting, but it wants to have a say in the eventual peace process and the postwar economic landscape of Ukraine. China had a growing economic relationship with Ukraine before the war, and it will doubtless play an extensive role in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. Although Kyiv insists that its supporters in the war should be the main beneficiaries of the opportunities that will come with the country’s revitalization, Ukraine may eventually turn to Beijing to help shoulder the enormity of its reconstruction needs. The peace plan Xi recently proposed to Putin in Moscow, however lopsided, is a sign that China wishes to be both a mediator and an economic player in Ukraine; it wants to be at the table so that whenever the war ends, it can act on its economic interests. China will do what it can to win the peace.
PROPPING UP PUTIN
The magnitude of these interests in the war ensures that China will not passively allow events in Ukraine to unfold however they will. Put negatively, China will go to considerable lengths to prevent the United States from succeeding in Ukraine. If the war continues to go badly for Russia, China will prop up Putin. Put positively, China will try to fit the war into its vision for regional and international order. It will, on the one hand, seek to expand commercial ties with Ukraine and Ukraine’s neighbors and, on the other hand, broaden the scope of action available to powers such as Russia that have flung off the rules written in Washington.
China could anchor itself in the war by making the risky decision to furnish Russia with lethal military assistance. Such support could be provided covertly. If this assistance went undetected or if it was not conclusively detected, China could still wear the mantle of peacemaker in Ukraine. So attired, it could drive a wedge between Europe and the United States—if Washington condemned Beijing for equipping the Russian war effort and took punitive measures but Europe refused to follow suit. European countries, fearing Chinese economic retaliation, could end up leaving Washington high and dry, fracturing the transatlantic alliance in the process.
Whatever covert support China delivered to Russia—including drones, artillery shells, and ammunition—would not bring Russia victory for the simple reason that Russia has no coherent path to victory in Ukraine. Chinese aid cannot fix the failures of Russia’s military leadership, the low morale among Russian troops, and the Kremlin’s impoverished strategic thinking. Yet material help from China could do a lot to prolong the war, to give Russia tactical advantages on the ground, and to convince a nervous Russian elite that Russia can continue fighting. Chinese assistance would increase Russia’s willingness to wage a long war, protecting Putin from the political vulnerabilities produced by his disastrous invasion.
China will not passively allow events in Ukraine to unfold however they will.
Suppose China went a step further and overtly entered the war on Russia’s side, making no attempt to conceal its weapons deliveries to Russia. Such a drastic move would represent China throwing down the gauntlet to the United States and Europe, brushing aside as trifling any Western threats of economic punishment. Chinese participation in the war would raise the stakes immeasurably for the United States and Europe. A Russian victory or partial victory with known Chinese support would make China a player in the broader landscape of European security. China’s joining up with Russia would demand greater military commitments to Ukraine from the United States and European countries already struggling with the demands of maintaining the Ukrainian war effort.
Overt support for Russia would fly in the face of public statements made by Chinese leaders since Putin launched his invasion, but there could be a strategic logic to such a bold move. China’s entry in the war would make the most sense as a preliminary distraction prior to a planned invasion of Taiwan months or years later. The resources that Western powers are forced to expend in Ukraine are resources they cannot immediately direct to Taiwan’s defense. Chinese participation in the Russian war effort would draw attention away from Taiwan and from the Indo-Pacific. In this scenario, the battlefield configurations in Ukraine might not matter that much to Beijing. China would simply hope that its involvement imposed costs on the West. It would not have to send a single soldier to Ukraine to do so. (The West has already proved that the course of the war can be affected without having to involve its uniformed soldiers.) Beijing’s announcement of direct and long-term military support to Russia would itself be transformative.
But it could also be disastrous for China. Russia might still lose the war. So far its military campaign has gone from failure to failure, and at every turn Ukraine has outperformed expectations. With Chinese fingerprints all over the war, a defeat for Russia would rebound on its backer. Indeed, this concern seems to have motivated China to stay on the sidelines, officials having come to the conclusion that Putin’s folly and ineptitude may not merit more than symbolic and situational support. China’s Ambassador to the EU, Fu Cong, recently explained that China’s “no limit” friendship with Russia was “nothing but rhetoric.”
China could also stand to lose the very thing it has gained from the war, a privileged global position. By giving Russia its military support, China would join the ranks of pariah states such as Iran and North Korea. It would worsen its already adversarial relationship with the West, for which it would pay a substantial economic price. And China would be less able to paint itself as a benign international presence in a world spinning out of control. China’s aid would not just signal tacit approval of Russia’s many attacks on civilians but also enable such war crimes. By helping wage war against a country that has done nothing to provoke China and with which China once had decent relations, Xi would set an ugly precedent and instill fear in countries farther afield from Ukraine. In seeking to undermine the West, he would make a Chinese-led international order that much harder to construct.
EUROPE’S TRUMP CARD
Whatever the risks of China’s joining the war might be, Xi will not be persuaded of anything he does not already believe about Russia and Ukraine. Western rhetoric will not deflect China from its three core interests in the war, and Xi is well aware that he will face sanctions should he cross Western redlines by giving Russia lethal aid. U.S. and European officials still need to drive this message in tandem, emphasizing that the United States and Europe will forge a comprehensive Western response to any Chinese entry into the war. Together with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, they will present a united front.
The Europeans in particular must communicate to China that their rejection of any Chinese deliveries of lethal weapons to Russia is a fundamentally European position and not merely the rhetoric of governments taking their cues from the United States. It should be stated repeatedly that the war in Ukraine is existential for Europeans, and impeding Chinese intervention is a fundamental European interest. By wading into the conflict, China would lose Europe. For their part, U.S. officials must impress on Beijing the United States’ patience and steely resolve in supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Demonstrating this fortitude and commitment to Ukraine’s cause should help Beijing see more starkly the risks of widening the war.
LIANA FIX is a Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy: A New German Power?
MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State.
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · April 26, 2023
12. How Tucker Carlson Helped Turn Americans Against the Military
How Tucker Carlson Helped Turn Americans Against the Military
The partisan firebrand told viewers that uniformed leaders were out to weaken the armed forces and the country itself.
defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron
For all the ways Tucker Carlson left his mark on U.S. politics, few are as startling as helping to turn right-wingers against the troops they once revered.
In the olden days, the right would blame social progress (opposing gays in the military, women in combat, etc.) on the Democratic politicians who forced unwanted “social experiments” upon the military. Today, they attack the military and its leaders.
It was a regular theme of Carlson’s top-rated primetime show on Fox News, emboldened by President Trump’s open disdain for “my generals.” Start at the top. We all know why the right hates Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley, who still draws fire on social media as a “traitor” who declined to offer “total loyalty” to his erratic, ill-informed, and authoritarian commander-in-chief. After Trump’s successor kept Milley on as his senior military advisor, Carlson began targeting the chairman for his efforts to fight racism in the ranks. “He’s not just a pig, he’s stupid,” the TV host said after Milley rebutted false accusations of pushing critical race theory. “The Pentagon is now the Yale faculty lounge, but with cruise missiles. That should concern you,” the Trinity College grad ranted to his viewers.
As Biden officials rolled out their national-security policies, Carlson pressed his attack on the Pentagon’s uniformed leaders for supporting the administration’s approach to China, NATO expansion, the international order, and support for Ukraine.
His audience heard it all.
Halfway through the Trump administration, Americans’ regard for and trust in the military began to nose-dive. The share of respondents who told a Reagan Forum poll they had “a great deal of confidence” in the military plunged from 70% in 2018 to 63% the following year, and 56% in early 2021. (It bottomed out at 45% during the Biden administration’s first winter, and rose in the most recent poll to 48%.)
Asked in the most recent poll why they felt that way, 62% of all respondents mentioned “over-politicization” among their reasons. But while 47% of Trump voters said they were bothered “a great deal” by it, just 21% of Biden voters said so.
That makes sense, after a few years of off-the-charts politicization by the Trump administration. Right-wing scholars and editorial boards interpreted the data to say that Biden’s “woke” policies were to blame, noting that half of respondents said it was a contributing factor. But that ignores the partisan cross-section: 68% of Trump voters were more upset about wokeness, while just 44% of Biden voters were. That’s the Carlson effect.
Night after night on his talk show, Carlson blasted the military in ways that previous conservative voices would not dare. He hated the military’s efforts to champion diversity, teach about racism, open service to gay and transgender Americans, allow women in combat, and root out white nationalists and other extremists in uniform. Beyond social issues, Carlson slammed military leaders for supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russian invaders. In almost the same breath, he accused generals of trying to weaken the U.S. military and drum up war with China.
In all of these positions, Carlson built a reputation as Donald Trump’s defender. He even tried to steer a multibillion-dollar Pentagon contract for cloud computing toward the company Trump favored.
Carlson mattered more to national security than most in Washington want to acknowledge. Where he led, conservatives follow. Over the past few years, Gallup has found rising support for Russia and less for Ukraine; more support for Israel and less for Palestinians; more support for border security and less for Mexico; and so on. In the Reagan Forum poll, Trump voters saw China as the top threat, while Biden voters pointed to Russia.
But for all his attacks, Carlson was unable to completely undermine Americans’ confidence in their military. The most recent Reagan Forum poll found that 80% of Biden voters and 83% of Trump voters said they still have either “a great deal” or “some” confidence in the U.S. military. That shows that even his audience knows the difference between the performance art of partisanship and the apolitical service to one’s country.
The “politicization of the military” debate, while noble in spirit, can be confounding, and its defenders tainted with naked political motivations. I suspect our politicians will leave the military out of it only when it benefits them to do so. Until then, Carlson’s legacy lives on. Later this year, a new crop of top uniformed Pentagon leaders will rise to replace Milley and several of the retiring service branch chiefs. They had better plan a good defense. Tucker’s coming at them.
defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron
13. Female Army commander faces wild claims she forcefully kissed, groped male troops
"Something is rotten in Denmark."
Female Army commander faces wild claims she forcefully kissed, groped male troops
Army Col Meghann Sullivan is accused of forcibly kissing one male subordinate and grabbing another below the belt
foxnews.com · by Michael Lee | Fox News
Video
US Army veteran on poll showing drop in American patriotism: There are important issues other than the economy
U.S. Army veteran and former NFL player Jake Bequette on the ‘disturbing’ poll and why social issues should not be ignored
A female Army officer is facing an investigation over allegations of multiple sexual assaults of male subordinates and an overall pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Col. Meghann Sullivan, who commands the Army's 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, has been accused of forcefully kissing a male subordinate and grabbing another below the belt without his consent.
The commander, who is the first woman to lead a SFAB battalion, is also accused of sexually harassing several other male subordinates, according to a Military.com report Tuesday.
It is unclear whether the investigation into Sullivan is ongoing, while the embattled officer appears to still be in command of the battalion, according to the report.
CONCERNS GROW AS US MILITARY FACES RECRUITMENT CRISIS FOR SECOND YEAR IN A ROW: 'CULTURAL ROT' IS SPREADING
U.S. Army Col. Meghann Sullivan, left. (U.S. Army)
"We have no information on that matter that we can share at this time," Security Force Assistance Command spokesperson Sgt. 1st Class Adrian Patoka told Military.com. "We take any and all allegations seriously and handle them appropriately as circumstances dictate."
The reported investigation comes as the Army has battled an epidemic of sexual harassment in its ranks for several years, though male victims only account for about 10%, or 14,000 cases per year, of unwanted sexual contact, according to Defense Department data. The amount of male victims is believed to be an undercount as a result of social stigma male soldiers face when reporting sexual assault allegations.
Army Col. Meghann Sullivan participates in a change of command ceremony at 5th Battalion, 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade. (U.S. Army)
TOP GUN MAVERICK: NAVY, AIR FORCE LOOK FOR RECRUITMENT BOOST FOLLOWING BIG OPENING FOR TOM CRUISE SEQUEL
The investigation also comes as Sullivan's boss, 5th SFAB Commander Col. Jonathan Chung, is the subject of a probe involving allegations he has displayed poor leadership and engaged in abusive treatment of subordinates.
Chung was suspended amid the investigation, according to Military.com. The outlet talked to over 20 of the commander's subordinates across multiple units, who almost universally detailed Chung's toxic leadership and inappropriate behavior.
A U.S Army badge. (Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP
U.S. Army Public Affairs did not immediately respond to a Fox News request for comment.
Michael Lee is a writer at Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @UAMichaelLee
foxnews.com · by Michael Lee | Fox News
14.‘Good riddance’: Pentagon officials cheer Tucker Carlson’s ouster
I actually thought this was the Duffelblog. I am surprised at Politico. If you think you are somehow taking the military's side here you are not. With no one on the record this should be a non-story.
‘Good riddance’: Pentagon officials cheer Tucker Carlson’s ouster
Politico
By LARA SELIGMAN
04/25/2023 07:40 PM EDT
The former Fox host ridiculed top DoD leaders over Biden-era policies.
At the upper levels of the Defense Department, news of Carlson’s firing from Fox News on Monday was met with delight and outright glee in some corners. | Jason Koerner/Getty Images
04/25/2023 07:40 PM EDT
From maternity flight suits to diversity policies to Ukraine aid, the military was a favorite punching bag for Tucker Carlson. Now that he’s off the air, some Pentagon officials are quietly cheering his departure.
Carlson’s criticism of Biden-era personnel policies appealed to many of the rank-and-file, which has a large bloc of conservative members. But at the upper levels of the Defense Department, news of Carlson’s firing from Fox News on Monday was met with delight and outright glee in some corners.
“We’re a better country without him bagging on our military every night in front of hundreds of thousands of people,” said one senior DoD official, who like others interviewed for this story was granted anonymity to discuss a politically sensitive topic.
“Good riddance,” said a second DoD official.
Asked to respond to the news that DoD officials are pleased by his departure from Fox, Carlson responded by text message: “Ha! I’m sure.” He declined to comment further.
The tension between the former cable host and Pentagon leadership isn’t new. Carlson drew the ire of top DoD officials early in the Biden administration for personal attacks on a number of military leaders, as well as ridiculing the armed forces’ efforts to increase diversity. A slew of conservative leaders quickly followed Carlson’s lead, giving rise to a small but vocal minority that to this day continues to hammer DoD officials, saying they’re focusing personnel policies at the expense of preparing for war. The Pentagon says only a small percentage of troops’ time is spent on diversity training.
Most memorably, Carlson’s remarks disparaging female service members in March 2021 prompted a rare rebuke from then-Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby.
After President Joe Biden announced new efforts to recruit and keep women in the service — including designing new body armor, updating requirements for hairstyles and the nominations of two female generals to become combatant commanders — at a White House ceremony, Carlson accused the commander in chief of making a “mockery” of the troops.
“So, we’ve got new hairstyles and maternity flight suits. Pregnant women are going to fight our wars. It’s a mockery of the U.S. military,” he said.
In response, Kirby took a rare swipe at the Fox News host.
“What we absolutely won’t do is take personnel advice from a talk show host or the Chinese military,” Kirby said during a briefing with reporters, adding that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin “shares the revulsion” of others who criticized Carlson’s remarks.
The comments yielded another rarity: The Pentagon’s in-house news service published an article focused entirely on the dust-up: “Press Secretary Smites Host That Dissed Diversity in U.S. Military.”
Kirby, who is now the top spokesperson for the National Security Council at the White House, declined to comment for this story.
The Fox News host targeted the Air Force in particular, calling Lt. Gen. Brad Webb, then-commander of Air Education and Training Command, a “doughy moron” for updating pilot tests to address systemic racism. He also mocked Maj. Gen. Ed Thomas, head of the Air Force’s recruiting office, for arguing that the service’s pilot force needs to become more diverse.
Carlson “made a mockery” of the free press and “repeatedly cherry-picked department policies and used them to destroy DoD as an institution,” said the first senior DoD official.
One general who clashed with Carlson on social media during the episode, Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe, had his retirement delayed for several months while the Army conducted a probe of the exchanges.
While several military leaders sent messages in support of women in the services without naming Carlson, Donahoe tweeted that the host “couldn’t be more wrong.” That prompted Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) to send a letter to Austin accusing Donahoe and other military leaders of expressing partisan views.
The saga ended in January with no action taken against Donahoe, who tweeted Monday’s news about Carlson’s exit with the message, “I have thoughts.” Donahoe declined to comment for this story.
Joe Gould contributed to this report.
POLITICO
Politico
15. The Last Frontier(10th SFG)
The Last Frontier
dvidshub.net
Photo By Sgt. Luis Solorio | A 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Green Beret prepares to land after conducting...... read more
Photo By Sgt. Luis Solorio | A 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Green Beret prepares to land after conducting freefall operations in the Artic Circle as part of the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center on March 31, 2023. Conducting freefalling operations in freezing temperatures prepares Green Berets to adapt and perform regardless of the adversities presented by the environment. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Luis M. Solorio) | View Image Page
AK, UNITED STATES
04.01.2023
FAIRBANKS, AK – 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Green Berets along with Canadian and Italian partner forces participated in the Joint Pacific Readiness Center (JPMRC) training rotation in Alaska from March 21-31, 2023.
The rotation serves as a reference point for Green Berets and their international partners to properly evaluate their capacity to thrive in a range of situations while assessing adversities presented during their mission.
Commanders take advantage of the JPMRC settings to train their troops in the distinctive terrain and circumstances that will most likely be encountered during operations or deployments within their own areas of operation. This training event uses unique joint training conditions to provide soldiers and allies with global training opportunities in authentic settings. These settings help the units’ ability to operate, perform, engage, and defeat enemy troops in arctic conditions while also strengthening their deployment capabilities.
This year’s training covered a variety of unconventional warfare operations in arctic temperatures like coordination with partner forces, enemy territory infiltration operations, and airborne operations.
“In cold weather environments such as the one here, we prepare our team to stay flexible, adaptable, effective, and ready to execute the mission,” said a team sergeant with 10th SFG(A). “It is essential for us to be able to perform under high-stress environments where adversities can be present at any time.”
During this training rotation, international cooperation helped improve the 10th SFG(A)’s effectiveness in irregular warfare procedures. This cooperation not only improves the readiness of all parties engaged, but it also helps to fortify ties between the U.S. military and its allies around the world.
During one of the final operations of this training rotation, Green Berets and Canadian partners performed freefall operations at an altitude of 8500 feet inside the Arctic Circle.
“Working with U.S. Special Forces is a great way for the team to learn, improve and become more efficient in different tactical aspects,” shared a Canadian soldier after the jump.
Both Green Berets and Canadian soldiers wore the “1st Special Service Force” shoulder patch, dating back to the heritage when the United States and Canada formed this Elite Commando Unit in World War II. The intent was to showcase the respect, partnership, and collaboration between both nations.
“I believe that finishing our training with this freefall operation along with the Canadian team is a great way to culminate this training rotation,” said another team sergeant with 10th SFG(A). “We wanted to add something special to this jump, hence the reason why we wore the 1st Special Service Force patch, it represents the long partnership we have with them.”
NEWS INFO
Date Taken: 04.01.2023 Date Posted: 04.25.2023 15:42 Story ID: 443237 Location: AK, US Web Views: 32 Downloads: 0
PUBLIC DOMAIN
This work, The Last Frontier, by SGT Luis Solorio, identified by DVIDS, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.
dvidshub.net
16. Zeroed Out: How JSOC’s Omega teams enabled the CIA’s Afghan militias
Since I have no personal knowledge of this I can only say that it seems like Jack Murphy and Sean Naylor have gotten some people to really talk a lot more than they should. But I cannot assess what is fact or fiction.
Zeroed Out: How JSOC’s Omega teams enabled the CIA’s Afghan militias
The joint CIA/JSOC hunter-killer teams stalked Afghanistan for nearly twenty years
https://thehighside.substack.com/p/zeroed-out-how-jsocs-omega-teams?publication_id=1180066&post_id=117172152&isFreemail=false
JACK MURPHY AND SEAN D. NAYLOR
APR 26, 2023
∙ PAID
21
2
Share
Thin clouds veiled the quarter moon that hung in the Afghan night sky as several dozen Toyota Hilux pickup trucks slowly ground to a halt.
Doors opened and scores of armed men, members of an Afghan militia, jumped out before the drivers began turning the vehicles around in case a quick extraction became necessary. Their target was straight ahead, a cluster of compounds in Panjwai district, a hotbed of Taliban support about 18 miles southwest of Kandahar. It was the summer of 2007 and, according to intelligence developed by the CIA, the Taliban had recently taken over the little village, kicking the civilians out of their homes and turning the place into an armed camp.
Mixed into the group of about 150 Afghan militiamen were a dozen or so Americans, and at least two Canadian special operators.
“I’ll go on and scout up ahead,” Staff Sgt. Mike Edwards, an Army Ranger, told a pair of snipers from Canada’s most elite special operations unit, JTF-2, who were tagging along for the mission. (The Canadian operators lived on the same base as the Americans, who found them useful to bring along on missions as, in addition to their military skills, both spoke Pashto.)
Sick with food poisoning, Edwards had been on the verge of staying back at the base until his team leader, a SEAL Team 6 chief petty officer, told him he really needed him on this mission. Now it was 2 a.m. and as he crept toward the enemy stronghold, Edwards felt as if a switch flipped inside him, the familiar rush of adrenaline jolting his senses alert. He was ready for combat.
Edwards was part of a secret military effort in Afghanistan called the Omega program that provided small teams of special operators to support the CIA’s use of locally recruited militias as proxy forces to go after insurgent leaders. In turn, the CIA personnel and their militias would sometimes support special operations missions.
Dating to the earliest years of the Afghanistan war, and widely viewed as a success inside the special operations and CIA communities, the Omega teams took part in the hunt for kidnapped U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl, helped capture numerous individuals who became prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and played a key role in tracking and killing American al-Qaida propagandist Adam Gadahn.
“The Omega contingent provided incredible capability to the overall effort” with the CIA’s militias, said a former senior Defense Department official. “It made a really good program into a great one.”
But other observers have heavily criticized the program, in part due to numerous war crimes allegations aimed at the militias. Still others said the Omega teams, like other special operations programs that focused on night raids with carefully vetted Afghan partner units, had limited operational and strategic impact. “They did more harm than good,” said an academic who worked closely with coalition forces in the field in Afghanistan, and who asked to remain anonymous because he still works with special operations forces.
In addition, several Omega teams experienced frictions between the military personnel and their CIA colleagues, according to team veterans. Nonetheless, the Omega program appears to have provided a template for many of the United States’ subsequent attempts in other countries to use proxy militias as a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
While Edwards moved silently toward the village, the Afghan militiamen encircled it from other directions, establishing blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping. The CIA’s Afghan surrogates had become adept at using deception tactics, driving to one area as if that were their objective before changing course and hitting the target in which they were really interested. On other occasions, they would park their vehicles and walk long distances over rugged terrain to their objectives, using darkness to conceal their movements.
It was almost four miles to the village, and the Americans commented to one another that even in the green glow of their night vision goggles, the wet agricultural paddies and lush vegetation made the area look like something out of a Vietnam War movie. As they moved, the two Canadian snipers went ahead of Edwards and a Navy SEAL teammate who was on the mission as an assaulter. Behind them were the team leader, a medic, and an Air Force combat controller whose job was to speak with and direct the numerous aircraft supporting the mission overhead.
“I tagged three of them in the head.”
As the team closed on the village, they mounted a levee that contained one of the many canals that crisscrossed the area. Suddenly, the Canadians up front started yelling in Pashto. Edwards and the SEAL assaulter moved forward to try to see what was going on. The Canadian snipers had come face to face with a sentry who had been sleeping outside the gate of one of the compounds. Awakened, and confused, he stood up with a Kalashnikov rifle in his hands trying to understand who was yelling warnings at him.
Although the sentry was armed, the Canadians could not fire on him until or unless he fired upon them first, according to Canada’s rules of engagement for its forces in Afghanistan. The U.S. personnel had their own rules of engagement and could shoot and kill any armed combatants, however, so Edwards stepped between the two Canadians and emptied a magazine from his MP7 submachine gun into the gate guard, who was no more than 15 meters away.
From atop the levee, the Americans could see down into the compound, where Taliban fighters had been asleep in their sleeping bags, their weapons propped against one another in little pyramids. Edwards and his SEAL partner – who requested anonymity in order to discuss covert operations – saw the courtyard come alive like a startled anthill.
“It was like shooting fish in a barrel,” the SEAL assaulter told The High Side. Edwards’ memory was of a similarly one-sided engagement. “I tagged three of them in the head,” he said.
Other SEALs and CIA personnel came running, hurling grenades into the compound. A militant wielding a belt-fed PKM machine gun emerged into the courtyard and fired up at Edwards standing on the levee.
As the fighter walked machine-gun fire toward him from less than 20 meters away, spraying dirt and debris into his eyes. With no where to take cover, Edwards gritted his teeth, aimed, and loosed another burst from his MP7 that hit the PKM gunner in the head, knocking him backwards through a doorway. As he fell, he banged into a lantern, which shattered on the floor, spreading flames that soon engulfed the entire structure.
Under heavy enemy fire and with the blaze out of control, the Americans and their Afghan allies withdrew while the combat controller began talking to their air assets circling above in the night sky.
Those aircraft included two Air Force A-10s – ground attack aircraft whose nose-mounted seven-barreled Gatling gun can spit 30mm rounds at a rate of 3,900 per minute – and an Air Force Special Operations AC-130 gunship armed with 105mm and 40mm cannon. The A-10 and the AC-130 are two of the most fearsome close air support aircraft in the world, and together they pounded away at the Taliban positions, killing dozens of militants, according to Edwards and the SEAL assaulter.
“We Winchestered an AC-130 and two A-10s,” Edwards told The High Side, meaning that all three aircraft completely exhausted their ammunition, at which point the combined U.S.-Afghan-Canadian force reattacked the target to finish the job, encountering several machine gun nests that had survived the aerial barrage. The SEAL teammate lobbed grenades through a “murder hole” cut in a compound wall to eliminate one of the Taliban machine gunners.
The coalition forces discovered Chinese C4 explosives in one of the buildings, but after coming under renewed fire, they withdrew again to let incoming attack jets destroy the remaining insurgent elements.
Not a single American or Afghan militiaman had been injured during the attack. In contrast, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft overhead counted about 45 dead enemy bodies in and around the compound, according to Edwards.
It was one night in a twenty-year war for a hunter-killer team called Omega-50.
The origins of the Omega program are to be found in the earliest days of the United States’ war in Afghanistan.
After the 9/11 attacks of 2001, the CIA inserted paramilitary teams into Afghanistan with orders to link up with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban militias – often alongside U.S. Special Forces teams – and topple the Taliban government. When that regime collapsed in December 2001, the CIA and Special Forces teams remained in country with their newly recruited militias, living on compounds that became bases from which they launched further strike operations against suspected Taliban and al-Qaida fighters.
The CIA used the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated Northern Alliance (as well as other militias recruited in the Pashtun heartlands of eastern and southern Afghanistan) for base security, then as patrol escorts, and finally as surrogate indigenous strike forces, according to a former paramilitary officer. “We tried to balance them ethnically so we deliberately tried to find qualified soldiers from all the tribes,” he said.
One of the new militias was the Afghan Combat Applications Group, based at an old brick factory on the outskirts of Kabul. That location became Eagle Base, which the agency later turned into one of its infamous “black site” secret prisons. Within ACAG was a sub-unit called the Mohawks that specialized in close target reconnaissance and human intelligence, according to a former special operations official familiar with the Omega program. The Mohawks primarily worked in Kabul, a multiethnic city where the unit’s Tajiks found it easier to blend in than they would, for instance, in a small town in overwhelmingly Pashtun Kandahar province, he said.
As the CIA expanded the facilities at the brick factory, ACAG grew to be several hundred strong by early 2003. The unit’s moniker was a nod to a longtime cover name – “Combat Applications Group” – for the Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta, aka “Delta Force.” But in 2003 the CIA renamed the Eagle Base proxy force the Counter Terrorism Pursuit Team.
At the same time that the CIA was expanding its surrogate militia at Eagle Base, the agency was starting to realize the importance of having proxies who could pass for locals in the provinces. The agency began dividing the CTPT into regional, ethnically homogenous sub-units, according to a former special operations official familiar with the Omega program. However, the rapid proliferation of the CIA’s militia program quickly ran up against the limits of the agency’s Special Activities Division (now called the Special Activities Center), the Ground Branch of which supplied the paramilitary operations officers who recruited and ran the militias.
Designed for small, deniable covert operations, Ground Branch lacked the firepower and logistical infrastructure of the U.S. military. Furthermore, CIA paramilitary officers could not usually call on military assets like medevac helicopters and close air support aircraft.
Meanwhile, Joint Special Operations Command, which controlled the military’s most elite counterterrorism forces, had deployed SEAL Team 6 operators to Bagram airfield, about 30 miles north of Kabul, with directions to stand by for possible orders to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. Of course, those orders didn't come for almost another decade. In the meantime, the SEALs noticed that their CIA counterparts about down the road at Eagle Base were going out on operations all the time, according to a former paramilitary officer.
To escape the confines of Bagram and, potentially, get onto some missions, the Team 6 operators at Bagram began hanging out at Eagle Base. Their timing was auspicious.
Just as the operators wanted to go on missions, the CIA wanted extra guns in the fight. Soon the military guys “were operating alongside the Paramilitary Officers during their operations,” said the former CIA paramilitary officer in a text to The High Side. “It started as an informal relationship,” he added.
That relationship had an element of quid pro quo about it. “Eventually, the CTPT directly supported [Joint Special Operations Command] operations,” rather than just the other way round, the former paramilitary officer said.
As an example, he cited the Capture and Apprehension Team, which was one of several CTPT spin-off-units the CIA created to perform various niche intelligence and paramilitary functions, and which was also located at Eagle Base.
The concept behind the CAT, according to a former CIA paramilitary officer, was that the Afghan proxies would travel in civilian vehicles wearing plain clothes to get close to their targets. Once there, they would retrieve night vision goggles and weapons from hidden compartments in the vehicles and surround the target structure just before a JSOC (pronounced “jay-sock”) strike force flew in on helicopters and assaulted the building. In time, the CAT militiamen became proficient enough that they ran their own operations, intercepting Taliban couriers and other targets without a shot being fired, according to a former senior CIA paramilitary officer.
On other occasions, “We would have CTPT guys accompanying a 65-man Ranger force sometimes,” said a former Ranger member an Omega team. This practice largely ended around 2014 as the growth of elite Afghan military outfits like the Afghan Reconnaissance Unit and the Ktah Khas meant the Rangers and other JSOC strike forces no longer needed the CIA militias to back them up, he added.
It wasn’t long before the idea of using JSOC operators to supplement the CIA paramilitary teams and their small proxy armies spread beyond Eagle Base. JSOC began sending small teams of special operators – mostly from Team 6 – to help the agency run its growing network of surrogate militias. The CIA called these early JSOC attachments “Ultras” (“Ultra” was also a Delta Force call sign) but around 2005 this special operations support to the agency was officially named the Omega program.
Here's how it worked.
The CIA’s Special Activities Division deployed paramilitary operations officers, who learn both espionage tradecraft and military fieldcraft at the CIA training facility in Virginia known as “The Farm,” to bases in Afghanistan. These paramilitary officers supervised independent contractors (later known as “paramilitary specialists”) working for the division’s Ground Branch.
While the Omega team leader answered to the senior paramilitary officer, the contractors trained, advised, and led the Afghan militias – the CTPTs (now plural after the CIA expanded its side of the program), which in 2009 were nominally assigned to Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, according to former paramilitary contractors, CIA officers, and special operations personnel interviewed by The High Side. The CIA officers and contractors operated under Title 50 of the U.S. Code which (among many other things) covers covert operations, they said. Omega team members were governed by Title 10, which covers the Defense Department, and remained under their own chain of command for administrative issues and subject to the military’s rules of engagement. However, their actions were carried out under the CIA’s Title 50 authorities.
Despite their Title 10 status, the Omega team members wore the same “tiger-stripe” combat uniforms that the CIA personnel and the militias had adopted to distinguish themselves as paramilitary forces separate from the U.S. and Afghan militaries, according to former Omega team members.
The CIA contingent supported by each Omega team usually included at least one paramilitary officer and some Ground Branch contractors, plus a chief of base and a communications expert, as well as analysts and logisticians. In addition to working with the Omega teams, the CIA personnel would run other compartmented programs to which the military personnel were not privy, according to a former CIA contractor.
The Omega program SEALs had specific tasks that did not include commanding CIA personnel or their Afghan proxies, according to a former senior enlisted Team 6 operator. “The SEAL Omega guys were not necessarily directing the battle,” he said. “They were there mainly in a communicative role to pass the status updates, control [airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] platforms and talk with the helicopters.”
“It was a big deal for the guys to get selected to go there.”
Indeed, the two most sought-after types of special operator for Omega teams, according to several individuals familiar with the program, were joint terminal attack controllers (a term describing any servicemembers qualified to direct close air support aircraft) and medics. “You had to have a trained JTAC to call in close air support,” said a retired senior enlisted member of SEAL Team 6. Explaining why for years SEAL Team 6 sent at least two operators to each Omega team, a former senior Team 6 officer said that one factor was that the Team 6 “shooters had a lot more experience than those independent contractors…but more important, we were active, licensed JTACS that can call our aircraft.”
Command of the missions belonged to the senior CIA paramilitary operations officer running the CTPT under a presidential authorization for covert action, who in turn reported to the chief paramilitary officer in Afghanistan, who was in Kabul. However, when it came to military issues such as calling in airstrikes, it was in effect the Omegas who were in charge because their JTAC (pronounced “jay-tack”) and team leader were the ones that had to give the pilots go-ahead in order for the bombs to be dropped, according to a former Omega team leader.
As the Omega program grew, JSOC might provide a team leader, an assistant team leader, a medic, a JTAC and perhaps some extra assaulters, intelligence collectors, and targeting analysts. These military personnel constituted the Omega team. An Afghan intelligence officer would also be assigned to the team to maintain its arrest and detention authorities.
Most Omega team missions with the CIA militias involved ground assaults using pickup trucks, but some were helicopter assaults that utilized a small fleet of Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters operated by the CIA’s Air Branch, according to former Omega team members.
Throughout the war in Afghanistan, anywhere between three and seven Omega teams would be active, depending on how many personnel were available and the perceived requirements at that particular moment. The number of Afghans assigned to the militias that the Omega teams helped the CIA control varied from a few hundred in Orgun-E (a base in eastern Afghanistan’s Paktika province) to a few thousand about 50 miles to the northeast in Khost. These Afghan militias were known by the Americans as Counter Terrorism Pursuit Teams and by the Afghans as National Strike Units. Individual militias often had their own nicknames like the “Mustangs” or “Headhunters” but after official control was passed to the National Directorate of Security in 2009, the units were rebranded with numerical designations typically began with a zero (e.g., NDS 04, NDS 08). As a result, they are sometimes referred to as “zero units.”
This is how the Omega teams were organized, according to former intelligence community officials and Omega team members:
Omega-10 was based in Asadabad, Kunar province, and worked with NDS 04.
Omega-20 was based in Jalalabad. The Afghan militiamen with whom they worked were known as “Mustangs.” By late 2005 there were two Omega teams in Jalalabad: one at the airport and one at a safe house in the city, according to two former members of the intelligence community.
Omega-30 worked out of Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost with NDS 10 (formerly known as the Khost Protection Force).
Omega-40 alternated between Orgun-E and an outstation in Shkin in Paktika province, working with NDS 09 and NDS 08.
Omega-50 worked out of Forward Operating Base Gecko, Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s former home in Kandahar that had been turned into a U.S. special operations and CIA base. Their Afghan proxies were nicknamed “the Mohawks.” The unit was also known as the Kandahar Strike Force and after 2009 was NDS 03, according to The Intercept.
Omega-60 was located at Eagle Base in Kabul. The Afghan proxies were divided into NDS 01 and NDS 02.
Omega-70’s location and length of existence remain unclear. A former JSOC intelligence analyst said that it might have been based in Fayzabad in northeast Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province.
Omega-80 worked out of Bari-Kowt, northwest of Asadabad.
The Omega program was largely manned by SEAL Team 6 operators and Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment’s Regimental Reconnaissance Company. However, as both organizations had difficulties manning the program while executing their other missions, Rangers from outside RRC and SEALs from other teams were also assigned to the Omega program over the years.
The Team 6 operators selected for the Omega teams were “carefully chosen, because [of] the amount of responsibility,” said a retired senior enlisted Team 6 member. “It was a big deal for the guys to get selected to go there. A guy has to operate on his own [in the Omega teams]. Doing those [command and control] things the guy…has got to make calls, he’s got to do briefings. The guy has to be a well-rounded operator to do that.”
Just like the SEALs, the Rangers prioritized experience when selecting soldiers to serve on Omega teams. “Seasoned guys” was how a former special operations official familiar with the program described them. “We’d send a couple of senior NCOs,” said a former Ranger. “And they would train…like 80 guys, and they would do ground raids in trucks.”
Some Omega teams gradually increased in size, combining SEALs, Rangers and other special operations personnel as needed.
Omega teams were therefore often composite teams drawn from different units, all supporting another agency. While this setup led to direct-action successes, it was not without the frictions that might be expected from mixing together different units, agencies, and bureaucracies.
Longtime Omega members cited the following examples of these frictions: SEALs on an Omega team not working well with Ranger Reconnaissance Detachment personnel who were supposed to be surveilling targets for them; the Defense Department investigating a SEAL assigned to Omega-10 for telling Ground Branch officers that if they didn't get him some missions they were “going to have problems;” CIA case officers at Asadabad more than once finding Omega-10 SEALs “passed out in a conference room at 3 a.m.” after the SEALs had been drinking to the point of being “shitfaced,” according to a former Ranger; JSOC not giving Omega members the support they needed in combat because of communication breakdowns (as an example a former Omega team member recalled a July 2013 mission in the Pech river valley in which the team leader had to hold his radio microphone in the air to transmit the sound of a raging gun battle in order to convince the JSOC task force that he needed close air support).
“With the guys at [Team 6] it is a roll of the dice if you get a military man or a criminal master mind.”
Many of the tensions arose when Team 6 SEALs were assigned to work with members of other special operations units, who often viewed the Navy’s special warfare personnel as cowboys lacking in professionalism. “With the guys at [Team 6] it is a roll of the dice if you get a military man or a criminal master mind,” said an Omega team medic from Army special operations. “That’s tongue in cheek, but only sorta.”
As an example, the medic cited a case of a SEAL Team 6 Omega team leader breaking into the residential hut of another Army Omega team medic who was talking to his wife on FaceTime. The SEAL proceeded to beat him up in a drunken rage while his shocked wife looked on. The Army hushed up the incident, a former Omega team member told The High Side.
These frictions caused internal problems for numerous Omega teams, but those teams were still able execute their missions, according to a former Ranger. “I don’t think it became a problem that impacted operational or strategic outcomes,” he said. “It just impacted how we perceived one another.”
Mike Edwards’ experiences ran the gamut of how an Omega tour might go. In 2007 he was serving as an instructor at the 75th Ranger Regiment’s Ranger Indoctrination Program at Fort Benning, Georgia, when the regiment tapped him to help man Omega-50. Knowing that he would be working with Team 6 operators left him wary, because on a previous JSOC task force deployment with that unit’s Blue Squadron the SEALs had treated him and his fellow Rangers like “beasts of burden,” forcing them to carry the SEALs’ machine guns and other heavy gear.
However, the SEALs on the Omega team were from Red Squadron. When Edwards arrived at the base the senior chief interviewed him and, realizing Edwards had more deployment time than any of the SEALs, made him the assistant team leader. From that point the SEALs treated him as a peer. “Red Squadron was awesome,” Edwards told The High Side.
The Afghan militias advised by the Omega teams have been accused of serious war crimes. A 2019 report by Human Rights Watch accused the CIA strike forces of “extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances, indiscriminate airstrikes, attacks on medical facilities, and other violations of international humanitarian law, or the laws of war.”
In December of 2018, local villagers accused NDS unit 01 of executing 12 schoolboys in Wardak province amongst other murders, according to The Intercept. Also in 2018, an NDS unit was accused of raiding a home in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province and executing two young men by shooting them in the back of the head, according to ProPublica, which documented a string of alleged abuses and war crimes by U.S.-trained and advised Afghan militias.
Experts on the special operations component of the Afghan war said that the Omega teams’ role cannot be judged separately from the actions of the CIA’s proxy militias.
“The CTPTs were a big part of that, so I’m not sure you can divorce the two,” said Jonathan Schroden, director of the special operations program at CNA.
“In the vast majority of cases they [Omega and CTPTs] can’t be separated,” said an academic who worked closely with coalition forces in the field in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was typical for the Omega teams to take the lead, he said.
An in-depth investigation by ProPublica of war crimes allegedly committed by the so-called zero units suggested that the covert nature of the surrogate forces’ operations shielded them – and their American advisers – from justice: “Because the Zero Units operated under a CIA program, their actions were part of a ‘classified’ war, with the lines of accountability so obscured that no one had to answer for operations that went wrong.” The fact that CIA-trained militias are exempt from the law that bars the U.S. military from training foreign units that commit “gross violations of human rights” only exacerbated the problem, according to ProPublica.
A similarly extensive investigation by The Intercept suggested that operating under the CIA’s Title 50 authorities helped the surrogate militias, and, by extension, the Omega teams, avoid oversight.
“That’s just hogwash from the CIA.”
The very fact that the militias were not formally part of the Afghan military was part of the attraction for the CIA, according to Patricia Gossman, associate director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division. “They were used because they did operate outside of ordinary chains of command and allowed U.S. forces a certain leeway and the CIA more leeway in conducting operations they wanted to conduct against al-Qaida and Taliban,” she said. “But with that greater leeway came less concern [about] and certainly less scrutiny of their behavior, which included very serious abuses.”
Such accusations are baseless, according to former CIA paramilitary officer Mick Mulroy, who also served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019.
“Any program involving a CIA and U.S. military contingent would be overseen by four congressional committees,” he wrote in a text to The High Side, referring to the House and Senate intelligence and armed services committees. “That is more oversight, and therefore scrutiny, than any single program that falls exclusively under the CIA or U.S. Military, respectively.”
Mulroy also denied allegations that the CIA’s proxy militias or the Omega teams habitually committed war crimes.
“I can say without hesitation that the accusations of systemic abuse by that unit are inaccurate,” he texted. “It is not supported by anything my colleagues or I saw. For that to have been true, a whole generation of CIA and U.S. military officers would have had to have been in collusion; that was not the case.”
Another former CIA officer who served in Afghanistan echoed Mulroy. “These Afghan forces and the U.S. advisors who worked with them took extraordinary measures to avoid civilian casualties,” the former CIA officer wrote in an email to The High Side. “Their operations did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, there were multiple layers of oversight by the US and Afghan governments. There was also extensive planning that went into their operations and various protocols in place to ensure the safety of civilians.”
The CIA’s proxy militias and their agency and military advisers had been the victims of a Taliban disinformation campaign, according to the former CIA officer. “Because they were so effective in combating terrorism and weakening the Taliban, these Afghan forces were often the subject of organized, terrorist-led propaganda that was intended to discredit them in the public eye,” the former officer wrote in an email to The High Side.
When asked about the allegations of war crimes, the CIA sent The High Side a lengthy statement the agency had released in 2019 in response to the Human Rights Watch report. “[W]e can say with some confidence that many, if not all, of the claims leveled against Afghan forces are likely false or exaggerated,” the statement says. “Past in-depth reviews of similar allegations have shown this to be the case.”
The war crimes allegations occur, according to the CIA statement, because “the Taliban is engaged in a systematic propaganda campaign against Afghan and coalition operations” that involves “exaggerating civilian casualties and portraying killed or captured Taliban fighters as innocent civilians.”
When this argument was repeated to Gossman of Human Rights Watch, she laughed. “I’m sorry, that’s just hogwash from the CIA,” she said. “There were too, too many of these cases for that to be true.”
A SEAL assigned to the Omega program for several deployments said that while with the program he fell under the same rules of engagement as he did on his purely military deployments. “Women and children were off the board unless it was a definite threat,” he said, adding that anyone on Omega who shot someone they were not supposed to would be sent home at a minimum.
An Omega-60 team leader at Eagle Base in Kabul in 2014 said the CIA shut down its proxy force missions from the base, leaving the Omega team with little to do for almost his entire four-month deployment, due to human rights abuses that the Afghan military was committing at nearby Pul-e-Charkhi prison, the country’s largest, in eastern Kabul. Because the proxy force would bring any prisoners it took to the prison, the CIA was wary of being seen as complicit in the abuse. But once it was determined that detainees from across the country were being sent to that prison, not just those taken by the CIA’s proxy forces, the CIA turned the missions on again, according to the Omega-60 team leader.
“Most of us [Omega members] were straight shooters.”
In 2009 the CIA renamed its militias the Afghan National Strike Units and transferred official control of them to the National Directorate for Security, according to a former CIA officer. Some Omega veterans blamed the NDS for the war crimes and the consequent harsh glare of publicity that fell on the U.S. special operators who worked with the proxies.
“NDS really wrecked our reputation,” an Omega team medic told The High Side. “Not that it's 100% unwarranted but most of us [Omega members] were straight shooters.”
An Omega-60 team leader recalled an episode in which the Afghan surrogate force from Eagle Base took action that he said the Americans’ rules of engagement would not have allowed them to take themselves. During a night raid in which the proxies killed 11 insurgents, a final enemy combatant had barricaded himself in a mosque. The Afghan assaulters breached the entrance. The first proxy fighter through the door was shot in the face and killed instantly. The second man through the door stepped over his body and continued the assault. The third and fourth proxy militiamen ran away.
The Americans threw several grenades into the building to keep the surviving militant occupied while the lone militiaman who’d entered the mosque squeezed through a window and escaped.
“We called NDS commander of the CTPT unit on the mission and told him what was going on,” the team leader recalled. “He said, ‘One of ours is dead?’”
Upon confirmation, according to the team leader, the NDS officer told the Americans, “Fucking level it.”
“We were like, ‘It’s a mosque,’” the team leader recalled. “He said, ‘I don't care, do it.’”
The Omegas’ rules of engagement prevented the Americans from destroying a mosque. Instead, they watched as the NDS commander had his force roll up to the mosque with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and completely demolish the building.
However, Gossman of Human Rights Watch was skeptical of any effort by U.S. personnel to shift the blame to the NDS for any human rights abuses committed by the militias, and she noted that the NDS was a CIA creation.
“There was an effort to Afghanize all the operations,” she said, adding that that initiative was probably a reaction to the “criticism in the late aughts about night raids.” However, she added, “I don’t think the CIA ever really got out of the game.”
What the NDS almost certainly did not control was what the Omega team members wore on their uniforms or painted on their compound walls.
Photographs provided to The High Side by Omega team veterans show team members wearing crusader-style cross patches on their tiger-stripe uniforms. Asked why they were wearing such potentially offensive (to Afghans) patches, Edwards said that he received one when he joined Omega-50 in 2007. At first, he thought it was a patch for Team 6’s Red Squadron. But one of the SEALs told him it was “an Omega patch,” he said. “I never saw it as an issue,” he said, describing the Afghan militias as “loyal and Americanized.”
Today, Edwards helps former Afghan allies that he worked with while in the military to escape the Taliban and immigrate to America with his advocacy group called Project Exodus Relief.
However, the real risk of wearing such blatantly Christian patches was to the teams’ efforts to build bridges with the wider community, according to CNA’s Schroden, who served from 2011 to 2012 as a senior advisor to coalition forces in Afghanistan, “Any symbols of Christianity would have generally been unhelpful among the Afghan population,” he said.
Another photo shows seven Omega-20 members, who all appear to be white, posing for a team photo in front of a wall on which someone has spray-painted the phrase “#BlackOpsMatter.” In the special operations and intelligence communities, “black ops” is slang for classified operations. The photo was taken in 2016, a year when the Black Lives Matter movement was gaining greater prominence in response to repeated instances of police killing or otherwise brutalizing black people in circumstances that were, at best, questionable.
A former Omega team leader said the military personnel were not responsible for the slogan. “Some agency guy did that,” he said in a text to The High Side. “We just took a pic in front of it because we were ‘blackops.’ I think it was a play on all the hash tags at the time…black rifles matter, black coffee matters and all that.”
But if there was a joke involved, it was lost on some observers.
“I certainly don’t find that humorous,” Schroden said of the team’s decision to pose in front of the spray-painted slogan. “I think a fair number of people would find that racially insensitive.”
When sent a list of questions about the Omega program by The High Side, a U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman replied, in part: “We do not have any information that relates to your questions.”
The effectiveness and operational impact of the CIA’s militias varied by time and place, according to Omega veterans and former members of the intelligence community.
The militias and their American handlers captured or killed “many” high-level targets, said a former senior intelligence official. “Several ended up at GITMO,” the former official said in a text, using the acronym for the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As an example, the former official cited Haji Hamidullah, whom the United States accused of being a commander in Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, a Taliban-linked Islamist party, and also of being an Iranian intelligence agent. Hamidullah was captured in July 2003 and four months later was sent to Guantanamo, where he remained until 2016, when he was sent to the United Arab Emirates. The UAE kept him in prison until 2019, when he was repatriated to Afghanistan, where he died five months later, according to The New York Times.
Although the U.S. government officially gave credit to the Afghan National Army for Hamidullah’s capture, even in internal documents, in fact it was the CTPT from Eagle Base that conducted the mission, according to a former CIA paramilitary officer who was present. It was routine in the early years of the war for the United States to credit the Afghan military for missions that the CIA-operated militias had really conducted, he said.
“I just remember that one because it was a ugly op,” the former paramilitary officer said in a text to The High Side. “Seven of his guys smoked. Three of my guys hit and injured.”
However, Omega veterans said that on their deployments working with the militias, the CTPTs mostly focused on much lower-level targets. A former Ranger assigned to Omega-30 in Khost from 2004 to 2005 said that even though the CIA militia there was “the biggest CTPT force we had,” it mainly targeted “the lower to mid-level Haqqani network.” When he was assigned to Omega-10 in Asadabad in 2013, he found a similar dynamic at play. The militia there, NDS 04, was targeting “just Taliban local shitheads - guys that we would not waste [JSOC] task force equities on,” he said. “The CTPT did not really go after higher-level HVTs,” he added, using the acronym for “high-value targets.”
The presence of a large number of Afghan allies on their compounds should have given the Omega teams a built-in advantage when it came to intelligence collection. When they located a target in their area of operations, there was usually an Afghan in their formation who was from that area and had invaluable local knowledge upon which they could draw to plan their mission.
“The CTPT did not really go after higher-level HVTs.”
Nonetheless, according to Edwards, “a lot of our intel was really bad.” In particular, he said, many of the missions driven by human intelligence “resulted in dry holes” (i.e., the target was not at the expected location). Edwards, who did two Omega tours, in 2007 and 2008, said that in his experience the JSOC task force in Afghanistan had better intelligence for its missions, and as a result the Ranger strike forces in that task force “were more likely to kill bad guys.”
Of the missions that were successful, Edwards estimated that the militias and their U.S. counterparts killed 25 percent of those targets and captured the remaining 75 percent. The CIA handed off most of the detainees to the NDS, but “a higher-level guy that JSOC wanted more info on, then we could take over the chain of custody to send him back to one of our facilities,” Edwards added.
The intelligence that drove these direct-action missions came via several routes. Some came from higher CIA headquarters. The Omega teams’ intelligence analysts were allowed to use the agency's classified computer terminals to read CIA tele-dissemination intelligence reports.
Meanwhile, Omega human intelligence personnel disguised as Afghans drove around Afghanistan in low-visibility vehicles to meet intelligence sources. During urban raids, Ground Branch operatives would drive a van specially outfitted with direction-finding equipment that could precisely pinpoint the location of an enemy cellphone so they could identify the house or apartment to the CTPT strike force that was rolling just a few minutes behind them.
“It was a high priority for the administration that we were looking for Bergdahl.”
The Omega teams also helped the Afghan proxy forces conduct cross-border missions into Pakistan.
U.S. military personnel were not allowed to cross the Pakistan border without presidential approval, but those rules did not apply to the Afghan proxies. Team members trained local support agents – mostly drivers – to collect “atmospherics” (i.e., relatively banal details about checkpoints, road conditions, etc.) when traveling into Pakistan. These agents could also be activated to ferry contraband or personnel across the border if needed, but mostly they were on standby in case U.S. or friendly foreign intelligence officers or their human assets were stranded inside Pakistan and needed extraction.
The cross-border operations sometimes involved meeting with sources who had difficulty traveling. One such meeting produced information about missing U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl, who deserted his post in 2009 and was captured by the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani Network, which held him in Pakistan until his release in 2014. Although that lead did not result in Bergdahl’s rescue, “it was a high priority for the administration that we were looking for Bergdahl,” a former ground branch contractor said.
The Omega program remained busy through the early to mid-2010s. This was particularly true of Mike Edwards’ old team, Omega-50, located at Kandahar airfield. “We went out just about every night for forty days in a row,” another Omega-50 member, an Army special operations medic, said about a 2011 deployment.
But the same operator found the pace a bit slower during a deployment with Omega-40 the following year in Orgun-E. “Omega-40…was up in the mountains and did not have the same op tempo as in Kandahar,” he said. “We were going out every couple weeks, sometimes out for a couple days.”
The Omega-50 missions he went on out of Kandahar had a “jackpot” rate of about 95 percent, meaning that on roughly 19 out of every 20 missions, the team and its Afghan surrogate force killed or captured their targets, he said. But Omega-40 did not enjoy the same level of mission success. “In the mountains it was a crapshoot,” he said.
“[In] 2013 and 2014 it was hot, going out almost every night,” an Omega-60 team leader said of his deployments with the Kabul-based outfit.
A January 2015 drone strike served as the exclamation point to a sequence of events that served to highlight the differences between the military’s Title 10 authorities and the CIA’s Title 50 covert action authorities. “We were always under Title 10 working within Title 50 authorities,” a former Ranger who served as an Omega Team leader told The High Side. “This never came into play except once when there was an American citizen target in Pakistan.”
That citizen was Adam Gadahn.
Born in Oregon, Gadahn converted to Islam in the 1990s, traveled to Pakistan, and then ceased contact with his family sometime after 2001. In the mid-2000s he attracted the FBI’s attention when he began appearing in al-Qaida videos as “Azzam the American.”
Gadahn evidently found an audience at the CIA as well. The agency was keen to locate the enemy propagandist, who never left Pakistan.
In late 2014 Gadahn’s pregnant wife traveled to Kabul from Pakistan to visit her uncle. But the CIA had an informant who was able to report her movements. With the help of Eagle Base’s Omega-60, the CIA had their proxies follow the wife, knowing that eventually she would travel back to Pakistan to give birth with her husband present.
This put Omega-60 in a difficult position.
A year previously, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel had conducted a video-teleconference with Omega-30, who had also been tracking Gadahn, and their CIA counterparts. He told the team that while they could help the CIA on the operation, the military's rules of engagement (which did not apply to the agency) prevented them from shooting Gadahn, according to a former Omega team leader. Those orders presumably still applied to Omega-60.
A former Omega team leader said the CIA knew they were hitting Gadahn. “It was targeted,” he said.
With the CIA’s surrogate troops tailing her on the ground, and a JSOC drone watching from above, Gadahn’s wife crossed into Pakistan, where a CIA drone picked up her trail. Not long after, in January 2015, the CIA killed Gadahn with a drone strike.
The Obama administration, which waited three months to announce that it had killed Gadahn, said that he was “not specifically targeted” and that “we did not have information indicating [his] presence” at the site of the drone strike. Press coverage at the time also said the CIA killed Gadahn in a so-called “signature strike,” meaning that the agency struck the target because of a pattern of movement around it, without knowing the identity of the individuals there. But a former Omega team leader said the CIA knew they were hitting Gadahn. “It was targeted,” he said. “[They] knew it was him.”
The CIA declined to comment.
In 2015, after a New York Times article mentioned Team 6’s role in the Omega program, the CIA gave it a new name: ANSOF, an abbreviation of Afghanistan National Special Operations Forces.
A Ranger Omega team leader recalled one particularly dicey operation he was on a year later with Omega-20.
It started with an Afghan who turned in a suicide vest to British forces in Kabul. They hid tracking devices in the vest and gave it back to the asset to return to the people he got it from so the British could track it all the way back to the bomb-making factory. Once the British thought they had detected that location – a structure in Nangarhar – the CIA, together with Omega-20, based in Jalalabad, launched a mission to hit the target.
As the team members prepared their vehicles before leaving their compound in Jalalabad, the provincial capital, the female CIA officers came out to hug them and wish them luck, something they had never done before.
“That was weird, I don't like that,” the Omega-20 team leader recalled thinking. The gesture felt to him too much like a final farewell.
They hit the target building but found no suicide vest factory. However, Apache attack helicopters overhead saw two people dash out of an adjacent building. Leaving a small security element with their vehicles, the rest of the Omega team and their Afghan surrogates took off in pursuit.
They moved into a field behind the houses, finding it crisscrossed with sunken waterways that function as irrigation canals. Nervous that the team’s Ranger joint terminal attack controller was too far ahead with the proxy fighters, the team leader called him back. The JTAC ran back to him, pushed his helmet-mounted mic away from his face and said in a frustrated tone, “You gotta let the pitbull off the leash,” before sprinting back to rejoin the vanguard.
Moments later the insurgents shot him in the gut.
He and the Afghan allies had walked right into a sandbagged fighting position that the militants had built into one of the sunken canals. The enemy fighters opened up on them with machine gun fire from less than 20 meters away. “It was a near ambush,” the Omega team leader recalled. (The U.S. Army defines a near ambush as one in which the assault element is within 50 meters of the kill zone.)
“You gotta let the pitbull off the leash.”
The JTAC was hit in the thigh and abdomen. Another round hit his helmet just centimeters from his face. Since he hadn’t fastened his chin strap, the impact knocked the helmet from his head. While the Omegas and their Afghan proxies were throwing grenades into the enemy bunker, the JTAC found his helmet, got on the radio and said he was hit, before turning over his duties to the team leader, who began directing aircraft to fire on the bunker.
With the enemy fighters killed, the Omega medic began working on the JTAC. He was the first casualty to ever receive a transfusion of freeze-dried blood, a new technology that had just been introduced in the special operations community. The medic gave the JTAC a fentanyl lollipop and ketamine (a general anesthetic) while preparing him for a medevac. Nonetheless, the JTAC woke up three times before being extracted.
The first time he asked the team leader for a dip of Copenhagen tabacco. The second time he asked him to tell a girl he loved her, then changed his mind.
The third time he woke up he told the team leader, “Eat big, lift big, live big.”
As the war dragged on, the CIA tried to show that its Kabul-based militia, NDS 01, could perform as a true national mission force for Afghanistan, meaning, among other things, that it had the capability to hit targets outside of its usual area of operations. “We had all the infrastructure and support at [Hamid Karzai International Airport] for that,” said a former Omega-60 team leader.
As part of this project, in 2015 Omega-60 in Kabul had some of their Afghan surrogates drive north to Mazar-i-Sharif in civilian vehicles, while others flew into the city via commercial air. The surrogate militia’s tactical vehicles (which were also civilian-style vehicles, in this case vans that the special operators called “Scooby vans,” after the iconic van from the Scooby Doo animated television series) were flown north aboard a CIA-owned Lockheed L-100 (a civilian variant of the C-130 Hercules).
Several Omega-60 members flew up on a CIA-operated private jet and linked up with their surrogate militiamen at Mazar-i-Sharif. Loading their weapons and climbing into the Scooby vans, they rolled out and quickly detained a suspected terrorist without incident. They took him back to the airfield and got him on a 45-minute flight back down to Kabul and then a CIA Air Branch-operated Mi-17 helicopter from Hamid Karzai International Airport to Eagle Base.
“It was a pretty cool op, a proof of concept that it could be done,” the Omega team leader told The High Side. Of course, the mission still required extensive support from the CIA and the Omega team just to move the team around the country. Indeed, despite their name containing the word “Pursuit,” the CTPTs rarely operated far from their own districts, according to multiple veterans familiar with the militias.
“They really went after just bad guys, locally, around that region,” said a former senior Team 6 officer. “Local kingpins.”
But former CIA officer Geeta Bakshi, who is now the executive director of FAMIL, a non-profit that seeks to help CTPT fighters and their families settle in the United States, paid tribute to the work that the proxy forces had performed. “Our Afghan partners were highly effective in conducting successful counterterrorism operations against some of the most deadly, ruthless, and indiscriminate terrorist networks in Afghanistan – including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and ISIS,” she wrote to The High Side. “They had a deep sense of responsibility for protecting innocent lives against the threat posed by these terrorist networks – it was the heart of their mission.”
That work was enhanced by the Omega program, according to Mulroy, the former CIA paramilitary officer and deputy assistant secretary of defense. “If we would have focused more on this design for the whole of our campaign there, it would have gone quite differently in overall costs in U.S. lives and taxpayer dollars,” he said.
As the accolades from inside the government rolled in for the Omega program, the Pentagon and the CIA began similar efforts in other parts of the world. This was entirely appropriate, according to Mulroy. “That program, I believe, is almost universally considered to have been one of if not the most effective [counterterrorism] program[s] in Afghanistan,” he said in a text. “It is a model for future partner force operations.”
The military ran some of these proxy force ventures exclusively, as did the CIA, while others were combined endeavors.
“It is a model for future partner force operations.”
In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the CIA’s Ground Branch established its Special Tactics Unit, a combined force of agency officers and Iraqis that tracked high-value targets, including Iranians involved in terrorist activities.
Another example was known as the Yukon Scouts, who were Yemenis who U.S. special operators spotted and assessed in Yemen before sending them to Saudi Arabia to be trained in spy tradecraft by Marine Corps special operations troops. Purely an intelligence gathering unit, the Yukon Scouts were reinserted back into Yemen at the conclusion of their training to conduct close target reconnaissance and to identify Iranian influence. The program died in 2019 due to funding issues despite its success, a former special operations soldier familiar with the program told The High Side.
The CIA and the Pentagon also exported the Omega concept to Yemen, according to a former Omega team member. They were on the verge of introducing it to Libya when the CIA scrapped the idea after the attack on the US temporary mission facility and CIA annex in Benghazi in 2016, he added.
In northeastern Somalia, SEAL Team 6 trained the Puntland Strike Force in basic military tactics while the Ranger Reconnaissance Company used the surrogate unit to run intelligence operations, the aim of which, at least in the early to mid-2010s, was to locate American hostages, according to a veteran of the Puntland mission. If the hostages were found, a troop of SEAL Team 6 operators would be called in for the rescue mission.
The Puntland Strike Force was a so-called 127e program, named for the budgetary authority (originally called Section 1208) that allows the U.S. special operations forces to use specific foreign units as surrogates in counterterrorism operations. As of 2019, there were at least eight such operations in Africa.
By about 2017, the 127e programs were at their height with perhaps two dozen of them up and running or in various planning stages, according to a former U.S. special operations soldier.
Active programs existed in Somalia and various other locations in Africa, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, while one continues to operate to this day in Syria. Some of them were, or are, exclusively run by U.S. special operations forces while other programs are run in conjunction with CIA personnel. The latter cases demonstrate the trajectory that such combined surrogate programs have taken since those early days at Eagle Base.
The Omega program appears to have never experienced a so-called Green-on-Blue incident in which one or more members of the Afghan security forces attacked their U.S. trainers or counterparts. Omega team veterans chalked this up to two main factors.
First, the Omegas and their CIA mentors treated their Afghan surrogates with respect. Second, the CIA paid the proxy militias very well. The lowest ranking militiaman in a counterterrorism pursuit team made about $900 USD a month, according to Omega team veterans. A junior enlisted soldier in the Afghan National Army, in contrast, made only $210 to $235, according to The Intercept.
That money appears to have engendered an unusual degree of loyalty from the militia members toward their CIA paymasters. “These were agency-bought-and-paid-for Afghans,” said a former senior SEAL Team 6 officer.
The zero units played a crucial role in securing Hamid Karzai International Airport during the chaotic last days of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. In return, the CIA ensured the militiamen and their immediate families were evacuated to the United States, some 5,800 of them along with their family members. There, they have encountered challenges in resettling, but are doubtless safer than they would be had they remained in Afghanistan, subject to the Taliban’s mercy.
As for Eagle Base, where the Omega program began almost two decades previously? On their way out of Afghanistan, U.S. forces blew it up.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
|