Quotes of the Day:

"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return." 

– Leonardo da Vinci

"If you always put limit on everything you do, physical or anything else. It will spread into your work and into your life. There are no limits. There are only plateaus, and you must not stay there, you must go beyond them." 

– Bruce Lee

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand." 

– Albert Einstein

1. N. Korea claims successful launch of new IRBM tipped with hypersonic warhead

2. It’s Time to Resolve the Korean War

3. In response to reports of “North Korean workers rioting in the Congo,” the National Intelligence Service says, “Incidents are on the rise.”

4. 'Reactionary fling' MZ workers' collective action is a headache... North Korea’s foreign currency earning dilemma

5. Exclusive: “Trump views S. Korea as just investment,” Trump’s former NSC advisor says

6. North Korea's Latest Hypersonic Missile System Is One Sinister-Looking Weapon

7. Russia says S. Korea's sanctions on Russian ships, individuals 'unfriendly'

8. NATO invites S. Korea to Washington summit in July

9. S. Korean firms win US$7.2 bln gas plant deal in Saudi Arabia

10. HD Korea Shipbuilding wins 278.9 bln-won order for 4 petrochemical carriers

11. South Korea seizes ship suspected of violating sanctions on North

12. State Dept. decries N. Korean missile launch, stresses commitment to diplomacy

13. Veto shows harms of NK-Russia alignment: Cho

14. Five reasons the Korea Hana Foundation should not run Hana Centers

15. Pyongyang man arrested for using counterfeit dollars

15. US turns to allies to monitor North Korea sanctions

16. North Korea declares missile system complete

17. South Korea, U.S. to practice crippling North's nuclear command

18. Kim Jong Un Faces Annihilation in Most Korea War Scenarios

1. N. Korea claims successful launch of new IRBM tipped with hypersonic warhead

Don't panic. This is a routine part of the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy while the regime pursue s advance military capabilities to support those strategies as well as prepare to use force to dominate the Korean peninsula.

Some thoughts for consideration.:

North Korea’s Missile Test: A Framework for How to Respond

The key question that is asked with every North Korean action is how should the ROK/U.S. alliance respond?

Policymakers should keep in mind that the Kim family regime’s political warfare strategy relies heavily on its blackmail diplomacy – the use of increased tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. Part of an information and influence strategy should be to counter the criticism that a North Korean provocation is a US and South Korean policy failure.

The ROK and U.S. should make sure the press, pundits, and public understand that this is a fundamental part of North Korean strategy and that it conducts provocations for specific objectives. It does not represent a policy failure; it represents a deliberate policy decision by Kim Jong-un to continue to execute his political warfare strategy. The following is a response framework for consideration:

First, do not overreact. But do not succumb to the criticism of those who recommend ending exercises. Always call out Kim Jong-un’s strategy As Sun Tzu would advise- “ …what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; … next best is to disrupt his alliances.” Make sure the international community, the press, and the public in the ROK and the U.S. and the elite and the Korean people living in the north know what Kim is doing.

Second, never ever back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.

Third, coordinate an alliance response. There may be times when a good cop-bad cop approach is appropriate. Try to mitigate the internal domestic political criticisms that will inevitably occur in Seoul and DC. Do not let those criticisms negatively influence policy and actions.

Fourth, exploit weakness in North Korea – create internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military. Always work to drive a wedge among the party, elite, and military (which is a challenge since they are all intertwined and inextricably linked).

Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve. Do not be afraid to show military strength. Never misunderstand the north’s propaganda – do not give in to demands to reduce exercises or take other measures based on North Korean demands that would in any way reduce the readiness of the combined military forces. The north does not want an end to the exercises because they are a threat, they want to weaken the alliance and force U.S. troops from the peninsula which will be the logical result if they are unable to effectively train.

Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc., or a combination.

There is no silver bullet to the North Korea problem. Therefore, the focus must be on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. This requires the execution of a superior ROK/U.S. alliance political warfare strategy. It must focus on resolving the Korean question, e.g., “the unnatural division of the peninsula” (per paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement). Solve that question and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be ended. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether the ROK/U.S. alliance actions move the region closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance interests.

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/

And I would add that a response to these test should be that it is these tests that are causing the suffering of the Korean people in the north. In 2022 the regime spent $650 million on missile tests while the World Food Program estimated the regime had a $415 million shortfall in food. The regime could have solved its food shortfall by properly allocating its resources. But the people cannot eat missiles.

(LEAD) N. Korea claims successful launch of new IRBM tipped with hypersonic warhead | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 3, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Wednesday it has successfully test-fired a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) tipped with a hypersonic warhead, saying that all missiles the country has developed are now solid-fuel and nuclear capable with warhead control capability.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un guided the testing of the Hwasongpho-16B Tuesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The South Korean military said Tuesday it detected the firing of an IRBM from the Pyongyang region and the missile flew about 600 kilometers before falling into the East Sea.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 3, 2024, shows the North's test-firing of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The latest launch came about three months after North Korea test-fired an intermediate-range hypersonic missile on Jan. 14. Last month, the North conducted a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new IRBM loaded with a hypersonic warhead.

Kim described the Hwasong-16 missile as a "powerful, strategic offensive weapon."

The North's leader said the country has perfected the project for "putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on solid-fueled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis," according to the KCNA.

A hypersonic missile is usually hard to intercept with existing missile defense shields. It travels at a speed of at least Mach 5 -- five times the speed of sound -- and is designed to be maneuverable on unpredictable flight paths and fly at low altitudes.

The KCNA said during Tuesday's test, the hypersonic glide warhead reached its first peak at a height of 101.1 kilometers and the second at 72.3 kilometers while making a 1,000-km-long flight as planned to accurately hit waters in the East Sea.

Citing military confrontational acts and war drills by North Korea's enemies, Kim said, "It is the most urgent task at present for our state to develop the overwhelming power capable of containing and controlling the enemies."

North Korea has been ramping up weapons tests this year, including the launches of cruise missiles from sea and land and firing drills involving super-large multiple rocket launchers.

The South Korean military is closely monitoring North Korea's preparations for further possible provocations ahead of the April 10 parliamentary elections in South Korea and major political events in Pyongyang this month.

North Korea will celebrate the birthday of late founder Kim Il-sung on April 15 and mark the founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 3, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un inspecting the test-firing of a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 3, 2024, shows the North's test-firing of a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 3, 2024

2. It’s Time to Resolve the Korean War

Paper does not trump steel.  Will a piece of paper defend the ROK against a 1.2 million army with the steel from artillery, takses, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons? That is the fundamental question that we should ask.

Yet there is one thing all Korea watchers have in common with the Korean people in the South and North and most Americans in the United States and that is the desire for peace on the Korean peninsula. We all desire peace, security, prosperity and a peaceful resolution to the “Korea question” as outlined in Paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. That “question” requires a resolution to the unnatural division of the peninsula.

Unfortunately, the fact is that the threat to peace comes from one source: the mafia like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime (which continues to receive crucial support from China and Russia). The nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime are the hostile elements in the region. The regime employs a political warfare strategy that is supported by blackmail diplomacy with the long-term preparation to use force when the regime deems the conditions in its favor. It is constantly seeking to achieve these conditions, the most important being to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to force the removal of US troops form the Korean peninsula.. It is executing a seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion, and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State we know as North Korea in order to ensure the survival of the regime. In support of that strategy Kim Jong-un’s objective is to split the ROK/U.S. alliance to drive U.S. forces off the peninsula to achieve a favorable balance of military capabilities to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula. There is no evidence that Kim has abandoned his family’s strategy and objectives of the last 70 years.

Since 1953 the Armistice, the strength of the Combined ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command has prevented a resumption of hostilities through conventional and extended nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, this has led to complacency in the South and the U.S. and the belief by some that the war can now simply be declared over and that such a declaration will influence Kim to re-start North-South engagement and come to the table to negotiate denuclearization. It is believed that such a declaration will prove to Kim that the ROK/U.S. alliance does not have a "hostile policy" toward the North. Sadly, no one is asking about eliminating Kim Jong-un’s hostile policy toward the ROK and the outside world.

Here are exce[ts from a paper I wrote in response to the proposed Congressional resolution calling for an end of war declaration a fwe years ago.

The list of findings in Sec. 2 of H.R. 3446 is good but incomplete. To judge the efficacy of the three proposed actions in the resolution it is important to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. This regime has correctly been described as a mafia-like crime family cult that conducts illicit activities around the world and conducts human rights abuses that have been judged as crimes against humanity by the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry. This is the nature of the regime, and it is important to understand that when engaging it. Based on careful analysis of North Korea documents (its Constitution, Workers Party of Korea Charter, and leadership writings and speeches) the vital national interests, strategic aims, and conditions for success can be discerned. First and foremost is the survival of the regime. To accomplish this the regime must complete the Korean revolution and dominate the entire peninsula under Northern rule. The key condition required for success is the removal of U.S. military forces from Korea.

The strategy of the regime can be succinctly described this way. The regime has been executing a seven decades-old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (e.g., blackmail diplomacy) and preparing for the use of force in order to unify the peninsula under what can be called the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. To successfully execute this strategy the regime must divide the ROK/U.S. alliance and push U.S. troops off the peninsula and demand an end to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective these are the requirements for demonstrating the end of the ROK and U.S. “hostile policy.” The regime must “divide to conquer,” divide the alliance to conquer the ROK.

Congress must consider the history and who were and still are the belligerents in the Korean Civil War - with emphasis on the conflict being a civil war between North and South. A review of the UN Security Council resolutions of 1950 (82-85) shows that the United Nations clearly identified the North as the hostile aggressor who attacked South Korea. The UN called on member nations to come to the defense of freedom in South Korea. It established the UN Command and designated the United States as executive agent for the UN Command which included providing the commander.

The United States did not declare war on the North. It intervened under UN authority and fought under the UN command. President Rhee placed the remainder of the Korean forces under the control (not command) of the UN Command. China did not officially intervene in the war. It sent "volunteers"- the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), to defend the north. The 1953 Armistice was signed by military representatives—the UN Command and the north Korean People's Army (nKPA) and then later by the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Commander in Chief of the nKPA.

The logical end to the Korean Civil War and adoption of a peace treaty must be brokered between the two designated belligerents (the North and South). The U.S. and PRC (People’s Republic of China) could provide security guarantees, but they should not be parties to the peace treaty and the U.S. should not try to have a separate peace treaty with the North. A separate peace is exactly what the regime has demanded for years so that it could then force the removal of U.S. troops. This also worries Koreans in the South who fear a separate peace that would allow the U.S. to abandon the South. This has been a key element of the Kim regime’s political warfare strategy.

There is an additional challenge to a peace agreement between North and South owing to their current constitutions. Both countries do not recognize the existence of the other and in fact both claim sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula and Korean population. A peace treaty would undermine both constitutions because signing a peace treaty would mean recognizing the existence of two Koreas.

If the North and South sign a peace treaty ending their hostilities it is logical to argue that the UN Command should be dissolved. The relevant UN Security Council Resolutions must be rescinded (82-85), though they would be subject to veto by any of the members of the P5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council). Also, there is nothing in the Armistice that says the signatories of the Armistice must also sign a peace treaty. International lawyers are going to hash this out, especially since both North and South are now members of the UN, unlike in 1950. While a logical argument can be made for the dissolution of the UN Command, and surely the regime will make it, an end of war declaration or peace agreement will have no automatic or legal bearing on the presence of U.S. troops.

The ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea exist separately from the Armistice. They are present because of the bi-lateral agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1953. Note that the MDT makes no mention of North Korea or the DPRK. The treaty only states that its purpose is to defend both countries from threats in the Asia-Pacific region. A peace agreement should technically have no impact on the presence of U.S. forces.

The most important question concerning an end of war declaration and peace agreement is how they will ensure the security of the ROK. Assuming the Kim regime continues executing its seven decades old strategy it will seek to exploit such an agreement to try to drive U.S. troops off the peninsula and undermine the ROK/U.S. alliance. Most importantly the existential threat will still be present across the DMZ. There is no piece of paper that can defend against an attack from the North.

It’s Time to Resolve the Korean War

The United States should prioritize war resolution as the first step toward peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/its-time-resolve-korean-war

Monday, April 1, 2024 / BY: Dan Leaf

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis

This essay is part of a series, Pursuing Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea, that explores how the United States and South Korea can peacefully coexist with a nuclear North Korea. 

The greatest challenge to peaceful coexistence between North Korea and the United States is the technical state of war between the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union may have been at ideological loggerheads, used proxies in regional conflicts and come close to direct superpower blows — but they were not in a state of war. Resolution of the Korean War should be set as a stated U.S. policy objective. This is a necessary Step Zero on the road to peaceful coexistence with North Korea today and could reduce the risk of deliberate or accidental conflict, nuclear or otherwise.

Lee San Hun dances with a flag that symbolizes a unified Korean Peninsula to mark the Korean War armistice anniversary in Ganghwa-do, South Korea, on September 21, 2022. (Chang W. Lee/The New York Times)

‘More Dangerous’ Than at Any Time Since June 1950

When facing potential conflict, communication channels matter. The Biden administration worked hard in 2023 to reestablish direct military-to-military contact with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. “We need those lines of communication so that there aren't mistakes or miscalculations or miscommunication,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in an interview with CBS’ “Face the Nation.” The absence of any direct communication between Washington and Pyongyang presents an even greater danger. Each side distrusts the other and expects the worst. The slightest misstep without the opportunity to deescalate could be catastrophic, not just for the Koreas, but for the entire world. Things could hardly be worse.

But on December 31, 2023, they did get worse. In his speech to the annual Korean Workers’ Party plenary, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that reunification with South Korea is no longer the goal nor possible, abandoning his family dynasty’s longstanding inter-Korean policy. North Korea now views South Korea as a separate state, its population mutated beyond repair and subjugation as the only option. This is not a mere provocation. North Korea immediately dismantled its reunification infrastructure, including organizations and websites, as well as symbols such as the Arch of Reunification. Subsequent pronouncements from North Korea reinforced the changed approach, bolstered it with mutual rhetoric with Russia and pledged to use everything in the regime’s arsenal to implement the policy.

Highly respected North Korea experts Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker have concluded that “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950.”

“That may sound overly dramatic,” they added, “but we believe that, like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.” They see the abandonment of reunification and Kim’s partnership with Russia’s Vladimir Putin as evidence that Kim has given up on another long-term goal: normalization of relations with the United States.

The U.S. Should Make Resolution of the War a Strategic Objective

To prevent reignition of the dormant but ever-more-dangerous conflict, the United States should add resolution of the Korean War to its strategic objectives, and given the growing risk, do so quickly in a substantive and credible manner. One approach is issuance of a U.S. presidential statement that explicitly introduces resolving the Korean War as a policy priority and is accompanied by tangible government commitment and resources. This type of move may not be feasible in the near term but should be considered as part of future North Korea policy reviews. A declaration of intent would signal that the United States is seeking to give substance to the 2018 Singapore Statement’s call to “establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity” and the 1953 Armistice Agreement’s recommendation that a political conference be held to settle through negotiation the “Korean question.” A move that messages a turn away from hostility could mitigate Kim’s belligerence against the United States and South Korea and open an avenue for dialogue unavailable since the U.S.-North Korea Hanoi summit in 2019.

Congress can also play an important role. While the legislative branch does not establish foreign policy, it can express support for resolving the Korean War through its oversight function and legislative action. In 2015, House Resolution 384 sought to honor veterans, victims and divided families by calling upon “the international community to support the vision of a unified Korea and assist efforts to promote international peace and security, denuclearization, economic prosperity, human rights, and the rule of law both on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere.” The resolution, sponsored by three Korean War veterans in the House of Representatives, did not pass. More recently, versions of the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act have been introduced in the past two sessions of Congress. The current version is in committee. The 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, and subsequent reauthorizations, established an ambassadorial-level position related to improving human rights in North Korea and devoted funds to this effort.

Legislation making the pursuit of resolution of the Korean War a matter of law could attract support from divergent elements. The lack of dialogue with North Korea is widely seen as increasing the risk of conflict. A 2024 Harris Poll showed that a plurality of 2,078 respondents believed that the United States should end the Korean War by signing a peace agreement (48% agreed; 30% disagreed, 22% didn’t know), which was up from 2021 (41%) but slightly down from 2023 (52%).

Denuclearization proponents should recognize that without dialogue, any hope for progress on North Korean nuclear disarmament is impossible. Those concerned about China’s regional and global ambitions might believe that any rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang would complicate China’s strategic calculus and dull the luster of the Kim-Putin relationship. Improved U.S.-North Korea relations could also create an environment that would facilitate discussions on North Korean human rights and engagements to improve the civilian population’s resilience. Finally, Kim’s disavowal of the notion of a unified Korea leaves room for an end-of-war agreement short of resolving inter-Korea differences.

Consultation, cooperation and negotiation with South Korea will be an essential facet of Korean War resolution, but no U.S. law can dictate agreement or demand action from our ally. So long as the law is consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea of 1953, it will enable the bilateral pursuit of a solution.

The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 is a useful point of reference for congressional action on resolution of the Korean War. Passed by voice vote with bipartisan support, this act pushed the State Department to have an office that focused on the issue, authorized up to $60 million over three years for assistance to refugees from the North Korea and allocated additional funds to promote human rights, democracy and freedom of information. The law also included the requirement for the president to appoint a special envoy to promote human rights in North Korea. A State Department focal point to lead the resolution of the Korean War is needed for continuity and credibility.

A Road Map for Peaceful Coexistence

The pursuit of a permanent peace to replace the “temporary” armistice has not been a U.S. policy priority since the failure of the 1954 Geneva Conference. During that conference, the participants dealt with the “Korean question” — how to reunite and bring peace to the Korean Peninsula — but eventually set it aside because of multiple disagreements and focused on the First Indochina War. Until the Soviet Union’s devolution, the Northeast Asian standoff was a subset of the larger Cold War effort to counter the communist bloc and keep the competition from overheating. Subsequent policy has centered on deterring conflict and forestalling North Korea’s nuclear ambition with secondary emphasis on the human condition within North Korea. Pyongyang now has a credible nuclear threat, and the efforts to put the cork back in the atomic bottle has been the preeminent objective for several U.S. administrations. However, efforts to end the war with formal action have been momentary excursions without significant progress.

Seventy years of stalemate and neglect have left much to do for an office focused on Korean War resolution. Areas that should be addressed include, among others:

• Examine the failure of the 1954 Geneva Conference to fulfill its obligation to resolve the Korean War permanently, and how the two Koreas’ current diverging positions on unification would affect the dynamics of peace negotiations.
• Establish a network of responsible parties for war resolution from the United Nations Command (UNC). While the UNC has a mission to facilitate “dialogue and actions that lead to a lasting peace,” that task is not among its four priorities. Resolution will require the agreement (or at the very least acquiescence) of the 16 members comprising the UNC with the United States and host South Korea.
• Initiate a formal “truth and reconciliation” process consistent with international norms and leveraging the many successes and failures in history. Allegations of civilian massacres and maltreatment of prisoners from both sides of the conflict must be aired and as much as possible adjudicated. Additionally, the United States should conduct an internal assessment of the legality of its extensive bombing of North Korea during the war, as that is a foundational element of residual North Korean animosity.
• Develop U.S. positions on the establishment of an inter-Korean border at the current Military Demarcation Line and updated maritime boundaries consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Request an advisory (non-binding) judgment maritime demarcation from the Permanent Court of Arbitration or another body with a record of quality jurisprudence on maritime disputes.
• Conduct an assessment of the implications of Korean War resolution on the status of the UNC, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; develop concepts for a new peace management system to replace the MAC during transition to peaceful coexistence.
• Examine options for the establishment of liaison offices with North Korea drawing on lessons from past attempts in the Agreed Framework, Six-Party Talks and during the 2018-19 U.S.-North Korea summits.
• In consultation with Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, integrate joint recovery and repatriation of Korean War remains into the war resolution effort.
• Work with the Department of Defense to create options for military-to-military relations and appropriate confidence-building measures between the U.S.-South Korean alliance and the North Korean military.

The sudden summitry of 2018-19 underscores that the United States must prepare for any prospect to end our longest war regardless of when and how that chance at settlement emerges. The armistice called for settlement talks within three months. Seventy years hence, the tasks listed above still require completion if we are to seize the moment and achieve final resolution.

If Not Now, When?

Decisive executive action toward resolving the Korean War is difficult to imagine today. However, by making it a policy priority, future U.S. administrations may be able to reduce the risk of potential nuclear war, counter Chinese and Russian influence in the region, open the door to denuclearization, reunite divided families, improve human rights and enable much-needed humanitarian assistance. If Congress is unable to act this term, resolution of the Korean War to enable peaceful coexistence should be at the top of the docket in the next session to mandate executive branch leadership in the pursuit of a principled and sustainable peace.

Dan Leaf is a retired three-star general and former deputy commander of U.S. Pacific Command and Deputy J-3 of U.S. Forces Korea. His essay, “An urgently practical approach to the Korean Peninsula,” won the Oslo Forum’s first-ever Peacewriter Prize in 2017.

The views expressed in this essay are the author’s and do not represent USIP.

3. In response to reports of “North Korean workers rioting in the Congo,” the National Intelligence Service says, “Incidents are on the rise.”

This Is a Google translation of a Joongang Ilbo article that was only published in Korean. It provides some important insight on regime control. The Japanese report in Sankai newspaper is also only in Japanese

In response to reports of “North Korean workers rioting in the Congo,” the National Intelligence Service says, “Incidents are on the rise.”

https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25238069#home

JoongAng Ilbo

input 2024.03.26 06:43

update 2024.03.26 07:47

More update information

Reporter Jeong Young-kyo 

North Korean workers are seen doing structural work at a large construction site in downtown Vladivostok, Russia's Primorsky Krai in April last year. Photo by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University

On the 26th, the National Intelligence Service issued a statement in response to a report by Japan's Sankei newspaper that there was a growing collective backlash among North Korean workers dispatched overseas, saying, "Various incidents and accidents are on the rise." There is an analysis that the series of collective actions by North Korean overseas workers, who served as 'the vanguard of foreign currency earning', may be unrelated to the North Korean people's contact with external cultures, which North Korea's State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un is trying to block.

Sankei reported, citing multiple sources, that on this day, about 200 North Korean workers who rioted in China were repatriated to their home country, and that North Korean workers dispatched to a construction site in the Republic of Congo, Africa, rioted. According to reports, dozens of North Korean workers working at a Congo construction site rioted in protest when their return home, which had been scheduled for last month, was postponed.

In response, the National Intelligence Service said, "It appears that various incidents and accidents due to the poor living conditions of North Korean workers dispatched overseas are on the rise, so we are tracking related trends." Although it does not list specific facts, it can be read to the effect that the intelligence in question is being understood.

People believed to be North Korean workers are seen preparing to return home at Beijing Capital Airport in China on December 21, 2019, one day before the deadline for repatriating North Korean overseas workers according to the UN Security Council resolution. yunhap news

Sankei previously reported that North Korean workers dispatched to a clothing manufacturing and seafood processing factory in Helong City, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province, China, first rioted in January. At the time, the National Intelligence Service actually confirmed this, saying, "Various incidents and accidents are occurring due to the poor living conditions of North Korean workers dispatched overseas, so we are monitoring related trends."

This position is attracting attention because the National Intelligence Service usually maintains a ‘NCND’ (neither admits nor denies) response to intelligence or information related to North Korea. The general interpretation of experts is that it appears to be because the National Intelligence Service has obtained reliable information and is tracking related issues.

According to a report from the expert panel of the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee, North Korean medical staff are earning foreign currency at local hospitals in African countries such as Congo, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire. It is said that foreign currency earning activities of workers dispatched by the North Korean authorities were also detected at the construction site of a large statue commissioned by North Korea's Mansudae Art Studio, which is on the Security Council's sanctions list against North Korea.

A TV scene captured on the evening of April 20th last year at a North Korean worker's dormitory located a little outside the center of Vladivostok. On the screen, the logo of the Korean Central Television and the title of the introductory compilation titled 'At the First Foot of the Juche Revolution', which contains stories about the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (anti-Japanese partisans), which is considered the origin of the North Korean military, were confirmed. Photo by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University

It is also noteworthy that the National Intelligence Service used the expression “increasing trend” in this position. This is because the collective opposition movement of North Korean workers dispatched overseas may be viewed as an unusual sign. In fact, it was unexpected that the riots that first started in China would continue to occur not only in neighboring regions but also in Africa.

In particular, even though the North Korean authorities repatriated the workers who rioted in China to their home country and punished them, the reason why this situation occurred was because Kim Jong-un enacted the 'Act on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture (2020)', 'Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (2023)', and ' There is also an analysis that the National Intelligence Service may be becoming more alert as it may be an effect of contact with external civilization, which it tried to prevent by enacting the 'National Secret Protection Act (2023)'.

Oh Gyeong-seop, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “Overseas workers, who had helped earn foreign currency during the sanctions phase, have returned as a ‘double-edged sword’ that can threaten the durability of the North Korean regime.” “We will try to prevent residents from relaxing their ideology through repression, but the ripple effect of this incident is expected to grow over time,” he said.

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"Molotov cocktails were thrown at the factory... 200 rioting North Korean workers were forcibly repatriated from China."

Reporter Jeong Yeong-gyo chung.yeonggyo@joongang.co.kr

4. 'Reactionary fling' MZ workers' collective action is a headache... North Korea’s foreign currency earning dilemma

This is also a Google translation of a Joongang Ilbo article. This is also based on reporting from Radio Free Asia and the Japanese Sankei Shimbun but those reports have not been translated into English.

This bears close watch as it provides indicators of possible internal instability in north Korea (that could begin with or be influenced by overseas workers).

Excerpts:

The background to the Kim Jong-un regime's concern about workers' ideological relaxation was due to the continuous departure of workers as the dispatch period was extended due to COVID-19. Between November and December 2022, nine North Korean workers who had been dispatched to various parts of Russia defected as a group and entered the country, and in March of last year, an executive managing North Korean workers in Vladivostok was caught and arrested while attempting to defect from North Korea.

These may ultimately become a ‘double-edged sword’ for the Kim Jong-un regime. Although it is a key 'financial source' for financing the Kim Jong-un regime's government, it can also become a so-called 'reactionary whip', a window through which external trends are introduced into North Korean society.

Experts predict that North Korea will continue to try to manage overseas workers by strengthening ideological control. This is because there is no suitable means of earning foreign currency that can replace the dispatch of workers overseas due to the international community's comprehensive sanctions, and it also meets the demand of Russia, which needs low-wage workers for the development of the relatively underdeveloped Far East region. This situation is also supported by the fact that Russian authorities arrested Baek, a Korean missionary who was helping North Korean workers in Vladivostok and other places, on espionage charges in January, and that Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), visited Pyongyang last month.

Kang Dong-wan, a professor at Dong-A University who studies the conditions of North Korea's overseas dispatched workers, said, "Young North Korean workers forced into harsh work sites are expressing their dissatisfaction with the authorities," and added, "As these people frequently access external information through smartphones, etc., this will continue to happen in the future." “There is a high possibility that the phenomenon will spread,” he said.

'Reactionary fling' MZ workers' collective action is a headache... North Korea’s foreign currency earning dilemma

https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25239722#home

JoongAng Ilbo

input 2024.04.02 02:02

update 2024.04.02 05:30

More update information

Reporter Jeong Young-kyo 

North Korean workers are seen doing structural work at a large construction site in downtown Vladivostok, Russia's Primorsky Krai in April last year. Photo by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University

As collective actions by workers dispatched overseas by the Kim Jong-un regime to earn foreign currency continue to take place, there is analysis that the North Korean authorities are having trouble managing the workers of the market generation, or North Korea's version of the MZ generation, who are taking the lead. Although the Ministry of National Security, which is the system's security and disciplinary agency, is cracking down on workers dispatched overseas, it is pointed out that it is difficult to completely control young workers who have been exposed to external information after living overseas for a long time.

Radio Free Asia (RFA) said on the 1st, "Most of those who have been identified as key figures in the collective action incident of North Korean workers in China and the African Republic of the Congo are currently in their 20s to 40s of the market generation generation," and added, "From the perspective of North Korea, which earns foreign currency, young workers are “It seems like an awkward situation continues because we cannot ignore local demands,” he said.

Previously, Japan's Sankei Shimbun reported that North Korean workers dispatched to a clothing manufacturing and seafood processing factory in Helong City, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province, China, first rioted in January. In addition, in February, about 10 North Korean workers at a clothing factory in Dandong, Liaoning Province, China, and dozens of North Korean workers dispatched to a construction site in the Republic of Congo took collective action citing delays in returning home, citing multiple sources. reported.

A TV scene captured on the evening of April 20th last year at a North Korean worker's dormitory located a little outside the center of Vladivostok. On the screen, the logo of the Korean Central Television and the title of the introductory compilation titled 'At the First Foot of the Juche Revolution', which contains stories about the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (anti-Japanese partisans), which is considered the origin of the North Korean military, were confirmed. Photo by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University

The collective action of North Korean overseas dispatched workers that started in China appears to be spreading across the continent to Africa. In relation to this, Sankei pointed out, "Although the North Korean authorities have been controlling information since the incident that occurred in China last January, rumors about collective action appear to be spreading among the 100,000 North Korean workers dispatched to China and Russia." did.

The National Intelligence Service also said, “We are monitoring related trends as the increased awareness of rights among North Korean workers dispatched overseas may lead to collective action.” There is an analysis in the diplomatic circles that this may be due to the influence of North Korean people, who are extremely wary of Chairman Kim Jong-un, from contacting external information.

After lifting the border blockade to prevent COVID-19, North Korea resumed earning foreign currency using overseas dispatched workers in earnest and intensively strengthened its crackdown on them. Circumstances were also confirmed where workers were gathered in government-run lodgings and forced to go to and from work, as well as forced to watch videos depicting the idolization of the ‘Kim family’ after work hours.

A Chinese restaurant opened in the space where the North Korean restaurant 'Koryogwan' was operated in Vladivostok, Russia's Far East, in May last year. It was confirmed that the restaurant has completed remodeling and is in business. Photo by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University

The background to the Kim Jong-un regime's concern about workers' ideological relaxation was due to the continuous departure of workers as the dispatch period was extended due to COVID-19. Between November and December 2022, nine North Korean workers who had been dispatched to various parts of Russia defected as a group and entered the country, and in March of last year, an executive managing North Korean workers in Vladivostok was caught and arrested while attempting to defect from North Korea.

These may ultimately become a ‘double-edged sword’ for the Kim Jong-un regime. Although it is a key 'financial source' for financing the Kim Jong-un regime's government, it can also become a so-called 'reactionary whip', a window through which external trends are introduced into North Korean society.

Experts predict that North Korea will continue to try to manage overseas workers by strengthening ideological control. This is because there is no suitable means of earning foreign currency that can replace the dispatch of workers overseas due to the international community's comprehensive sanctions, and it also meets the demand of Russia, which needs low-wage workers for the development of the relatively underdeveloped Far East region. This situation is also supported by the fact that Russian authorities arrested Baek, a Korean missionary who was helping North Korean workers in Vladivostok and other places, on espionage charges in January, and that Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), visited Pyongyang last month.

Kang Dong-wan, a professor at Dong-A University who studies the conditions of North Korea's overseas dispatched workers, said, "Young North Korean workers forced into harsh work sites are expressing their dissatisfaction with the authorities," and added, "As these people frequently access external information through smartphones, etc., this will continue to happen in the future." “There is a high possibility that the phenomenon will spread,” he said.

Reporter Jeong Yeong-gyo chung.yeonggyo@joongang.co.kr

5. Exclusive: “Trump views S. Korea as just investment,” Trump’s former NSC advisor says

We are going to see more and more of these types of articles in the Korean press as we get closer to November.

Exclusive: “Trump views S. Korea as just investment,” Trump’s former NSC advisor says

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/04/03/4KNBWZOIV5HOZK4ZAAOHWC6KOA/

Interview with former National Security Council (NSC) Advisor John Bolton

존 볼턴 전 백악관 국가안보보좌관은 "한국 같은 동맹국들이 실질적으로 트럼프 2기 행정부에 대비할 수 있겠냐"는 기자의 질문에 "트럼프가 당선된다면 선거 다음 날 바로 전화하고, 시간을 낭비하지 말고 정기적으로 전화하길 권한다"고 말했다./ 이민석 특파원

By Lee Min-seok,

Woo Ji-won,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2024.04.03. 11:35

Updated 2024.04.03. 13:36

“Trump lacks an understanding of the concept of ‘alliance,’ whether it’s with South Korea, Japan, or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Many works will be necessary to preempt any potential issues in the South Korea-U.S. relationship once he is re-elected.”

Former National Security Council (NSC) Advisor John Bolton said in a recent video interview with Chosunilbo on April 1. Bolton claimed that Donald Trump, fundamentally a real estate agent at his core, views Korea primarily as an investment and believes that the U.S. is spending money at a loss to protect Korea.

Bolton was a key U.S. foreign security adviser during the early years of Trump’s tenure. After resigning in November 2019 due to disagreements on foreign policy with Trump, he has become a vocal anti-Trump critic. Kim Sang-joo, Vice President of the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS), also participated in the interview.

How should South Korea prepare for a possible Trump’s second term?

“I recommend following the approach taken by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who were close to Trump during his tenure. Concerned about the threats from China and North Korea, Abe spoke with Trump over the phone and played golf every chance he got. As a result, Trump began to listen to Abe. Consistent communication and persistence are key when dealing with Trump. So, in the event of Trump’s reelection, President Yoon Suk-yeol should promptly call him the day after the election and ask him for his input whenever possible, as Trump enjoys discussing his opinion. Abe and Johnson did this, and it worked.”

Will Trump converse with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in his second term? (Bolton predicted that Trump would call Kim immediately once he is re-elected).

“Trump and Kim have met three times, yet none of the meetings have produced concrete outcomes. (From watching from the sidelines) Only shortly after the 2019 North Korea- United States Hanoi summit, Trump concluded that North Korea had no intention of giving up its nuclear development. One of Trump’s problems lies in his tendency to equate diplomatic relations between nations with personal friendships with the heads. The notion that ‘I’m close to Kim Jong-un, so U.S.-North Korea relations are good’ is dangerous.”

Who is Trump - Former White House National Security Council adviser John Bolton said in an interview on April 1 that former President Donald Trump could again call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea if he wins the U.S. presidential election in November. Photo shows former adviser Bolton looking on as then-President Trump speaks in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, US, May 2018. /AFP Yonhap News

What is particularly dangerous?

“Trump’s apparent affection for Kim Jong-un contradicts national interests. Let’s say Trump pursues another summit with Kim. People will question what the U.S. can gain from it if previous attempts failed. Trump’s eagerness for results may lead him to neglect careful analysis of the pros and cons of any U.S.-North Korea agreement. Reflecting on the 2018 Singapore summit, Trump unilaterally ended decades of joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises without consulting with any of his staff, catching many off guard. Kim Jong-un reportedly smiled broadly and said it was a great idea. Who knows what extraordinary thing Trump will give up this time to show off?”

The South Korean government has begun preparing for negotiations with the Biden administration on a special measures agreement (SMA). It is a preemptive move for a possible reelection of Trump, who has called for an excessive increase in contributions from Korea. Some fear that Trump could nullify the previous agreement if he returns to power.

Could Trump overturn the agreements made by the previous administration?

“I believe it could at any time, but it is a good sign that the South Korean government’s ‘long-term view’ on regional security and alliances under the Yoon administration has gained quite a support in the U.S. (across party lines). The Yoon administration appears willing to work with allies on issues, including the threats posed by North Korea and China. South Korea and the U.S. can consider the greater threats posed in the Indo-Pacific region (such as China).

Some argue that instead of pressuring Pyongyang to denuclearize, the U.S. should recognize North Korea as a nuclear power and move toward disarmament.

“Indeed, negotiations have not stopped North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, but even if we shift to disarmament, North Korea may not adhere to proper disarmament measures. Time is running out, but the attempt at denuclearization is not over. Additionally, the precarious foundation of North Korea’s hereditary dictatorship adds another dimension to consider in the denuclearization efforts.”

Do you think Trump would be willing to allow South Korea to build its own nuclear capability if he wins a second term as president?

“It’s very likely. I know there is a growing sentiment in South Korea and Japan that they don’t trust the U.S. nuclear umbrella (deterrence of nuclear escalation) and that they need to secure their own nuclear deterrent. That’s understandable. I believe that it’s better to enhance regional stability under a U.S. nuclear umbrella, but still, we must continue to evaluate how best to respond to threats from North Korea and China. Considering the possibility of aggression from North Korea or China, it is rational to contemplate the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula.” (The United States has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea since the 1950s to deter North Korean and Chinese provocations, but withdrew them in 1991 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.)

Will Trump make the case for withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea in the second presidency (as he did in the first term)? (The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the U.S. government to maintain a minimum of 28,500 U.S. service members in South Korea.)

“The extent of the president’s authority to deploy troops remains highly controversial. While the president is the commander-in-chief, the presidency’s decision to reduce or withdraw troops from South Korea would likely face tremendous pushback and anger from lawmakers (who see South Korea as a staunch ally). Congress approved a measure aimed at preventing any U.S. president from unilaterally withdrawing the United States from NATO without congressional approval in December last year and this passage came amid long-standing concerns that Donald Trump may try to exit the alliance if he returns to office. A similar controversy could arise over the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.”

American media outlets have been reporting on the list of potential staffers who will serve in a “second Trump” White House. What do you think of this?

“Trump loves to speculate about who he will pick. He likes to put potential candidates on the table and intentionally keep them on their toes. We don’t know who will be chosen. One thing for sure is that Trump’s most important criterion is “loyalty”. For Senior government figures, however, it should be loyalty to the Constitution. The president shouldn’t be afraid of his staff suggesting a course of action that he can’t think of off the top of his head. No president has ever been successful when he is surrounded by people saying “yes” to everything he says. I see this loyalty issue as a potential problem in Trump’s second term.”

“South Korea should be at the center of a group of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including India, Australia, Japan, and the United States, so the country had better consider creating a “Quint” that includes those countries,” said Bolton. He also added that South Korea’s evolving engagement in the economic and security spheres is a viable option as it can help strengthen regional security.

“If Trump wins a second term, I hope that President Yoon and the South Korean government can effectively communicate these initiatives to him, potentially garnering his support before any congratulatory call from Kim Jong-un. he said, “so that he understands how dangerous it is to belittle South Korea.”

6. North Korea's Latest Hypersonic Missile System Is One Sinister-Looking Weapon

Photos and video at the link: https://www.twz.com/land/north-koreas-latest-hypersonic-missile-system-is-one-sinister-looking-weapon?mc_cid=6d464456ba&mc_eid=70bf478f36

North Korea's Latest Hypersonic Missile System Is One Sinister-Looking Weapon

North Korea just tested a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile with a wedge-shaped hypersonic boost-glide vehicle on top.

BY

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

|

PUBLISHED APR 3, 2024 12:15 AM EDT

twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick · April 3, 2024

The North Koreans have released pictures and video showing what they claim is a new intermediate-range hypersonic weapon that uses a solid-fuel rocket booster and is topped with a wedge-shaped hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. The 14-wheel transport-erector-launcher (TEL) for the missile, called the Hwasongpho-16B, also has a clamshell section at the front that keeps the boost-glide vehicle, which is otherwise exposed, protected prior to launch. And yes, it is one sinister-looking concoction.

A picture of the newly unveiled Hwasongpho-16B on its TEL, with the clamshell at the front open. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, wearing a black leather jacket, is seen to the right. KCNA

As is typically the case, North Korean authorities released imagery and videos of the Hwasongpho-16B (which is also being referred to as the Hwasong-16B) along with an official release a day after the launch was conducted. It is already the afternoon of April 3 on the Korean Peninsula.

The test launch was conducted from a site outside of North Korea's capital Pyongyang that has been used in the past. The country's leader Kim Jong Un was, as is customary, in attendance, as were other senior officials.

Kim Jong Un walks in front of the Hwasongpho-16B TEL ahead of the recent test launch. KCNA

The official North Korean statement says that the missile "reached its first peak at the height of 101.1 kilometers [just over 62.8 miles] and the second [at] 72.3 kilometers [close to 45 miles] while making [a] 1,000-km-long flight [just over 621 miles] as scheduled to accurately hit the waters of the East Sea of Korea [also known as the Sea of Japan]."

KCNA

KCNA

For their part, South Korean authorities said yesterday that they had assessed the total distance covered by the missile to be around 372 miles (600 kilometers). They also said it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile, a category of ballistic missiles with maximum ranges between approximately 1,864 and 3,418 miles (3,000 and 5,500 kilometers), but added that "the North Koreans were likely experimenting with new warhead technologies," according to the AP.

A picture of Kim Jong Un at the recent Hwasongpho-16B test. The maps seen behind show details that align with the North Korean claims about the missile's flight. KCNA

Though The War Zone cannot independently verify North Korea's claims, the description of the Hwasongpho-16B test having two peak altitudes is in line with how weapons like this are designed to function. Hypersonic boost-glide vehicles are unpowered and rocket boosters are used to get them to a desired altitude and speed before they are released.

After release, the boost-glide vehicle travels along a relatively shallow atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, generally defined as anything above Mach 5, to its target. The vehicles are also designed to have a significant degree of maneuverability, allowing them to erratically change course and climb and descend along the way. This, together with their high speed, presents significant challenges for defenders when it comes to detecting and tracking the vehicle, as well as potentially attempting to intercept it or otherwise react to the incoming threat.

KCNA

North Korea's release claims the Hwasongpho-16B test demonstrated the boost-glide vehicle's ability to conduct "gliding-skip" maneuvers and to rapidly change direction. Also known as a "porpoise" trajectory, skip-gliding typically involves at least one pull-up maneuver to create one or more downward "steps" as the vehicle heads toward its target. This is a capability that more traditional ballistic missiles with detachable maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV) have to varying degrees, too.

The Hwasongpho-16B is also described as having "military strategic value," phrasing that authorities in North Korea have used in the past to describe nuclear-capable systems. However, there is no specific mention of exactly what kind of warhead could be fitted inside the boost-glide vehicle. It could potentially be envisioned as a dual-role system, with conventional and nuclear warhead types being accommodated. Still, a nuclear warhead would likely be the priority for a North Korean system like this.

The North Korean release further says that the Hwasongpho-16B has a two-stage booster section. From the pictures that the regime in Pyongyang has put out, it is unclear how many individual rocket motors might be contained in the first stage. The North Korean government made a separate announcement about a test of what was said to be a new solid-fuel rocket motor last month.

A view of the Hwasongpho-16B from the bottom just after launch. KCNA

North Korea has been heavily investing in solid-fuel rocket motors for its increasingly diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles for years now. Compared to liquid-fuel types, solid-fuel rockets are safer to handle and easier to maintain. The volatile and corrosive qualities of liquid rocket fuels typically mean missiles that are powered by them cannot be kept fueled for extended periods of time, though there are exceptions as you can read more about here. Missiles that use solid-fuel rocket motors, which do not need to be fueled before launch, are therefore much more responsive and flexible weapons that are also harder to target.

With this in mind, it is worth noting that North Korea has previously tested another ballistic missile-type design with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle on top, called the Hwasong-8. However, that design used a liquid-fuel booster.

A composite image showing a Hwasong-8, or a mock-up thereof, on display at an exhibition in Pyongyang in 2021. North Korean State Media

Based on the official English translation of the statement about the Hwasongpho-16B may suggest North Korea is looking to abandon liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, and hypersonic weapons based on them, altogether. Experts have noted that this does not directly align with the Korean language statement, which talks more generally about North Korea's work in the field of solid-fuel rockets.

As with the Hwasong-8 before it, the Hwasongpho-16B has a number of general visual similarities to the Chinese road-mobile DF-17 both in its design and that of its TEL, though the designs are clearly distinct. There have been indications in the past that Russia's silo-launched Avangard hypersonic missile, another type tipped with a boost-glide vehicle, might also have a broadly similar configuration.

There are certainly questions about what kind of outside assistance North Korea may have received to support its hypersonic boost-glide vehicle developments. These are incredibly challenging technologies that much more advanced countries struggle with bringing to fruition.

Whether there is any relationship to the DF-17 specifically, China could be one source of relevant technology and experience that could have aided in the development of the Hwasongpho-16B. North Korea and China have long been allies and Beijing has been accused in the past of helping Pyongyang evade international sanctions.

Last year, South Korea accused Russia of providing assistance to North Korea to support its spy satellite launch program. Relations between the Kremlin and Pyongyang have grown significantly tighter since Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia has since acquired large amounts of munitions, including short-range ballistic missiles, from North Korea to sustain its war effort and has cemented those deals in part through exchanges in kind. The U.S. government has said this includes support for North Korea's domestic ballistic missile programs.

Espionage is another potential avenue through which North Korea may have supported its hypersonic weapon developments.

However, even with North Korea's previous claims about its development of hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, it remains unknown just how viable a weapon the Hwasongpho-16B might be at present or even in the foreseeable future. Wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles are notoriously difficult to design and bring to an operational state. Just the fact they are flight testing anything like this has major propaganda value as hypersonic weapons become a very sought after capability among major powers, as well.

The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy are currently working on a common intermediate-range hypersonic missile, which uses a simpler conical boost-glide vehicle. The plan is for that weapon, the development of which has been delayed multiple times, to ultimately arm Zumwalt class stealth destroyers and Block V Virginia class submarines, and be capable of being fired from ground-based launchers. The U.S. Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had been working on air-launched hypersonic designs using wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles, but the future of those developments is currently uncertain, as you can read more about here.

A rendering of a notional conical hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. Dynetics

What is clear is that North Korea continues to push ahead with the development of new ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as work on other advanced weapons, which now include the Hwasongpho-16B.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick · April 3, 2024

7. Russia says S. Korea's sanctions on Russian ships, individuals 'unfriendly'

​Using north Korean ammunition to kill Ukrianians is also "unfriendly." Providing advanced technology and military capabilities to the South's existential threat is also unfriendly.

Russia says S. Korea's sanctions on Russian ships, individuals 'unfriendly' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2024

MOSCOW, April 3 (Yonhap) -- Russia's foreign ministry on Wednesday criticized South Korea's decision to impose sanctions on Russian ships and others, and vowed to take actions in response to the "unfriendly step."

On Tuesday, South Korea imposed sanctions on two Russian individuals and their companies involved in the illegal sending of North Korean IT workers overseas as well as two Russian vessels involved in shipping containers of military supplies between Pyongyang and Moscow.

"The introduction of illegitimate sanctions will have negative consequences for relations with Russia," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said during a briefing.

Zakharova said Russia will respond to the South Korean government's "unfriendly step," without elaborating.

Seoul's latest sanctions came after the U.N. Security Council failed to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions on North Korea by another year due to Russia's veto. The panel's mandate had been extended annually since it was launched in 2009.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2024

8. NATO invites S. Korea to Washington summit in July

AP4. (Asia-Pacific 4 is better than IP4 - IndoPacific 4)

Excerpt:

"I welcome the fact that I have now invited for the third time the heads of state and government from New Zealand, Australia, Japan and South Korea, our partners of the Asia-Pacific, to attend the summit in Washington in July," Stoltenberg said as NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels.

NATO invites S. Korea to Washington summit in July | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2024

BRUSSELS, April 3 (Yonhap) -- The chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) said Wednesday leaders of South Korea and three other nations in the Indo-Pacific region were invited to the upcoming summit scheduled in July in Washington.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said South Korea was invited to the NATO summit for the third year as one of the non-NATO partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which include Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

"I welcome the fact that I have now invited for the third time the heads of state and government from New Zealand, Australia, Japan and South Korea, our partners of the Asia-Pacific, to attend the summit in Washington in July," Stoltenberg said as NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels.

President Yoon Suk Yeol was invited to the two previous NATO summits held in Spain in 2022 and Lithuania in 2023.

Stoltenberg emphasized the importance of working with NATO allies and partners to support Ukraine as "Russia's friends in Asia are vital" for continuing its war.

"North Korea and Iran are delivering substantial supplies of weapons and ammunition (to Russia). In return, Pyongyang and Tehran are receiving Russian technology and supplies that help them advance their missile and nuclear capabilities," he said.

Stoltenberg said like-minded nations should work together in various areas, including technology, cyber and hybrid threats, to address "regional and global security consequences" stemming from Russia's deepening ties with its partners.

"So, like-minded nations around the world need to stand together to defend a global order ruled by law, not by force," he said.

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul attended the session of NATO allies and its partners to discuss the current security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and express Seoul's commitment to strengthening cooperation with NATO, according to the foreign ministry.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks ahead of a NATO foreign ministerial meeting held at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on April 3, 2024, in this image captured from YouTube. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2024

9. S. Korean firms win US$7.2 bln gas plant deal in Saudi Arabia

(3rd LD) S. Korean firms win US$7.2 bln gas plant deal in Saudi Arabia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Young-Sup Kwak · April 3, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS share prices in last para)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- Samsung E&A Co. and GS Engineering & Construction Corp. (GS E&C) have won a combined US$7.2 billion deal to expand a gas plant in Saudi Arabia, the biggest order for South Korean companies in the Middle Eastern country, the presidential office said Wednesday.

The Fadhili Gas Increment Program is a project run by Saudi Arabia's state oil giant, Saudi Aramco, to expand the capacity of an existing gas plant in an oilfield some 80 kilometers away from the city of Jubail in the country's east.

The deal is the result of an agreement reached during President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to Saudi Arabia last October to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in construction and infrastructure, the presidential office said in a press release.

It is also the third-largest overseas construction order won by a South Korean firm, after the $19.1 billion Barakah nuclear power plant project in the United Arab Emirates and the $7.7 billion Bismayah New City project in Iraq, it said.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) at a guesthouse prior to their attendance at the annual Future Investment Initiative (FII) forum, dubbed "Davos in the Desert," at the King Abdul Aziz International Conference Center in Riyadh on Oct. 24, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Samsung E&A said in a statement that it had clinched a $6 billion deal to construct two gas treatment facilities as part of the plant expansion program.

It marks the single-largest contract in the company's history and the largest-ever deal that South Korean builders have obtained from the Middle Eastern country.

The completion of the project would raise the plant's daily capacity to 38 million MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day) from the current 25 million MMSCFD, it added.

Samsung E&A is currently participating in two gas treatment and storage facility projects in Saudi Arabia, which has been investing big in gas plants in a bid to boost gas production.

In a separate regulatory filing, GS E&C said it had bagged a $1.22 billion deal to build a sulfur recovery unit at the plant, which is expected to take about 41 months.

This undated file photo shows the Fadhili gas plant in Saudi Arabia. (Yonhap)

The latest mega deal comes as a boon to South Korean construction companies struggling to labor through a sluggish domestic business, raising hopes they could bask in more orders from the Middle East.

The value of the contract accounts for about one-fifth of last year's $33 billion in total overseas orders obtained by South Korean builders.

As of Tuesday, this year their aggregate overseas orders came to $12.72 billion, more than double the $6.11 billion during the same period a year earlier.

Stung by a slumping property business in Asia's fourth-largest economy, local construction companies have been shifting their sights to overseas markets as Middle Eastern countries are expected to place more plant orders on the back of rising oil prices.

In a report issued in December last year, the Korea Research Center for Overseas Construction predicted construction projects in the Middle East to expand 3.3 percent in 2024 from a year earlier.

"There is a possibility that Middle Eastern countries could inject their huge profits from high oil and gas prices into the construction center," the think tank said.

Capitalizing on a construction boom in the region, large and smaller South Korean builders have clinched orders from Middle Eastern countries in recent months.

In June last year, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. signed a $5 billion deal with Aramco to build a mega petrochemical plant in the east of the country.

In light of brisk orders from the Middle East, industry sources said, South Korea is on course to achieve its 2024 target of $40 billion in overseas construction orders.

Shares in Samsung E&A and GS E&C got a big boost from the news. Samsung E&A closed 2.64 percent up at 25,300 won on South Korea's main bourse Wednesday, with GS E&C surging 4.34 percent to 15,630 won. The deal's announcement was made before the market closed, with the broader Korea Composite Stock Price Index rising 1.68 percent.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Young-Sup Kwak · April 3, 2024

10. HD Korea Shipbuilding wins 278.9 bln-won order for 4 petrochemical carriers

What is the undisclosed Asian shipper?

HD Korea Shipbuilding wins 278.9 bln-won order for 4 petrochemical carriers | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Young-Sup Kwak · April 3, 2024

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- Major South Korean shipyard HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co. said Wednesday it has won a 278.9 billion-won (US$207 million) order to build four petrochemical carriers for an Asian shipper.

Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., one of HD Korea Shipbuilding's three shipbuilding units, will construct the carriers at its shipyard in the southeastern port of Ulsan, HD Korea Shipbuilding said in a regulatory filing.

The vessels will be delivered to the undisclosed shipping company by August 2026, it added.

So far this year, HD Korea Shipbuilding has obtained orders to construct 82 vessels worth $8.75 billion, or 69.6 percent of its yearly target of $13.5 billion.

HD Korea Shipbuilding, a subholding company of shipbuilding, oil refining and machinery conglomerate HD Hyundai, has three domestic units under its wing -- HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard and Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Co.

A petrochemical carrier built by one of HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co.'s three affiliates (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Young-Sup Kwak · April 3, 2024

11. South Korea seizes ship suspected of violating sanctions on North

Excellent.

We need to see more of this. Let's take down the north Korean smuggling/sanctions evasion networks.

Wednesday

April 3, 2024

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 03 Apr. 2024, 15:32

Updated: 03 Apr. 2024, 15:52

South Korea seizes ship suspected of violating sanctions on North

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-03/national/northKorea/South-Korea-seizes-ship-suspected-of-violating-sanctions-on-North/2017382

A 3,000-ton ship, Deyi, is forced to dock in waters off Gamcheon Port in the southeastern city of Busan on Wednesday. [YONHAP]

South Korea seized a ship suspected of violating sanctions against North Korea last Saturday, the Foreign Ministry said Wednesday.

The South Korean government has previously detained ships suspected of violating sanctions, but the seizure of a vessel in its territorial waters is considered unusual and seen as Seoul ramping up measures against Pyongyang.

The 3,000-ton cargo ship, Deyi, departed from Nampo Port in North Korea late last month and was headed to Vladivostok, Russia, after stopping in Shandong, China, according to the Foreign Ministry. The exact nature of the ship’s suspected sanctions violations is under investigation by South Korean authorities and is still unclear as the ship’s captain has refused to open the cargo hold and is not cooperating with the investigation, the ministry said.

After the ship failed to comply with the stop order, the Coast Guard boarded the vessel and moved it to a marina in Busan's Namhang Port. The ship was carrying 13 people, including a captain of Chinese citizenship and Chinese and Indonesian crew members.

Related Article

Russia's veto a move to dismantle sanctions regime on North, experts say

UN Security Council fails to extend sanctions panel for North Korea

South Korea, U.S. slap sanctions on North Koreans, entities in Russia, China and UAE

However, as Nampo Port is known to be a key hub for North Korea’s illegal coal exports, the ship may have been involved in related activities.

The ship's seizure reportedly occurred on March 30 in territorial waters near Yeosu in South Jeolla. The United States is believed to have provided the South Korean government with circumstantial evidence of suspected sanctions violations. After the capture, the South Korean government moved the vessel to a marina in Namhang, Busan.

“We are conducting an investigation based on close cooperation between the United States and South Korea regarding the ship’s alleged violation of Security Council sanctions against North Korea,” said a Foreign Ministry official.

The capture by South Korea is in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, which authorizes member states to seize vessels suspected of engaging in activities prohibited by international law in their territorial waters. The resolution also mandates the prompt exchange of information on suspicious vessels among member states.

Previously, Seoul detained several ships suspected of violating sanctions that entered South Korean ports, such as the Panamanian-flagged oil tanker Katrin, suspected of illegal transshipments with North Korean ships, in February 2019. The Katrin was investigated for about four months before being scrapped. The decision to go further and seize a suspected vessel could express the South Korean government’s intention to implement the UN Security Council resolution more actively.

It is also noteworthy that the seizure happened just after the Security Council failed to extend the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring sanctions on North Korea due to Russia’s veto on March 28. The panel, a watchdog for sanctions implementation since 2009, will expire on April 30.

In response, the South Korean government plans to fill the gap left by the panel’s absence as much as possible by strengthening the sanctions monitoring network in cooperation with allied countries.

On Tuesday, Seoul also designated two ships, two organizations and two individuals as targets of new separate sanctions for their involvement in the illegal arms trade between Pyongyang and Moscow and the unlawful transfer of North Korean workers overseas.

This was the first time the South Korean government had announced unilateral sanctions targeting only Russian-flagged ships, organizations and individuals. It is seen as a signal that South Korea will step up its response to Russia's series of sanctions-busting activities.

BY PARK HYUN-JOO, LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]

12. State Dept. decries N. Korean missile launch, stresses commitment to diplomacy

Again, the Korean people in the north cannot eat missiles. every missile test equals the Korean people remaining hungry.

State Dept. decries N. Korean missile launch, stresses commitment to diplomacy

The Korea Times · April 3, 2024

The State Department in Washington is seen in this undated file photo. Yonhap

The U.S. State Department on Tuesday criticized North Korea's ballistic missile launch this week and called on the recalcitrant regime to return to dialogue, after Pyongyang fired a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile.

The North fired the missile into the East Sea from a site in or around Pyongyang on Tuesday morning (Korea time), according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The United States condemns the DPRK's April 2 ballistic missile launch," the spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"This launch, like the DPRK's other ballistic missile launches in recent years, took place in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions," the official added.

The spokesperson reiterated Washington's calls for reengagement with Pyongyang.

"We remain committed to a diplomatic approach to the DPRK and call on the DPRK to engage in dialogue," the official said, noting the North's missile launches pose a threat to regional security.

Military officials in Seoul put weight on the possibility of the North having tested an intermediate-range missile equipped with a hypersonic warhead.

Last month, the North claimed to have successfully conducted a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new intermediate hypersonic missile. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · April 3, 2024

13. Veto shows harms of NK-Russia alignment: Cho

Concur. And I think we need to call out the axis of dictators/totalitarians. And that includes China.

Excerpt:

North Korea during the drafting process of a resolution on the renewal of the panel's mandate. If included, these clauses would automatically terminate UN sanctions on North Korea after a fixed period unless they are extended.

"This also represents an irresponsible action by Russia, a permanent member, eroding international trust in both the United Nations sanctions regime and the Security Council, which it had advocated for," Cho said.

Cho further said he "strongly urges Russia to cease all cooperation with North Korea that violates Security Council resolutions and to fulfill its obligations as a permanent member of the UN Security Council."

But Cho also emphasized that the extension of the mandate of the panel of experts received support from 13 Security Council members, indicating that the majority of member states are committed to upholding the UN sanctions regime on North Korea and ensuring its comprehensive monitoring.

China, one of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, abstained from voting.

Veto shows harms of NK-Russia alignment: Cho

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · April 3, 2024

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : April 3, 2024 - 14:45

South Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong speaks during a press conference in Washington, DC on Tuesday. (Yonhap)

Russia's veto against renewing a panel of experts overseeing sanctions on North Korea illustrates the adverse repercussions of the growing alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow on international order and regional security, South Korean Ambassador to the US Cho Hyun-dong said Tuesday.

Russia exercised its veto power Thursday to block the yearly extension of the panel of experts responsible for monitoring the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. The panel of experts also releases reports on cases that bypass UN sanctions twice a year.

"I express deep regret that the resolution to extend the mandate of the panel of experts under the Sanctions Committee on North Korea, which has been routinely extended without disagreement over the past 15 years, was voted down due to Russia's exercise of veto power," Cho said during a press briefing in Washington.

Since establishing the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts in 2009, the 15-member UN Security Council has unanimously renewed the mandate of the committee’s panel of experts annually.

Cho pointed out that "this instance exemplifies how the close alignment between Russia and North Korea, including arms trade, not only adversely affects the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the European region but also the international order, including the UN and the global non-proliferation regime."

Russia proposed adding sunset clauses to all UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea during the drafting process of a resolution on the renewal of the panel's mandate. If included, these clauses would automatically terminate UN sanctions on North Korea after a fixed period unless they are extended.

"This also represents an irresponsible action by Russia, a permanent member, eroding international trust in both the United Nations sanctions regime and the Security Council, which it had advocated for," Cho said.

Cho further said he "strongly urges Russia to cease all cooperation with North Korea that violates Security Council resolutions and to fulfill its obligations as a permanent member of the UN Security Council."

But Cho also emphasized that the extension of the mandate of the panel of experts received support from 13 Security Council members, indicating that the majority of member states are committed to upholding the UN sanctions regime on North Korea and ensuring its comprehensive monitoring.

China, one of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, abstained from voting.

"The government will diligently cooperate with the international community through the strict enforcement of sanctions on North Korea, as well as through each country's unilateral sanctions. In this process, we will ensure seamless coordination with the US," Cho said.

South Korea and the US, along with other Security Council members, are reportedly discussing UN-centered responses to Russia's veto. However, less than a month remains before the term of the panel of experts ends on April 30.

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · April 3, 2024

14. Five reasons the Korea Hana Foundation should not run Hana Centers

I would like to hear what my escapee friends think about this.  

Five reasons the Korea Hana Foundation should not run Hana Centers

The South Korean government's new scheme to put the Korean Hana Foundation in charge of the centers would waste taxpayer money and establish a diffuse governance structure

By Kang Dong Wan, Dong-A University - April 3, 2024

dailynk.com

Five reasons the Korea Hana Foundation should not run Hana Centers - Daily NK English

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration is promoting resettlement support for North Korean defectors as one of the central items on its political agenda. This issue has gained so much attention that Yoon has designated a holiday to commemorate North Korean defectors. This is a big step for the South Korean government, particularly in light of the incidents that tarnished the previous administration’s track record, including the forced repatriation of North Korean fishermen and the death of a mother and son, both defectors, of starvation. However, competition for visibility between the government’s various ministries means that policy might stray from Yoon’s pledge of support.

The bottom line is that the Hana Center system must be restructured. However, the solution is not to let the Korea Hana Foundation operate it directly. Hana Centers are resettlement agencies for North Korean defectors, of which there are multiple regional branches. Until now, these centers have been run independently, but will soon fall under the purview of the Korea Hana Foundation. The government has announced its intentions to introduce a revision of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, which calls for the merger of all 25 Hana Centers nationwide under the Korea Hana Foundation.

Hana Centers are agencies that provide counseling, resettlement help, and services related to employment, education, and healthcare to North Korean defectors. Until now, the Ministry of Unification and local governments have entrusted the management of these centers to smaller regional organizations. The Korean Hana Foundation has justified its plans to operate the Hana Centers directly by citing lack of clarity surrounding responsibility for defectors due to the complex governance structure as well as problems with entrusting the program to private NGOs. But the most recent problem stems from the fact that the Korea Hana Foundation is a monopoly that will not grant the Hana Centers any real autonomy. It is clear why the Korea Hana Foundation is unfit to run them.

First, the Hana Center program has lost sight of its original purpose and is in dire need of restructuring. Hana Centers used to be called the “Regional Resettlement Centers.” As the name suggests, their primary mission is to offer “initial resettlement assistance” to defectors who have come to South Korea, completed their stint at Hanawon, and have chosen their new residence. However, the number of North Korean defectors who have escaped to South Korea has fallen dramatically over the past three years. There is even one Hana Center that has had to suspend its operations because there were not enough newcomers to form a cohort. The intended recipients of the resettlement services that Hanawon and the Korea Hana Foundation provide have disappeared. In the past, more than 1,000 North Koreans would arrive in South Korea in a given year, but it seems that escaping to South Korea has become more difficult for the time being due to the situation inside North Korea as well as China’s obstruction of viable escape routes.

Second, this new scheme would waste taxpayer money and establish a diffuse governance structure. The Korea Hana Foundation exists to support the 35,000 North Korean defectors that have come to South Korea. The number of North Koreans employed at the Korea Hana Foundation, also known as the North Korean Refugees Foundation, is insignificant at best, and likely retained for political reasons. Credible rumors have been circulating that executives at the foundation make upwards of KRW 100 million won annually, and there have been ongoing discussions surrounding reform of its lax management structure. It goes without saying that the Korea Hana Foundation will expand when it begins operating the Hana Centers, too. Of the 25 Hana Centers nationwide, currently three are operated by the Korea Hana Foundation. The head of any center’s position is essentially that of a team manager or departmental head. That means that 22 more executive-level staff would be needed to operate all 25 branches nationwide. Additionally, the current Hana Centers are privately-owned, so they do not incur many rental expenses, but branches operated by the Korea Hana Foundation would incur unnecessary leasing fees that it would pay for with tax money. 

Third, the biggest problem for the Hana Centers is that there is no restriction on how long each can be managed by its respective NGO. Under the present system, entities, including NGOs, compete for management rights of the centers. After a management organization is selected, its term is initially set to three years. After the Korea Hana Foundation audits the center, it can be contracted to the same organization. However, both the audit and contract are mere formalities, and there is no limit on how long an organization can manage the Hana Center after it is vetted by the Korea Hana Foundation. There are several organizations that have been running their respective Hana Centers since this system was developed 12 years ago. The biggest issue is that new, capable organizations are effectively blocked from entering the system. This approach encourages each provincial Hana Center to prioritize self-preservation above all else, making sure that the auditor from the Korea Hana Foundation is just satisfied enough with its performance. A Hana Center that pioneers creative and novel ideas to provide better services to defectors will be scored more negatively during its audit. When the Korea Hana Foundation allows an organization to continue operating a Hana Center, there is no way to contest its decision, and other organizations in the community are unable to compete for management rights.

Fourth, the employment structure is unstable. Even now, staff at the Hana Centers are treated differently from the counselors affiliated with the Korea Hana Foundation, and many have pointed out the potential for conflict between the two groups. The professional counselors from the Korea Hana Foundation are not permanent employees and are thus discriminated against at work. These counselors are on the front line helping North Korean defectors, yet they find themselves on the lowest rung of the ladder. If the Hana Centers were to be operated by the Korea Hana Foundation, it would result in an organizational structure that discriminates against employees who are not permanent workers.

Lastly, we must consider the profound loss that North Korean defectors will experience on an individual level, as well as the NGOs working to provide services for them. Until now, NGOs that advocate for defectors have always demanded that the heads of organizations related to defector issues be well-known and distinguished defectors who understand the needs of their constituents as it relates to policy. This is important for symbolic reasons as well. It is impossible to describe the sense of loss that defectors will feel if these posts go to executives with no relation whatsoever to North Korean defectors. If the Hana Centers are operated by the Korea Hana Foundation and positions start to be filled by South Korean employees, we will have to ask ourselves for whom the Korea Hana Foundation exists in the first place.

There is a definitive answer to the question of whether this restructuring is for the benefit of North Korean defectors. Local Hana Centers, which offer initial resettlement support to newcomers, should be consolidated to branches in each metropolitan area or transferred to the control of the Administration and Welfare Centers, which report to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. It is also crucial that the government promote projects for the social integration between resettled North Korean defectors and South Korean residents. Part of integrating North Korean defectors into society means recognizing them as citizens of equal status in South Korea instead of as victims that need protection and aid. These defectors risked death at the hands of the Kim family’s regime to find freedom in South Korea. To allow North Korean defectors to enjoy the same democracy, human rights, and economic security as the rest of us, we must first let them become members of civil society. I find myself thinking of my friend from Pyongyang who resettled in South Korea more than ten years ago, yet still feels that he is labeled a North Korean before anything else. Though he may happen to be from Pyongyang, he is a colleague of mine as well as a proud citizen of South Korea.

Translated by Audrey Gregg. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Kang Dong Wan, Dong-A University

Kang is a professor at Dong-A University and the former head of the university’s Busan Hana Center.

MORE STORIES

dailynk.com

15. Pyongyang man arrested for using counterfeit dollars

No nation counterfeits money better than north Korea

Pyongyang man arrested for using counterfeit dollars

"This young man is still under police investigation, and the source of the counterfeit dollars has yet to be determined," a source told Daily NK

By Jong So Yong -

April 3, 2024

dailynk.com

Pyongyang man arrested for using counterfeit dollars - Daily NK English

A Pyongyang resident in his 20s has been arrested by North Korean police for using counterfeit money, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Mar. 27 that the young man, a resident of Nangnang district, was arrested in mid-March after buying items with dollars that turned out to be counterfeit. He had been reported to police by a merchant at a market in Ryokpo district who found his behavior suspicious.

“Since the local currency is used in the market, it’s typical to exchange your dollars at the money changer before using them. But this young man raised suspicion because he bought items in the market with dollars and then asked for change in local currency,” the source said.

The merchants became even more suspicious when the young man bought items from several vendors with not one but several USD 100 bills, a large denomination in North Korea.

Finally, one of the merchants called the police officer in charge of the market and reported the young man’s suspicious behavior. The officer immediately went to the market and arrested the young man as he attempted to flee. He was handcuffed and taken to a police station.

The police accused the young man of using counterfeit dollars and focused their interrogation on how he came into possession of them. The young man initially refused to answer, but eventually talked after the policemen took turns beating him, the source said.

“Officials with Ministry of State Security badges came out of a ministry safe house in Potonggang district and exchanged ten fake USD 100 bills for one real USD 100 bill. Then they told me to keep quiet about the exchange and sent me on my way. I borrowed the real USD 100 bill from my family,” the young man told the police.

Ryokpo district’s police station, which handled the case, asked the district’s state security bureau to help with the investigation. But the state security department said it was inconceivable that the ministry would issue fake bills, and made the unlikely claim that fraudsters often try to get off the hook by shifting the blame to government agencies.

“This young man is still under police investigation, and the source of the counterfeit dollars has yet to be determined. He’s likely to be severely punished because he not only circulated counterfeit dollars, but also involved the Ministry of State Security,” the source said.

This was just one recent example of fake dollars circulating in Pyongyang, which has led to complaints from a growing number of merchants. As a result, police are stepping up efforts to identify the source of the fake dollars and apprehend the culprits.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler. 

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Jong So Yong

Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

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dailynk.com

15. US turns to allies to monitor North Korea sanctions

US turns to allies to monitor North Korea sanctions

April 02, 2024 9:11 PM

By Christy Lee

voanews.com · April 2, 2024

WASHINGTON —

The U.S. and like-minded countries must find new ways to monitor the enforcement of sanctions on North Korea after the mandate of a U.N. expert group expires this month, say former U.S. officials with deep experience in North Korea sanctions.

The U.N. Panel of Experts has been tasked with investigating whether member states are enforcing sanctions on North Korea for the past 15 years. But at a Security Council meeting on March 28, Russia vetoed a resolution calling for the panel's annual extension, and the panel will be disbanded after April 30.

This is the first time the Security Council has failed to extend the panel's mandate for another year. But Russia has grown closer to North Korea since Pyongyang began supplying weapons for Moscow's war in Ukraine in violation of the sanctions.

SEE ALSO:

Why Russia voted to end UN panel that monitors North Korea sanctions

The panel, consisting of eight experts and created in 2009, produced an in-depth report published twice a year describing cases that pointed to violations of the sanctions by U.N. member states and their entities and nationals. Those sanctions will remain in effect.

Once the panel is no longer active, the U.S. and other countries that supported its work — such as the U.K., France, Japan and South Korea — will have to rely on other ways to monitor and enforce the sanctions.

Potential alternatives include the use of new or existing coalition groups, which can be "far more powerful than relying on the U.N. Panel of Experts," said Joshua Stanton, an attorney based in Washington who helped draft the Sanctions and Policy Enforcement Act in 2016.

Stanton said via email to VOA on Friday that Washington should see Moscow's veto "as an opportunity to break free of Russian and Chinese obstructionism, to build a better coalition, and to give sanctions investigation and enforcement the vigor the U.N. system always denied."

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), led by the U.S. and consisting of more than 100 countries, aims to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including through interdiction.

It was created by former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2003 in response to a failed attempt by the U.S. and Spain to confiscate the cargo of a North Korean ship carrying ballistic missiles to Yemen in 2002.

PSI member states can rely on their national laws to authorize an interdiction, said Stanton.

Another international coalition is the Egmont Group, which aims to counter money-laundering and terrorism financing.

Created in 1995, it is comprises financial intelligence units from 174 member states that share information and collaborate to counter illicit financial activities. The U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a founding member.

The U.S. is establishing another coalition with South Korea. On March 26, Washington announced it held the inaugural meeting of the Enhanced Disruption Task Force with Seoul aimed at blocking North Korea from procuring refined petroleum in violation of U.N. sanctions.

Anthony Ruggiero worked in the U.S. government for more than 19 years, focusing on targeted financial sanctions and proliferation issues, including those involving North Korea. He told VOA in a telephone interview on Monday that these multilateral groups, like PSI, are "always a benefit" to monitoring and enforcing sanctions.

"We need those groups to say which authorities can take actions, whether through sanctions or enforcement actions or other mechanisms to stop these activities," added Ruggiero, who is now a senior director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

He also said that "U.S. sanctions are more robust than U.N. sanctions" and the question is whether Washington is willing to enforce them fully, for example, by targeting Chinese and Russian companies, individuals and banks that hire North Korean workers in violation of sanctions.

China has been accused of employing North Korean laborers to process seafood products and false eyelashes.

Expanding cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang has spurred concerns that North Korean workers will flock to Russia for wages they remit to the state.

Aaron Arnold, a former member of the U.N. Panel of Experts who is currently a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute based in London, said there will be opposition to sanctions monitoring outside the U.N.

Arnold told VOA via email on Friday, "While Western governments will, of course, step in to provide intelligence and information about North Korea's sanctions evasion activities, the stark reality is that these efforts will be viewed with a great deal of suspicion by non-Western countries."

voanews.com · April 2, 2024

16. North Korea declares missile system complete

Wednesday

April 3, 2024

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 03 Apr. 2024, 14:37

Updated: 03 Apr. 2024, 14:52

North Korea declares missile system complete

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-03/national/northKorea/North-Korea-declares-its-regimes-missile-system-complete-/2017240

North Korea successfully tested the Hwasong-16 missile, an IRBM equipped with a newly developed hypersonic warhead, on Tuesday. [YONHAP]

North Korea announced on Wednesday that it successfully test-fired a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) equipped with a hypersonic warhead. 

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that the regime’s missile system was complete as all missiles are "solid-fueled, warhead-controlled" and nuclear-armed. 

Kim guided the test for the Hwasong-16 missile, an IRBM equipped with a newly developed hypersonic warhead, on Tuesday, according to an English-language report on Wednesday from the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The test launch confirmed the overall design and technical characteristics of the missile and verified the reliability of the weapon system, the KCNA said.

Related Article

North launches intermediate-range ballistic missile into East Sea

North Korea fires ballistic missile into East Sea: JCS

North says it will launch more spy satellites this year

Russia's veto a move to dismantle sanctions regime on North, experts say

"The test verified the gliding-skip flight orbit and the cross-range maneuvering capability of the hypersonic glide vehicle (warhead)," the KCNA reported. "Testing was confined within a range of less than 1,000 kilometers [621.3 miles] for safety. The speed and altitude of the missile was controlled by delaying the start of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight orbit while in the active region."

The hypersonic warhead IRBM “reached its first peak at a height of 101.1 kilometers and its second peak at 72.3 kilometers while making the scheduled 1,000-km-long flight to accurately hit the waters of the East Sea of Korea,” the KCNA said.

This suggests that the missile flew on a typical ballistic missile trajectory of rising, descending, then rising again.

On Tuesday, the South’s Joint Chief of Staff said it detected an intermediate-range ballistic missile fired from Pyongyang and that it landed in the East Sea after flying for more than 600 kilometers.

Since last year, North Korea has been focusing on upgrading its IRBMs, which were previously less strategic due to their lack of solid-fueling. Considered a relatively weak link in North Korea’s missile system, IRBMs have a range of 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers, putting them within striking distance of targets such as Okinawa, Japan and Guam.

North Korea conducted its first solid-engine ground-based IRBM test in November last year. On Jan. 14 this year, it test-fired an intermediate-range hypersonic missile and conducted a ground engine test for a new hypersonic missile on March 19.

Hypersonic missiles can travel at a speed of Mach 5, maneuver unpredictable flight paths and fly at low altitudes. At Mach 5, a hypersonic missile can fly the 195-kilometer distance between Pyongyang and Seoul in approximately two minutes.

“Another powerful strategic offensive weapon was developed to demonstrate the absolute advantage of our defense science and technology,” Kim said about the test of the new IRBM equipped with a hypersonic warhead, according to the KCNA. 

“We will successfully implement the Party Central Committee’s three principles by building a missile-armed force able to rapidly, accurately and powerfully strike any enemy target worldwide. To do this, we will make all our tactical, operational and strategic missiles warhead-controlled and able to carry nuclear warheads."

At the test launch announced Wednesday, Kim Jong-un was accompanied by Kim Jong-sik, the vice department director of the North's ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee and General Jan Chang-ha, general director of the Missile Administration.

BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]

17. South Korea, U.S. to practice crippling North's nuclear command

Tuesday

April 2, 2024

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 02 Apr. 2024, 17:54

South Korea, U.S. to practice crippling North's nuclear command

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-02/national/defense/South-Korea-US-to-practice-crippling-Norths-nuclear-command/2016653

00:0003:22

United States Forces Korea Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera speaks to South Korean and U.S. service members at Command Post Theater Air Naval Ground Operations (CP Tango) during a media tour on March 9. According to South Korean military officials, LaCamera was one of the main advocates of incorporating left of launch strategies into the allies' next joint exercise, which is scheduled to take place in August. [JUN MIN-KYU]

South Korea and the United States plan to conduct drills to paralyze North Korea’s nuclear weapons command during their joint exercise in August, according to multiple military sources on Monday.

While details of the drill are yet to be disclosed, officials who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo said it would be the first to incorporate “left-of-launch” strategic thinking into the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise.

“Left-of-launch” strategies aim to preempt enemy strikes with non-kinetic technologies, such as electromagnetic propagation and cyber disruptions, before missiles can be launched. Such strategies aim to cripple weapons delivery systems by embedding disruptions in enemy command and control networks, targeting their electronic radar signatures and disabling ballistic missile guidance systems.

The North’s state media reported that the regime possesses an IT-based nuclear weapon management program during leader Kim Jong-un’s inspection of nuclear warheads and technology for mounting warheads on ballistic missiles at an undisclosed location in March last year.

State media said the program, named Haekbangasoe or “nuclear trigger” in Korean, is “responsible for the integrated operation of nuclear weapons by various means in a multifaceted operational space,” suggesting it is the key to the North’s nuclear arsenal.

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A South Korean military official told the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity that the need to develop a left-of-launch strategy suited to Seoul’s security needs “was mentioned in the Defense Ministry’s report released last year” and added that applying the theory to the allies’ joint exercise has “meaningful implications” for their joint readiness. 

South Korean military sources partially attributed the drill to Paul LaCamera, chief of United States Forces Korea and the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, who reportedly drew attention to gaps in Seoul’s existing deterrence strategy that became apparent during the last month’s Freedom Shield exercise.

Seoul’s so-called tri-axis defense strategy, which is aimed at deterring and defending against armed provocations by North Korea, consists of three components: Kill Chain, which aims to detect and destroy North Korean missiles before they can be launched; Korea Air and Missile Defense, which focuses on intercepting missiles mid-flight; and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), which threatens the elimination of North Korea’s leadership and command nodes in response to an attack.

The new left-of-launch drill that the allies plan to conduct during Ulchi Freedom Shield is intended to make up for any delays in detection and enable South Korean and U.S. military leaders to preempt a North Korean attack without the risk of escalating hostilities, according to one South Korea military official who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity.

“If North Korea carries out a surprise strike before the allies can detect it, it raises questions about the efficacy of the Kill Chain plan,” said the source, who also noted that any decision to execute KMPR could also be complicated by its enormous political cost.

Lee Sang-kyu, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, has also proposed that South Korean conventional assets be used to transport and use U.S. nuclear weapons in any potential conflict to bolster the KMPR plan.

According to Lee, the use of South Korea’s dual-capable aircraft to transport and use U.S. nuclear weapons would render the North uncertain about which South Korean conventional assets are carrying tactical weapons, which he argued would have a strong deterrence effect.

BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO, LEE KEUN-PYUNG, LEE YU-JEONG AND MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

18. Kim Jong Un Faces Annihilation in Most Korea War Scenarios

A relatively long read for a newspaper article. 

Photos, maps, and graphics at the link.

Although counterintuitive to some press and pundits, it is weakness and inaction that could lead to spinning out of control. It is alliance strength and decisive action that offers the best chance prevent escalation.

Kim Jong Un Faces Annihilation in Most Korea War Scenarios

Despite the risks, the North Korean leader’s provocations could quickly spin out of control

By Jon Herskovitz

April 2, 2024 at 6:00 PM EDT

Updated on April 2, 2024 at 8:39 PM EDT

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-02/kim-jong-un-faces-annihilation-in-nearly-all-korea-war-scenarios?sref=hhjZtX76

After decades of empty threats, much of the world tunes out when North Korea vows to unleash destruction on its enemies. But in the past few months, some prominent analysts began warning that Kim Jong Un may actually be serious about preparing for war.

Now in his 13th year running North Korea, Kim is more aggressively testing the boundaries of what his adversaries will tolerate. Backed by rapid progress in his nation’s nuclear capabilities and missile program, the 40-year-old dictator began 2024 by removing the goal of peaceful unification from North Korea’s constitution and declaring he had the right to “annihilate” South Korea.

Kim Jong Un supervises artillery firing drills in North Korea on March 7.KCNA/Korea News Service/AP Photo

While such bellicose rhetoric would normally be dismissed — Kim could just be posturing ahead of South Korean elections on April 10 — two prominent analysts set off a round of discussion among North Korea watchers with an article suggesting that this time Kim isn’t bluffing.

“Like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war,” former CIA officer Robert Carlin and nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker wrote in early 2024 on the website 38 North, which focuses on North Korea. They didn’t forecast how soon that could take place.

Carlin and Hecker’s views are not universal: Most analysts argue that any full-scale attack would be a move of desperation or suicide, inviting a response from South Korea and the US that would end the Kim family’s nearly eight-decade-long rule. But with multiple conflicts raging in Ukraine and the Middle East, it’s just the kind of war the world could stumble into – with potentially devastating consequences for not just the Korean Peninsula, but the global economy and, particularly, the chip supply chain.

Seoul’s response to all the speculation has been blunt: “The Kim regime will meet its end” if it pursues all-out war, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said in January.

Here are the potential scenarios if Kim Jong Un decides to make good on his threats to attack South Korea.

How It Begins

Back in 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, catching the US off guard. The forces of Kim Il Sung — Kim Jong Un’s grandfather — took over much of the peninsula before US and South Korean forces counterattacked. China’s intervention led to a stalemate that resulted in a cease-fire but no formal peace treaty, and the Korean Peninsula has remained split at around the 38th parallel ever since.

Kim Jong Un is unlikely to risk a similar invasion. But he has shown an appetite for smaller provocations that could spin out of control — a trait shared by his father, Kim Jong Il.

Read: Kim Jong Un Pledges to Advance His Atomic Ambitions in New Year

One flashpoint is the Yellow Sea border islands that are part of South Korea but located in waters claimed by Pyongyang. In 2010, some two years before Kim Jong Un took power, Yeonpyeong Island was the scene of a deadly artillery bombardment that killed two South Korean soldiers and two civilians, while setting houses ablaze. About six months earlier, South Korea accused North Korea of torpedoing its warship Cheonan near the island, killing 46 sailors — an allegation Pyongyang denied.

South Korea has since pledged that another attack in the Yellow Sea would be met by an even stronger response, raising the chance for miscalculations on both sides that could quickly escalate.

“If North Korea makes a provocation, we will punish it multiple times over,” conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol said in January after North Korea conducted artillery drills near a border island. The South Korean leader has taken a tough line with Kim’s regime and responded to its provocations with military drills, often enlisting the US in shows of force.

Attack on Seoul

Any peripheral attack that escalates would immediately turn the spotlight onto greater Seoul, home to about half of the country’s 51 million people. North Korea has spent decades stockpiling millions of rounds of artillery and thousands of rockets in the terrain north of the demilitarized zone, which sits some 40 kilometers (25 miles) away from South Korea’s largest city.

That border region is also home to about 70% of South Korea’s $1.67 trillion economy, the base for some of the world’s top technology and manufacturing powerhouses, including Samsung Electronics Co., LG Electronics Inc. and Kia Corp. Even a brief conflict would reverberate throughout global supply chains, disrupting the global economy.

In a display typical of his more aggressive stance, Kim watched his forces in March fire off the weapons that could be used in an attack on the South Korean capital. Just a one-minute artillery and rocket barrage against Seoul could result in nearly 15,000 casualties, according to a 2020 analysis by Rand. A one-hour barrage would see that number rise to more than 100,000.

In either case, a larger conflict would be inevitable.

Full Conflict

If Kim goes all-in on a war, he would likely kick it off with an artillery barrage at key military, political and economic targets in Seoul. North Korea keeps its howitzers, mortars and rocket artillery in hardened positions and ready to fire on short notice for exactly this purpose.

At the same time, an estimated 200,000 soldiers in Kim’s special operations units – part of a 1.1 million-strong active-duty army — would try to cross the border by land, sea, air and even tunnel, according to South Korea's Defense Ministry. One goal would be to target bridges on the Han River that flows through the center of Seoul, cutting the city in half and making it difficult for millions of people to flee to the less-populated southern end of the peninsula.

Kim would also seek to impose huge economic costs as quickly as possible. The Rand war game analysis determined that a five-minute North Korean artillery strike on one LG-run factory in Paju, north of Seoul, would put an $8.9 billion investment at risk and cause thousands of casualties.

But North Korea’s advantages in striking first wouldn’t last long.

South Korea is also ready to fight: It has Patriot defense systems to intercept incoming missiles, 555,000 active-duty troops and a military budget that’s larger than North Korea’s entire sanctions-ravaged economy. And there’s also 28,500 US troops based in South Korea, along with American spy satellites constantly monitoring the Korean Peninsula.

Although North Korea has a manpower advantage, the bulk of its forces rely on “increasingly obsolete equipment” dating back to the days of the Soviet Union, the International Institute for Strategic Studies said in its 2023 review of the world’s militaries.

North Korea’s few Soviet-era fighters and its squadrons of single-propeller An-2 biplanes — developed in the 1950s and with a top speed of about 160 miles per hour (260 kph) — would be easy pickings for South Korea’s surface-to-air missiles and modern F-35A jets, which can travel at speeds exceeding 1,200 mph.

“The United States and South Korea would essentially, instantly, from the very first moments of the war, have absolute air superiority in every way that could be imagined,” said Michael Mazarr, a senior political scientist at Rand.

Underwater Clunkers

North Korea has a large, but outdated submarine fleet

Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative, U.S. Department of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, GobalSecurity.org

Note: North Korea launched a modernized Soviet-designed Romeo Class submarine to its fleet in September 2023.

It’s the same when it comes to other weapons systems: Pyongyang’s submarines are mostly small underwater clunkers that can’t stray far from the coast because they are easily detected. Its tanks are Soviet-era, and easily destroyed by Javelin missile systems used in Ukraine to stop Russia.

What South Korea doesn’t strike in the first few waves would likely be subject to air and missile attacks in the days that follow, leaving North Korea’s cities vulnerable to destruction — as happened in the original Korean War.

“Inadequate availability of fuel and transportation assets, poor maintenance of ground lines of communication, and insufficient training all constrain North Korea’s ability to sustain large-scale conventional offensive operations,” the US Defense Intelligence Agency said in a recent report.

‘Bloody Nose’ Strike

Another possibility is a “bloody nose” strike against North Korea by the US and South Korea, an option discussed during the Trump administration. This scenario would only be on the table if the allies believed a large-scale North Korean attack was imminent, with the intent to show force and remind Kim that his antiquated military is no match for America’s might.

But the move was always seen as risky, likely leading directly to a bigger conflict. Moreover, in recent years, many of North Korea’s liquid-fuel rockets — which take time to fire off — have been replaced by solid-fuel versions that Kim can quickly shoot from train carriages, lake beds and launchers hidden in caves with little to no warning.

If Kim misjudged and thought the US and South Korea were looking to end his regime — instead of just deliver a message of deterrence — he might preemptively use a nuclear weapon, said Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow in Seoul at the Center for a New American Security.

A US National Intelligence Estimate that was declassified last year said Kim would probably only use his atomic arsenal if he believes he and his regime are in peril.

Televisions show file footage of a North Korean missile test, in Seoul in 2022.Photographer: Jung Yeon-Je/Getty Images

“Our analysis right now is, effectively, that he will engage in increasingly provocative behavior but not — is not interested — in escalating this into a full-on war and that there is a kind of a limit on this,” US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress in March.

Read: North Korea Aims to Shake Up US, S. Korea Votes, Spy Agency Says

If a broader North Korean attack looked likely, South Korea would aim to deploy new bunker-buster missiles and squadrons of fighter jets based south of Seoul. US bombers in Guam and ships and fighters based in Japan could also come to South Korea’s aid.

The South Korea-US alliance would use air superiority to target command centers, weapons storage sites, rocket launchers, radars, military bunkers, missile silos and nuclear storage facilities in hopes of wiping out as many of North Korea’s assets as possible.

Targeting Kim

Also on the target list: North Korea’s leaders, including Kim. Yoon has not been shy discussing his country’s so-called Three Axis plan that includes preemptive strikes, full-scale assaults and taking out Kim. Pyongyang’ propaganda apparatus has denounced South Korea for organizing ‘decapitation units” and pledged to destroy “the puppet warmongers” with a nuclear attack if they tried.

The question of nuclear weapons is the most harrowing. Various estimates indicate North Korea may have 40 to 90 warheads. The Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analyses said Kim seeks to have between 100 to 300 over the long term.

A strike on the Seoul region with one of North Korea’s more powerful bombs could cause about 400,000 fatalities and 1.5 million casualties, Rand estimated. North Korea could also strike out against US ally Japan, or target American facilities in Guam or even in North America, although opinion is divided on whether Kim’s regime has the ICBM technology to hit targets on the US mainland.

“North Korea has yet to demonstrate its capability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States, with questions lingering about its proficiency in reentry vehicle technology,” said Lami Kim, a nonproliferation expert at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.

Kim Jong Un, his daughter and an official watch a missile launching from an undisclosed location in North Korea on Dec. 18.KCNA/Korea News Service/AP Photo

In early April, Kim's regime tested a new missile that it said could deploy a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle capable of striking US bases in Japan and Guam, saying it was ``an ultra-modern weapon'' for protecting the nation.

North Korea has also sought to deploy lower yield tactical nuclear weapons for the battlefield, perhaps to slow down a US-led counterattack. But use of nuclear weapons would expose Kim to a far more powerful response, with the US being able to hit back quickly, and overwhelmingly.

In that case, the death toll for an all-out strike could reach into the millions. A full-blown war could knock the global economy off the rails, leading to trillions in dollars of damage. And Kim’s regime would almost certainly be finished.

“We assess that through 2030, Kim Jong Un most likely will continue to pursue a strategy of coercion, potentially including non-nuclear lethal attacks, aimed at advancing the North’s goals of intimidating its neighbors, extracting concessions, and bolstering the regime’s military credentials domestically,” said the latest US National Intelligence Estimate report.

Is Conflict Inevitable?

The biggest questions now are whether the die has already been cast and what could prevent it.

Most analysts say Kim’s more heated rhetoric is just amped-up saber-rattling, meant to influence South Korea’s elections, unsettle the West or win more concessions. Kim has staged provocations ahead of every election held in South Korea during his time in power, and he has more of an incentive to deal Yoon’s conservative party a blow in the April 10 vote for parliament.

“The fundamental goal of the regime is regime preservation,” said Rand’s Mazarr.

Another variable to consider is China — historically Pyongyang’s closest partner, which came to the aid of Kim’s grandfather during the first Korean War.

Read: Kim Jong Un’s Russia Lifeline Gives Big Reason to Avoid War

Beijing has every reason to prevent a conflict from starting or getting out of hand. A nuclear exchange on the peninsula, or a conventional war that results in North Korea’s defeat, would go against China’s long-term interests, potentially leaving American and South Korean troops near the Chinese border and the global economy in tatters.

But China’s influence over North Korea has long been limited, despite being the country’s most important trade partner. Even when Beijing was cooperating with the US on the UN Security Council to condemn North Korean nuclear developments during the Trump years, the measures failed to change Pyongyang’s behavior. Kim is also working to diversify his economy away from China, selling some of his artillery stockpiles to Russia for its war in Ukraine.

That economic windfall — which could be in the low billions of dollars — may be one factor that helps keep Kim in line, along with his own desire for self-preservation. The fact that he’s selling millions of artillery shells to Russia may be another signal that Kim doesn’t actually want a war, given he would risk running short of arms to defend himself.

Moreover, there is now a chance that Donald Trump, who met Kim three times and generally sought better relations with North Korea, will again win the US presidency. Either way, Kim has already shown he has a long-term plan for his family to continue to rule the nation his grandfather founded in 1948, signaling that his daughter could take the reins of power decades from now.

Kim would’ve already invaded South Korea if he was actually preparing for war, according to Daniel Pinkston, an international relations lecturer at Troy University in Seoul and a former Korean linguist with the US Air Force. A simpler explanation, he said, is that North Korea is deterred from doing so.

“The North Korea leadership is waiting for a restructuring of the world order and the collapse of the US-led alliance system in East Asia,” said Pinkston. “Unless that happens, I don’t see a theory of victory for North Korea.”

(Adds details on latest weapons test in 39th paragraph. An earlier version of the story corrected the name of the anti-tank missile system in 25th paragraph.)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com