Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Real knowledge is to know the extent of one's ignorance."

- Confucius

“The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing.”

- Socrates

"All you need is the plan, the road map, and the courage to press on to your destination."

- Earl Nightingale

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2023

2. Reframing the US policy debate on a ‘long war’ in Ukraine

3. U.S.-China Ties Are Spiraling. The Cabinet’s Stuck in a Turf War.

4. Great Powers Don’t Default

5. Iran Seizes U.S.-Bound Oil Tanker

6. When Russia is defeated in Ukraine, look to Chechnya

7. French twist: Emmanuel Macron cozies up to Chinese Communist Party

8. How to Spy on China

9. NATO: Ukraine allies sent 1,550 combat vehicles, ‘vast’ ammo

10. Why China is trying to mediate in Russia’s war with Ukraine

11. CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation

12. The New Age of Tragedy

13. Our Singular Century – How to connect the dots when they’re spinning out of control

14. China's Secretive Quest for Heavier Artillery

15. FDD’s Long War Journal’s response to Zalmay Khalilzad’s Twitter thread

16. How effective are US ‘Over-the-Horizon capabilities’ in Afghanistan?

17. Joint Collaborative Environments can help stop foreign disinformation

18. Why China Hasn’t Come to Russia’s Rescue

19. What Ukraine Means

20. Why Does Japan Have a Military Base in Djibouti?

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2023

Key Takeaways

The Russian military command appears to be reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with force generation, sustainment, and logistics.
The three command organs that are reportedly receiving new leadership as part of this reshuffle are noteworthy because they are associated with managing aspects of Russian force generation, troop sustainment, and logistical oversight.
Western officials expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to conduct a successful counteroffensive.
Russian forces are reportedly using new tactics to complicate Ukrainian air defenses’ ability to detect Russian missiles.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have launched a renewed campaign for national attention.
Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani in New Delhi, India on April 27.
Russian forces conducted defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut but may be transferring additional reserves to the Bakhmut area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces are further militarizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to defend against possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Washington Post reported that leaked US intelligence documents state that Russian military leaders aim to enlist 815,000 soldiers while balancing concerns about critical labor shortages.
Ukrainian partisans conducted three separate attacks in occupied territories on April 26-27.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27, 2023

Apr 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 27, 3:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Russian military command appears to be reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with force generation, sustainment, and logistics. Several prominent Russian milbloggers claimed on April 27 that Colonel General Aleksey Kuzmenkov, Deputy Head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), has replaced Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev as Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation for Logistics.[1] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Mizintsev’s dismissal may be a result of a combat readiness check of troops of the Northern Fleet carried out by former commander of the airborne (VDV) forces and Wagner affiliate Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who was recently re-appointed to an unspecified command role in Ukraine.[2] The milblogger claimed that Teplinsky’s inspection revealed that troops in certain places of the front were not receiving necessary weapons.[3] The Wagner Group has experienced significant issues with dealing with the Russian logistics enterprise, and Teplinsky’s reported role in identifying issues with supply may portend a renewed focus of Russian sustainment organs on providing Wagner with necessary logistical support, as Teplinsky’s affiliations with Wagner are well-established.[4] ISW previously reported on September 24, 2022, that Mizinstev replaced Army General Dmitry Bulgakov as Head of Logistics and that Mizintsev previously was the head of the Russian National Defense Control Center and oversaw command of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) during Russian operations in Mariupol in spring 2022.[5] Russian milbloggers additionally reported that former Head of the 8th Directorate of the Russian General Staff (State Secret Protection) Yuri Kuznetsov will become Head of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Russian Ministry of Defense and that Stanislav Gadzhimagomedov, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Russian General Staff will replace General Oleg Gorshenin as Head of the National Defense Control Center.[6] Official Russian sources have not yet confirmed these changes.

The three command organs that are reportedly receiving new leadership as part of this reshuffle are noteworthy because they are associated with managing aspects of Russian force generation, troop sustainment, and logistical oversight. The Russian National Defense Control Center is the body responsible for coordinating the actions of the Russian Armed Forces and is essentially the nerve center of the entire Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Alongside the coordination actions of the National Defense Control Center, the organs responsible for personnel and logistical oversight facilitate critical troop sustainment functions. The Russian General Staff may be scrambling to enact these changes as fear over a Ukrainian counteroffensive mounts in the Russian information space. These changes also suggest that existing commanders in charge of these functions failed to properly facilitate Russia’s winter offensive, which has largely culminated without making substantial gains. However, these changes are unlikely to effectively set conditions for Russian forces to respond to a Ukrainian counteroffensive in a timely manner. These changes may be part of a wider effort to reform and formalize the Russian Armed Forces over the long term.

Western officials expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to conduct a successful counteroffensive. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on April 27 that NATO has trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, emphasizing that Ukrainian forces are in a “strong” position to retake captured territory in their upcoming counteroffensive.[7] Stoltenberg also stated that NATO and its partners have delivered over 98 percent of promised combat vehicles to Ukraine, totaling over 1,550 armored vehicles, 230 tanks, and other unspecified equipment.[8] US European Command (EUCOM) Commander General Christopher Cavoli stated that the US has been working closely with Ukrainian forces to develop a counteroffensive plan, including developing techniques to surprise Russian forces.[9]

Russian forces are reportedly using new tactics to complicate Ukrainian air defenses’ ability to detect Russian missiles. Russian forces conducted four Kalibr missile strikes on Mykolaiv City on April 27, and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces directed the missiles using different terrain features, different heights of launches, and multiple trajectory changes to complicate their detection by Ukrainian air defenses.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged that Russian forces conducted a sea-based, long-range, high precision missile strike on April 27, following its recent notable silence about Russian missile and air strikes as part of its broader missile campaign in Ukraine.[11] ISW previously assessed that Russia‘s missile campaign to degrade Ukraine‘s unified energy infrastructure definitively failed and that Russian forces appear to have abandoned the effort.[12] Russian forces maintain the capability to renew their missile campaign if they desire, and Russian forces may employ these tactics in order to conserve their stocks of high precision missiles in the event of a renewed missile campaign.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have launched a renewed campaign for national attention. Kadyrov publicized that he met with several prominent Russian officials – including Russian National Guard Federal Service Director Viktor Zolotov, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Presidential Administration Head Anton Vaino, and Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov – on April 26. Kadyrov claimed that he discussed topics including relations between Russian regions and the federal government with Bortnikov and that Bortnikov thanked him personally for the stable situation in Chechnya.[13] Kadyrov also continues to draw heavily on Chechen soldiers’ role in Ukraine to bolster his own image. Kadyrov claimed on April 26 that Chechen Akhmat-1 Special Purposes Mobile Unit (OMON) security officers with extensive combat experience departed to replace their comrades in Ukraine.[14]

Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani in New Delhi, India on April 27.[15] Belarus’s ongoing efforts to build relationships with countries that have either supported or not condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine likely aim to build a coalition of non-Western countries and deepen pathways to help Russia evade Western sanctions, on which ISW has previously reported.[16] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Khrenin and Li discussed the status of an “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership between Belarus and China as well as prospects for cooperation in military and general spheres.[17] The Belarusian MoD’s mention of an “all-weather” partnership closely mirrors Russian efforts to frame the Sino-Russian relationship as a “no limits” partnership despite existing Chinese reservations. The Belarusian MoD stated that Khrenin and Ashtiani noted the existence of “significant potential and prospects” to strengthen military contracts and increase practical cooperation.[18]

Key Takeaways

The Russian military command appears to be reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with force generation, sustainment, and logistics.
The three command organs that are reportedly receiving new leadership as part of this reshuffle are noteworthy because they are associated with managing aspects of Russian force generation, troop sustainment, and logistical oversight.
Western officials expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to conduct a successful counteroffensive.
Russian forces are reportedly using new tactics to complicate Ukrainian air defenses’ ability to detect Russian missiles.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have launched a renewed campaign for national attention.
Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani in New Delhi, India on April 27.
Russian forces conducted defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut but may be transferring additional reserves to the Bakhmut area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces are further militarizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to defend against possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Washington Post reported that leaked US intelligence documents state that Russian military leaders aim to enlist 815,000 soldiers while balancing concerns about critical labor shortages.
Ukrainian partisans conducted three separate attacks in occupied territories on April 26-27.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) destroyed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivkse (30km southeast of Kupyansk), Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk), and Krokhmalne (25km southeast of Kupyansk).[19] A Russian milblogger remarked that the situation in the Kupyansk direction has not changed significantly and that mutual artillery strikes and reconnaissance operations are occurring along the line of contact.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction did not conduct any offensive actions and are continuing to fortify their positions and use UAVs to adjust artillery fire.[21]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in the Kreminna area on April 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued positional battles northwest of Kreminna near the Zhuravka gully and near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna).[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut on April 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to attack within Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[24] A milblogger claimed on April 27 that Wagner forces reached the main entrance to Bakhmut from Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske and cut the main but not final Ukrainian logistics line into Bakhmut, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[25] One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces broke through Ukrainian lines near Khromove, but another claimed that Wagner forces have not yet entered the settlement.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner Group assault detachments captured four unspecified blocks in northwestern, western, and southwestern Bakhmut.[27]

Russian forces may have relocated Eastern Military District (EMD) elements to reinforce the Wagner Group in the Bakhmut direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 26 that the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) has been operating in the Bakhmut area for the past month, which is the first mention of EMD presence near Bakhmut.[28] 5th Combined Arms Army elements may have recently operated along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline, and other EMD elements have suffered major losses near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast.[29] Neither the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) nor Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin have confirmed EMD activity in this area.\

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 26 that Russian forces made marginal advances near the railway north of Avdiivka, the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka, and near Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[31] The milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), near Nevelske (15km southwest of Avdiivka), and towards Sieverne. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 27 that Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack north of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka.[32] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces control 50 out of 59 blocks in Marinka, and one milblogger complained that Russian forces are unable to encircle Ukrainian forces in Marinka due to inadequate counterbattery fire.[33]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 27.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 26 that Russian forces conducted positional battles in the forest belt on the outskirts of Vuhledar and in the Mykilske dacha area (4km southwest of Vuhledar).[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces are further militarizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in order to defend against possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir in Zaporizhia Oblast. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 27 that satellite imagery shows that Russian forces have constructed firing positions on the roofs of several reactor buildings at the ZNPP.[36] A Russian milblogger argued on April 27 that Russian forces needed to strengthen defensive positions at the ZNPP in preparation for Ukrainian counteroffensives and a possible Ukrainian landing on the east (left) bank in the area.[37] The milblogger called on Russian forces to strengthen defenses at the ZNPP, near Enerhodar, and along the entire east (left) bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir.[38]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian logistics and concentration areas on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian concentrations in Kakhovka Raion and along the entire east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[39] Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions north of Korsunka (43km northwest of Kherson City) and southwest of Rybalche (35km southwest of Kherson City) as well as a Russian observation post in Kozachi Laheri (30km east of Kherson City).[40]

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts on April 27.[41] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted four Kalibr missile strikes on Mykolaiv City.[42]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Washington Post reported on April 27 that leaked US intelligence documents state that Russian military officials are attempting to quietly enlist 815,000 soldiers without further alarming government officials concerned about critical labor shortages caused by the war.[43] The Washington Post noted that Russia is facing its worst workforce shortage in 20 years.[44] Russian news agency Interfax reported on April 26 that the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) stopped publishing monthly state oil production statistics.[45] This may indicate state efforts to obscure decreased production and falling revenue.

Russian authorities continue significant recruitment efforts targeting Russia’s prison population. Russian prisoners are an attractive source of reinforcements because their heavily coerced recruitment draws limited public attention due to their lack of protections and minimal present contribution to the Russian economy. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on April 27 that Russian authorities are targeting individuals with criminal records, particularly with terrorism charges, to replenish manpower losses.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces are training 500 convicts who chose contract service as an alternative to imprisonment at field camps in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast. Russian opposition news source Mobilization News published on April 27 a statement from former prisoner Yuri Yakovlev, who claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruited him and other St. Petersburg IK-4 prison colony members on February 20 and sent them to the war zone in Donetsk Oblast on February 21 with no professional support, quality equipment, or clear contract conditions.[47] A regional branch of Radio Liberty noted that Russian authorities recruited over 100 IK-4 prisoners to fight in Ukraine.[48]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans reportedly conducted three separate attacks in occupied territories on April 26 and 27. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on April 27 that Ukrainian partisans used an improvised explosive device (IED) to kill occupation police officer Oleksandr Mishchenko in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 27 that members of the Ukrainian and Tatar partisan group “Atesh” killed two Russian servicemen in Velyki Kopani, Kherson Oblast, overnight on April 26-27.[50] The Center also reported that Ukrainian partisans used an IED to kill the head of the public reception of Kremlin-controlled opposition party “A Just Russia – For Truth” Sergei Tvetinsk in his car near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, on April 26.[51]

Russian occupation authorities and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin continue to announce plans to develop occupied territories to Russian standards. Khusnullin stated on April 27 that occupation administrations should propose individualized development plans to the Russian government to synchronize restoration projects with Russian state-owned enterprises.[52] Khusnullin stated that a comprehensive action plan will include 300 priority activities and is designed to take place from 2023 to 2025, with prospects extending to 2030.[53]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage-like partnerships with Russian federal subjects. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on April 27 that DNR officials and Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev signed an agreement on trade, economic, scientific, and social cooperation.[54]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/rybar/46327 ; https://t.me/rybar/46330 ; https://t.me/rybar/46331; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47103; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9148; https://t.me/bbbreaking/153976 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/99850

[2] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47111; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84013

[3] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47111

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24; https://apostrophe.ua/news/society/2022-03-23/lyubimchik-putina-chto-izvestno-pro-generala-prikazavshego-bombit-roddom-v-mariupole/263418; https://prm.ua/ru/zashchytnyky-maryupolia-unychtozhyly-okolo-shesty-t-si...

[6] https://t.me/rybar/46327 ; https://t.me/rybar/46330 ; https://t.me/rybar/46331; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47103; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9148; https://t.me/bbbreaking/153976 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/99850

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/allies-have-delivered-almost-all-promised-combat-vehicles-ukraine-nato-chief-2023-04-27/

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/allies-have-delivered-almost-all-promised-combat-vehicles-ukraine-nato-chief-2023-04-27/

[9] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/us-helping-ukraine-craft-war-plan-to-surprise-russia-in-coming-counteroffensive

[10] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0CLocxMLS54fwEKoMfi67n8zFkDi8cBFvFKDtiRL5G7pUyjDDMzYmG6SLqLrFtRQjl; https://suspilne dot media/457980-rosijski-vijska-vnoci-vdarili-po-mikolaevu-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6011

[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/25982

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040823

[13] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3579; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3578; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3576; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3575

[14] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3577

[15] https://t.me/modmilby/26388; https://t.me/modmilby/26395;

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2023

[17] https://t.me/modmilby/26388; https://t.me/modmilby/26395

[18] https://t.me/modmilby/26397

[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/25982; https://t.me/readovkanews/57620

[20] https://t.me/rybar/46315

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JSY3rnvT4Rv2UaLRPvXvx3Bbta7u39E9X7GxpaH414xPtWUe24kD1rWnzPwGkKUwl

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl;

[23] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83983; https://t.me/rybar/46315; https://t.me/wargonzo/12179

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JSY3rnvT4Rv2UaLRPvX...

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/12179

[26] https://t.me/rybar/46315 ; https://t.me/rybar/46319; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83983

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/25982

[28] https://t.me/milchronicles/1825`

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JSY3rnvT4Rv2UaLRPvXvx3Bbta7u39E9X7GxpaH414xPtWUe24kD1rWnzPwGkKUwl

[31] https://t.me/rybar/46315 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83983

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/12179

[33] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36428; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7581 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17623341

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JSY3rnvT4Rv2UaLRPvX...

[35] https://t.me/readovkanews/57616

[36] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1651455646817042432/photo/1

[37] https://t.me/rybar/46338

[38] https://t.me/rybar/46338

[39] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02ziybYgTm19qsp7hB6kz2NycYZs7xufMT4ukmqtwQUsYPiZgh6uecx33trxCmXajtl

[40] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/93410 ; https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1651540496139923457?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1651562749338566658?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1651568842894614529?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1651585695104790528?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1651563900217769986?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1651553974984536067?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1651587190227365888?s=20

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JSY3rnvT4Rv2UaLRPvXvx3Bbta7u39E9X7GxpaH414xPtWUe24kD1rWnzPwGkKUwl ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5403

[42] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0CLocxMLS54fwEKoMfi67n8zFkDi8cBFvFKDtiRL5G7pUyjDDMzYmG6SLqLrFtRQjl; https://suspilne dot media/457980-rosijski-vijska-vnoci-vdarili-po-mikolaevu-so-vidomo/ ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl ; https://suspilne dot media/457947-ssa-ocinili-perspektivi-kontrnastupu-ukraini-kitaj-pidtrimae-zernovu-ugodu-428-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1682600560&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[43] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/27/russia-troops-ukraine-war-leaked-documents/

[44] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/27/russia-troops-ukraine-war-leaked-documents/

[45] https://t.me/bbcrussian/45275; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/897916

[46]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0y3fsW6FdRERhiEjKcXePf196uD9t6Wx8PdkQ7pXY77NyVtgPXw5ctGiRMJCyqR8Cl

[47] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11526; https://t.me/severrealii/16335

[48] https://t.me/severrealii/16335

[49] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/04/27/u-melitopoli-likviduvaly-policzaya/; https://t.me/vrogov/8936; https://t.me/vrogov/8937; https://t.me/vrogov/8938; https://t.me/idelrealii/26923; https://t.me/riamelitopol/89130; https://t.me/riamelitopol/89135; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1786; https://t.me/readovkanews/57622; https://t.me/rybar/46326; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84002; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47099; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47098; https://t.me/milinfolive/99856; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23431; https://t.me/astrapress/25575

[50] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/04/27/partyzany-vbyly-dvoh-rosijskyh-vijskovyh-yaki-znushhalys-z-ukrayincziv-na-tot/

[51] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/04/27/na-hersonshhyni-partyzany-vbyly-rosijskogo-gastrolera/; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1651483746095202305?s=20

[52] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8945; https://t.me/mkhusnullin/1172; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1046

[53] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8945; https://t.me/mkhusnullin/1172; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1046

[54] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3374

REFRAMING THE US POLICY DEBATE ON A ‘LONG WAR’ IN UKRAINE

Apr 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Reframing the US policy debate on a ‘long war’ in Ukraine

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%98long-war%E2%80%99-ukraine

By Nataliya Bugayova

Key Takeaways:

The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Nor is the US fighting a proxy war. The West and Ukraine are not protracting or spreading this war; Russia is.
A long Russian war is not an inherent Kremlin goal, but rather the Kremlin’s adaptation in pursuit of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given, however, and disproportionately depends on whether Russia is given time and space to rebuild its capabilities.
The Kremlin’s ability to threaten the US and NATO, as well as the future of Russia’s power globally, disproportionately depends on Russia’s gains or losses in Ukraine.
Metering Western support to Ukraine and inadequately resourcing all of the required Ukrainian counteroffensives –not just the next one –will protract Russia’s war and increase the associated risks for the US.
The US risks facing the same escalation risks under worse conditions if it does not help Ukraine liberate its territory through a series of successive counteroffensive operations.
The West has a profound ability to shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The West’s problem is not capability; it is perception.

The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, intentional Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Ukraine is defending itself against an unprovoked Russian invasion, and the US is supporting Ukraine. Comparisons to Iraq or Afghanistan are not appropriate.

The US is not fighting a proxy war. Ukraine’s choice to defend itself against Russia’s genocidal efforts is exogenous to the West’s decision-making. Ukraine would have defended itself against Russia’s 2022 invasion in the absence of support from its partners – at the cost of more territory and lives. Even in 2014, when Ukraine’s military capability and Western willingness to counter Russia were minimal, barely equipped Ukrainian volunteers rushed to the frontline to combat Russian aggression.[1]

The West and Ukraine are not protracting or spreading this war; Russia is. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is entirely a war of choice. The Kremlin chose to launch a full-scale invasion despite the years-long presence of a peace framework (that the Kremlin routinely violated) and years of diplomatic efforts by Ukraine and the West. The Kremlin is choosing to protract this war and can choose to end it at any point.

Fixating on the “long war” scenario obfuscates the very real US interest at stake in Ukraine. The US problem is not a long war per se. The US problem is the risk of escalation in which the US will need to fight in this war – a risk that increases if Russia’s war protracts and if Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine.

Metering Western support to Ukraine, inadequately resourcing all of the required Ukrainian counteroffensives—not just the next one, and setting premature expectations of negotiations with Russia, will protract Russia’s war and increase the associated risks for the US. The length and effects of this war are path-dependent on at least two variables:

The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine disproportionately depends on whether Russia is given time and space to rebuild its capabilities.
The Kremlin’s ability to act on its intent to threaten the US/NATO, as well as the future of Russia’s power globally, disproportionately depends on Russia’s gains or losses in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s Ability to Sustain a Long War

A long war is not an inherent Kremlin goal, but rather the Kremlin’s adaptation in pursuit of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s plan for a quick war has failed. The Kremlin’s intent to control Ukraine and eradicate its statehood remains unchanged – a goal presently beyond Russia’s means given Ukraine’s resistance. The Kremlin is thus setting conditions for a protracted conflict. The Kremlin is explicit about its intent to reconstitute Russian forces and prepare for new offensives under better conditions to accomplish Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine, rather than halting following the failure of the Kremlin's initial plans and setbacks in 2022.[2]

The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given – it disproportionately depends on whether Russia gets the time and space to rebuild its capabilities. Russia’s ability to reconstitute its military capability is currently constrained. The Kremlin invaded Ukraine with insufficient resources which it has further exhausted to secure only limited gains. The Kremlin is trying to replenish its resources but is still pursuing half-measures below full national mobilization to regenerate its forces and mobilize its defense industrial base.[3]

Enabling further successful Ukrainian counteroffensives will deny the Kremlin a breather to replenish its resources, will further deplete Russia’s offensive potential, and eventually enable Ukrainian forces to expel Russia from Ukraine.

Space and time, on the other hand, could enable the Kremlin to reconstitute its capabilities. Space means Ukrainian territory Russia gets to use as a staging ground for further aggression. Time means a breather on the battlefield resulting from a premature cessation of hostilities or a slowed Ukrainian counteroffensive due to insufficient Western aid.

[Space] The US cannot avoid a long Russian war in Ukraine without helping Ukraine liberate its territory. Deprioritizing territory – as some argue[4] – only increases the risk of a long war. Territory is a core part of Russia’s capability to sustain this war, alongside manpower and equipment. Russia will use any territory in Ukraine as a staging ground to launch attacks on Ukraine, in this invasion or in any later effort. Like Crimea and Donbas, any territories that Russia holds in Ukraine will become Russian military bases in perpetuity. We know this is the Russian strategy because we are living it. This has already been a long Russian war in part because the Kremlin was allowed to keep its illegal gains in Ukraine in 2014. If the current lines hold, imagine how much further Russia could advance in future years after reconstituting its forces.

[Time] Metering Western support to Ukraine increases the risk of a long war. Momentum matters. Interruptions to Ukraine’s momentum provide a triple advantage to Russia: a chance for Russian forces to stabilize the frontline and reconstitute; lessened domestic pressures on Russian President Vladimir Putin; and a chance for the Kremlin to seize the narrative in the international – and particularly Western – information space. We already observed these effects when Ukraine was not able to exploit Russian battlefield setbacks in December-January through a third successive counteroffensive operation, in part due to insufficient Western aid.[5] This allowed Russia to stabilize its defensive lines, add weight to its offensive in Bakhmut, and prepare additional offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast.[6] Western support trailing Ukraine’s battlefield needs is how this war becomes lengthy and costly.

[Time] Planning to resource only the next Ukrainian counteroffensive – but not follow-on Ukrainian operations – increases the risk of a long war. Some argue that the West should help Ukraine’s next counteroffensive phase and use its results to bring Russia to the negotiating table[7] This approach is flawed given the importance of terrain to the Kremlin’s strategy. The Kremlin also has shown no interest in real negotiations, and the next Ukrainian counteroffensive alone is unlikely to change that.[8]

Finally, Ukraine will not liberate all the Russian-occupied territory in a single counteroffensive and will require several successive counteroffensives to win the war.[9] The US must prepare to resource successive efforts, some of which will be more successful than others. Insufficient commitment to resource successive phases of Ukraine’s counteroffensive is what, in part, cost Ukraine its momentum in January 2023.[10]

The Future of Russia’s Power

Russia may be weakened but the Kremlin’s intent regarding the US and NATO remains the same. Russia not only seeks to eradicate Ukrainian statehood, but also to control other states in the region, such as Belarus and Moldova, and eventually link Russian military gains across the former Soviet Union.[11] Putin still seeks to neutralize NATO and undermine the US. The Kremlin is rallying Russian society for a long fight against the West.[12]

The future of Russia’s power and the Kremlin’s ability to act on its unchanged intent regarding the US and NATO disproportionately depends on Russia’s gains or losses in Ukraine. If Russia loses gains in Ukraine, many of Russia’s already limited bases of power will further diminish.[13]

The US should not underestimate Russian capabilities in the long term, however. If Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine, the Kremlin will have a chance to reconstitute its forces, to launch future attacks against Ukraine, and to connect its military gains in Ukraine and Belarus. This would mean massive military and economic requirements for the US, NATO, and EU. And when Russia attacks Ukraine again, the US will have the same obligation to support its NATO allies, who are threatened by any war in Europe.

Russia keeping its gains in Ukraine will increase the risk of other states using nuclear blackmail. Any peace deal with Russia in which the Kremlin keeps gains in Ukraine would imply that the West yielded to Russia’s nuclear blackmail. It would hurt, not help, the US in its competition with China, as China would certainly internalize this lesson.

The US thus risks facing the same problem with the same escalation risks but under worse conditions if it does not help Ukraine liberate its people and territory through a series of successive counteroffensive operations.

The US and West have a profound ability to shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The West’s problem is not capability; it is perception. The West has an unambiguous interest in helping Ukraine preserve its sovereignty and prevent future Russian attacks on Ukraine, and the capability to do so. The West’s economic and military resources dwarf Russia’s. The West has known capability obstacles, but they are surmountable. For the West it is a question of choices and timelines – unlike for Russia, for which many military capability limits are insurmountable or surmountable only in the long run.

The West’s Achilles heel is perception – one of the few vulnerabilities within the Kremlin’s reach.

The Kremlin uses a “long war” narrative to target the West’s blind spots. The Kremlin’s “long war” narrative reflects Putin’s intent to rebuild Russia’s large-scale warfighting capability.[14] But it is also an information operation aimed to peel the West away from Ukraine. This information operation builds on previous Russian efforts, such as ceasefire narratives and nuclear blackmail.[15]

Targeting Western perceptions is among the few options within the Kremlin’s immediate reach as it tries to close the gap between its goals and means in Ukraine. Ukraine’s will to fight is not a variable, and neither are the Kremlin’s goals. But the Kremlin is likely hoping to buy time and space to get to a more advantageous position by tapping into the discourse around avoiding a “long war” and other sentiments in the West, manipulating the West’s perceptions about the impact its aid has on the battlefield, and muddying Western assessments about Ukraine’s capabilities, the Kremlin’s intentions, and escalation risks.

The US should not fall for the Kremlin’s perceptual traps or preemptively handicap its policy options by setting the expectation of peace talks that the Kremlin has expressed zero desire to enter in good faith. Russia is a not just any belligerent – it is a belligerent that has repeatedly and purposefully hijacked the notion of peace as a lifeline for its aggression.[16] Setting expectations of negotiations before helping Ukraine expel Russian forces further from Ukraine’s territory only benefits the Kremlin.

Additionally, this war cannot be resolved through typical negotiations. Putin has resorted to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine when other means to control Ukraine failed. The Kremlin is engaged in a genocidal effort, aimed to eradicate Ukrainian identity and statehood through a large-scale mechanized invasion.

The US and the West should instead reorient their defense production to resource Ukraine’s successive counteroffensive operations and – critically – help Ukraine plan for a sustained force regeneration effort. This requires recognizing the necessity of an upfront investment to secure US long-term national security interests. Enabling Ukraine to achieve a decisive victory faster is a better investment than allowing – through either lack of action or pressuring Ukraine into concessions – Russia to pursue the long war that is the Kremlin’s likely best chance of achieving its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-volunteer-soldiers-face-unexpected...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://www.rand.org/pbs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[7] https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2023/04/13/the-west-needs-a-new-strate...

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-spring...

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%...

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/risks-russian-ceasefire-offer

U.S.-China Ties Are Spiraling. The Cabinet’s Stuck in a Turf War.

Politico · by Bob Davis

Blinken vs. Yellen vs. Raimondo.

As the White House tries to ease tensions with China, bureaucratic rivalries are stalling the effort. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen (left) and Secretary of State Antony Blinken are among those vying to take charge. | Win McNamee/Getty Images

By Bob Davis

04/27/2023 04:30 AM EDT

Updated: 04/27/2023 11:37 AM EDT

Bob Davisis a former Wall Street Journal reporter where he covered U.S.-China relations and is the co-author of Superpower Showdown, a history of the two nations’ economic battles.

Relations between the U.S. and China are as poisonous as they have been in decades. But as the White House tries to ease tensions, bureaucratic rivalries in the administration are complicating the effort.

A meeting in Beijing between a Biden Cabinet member and a Chinese counterpart would help repair relations, or at least halt the downward spiral. But then comes the next question: Who should the envoy be? Right now, three Cabinet secretaries are jockeying to make the trip to China, and the White House is weighing its options but hasn’t decided. This story is based on interviews with current and former U.S. officials and China experts close to the administration.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken would be the obvious first choice to go, but he is currently persona non grata in Beijing for canceling a visit in February after the U.S. shot down China’s alleged spy balloon. He annoyed China further by using a meeting shortly afterward in Munich with China’s top foreign affairs official to publicly warn China not to arm Russia in its Ukraine war.

That’s provided an opening for both Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo to become the lead envoy. Both have said they wanted to travel to China, and, unlike Blinken, both have received public invitations from Chinese cabinet agencies. Treasury and Commerce have dispatched officials to Beijing to scout out possible meetings, although neither session is far along in planning. Yellen had expected to go to China in March until the balloon incident put the kibosh on that visit.

The bureaucratic wrangling has been fairly civil thus far by Washington standards, but the Biden administration is eager to tamp down any notion of internal conflict.

“The Administration has been clear about maintaining channels of communication with Beijing to manage competition responsibly,” said National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in a statement. “The engagements Secretary Blinken, Secretary Yellen, Secretary Raimondo and others will have in the coming months will all be a part of that.”

It’s also not as simple as who the U.S. may want to send. Chinese officials are also jostling over who should meet an American emissary, and it’s uncertain whether any of the Americans could score a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Meanwhile, as friction grows between the two superpowers, some wonder if détente is even possible at this point.

“We have left strategic competition behind,” said Christopher K. Johnson, a former CIA China analyst. “We’re in strategic rivalry and are at the risk of careening toward strategic enmity.”

Last November, the two sides looked as if they wanted an accommodation. Biden and Xi met in Bali and, despite their many differences, agreed that the two sides should work together on economic stability, food security, climate and other issues.

But follow-up meetings were scrapped after the balloon saga embarrassed Beijing. Then, China launched military drills around Taiwan after the island’s leader met with Speaker Kevin McCarthy in early April, which outraged Washington.

Since March, the Chinese have sent conflicting signals about their interest in warming ties with the U.S. On the one hand, Chinese leaders have used mainland economic conferences to welcome U.S. business investment. On the other, Beijing has raided an American financial analysis firm in Beijing and slowed merger approvals needed by American companies. Xi accused the U.S. by name — a breach of Chinese etiquette — of “all-round containment, encirclement and suppression.”

There are two strands of thought among the Chinese leadership, said Harvard University’s Graham Allison, a prominent political scientist who recently met with top Chinese leaders in Beijing. “One strand is fatalistic,” he said. “The second strand says, ‘We can’t let things remain this way. We need to get back to Bali, with private conversations about the flashpoints that matter most.’”

The U.S. has tried to pick up on that second strand but hasn’t gotten very far. Meetings of U.S. and Chinese officials are “like being trapped in a bad episode of ‘Seinfeld’ where the ‘Festivus airing of grievances’ is a year-round holiday,” said Johnson, who now heads the political-risk consultancy China Strategies Group.

Administration officials acknowledge Blinken hasn’t had much luck changing that dynamic, but they argue China’s top foreign affairs official, Wang Yi, and others are at least as much at fault for the downward spiral. The Financial Times also recently reported that Chinese officials are worried that the FBI would release a report on the balloon incident if Blinken visited Beijing, once again embarrassing them. Still, the bad vibes have the White House weighing the pros and cons of various potential envoys.

So far, Yellen hasn’t been at the center of China policymaking. The National Security Council plays an outsized role there, with the State Department also having an important voice. But issues fundamental to Treasury — global economic growth, financial sector stability — are among those China wants to discuss with the U.S. even as the two countries tangle over Taiwan, Russia and technology.

There’s also precedent for Yellen taking a lead on China. In the past, Treasury secretaries have played important roles as China envoys. In 1999, the U.S. mistakenly bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War, igniting protests across China. President Bill Clinton dispatched Treasury Secretary Larry Summers to meet China’s premier in the dusty city of Lanzhou in western China. Summers carried a letter from Clinton pledging to help China join the World Trade Organization. The tactic worked and the two sides soon started negotiating again.

Nine years later, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, who had long been friends with Chinese leaders, helped convince Beijing to work closely with President George W. Bush in fighting the global financial crisis. China’s economic officials in turn pressed Paulson to protect China’s stash of $1 trillion in U.S. government debt.

But Summers and Paulson were close to the White House and had something China wanted from the U.S. — WTO membership in Summers’ case, cash preservation in Paulson’s. Yellen has neither advantage. In many parts of the administration, the former Fed chair is still seen as academic and politically naive. Notably, she publicly criticized the heavy tariffs on Chinese goods imposed by the Trump administration, which Biden so far has decided to keep.

“She is afflicted with honesty,” said Ryan Hass, an Obama White House China expert now at the Brookings Institution.

Treasury is also viewed elsewhere in the government as holding on to the idea that a formal economic “dialogue” between the two nations would be useful, although the Biden White House has picked up Trump’s position that the Chinese used earlier dialogues, where senior officials met regularly, to filibuster a subject. Some at Treasury make sure not even to use the word “dialogue” when asking for White House approval to call or meet with Chinese counterparts.

“Yellen has been somewhat dovelike,” said a senior Biden foreign policy official. “On a number of key issues, she and the president aren’t on the same page. That will play a role where this ends up.”

During a speech last week at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Yellen gave a tough-minded preview of the kinds of conversations she anticipated having with the Chinese. The speech had two audiences: Beijing and those in Washington and the allied capitals that doubted the White House fully trusted her.

National security is of “paramount importance,” she said, with the U.S. focusing on keeping leading-edge technology from reaching the Chinese military and security establishment. But she tried to assure her Chinese listeners that the U.S. doesn’t want to decouple entirely from the Chinese economy, which, she said, “would be disastrous for both countries.”

“These national security actions are not designed for us to gain a competitive economic advantage, or stifle China’s economic and technological modernization,” Yellen said.

In other words, the two nations would disagree on many fronts, but there were still plenty of areas where they could profitably work together.

Within the White House, no decision has been made on whether Blinken, Yellen or Raimondo will be the initial envoy to Beijing. One consideration: Which of them would wrangle a meeting with the highest-ranking Chinese official?

That makes Raimondo a long shot for the first trip to Beijing. Commerce secretaries traditionally rank low in the Washington hierarchy and have been generally treated in Beijing as salespeople for corporate America. However, Raimondo plays a critical role in sanctioning Chinese companies and overseeing U.S. industrial policy — areas the Chinese want to discuss. Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, one of the seven members of the ruling Politburo Standing Committee, is expected to oversee technology issues for Beijing and would be a high-profile interlocutor on the Chinese side.

The State Department argues that Blinken should go first because State has a wider portfolio of issues than Treasury, including Taiwan, Russia’s war against Ukraine, military cooperation, fentanyl exports, imprisoned Americans and climate talks.

Some at State also are concerned that the Chinese could look to splinter the U.S. government by favoring Treasury and trying to cut out the State Department. In the Trump administration, for instance, the Chinese focused their lobbying on Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to try to sideline the uber-hawkish U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, who was pressing a trade war between the two nations.

It didn’t work under Trump, and U.S. officials say it wouldn’t work now. Beijing “won’t find a way to divide what we’re doing,” said Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo. “What we are trying to do is make it clear that we are going to protect our national security, but our goal is not to constrain China’s economy from growing.”

Before the balloon incident, Blinken intended to fly to Beijing to discuss a range of issues with his Chinese counterparts, including macroeconomic issues — but no “dialogues” — and expected to get a meeting with Xi Jinping. Treasury secretaries rarely meet with the top leader in one-on-one sessions. Instead, they often get time with China’s premier, the number two official who is usually in charge of running the economy. At the very least, Yellen would expect to meet with He Lifeng, China’s new vice minister in charge of trade and macroeconomics. In his previous job, He oversaw domestic economic planning and didn’t meet much with U.S. officials.

For all the aggravation with Blinken in Beijing, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has been throwing up some roadblocks to an early Yellen visit, said several China experts who have recently visited Beijing. Presumably, that’s for reasons similar to those in Washington; each ministry wants to assert its preeminence and have its ministers host the first U.S. cabinet visit since the balloon imbroglio. That’s especially important now in Beijing where Xi has reshuffled top government and Communist Party officials.

“There is a little bit of staking out one’s turf,” said former Clinton trade representative Charlene Barshefsky, who closely tracks Chinese politics. “There is a new set of ministers. They are letting it be known their jurisdiction and their predilections for policy.”

A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy said in a statement that the U.S. “should follow through on the common understandings between the two heads of state in Bali, so as to create the conditions and atmosphere needed for high-level exchanges and bring China-U.S. relations back to the right track.”

In the end, whom Biden chooses to make the first cabinet-level trip to Beijing may come down to who is available to travel when preparations are completed. The U.S. envoy may carry a letter from Biden during the trip. An important goal of this round of diplomacy is promoting a summit between Biden and Xi in November in San Francisco when the U.S. hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, an organization of 21 major economies, including the U.S., Japan, China and Russia.

But it’s far from clear that cabinet-level meetings will be enough for China to start modulating its policies. The U.S. has plenty it could offer China as inducements — cuts to tariffs that even Biden criticized when he was running for president in 2020, limiting U.S. export controls, backing away from banning TikTok in the U.S., among many other possibilities.

“At this moment, we need deeds as well as words,” said Summers, the former Treasury secretary.

But across the government, U.S. officials say the focus now is on restarting talks, not about making changes in policy — particularly anything resembling a concession that could be criticized by Republicans.

“We want senior empowered channels of communication,” said a senior State Department official. “We want to engage regularly.”

For Washington, in other words, the meetings are the message.

POLITICO

Politico · by Bob Davis

4. Great Powers Don’t Default

Excerpts:

No one should underestimate the stakes involved: U.S. dollar primacy is a national treasure. The strength of the dollar allows American households, businesses, and governments at all levels to fund themselves far more cheaply than would otherwise be the case. Families benefit from the dollar’s unrivaled status each day by paying lower interest rates on credit card debt, mortgages, and student loans. It has, at least so far, conferred on the United States the unique capacity to absorb a shock, such as the 2011 downgrade of the United States’ credit rating, without seeing the country’s borrowing costs rise or U.S. currency fall in value. Dollar primacy gives the U.S. government the singular power to deliver an economic shock to an adversary by excluding it from the dollar-based global financial system through sanctions.

But if taken for granted, the dollar will lose its primacy. The fact that the world must once again confront the question of whether the United States might default on its debt is itself a problem. Dollar primacy is nothing more than a network rooted in trust, habit, and an assumed lack of alternatives. All systems based on trust have tipping points, often psychological ones that are impossible to identify in advance. Dollar primacy was able to gather force over the past century thanks above all to faith in the United States’ stewardship of the global financial system—alongside rule of law, the quality and independence of U.S. institutions, the depth and liquidity of American capital markets, and an open system for trade, capital, and people. Although most of these competitive strengths are still very much intact, the study of networks—whether in ecology, technology, or finance—shows that they lose value slowly and then suddenly once confidence is lost.

To avoid this outcome, some lawmakers and outside experts have proposed unilateral options the Treasury Department could fall back on to bypass the debt limit: Exploit an obscure legal loophole to mint a trillion-dollar platinum coin to offset Treasury’s liabilities. Invoke the 18th Amendment to challenge the constitutionality of the debt limit. Prioritize the payment of debt service and selected spending programs to balance the budget and avoid new debt issuance. What do these options have in common? They are legally dubious, unworkable, or deeply damaging to the credibility of the United States. Pulling from a bag of tricks to pretend the country is honoring its obligations is not what great powers do. It is a clownish display rather than a confident show of readiness for global competition.

Great Powers Don’t Default

The Dangers of Debt-Ceiling Brinkmanship

By Matt Pottinger and Daleep Singh

April 27, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Matt Pottinger and Daleep Singh · April 27, 2023

Since its founding, the United States has viewed paying its bills as a matter of economic and national security. Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the U.S. Treasury, pushed for the federal government to assume all the debt incurred by the states during the Revolutionary War. In a report Hamilton presented to Congress in 1790, he described the “punctual performance of contracts”—that is, meeting all financial commitments on time—as a matter of national honor. It was also critical, Hamilton argued, to building confidence in a financial system and a national currency that could underwrite his fledgling country’s industrial development and provide “security against foreign attack” by competing empires in Europe.

More than a century later, during World War I, Congress created the debt ceiling—a legislative limit on how much debt the Treasury can take on. Given the controversy surrounding the debt ceiling today, it may be surprising to learn that its original purpose was to make it easier, not harder, for the Treasury to manage the country’s finances during a time of global conflict. Beforehand, Congress had to approve each instance of the Treasury’s borrowing, because only the legislature has the constitutional authority to tax, spend, and borrow. With the debt ceiling, the department could borrow as much as it wanted, up to the limit set by Congress. Leaving aside how unusual it was—no other developed country except Denmark has a debt limit—the measure was seen as a patriotic concession by Congress to share its fiscal authority with the executive branch in service of shared geopolitical purpose. As a direct result of this congressional action, the Treasury was able to issue massive amounts of war bonds, which mobilized the American industrial base and helped turn the tide of World War I in favor of the Allies. After the war, the U.S. dollar overtook the British pound as the world’s dominant currency.

A century later, the United States is again facing intensifying geopolitical competition. Both China and Russia have made clear their desire to challenge the U.S.-led international order. And together, they have the capacity to do so—China thanks to its economic, military, and technological heft, and Russia owing to its outsize appetite for taking risks that disrupt the status quo. The United States and its allies are pushing back forcefully against both revisionist powers, but as this contest plays out, many countries are choosing not to align with either side.

Instead of shoring up the nation’s finances to meet the geopolitical moment, congressional inaction now threatens to irreparably damage the United States’ global standing. The United States reached the debt limit in January. That same month, a group of Republicans in Congress said they would not raise the debt ceiling unless Democrats agreed to federal spending cuts. Earlier this month, Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy unveiled a bill for raising the debt ceiling by $1.5 trillion in return for $130 billion in spending cuts, a plan the White House quickly described as a nonstarter. On April 26, House Republicans narrowly passed the bill. Since hitting the debt ceiling, the Treasury has spent down its cash balance and deployed a range of accounting gimmicks (“extraordinary measures” in Treasury parlance) to keep paying the United States’ bills—bills for spending commitments already approved by Congress and presidents from both parties, not new outlays.

Time is running out. Most experts forecast that the department will exhaust its remaining headroom sometime between June and August. If Congress fails to raise the debt limit now, it will impair American power at a time when China and Russia are looking to exploit every weakness they can.

2011, BUT WORSE

There is no question that Washington must put the United States on a more responsible fiscal footing. Both political parties have failed to rein in deficit spending fueled by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, growing entitlement spending, and the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Threatening to default on the country’s debt, however, is the wrong way to address this problem—the equivalent of negotiating while putting a gun to one’s head.

Indeed, in the run-up to the potential default date, Congress will make the United States a global spectacle, as the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country careens toward the unthinkable. It won’t be the first time. Since 1960, Congress has raised the debt limit 78 times, in most cases under a Republican president. Sometimes, such as in 2011, Congress dithered until there were only days left before default hit. That year, the rating agency S&P downgraded the United States’ creditworthiness from AAA for the first time, but most of the financial and economic impact was short-lived, vanishing after Congress lifted the debt ceiling that August. In fact, the aftermath of the credit rating downgrade saw borrowing costs fall and the dollar strengthen—a result of the exorbitant privilege of issuing U.S. government bonds, the asset of choice for any investor seeking safe haven from risk, plus the good fortune of there being no plausible alternative to U.S. dollars. At the time, Europe was descending into its own debt crisis, Japan was mired in stagnation, China had yet to lure massive flows of foreign capital, and digital assets had not gone mainstream.

This time around, it could be worse. The context has changed dramatically. Congress is as polarized now as it has ever been. In 2011, Republicans had a comfortable majority in the House, with 24 more votes; today, it has only a five-vote margin. What is more, the amount of debt the United States must refinance is about twice as large as in 2011. Foreign holdings of U.S. government bonds are up $2.5 trillion since 2011 to $7 trillion in total; of these holdings, at least $1.5 trillion are held by governments that are not members of the G-7 and may have geopolitical motivation to pare their exposure to dollars at a moment of stress. In another difference from 2011, Europe is forging an ever-closer economic union, making euros a more plausible alternative to dollars worldwide. Finally, and most important, the United States is currently spearheading the most severe economic sanctions campaign in history against Russia, deriving its potency in large part from the United States’ ability to exclude a rogue actor from the dollar-dominated global financial system. Washington may need to employ an even more consequential sanctions campaign against Beijing in the event it attacks Taiwan or gives Moscow lethal support for the war in Ukraine.

RISKING A NATIONAL TREASURE

Although the sanctions are certainly justified and are doing more harm to Russia’s war-making capacity than Moscow is letting on, there is little question that sanctions are a double-edged sword. Some countries are considering what would happen if Washington’s Russia playbook were deployed against them, raising questions about whether continued dependence on U.S. dollars is a safe bet. Beijing and Moscow are encouraging their trading partners to build new payment mechanisms using their own currencies or the Chinese yuan. In other words, both the geopolitical incentive and operational capacity to reduce exposure to dollars is on the rise, and another debt ceiling drama needlessly gives other countries further justification to consider alternatives.

No one should underestimate the stakes involved: U.S. dollar primacy is a national treasure. The strength of the dollar allows American households, businesses, and governments at all levels to fund themselves far more cheaply than would otherwise be the case. Families benefit from the dollar’s unrivaled status each day by paying lower interest rates on credit card debt, mortgages, and student loans. It has, at least so far, conferred on the United States the unique capacity to absorb a shock, such as the 2011 downgrade of the United States’ credit rating, without seeing the country’s borrowing costs rise or U.S. currency fall in value. Dollar primacy gives the U.S. government the singular power to deliver an economic shock to an adversary by excluding it from the dollar-based global financial system through sanctions.

But if taken for granted, the dollar will lose its primacy. The fact that the world must once again confront the question of whether the United States might default on its debt is itself a problem. Dollar primacy is nothing more than a network rooted in trust, habit, and an assumed lack of alternatives. All systems based on trust have tipping points, often psychological ones that are impossible to identify in advance. Dollar primacy was able to gather force over the past century thanks above all to faith in the United States’ stewardship of the global financial system—alongside rule of law, the quality and independence of U.S. institutions, the depth and liquidity of American capital markets, and an open system for trade, capital, and people. Although most of these competitive strengths are still very much intact, the study of networks—whether in ecology, technology, or finance—shows that they lose value slowly and then suddenly once confidence is lost.

To avoid this outcome, some lawmakers and outside experts have proposed unilateral options the Treasury Department could fall back on to bypass the debt limit: Exploit an obscure legal loophole to mint a trillion-dollar platinum coin to offset Treasury’s liabilities. Invoke the 18th Amendment to challenge the constitutionality of the debt limit. Prioritize the payment of debt service and selected spending programs to balance the budget and avoid new debt issuance. What do these options have in common? They are legally dubious, unworkable, or deeply damaging to the credibility of the United States. Pulling from a bag of tricks to pretend the country is honoring its obligations is not what great powers do. It is a clownish display rather than a confident show of readiness for global competition.

MATT POTTINGER is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser from 2019 to 2021.
DALEEP SINGH is Chief Global Economist and Head of Macroeconomic Research for PGIM Fixed Income and served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for international economics from 2021 to 2022.

Foreign Affairs · by Matt Pottinger and Daleep Singh · April 27, 2023

5. Iran Seizes U.S.-Bound Oil Tanker

Iran Seizes U.S.-Bound Oil Tanker

fdd.org · · April 27, 2023

Latest Developments

Iranian naval forces seized a Marshall Island-flagged oil tanker traveling through international waters in the Gulf of Oman on April 27. The tanker, Advantage Sweet, was transporting oil from Kuwait bound for Houston, Texas, when Iran captured it around 1:15 p.m. local time just north of Oman’s capital, Muscat.

The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which patrols the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea, called the seizure a violation of international law and demanded the tanker’s immediate release. Earlier in April, the Fifth Fleet issued a warning advising all ships — especially Israeli ones — to proceed cautiously through the area due to an increased threat of Iranian harassment. According to the U.S. Navy, Iran has unlawfully seized at least five commercial vessels sailing through the region over the past two years.

Expert Analysis

“Threats to international maritime commercial traffic cannot be tolerated. The response from Washington and its allies should be resolute in demanding the ship’s immediate release while quickly ratcheting up pressure on the regime in meaningful and creative ways.” — Richard Goldberg, FDD Senior Advisor

“The regime in Tehran has learned that it very rarely pays a price for taking hostages, regardless of whether they are ships or people. Instead of treating hostage-taking as a standard part of the Western give-and-take with Iran, the United States and its allies need to exact a price from Tehran for subverting basic rules that help avoid war in a volatile region.” — David Adesnik, FDD Senior Fellow and Director of Research

Iran’s Record of Attacks and Seizures

Iran has been threatening commercial shipping in the region for years. In May 2019, Iran used mines to damage Saudi Arabian, Norwegian, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) tankers near the UAE’s Fujairah port. In June 2019, mines likely planted by Tehran damaged Japanese and Norwegian tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran seized the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero that same year, detaining the ship and crew members for over two months.

In January 2021, Iranian forces seized the South Korean tanker MT Hankuk Chemi near the UAE coast after it had passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran released the ship and its captain four months later. In July 2021, an Iranian drone off the coast of Oman attacked the MT Mercer Street, a Japanese-owned, Israeli-managed cargo ship, killing two crew members.

In May 2022, Iran seized two Greek oil tankers — the Delta Poseidon and the Prudent Warrior — in the Persian Gulf in response to the U.S. seizure, with Greek assistance, of the Iranian vessel Lana near the Greek island of Evia. Tha Lana had been violating U.S. sanctions by transporting crude oil. Iran released the ships in November after lengthy negotiations between Athens and Tehran.

Further Analysis

“U.S. Carrier Strike Group Transits Strait of Hormuz,” by Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel

“To Stop Iran’s Proxy Terrorists, Stop Iran,” by Bradley Bowman, Joe Truzman, and Ryan Brobst

fdd.org · · April 27, 2023

6. When Russia is defeated in Ukraine, look to Chechnya

Excerpts:

“We are tired of Russia,” adds the 45-year-old commander, who asked to be identified only by his military call sign Torto, a reference to a castle near his hometown back in Chechnya, which he left as a young rebel soon after the Second Chechen War ended in 2009.

“Russia is like a drunk neighbor. One day he comes to your home and wants to burn it. You catch him, he runs away. Another day he comes back sober and begs for forgiveness. And then he returns drunk with a pistol and kills your wife and kids,” he says.

“This is the Third Chechen War — and this time we will win,” interjects one of Torto’s soldiers, a 20-something who goes by the call sign Maga. A husband and father, he says his partner fully supports his decision to fight, although she “worries about me but knows this fighting needs to be done.”

When Russia is defeated in Ukraine, look to Chechnya

As far as Chechen volunteers are concerned, Ukraine is just the start of the fight against Russia.

Politico · by Stefan Boscia · April 27, 2023

KYIV — “After Ukraine, Chechnya,” says the Chechen commander fighting on Kyiv’s side.

The Chechen soldiers are clear they’re in Ukraine to make up for around two centuries of Russian oppression of their mountainous and frequently mutinous homeland — from Joseph Stalin’s population deportation in the 1940s to Boris Yeltsin’s razing of their capital Grozny to the current, brutal rule of Moscow’s satrap in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov.

“We are tired of Russia,” adds the 45-year-old commander, who asked to be identified only by his military call sign Torto, a reference to a castle near his hometown back in Chechnya, which he left as a young rebel soon after the Second Chechen War ended in 2009.

“Russia is like a drunk neighbor. One day he comes to your home and wants to burn it. You catch him, he runs away. Another day he comes back sober and begs for forgiveness. And then he returns drunk with a pistol and kills your wife and kids,” he says.

“This is the Third Chechen War — and this time we will win,” interjects one of Torto’s soldiers, a 20-something who goes by the call sign Maga. A husband and father, he says his partner fully supports his decision to fight, although she “worries about me but knows this fighting needs to be done.”

There are around 150 to 200 Chechen volunteers fighting on the Ukrainian side, most the émigré sons and grandsons of fighters who fought in the First or Second Chechen Wars.

They are divided into three formations — the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion, named after the first post-Soviet president of independent Chechnya; the Sheikh Mansur battalion, which has been criticized for ties with Islamist groups; and a more secretive battalion that works with Ukraine’s military intelligence service, GUR, and whose members dress in black and even when in the safe confines of Kyiv move around armed and wearing ski masks.

The consensus among the foreign volunteers here is that the Chechens are among the most committed and ideological about the fight, as much as the 200 or so Belarusians who fight for Ukraine, and much more so than most of the Westerners and Latin American volunteers. The latter tend to be here for the money. The former — mainly Americans and Brits — are generally veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, and with a few exceptions acknowledge they’re here because they didn’t fancy civilian life and don’t want their experience and training going to waste, although they also subscribe to the rightness of the Ukrainian cause.

The Chechens are currently engaged largely in Bakhmut, the monthslong bloody battle that’s led to high casualties on both sides and has been compared to clashes in World War I for its gore. A keen student of military history, Torto says, “it is Verdun,” a reference to the longest battle of World War I.

“It is sheer hell,” adds Torto, who has lived in Ukraine since 2016 and before that in Germany.

We are sitting in the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion’s so-called clubroom, a basement in the suburbs of Kyiv, discussing why they’re fighting in this war far from their homeland as well as discussing the qualities and characteristics of other foreign volunteers battling in Ukraine against Russia and what they think about the Chechens fighting for Vladimir Putin — an estimated 12,000 of them at various times since Russia invaded Ukraine.

Both Torto and Maga are in no doubt that they ultimately are here to fight for Chechnya — a defeat in Ukraine for Russia will lead inexorably to an armed uprising in their homeland in the North Caucasus, they argue, and not just there but right across the Caucasus region sandwiched between the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. “Sooner or later, we will all be free,” says Torto, a large bearded man who strokes gently a gray tabby cat clawing on his fatigues.

Maгa, a 29 year-old Chechen who has volunteered to fight for Ukraine | Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post via Getty Images

“Believe me, when Russia loses this war with Ukraine, it cannot exist as a state. It’s impossible. It will fall apart,” he adds, a view echoed by Belarusian volunteers POLITICO interviewed two days before. “We just need freedom. People need freedom,” Torto says.

Torto expresses disgust at Russia’s Chechen fighters, nicknamed Kadyrovites — and especially at the atrocities they’ve been associated with. Tagged the “TikTok army” for their online promotion of their brutality, the Kadyrovites have been accused of rapes, killings and looting in Bucha, and in July were accused of the torture and castration with a box cutter of a Ukrainian POW in Pryvillia, Luhansk region, which they posted on their Telegram channel.

Some investigators suspect it might have been Kadyrovites rather than Wagner group mercenaries who beheaded a Ukrainian captive earlier this month, which was also posted online. Maga and Torto disparage the Kadyrovites as “not real soldiers” who are only in Ukraine for the money.

The Kadyrovites are useful for Moscow as propaganda — a warning that Russia will treat Ukraine as it did Chechnya and destroy everything it can. And for Kadyrov they help promote his image as a warrior, they say. The TikTok army is seldom near the front lines, the pro-Ukrainian Chechens note, and are only used just for mopping-up operations to sow fear, say the pro-Ukraine fighters.

Aside from Bakhmut, where they have given no quarter, their proudest moments so far in the war have been running sabotage and reconnaissance operations north of Kyiv soon after Russia’s invasion and participating in the operation to liberate Izium, in northeast Ukraine.

But for all their diehard commitment to the fight, the Chechens are the poor relations of the foreign volunteers fighting here. Unlike the other foreign formations, they are not formally part of the international legion, aren’t paid by the Ukrainian government and must equip themselves. “They do give us ammunition when we are at the front lines,” says Maga.

To stay in the fight they are resourceful, appealing widely for donations and selling online war items collected from the battlefield. Other foreign and Ukrainian units are generous, often allowing the Chechens to keep the lion’s share of any arms and ammunition left behind by Russian forces when they retreat. “Russia is our biggest arms supplier,” chuckles Torto. Requestioned equipment includes some heavy machine guns grabbed from disabled tanks.

Why they’re treated differently isn’t fully explained by Ukrainian officials, who mention there are legal problems as they are technically Russian citizens. But Torto suspects it’s a lot to do with the widespread perception of Chechens as cutthroat rogues and thieves.

That hasn’t deterred members of the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion or dampened their enthusiasm for the fight, and they hope their participation in this war will slowly change how many Ukrainians view Chechens — although the cruelty of the Kadyrovites, of course, isn’t helping.

And of the expected major Ukrainian counter-offensive? They have high hopes but say it is not going to be easy to defeat Russia, which will mobilize more men. But the fight must go on, says Torto.

“When I hear French or German experts talking about how Russia must be saved and not be allowed to fall apart and how it can be rebuilt as a democratic state, I just shake my head,” he says.

Politico · by Stefan Boscia · April 27, 2023

7. French twist: Emmanuel Macron cozies up to Chinese Communist Party

French twist: Emmanuel Macron cozies up to Chinese Communist Party

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

OPINION:

Is France still an ally of the United States? Based on Emmanuel Macron’s three-day state visit to the People’s Republic of China earlier this month, the answer to that question is in doubt.

To say that the French president kowtowed to Xi Jinping, the most powerful Chinese ruler since Mao Zedong, would be to exaggerate — but not by much.

Alluding to Mr. Xi’s intention to displace the U.S. as a global leader, Mr. Macron reportedly told Mr. Xi that “France does not pick sides.”

The new international order Mr. Xi envisions would be based on rules made by the Chinese Communist Party. Apparently, that troubles Mr. Macron not at all.

What does? In an interview with journalists from Politico and Les Echos, a French financial newspaper, Mr. Macron warned against Europe becoming “America’s vassal.” He urged his fellow Europeans to seek “strategic autonomy,” and to avoid “getting caught up in crises that are not ours.”

Accompanying Mr. Macron to China were several dozen French tycoons. In their briefcases were contracts they were eager to have signed by Chinese businessmen or CCP leaders — a distinction without a difference if you understand Beijing’s strategy of “military-civil fusion.”

As far as we know, Mr. Macron did not raise thorny issues such as Beijing’s cover-up of the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, its persecution of Uyghurs, Tibetans and other minorities, or its crushing of Hong Kong’s freedoms in blatant violation of treaty obligations.

Nor did Mr. Macron suggest that French relations with the People’s Republic would suffer should Chinese troops invade Taiwan. Given that “Europeans cannot resolve the crisis in Ukraine,” he said, “how can we credibly say on Taiwan, ‘watch out, if you do something wrong we will be there’?”

At the conclusion of the visit, a 51-point joint declaration announced France’s “global strategic partnership with China.” That sounds like an alliance, don’t you think?

Mr. Macron also told reporters — this he’s said previously — that he wants Europe to become a “third superpower.” To achieve that goal would surely require significantly increased defense expenditures. That seems unlikely considering that many of Europe’s NATO members have never allocated even 2% of gross domestic product to defense — despite having repeatedly pledged to do so.

Nor did Mr. Macron reflect on the irony that less than a year ago, he withdrew French military forces from Mali, one of many former French colonies with which Paris had long maintained a “special relationship.”

Those troops — first deployed to the West African country nine years ago at the invitation of the Malian government to combat jihadis linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State — have now been replaced by Russian forces, including Wagner Group mercenaries infamous for ignoring the laws of armed conflict.

Since assuming office in 2017, Mr. Macron has not been a particularly effective French leader. Nor is he currently a popular one. A poll this month finds his support down to just 26%.

One issue driving dissatisfaction is his push for pension reform — raising the retirement age from 62 to 64. Frenchmen furious at the prospect of having to wait so long to take to their rocking chairs have nevertheless summoned sufficient energy to stage mass and sometimes violent protests.

One of Mr. Macron’s goals in Beijing was to persuade Mr. Xi to use his influence to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. He failed. The joint declaration I mentioned above neither condemned Russian aggression nor mentioned Beijing using its influence to rein in Vladimir Putin.

Mr. Macron made other — undoubtedly worse — statements concerning Taiwan and “strategic autonomy” on his visit to China. We know that because officials at the Elysee, the palace where French presidents reside, instructed Politico and Les Echos not to include them in their reports. (Abiding by such instructions was a condition for granting the interview.)

The Elysee then issued a statement asserting that France “is not equidistant between the United States and China. The United States is our ally, with shared values.”

Convinced?

Last Friday, China’s ambassador to France remarked that Ukraine and other independent nations that were once part of the Soviet empire may not be independent states in Beijing’s eyes because “there’s no international accord to concretize their status as a sovereign country.” Did he say that to embarrass Mr. Macron? Is Mr. Macron embarrassed (as he should be)?

The more things change, the more they remain the same, as the French say. Back in 1990, after spending three years as The New York Times’ correspondent and bureau chief in Paris, Richard Bernstein wrote “Fragile Glory: A Portrait of France and the French,” a marvelous book judiciously combining admiration and criticism.

He observed that the French, across the political spectrum, cling to the idea that their nation is “a beacon of illumination to the rest of the world.” He quoted Charles de Gaulle, who — despite the “humiliation and shame of defeat in World War II” — insisted: “France cannot be France without grandeur.”

Grandeur could be achieved, de Gaulle believed, by making France the leader of what Mr. Bernstein called “a third great power bloc in the world buffering the Soviet-American antagonism.”

It appears Mr. Macron is recycling that aspiration, imagining France buffering what he sees as the Sino-American antagonism.

French wines age well. Gaullist ideas, not so much.

What we once called the free world currently faces more formidable adversaries than during the Cold War. Some European leaders are clear-eyed about the threat posed by the imperial ambitions of Beijing and its partners in Moscow, Tehran, and other capitals of unfree nations.

Those leaders would be well advised to sit down with Mr. Macron and explain why an alliance with the U.S., for all its flaws, remains preferable to the alternatives.

• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washington Times.

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How to Spy on China

Beijing Is a Hard Target—but Better Tech Could Make It Easier

By Peter Mattis

April 28, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Peter Mattis · April 28, 2023

Over the past few months, as competition with China has intensified, the Biden administration has struggled to provide the United States and its allies with a clear picture of Beijing’s intentions. In mid-February, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that China could soon begin providing Russia with lethal aid for its war in Ukraine—a step that would dramatically change the dynamic of the conflict. But so far, the administration has not been able to confirm plans for such aid or to find concrete evidence that such transfers are taking place. Similarly, in late February, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns stated that Beijing will be prepared to conquer the island by 2027. Yet there is widespread disagreement among analysts in Washington about Beijing’s military plans and if and when such an invasion might occur.

There is a reason for this enormous uncertainty. The CIA and the other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community have worked hard to understand China’s plans, intentions, and capabilities. But although Washington may have a rough sense of when China’s military will be ready to invade Taiwan, American spies have difficulty understanding Chinese objectives and leveraging that understanding to anticipate Chinese actions. Unlike Russia, which has been thoroughly penetrated by the U.S. intelligence community, reporting by the New York Times and the Foreign Policy indicates that China dismantled the U.S. spy system at its borders, famously arresting and executing the CIA’s network of Chinese informants in the early 2010s. Moreover, power within the Chinese Communist Party is becoming ever-more concentrated at the top, making it harder for secrets to leak out. And Beijing’s international footprint is so sprawling that it is nearly impossible to keep tabs on all of China’s external activities and plans.

Above all, though, is the problem of Washington’s current approach to intelligence. Despite concerted efforts to do what it takes to gain more details on the CCP, the U.S. government remains largely wedded to traditional forms of intelligence gathering—government-managed, classified human and signals data—which are poorly adapted to today’s needs and have offered insufficient insight into Chinese intentions. Simply increasing the resources devoted to these existing practices is unlikely to yield the information Washington needs to predict Beijing’s behavior.

To truly gain a grasp of China, the United States needs to think much more creatively about the way it approaches intelligence gathering and the tools it uses to do so. In particular, it must give far more weight to open-source intelligence—which is essential to interpreting Beijing’s thinking—by establishing a centralized office for open-source analysis. It must embrace the most advanced new digital tools to harness and examine the data such intelligence provides. And it should significantly ramp up its efforts to cultivate China expertise and bring more China experts into its ranks. These steps may not give Washington perfect insight into Beijing, but they will make it possible for the United States to sweep up far more information on China and analyze it in a timely manner. They will also improve Washington’s ability to determine how accurate its findings are. And at the very least, when it comes to assessing China’s next moves, they may help prevent Washington from falling into the dark.

HARD TO HANDLE

There is no doubt that China is a vast, complicated, and hard intelligence target. Any spy agency would struggle to understand a strict dictatorship that governs nearly 1.4 billion people. But when it comes to maintaining secrets, China’s size and system can cut both ways. To control its enormous population, China has established 31 provincial-level governments, 299 prefecture-level cities, and over 1,300 counties—each with its own bureaucrats. The Chinese Communist Party also has branches in every major Chinese university, company, and scientific lab. Overall, the CCP itself has 97 million members. This sprawling structure means that, no matter how centralized decision-making is, most of China’s policy objectives and guidance must be communicated openly, creating a call-and-response dynamic that well-positioned analysts can freely observe.

Consider, for example, the path of China’s most recent Five-Year Plan, announced in October 2020. For analysts looking to understand its most important implications, the National People’s Congress revealed very little, publishing only a lengthy but broad outline of what the plan called for. Yet in response to that outline, China’s provinces developed their own, much more detailed five-year plans, each of which contained material that offers substantial insight on the direction of Chinese policy and who is responsible for which part. In the technological domain, these plans helped U.S. intelligence learn where it should try to identify government-backed investment funds, new university partnerships, talent recruitment programs, and the other tools the Chinese government uses to promote innovation.

Washington should also study local officials for another reason: they pose a national security threat. It was, for instance, Guangdong Province’s security department that recruited former CIA case officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee in 2010 and then handled him as a source until his arrest in 2018. According to the New York Times, the information Lee provided was one of the reasons China was able to dismantle the CIA’s spy network a decade ago. Guangdong’s security department and other local CCP officials later cultivated a relationship with Australian-Chinese billionaire Chau Chak-wing, who donated more than $2 million to Australian political parties to encourage a pro-CCP stance. According to FBI information publicized in the Australian Parliament, Chau also allegedly facilitated a UN bribery scheme, likely to bring then-UN General Assembly President John Ashe into the CCP’s web as part of Beijing’s efforts to change global governance. The bribes resulted in at least one American going to prison for helping make the payments.

The Chinese central government, of course, also tries to cultivate overseas assets. But given the scale of Beijing’s ambitions, even these efforts often happen in plain view. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which works to recruit both expat Chinese and U.S. scientists (in part to gain access to U.S. industrial secrets), has been widely publicized. The country runs hundreds of other publicly known talent recruitment programs, and it boasts roughly 600 overseas recruitment stations. The CCP has multiple international united front groups—some 600 of which operate inside the United States—that support its efforts to obtain expertise and technology from outside countries. Washington is aware of each, but few individuals probably understand the full sweep of these groups’ and programs’ activities.

Any spy agency would struggle to understand a strict dictatorship that governs nearly 1.4 billion people.

The United States has repeatedly said that it is concerned about China stealing its technology. But if Washington wants to better grasp the aims of these Chinese initiatives, it needs to invest more in collecting, processing, and analyzing the large and ever-growing body of public and commercially available information. Procurement and hiring notices, award announcements, and research funding—among many other sources—can all provide useful insights, especially when aggregated. Local CCP apparatchiks also release plenty of easily accessible data through their reports and statements that, studied broadly, can help the United States understand the full breadth of China’s plans and whether they are being carried out.

But so far, Washington’s efforts to use more public information have come up short. Over the last five years, multiple intelligence agencies have established open-source offices, but they are underfunded and do not communicate much with one another. As a result, the insights they gather tend to be siloed and incomplete. To remedy this lack of coordination and improve analysis overall, the United States should create a standalone open-source agency with the authority to acquire, examine, and share open-source data across all parts of the intelligence community.

This entity could be its own agency, or it could be built into one of the existing ones. But it must have an independent voice, one that allows it to influence budgetary decisions and analytic decisions, and generally ensure that open-source perspectives are included in how Washington approaches intelligence. The office should also serve as a gateway between the government and the many open-source analysts who work in the private sector. Ideally, it would employ a workforce of both cleared and uncleared personnel, allowing it to hire experts faster than traditional spy agencies yet still work closely with the intelligence community.

Since open-source findings come from publicly available data, much of the work of a central open-source entity would not be subject to the same restrictions as traditional intelligence agencies and could be shared with allies, preemptively alerting them to Chinese provocations. An open-source agency would also help Washington figure out where it really needs to target its clandestine operations—and where traditional spying is unnecessary. For example, the CCP’s influence efforts have public-facing organizations and meetings that can be tracked and used to identify the officials and groups tied to the CCP, as well as their targets. Clandestine collectors can exploit that knowledge to figure out what actors they should focus on.

FEWER HAYSTACKS, MORE NEEDLES

Creating a dedicated and well-resourced open-source agency is critical to improving U.S. intelligence on Beijing. But it is not sufficient. As the United States gathers more open-source information, it will have more data than any group of analysts can process. In 2017, the director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency told an audience that if the United States attempted to manually sift through all the commercial satellite data it will obtain over the next two decades, it would need 8 million image analysts. “Even now,” he continued, “every day in just one combat theater with a single sensor, we collect the data equivalent of three NFL seasons, every game. In high definition!”

To process this glut, both the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and the country’s Special Competitive Studies Project have argued that the intelligence community must embrace artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled tools that can identify patterns across huge quantities of data. Several intelligence agencies, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, have come up with strategies and plans to do just that. But here, again, Washington’s efforts are insufficient. The agencies’ plans have been unevenly implemented, and various agencies have developed technology that cannot easily exchange information. There are also different data standards across different initiatives, and agencies have struggled to access appropriate computing power. Many employees, afraid of being replaced or making mistakes, have been reluctant to acquire or use new tools.

The Biden administration has pushed the intelligence community to move past this hesitancy. But to ensure that they actually do, the community’s stakeholders at the White House and in Congress will need to see to it that intelligence agencies actually change. Without consistent demand from policymakers, the intelligence community will continue to instead focus on the missions of today, rather than orienting itself for how the U.S.-Chinese rivalry is evolving. The agencies’ leaders must make sure that incoming and existing intelligence officials are trained to use new technologies. It could even make familiarity with any AI tools a prerequisite for being promoted to senior positions.

To drive these changes, the intelligence community should create a unit to run projects that address the bottlenecks that make it hard for agencies to widely adopt digital technologies and artificial intelligence. Its goal should be to build a shared digital architecture for the whole intelligence community, promoting collaboration and making sure that spy agencies can deliver the right information, at the right time, to the right decision-makers. The unit should also make sure this architecture can help deliver findings to foreign partners when needed. In fact, the United States should collaborate with allies as it develops various digital tools. The U.S.-Chinese rivalry crosses the globe, and so Washington must work collaboratively to win.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

Even with rapid access to the best open-source information and advanced technologies, however, the intelligence community will not be able to make reliable assessments of Chinese intentions without the input of the best strategic minds and close students of China. And at present, Washington does not have enough of them. The number of Americans studying China or Chinese has been declining since 2013, and the number of Americans living in that country is also going down. Beijing has become increasingly hostile to foreigners, and so there are fewer job opportunities for Americans in China than there were at the end of the last decade—or even chances for Americans to visit.

Addressing this “knowledge crisis,” as navy intelligence chief Mike Studeman put it in February, will prove challenging. In addition to a dearth of business opportunities, there is no longer any civic institution in China—like the erstwhile University Services Centre in Hong Kong—where U.S. graduate students, professors, government officials, and journalists can go to mingle with their Chinese counterparts. But the intelligence community can make up for this loss by hiring people who lived and worked in China in the past. U.S. agencies will be hesitant to do so; on several occasions, the CIA has discovered that applicants who lived in China were recruited as operatives by Beijing. But if a handful of potential moles has paralyzed the intelligence community’s ability to hire people with experience and knowledge critical to its efforts, then its leaders must modernize the vetting processes.

Intelligence agencies should also consider creating an initiative akin to the military’s Foreign Area Officer program—which trains military officers as country specialists with language proficiency and knowledge about the state’s politics, culture, and society—so that they can cultivate more internal expertise. Such a program would allow employees to join intelligence organizations through normal processes and then later apply to a development program that will turn them into China specialists, including by spending time in-country attached to official diplomatic missions in China (or in Taiwan) and studying Mandarin.

Adding to the intelligence community’s China expertise will improve the U.S. government’s ability to understand the CCP’s intentions, better collect intelligence, and take effective policy action. For example, the United States has underestimated Beijing’s ambitions for years; it was not until 2019 that the Pentagon started saying that the CCP had global ambitions rather than just expanding interests and regional goals. And it took analysts such as the National Intelligence University’s Daniel Tobin, who lived in China and deeply studies the CCP’s documents, to show the government otherwise and to illustrate that the party has had a long and consistent desire to be internationally dominant.

Having this kind of expert enables the United States and allied officials to better anticipate Beijing’s moves. It helps Washington direct the intelligence community’s collectors toward the right operations, such as unraveling the CCP’s influence networks that enable Chinese power internationally, rather than more technical ones—like understanding the specific intent behind the surveillance balloons. More expertise, enabled by better tools and information, also will let U.S. intelligence better support specific actions. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, for example, broadly prohibits companies from importing goods forcibly made by members of China’s oppressed Uyghur minority. But enforcement depends on knowing which Chinese companies are participating in the government’s labor programs, which in turn requires that analysts who are proficient enough in Chinese that they can follow evolving terminology, corporate databases, and the ways in which companies and local governments try to hide the telltale signs of involvement.

UP TO THE TASK

The U.S. intelligence community’s struggles with China are certainly serious. But they are not unprecedented. During the Cold War, the United States also faced a large rival governed by a highly secretive communist party. Of course, there are many differences between the Soviet state and today’s China. But then, as now, Washington’s main challenger had a broad global footprint that required U.S. operatives to gather intel from around the world. And then, as now, the two sides worked hard to hunt down moles and plug intelligence vulnerabilities their adversaries exploited.

But just like in the twentieth century, the United States can find fresh ways to understand and predict its rival’s behavior. In the Cold War, Washington used new technology—most notably, satellites—to gain information on the Soviet Union. Today, it can use AI to process a growing influx of open-source data. During the twentieth century, the United States was able to rotate analysts through official missions behind the Iron Curtain, or on the Soviet periphery, to gain expertise. It can do the same again in Beijing.

If it takes all these steps, Washington will be able to get a much better handle on China. Indeed, the benefits of some of these innovations have already been shown. Open-source researchers have provided insights into sensitive Chinese activities, such as CCP espionage and political interference abroad. They have helped the United States understand how China organizes and has reformed its electronic signal intelligence, and they have allowed Washington to glean information about Chinese military activity near the Taiwan strait. If the intelligence community can obtain more open-source intel and embrace AI-enabled tools to examine the data, its analysts would be able to learn—and share—even more. If the community can recruit China experts, it will better anticipate Beijing’s actions and focus analysts’ activities and resources. Beijing’s decision-making may remain opaque, but Washington will still be able to understand China’s behavior.

PETER MATTIS is Director for Intelligence at the Special Competitive Studies Project.

Foreign Affairs · by Peter Mattis · April 28, 2023

9. NATO: Ukraine allies sent 1,550 combat vehicles, ‘vast’ ammo

NATO: Ukraine allies sent 1,550 combat vehicles, ‘vast’ ammo

militarytimes.com · by David Rising and Lorne Cook, AP · April 27, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine — NATO allies and partner countries have delivered more than 98% of the combat vehicles promised to Ukraine during Russia’s invasion and war, the military alliance’s chief said Thursday, giving Kyiv a bigger punch as contemplates launching a counteroffensive.

Along with more than 1,550 armored vehicles, 230 tanks and other equipment, Ukraine’s allies have sent “vast amounts of ammunition” and also trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said.

More than 30,000 troops are estimated to make up the new brigades. Some NATO partner countries, such as Sweden and Australia, have also provided armored vehicles.

“This will put Ukraine in a strong position to continue to retake occupied territory,” Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels.

His comments came a day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a “long and meaningful” phone call in their first known contact since Russia’s full-scale invasion more than a year ago.

Though Zelenskyy wsaid he was encouraged by Wednesday’s call and Western officials welcomed Xi’s move, the development didn’t appear to bring about any immediate shift in peace prospects.

Russia and Ukraine are far apart in their terms for peace, and Beijing — while looking to position itself as a global diplomatic power — has refused to criticize Moscow’s invasion. The Chinese government sees Russia as a diplomatic ally in opposing U.S. influence in global affairs, and Xi visited Moscow last month.

Stoltenberg said the 31 NATO allies were committed to shoring up Ukraine’s military, adding that taking back land occupied by the Kremlin’s forces would give Kyiv a stronger negotiating position if peace talks occur.

Ukrainian officials said China’s overture was encouraging. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on Thursday described the call between Xi and Zelenskyy as “very productive.”

“I’m convinced it is a good beginning for our relations in the future,” Shmyhal said after visiting Pope Francis at the Vatican.

But the Kremlin’s response was lukewarm.

Asked if the call could help end the fighting, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “We are ready to welcome anything that could lead to the termination of the conflict in Ukraine and the achievement of all the goals set by Russia.”

Peskov said the conversation between the Chinese and Ukrainian leaders was “the sovereign business of those countries and the issue of their bilateral dialogue.”

With battlefield positions in Ukraine largely static as a war of attrition took hold in recent months, Russian forces have kept up their bombardment of Ukrainian areas, often hitting apartment buildings and other civilian infrastructure.

At least seven civilians were killed and 33 were injured between Wednesday and Thursday, Ukraine’s presidential office said Thursday.

They included one person killed and 23 wounded, including a child, when four Kalibr cruise missiles hit the southern city of Mykolaiv, official said.

The governor of Mykolaiv province, Vitalii Kim, said 22 multi-story buildings, 12 private houses and other residential buildings were damaged in the attack.

Kalibr missiles are launched from ships or submarines, The ones that hit Mykolaiv were fired from somewhere in the Black Sea, according to Ukraine’s Operational Command South.

___ Cook reported from Brussels. Associated Press Writer Yuras Karmanau in Tallinn, Estonia, and Frances D’Emilio in Rome contributed. ___ Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

10. Why China is trying to mediate in Russia’s war with Ukraine

Excerpts:

Xi’s government has pursued a bigger role in global diplomacy as part of a campaign to restore China to what the ruling Communist Party sees as its rightful status as a political and economic leader and to build an international order that favors Beijing’s interests.

That is a sharp reversal after decades of avoiding involvement in other countries’ conflicts and most international affairs while it focused on economic development at home.

Why China is trying to mediate in Russia’s war with Ukraine

militarytimes.com · by Joe McDonald, The Associated Press · April 27, 2023

BEIJING — Chinese leader Xi Jinping said Wednesday that Beijing will send an envoy to Ukraine to discuss a possible “political settlement” to Russia’s war with the country.

Beijing has previously avoided involvement in conflicts between other countries but appears to be trying to assert itself as a global diplomatic force after arranging talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March that led them to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year break.

Xi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a phone call that a Chinese envoy, a former Chinese ambassador to Russia, would visit Ukraine and “other countries” to discuss a possible political settlement, according to a government statement.

It made no mention of Russia or last year’s invasion of Ukraine and didn’t indicate whether the Chinese envoy might visit Moscow.

The Xi-Zelenskyy phone call was long anticipated after Beijing said it wanted to serve as a mediator in the war.

Why does this matter?

China is the only major government that has friendly relations with Moscow as well as economic leverage as the biggest buyer of Russian oil and gas after the United States and its allies cut off most purchases.

Beijing, which sees Moscow as a diplomatic partner in opposing U.S. domination of global affairs, has refused to criticize the invasion and used its status as one of five permanent U.N. Security Council members to deflect diplomatic attacks on Russia.

Zelenskyy earlier said he welcomed a Chinese offer to mediate.

Why did China do this?

Xi’s government has pursued a bigger role in global diplomacy as part of a campaign to restore China to what the ruling Communist Party sees as its rightful status as a political and economic leader and to build an international order that favors Beijing’s interests.

That is a sharp reversal after decades of avoiding involvement in other countries’ conflicts and most international affairs while it focused on economic development at home.

In March, Saudi Arabia and Iran issued a surprise announcement, following talks in Beijing, that they would reopen embassies in each other’s capitals following a seven-year break. China has good relations with both as a big oil buyer.

Last week, Foreign Minister Qin Gang told his Israeli and Palestinian counterparts that his country is ready to help facilitate peace talks.

Wednesday’s statement warned against the dangers of nuclear war, suggesting Beijing might also have been motivated by what it sees as the growing danger of a more destructive conflict.

Mediating between Ukraine and Russia would increase China’s presence in Eastern Europe, where Beijing has tried to build ties with other governments. That has prompted complaints by some European officials that China is trying to gain leverage over the European Union.

Political science professor Kimberly Marten of Barnard College at Columbia University in New York doubted China would succeed in a peacemaker role.

“I have a hard time believing that China can act as peacemaker,” she said, adding that Beijing has been “too close to Russia.”

What are China’s relations with Russia?

China is the closest thing President Vladimir Putin’s isolated government has to a major ally.

Xi and Putin issued a joint statement ahead of the February 2022 invasion that said their governments had a “no limits friendship.”

Beijing has tried to appear neutral but has repeated Russian justifications for the invasion.

Xi received a warm welcome from Putin during a visit to Moscow in March. The Chinese defense minister visited Russia this month.

China has stepped up purchases of Russian oil and gas for its energy-hungry economy, helping to offset lost revenue resulting from Western sanctions. In exchange, China gets lower prices, though details haven’t been disclosed.

Marten said the Xi-Zelenskyy call was “kind of a slap at Russia, because Russia has been very keen to portray China as its ally.” She said the direct China-Ukraine contact “indicates China is taking at least a step away from Russia.”

What are China’s relations with Ukraine?

China was Ukraine’s biggest trading partner before the invasion, though on a smaller scale than Chinese-Russian trade.

In 2021, Ukraine announced plans for Chinese companies to build trade-related infrastructure.

Zelenskyy’s government was more ambivalent toward Beijing after it was clear Xi wouldn’t try to stop Putin’s war, but the two sides have remained amicable.

“Before the full-scale Russian invasion, China was Ukraine’s number one trading partner. I believe that our conversation today will give a powerful impetus to the return, preservation and development of this dynamic at all levels,” an official Ukrainian readout of the call reported.

Qin, the foreign minister, promised this month China wouldn’t provide arms to either side, a pledge that benefits Ukraine, which has received tanks, rockets and other armaments from the United States and European governments.

The Chinese ambassador to France set off an uproar in Europe when he suggested former Soviet republics — a group that includes Ukraine — might not be sovereign nations. That was in line with Putin’s comments denying Ukrainian sovereignty.

Beijing then reassured former Soviet states it respected their sovereignty and said the ambassador’s comments were a personal opinion, not official policy.

Elizabeth Wishnick, of the U.S.-based think tank CNA and Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute, said in an email: “I wonder if Xi’s call was set up quickly to deflect attention” from the uproar over the Chinese ambassador’s remarks.

Andrew Katell in New York contributed to this report.

11. CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation

We have to campaign to win in this space that is the gray zone of strategic compeittion

Conclusion:

CCP influence operations have already had an immediate impact by silencing and deterring Asian women from reporting critically on China. Left unaddressed, the CCP’s increasing investment in influence operations online threatens to successfully influence the economic decision-making of democracies, destabilise social cohesion during times of crisis, sow distrust of leaders or institutions and processes, fracture alliances and partnerships, and further deter journalists, researchers and activists in democracies from expressing their opinions.

CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Albert Zhang · April 26, 2023

Last week, the US Department of Justice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fake online personas on social media sites, including Twitter, to target Chinese dissidents through online harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whose sole purpose is to sow divisions within the United States’.

This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specific Chinese government agency of covert malign activities on social media. However, the MPS is one of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence users on social media.

Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) justifies its manipulation of information to maintain social stability and political control over China. More recently, China’s authoritarian leader, Xi Jinping, has revived the Cultural Revolution-era term ‘public opinion struggle’ and declared social media ‘the main battlefield’ because of its ability to spread values and ideas—like human rights and democracy—that are perceived as threats to the party’s political legitimacy.

The CCP’s efforts to shape public opinion online now go beyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They are more global and aggressive, often directly interfering in state sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’s broader strategic and economic goals.

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reporting by The Washington Post which explores the he alongside reporting by The Washington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.

The report canvasses the existing publicly available evidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating from China to provide an assessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCP has developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinated networks of personas and that multiple Chinese government agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operations on social media. Those operations have become more frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democracies by disrupting domestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.

As a case study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflage network, which Twitter and Meta attributed to the Chinese Government in 2019. This new iteration of the network is using inauthentic accounts on US-based and China-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the US is irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations against China and other countries. Drawing on slip-ups like an open browser tab identifiable in an image accidentally tweeted by a Spamouflage-linked account, we believe the Chinese Government agencies conducting this influence operation named it ‘Operation Honey Badger.’

Those anti-US claims appear to be part of a broader CCP propaganda campaign to support the expansion of Chinese cybersecurity services abroad and counter similar accusations of Chinese cyber operations. There may also be a domestic propaganda purpose to garner public support for China’s new cybersecurity laws by highlighting the US as a major threat.

Accounts in the network often posed as Westerners outside of China but our research geolocated some of the operators of the Spamouflage-linked accounts to Yancheng in Jiangsu Province. In addition, we show it’s likely that at least some operators behind the campaign are affiliated with the Yancheng Public Security Bureau, the MPS or are ‘internet commentators’ hired by the Cyberspace Administration of China.

The Washington Post discovered other possible links to Chinese police officers after ASPI shared a list of Weibo accounts that were likely part of the network. In one case, The Washington Post discovered an account that appears to have a self-taken photo of a Chinese police officer as its profile image.

Chinese cybersecurity company Qi An Xin (奇安信), a partly state-owned enterprise, also appears at times to be supporting the influence operation. Our research shows the company is deeply connected with Chinese intelligence, military and security services and that it might provide digital infrastructure support to Chinese Government agencies that conduct clandestine operations online.

Finally, the report provides key recommendations to policymakers and social-media platforms to counter the CCP’s increasingly sophisticated, cyber-enabled influence operations. Democratic governments and social-media platforms must shift from reactive responses to proactive strategies rapidly. This will require a reprioritisation of these issues and greater coordination and investment of resources.

For example, definitive public attribution like the unsealed US DOJ complaint can play a larger role in deterring malicious actors. The value of public attribution goes beyond deterrence too. It’s important that general publics are given basic information so that they’re informed about contemporary security challenges.

Social-media platforms should take advantage of the digital infrastructure, which they control, to more effectively deter cyber-enabled influence operations. To disrupt future influence operations, social-media platforms could remove access to engagement analytics for suspicious accounts breaching platform policies, making it difficult for identified malicious actors to measure the effectiveness of influence operations.

Government partners and allies should also strengthen intelligence diplomacy on this emerging security challenge and seek to share more intelligence with one another on such influence operations. Strong open-source intelligence skills and collection capabilities are a crucial part of investigating and attributing these operations, the low classification of which should make intelligence sharing easier.

For now, inauthentic accounts on social media—which hide their true origins and state affiliation—allow the CCP to continue pursuing its interests globally and provide plausibly deniable cover for its true strategic intentions. Those clandestine operations undermine the freedom of online users to form independent opinions and prevent general publics from judging and holding the CCP’s actions to account.

CCP influence operations have already had an immediate impact by silencing and deterring Asian women from reporting critically on China. Left unaddressed, the CCP’s increasing investment in influence operations online threatens to successfully influence the economic decision-making of democracies, destabilise social cohesion during times of crisis, sow distrust of leaders or institutions and processes, fracture alliances and partnerships, and further deter journalists, researchers and activists in democracies from expressing their opinions.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Albert Zhang · April 26, 2023

12. The New Age of Tragedy

I recommend Kaplan's new book. Like most of his, it is very thought provoking. His comments below are a useful precis.

Excerpt:

There is surely trouble ahead that will require anxious foresight and tragic thinking on our part. Tragic thinking encompasses many things, among them the realisation that fear is useful. We have to use fear without being immobilised by it. Above all, we must realise that given such a claustrophobic and overloaded world system, the assumption of linear progress is a dangerous notion to entertain.

The New Age of Tragedy

Great-power rivalry, resource scarcity and the crumbling of the liberal rules-based order.

By Robert D Kaplan, John Gray and Helen Thompson

NewStatesman · by Robert D Kaplan · April 26, 2023

The post-Cold War moment, a 30-year period when globalisation and free trade were orchestrated under the aegis of American supremacy, is ending. As the historian Anders Stephanson has written, “One could not deny that geopolitics reduced to a set of mopping-up operations was a historic achievement of US power.” Today, great-power rivalry, war and the competition for diminishing resources are old realities reborn, revenants of history that now define a present of increasing peril and uncertainty.

In The Tragic Mind (2023), the American correspondent, author and foreign policy adviser Robert D Kaplan argues that we must learn to think tragically to avoid tragedy. We need what he calls anxious foresight. The wisest among us fear disorder and anarchy as much as tyranny.

But thinking tragically is not fatalism. It is understanding our limitations and acting with more effectiveness.

For this wide-ranging exchange, we asked Kaplan, the Cambridge political economist Helen Thompson and the philosopher John Gray to explore what we are calling this new age of tragedy, and how societies might navigate and endure the gathering storms.

Robert D Kaplan

Weimar Germany connotates the ultimate doom: a cradle of modernity that gave birth to fascism and totalitarianism. More specifically, Weimar was an unstable political system that existed between late 1918 and 1933, born in the ashes of the First World War and ending with the ascension to power of Adolf Hitler. Our world is unlikely to be headed for such moral darkness. Nevertheless, Weimar constitutes a model of sorts. It was a system composed of a parliamentary upper house, a lower house, small states, and two large ones – Prussia and Bavaria – that were to some extent laws unto themselves. Complex and prone to bickering, Weimar was a classically overloaded political regime that existed in a state of perma-crisis. Such is our world today.

We do not have a world government; nor do we have any truly effective world governance. But owing to the shrinkage of geography caused by technology, there is an emerging world system, in which crises can migrate from one part of the Earth to another. Greater interconnections mean that any place or continent can be considered strategic and affect all the others. It is a global Weimar, where there is always a crisis.

The 20th-century computer scientist and polymath John von Neumann once said that the finite size of the Earth would become a source of instability. As populations rise in absolute numbers, as more and more human beings live in complex urban settings, and both weaponry and communications – especially cyber – develop and become more sophisticated, the Earth will eventually become just too small for its volatile politics. That is why, like Weimar, our world today seems so anxious, claustrophobic and unstable.

There is surely trouble ahead that will require anxious foresight and tragic thinking on our part. Tragic thinking encompasses many things, among them the realisation that fear is useful. We have to use fear without being immobilised by it. Above all, we must realise that given such a claustrophobic and overloaded world system, the assumption of linear progress is a dangerous notion to entertain.

The idealists among us say that geography is not determinative, and that fate is ultimately in the hands of human agency. But human agency need not have positive outcomes. Individuals such as Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are human agents who have caused a vast and bloody war in Ukraine and are driving Asia toward a high-end military conflict over Taiwan. In fact, as world geography shrinks, the price for human error and human malevolence grows. The margin for error narrows, so thinking without illusions becomes necessary.

In such a world, all political leaders must be realists, aiming for the lesser evil rather than for the ultimate good. And yet unbounded idealism mixed with hubris still threatens disaster. Suez, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and so on constitute a drum roll of avoidable disasters. And precisely because of the shrinkage of geopolitics produced by technology, there will be increasingly greater, even cataclysmic costs for such failures in the future. That is why in Ukraine and Taiwan we have to find a middle ground between acquiescence to authoritarian rule and inflexibly demanding perfect democratic outcomes. We have to get used to the prospect of many disappointments ahead.

John Gray

A global Weimar riven by new technologies and resource scarcity is our default condition. The task is not to shore up a semi-imaginary and defunct Western-led “rules-based order”, but to avoid catastrophic conflict in a post-hegemonic world.

The US will remain a great power. Even so, American decline is a trajectory human agency cannot alter. The idea that a nation now so intractably divided could construct a new international order is far-fetched.

Intensifying political polarisation poses a question about the capacity of American government to execute any long-term strategy. Even if it is defensible in legal terms, Trump’s indictment confirms that the justice system has become a weapon in partisan political warfare. As the next presidential election approaches in 2024, the US is entering a legitimation crisis.

This implosion forms the background of an accelerating international retreat. Saudi Arabia’s joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, Brazil, South Africa and Malaysia opting for closer ties with China, and India being increasingly non-aligned testify to America’s rapid descent. China’s proposals for peace in Ukraine may be vague and not altogether serious, but Russia cannot be restrained without Chinese intervention. A multipolar international system is already in operation.

American strategists are fixated on a world that belongs in the past. China has major vulnerabilities, including an economy weakened by Xi’s ruinous Zero Covid policy and an army that has not had combat experience since the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. The US, despite the drawdown of some of its armaments for use in Ukraine, retains formidable military capabilities battle-honed in decades of almost continuous foreign conflicts.

Yet America is unprepared for the war so many in Washington think is coming. It has offshored much of its industrial base to China. It continues to be heavily reliant on China for medical supplies and on Taiwan for high-end computer chips. Even if a national industrial strategy of the kind Joe Biden has launched is consistently implemented, remedying this self-inflicted dependency will take many years.

The world situation is similar to that in the run-up to 1914. New technologies have not overcome rivalry over scarce natural resources, only shifted its focus. A new version of the late-19th-century Great Game is being waged for strategic metals in Africa and the resources of Siberia and central Asia. Beginning as a response to russian aggression, the conflict in Ukraine has morphed into a proxy war between great powers in which resources are as important as ideology.

The least illuminating way of understanding this conflict is a collision between democracy and autocracy. There will be democratic states and tyrannies, along with myriads of hybrid regimes, in any foreseeable future. The hubristic fantasy of a global liberal order must be replaced by realism, restraint and an unceasing struggle to stave off disaster.

Helen Thompson

If we live on a finite Earth, we live in a geopolitical world in which the competition for resources creates winners and losers. The Weimar Republic began after Germany was defeated in the contest to control the energy source on which modernity would depend in the 20th century: oil. Victory in the Great Game in Eurasia between the late 19th century and the First World War went first to Britain and France in the Middle East and then to the Soviet Union when it reconquered the Baku oil fields in 1920.

Weimar’s answer to Germany’s defeat was to apply technology to the energy resource that Germany did have in abundance: coal. The first synthetic oil produced at the Leuna plant during the Weimar years was a triumph of German science and engineering. But technological success could not save German democracy. The Weimar Republic still needed to import oil as well as other resources, and that required a world economy in which Germany could be a trading power. When the 1929 stock market crash saw American investors retreat and the start of the economic depression, the Nazis easily exploited Germany’s humiliations. Hitler then sent Germany down the path of total conquest to procure resources and agricultural land by annihilating the populations whose lives already depended on them.

Today the Weimar problem is global because no state is protected from the hard world of resource competition that Hitler drove to such hideous finality. The shale oil and gas boom of the 2010s gave the US a respite from the foreign energy dependency that had trapped it in a succession of disasters in the Middle East. But the growth rate of shale output has slowed, leaving the Biden administration at the mercy of decisions made by the Saudi-Russian-led cartel Opec Plus. For the best part of two decades russia has been the world’s energy-exporting superpower. But the imposition of Western sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine has made it harder for russian companies to develop the Bazhenov shale basin in western Siberia, without which the russian oil industry will decline. Meanwhile, as governments across the world attempt to direct a low-carbon energy revolution, this competition for resources includes an ever growing list of raw materials.

The idea of linear progress always hid the problem of resource depletion under an a priori assumption that technology would ride to the rescue. Our tragedy in the West is that, for all the catastrophes of the 20th century, we still carry this hubristic world-view, blinding us to the complexity of our collective human predicament on a finite Earth.

Robert D Kaplan

Indeed, a finite Earth will feature a zero-sum contest for resources. Think of our present and future world as we do early modern Europe: competing states rammed up against each other, periodically at war, with little extra physical space to manoeuvre.

The late military historian John Keegan explains that Britain and the US could champion freedom only because the seas protected them “from the landbound enemies of liberty”. But continental Europe through the middle of the 20th century had no such luxury (and only afterwards because of an American security umbrella). And now that technology has contracted distance, reducing the protective power of expansive waters, the world itself has rediscovered the fate of an earlier Europe, where realism and pragmatism reigned.

The new Saudi-Russian Opec Plus is an example of this process, in which the contraction of distance has encouraged de facto alliances across yawning regions so that, with China moving closer to both russia and Saudi Arabia, a true Eurasian power system has come into being. It will be a claustrophobic world where technology won’t always be able to rescue us. That is why linear progress is a delusion – since even when technological fixes arrive to solve problems, they often arrive too late to prevent conflict and suffering.

Unlike in the two world wars, America will no longer be able to act as an unencumbered policeman on the world stage. As it is today, the US was intractably divided in the 1930s, when racism, anti-Semitism and right-wing hatred of Franklin Delano Roosevelt were prevalent. But the Second World War, a total war involving mass conscription, gave the US dynamism and unity.

When the war ended, the American economy dominated the world. That is no longer the case, particularly because China is a full-spectrum great power, with the world’s second-largest economy and a technological base that manufactures both high-end military and consumer products.

Yet, China faces grave economic, social and political problems of its own. Indeed, since the Ukraine War has dramatically weakened russia as a great power, it may be that all three powers – the US, China and russia – are in decline, though in different ways and at different speeds. But decline is relative, so one or more of these powers may continue to maintain leverage over the others in the foreseeable future.

The Royal Navy began its decline around the turn of the 20th century, yet Britain went on to help defeat Nazi Germany almost half a century later. That’s why decline itself may be overrated. Therefore, in this increasingly smaller and conflict-prone world, just as we should not become idealists ideologically demanding democratic systems everywhere, neither should we become fatalists, as there is much work to do.

Illustration by Matthieu Bourel

John Gray

Twenty-first-century conflicts reflect two kinds of scarcity, both on a global scale. The first is a zero-sum contest for the material resources of a finite planet, the second a type of value scarcity in which all the available options involve loss. The combination makes geopolitics inescapably tragic.

Tragedy is not imperfectability, nor is it the fact that progress is intermittent and reversible. Human beings confront tragedy when they know that whatever they do may not be enough to avert disaster. In such circumstances a measure of fatalism is reasonable, though it need not entail passivity.

Scarcities in resources and options are tightly intertwined. Geologists estimate that, in order to achieve global Net Zero, there will have to be more mining in the next few decades than throughout history. Here humans are approaching the physical limits of growth. But scarce natural resources trigger rivalry among states, drawing them into wars, and here scarcity of options is at work.

The two world wars were in part driven by a need for oil. New technologies can propel great powers towards disaster. High-end computer chips are needed to maintain the living standards to which billions of human have become accustomed. Over time technology spreads by diffusion, but whichever power controls these chips in the near future will have a major advantage. That is why, unless the West accedes to China’s absorption of Taiwan, which produces around two-thirds of the output, the island is fated to be the epicentre of a global conflict. Continuing the status quo is not an option.

An intensifying resource scarcity undermines the stability of states. A low- or zero-growth economy is not, as environmentalists and their opponents both believe, a policy choice, but a sign that humankind is testing the limits of an overcrowded planet. In both developmental dictatorships and advanced industrial states, governments rely heavily on economic expansion for their authority. Lacking the legitimacy given them by rising living standards, they are more likely to turn to war.

Scarcity of options is exacerbated by liberal ideology. Autocracies are proving less doctrinally rigid and more strategically flexible than democracies. As a matter of justice, the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Putin for war crimes looks fully justified. But it also shows a reckless disregard for the consequences. Putin is not Slobodan Milošević, a petty tyrant, but the commander of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. the West is implicitly staking the future on benign regime change in russia, a desperately dangerous gamble.

Western societies are based on the belief that resources and options can always in principle be expanded by human agency. In reality both are inherently limited – by geography, history and ideological folly – and it is this that explains the recurrence of tragedy in geopolitics. The task, as ever, is to make the best of the situation.

Helen Thompson

Faith that creative human agency can triumph over nature’s limits has been a central feature of most modern political projects, not least liberalism. Missing the fact that technology cannot create energy, this conviction has long proved overly sanguine. Those who assume that the political world can be reconstructed by the efforts of human will have never before had to bet so much on technology over energy as the driver of our material advancement.

We are now a long way removed from the revolutionary hopes of the 19th and 20th centuries that the transformation of collective life would mean the complete development of all natural resources and an end to scarcity. Even in China, Xi Jinping’s theoretical mission for the Chinese Communist Party to deliver “material abundance” as an aim of “scientific socialism” coexists with the dangers of “black swans” and “grey rhinos”, not least those that might arise from China’s foreign oil dependency – with all its implications for Beijing’s ability to fight a war for Taiwan.

The technologies of low-carbon energy do have some capacity to ameliorate geopolitical competition around hydrocarbons. But low-carbon electricity and electrification still depend on extracting metals from under the Earth’s surface. As John notes, technological progress can also invite geopolitical disaster. It was the knowledge that oil-fuelled warships would be superior to existing coal-fuelled navies that drove a great deal of the geopolitical competition over oil prior to 1914. A century later, Xi’s “Made in China 2025” strategy – when in 2015 the Chinese leadership bet the country’s future on dominating high-tech manufacturing supply chains and electric-vehicle production – terrified the political class in Washington into its present tech war against the country.

As climate change accelerates, the modernist faith in technology must do ever more work to keep at bay an underlying dread that fossil-fuel civilisation will prove no less tragic than all others in history. The assumption that modern human ingenuity is unique allows energy optimists to treat the technological successes in reducing the unit costs of low-carbon energy as the inevitable prelude to the next round of remedies required, starting with eliminating the present intermittency of solar- and wind-generated electricity. But a fear that a low-carbon modern civilisation is unrealisable also powers the recent techno-fantasies of one day transferring human life to Mars.

Clear-eyed realism about the available options and their respective human costs is essential. Denial of our tragic age will only lead to more suffering. But we are far from being helpless sleepwalkers in our collective human plight. Resource-driven geopolitics is riven with inescapable dangers. But it will only be an apocalyptic struggle if governments make it so by refusing to recognise the restraint required by coexistence in the face of the limits nature imposes.

Robert D Kaplan

The emphasis on scarcity and limits, particularly on resources, combined with the increasing connectedness of a Weimar world, has been an ongoing phenomenon for well over a century. Witness the two world wars. But attrition of the same can add up to big change.

If there is one Enlightenment philosopher who intuitively grasped this, even if he made mistakes, it is Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834). Indeed, a Weimar world is a Malthusian world. Malthus continues to be ridiculed for claiming that while population increases geometrically, food supplies increase only arithmetically, so that humankind risks eventual shortages and starvation.

In fact, during his lifetime, Malthus revised his theory numerous times while upholding the central thesis, that populations expand to the limits imposed by the means of subsistence. Perhaps more so than Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, Malthus introduced the whole subject of the physical and natural environment into contemporary political philosophy. Humankind might be nobler than the apes, but we are still biological. Therefore, our politics, Malthus suggested, are affected both by the natural conditions and by the densities in which we inhabit the Earth.

To keep from destroying ourselves in this Malthusian world, we will have to husband fear without being immobilised by it. We cannot assume that technology will come to the rescue of every dilemma. The Ancient Greeks argued that no man is lucky until he is dead, since catastrophe can befall any of us at any moment. To carry that over into humanity at large, we should not assume that catastrophe cannot befall us at any moment or in any historical period. That is, we will need to think tragically in order to avoid tragedy. And precisely because our civilisation is rubbing up against limits of resources and space, such tragic thinking is more vital than ever before.

Yet, it is less in evidence. Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer in Britain are technocrats in spirit and background, and technocrats assume there is a solution to every problem, which leads to a certain arrogance. Meanwhile, the American political elite is more ideological than ever before, and this leads to another form of arrogance; the world’s problems will not go away if only all of humanity became democratic – as the American elite seems to believe.

I fear that the elites in both Britain and the US will have to learn about tragedy the hard way, by actually living it, due to their failures in seeing it ahead of time.

In 1798 Thomas Malthus linked population growth and resource scarcity. Photo by SZ Photo / Blanc Kunstverlag / Bridgeman Images

Helen Thompson

Since Malthus wrote without understanding that he lived at the start of an energy revolution that would transform the cycles of land fertility, his medium-term prophecy was doomed. The likely long, drawn-out end of the energy world that began in the 18th century may well validate his pessimism. But the limits of our own knowledge today could also lead us to the sort of unnecessary millenarian conclusions that he drew.

The stridency with which some think that energy abundance is a right of modernity flies in the face of a long history of reckoning with resource scarcity. In his 1865 book The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal Mines, the English economist William Stanley Jevons explained how, by turning to a finite energy source, Britain had placed itself on an economic trajectory towards ever greater dangers from which it would not be able to escape.

Since the US began to dominate the modern economic world on the back of oil, Americans have been through multiple cycles of exploration and depletion. Pithole in Pennsylvania, where the first commercial American oil well was drilled in 1865, was a ghost town by the 1880s. As the early-20th-century wildcatters who found huge quantities of oil in Texas understood, fossil-fuel industrial civilisation has always been a roller-coaster.

Scientific invention and the viability of its commercial exploitation to surpass resource constraints are part of that roller-coaster. The energy historian and scientist Vaclav Smil estimates that perhaps half of us today would not be alive without synthetic ammonia.

The scientific push for this innovation came from the fear in the early 20th century that the natural nitrates used as fertilisers were running short. The chemist Fritz Haber’s invention was mass-produced as a result of German desperation when, during the First World War, the Allies’ naval blockade cut off German trade with Chile, exporter of most of the world’s nitrate supply.

Thomas Malthus has become relevant again because we are deliberately trying to undo the energy revolution he missed. We also know that technological advancement is a contingency, often around war, that cannot transcend the laws of thermodynamics. Any honest assessment of our likely future should recognise the enormity of trying to substitute electricity for fossil fuels in food production and distribution while already knowing the limits of technology to solve the problem.

Our partial agency is why we must learn to live consciously with mind-boggling uncertainty. Searching for and extracting metals will be another high-risk voyage, pitting human creativity against the inexorable force of resource depletion that will play out regardless of temporary successes.

If the energy predicament is singularly modern, the tragic mindset, shaped as it was by earlier civilisational experiences of limits, can still offer wisdom as we reckon with the Faustian odyssey that using fossil-fuel energy set in motion.

John Gray

Today, the great powers have some things in common with the characters in Jean-Paul Sartre’s play No Exit (1944). Three dead souls find themselves in a locked room, seemingly damned for their sins. One of them tries to escape, but when the door opens he cannot make himself go through it, and all three remain stuck in the room. In a celebrated line, the failed escapee concludes: “Hell is other people.”

The great powers are trapped in a geopolitical version of Sartre’s room, a claustrophobic world from which there seems to be no exit. This is not the binary world of the Cold War. Three or more states – America, China, Russia and India – are contending for the shrinking resources of an overloaded planet.

As Robert argues, the theorist who best explains this situation is Thomas Malthus. In 1798, when he first published his An Essay on the Principle of Population, there were about 800 million human beings. Now there are approaching eight billion. Not only have human numbers increased tenfold, but many people today enjoy living standards higher than most have done throughout history.

In assuming food production could not be increased, Malthus was mistaken, but in a roundabout way he may yet be proved right. The spike in population and living standards was largely a by-product of hydrocarbons. It is true that birth rates are falling in many countries. But unless there is a large-scale die-off, global human numbers will still reach around 10 billion in this century, and feeding a population of that size will require enormous quantities of energy.

Mechanised agriculture, fertilisers, insecticides, factory farms, refrigerators and transportation require giant inputs of fossil fuels. Intensive farming is the extraction of food from oil, part of the worldwide industrialisation that has ravaged wilderness, depleted the biosphere and destabilised the climate. The confluence of global warming, energy scarcity, pandemic and geopolitical warfare may signal the beginning of a brutal rebalancing of the kind Malthus described.

As Helen says, there is an underlying mood of existential dread, a nagging suspicion that our civilisation may destroy itself as so many others have done in the past. With his fantasies of interplanetary migration, Elon Musk is an unwittingly tragic figure – as much an expression of a hidden despair as of the techno-optimism he loudly proclaims.

The reality of a planet from which there is no exit is intensifying competition for control of its resources. Ukraine is not only the world’s breadbasket but a rich site of rare earths, while the russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk contain substantial deposits of shale gas. Geology and geography shape our conflicts as profoundly as any clash between autocracy and democracy.

If there is hope, it is in recognising this fact. Global disaster could still be averted by reality-based diplomacy. It will be unfortunate if, like Jean-Paul Sartre’s failed escapee, our leaders cannot bring themselves to go through the door.

[See also: Why liberalism is in crisis – by John Gray and Ross Douthat]

Topics in this article : China , Energy , Europe , Food , Green revolution , History , Magazine , Russia , Technology , United States

This article appears in the 26 Apr 2023 issue of the New Statesman, The New Tragic Age

NewStatesman · by Robert D Kaplan · April 26, 2023

13. Our Singular Century – How to connect the dots when they’re spinning out of control

Excerpts:

The narrative frameworks that interest me most these days aren’t the ones that purport to work like AI chatbots, offering unfailing answers to all the problems we face. They work more like filters, helping me sort out the real news from the faux news and the news fluff, and they act like good binoculars, enabling me to see details that I would otherwise miss. I’m looking for frameworks that give me the perspective and context that lead to smart questions. And as I struggle to make sense out of the torrent of events in both domestic and international life, I’m increasingly drawn to three complementary “big picture” narrative frameworks that put American and world events in a helpful perspective.

The first, oldest, and most universal story is the one with which we started: the gradual development of the technological capabilities and cultural complexity of human society going back to the first grunting flint chippers at the dawn of human time. The second, much more recent and fast-moving story is the rise and spread of Abrahamic religion and politics, a process that began thousands of years ago with the rise of monotheism in the Middle East and that continues to the present day. The youngest and fastest moving story is the rise of global capitalism under the auspices of the two successive English-speaking world powers: the British Empire and the United States.

Taken separately, each of these narratives casts light on the exceptional and unique nature of the times that we live in. Taken together, they enrich our understanding while pointing us toward ways of imagining and building a brighter future. Abrahamic religion and politics rise out of the larger, older drive toward technological mastery and social complexity. From the first emergence of the Abrahamic worldview in the ancient Middle East, the complicated legacy of the ancient patriarch has acted as an intensifier and accelerant, dramatically expediting the development of human culture even as it stimulates the continuing advance of humanity’s understanding of and mastery over natural forces. Similarly, the rise of the capitalist world order under Anglo-American auspices emerges out of the older two stories, and in its turn it both accelerates and intensifies processes that were already at work.

Our Singular Century

How to connect the dots when they’re spinning out of control

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Tablet · by Walter Russell Mead · April 27, 2023

The American historian Henry Adams was the son of Charles Francis Adams, Abraham Lincoln’s ambassador to Britain during the Civil War who was charged with keeping Britain from intervening on the side of the South. Henry was the grandson of President John Quincy Adams and the great-grandson of President John Adams. Born in 1838 when the railroad was still a novelty, he died in 1918. His histories of the Jefferson and Madison administrations are still read with respect.

It was the acceleration of historical change more than the fact of it that increasingly fascinated Adams as he watched the Industrial Revolution and its associated dislocations unfold around him. Late in his life he set himself the task of quantifying, so far as this was possible, the rate of change as measured by the total amount of physical force that human beings could control. His results have fascinated me for years.

What he found is what we can call the Adams curve. Wind power and human and animal muscle power were the resources at humanity’s disposal for much of our history, and the amount of force humanity could generate grew slowly with population and a slow increase in the mastery of natural forces.

After 1600 his estimates showed the beginning of a faster increase in humanity’s power. The increase visibly accelerates between 1700 and 1800, and between 1800 and 1900 the flat line of earlier centuries takes the shape of a hyperbola as the rate of increase in human power reached for the sky. As Adams put it, “The world did not double or treble its movement between 1800 and 1900, but, measured by any standard known to science—by horse-power, calories, volts, mass in any shape—the tension and vibration and volume and so-called progression of society were fully a thousand times greater in 1900 than in 1800.”

Looking ahead, Adams saw only more of the same, with the curve of human progress becoming more hyperbolic as it became more nearly a vertical line moving straight up the graph. The historian, whose early recollections included walking hand in hand with his grandfather John Quincy Adams to the town school, looked forward to an unrecognizable future in which the gap between pure thought and the material world would close sometime around 2025.

ChatGPT beat his predictions by a few years, but we are now exploring the world that Adams glimpsed from afar more than 100 years ago.

The ‘Adams curve.’ From ‘The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma’ by Henry Adams (Macmillan, 1919)archive.org

As humanity rode the skyrocketing Adams curve toward the stratosphere during the ensuing century, speculation about the meaning of this development became more widespread, while competing visions of the end state toward which all this activity pointed increasingly preoccupied philosophers, the tech wizards engaged in constructing the new future, ordinary citizens, and even national leaders.

Henry Adams predicted an era in the 21st century in which the rate of change had become so nearly infinite that no one from past eras could hope to describe or understand it. As late 20th- and early 21st-century thinkers followed Adams’ analysis, often unknowingly, they elaborated on this concept, borrowing a term from astrophysics to describe the barrier between present day experience and the unknowable future on the far side of essentially infinite change.

They called that great divide between us and the future a “singularity.” Physicists developed this term to describe what lay inside the event horizon of a so-called black hole, a collapsed star whose density is so great that its escape velocity is greater than the speed of light. Because no light could escape from inside the singularity, those on the outside of the black hole’s event horizon can never really know what is happening inside it. Information cannot come to us from the inside.

Later scientists have somewhat revised that view, given the possibilities of quantum entanglements and other quirky phenomena in this complicated universe, but the analogy is still a compelling one. In Adams’ language, the singularity means the point when the rate of change is so fast that the future is unknowably other than the past. There is an “event horizon” that separates two completely different eras.

When the Silicon Valley tech lords speak of the singularity, they generally refer to an epochal development in the world of IT that fundamentally alters the conditions of human life. The ability to extend our consciousness indefinitely by uploading our personalities and memories into cyberspace would be one example with technological progress essentially abolishing human mortality. The emergence of runaway artificial intelligences that improved their own performance and intelligence so rapidly that human beings would be helpless onlookers in a world run by super-smart machines would be a less pleasant one.

Henry Adams, circa 1883Marian Hooper Adams/Wikipedia

People have, however, imagined other equally dramatic breaks with the past that could also fairly be labeled singularities. The establishment of a truly peaceful and just world order in which technological progress made us all rich while brilliantly designed new global institutions created global justice and world peace would be a decisive break from everything in the past. Advances in medicine could indefinitely prolong human lifespans without the bother and inconvenience of moving one’s consciousness to cyberspace.

Other clean breaks with the past are not as attractive. Runaway climate change, activists warn, could lead to a “condition Venus” that would ultimately cleanse our planet of all life. Or the use of nuclear or biological weapons of mass destruction could drive our guilty species into extinction.

These scenarios are not just the subject of deranged musings by religious fanatics and conspiracy freaks. Since 1945 the question of avoiding a nuclear holocaust has engaged the attention of politicians around the world. Mainstream American thought has historically believed that it was America’s purpose to bring about the “Liberal Singularity,” a point in time in which tyranny, oppression, poverty and war would vanish from human life. Communist and socialist movements offered rival paths toward achieving a total transformation of the human condition. Silicon Valley is filled with tech bros seeking immortality not through their work but, as Woody Allen once put it, by not dying. Climate activists seek to prevent a climate apocalypse in which climate change would disrupt or destroy human civilization. Many of the world’s greatest thinkers, wealthiest entrepreneurs, most committed activists and most senior political leaders see either enabling a positive singularity or staving off a negative one as the central task of their lives.

We live in a singular century. Faced, apparently, with the possibility that the next century could witness either the extinction of humanity or the establishment of a global utopia, both our hopes and our fears tend to be larger than life. Political opponents are not just people with whom we disagree. They are people whose misguided views could destroy the planet. Do ordinary standards of political competition still apply when your opponents’ policies will destroy human civilization? Should they be allowed free speech? Should they be able to organize politically even if their electoral victories would destroy life on Earth?

Living in the shadow of the singularity changes the way politics and society work. It also creates a greater need for intellectual balance and clarity.

ChatGPT beat his predictions by a few years, but we are now exploring the world that Adams glimpsed from afar more than 100 years ago.

Copied link

Confucius famously taught that social reform had to begin with the rectification of names. Words must correspond to realities, or both the political and social realms will collapse into disorder. Abraham Lincoln concurred, reportedly quoting an old saw to Secretary of State William Seward in an 1862 cabinet meeting. “How many legs does a sheep have,” he asked, “if you count a tail as a leg?”

“Five,” said Seward.

“Wrong,” Lincoln responded. The answer was four—calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.

That reactionary, literalist viewpoint would get Lincoln in trouble on some American college campuses today, but Honest Abe was right. Political action must be based on solid facts, clearly seen and frankly named. But Americans today don’t just need to know what the facts are. We need to understand what they mean. We don’t just need a rectification of names. We need a clarification of narratives.

It is narrative that gives meaning to facts. Kids draw lines in connect-the-dots activity books to turn an apparently unrelated set of spots on the page into the drawing of a zebra or a butterfly. As they grow up, they learn to make sense of events around them by relating them to larger stories. That’s how detectives solve crimes—connecting the dots.

Many of our political conflicts today are less about the dots than about how to connect them. If we embrace the 1619 Project narrative, in which racism and slavery are seen as the principal drivers of American history and values, we see America as a monster. If we embrace a narrative that sees American history, however imperfect, as a story of progress and moral improvement we draw a very different picture.

Those debates matter, but I don’t think America’s biggest problem is that we are divided between two coherent but opposed worldviews. Our problem is deeper. There are so many dots, and so many of them seem to be moving around the page, that it is getting harder to draw any kind of picture at all.

I see a lot of young people in my work and continue to be astounded at how intelligent, mature, and wide awake so many of them are. I’m also astounded at how confused and bewildered so many of them feel amid the explosive change and careening events that characterize our dizzying century. Their distress is a reasonable response to an unreasonable era. Anyone whose psychic equilibrium has not been challenged by the cultural and political earthquakes testing the cohesion of our society and civilization has not been paying attention.

But while confusion and bewilderment may be appropriate responses to tumultuous times, they are not enough. All of us, and especially the younger generations on whom the full burden of the future must inevitably fall, need to develop the lucidity of thought and the steadiness of character required for effective action in a society that staggers and lurches through our chaotic era like a drunk sailor in rough seas on a slick deck.

In times like these, people hunger for explanations—for a way of connecting the dots to make sense out of the cascade of events. This is why we live in an age of conspiracy theories. Those theories are often desperate attempts to make sense of an unpredictable and terrifying world. It might be depressing to think that the world is controlled by lizard people, by the Bavarian Illuminati, by the Elders of Zion, the Deep State or a grand corporate conspiracy, but at least one has the comfort of knowing who the singular enemy is. Knowledge gives power, and even the illusion of knowledge that comes from embracing a conspiracy theory can feel empowering, at least for a while.

Via Meadia

Like everybody else, I struggle to keep my emotional and intellectual balance in these difficult conditions, and while I haven’t bought into the various attractively cinematic conspiracy theories flashing over the internet, I do find it important to have some way of connecting the dots and making sense of the world. For me, what works is not a grand ideology like Marxism that purports to combine a single unified explanation for everything that is going on with a method of shaping history toward the desired conclusion. The 20th century was littered with the corpses produced by these naively self-confident ideological fever dreams, and I can see no good coming out of a return to them. And I’ve seen too much of the way the world really works and have come to know too many of the people and the institutions singled out by the conspiracy mongers to credit “the Jews,” “the bankers,” “the deep staters,” or any of these other popular villains with the wisdom or the cunning needed to rule the world.

Others look to religion to provide a clear and all-encompassing explanation of world events, and an easily understood method for dividing out the good guys and the bad. This approach also falls short. As a Christian, admittedly a rather imperfect one, I believe that we all benefit from God’s providence and live under his judgment, and that when properly seen and understood the tangled threads of human history will ultimately reveal the work of a divine hand. But my faith also teaches me that, as C.S. Lewis put it in the Narnia books, Aslan is not a tame lion. Faith in God can help you find the inner strength to face the storms of history with courage and resolve, but the Christian revelation is intended to lead people toward a deeper engagement with the mystery and the wonder of the universe. Those who look for point-by-point guides to a coming apocalypse in the Christian scriptures, or those who think that a simplistic reading of the ethical teachings of Christ eliminates the need for hard political thinking are missing the point. Christianity—and in this it resembles all the great religious traditions—exists to enrich and to complicate rather than to simplify our understanding of the contemporary world.

What 20th-century ideologies, 21st-century conspiracy theories, and naive readings of religious teaching have in common is a kind of ChatGPT approach to the contemporary world. That is, they present themselves as an intellectual machine that will pop out an answer for every question they are asked. A universal answer machine is a handy thing to have, and one can understand why so many people derive so much comfort and satisfaction from having them.

But are such machines what we really need?

The narrative frameworks that interest me most these days aren’t the ones that purport to work like AI chatbots, offering unfailing answers to all the problems we face. They work more like filters, helping me sort out the real news from the faux news and the news fluff, and they act like good binoculars, enabling me to see details that I would otherwise miss. I’m looking for frameworks that give me the perspective and context that lead to smart questions. And as I struggle to make sense out of the torrent of events in both domestic and international life, I’m increasingly drawn to three complementary “big picture” narrative frameworks that put American and world events in a helpful perspective.

The first, oldest, and most universal story is the one with which we started: the gradual development of the technological capabilities and cultural complexity of human society going back to the first grunting flint chippers at the dawn of human time. The second, much more recent and fast-moving story is the rise and spread of Abrahamic religion and politics, a process that began thousands of years ago with the rise of monotheism in the Middle East and that continues to the present day. The youngest and fastest moving story is the rise of global capitalism under the auspices of the two successive English-speaking world powers: the British Empire and the United States.

Taken separately, each of these narratives casts light on the exceptional and unique nature of the times that we live in. Taken together, they enrich our understanding while pointing us toward ways of imagining and building a brighter future. Abrahamic religion and politics rise out of the larger, older drive toward technological mastery and social complexity. From the first emergence of the Abrahamic worldview in the ancient Middle East, the complicated legacy of the ancient patriarch has acted as an intensifier and accelerant, dramatically expediting the development of human culture even as it stimulates the continuing advance of humanity’s understanding of and mastery over natural forces. Similarly, the rise of the capitalist world order under Anglo-American auspices emerges out of the older two stories, and in its turn it both accelerates and intensifies processes that were already at work.

Engagement with these three narratives has been a feature of my work for many years. Readers of both God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World and my most recent book, will recognize some of these ideas. As Via Meadia 2.0 works to identify some positive steps that Americans can take on the way toward renewing the promise of American life, we’ll also be looking at these framing narratives. That’s partly because I think readers deserve to see and, should they choose, to contest the underlying assumptions behind the ideas and proposals to be discussed here. And it’s partly because I think looking at the ways I’ve used history and culture to sharpen my analysis of contemporary politics will help readers trying to figure these things out for themselves.

In my next essay, I’ll begin at the beginning, with the oldest and most universal of the three: the technological and social development that we find at work virtually everywhere in human history and prehistory that we look—and that we often, for lack of a better word, call progress. Henry Adams wanted to understand the impact that the Industrial Revolution would have on his world. Examining the widespread and consequential impacts of earlier revolutions can help us keep our heads as the Information Revolution transforms our society.

Tablet · by Walter Russell Mead · April 27, 2023

14. China's Secretive Quest for Heavier Artillery

Excerpts:

China’s renewed interest in larger-caliber artillery may reflect the war in Ukraine, where both sides have used field guns to create openings for advance and blunting the enemy’s thrusts. In fact, both Russia and Ukraine have put the Soviet-era Malka to use. The massive gun is reportedly capable of creating a 16-foot hole in the ground or leveling a building with a single shot.

While it is unlikely that artillery would play quite as central a role in a Taiwan conflict, the PLA may be taking notes about the continued value in modern wars of powerful, long-range guns to clear large swathes of territory, strike strategic targets, flatten urban centers of resistance, and terrorize enemy populations.

Other sources speculate that this more powerful artillery could bridge the gap between the PLA’s smaller-caliber, shorter-range artillery and its longer-range rocket artillery. Special extended-range projectiles allow artillery to fire further, but with a tradeoff of smaller explosive charges, often unable to damage reinforced targets. In contrast, the diameter difference of just two inches allows the 203mm cannon to fire roughly twice as heavy a projectile as a 155mm cannon. A larger-caliber artillery system would thus give the PLA the ability to launch more explosive charge, at a longer distance, improving its ability to penetrate and destroy fortified targets deep in the enemy’s rear.

The PLA’s research into 203mm artillery by no means ensures its eventual fielding. Any new large artillery systems will likely come with the same drawbacks that led to most militaries to abandon them decades ago: a lower rate of fire; bulky, hard-to-move firing platforms; and difficult logistics.

But the research contract shows that the PLA Army has a real interest in artillery that happens to outmatch American cannons.

China's Secretive Quest for Heavier Artillery

A now-deleted post reveals a research contract to test-fire 203mm shells, bigger than anything in the U.S. or Chinese arsenal.

By MA XIU and PETER W. SINGER

APRIL 27, 2023 02:59 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Ma Xiu

The People’s Liberation Army will soon begin experimenting with a bigger, more powerful cannon than any in the current Chinese or American arsenal, according to a contract recently awarded by the PLA Strategic Support Force.

A now-deleted post on the official Weapons and Equipment Procurement Information Network, a clearinghouse for Chinese military contracts, makes clear that the PLA is interested in testing 203mm (8-inch) artillery. That’s substantially larger than the PLA’s current 155mm (6-inch) guns, which suggests efforts to arm its future force with tubed artillery of longer range and much greater firepower.

While many militaries fielded 203mm cannons in the first part of the 20th century, most have phased them out in favor of 155mm guns. Today, the only 8-inch types used are the Russian 2S7 Pion/2S7M Malka, built between 1975 and 1990; and the old U.S. M110 self-propelled howitzer. Based on a cannon designed in 1919, the M110 was used by U.S. forces from 1963to the 1990s; it remains in service with several other nations as a legacy of Cold War partnerships.

China dabbled with 203mm artillery in the late 1980s, when Chinese arms manufacturer Norinco hired Gerald Bull, the Canadian engineer widely considered one of history’s greatest artillery developers. Bull, whose projects ranged from gun-launched rockets designed to reach outer space to Saddam Hussein’s “Project Babylon” supergun, traversed the globe selling his designs to a wide range of unsavory regimes, often with the U.S. government’s quiet approval. The PLA had originally hired Bull to develop a 155mm gun that could help counter the Soviet Union’s overwhelming firepower to the north. This became the PLL-01 howitzer, which remains in service today. Bull and Norinco went on to develop the 203mm W-90 artillery system, which apparently never advanced beyond the prototype stage. There are several possible reasons: technical difficulties, fewer export opportunities after the Iran-Iraq War, and Bull’s violent death in 1990 at the hands of a still-unknown intelligence service.

The W-90, China’s previous attempt to create 203mm artillery

The PLA’s recent announcement suggests a new effort to revisit this past ambition and move beyond its current 155mm artillery. Though the contract award provides little detail about the PLA’s intentions, it does offer intriguing clues. For example, the tests must include the firing of an 85kg projectile at about 920 meters per second. The Malka can reportedly fire a 110kg projectile at 960 meters per second, suggesting that Chinese guns may not yet be up to Russian standards. (Still, given China’s history of defense cooperation with Russia—and ruthless theft of its technology—it is not implausible that the PLA will soon be receiving similar help with its artillery.)

The contract also calls for recording data on the projectile’s penetrative capabilities. This suggests that such a future artillery system may be intended to destroy strategic underground or reinforced targets, a prominent feature of Taiwan’s defenses.

The contract was awarded to China’s leading institution for developing advanced artillery, the Nanjing University of Science and Technology. Beginning as a military artillery academy in the 1950s, NUST has since designed many of the PLA’s artillery systems, including the most recent new system, the PCL-181 155mm howitzer unveiled at the 2019 National Day Parade. Today, it is perhaps the only school in China with a dedicated academic department for artillery engineering.

Interestingly, the cannon contract was awarded not by the PLA Army, who would be the most likely to use this system, but by the PLA Strategic Support Force, or PLASSF, responsible for the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare forces. While this may seem strange, the PLASSF also oversees numerous R&D facilities. For example, it runs one of the country’s leading institutes for hypersonic flight vehicle development: the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center.

While the contract does not specify which PLASSF institution is managing the project, several open-source clues point to the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT) in Xi’an (a.k.a. Unit 63672). NINT is one of two PLASSF units known to be located in the Lintong district of Xi’an, named in the contract. Further, the phone number given in the contract (029-84767993) is very similar to others confirmed to be associated with NINT; a search reveals that all NINT numbers apparently begin with 029-84767XXX, with only the final three digits differing. This is not true of the other PLASSF unit located in Lintong District, and thus strongly suggests that NINT is the PLASSF unit that is working on this project.

It is notable that NINT is primarily responsible for nuclear weapons research, raising the possibility that this research could involve development of tactical nuclear artillery. The comparable Russian Malka is reportedly able to fire tactical nuclear projectiles, as was the M110 howitzer, the last 203mm artillery system deployed by the U.S. military. However, NINT also oversees other non-nuclear military research, including in lasers, electronics, materials, and chemistry, and a review of patents and academic journal articles demonstrate that NINT does have at least one team focused on artillery research. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to conclude the new weapon would have a nuclear capability.

China’s renewed interest in larger-caliber artillery may reflect the war in Ukraine, where both sides have used field guns to create openings for advance and blunting the enemy’s thrusts. In fact, both Russia and Ukraine have put the Soviet-era Malka to use. The massive gun is reportedly capable of creating a 16-foot hole in the ground or leveling a building with a single shot.

While it is unlikely that artillery would play quite as central a role in a Taiwan conflict, the PLA may be taking notes about the continued value in modern wars of powerful, long-range guns to clear large swathes of territory, strike strategic targets, flatten urban centers of resistance, and terrorize enemy populations.

Other sources speculate that this more powerful artillery could bridge the gap between the PLA’s smaller-caliber, shorter-range artillery and its longer-range rocket artillery. Special extended-range projectiles allow artillery to fire further, but with a tradeoff of smaller explosive charges, often unable to damage reinforced targets. In contrast, the diameter difference of just two inches allows the 203mm cannon to fire roughly twice as heavy a projectile as a 155mm cannon. A larger-caliber artillery system would thus give the PLA the ability to launch more explosive charge, at a longer distance, improving its ability to penetrate and destroy fortified targets deep in the enemy’s rear.

The PLA’s research into 203mm artillery by no means ensures its eventual fielding. Any new large artillery systems will likely come with the same drawbacks that led to most militaries to abandon them decades ago: a lower rate of fire; bulky, hard-to-move firing platforms; and difficult logistics.

But the research contract shows that the PLA Army has a real interest in artillery that happens to outmatch American cannons.

Ma Xiu is a Senior Research Analyst focusing on the People’s Liberation Army at BluePath Labs, LLC.

BluePath Labs Research Analyst Taylor A. Lee also contributed research to this article.

defenseone.com · by Ma Xiu

15. FDD’s Long War Journal’s response to Zalmay Khalilzad’s Twitter thread

Excerpts:

FDD’s Long War Journal, to be clear, does not advocate for the return of U.S. troops to Afghanistan. But instead wishes to see such public officials, especially those who have dedicated much of their professional careers working on Afghan issues, make more accurate, or at least more nuanced statements and assessments, on the country rather than tired, inaccurate, and misleading talking points that have been previously refuted.

The Taliban fully control the country; resistance to the Taliban is nascent at best and there is no “Northern Alliance 2.0” to give the West a window into the country. The Taliban-controlled country is rife with starvation, near famine, and drought as the Taliban tightens its grip on power. And human rights remain abysmal, made ever more clear with the return of the 1990’s-style repression of Afghan women and girls.

Khalilzad continues to play his recognizable political motif about the Taliban and Afghanistan, providing the reader with his common refrain. But just as he was out of tune during the negotiations in Doha, he remains playing the wrong notes today.

The Washington Post’s article, though based on leaked U.S. intel assessments, is seemingly largely based in reality and provides a bleak picture of Afghanistan’s current state and its future for hosting a myriad of terrorist organizations – including jihadis on opposing sides of the global jihadi schism. If anything is sensationalist, it’s Khalilzad’s recent Twitter thread.

April 27, 2023 | FDD's Long War Journal

FDD’s Long War Journal’s response to Zalmay Khalilzad’s Twitter thread

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · April 27, 2023

In a brief Twitter thread responding to a recent article from The Washington Post, Zalmay Khalilzad, one of the key architects of the 2020 Doha Agreement that set the stage for the collapse of Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, continued to tout his failed deal and again urged the U.S to cooperate with the Taliban regime.

The article in question, “Afghanistan has become a terrorism staging ground again, leak reveals,” detailed leaked U.S intelligence documents that provide worrying assessments of activities, including external attack plotting, by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (IS-K) from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. FDD’s Long War Journal cannot speak to the veracity of the leaked documents, but the assessments match current open-source evidence of the Islamic State’s operations in Afghanistan.

Khalilzad, speaking on-brand with his previous statements, vehemently denied this depiction of Afghanistan. According to Khalilzad, since the U.S. withdrawal at the end of Aug. 2021, Afghanistan has not become a terrorist safe haven. Instead, Khalilzad claimed Al Qaeda has “declined significantly,” while “the U.S. and the Taliban have a common interest against the Islamic State Khorasan Province,” and said it is possible to “hold the Taliban to their commitments on terrorism.” He claimed the Taliban can be relied on as a counterterrorism partner and “the experience of the last two years is better than many expected.”

Khalilzad’s points are at-best demonstrably false, and at worst, entirely dangerous. For instance, Khalizad’s stance that the Doha Agreement is enforceable in any way, shape or form enforceable is both. The U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri as he sheltered at a Taliban run safe house in Kabul last summer should have put Khalilzad’s proposition to rest. And yet Khalilzad continues to push for engagement with the Taliban.

Khalilzad’s Twitter thread is nothing if not consistent with his previous public statements on Afghanistan and the Doha Agreement. In addition, the former ambassador continues to downplay the Taliban-al-Qaeda-alliance, the most important jihadi alliance in Afghanistan (and beyond).

And to note the sad coincidence, Khalilzad’s thread of his repeated talking points largely fall in line with what Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s official spokesman, himself said about The Washington Post’s article.

Given Zalmay’s continued outsized relevance pertaining to U.S policy in Afghanistan, FDD’s Long War Journal feels it necessary to refute the key ideas in Khalilzad’s Twitter thread, point by point.

A few days ago, the @washingtonpost headlined on its front page that "Afghanistan has become a terrorism staging ground again." They sourced this judgment to a leaked Pentagon document. However, this sensationalist hyperbole is unwarranted.

[Thread]https://t.co/gRcB45vxsu

— Zalmay Khalilzad (@realZalmayMK) April 25, 2023

1. Khalilzad: A few days ago, the @washingtonpost headlined on its front page that “Afghanistan has become a terrorism staging ground again.” They sourced this judgment to a leaked Pentagon document. However, this sensationalist hyperbole is unwarranted.

The Washington Post article referenced by Khalilzad is anything but “sensationalist hyperbole.” The leaked intelligence documents are not the only sources sounding the alarm about the Islamic State’s rising capabilities in Afghanistan. The head of the U.S Military’s Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, himself testified before Congress last month warning of IS-K’s growing regional threat, to include growing capacities to target the U.S or Europe.

Other analysts have also pointed out IS-K’s growing strength on the ground, while also positioning itself to attract more Central Asian recruits to not only boost its numbers, but also make inroads across the region. This positioning was additionally noted in the latest report from the United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Despite a severe challenge from the Taliban and al-Qaeda, IS-K nevertheless seeks to utilize Afghanistan as a regional base for attacks elsewhere.

The Washington Post article itself details how the Islamic State is using Afghanistan as a base for its global terror operations. This is happening despite the fact that Afghanistan is in the grip of the Taliban, and the two groups are mortal enemies, as the Taliban refuses to join the Islamic State and swear allegiance to its would-be caliph.

While FDD’s Long War Journal strongly disagrees with Bruce Riedel’s quoted conclusion (“al-Qaeda is all but done”) at the end of the article, the intelligence assessment about the Islamic State’s growing threat from Afghanistan appears accurate and comports with open-source information and is therefore concerning, to say the least.

2. An upswing in terrorism from #Afghanistan had been one of the fears associated with the US withdrawal. But that has not happened.

Khalilzad is making a common mistake in his analysis. He assumes that because a terrorist threat against the West has not yet materialized since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, it will indefinitely remain that way. The Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and a host of regional and global terrorist groups, are based in Afghanistan. It was widely anticipated that the Taliban would attempt to keep plots from Afghanistan at bay, and that al-Qaeda and its allies would cooperate.

It is in the best interest of all parties (excluding the Islamic State) to comply as it is in all of their interests to keep the heat off of the Taliban as it consolidates its power and seeks to receive support and recognition from countries like Russia, China, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and others. The Islamic State, for its part, has tried to play spoiler to such maneuvers, with attacks against Chinese, Russian, and other interests and targets throughout the country and across Afghanistan’s borders.

Moreover, just because Al Qaeda and its allies may not necessarily be plotting or executing attacks external today does not mean they are not building the capacity to do so in the future. These groups now have exactly what the 9/11 Commission Report said was important to allow terrorist groups to survive and thrive: safe haven and state sponsorship.

3. Al Qaida has declined significantly and is currently at its weakest in Afghanistan. In regard to ISIS-K, the Taliban regard them as their mortal enemies and have carried out ongoing deadly attacks against them, killing many of their leaders.

There is no evidence to support this, and in fact, there is evidence of the opposite. Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul in the summer of 2022, less than one year after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, is not evidence of weakness, but its strength. It is also evidence of the enduring ties between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda would not allow its emir to shelter in Kabul if it didn’t think he was welcomed and protected by the Taliban.

Zawahiri was living in a posh mansion that was owned by a deputy of Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of two Taliban deputy emirs as well as the interior minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In addition, Sirajuddin is the head of the al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network, which is itself a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Sirajuddin is himself listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for his ties to al-Qaeda. The U.S State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program currently has a $10 million bounty for Sirajuddin.

And for its part, no Taliban leaders have come out to denounce the fact that Sirajiddin was sheltering Zawahiri. In fact, the Taliban have not even admitted Zawahiri was killed in the Kabul strike. The Taliban instead denies the presence of any foreign terrorist organization (or foreign terrorist leaders) inside Afghanistan, despite no one taking its claims seriously.

Instead, other top Al Qaeda leaders and commanders are known to have entered or are currently operating in Afghanistan, all under the support of the Taliban. For instance, Saif al-Adl, the longtime Al Qaeda leader who is widely believed to have succeeded Zawahiri, is rumored to have entered Afghanistan shortly after the latter’s death (though both the UN and the U.S. currently assess Adl to be Iran-based and not currently in Afghanistan).

Dr. Amin al-Haq, Osama bin Laden’s former chief of security who guarded him at the battle of Tora Bora, triumphantly returned to his home province of Nangarhar just days after the Afghan government collapsed. The Taliban even escorted al Haq to his home; the parade was captured on video and posted online.

Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, a key Al Qaeda leader who was detained in Bagram for more than a decade before being freed in the last days of the Afghan government, has reportedly reorganized his Al Qaeda cadre and is operating training camps in northeastern Afghanistan according to the United Nations.

And of course, the leaders of various foreign jihadi groups in Afghanistan who also act as dual-hatted Al Qaeda or Taliban leaders, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party’s Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, are also still based inside the country. Also is the case of Mahdi Arsalon, a Tajik national who serves as the emir of the Al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Ansarullah, while also commanding several districts of Afghanistan’s north as a local Taliban leader.

Khalilzad’s tired point about al-Qaeda’s defeat has long been repeated ad nauseam for over a decade, despite no actual evidence to support this claim. Estimates on al-Qaeda’s relative strength in Afghanistan have long been inaccurate, as documented by FDD’s Long War Journal over the last three presidencies.

That Al Qaeda largely acts as and consists of a constellation of varied forces inside Afghanistan, which are then often integrated within the Taliban’s own military structures, muddles the accuracy of any assessment of its numbers and strength inside the country.

And to be clear, gauging Al Qaeda’s relative strength through the exclusive lens of its capacity to execute attacks abroad – particularly against the United States – greatly misunderstands not only how Al Qaeda operates, but its raison d’etre of fomenting, supporting, and playing a part in various Islamic insurgencies around the globe.

Khalilzad is right, however, about the Islamic State and the Taliban being mortal enemies and the Taliban has indeed attempted to suppress them. But broken clocks are right twice a day.

4. ISIS-K does remain a threat, and it remains to be seen if the Talibs can eliminate them. They face challenges. For example, Tajikistani extremists have been able to cross into Afghanistan and join ISIS.

And

5. Controlling the Afghanistan borders was one of the biggest challenges when our forces were in Afghanistan. The neighbors, especially Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Iran must do their part to prevent ISIS terrorists from crossing into Afghanistan.

IS-K’s attempts to recruit and incorporate more Central Asians into its ranks was addressed above. However, this fact does not help Khalilzad’s case, in fact, it does the opposite.

The fact that IS-K is acting, or attempting to act, as a beacon for both Central Asians outside of Afghanistan, and more-radical members of already established Central Asian jihadi groups inside Afghanistan, only helps the group expand its reach.

That said, FDD’s Long War Journal largely agrees with Khalilzad’s points in these specific tweets. However, he misses the context, or consciously chooses to omit, of other regional jihadis in Afghanistan that threaten the region. Namely, he omits the whole galaxy of jihadi groups in Afghanistan that operate within Al Qaeda’s orbit.

Tajik, Uighur, Uzbek, and other Central Asian terrorists, are already present inside Afghanistan alongside al-Qaeda and often are integrated into Taliban structures, this includes Jamaat Ansarullah, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and the Islamic Jihad Union, to name a few.

Pakistani jihadis also routinely cross the border and join al-Qaeda and allied other groups, including a long list of Pakistani terror groups sheltered by the Taliban, such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (or TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, and others.

All such groups listed have their own extensive ties to Al Qaeda. And as mentioned above, senior leaders and commanders of these groups are often dual-hatted Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders and commanders.

Perhaps the most worrying is the role of the TTP in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda helped write the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan’s charter and issued orders to its leaders. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan swears allegiance to the Taliban’s emir, helped the Afghan Taliban battle the U.S. and the prior Afghan government, and has a safe haven in eastern Afghanistan. It is now using this relative resurgence to regroup, restructure, and continue its jihad in Pakistan.

Khalilzad is absolutely aware of these groups and their ties to both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But more worrying, Khalilzad’s omission of these groups, particularly the TTP, does not capture the entire picture of the Taliban’s Afghanistan.

While the Taliban is rightfully publicly concerned about the Islamic State’s infiltration of its borders, it still privately supports a whole host of foreign jihadi groups within its borders and their members entering Afghan territory.

And whereas the Islamic State does threaten regional stability, at least one foreign jihadi group currently operating inside Afghanistan, the TTP, is already helping to destabilize a regional neighbor. These points expand beyond just IS-K and speak to the danger writ large of Afghanistan’s current terrorist safe haven.

Though Khalilzad was likely attempting to just keep the brief thread germane to The Washington Post article’s contentions, he nevertheless left out the entire other half of the discussion related to the dangers faced by Afghanistan’s neighbors vis-a-vis regional jihadis.

Any discussion of “controlling Afghanistan’s borders” in regard to foreign jihadis must include at least a recognition of all of the other various foreign groups in the country, most of which are within Al Qaeda’s orbit.

6. The US and the Taliban have a common interest against ISIS-K. Thus, the current bottom line is that from a US standpoint, things have improved in regard to Al Qaida and have remained more or less the same regarding the threat from ISIS in Afghanistan.

Just because the U.S and the Taliban have a common enemy does not make the two natural allies. The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan itself is a terrorist state. As noted above, it sponsors Al Qaeda and and its allied terror groups, continues to maintain “suicide battalions,” and proudly flaunts its use of suicide bombers against the U.S., NATO, the Afghan government, and civilians alike. The Taliban’s current government includes numerous Specially Designated Global Terrorists, former detainees from Guantanamo Bay, and mass murderers and human rights violators.

Using and trusting terrorists to fight terrorists is simply bad policy, especially when one such terrorist side continues to harbor and support a separate terrorist entity that is vehemently opposed to the United States.

7. When the US still had forces in Afghanistan, ISIS-K had plans and intentions to attack the US and the West. According to the DNI’s Annual Assessment, published in February, it “RETAINS the intent to conduct operations against the West”

This tweet only seemingly hurts his case in that The Washington Post’s article is “sensationalist hyperbole.”

8. We should hold the Taliban to their commitments on terrorism. For our part, we must remain vigilant by both monitoring the evolution of the terror threat from Afghanistan and retaining the ability to protect and defend ourselves.

And

9. At the same time, we should be pragmatic in dealing with the Taliban in the service of our counter-terror and geopolitical interests and continue expressing our concerns about the human rights of the Afghan people.

The Doha Agreement was dead the moment the ink hit the paper. The Taliban was never serious about its commitments to Doha. It never intended to negotiate with the now-ousted Afghan government – a fact made even more evident that the actual Afghan government was not even present during large parts of the proceedings.

The Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda at the time the document was signed and continues to do so to this day. The Taliban were never going to respect the rights of Afghan women and girls. There never were so-called “moderate” Taliban. The Taliban played the U.S. in Doha, and continues to do so. Khalilzad cannot or will not recognize this, but instead continues to push the agreement while indirectly repeating many of the Taliban’s own talking points.

10. The experience of the last two years is better than many expected—with no US loss of life since the withdrawal and with the saving of some $40 billion that we spent on the war there annually.

It is difficult to see what in Afghanistan is “is better than many expected” since the U.S. withdrawal. Afghanistan remains a safe haven for a myriad of terrorists, and Al Qaeda and its allies have safe haven and state sponsorship. And as mentioned, the Islamic State continues to rampage across areas of Afghanistan, including sporadic large-scale attacks inside Kabul.

FDD’s Long War Journal, to be clear, does not advocate for the return of U.S. troops to Afghanistan. But instead wishes to see such public officials, especially those who have dedicated much of their professional careers working on Afghan issues, make more accurate, or at least more nuanced statements and assessments, on the country rather than tired, inaccurate, and misleading talking points that have been previously refuted.

The Taliban fully control the country; resistance to the Taliban is nascent at best and there is no “Northern Alliance 2.0” to give the West a window into the country. The Taliban-controlled country is rife with starvation, near famine, and drought as the Taliban tightens its grip on power. And human rights remain abysmal, made ever more clear with the return of the 1990’s-style repression of Afghan women and girls.

Khalilzad continues to play his recognizable political motif about the Taliban and Afghanistan, providing the reader with his common refrain. But just as he was out of tune during the negotiations in Doha, he remains playing the wrong notes today.

The Washington Post’s article, though based on leaked U.S. intel assessments, is seemingly largely based in reality and provides a bleak picture of Afghanistan’s current state and its future for hosting a myriad of terrorist organizations – including jihadis on opposing sides of the global jihadi schism. If anything is sensationalist, it’s Khalilzad’s recent Twitter thread.

Read in FDD's Long War Journal

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · April 27, 2023

16. How effective are US ‘Over-the-Horizon capabilities’ in Afghanistan?

Excerpts:

Since leaving Afghanistan in August 2021, the U.S. military has increased the time its aerial assets loiter over the country to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, said Army Col. Joe Buccino, a spokesman for CENTCOM.

“However, these assets must travel a considerable distance, meaning much of the flight time is devoted to travel to Afghanistan and back,” Buccino told Task & Purpose on Wednesday.

Afghanistan expert Jonathan Schroden said he has not seen any public evidence to back up Kirby’s argument that the U.S. military’s “Over-The-Horizon capabilities” in Afghanistan have gotten much better since American troops left the country.

“I think it’s safe to assume that they likely have improved in their ability to monitor what’s happening there, if only through the development of whatever efficiencies and lessons learned that they may have implemented over a year-and-a-half,” said Schroden, who works for CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization in Arlington, Virginia. “So, I think it’s fair to assume that some improvement has likely occurred. But I also can’t point to any public data or operational outcomes that would underpin or support such a claim empirically.”

With no prospect of U.S. troops returning to Afghanistan, the Defense Department and intelligence community will likely be monitoring ISIS-K and al-Qaida from over the horizon for the foreseeable future.

How effective are US ‘Over-the-Horizon capabilities’ in Afghanistan?

A key part of “Over-The-Horizon capabilities” is information gathering.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED APR 27, 2023 9:00 AM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 27, 2023

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby has argued that the Taliban killing of the Islamic State group leader believed responsible for the August 2021 attack on Abbey Gate that killed 13 U.S. service members helps to vindicate President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw all American troops from the country.

“Having him gone is a good thing and it does part and parcel reflect the president’s decision to leave Afghanistan,” Kirby told reporters on Wednesday. “It does, in fact, prove, that you don’t need boots on the ground, you don’t need to remain in a particular field of battle, to be able to go after terrorists.”

Kirby stressed that the United States has “Over-the-Horizon capabilities” to monitor and strike terrorist groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Moreover, those capabilities have improved since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, noting that a July 2022 U.S. drone strike in Kabul killed al-Qaida’s top leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

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What are ‘over-the-horizon’ capabilities?

In broad terms, “Over-the-Horizon capabilities” refer to a wide range of aircraft and other means by which the Defense Department and intelligence community can persistently monitor certain areas for potential threats, assess emerging threat networks over time, and strike authorized targets that are a threat to the United States – all without the need for troops on the ground, said Army Lt. Col. Rob Lodewick, a Pentagon spokesman.

For operational security reasons, a U.S. official declined to elaborate on exactly how the United States conducts intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

It is unclear exactly how the recent death of the ISIS-Khorasan leader at the hands of the Taliban demonstrates that the U.S. military’s “Over-the-Horizon capabilities” have gotten better over time. Kirby said the United States did not participate in the Taliban operation that killed the ISIS-K leader, nor did U.S. intelligence agencies share any information about the leader with the Taliban.

However, the United States was able to verify the ISIS-K leader’s death, showing how information gathering is an important part of “Over-the-Horizon capabilities,” Kirby said.

“It’s not just about the dropping of a bomb or the insertion of special operations troops,” Kirby said. “It is about information and intelligence, and we continue to work to improve those capabilities. And again, further validation that you don’t have to have boots on the ground. We don’t need a presence in Afghanistan to be able to know things, to monitor things – and quite frankly, to strike if and when we feel the need.”

How often does the U.S. employ ‘over-the-horizon’ capabilities?

The U.S. has rarely demonstrated its ability to disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan from over the horizon.

Army Gen. Michael ‘Eric’ Kurilla, head of U.S Central Command, told lawmakers in March that in addition to the drone strike that killed al-Zawahiri, the U.S. military has conducted two “non-kinetic” missions in Afghanistan since the troop withdrawal.

Kurilla did not elaborate on what those missions were, telling Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) that he would discuss the matter further in a classified setting.

The general also said the U.S. military’s intelligence on Afghanistan has degraded since all U.S. troops left the country.

“I believe we can see the broad contours of an attack,” Kurilla told Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) during the March 16 hearing. “Sometimes we lack the granularity to see the full picture. And we are working to close that gap with our alternative airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and some of our other intelligence that we are working to penetrate into those networks.”

Indeed, the Taliban have grown so tired of foreign drones flying through Afghanistan’s airspace that they vowed to spend more money on air defense systems.

Since leaving Afghanistan in August 2021, the U.S. military has increased the time its aerial assets loiter over the country to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, said Army Col. Joe Buccino, a spokesman for CENTCOM.

“However, these assets must travel a considerable distance, meaning much of the flight time is devoted to travel to Afghanistan and back,” Buccino told Task & Purpose on Wednesday.

Afghanistan expert Jonathan Schroden said he has not seen any public evidence to back up Kirby’s argument that the U.S. military’s “Over-The-Horizon capabilities” in Afghanistan have gotten much better since American troops left the country.

“I think it’s safe to assume that they likely have improved in their ability to monitor what’s happening there, if only through the development of whatever efficiencies and lessons learned that they may have implemented over a year-and-a-half,” said Schroden, who works for CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization in Arlington, Virginia. “So, I think it’s fair to assume that some improvement has likely occurred. But I also can’t point to any public data or operational outcomes that would underpin or support such a claim empirically.”

With no prospect of U.S. troops returning to Afghanistan, the Defense Department and intelligence community will likely be monitoring ISIS-K and al-Qaida from over the horizon for the foreseeable future.

The latest on Task & Purpose

New details emerge about Col. Chung, the suspended commander of 5th SFAB
Navy SEAL doctor astronaut Jonny Kim somehow finds time to become naval aviator
Russia’s Spetsnaz forces are being annihilated in Ukraine, leaks claim
75th Ranger Regiment team wins Best Ranger Competition for third year in a row
Wagner Group leader calls for end to Russia’s ‘special military operation’

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 27, 2023

17. Joint Collaborative Environments can help stop foreign disinformation

Excerpts:

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, created by Congress to develop a strategic approach to defend against cyber attacks, published a report in 2020 calling for the formation of a Joint Collaborative Environment. The JCE is described as “a common and interoperable environment for the sharing and fusing of threat information, insight, and other relevant data across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.”

The JCE would create the dynamic environment to help facilitate information-sharing, while a JCDC branch devoted to foreign malign influence could organize stakeholders to respond to the threat.

All too often, analyses of cyberattacks focus strictly on the technical components of what is happening, while ignoring the broader context of why the attack is happening. By integrating foreign malign influence into existing cybersecurity infrastructure, the U.S. government can produce a comprehensive approach to the challenge.

Joint Collaborative Environments can help stop foreign disinformation

federaltimes.com · by David Rubin · April 27, 2023

Foreign espionage and propaganda campaigns are as old as politics itself. Yet, many Americans were surprised (some are still in disbelief) to learn the extent to which adversarial nations conduct influence operations, like Russia’s influence campaigns during U.S. presidential elections.

Today, the U.S. faces increasingly complex and sophisticated threats from foreign governments exerting malign influence—covert actions to influence public sentiment and public discourse.

As recently as July 2022, the Justice Department unsealed an indictment against an individual working on behalf of Russian intelligence for “allegedly orchestrating a years-long foreign malign influence campaign that used various U.S. political groups to sow discord, spread pro-Russian propaganda, and interfere in elections within the United States.”

Foreign influence operations rose dramatically throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the 2022 Digital Defense Report from Microsoft. The report highlighted that nation states most frequently targeted social media platforms controlled by U.S. technology companies to “distribute propaganda” to “erode trust, increase polarization, and threaten democratic processes.”

The report also explained how think tanks and NGOs, universities and academics, and government officials were the next most frequently targeted.

“These are desirable ‘soft targets’ for espionage to collect intelligence on geopolitical issues,” the report concluded.

On a technical level, many major U.S. technology companies already work together to support U.S. government efforts to counter foreign cyber intrusions. To combat foreign malign influence, the U.S. and its allies could take a page from this cyber strategy.

Cyberattacks in the digital space grew dramatically over the last two decades. Global ransomware costs have ballooned from $325 million in 2015 to $20 billion in 2021, a 57-fold increase in just six years, according to a June 2022 report from Cybersecurity Ventures, the publisher of Cybercrime Magazine.

To meet this threat, the U.S. government evolved and adapted. A key strategy was an early effort to develop institutional capabilities where businesses—which are often competitors—could share near real-time threats in the cyber domain. This development included the creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers in 1998. An Executive Order in 2015 expanded this to non-sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations.

The success of these information sharing models led to the 2021 creation of the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security.

The JCDC leads “integrated public-private sector cyber defense planning” by creating a “cybersecurity information fusion.” The collaborative has become an active information-sharing environment enabling cyber cooperation between the private sector, government (federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial) and international allies.

This cooperative model seemed a logical step because most attacks are against infrastructure created and owned by private companies, and these companies naturally have deeper technical knowledge of their software and systems.

Similarly, foreign influence operations also take place in public spaces that are privately-owned, primarily social media platforms. Despite this reality, however, no information-sharing space exists for private companies and the U.S. government to work together against the spread of disinformation on these networks.

The U.S. government needs a place to share information with the private sector on the tactics and techniques used by malign actors. While tech and social media companies compete against each other to build audience influence, they all suffer the burden of malicious actors trying to hijack that influence.

Efforts by foreign powers to spread disinformation generally occur across platforms simultaneously. A safe space for private companies to cooperate with each other would bolster their ability to collective thwart foreign influence operations and preserve the security of their networks.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, created by Congress to develop a strategic approach to defend against cyber attacks, published a report in 2020 calling for the formation of a Joint Collaborative Environment. The JCE is described as “a common and interoperable environment for the sharing and fusing of threat information, insight, and other relevant data across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.”

The JCE would create the dynamic environment to help facilitate information-sharing, while a JCDC branch devoted to foreign malign influence could organize stakeholders to respond to the threat.

All too often, analyses of cyberattacks focus strictly on the technical components of what is happening, while ignoring the broader context of why the attack is happening. By integrating foreign malign influence into existing cybersecurity infrastructure, the U.S. government can produce a comprehensive approach to the challenge.

David Rubin is a managing director for Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics LLP, where he assists clients within the U.S. Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement.

Chris Weggeman is a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General, where he led cyber mission forces at the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). He is a managing director for Deloitte & Touche LLP serving government and the public sector in cyber and strategic risk.

18. Why China Hasn’t Come to Russia’s Rescue

Conclusion:

At the Beijing Olympic Games in 2022, only a few weeks before Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian and Chinese leaders claimed that their friendship knew “no limits.” More than a year later, Xi and Putin have only confirmed the adage that some things are easier said than done. Putin’s grand expectations have yet to be met. And contrary to official declarations, Russia’s enthusiastic pivot to China has not been reciprocated.

Why China Hasn’t Come to Russia’s Rescue

Their “No Limits” Partnership Has Been an Economic One-Way Street

By Agathe Demarais

April 28, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Agathe Demarais · April 28, 2023

Since 2014, when Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its illegal annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin has claimed that Russian companies are looking to China in search of opportunity. That pivot eastward has taken on greater urgency since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Last year, two bridges opened across the Amur River, which marks the border between Russia and China. And at a meeting in March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to deepen economic cooperation as part of their “no limits” partnership.

But just how big of a helping hand has China really offered Russia since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine? Assessing the reality of Russia’s eastward economic turn is not easy. Last year the Kremlin classified its trade data, making it difficult to track China’s support for Russia. Combing through Chinese customs data is now the only way to find out what is (or is not) being traded.

These data do not capture smuggling and may be incomplete, but they are reliable enough to provide the big picture: China appears to be wary of increasing trade with Russia. And contrary to conventional wisdom, Moscow does not have much to offer Beijing. China does not buy Russian oil and gas at a large discount, and it wants a diverse array of energy providers. Russia’s much-vaunted pivot toward China, in other words, is probably not as successful as Putin and Xi claim.

PAPER PIVOT

In 2022, Western sanctions mostly targeted Russian imports of Western products, including parts for cars, planes, and machinery, reflecting Europe’s reluctance to break its addiction to Russian energy. Russia also lost access to advanced semiconductors, which rely on U.S. technology. This caused a headache for the Kremlin: Russia needs high-end microchips to build the missiles it uses in Ukraine. Western countries know that Russia will always find buyers for discounted hydrocarbon exports, but locating alternative suppliers for imports of advanced technology is trickier—and Chinese firms are not rushing to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Western firms.

On paper, the Chinese-Russian trade relationship appears to be gaining steam. The U.S. dollar value of China’s exports to Russia rose by a solid 12.8 percent in 2022, boosted in part by exchange rate movements: last year, the yuan depreciated against both the dollar and the ruble, increasing the competitiveness of Chinese exports to Russia. But this seemingly robust growth in Chinese shipments across the Amur was not exceptional. Most of China’s top 20 trading partners recorded growth of ten percent or more in their imports from China last year. The value of Chinese exports to Australia and India—hardly Chinese allies—jumped by around 20 percent in 2022, for example.

The dollar value of China’s exports to Russia paints a more modest picture of the trading relationship. In 2022, Chinese firms shipped $76 billion worth of goods to Russia, roughly the value of their shipments to Indonesia, Taiwan, and Australia. That represented only two percent of China’s total exports—on a par with Chinese shipments to Thailand, whose economy is a quarter the size of Russia’s. Nor was 2022 an outlier: since 2014, China’s exports to Russia have grown by only around 40 percent in nominal terms, compared with more than 200 percent for China’s exports to India, Vietnam, and Singapore.

Chinese firms are not rushing to fill the gap left in Russia by the withdrawal of Western companies.

This raises the question of why Russia is not an attractive market for Chinese firms. Some of the answers are obvious. The Russian economy recorded a recession last year. Growth will at best stagnate this year, and projections suggest that Russia’s GDP will not recover to its prewar level until 2027. The Kremlin’s decision in 2022 to dispense with international norms protecting intellectual property is another disincentive. Beijing may not be known for respecting Western intellectual property at home, but Chinese companies still want their know-how to be protected when they are doing business abroad. In addition, Beijing has yet to order its state-owned enterprises to enter the Russian market. And given that the Russian population has traditionally been suspicious of China, Chinese companies know that they may not be welcomed with open arms.

But the main reason Chinese firms are so reluctant to do business across the Amur may have more to do with Washington than with Moscow. Chinese businesses worry that the United States could impose secondary sanctions that would target firms from any country that do business with Russian companies. So far, Washington has only imposed such measures on deals with Russia’s military sector. If the United States were to expand these measures to other economic sectors, all companies around the world would be forced to choose between the U.S. and Russian markets. For most firms, sticking with the United States would be a no-brainer. As a result, Chinese companies have little incentive to invest time and money in developing relationships with Russian businesses that they might soon need to abandon.

Perhaps more concerning for the Kremlin, Chinese firms that are doing business across the Amur are not making up for the departure of Western suppliers from the Russian market: Chinese businesses mostly send basic mobile phones, transport equipment, and computers. Chinese companies are not shipping advanced technology to Russia: according to Chinese customs data, Chinese semiconductor exports to Russia remained flat overall in 2022. Again, the United States may be to blame: like Russia, China has lost access to advanced semiconductors as a result of a raft of U.S. export controls that were introduced in late 2022. The chips that China can manufacture are mostly basic and probably of limited use to Russia.

The United States made a bet when it simultaneously curbed the ability of both Russia and China to import sophisticated semiconductors in 2022. Washington hoped that instead of cooperating to circumvent these measures, Beijing and Moscow would compete to obtain high-end chips—and for the most part, that bet has paid off. Russia appears to be smuggling some semiconductors from Turkey, and possibly Kazakhstan, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates. But Russia probably cannot secure enough semiconductors to meet the demands of its large economy, undercutting Moscow’s ability to create a technology ecosystem from scratch and build supply chains for advanced products. Over time, this will weigh heavily on Russia’s economic outlook.

NOT SO SPECIAL

On the other side of the trade balance, the rise in Russian exports to China appears more impressive: the value of Russian shipments to China increased by 43 percent in 2022. But again, the reality may not be so rosy. The war-induced rise in commodity prices explains part of the increase. Crude oil, gas, and coal make up the bulk of Russia’s exports to China. In 2022, the price of these commodities shot up. As a result, many commodity producers recorded steep jumps in their exports to China: Canada’s climbed 39 percent in 2022, for instance. Russia’s exports soared as well. And contrary to popular belief, China does not appear to buy Russian commodities at a discount.

Again, the absolute size of Russia’s exports to China suggests a more modest reality. Russia’s exports to China remain low, at $114 billion last year. That figure represents just 4 percent of Chinese imports—on a par with China’s shipments from Malaysia, whose economy is one-sixth the size of Russia’s. Of course, some smuggling is taking place, with Russian oil increasingly being transported under the radar by a growing fleet of Russian ships. But China is probably not hiding most of its imports of Russian crude. It has no need to do so; the United States and its allies have not imposed an embargo on Russian oil exports, mostly for fear of driving up crude prices and inciting a backlash against sanctions in the global South.

Looking ahead, Russia’s energy exports to China may have reached a plateau. Beijing has always been careful to maintain a diverse mix of energy suppliers. Shipping insiders believe that China caps oil imports at around two million barrels per day from any country—a level that Saudi Arabia reached long ago and that Russia probably hit in late 2022. The Chinese leadership may prove especially careful with Russia in this regard, given that Putin showed in 2022 that he had no qualms about turning off the gas tap to Europe. Capacity constraints will also limit Russian hydrocarbon exports to China. Only a few Chinese refiners are equipped to refine Russian crude, which is rich in highly toxic mercury.

The picture is similar for gas. Shipments through the Power of Siberia pipeline, the main conduit for Russian gas deliveries to China, cannot grow much until upgrades are completed in 2025. Putin has long pushed for the construction of a new pipeline connecting Russia to China, Power of Siberia 2. He had high hopes that Xi’s visit to Moscow in March 2023 would seal the deal. Yet Xi seems in no hurry to oblige, and for good reason: China has already agreed to build a pipeline linking the Russian island of Sakhalin to mainland China. If Power of Siberia 2 were to be built as well, Russia would supply around half of China’s gas imports, making Beijing just as dependent on Russian gas as Europe used to be.

A LOPSIDED FRIENDSHIP

A look at Chinese customs data makes it clear that China retains the upper hand in its economic relationship with Russia and that Beijing appears in no rush to provide an economic lifeline to the Kremlin. In the future, Chinese businesses could still come to Russia’s rescue by beefing up their investments there. So far, there is no indication that they are preparing to do so, but investment decisions typically take three to five years to materialize. It is unlikely that Chinese firms will fill the entire void left by departing Western businesses, however. Companies from countries that Russia now considers “unfriendly”—which used to bring innovation to Moscow—made up 90 percent of foreign direct investment to Russia over the past decade. Today, that share is probably close to zero (although Russia’s classification of foreign investment data makes it hard to give a precise figure.)

At the Beijing Olympic Games in 2022, only a few weeks before Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian and Chinese leaders claimed that their friendship knew “no limits.” More than a year later, Xi and Putin have only confirmed the adage that some things are easier said than done. Putin’s grand expectations have yet to be met. And contrary to official declarations, Russia’s enthusiastic pivot to China has not been reciprocated.

AGATHE DEMARAIS is Global Forecasting Director at the Economist Intelligence Unit and the author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests.

Foreign Affairs · by Agathe Demarais · April 28, 2023

19. What Ukraine Means

Excerpts:

So what does Ukraine mean? What has the Russian war on Ukraine this past year revealed?

What Ukraine means for world politics is that the seemingly stable post–Cold War settlement in Europe was in fact a truce.

What Ukraine means for Russia is that its political culture is suffering from a false historical-cultural narrative that has metastasized into a form of paranoia, accelerating the country’s descent into kleptocratic autocracy and international pariah status.

What Ukraine means for Ukraine is that an impressive process of nation-building, which has accelerated since 2013, must be continued and intensified amid a war for national survival.

What Ukraine means for the United States is that there is no holiday from history and no escape from world politics for America and Americans.

...

And Ukraine has displayed the distinctive civic friendship—the sense of mutual responsibility that bridges demographic divides and lies far beyond the woke identity-silos—that embodies the social doctrine principle of solidarity.

Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War has two memorable passages that have been pondered for millennia. One, the “Melian Dialogue,” is a classic statement of realpolitik in its harshest form, as the Athenians tell the Melians, who claim a natural right to remain neutral between Athens and Sparta, that questions of justice do not bind greater powers in their conduct toward lesser powers, after which the Athenians proceed to destroy Melos. The second is Pericles’s funeral oration for the Athenian dead after the first year of the war, in which the great orator (according to Thucydides) says that “the secret of happiness is liberty and the secret of liberty is courage.”

Having refused, at tremendous cost, to resign themselves to the fate of the Melians, the people of Ukraine, maintaining a remarkable and inspiring morale under relentless assault, have given twenty-first-century expression to Pericles’s formula for happiness—but they have also added something of great value to it. For if the secret of happiness is liberty and the secret of liberty is courage, the secret of courage is faith: faith in a larger reality than ourselves; faith in a destiny beyond this life and its great but inevitably transient satisfactions; faith that we are creatures capable of nobility and self-giving, not merely self-assertion and willfulness; faith that solidarity is possible amid plurality; faith that courage can overcome evil, some day.

That is what Ukraine means. And that is why we owe a great debt of gratitude and solidarity to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

What Ukraine Means | George Weigel

First Things · by George Weigel · May 28, 2023

On February 24, 2022, something considered so unlikely in the twenty-first century as to be almost unimaginable happened: A large European state mounted a full-scale, full-spectrum invasion of another large European state.

The invaded state posed no threat to the aggressor’s security, only to its leader’s warped ideology. And in another chilling parallel to the mid-1930s, scripts written in that low decade returned with a vengeance: The aggressor polluted the global information space with a barrage of propaganda and lies, while some in the West, echoing Neville Chamberlain, asked why they should be concerned about a “quarrel in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing.” Now, after a year marked by bestial cruelty on one side and astonishing courage on the other, the Russian war on Ukraine stands before us as a pivotal moment in contemporary history. Grasping what that moment means is essential in devising wise policy that promotes peace, security, and freedom for both the United States and Ukraine; failure to understand just what is at stake in Ukraine will lead to inept policymaking and raise the specter of a Hobbesian world in which all are at war with all.

So what does Ukraine mean? What has the Russian war on Ukraine this past year revealed?

What Ukraine means for world politics is that the seemingly stable post–Cold War settlement in Europe was in fact a truce.

What Ukraine means for Russia is that its political culture is suffering from a false historical-cultural narrative that has metastasized into a form of paranoia, accelerating the country’s descent into kleptocratic autocracy and international pariah status.

What Ukraine means for Ukraine is that an impressive process of nation-building, which has accelerated since 2013, must be continued and intensified amid a war for national survival.

What Ukraine means for the United States is that there is no holiday from history and no escape from world politics for America and Americans.

At the macro level of world politics, the Russian war on Ukraine has falsified the post–Cold War conviction of many in Western Europe, and some in North America, that a Europe without wars was possible. Perhaps there would be occasional flare-ups in the ever-restive Balkans. But big wars between big states were a thing of the past, it was thought, because alternative security arrangements, underwritten by economic interdependence, were securely in place.

What seemed like a version of Immanuel Kant’s system of perpetual peace turned out to be a truce, however, because non-quantifiable forces were at work beneath the surface of history, much like the geological forces at work beneath the crust of the Earth. And those forces finally erupted. On this geological analogy, a spasm of earthquakes in parts of Ukraine did not wake Europe and the United States from their Kantian slumbers in 2014. Then came the volcanic eruption of February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine with the clear intent to destroy that country’s sovereignty—or, failing that, its economic, social, and cultural infrastructure. And the Kantian dream was shattered.

The experience of the past year also means that culture is far more a driver of history than most Realist accounts of world politics allow. Russia’s war on Ukraine is a war against the post–Cold War European order and, more broadly, the political culture of the West. One important cultural driver of this war is a false history according to which Moscow is the sole legitimate heir of the baptism of the Eastern Slavs in 988 (an event that actually occurred outside Kyiv, at a time when Moscow was a forest inhabited by wolves and bears). The historical complications of Eastern Slavic demographics notwithstanding, this Russian narrative—according to which Ukrainians are at best “little brothers” to the Great Russian hegemon, and at worst no nation at all—is simply false, as a matter of history. But this false storyline lay behind the imperialism of the fifteenth-century Muscovite prince, Ivan the Great, known as the “gatherer of the Russian lands,” and it underwrote Russia’s imperial expansion for centuries. It endured even into the late Soviet period; thus, in 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet regime spent great sums renovating Russian Orthodox churches in preparation for that year’s millennium celebrations, which wrote Ukrainians entirely out of the story of Eastern Slavic Christianity that began in 988. And whatever Vladimir Putin’s true convictions about these matters, the man who once called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century has been quite happy to use this false history to legitimate his determination to extinguish Ukraine as an independent state and to restore a Russian empire. (The great symbol of this absorption of Ukraine into Russian mythology is the 52-foot-tall statue of the Kyivan prince Volodymyr, who led the conversion of the Eastern Slavs to Christianity, which Putin erected in central Moscow in 2016.)

Thus the claim by such distinguished scholars of world politics as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski—that Russia without Ukraine can be neither a great power nor the center of an empire—is both true and insufficient. Russia without Ukraine is also a Russia that must confront the historical fiction that has shaped, and warped, its national self-concept and self-image for centuries.

The war on and in Ukraine has also clarified—or should have clarified—that there is no such thing as a self-regulating international order. Someone—some power or powers—will define the ordering of world affairs. Finland and Sweden have recognized this empirical fact of international public life in their application to join NATO. Others in the West—in France, in Germany, and in the Congress of the United States—have not. But when Putin says that his ultimate goal is “the collapse of Western hegemony,” he must be taken seriously.

By “the collapse of Western hegemony,” Putin means the destruction of the systems of international security and international exchange that have prevented a global conflagration since 1945. That same network of alliances, diplomatic agreements, and international institutions also created the conditions for billions of people to lift themselves out of poverty. No sane person in the West ought to want Putin’s dream to come true—no matter how much we rightly deplore the sludge exported by Western culture, and no matter how much we rightly criticize the bottom-line-only approach to international economics, the green wokery, and the elitism of the “Davos People.”

A world after the triumph of Putin’s efforts to reverse the achievements made possible by the West’s victory in the Cold War would be a far worse world for everyone, as the global economic wreckage wrought by Putin’s war over the past year should have demonstrated. And this concern to protect the international order is not “philanthropic.” To borrow from President Franklin Roosevelt when he tried to alert the American people in 1940 to the dangers posed by the potential triumph of Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo’s Japan, such a world would be “a shabby and dangerous place to live in—yes, even for Americans to live in.”

The international systems that Putin deplores under the rubric of “Western hegemony” can and must be reformed. What Putin wants to put in their place can and must be resisted and defeated.

In addition to the devastation it has wrought in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s war has done enormous damage to Russia. Effective political opposition to Putin’s dictatorship has been essentially eliminated. Brave opposition leaders such as Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Kara-Murza have been imprisoned, along with thousands of anti-war protesters. Public criticism of the war, or of the Russian military’s warmaking, has been banned as treasonous. Thus in Arkhangelsk, a nineteen-year-old university student, Olesya Krivtsova, was threatened with a sledgehammer while being arrested for protesting Putin’s aggression against Ukraine on social media; she now faces ten years in prison.

These draconian measures of social control, plus the fact that Russians live within what a dissident Russian TV journalist, Marina Ovsyannikova, rightly called a gigantic “propaganda bubble” that regularly informs the Russian people that the West wants to destroy them, have led to the virtual extinction of a functioning civil society capable of holding the Russian state accountable—or of even wishing to do so. Putin’s war has also exposed and intensified the subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church’s leadership to Russian state power, as demonstrated by statements that border on the blasphemous blessing of aggression and murder by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia.

The ongoing falsification of the deep Russian past has been matched by a falsification of more recent Russian history. A new bust of Josef Stalin, whose only parallel as a twentieth-century mass murderer might be Mao Zedong, was unveiled in Volgograd (formerly “Stalingrad”) to mark the eightieth anniversary of the Red Army’s victory there in World War II. The unveiling came just before Vladimir Putin’s visit to Volgograd on February 2, during which, it is safe to assume, he did not criticize the record of the man who once said that “a single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic”—and who was arguably responsible for more Russian deaths than his onetime ally Adolf Hitler.

The war on and in Ukraine has also revealed the deep corruption of Russia’s once-vaunted armed forces during Putin’s decades in power. Financial skimming and graft in the procurement process were evidently widespread, exemplified by defective Chinese-made tires on Russian personnel carriers that burst during the early stages of the invasion. The war in Ukraine has also revealed a large technology gap: Second-generation NATO weaponry in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers has proven quite effective against fourth- and fifth-generation Russian weaponry. Then there is the question of leadership. When Russian forces faltered almost immediately in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance, it was not least because of the Russian army’s lack of well-trained NCOs and junior officers prepared to take the initiative in real-time battlefield decision-making. In the aftermath of the failed attempt at a quick victory, the invaders relied more and more on the mercenaries of the Wagner Group (thousands of whom were recruited from Russian prisons and labor camps) and the brutal Chechen irregulars provided to Putin by his onetime foe and current ally, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

The combination of inept leadership, technological inferiority, and poorly motivated troops has led over the past year to enormous Russian casualties (often referred to as “cannon meat” in Russian parlance). In early February, U.S. government officials put the number of killed, wounded, and missing at “approaching 200,000.” Other reliable estimates put that figure at closer to 270,000—which, if accurate, would mean that, statistically speaking, every Russian involved in the invasion of February 24, 2022, has been killed, is in hospital, or is missing. These casualty rates are unsustainable, even for Russia. And as knowledge of these figures has seeped through Putin’s propaganda shield, young Russians are leaving the country in droves, not only to avoid conscription as more “cannon meat,” but because the Russian future looks so bleak.

A war whose stated purpose was the restoration of Russian greatness has become the war that has finally stripped the mask from post-Soviet Russian corruption, incompetence, and self-delusion, while further exposing the extraordinary social and cultural damage done to Russia by seventy-four years of communism.

What has the war on and in Ukraine revealed about Ukraine?

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has won the admiration of a great many people around the world for his inspiring articulation of his people’s cause. It is important to understand, however, that President Zelensky, whose poll ratings were cratering in the months before the war, has been following his people as much as leading them. For Ukraine is in the midst of an impressive project of national self-renewal that Putin’s war has, paradoxically, both threatened and intensified. The threat is obvious: the prospect of national extinction. The intensification requires a little explanation. For Ukraine’s astonishing and sustained resistance—which embodies a national commitment that shows no signs of slacking—cannot be explained solely by the understandable desire to punch a bully in the nose.

While the roots of today’s Ukrainian national identity reach back a millennium, the national fervor, grit, and resilience displayed these past twelve months can trace their immediate origins to what Ukrainians call the Maidan Revolution of Dignity. After a corrupt and Putin-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, buckled to Kremlin pressures and reneged on Ukraine’s “association agreement” with the European Union, a mass public movement took to Kyiv’s Independence Square, the “Maidan,” to demand a reversal of Yanukovych’s decision. From November 21, 2013, until February 24, 2014, the Maidan movement held out, even against armed force.

When it finally triumphed and Yanukovych was driven into exile in Russia, one veteran demonstrator said, insightfully, “We came to the Maidan looking for Europe and we found Ukraine.” For in those often frozen winter months of demonstrations and prayer vigils in the heart of the nation’s capital, Ukrainians discovered each other—and their coherence as a nation across ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. The “Ukraine” that has resisted, and in some cases beaten back, Putin’s aggression is the Ukraine that came to national self-awareness on the Maidan in 2013–2014.

In the years that followed, a bottoms-up process of civic and political renewal has taken place. Post-Soviet Ukraine suffered from a top-down system of governance in which Kyiv controlled just about everything. Economic and political development aid from the West since the Maidan Revolution of Dignity has focused on building the infrastructure of Ukrainian democracy—social, political, and economic—from the local level up. The result has been a Ukraine in which a critical mass of people feel a real stake in the country’s future and believe they have a role in building that future. Since the Maidan, Ukrainians have ceased to be passive subjects of a faraway, centralized, and unaccountable governing system and have developed a robust sense of citizenship.

Two years ago, no one expected that this revitalized sense of national civic identity would result in great numbers of civilians forming volunteer national defense units to aid the Ukrainian army in defending Kyiv. But that is what happened. “We are fighting for each other,” Ukrainians tell Western visitors. That sense of shared responsibility for the nation has been reinforced by the brutalities of the Russian occupiers. As Oleksandra Matviichuk, executive director of the Nobel Peace Prize–winning Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties, told Jay Nordlinger, Ukrainians are fighting, not just for the territory that is historically theirs, but for the people living in those areas:

This war started not in February 2022 but in February 2014 [when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and occupied parts of eastern and southern Ukraine] . . . I am very aware of what Russians did to people in the occupied territories. I have interviewed hundreds of people. They have told me how they were beaten, how they were raped, how their fingers were cut off, how they were crammed into wooden boxes, how they were tortured with electricity. One lady reported that her eyes were dug out with a spoon. We will never leave our people alone in these occupied territories. It would be inhuman to leave them . . .

Or as Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi put it to Timothy Garton Ash, “The Ukrainian army is 42 million people.” That is, the entire country is engaged, one way or another, in resisting Putin’s stated determination to eradicate Ukraine.

This striking process of nation-building must and will continue, not least by an ongoing process of cleansing Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian economy of corruptions that became deeply entrenched during the Soviet period of Ukraine’s history. In early 2023, for example, President Zelensky acted against a powerful oligarch and a dozen corrupt senior government officials. As Daniel Twining of the International Republican Institute wrote on February 8, “Far from sweeping graft under the rug during a struggle for national survival, Zelensky’s administration has doubled down on holding senior leaders accountable—because corruption has been a driver of malign Kremlin influence in Ukraine and combatting it aggressively is part of the country’s fight for an independent democratic future.” Maintaining and extending that commitment to fight corruption will be essential in maintaining Western support for Ukraine going forward.

As Ukraine continues to fight what its people rightly understand to be an anti-colonial war against a neo-colonial aggressor, it will also face challenges in protecting civil liberties and strengthening civil society institutions. One issue is the legal status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. A draft law introduced in December 2022 proposed to outlaw the activities of “religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in the Russian Federation.” Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church rightly objected, arguing that this would make a banned church into a martyr-church, and proposing instead that the focus be on individuals (however religiously affiliated) who are traitors. Major Archbishop Shevchuk also stressed, however, that “our northern neighbor, who is killing us today, cannot use any of the churches for his geopolitical purposes.” That this kind of wise counsel is available publicly in Ukraine, while the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow sets up straw men and issues apocalyptic threats, publicly stating that “any desire to destroy Russia will mean the end of the world,” suggests that Ukraine enjoys a vibrant civil society while Russia is burdened by a sick and corrupt one.

President Zelensky faces challenges that will further test his character and political skills. By necessity under today’s wartime conditions, Ukraine is largely being governed by the presidential administration, whose actions and decisions are publicized by television news that, by presidential decree, broadcasts identical content and often features government officials. There is real information exchange in Ukraine because of social media and the internet. But the question of a virtual governmental monopoly on TV news ought to be addressed before the country’s March 2024 elections, laying the foundations for a free media environment while taking into account the fact that oligarchs once warped the Ukrainian information space by their ownership of TV channels.

As he considers his country’s further development into democratic maturity, and his own future beyond his likely reelection in 2024, President Zelensky would do well to remember what King George III said when told that President George Washington would not personalize and perpetuate his presidential power by seeking a third term: “If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world.”

What Ukraine means for the United States is that the United States must take the full measure of its interests and responsibilities and engage in a foreign policy debate that recognizes facts while reckoning with a variety of policy options, none of which are risk-free.

A serious foreign policy debate would not be conducted in sound bites; nor would it engage in chippy epithets about the dangers of “blank checks”; nor would it grotesquely misrepresent the war as “a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia.” Neither would such a debate dismiss decades of often effective support for nascent democracies around the world with sweeping denunciations of (as one “national conservative” put it) “the crusading spirit—the need to make the world safe for democracy or engage in nation-building.” Dwight D. Eisenhower was not pilloried for titling the memoir of his service in World War II Crusade in Europe, or for using a flaming, biblically inspired sword as the shoulder patch of those assigned to SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force), which was tasked with liberating Europe from Hitler’s legions. Would the world today be FDR’s “shabby and dangerous place”—would the United States be safer and more prosperous—if America had turned its back on “nation-building” in Germany and Japan after that war, or if a bipartisan consensus had not supported the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of postwar Europe?

More recently, new democracies in central and eastern Europe have arisen with American support in democracy-building and under a protective NATO security umbrella (to which, to be sure, they have contributed). However flawed they are—and all democracies are flawed to one degree or another—the new democracies that have arisen from beneath the rubble of the old Warsaw Pact have become staunch allies. The founding democratic generation remembers the support they received from the West when they battled totalitarianism as human rights activists in the last decade of the Cold War. These new democracies have also been exemplary allies of Ukraine in its current existential fight for survival, with one notable exception.

Moreover, a foreign policy debate worthy of a great power cannot be conducted through what former Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin once dubbed “pseudo-events.” A mature great power will ignore political theater concocted to draw media attention to the actors involved, such as, for example, H.Res. 113, the “Ukraine Fatigue Resolution” recently authored by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R–FL) and co-sponsored by ten House Republicans. The resolution, which states that “the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement,” is little more than irresponsible posturing for the sake of a few minutes on Fox News. It sends a dispiriting message to the brave people of Ukraine who look to the United States for leadership in the cause of freedom, and who have consistently expressed their deep gratitude for American aid. And what kind of signal does it send to wobbly allies in France and Germany, still imagining that Putin can be appeased? Above all, what signal does it send to Vladimir Putin who, like all bullies, looks for signs of weakness and irresolution?

The costs of American support for Ukraine are well within reason, given the $1.6 trillion in discretionary spending in the fiscal 2023 federal budget and America’s economic capacity. In 2022, the financial, humanitarian, and military aid the United States (population 330,000,000) provided Ukraine ranked behind the aid given by Poland (38 million), Lithuania (2.8 million), Latvia (1.9 million), and Estonia (1.3 million) as a percentage of GDP. The omnibus spending bill passed at the last moment by Congress in December 2022 included $38 billion for Ukraine in 2023, which was far less than what Americans spent in 2022 on frozen and retail pizza. Yes, accountability for U.S. aid is imperative, both for the American taxpayer and for Ukraine’s own development as a functioning democracy and a trustworthy ally. But to suggest that the United States cannot afford to support Ukraine—or cannot afford to support Ukraine while deterring China—is not plausible.

Appeals to foreign policy Realism, twenty-first-century style, as a reason to disengage from Ukraine are equally unconvincing. A true Realism about what Ukraine means for the United States was well articulated by Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas in a February op-ed article:

We should back Ukraine to the hilt because the likeliest alternative isn’t peace, but rather another “frozen conflict” that favors Russia and harms our interests. Russia would retain key strategic terrain and much of Ukraine’s industry and agriculture. Food and energy prices would remain high, potentially starving many nations and exacerbating the migrant crisis in the West.

Meanwhile, Russia could rebuild its strength and seize the rest of Ukraine when the opportunity arose. Such an outcome would create millions more Ukrainian refugees, drive inflation higher, and worsen supply-chain disruptions. Russia would also extend its border deep into Europe. Next on the chopping block would be Moldova, site of another frozen conflict. And after that, a NATO nation.

Stopping Russia also will allow the U.S. to focus on the greater threat from China. A Russian victory would force us to divert more resources for a longer time to Europe to deter Russian expansionism, creating persistent threats on both fronts. But a Ukrainian victory and a durable peace will secure our European flank as we confront China.

America is not going to be great, stay great, or become great again—choose your slogan—if we do not soberly face the reality that America’s interests are deeply implicated in the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Rebuffing Putin’s aggression and sustaining Ukrainian sovereignty will make the world, and Americans, safer, while demonstrating to China that the mature democracies that are the backbone of a decent global order have not decayed into fecklessness.

Finally, what does Ukraine mean for the future of the West?

Western civilization is suffering from a wasting disease of self-absorption, based on defective ideas of the human person, human community, and human happiness. The dominant cultural forces in the West insist that we are mere bundles of desires, all of which are morally commensurable or equal; that the gratification of those desires is the meaning of happiness; and that seeing to the satisfaction of those desires is, in the name of human rights, the primary responsibility of the state. Meanwhile, woke culture, spreading out from our institutions of higher learning like a plague and infecting the bureaucracies of the administrative state, is creating a society of silos in which race-mania, “gender identity,” and “isms” of all sorts are somehow supposed to foster living in solidarity, although they are fostering precisely the opposite: social fragmentation leading to perilously high levels of mental illness, violence, and public irrationality.

Over the past year, Ukraine and Ukrainians have provided the West with an alternative vision of the human condition.

By looking death in the eye and refusing to flinch, Ukrainians, both soldiers and civilians, have reminded the West that we are more than our subjectivity—that we can know, embrace, and live by truths greater than “me.” We can make sacrifices. We can exhibit courage. We can refuse to be mastered by evil. We can live in a solidarity that is based on the truths built into the world and into us.

Since the Maidan Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine, without realizing it and often imperfectly, has nonetheless lifted up before a self-absorbed and often decadent West the four foundational principles of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church: personalism, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity.

Under brutal assault for a year now (and indeed since the Russian invasion of the Donbas and Crimea in February 2014), Ukraine has stood firm for the inalienable dignity and value of every human life.

During a year of savage warfare, Ukraine has lived the moral truth embedded in the principle of the common good, that each individual’s exercise of his or her freedom should contribute to the welfare of all, not merely to his or her own advantage, aggrandizement, or survival.

Since the Maidan, Ukraine has been building a decentralized system of governance that reflects the social doctrine principle of subsidiarity in its respect for local initiative, bottoms-up decision-making, and support for those in need of subsidium, assistance. The subsidiarity principle is also embodied in the innovative battlefield tactics of Ukraine’s armed forces and by what Gen. Mark Hertling, former U.S. Army commander in Europe, has called their “culture of adaptability.” Volunteer civil society groups crowdfunding materiel Ukrainian soldiers say they need, including drones, provide another example of subsidiarity at work.

And Ukraine has displayed the distinctive civic friendship—the sense of mutual responsibility that bridges demographic divides and lies far beyond the woke identity-silos—that embodies the social doctrine principle of solidarity.

Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War has two memorable passages that have been pondered for millennia. One, the “Melian Dialogue,” is a classic statement of realpolitik in its harshest form, as the Athenians tell the Melians, who claim a natural right to remain neutral between Athens and Sparta, that questions of justice do not bind greater powers in their conduct toward lesser powers, after which the Athenians proceed to destroy Melos. The second is Pericles’s funeral oration for the Athenian dead after the first year of the war, in which the great orator (according to Thucydides) says that “the secret of happiness is liberty and the secret of liberty is courage.”

Having refused, at tremendous cost, to resign themselves to the fate of the Melians, the people of Ukraine, maintaining a remarkable and inspiring morale under relentless assault, have given twenty-first-century expression to Pericles’s formula for happiness—but they have also added something of great value to it. For if the secret of happiness is liberty and the secret of liberty is courage, the secret of courage is faith: faith in a larger reality than ourselves; faith in a destiny beyond this life and its great but inevitably transient satisfactions; faith that we are creatures capable of nobility and self-giving, not merely self-assertion and willfulness; faith that solidarity is possible amid plurality; faith that courage can overcome evil, some day.

That is what Ukraine means. And that is why we owe a great debt of gratitude and solidarity to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

George Weigel is Distinguished Senior Fellow of Washington, D.C.’s Ethics and Public Policy Center. This article is adapted from his twenty-first William E. Simon Lecture.

Image by Pixabay via Creative Commons. Image cropped.

First Things · by George Weigel · May 28, 2023

20. Why Does Japan Have a Military Base in Djibouti?

Excerpts:

The legal immunity granted by the Djibouti government to Japanese SDF personnel could be seen as a reflection of the amount of trust the former places in the latter. However, the problem is that Japan itself lacks any laws that deal with the misconduct of military personnel on overseas missions. In other words, Japan, at the moment, has no way to hold SDF members accountable, should the need to do so arise under the SOFA.

The Japanese government also acknowledges these circumstances. Former Defense Minister Kono Taro has previously emphasized that overseas crimes of SDF members cannot be penalized under the current Japanese legal system.

The role that the Japanese base in Djibouti is playing amid raging conflict in Sudan has proven its significance not only in securing the freedom of navigation, which is vital for Japan’s national interest, but also in protecting the lives of Japanese citizens who are endangered by instability on the African continent – and possibly in the Middle East, too. However, the absence of a mechanism for Japanese forces to take full responsibility for their actions could jeopardize relations with Djibouti. If a situation arises where an SDF member harms a local and doesn’t face any consequences, public unrest could flare up.

Japan should reckon with the legal insufficiency that exists in its SOFA with Djibouti by adopting a legal framework that can hold overseas SDF members accountable.

Why Does Japan Have a Military Base in Djibouti?

The unfolding crisis in Sudan has drawn attention to Japan’s only overseas base – and some of the problems surrounding the installation.

thediplomat.com · by Jio Kamata · April 28, 2023

The fallout of a power struggle within the Sudanese military ranks has ignited an armed conflict, which is unfolding as a humanitarian disaster for the locals and endangering the lives of foreign nationals. Increasingly concerned about the fate of their own people, nations have announced they are evacuating their embassies or sending forces for rescue missions in Sudan.

Japan, one of the many nations alarmed by the situation in Sudan, has announced that its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will dispatch their own aircraft to the East African nation of Djibouti, which hosts Japan’s only overseas base, in order to help evacuate diplomatic personnel and natives. Although the contentious situation in Sudan is starting to gain attention in Japan, the SDF response raises a more basic question: Why does Japan have a military base in the Republic of Djibouti in the first place?

Initially, the need for a Japanese base in Djibouti arose due to piracy. After a spike in the number of pirate attacks around the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the issue emerged on the radar of not only Japan but also the international community writ large. The Gulf of Aden faces one of the planet’s most crucial maritime chokepoints, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which the bulk of the world’s oil and commerce flows. Concerned that a surge in piracy here would have real consequences for the global economy, the United Nations General Assembly passed multiple resolutions calling for deterring piracy, and a number of countries turned to Djibouti to install bases for their anti-piracy operations.

For Japan the stability of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, to which the piracy eventually spread, was even more pressing since Japan’s wellbeing as a nation was on the line. According to a government report on anti-piracy efforts, approximately 1,700 Japanese-related commercial vessels and 18 percent of exported automobiles – Japan’s driving economic force – travel through the Gulf of Aden. Beyond that, Japan’s heavy dependence on oil from the Middle East – which supplies close to 90 percent of Japan’s oil – multiplied the necessity for Japan to be more committed around the region.

With such high security concerns, Japan took the unprecedented step of acquiring a base on Djibouti’s territory, utilizing it as a hub to secure safe navigation for Japanese maritime commerce.

In 2009, Japan and Djibouti signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which laid the legal foundation for the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) to station troops in Djibouti. Two years later, Japan’s first overseas military base was opened on Djibouti soil. Since then, the number of piracy incidents has plummeted, which indicates that international collaboration – including Japan’s efforts – has had a chilling effect on piracy.

Nevertheless, the Japanese populace scarcely registered the fact that Japan now dispatches troops to a foreign land in East Africa. Even less recognized in Japan is the unequal nature of the SOFA that Japan ratified with Djibouti. Critics of the SOFA accuse it of being an unequal agreement, since it renders Japanese military members immune from any type of criminal accusation under Djibouti domestic law – exactly the same situation that many Japanese decry as it applies to U.S. troops in Japan.

The SOFA with Djibouti states that Japan has the right to exercise “all the criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary powers conferred on them by the laws and regulations of Japan” within Djibouti’s territory. Even the Japan-U.S. SOFA, which some Japanese argue shields U.S. military personnel who commit crimes from being prosecuted, acknowledges that there are circumstances when the hosting nation – in this case Japan – can exercise criminal jurisdiction. Conversely, the language in the Japan-Djibouti SOFA seems extreme, as Japan assumes jurisdiction over “all” criminal cases involving its military personnel.

The unique treatment that Japan received from Djibouti regarding criminal jurisdiction has been pointed out by outside observers. For instance, U.S. Senator Mike Lee criticized the Japan-Djibouti SOFA for allowing “Japanese service members [to be] immune from criminal prosecution,” in the context of criticizing Japan’s detainment of a U.S. Navy officer in Japan, whom Lee believes was falsely convicted.

The legal immunity granted by the Djibouti government to Japanese SDF personnel could be seen as a reflection of the amount of trust the former places in the latter. However, the problem is that Japan itself lacks any laws that deal with the misconduct of military personnel on overseas missions. In other words, Japan, at the moment, has no way to hold SDF members accountable, should the need to do so arise under the SOFA.

The Japanese government also acknowledges these circumstances. Former Defense Minister Kono Taro has previously emphasized that overseas crimes of SDF members cannot be penalized under the current Japanese legal system.

The role that the Japanese base in Djibouti is playing amid raging conflict in Sudan has proven its significance not only in securing the freedom of navigation, which is vital for Japan’s national interest, but also in protecting the lives of Japanese citizens who are endangered by instability on the African continent – and possibly in the Middle East, too. However, the absence of a mechanism for Japanese forces to take full responsibility for their actions could jeopardize relations with Djibouti. If a situation arises where an SDF member harms a local and doesn’t face any consequences, public unrest could flare up.

Japan should reckon with the legal insufficiency that exists in its SOFA with Djibouti by adopting a legal framework that can hold overseas SDF members accountable.

Jio Kamata

Jio Kamata is a freelance writer and regular contributor to the Japanese opinion website Agora. His articles have also been published in The Japan Times and Japan Forward.

thediplomat.com · by Jio Kamata · April 28, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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