Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“It is always the herd men who win battles and the free men who win wars.”

- John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down

“Society tames the wolf into a dog. And man is the most domesticated animal of all.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

"I am losing precious days. I am degenerating into a machine for making money. I am learning nothing in this trivial world of men O must break away and get out into the mountains to learn the news."

- John Muir

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023

2. US confident in Ukraine offensive despite Russian military’s formidable power, EUCOM commander says

3. Russia can fund war in Ukraine for another year despite sanctions, leaked document says

4. Opinion Biden is quietly encouraging Assad’s rehabilitation. He should reverse course.

5. Xi holds first talks with Zelenskiy since Russian invasion of Ukraine

6. How Russia has fortified swathes of Ukraine

7. The Afghan Withdrawal Coverup

8. Opinion | What 6 data points tell us about the status of the war in Ukraine

9. U.S., Philippines Sink Warship With Aircraft After Missing With Himars in Drill

10. With Marcos watching, US Army HIMARS fires 6 times but misses target in South China Sea

11. 442. What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

12. What Xi did and didn’t say to Zelensky

13. Occam’s razor relevant to Taiwan

14. Yuan overtakes dollar to become most-used currency in China's cross-border transactions

15. Buildup resumed at suspected Chinese military site in UAE, leak says

16. SOCOM's New Recon Aircraft to Pack Big Punch

17. Facts Are Stubborn Things: The Dangers of Protracted War with China

18. Taiwan readying a reciprocal show of force at China

19. Bring Back Branch Magazines

20. China has widened its already sweeping counter-espionage law. Experts say foreign businesses should be worried

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2023

Key Takeaways

Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians.
Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut.
The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression.
Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, stating that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states.
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces made gains within Bakhmut and north of Avdiivka.
Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.”
Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 26, 2023

Apr 26, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 26, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on April 26 that Russia is trying to change the ethnic composition of Ukraine by actively conducting a large-scale resettlement of people mainly from poorer and remote regions of Russia into Ukraine.[1] Malyar noted that the most intensive efforts are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast and remarked that Russia is also deporting Ukrainians and forcibly resettling them in Russia.[2] ISW previously reported on specific instances of Russian authorities overseeing the depopulation and repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine, particularly in occupied Kherson Oblast over the course of 2022. Ukrainian sources remarked in October 2022 that Russian authorities in then-occupied parts of Kherson Oblast deported large groups of Ukrainian residents to Russia under the guise of humanitarian evacuations and then repopulated their homes with Russian soldiers.[3] Russia may hope to import Russians to fill depopulated areas of Ukraine in order to further integrate occupied areas into Russian socially, administratively, politically, and economically, thereby complicating conditions for the reintegration of these territories into Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that such depopulation and repopulation campaigns may amount to a deliberate ethnic cleansing effort and apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut. A video appeal addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin by personnel of the “Potok” PMC (reportedly one of three volunteer detachments from Russian-state owned energy company Gazprom) claims that Gazprom officials told members of “Potok” that they would be signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but then forced personnel to sign contracts with PMC “Redut.”[5] One Potok soldier claimed that Gazprom created two other units — “Fakel” and “Plamya,” which were attached to the Russian MoD.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that ”Potok“ is not a PMC, but a BARS (Combat Reserve) unit, however.[7] The ”Potok” personnel also reported poor treatment by Wagner fighters who threatened to shoot ”Potok” personnel if they withdrew from the line of contact. A Wagner fighter claimed in an interview published on April 26 that ”Potok” fighters abandoned Wagner’s flanks at night.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that “Potok” fighters abandoned their positions in Bakhmut due to a lack of ammunition.[9] ISW previously assessed that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin likely views the proliferation of PMCs around Bakhmut as competition, and it appears that the increased prevalence of other PMCs around Bakhmut may be causing substantial friction.[10]

The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression. The Russian Federation Council approved three bills on April 26 which would allow for the deprivation of Russian citizenship for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces and for actions that threaten national security, allow for life sentences for high treason, and allow for five-year sentences for those who promote the decisions of international organizations in which Russia does not participate.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has supported laws strengthening punishments for trespassing at facilities run by certain federal bodies, misappropriation of Russian military assets, and discreditation of all Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine to expand pretexts for the arrests of Russian citizens and the removal of officials who have fallen out of favor.[12] The Kremlin is likely setting numerous conditions for domestic crackdowns to give Russian officials carte blanche in prosecuting anyone perceived to be against Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s war in Ukraine. The harsh punishments stipulated by these laws likely aim to promote widespread self-censorship amongst the Russian population. ISW has also assessed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs, and Russian authorities may use these new laws to support these efforts.[13]

Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remarked on April 26 that as soon as weather conditions improve in Bakhmut, Ukraine will launch a counteroffensive, which may coincide with Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday (the commemoration of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945).[14] A prominent Russian milblogger insinuated that Ukraine may be planning counteroffensive actions in order to ruin May 9 celebrations in Russia.[15] The invocations of May 9 suggest that the Russian information space continues to place symbolic importance on dates associated with Russia’s Great Patriotic War, which continues to shape discourse on the prospects of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during a press conference in New York on April 25 that discussions about the potential for negotiations after a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive are ”schizophrenic.”[16] Increasingly despondent and panicked rhetoric emanating from prominent information space figures suggests that the Russian information space has not yet settled on a line about how to address significant and growing concerns about the near future.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Xi’s statement made China’s position on Ukrainian independence clear, rejecting Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye’s April 22 statements that post-Soviet states lack a basis for sovereignty.[17] Both Ukrainian and Chinese government readouts of the call mentioned a possible role China could play in negotiating nuclear issues.[18] Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova expressed broad agreement with China’s peace plan and blamed Ukraine for rejecting it.[19] The tepid Russian response to Zelensky and Xi’s call is likely further evidence of Russia’s displeasure at China's unwillingness to establish a no-limits bilateral partnership. It is not clear that Chinese actions match Chinese rhetoric, however. According to US government statements and investigative journalism reports, China may be providing non-lethal military assistance to Russia.[20]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on April 26 in which they reportedly discussed the development of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh.[21] The brief Kremlin readout for the conversation called for strict compliance with the agreements made by Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani leaders considering the increasing tensions in the Lachin corridor.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 26 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lentsov is the new commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh and will oversee operations at the 30 observation posts that Russian forces operate in the area.[23] The Russian MoD likely announced the appointment to signal to Armenia a commitment to meet Russia's peacekeeping responsibilities and to augment Putin’s effort to reassure Pashinyan.

The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s redeployment of elements of its peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is likely eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia.[24] Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeeping forces of not meeting their obligations in December 2022 and stated on March 16, 2023, that Armenia should appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if Russia is unable to uphold the November 9, 2020, ceasefire agreement.[25] The Kremlin's efforts are likely failing to convince Armenia that it will uphold its obligations under the ceasefire agreement, and Russia’s potential inability to do so may severely degrade Russia’s standing with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. The Russian State Duma approved on April 4 the first draft of a bill that would allow all Russian personnel, including conscripts, to participate in Russian peacekeeping operations, likely in an effort to send conscripts to sustain the peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.[26] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on April 24 that the Kremlin made a decision to replace the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh with a contingent of conscripts, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian conscripts serving in Nagorno-Karabakh.[27]

Key Takeaways

Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians.
Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut.
The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression.
Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, stating that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states.
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces made gains within Bakhmut and north of Avdiivka.
Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.”
Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 26.[28] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations along this sector of the front for “some time” but that Russian forces are continuing to conduct heavy indirect fire in this sector of the front.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), Torske (16km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed back Ukrainian forces from positions on the eastern outskirts of Spirne (24km south of Kreminna) on Apri 25, although ISW assessed that Russian forces likely occupied these positions at an earlier date.[31]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Svatove. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces suppressed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and Krokhmalne (21km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast and Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (15km northwest of Svatove).[32] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivske and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued making gains in Bakhmut as of April 26. Geolocated footage posted on April 26 shows that Russian troops have advanced to Persha Lisova Street in western Bakhmut (within a few blocks of the Yuvileina 00506 road that runs into Khromove).[34] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner fighters reached the intersection of Tchaikovskyi and Yuvileina Streets, which would hypothetically allow them to advance up Yuvileina Street towards Khromove and cut remaining Ukrainian logistics lines into Bakhmut.[35] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied these claims, however, and played down the significance of Wagner’s capture of that intersection, stating that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use roads under Wagner’s fire control anyways.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner is continuing to fight in northern, western, and southern Bakhmut.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner controls up to 85 percent of the city, which is consistent with ISW’s control of terrain calculations including territory covered by Russian claims.[38] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 17 combat clashes in the Bakhmut direction over the past day.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest) and Bohdanivka (6km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Khromove (3km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[40]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 26 and have made a marginal advance north of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage posted on April 26 shows that Russian forces have made limited gains west of the N20 Donetsk City-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk highway about 10km north of Avdiivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 26 that Russian forces successfully advanced west of Novobakhmutivka and pushed Ukrainian forces away from the N20 highway, which appears consistent with available footage confirming these positions.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks towards Avdiivka itself; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued fighting along the outskirts of Donetsk City and advanced towards Sieverne.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on April 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade are conducting small arms engagements on the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[45] Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces have increased their use of FAB-500 airdropped bombs to target Ukrainian strongholds in urban areas of Bakhmut, and several Russian sources posted footage of Russian airstrikes on Vuhledar.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were no confirmed ground attacks in this area on April 26.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as of April 26. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian reconnaissance and river crossing activity is most prevalent on Velykiy Potemkin island (6km south of Kherson City), south of Kindyika (8km east of Kherson City), and west of Veletenske (18km southwest of Kherson City).[48] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions on Velykiy Potemkin island as well as in coastal areas near Kindyika on April 25.[49] Another Russian milblogger amplified geolocated footage on April 25 of the ”Kherson” volunteer detachment on a section of the E58 highway south of the Antonivsky Bridge on an unspecified date and argued that reports about Ukrainian forces establishing positions on the east (left) bank are false.[50] This milblogger has previously reported demonstrably false information, and it is possible that he may have purposefully posted old footage of the area to refute reports about Ukrainian forces holding positions on the east (left) bank. ISW has not observed any new additional visual evidence to validate or confirm Russian claims about Ukrainian positions or activity on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. ISW expanded Russian claims northward closer to the dacha area south of Antonivka (9km west of Kherson City) on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River based on claims from the prominent milblogger. ISW has not observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating south of the Antonivsky Bridge since April 22.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian logistics on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on April 26 that Ukrainian forces are already quietly conducting counteroffensive activities in Kherson Oblast by targeting Russian ammunition depots as well as equipment and manpower concentration areas.[51] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 25 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower and concentrations areas as well as an observation post.[52]

Russian officials are continuing efforts to secure rear ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in occupied Crimea. Head of the Russian Federal Road Agency Nikita Khrapov claimed on April 26 that Russian builders have finished the most difficult stages of the restoration of the railway section of the Kerch Strait Bridge and that railway traffic across the bridge will resume ahead of schedule on an unspecified date in May.[53] A Russian Transport Ministry representative stated on April 26 that Russian officials plan for more than 80 inspection points to operate at entrances to the Kerch Strait bridge by April 28.[54] Russian officials are likely increasing efforts to secure and improve the GLOC across the Kerch Strait into Crimea in preparation for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Satellite imagery indicates that Russian forces have transferred armored vehicles and artillery systems from occupied Crimea to an unspecified area as of April 25. Geolocated satellite imagery shows a military depot near Turhenieve (21km northeast of Dzhankoi) with armored fighting vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems on February 11 noticeably empty on April 25.[55] Russian forces may have transferred the military equipment to support ongoing Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast or to other sectors of the front in preparation for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.” Multiple Russian opposition news outlets reported on April 26 that Russian anti-war project “Walk in the Forest” head Grigory Sverdlin stated that Russian authorities in St. Petersburg have started issuing military registration summonses that warn that failure to register will lead to “restrictive measures.”[56] ISW reported on April 11 that the Kremlin passed legislation banning individuals who are 20 days delinquent in reporting to a military office from driving vehicles, buying or selling real estate, or taking out loans.[57] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Western Military District press service confirmed that military registration summonses included warnings of restrictive measures.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian sources claimed on April 26 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the FSB arrested a Russian citizen planning to explode two improvised explosive devices (IED) on a Russian naval hospital in Simferopol, Crimea.[59]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to discuss measures to improve infrastructure in occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated that LNR representatives met with Russian Minister of Energy Sergey Mochalnikov on April 25 to discuss developing the coal industry in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[60] Pasechnik claimed that coal mines in occupied Luhansk Oblast have retained their potential throughout the war and that investors are prepared to invest in mines that have been closed since 2013 to bring them to the necessary levels of productivity.[61] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on April 26 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin met with DNR officials, where the participants emphasized the importance of patronage between Russian federal subjects and occupation authorities when developing roads and restructuring the coal industry in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian missile forces began combat training with Iskander-M missile systems at a Russian training ground on April 26.[63]

Belarusian forces began deploying conscripts into armed formations of the Belarusian Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, border service, and security bodies on April 26. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted that this is part of the February to May conscription call-up and that 10,000 conscripts will deploy to various formations.[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/672

[2] https://t.me/annamaliar/672

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102922

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622

[5] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163200732254208?s=20; https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163208646901761?s=20

[6] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163204255461376?s=20

[7] https://t.me/evilsailor/313; https://t.me/grey_zone/18415

[8] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163202565152770?s=20

[9] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163206302179328?s=20

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[11] https://t.me/bbcrussian/45245 ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2023/04/26/16616899.shtml ; https://newizv dot ru/news/2023-04-26/sovfed-odobril-pozhiznennoe-lishenie-svobody-za-gosizmenu-405519

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar0318723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032823

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041923

[14] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/852

[15] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83939

[16] https://tass dot ru/politika/17610689

[17] https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-ambassador-to-france-says-ex-soviet-...

[18] https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vidbulasya-telefonna-rozmova-prezident...

[19] https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/5335

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/any-china-lethal-aid-russia-would-come-rea...

[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70988

[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70988

[23] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17620815

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031623

[25] https://infocom dot am/en/article/95533; https://www.panarmenian dot net/eng/news/304636/Pashinyan_Russian_peacekeepers_becoming_silent_witnesses_to_Karabakh_depopulation; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/12/22/armenia-russias-peacekeepers-failed-mission-in-nagorno-karabakh ; https://ria dot ru/20230316/karabakh-1858258784.html; https://www.panorama dot am/ru/news/2023/03/16/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8F%D0%BD-%D0%90%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D1%8B-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2/2807734

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[27] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/kirilo-budanov-viyti-kordoni-1991-roku-tsilkom-1682282231.html; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vyity-na-kordony-1991-roku-tsilkom-dosiazhne-zavdannia-tsoho-roku.html

[28] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10079 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaf... com.ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[31] https://t.me/rybar/46269

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/25959

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/25958

[34] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1651092204977287168?s=20; htt...

[35] https://t.me/milchronicles/1823; https://t.me/kommunist/17092

[36] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/853

[37] https://t.me/readovkanews/57545; https://t.me/rybar/46269; https://t.m...

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83951

[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcn...

[41] https://twitter.com/operativno_ZSU/status/1650858094648516610?s=20; htt... https://t.me/operativnoZSU/93060

[42] . https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcn...

[44] https://t.me/rybar/46269; https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[45] https://t.me/rybar/46283

[46] https://t.me/grey_zone/18455; https://t.me/rybar/46283; https://t.me/m...

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcn...

[48] https://t.me/rybar/46266

[49] https://t.me/rybar/46266

[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/12152; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/... https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1651130523438202882?s=20

[51] https://t.me/hueviyherson/38469

[52]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0fi4fCh1m9qF...

[53] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17613353

[54] https://tass dot ru/v-strane/17617369

[55] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1651167988089847809

[56] https://t.me/sotaproject/57810; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-652420...

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/189529

[59] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2413; https://t.me/kommunist/17094; https://t.m...

[60] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1035

[61] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1035

[62] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3367

[63] https://t.me/modmilby/26343; https://t.me/mod_russia/25953

[64] https://t.me/modmilby/26341; https://t.me/modmilby/26366 ; https://t....

US confident in Ukraine offensive despite Russian military’s formidable power, EUCOM commander says

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · April 26, 2023

In this screenshot, Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, commander of U.S. troops in Europe and NATO’s supreme allied commander, talks with reporters on Jan. 19, 2023, following a two-day meeting of allied military leaders at NATO headquarters in Brussels. (NATO)

WASHINGTON — The commander of U.S. troops in Europe expressed confidence Wednesday in an upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive but said Russia remains a formidable military force that has grown since invading Ukraine last year.

Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, who also serves as NATO’s top general, offered lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee a positive appraisal of Ukraine’s readiness to claw back territory occupied by Russian forces while countering it with a sobering look at Russia’s military capabilities.

“Much of the Russian military has not been affected negatively by this conflict,” Cavoli said.

The Kremlin’s ground forces have been “somewhat” degenerated by the war in Ukraine, but its military is bigger today than it was at the start of the invasion and maintains most of its power, he said. Russia’s Navy has lost one ship, and its Air Force has only lost about 80 planes, leaving another 1,000 fighter jets and fighter bombers for battle, Cavoli said.

The Russian air force’s inability to establish air dominance in Ukraine should not be taken as a sign of weakness, cautioned Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

“I think we should not make the mistake of underestimating Russia’s military capabilities because the stakes of getting it wrong are too high,” she said.

Russia continues to flex its military muscle worldwide. In the North Atlantic, for example, Russian submarines have stepped up patrol activities and demonstrated that the country’s undersea forces remain unaffected by the war in Ukraine, Cavoli said.

“I can say that the Russians are more active than we’ve seen them in years, and their patrols into the Atlantic and throughout the Atlantic are at a high level most of the time,” he said. “This is despite all of the efforts that they’re undertaking inside Ukraine.”

Still, Cavoli on Wednesday said Ukraine is well-equipped for an offensive. The U.S. and Ukraine together crafted a list of necessary equipment, and the U.S. has spent the past few months pulling it from allies and its own inventories, he said.

Ukraine now has more than 98% of the combat vehicles that it needs to push into the southern and eastern parts of the country held by Russian forces.

“I am very confident that we have delivered the materiel that they need, and we’ll continue a pipeline to sustain their operations as well,” Cavoli said.

Several House lawmakers argued Wednesday that Ukraine needed more of an edge to break through largely static front lines where Russians troops have become deeply entrenched over the winter.

Rep. Chrissy Houlahan, D-Pa., raised the prospect of sending F-35 jets, a request the White House has repeatedly shot down. Republicans Mike Rogers of Alabama, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Joe Wilson of South Carolina implored defense officials to send Ukraine cluster bombs.

Rogers said the U.S. has more than 3 million of the munitions, which release large numbers of smaller bomblets and are banned in many countries. The Russian military has used cluster weapons in Ukraine hundreds of times, damaging civilian infrastructure and killing civilians, according to the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission.

“Those should be provided [to Ukraine],” Wilson said. “It’s just inconceivable that we don’t do more.”

Cavoli acknowledged the effectiveness of the munition for targeting dense formations of personnel and equipment but said Ukraine’s top need in the near- and mid-term is ground-based air defense. He assured lawmakers that Kyiv was ready to make use of every tool that the U.S. and its allies have provided for the counteroffensive.

“According to the modeling that we’ve very carefully done with them, the Ukrainians are in a good position,” the general said. “They have some weaknesses that I prefer not to talk about in public … but we are confident.”

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · April 26, 2023

3. Russia can fund war in Ukraine for another year despite sanctions, leaked document says

Excerpts:

The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report this month that found Russia still possesses a “remarkable degree of adaptability to Western sanctions,” echoing the classified assessment, though they had slowed the pace of Moscow’s campaign to wear down Ukraine.

Putin publicly praised the resilience of the Russian economy in January, suggesting that it had beaten growth expectations to only shrink by about 2.5 percent during 2022. The actual dynamics of the economy turned out to be better than many expert forecasts, he said during a virtual meeting on the economy. Ukraine’s economy, meanwhile, shrank by more than 30 percent.

Prigozhin has also waved off the effects of sanctions. In February, he issued a statement that economic measures by Britain, Canada and the United States were “illegitimate” and suggesting they were engaged in terrorism.

It remains unclear what links Prigozhin’s business empire had with MTS Bank. The United States imposed sanctions on the bank in March, only weeks after it had been granted a business license in the United Arab Emirates. The license was subsequently revoked by Abu Dhabi in light of the sanctions.

“I think any argument that the sanctions are not impacting Russia or those who are targeted are belied by the fact that once world class companies have been hollowed out, and that the very people who claim that sanctions have not impacted them are complaining loudly about their injustice,” said Adam Smith, a partner at the law firm Gibson Dunn and former Obama administration sanctions official.

Russia can fund war in Ukraine for another year despite sanctions, leaked document says

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · April 26, 2023

U.S. intelligence holds that Russia will be able to fund the war in Ukraine for at least another year, even under the heavy and increasing weight of unprecedented sanctions, according to leaked U.S. military documents.

The previously unreported documents provide a rare glimpse into Washington’s understanding of the effectiveness of its own economic measures, and of the tenor of the response they have met in Russia, where U.S. intelligence finds that senior officials, agencies and the staff of oligarchs are fretting over the painful disruptions — and adapting to them.

While some of Russia’s economic elites might not agree with the country’s course in Ukraine, and sanctions have hurt their businesses, they are unlikely to withdraw support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to an assessment that appears to date from early March.

“Moscow is relying on increased corporate taxes, its sovereign wealth fund, increased imports and businesses adaptability to help mitigate economic pressures,” reads part of the assessment, which is labeled top secret, the highest level of classification.

The documents are part of a trove shared in a Discord chatroom and obtained by The Washington Post. Massachusetts Air National Guard technician Jack Teixeira was charged this month with taking and transmitting the classified papers. He could be facing 15 years in prison.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began last year, the United States and its allies have fired a fusillade of sanctions at Kremlin-linked people and businesses, prohibiting companies from doing business with them, alongside export controls and other trade measures designed to squeeze Russia’s economy and punish its elites.

The Discord Leaks

Dozens of highly classified documents have been leaked online, revealing sensitive information intended for senior military and intelligence leaders. In an exclusive investigation, The Post also reviewed scores of additional secret documents, most of which have not been made public.

Who leaked the documents? Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested Thursday in the investigation into leaks of hundreds of pages of classified military intelligence. The Post reported that the individual who leaked the information shared documents with a small circle of online friends on the Discord chat platform.

What do the leaked documents reveal about Ukraine? The documents reveal profound concerns about the war’s trajectory and Kyiv’s capacity to wage a successful offensive against Russian forces. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment among the leaked documents, “Negotiations to end the conflict are unlikely during 2023.”

What else do they show? The files include summaries of human intelligence on high-level conversations between world leaders, as well as information about advanced satellite technology the United States uses to spy. They also include intelligence on both allies and adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, as well as Britain, Canada, South Korea and Israel.

What happens now? The leak has far-reaching implications for the United States and its allies. In addition to the Justice Department investigation, officials in several countries said they were assessing the damage from the leaks.

1/5

End of carousel

Those elites “are likely to persist in upholding the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine” and in “helping Moscow circumvent sanctions,” the leaked assessment finds. But experts say that the sanctions’ effectiveness — not just to hurt the Russian economy, but to deter, punish and send a message — relies on factors more complex than what a single assessment can take into account.

The document does not address the impact of newly imposed sanctions or the long-term pain of oil price ceilings in Europe. Russian oil revenue has plummeted.

Even if Russia in theory could fund the war for another year, the leaked assessment does not explore other factors that could affect Russia’s ability to fight, such as ammunition expenditure and the need to recruit or conscript new soldiers.

The Treasury Department declined to comment on the documents in question. The White House did not respond to questions about them.

While Putin and those close to him have dismissed the impact of sanctions, which have failed to stop the Russian war effort, by Washington’s own classified assessment, leaked documents also provide a window into the consternation they have caused among some of their intended targets.

While the documents do not include in-depth discussion of their sources, they are marked with a code indicating the data was gleaned from intercepted communications. That suggests that the United States has gained access to the channels where Russian figures privately discuss how to limit the impact of sanctions.

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, U.S. intelligence found, had drafted a letter to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in early March to seek backing for contingency plans to avoid a “potentially embarrassing collapse” of Russian state-controlled entities such as the International Investment Bank, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the Eurasian Investment Bank, because of sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies.

On April 12, the United States imposed sanctions directly on the Budapest-based International Investment Bank, prompting the Hungarian government to announce it would pull out of cooperation with the financial institution, which Russia describes as an international development bank.

Some experts expressed surprise that Siluanov would be so worried about an institution with a relatively small market cap.

“Economically, IIB is not of crucial importance to Russia,” Maria Snegovaya, one of the authors of the recent CSIS report on sanctions, said in an email. “The expectations that the bank will be sanctioned have been there for almost a year at this point.”

But the bank, which was set up during the Soviet era as an international institution with certain diplomatic benefits, had long been suspected of links to espionage and money laundering, said András Rácz, a senior research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

According to another document, U.S. intelligence found that officials at Russia’s top intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service, or FSB, were concerned about the insufficient amount of foreign currency held by domestic Russian banks. These officials also warned that the United States could impose secondary sanctions on the Chinese companies that still did business with Russia, and urged that such transactions be kept secret.

Employees of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the Russian tycoon behind the Wagner Group, a private security contractor network that has taken up arms in Ukraine, “understood” that recently announced sanctions on Russia’s MTS Bank would end transactions with American companies resulting in “the suspension of US dollar transactions on 15 May,” according to an intelligence document.

The document also said that a “finance employee” of the oligarch was concerned that Chinese companies would end their business with Russia to avoid the impact of sanctions.

The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report this month that found Russia still possesses a “remarkable degree of adaptability to Western sanctions,” echoing the classified assessment, though they had slowed the pace of Moscow’s campaign to wear down Ukraine.

Putin publicly praised the resilience of the Russian economy in January, suggesting that it had beaten growth expectations to only shrink by about 2.5 percent during 2022. The actual dynamics of the economy turned out to be better than many expert forecasts, he said during a virtual meeting on the economy. Ukraine’s economy, meanwhile, shrank by more than 30 percent.

Prigozhin has also waved off the effects of sanctions. In February, he issued a statement that economic measures by Britain, Canada and the United States were “illegitimate” and suggesting they were engaged in terrorism.

It remains unclear what links Prigozhin’s business empire had with MTS Bank. The United States imposed sanctions on the bank in March, only weeks after it had been granted a business license in the United Arab Emirates. The license was subsequently revoked by Abu Dhabi in light of the sanctions.

“I think any argument that the sanctions are not impacting Russia or those who are targeted are belied by the fact that once world class companies have been hollowed out, and that the very people who claim that sanctions have not impacted them are complaining loudly about their injustice,” said Adam Smith, a partner at the law firm Gibson Dunn and former Obama administration sanctions official.

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · April 26, 2023

4. Opinion Biden is quietly encouraging Assad’s rehabilitation. He should reverse course.

Excerpts:

On moral grounds, the case for isolating Assad is unassailable. But it is also in the United States’ narrow self-interest. Increasingly, the Syrian regime resembles a narco-trafficking cartel, flooding the region with an amphetamine-like drug known as captagon. Damascus also remains an integral part of the Iranian network that transfers advanced weapons and hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas and Hezbollah — the U.S.-designated terrorist organizations that brought the region to the brink of war earlier this month with rocket attacks on Israel.

Assad’s rehabilitation has only come this far because the administration gave his neighbors the green light. A reversal could stop the process in its tracks.

Opinion Biden is quietly encouraging Assad’s rehabilitation. He should reverse course.

By

April 26, 2023 at 6:15 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by David Adesnik · April 26, 2023

David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

In the first weeks of Joe Biden’s presidency, Secretary of State Antony Blinken committed to “putting human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy.” Before taking office, Blinken expressed deep regret for the way the United States “failed to prevent a horrific loss of life” in Syria during his tenure as the No. 2 official at the State Department under Barack Obama.

Yet now that Blinken holds the top diplomatic position, U.S. policy toward Syria is the opposite of what one might expect. Rather than isolating Bashar al-Assad and ensuring that his regime remains a pariah, the administration has quietly encouraged Assad’s diplomatic rehabilitation.

This policy runs contrary to the spirit of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which Congress passed in late 2019 with strong bipartisan support as part of its annual defense authorization bill. This law sought to cement Assad’s isolation by creating a statutory requirement that the president impose sanctions on all who do business with the Assad regime.

During its first months in office, the Biden administration pledged faithful implementation of the act. Yet half a year passed before it imposed sanctions on any Assad regime entities, whereas the Trump administration, despite its erratic policy toward Syria, had announced new targets every month after the law went into effect.

Before Western audiences, the Biden administration speaks as if it were still committed to isolating Assad. Last month, to mark the anniversary of the 2011 uprising against the Assad dictatorship, the White House joined with the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Germany to declare, “We are not normalizing relations with the Assad regime [and] we will not normalize until there is authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution” to the Syrian civil war.

Yet as various Arab states have kicked off efforts to normalize relations with the Assad regime, the Biden administration has signaled its readiness to accept the outcome. Instead of strongly protesting these moves, last month Barbara Leaf, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, said in an interview: “We advise our friends and partners in the region that they should get something in return for this engagement with Assad.”

The administration says it expects Assad to make concessions on human rights in exchange for normalization. Leaf said those who engage Assad should “press him” to consider “the security of his own people.” Specifically, press him to “create the conditions to permit IDPs [internally displaced persons] and refugees to return home in safety and security.” She repeated similar talking points to the regional news outlet Al-Monitor and again in a State Department digital briefing.

The idea that such requests would bear fruit is fanciful. The regimes set to restore ties with Assad have abysmal human rights records of their own, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They will not advocate for the Syrian people.

The administration has not offered any clear rationale for supporting engagement. The primary cause seems to be fatigue. With unstinting support from Russia and Iran, Assad has demonstrated his staying power. The administration does not appear to want to invest the diplomatic capital necessary to keep him isolated.

Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress have a very different view of the situation. Almost a year to the day after Biden took office, four top lawmakers sent him a letter restating their opposition to the administration’s “tacit approval of formal diplomatic engagement with the Syrian regime.” Two of the four were the Democratic chairs of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees. The other two were the Republican ranking members of those committees. At a time of intense polarization in Congress, this position commands bipartisan support.

On moral grounds, the case for isolating Assad is unassailable. But it is also in the United States’ narrow self-interest. Increasingly, the Syrian regime resembles a narco-trafficking cartel, flooding the region with an amphetamine-like drug known as captagon. Damascus also remains an integral part of the Iranian network that transfers advanced weapons and hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas and Hezbollah — the U.S.-designated terrorist organizations that brought the region to the brink of war earlier this month with rocket attacks on Israel.

Assad’s rehabilitation has only come this far because the administration gave his neighbors the green light. A reversal could stop the process in its tracks.

The Washington Post · by David Adesnik · April 26, 2023

5. Xi holds first talks with Zelenskiy since Russian invasion of Ukraine

Excerpts:

Xi told Zelenskiy that China would send special representatives to Ukraine and hold talks with all parties seeking peace, Chinese state media reported.

Zelenskiy said in an evening video address that there was "an opportunity to use China's political power to reinforce the principles and rules that peace should be built upon."

"Ukraine and China, like the absolute majority of the world, are equally interested in the strength of the sovereignty of nations and territorial integrity," he said.

Zelenskiy also said Xi had expressed "words of support" for the extension of a deal to export Ukrainian grain from its Black Sea ports. Moscow has said the pact will not be renewed beyond May 18 unless the West removes obstacles to Russian grain and fertiliser exports.:

Xi holds first talks with Zelenskiy since Russian invasion of Ukraine

Reuters · by Dan Peleschuk

BEIJING, April 26 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Wednesday for the first time since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fulfilling a longstanding goal of Kyiv which had publicly sought such talks for months.

Zelenskiy, describing the hour-long phone call as "long and meaningful", signalled the importance of the chance to open closer relations with Russia's most powerful friend, naming a former cabinet minister as Ukraine's new ambassador to Beijing.

Xi told Zelenskiy that China would send special representatives to Ukraine and hold talks with all parties seeking peace, Chinese state media reported.

Zelenskiy said in an evening video address that there was "an opportunity to use China's political power to reinforce the principles and rules that peace should be built upon."

"Ukraine and China, like the absolute majority of the world, are equally interested in the strength of the sovereignty of nations and territorial integrity," he said.

Zelenskiy also said Xi had expressed "words of support" for the extension of a deal to export Ukrainian grain from its Black Sea ports. Moscow has said the pact will not be renewed beyond May 18 unless the West removes obstacles to Russian grain and fertiliser exports.

Xi, the most powerful leader to have refrained from denouncing Russia's invasion, visited Moscow last month. Since February, he has promoted a 12-point peace plan, greeted sceptically by the West but cautiously welcomed by Kyiv as a sign of Chinese interest in ending the war.

China will focus on promoting peace talks, and make efforts for a ceasefire as soon as possible, Xi told Zelenskiy, according to the Chinese state media reports.

"As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a responsible major country, we will neither sit idly by, nor pour oil on fire, still less seek to profit from it," Xi said.

The White House welcomed the call but said it was too soon to tell whether it would lead to a peace deal.

French President Emmanuel Macron's office said he had pushed Xi to hold the call with Zelenskiy during a visit to Beijing this month.

NO PEACE TALKS IN SIGHT

[1/3] Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping via phone line, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine April 26, 2023. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via REUTERS

The 14-month war is at a juncture, with Ukraine preparing to launch a counteroffensive following a Russian winter offensive that made only incremental advances despite bloody fighting.

There are no peace talks in sight, with Kyiv demanding Russia withdraw its troops and Moscow insisting Ukraine must recognise its claims to have annexed seized territory.

"There can be no peace at the expense of territorial compromises," Zelenskiy said in a Twitter post on Wednesday.

"The territorial integrity of Ukraine must be restored within the 1991 borders."

Ukrainian officials have long urged Beijing to use its influence in Russia to help end the war.

Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a "no limits" partnership agreement weeks before Putin ordered the invasion.

Since then, China has denounced sanctions against Moscow but has held back from openly supporting the invasion. China has also become Russia's biggest economic partner, buying up oil that can no longer be sold in Europe.

Following Wednesday's call, Russia's foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said: "We note the readiness of the Chinese side to make efforts to establish a negotiation process."

Washington has said in recent months it was worried about China providing weapons or ammunition to Russia, although Beijing denies any such plans.

China says it is positioned to help mediate because it has not taken sides.

"What China has done to help resolve the Ukraine crisis has been above board," said Yu Jun, deputy head of the foreign ministry's Eurasian department.

Western countries say China's peace proposal is too vague, offers no concrete path out of the war, and could be used by Putin to promote a truce that would leave his forces in control of occupied territory while they regroup.

Reporting by Beijing Newsroom; Editing by Andrew Heavens

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Dan Peleschuk

6. How Russia has fortified swathes of Ukraine

Extensive photos, graphics, and sketches are at the link: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/COUNTEROFFENSIVE/mopakddwbpa/index.html

How Russia has fortified swathes of Ukraine

Digging in

How Russia has heavily fortified swathes of Ukraine – a development that could complicate a spring counteroffensive.

Reuters · by Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa and Adolfo Arranz

When Ukraine's military paused to regroup towards the end of 2022, extensive Russian fortifications designed to slow any Ukrainian advances started to spring up along, behind and sometimes far removed from the front lines.

Satellite images of thousands of new defensive positions reviewed by Reuters show Russia has been digging in at key strategic points in readiness for an offensive by a Ukrainian military rearmed with state-of-the-art Western weapons.

A map shows all the locations in Russia, along its border with Ukraine, and in Russian-held Ukraine, where the American Enterprise Institute found any kind of fortification built by Russia.

Stretching from the Russian city of Voronok down through eastern Ukraine and southwest to the Crimean Peninsula, new trenches, anti-vehicle barriers and revetments for equipment and material have appeared, said Brady Africk, an open-source intelligence researcher and an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.

Four maps show when the fortifications built by Russian along its border with Ukraine and in Russia-held Ukraine were first spotted on satellite imagery. Relatively few fortifications appeared before October 2022. In October and November, fortifications appeared along parts of the frontline and inner regions of Russian-held Ukraine. In December 2022 and January 2023, fortifications appeared inside Russian regions and more parts of occupied Ukraine. And in January and February, more fortifications were seen in Russian-held Ukraine, especially in northern Crimea.

Russia’s winter offensive made few gains. As the war carries over into a second spring and Ukraine prepares to renew its own attacks with an arsenal of new Western weapons and freshly trained troops, the Russian military most likely sees prepared defences as the best chance of staving off a decisive defeat, said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

“After the Kharkiv offensive, Russia kind of realized that defeat was possible - they could lose territory. I think that was a realization that Ukraine can do offensive operations,” he said. The fortifications are “an acknowledgement of the risk that Ukraine could make another breakthrough”.

The trenches

The most common - and easiest to construct - type of defensive work is a trench. U.S. Army field manuals say such fighting positions should be dug roughly armpit-deep, be in non-obvious locations, ideally using natural cover for concealment, and include a front wall of sandbags, rocks, dirt or other protective material.

An illustration shows what a typical trench looks like.

Trenches offer obvious protection from bullets and can help infantry survive artillery barrages, which have been a prominent feature of the war in Ukraine. Fragments from an 80mm mortar round, for instance, can be stopped with just 30 cm of dirt, the Army documents say, meaning that only an explosion overhead will have much effect on emplaced troops.

Russian forces have dug many such trenches along what they see as key roads and junctions, and outside strategic cities, Africk said. At least two locations, Tokmak and Bilmak in the Zaphorizhzhia region, are encircled by defensive works.

A zoomed-in map shows fortifications around several towns such as Tokmak, Bilmak and Mykhailivka, along plain terrain and along major roads in Russian-held Ukraine.

Most of the trenches are built in a zig-zag or angular pattern, which limits enemy sight lines and offers additional protection from shell fragments coming from the side. In some cases, the trenches are clearly visible in satellite images, are not well concealed and are built in open spaces.

Satellite images show examples of fortifications built in Russian-held Ukraine.

Being dug in does not automatically mean the defender has an advantage, said Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army and a combat engineer. Poorly planned defensive positions might even make them worse off, he said.

“A dumb adversary dug in versus a smart one that is conducting maneuvers is a different kettle of fish,” Ryan said. “It all depends on how well-sited these obstacles are. … Once you dig yourself in, it’s very easy to find you.”

Obstacles and traps

Barriers can range from ditches and barbed wire to hardened concrete obstacles. They are meant to restrict an adversary’s ability to maneuver, or to funnel their forces into areas that make them more vulnerable to attack. For trucks and other wheeled vehicles that mostly stick to roads, this is an easier task: Barbed wire, tree trunks, and even deep holes can slow or stop them.

An illustration shows what a typical excavated ditch looks like.

Africk said his research showed Russian anti-vehicle ditches and barriers such as “dragon’s teeth” - concrete pyramid blocks set in staggered rows to block tanks - were common in Ukraine. Jack-shaped steel “hedgehogs” use the same sort of mechanics, wrecking tracks or tipping tanks into vulnerable positions.

An illustration shows what hedgehog barriers and dragon’s teeth typically look like.

Tracked vehicles such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers can plow over or through most obstacles, as well as travel off road, which adds to the difficulty of stopping them. Although barriers can be effective, another common means of stopping such vehicles is a mine. These weapons are cheap, easily hidden, and some can be scattered via artillery - meaning personnel do not have to approach the area to place them.

Many, such as the Soviet-era TM-62, which has been widely used in Ukraine, will not detonate without the pressure or magnetic presence of a heavy vehicle. Others are “off-road” mines, such as the PARM systems Germany has supplied to Ukraine. They are deployed some distance from the target area and are triggered remotely, for instance with a tripwire, firing a small penetrator. All are devastating, even against heavy armour. Around Vuhdelar, a city in southern Ukraine that Russia pushed hard to capture during the winter, mines destroyed dozens of Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers and mine-clearing vehicles, Lee said.

“If Russia employs mines effectively as well, it will be difficult for Ukraine,” he said.

Special equipment is needed to clear a path through a minefield, Ryan said. Plows and rollers can be attached to tanks, or other heavy vehicles can fire line charges - ropes of explosives - to blow up mines. That sort of equipment, and more, has been included in all the recent U.S. and European security assistance packages, he said.

An illustration shows plows attached to a tank as it approaches a buried mine. Another drawing shows how an armored vehicle fires a rocket attached to a cluster of small explosives that trigger the detonation of buried mines.

The weather is another major factor. Mud - which appears seasonally in Ukraine during a period known locally as bezdorizhzhia that starts around March 1 - can make maneuvering off roads difficult or impossible even for tracked vehicles. During the mud season in 2022, many photos and videos emerged of Russian and Ukrainian vehicles that had been bogged down and abandoned.

A Russian tank is seen stuck in mud near the village of Nova Basan, in Chernihiv region, Ukraine. April 1, 2022. REUTERS/Serhii Nuzhnenko

Danger and messaging

The Ukrainian military’s counter-attacks in 2022 came largely against Russian forces that had not dug in, and were more widely dispersed than in 2023 because they were occupying more territory.

To some extent, looking at where Russian forces have built visible fortifications can help show what their commanders see as important, retired major general Ryan said.

A map shows fortifications along major roads in southern Ukraine and Crimea.

“The Russian assessment appears to be that the Ukrainians’ most likely and most dangerous place to attack is in the south, particularly in Zaporizhzhia,” he said.

Breaking through

The sheer scale of the Russian defensive works is not, in itself, an obstacle, Ryan said. Ukraine’s military does not need to attack every kilometre in every theatre. Rather, commanders will weigh the strength of the defences, the importance of an area to their objective and the forces they can bring to bear against it, he said.

“Just because an area has heavy defences, it doesn’t mean you will choose not to fight through it,” he said. “Sometimes that is just what you have to do.”

Concentrating forces, a cornerstone of classic military doctrine, could offer Ukraine an advantage at a specific point on the front and allow them to push into Russian rear areas. That could unravel other defensive areas and create a wider breakthrough, said Lee at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Tanks and other armored vehicles must operate alongside engineers, artillery, and even aircraft to defeat layered defenses, he said - an approach called “combined arms” - and recent shipments of Western military gear would help with that.

A series of illustrations show various layers of fortifications that approaching tanks or other armored vehicles could face. The layers can include dragon’s teeth, irregular and zig-zag trenches, revetments, camouflaged areas such as tree cover and anti-tank ditches.

Competent planning by Ukraine could prove even more valuable than better weapons, Ryan said.

“The most important assistance they have received is not so much the equipment, but… the training of battalion and brigade and higher-level staff in these very complex combined arms activities,” he said. “You can’t just get a pickup team and do this. It is the most complex ground operation you can conduct.”

The next move

How the front lines change in 2023 will come down to where Ukraine chooses to focus, what forces it uses and how well-prepared Russia is in those areas, Lee said.

Fortifications, if built and used properly, could make a major breakthrough difficult - but with Western provision of artillery shells most likely at its peak, Ukraine’s military may not get another chance, he said.

The fortifications, though, like other aspects of the war, will leave scars well after the last shell is fired, Africk said, telling of how another researcher found a mark he was having trouble interpreting on the terrain in a satellite photo of Ukraine.

Eventually, he realised he was looking at the remains of a trench from World War II.

“These things are going to be around for a long time,” Africk said.

Note

Frontline as of April 10, 2023.

Sources

Russian Fortifications, Brady Africk; Planet Labs PBC; Natural Earth; Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project; Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, NASA; WorldPop project, University of Southampton; LandScan program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; OpenStreetMap

Satellite imagery

Planet Labs PBC

Edited by

David Clarke; Mike Collett-White; Simon Scarr

Reuters · by Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa and Adolfo Arranz

7. The Afghan Withdrawal Coverup

Excerpt:

Mr. McCaul has since seen the underlying State review on which the White House summary is partly based. In his letter to Mr. Blinken, he cites unclassified portions of State’s review that contradict the White House’s narrative. Even the snippets provided in the letter suggest the full report would reveal mistakes that should be accounted for

The Afghan Withdrawal Coverup

The State Department won’t release crucial documents on the fiasco.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-withdrawal-biden-administration-antony-blinken-michael-mccaul-letter-f9258d8e?mod=hp_opin_pos_5#cxrecs_s

By The Editorial BoardFollow

April 26, 2023 6:38 pm ET

House Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul speaks during a House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on the United States evacuation from Afghanistan on March 8. PHOTO: ANDREW HARNIK/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan was a debacle that continues to undermine U.S. credibility abroad. Yet the Biden Administration won’t release the full record of what happened, and now House Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul is calling out the coverup.

Mr. McCaul wrote on Tuesday to Secretary of State Antony Blinken seeking the public release of State’s 87-page after-action report on the withdrawal. The public has been provided only a 12-page summary, which was written by the White House National Security Council and essentially blames the mess on Donald Trump.

Mr. McCaul has since seen the underlying State review on which the White House summary is partly based. In his letter to Mr. Blinken, he cites unclassified portions of State’s review that contradict the White House’s narrative. Even the snippets provided in the letter suggest the full report would reveal mistakes that should be accounted for. For example:

• The report says in both the Trump and Biden administrations “there was insufficient senior-level consideration of worst case scenarios and how quickly these might follow,” including the rapid collapse of the Kabul government.

• While the U.S. military “moved swiftly” to comply with President’s Biden’s April decision to “proceed with the withdrawal of U.S. forces under a new deadline of September 11,” the “speed of that retrograde compounded the difficulties the Department faced in mitigating the loss of the Department’s key enablers.” It cites the abandonment of Bagram Air Base, leaving Kabul airport as “the only avenue for a possible noncombatant evacuation operation.”

• The report faults the State Department for leaving it “unclear who in the Department had the lead” in planning for evacuation, and says that adding to the “confusion” was “[c]onstantly changing policy guidance and public messaging from Washington regarding which populations were eligible for relocation and how the embassy should manage outreach and flow.”

State claims too much of its report is classified to make more of it public. Yet Mr. McCaul notes that “the vast majority of its contents” are marked as either “Sensitive but Unclassified” or “Unclassified.” He says there is little obvious rationale for the portions of the document marked “secret”—suggesting the classification exists more to prevent embarrassment than protect national security. The administration can safely release an “appropriate” version, he says.

Mr. Blinken also continues to stonewall Mr. McCaul’s subpoena to see an internal State Department dissent cable written by 23 Kabul Embassy officials in July 2021. Press reports say it warned that Mr. Biden’s withdrawal deadline risked a quick Kabul collapse—meaning the Administration was advised by its own officials that it was courting disaster.

State says sharing the cable and the writers’ identities risks “chilling” diplomats from using the dissent channel. Yet it continues to balk even after Mr. McCaul offered to view the cable in a classified setting with names redacted. The Republican has twice pushed back his subpoena deadline in a good-faith effort to get State’s cooperation. Litigation may be next.

The White House wants Americans to forget the Afghan tragedy, but voters deserve to know the truth about an episode that will harm U.S. interests for years to come.

8. Opinion | What 6 data points tell us about the status of the war in Ukraine

The six:

Stalemate on the ground

Support for Ukraine remains strong

Ukraine’s budget deficit has widened

Over one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced

Divergence among Group of 20 states

Zelensky is winning the digital battle

Opinion | What 6 data points tell us about the status of the war in Ukraine

The Washington Post · by Michael O’Hanlon · April 26, 2023

Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight chair in defense and strategy and director of the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution. Constanze Stelzenmüller is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. David Wessel is the director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings. The authors comment individually on the data that they and their Brookings Institution colleagues have gathered below.

As a rather mild winter in Eastern Europe turns to spring and mud turns gradually to firm soil, the Russia-Ukraine war is entering a new phase. The question is whether this will lead to a change in warfare — from the high-intensity attrition kind that has been going on for the past six months to so-called maneuver warfare, in which positions and territorial holdings can shift significantly.

Each side promotes its own theory of victory — and believes it has the upper hand.

Stalemate on the ground

Michael O’Hanlon: Since last fall, territory holdings have mostly come to a stalemate. Russia controls about 17 percent of the land area — up from 7 percent before Feb. 24, 2022, but down from at least 22 percent a year ago. Any movement in recent months has been localized and limited.

Rates of artillery fire illustrate the trends in fighting. Last spring and summer, the Russians used perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 rounds of ammunition a day. Since last fall, that has dropped to about 10,000 rounds. In the early going, Ukrainian soldiers fired as many as 6,000 rounds a day, and these increasingly included precision rounds, like the vaunted HIMARS system. Since fall, this number has fallen to roughly 3,000 rounds (though by some accounts the numbers have picked up of late – and all of these estimates could be off by perhaps 25 to 50 percent.) A key question for Ukraine’s spring offensive is just how much it might increase the numbers, given constraints on availability and production. Russia’s winter/spring offensive seems to have petered out, but not before tens of thousands of additional Russians (and smaller but significant numbers of Ukrainians) were killed or wounded.

Support for Ukraine remains strong

O’Hanlon: For Ukraine’s Western friends, the strategy is to supply the country with more high-technology weaponry — tanks, air- and missile-defense systems, and (one hopes) ample artillery rounds — to prepare for a spring offensive while also helping Ukraine protect its main cities against aerial attack and withstand Russia’s efforts to take more territory. The goal is for Ukraine to move from attrition warfare (where Russia has advantages of scale) to maneuver warfare (where Ukraine’s army might outperform the invaders with superior mobility and precision). So far, Western support has held steady.

Heavy artillery fighting has led to high casualties on both sides. Russia may have had as many as 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers killed, American officials estimate, with three times that many wounded. Ukraine is reported to have lost just over half Russia’s total. But it has also had as many as 50,000 civilian fatalities (or more), according to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark A. Milley and others.

Ukraine’s budget deficit has widened

David Wessel: Ukraine’s spending, much of it on the military, continues to far outstrip its revenue, forcing the government to turn to money-printing and aid from abroad, including grants from the U.S. that have prompted a handful of U.S. politicians to question giving Ukraine a “blank check.” Meanwhile, international financial institutions have been stepping up aid. In late March, the International Monetary Fund, at the urging of the United States, changed its rules to allow it to lend money with less assurance of repayment, and then said it would loan Ukraine $15.6 billion over four years.

In turn, Ukraine pledged to better collect taxes, borrow on domestic bond markets and curtail money-printing. The European Investment Bank, for its part, created an “E.U. for Ukraine” initiative to increase funding for repairs and reconstruction in the war-torn country.

Over one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced

O’Hanlon: Ukraine’s European neighbors are generously hosting more than 5 million refugees, and any fair reckoning of transatlantic and global burden-sharing must account for this. The cost of taking in a refugee and providing support for a year is about 10,000 euros (about $11,000), and often a good deal more, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates. This implies that, since last summer, Europe has spent more than 40 billion euros and perhaps 50 billion or more on Ukrainian refugees — far more than the modest amounts spent by the United States and Canada.

Constanze Stelzenmüller: The war has transformed Ukrainians’ lives. Russia’s tactics of terror and destruction have displaced more than one-third of the population, with almost 5.3 million registered as refugees across Europe (excluding Belarus and Russia) and an additional nearly 5.4 million internally displaced.

Russia has also been accused of forcibly abducting people, leading the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin for the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children. And large numbers continue to flee Ukraine.

Governments and civil society in host countries have created special programs for temporary protection of refugees, granting legal status and access to public services. As pressure on the host countries increases, the continued fighting makes a safe return for refugees increasingly uncertain. As time passes, their roots in the host communities will only grow deeper, and new opportunities for education and employment — especially for young people — may mitigate the desire to return home.

Divergence among Group of 20 states

Stelzenmüller: Russia’s war of aggression has revitalized the role of the United Nations General Assembly as a forum for support of Ukraine’s self-defense. Most member states have condemned Russia’s invasion, declared support for Ukrainian sovereignty, and called for a just and lasting peace. On six emergency resolutions in support of Ukraine to date, however, several countries have taken a “neutral” position or even aligned with Russia — including members of the Group of 20 who have abstained from votes defending Ukrainian independence and denouncing the Russian aggressor, most notably India, Brazil and South Africa. This reflects the sentiment among many non-Western countries that the war is a regional issue that does not directly affect them, and that supporting Ukraine is not in their immediate interest.

Zelensky is winning the digital battle

Zelensky’s speeches that targeted foreign audiences

Count of speeches:

■1

■2

■3

Data as of April 6

Source: Official website of President of Ukraine, compiled by Brookings Institution

Stelzenmüller: The war in Ukraine may be the first truly modern war, in which digital capabilities have transformed the dynamics on the ground as well as the international response. Ordinary citizens have documented actions in real time with mobile phones. Satellite imagery has helped collect evidence of war crimes. Public web services have provided platforms for information-sharing on the frontlines. And Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has conducted an unprecedented digital campaign of global outreach. Beyond his daily video messages to Ukrainians, Zelensky has since Feb. 24, 2022, addressed audiences around the world more than 200 times.

About this project

The data is collected and tracked by the Brookings Institution. Special thanks to Natalie Britton, Ted Reinert, Alejandra Rocha, Sophie Roehse and Mallika Yadwad.

The Washington Post · by Michael O’Hanlon · April 26, 2023

9. U.S., Philippines Sink Warship With Aircraft After Missing With Himars in Drill

This is why we train.

U.S., Philippines Sink Warship With Aircraft After Missing With Himars in Drill

Major military exercises aimed at deterring China end with less-than-flawless finale

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-philippines-sink-warship-with-aircraft-after-missing-with-himars-in-drill-2140e101?page=1

By Alastair GaleFollow

April 26, 2023 8:02 am ET

With Marcos watching, US Army HIMARS fires 6 times but misses target in South China Sea

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · April 26, 2023

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. waves to reporters after touring a M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, while attending a Balikatan live-fire drill at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

SAN ANTONIO, Philippines — The Philippines’ president was on hand Wednesday as one of the U.S. Army’s best-known weapons missed its target — a decommissioned warship floating miles away in the South China Sea — during a live-fire exercise.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. observed from a tower as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, fired six times at the Philippine navy corvette, invisible over the horizon, and a narrator over a public address system described the action down range. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson sat beside Marcos.

The two HIMARS launchers — designed to strike targets on land — missed each time, but a barrage of ordnance from U.S. and Philippine artillery and aircraft eventually sank the vessel.

“Shore-based fire against a ship is exceptionally hard,” Lt. Col. Nick Mannweiler, a spokesman for Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said during the drill at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui.

A rocket fires from an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, during a Balikatan drill at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Ryan, commander of the 25th Infantry Division, speaks to reporters during a Balikatan drill at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

Philippine soldiers fire 155 mm truck-mounted howitzers during a Balikatan drill at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

The training was part of Balikatan, an annual joint exercise involving more than 17,000 U.S. and Filipino troops that wraps up Friday.

Balikatan, the largest ever in terms of troop numbers, demonstrates further evidence of a decided shift by Marcos toward the Philippines’ longtime ally the United States. His predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, employed a friendlier approach toward regional rival China, which nonetheless continued to assert control over maritime territory the Philippines claims in the South China Sea.

The HIMARS’ failure to hit a vessel at sea wasn’t a big deal, according to Mannweiler. The training tested troops’ ability to sense a ship and pass targeting information to weapons operated by the U.S. and Philippines, he said.

The training “sets the condition for more fruitful work like this in future,” Mannweiler said.

Once the HIMARS was fired, artillerymen from the 25th Infantry Division and their Philippine counterparts pounded the boat with 105 mm and 155 mm rounds fired from howitzers. Those rounds were on target, said U.S. Army Maj. Jeff Tolbert, a spokesman for the 25th Infantry Division.

Finally, U.S. and Philippine aircraft took turns attacking the target boat with guns and bombs. An Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone soared overhead, feeding images of the target to commanders calling in the attacks.

U.S. Marines participate in a live-fire drill featuring a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, during Balikatan at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. takes a tour of an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in San Antonio, Philippines, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Buy Photo

A Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II stealth fighter delivered the final blow, and the vessel sank around 2:50 p.m., Tolbert said.

The HIMARS launchers belong to 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, based at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., said battalion commander Lt. Col. Tim Lynch.

Marcos inspected one of the launchers before the live-fire exercise. That launcher, dubbed Wild Bill, is part of Outlaw Platoon, said Alpha Battery commander Capt. Cody Dobiyanski, who showed Marcos around.

The U.S. provided HIMARS batteries, designed to strike targets on land, to Ukraine last year. It’s been credited with evening the odds for the Ukrainians, who are battling Russian invaders.

In combat, U.S. forces would likely use a torpedo or Harpoon missiles against a warship, Mannweiler said.

Philippine army Col. Mike Logico, director of the Joint Command Training Center, told reporters that Marcos understands the challenges of a large-scale bilateral exercise.

“What we demonstrated was the capabilities of the HIMARS and probably also its limitations,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · April 26, 2023

11. 442. What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

What if we do not have to fight LSCO? As the Joint Concept for Competing says we could "lose without fighting."

We absolutely need to have the best prepared military to be able to fight across the spectrum of conflict because that gives us the best chance of deterring LSCO. But if we do not invest in and prepare for other forms of conflict, e.g. irregular warfare., we will again, lose without fighting.

We must be able to campaign to win in the gray zone of strategic competition by conducting competitive statecraft and irregular warfare. To do otherwise risks, again, losing without fighting.

APRIL 27, 2023 BY USER

442. What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/442-what-happens-if-great-powers-dont-fight-great-wars/

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist welcomes returning guest blogger LTC Nathan Colvin with today’s submission, judged as a semi-finalist in our recent Back to the Future Writing Contest. Tackling our writing prompt — How could our future be different than our past experiences and what are the potential surprises or disadvantages? — LTC Colvin’s cautionary piece explores the return of Great Power Conflict, reminding us that the U.S. Army’s current operational concept is Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), not Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). “While conflict in multiple domains is likely, large-scale multi-domain operations remain less likely between two great powers due to the conventional material costs and the slippery slope toward nuclear weapon use.” The Joint Force’s approach to deterrence and conflict must address the full spectrum of operations, as future conflicts are likely to remain hybrid ones. “Assuming that great powers will only fight great wars can lead to death by a thousand cuts while holding a tourniquet” — Read on!]

Introduction

Russian tanks roll across the heart of Europe. China dramatically increases capabilities across all domains. Great powers are back with a vengeance. Analogies drawn from the Cold War and World War II return. Multipolarity challenges the United States’ hegemonic position. Deterrence makes its way back into strategic thought. Great nations with big armies renew conversations about power balancing. Theorists are proud to make realism great again. Like an elastic band snapping into place, Army culture returns to familiar conversations about relative combat power, fires, and maneuver. While certainly the most dangerous form of war, are Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) inevitable amongst great powers?

My argument is no. While geopolitical dynamics may resemble historical conditions leading to direct great power wars, states are more interdependent than ever, are restricted by the nuclear weapons revolution in military affairs, and are constrained by the costs of conventional war. The proper lesson from history is that conflict abhors a vacuum, and threats will take advantage of whatever space is available. Therefore, the Army must consider diverse solutions to deter and win in both LSCO and non-LSCO Multi-Domain Operations.

What’s so great about these powers anyway?

What makes a great power, well, great? Although definitions vary, great powers can exert themselves beyond their near abroad to achieve goals. Today, great power should be able to extend capabilities to a global scale (Bohler 2017) through their level of capability, geographic reach, and be recognized as a great power by other nations (Danilovic 2002). France, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, United States, Russia/USSR, and China are historical Great Powers.

The Congress of Vienna, watercolor etching by August Friedrich Andreas Campe, where the concert of European powers assembled in 1814. From the collection of the State Borodino War and History Museum, Moscow / Source: Fine Art Images/Heritage-Images via Brittanica

Great powers interact with the world cooperatively or competitively. When competition between two powers leads to direct military clashes, conflict occurs. Where cooperation occurs, both states benefit from the transaction, while in competition or conflict, one or both powers suffer. The dynamics of these interactions create a hierarchy of states, first formally recognized in the 1814 Concert of Europe.

Realists say that states vie to be the most powerful while limiting other states’ ability to overtake them. The resulting phenomenon of states allying with the leader (bandwagoning) or against them (balancing), is known as balance of power theory (Waltz 1979). When one power is on the rise, another declines – which puts them on a crash course for a zero-sum conflict (Mearsheimer 2010). The current dominant narrative puts China on the rise, Russia trying to rise, and the United States in relative decline (Kroenig 2022). No doubt a recipe for war, right?

Historically speaking, you could argue there is significant proof that great power war is inevitable. After all, since the Concert of Europe, great powers fought each other from the Hundred Days War to World War II. However, during the same period, there were as many small and/or proxy wars as great power wars. After World War II, the dynamic shifted further as “the resultant Cold War was an approximately 40 year-long political, military and economic confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies… [that] never escalated into direct military confrontation between the superpowers, but involved an unprecedented arms race with both nuclear and conventional weapons as well as plethora of proxy conflicts”(UCDP 2023). The Korean, Vietnam, and Russian-Afghanistan wars were the closest great powers came to direct conflict, but they remained proxy wars. What can we attribute to this nearly 80-year lack of Great Power Conflict?

(Not) Going Nuclear

In the pre-WW II examples, Great Powers could gain from conflict. Zero-sum outcomes incentivized the use of force and created conditions for increasingly lethal battlefield capabilities. Increased capability extended the scale of vertical escalation possible. This trend continued until the Cold War. The parallel expansion of nuclear arsenals created a new dynamic. As Bull (1996, 48) points out, “it is only in the context of nuclear weapons and other recent military technology that it becomes pertinent to ask whether war could not now be both ‘absolute in the results’ and take the form of a ‘single instantaneous blow’ in Clausewitz’s understanding of those terms.” In other words, nuclear weapons “capped” the escalation race, especially once stockpiles ensured Mutually Assured Destruction. At that point, winner-takes-all possibilities shifted to a likely lose-lose situation.

If vertical escalation is capped, what are other choices? Investments in hypersonics, long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, space, and cyber capabilities extend geographic range, supporting horizontal escalation options. Alternatively, great powers could avoid military confrontation with each other, instead choosing to escalate both vertically and horizontally in the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. In the Cold War, that led to the exclusive use of proxies. Today, adversaries take advantage of complex interdependence to employ “hostile acts outside the realm of armed conflict to weaken a rival country, entity, or alliance” known as gray-zone aggression (Braw 2022). This leads to a sort of “diagonal escalation.”

There will not be (and probably never have been) purely conventional or unconventional wars – only hybrid ones. Hybrid wars are fought at varying intensities and scales, depending on the “means” available, the creativity of “ways” imagined, and the “ends” desired by the adversary. As the resources required to employ, and the destruction of lethal means increases, the more likely conflict will press “ways” horizontally into multiple domains and dimensions. While conflict in multiple domains is likely, large-scale multi-domain operations remain less likely between two great powers due to the conventional material costs and the slippery slope toward nuclear weapon use. If LSCO does occur, the likelihood of fighting through a CBRN environment is high.

Panic at the LSCO

Yet in the Army today, what is old is new again. LSCO harkens back to the Army’s historical victories and provides a clearer purpose than “small wars” or counterinsurgency, making it particularly palatable to Army culture. However, the Army’s operational concept is Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), not LSCO. While MDO acknowledges the very real possibility of LSCO, it does not forecast LSCO’s inevitability over other forms of conflict, competition, or even cooperation. So, while all LSCO is likely a Multi-Domain Operation, not all MDO is LSCO. Assuming that great powers will only fight great wars can lead to death by a thousand cuts while holding a tourniquet. Instead, our approach to the future must include the full spectrum of operations.

Figure 1 – A Google Trends Analysis was conducted by the author between the terms Large-Scale Combat Operations, Multi-Domain Battle, and Multi-Domain Operations on July 31, 2022. As MDB transitioned to MDO, Large-Scale Combat Operations became an increasingly prevalent topic (Google, 2022).

Ramifications for the Future

To be clear, I am not saying that developing LSCO capabilities is wrong. But like Kagan (2020), I am saying we must ensure that our refocus precludes an overcorrection. For example, the current Russo-Ukraine War is cited as a case for the return of LSCO. Yet from a Great Power perspective, it is a proxy war. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and is now a target by a state that is bound by treaty to guarantee its security. Operationally, we may learn LSCO lessons from this war, but strategically the lessons are different.

The Army of the future must be able to generate deterrence by denial and by punishment in both LSCO and Non-LSCO conditions, across multiple domains, and diverse geography. Deterrence by denial requires both capability and will that make it infeasible for an adversary to succeed, while punishment requires severe penalties (Mazarr 2018). If the Army attempts to leave unconventional war behind, non-denied space is created which adversaries could exploit, likely through proxies. Conventional responses are often unsuitable to such threats, providing adversaries with an asymmetric advantage resistant to deterrence by conventional punishment. To mitigate outcomes such as these, tailored forces are required in the unconventional space (Crombe, Ferenzi, and Jones 2021). Ensuring balance across domains and DIME is foundational to integrated deterrence (McInnis 2022).

Avoiding historical biases toward conventional capability and not relying on Cold War definitions of deterrence requires vigilance. As designers of the future endure the machinations of modernization, they should employ tools to maintain balance. For example, the matrix in Table 1 (below) looks at geographic threats, compared to both LSCO and non-LSCO conflict types. Experimentation, wargaming, operations research, historical review, or other methods help determine the form of capabilities required by the framework. In turn, force designs can be tailored and judged appropriately across all three components. Tools like these should be employed in the developmental processes.

Table 1 – By comparing threats against possible conflict types, general requirements for future forces become clearer and comparable. This is just a small example of the many thought experiments that can be used to ensure capabilities are fit-for-purpose.

Conclusion

The Army may learn incorrect historical lessons if we assume great powers will fight great wars. While many great powers fought each other directly, they also fought small adversaries and used proxies. Russia is learning today the costs of modern conventional war are so high it is difficult to justify its use. Since World War II, no two nuclear-armed countries directly went to war with each other. A focus on the “most dangerous” form of war (LSCO) is appropriate to create a credible deterrent, but cannot wholly replace other capabilities required for MDO. Strategically, without credible non-LSCO capabilities, deterrence by denial is not truly possible.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens by Dr. Jacob Barton

Great Power Conflict: 2040

Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts and associated podcast, with Brent L. Sterling

Then and Now: Using the Past to Secure the Future and associated podcast, with Warrant Officer Class 2 Paul Barnes, British Army,

Four Models of the Post-COVID World

The Future Operational Environment: The Four Worlds of 2035-2050

The Army’s Next Failed War: Large Scale Combat Operations, by MAJ Anthony Joyce

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. David Kilcullen

Non-Kinetic War, by COL Steve Banach (USA-Ret.)

Alternate Futures 2050: A Collection of Fictional Wartime Vignettes, by LTC Steve Speece

The Battle of Rioni River Valley: A Story of Future Warfare in 2030, by MAJ James P. Micciche

The Outsized Fear of Small Nuclear Threats, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano and Bob Williams

About the Author: Nathan Colvin is a U.S. Army Strategist recently selected for Colonel and the U.S. Army War College Fellowship in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary. He holds a Graduate Certificate in Modeling and Simulations from Old Dominion University, where he is also completing his last semester of coursework toward a Ph.D. in International Studies as an I/ITSEC Leonard P. Gollobin Scholar. He earned master’s degrees in Aeronautics and Space Studies (Embry-Riddle University), Administration (Central Michigan University), and Military Theater Operations (School of Advanced Military Studies). He has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Latvia as an aviator, operational planner, and strategist. He is currently participating in the HillVets LEAD program where he will chair a panel on US-Ukrainian Veteran cooperation in employment and entrepreneurship.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

12. What Xi did and didn’t say to Zelensky

Excerpts:

A report on Chinese government television CGTN said Beijing would send a fact-finding commission to Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, while Zelensky announced he would dispatch an ambassador to Beijing.

Whether negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will follow is unclear. If so, they would require the closure of major, so far insurmountable gaps in their positions.

One key difference: Zelensky has insisted that Russian troops must withdraw without preconditions before talks can take place. Putin says Russia is willing to agree to a ceasefire, but not pull its forces from Ukrainian territory.

How Chinese mediation could resolve this fundamental difference is altogether unclear.

What Xi did and didn’t say to Zelensky

Chinese leader had incentive to walk back undiplomatic comments on Baltic state independence but his peace talk is still a non-starter

asiatimes.com · by More by Daniel Williams · April 27, 2023

China’s President Xi Jinping spoke by phone with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky as Beijing tries to set up peace talks with Russia and escape a sense among Western Europeans that it is fully engaged in trying to help Moscow crush Ukraine’s independence.

The hour-long phone call was the first communication between the two leaders since before the war began 14 months ago and China announced its “no limits” partnership with Russia.

China came under intense European criticism after one of its top diplomats, ambassador to France Lu Shaye, suggested that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—all former Soviet republics – are not sovereign states at all.

“These countries of the former Soviet Union do not have the effective status in international law, since there is no international agreement that would solidify their status as sovereign countries,” Lu said in a television interview in Paris.

That is the same reasoning used by Russian President Vladimir Putin when he invaded Ukraine, which is an ex-Soviet republic that also wants to join NATO and the EU, like the three Baltic countries did in 2004.

Lu’s comment on the Baltic Sea states also appeared to supplement Beijing’s unwillingness to criticize Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, which is partly based on the same logic. Russia first objected to Baltic state independence in the 1990s.

Ambassador Lu Shaye’s comments on the Baltic independence caused an uproar in Europe. Image: Chinese Embassy in Paris

Xi may have been spooked by a ferocious European response to Lu’s remarks and saw it fit to backtrack. On Monday, Beijing issued an awkward statement denying that the three Baltic countries are in any way illegitimate.

“Each member republic of the Soviet Union has the status of a sovereign state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,” declared Mao Ning, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson.

Lu’s own embassy said his statement was a personal opinion, not policy. In Beijing, officials said Europe was making “some small things into a big deal,” according to the Chinese state mouthpiece newspaper Global Times.

The uproar threatened China’s long-term goal of putting distance between the US and its European allies.

“Xi’s strategy is to weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance. It was really important for Xi to fix it and fix it fast,” surmised Theresa Fallon, director of the Centre for Russia Europe Asia Studies, based in Brussels.

European reaction – in particular among the Baltic states – reflected its alarm over increasingly bellicose Chinese policy statements. China’s so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy” is usually unleashed to broadcast positions against the United States.

US President Joe Biden’s administration got a taste of “wolf warrior” diplomatic style early in its term in office. In 2021, Yang Liechi, a top Chinese foreign policy official, met with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and accused the US of trying to “strangle China.”

”We believe that it is important for the United States to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world,” Yang said.

Last February, China’s then-foreign minister, Wang Yi, answered American complaints about the flight of a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon over US territory by warning, “If the US side continues to fuss over, dramatize and escalate the unintended and isolated incident, it should not expect the Chinese side to flinch.”

The Baltic affair also undercut French President Emmanuel Macron’s effort to wean Europe from generally following Washington’s foreign policy, including its punitive position toward China.

Macron promoted the idea of European foreign decoupling from the US during a visit to Beijing earlier this month. China unsurprisingly favors Macron’s Europe-first proclivities.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) and French President Emmanuel Macron (R) visit the garden of the residence of the Governor of Guangdong, on April 7, 2023, where Chinese President XI Jinping’s father, XI Zhongxun lived. Photo: Pool / Twitter Screengrab

But the Baltic dustup seemed to have hardened official Europe’s attitude toward China’s wartime political and economic support for Russia.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Ukraine crisis is currently a key factor in determining the future of EU-China relations. The union’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said China’s support for Russia’s Ukraine policy “will determine the quality” of its relations with the EU.

As for the phone call itself, Zelensky described it as “meaningful” while China emphasized the conversation’s “core position” of promoting “peace and talks.”

Xi reiterated his unwillingness to effusively support Russia’s invasion and declared that “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity” is the “political basis of China-Ukrainian relations.”

Xi also repeated China’s opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has brandished the nuclear threat against both Ukraine and its European allies.

The further evolution of China’s Ukraine war policy will require some diplomatic acrobatics. China has taken Russia’s side on several issues, not least echoing Moscow’s line by never referring to the invasion as “war.” Instead, Beijing employs Moscow’s official euphemism “special military operation.”

Nor has Beijing described Russia’s attack on Ukraine as an invasion. Rather, China blames the United States and its allies for “stoking” the fire of warfare by supplying arms to Ukrainian defenders.

China believes the West is largely responsible for the Ukraine war’s carnage. Photo: US Department of Defense

A report on Chinese government television CGTN said Beijing would send a fact-finding commission to Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, while Zelensky announced he would dispatch an ambassador to Beijing.

Whether negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will follow is unclear. If so, they would require the closure of major, so far insurmountable gaps in their positions.

One key difference: Zelensky has insisted that Russian troops must withdraw without preconditions before talks can take place. Putin says Russia is willing to agree to a ceasefire, but not pull its forces from Ukrainian territory.

How Chinese mediation could resolve this fundamental difference is altogether unclear.

asiatimes.com · by More by Daniel Williams · April 27, 2023

13. Occam’s razor relevant to Taiwan

Excerpts:

Ideologically, it appears that Russia’s communist government is bankrupt. It can only revert to a totalitarian regime such as that fostered by former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Unfortunately, Stalin’s collateral damage constantly lurks in the background, especially in Ukraine.

The same can be said for the PRC in answer to why and how the goals of Marxism died in the testing fire of reality. Regions in China such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia look for answers. Even Hong Kong, which had originally been promised democracy from 2017 until 2047 has seen that dream go up in smoke.

This is what a democratic Taiwan must examine as candidates begin to present their platforms for the presidential election.

Taiwan’s democracy is not perfect; no democracy is, but it offers its citizens the freedom and control that its totalitarian neighbors want to take away. Will the next president defend that?

Wed, Apr 26, 2023 page8

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/04/26/2003798616

Occam’s razor relevant to Taiwan

By Jerome Keating
Looking to the future and next year’s presidential election, it is a good time for Taiwanese to take stock of their democracy.
In this, Russia, with its war in Ukraine and its recent visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) provides interesting insights.
Russia has always had an indirect historic relationship with Taiwan through its Marxist/Leninist principles and ideology. When Russia’s 1917 revolution was still being fought, the Bolsheviks took the communist name in 1918, and then founded the Communist International, or Comintern, on March 2, 1919, with the aim of establishing communist governments around the world.
By June 1920 Russian representatives had gone to China and by July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been formed. Although Taiwan was a Japanese colony at the time, these events would set in motion the inevitable collision between Taiwan and China.
Fast forward to when that same CCP won the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was driven into exile on Taiwan and Taiwanese had to win their democracy after the imposition of martial law and the KMT’s White Terror era. This illustrates the many challenges that Taiwan’s democracy overcame and currently faces.
However, what is more important is that Taiwanese can see how Russia and China lost whatever ideological goals they might have had and became hegemonic, totalitarian states.
Neither Russia nor China has been able to pass the purifying fire set forth by British author George Orwell in his satire Animal Farm. Instead, although Orwell did not live to see his prediction fulfilled, Russia and China well illustrated his summary prediction on how one of the pigs’ Seven Commandments, “All animals are equal,” would mysteriously change to “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”
For Russia, the year 1991 best illustrates that as glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) took their toll. The USSR, which had been formed in 1922, dissolved in 1991; similarly the Warsaw Pact, formed in 1955, broke apart in 1991.
Russia is the world’s largest country; it borders 14 other countries and stretches from Europe to the Pacific Ocean. Its access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans might not the be the best, but given its position, this would not be an economic trade barrier to any strong, peace-loving country.
Russia does not need more territory. Why then should the world’s largest nation be so hegemonic? Why should the focus of that hegemony be directed toward Ukraine, from which any passage to the Mediterranean still needs to maneuver the narrow Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.
Pundits would readily provide a vast variety of historic and ethnic reasons to justify Russian President Vladimir Putin in his endeavors, but for Taiwan’s consumption, a deeper but simpler answer is found by applying Occam’s razor and asking simple, direct questions.
Has communism ever had a viable ideology that went beyond its hypothetical stage?
Why have Russia and China lost their ideological goals and reverted to becoming empires in which Russia replaced a tsar with Putin and China replaced an emperor with Xi?
For Russia, why did so many Warsaw Pact members vote with their feet and leave? What benefits was the Warsaw Pact not providing that made such member states decide to leave? Similarly, why did so many member nations of the USSR abandon it?
For Putin, an even deeper message is revealed. Why have formerly long-term neutral nations such as Finland and Sweden now decided to join NATO? What did Russia’s actions in Ukraine betray that prompted this action?
Ideologically, it appears that Russia’s communist government is bankrupt. It can only revert to a totalitarian regime such as that fostered by former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Unfortunately, Stalin’s collateral damage constantly lurks in the background, especially in Ukraine.
The same can be said for the PRC in answer to why and how the goals of Marxism died in the testing fire of reality. Regions in China such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia look for answers. Even Hong Kong, which had originally been promised democracy from 2017 until 2047 has seen that dream go up in smoke.
This is what a democratic Taiwan must examine as candidates begin to present their platforms for the presidential election.
Taiwan’s democracy is not perfect; no democracy is, but it offers its citizens the freedom and control that its totalitarian neighbors want to take away. Will the next president defend that?
Jerome Keating is a writer based in Taipei.

14. Yuan overtakes dollar to become most-used currency in China's cross-border transactions

Yuan overtakes dollar to become most-used currency in China's cross-border transactions

finance.yahoo.com · by Reuters April 26, 2023 at 4:13 AM·1 min read

SHANGHAI (Reuters) - The yuan became the most widely-used currency for cross-border transactions in China in March, overtaking the dollar for the first time, official data showed, reflecting efforts by Beijing to internationalise use of the yuan.

Cross-border payments and receipts in yuan rose to a record $549.9 billion in March from $434.5 billion a month earlier, according to Reuters calculation based on data from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

The yuan was used in 48.4% of all cross-border transactions, Reuters calculated, while the dollar's share declined to 46.7% from 48.6% a month earlier.

The volume of cross-border transactions covers both the current and capital accounts.

China has long been promoting the use of yuan to settle cross-border trades as part of an efforts to internationalise the use of its currency.

The yuan's use in global trade finance remains low, though it has shown steady increases.

Data from SWIFT showed that the yuan's share of global currency transactions for trade finance rose to 4.5% in March, while the dollar accounted for 83.71%.

(Reporting by Jindong Zhang, Winni Zhou and Tom Westbrook)

finance.yahoo.com · by Reuters April 26, 2023 at 4:13 AM·1 min read

15. Buildup resumed at suspected Chinese military site in UAE, leak says

Excerpts:

But two senior officials said they doubted the UAE would go too far in jeopardizing its security relationship with the United States, even if it prefers China’s agnostic stance on human rights and democracy.

Still, the UAE’s ties to China have strained plans to move forward on a planned $23 billion sale of American F-35 fighter jets, Reaper drones and other U.S. weapons while prompting conjecture within the Biden administration over whether to prioritize preserving its legacy partnerships in the Middle East or countering the rise of China.

“There are people that believe that this is a very harrowing time in the Middle East, and the most important element of our diplomacy, right now has to be a degree of patience,” a senior U.S. official said. “But there are debates, absolutely.”

Buildup resumed at suspected Chinese military site in UAE, leak says

THE DISCORD LEAKS | The activity has disturbed some U.S. officials, who worry a longstanding U.S. ally is growing too close to Beijing

By John Hudson, Ellen Nakashima and Liz Sly

April 26, 2023 at 8:44 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · April 27, 2023

American spy services detected construction at a suspected Chinese military facility in the United Arab Emirates in December — one year after Washington’s oil-rich ally announced it was halting the project because of U.S. concerns, according to top-secret intelligence documents obtained by The Washington Post.

Activities at a port near Abu Dhabi are among several developments in the UAE involving the Chinese military that U.S. intelligence is monitoring out of concern that the Emiratis — a longtime U.S. security partner — are developing closer security ties to China at the expense of U.S. interests, according to the documents and related interviews with senior Biden administration officials. Sightings of Chinese military personnel around other sensitive construction sites have also disturbed U.S. officials.

Beijing’s efforts in the UAE are part of an ambitious campaign by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to build a global military network that includes at least five overseas bases and 10 logistical support sites by 2030, says one of the documents, which features a map of other planned facilities in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and throughout Africa.

Chinese military officials call the initiative “Project 141,” the leaked materials say.

The Post obtained the classified documents, which have not been previously reported, from a trove of intelligence material leaked onto the Discord messaging platform. The disclosures, including details about Beijing’s aerial surveillance program and plans to develop supersonic drones, come at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China as both countries vie for global influence and resources.

The Discord Leaks

1/5

End of carousel

Concern about China’s actions in the UAE vary among U.S. officials, with some viewing the development as manageable and others seeing a significant threat that warrants more forceful pressure from the United States. There is also a lack of consensus about whether the UAE has made a strategic decision to deeply align with China or maintain a balancing act that includes the United States, its longtime protector.

“There are some people in the administration who think the UAE has fundamentally decided to work with us. I do not believe that,” said a senior administration official, who like others interviewed for this report spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive security matter.

The UAE’s leaders “think that China is hugely important right now and rising in the Middle East,” this person said.

The revelations coincide with China’s quest to expand its role as a global player — mediating a rapprochement between arch-nemeses Saudi Arabia and Iran last month and putting forward a 12-point peace plan in February to resolve the war in Ukraine. The Middle East has become a particular focal point of U.S.-China competition as Beijing strikes trade deals and forges closer political ties in a region previously dominated by the United States.

A UAE representative, alluding to the FBI’s arrest of a suspect in the leak case, declined to answer questions about the intelligence documents, saying “our policy is not to comment on out-of-context material purported to have been criminally obtained.”

A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Liu Pengyu, said U.S. concerns about China’s military facilities abroad are misplaced.

“As a principle, China conducts normal law enforcement and security cooperation with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit,” Liu said.

“The U.S. runs more than 800 overseas military bases, which has caused concern by many countries around the world. It is in no position to criticize other countries,” he added.

U.S. officials insist they will not allow a Chinese base to become operational in the UAE, saying that such a facility would jeopardize sensitive U.S. military activities in the Middle East.

“UAE is a close partner, and we are regularly engaged with its senior leadership on a number of regional and global matters,” a second senior administration official said. This person said there were “no current indications” a Chinese base would be completed without a significant uptick in activity that would be noticeable.

U.S. officials are particularly focused on the Khalifa Port, about 50 miles north of the capital, where a Chinese shipping conglomerate operates. In December 2021, the UAE announced that it halted Chinese construction at that facility after U.S. officials argued that Beijing intended to use it for military purposes.

“We stopped the work on the facilities,” Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the UAE’s leadership, said at a Washington think tank event as the country faced public pressure to address a Wall Street Journal article detailing China’s activities.

But a year later, the PLA facility “likely was connected to municipal power and water” and “a walled perimeter was completed for a PLA logistics storage site,” one of the leaked U.S. intelligence documents says. A second document warns that “the PLA facility” is “a major part” of Beijing’s plan to establish a military base in the UAE.

The newly detected activity there has convinced some U.S. officials that the UAE is not playing it “straight” with Washington.

“I don’t think that they’ve gone to the Chinese and said, ‘It’s over, we’re not going to do this,’ ” the first administration official said.

The Biden administration also is concerned that PLA personnel have been observed at two UAE military bases in the country’s interior, where the Arab ally operates drones and ballistic missile defense systems, said officials familiar with the matter.

In addition, U.S. officials believe the PLA has been involved in the construction and expansion of an airstrip down the coast from Abu Dhabi, though some in the administration contend the existence of PLA personnel at Chinese construction sites is not alarming in and of itself, noting their presence at Chinese construction sites in other countries that do not have a military outpost.

China’s expanding foothold in the world’s ports facilitates its intelligence gathering on U.S. military movements and activities in those areas, said Camille Lons of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Under a Chinese law passed in 2017, even commercial Chinese companies are obliged to share information with the military if called upon to do so. “It’s difficult to know if that happens, but it’s a matter of concern,” she said.

Like other experts interviewed for this story, Lons was speaking generally and had not seen the leaked documents.

Jacqueline Deal, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said China’s establishment of a base and associated facilities in the UAE would complicate the United States’ ability to operate. One of the biggest U.S. bases in the Middle East, Al Dhafra Air Base, lies about 50 miles from the Khalifa port.

“If we have forces in the region and we’re trying to move them or use them, they will have a base from which to observe and possibly interfere,” she said. “And they’ll have more influence with the local government.”

The terminal at Khalifa port is part of a network of more than 100 strategically located commercial ports and terminals that China has invested in around the world. Beyond the UAE, U.S. officials have identified Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Tanzania and Angola as among the locations where Chinese ports may serve a dual use, potentially enabling Beijing to “both interfere with U.S. military operations and support offensive operations against the United States,” according to a 2020 Pentagon report to Congress.

In some parts of the world, such as Europe, it is unlikely port facilities would ever be turned to military use because the host countries would never agree. But China’s Maritime Silk Road, as Beijing calls the network, offers other advantages.

Chinese stakes in at least a dozen European ports give Beijing a level of control over supply routes that would make it difficult for Europe to impose serious sanctions on China should they become necessary and could enable Beijing to disrupt or divert Western supply routes in the event of a confrontation, said Francesca Ghiretti of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a German think tank.

U.S. officials believe China’s expanding economic ties have given it an opportunity to establish a military foothold in new regions — though they acknowledge that Washington’s network of global bases is far more extensive and powerful.

Currently, Djibouti is the only overseas location where China has an acknowledged base, officially opened in 2017 by the PLA Navy. There, according to the document, the PLA in February “almost certainly was nearing completion of an antenna operations building at Doraleh” for satellite spying over Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

Last June, The Post reported that China was moving ahead with secret plans to build a facility for exclusive PLA use at a naval base in Cambodia on the Gulf of Thailand. Both countries denied that was the case, with Cambodian officials saying that China was merely financing the base upgrade and helping train Cambodians in ship repair. But a Chinese official in Beijing confirmed to The Post that “a portion of the base” will be used by “the Chinese military.” One of the classified documents reinforces that, saying a portion of the facility would be designated a “division-grade” military base.

Elsewhere in the world, a Chinese working group had plans to visit both Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in February to assist with preparations to build a joint training center and to train Equatorial Guinean personnel on communications equipment, according to the leak documents.

But most of those projects have not carried the same alarm in Washington as China’s activities in the UAE because those host countries are not nearly as close to the United States. Since 2012, the UAE has been the third-biggest purchaser of U.S. weapons in the world. Its armed forces have fought alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The country also hosts 5,000 U.S. military personnel at al-Dhafra and U.S. warships at the Jebel Ali deep-water port.

The United Arab Emirates is beginning to look ahead to a time when China may rival and even eclipse the United States as a military power, said Riad Kahwaji, who heads the Dubai-based Inegma security consultancy. “The Chinese have managed to replace you in every other thing so why not security?” he said.

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, an Emirati political analyst, said the UAE began exploring other security partners after what they saw as America’s slow response to missile attacks against Abu Dhabi by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. The UAE was part of the Saudi-backed coalition that waged a fierce air campaign against Houthi militants for years.

But two senior officials said they doubted the UAE would go too far in jeopardizing its security relationship with the United States, even if it prefers China’s agnostic stance on human rights and democracy.

Still, the UAE’s ties to China have strained plans to move forward on a planned $23 billion sale of American F-35 fighter jets, Reaper drones and other U.S. weapons while prompting conjecture within the Biden administration over whether to prioritize preserving its legacy partnerships in the Middle East or countering the rise of China.

“There are people that believe that this is a very harrowing time in the Middle East, and the most important element of our diplomacy, right now has to be a degree of patience,” a senior U.S. official said. “But there are debates, absolutely.”

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · April 27, 2023

16. SOCOM's New Recon Aircraft to Pack Big Punch

SOCOM's New Recon Aircraft to Pack Big Punch

nationaldefensemagazine.org

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

4/27/2023

By Jan Tegler

Air Tractor photo

When Special Operations Command selected L3Harris Technologies and Air Tractor Inc.’s AT-802U Sky Warden for its Armed Overwatch program last August, the command didn’t have a formal designation for the rugged, versatile, single-engine airplane now known as the OA-1K.

But they did have a mission in mind.

They wanted one airplane that could “collapse the stack” of aircraft needed to perform irregular warfare missions in remote locales. Able to tackle the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions of the unarmed U-28A Draco and MC-12W Liberty aircraft it will replace, the OA-1K adds strike capability for close air support and precision strike missions with a gunship-like punch.

The contract award to L3Harris for as many as 75 of its modified turboprops could be worth up to $3 billion, according to the command. It’s the culmination of an effort to field light attack/reconnaissance aircraft by the Air Force and Special Operations Forces that dates back to 2009.

Transformed into the “Armed Overwatch” program in 2020, it became a competition between six companies in 2021, reduced to three by spring 2022 with the OA-1K chosen on August 1, 2022.

Low initial rate production is already underway at L3Harris’s Tulsa, Oklahoma, facility with three OA-1Ks being built, and a fourth aircraft — a modified version of the Air Tractor 802U the special ops airplane is based on — is in use for flight envelope expansion and handling qualities testing, according to the company.

Luke Savoie, L3Harris’s president of ISR, said the OA-1K is “all about giving special operators options and flexibility in a package with a small logistical footprint.” While it’s not clear yet exactly what sensor and weapon combinations Air Force Special Operations Command will load the OA-1K with for different missions, L3Harris considered and modeled options that OA-1K aircrews could employ far away from fixed bases, Savoie said.

“How do you start to bring gunship level effects into austere, very hard to reach areas or areas that are becoming harder to reach because of basing availability or where the enemy has shifted?” he said. “How do you bring the magazine and persistence you need?”

BAE Systems’ Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, or APKWS, is one way to do that, Savoie said. Sky Warden tested and demonstrated APKWS on the AT-802U prototype used during Armed Overwatch program evaluations. The OA-1K can gain outsize effects with such an option, he noted.

That’s because the APKWS kit that turns “easy-to-move” 2.75-inch rockets into precision-guided munitions can be assembled on-site and is common to other weapons like L3Harris’s Vampire counter-UAS system. Savoie, a former U-28/AC-130 pilot, said the kit is desirable because of its precise, low collateral damage capability against hard and soft targets and because it can achieve proximity fuse-like effects.

“When we look at what gunships like the AC-130 do with their 105 mm cannon with a proximity fuse providing area-effect type of things against soft targets, APKWS essentially brings that same capability,” he said. “It does that at a fraction of the cost of multiple shots or having to put guns on a platform to provide suppression or an area effect to break contact against soft targets.”

The aircraft can carry up to eight common launch tubes — nearly matching the 10 that the AC-130s feature — capable of launching AGM-176A Griffin laser/GPS-guided mini missiles, small glide munitions or air-launched effects, which gives the OA-1K a formidable magazine, Savoie added.

He compared it to AC-130 capability “where you’re providing the same level of these magazines, the same level of persistence — we’ve demonstrated now close to 11 hours — and we can also do it with the sensors.”

L3Harris designed OA-1K to use the company’s MX-15 and MX-20 electro-optical/infrared medium and high-altitude imaging systems for ISR and laser targeting.

“Our standard configuration is an MX-15 and an MX-20. We’ve demonstrated the ability to carry two MX-20s, the same sensors that are on the AC-130,” he said. “Now you’re starting to get to the level of effects of a gunship in areas that are much harder to reach.”

Many other types of precision-guided missiles and air launched effects were considered when designing OA-1K to give users like AFSOC and other potential customers a menu of munitions they can use and change over time, Savoie said. To further accommodate various weapons loadouts, L3Harris is performing external reinforcement of the AT-802U’s wing that will enable production OA-1Ks to carry up to 6,000 pounds of ordnance.

The company has spent the last year modeling how many Harpoons — AGM-84 variants — and JASSM-ERs, or Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range, could be carried on the aircraft. The assessments were done independently of Special Operations Command, he added.

L3Harris has done OA-1K captive-carry tests with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 Paveway laser-guided bombs, and he noted that GBU-12s could be swapped for GPS-guided GBU-39 small diameter bombs or GBU-53 StormBreaker laser/GPS/millimeter-wave-radar-guided bombs.

“We designed the Sky Warden to take advantage of its flexibility,” Savoie explained. “Some alternative platforms get very sensitive as to what you can hang out on the wings. The great thing about the 802U is that it has very little effect on the performance of the platform or maneuvering restrictions. The envelope does not shrink as you put stuff [on the wings].”

Minimizing the differences in the mission system and weapons OA-1K employs and those used by other special operations aircraft was also important. “We wanted mission system familiarity for aircrew,” Savoie stressed. “We want even the ground crews to have familiarity” without requiring any special weapons training.

Given the capabilities of the sensors and weapons OA-1K can utilize, L3Harris sought to diminish the workload for its two-man aircrew. Savoie said the airplane’s autopilot, fully integrated with its mission system, is the best example the company has ever designed.

“We have linkages into our mission system through it. So, I can be looking at something with the MX-20. The back-seater can hit a button on the window grip, or the pilot can hit it on the throttle or the stick and populate the system straight into the aircraft’s Garmin 3000 integrated flight deck system,” he said.

“The front-seater can hit a button and the autopilot will fly completely coupled orbits around a target, never having to shift over or do anything like that,” he added. “You can transition from orbit center to over-center, mode-to-mode-to-mode completely seamlessly.”

Savoie observed that when flying the U-28 or C-130, he was often the linkage between the planes’ mission systems and their flight management systems. That required him to manually type information into their autopilots to fly orbits around targets.

“Now our visual sensors are completely linked in,” he explained.

Wearing Thales’ Scorpion Helmet, the same headgear A-10 pilots use, an OA-1K pilot “can actually look outside, see something, hit a button, drop a [GPS] point there and couple the autopilot around that point. It is now very much machine to machine, with the front-seater being able to confirm things versus having to sit there and type in coordinates. It dramatically reduces workload,” he said.

The OA-1K was designed with the customer’s preference to accommodate two 20-inch-class sensors in mind. Mounted underneath the aircraft’s wings aft of its fixed main gear, the MX-15/MX-20 offer “unrestricted operations in the inside of orbits with no obstructions, blockages, etc. And both sensors can [laser] designate for a forward firing weapon or an orbit weapon,” he said.

The ability to connect OA-1K with other aircraft, operations centers or ground forces to deliver video or metadata via line of sight and beyond-line-of-sight links was also a major consideration in its design, he added.

“We asked how we can make people not aboard the platform as smart as possible,” Savoie said. “If a person in an operations center calls the airplane and says, ‘Hey, we see movement on building 12. Please confirm that no one’s armed.’ And the reply is, ‘Yep, no one’s armed.’ That’s one question and done because we’re off-boarding the video, etc.”

OA-1K’s ability to “remote” its wing-mounted sensors to forces on the ground or in the air multiplies its utility. For example, when flying with three sensors, L3Harris recognized that one could be “latched to an ATAK user,” he said. ATAK is an Android smartphone mapping, navigation and situational awareness app used by special operators.

“That sensor would follow that user everywhere they went,” Savoie said. “So, if you were doing convoy escort, one of the sensors was always on the convoy. If you’re part of that convoy and you want one of the sensors, you can control it, put it down on your map and move it around anywhere you want.”

Information shared via OA-1K’s digital backbone isn’t limited to its own sensors. Link 16 connectivity allows the special operations airplane to ingest tracks from other aircraft or share its tracks with F-16s, for example.

F-16 pilots “can sit there with their Sniper pod and slew it to where the OA-1K’s MX-20 is going and see what one of our pilots is looking at,” Savoie noted.

Though it lacks ejection seats, OA-1K should protect its crew well in combat or from most impacts with the ground, Savoie said. The airplane’s rugged armored construction is complimented by an integrated steel roll cage “stronger than what a NASCAR race car has” encasing its front/rear cockpits.

“This airplane is designed to be very survivable,” he continued. “The original 802 is intended to operate at 20 feet off the ground predominantly. We’re operating at much more hospitable and safe flight regimes with OA-1K.”

Savoie summed up OA-1K as a platform designed with the potential to perform tasks most irregular warfare mission users might need. Intriguingly, he said L3Harris thought outside the box with OA-1K, mindful of the Agile Combat Employment concept that the Air Force is turning to for distributed operations from the Indo-Pacific to the Arctic.

Though some might consider it unsuitable for operations against a peer foe like China, in contested airspace the OA-1K can operate at “altitudes and speeds where it becomes survivable again,” Savoie said.

A command spokesperson said airframe tests will continue this year with verification of integrated mission systems functionality prior to operational testing in 2024. A formal training unit will stand up in the third quarter of fiscal year 2024, with the first operational OA-1K squadron forming in 2026 at a location yet to be determined. Full operational capability is expected in 2029, the spokesperson said.

Topics: Special Operations, Air Power

nationaldefensemagazine.org

17. Facts Are Stubborn Things: The Dangers of Protracted War with China

Excerpts:

The United States is at one of its most vulnerable positions in history. Americans seem confident their military capacity and their economic, technological, and social advantages will endure. As is too often a harsh and painful lesson in U.S. history, a pattern of ignoring growing peril again threatens our republic.

The United States is responding far too slowly to change or avoid this predicament. There is merit in pursuing an alternative approach to current foreign policy and a narrative that pushes America towards conflict. A key element of President Joseph Biden’s policy toward China that is increasing tension is the notion that “we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So, we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.” This approach has arguably done more to provoke China than to advance cooperation. A more diplomatic economic approach that buys the United States time to onshore industrial capacity and to secure supply lines makes better sense than increasing risk of a conflict whose potential scope and impact are difficult to predict. History shows Americans can be reluctant to act until war forces them to. With respect to China’s threat, that may then be too late to protect the U.S. Homeland or the Western liberal international order. These stubborn facts are indicators that Americans may just have to acclimate themselves to citizenship within a fading power, which many now characterize the United States to be.

Facts Are Stubborn Things: The Dangers of Protracted War with China

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by John Mauk · April 27, 2023

Wargames are useful to assess possible outcomes and develop strategies, but this particular outcome is optimistic at best and is underpinned by flawed assumptions.

Uncomfortable facts often get in the way of what we want to be true. Such is the case of the United States’ capacity to defeat China in a prolonged conflict. Recent wargame findings assert that the United States could fight an invasion of Taiwan to a stalemate. Wargames are useful to assess possible outcomes and develop strategies, but this particular outcome is optimistic at best and is underpinned by flawed assumptions. In reality, any conflict over Taiwan will almost certainly be a prolonged war that favors China.

As the United States and the West push back against Chinese violations of international law and its economic coercion, U.S.-China trade conflict has grown exponentially with both the U.S. and Chinese governments becoming increasingly confrontational. U.S. actions to deny China access to sophisticated microchip technology amplify Chinese claims over Taiwan, the world’s biggest microchip manufacturer. China’s declared intent to reunify with Taiwan by force if necessary fuels further confrontation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only added more incentive for the United States and Taiwan to bolster the latter’s self-defense capacity. Predictably, this evokes Chinese anger and increases the prospect that China might attack Taiwan. The most likely scenarios indicate China’s doing so would very likely precipitate a world war that would not end quickly.

Both the United States and China have compelling reasons to avoid open conflict. Economically, the United States, as is true for most Western nations, depends on Chinese manufacturing and goods. The Chinese economy depends on its manufacturing and global trade. A world war would severely damage the world’s two biggest economies, not to mention all others. Politically, a Chinese Communist Party focused on retaining its power domestically as well as on ascending to great power status may rationalize it must act forcefully to achieve its goals. Any resulting high intensity war of attrition over Taiwan, short of a nuclear exchange, will undoubtedly favor China. Why? The U.S. military strategy to combat China cannot be sustained. Wargames indicate the United States will lose significant combat power quickly. U.S. military forces are too small, their supply lines are too vulnerable, and America’s defense industrial capacity is far too eroded to keep up with the materiel demands of a high-intensity conflict. Another critical factor undermining U.S. capacity to sustain a war is that Americans lack the resilience to fight a sustained, brutal conflict. A war with China would require far greater numbers of Americans to serve in the military or to support it directly in some manner — something they are increasingly unwilling to do. Current recruiting challenges emphasize this growing national security problem.

Scholars and pundits alike have been quick to characterize Sino-American geopolitical and economic confrontation as a new cold war. This evokes comparisons to the West’s confrontation with the Soviet Union, but these situations have very little in common. The West was able to isolate the Soviet Union economically and technically, successfully blunting its strategic aspirations. This is not possible with China.

China is now what the United States used to be, in terms of economic power and industrial capacity. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States and most Western nations are economically reliant on China. China has built a capacity to sustain a protracted war of any type. More directly, China is well-postured to sustain a protracted high intensity war of attrition. The United States is not currently capable of doing so.

While the United States still lacked a peer competitor, it focused far too long on counterterrorism and allowed its defense industrial capacityand military end-strength to erode to a dangerous state. As a result, the United States increasingly underpins its security with technological superiority and a coalition of partners and allies. This is a deeply flawed approach to conflict, given the narrow technological advantages the United States might expect to retain against China, considering America’s deep dependence on Chinese manufacturing.

The reality is that China has now developed a “full-spectrum peer” capability to rival the United States with China’s industrial and manufacturing capacity, as well as with its rapid technological advancement. This was achieved through a combination of intense domestic research and development, and the outright theft of Western technology and intellectual property. In a relatively short time, the Chinese successfully mobilized a nation, transformed its industrial base, and built the military capabilities to compete directly with the United States.

These strengths, coupled with the sheer size of China’s military, are compelling enough, but China also possesses other key advantages. For example, Chinese research and development has rapidly become the best in the world. In fact, Chinese research is now of higher quality and more often cited than U.S. research is. Key U.S. technological advantages are narrowing quickly and the United States may soon fall behind China in advanced computing and other key, emerging technologies.

Meanwhile, U.S. security posture remains largely underpinned by an outdated notion that its defense industrial base and manufacturing capacity could be ramped up sufficiently to meet national needs during a war. The challenges the United States has experienced in providing weapons and ammunition to Ukraine provide insight into a current lack of such capacity. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has treated conflict like a “pick-up” game, for which it ramps up defense manufacturing as required. This will no longer work. Since the opening of China in the early 1970s, U.S. capacity to ‘play’ has shrunk in proportion to China’s growth.

The current political divide in the U.S. also impedes addressing the most basic of national security issues.

In fact, the United States lacks the capacity to support the replacement demands of any military force capable of defeating China, in the compressed timeframe it should expect to have to do so. For example, the United States used to be the world’s export leader in steel production. Today, it is the largest steel importer in the world, dependent on others for one of the fundamental building blocks of military hardware. Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturing is now nearly double that of U.S. production. China has also sought to control much of the rare earths minerals market that is vitally important to the U.S. ability to build and sustain military systems, information technology, and all manner of other essential products.

The current political divide in the U.S. also impedes addressing the most basic of national security issues. Despite the promises of the recent American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, an earnest attempt to reverse and restore American industrial and manufacturing capacity is likely a decades-long proposition.

There is a strategic intent to China’s actions, and the United States should expect China to attempt to deny and disrupt U.S. access to critical materials vital to the manufacture of critical defense technologies. America should assume China understands its history and the implications of allowing the United States the space and time to react. A thinking and resolute China almost certainly will focus on preventing it from doing so.

Technology and manufacturing are not America’s only compelling challenges. Americans in general are unprepared for, unwilling, or incapable to perform military service. Short of reinstituting a draft, U.S. military services cannot attract or retain enough manpower quickly enough to sustain a fight with China. Alarmingly, Department of Defense (DOD) statistical analyses indicate that less than 2% of Americans now serve in the armed forces, and that 71% of Americans between 17 and 24 are ineligible for military service. Worse yet, a recent DOD poll indicates that the propensity of young Americans to serve in the miliary has fallen steadily over the past 40 years from about 25% in 1984 to about 9% in 2021. The reasons for this eroded willingness to serve are varied but surveys reveal disturbing realities about U.S. nationalism and views on national service. Young Americans increasingly view other countries as better than the United States and in fact are accepting of, or ambiguous about, the idea that other countries might become more powerful than the United States militarily. Such naive notions are particularly dangerous when an authoritarian Chinese state with hegemonic aspirations is working diligently to do just that.

We can debate the underlying reasons an increasingly unfit and nationally ambivalent generation of Americans does not worry about the threat of war; however, it is evident that many Americans take their security for granted and do not likely consider that the horrors of war could be visited upon them directly. The facts are young Americans are not serving in the military, a majority do not want to serve, and most are not capable.

The United States is at one of its most vulnerable positions in history. Americans seem confident their military capacity and their economic, technological, and social advantages will endure. As is too often a harsh and painful lesson in U.S. history, a pattern of ignoring growing peril again threatens our republic.

The United States is responding far too slowly to change or avoid this predicament. There is merit in pursuing an alternative approach to current foreign policy and a narrative that pushes America towards conflict. A key element of President Joseph Biden’s policy toward China that is increasing tension is the notion that “we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So, we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.” This approach has arguably done more to provoke China than to advance cooperation. A more diplomatic economic approach that buys the United States time to onshore industrial capacity and to secure supply lines makes better sense than increasing risk of a conflict whose potential scope and impact are difficult to predict. History shows Americans can be reluctant to act until war forces them to. With respect to China’s threat, that may then be too late to protect the U.S. Homeland or the Western liberal international order. These stubborn facts are indicators that Americans may just have to acclimate themselves to citizenship within a fading power, which many now characterize the United States to be.

Dr. John Mauk is a retired Army Colonel and former faculty at the U.S. Army War College whose research is focused on US national security issues with focus on National Security policy decision-making.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Cpl. Xing Wang leaves camp to go hunting during the survival phase of Exercise Kowari, being held in the Daly River region of the Northern Territory, on 5 September 2016. Kowari is an Australian army-hosted survival skills exercise designed to increase defense cooperation between forces from the U.S., Australia and China.

Photo Credit: Australian Defence Force photo by Cpl. Jake Sims

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by John Mauk · April 27, 2023

18. Taiwan readying a reciprocal show of force at China

Excerpts:

At the same time, Taiwan may be taking a less-than-optimal approach to its defensive strategy and military modernization. Asia Times pointed out in May 2022 that Taiwan’s “porcupine” and “Fortress Taiwan” strategies will not be enough if blockaded, starved, and pressed to surrender via attrition warfare.

Asia Times noted in December 2022 that Taiwan’s preoccupation with acquiring high-end prestige assets such as frigates and fighter planes, with a view to challenge and fight China’s military head-on, is an unrealistic and escalatory approach.

Nevertheless, Taiwan may move to a “pit viper strategy,” which would entail limited retaliatory missile strikes at major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai in the event of a conflict.

Taiwan readying a reciprocal show of force at China

Taiwan’s Han Kuang 2023 exercises will simulate defeating a Chinese blockade as well as repel an amphibious invasion

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 27, 2023

Taiwan is preparing for its annual Han Kuang military exercises, a defiant show of force as fears mount of an impending conflict with China.

South China Morning Post (SCMP) has reported that Taiwan is readying for its Han Kuang 2023 military exercise, which is scheduled to be held from July 24-28.

Significantly, this year’s iteration includes simulations of breaking a Chinese blockade, adding to scenarios rehearsed in previous exercises that emphasized defeating a Chinese amphibious invasion.

A US-built system will perform round-the-clock computer simulations of joint, combined and coalition operations as part of the upcoming drills.

Live fire exercises, meanwhile, will emphasize combat force preservation, maritime interception, protection of major facilities such as sea and airports, civil defense mobilization, air defense, and counter-amphibious invasion, according to the SCMP report.

Last year’s Han Kuang exercise focused on different scenarios. In an August 2022 article for Global Taiwan Institute, John Dotson noted that Han Kuang 2022 emphasized dispersal and civil defense drills, naval and air maneuvers, counter-amphibious invasion exercises and a simulated airport seizure.

Dotson mentions that while many of the scenarios featured in Han Kuang 2022 can be realistically expected as part of a Chinese invasion, the heavily scripted nature of the exercise gives it limited value in preparing Taiwan’s military for a real shooting war.

Han Kuang 2021 was broadly similar to 2022’s iteration. In an October 2021 article for the Global Taiwan Institute, Dotson notes that Han Kuang 2021 featured dispersal, biological warfare counter-amphibious invasion, air defense and emergency takeoff and landing drills.

Moreover, he mentioned that Han Kuang 2021 showed Taiwan’s capability to use major highways as improvised runways and the coastal deployment of road-mobile HF-2 and HF-3 anti-ship missiles.

A Hsiung Feng-3 anti-ship missile is fired from the Tuo Jiang stealth corvette in a file photo. Photo: Handout

However, Dotson points out that the exercise’s limited scope and timeframe and scripted and piecemeal nature makes it inadequate in preparing Taiwan’s military for an actual Chinese invasion, noting in particular the small number of fighter jets involved in emergency takeoff and landing drills and limited civil defense scenarios.

Han Kuang 2020 was a prelude to the scenarios in 2021 and 2022, but it was notable for introducing several new firsts.

For example, Lienhai Sung notes in a June 2020 article for the Global Taiwan Institute that Han Kuang 2020 included the first-ever deployment of a newly formed Combined Arms Battalion, joint anti-decapitation law enforcement special forces units, joint operations between regular and reservist artillery units and a live-fire torpedo exercise.

Sung mentions that Han Kuang 2020 showed Taiwan’s progress in developing asymmetric warfare capabilities and reservist forces to counter China’s increasingly powerful conventional and paramilitary forces.

But he also cautions that Han Kuang is meant as a capability demonstration, not a field training exercise. Accordingly, Sung says that Han Kuang should measure Taiwan’s progress in developing desired capabilities and not serve merely as a broad check of Taiwan’s overall military modernization.

Despite Taiwan’s determined efforts to shape perceptions of credible defenses through the Han Kuang exercises, it has larger systematic limitations.

Wu Shang-Su notes in a 2015 commentary in the peer-reviewed Journal of Defense Management those include internal issues such as conscription, the high likelihood of Chinese penetration into Taiwan, questionable popular resolve to defend the island against invading forces and the overall slow modernization of Taiwan’s military.

Dotson notes in a February article for the Global Taiwan Institute that conscription is hugely unpopular in Taiwan. The current four-month service contract is too short for meaningful training, with five to seven days of refresher training on alternate years also being inadequate.

Although he mentions that Taiwan plans to revamp its conscription model in 2024 by extending the contract of service to one year, increasing pay for conscripts and laying out a broad framework for how conscripts would be used as “garrison troops” for territorial defense as opposed to all-volunteer main battle troops who will bear the brunt of frontline fighting.

It is an open secret that Chinese spies have extensively penetrated Taiwan’s military, with severe implications for the island’s defense. A Reuters December 2021 special report covers China’s extensive espionage within Taiwan’s military, with top-ranking officers bribed to leak classified information to Chinese spies.

The Reuters report notes that leaked intelligence can be helpful for invasion preparations, while disloyal officers can refuse to fight, misdirect their troops or even defect to China. It also states that Chinese agents can spearhead decapitation operations against Taiwan’s command and control, political and military leaderships.

Taiwanese soldiers in a row. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Although the Taiwanese public has overwhelmingly negative views of China, they harbor significant doubts about the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense.

A March 2020 survey by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council shows that 90% of respondents oppose China’s “one country, two systems” model, with 90.5% against China’s military intimidation and 91.5% disagreeing with China’s diplomatic suppression of Taiwan.

However, an April 2022 survey by Inkstick shows 53.8% of Taiwanese aged 20 and above believe the US will not intervene on behalf of Taiwan, while only 36.3% say they do.

At the same time, Taiwan may be taking a less-than-optimal approach to its defensive strategy and military modernization. Asia Times pointed out in May 2022 that Taiwan’s “porcupine” and “Fortress Taiwan” strategies will not be enough if blockaded, starved, and pressed to surrender via attrition warfare.

Asia Times noted in December 2022 that Taiwan’s preoccupation with acquiring high-end prestige assets such as frigates and fighter planes, with a view to challenge and fight China’s military head-on, is an unrealistic and escalatory approach.

Nevertheless, Taiwan may move to a “pit viper strategy,” which would entail limited retaliatory missile strikes at major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai in the event of a conflict.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 27, 2023

19. Bring Back Branch Magazines

Is Special Warfare magazine dead? The last issue is from March 2022 here: https://www.swcs.mil/Resources/Special-Warfare/

As an aside I had a subscription to Armed Forces Journal my entire Army career.

Excerpt:

Deceased military journals litter history. The Military Service Institution of the United States sponsored a journal with support from the Army chiefs between 1879 and World War I. Armed Forces Journal ran from 1863 until 2014. While this article focused on the Army, all services should take a hard look at their professional publications. Building a military community invested in furthering the profession is tough. But reviving branch magazines will build a cohort of writers and thinkers that the Army will need to guide it through the next war.

Bring Back Branch Magazines - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Zachary Griffiths · April 27, 2023

I don’t fully know why Special Warfare seems to have died. Published out of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Warfare has been the branch magazine of the United States Army’s Special Forces—a formerly thriving place for discourse, disagreement, and discussion of the issues on the minds of the Army’s special operations professionals. The fact that it is no longer such a place is a loss for both Army special operations forces and the entire special operations community.

However, just as Special Warfare seemed to be nearing its end, the Irregular Warfare Initiative launched, bringing together practitioners and academics to discuss irregular warfare. The overlap between these audiences is not a perfect circle, but it is close. How could Special Warfare die and the Irregular Warfare Initiative thrive? Special Warfare benefitted from institutional support, a professional editing team, and a print shop. But Special Warfare’s most recent publication was a 7,168-word issue in March 2022. Three military officers found free time during their graduate studies to build the Irregular Warfare Initiative into an outlet that published 21,775 words last month alone. Dispassionate analysis would have favored Special Warfare, but the dedication of those professionals built the Irregular Warfare Initiative into a modern, multiplatform outlet.

The tale of these two outlets is reflected across the Army’s professional publishing landscape today. Like Special Warfare, other branch magazines are in decline, publishing fewer pages, less often, and to smaller audiences. But it doesn’t have to be this way. By either reforming the Army’s professional journals into modern multiplatform outlets powered by constantly renewing volunteers, or merging with an existing modern platform, branch magazines can again engage their specialist audiences, drive debate about emerging concepts and doctrine, and ready the Army for the next war.

Decline in Branch Magazines

If the Army is a learning organization, the Army’s branch magazines should create space for professional discourse. As Samuel Huntington described, military knowledge is “capable of preservation in writing . . . [and] essential to professional competence.” Effective branch magazines support a military culture that both learns and furthers the profession through writing and organic professional development. They share lessons, welcome innovative ideas, and foster communities of interest.

These magazines have existed alongside non-branch-specific publications in a robust ecosystem emblematic of a military that is not just an armed force, but a profession. For example, the Army’s strategy-focused journal is Parameters, the journal of the Army War College, while Military Review, the journal of the Army’s Command and General Staff College and a publication of the Army University Press “provides an established and well-regarded Army forum to stimulate original thought and debate on topics related to the art and science of land warfare.” Both of these have taken steps to modernize and reach their audiences on a publishing landscape vastly different, and much more digital, than when they began publishing—although more could be done. The Army War College augments Parameters with a robust podcast production, but the journal itself still publishes complete issues and individual articles only as PDF files, which are not mobile friendly. Military Review has better optimized its content for mobile, desktop, and printed forms, though the podcasts that complement it are limited.

Still, even with these and other publications adapted to modern publishing, there is a need for discussion spaces that are specific to particular functional areas and forums for explaining, digesting, or debating Army doctrine, policy, or other definitive information. This is where branch magazines, or some cases, professional bulletins, published by branch centers of excellence enter the picture. Branch magazines serve a crucial role in promoting lateral communication and sharing lessons across different units, but unfortunately, these are the publications that have modernized the least and have effectively lost their way.

This becomes clear by looking at Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery (published before 2020 as Fires), and Engineer—four magazines with strong relationships to core functions of the Army. From 1982 to 2020, these four branch magazines published fewer issues and fewer pages, more erratically, each year. Over the last four decades, the average number of issues dropped from 5.25 per branch per year to 3.5. The decline is also associated with the number of pages published, down from 1,114 pages in 1982 (278.5 per branch) to just 442 pages in 2020 (110.5 per branch).

The irregular publication schedule is also a concern. Although these magazines appear to aim for quarterly publication, their schedules vary. Armor published four issues in 2020, three in 2019, and three in 2018. Infantry published four in 2020, two in 2019, and four in 2018. Field Artillery published four, six, and seven, and although it seems to have had the goal of publishing four issues per year since it was rebranded from Fires in 2020, it fell short in 2022. Erratic publication schedules may make it more difficult for authors to commit to an outlet when other outlets promise timely publication.

Even for branch magazines with semiregular publication schedules, the decline in readership and engagement with audiences should concern Army leaders. Most Army branch magazines appear to have transitioned to the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) but without successfully engaging their community. Infantry transitioned to online-only in 2022. Engineer is online-only, now publishing only one issue a year.

While the precise meaning of the “hits” and “download” metrics displayed by DVIDS for each publication are unclear, these three magazines appear to have weak engagement. Infantry averaged 720 hits over six issues in 2022 and 2023. Engineer averaged 2,260 hits over two total issues in 2022 and 2023. Both averaged single-digit downloads for each issue. Similarly, no issue of Field Artillery published since 2020 has been downloaded more than six times. The remarkably low numbers of downloads of entire magazines suggest extremely small readership—especially because one of the downloads for each issue came when I coded the data. For purposes of comparison, an article I coauthored for the Modern War Institute garnered 38,627 pageviews on just the first day that it was published.

Social media is another aspect of professional engagement with these outlets worth considering. Modern and online-first military and defense outlets have significant followings. The Modern War Institute counts over sixty-eight thousand Twitter followers, while the Army University Press has just over seven thousand, and the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, which publishes Parameters, has a little over five thousand. None of the four branch magazines under consideration have social media presences, and accounts associated with the branches do not widely promote magazine content. For example, the Twitter account for Fort Benning, the home of Army infantry, has over sixty-one thousand followers—an impressive reach that could drive attention to professional discussions relevant to the infantry. But I could only find five references to Infantry magazine among Fort Benning’s tweets, and three of those tweets described a poem published by the magazine—in 1956. Given the importance of social media in modern media consumption, the low follower counts for Army professional outlets suggest concerningly weak engagement.

Outdated and Ignored

The decline of military branch magazines can be attributed to two main reasons. First, their formats have not changed with the times. They continue to be published as entire issues, with long spaces of time between them, and entirely in PDF format. Meanwhile, new outlets like the Modern War Institute and War on the Rocks have proliferated. They feature modern, mobile-first formats and publish constantly, engaging with their readers on a daily basis. They also offer military writers fast publication and access to large audiences. Still, they cannot fully replace branch-specific professional publications. Because of their larger readership, they necessarily seek to publish on topics of interest to wide, diverse audiences, and are less likely to focus on the arcane topics that are of interest to military branch specialists.

Second, branch magazines lack a strong connection with the force. This is perhaps even true of Army journals like Parameters and Military Review. Since hiring the first civilian in about 1955, the portion of military personnel on the staff of Military Review, for example, has fluctuated from a low point of 23 percent in 1985 to a high point of 60 percent in 1990, but is now at 33 percent. Over the same period, the mean grade of Military Review staff has steadily increased from a junior major to a mid-grade lieutenant colonel. This shift in staffing has reduced connections with the operational and tactical levels of the force. It is reasonable to expect that similar patterns at the branch magazines—the staffs of which are composed of civilian editors—would also create a certain detachment from the force. This is not to denigrate the work of these editors, of course, but rather to suggest that adopting a model that also incorporated uniformed personnel would create a more organic connection between the publications and the communities of professional interest they serve.

What to Do

This article assesses that the Army’s branch magazines are sick—producing less content for a smaller audience and disconnected from their readers. To improve, they must modernize into multiplatform outlets, built around a core of contributing officers, that further professional debate. This begins with engaged editorial staffs and may require a shift in “ownership” of the publications back onto the professionals they serve.

Below, I present two options to address these problems. First, centers of excellence could share editorial control with select student editors as they come through schools and then as volunteer editors in the force as the Irregular Warfare Initiative does. Second, branch magazines could merge with another outlet, like the Modern War Institute, to publish their articles on dedicated channels on an existing platform. Of course, there is a third option—the Army could also do nothing—but this would effectively let these outlets continue to wither.

Sharing editorial control of a modernized, multiplatform magazine with a volunteer board of students in professional military education could take a form similar to the way law schools structure their legal journals. Law review editorial teams are typically structured across multiple years, with newer members starting by assisting and gradually taking on more responsibilities. The Army could do something similar, training military students as junior editors and then encouraging them to continue as volunteer editors when they return to the force. All outlets should establish editorial boards to remain synchronized with command priorities. Beyond the board, civilian public affairs professionals should continue to lay out articles, provide high-quality graphics, and provide other professional support. In any situation, some military and civilian staff will be crucial continuity that balances against the effects of cycling through new volunteer editors.

For branch magazines, the best place to pilot this style of editorial team is at the branch centers of excellence. Students in captains career courses who test well either in the writing portion of the GRE, the graduate school entrance exam that all students in these courses take, or during the courses’ writing modules could move into a writing elective or volunteer program that equips them to edit articles for their branch magazines. The overlap of many captains career courses would allow for a continually renewing cohort of officers to make connections, share in the experience of editing, and remain connected to the community after returning to the force as volunteer editors. Lieutenants should also be familiarized with their branch magazines, meet with student and professional editors, and be encouraged to submit articles.

Student participation is the strength of this option, building a core of stakeholders in the branch magazines’ success, increasing career-long engagement, and building officers’ communication skills, while ensuring content remains relevant to the active force. This option’s weakest point is in the required leadership engagement. Reviving branch magazines will require both attention and financial resources to modernize, select and train volunteers, and direct them to ensure it becomes a productive forum.

As a second option, branches could partner with an outlet like West Point’s Modern War Institute, as the Irregular Warfare Initiative did when it launched. Reduced costs and a wider audience are the strengths of this option. With the editorial and hosting burdens managed by an outside entity, branches would have the discretion to determine whether to invest in it as a platform. Potential investments might include essay competitions, conferences, or fellowships. As these investments would reach beyond a purely parochial audience, they could magnify impact and breadth of discussion.

Unfortunately, though, merging would decrease each command’s ability to message through a forum it controls to a specialist audience. For this reason, and because of the positive downstream effects of building a team that leverages military students as editors and encourages them to continue when they return to the operational force, I argue in favor of the first option. Still, both would improve the relevance and influence of branch magazines, making either of them better alternatives than the status quo.

One final element is worth noting: fixing article indexing. A key strength of professional journals is that their articles are preserved for future research. The institutional memory embodied by, for example, the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library and other online indices make professional journals an important historical record. Regardless of which approach the Army adopts for its branch magazines, and even if it does nothing else, the articles should also be indexed. Indexing and adding modern metadata tags compliant with research tools like Zotero will make sure students in professional military education, doctrine writers, and others have easy access to these articles.

Branch magazines are not doomed to decline. The Pineland Underground podcast launched by the Special Warfare Center and School in July 2022 demonstrates that interest persists within the command to engage professionally. Professional, branch-specific publications improve professional expertise, help the Army develop lateral connections, surface ideas, build communities around shared problems, and improve writing skills. Healing the Army’s branch magazines is a worthwhile goal that requires sustained engagement.

To galvanize change, the Army should take the following steps. First, the incoming chief of staff should add the Army’s publications to his list of transition team priorities, study the Army’s publication infrastructure, survey soldiers who write and those who do not, and decide whether it is fit for purpose. Second, the Army should convene a publication summit to develop best practices for branch magazines. Finally, it should consider revising Army Pamphlet 25-40 to facilitate the transition to more modern formats.

At the branch level, leaders should reorganize their magazines into multiplatform outlets with a volunteer editorial team. Establishing the external editorial board and recruiting and training volunteers would likely take six to nine months. The first step should be to build a planning team. Inaugural board meetings could determine the parameters for the volunteer team, before launching the recruiting effort. With the external board established and volunteers recruited, the volunteers must then be trained and articles solicited.

Once reestablished, turnover in volunteer editors should create a virtuous cycle. Volunteers will develop a stake in the outlet, recruit the next cohort, continue to support the magazine when they return to the field, and then recommend their talented junior officers to volunteer in the future. After training, the volunteers would solicit, select, edit, and publish articles with support from the branch’s public affairs professionals. Volunteers could also manage the outlet’s social media presence and ensure it continues to reach its intended audience.

Deceased military journals litter history. The Military Service Institution of the United States sponsored a journal with support from the Army chiefs between 1879 and World War I. Armed Forces Journal ran from 1863 until 2014. While this article focused on the Army, all services should take a hard look at their professional publications. Building a military community invested in furthering the profession is tough. But reviving branch magazines will build a cohort of writers and thinkers that the Army will need to guide it through the next war.

Zachary Griffiths is an Army officer who edits for the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He tweets at @z_e_griffiths and would love to help your branch magazine.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.usma.edu · by Zachary Griffiths · April 27, 2023

20. China has widened its already sweeping counter-espionage law. Experts say foreign businesses should be worried

Be afraid. Be very afraid.

China has widened its already sweeping counter-espionage law. Experts say foreign businesses should be worried | CNN Business

CNN · by Simone McCarthy,Nectar Gan · April 27, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

China has broadened the scope of its already sweeping counter-espionage law in a move that analysts warn could create further legal risks or uncertainty for foreign companies, journalists and academics.

The changes expand the definition of espionage from covering state secrets and intelligence to any “documents, data, materials or items related to national security and interests,” without specifying specific parameters for how these terms are defined.

Cyber attacks targeting China’s key information infrastructure in connection with spy agencies are also categorized as espionage under the new version of the law, which goes into effect on July 1.

The amendment, approved by China’s top legislative body Wednesday, comes amid an increasing emphasis on national security under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the country’s most assertive leader in a generation.

Xi has overseen a raft of new measures to crack down on perceived threats within and outside China and sought to control the flow of information outside the country during his 10 years in power.

The original version of the law, passed in 2014, was already “very ambiguous and very powerful,” said Yasuhiro Matsuda, an international relations professor at the University of Tokyo. “But China thinks it’s not enough,” he said.

The broadened counter-espionage law comes just months after China lifted its pandemic-era border restrictions following three years of self-imposed Covid isolation – measures which had kept most foreign businesspeople and researchers away.

“China is opening up, and that makes it much more vulnerable” in the eyes of Chinese leaders, Matsuda said.

The revision is likely to heighten concerns of foreign individuals, such as academic researchers or journalists, and businesses about visiting or operating in China.

The new language in the amendment suggests “any organization and anyone can be suspect … and anything can be counted as a threat to national security” in the arbitrary application of the law, Matsuda said. “This will definitely cause a chilling effect,” he said.

Heightened risks

The lack of clarity around what kind of documents, data or materials could be considered relevant to national security will pose major legal risks to academics and businesses trying to gain a better understanding of China.

According to analysts, topics such as the origin of Covid, China’s real pandemic death toll, and authentic data on the Chinese economy could all fall within the crosshairs of the law.

“Before (some activities) used to be normal engagement, but now they could be espionage,” said Alfred Wu, an associate professor in Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore.

“Something like a local government budget you could broadly define as relating to national security, or even food security,” he said. “Researchers definitely need to be careful.”

China says its laws related to national security and espionage are meant to safeguard the country.

Concerns about application of the law have been compounded by a series of arrests of foreign nationals on espionage charges in recent years.

Foreign governments have described the cases as being politically motivated and accused Beijing of violating due process, such as denying access to counsel and holding close-door trials.

In one high-profile example, two Canadians – former diplomat Michael Kovrig and businessman Michael Spavor – were detained by China for nearly three years.

Their arrest on espionage charges in late 2018 came shortly after Canada arrested Chinese businesswoman and Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a US warrant related to the company’s business dealings in Iran.

Beijing repeatedly denied that their cases were a political retaliation, but the two men were released on the same day Meng was allowed by Canada to return to China.

Businesses on edge

In recent weeks, Japan has called for the release of one of its nationals employed by Astellas Pharma, who was detained in China last month on espionage charges.

At least 17 Japanese nationals have been detained in China on suspicion of spying and other activities since 2015, according to Japanese state broadcaster NHK.

These circumstances have already had an impact on personnel traveling to China from Japan, according to Kawashima Shin, a professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo.

“It is so difficult – so many Japanese scholars have already decided not to go China,” said Kawashima.

From Bei Ling/Twitter

China detains Taiwan-based man who published books critical of Communist Party

Japanese companies also note the definition of espionage under the law is “vague,” so they also “hesitate to send businesspeople” to China, he said. “It’s a big problem.”

One issue is that in past detentions details of the court cases have not been open, so it becomes difficult for companies or individuals to make risk assessments and judge at what point an activity may be crossing a legal line, Kawashima said.

“Even with this amendment we still don’t understand what kind of document constitutes a national security issue,” he added. “China can decide case by case.”

Western businesses are also on edge.

Last month, Chinese authorities closed the Beijing office of Mintz Group, an American corporate due diligence firm, and detained five local staff. And on Thursday, US consultancy Bain & Company said Chinese police have questioned staff at its Shanghai office.

Chinese authorities did not offer details about both cases, including the reason for the crackdown, but analysts say the move is likely to further spook foreign businesses operating in China.

“The Chinese government has continuously said it welcomes foreign investment. However, a flurry of recent actions taken against US enterprises in China has sent the opposite message,” said Michael Hart, President of AmCham China.

“Our business community is spooked, and our members are asking, ‘Who’s next?.’ Irrespective of the government’s intention, that’s the message being received.”

CNN’s Michelle Toh contributed reporting.

CNN · by Simone McCarthy,Nectar Gan · April 27, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 26, 2023

Tags

US confident in Ukraine offensive despite Russian military’s formidable power, EUCOM commander says

Russia can fund war in Ukraine for another year despite sanctions, leaked document says

Opinion Biden is quietly encouraging Assad’s rehabilitation. He should reverse course.

By

April 26, 2023 at 6:15 a.m. EDT

Xi holds first talks with Zelenskiy since Russian invasion of Ukraine

NO PEACE TALKS IN SIGHT

How Russia has fortified swathes of Ukraine

Digging in

The trenches

Obstacles and traps

Danger and messaging

Breaking through

The next move

The Afghan Withdrawal Coverup

The State Department won’t release crucial documents on the fiasco.

Stalemate on the ground

Support for Ukraine remains strong

Ukraine’s budget deficit has widened

Over one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced

Divergence among Group of 20 states

Zelensky is winning the digital battle

Opinion | What 6 data points tell us about the status of the war in Ukraine

Stalemate on the ground

Support for Ukraine remains strong

Ukraine’s budget deficit has widened

Over one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced

Divergence among Group of 20 states

Zelensky is winning the digital battle

U.S., Philippines Sink Warship With Aircraft After Missing With Himars in Drill

Major military exercises aimed at deterring China end with less-than-flawless finale

With Marcos watching, US Army HIMARS fires 6 times but misses target in South China Sea

442. What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

What Xi did and didn’t say to Zelensky

Occam’s razor relevant to Taiwan

Yuan overtakes dollar to become most-used currency in China's cross-border transactions

Buildup resumed at suspected Chinese military site in UAE, leak says

THE DISCORD LEAKS | The activity has disturbed some U.S. officials, who worry a longstanding U.S. ally is growing too close to Beijing

SOCOM's New Recon Aircraft to Pack Big Punch

Facts Are Stubborn Things: The Dangers of Protracted War with China

Taiwan readying a reciprocal show of force at China

Bring Back Branch Magazines - Modern War Institute

China has widened its already sweeping counter-espionage law. Experts say foreign businesses should be worried | CNN Business

Heightened risks

Businesses on edge