Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Real knowledge is to know the extent of one's ignorance."

- Confucius

“The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing.”

- Socrates

"All you need is the plan, the road map, and the courage to press on to your destination."

- Earl Nightingale

1. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Welcomes Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to the Pentagon

2. What Has North Korea Learned from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

3. China denounces US plans to send nuclear ballistic submarine to South Korea

4. Experts react: The US and South Korea strike a deal on nuclear weapons. What’s next for the alliance?

5. U.S., South Korea Nuclear Pledge Follows North Korean Weapons Advances

6. Washington Declaration will help deter N. Korean threat but not a 'nuclear sharing' agreement: U.S. official

7. US-South Korea nuclear weapons deal – what you need to know

8. Nuclear Deal with U.S. Tightens Korea's Shackles

9. [ANALYSIS] Is Yoon-Biden summit a win-win for both S. Korea, US?

10. Washington agrees to lessen burden on Korean firms investing in US

11. Yoon becomes 1st S. Korean to receive briefings at Pentagon, DARPA

12. Korea and India as catalysts for Indo-Pacific era

13. S. Korea, US agree to minimize US CHIPS Act-induced uncertainties

14. ‘Lord Commander’ of the DMZ Has Seen It All on the Korean Frontier

15. Why Biden and Yoon’s Agreement Is a Big Deal

16. The scariest advancements in North Korea missile tech so far

17. Backups are needed to confirm the declaration

18. Not every North Korean missile needs a response. South Korea and the US should focus more on readiness and deterrence.

1. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Welcomes Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to the Pentagon

Two important statements from President Yoon.

Excerpts:

Now the world order faces a profound challenge. There is a deepening competition between the free world and autocracies, and now, as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia is under serious conditions.

...

Mr. Secretary, I have full confidence in U.S. commitment to the extended deterrence. If North Korea dares to use nuclear arsenal, it will face a decisive and overwhelming response by the Republic of Korea forces and the alliance, including the U.S. nuclear capability.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Welcomes Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to the Pentagon

defense.gov

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III: Well, Mr. President, it's great to see you again and it was a pleasure meeting with you in Seoul in January. Thanks for being such a great host. And I'm delighted to host you and your delegation at the Pentagon as a part of your state visit. Your visit underscores the strength of our alliance and the importance of working together with allies and partners to build a more secure and prosperous world.

The Republic of Korea has been a steadfast friend for decades. We rely on you more and more each day and we do so with immense gratitude. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and over the decades, we've built one of the most robust, capable and interoperable alliances on Earth. And we've deterred major conflict and aggression on the Korean Peninsula.

We still face ongoing challenges from North Korea, including its dangerous and destabilizing missile testing program, and from others who would undermine the rules-based international order. So I want to underscore, Mr. President, what I said in January, that the U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK is ironclad. And so is our extended deterrence commitment to your country, which includes a full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including conventional, nuclear and missile defense capabilities.

For seven decades, U.S. and ROK service members have worked shoulder to shoulder, and we honor their service by ensuring that the U.S.- ROK alliance remains a foundation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific for decades more. The ROK today is a spectacular economic success and a thriving democracy, and under your leadership, Mr. President, it is emerging as, in your words, “a global, pivotal state.”

The ROK and the United States have a shared vision rooted in freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Our alliance stands as a pillar of a free and open Indo-Pacific and I'm confident that we will move forward together and I look forward to charting an ambitious path to advance our shared priorities in the Indo-Pacific.

So Mr. President, thanks again so much for being here and thank you for your enduring commitment to our alliance.

PRES. YOON (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): Mr. Secretary, it's my pleasure to meet you here at the Pentagon, following our meeting (inaudible) last January. And also, I would like to thank Chairman Milley and other DOD officials for your warm hospitality. I also want to thank General LaCamera and all USFK service members for standing together with the ROK forces and for robustly defending the peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Now the world order faces a profound challenge. There is a deepening competition between the free world and autocracies, and now, as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia is under serious conditions.

Despite strong warnings from the international community, North Korea is -- keep advancing its nuclear and missile capability and conducting acts of provocation with unprecedented frequency and magnitude. Recently, (inaudible) revealed a smaller-sized nuclear warhead and they publicly mentioned the -- about the use of its tactical nuclear weapons, and also they tested and launched a solid propelled ICBM. Going forward it is likely that, through diverse acts of provocations, North Korea will continue to put pressure on the ROK-U.S. alliance and try to drive a wedge between our alliance.

Mr. Secretary, the Korean government -- based on our robust combined defense posture, we will be -- we resolutely and affirmatively respond to North Korean threats. Against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, we will be prepared with our capability for punishment and with our overwhelming response capability, including Korea's (inaudible) system. We will also step up our exercises and training as a combined force, and also we will increase our security cooperation between the three countries, Korea, the United States and Japan.

Yesterday President Biden and I, with a view to responding more strongly and effectively against North Korea's nuclear threat, we agreed to strengthen the US extended deterrence. We agreed to work to enable our both countries to find out practical ways to strengthen the extended deterrence including joint planning exercises and tabletop exercise simulations.

Mr. Secretary, I have full confidence in U.S. commitment to the extended deterrence. If North Korea dares to use nuclear arsenal, it will face a decisive and overwhelming response by the Republic of Korea forces and the alliance, including the U.S. nuclear capability.

Now it is time that North Korea should realize that it cannot -- they will gain nothing from a (inaudible) and I urge North Korea once again to make this right decision towards denuclearization for a sustainable and genuine peace, and join in prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Secretary, this year marks the 70th anniversary of the ROK - U.S. alliance. Over the past seven decades, it has been the linchpin maintaining the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia.

Our alliances sharing our common, universal values, I hope that we could enhance our cooperation as global confidence and strategic alliance moving towards a future together. Our alliance is robust and watertight and we can overcome any challenges of the future. It is my view that enhancing our security together through our cooperation.

Mr. Secretary, once again, I thank you for a warm welcome and your hospitality. Thank you.

SEC. AUSTIN: Mr. President, welcome again to the Pentagon. We're delighted to have you here and look forward to a great discussion. Thanks, everybody.

defense.gov

2. What Has North Korea Learned from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

Conclusion:

The final hybrid geopolitical and military lesson from Ukraine is the limited utility of nuclear weapons. As the Americans learned in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, nuclear weapons are not effective in compelling non-nuclear states to acquiescence to the demands of a nuclear power. The Soviets learned this lesson in Afghanistan as well, but Putin seems to have forgotten or he feigns ignorance. Nuclear saber-rattling is not credible for compellence, as the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated once again. North Korean media are likely to express shrill nuclear threats occasionally in the future, particularly during combined ROK-U.S. military exercises in South Korea. The aim of these threats is to intimidate Seoul, Washington, and their allies to coerce them into accepting Pyongyang’s demands. However, any threat by the leadership to use its nuclear weapons for anything other than a last gasp of desperation as the regime was being destroyed by force is simply not credible because it would be suicidal. However, the Kim family regime is not suicidal, which is one reason the regime has survived decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe.

Thu, 04/27/2023 - 10:05pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-has-north-korea-learned-russias-invasion-ukraine

What Has North Korea Learned from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

Daniel A. Pinkston, Ph.D.

Troy University, Korea

April 2023

As Russia’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine continues into its second year, most observers have been surprised by some aspects of the conflict. The consensus is that the Russian military shockingly has underperformed against Ukraine, and the Ukrainian resistance has exceeded expectations.[1] Furthermore, students of international relations and warfare are analyzing the implications for geopolitics as well as the advances in weapon systems. While many analysts have considered the possible implications for conflict in the Taiwan Strait,[2] it is important to understand the lessons Pyongyang is learning from Ukraine given North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities.[3]

Pyongyang is an ardent student of conflict and international affairs, so North Korea is observing Ukraine with great interest. To accomplish this objective, Pyongyang has several institutions and channels to support its monitoring of the situation abroad. These institutions are embedded in the ruling Korean Workers Party (KWP), the state, and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to form a network for processing information and distributing the “guidance decisions” of the party leadership (Kim Jong-un). The system is personalistic with an extreme concentration of power under the party’s "monolithic leadership” system and the “monolithic ideological” system,[4] which are prone to interject considerable cognitive biases for North Korean analysts and policy advisers.

In the context of the Ukraine conflict, the North Korean leadership is particularly interested in the war’s impact across four dimensions:

geopolitical trends;
possible consequences for Pyongyang’s foreign policy;
possible effects on inter-Korean policy; and
developments in military technology.

As the leadership seeks clarity in these issue areas, the collection, processing, and analysis of information subsequently is linked to senior decision-makers for the distribution of “party guidance,” thus forming a continuous loop of information flows and directives to support the Kim family regime.

The senior leadership: what is it and how does the central node of the system learn?

How do the channels work? In North Korea, all activities are conducted under the guidance of the party, which is clearly stated in both the KWP Bylaws[5] and the DPRK constitution.[6] Therefore, assessments and understanding of the party’s organization, motivations, and objectives are critical to any analysis of North Korea. The ultimate North Korean decisionmaker and consumer of information across all issue areas is KWP General-Secretary Kim Jong-un. Regarding issues of grand strategy, the Politburo Presidium constitutes Kim’s closest advisers. In addition to Kim, the Politburo Presidium consists of four members: Kim Tŏk-hun, Cho Yong-wŏn, Ch’oi Ryong-hae, and Ri Byŏng-ch’ŏl, whose portfolios cover the main issues of concern for the Kim regime. Furthermore, the Politburo Presidium nominally has the authority to lead and to appoint a successor if Kim Jong-un were unable to serve as Supreme Leader.[7]

Kim Tŏk-hun (62) is concurrently serving as premier of the cabinet and as vice chairman of the State Affairs Commission. He was recently named chairman of the State Physical Culture and Guidance Commission, but he is considered an economic technocrat who managed electrical and heavy machinery factories in Chagang Province, where many military production facilities are located. He also served as chairman of the Chagang Province People’s Committee before being promoted to the national-level leadership.[8]

Cho Yong-wŏn (66) rose through the ranks of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) and currently serves as the director. Cho also sits on the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Affairs Commission (SAC).[9] Cho knows all the background of senior party members, and controls monitoring and investigations of “organizational life (조직생활),” which is the recorded history of every party member’s activities, particularly those that demonstrate the degree of loyalty (or disloyalty) to the Kim regime.[10]

Ch’oi Ryong-hae (73) is a former princeling and arguably about the closest one can get to being “North Korean royalty” but not a Kim family member. Ch’oi’s father was a guerrilla comrade of Kim Il-sung who later became defense minister, so the Kim-Ch’oi family ties go back generations. Ch’oi has served in a number of important positions given his closeness to the Kim family. He has held the rank of vice marshal and has served as the director of the General Political Bureau (GBP), which is the party’s political officer system that provides the oversight and control of the KPA. Ch’oi is not a professional military officer, but he concurrently serves as first vice chairman of the SAC. Ch’oi has a diverse background with prior service in the OGD, the CMC, and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League.[11] In 2014, Ch’oi paid a seven-day visit to Russia as a special envoy seeking to improve bilateral ties.[12] Although over eight years have passed since his trip, Ch’oi almost certainly is a centerpiece of Pyongyang’s current efforts to exploit opportunities presented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ri Byŏng-ch’ŏl (75) holds the rank of marshal and is a former commander of the KPA Air and Anti-Air Force. He’s also a vice chairman of the CMC and has served on the SAC.[13] Ri is rumored to be related to Ri Sŏl-ju, Kim Jong-un’s wife, and has played a prominent role in North Korea’s rapid weapons and missile development in the Kim Jong-un era. There are eight additional members of the Politburo and 17 alternate members (as of spring 2023).[14] Politburo staff including analysts and advisers undoubtedly act as gatekeepers for the information that passes to and from the senior leadership.

According to the KWP Bylaws, the party must continuously strengthen the ideological power and technical military capacity of the state. The supreme deliberative and decision-making authority on military affairs is the CMC with the KWP party general-secretary serving as the ex officio CMC chairman.[15] The two vice chairmen are Ri Byŏng-ch’ŏl and Ri Yŏng-gil (68),[16] a vice marshal and professional military officer who has served in several high-level KPA positions. Most of the other nine CMC members have extensive military backgrounds[17] so they would be qualified and interested in the details of new weapons technologies and how they are integrated into the fighting forces of Russia and Ukraine. The CMC is the ultimate deliberative and decision-making body on military affairs,[18] so the CMC will review developments in unmanned systems, artificial intelligence (AI), loitering munitions, cyberwarfare, influence operations, and other aspects of the Ukraine conflict as the senior party leadership excogitates new technologies and tactics that could be adopted by the KPA.

In Pyongyang, the senior leadership clearly is looking to Ukraine for lessons regarding geopolitical trends, North Korean foreign policy, inter-Korean policy, and developments in military technology, as mentioned above. But how is this foreign information collected, processed, and disseminated to the leadership? And what are the lessons the leadership likely is learning?

Intelligence collection

Regarding intelligence collection, Pyongyang can conveniently access vast amounts of open-source information from the internet. North Korea has several institutions throughout the party, state, and military that can collection information from abroad. The KPA General Staff’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) remit includes foreign intelligence, cyber operations, reconnaissance, and covert operations.[19] The RGB’s Technology Reconnaissance Bureau (Third Bureau) and the Foreign Intelligence Bureau (Fourth Bureau; formerly Office 35) responsible for collecting strategic and overseas intelligence on South Korea, the U.S., and other important countries, and presumably Ukraine and NATO countries given the current conflict.[20] The RGB administratively is under the General Staff, but it is under the direct command and control of Kim Jong-un.[21] In June 2022, Major General Ri Ch’ang-ho was appointed RGB director and to the CMC.[22]

In sum, the RGB is positioned to collect information regarding a broad range of issues for the leadership, but it is not the only agency capable of doing so. Regarding geopolitics and its impact on North Korea’s foreign policy, the KWP International Department is the leading authority on international affairs,[23] but the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains 46 embassies abroad, including missions in the following important countries: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.[24]

North Korea’s diplomatic missions abroad develop human intelligence (HUMINT) networks to assess the geopolitical trends as they pertain to Ukraine and Pyongyang’s foreign policy interests. Embassies are staffed with diplomats, political officers, security officers, and defense attachés that are managed by the Defense Ministry’s Foreign Military Affairs Bureau. Embassy staff whether wearing a party hat, a state hat, a KPA hat, or some combination of the three, maintain formal contacts with their government hosts. Staff also network with non-governmental entities for various economic and political reasons. Economic objectives can include DPRK exports, which includes arms sales, and imports of items and materials that the regime prioritizes back home—often luxury goods and military components or technology for weapons development. DPRK missions are expected to earn foreign exchange to finance their operations, and if possible, to remit hard currency to Pyongyang, so missions are engaged in a range of business activities, some of them illicit.

The KWP has an extensive network of “liaison organizations” and “friendship committees” that develop contacts with foreign non-governmental organizations such as political parties and activist groups. These liaison organizations target both Korean diaspora and other foreign nationals abroad, and they are under the control of the KWP’s Foreign Cultural Liaison Committee.[25]

According to the KWP Bylaws, the party’s basic foreign policy principles are grounded in independence, peace, and friendship with an aim to strengthen amicable relations with other countries to enhance the capacity of anti-imperialism and solidarity.[26] The text from the party bylaws preamble is reiterated in Article 17 of the DPRK constitution:

Independence, peace and friendship are the basic ideals of the foreign policy and the principles of the external activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The State shall establish diplomatic as well as political, economic and cultural relations with all friendly countries, on the principles of complete equality, independence, mutual respect, non-interference in each other’s affairs and mutual benefit. The State shall promote unity with people all over the world who defend their independence, and resolutely support and encourage the struggles of all people who oppose all forms of aggression and interference and fight for their countries’ independence and national and class emancipation.

International liaison with Korean diaspora is the responsibility of the party’s United Front Department (UFD), which is tasked with North-South Korean relations and managing foreign supporters of the party’s unification line. There are several UFD subordinate organizations assigned to liaise with the Korean diaspora and foreign nationals abroad through “friendship committees” for cultural exchanges and other activities. These organizations are managed through DPRK diplomatic missions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) party committee.

DPRK embassies have a minimum of eight personnel assigned including the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission (chargé d’affaires), a party representative who ensures all personnel are following the party guidance as issued form Pyongyang. North Korean embassies have three main areas of activities: economic, information collection from South Koreans abroad, and collection of information about the United States. The details of the collection effort depend upon the location and the tasking from Pyongyang that is delivered through the MOFA party committee.[27] Undoubtedly, DPRK diplomatic missions in Moscow, Minsk, Warsaw, Bucharest, Berlin, London, Brussels, Tehran, and other relevant capitals have adjusted their collection activities towards the geopolitical developments surrounding the war.

Regarding military intelligence, defense attachés collect open source and possibly covert information through formal military channels in their host countries. In locations tasked with the procurement and/or sales of materials, components, or systems related to weapons, a representative from the party’s Munitions Industry Department (군수공업부, also known as the Machine-Building Industry Department) will post a representative to manage those activities.[28] It’s safe to assume that those representatives are scouting the landscape for potential suppliers of new weapon systems that emerge from the conflict in Ukraine. Furthermore, if the war in Ukraine has a ripple effect of greater insecurity in other regions, those missions will look for opportunities to export North Korean arms. For example, if the war is prolonged and causes greater food insecurity in Africa, the destabilizing effects could drive actors to acquire North Korean small arms, which are price competitive in international arms markets.

Advantages and disadvantages of North Korean information collection and learning

North Korea has two main advantages when collecting information from abroad. First, all organizations whether in Pyongyang or abroad have access to a tremendous amount of open-source information—much more than North Korea could ever collect, process, and analyze. The RGB also has range of cyber capabilities that target foreign computer networks, but it’s unknown whether North Korea has conducted cyber espionage related to the Ukraine conflict. Nevertheless, it’s probably a lower espionage priority compared to targets in South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and others in the Indo-Pacific.

Open societies such as those in Europe, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. not only provide enormous amounts of open-source information, but they also permit relative freedom of movement, which makes it easy to operate North Korean liaison networks. While most foreign government officials, at least those in the liberal democracies, are almost certainly guarded in their personal interactions with DPRK MOFA officials, these contacts are connected to an information channel back to Pyongyang. Furthermore, even though North Korean officials are monitored and in most cases their movements are limited abroad, local citizens are much less restricted and more approachable than North Korean citizens are for foreign diplomats in Pyongyang.

On the other hand, North Korean information collection, analysis, and learning face two major obstacles—one temporary and the other more intractable. First, COVID-19 has disrupted the operations of liaison HUMINT networks overseas. In addition, the pandemic has impacted reporting channels from regular government interlocutors and the defense attaché system. Many DPRK diplomats and intelligence officers were stranded abroad and many foreign missions in Pyongyang have been closed or now operate with minimal staff.

The second and more enduring problem for North Korea is cognitive biases. This bias is present in both HUMINT collection, processing, and analysis. First, although North Korean embassy staff are exposed to a range of foreigners with various careers, motivations, and objectives, the liaison networks and friendship committees consist of like-minded fellow travelers who echo what the North Korea authorities want to hear, such as their “solidarity in opposing American imperialism.” Cognitive biases accompany the processing and analysis of information from the very bottom until final reports are dropped into Kim Jong-un’s inbox. A whole lifetime of indoctrination under the monolithic ideological system and the monolithic leadership system instills confirmation biases about the international system and the causes of war. Those who deviate from the party’s ideology are unlikely to survive and succeed in North Korea; only those who adhere closely to party guidance and its world view will be recruited for positions of information collection, processing, and analysis.

The lessons from Ukraine for North Korea

The first geopolitical lesson from the conflict in Ukraine is that U.S. and allied resilience and resolve are greater than what has been depicted in Russian, Chinese, and North Korean story lines. Moscow and Pyongyang did not expect to see such determined counterbalancing from Europe and NATO against Russian aggression. However, after a decade of North Korea’s accelerated nuclear and missile development, similar counterbalancing is now emerging in Northeast Asia in the context of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and in trilateral security cooperation. Increasingly closer security cooperation among the U.S. and its allies contradicts the views of many autocrats who were convinced America and the West were in decline. There has been plenty of evidence to support such a view: Trumpian chaos that weakened U.S. alliances, the UK withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit), the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Russia’s unrequited aggression in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine.

The usual suspects—Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran—have their own versions of this narrative, but for Pyongyang, the “ideological weakness of the U.S. and its vassals” is said to be compounded by decadent bourgeois capitalism and American immorality. In sum, they agree the world would be better off if the U.S. and its allies were punished and weakened even if the process includes military aggression, astronomical economic costs, and war crimes in violation of the UN Charter and international law.

Although Ukraine, NATO, the EU, the U.S. and its allies are standing up to Russian aggression, and are demonstrating they are not weak, cognitive biases likely will prevent the North Korean leadership from correctly learning this lesson. Instead of viewing this conflict as Ukraine defending its sovereign territory while the U.S., NATO, and like-minded countries are responding to protect the liberal world order, Pyongyang will interpret this as Russia acting preemptively against “Western aggression,” which Pyongyang believes is an enduring feature of the international system and “American hegemony.”

Pyongyang views the East Asian geopolitical situation in similar ways. Borrowing extensively from Lenin’s theory of capitalist imperialism and from Thomas Hobbes’s depiction of “the state of nature,” Pyongyang sees the international system as a menacing place where foreign powers seek conquest and the enslavement of the Korean people. For the KWP, security is a never-ending zero-sum struggle, and acquiring more power is the only pathway to security and survival. Echoing the words of John Mearsheimer, in Pyongyang’s view, no amount of power would ever be sufficient unless there is a transformation of the international system. The North Korean literature is replete with stories of innocent Korean peasants defending their homeland from foreign invasions centuries before the United States existed. The concept of collective security is incomprehensible to the North Korean mindset; therefore, NATO, and U.S. alliances in East Asia can only be instruments for American imperialism. Therefore, the KWP leadership would be pleased if the conflict in Ukraine led to the fracturing of NATO and the ultimate demise of U.S. alliances in East Asia.

The second lesson is that the “Beijing-Moscow unlimited partnership” does have limits. All relations between states have boundaries; even the closest treaty allies do not agree on everything. However, compared to alliances of democracies with shared interests and values, authoritarian regimes are more opportunistic and they have greater credible commitment problems—not just with democracies but also among themselves. This is not really a lesson for Pyongyang though; the inability to make credible commitments is a way of life in North Korean domestic politics. Nevertheless, North Korea will take advantage of any opportunity to profit from the war in Ukraine and to undermine the liberal world order. In the short-term, Moscow-Pyongyang ties almost certainly will improve as the two isolated revisionist states can benefit from mutual support.

For North Korea, closer cooperation between China and Russia in their efforts to undermine the West also provides North Korea with greater autonomy in its efforts to subvert the Korean War Armistice regime and the broader liberal world order. The days of the UN Security Council adopting punitive resolutions for North Korean nuclear and missile tests are over. Now the North Korean leadership could feel emboldened since China almost certainly will be even more tolerant of North Korean belligerence than it has been in the past. For North Korean foreign policy, Pyongyang might believe now is a good time to seek greater cooperation with other revisionist states dissatisfied with the liberal world order.

As for inter-Korean relations, Pyongyang has shown no desire for dialog with the Yoon Seok-yol government, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. North Korea’s operational nuclear arsenal combined with Beijing’s tolerance for Pyongyang’s tolerance for belligerence means that the North Korean leadership could take greater risks in coercive actions towards Seoul. As a result, the Korean peninsula could face increasing dangers of the stability-instability paradox, especially if Pyongyang senses any gap in the combined U.S.-ROK integrated deterrence posture.

The third lesson of the war in Ukraine is the poor performance of the Russian military. There are many reasons for this, but rampant corruption has been a major cause. Despite two decades of “military modernization,” the Russian military has been exposed as corrupt and inefficient.[29] All military services are susceptible to corruption, but autocratic regimes are even more vulnerable than democracies. This vulnerability also applies to the KPA and the North Korean arms industry overall. North Korea’s analysts must be aware of Russia’s poor military performance but it’s uncertain what they believe the underlying causes are. The North Korean leadership believed the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to corrupt leaders and the decay of ideology in the Soviet bloc, and now they probably blame similar causes as well as the Kremlin’s assertion that “Russia is at war with NATO and the West.” While corruption is prevalent in North Korea, the leadership doesn’t see it as a structural problem inherent to the system, but as a sign that ideological indoctrination has not been sufficient. Regardless of outcome in political, military, or economic affairs, Pyongyang is quick to cite inadequate ideological fortitude. Therefore, we should expect the North Korean leadership to see the ineptitude of the Russian military as further evidence of the need to double down on the party’s ideology.

The final hybrid geopolitical and military lesson from Ukraine is the limited utility of nuclear weapons. As the Americans learned in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, nuclear weapons are not effective in compelling non-nuclear states to acquiescence to the demands of a nuclear power. The Soviets learned this lesson in Afghanistan as well, but Putin seems to have forgotten or he feigns ignorance. Nuclear saber-rattling is not credible for compellence, as the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated once again. North Korean media are likely to express shrill nuclear threats occasionally in the future, particularly during combined ROK-U.S. military exercises in South Korea. The aim of these threats is to intimidate Seoul, Washington, and their allies to coerce them into accepting Pyongyang’s demands. However, any threat by the leadership to use its nuclear weapons for anything other than a last gasp of desperation as the regime was being destroyed by force is simply not credible because it would be suicidal. However, the Kim family regime is not suicidal, which is one reason the regime has survived decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe.

[1] Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower,” UkraineAlert Blog, Atlantic Council, 13 September 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainian-victory-shatters-russias-reputation-as-a-military-superpower/.

[2] Matt Yu, Tang Pei-jun and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Experts discuss lessons of Russia's war in Ukraine for Taiwan, China,” Focus Taiwan (CNA English News), 24 February 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202302240019.

[3] David Albright, “North Korean Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: New Estimates of its Size and Configuration,” Institute for Science and International Security, 10 April 2023, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/2023-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-new-estimates/.

[4] 조선로동당규약 (2021.1 개정) [KWP Bylaws (revised January 2021)]; Gyeong-Seob Oh and Jin-Ha Kim, “Sectoral Assessment of Kim Jong-un's Decade in Power: The Creation and Stabilization of the Kim Jong-un Regime's Monolithic Rule,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies,

Vol. 30, No. 2. 2021. 119~150, https://doi.org/10.33728/ijkus.2021.30.2.005.

[5] 조선로동당규약 (2021.1 개정) [KWP Bylaws (revised January 2021)].

[6] Article 11, DPRK Constitution (2019).

[7] 조선로동당규약 (2021.1 개정) [KWP Bylaws (revised January 2021)].

[8] “김덕훈,”통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=10302; “김덕훈,” 북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 81-92 쪽.

[9] “조용원,”통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=45158; “조용원,” 북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 809-819 쪽.

[10] 북한이해 2022, 통일부, 국립통일교육원, 2022년 2월, 49-50 쪽, 221-222쪽.

[11] “최룡해,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=24305; “최룡해,” 북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 860-887 쪽.

[12] Shannon Tiezzi, “The Renaissance in Russia-North Korea Relations,” The Diplomat, 22 November 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-renaissance-in-russia-north-korea-relations/.

[13] “리병철,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=23305; “리병철,” 북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 386-393 쪽.

[14] “당,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/getPowerStructureDang.do.

[15] 조선로동당규약 (2021.1 개정) [KWP Bylaws (revised January 2021)].

[16] Ri Yŏng-gil also currently serves as Minister of National Defense. “리영길,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=36429;북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 422-429 쪽.

[17] “당,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/getPowerStructureDang.do.

[18] 북한이해 2022, 통일부, 국립통일교육원, 2022년 2월, 49-50 쪽, 59-62쪽.

[19] 정지용, “‘미인계’ 여성 공작원 양성하는 북한 정찰총국,” 한국일보, 16 February 2017, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201702161828684725; “정찰총국,” 북한 지식사전, 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=341&menuId=NK_KNWLDG_DICARY; “정찰총국,” 나무위키, https://namu.wiki/w/%EC%A0%95%EC%B0%B0%EC%B4%9D%EA%B5%AD.

[20] 김일기 및 김호홍, “김정은 시대 북한의 정보기구,” INSS 연구보고서 2020-6 (INSS Research Report 2020), 국가안보전략연구원, 2020, 61-62, 68-70 쪽.

[21] 김일기 및 김호홍, “김정은 시대 북한의 정보기구,” INSS 연구보고서 2020-6 (INSS Research Report 2020), 국가안보전략연구원, 2020, 61쪽.

[22] Very little is known about Ri prior to his appointments. “북한, 인민군 정찰총국장에 리창호 임명,” 연합뉴스, 11 June 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20220611016400042; “리창호,” 통일부, 북한정보포털, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do?menuId=PEOPLE_86&nkpmno=2307;북한

주요 인물정보 2022, 통일부, 2022, 470 쪽.

[23] 북한이해 2022, 통일부, 국립통일교육원, 2022년 2월, 85 쪽.

[24] “North Korea in the World,” East-West Center (EWC) and the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK), https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/diplomatic/dprk-embassies-worldwide.

[25] 북한이해 2022, 통일부, 국립통일교육원, 2022년 2월, 85 쪽.

[26] 조선로동당규약 (2021.1 개정) [KWP Bylaws (revised January 2021)].

[27] Confidential interview data, February 2023.

[28] Confidential interview data, February 2023.

[29] Paul D. Shinkman, “How Russian Corruption Is Foiling Putin’s Army in Ukraine,” U.S. News & World Report, 31 August 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-08-31/how-russian-corruption-is-foiling-putins-army-in-ukraine.

About the Author(s)

Daniel A. Pinkston

Dr. Daniel A. Pinkston is based in Seoul as a full-time lecturer in international relations with Troy University. Previously he was the Northeast Asia Deputy Project Director for the International Crisis Group in Seoul, and the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Pinkston received his Ph.D. in international affairs from the University of California, San Diego, and he has a master’s degree in Korean studies from Yonsei University. He is the author of The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, and he has published several scholarly articles on North Korean WMD and Korean security affairs. He also served as a Korean linguist in the U.S. Air Force.

3. China denounces US plans to send nuclear ballistic submarine to South Korea

And the friend who flagged this for me highlighted this as the money quote:

"What the US does is full of Cold War thinking, provoking bloc confrontation, undermining the nuclear non-proliferation system, damaging the strategic interests of other countries, exacerbating tensions on the Korean peninsula, undermining regional peace and stability, and running counter to the goal of the denuclearisation of the peninsula."

China denounces US plans to send nuclear ballistic submarine to South Korea

finance.yahoo.com · by South China Morning Post April 27, 2023 at 2:30 AM·3 min read

China denounced the United States' plan to send a nuclear ballistic missile submarine to South Korea as Washington and Seoul strengthen their alliance to counter pressure from Pyongyang.

Foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Thursday that China firmly opposed the deployment of the nuclear submarine and other "US strategic assets" announced by US President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on Wednesday. Mao added that the decision was the result of the US' "selfish geopolitical interests".

"The United States has put regional security at risk and intentionally used the issue of the [Korean] peninsula as an excuse to create tension," she said in Beijing.

Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team.

"What the US does is full of Cold War thinking, provoking bloc confrontation, undermining the nuclear non-proliferation system, damaging the strategic interests of other countries, exacerbating tensions on the Korean peninsula, undermining regional peace and stability, and running counter to the goal of the denuclearisation of the peninsula."

Mao's comments came after Yoon's visit to Washington concluded with a declaration that reaffirmed a "nuclear umbrella" to protect South Korea from threats from the North. According to the declaration, US strategic assets - such as bombers and aircraft carriers - will be deployed to the Korean peninsula more regularly.

In particular, a US nuclear ballistic missile submarine will "visit" South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s. Biden said no nuclear weapons would be permanently based there.

"We're not going to be stationing nuclear weapons on the peninsula," he said in a joint press conference with Yoon at the White House. "But we will have visits to ports, visits of nuclear submarines and things like that."

The two sides will establish a Nato-style nuclear consultative group to share information on nuclear assets and intelligence, as well as jointly plan exercises, drills and implementation plans, according to Yoon.

However, Mao's criticism was focused on the US and did not mention South Korea's role. She also did not say whether China would take any retaliatory measures.

In 2016, Seoul's decision to deploy the US-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system against North Korean missiles was seen as a threat to China's national security and sparked economic sanctions against South Korea.

With rising geopolitical tensions in the region, the US has raised its strategic weapon deployment in the Indo-Pacific while strengthening its military ties with regional allies. It has also agreed to provide nuclear submarines to Australia through the Aukus framework, a decision that drew strong opposition from Beijing.

This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the SCMP app or visit the SCMP's Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2023 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.

finance.yahoo.com · by South China Morning Post April 27, 2023 at 2:30 AM·3 min read

4. Experts react: The US and South Korea strike a deal on nuclear weapons. What’s next for the alliance?

Many useful insights here.

Experts react: The US and South Korea strike a deal on nuclear weapons. What’s next for the alliance?

By Atlantic Council expert

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-us-and-south-korea-strike-a-deal-on-nuclear-weapons-whats-next-for-the-alliance/

US President Joe Biden welcomed South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to the White House on Wednesday to commemorate seventy years of the US-South Korea alliance and the war that forged it—but this state visit is no backward-looking affair. While the top items on the agenda (nuclear weapons and microchips) were invented nearer to 1900 than today, the two leaders are navigating the political tensions around those technologies to find a common future. Below, Atlantic Council experts break down the two leaders’ Washington Declaration on nuclear weapons, how the leaders are addressing Seoul’s concerns over US industrial policy, and more.

This post will be updated as the Yoon visit unfolds and more reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Markus Garlauskas: This is the day US-South Korea truly became a nuclear-armed alliance

Matthew Kroenig: A helpful step forward on nuclear deterrence—but also a stopgap measure

Robert M. Soofer: Missing from the package of assurance measures is US homeland missile defense

Rachel Whitlark: US assurances keep South Korea away from its own nuclear weapons—for now

Jessica Taylor: US elections and a transition of South Korean command raise bigger questions

Fredrick “Skip” Vincenzo: More can be done to convince North Koreans not to follow Kim Jong Un into war

Thomas Cynkin: Trading Los Angeles for Seoul? The Washington Declaration and the US nuclear umbrella

Lauren D. Gilbert: Strengthening US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation

This is the day US-South Korea truly became a nuclear-armed alliance

The new Nuclear Consultative Group that Biden and Yoon announced today for the South Korea-US alliance is a major step forward for the alliance’s efforts to deter, prepare for, and respond to North Korea’s nuclear coercion tactics and aggression. Today may be marked as the day that the US-South Korea alliance truly became a nuclear-armed alliance—even if the nuclear weapons are still US-owned and US-controlled, we can now consider nuclear weapons to be an alliance capability.

However, this is just a step and one that requires a great deal of follow-through to realize its promise. This announcement opens the door for a whole new level of necessary hard work in the alliance on nuclear issues, as the presidents alluded to today. War plans and training will have to be continually revised to account for new approaches and new realities, particularly including North Korea’s rapidly growing strategic and tactical nuclear and missile capabilities. The alliance will have to conduct new military exercises and table-top simulations with nuclear considerations at the forefront, incorporating the lessons learned each time. Mindsets will also have to change—rather than focusing on how the United States will “provide” extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea through threats of US nuclear punishment, the focus going forward should be on how to integrate US and South Korean capabilities and approaches to a wide spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. The mindset within the alliance will also have to fully come to grips with the harsh reality that nuclear deterrence may fail, meaning that the alliance should be prepared to be resilient in the face of nuclear attacks and to launch a coordinated counterattack as an alliance.

Today’s important step may be moving onto uncertain new terrain for the US-South Korea alliance, but this is not new territory for the United States. In fact, it is a step that was probably long overdue. Experts in South Korea and the United States had been openly advocating for such a mechanism for years, often citing the model of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which was founded in 1966. There is a reason that NATO is held up as an example of how nuclear and non-nuclear armed allies can work together on nuclear deterrence and response. Even if NATO’s nuclear mechanisms are not perfect and the US-South Korea alliance is different from NATO in many ways, there is much to be learned from over seventy years of working with non-nuclear US allies in the nuclear-armed NATO alliance. Washington should also work with NATO allies to help ensure that South Korea will be invited to learn from NATO more directly, through involvement in NATO deterrence-related institutions and exercises. This should include, for example, official observer status for these allies in NATO’s Steadfast Noon nuclear exercises, invitations to selected NATO NPG activities, and regular participation in NATO nuclear educational programs.

—Markus Garlauskas is director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and former US national intelligence officer for North Korea.

A helpful step forward on nuclear deterrence—but also a stopgap measure

Assuring allies is a stated goal of US nuclear strategy. By assuring allies that they are protected by US nuclear weapons, the United States can maintain stability in important regions and dissuade our allies from building independent nuclear arsenals, contributing to our nonproliferation goals.

Presently, the greatest challenge to assurance is South Korea. In the face of a growing North Korean threat, a majority of the South Korean public now supports building an independent nuclear arsenal.

During the Cold War, the United States assured South Korea in part by maintaining forward-deployed nuclear weapons on Korean territory. They were removed at the end of the Cold War, and some argue that they should be returned.

The Biden administration’s announcement aims to take measures short of nuclear deployments to assure South Korea. The administration renamed and promised to deepen long-standing dialogues between Washington and Seoul on nuclear issues.

This is a helpful step forward. There is more the United States can do to strengthen assurance short of deployments, such as more detailed discussions on nuclear deterrence scenarios. This announcement also gives a concrete win to Yoon to bring home to Seoul.

Ultimately, however, this is a stopgap measure. To deal with the growing North Korean and Chinese nuclear threats, the United States will soon need theater nuclear weapons deployable and deployed to Asia.

One obvious option is the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). This system was put in place by then US President Donald Trump and canceled by Biden. But bipartisan majorities in Congress have restored funding to the program.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. He formerly served as a nuclear-weapons expert in the US Department of Defense and intelligence community.

Missing from the package of assurance measures is US homeland missile defense

The set of measures announced by Biden and Yoon will be helpful in reassuring a nervous South Korean population that the United States can be counted upon to help deter North Korean nuclear threats. The regular, temporary deployment of US nuclear-capable forces to South Korea, creation of a new bilateral nuclear consultative group, and better integrating South Korean conventional assets into the nuclear deterrence mission should help reinforce the deterrence signal meant for the North Korean leadership.

Yet these important steps may not address fully the underlying dilemma that provokes South Korean angst over the US nuclear umbrella: Would the United States use its nuclear weapons against a North Korea that is growing its capability to target American cities with nuclear weapons? Having the nuclear capabilities to strike North Korea is only part of the deterrence equation. The United States must also convince the adversary that it has the will to use these weapons in the face of nuclear retaliation.

The United States today minimizes that risk through the deployment of a national missile defense system comprised of forty-four long-range ground-based interceptors. The Biden administration will update the system and expand the number of interceptors by twenty starting in 2028, though it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to stay ahead of the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat.

The United States does not rely only on missile defense to counter the North Korean threat. Rather, it employs missile-defeat tactics meant to eliminate the missile threat prior to launch. Through this combination of missile defense/defeat and the threat of nuclear retaliation, the United States signals to North Korea that any nuclear use against the United States or its allies would be both futile and fatal. By taking steps to protect the homeland against North Korean ICBMs the United States makes clear its willingness to run risks on behalf of its allies. In this sense, homeland missile defense should be included in the package of assurance measures discussed by the two countries.

—Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He formerly served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy.

US assurances keep South Korea away from its own nuclear weapons—for now

News from the White House today reveals that the United States will, for the first time, provide South Korea with a central planning role for the use of US nuclear weapons in conflict scenarios with North Korea. It is a move akin to how the United States integrates NATO allies in conflict preparations and plans. While perhaps challenging for the larger nuclear non-proliferation regime and significant for security dynamics and stability on the Korean Peninsula, recent events make this increased nuclear sharing understandable. This growing and deepening cooperation in the nuclear realm is one way the United States is attempting to reassure South Korea about its commitment to protect and defend its ally amid a worsening security environment. Similar are the Freedom Shield and Warrior Shield FTX military exercises the two states jointly conducted last month—the largest such exercises undertaken in five years.

Such reassurance is needed in light of former US President Donald Trump’s public discussion of withdrawing US troops from South Korea unless it upped its financial contributions for hosting them (and the possibility of a second Trump administration or election of a Trump acolyte in 2024 who makes good on such ideas). Further integration of the South Koreans into US planning can also be understood as a way to try to stave off growing domestic interest in an indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons option, which may be an increasingly popular conversation topic ahead of South Korea’s presidential elections in 2027. Moreover, an expanding North Korean nuclear arsenal understandably generates increasing nervousness and insecurity among South Koreans. These ongoing dynamics between the United States and South Korea are emblematic of the kinds of difficult conversations and tradeoffs Washington may need to make with its currently non-nuclear allies in a worsening regional security environment.

Currently, the United States remains committed to upholding nuclear non-proliferation norms, including taking increasingly significant steps to try to forestall allied proliferation. However, given that tensions are growing in key regions around the globe and the decision to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons is ultimately a state’s own choice, the United States may soon need to ask uncomfortable questions and reexamine its historical commitment to keeping allies away from their own nuclear weapons. A point may arrive where allied reassurance hits its limit and/or the United States views allied proliferation as augmenting the US security position vis-à-vis some hostile actor or actors rather than undermining it. US policymakers would do well to think through these difficult tradeoffs sooner rather than later.

—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

US elections and a transition of South Korean command raise bigger questions

The Washington Declaration demonstrates an important step toward strengthening the US-South Korea alliance. However, in short order it may not have the ability to decrease the South Korean public’s desire for an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. The declaration and plans for rotation of a US nuclear-armed submarine to South Korea is likely to draw ire from not just North Korea but China as well. However, overall nuclear employment decision-making will still rest with Washington.

Any concerns surrounding US abandonment will likely not be resolved within one US administration. With the 2024 US presidential election looming, it is unclear whether the winner of the election will hold similar views toward cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence.

Yoon’s declaration of commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a quick turn from his earlier comments in which he signaled possible support for South Korea one day developing its own nuclear weapons. It begs the question of whether Washington’s decision to further include South Korea in this manner after Yoon’s comments will extend to other regional allies. And in the long term, the declaration does not address concerns surrounding the transition of wartime operational control of the allies’ joint forces to South Korea. The question remains: How can a South Korean general be in charge of the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command in a conflict when final say on nuclear weapons will always reside in Washington?

—Jessica Taylor is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served in South Korea from 2019 to 2021 as an international relations strategist for the headquarters command staffs of United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea.

More can be done to convince North Koreans not to follow Kim Jong Un into war

The joint statement issued by Biden and Yoon comprehensively affirms the strength of the US-South Korea alliance and demonstrates the shared values of both nations. While it gives particular attention to North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and missile programs, its sincerity of commitment across a range of issues provides a firm basis for further maturation of the alliance.

And yet, what the statement did not say also matters. North Korea is perilously close to being able to hold American cities at risk. Two weeks ago, it successfully tested what appears to be a solid-fuel long-range missile. Simply putting North Korea on notice that, as the leaders’ joint statement emphasized, “a DPRK nuclear test would be met with a strong and resolute response” might not be enough. Should North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have the audacity to test a long-range missile that successfully detonates a warhead, it’s likely because he believes that showing he possesses such a credible threat will make the United States too risk adverse to use meaningful force against him.

The danger is not that Kim might simply decide to attack South Korean or US cities but rather that this credible of a threat might give him potentially game-changing leverage because it would undermine the credibility of US deterrence. If Kim comes to believe he can deter a regime-ending response, he might decide he can “safely” use that leverage to coerce South Korea into favorable political concessions—something likely to result in miscalculation and conflict. This is a dangerous development that is decades in the making. Yoon and Biden inherited this mess and are not to blame for where we are, but it is time to start doing more than threatening consequences.

What can be done? Rather than focusing on deterring Kim—who may not be deterrable—the alliance should be aggressively waging a public information campaign to convince elites and others in North Korea that following Kim into conflict is the greater risk. If, at the brink of a conflict, they believe Kim is to blame, many of these ordinarily loyal people—in charge of critical weapons and military formations—might be deterred from engaging in hostilities if they feel they have credible alternatives for them and their families. Although not likely to be as successful as the peaceful capitulation of East German and Soviet elites at the end of the Cold War, if a critical mass come to believe that there is hope for them in a life after Kim, the potentially devastating costs of a war on the Korean Peninsula could be significantly reduced. A good start for the next joint statement might be to publicly commit to fair treatment for North Koreans if—should war occur—they refrain from fighting.

—Fredrick “Skip” Vincenzo, US Navy (ret.), is a senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Trading Los Angeles for Seoul? The Washington Declaration and the US nuclear umbrella

Throughout the Cold War and beyond, the United States has striven to ensure the credibility of its nuclear umbrella both to deter potential aggressors from attacking US allies by conventional or nuclear means and to reassure US allies that they do not need to deploy their own nuclear weapons. That credibility was strongest in cases where a potential adversary lacked the means of directly attacking the US homeland. With its own territory and people out of harm’s way, the United States would be able to retaliate with impunity. However, with the advent of nuclear weapons systems capable of directly targeting the United States, Washington and its NATO allies devised what would be described as a “seamless web of deterrence,” namely by ensuring dominance at each escalatory step. Thus, when the then-Soviet Union deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, the Carter administration with NATO concurrence responded by deploying its own. Were the Soviet Union to attack European NATO allies with intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the United States would be able to respond proportionately without having to resort to escalating and utilizing its central strategic nuclear forces.

The United States decided to withdraw its tactical nuclear forces from the Korean Peninsula in 1991, partly based on the hope that this would help persuade North Korea to forswear its nuclear weapons program. Since then, Washington has relied on periodic consultations in various formats to reassure its Korean allies that they can continue to depend on the US nuclear umbrella. However, with the advent of an aggressive nuclear modernization program by North Korea, which includes development not only of tactical nuclear weapons, but of ICBMs capable of striking the United States as well, the US nuclear umbrella covering South Korea appears to be fraying. Accordingly, the tide of South Korean public opinion has turned: seven-in-ten South Koreans now support developing their own nuclear arsenal, and a majority supports the return of US nuclear weapons to South Korea—long anathema to the South Korean public. This no doubt also reflects, in part, concerns about China. More broadly, China’s own nuclear buildup, its increasing backing of North Korea, and the growing risk of US-China military conflict over Taiwan all impinge on South Korea’s security.

Enhanced coordination of nuclear planning between Washington and Seoul as outlined in the Washington Declaration is designed to bolster Seoul’s confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. This is an important step forward and, in the short term, may alleviate pressure on South Korea to go nuclear. Ultimately, however, US force posture with respect to North Korea and a consistent, highly visible US commitment to the defense of South Korea will be the major determinants of whether this position remains sustainable.

—Thomas Cynkin is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the practice lead, Japan and Northeast Asia, of the Transnational Strategy Group, a global consulting firm operating at the nexus of policy and business.

Strengthening US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation

The nuclear aspects that came out of the first state visit from a Korean president to the United States in twelve years were undoubtedly an important step for the alliance and a larger assurance of the United States’ extended deterrence. However, it was not the only theme of note. The leaders’ joint statement showed the Yoon administration’s commitment to working with the United States in building regional partnership and defending a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. In particular, the statement’s references to US-South Korea-Japan cooperation and maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait show the two presidents’ dedication “to ensure the future of the Indo-Pacific is free, is open, prosperous, and secure.”

After a significant deterioration in US-South Korea-Japan relations in recent years, President Yoon has dedicated himself to improving ties with Japan and developing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan—even directly stating that both presidents “agreed to continue our efforts in strengthening…trilateral cooperation.” This intention to improve both economic and regional defense measures among the three countries, alongside the statements on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, implicitly affirms the two countries’ commitment to defending against both a North Korean and a Chinese threat—either in separate contingencies or through a potential simultaneous conflict.

Yoon’s White House visit comes as public opinion is shifting in Korea. For the first time in recent history, Koreans consider China to be less favorable than Japan. It is crucial that the three democracies work together to build on recent progress. As relations continue to improve, the countries should work toward a formal institutionalization of trilateral security and economic mechanisms to enhance interoperability and cement increased cooperation, bolstering regional security and prosperity.

—Lauren D. Gilbert is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

5. U.S., South Korea Nuclear Pledge Follows North Korean Weapons Advances

U.S., South Korea Nuclear Pledge Follows North Korean Weapons Advances

Kim Jong Un’s regime has poured its resources into developing a more capable atomic arsenal

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-south-korea-nuclear-pledge-follows-north-korean-weapons-advances-eb593d7?page=1

By Dasl YoonFollow

Updated April 27, 2023 2:55 pm ET

SEOUL—Behind the Biden administration’s pledge to work more closely with South Korea on nuclear deterrence: an accelerated program by North Korea to build a more formidable atomic arsenal while the world was distracted by Covid-19 and the Ukraine war.

Kim Jong Un’s regime has carried out a spree of weapons tests unlike any in the country’s previous history, with a record number last year and a flurry at the start of this year. The tests have allowed the country to expand its capabilities faster than many weapons experts had expected.

In return for more say in the use of the U.S. nuclear force, South Korea agreed not to develop its own nuclear weapons. The country’s president, Yoon Suk Yeol, had raised that possibility in January partly because, with North Korea keeping its door shut to negotiations, the only strategy Washington and Seoul have is strengthening deterrence.

“North Korea has increasingly asserted its nuclear status as nonnegotiable and developed capabilities to make that a reality,” said Markus Garlauskas, a former U.S. intelligence official on North Korea.

Washington Declaration will help deter N. Korean threat but not a 'nuclear sharing' agreement: U.S. official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 28, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, April 27 (Yonhap) -- The agreement reached by the leaders of South Korea and the United States on strengthening U.S. extended deterrence is not an agreement designed to enable sharing of nuclear weapons between the allies, a senior U.S. official said Thursday.

The official noted the agreement, dubbed the Washington Declaration, is designed to address North Korea's evolving threats and nuclear rhetoric, but is not "nuclear sharing."

"So let me just be very direct. I don't think that we see this as a de facto nuclear sharing," said Edgard Kagan, special assistant to the president and senior director for East Asia and Oceania of the National Security Council (NSC).

His remarks come one day after South Korea's deputy national security adviser, Kim Tae-hyo, argued that the joint declaration will make the people of South Korea "feel that they are sharing nuclear weapons with the United States."

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) shakes hands with U.S. President Joe Biden during a joint news conference after their summit at the White House in Washington, D.C., on April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden issued the joint statement Wednesday after holding a bilateral summit in Washington.

The agreement calls for the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which U.S. officials said will provide additional insights into how the U.S. plans and prepares for major nuclear contingencies.

"I think that we see this as a very significant strengthening of the partnership and the alliance between the ROK and the United States," Kagan said of the Washington Declaration, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

"We see this as a very important way to respond to the very obvious challenges that are being posed by the DPRK's very aggressive testing, but also rhetoric," he added while speaking with South Korean reporters in Washington.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's formal name.

When asked about a possible difference between Seoul and Washington in how they view the Washington Declaration from the very start, the NSC official noted it is a "very significant step" that will allow "better cooperation, better understanding between our governments talking about very sensitive issues."

"I think that from our standpoint, we say nuclear sharing, that has very significant implications. I think that the important thing is what this is, and what this is is a very significant step," Kagan said.

Senior U.S. administration officials earlier said the NCG is modeled after NATO's nuclear policy planning body, the Nuclear Planning Group.

Kagan explained the NCG will be fundamentally different from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in that it will be a bilateral arrangement and one between a nuclear state, the United States, and a non-nuclear state.

"And I think we've also made clear that we are working as partners, that this is an area where, obviously, there are significant differences between the United States and the ROK, in terms of the U.S. being a nuclear state under the (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)," he said.

"But we believe that there's tremendous room to do more together, and we look forward to doing that," Kagan added.

The Washington Declaration comes after a debate in Seoul, partly prompted by President Yoon, on whether the country should consider arming itself with its own nuclear weapons.

Seoul reaffirmed its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT in the Washington Declaration.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 28, 2023

7. US-South Korea nuclear weapons deal – what you need to know

Excerpts:

Well, there’s strong language. Whereas the U.S. has repeatedly “reaffirmed” its commitment in the past to the defense of South Korea, the wording in the Washington Declaration is more robust. It builds on the language contained in the joint statement released during Biden’s visit to Seoul soon after Yoon assumed office in May 2022. On that occasion, the U.S. pledged its “extended deterrence commitment to the (Republic of Korea) using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.”

This time, lest there be doubt, that affirmation is made “in the strongest words possible.”

But what does that mean in real terms? First, the U.S. “commits to make every effort to consult with the (Republic of Korea) on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula.”

More substantively, the two sides commit “to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence,” including through “enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats” to South Korea.

...

As such, it is reasonable to assume that Pyongyang will respond with a threatening act or two in the coming days. Using the Washington Declaration as cover, expect North Korea to embark on another brazen act of defiance. Last December, Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister and deputy, threatened an intercontinental ballistic missile test on a normal trajectory, rather than the steep angle launches that avoid threatening nearby countries. And in 2017, North Korea’s former foreign minister Ri Yong Ho suggested that Kim Jong Un was considering testing a hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific. Either would represent a ratcheting up of North Korea’s provocations.

China, meanwhile, is likely to fall back on its decades-old mantra that issues on the Korean Peninsula need to be resolved “through dialogue” – a position that not only fails to penalize Pyongyang but indirectly empowers the isolationist state.

US-South Korea nuclear weapons deal – what you need to know

theconversation.com · by Sung-Yoon Lee

The United States and South Korea have unveiled an agreement under which leaders in Seoul will be handed an enhanced role in planning any nuclear response to a strike in the region by North Korea.

Announced at a state visit to Washington by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on April 26, 2023, the so-called “Washington Declaration” will see U.S. deployments of “strategic assets” around the Korean Peninsula, including an upcoming visit by a nuclear submarine. The last time the U.S. had nuclear weapons in South Korea was 1991

The Conversation asked Sung-Yoon Lee, an expert on U.S.-Korean relations at Tufts University, to explain what the decision to revamp nuclear relations means and why it has come now.

What is in the ‘Washington Declaration’?

Well, there’s strong language. Whereas the U.S. has repeatedly “reaffirmed” its commitment in the past to the defense of South Korea, the wording in the Washington Declaration is more robust. It builds on the language contained in the joint statement released during Biden’s visit to Seoul soon after Yoon assumed office in May 2022. On that occasion, the U.S. pledged its “extended deterrence commitment to the (Republic of Korea) using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.”

This time, lest there be doubt, that affirmation is made “in the strongest words possible.”

But what does that mean in real terms? First, the U.S. “commits to make every effort to consult with the (Republic of Korea) on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula.”

More substantively, the two sides commit “to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence,” including through “enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats” to South Korea.

It will come as a welcome development to decision-makers in South Korea, although it raises questions about just how much intel on North Korea’s threat and capabilities the U.S. – and Japan, with its advanced signal intelligence systems – did not share with previous administrations in Seoul.

Second, the two allies will establish a new nuclear consultative group to “strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning and manage” the growing threat posed by Pyongyang. This means Seoul now will have a seat at the table when it comes to planning any nuclear response strategy and in readying its “conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency.”

In sum, Seoul will now have a much greater say in intel-sharing and planning for a joint long-term nuclear strategy, with a focus on its own role in any future flare-up in the Korean Peninsula.

It is a big step forward.

Why are the US and South Korea announcing this now?

The international security environment has drastically changed over the past year, necessitating credible countermeasures from the two allies, in cooperation with Japan. North Korea has fired well over 100 missiles since January 2022. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its many alleged war crimes have only pulled China and North Korea closer into its sphere. And China has gone beyond its usual “wolf-warrior diplomacy” rhetoric by conducting threatening military drills around Taiwan last August and, again, this April.

The Washington Declaration comes on the 70th anniversary of the alliance between Washington and Seoul. The timing serves as an opportunity to reflect on and reassess the relationship. But, no doubt, the main drivers in this strongly worded reaffirmation of the alliance are the recent actions taken by the governments in Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing.

How has South Korea’s position on nuclear options evolved?

The Korean Peninsula has been through two periods of actual “denuclearization” since the 1953 armistice that ended combat during the Korean War.

The first was in the 1970s when the U.S., catching wind of South Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program, threatened to withdraw all U.S. troops from the South unless Seoul completely dismantled the program. And, so, the government abandoned its nuclear ambitions.

The second came in 1991 when the U.S. and South Korea – perhaps anticipating the coming collapse of the Soviet empire and a severely debilitated North Korea – agreed to withdraw all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the South, even as the North was working on its own nuclear program while vigorously talking “denuclearization.”

But in recent years, public opinion in South Korea has strongly shifted toward self-nuclearization rather than rely on the U.S. stockpile off South Korea’s shores. North Korea’s relentless pursuit of more powerful nuclear and missile capabilities, starting with the resumption of ballistic missiles tests in May 2019 after an 18-month lull, has stiffened views in the South.

President Yoon himself floated the idea of self-nuclearization earlier this year. But the Washington Declaration appears to have tempered down such sentiment. In it, Yoon “reaffirmed the (Republic of Korea’s) longstanding commitment” to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which would prevent the country from building up its own nuclear weapons stockpile.

How will the declaration affect regional tensions?

A staple of North Korean propaganda is that its arms program is a response to U.S. “hostile policy” – which Pyongyang defines as anything from Washington raising concerns about its egregious human rights record to the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea and joint U.S.-South Korea military drills.

North Korea has launched more than 100 missiles since the beginning of 2022. Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images

As such, it is reasonable to assume that Pyongyang will respond with a threatening act or two in the coming days. Using the Washington Declaration as cover, expect North Korea to embark on another brazen act of defiance. Last December, Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister and deputy, threatened an intercontinental ballistic missile test on a normal trajectory, rather than the steep angle launches that avoid threatening nearby countries. And in 2017, North Korea’s former foreign minister Ri Yong Ho suggested that Kim Jong Un was considering testing a hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific. Either would represent a ratcheting up of North Korea’s provocations.

China, meanwhile, is likely to fall back on its decades-old mantra that issues on the Korean Peninsula need to be resolved “through dialogue” – a position that not only fails to penalize Pyongyang but indirectly empowers the isolationist state.

theconversation.com · by Sung-Yoon Lee

8. Nuclear Deal with U.S. Tightens Korea's Shackles

There is growing criticism over the Washington Declaration in Seoul. This kind of spin is supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy to undermine the ROK and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. This declaration was designed to defeat Kim's strategy and now Kim reads articles like this one and just smiles.

Excerpt:

In fact, Wednesday's declaration seems to put more emphasis on American concerns that South Korea could develop its own nuclear weapons than on the North Korean nuclear threat that prompts such aspirations. Ultimately, South Korea must be in a position to defend itself.

Nuclear Deal with U.S. Tightens Korea's Shackles

english.chosun.com

April 27, 2023 13:38

Presidents Yoon Suk-yeol and Joe Biden have announced that South Korea will have some say in the use of American nuclear arms in defense against a North Korean nuclear attack. The two allies will form a "nuclear consultative group" for information sharing and planning of the use of U.S. nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and bombers carrying nuclear weapons. The solution can be compared to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and will give South Korea a better understanding of the U.S.' nuclear umbrella and ensure that it can be mobilized in times of emergency.

But part of the NATO pledge is the presence of nuclear warheads at U.S. airbases in Europe, which is significantly different to what Seoul and Washington have agreed. The question remains whether Washington will really protect Seoul even if that places U.S. territory in the crosshairs of North Korea's nuclear missiles. According to a survey early this year, half of South Koreans doubt that the U.S. will exercise its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

The price for South Korea is high. In return it has pledged to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- in other words it has relinquished any ambitions to arm itself with nuclear weapons in the face of the North Korean threat. Only in January, Yoon hinted that South Korea should acquire its own nuclear arms, but now the U.S. has firmly blocked that option. "I have absolute authority, and sole authority, to launch a nuclear weapon, but what the declaration means is that we will consult with our allies, if any action is so called for," Biden insisted.

It was hasty to jettison South Korea's right to protect its sovereignty and people at a time when North Korea is repeatedly threatening to launch a nuclear attack against it. Some security experts have said recently that a decision by South Korea to arm itself with nuclear weapons would not violate the NPT. U.S. officials should pay attention to this view.

In fact, Wednesday's declaration seems to put more emphasis on American concerns that South Korea could develop its own nuclear weapons than on the North Korean nuclear threat that prompts such aspirations. Ultimately, South Korea must be in a position to defend itself.

Read this article in Korean

english.chosun.com

9. [ANALYSIS] Is Yoon-Biden summit a win-win for both S. Korea, US?

It should be. But the South Korean critics are trying to undermine it.

Excerpts:

Ahn Ho-young, a former South Korean ambassador to the U.S., saw the state visit as a success both in symbol and substance, through which the two nations were able to reaffirm their strong alliance.

"I would say that the summit was a win-win for both sides," Ahn told The Korea Times.

In addition to the joint agreement to bolster investment, trade, technological and people-to-people ties, he also gave high scores to the Washington Declaration, a separate document signed between Yoon and Biden, under which the U.S. promised stronger extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threats.

Under the agreement, Seoul and Washington will establish a "Nuclear Consultative Group," an unprecedented consultative body to "strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime."

...

Hong Hyun-ik, former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, positively assessed the summit in terms of broadened cooperation on critical and emerging technologies such as semiconductors, batteries and artificial intelligence (AI).

But Hong was quite critical of the Washington Declaration. He saw the Yoon administration as giving up the idea of Korea building its own nuclear arsenal too easily in return for the pledge on stronger extended deterrence, thereby making the nation more reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

"We should see how things develop depending on the working-level talks, but at this point, it is ambiguous how the U.S. government will enable South Korea's participation in operating its nuclear assets," he said, pointing out that the agreement is a declaration ― not a treaty ― with no legally binding force.

He also expressed concerns that the state visit has made it clear to the international community that South Korea has chosen alignment with the U.S., ruffling the feathers of both China and Russia

[ANALYSIS] Is Yoon-Biden summit a win-win for both S. Korea, US?

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-28 15:53 | Foreign Affairs · April 28, 2023

President Yoon Suk Yeol listens as U.S. President Joe Biden speaks during a joint press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C., Wednesday (local time). Reuters-Yonhap

Experts divided over outcomes of summit to mark 70th anniversary of alliance

By Lee Hyo-jin

The summit between President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden ended on a high note, with the two leaders vowing to deepen the bilateral partnership in multiple areas including security and the economy.

However, diplomatic observers had differing assessments of the detailed outcomes of the meeting. While some hailed the success of the win-win negotiation, others expressed regrets that Seoul made too many concessions in return for Washington's strengthened nuclear umbrella.

Yoon is currently on a state visit to Washington marking the 70th anniversary of the bilateral alliance. The six-day visit included a summit between the two leaders on Wednesday (local time), as well as a slew of ceremonies commemorating the seven decades of bilateral ties.

Ahn Ho-young, a former South Korean ambassador to the U.S., saw the state visit as a success both in symbol and substance, through which the two nations were able to reaffirm their strong alliance.

"I would say that the summit was a win-win for both sides," Ahn told The Korea Times.

In addition to the joint agreement to bolster investment, trade, technological and people-to-people ties, he also gave high scores to the Washington Declaration, a separate document signed between Yoon and Biden, under which the U.S. promised stronger extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threats.

Under the agreement, Seoul and Washington will establish a "Nuclear Consultative Group," an unprecedented consultative body to "strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime."

"The U.S. has been very reluctant about sharing any information of its nuclear weapons to its allies, which I know well from my own experience. So the pledge…is a major step forward in extended deterrence," said the former ambassador, adding that South Korea will now be able to have a voice in nuclear planning.

Differing views

South Korea's deputy national security adviser Kim Tae-hyo said on Wednesday that the planned measures in the Washington Declaration would "feel like the South Korean people are actually sharing nuclear weapons with the U.S."

U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania Edgard Kagan and Cynthia L. Gire arrive for the state dinner with President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House, Wednesday (local time). AP-Yonhap

However, just one day later, Edgard Kagan, senior director for East Asia and Oceania of the National Security Council (NSC), stated that the declaration "is not an agreement designed to enable sharing of nuclear weapons."

Regarding the different rhetoric between the officials, Ahn commented, "I think Kagan was speaking rather bluntly, referring to the fact that there are no U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean Peninsula. Technically speaking, nuclear weapons sharing is not possible in the current situation."

Hong Hyun-ik, former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, positively assessed the summit in terms of broadened cooperation on critical and emerging technologies such as semiconductors, batteries and artificial intelligence (AI).

But Hong was quite critical of the Washington Declaration. He saw the Yoon administration as giving up the idea of Korea building its own nuclear arsenal too easily in return for the pledge on stronger extended deterrence, thereby making the nation more reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

"We should see how things develop depending on the working-level talks, but at this point, it is ambiguous how the U.S. government will enable South Korea's participation in operating its nuclear assets," he said, pointing out that the agreement is a declaration ― not a treaty ― with no legally binding force.

He also expressed concerns that the state visit has made it clear to the international community that South Korea has chosen alignment with the U.S., ruffling the feathers of both China and Russia

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, right, arrives to welcome President Yoon Suk Yeol to the Pentagon in Washington, Thursday (local time). AFP-Yonhap

Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans' University, believes that the two leaders developed the best outcomes they could in the current state of affairs.

"Realistically speaking, Washington would never agree on Seoul's call to acquire its own nuclear weapon or redeploy tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. It was a good idea for our government to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," he said.

But Park expressed disappointment that the summit did not bring fruitful results regarding the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act.

"I would say the timing wasn't so good for our officials to bring up the topics with their U.S. counterparts," he said, mentioning Biden's announcement on his 2024 re-election bid which came just one day ahead of the summit with Yoon. "From Biden's perspective, now that he is officially seeking a second term, it's certainly not a good idea to show concessions on the policies which his administration touts as one of its major achievements."

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-28 15:53 | Foreign Affairs · April 28, 2023

10. Washington agrees to lessen burden on Korean firms investing in US

Washington agrees to lessen burden on Korean firms investing in US

The Korea Times · April 28, 2023

Lee Chang-yang, left, minister of trade, industry and energy, shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo during the U.S.-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue at Willard InterContinental, a hotel in Washington D.C., Thursday (local time). Courtesy of Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy

Two nations to bolster cooperation on clean energy

By Baek Byung-yeul

South Korea and the United States have agreed to minimize uncertainty and business burdens for Korean companies investing in the U.S. arising from the implementation of the CHIPS Act, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Friday. The two nations also decided to work closely with Korean companies to address their concerns regarding the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Minister Lee Chang-yang and his counterpart U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo issued a joint declaration at the first U.S.-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue in Washington, D.C., held on the occasion of President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to the U.S. on Thursday (local time).

The two countries agreed to minimize investment uncertainty and management burdens for companies under the obligations set out in the CHIPS Act, including the conditions for applying for subsidies and the guardrail clause that limits semiconductor production capacity in China for 10 years upon receipt of a subsidy.

Korea and the U.S. will also establish a public and private semiconductor cooperation forum to strengthen ties in the chip industry between the two countries.

Regarding semiconductor export controls, where the U.S. has banned the export of U.S.-made equipment to semiconductor companies in China, they will discuss how to operate export control measures more predictably to minimize supply chain disruptions after the expiration of the one-year blanket license applied to Korean companies in October.

The U.S. has been attempting to limit China's chip technology development through the CHIPS Act but the details of the regulations have raised concerns over Korean companies actively selling their chips in China.

This is because chip companies that receive subsidies in the U.S. are banned from expanding chip production by more than 5 percent for advanced chips and 10 percent for older technology in China for 10 years after receiving the benefits.

On the supply chain for components and materials used in minerals and batteries, as opposed to semiconductors, and on the IRA, a legal entity that addresses the terms of electric vehicle subsidies, the two countries agreed to continue discussions, although there was no agreement to reduce uncertainty and burdens.

"Over the past year, Korea and the U.S. have been closely consulting on key issues such as the implementation of the CHIPS Act and the IRA," Minister Lee said.

"Based on this, the ministry was able to agree with of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo today on specific directions for cooperation, including minimizing business uncertainty and management burdens and creating a favorable business environment for companies."

Lee Chang-yang, right, minister of trade, industry and energy, poses with U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm at the latter's office in Washington, D.C., Thursday (local time). Courtesy of Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy

Minister Lee also had a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm on the same day.

The two shared their awareness of the April 26 agreement between the two leaders of the two nations on spreading clean energy and strengthening cooperation on nuclear power and discussed concrete measures to implement it.

"The two ministers agreed on the need for joint cooperation on energy policy to expand carbon-free energy sources such as nuclear, renewable and hydrogen; reduce dependence on fossil fuels; improve energy efficiency in industry, buildings and transportation; and secure energy resource supply chains including key minerals," the ministry said.

"They also agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in policy, technology development, commercialization and dissemination through the Korea-U.S. Energy Policy Dialogue with the goal of supporting decarbonization across the economies of both countries," the ministry added.

Regarding Westinghouse's intellectual property lawsuit over Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Minister Lee urged his counterpart to work together to resolve the legal dispute between Korean and American nuclear power companies at the earliest opportunity, the ministry said.

In October, 2022, Westinghouse filed a lawsuit against KHNP for an alleged IP infringement, claiming that KHNP needs its consent and that of the U.S. government to export its nuclear power plant APR1400 as the power plant is developed based on its patented reactor technology.

The Korea Times · April 28, 2023

11. Yoon becomes 1st S. Korean to receive briefings at Pentagon, DARPA

Yoon becomes 1st S. Korean to receive briefings at Pentagon, DARPA

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-28 15:39 | Politics · April 28, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol takes part in a meeting hosted by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon in Washington, Thursday (local time). Reuters-Yonhap

By Nam Hyun-woo

WASHINGTON D.C. ― President Yoon Suk Yeol visited the U.S. Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Thursday (local time), where he received briefings from U.S. military leadership.

Yoon, who is on a state visit to the U.S., is the first South Korean president to visit the NMCC and the first foreign leader to visit DARPA. It appears to be a symbolic gesture from the U.S. to show its commitment to the Seoul-Washington alliance. It is also seen as a follow-up measure to the Washington Declaration, which calls for the two countries' leaders to discuss nuclear and strategic planning against North Korea's threats.

"Despite the strong warnings from the international community, North Korea is elevating its nuclear and missile capabilities and staging provocations at unprecedented level and frequency," Yoon said.

"If North Korea dares to use its nuclear arsenal, it will face decisive and overwhelming response by the Republic of Korea forces and the allies including U.S. military capability."

First lady asks Angelina Jolie to support animal rights in Korea

The NMCC is a key command and control center inside the Pentagon that directly assists the U.S. president and military commanders in emergencies. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and other ranking U.S. officials attended the briefing.

Yoon said he and U.S. President Biden agreed a day earlier to strengthen the extended deterrence to respond to the North's nuclear and missile threats more effectively, and he "fully trust(s)" the U.S.' extended deterrence commitment.

"Now is time that North Korea should realize that they will gain nothing from nuclear weapons, and I urge North Korea once again to make the right decision for denuclearization for a sustainable and genuine peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula," Yoon said.

Yoon and Biden announced the Washington Declaration during their summit a day earlier, in which they agreed to create a new nuclear consultative group to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the North.

Also, the U.S. promised to further enhance the regular visibility of its strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula, saying a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine will visit South Korea in the near future.

"The U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea is ironclad and so is our extended deterrence commitment to your country which includes the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including conventional, nuclear and missile defense capabilities," Austin said.

At DARPA, Yoon was briefed by DARPA Director Stefanie Tompkins on the overall operation of the agency and viewed advanced technologies under research.

DARPA is an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and is widely known for inventing the digital protocols that gave birth to the internet. It also developed many of the technologies used for GPS, stealth, voice recognition, autonomous driving, artificial intelligence and others.

According to presidential spokesperson Lee Do-woon, Yoon said the South Korean military is seeking to upgrade its systems by incorporating advanced science and technology, and the country recognizes that the development of advanced science and technology is a significant factor for both economic development and national security. He expressed hopes to expand Korean scientists' participation with DARPA in advanced science and technology.

The Korea Times · by 2023-04-28 15:39 | Politics · April 28, 2023

12. Korea and India as catalysts for Indo-Pacific era

Korea and India as catalysts for Indo-Pacific era

The Korea Times · April 27, 2023

Following is the keynote address of Dr. Hyun Jin Preston Moon at the recent Global Peace Leadership Conference Indo-Pacific 2023 in New Delhi. Speaking to prominent Indian leaders and others from throughout the larger region, Dr. Moon incisively analyzes global trends and geopolitical dynamics, as well as the significant opportunities afforded by the rise of the Indo-Pacific region. Citing prospects for vibrant synergy between increasingly influential India and a free and unified Korea with its enormous potential, he articulates a compelling vision for the Korean Dream as the catalyst for a new era of human development. ― ED.

By Hyun Jin Preston Moon

The world today is in crisis. In the United States and Europe, for example, the rise of "woke" politics is challenging the traditional Judeo-Christian values and classic liberal views of the West and its institutions from within. There is an alarming cacophony of conflicting ideas about society and the human condition, from the nature of the state to individual identity and gender relations. The result has been widespread political and social instability, uncertainty and moral confusion.

The liberal ideals of Western democracies rooted in individual freedoms and "inalienable" rights are being undermined for the sake of collective conformity with almost religious fervor. Although the end of the Cold War revealed the evils of socialism and communism, a new secular Marxist worldview is taking hold in the West, uprooting its values, norms, traditions and institutions.

This unfortunate reality is eroding the common ground upon which society can stand, as both progressive and traditional sides become more polarized, creating an untenable situation. This "woke" orthodoxy is not content just to undermine the traditional values upon which Western democracy stands, sowing discord within. It seeks to export its ideas to other cultures such as those of India, East Asia, and traditional African societies and twist their values into its own distorted image.

In the realm of geopolitics, we are witnessing the rise of assertive statist powers that are prepared to impose their will on their neighbors, reminiscent of the actions taken by totalitarian regimes of the last century that led to two World Wars and the Cold War. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia was a shock to most in the West that had become complacent about Putin's ambition to restore the territorial influence of the former Soviet Union. Heading into the second year of the war, there seems to be no end in sight for the near term as Ukraine seeks to regain its lost territories and Russia fortifies its positions.

Here in Asia, China has made it clear that it is prepared to violate Taiwanese sovereignty, even by force, under its "One China" policy. That is why so many experts are concerned by the war in Ukraine since many believe that Chinese authorities are studying that conflict and its implications for an invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. has preempted that concern by showing its commitment to the island's defense through the well-publicized visit of former Speaker Pelosi last year and the recent meeting between current Speaker McCarthy and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.

The threat to Taiwan and China's intent on controlling the South China Sea, the world's most vibrant trade route, through the creation of military island bases has raised alarm among all its neighbors. These provocative moves have led the U.S. and its allies to join a variety of new organizations. The Quad dialogue of the U.S., Australia, India and Japan, advanced by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was considered the "Asian NATO" in response to the rising threat of China. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity of 2022 represented fourteen regional nations with a combined economic output of 40 percent of the world's GDP as a counter to China's efforts to economically influence the region.

These developments and President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Russia and the Middle East are beginning to solidify the emerging lines between the free world and the world under Chinese influence.

The rise of the Indo-Pacific and the need for guiding spiritual principles

As a result, the tides of history are shifting from the Atlantic sphere to the Indo-Pacific. Whether that will prove to be for better or worse will be determined by the collective decisions made in the present and near future.

In this geopolitical environment, any nation that cherishes the ideals of fundamental freedom and human rights would clearly be wise to align with the U.S. and its democratic allies. For the threat that China poses is the rise of totalitarian statist regimes that challenges the ideal of liberty. It is important to note that, although China has adopted some aspects of a market system, it never relinquished its one-party communist rule or the Maoist revolution; and it never embraced democracy nor the ideals of liberty that form the foundation of the free world.

Given this threat to liberty, the confusion being spread by the "woke" left in all Western democracies is even more alarming. At no time in human history should the West be clearer about its core values and whence its freedom and rights derive. Many of the activists living in the West, however, take them for granted, failing to recognize the hard-won religious and philosophical milestones, rooted in the Judeo-Christian ethic that gave birth to them.

The formation of the United States of America in 1776, through its Declaration of Independence from the British Empire, planted the seeds of those ideals with its pregnant second sentence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

The foundational premise in those immortal words is that human freedom and rights come from the transcendent power of God, our Creator, and not any human authority or institution; and that they are "unalienable." In our current global circumstances, there is an urgent need to clarify and uplift that time-honored universal spiritual principle. It is important that we understand which ideas will lead to a peaceful, harmonious future and which will dissolve social bonds, leading to chaos and anarchy, most likely followed by tyranny.

What is important to note is that not all democracies are truly free, as we see in the case of ancient Greece and even the Roman Empire; nor are they immune from the tyranny of mob rule. Spiritual principles provide the much-needed compass to navigate through rapidly changing norms and guide humanity toward God's ideal, which I believe, is rooted first and foremost in families centered on the original, creative love of God. We do not have to look far to find evidence of these universal principles.

We can find them in the great faith traditions that have preserved, taught and practiced time-honored traditions that point to the innate value of human life and the proper order in human relationships, especially in the family, as well as to virtues by which to live. Throughout history, God has inspired the founding of various faith and wisdom traditions to elevate human consciousness and cultivate ethical civilizations.

It should be people of faith who lead the world to peace. I believe the vision that can unite and inspire humanity to transcend all the walls of division is none other than "One Family under God." All faiths should cooperate and adopt this vision to build a world free of conflict, reflecting the highest spiritual ideals, rooted in universal principles and values that reflect God's truth, righteousness, goodness and love for all humanity.

Only then will we be able to harness the power of faith to transform the world and build true everlasting peace and harmony for all. We can no longer afford to proclaim that we are all "One Family" while continuing to live in our separate boxes.

The non-violence paradigm and its Korean and Indian roots

My homeland of Korea and India share a special relationship in history that will have important implications for this century.

There is a historic connection between the two countries that goes back two millennia. In the first century CE the Indian princess Suriratna sailed to Korea, married King Suro and became the queen known to Koreans as Heo Hwang-ok. There are memorials to her in both India and Korea. That marriage alliance connected our ancient civilizations and made clear that there were significant connections between the two countries at that time and ever since.

In the last century, the Korean March 1 Independence Movement, launched in 1919 while the Paris Peace Conference was being held after World War I, influenced Indian independence by introducing the platform of mass non-violent protest rooted in universal spiritual truths. Two million Koreans on the peninsula, ten percent of the population, engaged in peaceful protest over two months, making it the largest demonstration of non-violent resistance up until that time.

By 1920 Gandhi had formulated "Satyagraha" or "truth force" that became the governing philosophy behind the Indian non-violence movement. In 1929, Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore, a leading thought leader of Indian independence, met with Korean students in Japan and was deeply moved by the undying aspirations of the Korean people. He immortalized those aspirations in a famous quatrain called "Lamp of the East" describing Korea as one of the ancient sources of light in Asia, waiting to be relit "for the illumination of the East."

The main impetus for independence in both Korea and India in the early 20th century drew power from their own ancient spiritual traditions. In the case of Korea, it was motivated by "Hongik Ingan" that mandated the Korean people to "live for the benefit of humanity;" and for India, it was "Vasudaiva Kutumbakam" that proclaimed that "The World is One Family." As a result, both movements were not driven simply by resentment toward the colonial power. Certainly, they wanted to be free of foreign rule, but each had a greater vision of a peaceful and harmonious coexistence with their oppressors as well as their neighbors after independence.

Later, this approach became the inspiration for Martin Luther King Jr. and the American civil rights movement. Dr. King applied the spiritual principle of non-violence to prick the conscience of a nation. He looked to America's founding creed of equality to hold the nation to account for its moral failure in its treatment of Black Americans. His historic "I Have a Dream" speech did not simply condemn the injustice but called all people to renew their commitment to those founding ideals.

Similarly, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela adopted the principles of non-violence rooted in universal truths while he was in prison for his attempt to violently overthrow the apartheid government. He learned to forgive his oppressors and later worked with then President de Klerk, in the early 1990s upon his release, to dismantle the system of segregation. He became the first Black president South Africa in 1994 and played a central role in reconciliation between the races, being globally recognized for his work and statesmanship.

Due to our two countries' important legacy in shaping the most significant movements for freedom, equality and human rights of the 20th century, I believe that our destinies are intertwined. We have an even greater role to play in this century, as the world stands on the precipice of war and chaos. Our distinctive spiritual heritage and history of non-violence place us in a unique position to champion peace in the Indo-Pacific region, here in the southern heart of Asia and across to the pan-Pacific Rim to the east and eventually to the whole world.

The Korean dream and launching of a new era

However, before we can open a new chapter in the story of this region, we must bring a close to the last vestige of the 20th century's tragic legacies of colonialism and Cold War geopolitics that remain on the Korean Peninsula.

It is deeply ironic that the nation which initiated the paradigm of non-violent mass protest rooted in universal truths remains divided to this day. Korea has been unable to realize the aspirations of the Sam-Il movement of more than a century ago, while every other colonized people, as well as nations in the Soviet sphere of influence, were eventually able to achieve national sovereignty and unification. Thus, Korean unification is of utmost importance in setting a new precedent for peace in Asia and from Asia to the world.

I have developed a new vision for unification called the Korean Dream. Unlike past efforts, it draws upon the ancient Korean philosophical ideal of Hongik Ingan, which precedes the current ideological division by millennia, to tackle the present challenge. It was the impetus behind the high moral ideals of the independence movement and gave all Koreans a sense of providential purpose to create a model nation that could benefit all mankind. It challenges the divided peninsula to discard the foreign construct of division and recognize its common identity and destiny.

In order to do this, I plan on re-launching the paradigm of the Sam-Il movement to bring about unification. To that end, I have created Action for Korea United (AKU), a coalition of civil society activists, organizations, NGOs and associations that represents millions of South Koreans. To date, we have a thousand partners united in the largest grassroots movement for unification in the history of South Korea.

We plan to hold peace rallies in the South that will climax in 2025 with a massive event for unification that will highlight the 80th anniversary of Korean independence from Japanese rule. Imagine if tens of millions of Koreans on the peninsula and in the diaspora, as well as supporters from around the world, gathered their collective voices to demand the peaceful unification of Korea. Surely, the metaphysical and physical wall that divides the peninsula would fall and a new era will dawn for the Korean people, the Indo-Pacific and the world.

I hope and trust that the spiritual and thought leaders of India will recognize the moment and give their support for the Korean Dream. The rising prominence of India in this region is evidenced by its role in hosting the upcoming G20 meeting, drawing upon the rich heritage of Indian spirituality to create the meeting theme of "One Earth, One Family, One Future." It is also noteworthy that India is convening the "C20" of civil society counterparts to G20, giving substance to spiritual principles by promoting the essential value of service and the ethos of one family.

This is highly significant because of the clear recognition that politics, economics and technology alone are inadequate to resolve the many challenges facing the world today. These challenges arise, at root, from a clash of fundamental worldviews that can only be effectively addressed by drawing on deep and ancient spiritual traditions and the universal truths they embody.

What is most important is that we recognize the universal principles that are manifested in these traditions. We are all essentially connected in the one human family, and we are one family because of our shared origin in the Creator God. Our inherent value and fundamental rights are endowed to us by God. To encapsulate these truths in a way that all can easily grasp, I have long advocated the simple yet profound vision statement ― One Family under God.

The Global Peace Foundation and its partners in India will establish the Indo-Pacific Leadership Forum to further implement this movement to foster one global family, guided by the traditions and values shared across all the cultures of this region.

The Leadership Forum will work in a similar way to the Latin American Presidential Mission that I founded. Through it, public-minded former presidents work for the benefit of Latin America through promoting peace, cooperation among countries and spiritual and material development of the people.

I encourage the peacebuilders of this region, in their respective spheres of influence, to join together and invest your passion, energy and talent for the benefit of all humanity, in pursuit of the greatest dream of all, the dream that all people everywhere can come to live together as One Family under God!

Dr. Hyun Jin Preston Moon is chairman and founder of Global Peace Foundation.

The Korea Times · April 27, 2023

13. S. Korea, US agree to minimize US CHIPS Act-induced uncertainties

S. Korea, US agree to minimize US CHIPS Act-induced uncertainties

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · April 28, 2023

South Korean Industry Minister Lee Chang-yang and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo agreed to minimize uncertainties and business burdens chipmakers face over the US’ semiconductor subsidy program, Seoul’s Industry Ministry said Friday.

The two sides held their first Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue, or SCCD, in Washington on Thursday and released a joint declaration statement, vowing to work closely together to minimize the impacts of the US’ CHIPS Act and Inflation Reduction Act, the ministry said. The meeting took place on the sidelines of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to the US.

In their talks, Lee told Raimondo how the requirements of the US chip subsidy program create uncertainties for Korean chipmakers by demanding “excessive” corporate information from recipients and requiring them to share excess profit with the US government.

Lee also pointed out that the guardrail provision of the CHIPS Act limiting the beneficiaries from expanding chip production in China is causing business burdens, and requested the US Department of Commerce to help resolve the uncertainties, according to the ministry.

Washington announced the US CHIPS and Science Act aimed at boosting the country's semiconductor industry by offering ample subsidies to global chipmakers to build chip manufacturing facilities on its soil.

Samsung Electronics, the world's No. 1 memory chipmaker, is building a chip manufacturing plant in Taylor, Texas and has reportedly applied for the chip subsidy.

SK hynix also plans to build an advanced chip packaging plant in the US and is currently looking for a site to break ground.

"The participants will continue discussions on the requirements and opportunities of the CHIPS Act and Korean incentives for interested private sector entities to minimize uncertainties of corporate investments and business burdens," the two sides said in the joint declaration.

"The participants jointly share the desire to create favorable conditions for investment from Korean and US firms in both the Korean and US semiconductor ecosystems."

Under the agreement, the two sides vowed to closely cooperate on advanced semiconductors to implement necessary measures that protect national security while minimizing disruptions to global semiconductor supply chains, maintaining viability of semiconductor industries, and encouraging technological advancement.

Lee also requested the US government to take measures, addressing Korean companies' concerns over the one-year exemption of export controls they received to bring in chip equipment needed to produce chips in China. The waiver will expire in October.

The two countries will also establish a forum within the SCCD to bring both public and private research institutions of both countries to explore collaboration opportunities, the joint declaration said. The fields for potential collaboration include leading-edge and next-generation semiconductors, advanced packaging and advanced materials and parts.

The deal also included cooperation for supporting the growth of the robotics and additive manufacturing industries.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · April 28, 2023

14. ‘Lord Commander’ of the DMZ Has Seen It All on the Korean Frontier

He is a fascinating guy. We were able to spend some time with him at Panmunjom in 2019.

‘Lord Commander’ of the DMZ Has Seen It All on the Korean Frontier

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · April 28, 2023

The Saturday Profile

He faced off with North Korean troops, helped prepare for the Trump-Kim summit and witnessed some of the most hair-raising — and bizarre — moments on the world’s most heavily armed border.

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Lt. Cmdr. D.E. McShane, the former Joint Duty Officer in Panmunjom, in the DMZ, after guitar lessons with wounded veterans at Camp Humphreys in South Korea in April.Credit...Woohae Cho for The New York Times

April 28, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

Lt. Cmdr. D.E. McShane was holding his plane ticket home to begin his retirement in 2019 when President Donald J. Trump announced that he would be flying to the border between the two Koreas to meet Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea.

Dan-o McShane, as the former U.S. Navy officer is known, had been stationed in the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, between North and South Korea for six years. Like the rest of the world, he learned of Mr. Trump’s plans to meet Mr. Kim in the DMZ on Twitter — only a day before the meeting was to take place.

Suddenly, the lieutenant commander was thrust into making frantic preparations, his retirement plans scuppered.

“That started a whole 24-hour communication event that would result in multiple messages passed overnight,” said Commander McShane, who was the American-led United Nations Command’s top military officer at the border in the village of Panmunjom at the time.

“I lay down on the couch for a minute and then at 4 a.m., North Korea would call because they’re working just as hard on their side because Kim Jong-un’s going to come down to them and that’s probably a bigger cult of personality than the Donald Trump cult of personality.”

The Korean War armistice was signed at Panmunjom in 1953, creating the DMZ as a buffer between the two Koreas. The U.N. Command and North Korea opened the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom as the sole point of contact between the two enemies.

Each side has since assigned a joint duty officer at Panmunjom to help enforce the cease-fire. On the U.N. side, an American Navy officer has typically served a year or two under the U.N. flag. Commander McShane served for a record eight years, from 2013 to 2021, becoming the longest-serving U.N. joint duty officer at Panmunjom in history.

Commander McShane became the longest-serving U.N. joint duty officer at Panmunjom before he retired.Credit...Woohae Cho for The New York Times

During that time, he faced off with North Korean troops, prepped for the Trump-Kim summit, saw tensions ebb and flow with the political mood and witnessed some of the most hair-raising — and bizarre — moments at the DMZ, the world’s most heavily armed border.

His first night on the job, a land mine exploded nearby. The next night, two went off. Soon, he stopped registering them; the DMZ is strewn with two million land mines. Animals step on them all of the time. It was “a bit of a culture shock,” Commander McShane recalled.

Twice a day — at 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. — he rang his North Korean counterpart on a peach-colored phone the U.N. Command operated to ensure that the hotline was open. The messages were usually mundane: “We’re trimming the grass over here. Don’t shoot us!” he said.

One of Commander McShane’s main duties at the DMZ was to use a peach-colored phone the U.N. Command operated for a hotline with North Korea.

Some U.S. soldiers in Panmunjom liked to call themselves the “Merry Mad Monks of the DMZ” because serving in such an isolated, off-limits spot was like living in a monastery. They organized cookouts and teed off at “the world’s most dangerous golf course”: a one-hole, par 3 surrounded on three sides by land mines.

Unfamiliar with Navy abbreviations like LCDR, for lieutenant commander, Army soldiers stationed at the DMZ nicknamed Commander McShane “the Lord Commander,” a reference to the HBO series “Game of Thrones.”

He remembered once spotting a white dog ambling around Panmunjom. He fed and played with it for two weeks until it trotted across the demarcation line, “like he’s done it 1,000 times.”

The dog went up the stairs of the gray Stalinist building on the North Korean side. A soldier opened the door and the dog walked right in, never to be seen again. “The joke was, of course, that he’s a spy,” Commander McShane said.

A stray white dog at Panmunjom was fed by Commander McShane for two weeks until it trotted across the border. The joke was that the dog was a North Korean spy.

Soldiers watching the stray dog crossing the demarcation line bisecting Panmunjom and the two Koreas.

The stray dog entering the door to the Stalinist building on the North Korean side of Panmunjom, or “peace village.”

At Panmunjom, North Korean and U.S. officers occasionally meet in person, even talking baseball. The North Koreans loved Doritos and South Korean Choco Pies, Commander McShane said. The U.N. officers also brought Marlboro cigarettes and Johnnie Walker whiskey as gifts.

But things could also get ugly.

When inter-Korean relations soured in 2015 after two South Korean soldiers were maimed by North Korean booby traps, loudspeakers raged around Panmunjom with North Korean propaganda 20 hours a day — and with South Korean side blasting pop music.

Sitting in his office one afternoon in 2017, Commander McShane recalled, he heard bursts of gunfire. Outside, a North Korean soldier was running his way across the border through a hail of bullets before making it to the South, shot but alive. By then, the hotline was no longer working; the North Koreans had switched it off to protest U.N. sanctions imposed on the country after its third nuclear test in 2013.

After the soldier’s defection, Commander McShane and his young translator were ordered by his higher-ups to go outside with a bullhorn to deliver a message, standing near the borderline.

It was dark and raining. Earlier that day, he had heard a single gunshot from the North, likely the sound of an officer killing himself, knowing his fate for failing to stop the defector, Commander McShane recalled.

Commander McShane used the bullhorn to invite the North to a joint investigation of the defection. Back in his office, he saw a North Korean flashlight blinking at him, and he was ordered to go back outside and repeat the message. His translator hid behind a brick wall until she had to repeat the message in Korean.

“They never replied to that series of messages, but that was the only time I ever felt super unsafe giving a message,” the commander said.

The Navy kept extending Commander McShane’s tour because it had difficulty finding a qualified replacement. A joint duty officer at Panmunjom must be a lieutenant commander with a master’s degree in East Asian studies and rigorous Korean language training. On the day of the Trump-Kim summit, the Navy extended his tour for the fifth time.

Commander McShane during the Trump-Kim summit at the DMZ in 2019.

“Unpack,” his boss texted that day. “No selfies with the president.”

North Korean officers showed up hours later with three crates packed with dozens of North Korean flags. Commander McShane had only three American flags at his disposal. The North Korean “guys are just furious with me,” he recalled. They wondered, “‘How can you not have all this American stuff up here?’”

“I’m like, dude, I am the American stuff up here,” he said. “Everything is U.N.”

A Marine Corps helicopter had to bring more American flags from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. He used coat hangers for a flag spreader.

Daniel Edward McShane III speaks with a slight Southern accent and calls himself “a little talky.” Born in Charlotte, N.C., in 1970, he joined the Navy in 1999, and flew over Afghanistan and Iraq before being selected for the Blue Angels, the Navy’s aerobatic flying team. He now teaches guitar to wounded American veterans at Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul, as part of a program sponsored by the American Red Cross and the Wounded Warrior Project.

He said his most awkward moment at the DMZ was when Mr. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, came to Panmunjom in 2018 to prepare for her brother’s summit with Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president at the time. During a meeting, Ms. Kim, who has served both as a charming emissary and as a foul-mouthed spokeswoman for her brother’s regime, sat next to the commander, laughing and even lightly touching his arm.

Soldiers at Panmunjom would later tease him, calling Ms. Kim his “girlfriend.”

Sadly, Commander McShane said, the inter-Korean détente he witnessed during his times at the DMZ was “too short.” Relations between the two Koreas are at their lowest point in years, with North Korea conducting a record number of missile tests in recent months.

Mr. Kim and Mr. Moon jointly planted the “peace and prosperity tree” in Panmunjom to mark their 2018 summit, but the pine started browning shortly after it was planted. Commander McShane’s top boss, U.S. Army Gen. Robert B. Abrams, told him: “Don’t let that tree die.” (He added that the general was “a little more forceful than that.”)

For a couple months, Commander McShane used a hose to water the tree himself. “In the DMZ, there are very few things you can point to as a visual kind of containment of hope,” he said. “I think it’s important to keep that thing going.”

The tree lived.

The “peace and prosperity tree” in Panmunjom, planted jointly by Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, and Moon Jae-in, the former president of South Korea, in 2018.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · April 28, 2023

15. Why Biden and Yoon’s Agreement Is a Big Deal

Unfortunately not all Koreans in the South are reassured by this. The application of iR theory must take into account the culture and the local politics.

This agreement sounds good to foreign policy specialists and to many Korea watchers (and I support it) but it is not being received the same among some factions in South Korea. But Preoffessor Allison does acknowledge ther is more work to be done.

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, the agreement’s significance will be missed by many Americans who live in what has been called the United States of Amnesia. Like so much else about the international order today, many take for granted the fact that we now live in the 78th year since nuclear weapons were used in war.

...

The ongoing challenge for Washington, therefore, is to reassure allies like Seoul—as well as European allies that worry about nuclear threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin—that it really does have their backs. Doing this successfully requires extensive, candid conversations between presidents, militaries, intelligence communities, diplomats, legislators, and even citizens.

This is not a job that can ever be finished. Persuading allies that their best choice is to rely on a partner that can sometimes appear fickle is a challenge that Washington must address every day. In the case of Seoul, the fact that Washington continues to keep 28,000 troops in South Korea in an integrated U.S.-South Korean command that stands “ready to fight tonight” is foundational in that strategy. But yesterday’s announcement will provide additional reassurance.

For now, though, Biden and his national security team’s success in embracing their South Korean ally, respecting Yoon and his colleagues’ concerns, and taking concrete steps to persuade them that reliance on the United States is preferable to their alternatives is another big win for Team USA.

Why Biden and Yoon’s Agreement Is a Big Deal

Reassuring allies prevents nuclear proliferation and is a win for Team USA.

By Graham Allison, a professor of government at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Foreign Policy · by Graham Allison · April 27, 2023

The Washington Declaration signed by U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol yesterday should be a ringing reminder of one of the greatest achievements of U.S. national security strategy: its decadeslong success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The agreement strengthened nuclear deterrence coordination between the two allies and offered a greater sense of assurance that South Korea falls under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Unfortunately, the agreement’s significance will be missed by many Americans who live in what has been called the United States of Amnesia. Like so much else about the international order today, many take for granted the fact that we now live in the 78th year since nuclear weapons were used in war.

After having survived the most dangerous crisis in recorded history—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—U.S. President John F. Kennedy predicted a world in which there would be 15 or 20 nuclear states by the 1970s. That forecast reflected the conventional wisdom of the time that as states acquired the technical and economic base to build their own nuclear weapons, many would, and the world would see recurring nuclear wars, terrorist nuclear attacks, and anarchy.

Today, however, South Korea—like most wealthy nations—does not have its own nuclear arsenal. When he met with Biden, Yoon reaffirmed his country’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment to remain non-nuclear and instead bet his country’s very survival on Washington’s promise to use its nuclear arsenal to deter nuclear-armed Pyongyang from attacking.

This is not because Seoul is incapable of developing its own nuclear weapons. Seven decades on, nuclear weapons are not exactly a frontier technology. Intelligence estimates indicate that North Korea, one of the world’s poorest countries, could have an arsenal of 40 nuclear weapons and a stockpile of fissile material from which it could make an additional hundred. But Pyongyang is, relatively speaking, an outlier—one of only nine countries known to have nuclear weapons.

What falsified Kennedy’s forecast and prevented the emergence of such a dangerous world? Among many factors, first and foremost has been a concerted, sustained, strategic campaign by U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican, to prevent nuclear proliferation. The agreement with Yoon is just the most recent nail that is keeping the lid on this box.

The U.S. strategy has consisted of five primary pillars: a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter adversaries from attacking; the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty in which 185 states have now committed to forgo nuclear weapons; U.S. “extended deterrence,” in which Washington has committed to use its nuclear arsenal to deter any attack on select allies; artful coercion of allies at moments when they have been tempted to go nuclear; and relentless opposition to states such as Iran that have sought to upset this regime. Yesterday’s agreement significantly strengthened the extended deterrence pillar of this strategy by creating a consultative group akin to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, bolstering South Korean involvement in U.S. nuclear statecraft.

This strategy has been extraordinarily successful. It has persuaded 95 percent of the world’s countries to accept a position in which other nations, including their deadly enemies, have nuclear weapons and they do not.

In Seoul’s case, it faces an existential threat from Pyongyang. After a bloody war, South Korea has been in a stalemate with North Korea for the past 70 years. Today, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un repeatedly threatens to attack with his million-man conventional force, extensive conventional artillery tubes that can effectively destroy the city of Seoul, and a growing nuclear arsenal that could erase South Korea from the map. North and South Korean troops face off regularly along their border, and North Korea engages in repeated provocations including kidnapping South Koreans, firing shells near South Korea, the sinking of a South Korean ship, and threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.”

But South Koreans have grown more anxious about the strength of U.S. commitments as North Korea’s huge investments in building not only nuclear weapons, but missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads to targets, pose an increasingly credible threat to the U.S. homeland. Yoon and his national security team have certainly asked themselves whether the United States would really risk Seattle to defend Seoul. And in answering that question, they have to think not only about Biden but about the possibility that America’s president in 2025 could be Donald Trump.

During the Cold War, many Europeans were haunted by similar questions. Standing as they did on the front line that separated the free West from the Soviet-led East, Germans repeatedly wondered whether the United States would really risk Washington to defend Berlin or Boston to defend Bonn. Such concerns cannot be dismissed or wished away.

The ongoing challenge for Washington, therefore, is to reassure allies like Seoul—as well as European allies that worry about nuclear threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin—that it really does have their backs. Doing this successfully requires extensive, candid conversations between presidents, militaries, intelligence communities, diplomats, legislators, and even citizens.

This is not a job that can ever be finished. Persuading allies that their best choice is to rely on a partner that can sometimes appear fickle is a challenge that Washington must address every day. In the case of Seoul, the fact that Washington continues to keep 28,000 troops in South Korea in an integrated U.S.-South Korean command that stands “ready to fight tonight” is foundational in that strategy. But yesterday’s announcement will provide additional reassurance.

For now, though, Biden and his national security team’s success in embracing their South Korean ally, respecting Yoon and his colleagues’ concerns, and taking concrete steps to persuade them that reliance on the United States is preferable to their alternatives is another big win for Team USA.

Foreign Policy · by Graham Allison · April 27, 2023

16. The scariest advancements in North Korea missile tech so far

Useful summary.

The scariest advancements in North Korea missile tech so far

By Min Joo Kim and Michelle Ye Hee Lee

April 28, 2023 at 6:21 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · April 28, 2023

SEOUL — North Korea has been firing off missile after missile after missile this past year — in fact, Kim Jong Un’s regime has launched more than 100 since the beginning of 2022. Nearly every time, the regime’s propagandists claim they have made significant advancements in their nuclear and weapons program.

The flurry of tests show these claims are not just empty words and reflect actual progress, analysts say, as Kim is making his arsenal of missiles easier to launch, harder to track and one day capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Diplomacy remains far out of reach, and North Korea has dug in its heels over its nuclear ambitions. Last September, North Korea updated its nuclear doctrine and announced that there would be “absolutely no denuclearization, no negotiation and no bargaining chip to trade” even if international sanctions were lifted.

The North’s rhetoric and advancements have only fueled South Koreans’ desire for their own nuclear deterrent and during South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to the United States, President Biden pledged that any North Korean nuclear attack on the South “will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response,” with a full range of U.S. capabilities, “including nuclear.”

So what has North Korea’s achieved so far?

Solid-fuel missiles

One of the most notable recent developments is Pyongyang’s launch this month of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-18.

Kim has long wanted this technology. It’s no wonder, since solid-fuel propellants are easier to operate than liquid-propelled missiles and most countries with ICBMs maintain a mix of both types.

For solid-fuel missiles, fuel and oxidizer are mixed together into a hard chemical mixture, then packed into a metal cylinder ready for ignition.

That means the missile can be rolled out into the open with the fuel inside it, ready to launch. The solid propellants are more cost-efficient in terms of management, storage and deployment, said Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analysis.

In contrast, liquid-fuel missiles use fuel and oxidizer pumped into a combustion chamber, which combust when mixed and burned. The fuel and oxidizer need to be loaded on-site ahead of launch, which can be time-consuming.

Although far from perfect, the recent test “marks the first big step for North Korea’s propulsion system technology, toward its goal of sending a nuclear warhead to the U.S. mainland,” Shin said.

Multiple launch methods

In case of a conflict on the peninsula, a high priority for South Korea and the United States will be to find and destroy as many nuclear-capable North Korean launchers as possible. North Korea is now making this a much more difficult task.

“North Koreans are saying, if you want to play whack-a-mole with our nuclear force, we’re going to have more moles than you can track and going to be hiding them in places you previously didn’t have to think about,” said Ankit Panda, nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.

North Korea has test-fired numerous short-range ballistic missiles from a variety of locations, such as trains, submarines, and mobile launchers.

It has been experimenting with submarine-launched missiles since 2015. Last month, Pyongyang said it fired two cruise missiles from the 8.24 Yongung, its ballistic-missile submarine. A missile launched from a submarine has a complex trajectory that is hard to intercept, making it a major maritime threat.

North Korea also appears to now have the capability to launch missiles from underground. Photos suggest that during military drills in March, it fired a missile from a buried silo, allowing prelaunch preparations to be conducted without early detection.

These silos are especially useful for sheltering long-range missiles that North Korea is developing. One drawback of silos is that they are exposed to an aerial survey. Satellite photos from earlier this year captured possible signs of silos in North Korea.

Testing short-range missiles

Most of North Korea’s recent testing has been of short-range ballistic missiles, as the country works to improve capabilities in this range — which can reach South Korea.

The KN-23 is similar to the Russian SS-26 but has a significantly greater range, according to research by the Council of the European Union. The KN-24 is a solid-fuel ballistic missile launched from a mobile launcher, and is similar to the U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

The KN-25 is a multiple rocket launcher system capable of firing multiple missiles in quick succession. The system is described by North Koreans as that of “super-large caliber.”

These systems are known to be operable and are “mature systems with sufficient sophistication that could present a real threat against the South,” said Go Myong-hyun, defense analyst at Asan Institute in Seoul.

Launching a spy satellite

North Korea said last week it is ready to launch its first military reconnaissance satellite, which would also help the regime hone its ICBM technology, Shin said. The regime’s space program is considered a pretext for developing missiles and rockets, and is banned under United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Such technology would help North Korea develop strategic situational awareness capabilities, which it currently lacks, Panda said. The spy satellite would give North Korea independent ability to detect a potential attack, which could allow the North to justify a preemptive strike against its enemies.

North Korea has not disclosed the anticipated timeline of the launch but its neighbors are already braced for it. Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada this week ordered the military to be ready to shoot down the North’s satellite rocket if necessary. Antimissile defense systems have been deployed in southern Japan.

Reentry testing

The United States and its allies have never shot down a test missile fired by North Korea, which is typically launched on a high, or “lofted,” angle so that it doesn’t travel too far — and land on neighboring countries’ territory.

However, North Korea in February warned that its missiles would soon be able to hit targets in the Pacific, threatening to turn the ocean in to a “firing range.”

“The frequency of using the Pacific as our firing range depends upon the U.S. forces’ action character,” said Kim Yo Jong, powerful sister of the North Korean leader. She also warned the U.S. and its allies against intercepting its test missiles, saying it would be considered a “declaration of war.”

North Korea could soon launch an ICBM at a normal angle to experiment with its reentry technology, said Kim Dong-yub, a former South Korean navy officer who teaches at University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

Over the course of its flight, an ICBM exits and then falls back into the Earth’s atmosphere, exposing itself to extreme temperature changes. A reentry vehicle is necessary to shield the missile’s warhead from fiery heat during its high-velocity descent through the air. Unless the aerodynamics of reentry are worked out precisely for a proper shield, the warhead will burn up and fail to hit the target on the ground.

North Korea is looking for distant testing grounds to perfect its reentry technology. The test missile, if fired into American waters, would mark a major geopolitical escalation, Kim Dong-yub said. “North Korea is pushing the limits of what it can do under the name of a ‘test,’ to demonstrate its weapons in a chillingly warlike situation,” he said.

What about nuclear warheads?

For all its technological advances in recent years, there is one key thing that North Korea has not proved it can do: Make a nuclear warhead that is small enough to put on a missile. That process is called miniaturization — and it’s difficult.

Last month, the North Korean leader unveiled what he said was a small new nuclear warhead that could fit into short-range missiles. It was called the “Hwasan-31,” meaning “volcano.”

“North Korea has clearly been making its nuclear warheads smaller and lighter,” said South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, in reference to the new Hwasan-31. He told lawmakers this month that the North’s achievements so far are “not negligible” and have to be assessed closely.

Lee said that North Korea has completed preparations for a new nuclear test, in what would be the first since 2017. Experts say the test would shed more light on how far North Korea has advanced in its goal to miniaturize nuclear warheads to mount on tactical weapons aimed at South Korea or Japan.

Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for limited use on the battlefield. They have shorter ranges and lower explosive yields than strategic weapons intended for targets bigger and farther away. These “smaller nukes,” often exploited for saber-rattling still have the destructive power to cause a large number of fatalities, experts say.

Lee reported from Tokyo.

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · April 28, 2023

17. Backups are needed to confirm the declaration

Unfortunately the only way to "prove" the reliability of the U.S. commitment is for north Korea to conduct an attack so that the US commitment can be put into effect.

Conclusion:

Although enhanced deterrence is meaningful, it remains to be seen if it is really reliable. Follow-up actions on the working level are needed to confirm. The two governments also must continue joint military drills so that the declaration does not simply end with a declaration. As flexing muscles alone can hardly ensure peace, both sides must continue with their efforts to bring the recalcitrant government in Pyongyang to the negotiating table.

Thursday

April 27, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Backups are needed to confirm the declaration

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/04/27/opinion/editorials/Yoon-Suk-Yeol-Joe-Biden-nuclear/20230427204142557.html

President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed on strengthening nuclear deterrence against growing threats from North Korea after a summit in Washington D.C. The changes were laid out in the joint statement dubbed the “Washington Declaration,” the first separate narrative on nuclear deterrence in 70 years of the alliance.

The keystones are the establishment of a joint nuclear consultative group (NCG) modelled after the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, regular deployment of U.S. strategic assets like nuclear-armed submarines and strategic bombers to South Korea, and a recommitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by South Korea.

The declaration is a practical compromise between Seoul and Washington over the deepening security threat from the nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea and their response to rapid changes in international geopolitics and security environments. Many in South Korea had wondered if Washington would really come to defend Seoul when New York could be threatened by ICBM attacks from North Korea.

The centerpiece of Yoon’s visit is the launch of a bilateral NCG that would regularly discuss response actions based on U.S. nuclear strategy. The two governments through the channel will be coordinating strategies against diverse contingencies. Washington said that Seoul will be able to share “additional insight” into how the U.S. plans and prepares for major contingencies.

To earn trust in its nuclear umbrella, the U.S. will have strategic assets like nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines regularly visit Korea and the surrounding area. Military drills and simulation activities will help raise defense capabilities further to deter North Korea’s provocations.

In return, the U.S. has asked for South Korea’s recommitment to NPT obligations. The provision comes amid the recent talk of South Korea developing native nuclear weapons. The approval of South Korea’s own nuclear armaments gained 60 percent in public poll. But Washington made it clear that tactical or any other types of nuclear weapons will not be redeployed in Korea. The U.S. stressed that the two leaders made a strategic — and mutual — promise.

Although enhanced deterrence is meaningful, it remains to be seen if it is really reliable. Follow-up actions on the working level are needed to confirm. The two governments also must continue joint military drills so that the declaration does not simply end with a declaration. As flexing muscles alone can hardly ensure peace, both sides must continue with their efforts to bring the recalcitrant government in Pyongyang to the negotiating table.

18. Not every North Korean missile needs a response. South Korea and the US should focus more on readiness and deterrence.

Thank you Dr. Taylor. We should remember that every "traditional" response to Kim's provocations reinforces his legitimacy. As President Yoon said earlier this year, we should respond with information. We should also call out Kim's human rights abuses and the diversion of resources that could help feed the people to build nuclear weapons and missiles is the cause of the suffering of the Korean people in the north.

Not every North Korean missile needs a response. South Korea and the US should focus more on readiness and deterrence.

atlanticcouncil.org · By Jessica Taylor· April 27, 2023

During their summit this week in Washington, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and US President Joe Biden discussed alliance measures to improve deterrence against North Korea, including the establishment of a new Nuclear Consultative Group. Going forward, the allies should focus on this type of strategic measure rather than on a reactive approach to North Korea’s weapons tests and demonstrations.

Earlier this month in one of the latest tit-for-tat rounds, the alliance responded to North Korea’s testing of its new solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-18, with air drills. South Korea’s defense ministry stated that the drills were to demonstrate “the powerful strength of the alliance and the United States’ will to provide extended deterrence against the recent series of North Korea provocations.”

There are many ways to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance, including through planned military exercises that demonstrate alliance cohesion and resolve. But it is far from clear that quick drills in response to North Korean provocations—the short-order shows of force that risk becoming more and more frequent as Pyongyang tests more missiles than ever—are effective. They might even be counterproductive. So why does the alliance continue to respond in this manner?

Efforts to regain public confidence

After a few troublesome years for the US-South Korea alliance, Yoon and Biden moved to reestablish large-scale exercises and quick responses to North Korean “provocations” in order to display efforts to strengthen deterrence, with the aim of regaining public confidence. Under the previous administrations in Seoul and Washington, the alliance had dramatically scaled back its military activities in an attempt to better enable diplomacy with North Korea. As it became clear that there was no acceptable deal to be made with Kim Jong Un on his nuclear and missile programs, North Korea resumed, and then escalated, its missile launches and nuclear rhetoric. Coupled with former US President Donald Trump’s disparaging of the alliance, the South Korean public’s faith in US security guarantees deteriorated. As a result, now most of the South Korean public supports Seoul developing its own nuclear weapon capability—in part because they are losing faith in the deterrence extended by the United States, particularly the “nuclear umbrella.”

As Robert Abrams, former commander of the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command, attests, the return of large-scale alliance military exercises is appropriate, particularly considering North Korea’s evolving capabilities. But the alliance should focus on using its military exercises to strengthen readiness instead of as a response measure. In the last year, the alliance has been attempting to militarily respond and deter North Korea’s testing of its advancing military capabilities that are arguably not only militarily undeterrable but do not represent indications of an impending armed conflict, in the assessment of Admiral John Aquilino, head of US Indo-Pacific Command.

Though these response activities are designed, at least in part, to reassure the South Korean public, they may have the opposite result. With the anticipated North Korean launch of a reconnaissance satellite and continued expectation that North Korea will conduct a seventh nuclear test, the alliance is at risk of being pulled into a spiraling escalation cycle if it continues its current trajectory. Doing so risks heightening the public’s concern of escalation and thus diminishing the public’s confidence that the alliance can deter armed conflict. Amid expectations for increased tensions, the alliance has continued to promise to punish North Korea for its provocations, but these promises seem empty and set unrealistic expectations about the ability to stop North Korea’s launches.

Do not just follow the leader

The alliance must avoid the political pressure and pitfalls of continuing to respond to North Korea’s antics.

First, the United States and South Korea should avoid using military drills as a form of retaliation. They should instead stress that it’s normal and expected for militaries to train—just as North Korea continues its military training exercises and has done so even in times where the alliance scaled back its activities to provide diplomatic space for negotiations.

Second, the alliance should seek to maintain readiness and deterrence without tying its military activities to the perceived level of “tensions” on the Korean peninsula. Maintaining a set alliance exercise schedule instead of using ad hoc exercises to respond to “provocations” will aid in defeating perceptions that alliance activities are inflammatory. In addition, the alliance should refrain from offering to scale back readiness exercises in its attempts to negotiate with North Korea. Making exercises a negotiating point adds salience to the regime’s false claims that exercises are threats to North Korea’s security that justify its weapons programs, while impeding training threatens alliance military readiness. In addition, the end of both long pauses in large-scale drills and limitations on live-fire training have led to the perception among peninsula observers that the alliance is escalating tensions rather than simply returning to its normal routine of training activities that it had maintained since the 1990s.

Third, the alliance should strengthen deterrence and public reassurance by evolving its combined defense posture toward North Korea’s emergent capabilities.

For instance, analysts assess North Korea’s development of solid-fueled missiles reduces the potential warning time for North Korean missile launches, as liquid-fueled missiles have to be fueled immediately ahead of launch making their detection easier via satellite imagery. Thus, improving the alliance’s ability to detect and defend against North Korean missile launches on short notice is a worthwhile endeavor toward deterrence and reassurance. Currently, South Korea is pursuing its own independent missile defense capability rather than alliance integration of missile defense efforts, in part because of China’s opposition to US missile defense cooperation with regional allies. Maintaining separate missile defense systems is hardly a recipe for confidence in the alliance’s counter-missile efforts. Moving to strengthen alliance missile defense will go farther toward strengthening deterrence and public reassurance than trying to match each activity by North Korea.

More broadly, as North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, there are mounting questions surrounding the effectiveness of South Korea’s unilateral “Three Axis” deterrent system, which stands apart from alliance military efforts. The system consists of a plan, a first axis, to incapacitate North Korea’s leadership in response to aggression through “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation.” The second axis is a “kill chain” that will enable rapid strikes on mobile targets. The third axis is South Korea’s Air and Missile Defense System. Rather than strengthening the alliance’s combined posture and reassuring the South Korean public, portraying these capabilities as independent of the US military just feeds the narrative that the United States cannot be relied upon. Thus, absent a diplomatic resolution to aid in regaining and strengthening the South Korean public’s confidence, the alliance should focus on ensuring that it continually evolves its combined abilities.

Yoon and Biden took an important step this week to strengthen cooperative decision making on nuclear deterrence by enhancing dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats to South Korea and the region. Their task now is to stick to the plan and make sure they do not get distracted by the next North Korean provocation.

Jessica Taylor is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served in South Korea from 2019 to 2021 as an international relations strategist for the headquarters command staffs of United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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