Quotes of the Day:
“I am by nature a dealer in words, and words are the most powerful drug known to humanity.”
– Rudyard Kipling
"If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known, that we are at all times ready for War."
– George Washington
"The moral reality of war is divided into two parts. War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.... The two sorts of judgment are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. But this independence, though our views of particular wars often conform to its terms, is nevertheless puzzling. It is a crime to commit aggression, but aggressive war is a rule-governed activity. It is right to resist aggression, but the resistance is subject to moral (and legal) restraint. [This] dualism ... is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war."
– Michael Walzer
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. The Ukraine War, Redefined
3. How deep does the rot in the Russian army go?
4. Tokyo needs to brace itself for return of a new cold war
5. Can Western Tanks, Artillery, and Missiles Save Ukraine? Don’t Count on It.
6. The Russia-Ukraine War: What Historical Analogies Make Sense?
7. What Have US Special Operators Learned In Ukraine?
8. Sweden, Finland Gave Up Neutrality a Long Time Ago
9. Iran’s attempts to kill Pompeo, current U.S. officials are real and ongoing, Blinken says
10. Russia Uses Cyberattacks in Ukraine to Support Military Strikes, Report Finds
11. White House preparing to ask Congress for massive Ukraine aid package
12. U.S. soldier says Russians using Twitter to learn his Ukrainian location
13. Hiring for the Foreign Service Is Getting an Overhaul
14. Taliban Faces Rising Armed Resistance From Former Government Factions
15. Russia doubles fossil fuel revenues since invasion of Ukraine began
16. Ukraine crisis: Why India is buying more Russian oil
17. US Army to choose whether it’ll pursue a hybrid Bradley vehicle in FY23
18. Russia unable to fight another war after catastrophic military losses
19. U.S. no longer in ‘full-blown’ pandemic phase, Fauci says
20. Japan edges from pacifism to more robust defense stance
21. U.S. has "credible" information Russian troops executed Ukrainians trying to surrender
22. A political reckoning in Sri Lanka as debt crisis grows
23. The Fight for Ukraine Is Forging a New World
24. How the Ukraine War Is Changing Japan
25. Start with the Political: Explaining Russia’s Bungled Invasion of Ukraine
26. Ukraine and the Words That Lead to Mass Murder
27. China delivered a masterstroke while the world watched Taiwan
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
April 27, 8pm ET
Russian forces made minor but steady advances both from Izyum and in continued assaults along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine on April 27. Russian forces took several small towns directly west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. While this line of advance takes Russian forces away from their main objective of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, they likely intend to outflank Ukrainian defensive positions on the highways to Barvinkove and Slovyansk. Russian forces made several small advances in eastern Ukraine; Russia’s increasing concentration of artillery assets is likely enabling these tactical advances. Russian forces are advancing methodically in several sectors but have achieved no notable breakthroughs. The capability of Russian forces to encircle large groups of Ukrainian forces remains in doubt.
The Kremlin continued to prepare for a likely false-flag missile attack against the Moldovan territory of Transnistria, which is illegally occupied by Russian forces. Russian proxies in Transnistria falsely claimed Ukrainian forces are preparing to attack Transnistria, and Ukrainian intelligence reported Russian forces are preparing to conduct a missile strike on Transnistria and blame Ukraine. Russian and Transnistrian forces also increased their readiness for possible operations in the last 24 hours. Russia may intend to involve Transnistria in the war in Ukraine to utilize Transnistria’s (limited) reserve forces or to launch attacks and shell Ukraine from Transnistrian territory. The Kremlin may alternatively seek to destabilize Moldova itself to raise tensions in Moldova and neighboring Romania and put additional pressure on NATO, possibly seeking to reduce Western military support to Ukraine either by diverting NATO forces to Romania or threatening a wider escalation.
Russian forces are stepping up “filtration measures” in occupied territories and abducting Ukrainian citizens, likely for use in future prisoner exchanges. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 27 that Russian forces are conducting large-scale “filtration measures” in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk Oblasts.[1] The “filtration” targets men of military age, former military and law enforcement personnel, and pro-Ukrainian activists for interrogation, torture, and possible execution. The GUR reported Russian forces are additionally shipping Ukrainian hostages to Crimea to “replenish the exchange fund,” seeking to exchange Ukrainian civilians for Russian military prisoners in future prisoner swaps. The GUR additionally speculated that Russian forces may be preparing to use Ukrainian civilians to portray Prisoners of War in May 9th Victory Day celebrations, noting that Russian forces conducted similar propaganda efforts in Donetsk in 2014.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted drone or possibly missile strikes on Russian logistics centers in Belgorod and Voronezh on April 27. Russian sources and social media reported multiple explosions early on April 27, which Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mikhail Podolyak later euphemistically confirmed were Ukrainian strikes, stating Russian cities cannot “sit out” the invasion of Ukraine and “the disarmament of the Belgorod-Voronezh warehouses is a natural process.”[2] Ukrainian forces will likely conduct further cross-border strikes to disrupt Russian logistics, which the Kremlin will likely falsely frame as an escalation or somehow a war crime.
Key Takeaways
- Concentrated artillery is likely enabling limited Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, though Russian forces continue to struggle to break through prepared Ukrainian defenses.
- Russian forces funneled additional reinforcements and tactical missile units into the Izyum front and made minor advances. Russian forces are likely attempting to bypass Ukrainian forces on the road to Barvinkove by advancing directly west before pivoting southwards in the coming days.
- Heavy Russian bombardment and continued assaults failed to make headway against Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal plant, even as Russian forces reportedly prepared to stage a press tour in the occupied areas of the city on April 28.
- Russian forces around Kherson are likely preparing for a renewed push to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days but Ukrainian counterattacks continue to disrupt Russian operations in the area.
- Russian occupation forces continued preparations to announce the creation of a Russian proxy “Kherson People’s Republic” (KNR) amid widespread Ukrainian resistance.
- The Kremlin may be preparing to either bring Transnistria into the war in Ukraine or destabilize Moldova itself to put additional pressure on NATO.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued ground and air assaults against Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant on April 27. The Ukrainian military reported Russian forces continued to conduct a high tempo of air strikes against Ukrainian defenders, including by Tu-22M3 strategic bombers.[3] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko and the commander of the Ukrainian 36th Marine Brigade separately reported that Russian forces continued ground assaults on the Azovstal facility and that Ukrainian forces are running low on food, water, and ammunition.[4]
Russian forces are also stepping up occupation and “filtration” measures in Mariupol to consolidate control of the city and turn it into a propaganda victory.[5] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin will hold a press tour in Mariupol on April 28 for Kremlin-loyal outlets – including foreign journalists – including faked witness testimonials about the course of the battle.[6] Andryushchenko separately reported that Russian occupation forces are increasingly restricting civilian movement in Mariupol and “resorting to physical coercion and blackmail” to force Ukrainian citizens to work for the occupation regime.[7]
Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces made marginal advances in frontal assaults around Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Popasna on April 27 and continued to shell the entire frontline.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Russian forces captured Novotoshkirske, a small town 25 km south of Severodonetsk, and attempted to advance further west.[9] Russian forces advancing south from the Svatove area (west of Rubizhne) additionally captured the town of Zarichne.[10] Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in Avdiika, near Donetsk city.[11] Russian forces are making slow progress on these multiple small axes of advance, likely due to their increasing use of concentrated artillery, but their ability to encircle Ukrainian forces and the extent to which they will be able to advance remain unclear.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)
Russian forces in Izyum continued attacks on three lines of advance – southeast towards Slovyansk, southwest towards Barvinkove, and directly west away from Donetsk Oblast – on April 27.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Nova Dmytrivka, towards Barvinkove, and repelled unspecified attacks towards Slovyansk.[13] The Ukrainian general Staff reported that elements of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 35th CAA, and 68th Army Corps are active on the Barvinkove front.[14] Two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) from the 76th Airborne Division – which was heavily damaged in fighting northwest of Kyiv – deployed from Belgorod, Russia, to the Izyum frontlines on April 27.[15] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense additionally reported that two Iskander-M ballistic missile batteries, likely in part from the 20th CAA’s 448th Missile Brigade, deployed to Belgorod Oblast from an unspecified location on April 27.[16]
Russian forces made territorial advances directly west of Izyum, capturing the town of Zavody and the outskirts of Velyka Komyshuvakha, 20km west of Izyum.[17] Russian forces west of Izyum most likely intended to pivot southwards and advance on Barvinvoke after completing the capture of Velyka Komyshuvakha, seeking to bypass Ukrainian defenses along the T2122 highway. These forces could alternatively attempt a deep encirclement of Ukrainian forces that is unlikely to succeed, as Russian forces pushing west of Izyum are moving away from the otherwise mutually-supporting Russian lines of advance roughly converging west of Severodonetsk.
Russian forces continued to partially encircle Kharkiv and shell civilian infrastructure across the oblast on April 27.[18]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to shell along the entire line of contact along the southern axis and reinforce forward positions in preparation for the likely resumption of offensive operations towards Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on April 27.[19] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk stated that elements of Russia’s 8thCAA, 49th CAA, 22nd Army Corps, coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet, and airborne troops are reinforcing their forward positions and replenishing ammunition for further operations.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are actively conducting aerial reconnaissance in likely preparation for offensive operations.[21] Local fighting continued in the Mykolayiv direction, with Russian forces conducting failed attacks towards Tavriyske and Nova Zorya and Ukrainian forces reportedly recapturing Shyroke, Novopetrivka, and Lyubino, 50 km north of Kherson.[22] Russian forces are likely attempting to recohere forces to launch larger-scale offensive operations in the coming days to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast, but successful Ukrainian counterattacks are likely delaying and disrupting Russian operations.
Russian occupation forces continued preparations to announce the creation of a “Kherson People’s Republic” (KNR) amid widespread Ukrainian resistance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 27 that Russian forces are printing ballots and conducting a census for a “referendum” and preventing civilians from leaving the occupied territories.[23] Multiple Ukrainian government sources reported that Russian forces are taking several steps to crack down on possible resistance, including reports by the Pivden Operational Command on April 26 that Russian forces are appointing collaborators to local government positions; reports Rosgvardia forces stepped up filtration measures in Kiselivka and Stanislav; and reports that Russian forces are attempting to identify the places of residence of Ukrainian security personnel.[24] Local social media users additionally shared footage of a large protest against the creation of the KNR in Kherson’s Freedom Square on April 27.[25] The Kremlin likely intends to create further proxy states modeled on the DNR and LNR in Kherson and elsewhere to consolidate its control over occupied Ukrainian territory – both by creating an occupation government and by falsely claiming in negotiations that the territory is occupied by “independent” states, not Russian military forces.
Russian forces also continued to prepare for a likely false-flag missile attack against the Moldovan territory of Transnistria, which is illegally occupied by Russian forces. The Kremlin mobilized Transnistrian proxy forces on April 27 as Russian state media began setting rhetorical conditions for the possible recognition of the self-styled Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in Transnistria. Russian media is increasingly reporting that Transnistria may need to “protect the interests of the republic” by declaring its independence, echoing language used by the Kremlin prior to its recognition of the DNR and LNR in mid-February.[26] Ukraine’s Pivden Operational Command directly claimed on April 27 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct false-flag missile strikes into Transnistria to accuse Ukraine of attacking the unrecognized republic.[27] Local Transnistrian officials and media reported unconfirmed gunshots and several claimed incidents of Ukrainian drones crossing into Transnistria; ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Transnistria announced a “red level” of threat, increased the readiness of its forces, and strengthened checkpoint security on April 27.[29]
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City will likely made steady but tactical gains against Ukrainian defenders.
- Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate but may conduct costly assaults on remaining Ukrainian defenders to claim a propaganda victory.
- Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
- Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or might move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally.
[20] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/27/na-kryvorizkomu-ta-mykolayivskomu-napryamkah-ochikuyetsya-aktyvizacziya-bojovyh-dij/.
2. The Ukraine War, Redefined
Excerpts:
The war has always involved the U.S. and Russia, but in a sense, it is now an open duel between them. The Russians must provide troops and equipment. The U.S. is providing equipment but not troops. The American bet is that Ukraine can field more and better-trained forces armed with advanced weapons, while Russia will have to struggle to replace its losses. It is far easier for the United States to produce and ship weapons than it is for the Russians to sustain losses.
This puts Russia in a difficult position. Given the weapons flows announced and the other weapons likely to be supplied, it must try to end the war in the next month or so, only against a much better-armed and motivated Ukrainian force. And having failed to break them so far, the direction of the war is going against the Russians.
The visit by two senior cabinet officials, and the very open listing of at least part of the arms shipments, is clearly intended to signal to Moscow that not only will it not defeat the Ukrainians but Ukraine might force Russia from the battlefield altogether. Obviously, a Russian preemptive attack is now a possibility, but an obvious strategy for Ukraine is to hold, retreat and rearm. Perhaps the Americans are also hoping that this will force the Russians to the negotiating table. That would be the lesser risk. Certainly, the Russians, whose intelligence likely knew this was coming, will have to recalibrate a war that was never really calibrated.
The Ukraine War, Redefined - Geopolitical Futures
The Ukraine War, Redefined
April 26, 2022
5218
The war in Ukraine began under a faulty assumption shared by many, including the United States, that if Russia invaded, it would defeat Ukraine, and it would do so quickly. The Russians deployed their forces carelessly, without much regard for the Ukrainians. When the Russians encountered resistance against their disorganized armored and infantry forces, operating pretty much without air support, they acknowledged problems but continued to assume that the problems they faced were simply the friction of the battlefield rather than something that risked the outcome they assumed was theirs.
The United States still tended to share that view but sent supplies to Ukraine via Poland, a move meant to show that Washington was committed more to the resistance than to a belief that Russia was at risk. Moscow continued to press on three fronts: from Belarus in the north, through the Donbas in the east, and from Crimea in the south. It was a chaotic advance thanks to a lack of coordination of the fronts and the inability to supply three separate fronts simultaneously. The Russian failure was symbolized by the 40-mile backup of tanks moving south from Belarus toward Kyiv.
The most startling thing, and one likely to be studied by military historians for years to come, is that the Ukrainian resistance did not break and in many instances intensified. This led to a reevaluation by both Americans and Russians that the Ukrainians might successfully resist for an extended period of time, embarrassing the Russians so much that it would cost them badly needed credibility with partners like China. From the American point of view, Ukraine shifted from being a lost cause, in which defeat had to come gracefully, to a strategic opportunity.
The shift was made possible by Russian failures. Washington had already made what it felt was the least dangerous strategic move in waging economic and financial warfare against Moscow, and in uniting NATO to support the mission. But that doesn’t explain Russian problems on the battlefield: logistics, the inability to mount mobile warfare because of logistics, and the shortage of trained infantry. It’s why, even as Russia abandoned its armored thrust toward Kyiv from Belarus, and as it adopted a much more cautious strategy of moving against Donbas, where it already had substantial influence, and a southerly attack toward Odesa, time wasn’t on Moscow’s side.
So Russia brought in a new commander who had operated in Syria using both conventional warfare and counter-population attacks. The same tactics applied to urban areas worked but more slowly and with greater casualties to infantry than Russia could readily sustain. At this point, it became clear that Ukrainian forces were highly motivated and reasonably well trained. They could take casualties, replace them and not have their force collapse. Not so with Russia. Ukraine could very possibly fight the Russians to a stalemate that the Russians couldn’t afford militarily or politically. Given the paucity of Russian reserves, it was possible that Ukraine might force the Russians to retreat or even withdraw.
At this point, U.S. strategy shifted. Over the weekend, the U.S. secretary of state and secretary of defense went openly to Kyiv, showing disregard for Russian interception, and offered the Ukrainians a massive infusion of weapons from unmanned aerial vehicles to artillery, radar and everything else needed to arm a modern army. The fact that the arrival of these weapons via Poland would take some time showed another degree of confidence, which was that the fighting would be going on in the weeks and months that delivery would take. When we look at the full array of weapons, we can glimpse that the U.S. is now arming a force capable of going on the offense.
The war has always involved the U.S. and Russia, but in a sense, it is now an open duel between them. The Russians must provide troops and equipment. The U.S. is providing equipment but not troops. The American bet is that Ukraine can field more and better-trained forces armed with advanced weapons, while Russia will have to struggle to replace its losses. It is far easier for the United States to produce and ship weapons than it is for the Russians to sustain losses.
This puts Russia in a difficult position. Given the weapons flows announced and the other weapons likely to be supplied, it must try to end the war in the next month or so, only against a much better-armed and motivated Ukrainian force. And having failed to break them so far, the direction of the war is going against the Russians.
The visit by two senior cabinet officials, and the very open listing of at least part of the arms shipments, is clearly intended to signal to Moscow that not only will it not defeat the Ukrainians but Ukraine might force Russia from the battlefield altogether. Obviously, a Russian preemptive attack is now a possibility, but an obvious strategy for Ukraine is to hold, retreat and rearm. Perhaps the Americans are also hoping that this will force the Russians to the negotiating table. That would be the lesser risk. Certainly, the Russians, whose intelligence likely knew this was coming, will have to recalibrate a war that was never really calibrated.
George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.
Dr. Friedman is also a New York Times bestselling author. His most recent book, THE STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, 2020 describes how “the United States periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war with itself, yet after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both faithful to its founding and radically different from what it had been.” The decade 2020-2030 is such a period which will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture.
His most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages.
Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.
3. How deep does the rot in the Russian army go?
Or per the subtitle: bothin some combination.
Excerpt:
Mr Kofman believes the question of “how much of this war is a bad army, which in important ways it clearly is, and how much is a truly terrible plan” has not yet been answered. And yet answering it is essential. In a seminal paper in 1995, James Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford University in California, argued that costly and destructive wars that rational governments would prefer to avert through negotiation can nonetheless still occur owing to miscalculations about the other side’s capabilities. In theory, a war-averting peace deal would reflect the relative power of the two potential belligerents. But the two sides can fail to reach such a bargain because that relative power is not always obvious.
How deep does the rot in the Russian army go?
The fiasco in Ukraine could be a reflection of a bad strategy or a poor fighting force
Apr 27th 2022
THE JOB of organising NATO’s biggest military exercise since the cold war kept Admiral James Foggo, then the commander of American naval forces in Europe and Africa, busy in the summer of 2018. Trident Juncture was to gather 50,000 personnel, 250 aircraft and 65 warships in the European Arctic in October. As logistically taxing as that sounds, it was small fry compared with what Russia was planning in Siberia in September. The Vostok exercises would be the biggest since the Soviet Union’s mammoth Zapad drills of 1981, boasted Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister: they would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships.
This was a huge feat. “It was a big lift for us to get 50,000 people in the field,” recalled Admiral Foggo recently. “How did they do that?” The answer, he eventually realised, was that they did not do it. A company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok was counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons. This chicanery might have been a warning sign that not everything was as it seemed in the Russian armed forces, even before they got bogged down in the suburbs of Kyiv.
“It’s not a professional army out there,” said Admiral Foggo. “It looks like a bunch of undisciplined rabble.” Since they invaded Ukraine on February 24th, Russian forces have succeeded in capturing just one big city, Kherson, along with the ruins of Mariupol and chunks of Donbas, the eastern industrial region that they partially occupied in 2014 and now hope to conquer in its entirety. That meagre haul has come at the cost of 15,000 dead Russian soldiers, according to a recent British estimate, exceeding in two months the Soviet losses in a decade of war in Afghanistan. The invasion has clearly been a fiasco, but how accurate a reflection of Russia’s military capabilities is it, astonished Western generals wonder?
On the eve of war, Russia’s invasion force was considered formidable. American intelligence agencies reckoned that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. No one thought that the city would be welcoming such dignitaries as Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, America’s secretaries of state and defence respectively, two months after the fighting started. The belief was that Russia would do to Ukraine what America had done to Iraq in 1991: shock and awe it into submission in a swift, decisive campaign.
This belief was based on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that America underwent in the 18-year period between its defeat in Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf war. In 2008 a war with Georgia, a country of fewer than 4m people, though successful in the end, had exposed the Russian army’s shortcomings. Russia fielded obsolete equipment, struggled to find Georgian artillery and botched its command and control. At one stage, Russia’s general staff allegedly could not reach the defence minister for ten hours. “It is impossible to not notice a certain gap between theory and practice,” acknowledged Russia’s army chief at the time. To close that gap, the armed forces were slashed in size and spruced up.
Ambition in spades
Russian military expenditure, when measured properly—that is, in exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power—almost doubled between 2008 and 2021, rising to over $250bn, around triple the level of Britain or France. Around 600 new planes, 840 helicopters and 2,300 drones were added to the arsenal between 2010 and 2020. New tanks and missiles were flaunted at parades in Moscow. Russia tested new tactics and equipment in Donbas, after its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and in its campaign to prop up Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s dictator, the following year.
A retired European general says that watching this new model army fail reminds him of visiting East Germany and Poland after the end of the cold war, and seeing the enemy up close. “We realised how shite the 3rd Shock Army was,” he says, referring to a much-vaunted Soviet formation based in Magdeburg. “We’ve again allowed ourselves to be taken in by some of the propaganda that they put our way.” Russia’s army was known to have problems, says Petr Pavel, a retired Czech general who chaired NATO’s military committee in 2015-18, “but the scope of these came as a surprise to many, including myself—I believed that the Russians had learnt their lessons.”
The charitable interpretation is that the Russian army has been hobbled in Ukraine less by its own deficiencies than by Mr Putin’s delusions. His insistence on plotting the war in secrecy complicated military planning. The FSB, a successor to the KGB, told him that Ukraine was riddled with Russian agents and would quickly fold. That probably spurred the foolish decision to start the war by sending lightly armed paratroopers to seize an airport on the outskirts of Kyiv and lone columns of armour to advance into the city of Kharkiv, causing heavy casualties to elite units.
Yet, this coup de main having fizzled, the army then chose to plough into the second largest country in Europe from several directions, splitting 120 or so battalion tactical groups (BTGs) into lots of ineffective and isolated forces. Bad tactics then compounded bad strategy: armour, infantry and artillery fought their own disconnected campaigns. Tanks that should have been protected by infantry on foot instead roamed alone, only to be picked off in Ukrainian ambushes. Artillery, the mainstay of the Russian army since Tsarist times, though directed with ferocity at cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol, could not break through Ukrainian lines around Kyiv.
Problems in profusion
In recent weeks officials and experts have debated the causes of Russian failure. Some have drawn comparisons to the collapse of the French army in 1940. But the analogy is not apt, says Christopher Dougherty, a former planner for the Pentagon. “France failed because it followed bad doctrine,” he says. “Russia’s failing in part because it’s not following its doctrine, or basic principles of war.”
Inexperience is part of the problem. As the historian Michael Howard once noted, the expertise a military officer hones “is almost unique in that he may only have to exercise it once in a lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to practise throughout his life on dummies for one real operation.” America has been wielding the scalpel nearly continuously since the end of the cold war, in Iraq, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and so on. Russia has not fought a war of this magnitude against an organised army since seizing Manchuria from Japan in 1945.
Things it could do in smaller wars, in Donbas and Syria—such as using electronic sensors on drones to feed back targets for artillery—have proved harder on a larger scale. And things that appeared easy in America’s wars, such as wiping out an enemy’s air defences, are actually quite hard. Russia’s air force is flying several hundred sorties a day, but it is still struggling to track and hit moving targets, and remains heavily reliant on unguided or “dumb” bombs that can be dropped accurately only at low altitudes, exposing its planes to anti-aircraft fire.
All armies make mistakes. Some make more than others. The distinguishing feature of good armies is that they learn from their mistakes rapidly. In abandoning Kyiv, focusing on Donbas and putting a single general, Alexander Dvornikov, in charge of a cacophonous campaign, Russia is belatedly showing signs of adaptation. In early April a Western official, when asked whether Russia was improving tactically, observed that armoured columns were still being sent unsupported and in single file into Ukrainian-held territory—a suicidal manoeuvre. On April 27th another official said that Russian forces in Donbas appeared unwilling, or unable, to advance in heavy rain.
In part, Russia’s woes are down to Ukraine’s heroic resistance, buoyed by a torrent of Western weaponry and intelligence. “But just as much credit for the shattering of Russian illusions lies in a phenomenon long known to military sociologists,” writes Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University, “that armies, by and large, reflect the qualities of the societies from which they emerge.” Russia’s state, says Mr Cohen, “rests on corruption, lies, lawlessness, and coercion”. Each one has been laid bare by Russia’s army in this war.
“They put a lot of money into modernisation,” says General Pavel. “But a lot of this money was lost in the process.” Corruption surely helps explain why Russian vehicles were equipped with cheap Chinese tyres, and thus found themselves stuck in the Ukrainian mud. It may also explain why so many Russian units found themselves without encrypted radios and were forced to rely on insecure civilian substitutes or even Ukrainian mobile phone networks. That, in turn, may well have contributed to the war’s toll on Russian generals (Ukraine claims to have killed ten of them), since their communications at the frontline would have been easier to intercept.
Yet corruption cannot be the whole story. Ukraine is also corrupt, and not much less so than Russia: they sit respectively in 122nd and 136th position on the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, a pressure group. What really distinguishes the two is fighting spirit. Ukrainian soldiers are battling for the survival of their country. Many Russian ones did not even know they were going to war until they were ordered over the border. A European intelligence official says that conscripts—whom Mr Putin has repeatedly and publicly promised not to send to war—have resisted pressure to sign contracts that would turn them into professional soldiers; others have refused to serve outright. The official says that units affected include the 106th Guards Airborne Division and its 51st Guards Parachute Regiment, which are part of the notionally elite VDV airborne forces, and the 423rd Motorised Rifle Regiment, part of an important tank division.
Difficulties in droves
Ill-trained and poorly motivated soldiers are a liability in any conflict; they are especially unsuited to the complexities of modern combined-arms warfare, which requires tanks, infantry, artillery and air power to work in synchrony. To attempt such daunting co-ordination in Ukraine with sullen teenagers, press-ganged into service, fed expired rations and equipped with badly maintained vehicles was the height of optimism.
Such a task requires, at the very least, sound leadership. And that too is in short supply. Non-commissioned officers—senior enlisted men who train and supervise soldiers—are the backbone of NATO’s armed forces. Russia does not have a comparable cadre. There are “too many colonels and not enough corporals”, says a European defence official. Staff training is rigid and outdated, he says, obsessed with the second world war and with little attention paid to newer conflicts. That may explain why doctrine was thrown out of the window. Manoeuvres that seemed easy at Vostok and other stage-managed exercises proved harder to reproduce under fire and far from home.
To the extent that Russian officers have studied their military history, they appear to have imbibed the worst lessons of the Afghan, Chechen and Syrian wars. During their occupation of northern Ukraine, Russian soldiers not only drank heavily and looted homes and shops, but murdered large numbers of civilians. Some have been rewarded for it. On April 18th the 64th Motorised Infantry Brigade, accused of massacring civilians in Bucha, was decorated by Mr Putin for its “mass heroism and courage” and accorded the honour of becoming a “Guards” unit.
War crimes are not always irrational. They can serve a political purpose, such as terrorising the population into submission. Nor are they incompatible with military prowess: Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht was good at both fighting and murdering. But brutality can also be counterproductive, inspiring the enemy to fight tenaciously rather than surrender and risk being killed anyway.
The savagery and confusion of Russia’s forces in Ukraine is consistent with their recent conduct in Syria. Their bombing of Ukrainian hospitals echoes their bombardment of Syrian health facilities. By the same token, Israeli military officers who watched the Russian air force in Syria closely came away surprised by its struggles with air defence, target acquisition and high-tempo sorties. At one stage they thought Syrian involvement in air operations was the only plausible explanation for such a low level of professionalism.
In the end they concluded that Russia lacked the training, doctrine and experience to make the most of its advanced warplanes. Israeli military pilots were struck, both on combat tours and during their day jobs as airline pilots, by Russia’s crude approach to electronic warfare, which involved blocking GPS signals over vast swathes of the eastern Mediterranean, sometimes for weeks at a time. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine became bogged down, Israeli analysts realised that Russian ground forces were afflicted by many of the same problems.
Some of Russia’s most important diplomatic partners appear to be drawing the same lesson. Syed Ata Hasnain, a retired Indian general who once commanded India’s forces in Kashmir, notes “Russian incompetence in the field”, rooted in “hubris and reluctance to follow time-tested military basics”. A group of retired Indian diplomats and generals affiliated with the Vivekananda International Foundation, a nationalist think-tank close to the Indian government, recently discussed Russia’s “visible and abject lack of preparation” and “severe logistical incompetence”. The fact that India is the biggest buyer of Russian arms lent their conclusion particular weight: “the quality of Russian technology previously thought to be superlative is increasingly being questioned”—though Ukraine, of course, uses much of the same equipment.
A similar process of reassessment is now under way in Western armed forces. One camp argues that the Russian threat to NATO is not as great as was feared. “The reputation of the Russian military has been battered and will take a generation to recover,” reads a recent assessment by a NATO government. “It has proven to be worth less than the sum of its parts in a modern, complex battlespace.” But another school of thought cautions against hasty judgements. It is too early to draw sweeping lessons, a senior NATO official warns, with the war still raging and both sides adapting.
If one of Russia’s errors was to draw false confidence from its success in seizing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and averting the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in 2015, the argument runs, there is a similar risk that Russia’s foes might infer too much from the current shambles in Ukraine. Michael Kofman of CNA, a think-tank, acknowledges that he and other experts “overestimated the impact of reforms…and underestimated the rot under Shoigu”. But context is everything, he notes. In recent years the scenarios that have preoccupied NATO planners have not been wars on the scale of the current one, but more modest and realistic, “bite and hold” operations, such as a Russian invasion of parts of the Baltic states or the seizure of islands such as Norway’s Svalbard.
Wars like this could play out very differently from the debacle in Ukraine. They would start with a narrower front, involve fewer forces and place less strain on logistics, says Mr Kofman. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian general staff would necessarily underestimate NATO in the way that they mistakenly dismissed the Ukrainian army. And if the Russian government was not trying to play down a future conflict as nothing more than a “special military operation”, as it has in Ukraine, it could mobilise reserves and conscripts in far greater numbers. Many crucial Russian capabilities, such as anti-satellite weapons and advanced submarines, are not known to have been tested in Ukraine at all.
Geography is important, too. While Russian logistics are “eerily reminiscent” of the old Soviet army, says Ronald Ti, a military logistician who lectures at the Baltic Defence College in Estonia, their dependence on railways would be less of a problem in an attack on the Baltic states. “A fait accompli operation where they bite off a chunk of Estonian territory is well within their capabilities,” says Mr Ti, “because they can quite easily supply that from railheads.” (Whether the Russian air force, its inexperience and frailties now exposed, could protect those railheads from NATO air strikes is another matter.)
Lessons in abundance
Mr Kofman believes the question of “how much of this war is a bad army, which in important ways it clearly is, and how much is a truly terrible plan” has not yet been answered. And yet answering it is essential. In a seminal paper in 1995, James Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford University in California, argued that costly and destructive wars that rational governments would prefer to avert through negotiation can nonetheless still occur owing to miscalculations about the other side’s capabilities. In theory, a war-averting peace deal would reflect the relative power of the two potential belligerents. But the two sides can fail to reach such a bargain because that relative power is not always obvious.
“Leaders know things about their military capabilities and willingness to fight that other states do not know,” wrote Mr Fearon, “and in bargaining situations they can have incentives to misrepresent such private information in order to gain a better deal.” That helps explain why Russia so wildly inflated its supposed prowess in the Vostok exercises. And it can work. “I suspect many of us were taken in by Victory Day parades that showed us all of the smart bits of kit,” says the European general.
The battle for Donbas will not entirely settle this debate. A Russian army that prevails in a war of attrition through sheer firepower and mass would still be a far cry from the nimble, high-tech force advertised over the past decade. More likely is that Russia’s plodding forces will exhaust themselves long before they achieve their objectives in southern and eastern Ukraine, let alone before mounting another attempt on Kyiv. The world’s military planners will be watching not just how far Russia gets in the weeks ahead, but also what that says about its forces’ resilience, adaptability and leadership. Like a knife pushed into old wood, the progress of the campaign will reveal how deep the rot runs.
4. Tokyo needs to brace itself for return of a new cold war
From one of our best Asian scholars.
Excerpts:
As the only country that has ever experienced a nuclear attack, Japan’s deep-seated pacifism and strong opposition to military conflict have long shaped its foreign policy.
When China needed economic aid and official development assistance from Japan, Tokyo willingly helped Beijing to promote a market economy. In talks with Russia, Japan has promised economic and trade cooperation. In the 1990s, Japan helped finance the (doomed) project to supply North Korea with “peaceful” atomic reactors.
Now, however, Japan is awakening from its long dream of peace and tranquility.
While the specific threat to the Japanese islands may not have changed, the emerging belligerent character of Russia may portend a return to the dangerous years of the Cold War, inclining Japan and the United States to cooperate more closely on security affairs.
When Tokyo and Washington revise the guidelines in the future, they may indeed provide the basis for including South Korea and other Asian countries in security cooperation as well, just as European nations are now committing themselves more fully to NATO.
Tokyo needs to brace itself for return of a new cold war
Washington – Seven years ago on April 27, 2015, Japan and the United States unveiled the third revision of their Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.
This document had personal significance for me because I was the task leader at the Institute for Defense Analyses to provide a discussion forum on the guidelines for delegations from Japan and the United States.
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, first signed in 1951 and then revised in 1960, serves as the foundation for this important alliance, whereas the periodically updated guidelines provide focus and goals for important aspects of cooperation between the two allies.
The first guidelines, announced in 1978, were formulated during the Cold War era. They specified the responsibilities for the Self Defense Forces and U.S. forces in the event of Soviet aggression toward Japan. Neither China nor North Korea was considered to pose an imminent threat in those days.
In 1997, the guidelines were revised to prepare for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of Pyongyang’s relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Then in 2015, the guidelines were expanded to address a variety of new security challenges, including cybersecurity, the militarization of space and China’s regional assertiveness in the East Sea.
At the time, a regional Russian threat was not considered to be serious in the minds of many Japanese — even though Moscow had forcibly annexed Crimea the previous year.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine turned back the clock.
Although the two countries don’t share a border, a long-running dispute involves ownership of the four southernmost of the Kuril Islands, which stretch between Japan and Russia. Moscow calls them the Southern Kurils and Tokyo calls them the Northern Territories, and in fact the island dispute has prevented the two nations from signing a postwar peace treaty. The islands were captured by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War, and since then, every Japanese prime minister has tried to get them back.
During his second term as prime minister, from 2012 to 2020, Shinzo Abe met Russian leader Vladimir Putin formally and informally about two dozen times. Abe doggedly proposed dialogue to address the issue of the territories, and in 2018, Putin hinted that Russia might consider returning at least two islands to Japan — if Tokyo recognized Moscow’s sovereignty over all the islands.
On March 25, a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Japanese government announced that it would spend ¥1.05 trillion ($8.2 billion) to support American forces in Japan over the next five years, an 11% increase over the previous allocation.
The budget covers the maintenance of facilities used by the 55,000 U.S. troops based in Japan and the cost for Japanese forces to participate in joint military exercises. The increase in Japan’s host nation support budget was officially attributed to threats from North Korea and China, but not from Russia.
Japan has traditionally kept its overall defense budgets low, ranking ninth among the world’s 10 biggest spenders. At $49 billion, just under 1% of GDP, the annual budget is dwarfed by the U.S. budget of $7.8 billion (just over 3% of GDP). However, it now appears that future budgets will finally crack the “sacred” 1% ceiling.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine does not translate into a direct threat to Japan. Japan joined other Western countries in invoking economic sanctions on Russia and extending economic aid to Ukraine, angering Moscow.
True, all hope of resuming dialogue over the Northern Territories in the foreseeable future seems dead. But for Japan, this territorial issue is markedly different from Ukraine’s territorial concern because Japan lost control of the islands over 75 years ago.
The more likely threat posed by Russia’s invasion of a neighboring country is that it might solidify and embolden a renewed cold war bloc that includes China and North Korea, two states that do pose a threat to Japan.
Far to the south of Japan’s main islands, the Japanese government controls several uninhabited islands (which it calls the Senkakus) that are also claimed by Taiwan and China. The Chinese regularly send military aircraft and ships toward the islands, far more aircraft than Russia sends to probe the air defenses of Japan. North Korea, which harbors considerable animosity toward Japan, has frequently launched missiles in the direction of and occasionally over Japan.
As the only country that has ever experienced a nuclear attack, Japan’s deep-seated pacifism and strong opposition to military conflict have long shaped its foreign policy.
When China needed economic aid and official development assistance from Japan, Tokyo willingly helped Beijing to promote a market economy. In talks with Russia, Japan has promised economic and trade cooperation. In the 1990s, Japan helped finance the (doomed) project to supply North Korea with “peaceful” atomic reactors.
Now, however, Japan is awakening from its long dream of peace and tranquility.
While the specific threat to the Japanese islands may not have changed, the emerging belligerent character of Russia may portend a return to the dangerous years of the Cold War, inclining Japan and the United States to cooperate more closely on security affairs.
When Tokyo and Washington revise the guidelines in the future, they may indeed provide the basis for including South Korea and other Asian countries in security cooperation as well, just as European nations are now committing themselves more fully to NATO.
Kongdan Oh is an independent scholar. She was formerly a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
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5. Can Western Tanks, Artillery, and Missiles Save Ukraine? Don’t Count on It.
I would describe this in another way. It will be the people of Ukraine who save Ukraine. Western tanks, artillery, and missiles will help them do it but in the end it will be the Ukrainians who achieve victory.
I think comparing US training in peacetime to the necessity of the Ukrainians training in wartime is not helpful. Our mental models based on US training in CONUS or at our training centers and ranges could hold us back from doing everything we can. The Ukrainians do not operate on the US mental models. I believe the Ukrainians have proven very adept at handling sophisticated weapons. Their ability to learn, adapt, and anticipate is something to admire and respect. It is not ideal to build an airplane in flight but the Ukrainians are doing it and we need to help them.
Can Western Tanks, Artillery, and Missiles Save Ukraine? Don’t Count on It.
On Monday, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said one U.S. objective in its support of Ukraine was to “weaken” Russia. Former NATO commander Gen (ret). Wesley Clark recently told CNN that one way to accomplish that goal is to send Ukraine “500 tanks, a couple thousand tubes of artillery and rockets.” And, he added, “we’ve got to get (all those tanks and artillery tubes) moving if we’re going to break” Russia’s offensive in the Donbas.
While it may seem self-evident that Ukraine could defeat Russia’s attack if the West provided large numbers of tanks to the front quickly enough, the difficulties and challenges of combat realities make such an outcome highly unlikely. In a best-case scenario for Ukraine, it would take the better part of a year to be able to produce an armored combat capacity strong enough to expel the Russian army from Ukrainian territory – and as explained below, even with such weapons, Ukraine may still not succeed.
Current Tactical Situation in Russo-Ukraine War
First, let’s consider the existing military situation in the east of Ukraine today.
The biggest fight raging at the moment is the Battle of Donbas, in which up to 50,000 Ukrainian troops are defending against reportedly a Russian attack of more than 70,000 troops. Putin’s army is trying to hold the center of a 300-mile front with one portion of its force, attempting penetration of the northern shoulder of Ukraine’s defenses with armored troops that repositioned from Kyiv, and pushing on the southern shoulder with troops recently redeployed from Mariupol.
Russia is waging two efforts to support this main fight, by conducting limited offensives against Kharkiv in the north and in the Kherson region in the south of Ukraine. The intent of these two actions appears to be designed to hold significant Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in place to prevent them from attacking the flanks of Russian troops attacking the Donbas front. Meanwhile, other contingents of UAF troops are defending the coast near Odesa and near Kyiv to guard against any future incursions from Crimea or Belarus.
Though the Ukrainian government has placed a strict embargo on its combat losses, in all probability they have suffered similar levels as that of the Russians, which are reported to be upwards of 40,000 dead and wounded. Other than the possibility of holding back some strategic reserve force, in all likelihood Ukraine has its entire armed force decisively engaged throughout the country.
Second, in order to generate an armored, mobile striking force of sufficient strength to dislodge Russian troops from their current positions, Kyiv would need to take a number of critical steps. At the top of the list, of course, is to procure sufficient numbers of armored vehicles: tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, air defense systems, ammunition and fuel carriers, and other related kit.
To be effective, these weapons must be something close to interoperable, have similar maintenance requirements, and be easy enough to operate that they require minimal training time. Ideally, that would mean getting all types of combat systems that Ukraine has already been using for decades.
While it may sound good to add some modern U.S. howitzers, German tanks, and British anti-air systems, for example, trying to graft those platforms into a system designed to supply and maintain a Soviet-era force would be building in challenges and roadblocks, if for no other reason than each would require its own separate trained mechanics to maintain and repair, and separate types of ammunition from all their other systems; no logistics system could adequately accommodate such disparity.
Third, and most significant: Once the challenges of getting equipment that can be operated and maintained by UAF troops, Ukraine would need to generate a new, trained crop of soldiers almost from scratch. As noted above, the entirety of the Ukrainian army is currently decisively engaged in fierce combat throughout the country. Kyiv doesn’t have the manpower to pull those trained troops off the line and send them somewhere to be trained. New forces would have to be generated, out of contact, while the existing troops try to hold the line against Russia’s attacks. That is a far more daunting task than it seems. Here’s why.
Challenges of Training Ukraine Troops to Use New Heavy Weapons from the West
As in any military task, it is necessary to start with the desired end-state in mind. To have a fighting chance of eventually expelling Russian troops from its territory, Ukraine will need meaningful numbers of effective mechanized brigades. Each mechanized brigade would consist of some mix of tank, infantry, artillery, and air defense companies (plus maintenance and logistic units, of course). To produce a system of such combat units that can fight effectively, however, the process starts at the individual trooper level.
M1 Abrams Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
First, let’s take the tank. Soviet-style T-64 and T-72 tanks, which the UAF has used for decades, are operated by a three-manned crew: the driver, the gunner, and the tank commander. Each of these individuals first hast to learn how to do their job and do it well. The Gunner has to know how to operate the various fire control systems, sights, and techniques for engaging targets. The driver must be proficient at handling the massive vehicle, understand where the tank can and can’t maneuver, how to control the vehicle, and be responsive to the orders of the tank commander.
For his part, the tank commander must know the capabilities and limitations of the tank as well as the driver, must know how to perform the duties of the gunner, and then understand how to “fight the tank” under every environmental circumstance in which the tank may be required to operate.
Once those individual positions have been mastered, then the tank has to learn to fight as a team, which is crucial for the tank’s performance. The next step in forming an armored unit is to build the platoon, which is the tactical unit that faces the enemy. It is typically composed of three to four tanks, led by a lieutenant serving as a platoon leader.
Next, the tank platoon has to learn how to fight as part of a tank company, which is composed of three to four tank platoons. The tank company is usually commanded by a captain. The company commander, joined by his senior enlisted non-commissioned officer and other sergeants, has to fight the platoons as a coordinated team, ensuring that each platoon does its job, but also must know the different tasks he must assign to other platoons so that all work in unison to accomplish a single objective.
T-80 Tank firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
After that, the tank company has to learn how to fight together within the battalion, usually commanded by a Lt. Col. The battalion commander and his staff must know how to fight each of the companies to achieve their mission, and also understand their role in the larger mission, which could be anything from the main effort, a supporting effort, flank support, or as a tactical reserve. The same is then true one level higher with battalions working within a brigade.
Each of these echelons, from platoon to brigade, must be mastered if the battle force is to be successful in combat. As I personally observed in the 1990s as a part of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) which was based in Germany, training a brigade-level unit in peacetime is very time-consuming.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the 2nd ACR to deploy to the Middle East, along with hundreds of thousands of other U.S. units. We had to retrain ourselves from European terrain and scenarios to desert and Iraqi scenarios as rapidly as possible.
We spent six full months firing weapons and training with the equipment and the crews who would fight the war before Operation Desert Storm began on the ground in late February 1991. We executed the final maneuver training in the Saudi deserts, at platoon, company, battalion, and finally regimental (brigade) level.
Since testing at U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, the Department of Defense’s lone extreme cold natural environment testing facility, began in January 2020, the M1A2 System Enhancement Package version 3 main battle tank was driven more than 2,000 miles in rugged conditions across three seasons of sub-Arctic weather, fired hundreds of rounds for accuracy in extreme cold, and underwent testing of its auxiliary power unit.
Though the platform was extensively tested at U.S. Army Yuma Test Center prior to being put through its paces in Alaska, the sub-zero temperatures brought forth glitches that would have been unimaginable in the desert.
All of that was done out of enemy contact, using the equipment we had trained on for years, that was fully maintained, and led by officers and sergeants with decades of combined experience. Even then, I personally observed that not every American unit performed well. Some were nothing short of brilliant in combat, while others were tentative, and still others outright weak. For Ukraine to form an effective fighting force, they will have none of the advantages we had.
The Cold Calculations of Combat Realities
To build its army, Ukraine would have to train new troops not currently engaged in combat. It would be difficult, but definitely doable, to train new recruits at crew-level tasks of operating tanks, artillery, and other combat gear in an accelerated timeframe. Beyond that, however, there comes an increasing cost in cutting corners and timelines.
For example, in the American army, a company commander typically has five to six years’ worth of experience at the platoon level before taking the reins of a tank company. A battalion commander must have at least 16 years of experience, and a brigade commander, 22 years. The Ukrainian Army virtually didn’t exist eight years ago, so no officer will have much more experience than a company commander in the US, but even that understates the challenge.
For the majority of the eight years since 2014, the vast majority of UAF training and operations have been in static, World War I-style trench warfare; few officers or men have experience commanding tank or infantry units in mobile operations. Though officers can be taught many things, experience can’t be conveyed; it has to be earned over a period of years. Consider the ramifications of the monumental task facing Kyiv today.
Zelensky’s government must figure out how to train multiple mechanized brigades while virtually the whole of his army is actively defending his country. That means that Kyiv will either have to curtail every aspect of training and try to simply rush tanks, artillery tubes, and air defense systems into the front lines, while troops are actively fighting, in the hopes that the added equipment enables them to form offensive potential to launch counteroffensives necessary to drive Russian troops off the territory they currently possess.
An M60A1 tank from the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces fires a round at a range in Wadi Shadiyah during a massive military demonstration in front of dignitaries and media.
Or it will require Ukraine to hold the lines against Russia’s attacks throughout the country in order to form a new armored organization, from scratch, in either a third country or in a relatively safe part of western Ukraine. In that safe location, troops would have to conduct many months of training, even in an expedited way, out of contact with the enemy, so that they could later be brought into the fight at full strength.
Obviously, either of those scenarios couldn’t be started until Ukraine had received a comprehensive set of combat equipment from western countries, had the gear brought up to operational standards, and supplied with large stocks of fuel and ammunition (necessary to sustain the training phase and then a sustained offensive campaign). Just the assembling of the equipment and sustainment would take three to four months, and that only after Western countries had made the decision to provide specific kit. Only then could the months of individual, crew, platoon, company, and battalion training begin – also measured in months.
There will be the temptation to treat this like a fire brigade: if the house is on fire, you marshal everything you can, throw it all at the fire as it becomes available, and hope you can extinguish the blaze. Many will want to rush every tank, artillery tube, rocket launcher, or anti-air missile to the front as soon as it’s available, to bolster the fighting capacity of the troops right now. While that will be an understandable temptation, such a course would have little chance of success.
T-84 Ukrainian tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
War simply doesn’t work that way. It’s not merely about having a number of tanks or rocket launchers, but about having trained, disciplined troops that know what they’re doing, working as a team of teams, in various combat units working towards a single goal. It’s not unlike a sports team. It is possible to assemble a group of bone fide all-star athletes on a team, but if they don’t train together so that each works together as a team, even all-stars can get thrashed by an opponent that has less talent but works better together.
The Bottom Line
On one level, it is completely understandable that Zelensky would aggressively seek heavy weapons for his forces. But combat fundamentals aren’t impressed by emotions, the rightness of one’s cause, or how earnestly one side may desire a given outcome. If heavy weapons are inserted into the war zone piecemeal, sent to the front lines as they come in, they will add only marginal capacity to the units engaged at the front.
More importantly, it will be many weeks or months before meaningful volumes of heavy weapons could be delivered to Ukrainian combat units. Choosing to train new combat units from scratch, out of contact, would give Ukraine a better chance at producing a battle force of sufficient strength that it would have a chance to expel Russian forces, but doing so would take, in all likelihood, nine months to a year from now – and its not clear Ukrainian troops currently under fire could hold the line that long.
The ugly bottom line is this: the Battle of Donbas is almost certainly going to be won or lost with the forces engaging on the front lines today, using the equipment they have. It will take too long for Western governments to come up with a coherent equipping plan and then prepare, ship, and deliver the kit to its destination in a timeframe that could provide Kyiv’s troops the ability to tip the balance against Russia in the Donbas.
Ukraine may be forced to make a choice between horrible options. Zelensky could roll the dice and try to create a stalemate to hold Russia at bay for close to a year and then mount an offensive with a trained battle force, or seek a negotiated settlement on the best terms available to stop the destruction of his army and people.
Trying to force and sustain a stalemate would guarantee Ukraine’s people continue to suffer and die and its economy to remain stagnant for the foreseeable future, and with no guarantee that creating an offensive force would later succeed (and employing it would necessarily spike the casualties again). Agreeing to a negotiated settlement in the near term would likely cement the loss of some eastern Ukrainian territory to Russia or Russian-speaking population, yet end the destruction in the rest of the country.
War is a horrible crucible that rarely produces any winners, and this one is the ugliest, bloodiest, and cruelest in Europe in nearly a century. Everyone must understand at this point there are not “good” solutions. Ukraine’s leaders must choose among a raft of unpalatable options in search of the least detestable.
I do not envy their task.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis1.
6. The Russia-Ukraine War: What Historical Analogies Make Sense?
Excerpts:
This war is generating its own stories, which will eventually become narratives, which will eventually become analogies that will inform the behavior of future policymakers. The loss of Moskva will become a cautionary tale; Ukrainian heroism on the approaches to Kyiv will become a story of national virtue; the beleaguered defenders of Mariupol will become kinfolk of the final holdouts at Masada and the Alamo.
The visibility of the war, which continues to dominate foreign policy news around the world, will undoubtedly make it a touchstone for how people think about war and peace for decades to come.
The Russia-Ukraine War: What Historical Analogies Make Sense?
Which analogies are we using to understand the Russia-Ukraine War? Yuen Khong’s pioneering work in Analogies at War described how policymakers tend to think in terms of analogies when faced with new international crises. We understand the world through stories as much as through data, and when faced with uncomfortable or unfamiliar situations policymakers tend to reach for stories that they understand.
The choice of analogy tends to reflect generational concerns (policymakers who came of age during World War II tend to favor Munich analogies, those who cut their teeth in the early Cold War tend to think in terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and so forth), but also the motivated bias of practitioners (people reach for analogies that suggest their endeavors may enjoy success). Other scholars have built upon Khong’s work; for example, Eric Mosinger runs through several World War II analogies that have informed Western thinking about the war since it began two months ago.
The Russians have purposefully attempted to activate analogic thinking by declaring that their purpose is to “denazify” the Ukrainian government, a claim intended to remind soldiers and civilians of the Second World War. The Ukrainians, for their part, have borrowed and repurposed other analogies from Soviet history, including the historic defense of Stalingrad. Analogies do not truly belong to anyone in a proprietary sense, it would seem.
One ready analogy remains the “Winter War,” waged between Russia and Finland in the winter of 1939-1940. As I discussed in a previous column, the Winter War offers a narrative of defiance in the face of overwhelming odds and a testament to what a small but dedicated country can accomplish when fighting tenaciously on the defensive. However, Russia won the Winter War; the Red Army picked itself up off the floor, rethought its approach, and recapitalized its forces, then undertook a war-winning offensive that not only pushed the Finns out of the disputed territory but threatened Finnish sovereignty. This analogy is surely attractive to the Russians at this point, not so much for the humiliating defeat part but rather for the recovery and resurgence bit. That Russia produced some 2800 tanks in 1940 to replace its losses and likely has not yet produced 28 tanks in 2022 suggests a degree of caution, however.
On the other hand, sits the Kerensky Offensive. In the late winter of 1917 revolutionaries overthrew the Romanov Dynasty, ending centuries of imperial rule and threatening to take Russia out of World War I. Heavy allied pressure immediately fell upon the new Provisional government, led by Alexander Kerensky, to continue the war and indeed to launch an offensive against the forces of the Central Powers. The offensive, launched in July 1917 and conducted in what is now Western Ukraine, was intended to replicate the success of the 1916 Brusilov Offensive (indeed, it was led by the same General Aleksei Brusilov) and reassure that British, French, and Americans of Russian commitment to the war.
Unfortunately for the Russians, while continuing the war still enjoyed some popular support, but the Imperial Army had been badly battered by three years of conflict and was in no mood to continue. Discipline, which had been brutal under the Czars, was in full collapse as reforms sharply reduced the latitude of officers. The Russian system of munitions supply was also nearing collapse because of industrial unrest and a lack of raw materials. The offensive was launched in late June but made only hesitant progress against German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Within two weeks the Germans had counter-attacked, erasing Russian gains and pushing Russians forces back beyond their starting points. By late July the army was in full collapse. The Germans advanced as rapidly as their logistics and the technology of 1917 would allow.
The analogy draws some support from stories of disaffection within the Russian ranks, but it bears mention that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has already outlasted the Kerensky Offensive by more than a month. Russian troops may have low morale, but evidence indicates they’re still better off than the beleaguered forces Brusilov had at his disposal in July 1917. Still, the idea that the Russian Army might simply collapse of its own weight is attractive to Ukrainians and to others who want to see Russia fail.
Russian troops fire rocket artillery during an exercise at the Luga training ground (Leningrad region), dedicated to Missile Troops and Artillery. Photo: Konstantin Morozov / mil.ru
This war is generating its own stories, which will eventually become narratives, which will eventually become analogies that will inform the behavior of future policymakers. The loss of Moskva will become a cautionary tale; Ukrainian heroism on the approaches to Kyiv will become a story of national virtue; the beleaguered defenders of Mariupol will become kinfolk of the final holdouts at Masada and the Alamo.
The visibility of the war, which continues to dominate foreign policy news around the world, will undoubtedly make it a touchstone for how people think about war and peace for decades to come.
7. What Have US Special Operators Learned In Ukraine?
I certainly hope we have also learned the importance of resistance.
Excerpts:
Ukraine represents a “fifth modern era for special operations,” Howard said, one that shifts away from the counterterrorism capabilities that U.S. special operations have so heavily focused on for the past two decades.
“We over-rotated on counterterrorism. Clearly,” Howard said. “And we have lost some ground in the distinctive things that only we can do and we are moving with urgency to make the main thing the things that only we can do in the maritime domain.”
The Marine Corps’ special operations commander, Maj. Gen. James Glynn, agreed.
“The choices that we're having to determine right now is what of the counterterrorism skill set, the stuff that we've invested in and developed very well over the last 20 years, how much of it translates? How well does it translate? And what else do we need to be able to do?” Glynn said.
What Have US Special Operators Learned In Ukraine?
The Army, for one, is considering creating a special-operations drone specialty.
U.S. special operators are taking at least two lessons from Russia’s two-month-old war in Ukraine. First, the international partnerships the U.S. has been fostering for the past 20 years are playing a huge role. And drones are playing an even bigger one.
The leaders of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps special operations commands all testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on Wednesday. While the focus of the hearing was on general readiness and the shortfalls of the 2023 budget request, many of the questions focused on Ukraine.
“What are the follow-on risks of the invasion?” asked Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa. “Where do we need to expand our footprint and presence in EUCOM”—that is, U.S. European Command.
The Army’s Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga said Russia’s invasion has “added emphasis” to the need to continue to expand “longstanding generational relationships” across eastern Europe.
“With the scale and scope of the threat of Russia and China, we won't be able to do this alone,” Braga said. “That's why I talked about our international partners and how increasing their capacities and their capabilities is so critical.”
The impact of international partnerships with special operations forces of a “multitude of different countries” in Ukraine is an “untold story,” he said.
“I won’t name the number right now, but they have absolutely banded together…And I think that really bore out from the last 20 years of working together, sweating together, bleeding together on different battlefields, on different continents,” Braga said.
On the homefront, U.S. special operations is at an “inflection point,” Naval Special Warfare Commander Rear Adm. Hugh Howard said.
Ukraine represents a “fifth modern era for special operations,” Howard said, one that shifts away from the counterterrorism capabilities that U.S. special operations have so heavily focused on for the past two decades.
“We over-rotated on counterterrorism. Clearly,” Howard said. “And we have lost some ground in the distinctive things that only we can do and we are moving with urgency to make the main thing the things that only we can do in the maritime domain.”
The Marine Corps’ special operations commander, Maj. Gen. James Glynn, agreed.
“The choices that we're having to determine right now is what of the counterterrorism skill set, the stuff that we've invested in and developed very well over the last 20 years, how much of it translates? How well does it translate? And what else do we need to be able to do?” Glynn said.
Special operators are learning in Ukraine what this future, non-counterterrorism battleground will look like—and a lot of it isn’t on the ground.
“It’s impressive to see the impact that manned and unmanned drones are having,” the Army’s Braga said. While drones were already part of the Army’s modernization effort, he said, their impact in Ukraine have led USASOC to consider creating a military occupational speciality or branch within special operations dedicated to manned and unmanned drones so that it’s “not just an additional duty, it’s an actual specialty.”
“I cannot envision a future battlefield without ever-increasing manned and unmanned robotics and the application of AI to maximize their effect and impact across all warfighting functions,” Braga told lawmakers on Wednesday.
And, of course, like the rest of the Defense Department, special operations needs to do all this with a flat budget.
“The topline request for SOCOM is the same as it was last year, despite a significant increase in threats,” Ernst said. “As we all know, a flat budget request equals a budget cut. This reality is only exacerbated by the rising inflation.”
The f2023 budget request for SOCOM is $1.3 billion less than its fiscal year 2020 budget in real terms, Ernst said. SOCOM also provided a list of $650 million in unfunded priorities.
“Each year, we find ourselves trying to balance our budgeting recommendations among modernization, readiness, personnel programs…and every year we come up short,” Air Force Special Operations Commander Lt. Gen. James Slife said. “The budget that was submitted…represents a balance of risk among those areas.”
8. Sweden, Finland Gave Up Neutrality a Long Time Ago
Conclusion:
There are still neutral countries in the world. Switzerland only joined the United Nations in 2002 and is, of course, a member of neither the EU nor NATO. But Sweden and Finland are not neutral. And unlike Finland after World War II, Ukraine won’t face enforced neutrality whenever this war ends—because Russia is not in a position to block an EU membership bid. Words matter.
Sweden, Finland Gave Up Neutrality a Long Time Ago
Their collective-defense rights as EU members suggest a way forward for Ukraine.
BY ELISABETH BRAW
SENIOR FELLOW, AEI
APRIL 26, 2022 03:02 PM ET
Sweden and Finland are, countless reporters and commentators tell us, about to give up their neutrality when they submit membership applications to NATO next month. One part of this statement is correct: the two neighbors and geopolitical sisters are expected to apply for NATO membership in mid-May. But they’re not neutral. The two countries relinquished their neutrality when they joined the European Union in the 1990s. Being neutral, in fact, has little to do with being a member of NATO. That’s important to consider when discussing Ukraine’s eventual future.
“Neutral Finns and Swedes reconsider idea of NATO membership,” the Associated Press reported on March 3. Virtually every news outlet has disseminated similar stories, and there’s reason for the enormous interest in the two countries. The past few weeks have triggered fundamental changes in the countries’ relationship with NATO. For as long as I can remember—and I’m a child of Cold-War Sweden—Sweden has proudly remained outside NATO.As children, we all learned Sweden’s posture by heart: “Alliance non-alignment in peacetime aimed at neutrality in war.” Over the years, public opinion has sometimes moved towards more support of NATO membership, and sometimes it has declined, but it has never remained consistently above 50 percent. And even if public opinion had climbed past the halfway mark and cruised there, the often-governing Social Democrats—longstanding NATO skeptics—always had a card up their sleeve. Joining the alliance would only be possible if Finland were to join at the same time, they said. And in Finland, support for joining the NATO remained firmly around 20 to 25 percent.
Then, of course, came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Finland’s support for NATO membership skyrocketed past 60-percent, and support in Sweden rose too. Sweden’s center-right opposition parties all said they wanted the country to apply for membership. The governing Social Democrats decided to kick the can down the road and said they’d appoint a commission to study the matter. But in Finland, the center-left government took decisive action. Prime Minister Sanna Marin commissioned a government report on the pros and cons of joining the alliance, which the government submitted to Parliament on April 13. The report saw mostly advantages in joining NATO, noting, for example, that “should Finland and Sweden become Nato members, the threshold for using military force in the Baltic Sea region would rise, which would enhance the stability of the region in the long term.” Surveying the parliament’s 200 members, national broadcaster YLE reported that 112 supported a NATO bid while only 12 were opposed it. (33 were undecided and 43 did not respond.) The Swedish government seems to have realized that it would be utterly foolish to sit out a unique opportunity to join NATO swiftly, with minimal trouble, and with Finland providing coverage. It announced that its review would be concluded by May 13 rather than a previously announced later date. It matters, too, that 47 percent of Swedes support joining NATO—and that 59 percent support the move if Finland joins too. The governments have also announced that President Sauli Niinistö of Finland will visit Sweden on May 17 and 18. A NATO announcement is imminent.
This has prompted the flurry of media reports about the two countries discarding their neutrality. News klaxon! It has been 27 years since Sweden and Finland were last neutral—that is, since they joined the EU. “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power,” states Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union. In fact, the EU’s mutual-defense clause is as strong NATO’s famous Article 5, in which NATO member states agree to “assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”
In 1995, Sweden and Finland finally made the leap after having remained outside, together, for many years. In the case of Finland, the long wait was necessitated partly by its post-World War II “friendship treaty” with the Soviet Union. And in the case of Sweden, the country wanted to proudly chart its own course outside any alliances. It wanted to be neutral.
Yes, the EU would hardly be in a position to militarily avenge an armed attack against one of its member states. But Article 42.7 means its members are not neutral, even though Ireland likes to present itself as such and even though media and commentators like to smack the neutrality label on Sweden and Finland (and Austria). That matters a great deal, and not just concerning Sweden and Finland. Consider Ukraine. In recent weeks, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has suggested he’s willing to forgo NATO membership for Ukraine. This represents an offer to Russia in a potential peace agreement and a recognition of the reality that a NATO membership bid may not be successful.
But remaining outside NATO would not leave Ukraine stranded. The country has a viable chance of entering the EU, albeit not in the near future. That would give it 27 countries committed to coming to its aid. And Ukraine could form a mutual-assistance community with other neighbors. Consider Georgia and Moldova.
There are still neutral countries in the world. Switzerland only joined the United Nations in 2002 and is, of course, a member of neither the EU nor NATO. But Sweden and Finland are not neutral. And unlike Finland after World War II, Ukraine won’t face enforced neutrality whenever this war ends—because Russia is not in a position to block an EU membership bid. Words matter.
Elisabeth Braw is a Senior Fellow at AEI, specializing in defense against gray-zone aggression. She previously directed the Modern Deterrence program at the Royal United Services Institute. She is the author of The Defender's Dilemma Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression (AEI, 2021).
9. Iran’s attempts to kill Pompeo, current U.S. officials are real and ongoing, Blinken says
Iran’s attempts to kill Pompeo, current U.S. officials are real and ongoing, Blinken says
Iran’s attempts to assassinate former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are real and ongoing, his successor, Antony Blinken, told Congress on Tuesday.
Testifying before a Senate panel, Blinken acknowledged details made public last month in a sensitive State Department report that outlined a security arrangement for the former secretary involving round-the-clock government protection.
“I’m not sure what I can say in an open setting, but let me say generically that there is an ongoing threat against American officials, both present and past,” Blinken said. “We are making sure and we will make sure for as long as it takes that we’re protecting our people, present and former, if they’re under threat.”
Pompeo, a former U.S. secretary of state and CIA director under President Donald Trump, was one of the architects of the Trump administration’s hardline approach to Tehran, reimplementing sanctions after the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal and supporting the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, a top Iranian general.
All former secretaries of state automatically receive protection from the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security for 180 days after leaving office.
But Blinken has repeatedly extended that protection for 60-day increments due to “a serious and credible threat from a foreign power or agent of a foreign power arising from duties performed by former Secretary Pompeo while employed by the department,” according to the sensitive State Department report to Congress last month.
The department is spending over $2 million per month to protect Pompeo and one of his top former aides, Brian Hook, and have spent over $13 million to date, according to the report.
Blinken was responding to questioning from Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, who asked the secretary whether the Biden administration was requiring Iran to pledge “not to murder a former secretary of state.”
“They know what they’d need to do to address this problem, and that’s pretty straightforward,” Blinken said. “Within the context of any engagements we have, directly or indirectly with Iranians, one of the strong messages we send to them is, they need to stop targeting our people — period.”
The State Department did not respond to a request for additional comment. A representative of Pompeo did not provide comment.
The Biden administration has been concerned with the threats against Pompeo and Hook since January.
“Make no mistake: the United States of America will protect and defend its citizens,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the time. “As Americans, we have our disagreements on politics. We have our disagreements on Iran policy. But we are united in our resolve against threats and provocations. We are united in the defense of our people.”
___
© 2022 McClatchy Washington Bureau
Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC
10. Russia Uses Cyberattacks in Ukraine to Support Military Strikes, Report Finds
Cyber operations are and will forever more be an integral part of modern warfare. And I hope we are learning from our Ukrainian friends.
Excerpts:
Parallels also emerged between the targeting of nuclear facilities in Ukraine and Russian disinformation campaigns that spread false rumors about Ukraine developing biological weapons. In early March, Russian troops captured the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility, Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant. During the same period of time, Russian hackers worked to steal data from nuclear power organizations and research institutions in Ukraine that could be used to further disinformation narratives, Microsoft said.
One of the groups, which is affiliated with Russia’s Federal Security Service and has a history of targeting companies in the energy, aviation and defense sectors, was able to steal data from a Ukrainian nuclear safety organization between December and mid-March, Microsoft said.
By the end of March, Russian hackers were beginning to pivot their focus to eastern Ukraine, as the Russian military began to reorganize troops there. Little is known about hacking campaigns backed by Russia that occurred during April, as investigations into many of those incidents are ongoing.
“Ukrainians themselves have been better defenders than was anticipated, and I think that’s true on both sides of this hybrid war,” Mr. Burt said. “They’ve been doing a good job, both defending against the cyberattacks and recovering from them when they are successful.”
Russia Uses Cyberattacks in Ukraine to Support Military Strikes, Report Finds
By Kate Conger and David E. Sanger
April 27, 2022
Updated 3:24 p.m. ET
A new study by Microsoft shows that Russian cyberattacks often happened within days or even hours of missile strikes.
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Russia used hackers to conduct hundreds of subtle attacks, many timed to coincide with incoming missile or ground attacks, according to a new report.Credit...Alexandr Demyanchuk/EPA, via Sputnik
April 27, 2022, 1:22 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON — For weeks after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, American officials wondered about the weapon that seemed to be missing: Russia’s mighty cyberarsenal, which most experts expected would be used in the opening hours of an invasion to bring down Ukraine’s power grid, fry its cellphone system and cut off President Volodymyr Zelensky from the world.
None of that happened. But in a new study released Wednesday by Microsoft, it is now clear that Russia used its A-team of hackers to conduct hundreds of far more subtle attacks, many timed to coincide with incoming missile or ground attacks. And it turned out that, just as in the ground war, the Russians were less skillful, and the Ukrainians were better defenders, than most experts expected.
“They brought destructive efforts, they brought espionage efforts, they brought all their best actors to focus on this,” said Tom Burt, who oversees Microsoft’s investigations into the biggest and most complex cyberattacks that are visible through its global networks. But he also noted that while “they had some success,” the Russians were met with a robust defense from the Ukrainians that blocked some of the online attacks.
The report adds considerable subtlety to an understanding of the early days of the war, when the shelling and troop movements were obvious, but the cyberoperations were less visible — and more difficult to blame, at least right away, on Russia’s major intelligence agencies.
But it is now becoming clear that Russia used hacking campaigns to support its ground campaign in Ukraine, pairing malware with missiles in several attacks, including on TV stations and government agencies, according to Microsoft’s research. The report demonstrates Russia’s persistent use of cyberweapons, upending early analysis that suggested they did not play a prominent role in the conflict.
“It’s been a relentless cyberwar that has paralleled, and in some cases directly supported, the kinetic war,” Mr. Burt said. Hackers affiliated with Russia were carrying out cyberattacks “on a daily, 24/7 basis since hours before the physical invasion began,” he added.
Microsoft could not determine whether Russia’s hackers and its troops had merely been given similar targets to pursue or had actively coordinated their efforts. But Russian cyberattacks often struck within days — and sometimes within hours — of on-the-ground activity.
At least six Russian nation-state hacking groups have launched more than 237 operations against Ukrainian businesses and government agencies, Microsoft said in its report. The attacks were often intended to destroy computer systems, but some also aimed to gather intelligence or spread misinformation.
Although Russia routinely relied on malware, espionage and disinformation to further its agenda in Ukraine, it appeared that Moscow was trying to limit its hacking campaigns to stay within Ukraine’s borders, Microsoft said, perhaps in an attempt to avoid drawing NATO countries into the conflict.
The attacks were sophisticated, with Russian hackers often making small modifications to the malware they used in an effort to evade detection.
“It’s definitely the A-team,” Mr. Burt said. “It’s basically all of the key nation-state actors.”
Still, Ukrainian defenders were able to thwart some of the attacks, having become accustomed to fending off Russian hackers after years of online intrusions in Ukraine. At a news conference on Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said they believed Russia had brought all of its cybercapabilities to bear on Ukraine. Still, Ukraine managed to fend off many of the attacks, they added.
Microsoft detailed several attacks that appeared to show parallel cyberactivity and ground activity.
On March 1, Russian cyberattacks hit media companies in Kyiv, including a major broadcasting network, using malware aimed at destroying computer systems and stealing information, Microsoft said. The same day, missiles destroyed a TV tower in Kyiv, knocking some stations off the air.
The incident demonstrated Russia’s interest in controlling the flow of information in Ukraine during the invasion, Microsoft said.
A group affiliated with the G.R.U., a Russian military intelligence agency, hacked into a government agency’s network in Vinnytsia, a city located to the southwest of Kyiv, on March 4. The group, which was previously linked to the theft of emails related to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, carried out phishing attacks against military officials and regional government employees that were intended to steal passwords to their online accounts.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
Card 1 of 3
Explosions in the border regions. Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova on Ukraine’s western flank, was struck by explosions that Ukraine said were carried out by Russia as a pretext to invade Ukraine from that side. Local officials in three Russian districts bordering Ukraine later reported overnight blasts, raising the specter of broader conflict spilling beyond Ukraine’s borders.
The hacking attempts represented a pivot for the group, which typically focuses its efforts on national offices rather than regional governments, Microsoft said.
Two days after the phishing attempts, Russian missiles struck an airport in Vinnytsia, damaging air traffic control towers and an aircraft. The airport was not near any areas of ground fighting at the time, but it did have some Ukrainian military presence.
Russian hackers and troops appeared to move in concert yet again on March 11, when a government agency in Dnipro was targeted with destructive malware, according to Microsoft, while government buildings in Dnipro were hit by strikes.
Parallels also emerged between the targeting of nuclear facilities in Ukraine and Russian disinformation campaigns that spread false rumors about Ukraine developing biological weapons. In early March, Russian troops captured the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility, Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant. During the same period of time, Russian hackers worked to steal data from nuclear power organizations and research institutions in Ukraine that could be used to further disinformation narratives, Microsoft said.
One of the groups, which is affiliated with Russia’s Federal Security Service and has a history of targeting companies in the energy, aviation and defense sectors, was able to steal data from a Ukrainian nuclear safety organization between December and mid-March, Microsoft said.
By the end of March, Russian hackers were beginning to pivot their focus to eastern Ukraine, as the Russian military began to reorganize troops there. Little is known about hacking campaigns backed by Russia that occurred during April, as investigations into many of those incidents are ongoing.
“Ukrainians themselves have been better defenders than was anticipated, and I think that’s true on both sides of this hybrid war,” Mr. Burt said. “They’ve been doing a good job, both defending against the cyberattacks and recovering from them when they are successful.”
11. White House preparing to ask Congress for massive Ukraine aid package
We had better keep our printing presses going to keep printing money.
White House preparing to ask Congress for massive Ukraine aid package
Administration officials described the amount of the request as “massive” but would not provide a specific dollar amount for the aid, which is intended to last through September.
NBC News · by Carol E. Lee, Kristen Welker, Courtney Kube and Julie Tsirkin
WASHINGTON — President Joe Biden will request Congress fund a new supplemental aid package for Ukraine during remarks from the White House Thursday morning, two sources familiar with the matter told NBC News.
The extra funding is intended to last for the next five months, through the end of the fiscal year, the sources said.
Administration officials earlier described the amount of the request as “massive” but would not provide a specific dollar amount. Some details were still not finalized, the officials said.
The amount, however, is intended to fund U.S. military, economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine through Sept. 30, the officials said. The new fiscal year begins Oct. 1.
The extended assistance package for Ukraine comes as the Biden administration has said its goals in Ukraine are now to “weaken” Russia, as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin put it this week, and U.S. officials are increasingly open that the aim is for Ukraine to win the war against Russia.
The military aid is expected to include capabilities Ukraine could use now and equipment for the longer term.
April 27, 202203:11
The U.S. has provided Ukraine with more than $3 billion in military aid since Russia’s invasion. In announcing the most recent $800 million U.S. aid package last week, Biden said he had nearly run out of funding authorized by Congress for military aid and he would be submitting a new request this week.
After NBC News reported Wednesday that the request would be through the current fiscal year, White House press secretary Jen Psaki said the announcement “will definitely be this week.”
“In terms of the length or the size, I don’t have a number for you at this point in time,” Psaki said, “but there are plans for this to be a proposal to go through the fiscal year, and it will include, as our past packages have included, security or military assistance, humanitarian economic assistance, given those in our view will help address a range of the needs the Ukrainians have.”
Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Wednesday that he had spoken to the White House about the supplemental funding request and expected it would be made on Thursday.
“I believe we will get a very strong, broad-based request for Ukrainian aid tomorrow,” Schumer said.
NBC News · by Carol E. Lee, Kristen Welker, Courtney Kube and Julie Tsirkin
12. U.S. soldier says Russians using Twitter to learn his Ukrainian location
Then stop using the damn twitter machine!
U.S. soldier says Russians using Twitter to learn his Ukrainian location
Newsweek · by Patricia McKnight · April 27, 2022
A U.S. Army veteran who has been documenting his time as a combat volunteer in Ukraine claims Russians are targeting him on Twitter to figure out his location.
After leaving his home in Connecticut, former U.S. Army staff sergeant James Vasquez has live-tweeted his experience on Ukraine's front lines throughout Russia's invasion. Vasquez's Twitter account has amassed over 310,000 followers, with some following him for potentially deceptive purposes.
Vasquez tweeted on Wednesday that Russians have been trying to get the soldier's location from his social media account. While the site lets users share their location with every tweet, some users disable the feature to keep their location private.
"These Dumba** Russians keep tweeting me that Elon Musk has blocked me and I need to put my location on in settings to resolve it," Vasquez wrote on Wednesday.
These Dumbass Russians keep tweeting me that Elon Musk has blocked me and I need to put my location on in settings to resolve itð¤£ð¤£ð¤£. That is more lame than you have an important message about your car warranty. Are we really considering this country a super power?
— James Vasquez (@jmvasquez1974) April 27, 2022
Vasquez said the Russians' Musk claim is a laughable attempt to gain his unit's location in Ukraine. He compared the attempt to the car warranty salesmen that call and pry for information.
A U.S. Army veteran said on Wednesday that some Twitter users have attempted to trick him into revealing his unit's location in Ukraine. A member of the Ukrainian military guards a forward position in a village in the front line Hulyaipole District, Zaporizhia Region, Ukraine, on April 27, 2022. Getty Images
"That is more lame than you have an important message about your car warranty," Vasquez said. "Are we really considering this country a super power?"
However, some people on Twitter don't think it was smart for Vasquez to bring his cell phone to the front lines for fear that the device's location could be obtained another way.
"It's a bad idea for anyone to bring a smartphone into a combat zone, even with GeoLocation turned off," a Twitter user said. "The phone can still be geo located. I know I mentioned that before, but better safe than [killed in action]."
Aside from joking about the messages he has allegedly received from Russians, Vasquez has gained popularity by blogging his way through Ukraine's border, shelling from Russian forces and other scenes from the front lines.
"I want to thank everybody and tell you how much I appreciate all your help and your generosity and your well wishes and your prayers and your donations," Vasquez said in his video. "It's just super overwhelming not just for me but for everybody that I'm here with. So, thank you. Thank you."
Newsweek reached out to Vasquez for comment.
Newsweek · by Patricia McKnight · April 27, 2022
13. Hiring for the Foreign Service Is Getting an Overhaul
Excerpts:
Continuing an effort first undertaken by President Trump, the Biden administration is in the midst of implementing a governmentwide initiative to make determinations on qualifications for federal jobs based more on evaluations of a candidate’s skills. The Office of Personnel Management has rolled out a new assessment system allowing subject matter experts to more accurately measure job applicants’ skillsets and make it easier for hiring managers to select qualified candidates.
At a Senate hearing on Tuesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the department has already onboarded 179 FSOs this year and is on pace for its largest annual hiring total in a decade. Blinken thanked lawmakers for providing funding in the fiscal 2022 omnibus to make that possible and asked for another increase as requested in the fiscal 2023 budget to allow for more than 500 additional FSOs next year. Such a staffing level would allow for a “float” of more than 200 officers who can engage in training and temporary assignments to further “professionalize” the department’s workforce.
In his first weeks in office, Biden went to State to praise FSOs and tell the workforce they were “the center of all that I intend to do.”
“In our administration you’re going to be entrusted and empowered to do your job,” Biden said. “I believe in you. We need you, badly. I trust you. I’m going to have your back. That I promise you.”
Hiring for the Foreign Service Is Getting an Overhaul
The nearly 100-year-old test will play less of a role in picking candidates.
BY ERIC KATZ
SENIOR CORRESPONDENT
APRIL 27, 2022 08:00 AM ET
The Biden administration is overhauling the hiring process for Foreign Service officers at the State Department, deemphasizing the importance of the test that all applicants must take in hopes of widening its talent pool.
The union that represents those workers, the American Foreign Service Association, blasted the decision, saying the more open-ended process could lead to more politicized hiring. State made the change as the Biden administration is lowering the strict educational attainment thresholds that have long been in place across government while giving subject matter experts a larger role in evaluating candidates.
Those seeking to become FSOs have since 1924 taken a test that measures their writing and language skills, world history and U.S. government knowledge, and judgment in relevant situations. Candidates who pass the test, which is offered three times annually, then submit a series of personal narrative essays and are reviewed by a “qualifications evaluation panel.”
Under the new system, which will go into effect for the June 2022 application period, the test will no longer serve as the “single gateway” to move forward in the process. Instead, everyone who completes the test will go to the evaluation panel. The panelists will “review the full application package for eligible candidates,” including test results and personal narrative essays. The panels will then select candidates to move forward to the oral assessment stage.
Eric Rubin, a former FSO and ambassador who now serves as AFSA’s president, said his organization was “deeply concerned” about the changes. AFSA was not consulted on the reform, he said, breaking with the Biden administration’s promises to engage more directly with federal employee unions than did their predecessors.
“We urge fuller transparency on how hiring decisions will be made through this new system, which risks being seen as excessively subjective and subject to partisan influence,” Rubin said.
Ned Price, a State spokesman, pushed back on the criticism, saying the new process would lead to a "more qualified pool of candidates."
"To meet the secretary's goals to modernize American diplomacy, win the competition for talent and ensure that all applicants can present a full picture of their qualifications, the Department of State today is announcing improvements to the Foreign Service selection process," Price said. "The department is moving away from FSO test as a pass/fail gateway test and expanding focus on a candidates’ education and experience for a more holistic approach in the selection process."
He added State did not opt to get rid of the test altogether as it still needs “metrics to measure potential new colleagues against” and predicted that allowing more people to get deeper into the process would “not at all” slow down hiring.
“We are confident that this restructured and revised process will help us select [an] applicant pool that is experienced and that brings to bear the talents and diversity this country has to offer,” Price said.
Continuing an effort first undertaken by President Trump, the Biden administration is in the midst of implementing a governmentwide initiative to make determinations on qualifications for federal jobs based more on evaluations of a candidate’s skills. The Office of Personnel Management has rolled out a new assessment system allowing subject matter experts to more accurately measure job applicants’ skillsets and make it easier for hiring managers to select qualified candidates.
At a Senate hearing on Tuesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the department has already onboarded 179 FSOs this year and is on pace for its largest annual hiring total in a decade. Blinken thanked lawmakers for providing funding in the fiscal 2022 omnibus to make that possible and asked for another increase as requested in the fiscal 2023 budget to allow for more than 500 additional FSOs next year. Such a staffing level would allow for a “float” of more than 200 officers who can engage in training and temporary assignments to further “professionalize” the department’s workforce.
In his first weeks in office, Biden went to State to praise FSOs and tell the workforce they were “the center of all that I intend to do.”
“In our administration you’re going to be entrusted and empowered to do your job,” Biden said. “I believe in you. We need you, badly. I trust you. I’m going to have your back. That I promise you.”
This story has been updated with comment from the State Department.
14. Taliban Faces Rising Armed Resistance From Former Government Factions
Will anyone support the resistance?
Excerpts:
Kate Clark, the co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network think tank, said that although most drivers of war have not disappeared from Afghanistan, it is not clear whether it will lead to an armed opposition.
She points to the Taliban, which took years to regroup and recover from their ousting in late 2001 to reappear as an insurgency.
“The armed opposition that has emerged is in a relatively weak position by historical standards: it controls no territory next to a border [and] has no neighbor or great power obviously backing it,” she told RFE/RL.
Taliban Faces Rising Armed Resistance From Former Government Factions
For nearly two decades, the Taliban launched an annual deadly spring offensive in a bid to regain the power it lost in 2001.
As the snows melted in the Afghan mountains, Taliban fighters hastened their attacks on officials and troops of the pro-Western Afghan republic and soldiers from dozens of NATO-led Western countries allied with it.
Now, in an apparent reversal of roles, factions of the fallen Afghan republic are claiming attacks on the Taliban in many provinces in what seems to be an uncoordinated spring offensive.
Those groups are tapping into vast reserves of potential guerrilla fighters from among the hundreds of thousands of Western-trained security forces that served the former government but lost their jobs after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan eight months ago.
Anti-Taliban uprising forces in Panjshir. (file photo)
Former leaders of the West-backed republic hope the rebellion will eventually turn into a national uprising against what they view as Taliban rule that has repressed women and alienated ethnic and religious minorities.
They are also banking on attracting help from Afghanistan’s weary neighbors and global powers concerned by the return of terrorist groups to the country already reeling from rising violence by the radical Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).
The Taliban, however, considers the resistance small and insignificant.
“There is nothing that has improved since the Taliban seized power,” said a former official of the Afghan Foreign Ministry close to the emerging resistance. “I am sure we will see a much bigger uprising against the Taliban,” he added, requesting anonymity because of security fears.
One of the most visible anti-Taliban groups is the National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Masud, son of the Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masud who successfully prevented the Taliban from overrunning Afghanistan until he was killed by Al-Qaeda assassins two days before the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001.
Former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, who like Masud hails from the northern province of Panjshir, is a close ally. The two left Panjshir in September, just weeks after the Taliban takeover of Kabul the previous month. But their supporters are still launching sporadic attacks against the Taliban in remote Panjshir valleys.
Supporters of former Interior Minister Masud Andrai have offered the most formidable resistance with somewhat regular attacks on the Taliban in Andrab, a high-altitude valley in the northern province of Baghlan.
One of the most significant attacks was in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif last week when supporters of former warlord Atta Mohammad Noor clashed with the Taliban.
His nephew, Sohail Zmarai, was reportedly killed in an intense firefight that was acknowledged by the Taliban.
Taliban fighters pose for a picture in front of a bakery in the Khenj district of Panjshir Province in September.
Some reports suggest the supporters of late anti-Taliban police commander Abdul Raziq are ready to join the resistance in Kandahar.
Attacks have also been reported in recent weeks in the Kapisa, Parwan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Ghor, Sar-e Pol, and Jawzjan provinces. The violence is distinct from the IS-K attacks that have mainly targeted Shi'ite mosques and schools in Kabul and several Afghan cities this month.
Former Defense Minister Bismillah Khan, ex-General Staff chief Yasin Zia, and Abdul Ghani Alipur -- an ethnic Hazara militia leader -- are other notable names in the resistance.
“The Taliban offered us nothing,” Ahmad Masud said in a video message last month, elaborating on how months of negotiations with the Taliban failed to secure a political agreement.
“They offered us two things: surrender and pledge allegiance [to the Taliban],” he said.
The Taliban's rigid policies are apparently a reason for the increased armed resistance, with the various opposition factions claiming attacks against Taliban officials and fighters in several provinces.
“[Anti-Taliban] groups are popping up everywhere in Afghanistan,” the former Foreign Ministry official said. “They were just waiting to see how things would go under the Taliban.”
The official said former government leaders involved in the resistance are trying to unite behind a vision in ongoing negotiations. “Sometime soon there will be a conference in Europe,” he said.
Former government officials and leading warlords such as ethnic Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, Hazara Mohammad Mohaqiq, Noor, and others have a long history of infighting, which might prevent them from posing a serious challenge to the Taliban.
There are also signs that former Afghan Army leaders are trying to rally their troops.
Afghan resistance movement and anti-Taliban uprising forces patrol on a hilltop in the Darband area of the Anaba district, Panjshir Province, in September.
"The Taliban has left us no choice but to pick up our weapons again to win back our freedom," former Lieutenant General Sami Sadat said.
Sadat fought some of the most challenging battles against the Taliban last year and was widely regarded as a capable military leader.
“We will take all practical steps for our homeland,” he added. “These include political and civic activism and military engagement.”
But the Taliban is not impressed.
“We can control these small and fragmented efforts,” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Radio Azadi. "We have the intelligence to prevent and eliminate such efforts."
Mujahid said that after four decades of war, Afghanistan is awash with weapons, which makes it easy to launch attacks. “Yet our forces are capable of providing security to the people and act against those trying to resist [our government].”
Kate Clark, the co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network think tank, said that although most drivers of war have not disappeared from Afghanistan, it is not clear whether it will lead to an armed opposition.
She points to the Taliban, which took years to regroup and recover from their ousting in late 2001 to reappear as an insurgency.
“The armed opposition that has emerged is in a relatively weak position by historical standards: it controls no territory next to a border [and] has no neighbor or great power obviously backing it,” she told RFE/RL.
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, rebellions backed by foreign powers have succeeded in Afghanistan. The mujahedin forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan with generous funding and support from the West and Pakistan. And Afghan forces and their Western allies failed to eradicate the Taliban because of its safe havens in Pakistan.
Clark said that the failed republic is tainted in the minds of many Afghans because of widespread corruption and lackluster governance.
“The Taliban are more used to fighting than governing and would probably prefer armed ‘rebellion’ to mass civil disobedience,” she said.
15. Russia doubles fossil fuel revenues since invasion of Ukraine began
How can this be?
Russia doubles fossil fuel revenues since invasion of Ukraine began
Country receives about €62bn from exports of oil, gas and coal in two months, with Germany the biggest importer
Russia has nearly doubled its revenues from selling fossil fuels to the EU during the two months of war in Ukraine, benefiting from soaring prices even as volumes have been reduced.
Russia has received about €62bn from exports of oil, gas and coal in the two months since the invasion began, according to an analysis of shipping movements and cargos by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
For the EU, imports were about €44bn for the past two months, compared with about €140bn for the whole of last year, or roughly €12bn a month.
Even though exports from Russia have been reduced by the war and sanctions, the country’s dominance as a source of gas has meant cutting off supplies has only increased prices, which were already high because of tight supply as global economies recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic. Crude oil shipments from Russia to foreign ports fell by 30% in the first three weeks of April, compared with rates in January and February, before the invasion, according to the CREA data.
But the higher prices Russia can now command for its oil and gas mean its revenues, which flow almost directly to the Russian government through state-dominated companies, have risen even while sanctions and export restrictions bite. Russia has effectively caught the EU in a trap where further restrictions will raise prices further, cushioning its revenues despite the best efforts of EU governments.
Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst for CREA, said the cash propped up Putin’s war effort, and the only way to disable his war machine was to move rapidly away from fossil fuels. “Fossil fuel exports are a key enabler of Putin’s regime, and many other rogue states,” he said. “Continued energy imports are the major gaps in the sanctions imposed on Russia. Everyone who buys these fossil fuels is complicit in the horrendous violations of international law carried out by the Russian military.”
Louis J Wilson, senior adviser at campaigning group Global Witness, said Russia’s willingness to violate its own contracts meant businesses now had no excuse for continuing to trade with Russia. “Fossil fuel majors and commodity traders who have continued trading in Russian fossil fuels, claiming that they are forced to do so by their long-term contracts, should take note of the value of the agreements they hold with Russian entities. Russia is willing to tear up these contracts to support their own war effort, yet European companies supposedly feel compelled to continue financing war crimes out of respect for them,” he said.
“The corporate enablers of this deadly trade have shown they will stop at nothing to continue profiting from Russia’s blood oil.”
Germany was the biggest importer in the last two months, despite repeated avowals by the government that halting dependence on Russian oil was a priority. The country paid about €9bn for imports during the period. Italy and the Netherlands were also big importers, with about €6.8bn and €5.6bn respectively, but as those countries operate major ports, which take in products for refining and use in the chemical industries as well as for domestic consumption, many of those imports were probably used elsewhere.
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A spokesperson for Shell told the Guardian that the company had taken decisive action in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. “We have announced our intent to exit our joint ventures with Gazprom and related entities and to phase out all Russian hydrocarbons, in consultation with governments. Since we announced this intent, we have stopped all spot purchases of Russian crude, liquefied natural gas and of cargos of refined products directly exported from Russia.”
And a spokesperson for Exxon said: “We support the internationally coordinated efforts to bring Russia’s unprovoked attack to an end, and we are complying with all sanctions. We have not made any new contracts for Russian products since the Russian invasion, and there are no deliveries of Russian crude or refined products currently scheduled for the UK. We will not invest in new developments in Russia.”
“Two months after Putin invaded Ukraine, Germany is still funding the Russian war chest to the tune of €4.5bn a month. Berlin is the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels,” Bernice Lee, a research director at the Chatham House thinktank, told the Guardian. “The world is looking to Germany to demonstrate strength and determination towards Russia, but instead they’re bankrolling the war and blocking a European embargo on Russian oil.”
16. Ukraine crisis: Why India is buying more Russian oil
I guess this partially answers why Russia's fossil fuel revenues have gone up.
Ukraine crisis: Why India is buying more Russian oil
By Shruti Menon
BBC Reality Check
Rising global oil prices are a concern for India's policymakers
As calls continue for India to keep its distance from Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine, its oil purchases from Russia have more than doubled from last year.
The Indian government has defended the move to buy Russian oil, and said what it buys from Russia in a month is less than what Europe buys from Russia in an afternoon.
Why is India buying more Russian oil?
India has taken advantage of discounted prices to ramp up oil imports from Russia at a time when global energy prices have been rising.
The US has said that although these oil imports do not violate sanctions, "support for Russia...is support for an invasion that obviously is having a devastating impact".
UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss also urged India to reduce its dependence on Russia during a trip to Delhi in March, which took place at the same time as a visit by the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov.
Mr Lavrov told his Indian counterparts that Russia was willing to discuss any goods that India wanted to buy and urged that payments be made in roubles.
Where does India get its oil?
After the US and China, India is the world's third-largest consumer of oil, over 80% of which is imported.
But in 2021, only around 2% of its total oil imports (12 million barrels of Urals crude) came from Russia, according to Kpler, a commodities research group.
By far the largest supplies last year came from oil producers in the Middle East, with significant quantities also from the US and Nigeria.
In January and February, India didn't import any oil from Russia.
But so far, the amount of Urals oil contracts made for India covering March, April, May and June - around 26 million barrels - is higher than the quantity purchased during the whole of 2021, according to Kpler.
What's the deal India is getting?
Following its invasion of Ukraine, there are now fewer buyers for Russia's Ural crude oil, with some foreign governments and companies deciding to shun Russian energy exports, and its price has fallen.
While the exact price of the sales made to India is unknown, "the discount of Urals to Brent crude [the global benchmark] remains at around $30 per barrel", says Matt Smith, an analyst at Kpler.
These two types of crude normally sell at a similar price.
At one point in March, as the price of Urals crude continued to drop, the difference between them reached an all-time record, he adds.
So "India is likely to purchase at least some of this [Russian] crude at a significant discount," he says.
Image source, Getty Images
Image caption,
India imports more than 80% of its oil
What's the impact of financial sanctions?
Although the price is attractive, India's big refining companies are facing a challenge trying to finance these purchases, because of sanctions on Russian banks.
It's a problem facing trade in both directions.
One of the options India is looking at is a transaction system based on local currencies, where Indian exporters to Russia get paid in roubles instead of dollars or euros.
The US has made clear its reservations with this, saying it could "prop up the rouble or undermine the dollar-based financial system".
Where else is India looking to buy oil?
India's oil imports from the US have gone up significantly since February, according to analysts at Refinitiv.
However, market analysts say this may not be sustainable in the future as the US seeks to use its domestic oil production to replace supplies from Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
But this is unlikely to resume without a wider deal reached in international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme.
17. US Army to choose whether it’ll pursue a hybrid Bradley vehicle in FY23
The M2 Asomething Prius Bradley.
Excerpts:
The Bradley vehicle is already pushed to the maximum when it comes to using power to support everything from running the vehicle to controlling its payloads. Going hybrid would provide other benefits as well such as greater survivability by reducing thermal and acoustic signatures, better acceleration, increased lethality and more onboard power to support the possible incorporation of high-energy lasers, according to budget documents.
The Army plans to conclude development efforts in the third quarter of FY22 and will then test prototypes at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Testing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, will also take place beginning in the fourth quarter of FY22.
Both testing efforts will come to a close in the first quarter of FY23, the justification books show.
Earlier this year, a 3rd Infantry Division unit at Fort Stewart, Georgia, became the first unit equipped with the modernized M2A4 Bradley following the Army’s decade-long effort to upgrade the vehicles.
The “A4″ variant is an engineering change proposal program that brings in new suspension and track upgrades. It also upgrades the electrical system and powertrain to restore lost mobility and integrate new technologies.
US Army to choose whether it’ll pursue a hybrid Bradley vehicle in FY23
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army will decide whether it will further pursue a hybrid version of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle in fiscal 2023, according to budget justification documents.
The service has been working to develop a hybrid Bradley for several years and will wrap up the process through a series of tests in FY22.
The funding for hybrid Bradley prototyping is not broken out of a combat vehicle prototyping line item of $164 million in FY22, according to the documents. The funding includes other efforts to examine advanced combat vehicle concepts, next-generation fire control technologies, XM913 chain gun development and even a vehicle protection technology demonstrator.
The Bradley vehicle is already pushed to the maximum when it comes to using power to support everything from running the vehicle to controlling its payloads. Going hybrid would provide other benefits as well such as greater survivability by reducing thermal and acoustic signatures, better acceleration, increased lethality and more onboard power to support the possible incorporation of high-energy lasers, according to budget documents.
The Army plans to conclude development efforts in the third quarter of FY22 and will then test prototypes at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Testing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, will also take place beginning in the fourth quarter of FY22.
Both testing efforts will come to a close in the first quarter of FY23, the justification books show.
Earlier this year, a 3rd Infantry Division unit at Fort Stewart, Georgia, became the first unit equipped with the modernized M2A4 Bradley following the Army’s decade-long effort to upgrade the vehicles.
The “A4″ variant is an engineering change proposal program that brings in new suspension and track upgrades. It also upgrades the electrical system and powertrain to restore lost mobility and integrate new technologies.
The road to delivering the A4 has been rough. A year ago, the Army was testing a solution to address overheating and toxic gas production in the newest version of the Bradley’s turret battery, for example, which delayed the program by almost a year.
Integrating electric capability into a vehicle like Bradley is challenging. but it will likely be far into the future when the Army considers fully electric options for combat vehicles or tanks.
The Army’s recently released climate strategy lays out a goal to field fully electric tactical vehicles by 2050, but hybrid ones by 2035.
Additionally, the Army is continuing analysis and technology development of a next-generation powertrain for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that considers hybrid and a fully electric option. Oshkosh unveiled a hybrid version of the JLTV earlier this year.
“It’s about size and weight,” Brig. Gen. Glenn Dean, program executive officer for ground combat systems, told Defense News in an interview last year. “If you took the amount of batteries with current technology that you would need to move an Abrams tank purely electrically, it’s bigger than the tank, so we have a packaging and storage problem when it comes to pure electric.”
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts from Kenyon College.
18. Russia unable to fight another war after catastrophic military losses
Russia unable to fight another war after catastrophic military losses
Newsweek · by Giulia Carbonaro · April 27, 2022
On Monday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the U.S. wanted to see Russia so "weakened" that it won't be able to support another war like the one it initiated in Ukraine.
Now, analysts suggest Moscow might have already reached that point.
In an article published on Wednesday, analysts told The Times they believe Russia already burned through so much of its military strength in the past two months of war that it could be "years" before the Kremlin is able to order another such invasion of a neighboring country.
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at Washington think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the British newspaper that, according to estimates, Russia might have already lost the equivalent of two years of tank production, one year's supply of aircraft and likely several year's worth of missile production since the beginning of the invasion on February 24.
Analysts believe that Russia has lost so much of its military equipment since the beginning of the war in Ukraine on February 24 that it will take the country "years" to restore its inventory. Russian President Vladimir Putin talks to officers as he attends Russia's large-scale Center-2015 military exercises at Donguzsky Range on September 19, 2015 in Orenburg, Russia. Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images
According to the investigative website Bellingcat, Russia is estimated to have lost 70 percent of the precision missiles in its inventory - costly, highly valuable military equipment.
Ukrainian authorities claim even bigger losses among the Russian army, saying that the Russian military has lost a total of 939 tanks, 185 planes, 155 helicopters, 421 artillery units and eight ships since the beginning of the war, according to the latest estimates.
These numbers are likely inflated, and yet independent estimates still report significant losses for Russian troops.
Oryx, a website that has been documenting equipment losses, has collected photo and video evidence of 3,222 vehicles and pieces of military equipment lost by Vladimir Putin's forces in Ukraine in the last two months.
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Santa Monica-based political think tank RAND estimated that Russia had a total of some 2,700 tanks at the beginning of the war in February. Oryx estimates that Russia has so far lost 571 tanks in Ukraine, on top of 4 naval ships, 38 helicopters, 26 aircraft and hundreds of armored vehicles.
Such losses forced Russia to draw its troops back from the area surrounding Kyiv last month and redirect offensive to the Donbas region, which is now the declared target of the Russian campaign in Ukraine.
The military setbacks suffered by Russia in the past almost nine weeks of war are matched by unexpectedly high troop losses among the ranks of Moscow's soldiers in Ukraine. NATO estimates that Russia might have lost between 7,000 and 15,000 soldiers - a quarter of its initial ground combat force estimated at 140,000, as Cancian writes.
A woman walks past destroyed Russian military vehicles close to the central train station that was used as a Russian base on March 30 in Trostyanets, Ukraine. Oryx estimates Russia has lost over 500 tanks in Ukraine. Chris McGrath/Getty Images
Russia admitted to huge losses among its troops, though it's believed that the real number of total deaths has not been shared with the public in Russia. In an interview with Sky News on April 7, Kremlin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Russia had suffered "significant losses of troops," adding that it was "a huge tragedy for us."
But in its latest update, Moscow reported the loss of less than 1,500 soldiers in Ukraine.
Ukrainian authorities report the number of deaths among Russian troops to be much higher than either NATO estimates and Russia's reports: last week, Ukrainian Land Forces claimed over 21,000 Russian troops had lost their lives during the conflict.
IISS military analyst Henry Boyd told The Times that Russia could replenish its inventory by drawing upon reserves of Soviet-era tanks, but it's possible that troops would be unable to use such dated equipment, and reactivating such equipment would equal a drop in quality of Russia's military power.
At the same time, Western sanctions are likely slowing down production of new military equipment, impeding Russia from having access to necessary components.
Newsweek reached out to the Russian Ministry of Defense for comment.
Newsweek · by Giulia Carbonaro · April 27, 2022
19. U.S. no longer in ‘full-blown’ pandemic phase, Fauci says
Hopefully this means good news and good times ahead.
U.S. no longer in ‘full-blown’ pandemic phase, Fauci says
By Joel Achenbach and Bryan Pietsch
Yesterday at 5:32 a.m. EDT|Updated yesterday at 2:30 p.m. EDT
The United States is finally “out of the full-blown explosive pandemic phase” that has led to nearly 1 million deaths from covid-19 and more than two years of suffering and hardship, Anthony S. Fauci, President Biden’s chief medical adviser, said Wednesday.
“We’re really in a transitional phase, from a deceleration of the numbers into hopefully a more controlled phase and endemicity,” Fauci told The Washington Post.
Fauci’s comments came a day after he told PBS’s “NewsHour” that he believed the country is “out of the pandemic phase,” and he expanded on, and clarified, that view Wednesday, making clear that the pandemic is not over and the United States could still see new waves of infections as the virus continues to mutate and spin off highly transmissible variants. But Fauci and other infectious-disease experts are hoping that the population has built up enough immunity from previous infections and vaccinations to avoid another devastating surge in hospitalizations and deaths.
“The world is still in a pandemic. There’s no doubt about that. Don’t anybody get any misinterpretation of that. We are still experiencing a pandemic,” Fauci said.
His comments follow a report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicating that roughly 3 in 5 people in the United States have already been infected by the coronavirus. About 1 in 4 people had a first-time infection during the winter wave caused by the omicron variant.
These startling numbers suggest the country has a much higher level of collective immunity than it did before omicron. What is far less clear is how long that immunity will persist, and to what extent it could be evaded by new coronavirus variants.
The omicron subvariant BA.2.12.1 is the latest version to seize the attention of public health experts. It is rapidly gaining traction, and CDC estimated Tuesday that it accounted for about 30 percent of new infections. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky said preliminary estimates suggest it is about 25 percent more transmissible than the omicron subvariant BA.2, itself more transmissible than the original omicron strain.
The virus’s ability to mutate and work around the human immune system has made experts cautious about predicting the trajectory of the pandemic.
“Not to be gloom and doom, but the central issue is that we do not know whether the virus will spawn new variants capable of eroding the protection from vaccines and therapeutics,” Columbia University epidemiologist Jeffrey Shaman said in an email Wednesday. “Over the coming years, we will gain a better sense of that capacity.”
Fauci’s comments on the end of the “pandemic phase” could easily be misinterpreted, said Andrew Noymer, an epidemiologist at the University of California at Irvine.
“There’s still a lot of moving parts here. I don’t disagree with what Fauci said, but as soon as I heard it, I figured it would be wildly misinterpreted by your average member of the public,” Noymer said.
Fauci took pains Wednesday to explain his thinking. The country has not reached a major milestone, he said. He was pointing out what is clear from the coronavirus trackers in recent months: The country is in a different position than it was previously. He said the United States was in the “full-blown pandemic phase” in the winter, then entered a period he refers to as the “deceleration” phase.
“There’s the full-blown pandemic dynamic, the way we were months ago, where we were having 900,000 cases a day, tens of thousands of hospitalizations, 3,000 deaths a day,” he said. “The deaths went from 3,000 down to 300.”
The country is transitioning, he said, to what he calls the “control” phase. That’s where he expects the health emergency to settle down, with the virus still circulating but not causing devastating new waves of hospitalization and death. Asked if the country is in the control phase now, he said not quite yet.
In May 2021, Fauci told The Post he thought the virus could reach the “control” stage by autumn of that year. The delta variant soon rendered that a pipe dream. Before the delta wave had even subsided, omicron came roaring in, sickening tens of millions as 2021 turned into 2022.
Case numbers dropped precipitously for a couple of months but have been ticking upward in recent weeks, driven by the omicron subvariants BA.2 and BA.2.12.1.
“Right now, we’re at a low enough level that I believe that we’re transitioning into endemicity. … We’re not in the full-blown explosive pandemic phase. That does not mean that the pandemic is over,” Fauci said. “A pandemic means widespread infection throughout the world. … In our country, we’re transitioning into more of a controlled endemicity.”
Restrictions are easing as many Americans appear to be putting the pandemic behind them. Masking requirements have been lifted across most of the country, and officials stopped enforcing a federal mask mandate in transportation settings after a judge struck down the requirement.
Officials cautioned that the new CDC data on widespread infections does not ensure that individuals have infection-induced immunity against the virus. While previous infections are believed to offer some protection against serious disease for most people, health experts say the best protection against infection and serious disease or death is vaccination.
The coronavirus will not be eradicated, Fauci told PBS, but can be handled if its level of spread is kept “very low” and people are “intermittently” vaccinated, though he said he did not know how frequently that would have to happen. And he echoed warnings from the World Health Organization and the United Nations this month that the pandemic is far from over worldwide as vaccination rates remain too low, particularly in developing nations.
The Biden administration, meanwhile, is appealing a ruling by a Trump-appointed judge that struck down the federal transportation mask mandate, including on planes, though even if successful, the effort would face an American public that could be unwilling to comply again.
And in a reminder that the coronavirus is still present, the White House on Tuesday announced arguably the nation’s highest-profile coronavirus infection since President Donald Trump’s in 2020, saying that Vice President Harris had tested positive and was asymptomatic. She was not considered a close contact to Biden, the White House said.
Fauci, meanwhile, has decided against going to the swank White House Correspondents’ Association dinner Saturday, which Biden reportedly plans to attend. Fauci this month attended the Gridiron dinner, at which scores of people became infected. On Wednesday, he declined to discuss his reasoning for skipping what’s often referred to as the “nerd prom,” saying simply, “It’s just my personal choice.”
20. Japan edges from pacifism to more robust defense stance
Japan edges from pacifism to more robust defense stance | DW | 28.04.2022
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, conservative Japanese MPs are pushing for the country to move further away from its pacifist principles, towards greater defense spending and counterstrike capabilities.
The assets of Russia's central bank and other major Russian banks have been frozen, along with assets owned by 500 Russian individuals and organizations. Japan has banned the export of high-end technology to Russia and made it illegal to make new investments there.
Japan will revoke Russia's trade status as a so-called favored nation. In addition, the Asian nation wants to quickly forego Russian coal imports, but will not abandon a joint Russo-Japanese liquefiednaturalgas project in Siberia. 60 out of 168 Japanese companies operating in Russia have withdrawn from the country. Among them are carmaker Toyota and tech giant Sony.
Japan's swift and determined action regarding Russia shows the country seeks to become a leading actor in world politics. Indeed, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida hopes greater international standing will allow Japan to assert its political and economic interest. 64-year-old Kishida, who served as foreign minster between 20212 and 2017 and briefly as defense minister, seeks to close ranks with the US, its strategic partner.
At the same time, Japan yearns to graduate from the role of junior partner. "Japan will reorient its security policy given Russia's invasion of Ukraine," according to Japan expert Sebastian Maslow of Sendai Shirayuri Women's College.
Boosting defense spending
Japan, which once placed pacifism at the center of its foreign policy, is adopting an ever more robust security stance. This gradual shift was initiated by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. It has entailed a reinterpretation of Article 9of the JapaneseConstitution which prohibits Japan from waging war and maintaining an army. Despite this, Abe has permitted the country's Japan Self-Defense Forces to aid international allies in case of a "severe threat."
If, for instance, a US warship was attacked, Japanese Self-Defense Forces could come to its protection. They have also been granted permission to embark on mine clearance missions in the Middle East to protect Japanese economic interests. Previous leaders had reject such "collective self-dense" as unconstitutional.
In light of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Kishida and the conservative leadership aim to further erode the country's pacifist stance. Several days ago, members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LPD) proposed doubling Japan's defense budget to 2% of GDP within five years.
Former Prime Minster Abe backed the move. "All NATO countries have without exception declared they will grow their defense budget to 2% of GDP," Abe said last week at the Forum for Strategic Studies, adding that Japan would "make a fool of itself" if it didn't follow suit.
Thus far, Japan stuck to a threshold of 1% of GDP, in line with its defensive foreign and defense policy. "Aside from Putin's war, dangers posed by China and North Korea are being used to justify this defense spending surge," explains Maslow. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Japan already grew its budget by 7,3% last year to $54,1 billion (€51,3 billion) — the greatest increase since 1972.
This policy shift could be codified later this year when Japan amends its national security strategy for the first time since 2013. Japan's BuddhistKomei, the LDP's junior coalition partner, has signaled it would oppose this step. Komei leader Natsuo Yamaguchi has said that the Japanese public would not "readily accept" a doubling of the defense budget if this meant cutting social welfare or raising taxes.
Counterstrike capacity
LDP security experts are calling for the introducing of weapons systems capable of countering enemy threats before they strike. Shinzo Abe previously also had called for Japan to develop counterstrike capabilities. This ability would, however, go against the country's constitutionally enshrined pacifism.
Speaking to US military publication Stars and Stripes, Tetsuo Kotani, a senior research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, explained the government's agenda: "We are trying to introduce counterstrike capabilities." He added that "we will rely on existing missile defense systems to intercept the first wave of missiles but after missile strikes start, we need to eliminate the missile launchers or runways in enemy territory to disrupt their operations." Japan currently operates Patriot and Aegis missile defense systems. To enhance its counterstrike capacity, it may allow the deployment of medium-range missile systems on Japanese territories, he said.
Japan does not, meanwhile, intend to abandon its pledge to shun nuclear weapons. While former Prime Minister Abe recently suggested US nuclear weapons could be station in Japan, as is the case in Germany, this idea was quickly dismissed by current Prime Minster Kishida. He said doing so would violate Japan's commitment to neither build, own nor station nuclear weapons.
This article was originally written in German.
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
21. U.S. has "credible" information Russian troops executed Ukrainians trying to surrender
The evil nature of Putin's military (and contractors) fighting Putin's War.
U.S. has "credible" information Russian troops executed Ukrainians trying to surrender
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · April 28, 2022
The U.S. has "credible information" that a Russian military unit in Ukraine's Donetsk region "executed Ukrainians who were attempting to surrender, rather than take them into custody," a top American official told the United Nations Wednesday.
What they're saying: "If true, this would be a violation of a core principle of the laws of war," said Beth Van Schaack, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice in her remarks to the U.N. Security Council.
- Specifically, "the prohibition against the summary execution of civilians and combatants who are hors de combat by virtue of surrender, injury, or other forms of incapacitation," she said.
- Van Schaack added that the U.S. also has "credible reports of individuals killed execution-style with their hands bound; bodies showing signs of torture; horrific accounts of sexual violence against women and girls."
The bottom line: "These images and reports suggest that atrocities are not the result of rogue units or individuals; they, rather, reveal a deeply disturbing pattern of systematic abuse across all areas where Russia’s forces are engaged," Van Schaack said.
-
President Biden accused Putin's forces earlier this month of committing "genocide" in Ukraine, but the Kremlin has repeatedly denied that its forces have committed any war crimes in the country.
- The Kremlin has repeatedly denied that its military has committed any atrocities in Ukraine.
Between the lines: War crimes have been historically hard to investigate and often even more challenging to prosecute, per Axios' Laurin-Whitney Gottbrath.
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · April 28, 2022
22. A political reckoning in Sri Lanka as debt crisis grows
Is Sri Lanka a blinking red light flashing a warning to others?
Excerpts:
The unravelling of Sri Lanka’s economy has been swift and painful. Imports of everything from milk to fuel have plunged, spawning dire food shortages and rolling power cuts. People have been forced to queue for hours every day to buy essentials. Doctors have warned of a crippling shortage of life-saving drugs in hospitals, and the government has suspended payments on $7 billion in foreign debts due this year alone.
“The Rajapaksas, like an octopus, have held on to every aspect of public life in Sri Lanka,” de Silva said. “They have been running it as if it was their kingdom. They wished and they did –- that’s how it was and people were with them.”
President Rajapaksa has defended his government, partly blaming the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine. “This crisis was not created by me,” he said in a speech last month, adding that his government was working hard on solutions. They include approaching the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for assistance, after repeated calls to do so.
But as protesters seethed, the president and prime minister have changed tact in recent weeks. They have admitted to mistakes they made that exacerbated the crisis, such as implementing a short-lived ban last year on importing chemical fertilizers that badly hurt farmers and conceding that they should have sought a bailout sooner.
A political reckoning in Sri Lanka as debt crisis grows
AP · by KRUTIKA PATHI and KRISHAN FRANCIS · April 28, 2022
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka (AP) — Sherry Fonseka joined millions in 2019 in electing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a military strategist whose brutal campaign helped end Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war 10 years earlier.
Now he is one of thousands who, for weeks, have protested outside the president’s office, calling on Rajapaksa and his brother, Mahinda, who is prime minister, to resign for leading the country into its worst economic crisis since its independence from Britain in 1948.
With the island teetering near bankruptcy, Fonseka, who owns a small garment business in the capital, Colombo, has resorted to spending his own savings to pay the salaries of his 30 employees. But he knows he will soon have to let them go and is clear about who is to blame.
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“All of us thought we made the correct decision (to elect Rajapaksa), but we’ve realized we were wrong. We should have the backbone to tell people, and the world, that we made a mistake,” he said.
In recent weeks, protests have erupted across the country demanding that Rajapaksa quit.
The protests highlight the dramatic fall of the Rajapaksas from Sri Lanka’s most powerful political dynasty in decades to a family grasping to retain power. Despite accusations of atrocities during the civil war, Gotabaya and Mahinda, who was previously president, remained heroes to many of the island’s Buddhist-Sinhalese majority and were firmly entrenched at the top of Sri Lankan politics before the revolt by previous supporters like Fonseka.
“The pendulum has swung from ‘it’s all about the Rajapaksas, they are the people who saved this country,’ to ‘it is because of the Rajapaksas that the country is now ruined,’” said Harsha de Silva, an economist and opposition lawmaker.
The unravelling of Sri Lanka’s economy has been swift and painful. Imports of everything from milk to fuel have plunged, spawning dire food shortages and rolling power cuts. People have been forced to queue for hours every day to buy essentials. Doctors have warned of a crippling shortage of life-saving drugs in hospitals, and the government has suspended payments on $7 billion in foreign debts due this year alone.
“The Rajapaksas, like an octopus, have held on to every aspect of public life in Sri Lanka,” de Silva said. “They have been running it as if it was their kingdom. They wished and they did –- that’s how it was and people were with them.”
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President Rajapaksa has defended his government, partly blaming the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine. “This crisis was not created by me,” he said in a speech last month, adding that his government was working hard on solutions. They include approaching the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for assistance, after repeated calls to do so.
But as protesters seethed, the president and prime minister have changed tact in recent weeks. They have admitted to mistakes they made that exacerbated the crisis, such as implementing a short-lived ban last year on importing chemical fertilizers that badly hurt farmers and conceding that they should have sought a bailout sooner.
Influential Buddhist monks have urged Rajapaksa to form an interim government under a new prime minister, signaling a further decline in the family’s image as protectors of the country’s 70% Buddhist-Sinhalese majority. Some observers say it’s too soon to measure how much support for the Rajapaksas has fallen among their hardcore base, but for many their response has been too little and too late.
“There is now recognition across the government of several missteps, but it’s one that’s come at a huge cost to the people,” said Bhavani Fonseka, a senior researcher at the Colombo-based Center for Policy Alternatives.
The Rajapaksas were a powerful land-owning family which for decades dominated local elections in their rural southern district, before rising to the helm of national politics in 2005 when Mahinda was elected president. He remained in power until 2015, overseeing the end of the civil war against ethnic Tamil rebels in 2009, before losing to the opposition led by his former aide.
Suicide bombings that killed 290 people on Easter Sunday in 2019 paved the way for the Rajapaksas’ return, this time as Gotabaya launched a high-pitched nationalist campaign that tapped outrage and disillusionment with the previous government over the attacks.
He vowed a return to the muscular nationalism that had made his family popular with the Buddhist majority, and also to bring the country out of an economic slump with a message of stability and development.
Tourism had dropped sharply after the bomb attacks and Sri Lanka needed badly to boost revenue to service a slew of foreign loans for splashy infrastructure projects. Some involved Chinese money and were commissioned under his brother’s presidency, but had failed to create profits, instead collecting debt.
Just days into his presidency, Rajapaksa pushed through the largest tax cuts in Sri Lanka’s history to spur spending even as critics warned that it would shrink the government’s finances. According to Nishan de Mel, executive director of Verité Research, Sri Lanka’s tax base fell by 30%.
“When you do something like that, you have some kind of internal analysis or document that shows why these cuts could help the economy. There was nothing of that sort,” de Mel said.
The move triggered immediate punishment from the global market as creditors downgraded Sri Lanka’s ratings, making it impossible for it to borrow more money as its foreign exchange reserves continued to dwindle. Then the coronavirus hit, further crushing tourism as debts snowballed.
Analysts say the Rajapaksas’ response to the economic challenges underscored the limitations of their strongman politics and their family’s near-monopoly on decision making, heavily relying on the military to enforce policy and passing laws to weaken independent institutions.
Three other Rajapaksa family members were in the Cabinet until early April, when the Cabinet resigned en masse in response to the protests.
“Their entire political ideology and credibility is in serious crisis,” said Jayadeva Uyangoda, a veteran political scientist.
But many fear that things will only get worse before improving. A divided and weak opposition without a majority in Parliament has kept the Rajapaksas in power. An IMF bailout could see austere measures intensifying hardships for people before there is relief.
Meanwhile, the focus remains on the protests, which are drawing people across ethnicities, religion and class. For the first time, middle-class Sri Lankans have taken to the streets in large numbers, Uyangoda said.
They include Wijaya Nanda Chandradewa, who joined the crowd outside the president’s office on Saturday. A retired government employee, Chandradewa said he fell for Rajapaksa’s promise to rebuild a Sri Lanka scarred by the 2019 bombings.
“He said there will be one country and one law -- now there is neither the law nor the country,” Chandradewa said, adding that the only option now is for Rajapaksa to quit.
“He showed us a fairyland and cheated us and misled us,” he said. “We have to fix our mistakes and build a system to bring in the right leader.”
___
Pathi reported from New Delhi.
AP · by KRUTIKA PATHI and KRISHAN FRANCIS · April 28, 2022
23. The Fight for Ukraine Is Forging a New World
Good to see the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs thinking (and writing) beyond the immediate threat and helping to influence the future.
But a "tripolar" world?
Excerpts:
Surely, the new tripolar world will need some time to find its own unique balance that will shape the 21st century. This balance will be defined by decades of competition and tension as well as cooperation and alignment. The digital world will inevitably push back against both the United States and China on many fronts.
Yet this competition will not resemble the Cold War—it will be something new. Whether the culture of cooperation and seeking win-win solutions will prevail over animosity in this triangle will define our common future. To this end, we need a consensus early on: Whatever the rivalry between the great powers in the physical world, the digital world should remain a space of cooperation, while inevitable tensions should not exceed a critically minimal level.
As the great disruptor of the 21st century, the digital universe must strike a balance between the common good and narrow interests. It must remain decentralized and controlled by communities, not governments. At the same time, it must be governed. The question of whether the metaverse, Web3, the Internet of Things, and cryptocurrency will remain decentralized and community-driven is the defining question of this century. I believe it is in the best interests of all big players to strike a balance early on.
It may not seem obvious now, but Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russia would further catalyze this digital transformation and speed up the establishment of the tripolar world. On the other hand, the defeat of a vibrant, democratic Ukraine by the frozen authoritarian Russia would reverse world history.
We will prevail, together with those who root themselves in the moral choice of good over evil, freedom over fear, and light over darkness.
The Fight for Ukraine Is Forging a New World
If Ukraine prevails against Russia, the global movement toward a more empowered and freer digital world will accelerate.
Ukraine’s fight for its right to have a future has accelerated a great shift in the global order of the 21st century. One can already see elements of the new world emerging from the fires of war in Ukraine. The unity between North America and the European Union has been restored and cemented, and the notion of the West has regained its original meaning, while Russia’s strategic decline weakens China’s system of alliances.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has set Europe in motion again. To the discomfort of some European states, Ukraine became central to the rise of the new Europe. For Europe to succeed in restoring peace and solidifying prosperity and security in the region, Ukraine must be part of the European Union and, broadly speaking, of the West, led by the United States. And it will.
The world of tomorrow will be tripolar. Two obvious poles will be the United States and China. India will be gaining force as a strong democratic power. But the third, less obvious pole will be the newly emerging, decentralized community of global internet users, and it will be defined by rapid technological development and disruptive innovation. This community will be largely centered on what some already call the “metaverse.”
“Netizen” may sound like a fancy word combining the words “citizen” and “net,” but it describes a historic shift and the emergence of a new global power. Many people around the globe are becoming deeply invested in their online lives and forming their identities as “citizens of the net.” They already trust their online communities more than their nation-states. They will gain more and more force, transcending borders and transforming the world. They are already here, decentralized, self-sufficient, and effective. They have big ideas and the will to advance them; loyal and trusting followers; their own space of existence; and instruments such as computer code and blockchain technology that enable them to scale up their ideas quickly.
Yet this brave new world will only come about if the environment is conducive. That’s why the stakes of the Russia-Ukraine war are so high. They go beyond just a physical war; if Ukraine is victorious, and it and other like-minded countries remain free to pursue their democratic ideals, the global movement toward a more empowered and freer world, free of borders, will accelerate. But if it goes the other way—if Russia succeeds in stamping out freedom and democracy in Ukraine and beyond—we will enter a bleak world of no rules and no freedom, where might makes right and all else is erased.
The war in Ukraine is already demonstrating to the world how the people of the third pillar are making a difference, in three major ways.
First, netizens are playing an active part in Ukraine’s defense against Russian invasion. For instance, members of the global online hacker collective known as Anonymous have chosen to devote their skills to cutting through the firewalls of Russian government propaganda and delivering the truth about the war to the Russian people. Anonymous’s decision to declare “cyber war” against Russia was their own choice, not an order from some government or military higher command.
Second, netizens are grasping every opportunity to provide alternatives to what is usually offered by governments. Take, for example, the tech billionaire Elon Musk’s public announcement that he would provide Ukraine with Starlink satellite internet service. In the early days of the invasion, Starlink terminals were swiftly deployed to Ukraine, enabling an alternative system of uninterrupted communication and hindering Russia’s ability to knock down communications across the entire country.
Third, the use of cryptocurrency has allowed the Ukrainian government to raise money worldwide to fund our defense effort and has helped restrict ways to circumvent financial sanctions. Ukraine’s government as well as a number of big governmental Twitter accounts called for cryptocurrency donations in the early days of the invasion and have been able to mobilize large sums later added to the national accounts funding the armed forces. On the other hand, we have successfully focused part of our diplomatic efforts on closing cryptocurrency loopholes for sanctioned Russians to prevent them from cheating around restrictions.
Russia has attacked Ukraine with a brutal military force aiming to destroy us as a nation and as a state. Russia’s war against Ukraine is the struggle of the old against the new. With the bulk of the Russian army pouring over our borders in the early hours of Feb. 24, our chances seemed slim. Yet, against all odds, Ukraine has held its ground and proved experts and decision-makers wrong.
As we prove day by day, political leadership in this age is less about hierarchical state power and more about leading by example and galvanizing the energy of communities.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky leads by his example and his sincerity, not just statements and orders. He is one of the people, not a distant figure somewhere at the top. He is close to Ukrainians, posting his sloppy selfie videos and sharing his daily presidential routine with the people of Ukraine on his social media late at night. His leadership and public image are in stark contrast with that of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is shown on television spewing angry orders at his generals, who sit silently and obediently on the far side of an endless table.
This striking difference is just a glimpse of the abyss between two political models: the communal future and the hierarchical past; the existing political order and the emerging one. Surprisingly, it appears that to lead the world and gain popularity at home and abroad one needs courage, a selfie camera, and sincerity, not nuclear weapons, oil revenues, and a heavy-handed state propaganda machine. This is a model of the future and the reason why Ukraine will prevail and Russia will lose.
We are entering new, uncharted territory—an outcome no one could have predicted. Those who believe this war has an impact only on the future of Ukraine and Russia are wrong. Its repercussions are being and will continue to be felt around the globe—and not just in the physical world, but in the online world as well.
What unites the people of the third pillar is that they took Ukraine’s side in the war not because the government of Ukraine or any other country forced them to, but because they made their own choice to employ their powers to help defend Ukraine and its people from Russia’s naked aggression.
Ironically, these netizens are the ones who believe that the idea of a nation-state is outdated and that this new, decentralized online world is the future. They reject vertical hierarchies and physical borders. They rely on blockchain and cryptocurrency instead of banks and governments. Netizens can be Ukrainian, but also American or Chinese. They can remain true patriots of their countries. They can belong to the global digital community and be proud of their identities at the same time.
Netizens believe their new world will outlive the bipolar world order. It may. But first, all three poles have to learn how to coexist and engage with each other.
We should not be afraid of this new “liquid modernity,” as the Polish sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman defined it, but rather should open ourselves up to the enormous opportunities it brings. With its highly developed digitalization and strong horizontal social cohesion, modern Ukraine is a perfect driver of and a global lab for this tide of change.
The traditional notion of a geopolitical pole requires a mobilizing utopia, a comprehensive social order, and a competitive economic model. The digital world has all three. It already mobilizes enormous investment and resources, which are bound neither to the liberal-democratic United States nor to the state-controlled and traditionalist China. In the classical unipolar and bipolar worlds, multinational corporations have always depended on the dollar. The new economy will increasingly rely on its own new currency. Ukraine is part of it, too. As I already mentioned, our army right now is partially funded by cryptocurrency donations from all over the world, raised in social media campaigns. It feels natural that the victory bonds of the 21st-century are cryptocurrency-based.
The two traditional poles, the United States and China, will try to regulate and control the disruption caused by this new online world, but they are unlikely to succeed strategically.
Surely, the new tripolar world will need some time to find its own unique balance that will shape the 21st century. This balance will be defined by decades of competition and tension as well as cooperation and alignment. The digital world will inevitably push back against both the United States and China on many fronts.
Yet this competition will not resemble the Cold War—it will be something new. Whether the culture of cooperation and seeking win-win solutions will prevail over animosity in this triangle will define our common future. To this end, we need a consensus early on: Whatever the rivalry between the great powers in the physical world, the digital world should remain a space of cooperation, while inevitable tensions should not exceed a critically minimal level.
As the great disruptor of the 21st century, the digital universe must strike a balance between the common good and narrow interests. It must remain decentralized and controlled by communities, not governments. At the same time, it must be governed. The question of whether the metaverse, Web3, the Internet of Things, and cryptocurrency will remain decentralized and community-driven is the defining question of this century. I believe it is in the best interests of all big players to strike a balance early on.
It may not seem obvious now, but Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russia would further catalyze this digital transformation and speed up the establishment of the tripolar world. On the other hand, the defeat of a vibrant, democratic Ukraine by the frozen authoritarian Russia would reverse world history.
We will prevail, together with those who root themselves in the moral choice of good over evil, freedom over fear, and light over darkness.
24. How the Ukraine War Is Changing Japan
Excerpts:
It is difficult to know whether the current outpouring of empathy toward Ukraine will continue after media coverage of the war recedes and the economic cost of sanctions are felt in people’s lives. According to an Asahi poll that concluded on March 20, 67 percent of the Japanese public supports imposing economic sanctions on Russia even if there are negative repercussions for Japan’s economy. At first blush, this might appear to be an easy choice: Japan depends far more on trade with China and the United States than it does on trade with Russia; the disappearance of Russian-sourced crab from Japanese menus, for example, seems a tolerable sacrifice to many. On the other hand, abandoning Japan’s stake in the Sakhalin-2 liquified natural gas project, which is based in Russia and viewed as critical to Japan’s long-term energy security, will be a far tougher choice for resource-poor Japan to make.
Kishida’s leadership will be crucial, and since the crisis began, he has sought to reassure Japan’s citizens that he is prepared to rise to the challenge. In his recent public statements, Kishida has repeatedly emphasized the historical significance of this moment for the people of Japan. For example, after Russian forces committed atrocities in Bucha, he declared that “we are at a critical juncture to stop the unlawful invasion and to defend a peaceful order.” The moment may prove to be a good match for Kishida’s foreign policy platform, which he has described in speeches as “realism diplomacy for a new era,” and which emphasizes protecting universal values, addressing global challenges, and defending peace and security. And as Japan is scheduled to host the G-7 summit in 2023, Kishida’s hometown, Hiroshima, may turn out to be the ideal venue. If, as many hope, Ukraine is well into its own reconstruction phase by then, a G-7 summit in Hiroshima would symbolize a new beginning after war and destruction and the new confidence that Zelensky described in his speech to the Diet, that “tomorrow will come and will be stable and peaceful. For us, for future generations.”
How the Ukraine War Is Changing Japan
Tokyo Moves Toward a More Assertive Security Strategy
April 28, 2022
At 6 p.m. on March 23, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appeared before the Japanese parliament via video link from Kyiv, broadcasters across Japan interrupted their evening programming to carry Zelensky’s address live. Millions of ordinary Japanese citizens watched in real time as Zelensky praised Japan’s courage as the first Asian nation to stand up for Ukrainian democracy, expressed grave concerns about the security of nuclear power plants and the potential use of nuclear weapons—subjects that have particular resonance in Japan—and received a standing ovation from the hundreds of senior Japanese officials and lawmakers who had crowded a meeting room in the lower house of the Japanese Diet for the historic virtual meeting with Zelensky.
As recently as mid-February, Ukraine was a country that even relatively well-educated Japanese might have struggled to place on a map. But after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops into Ukraine in February, Japanese views on the country evolved quickly. Within days, the usual, slightly disconnected expressions of sympathy or anger evoked by news of distant suffering or injustice had given way to widespread alarm that, in the words of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had undermined “the very foundation of the international order,” and that Japan’s own safety and sovereignty could be at risk.
In Japan, Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine has intensified debate about Tokyo’s own self-defense capabilities and has triggered what may well be, as Kishida suggested on his return from emergency NATO talks in Brussels, the greatest foreign-policy challenge Japan has faced since the end of World War II. Japanese leaders’ decisive actions and bold statements in support of Ukraine have surprised many foreign observers. But what they may not understand is that Tokyo’s new approach has evolved alongside profound changes in Japanese society’s orientation toward the outside world and fundamental shifts in Japanese public opinion that could affect Japan’s foreign policy for years to come.
CONDEMNING RUSSIA'S ACTIONS
Japan’s quick and forceful criticism of Russia would have been slightly harder to imagine just a few years ago. After former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was sworn in for his second term in December 2012, Japanese leaders made significant investments in Russia’s economy and forged strong ties with Russian leaders. By the time Abe left office in 2020, he had met with Putin on 27 occasions, including once at an intimate and luxurious onsen, or natural hot springs spa, in Abe’s ancestral hometown of Nagato—a meeting that became known as “the onsen summit.”
Under Abe, Japan created a new cabinet-level position devoted to pursuing economic ties with Russia, and cooperation between the two countries has since led to more than 200 Japanese private-sector projects in Russia, including the ambitious Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 oil and gas developments. Although Japan joined other G-7 countries in criticizing Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea, its criticism was far more muted than that of others. Less than three weeks after Russia’s attempted assassination of former intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018, while other G-7 members were censuring Moscow and expelling its diplomats from their countries, the Abe government welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Tokyo with a birthday cake shaped like a soccer ball.
Tokyo’s new approach has evolved alongside deep changes in Japanese society’s thinking about the outside world.
The Abe government hoped its silence on Russian transgressions would aid its negotiations with Moscow over a long-awaited peace treaty between Japan and Russia that would lead to the four southernmost Kuril Islands being returned to Japan. The four islands, located north of Hokkaido, are known in Japan as “the northern territories” and have been under Russian control since their annexation by the Soviet Union in the final days of World War II. Japan’s hopes that Russia might return the islands were effectively crushed in July 2020, when Russia amended its constitution to ban all territorial concessions. In hindsight, Japanese leaders’ long courtship of Putin and efforts to bring about a historic peace deal began to appear at least misguided—or at worst, humiliatingly naive.
The horrifying images that began emerging from Ukraine in February gave Kishida an opportunity to decisively pivot away from his predecessors’ policies toward Russia. The Kishida government quickly joined other G-7 countries in sanctioning Russia and freezing the assets of top Russian officials and oligarchs with close Kremlin ties. Japan went on to expel eight Russian diplomats and supported additional measures designed to isolate Russia from the international financial system and the global economy, such as excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT system.
Meanwhile, Japan’s direct assistance to Ukraine has exceeded expectations. In addition to $100 million in emergency humanitarian assistance and an additional $100 million in loans, the Japanese government has supplied Ukrainian forces with bulletproof vests, helmets, winter battle dress uniforms, tents, cameras, hygiene products, emergency rations, generators, binoculars, flashlights, and medical equipment. Although these provisions may seem modest when compared with the expensive weaponry pouring into Ukraine from other countries, the decision to supply Ukrainian fighters at all was a watershed moment for Japan’s defense policy establishment, given its self-imposed restrictions on exporting military equipment abroad.
The Japanese government’s announcement that it would accept evacuees from Ukraine came as another major surprise. For decades, Japan has been infamous for its reluctance to accept refugees; since 1982, fewer than one percent of the people who have applied to the Japanese government for refugee status have been allowed to stay. Given this history, the speed with which the Kishida cabinet has reversed long-standing policy has stunned many Japanese and foreign observers. By March 24, when U.S. President Joe Biden bowed to international pressure and announced that the United States would accept refugees from Ukraine, Tokyo had already admitted 188 Ukrainian refugees, issued visas to 300 more, and launched a government-wide task force to coordinate refugee policy. On April 5, when Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi returned from an official visit to Poland, he brought 20 Ukrainian refugees back to Japan with him on a government plane.
SEEKING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
Although Kishida’s recent actions sanctioning Russia represent major reversals of Abe’s policies, some of the measures the current Japanese government has taken in support of Ukraine have actually built on steps taken by the Abe administration. For example, Abe’s efforts to play a constructive role in the G-7 and to constrain then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to damage it, helped raise Japan’s standing within the group. In the current crisis, Kishida has leveraged that newfound status to bring more Asian countries into the coalition against Putin. Before his trip to Brussels, Kishida traveled to India and Cambodia to enlist their commitment to condemning “any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force,” as he put it. His predecessor’s efforts to reinvigorate the Quad—a regional security grouping composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—and to promote a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific helped to lay the groundwork for Japanese leadership during the current crisis.
Abe’s decision to establish a National Security Secretariat and to strengthen cross-ministerial coordination mechanisms has also served the Kishida government well during the Ukraine crisis, enabling it to respond to fast-moving events with agility and speed. This seems to have finally allowed the Japanese government to move past the so-called Gulf War trauma it suffered in 1990-91, when its hesitation over how best to support the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War led to criticism that it had done too little, too late.
Even more consequential changes are taking place beneath the surface, within Japanese society itself. The current crisis has been a powerful reminder for the Japanese public that peace should not be taken for granted, that a country’s security requires action from its people, and that democracy and freedom are worth fighting for. These realizations may soon lead to changes in Japan’s foreign policy trajectory and in the role Japan plays in its alliance with the United States.
Since the war in Ukraine began, the fate of its people has been increasingly present in Japanese public discourse. Throughout Japan, castles, temples, government buildings, and other major landmarks are lit up at night in the yellow and blue of the Ukrainian flag. Young Japanese have gathered around Tokyo’s famous Shibuya crossing for demonstrations in support of Ukraine, and the city of Kyoto celebrated the 50th anniversary of its sister-city relationship with Kyiv by launching a program to receive and support Ukrainian evacuees.
On February 27, Hiroshi Mikitani, the chief executive officer of Rakuten, a Japanese e-commerce giant, launched a donation drive with the goal of raising one billion yen ($7.9 million) to aid Ukraine—and ended up raising nine times that sum in the first ten days. Municipalities across Japan are providing consultation services for prospective Ukrainian refugees, helping them find housing, medical services, and childcare. The Nippon Foundation has launched an initiative that provides refugees with free flights to Japan, then matches them with companies and local governments that have offered the refugees housing and financial assistance. Such efforts enjoy overwhelming public support: a recent survey found that 90 percent of the Japanese public supports accepting Ukrainian refugees.
Commentators seeking to explain Japan’s outpouring of support for Ukraine often point to the particulars of Ukraine’s present suffering, which are peculiarly reminiscent of many of Japan’s past traumas. Zelensky did not name Fukushima, Nagasaki, or Hiroshima in his address to Japan’s parliament, but the Japanese public instantly understood his concerns about nuclear dangers. Many Japanese have experienced forced dislocation due to natural disasters, such as the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, and empathize with Ukrainians longing to return home.
For many ordinary Japanese, the war in Ukraine has led to the realization that they cannot take their own security for granted. Many now believe they could soon see a “unilateral change to the status quo by force,” to borrow Kishida’s phrase, in Japan’s immediate neighborhood. A public opinion survey conducted in late February found that 77 percent of Japanese respondents were concerned that Russian aggression in Ukraine could have a “spillover effect” on China’s thinking about whether to take military action against Taiwan.
The valor of the Ukrainian forces has spurred a rare philosophical debate within Japan about what countries should fight for.
Finally, the valor of the Ukrainian forces has spurred a rare philosophical debate within Japan about what countries should fight for. After some Japanese pundits argued early on that Ukrainian forces should simply give up, since fighting the Russians would lead to more loss of life, they received heated pushback from politicians, other experts, and the Japanese public.
The war in Ukraine may turn out to be a wake-up call for the Japanese public. Japan, unlike Ukraine, is a treaty ally of the United States, but not everyone finds that completely reassuring. Referring to Biden’s 2021 argument that “American troops cannot and should not be fighting in a war and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves,” some Japanese commentators argue that Japan must think hard about what that line of reasoning means for Japan.
The broader public debate over Japan’s defense policy that the war in Ukraine sparked is still in its infancy, and it is impossible to predict what kind of policy outcomes or new agreements it might eventually produce. What is certain, however, is that within a few short weeks, the war has significantly sharpened the country’s focus on defense policy, just as the Japanese government prepares for the formal review of its National Security Strategy, which it is scheduled to conduct this year. Though Japan’s security strategy will remain focused on China and North Korea, Japanese policymakers are keenly aware of the fact that the war in Ukraine may lead the United States to shift attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific.
A DISTANT WAR WITH A DEEPER MEANING
For Japanese society, the war in Ukraine also has a deeper meaning, and its impact has resonated far beyond the defense policy establishment. Since World War II, Japan has been, in the words of the preamble to the 1946 Japanese constitution, “determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” That trust has now been broken by Russia, endangering not just Ukraine, but the entire postwar international order. If Japan is to uphold the national goal described in the subsequent sentence of its constitution’s preamble—“to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth”—it must overcome any remaining reticence with regard to its involvement in matters of international security and prepare to take bold and concrete action.
Zelensky’s speech to Japan’s parliament, which displayed an astute understanding of Japanese society’s attachment to pacifism, offered Japan a path forward. Zelensky did not call for Japan to send arms, as he has when speaking to lawmakers in many other countries. Instead, he asked Tokyo to continue pressuring Russia through sanctions. Describing his admiration for Japan’s values and history of development, defending peace, and protecting the environment, Zelensky called on Japan to play a leading role in rebuilding Ukraine and reforming international institutions.
Japan’s own experiences of rebuilding after being destroyed by war and natural disasters should not only produce greater empathy among the Japanese toward Ukrainians, but spur action on behalf of the Ukrainian people and others around the world who are seeking refuge from tyranny and oppression. Although the few hundred Ukrainian evacuees who have arrived in Japan to date are a tiny proportion of those seeking refuge, their presence in Japan is likely to be an important catalyst for policy change within the country.
It is difficult to know whether the current outpouring of empathy toward Ukraine will continue after media coverage of the war recedes and the economic cost of sanctions are felt in people’s lives. According to an Asahi poll that concluded on March 20, 67 percent of the Japanese public supports imposing economic sanctions on Russia even if there are negative repercussions for Japan’s economy. At first blush, this might appear to be an easy choice: Japan depends far more on trade with China and the United States than it does on trade with Russia; the disappearance of Russian-sourced crab from Japanese menus, for example, seems a tolerable sacrifice to many. On the other hand, abandoning Japan’s stake in the Sakhalin-2 liquified natural gas project, which is based in Russia and viewed as critical to Japan’s long-term energy security, will be a far tougher choice for resource-poor Japan to make.
Kishida’s leadership will be crucial, and since the crisis began, he has sought to reassure Japan’s citizens that he is prepared to rise to the challenge. In his recent public statements, Kishida has repeatedly emphasized the historical significance of this moment for the people of Japan. For example, after Russian forces committed atrocities in Bucha, he declared that “we are at a critical juncture to stop the unlawful invasion and to defend a peaceful order.” The moment may prove to be a good match for Kishida’s foreign policy platform, which he has described in speeches as “realism diplomacy for a new era,” and which emphasizes protecting universal values, addressing global challenges, and defending peace and security. And as Japan is scheduled to host the G-7 summit in 2023, Kishida’s hometown, Hiroshima, may turn out to be the ideal venue. If, as many hope, Ukraine is well into its own reconstruction phase by then, a G-7 summit in Hiroshima would symbolize a new beginning after war and destruction and the new confidence that Zelensky described in his speech to the Diet, that “tomorrow will come and will be stable and peaceful. For us, for future generations.”
- TAKAKO HIKOTANI is a Professor at Gakushuin University International Centre and Senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute in Tokyo. From 2016 to 2021, she was Gerald L. Curtis Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy at Columbia University, where she continues to serve as an Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.
25. Start with the Political: Explaining Russia’s Bungled Invasion of Ukraine
Excerpts:
Russia military analysts have their work cut out for them in explaining the early failures of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I have attempted to provide an explanation for how some of the contingent political factors contributed to the Russian military’s poor performance. A portion of the failure is a result of incorrect political assumptions that limited military planning and operational expectations. But this does not explain nearly all of the failures. What appear to be inherent weaknesses in the Russian military and in need of further analysis are the clear lack of effective command and control, an overly timid air force, and poor tactical performance on basic unit-level skills, to name a few. The obvious second half of this analysis is the performance of the Ukrainian military. While this article has focused solely on Russian operations, the successful Ukrainian operations to halt Russia’s attempt to seize most of Ukraine needs detailed study.
Given that this is not the war Russia planned and trained for, it is difficult to say how it would have performed in a conflict it did prepare for — one against the United States and NATO. This is just the beginning of understanding and properly preparing for Russian military power — or the lack thereof — going forward and the implications it will have for the United States, NATO, and Russia’s neighboring countries.
Start with the Political: Explaining Russia’s Bungled Invasion of Ukraine - War on the Rocks
Many of us who analyze the Russian military for a living have been shocked to see Russian forces fumble the way they have in Ukraine. There are already some heated calls for analytical accountability, most prominently from Eliot Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien, into how the body of Russian military analysts could have gotten the Russian military so wrong. There is no doubt that the Russian military has performed much more poorly than most anticipated and it is important to understand why. However, observers should beware of drawing simplistic, overarching conclusions about Russian military power writ large.
One can lump Russian military failure into two large categories: those that are contingent to the current conflict and set of circumstances surrounding the invasion, and those that are inherent to the Russian military. Based on my experience as an analyst of the Russian military and former member of the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration, I focus here on the former: those contingent political factors that have contributed to the Russian military’s poor performance. I plan to follow this up with another article on those failures inherent to the Russian armed forces.
The stage was set by Moscow’s inaccurate and chauvinistic assumptions about Ukraine, its leaders, its military, and its people. When these assumptions were paired with a desire to keep the invasion plans secret from those tactical echelons that were ordered to execute it, we can start to understand the disastrous Russian military operations during the opening days.
The fundamental mistake made at the leadership level, that carried down to the lowest ranks, was an underestimation of the lengths Ukraine’s leadership, military, and people would go to defend it. Putin’s speech about the nature of Ukraine and its current leadership, purportedly consisting of drug addicts and neo-Nazis, was apparently not just propaganda. It betrayed at least some of his real thoughts: that the Ukrainian state was little more than an aberration that could not stand up to Russian power. The Russian leadership seems to have believed that Ukraine’s national character was little more than a house of cards that just needed a little shove. Had Putin and Sergei Shoigu, his minister of defense, believed that Ukraine would put up a hearty resistance, they might have employed the considerable power of the Russian military as it was intended, with in-depth planning for complex warfare involving phased and coordinated operations across all domains.
Carl von Clausewitz, in On War, discussed the need to understand the war upon which one is embarking and the difficulty of aligning political and military objectives, coupled with the challenge of defining the scale and effort required for a military campaign. Given the haphazard way in which Russian operations were executed during the opening weeks, the leadership expected a wholly different type of war than the one Russian forces have experienced so far. Clausewitz also notes that the end calculation of what level of effort is required is not objective but relies on “the qualities of mind and character of the men making the decision.” It would be difficult to find a better example of how the faulty views of one person could so straightforwardly bring about the initial failures of an operation than Putin and his invasion of Ukraine.
Putin’s erroneous assumptions likely justified the decision, by him, to keep the invasion largely secret from the Russian people and probably many in the leadership. Additionally, the unprecedented public sharing by the United States and other countries of the intelligence about the impending invasion may have complicated Putin’s timing and planning. If this invasion was to be easy, a quick result would forgo the need to prepare the population for an extended conflict. The logic would be that it would also limit Western responses since any punitive actions would be after the fact and lack credibility and sustainability. Installing even a partially legitimate puppet government in Kyiv would both support the narrative given to the Russian domestic population and frustrate attempts by the West to exact severe punishments on Russia.
At a more fundamental level, the soldiers themselves were likely shocked by suddenly finding themselves first, at war, and second, against a capable opponent. Interviews with captured Russian officers and enlisted personnel suggest that the operation and its scope were likely not shared at the tactical level. For those of us who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, every soldier, staffer, and commander understood where they were going, the danger they might face, and at least the rough outlines of the types of missions they were going to undertake. While there are an infinite number of surprises in war, we all knew we were going to combat. Turning to the Russian military’s experience thus far in Ukraine, it is apparent that this process of emotional and mental preparation for war was missing.
The lack of understanding and mental preparation of Russian troops, coupled with the initial results of the campaign, appear to be creating some impetus for some desertion within the Russian military. This is not to say that the Russian military is preparing to dissolve and retreat to Russia. Having some degree of desertion, soldiers in ones or twos, should not be unexpected, especially in a war between two countries with such deep connections. It’s another problem altogether for the Russian military when we start seeing sets of vehicles, representing an entire small unit, fully fueled and functional but with no crew.
At the time of this writing, Russian forces have pulled away from Kyiv and are focusing on operations in the east. Faced with an inability to achieve his initial strategic goals, Putin has likely decided that solidifying and expanding the separatist controlled areas in the east is the best he can do and still provide some semblance of a successful narrative to the Russian people. Russian operations in the east will benefit from shorter, more secure logistics, a small geographic area to focus combat power, and a more clear and efficient command and control structure with the reported appointment of Gen. Aleksandr Dvornikov as Russia’s top commander in Ukraine. However, this general will face the challenges of cobbling together a low-morale force that has taken heavy casualties and coordinating disparate units into an operational whole with a clear task.
There is a lot of speculation about how the rest of the Russo-Ukrainian War will unfold. Will this turn into a long, drawn-out stalemate in the east, or will Russia be able to recover from its initial failures and take advantage of its new operational situation and achieve the Kremlin’s revised strategic objectives? What is Ukraine’s strategic goal, now that it has survived Russia’s ham-fisted attempt to snuff out its existence? Motivated by its recent victory in defending Kyiv and blooding Russia’s forces, will Ukraine attempt to drive Russian forces out of the east entirely? Perhaps in the weeks or months ahead Russia will have an exhausted military that culminates without achieving even Putin’s minimalist objectives — whatever those may be. As Cathal Nolan notes, it is often “exhaustion of morale and materiel rather than finality through battles” that decide the outcomes of wars.
Russia military analysts have their work cut out for them in explaining the early failures of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I have attempted to provide an explanation for how some of the contingent political factors contributed to the Russian military’s poor performance. A portion of the failure is a result of incorrect political assumptions that limited military planning and operational expectations. But this does not explain nearly all of the failures. What appear to be inherent weaknesses in the Russian military and in need of further analysis are the clear lack of effective command and control, an overly timid air force, and poor tactical performance on basic unit-level skills, to name a few. The obvious second half of this analysis is the performance of the Ukrainian military. While this article has focused solely on Russian operations, the successful Ukrainian operations to halt Russia’s attempt to seize most of Ukraine needs detailed study.
Given that this is not the war Russia planned and trained for, it is difficult to say how it would have performed in a conflict it did prepare for — one against the United States and NATO. This is just the beginning of understanding and properly preparing for Russian military power — or the lack thereof — going forward and the implications it will have for the United States, NATO, and Russia’s neighboring countries.
Jeffrey Edmonds is a senior analyst on CNA’s Russia Studies Program. Prior to CNA he served as a director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration. He is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and has served on active duty and the reserve for over 25 years. The views expressed here are his own.
26. Ukraine and the Words That Lead to Mass Murder
There are lessons and parallels around the world. Everyone should step back and think about how they describe their own political opponents.
Conclusion:
All of this—the indifference to violence, the amoral nonchalance about mass murder, even the disdain for the lives of Russian soldiers—is familiar to anyone who knows Soviet history (or German history, for that matter). But Russian citizens and Russian soldiers either don’t know that history or don’t care about it. President Zelensky told me in April that, like “alcoholics [who] don’t admit that they are alcoholic,” these Russians “are afraid to admit guilt.” There was no reckoning after the Ukrainian famine, or the Gulag, or the Great Terror of 1937–38, no moment when the perpetrators expressed formal, institutional regret. Now we have the result. Aside from the Kravchenkos and Kopelevs, the liberal minority, most Russians have accepted the explanations the state handed them about the past and moved on. They’re not human beings; they’re kulak trash, they told themselves then. They’re not human beings; they’re Ukrainian Nazis, they tell themselves today.
Ukraine and the Words That Lead to Mass Murder
First comes the dehumanization. Then comes the killing.
In the terrible winter of 1932–33, brigades of Communist Party activists went house to house in the Ukrainian countryside, looking for food. The brigades were from Moscow, Kyiv, and Kharkiv, as well as villages down the road. They dug up gardens, broke open walls, and used long rods to poke up chimneys, searching for hidden grain. They watched for smoke coming from chimneys, because that might mean a family had hidden flour and was baking bread. They led away farm animals and confiscated tomato seedlings. After they left, Ukrainian peasants, deprived of food, ate rats, frogs, and boiled grass. They gnawed on tree bark and leather. Many resorted to cannibalism to stay alive. Some 4 million died of starvation.
At the time, the activists felt no guilt. Soviet propaganda had repeatedly told them that supposedly wealthy peasants, whom they called kulaks, were saboteurs and enemies—rich, stubborn landowners who were preventing the Soviet proletariat from achieving the utopia that its leaders had promised. The kulaks should be swept away, crushed like parasites or flies. Their food should be given to the workers in the cities, who deserved it more than they did. Years later, the Ukrainian-born Soviet defector Viktor Kravchenko wrote about what it was like to be part of one of those brigades. “To spare yourself mental agony you veil unpleasant truths from view by half-closing your eyes—and your mind,” he explained. “You make panicky excuses and shrug off knowledge with words like exaggeration and hysteria.”
He also described how political jargon and euphemisms helped camouflage the reality of what they were doing. His team spoke of the “peasant front” and the “kulak menace,” “village socialism” and “class resistance,” to avoid giving humanity to the people whose food they were stealing. Lev Kopelev, another Soviet writer who as a young man had served in an activist brigade in the countryside (later he spent years in the Gulag), had very similar reflections. He too had found that clichés and ideological language helped him hide what he was doing, even from himself:
I persuaded myself, explained to myself. I mustn’t give in to debilitating pity. We were realizing historical necessity. We were performing our revolutionary duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist fatherland. For the five-year plan.
There was no need to feel sympathy for the peasants. They did not deserve to exist. Their rural riches would soon be the property of all.
But the kulaks were not rich; they were starving. The countryside was not wealthy; it was a wasteland. This is how Kravchenko described it in his memoirs, written many years later:
Large quantities of implements and machinery, which had once been cared for like so many jewels by their private owners, now lay scattered under the open skies, dirty, rusting and out of repair. Emaciated cows and horses, crusted with manure, wandered through the yard. Chickens, geese and ducks were digging in flocks in the unthreshed grain.
That reality, a reality he had seen with his own eyes, was strong enough to remain in his memory. But at the time he experienced it, he was able to convince himself of the opposite. Vasily Grossman, another Soviet writer, gives these words to a character in his novel Everything Flows:
I’m no longer under a spell, I can see now that the kulaks were human beings. But why was my heart so frozen at the time? When such terrible things were being done, when such suffering was going on all around me? And the truth is that I truly didn’t think of them as human beings. “They’re not human beings, they’re kulak trash”—that’s what I heard again and again, that’s what everyone kept repeating.
Nine decades have passed since those events took place. The Soviet Union no longer exists. The works of Kopelev, Kravchenko, and Grossman have long been available to Russian readers who want them.
In the late 1980s, during the period of glasnost, their books and other accounts of the Stalinist regime and the Gulag camps were best sellers in Russia. Once, we assumed that the mere telling of these stories would make it impossible for anyone to repeat them. But although the same books are theoretically still available, few people buy them. Memorial, the most important historical society in Russia, has been forced to close. Official museums and monuments to the victims remain small and obscure. Instead of declining, the Russian state’s ability to disguise reality from its citizens and to dehumanize its enemies has grown stronger and more powerful than ever.
All of this—the indifference to violence, the amoral nonchalance about mass murder—is familiar to anyone who knows Soviet history.
Nowadays, less violence is required to misinform the public: There have been no mass arrests in Putin’s Russia on the scale used in Stalin’s Russia. Perhaps there don’t need to be, because Russian state-run television, the primary source of information for most Russians, is more entertaining, more sophisticated, more stylish than programs on the crackly radios of Stalin’s era. Social media is far more addictive and absorbing than the badly printed newspapers of that era, too. Professional trolls and influencers can shape online conversation in ways that are helpful to the Kremlin, and with far less effort than in the past.
The modern Russian state has also set the bar lower. Instead of offering its citizens a vision of utopia, it wants them to be cynical and passive; whether they actually believe what the state tells them is irrelevant. Although Soviet leaders lied, they tried to make their falsehoods seem real. They got angry when anyone accused them of lying, and they produced fake “evidence” or counterarguments. In Putin’s Russia, politicians and television personalities play a different game, one that we in America know from the political campaigns of Donald Trump. They lie constantly, blatantly, obviously. But if you accuse them of lying, they don’t bother to offer counterarguments. When Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government reacted not only with a denial, but with multiple stories, plausible and implausible: The Ukrainian army was responsible, or the CIA was, or it was a nefarious plot in which 298 dead people were placed on a plane in order to fake a crash and discredit Russia. This constant stream of falsehoods produces not outrage, but apathy. Given so many explanations, how can you know whether anything is ever true? What if nothing is ever true?
Instead of promoting a Communist paradise, modern Russian propaganda has for the past decade focused on enemies. Russians are told very little about what happens in their own towns or cities. As a result, they aren’t forced, as Soviet citizens once were, to confront the gap between reality and fiction. Instead, they are told constantly about places they don’t know and have mostly never seen: America, France and Britain, Sweden and Poland—places filled with degeneracy, hypocrisy, and “Russophobia.” A study of Russian television from 2014 to 2017 found that negative news about Europe appeared on the three main Russian channels, all state-controlled, an average of 18 times a day. Some of the stories were invented (the German government is forcibly taking children away from straight families and giving them to gay couples), but even true stories were picked to support the idea that daily life in Europe is frightening and chaotic, Europeans are weak and immoral, the European Union is aggressive and interventionist.
If anything, the portrayal of America has been worse. U.S. citizens who rarely think about Russia would be stunned to learn how much time Russian state television devotes to the American people, American politics, even American culture wars. In March, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, displayed an alarmingly intimate acquaintance with Twitter arguments about J. K. Rowling and her views on transgender rights at a press conference. It’s hard to imagine any American politician, or indeed almost any American, talking about a popular Russian political controversy with the same fluency. But that’s because no American politician lives and breathes the ups and downs of Russian partisan arguments in the same way that the Russian president lives and breathes the battles that take place on American cable networks and on social media—battles in which his professional trolls and proxies compete and take sides, promoting whatever they think will be divisive and polarizing.
Within the ever-changing drama of anger and fear that unfolds every night on the Russian evening news, Ukraine has long played a special role. In Russian propaganda, Ukraine is a fake country, one without history or legitimacy, a place that is, in the words of Putin himself, nothing more than the “southwest” of Russia, an inalienable part of Russia’s “history, culture and spiritual space.” Worse, Putin says, this fake state has been weaponized by the degenerate, dying Western powers into a hostile “anti-Russia.” The Russian president has described Ukraine as “fully controlled from the outside” and as “a colony with a puppet regime.” He invaded Ukraine, he has said, in order to defend Russia “from those who have taken Ukraine hostage and are trying to use it against our country and our people.”
Top: Women walk past people dying of starvation during the Ukrainian famine in the early 1930s. Bottom: Ira Gavriluk stands among the bodies of family members who were killed outside her home in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, in April. (Sovfoto / UIG / Bridgeman Images; Felipe Dana / AP)
In truth, Putin invaded Ukraine in order to turn it into a colony with a puppet regime himself, because he cannot conceive of it ever being anything else. His KGB-influenced imagination does not allow for the possibility of authentic politics, grassroots movements, even public opinion. In Putin’s language, and in the language of most Russian television commentators, the Ukrainians have no agency. They can’t make choices for themselves. They can’t elect a government for themselves. They aren’t even human—they are “Nazis.” And so, like the kulaks before them, they can be eliminated with no remorse.
The relationship between genocidal language and genocidal behavior is not automatic or even predictable. Human beings can insult one another, demean one another, and verbally abuse one another without trying to kill one another. But while not every use of genocidal hate speech leads to genocide, all genocides have been preceded by genocidal hate speech. The modern Russian propaganda state turned out to be the ideal vehicle both for carrying out mass murder and for hiding it from the public. The gray apparatchiks, FSB operatives, and well-coiffed anchorwomen who organize and conduct the national conversation had for years been preparing their compatriots to feel no pity for Ukraine.
They succeeded. From the first days of the war, it was evident that the Russian military had planned in advance for many civilians, perhaps millions, to be killed, wounded, or displaced from their homes in Ukraine. Other assaults on cities throughout history—Dresden, Coventry, Hiroshima, Nagasaki—took place only after years of terrible conflict. By contrast, systematic bombardment of civilians in Ukraine began only days into an unprovoked invasion. In the first week of the war, Russian missiles and artillery targeted apartment blocks, hospitals, and schools. As Russians occupied Ukrainian cities and towns, they kidnapped or murdered mayors, local councilors, even a museum director from Melitopol, spraying bullets and terror randomly on everyone else. When the Ukrainian army recaptured Bucha, to the north of Kyiv, it found corpses with their arms tied behind their backs, lying in the road. When I was there in mid-April, I saw others that had been dumped into a mass grave. In the first three weeks of the war alone, Human Rights Watch documented cases of summary execution, rape, and the mass looting of civilian property.
Mariupol, a mostly Russian-speaking city the size of Miami, was subjected to almost total devastation. In a powerful interview in late March, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, noted that in previous European conflicts, occupiers hadn’t destroyed everything, because they themselves needed somewhere to cook, eat, wash; during the Nazi occupation, he said, “movie theaters were operating in France.” But Mariupol was different: “Everything is burned out.” Ninety percent of the buildings were destroyed within just a few weeks. A massive steelworks that many assumed the conquering army wanted to control was totally flattened. At the height of the fighting, civilians were still trapped inside the city, with no access to food, water, power, heat, or medicine. Men, women, and children died of starvation and dehydration. Those who tried to escape were fired upon. Outsiders who tried to bring in supplies were fired upon as well. The bodies of the dead, both Ukrainian civilians and Russian soldiers, lay in the street, unburied, for many days.
Yet even as these crimes were carried out, in full view of the world, the Russian state successfully hid this tragedy from its own people. As in the past, the use of jargon helped. This was not an invasion; it was a “special military operation.” This was not a mass murder of Ukrainians; it was “protection” for the inhabitants of the eastern-Ukrainian territories. This was not genocide; it was defense against “genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime.” The dehumanization of the Ukrainians was completed in early April, when RIA Novosti, a state-run website, published an article arguing that the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine would require the “liquidation” of the Ukrainian leadership, and even the erasure of the very name of Ukraine, because to be Ukrainian was to be a Nazi: “Ukrainianism is an artificial anti-Russian construct, which does not have any civilizational content of its own, and is a subordinate element of a foreign and alien civilization.” The existential threat was made clear on the eve of the war, when Putin reprised a decade’s worth of propaganda about the perfidious West, using language familiar to Russians: “They sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people from within, the attitudes they have been aggressively imposing on their countries, attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature.”
For anyone who might have accidentally seen photographs of Mariupol, explanations were provided. On March 23, Russian television did broadcast film of the city’s ruins—drone footage, possibly stolen from CNN. But rather than take responsibility, they blamed the Ukrainians. One television anchorwoman, sounding sad, described the scene as “a horrifying picture. [Ukrainian] nationalists, as they retreat, are trying to leave no stone unturned.” The Russian Defense Ministry actually accused the Azov battalion, a famously radical Ukrainian fighting force, of blowing up the Mariupol theater, where hundreds of families with children had been sheltering. Why would über-patriotic Ukrainian forces deliberately kill Ukrainian children? That wasn’t explained—but then, nothing is ever explained. And if nothing can be known for certain, then no one can be blamed. Maybe Ukrainian “nationalists” destroyed Mariupol. Maybe not. No clear conclusions can be drawn, and no one can be held accountable.
Few feel remorse. Published recordings of telephone calls between Russian soldiers and their families—they are using ordinary SIM cards, so it’s easy to listen to them—are full of contempt for Ukrainians. “I shot the car,” one soldier tells a woman, perhaps his wife or sister, in one of the calls. “Shoot the motherfuckers,” she responds, “as long as it’s not you. Fuck them. Fucking drug addicts and Nazis.” They talk about stealing television sets, drinking cognac, and shooting people in forests. They show no concern about casualties, not even their own. Radio communications between the Russian soldiers attacking civilians in Bucha were just as cold-blooded. Zelensky himself was horrified by the nonchalance with which the Russians proposed to send some trash bags for the Ukrainians to wrap the corpses of their soldiers: “Even when a dog or a cat dies, people don’t do this,” he told journalists.
All of this—the indifference to violence, the amoral nonchalance about mass murder, even the disdain for the lives of Russian soldiers—is familiar to anyone who knows Soviet history (or German history, for that matter). But Russian citizens and Russian soldiers either don’t know that history or don’t care about it. President Zelensky told me in April that, like “alcoholics [who] don’t admit that they are alcoholic,” these Russians “are afraid to admit guilt.” There was no reckoning after the Ukrainian famine, or the Gulag, or the Great Terror of 1937–38, no moment when the perpetrators expressed formal, institutional regret. Now we have the result. Aside from the Kravchenkos and Kopelevs, the liberal minority, most Russians have accepted the explanations the state handed them about the past and moved on. They’re not human beings; they’re kulak trash, they told themselves then. They’re not human beings; they’re Ukrainian Nazis, they tell themselves today.
This article appears in the June 2022 print edition with the headline “‘They’re Not Human Beings.’” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.
27. China delivered a masterstroke while the world watched Taiwan
Pay no attention, nothing to see here.
China delivered a masterstroke while the world watched Taiwan
Illustration: Dyson
The family of the Australian man whose vigilance helped frustrate the Japanese Imperial Army’s invasion of the Solomon Islands 70 years ago certainly has noticed. And they’re very upset.
“To say I am disappointed and dismayed at the decision would be an understatement,” says Alexandra Clemens from her home in Melbourne. “I am the daughter of Martin Clemens who valiantly stood his ground on the allies’ behalf alone on Guadalcanal for years before the US finally arrived in 1942.”
Martin Clemens was a civil servant on Guadalcanal, the main island in the Solomons group, as the Japanese juggernaut conquered Asia and prepared to roll into the South Pacific. Born in Scotland, he worked for the British colonial administration as a district officer.
When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and then seized the “impregnable” British fortress of Singapore, the other Brits fled in fear. The big plantation owners, even Clemens’s boss, the commissioner, left.
Martin Clemens worked with Solomon Islands scouts to relay valuable information to the allies from Guadalcanal.
Clemens, 25 years old, chose to stay. He worked with local Solomon Islanders to send intelligence to the allies. When the Japanese started to arrive on Guadalcanal, he hid in the mountains and reported their every move using a refrigerator-size heavy wireless that needed four men to lift it, the cutting-edge mobile phone tech of its time.
Improvisation was key. When the batteries eventually ran flat, Clemens used the citric acid from pineapple juice to recharge them. He had no money or supplies, only his wits and wiles and the local people.
So when the Japanese started to build an air base, Clemens made sure the US Marines knew about it. This was the critical development.
The Japanese Imperial Army wanted then what the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is working towards today – control of the oceanic lifeline that connects Australia and New Zealand with the US and Asia.
Related Article
If the Japanese were able to establish a base on Guadalcanal, they could control US access from Australia, where the US Far East commander General Douglas MacArthur had his base, to the rest of the Pacific and points north. US and other allied forces needed to be able to pass through the choke point to wage war on Japanese occupation forces through the region. Their resupply vessels needed free access, too.
The US Marines 1st Division was dispatched. The first Allied land assault on the Japanese in World War II was afoot. Clemens worked with his volunteer spy army of about 400 Solomon Island natives to feed detailed intelligence to the marines to guide their landing. He stayed on and helped the allies with essential local knowledge.
Clemens was the embodiment of the vigilance that Australia and its allies seem to have neglected today. He had another vital lesson to offer contemporary times – how to win over the people of the Solomons. He could not have sustained his reconnaissance without them.
The Japanese knew he was watching them and regularly swept the island searching for him. One word from a local and he’d have been finished. As he wrote in his book Alone on Guadalcanal, he would not have survived without “the sorely tried but unswerving loyalty of the Solomon Islanders”. They “daily carried out miracles of deception”.
How did he earn their loyalty, especially when many of them were being paid by the Japanese to build their air base? The islanders were anxious about the future and “begged me to tell them what was to happen. All that I could say was that, someday, someone would rescue us from our sorry plight, and that, until that happy day, I intended to stay with them”.
The commander of the 1st Marines in the Guadalcanal campaign, General Alexander Vandegrift, added that Clemens won the trust of the Solomon Island locals by the “force of his character, by example and the personification of the virtues of our Western philosophy”.
Clemens’s daughter Alexandra adds that her father’s cause was much strengthened when Japanese troops stole the islanders’ pigs. He kept his word and stayed on Guadalcanal through the months of grinding fighting and until the Japanese surrender in 1945.
Among the consequences of Clemens’ work is the survival of a junior US naval officer who went on to become an American president. Clemens’ scouts told him of a US patrol boat that had been sunk, its survivors marooned on a remote island. They’d written a message on a coconut shell for the scouts to give to the US Navy, which they hoped would find them.
Caroline Kennedy’s father owed his life to Martin Clemens, who stayed behind on Guadalcanal to send intelligence to the allies. Bloomberg
Clemens told the scouts to organise a rescue, which is how Lieutenant John F. Kennedy and his crew came to be delivered from their week-long ordeal.
And now Kennedy’s daughter, Caroline, has been nominated by Joe Biden to be the next US ambassador to Canberra. Without Clemens and his scouts, so much modern history might have been different.
He was the first person to be admitted as an honorary non-American member of the Marine Corps. He was awarded honours by the US, Britain and Australia, the country he adopted and died in. The Obama administration sent a colonel and staff sergeant to his funeral in 2009.
But now a hostile force is, once again, on the brink of establishing control of that critical lifeline. China has established the political foundation for military operations through the Solomon Islands.
What would Martin Clemens think if he were looking on today? “He would feel a bit betrayed,” reflects Alexandra. “It would be a great disappointment.“
His example teaches unwavering vigilance and the power of working closely in a trusting relationship with the peoples of the Pacific. Lest we forget.
Peter Hartcher is international editor.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
