Quotes of the Day:

“Fools learn from experience, I prefer to learn from the experience of others.”

– Otto von Bismarck

"We live in a world where the funeral matters more than the dead, the wedding more than love and the physical rather than the intellect.

We live in the container culture, which despises the content."

– Eduardo Galeano Uruguayan journalist, writer and novelist (1940 — 2015)

“Those who know the true use of money, and regulate the measure of wealth. According to their needs, Liv, contented with a few things.” 

– Baruch Spinoza, a Dutch philosopher, 1632–1677

1. How North Korea Cheated Its Way to Crypto Billions

2. Why Donald Trump should meet Kim Jong-un again – in Mongolia

3. "Kim Yo Jong: The World's First Nuclear Despotess"

4. China, E.U. prepare ‘countermeasures’ as Trump tariffs unite friends and foes

5. “Trump Supports Existing Agreements of ‘Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultation Group’”

6. What does President Yoon Seok-yeol’s impeachment mean for South Korea’s democracy?

7. Dismantling VOA and other U.S. Media is a Strategic Mistake

8. Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

9. Yoon not to attend impeachment ruling session Friday

10. Chinese national under probe over allegedly bribing soldier for military secrets

11. Seoul to devise support measures for local industries, says 'regrets' U.S. reciprocal tariff plans

12. Acting president calls for all-out response to U.S. announcement of 25 pct tariffs

13. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan meet in Brussels after Trump's tariff announcement

14. DPRK IT Workers Expanding in Scope and Scale

15. Spring hunger forces N. Korean rural families to borrow grain at crushing interest rates

16. Hanwha Aerospace inks 371.4 bln-won deal to export K9 howitzer to India

17. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

18. Russia, Cuba and North Korea escape worst of Trump's tariff wrath

19. Extended Deterrence: A Tool That Has Served American Interests Since 1945

1. How North Korea Cheated Its Way to Crypto Billions

Please go to the link to view the graphics.

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-cryptocurrency-580d7d3f?st=JbbGUU&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Excerpts:

The FBI added that North Korea is using difficult-to-detect phishing campaigns featuring advanced malware. The hackers often target people working in the crypto industry and look for details about them on social media and websites. They then customize fictional scenarios that appeal to their victims, such as job offers or investment opportunities, the agency said.

Once the victims click on shared links for virtual calls or job applications, the hackers gain access to systems, potentially enabling them to tap users’ crypto.

In December, a U.S. court indicted 14 North Korean nationals for allegedly using false, stolen or borrowed identities of U.S. citizens to get remote jobs at U.S. companies and nonprofit organizations. North Koreans involved in the campaign, who referred to themselves as “IT warriors,” allegedly pocketed at least $88 million in salaries for the Kim regime, and got access to the companies’ computer networks. Several crypto firms have fallen prey to North Koreans who pose as job candidates, according to industry insiders.

“The sense we get is that North Korean hackers are increasingly around us,” said Ben Turner, head of engineering at Cloudburst Technologies, a crypto intelligence data firm.

It is not like this is new. We have identified similar activities in the past though the all purpose sword of north korea just keeps getting better and more sophisticated.. in 2018 Mathew Ha and I wrote a monograph that included this recommendation noting this activities:

 The new task force should include enhanced information

sharing. For instance, South Korea’s Korea Internet

Safety Agency successfully prevented a spear-phishing

campaign targeting 10 cryptocurrency exchanges earlier

in 2017.164 Sharing insights from such experiences will

be instrumental in fortifying cyber defenses.

From Kim Jong Un’s ‘All-Purpose Sword’ North Korean Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare, October 2018, https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/REPORT_NorthKorea_CEEW.pdf

How North Korea Cheated Its Way to Crypto Billions

More than $6 billion from heists highlights the sophistication of cyber operations funneling cash to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear program

Illustration: Alexandra Citrin-Safadi/WSJ; iStock

By Patricia KowsmannFollow in Singapore and Timothy W. MartinFollow in Seoul

Updated April 3, 2025 12:07 am ET

At 11:49 a.m. on July 18, North Korean hackers pounced on a major cryptocurrency exchange handling hundreds of millions of dollars. 

The hackers slipped into the exchange’s virtual vault, took control and then started pilfering cryptocurrency tokens. Within a little more than an hour, the hackers had disappeared—and with them, more than $200 million for the Kim Jong Un regime. 

The shocking theft at WazirX, India’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, along with several other major recent heists, has made it clear: North Korea is now the world’s most dangerous crypto thief.

It has swiped more than $6 billion in cryptocurrency over the past decade—a sum so large that no one else compares.

The country’s hackers are both patient and brazen, according to investigators. To get into companies’ computers, they comb through employees’ Facebook and Instagram pages and invent tailor-made stories to trick them into clicking on links with viruses. Some North Korean hackers have even become employees themselves, fooling U.S. companies into hiring them as remote IT workers and gaining access to their networks.

After grabbing their bounty, North Korean hackers are masters at escaping. At WazirX, investigators believe they used algorithms to spread funds through global crypto networks faster than any human could, making it almost impossible for authorities to catch up. Once the crypto is dispersed, North Koreans often lie low until investigators lose interest and move on, waiting months or years to convert their haul into traditional money that can be spent.

Cryptocurrency theft by North Korean hackers

Total amount

Percentage of industrywide theft losses

$1.6 billion

100%

90

1.4

80

1.2

70

1.0

60

0.8

50

40

0.6

30

0.4

20

0.2

10

0

0

2016

’20

’25

2021

’22

’23

’24

’25

Note: 2025 data as of March 26

Source: Chainalysis

“North Korean hackers are playing a different game than anyone else,” said Nick Carlsen, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation analyst who is now an investigator at TRM Labs, a blockchain-analytics firm.

Pyongyang’s crowning achievement came in February with a $1.5 billion raid of Bybit, one of the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, in the largest-ever such heist. That followed several hackings in 2024, when North Korea stole more than $6 out of every $10 lost by the cryptocurrency industry, according to Chainalysis, which tracks crypto theft.

The illicit money helps fund the Kim regime’s nuclear program and prop up the country’s sanctions-strapped economy.

North Korea’s success reflects the major resources dedicated to the task. The regime commands more than 8,000 hackers as though they were in a military unit, with the country’s brightest minds. State support means its hackers can wait months or years to exploit a single slip in a company’s digital security. Pyongyang’s desperation for cash, and its lack of concern for diplomatic blowback, have fueled its drive to be better than anyone else. 

“The North Koreans are very pragmatic and just want to get things done—that’s what makes them special,” said Joon Kim, owner of Seoul-based Naru Security, which works with South Korea’s intelligence agency and national police on cyber issues.

Pyongyang hasn’t commented publicly about the latest crypto hackings. It has denied involvement in other cyber offensives in the past, which U.S. authorities said included the 2014 email hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment, 2016’s theft of $81 million from Bangladesh’s central bank and the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017.

ByBit, a cryptocurrency exchange, was the target of a $1.5 billion raid by North Korean hackers. Photo: KARIM SAHIB/AFP/Getty Images

U.S. officials and private investigators said North Koreans leave behind digital crumbs making it clear they are the culprits, including familiar malware code and crypto wallets that were reused from prior heists attributed to Pyongyang. 

Anatomy of a theft

The theft from WazirX, the Indian crypto exchange, showcased many of North Korea’s go-to moves.   

At the time, company officers were conducting a routine operation: moving $625,000 in crypto from a WazirX “cold wallet,” a digital vault where exchanges keep their reserves, to a so-called “hot wallet,” used to fulfill client transactions and withdrawals. 

The transfer required three WazirX officials and an external service provider to sign off. Once those approvals were done, North Koreans somehow took control of the cold wallet and drained all the money in it—more than $200 million—and dispersed it without being caught.

It worked like this:

Please go to the link to view the graphics.

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-cryptocurrency-580d7d3f?st=JbbGUU&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

With almost half of its assets gone, WazirX had to shut down its exchange. Only around $3 million of the stolen crypto has been frozen, in this case by Tether, the company that issues a cryptocurrency bearing its own name. A representative for WazirX said it is trying to maximize recovery for users and reactivate its platform as quickly as possible.

The Wall Street Journal wasn’t able to determine how the North Koreans got access to WazirX’s cold wallet or modified the necessary approvals to take control.

But it was clear they were highly skilled. The North Koreans used more than 400 transactions—all in a little over an hour—to move WazirX crypto tokens to a wallet they controlled, suggesting the use of automation, according to Benedict Hamilton, a managing director at Kroll, the firm WazirX hired to help trace the funds and restructure its debt. 

Most of the funds have likely already been converted to cash, Hamilton said.  

‘Computer wars’

North Korea spent decades cultivating its elite hacking capabilities, with the current dictator’s late father, Kim Jong Il, once professing, “All wars in future years will be computer wars.”

The country’s cyber-attacking operation, according to South Korean officials, comprises six groups and roughly a dozen supporting organizations. 

Youths who show aptitude for math and science are quickly enlisted for training. Cyber operatives do little other than work on improving their skills, and are subject to physical punishment, said Elma Duval, a co-author of a report by PScore, a Seoul-based advocacy group that interviewed former North Korean IT workers. Still, they live more comfortably than most North Koreans. 

Kim Jong Un uses stolen cryptocurrency to help prop up his sanctions-strapped regime. Photo: KCNA/AFP/Getty Images

The reason for North Korea’s focus is obvious: It needs roughly $6 billion a year to fund its various government activities, South Korea’s spy agency has said, including hundreds of millions of dollars estimated to be earmarked for its nuclear program.

International sanctions have limited North Korea’s take from its traditional cash cows, including arms sales, coal smuggling and overseas labor. Crypto theft offers a low-risk way for Pyongyang to fill its coffers, said Eric Penton-Voak, who served as coordinator of the U.N. panel overseeing sanctions enforcement of North Korea from 2021 to 2023.

“North Korea has to pay more for everything, so they have to steal more than anyone else,” he said. “It’s very expensive to be a sanctioned country.”

IT warriors

The country’s expanding cyber-theft capabilities are especially worrisome to global regulators because they coincide with an explosion of consumer interest in crypto.     

In September, the FBI issued a warning that North Korean hackers were conducting research on companies associated with exchange-traded funds that hold crypto instead of stocks. This corner of the financial market attracted around $37 billion in net inflows last year, from everyday U.S. investors to such giants as BlackRock and Fidelity Investments.

The FBI added that North Korea is using difficult-to-detect phishing campaigns featuring advanced malware. The hackers often target people working in the crypto industry and look for details about them on social media and websites. They then customize fictional scenarios that appeal to their victims, such as job offers or investment opportunities, the agency said. 

Once the victims click on shared links for virtual calls or job applications, the hackers gain access to systems, potentially enabling them to tap users’ crypto. 

In December, a U.S. court indicted 14 North Korean nationals for allegedly using false, stolen or borrowed identities of U.S. citizens to get remote jobs at U.S. companies and nonprofit organizations. North Koreans involved in the campaign, who referred to themselves as “IT warriors,” allegedly pocketed at least $88 million in salaries for the Kim regime, and got access to the companies’ computer networks. Several crypto firms have fallen prey to North Koreans who pose as job candidates, according to industry insiders.

“The sense we get is that North Korean hackers are increasingly around us,” said Ben Turner, head of engineering at Cloudburst Technologies, a crypto intelligence data firm.

Write to Patricia Kowsmann at patricia.kowsmann@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

2. Why Donald Trump should meet Kim Jong-un again – in Mongolia

It appears some of us have been paving the way for this unbeknownst to us. Mongolia is a great venue. We have been going to Mongolia every year and holding meetings with the members of the international community on a free and unified Korea. It is the proverbial safe space where we can meet with scholars and practitioners from across the spectrum of universities to think tanks to former government officials from the region to include South Korea, Mongolia, Japan, China, Russia, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Australia as well as others from Europe, Africa, and South America. north Korea is always invited but alas...

If you go to the link and see the photo of the statue of Ghengis Khan you will note that he is atop the largest statue of a horse in the world. In addition to holding a public conference in the capital UlaanBaatar we would meet in the countryside near that stature and stay in traditional gers (also known by the Russian name yurt) and hold private sessions on everything surrounding security, development, and economic issues relating to the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. We meet throughout the day, break bread, ride horses, see traditional Mongolian entertainment in the evening, and then sit around the campfire at night and discuss how to solve all problems. :-)  (I usually get lectured by a couple of our Chinese friends about how the US military is the cause of all problems!) 

The Mongolians are great hosts so this would be a great venue. I would love to see the President and Kim stay in a Ger (Yurt) until all problems are resolved. 

Why Donald Trump should meet Kim Jong-un again – in Mongolia | Lowy Institute

As a venue that addresses the practical and symbolic barriers that hampered previous efforts, Mongolia offers unique advantages.

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-donald-trump-should-meet-kim-jong-un-again-mongolia

lowyinstitute.org · by Tuvshinzaya Gantulga

With Donald Trump back in the White House and North Korea’s nuclear program under Kim Jong-un continuing unchecked, another summit between the two leaders seems to be a matter of when, not if. This time, they should meet in Mongolia.

The first two Trump-Kim summits produced spectacle but little substance. Singapore offered glamour in 2018 but yielded only vague commitments. Hanoi in 2019 collapsed entirely. Their third meeting on the DMZ was made for the cameras. The diplomatic window closed afterwards as Covid-19 and US domestic politics intervened.

Now, that window has reopened. North Korea has advanced its capabilities significantly, testing intercontinental ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear warheads while deepening ties with Russia. The nuclear challenge hasn't disappeared – it has intensified.

When Trump decides to reengage with Kim – and most likely he will – the choice of venue will shape both process and outcomes.

For Washington and Pyongyang to re-engage effectively, they’ll need a venue that addresses the practical and symbolic barriers that hampered previous efforts. Mongolia offers unique advantages that neither side can afford to ignore.

First, accessibility. When Kim travelled to Singapore, he was forced to borrow a Chinese aircraft that may have led to a national embarrassment. Mongolia allows him to arrive by train, just as his grandfather did in 1988, projecting independence rather than reliance on Beijing. For a regime obsessed with symbolism and self-sufficiency, this matters tremendously.

Second, Mongolia’s diplomatic positioning. Unlike other potential hosts, Mongolia maintains equally constructive relationships with both sides without competing strategic agendas. A democracy with strong Western ties, Mongolia nonetheless treats North Korea with consistent respect rather than isolation. This balanced approach – democratic values paired with pragmatic engagement – serves both American and North Korean interests.

The giant steel statue of Ghengis Khan, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (Jéan Béller/Unsplash)

The limited progress of the Biden administration on North Korea issues has demonstrated that “strategic patience 2.0” only buys time for the regime to advance its nuclear program. Trump’s unconventional approach, for all its flaws, at least created direct channels between the leaders. Those channels need to be reopened, but with clearer objectives and realistic expectations.

A Mongolian summit would signal both continuity and reset – acknowledging previous diplomatic efforts while creating space for more substantive negotiations. The setting itself would reinforce the message that this engagement is different from the attempts of the past.

South Korea, too, would welcome the summit in Mongolia. Seoul’s relations with Washington have become more complicated, with growing concerns about US security commitments. Former presidential adviser Moon Chung-in recently noted that “there is no guarantee the US will protect [South Korea] in the event of inter-Korean war”. It means the better relations Washington and Pyongyang have, the more secure Seoul would feel.

Some critics will argue that North Korea has proven untrustworthy in previous talks. That’s precisely why the diplomatic approach must evolve. Trump’s return to office creates an opening, but previous mistakes need not be repeated. A focused dialogue in Mongolia – modest in setting but significant in substance – could establish parameters around North Korea’s nuclear program rather than pursuing the elusive goal of complete denuclearisation.

When Trump decides to re-engage with Kim – and most likely he will – the choice of venue will shape both process and outcomes. Mongolia offers what other venue options could not: a setting where both leaders can meet as equals, unburdened by excessive expectations or third-party interests. Mongolia might be the missing piece in a diplomatic puzzle that has confounded US presidents for decades.

lowyinstitute.org · by Tuvshinzaya Gantulga

3. "Kim Yo Jong: The World's First Nuclear Despotess"

By Sung Yoon Lee

The short but insightful article can be accessed on page 26 at this link: https://issuu.com/royalsocietyforasianaffairs/docs/caravanserai_-_issue_6_-_spring_2025?fr=sMTk5Nzg0MDMzNjk

Note the photos of Kim with Americans and South Korea officials.

Conclusion: 

In manipulating her foes to resign themselves into accepting her nation's nukes as an immutable reality, she reaffirms a reality at once sinister and grim like the daily a lot of her people: “The supreme leader, obviously loves his daughter, doesn't he? He's not crazy enough to start a nuclear war, is he?” Maybe we'll all just have to live with a nuclear North Korea… The nature of the regime notwithstanding. Yet another victory it shall be for the dystopian dynasty.

4. China, E.U. prepare ‘countermeasures’ as Trump tariffs unite friends and foes

It is obvious that I did not take enough classes in economics in college because I just do not grasp the logic of these tariffs.

China, E.U. prepare ‘countermeasures’ as Trump tariffs unite friends and foes

Allies and adversaries alike were reeling from Trump’s tariff blitz, with some signaling they were ready to retaliate, while others were still hoping for talks.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/02/trump-tariffs-reaction-markets-retaliation/

UpdatedApril 3, 2025 at 2:51 a.m. EDTtoday at 2:51 a.m. EDT

8 min

591

Shock, outrage as the world reacts to Trump tariffs

1:56

On April 3, world leaders called President Donald Trump's new tariff plan “regrettable” and “a major blow to the world economy.” (Video: The Washington Post)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Christian Shepherd and Steve Hendrix

SEOUL — China is promising to retaliate against President Donald Trump’s “typical bullying” with unspecified countermeasures, while the European Union said it is working on its response, as allies and adversaries alike reeled Thursday from what Trump billed as a “Liberation Day” tariffs blitz.

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Stock markets across Asia fell upon opening Thursday after Trump imposed huge tariffs on all the region’s leading economies, although they recovered some of their losses during the trading day, while analysts warned the measures risked strengthening China’s hand in the region.

“This decision, which is so unprincipled, so abrupt, so profound in its impact, calls into question what kind of partner the U.S. will be,” said Susannah Patton, the director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank. “It will play into China’s narrative that the U.S. is a unreliable, distant partner that can come and go.”

Stock indexes are seen on a ticker display Wednesday in the financial district of Shanghai, as people pass by on a pedestrian bridge. (Go Nakamura/Reuters)

European political and business leaders awaking to the specifics of the tariff spikes added their shock, outrage and confusion to the global chorus.

Governments held back on rolling out specific countermeasures, with most promising to respond with “cool and calm heads,” in the words of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. But beneath the diplomatic restraint were anger and fears of spreading economic chaos.

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Robert Habeck, Germany’s outgoing economy minister, warned that the U.S “tariff mania could trigger a spiral that could also drag countries into recession and cause massive damage worldwide.”

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni described the introduction of tariffs against the E.U. as “wrong” and said she would work on a deal with the U.S. to “prevent a trade war that would inevitably weaken the West in favor of other global actors.”

With Wednesday’s announcements, Trump increased the levy on Chinese exports to the United States from 20 to 54 percent. He also slapped duties of 24 and 25 percent on Japan and South Korea, respectively — both key security allies in the region and major trading partners — and 32 percent on Taiwan.

But he also targeted many of the countries that had benefited from efforts, encouraged by the United States across administrations, to diversify supply chains away from China: Cambodia was stung with a 49 percent tariff, Vietnam 46 percent and Thailand 36 percent.

Justifying his tariffs at an announcement in the White House Rose Garden on Wednesday, Trump said the United States had been “looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by nations near and far, both friend and foe alike.”

The size of the tariffs stunned the United States’ allies in particular.

“We are bewildered,” said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, an American treaty ally.

“It’s worse now to be a U.S. ally than to be an adversary. As an adversary, at least you know what you’re getting,” Thitinan said. “To be an ally and then be treated like an adversary … that is not expected; it’s not nice.”

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, whose country got off relatively lightly with a 10 percent blanket duty, offered a similar sentiment. “The administration’s tariffs have no basis in logic, and they go against the basis of our two nations’ partnership. This is not the act of a friend,” Albanese said.

The European Union, which was hit with a 20 percent blanket tariff, is ready to respond if talks with Washington fail, said the head of the E.U. executive branch, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

“There seems to be no order in the disorder. No clear path through the complexity and chaos,” she said in a statement describing the tariffs as a “major blow.”

The 27-nation bloc is finalizing its first round of retaliation to U.S. steel tariffs and is “now preparing for further countermeasures to protect our interests and our businesses if negotiations fail,” she said. “It is not too late to address concern through negotiations,” she added. Speaking to “my fellow Europeans,” she said, “I know that many of you feel let down by our oldest ally.”

Von der Leyen also warned of possible spillover from other markets, as industry leaders worry that a U.S.-China trade war could prompt Beijing to divert cheaper goods to the continent, creating unwelcome competition. “We will also be watching closely what indirect effects these tariffs could have. Because we cannot absorb global overcapacity, nor will we accept dumping on our markets,” she said.

Trump signs reciprocal tariff executive order

2:31

President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing a 10 percent tariff on all imported goods at a White House event on April 2. (Video: The Washington Post, Photo: Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post)

The tariffs are particularly onerous on China, the world’s second-biggest economy and the target of much of Trump’s ire as it ran a nearly $1 trillion trade surplus with the United States last year.

The new tariff of 34 percent on Chinese goods comes on top of the 20 percent levy already imposed as Trump accused Beijing of not doing enough to stop the flow of fentanyl and its precursors into the United States. It is also in addition to the existing tariffs on goods including some appliances, machinery and clothing that were already as high as 45 percent.

China’s Commerce Ministry condemned the tariffs, pledged unspecified countermeasures and noted that many American trading partners shared Beijing’s dissatisfaction.

“As Trump’s big tariff stick threatens the world, it pushes the United States’ allies to talk to China,” said Ma Bin, an associate professor at Fudan University in Shanghai. “This driving force is really obvious.”

Trump’s latest announcement means that everything the United States imports from China — iPhones, laptops, toys, video game consoles — will carry a minimum tariff of 54 percent, said Chad Brown, a senior fellow from the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Analysts said Beijing is likely to retaliate with additional tariffs on politically sensitive U.S. exports like farming goods while expanding export controls on key raw materials and regulatory pressure on American companies.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has not yet directly engaged with Trump to negotiate tariffs, relying instead on a well-honed retaliatory playbook to ride out the onslaught.

“Xi is playing the long game: Avoid concessions, absorb the hit, and bet Trump blinks first,” said Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank.

China wants to negotiate, but it held back after earlier tariffs because it expected those were “just the hors d’oeuvre, not the main course,” said Henry Gao, an expert on trade at Singapore Management University.

Trump also signed an executive order Wednesday to close the duty-free trade loophole for small packages, which he said is necessary to prevent synthetic opioids from entering the United States. Goods will now be charged 30 percent of their value, or $25 each, effective May 2, a move that will affect shipments from online retailers such a Temu and Shein.

But China was hardly singled out. Taiwan’s executive branch called the measures “seriously unreasonable.”

Just how disruptive the sweeping duties are for allies will depend on enforcement and potential exemptions, analysts said. The White House listed carve-outs for industries like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals that may provide relief for partners such as Taiwan and South Korea.

An observation platform at the port in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, on Wednesday. (Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters)

Japan and South Korea view the tariffs as an opening salvo for negotiations with the Trump administration.

Cars from the two countries, home to Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and Kia, were already set to be hit with the 25 percent tariff on foreign-made vehicles and auto parts that Trump announced last week and came into effect at 12:01 a.m. on Thursday.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba gave his most forceful response to date Thursday, saying his government had “repeatedly requested” a review of the tariffs, which he called “extremely regrettable” and one-sided.

“This will not only impact the economic relationship between Japan and the United States, but also have significant repercussions on the global economy and the multilateral trade system as a whole,” Ishiba said. “We have serious concerns.”

But Japan has few options to hit back, and retaliatory tariffs would be difficult for Tokyo to levy, experts say.

In Seoul, acting president Han Duck-soo convened an emergency task force Thursday to discuss countermeasures, saying “the global trade war has become a reality.”

Trump’s tariff policy could push Japan to look to other countries to decrease its supply chain dependence on America, including increasing trade with China, said Keisuke Hanyuda, former Japanese trade negotiator.

“Japan relies heavily on the U.S. for security. But if Japan starts to see Trump’s stance as unreliable on that front, then it would be a totally different story,” Hanyuda said. “That’s why China has been actively reaching out to Japan.”

Beijing appears to recognize this vulnerability in Tokyo and Seoul.

After a previously scheduled meeting of the three countries’ trade ministers on Sunday, Chinese state media said they agreed to coordinate supply chains and hold talks on export controls in response to the U.S. tariffs. Tokyo and Seoul swiftly played down that characterization, saying the three had agreed to continue cooperating broadly on economic and trade matters.

Shepherd reported from Singapore and Hendrix from London. Chie Tanaka in Tokyo, Lyric Li in Seoul, Rebecca Tan in Singapore, Kate Brady in Berlin, and Ellen Francis and Beatriz Ríos in Brussels contributed to this report.

5. “Trump Supports Existing Agreements of ‘Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultation Group’”

Some good news.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

“Trump Supports Existing Agreements of ‘Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultation Group’”

Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org

2025.04.03

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/03/fleitz-trump-ncg-washington-declaration/

Anchor: Fred Fleitz, vice president of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and one of President Donald Trump's closest associates, said that President Trump will fully support the Washington Declaration and the nuclear consultative group, as well as the South Korea-U.S. agreements reached during the Biden administration. Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul.

The Sejong National Strategy Forum titled 'Trump's 2nd Term Administration and East Asian Security' was held in Seoul on the 3rd, hosted by the Sejong Institute, a private research institute in Korea.

Fred Fleitz, vice president of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), a policy research institute that produced many Trump second-term administration officials, said at the event that “US President Trump will fully support the 2023 Washington Declaration and the US-ROK agreement on the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).”

Deputy Director Fletz also said, “President Trump will continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, as well as the Quad and Okurs,” adding, “The relationship between the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region will not be shaken.”

[Fred Fleitz, Vice President, America First Policy Institute] President Trump will fully support the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) agreement.

Regarding the possibility of a summit between U.S. President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Deputy Director Fleitz said, “Minimum conditions for a meeting, such as North Korea halting missile tests, must be met.”

Deputy Director Flyts said that while President Trump is likely to show a willingness to resume direct diplomacy with General Secretary Kim, he is likely to first hold high-level consultations among South Korea, the US, and Japan before pushing for a US-North Korea summit.

He added that after the North Korea-US summit, credible verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of the nuclear agreement and full cooperation from North Korea will be essential.

Deputy Director Fred Fleitz served as the Chief of Staff to the National Security Council (NSC) during the first Trump administration and is considered one of President Trump's closest aides, having also worked on Trump's second-term transition team.

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Sejong National Strategy Forum on 'Trump's 2nd Administration and East Asian Security' held in Seoul on the 3rd. (RFA)

“North Korea will not accept ‘small deal proposal’”

Director Hwang Tae-hee, who is currently serving as the Director of the Unification Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Unification after taking a leave of absence from his position as a professor of political science and diplomacy at Yonsei University, said that the possibility of a small deal, or a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program or disarmament talks between the U.S. and North Korea, is unlikely to come to fruition.

Since the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit, North Korea has advanced its nuclear weapons, and through the dispatch of troops to the war in Ukraine, it has secured enough food and energy from Russia to sustain its regime, eliminating the need for assistance from the United States. In addition, General Secretary Kim is still politically burdened by the failure of the previous summit.

In particular, Director Hwang explained that North Korea's fundamental goal in strengthening its nuclear arsenal is to secure the ability to achieve mutually assured destruction (MAD) against the United States and successfully deter it, and therefore North Korea will not accept a proposal to give up intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.

[Hwang Tae-hee, Director of the Ministry of Unification’s Unification Cooperation Bureau] Wasn’t North Korea’s goal to complete mutually assured destruction and succeed in deterrence? The result of a small deal would not ultimately be favorable to North Korea, so North Korea would not prefer it.

Shin Beom-chul, another presenter that day and senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said that US President Trump's recent use of the expression "nuclear power" to describe North Korea was merely intended to emphasize the existence of a nuclear threat from North Korea, and that it does not mean that North Korea is a legitimate nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

Senior Researcher Shin also analyzed that President Trump's intention is to manage the crisis by maintaining a good relationship with General Secretary Kim, and that there is no reason for South Korea to oppose this.

[Senior Researcher Shin Beom-chul, Sejong Institute] I think President Trump’s remarks on North Korea’s nuclear program are quite strategic and very desirable. President Trump’s current grand strategy in terms of security is to focus all of his energy on deterring China. That’s why I see North Korea as a threat that needs to be managed.

Former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command Charles Flynn.

Former U.S. Pacific Commander General Charles Flynn. (RFA)

Former U.S. Pacific Command Commander Charles Flynn said at the event that the two most concerning things about North Korea-Russia cooperation are North Korea obtaining various types of information, including weapons systems, in real time through its participation in the war and the transfer of military technology from Russia.

Former Commander Flynn suggested that “South Korea-U.S. cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue should be based on integrated deterrence and extended deterrence, and in order to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance, expansion and strengthening of South Korea-U.S. joint training is required.”

He also said that the existing three-axis system needs to be strengthened to ensure that troops can survive and maintain combat capabilities even in environments contaminated with North Korea's chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, Korean-American congressman Young Kim, a three-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives, emphasized in a video address that as cooperation among North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran strengthens, the U.S. must continue to work with its allies, including South Korea, to secure extended deterrence.

Regarding the recent designation of South Korea as a sensitive country by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jeong Byeong-won stated that it is excessive to interpret it as a U.S. check on public opinion in some parts of Korean society that South Korea should arm itself with nuclear weapons.

This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.

Editor Yang Seong-won

6. What does President Yoon Seok-yeol’s impeachment mean for South Korea’s democracy?

​All parties and all citizens and especially leaders must prioritize national security and national prosperity over political divisions. I wish and hope to see Koreans band together to tackle their problems just as we saw them react to the IMF crisis in 1997. Then there was a whole-of-society effort to save South Korea's economic well being. Now they need to apply the same effort for their political well being.

Advice from my friend from north Korea who is a political leader in the UK and who is also a colleague at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS), Jihyun Park.

Excerpts:

A call for unity and democratic renewal

South Korea’s ongoing political crisis presents a critical moment for national reflection and recommitment to democratic principles—three key efforts are imperative:

First, political leaders must prioritize national security and liberal democracy above partisan interests. The nation’s stability and democratic foundations should be the guiding principles for all political decisions.

Second, citizens must exercise their democratic rights responsibly, making informed choices that safeguard freedom and democracy without succumbing to ideological polarization.

Finally, all sectors of society must transcend political divisions and unite for South Korea’s future, fostering a political environment that values cooperation over conflict.

The nation’s future hinges on its ability to heal divisions, restore public trust in institutions, and unite its people. While South Korea thrives as a democratic republic with free elections, freedom of speech, and economic prosperity, North Korea remains a totalitarian state with no civil liberties, severe repression, and widespread poverty. This contrast highlights the importance of safeguarding South Korea’s hard-won freedoms in a region characterized by authoritarianism and political instability.

by Jihyun Park and 1 others

Apr 3, 2025 in CEIAS Insights

What does President Yoon Seok-yeol’s impeachment mean for South Korea’s democracy?

https://ceias.eu/what-does-president-yoon-seok-yeols-impeachment-mean-for-south-koreas-democracy/

South Korea is at a crossroads as the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol exposes deep political fault lines, testing the strength of its institutions and raising concerns about its role as a democratic bellwether in Asia.

Key takeaways:

1. The impeachment crisis underscores the severe partisan divisions in South Korea.
2. The fragility of South Korea’s democracy has been put on full display, showing the risk of undermining the success of country’s democratization.
3. Overcoming the current crisis requires political leaders to prioritize national security, democratic principles, and to unite for the future of South Korea.

The impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol last December was a pivotal moment for South Korea, carrying far-reaching implications for its democracy, political stability, and international standing. While this crisis centers on the actions of one leader, its deeper significance lies in the test it presents to South Korea’s democratic resilience and its ability to unite amidst internal divisions and external threats. This period is particularly salient for those who view South Korea as a symbol of hope and freedom, especially North Korean defectors who, having fled oppression, recognize what is at stake.

The unfolding crisis: Martial law and impeachment

South Korea’s political landscape underwent significant upheaval in 2024, culminating in a constitutional crisis. The April 2024 parliamentary elections resulted in a landslide victory for the Democratic Party of Korea, the party in opposition to President Yoon. This led to political deadlock, with disputes over budget allocations and controversy surrounding First Lady Kim Keon-hee, who faced allegations of bribery and stock price manipulation. The Democratic Party of Korea took aggressive measures, impeaching prosecutors and the chair of the Board of Audit and Inspection for inadequate investigation of these scandals. Yoon’s veto of a special investigation law further intensified political polarization.

On December 3, 2024, Yoon declared martial law, citing “anti-state activities” and alleged collaboration with North Korea by opposition parties. Likely influenced by South Korea’s history of military responses to political crises, Yoon may have believed his actions were constitutionally justified. However, the move was short-lived. Within hours, the declaration of martial law was reversed, and on December 14, the National Assembly impeached Yoon on charges of rebellion and undermining peace, marking only the third presidential impeachment in the nation’s history.

Following the crisis, alarming details emerged about Yoon’s alleged plans and military collusion. Leaked documents revealed extensive preparations for mass arrests of opposition leaders, judges, and civil society figures. They also revealed that Yoon had been considering using martial law for more than a year and had strategically appointed allies to key positions. Although elected democratically, Yoon’s actions—especially the suspension of democratic processes—were widely seen as disproportionate to any immediate threat. 

The ramifications of Lee Jae-myung’s acquittal: A battle for leadership and democracy

The acquittal of South Korea’s opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, on charges of violating the Public Official Election Act in March has raised questions about a potential double standard in the nation’s judiciary, with critics arguing that political considerations may have influenced the courts’ decisions. The Seoul High Court overturned a previous conviction that had sentenced Lee to a one-year suspended prison term and which would have barred him from running for office for 10 years. It ruled that his statements during his 2022 presidential campaign were either unverifiable or constituted general opinions rather than actionable falsehoods. This decision effectively clears the way for Lee to consolidate his leadership within the Democratic Party of Korea and positions him as a top contender for the presidency, should Yoon be removed from office.

The juxtaposition between Lee’s legal victory against Yoon’s legal woes lay bare deepening political polarization in South Korea. Critics claim that Lee exploited the political turmoil to strengthen his position while evading legal accountability. Meanwhile, Yoon’s supporters have rallied in unprecedented numbers, elevating him to a symbolic figure of resistance against what they perceive as politically motivated attacks. These developments have eroded public trust in South Korea’s judiciary, with recent polls indicating that only 53 percent of Koreans express confidence in the Constitutional Court.

The fragility of democracy: A North Korean perspective

South Korea’s democracy, though young, was forged by decades of struggle for freedom, with moments like the Gwangju Uprising and the Seoul Spring defining the democratic journey. But today’s threat emerges not from military dictatorship but from within the political system. Deep partisan divides are increasingly threatening the stability of South Korea’s democracy, raising alarm bells about the future of the nation’s democratic project.

For North Korean defectors, this moment carries a particular weight. South Korea has long represented the hope of freedom, an opportunity to escape the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong-un and live in a society where individual rights and freedoms are protected. The possibility that these very freedoms may be undermined through internal political conflict is a deeply unsettling prospect. In particular, the divisive impeachment process Yoon has been subjected to mirrors the kind of political instability that defectors have fled from in North Korea, where internal strife and power struggles only serve to bolster authoritarian control.

Yoon’s administration has been an ally of defectors, working to strengthen their rights and ensure their safety. His policies, such as the establishment of North Korean Defectors’ Day in 2024 and his commitment to preventing forced repatriations, have signaled a dedication to supporting those who risked their lives to escape one of the world’s most oppressive regimes. Furthermore, the Yoon administration’s strategy of “freedom-based unification,” which aims to empower North Koreans through access to independent information, stands as a testament to South Korea’s moral leadership in the region. These efforts are now at risk, as political divisions threaten to derail the very principles upon which these policies were founded.

A divided response to impeachment

The impeachment case against Yoon has placed South Korea’s Constitutional Court at the center of the political turmoil, with demands for a prompt ruling amid growing public frustration. The court has taken longer than usual to reach a verdict, fueling speculation about internal deliberations. At least six of the court’s eight justices must vote to remove Yoon from office, a decision that would trigger a snap election within 60 days. This legal process raises divisive questions about judicial impartiality under intense public scrutiny, as rival camps seek to sway opinion through protests. While South Korea’s Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial under Article 27, emphasizing judicial independence and protection from external pressures, the scale and intensity of the protests risk creating a prejudicial environment that could challenge these safeguards. These protests highlight deep divisions within South Korean society, reflecting contrasting modes of organization and competing visions for the nation’s future.

On the one hand, mass-mobilized protests, often orchestrated by political parties and advocacy groups, utilize structured campaigns and institutional frameworks to advocate for change. These protests consolidate a unified message and rally supporters around shared values, such as anti-authoritarianism or progressive ideals. However, this ideological focus can exacerbate social divisions by framing issues in binary terms—“pro-Yoon” versus “anti-Yoon”—potentially alienating moderate voices and complicating efforts at compromise. While these movements have historical resonance in South Korea’s pro-democracy tradition, they risk undermining democratic unity by prioritizing specific agendas over broader democratic principles.

On the other hand, grassroots or spontaneous protests are driven by voluntary citizen participation, reflecting a bottom-up approach that emphasizes participatory democracy. These movements rely on direct civic engagement, with participants often mobilizing organically out of a shared sense of civic duty or concern for democratic values. Decentralized, they bring together diverse voices to address immediate political or social crises. However, their lack of formal organization can limit their ability to sustain long-term momentum or achieve concrete policy outcomes.

The upcoming verdict in Yoon’s trial, scheduled for April 4, has heightened concerns about potential social chaos and even bloodshed as a result of clashes between these groups. The Court’s handling of the announcement, whether prioritizing the order or the reasoning behind it, will signal the level of internal consensus and the potential for dissenting opinions, further shaping public perception of the trial’s legitimacy.

A call for unity and democratic renewal

South Korea’s ongoing political crisis presents a critical moment for national reflection and recommitment to democratic principles—three key efforts are imperative:

First, political leaders must prioritize national security and liberal democracy above partisan interests. The nation’s stability and democratic foundations should be the guiding principles for all political decisions.

Second, citizens must exercise their democratic rights responsibly, making informed choices that safeguard freedom and democracy without succumbing to ideological polarization.

Finally, all sectors of society must transcend political divisions and unite for South Korea’s future, fostering a political environment that values cooperation over conflict.

The nation’s future hinges on its ability to heal divisions, restore public trust in institutions, and unite its people. While South Korea thrives as a democratic republic with free elections, freedom of speech, and economic prosperity, North Korea remains a totalitarian state with no civil liberties, severe repression, and widespread poverty. This contrast highlights the importance of safeguarding South Korea’s hard-won freedoms in a region characterized by authoritarianism and political instability.

Authors

Jihyun Park

Jun Kajee

7. Dismantling VOA and other U.S. Media is a Strategic Mistake

​Of course I fully concur with Ambassador De Trani. 

​I am sitting here doing my daily news commentary wearing my VOA hat (that says "A Free Press Matters"). Coincidentally on my last appearance on VOA Washington Talk last month the staff gave me a VOA hat and T-shirt and I jokingly asked - are these parting gifts? For all the years I have worked with VOA this is the first time they handed out some swag.

This was the a VOA Washington Talk episode Ambassador DeTrani and I did together in January https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UMyKxXyGxc

Dismantling VOA and other U.S. Media is a Strategic Mistake 

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/dismantling-voa-and-other-u-s-media-is-a-strategic-mistake?utm

Posted: April 3rd, 2025

By Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea, was the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and served as the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, ODNI. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.

OPINION — President Ronald Reagan believed in the power of communication. He aimed to inform a global audience about American values and find ways to provide truthful information and analysis to those who were denied access by their own government to the truth. 

President Reagan selected Charles Wick, a successful businessman, to head the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and William J. Casey, his former campaign manager and successful businessman, to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Wick had an array of agencies – Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Marti (directed at Cuba) and others – which provided news and analysis in twenty-seven languages to twenty-three countries. Mr. Casey would assist, providing support, for example, to the Solidarity labor movement in Poland and methods for USIA to penetrate the Iron Curtain to reach people who had been denied access to truthful information. 

During the Reagan years, information was getting into the former Soviet Union, to include Russian literature (Samizdat) banned by Moscow. When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected supreme leader in March 1985, he inherited a demoralized and financially bankrupt country. In November 1986, Mr. Gorbachev made the decision to withdraw all Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan; that deployment was costing Moscow $4-$5 billion per year, and the Soviets were suffering heavy casualties. Gorbachev also implemented a policy of openness (Glasnost) and economic and political reform (Perestroika) for the beleaguered Soviet Union. In August 1991, Gorbachev resigned and shortly thereafter Ukraine and Belarus declared independence and the Baltic States sought international recognition as sovereign states. hat was the end of the Cold War. 

Much of the credit must go to President Ronald Reagan for ending the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Among other things, the Reagan administration worked to give people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accurate news and analysis about their own countries and the world, along with access to literature their own governments were denying to the public. This contributed to Gorbachev’s decision to implement the Glasnost policy. Indeed, an informed public demanded the truth from their government, and it was the truth that helped to end the Cold War and facilitate the dissolution of the Soviet empire. 

The Trump administration’s recent decision to dismantle the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia and other government media organizations is unfortunate. VOA, established in 1942, serves an audience of 360 million people each week in 50 languages. The Agency for Global Media that oversees VOA manages organizations that broadcast in 64 languages, reaching 427 million people. Why would we cease communicating with the people in Iran via Radio Free Europe/Radio Farda, which is heard by over six million people each week? Why would we stop communicating with the people in all these countries, especially those in autocracies that censor the news and deny their people access to truthful news and analysis? 

We live in a global community and a time that unfortunately mirrors the Cold War, with autocrats in different parts of the world controlling access to news and information. We should proudly communicate the narrative of the United States and its liberal democracy and values, while ensuring that objective and independent news and analysis are accessible to everyone, especially those residing in countries where the news is censored. Information is powerful, and unilaterally deciding to stop communicating with other countries is not in our interest. 

The international reaction to the dismantling of VOA was welcomed by many of our adversaries. China’s Global Times called VOA “a lie factory.” Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang and others no doubt share this view. These countries fear the truth. 

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

8. Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

​A sobering conclusion.

Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for South Korea’s Democracy?

Whether Lee Jae-myung ultimately secures the presidency or not, the current political situation will dictate South Korea’s political trajectory. Lee’s rapid resurgence from electoral defeat in 2022 to frontrunner status amid scandal and an impeachment crisis underscores the volatility of South Korea’s political status quo. It also reveals deeper institutional problems, including prosecutorial authority wielded as a partisan weapon, impeachment employed as a political tactic rather than a measure of last resort, and a party system dominated by personality-driven leadership rather than coherent policy platforms. Collectively, these trends pose serious challenges to South Korean democracy’s long-term stability.

If Lee runs and wins in a snap election, South Korea would witness yet another dramatic power shift following an impeachment. This would repeat the 2017 experience and essentially complete a cycle that began with Yoon’s tenure. This could pave the way for reforms (the DP has vowed to curb prosecutorial overreach, for instance), but it might also tempt a triumphant Lee to settle scores, further entrenching the cycle of political retribution.

Alternatively, if the courts or the voters halt Lee’s rise – whether through a disqualifying verdict or an electoral upset – it would signal a different reckoning and another crisis. The conservatives would feel vindicated in portraying Lee as unfit, and the DP would face pressure to reinvent itself beyond its embattled figurehead. Or, worse, it would invite even greater political chaos and social unrest.

Regardless of the outcome, South Korea is at an inflection point. The coming weeks will reveal whether the country can steer itself toward more stable politics or if the Lee-versus-Yoon saga merely reflects a highly polarized and confrontational new normal. Politics in South Korea today suggest the latter is much more likely.

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent and overcome his legal battles without further deepening societal divisions – will likely be tested. Whether he succeeds or fails, the broader implications will extend far beyond Lee himself. The outcome will reverberate far beyond this one man’s career, shaping the health of South Korea’s democracy and society in the months and years to come.

Cover Story

Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent without further deepening societal divisions – will pose a key test for South Korea’s democracy.

https://magazine.thediplomat.com/2025-04/will-lee-jae-myung-rise-from-south-koreas-political-chaos

By Steven Denney

South Korea is amid a high-stakes political moment, and Lee Jae-myung is front and center. President Yoon Suk-yeol faces potential removal from office by the Constitutional Court, which is deliberating impeachment charges stemming from his attempt to impose martial law in December 2024. The impeachment motion accuses Yoon of violating constitutional order, with the court’s pending decision set to determine his political fate. As of this writing, at the end of March 2025, the Constitutional Court still has not issued its ruling in Yoon’s impeachment case.

If the court upholds Yoon’s impeachment, thus removing him from office, there will be a snap presidential election. Lee, leader of the liberal opposition Democratic Party (DP), has positioned himself as the frontrunner to represent his party if such an election occurs. His supporters celebrate him as a defender of democracy, ready to take the presidency if Yoon is removed, while conservatives see him as a polarizing, ideological firebrand.

Lee enjoys substantial leads in hypothetical polling matchups against all likely opponents, strongly suggesting he would be the favorite to win a snap presidential election, but his overall appeal faces notable constraints due to intense negative partisanship and persistent unease among moderate voters.

How exactly did Lee reach this pivotal moment? Understanding his rise as the liberal frontrunner requires examining his formative background, political career, and especially his strategic consolidation of power following the 2022 election defeat.

Who Is Lee Jae-myung?

Born into poverty in Andong, Lee often emphasizes his humble beginnings, recounting childhood experiences of hardship as foundational to his political beliefs. After compulsory military service, Lee passed the notoriously difficult national bar exam entirely through self-study, subsequently gaining prominence as a lawyer advocating labor rights and social justice cases.

Lee’s trajectory closely parallels the careers of previous progressive presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in. Both rose from modest backgrounds, gained prominence by passing the bar exam without formal legal education, and built reputations as lawyers advocating for labor and human rights during South Korea’s democratization period.

Lee entered electoral politics as mayor of Seongnam City (2010–2018), pursuing progressive and populist policies such as youth welfare allowances and the expansion of public services. As governor of Gyeonggi Province (2018–2021), he further solidified his reputation as a pragmatic yet populist leader, launching initiatives such as universal basic income pilots and ambitious public housing programs.

However, Lee’s tenure as an executive leader was also marred by ethical controversies, most notably those surrounding alleged corruption in real estate development and football club sponsorship. Such accusations have persisted, significantly shaping negative public perceptions about his character.

Nevertheless, Lee’s early life experiences and legal career have reinforced his image as a populist champion of the disadvantaged, aligning him ideologically and personally with the lineage of progressive South Korean leaders. With that advantage, he secured the DP’s presidential nomination in 2022.

Lee After 2022: From Defeat to Dominance

Lee Jae-myung’s political trajectory since 2022 can be defined as one of rapid recovery and power consolidation. After his razor-thin defeat to Yoon in the presidential election, Lee worked stridently to remain politically relevant. He ran for and won a seat in the National Assembly just months later, giving him a parliamentary platform despite losing the presidency. By August 2022, he had leveraged his popularity within the party to win the DP’s chairmanship. Once at the helm, Lee moved to consolidate control and cement his preferred policy and political agenda as the party’s platform.

As party leader, Lee pursued a dual strategy: aggressively confronting the ruling conservatives in the legislature while promoting pragmatic and populist policies to the public. He initiated an economic agenda focused on people’s livelihoods, captured in the slogan “meoksanism” – derived from a Korean phrase concerning “eating and living” issues. The goal was to make practical concerns like jobs, housing, and social welfare – rather than abstract ideals or ideology – the party’s issues-based foundation and primary public focus. This emphasis on everyday economic matters aimed to broaden the DP’s appeal to moderate voters, even as Lee maintained a tough – and arguably ideological – stance against the Yoon administration in daily politics.

Lee’s takeover, however, was not without resistance. Many of the DP old guard, including former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, initially harbored doubts about him. In addition to clashes over control of the party’s direction, they warned that the swirl of corruption accusations around Lee – often dubbed the “Lee Jae-myung judicial risk” – could doom the DP’s fortunes. There were also ideological and stylistic splits: Lee’s left-leaning populism and combative style clashed with the more cautious, centrist approach preferred by some DP lawmakers.

These internal tensions came to a head in early 2023 when prosecutors, under Yoon’s direction, sought to jail Lee ahead of trial on corruption charges related to a development project in Seongnam City while Lee was mayor, and illegal remittances to North Korea when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. Typically, lawmakers are immune from arrest while parliament is in session, but prosecutors took the extraordinary step of requesting a pre-trial arrest warrant, forcing the National Assembly to vote on waiving Lee’s immunity.

In February 2023, DP lawmakers closed ranks and voted to shield their leader, although more than a few intra-party dissidents failed to reject the motion. By September 2023, however, the cracks in party unity widened: a significant number of DP members broke ranks and joined the ruling party in approving Lee’s arrest – a potentially devasting development brought about by Lee’s own caucus. Lee was on the brink of imprisonment, saved only when a judge threw out the warrant for lack of evidence.

The near-arrest was likely humbling for Lee, but ultimately, it strengthened his hold on the party. After the court’s reprieve, Lee and his backers swiftly marginalized those who opposed his control. Key dissenters were stripped of positions and effectively put on notice, making it clear that disloyalty would not be tolerated. By quashing the revolt within his party’s ranks, Lee solidified his position as the dominant figure in the DP.

Lee’s consolidation of power within the DP was also notably strengthened by the influence of highly engaged online party activists, whose digital presence and coordinated campaigns have disrupted traditional local-to-national hierarchies in shaping party agendas. One prominent example is the Gaeddal (from a combination of words for “reform” and “daughters”) group – young, predominantly female online supporters of Lee – whose intense online activism notably pressured DP lawmakers during critical party decisions. Heading into 2024, the intense intraparty dynamics meant the DP had effectively become Lee’s party, for better or worse.

Legal and Prosecution as Political Weapon

Consideration for the veracity and legality of legal charges notwithstanding, Lee has been beset by a litany of investigations and indictments since Yoon Suk-yeol took office. Lee insists these probes are a political conspiracy orchestrated by Yoon – a former chief prosecutor himself – to thwart the opposition. The overt politicization of prosecution is undoubtedly true, but the political effect – and perhaps intent – has been to keep Lee under a cloud of suspicion.

Several high-profile cases are pending against Lee Jae-myung. The most consequential involved his alleged violation of election law. In November 2024, the Seoul Central District Court found Lee guilty of spreading false information during a televised debate in 2021 and sentenced him to one year in prison, with the sentence suspended for two years. Lee appealed, and on March 26, 2025, the Seoul High Court overturned this conviction. Prosecutors from the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office have indicated they will appeal to the Supreme Court.

If the Supreme Court, which will have the final say on the matter, sides with prosecutors and reinstates Lee’s original conviction, it would immediately disqualify him from public office, barring him from the presidency for 10 years – if he is not yet president. This judicial uncertainty remains especially critical, as Lee could potentially be campaigning in a snap election if Yoon is removed from office by the Constitutional Court.

In practical terms, a final ruling might not arrive until after any early election – his defense team will undoubtedly seek to buy time. Still, the possibility looms that a court could abruptly disqualify the frontrunner in the middle of a presidential campaign. It is a wild card that haunts Lee’s camp.

Other cases add further political baggage, even if their legal resolution is some time away. In addition to the corruption charges that nearly jailed Lee in 2023, he is also implicated in a municipal football club sponsorship case. Although a judicial resolution remains unlikely in the short term, these unresolved cases lend ammunition to Lee’s opponents. Headlines regularly highlight developments in Lee’s court proceedings, bolstering conservative portrayals of the DP leader as inherently corrupt, while his supporters consistently denounce these investigations as politically motivated and representative of selective justice

Institutional Deadlock and Political Polarization

Lee’s story unfolds against a deeply polarized institutional struggle in Seoul. Since 2022, the South Korean government has been effectively gridlocked. Throughout that time, Lee’s DP has maintained a significant majority in the National Assembly, while Yoon’s conservative People Power Party (PPP) has controlled the presidency. This divide led to a form of political trench warfare between the legislature and the executive, with each side leveraging its power to undermine the other.

In the National Assembly, the opposition led by Lee utilized its majority to obstruct Yoon’s policy agenda and political priorities. Key administration initiatives – from business deregulation to labor law reforms – were stalled or voted down. The Assembly even took the unprecedented step of impeaching a Cabinet official appointed by Yoon. In February 2023, months after a tragic Halloween crowd crush in Seoul’s Itaewon district, which officials failed to prevent, the opposition impeached Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, a close ally of Yoon. Although the Constitutional Court later reversed the impeachment, ruling that the failures did not meet the “grave violation of law” threshold for removal, it marked the first impeachment of a minister in Korean political history – a dramatic display of the legislative power that the DP was willing to wield. Lee Sang-min was the first Korean minister to be impeached, but not the last; some 30 impeachment attempts followed.

Yoon, for his part, actively used his presidential powers to counter an opposition-dominated legislature. Facing gridlock, Yoon increasingly resorted to executive actions and the prosecutorial apparatus to advance his agenda and challenge opponents. His administration initiated audits of opposition-led local governments and filed lawsuits against labor unions protesting his policies. Most visibly, Yoon leveraged the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office – a powerful judicial body under his administration’s influence – to aggressively investigate Lee and other opposition politicians, prompting DP lawmakers to accuse him of governing through a “prosecutorial dictatorship.” Additionally, Yoon has exercised his veto power on 21 occasions since taking office in May 2022, a notably high number compared to his predecessors.

These maneuvers fueled a cycle of escalating political hostility. Lee’s supporters argue that Yoon’s reliance on the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and executive decrees recalls the authoritarian tactics of past regimes, warning that democracy is endangered when the executive bypasses legislative authority. Conversely, conservatives accuse the DP of manipulating party rules specifically to protect Lee – highlighting, for example, the controversial amendment of the party’s charter in June 2024, which allowed an indicted party leader to remain in office. Yoon’s allies have criticized this move, claiming the DP has devolved into “Lee Jae-myung’s bulletproof vest,” prioritizing his personal legal battles over normal party governance.

Each side has increasingly portrayed the other as an existential threat to the country’s democracy, eroding neutral ground in South Korea’s political discourse and causing even routine governance tasks, such as annual budget negotiations, to deteriorate into bitter confrontations.

South Korea’s constitutional design arguably magnifies these tensions. The president serves a single five-year term without the possibility of re-election, and mid-term legislative elections can result in a divided government. This structure often leads to a zero-sum power struggle, where the opposition is motivated to obstruct and wait out the presidency, while the president may be inclined to advance their agenda unilaterally before their term concludes. Impeachment, originally intended as a last resort, is increasingly employed as a political tool in this environment. Consequently, there is a growing consensus on the necessity of constitutional amendments to address these systemic issues. ​

The specter of political deadlock escalating into a constitutional crisis became a stark reality on December 3, 2024, when Yoon declared martial law, citing, among other things, opposition lawmakers’ “anti-state” obstruction. This unprecedented move was met with a relatively swift backlash from the National Assembly. Accusing Yoon of abusing presidential authority and undermining democratic norms, the Assembly voted to impeach him on December 14, marking the first presidential impeachment in South Korean history based on charges unrelated to corruption.​

Initially, conservative lawmakers from the PPP resisted the impeachment motion, viewing it as a politically motivated attack on the presidency. However, as public outcry intensified and concerns over democratic erosion grew, key conservative figures began to reconsider their positions.​ Notably, Han Dong-hoon, then the PPP’s party leader, shifted his stance to support the impeachment after learning that Yoon had ordered the arrest of prominent politicians, including Han himself, during the martial law period.

​In contrast, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon maintained his opposition to the impeachment, although both Oh and Han opposed the martial law declaration. Oh advocated for a transition to a responsible prime minister system to stabilize the government, emphasizing that impeachment was not the only solution.

Divergent positions among conservative leaders during this turbulent period highlight internal divisions within the PPP. Nevertheless, the PPP has demonstrated significantly greater internal cohesion than its predecessor, the Saenuri Party, did during President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal from office in 2017. Whereas Saenuri fractured under pressure and eventually collapsed, the PPP has maintained strategic party discipline despite some notable dissent from high-profile members.

Yoon’s impeachment has further divided the public, intensifying political polarization and sparking mass protests nationwide. In contrast to the bipartisan consensus that characterized the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, the politics of Yoon’s impeachment has unfolded along markedly partisan lines. Polls show the majority of the public (and a plurality of conservatives) supported Yoon’s impeachment due to the severity of his martial law declaration, but negative partisanship and general unfavorability toward Lee remains strong, significantly limiting the public consensus around the opposition’s actions.

The sustained resilience within conservative ranks heightens the risk of political backlash against the DP and specifically Lee. While the vast majority supported Yoon’s impeachment, conservative support has not collapsed, in part because centrist and undecided voters have expressed growing unease over the opposition’s aggressive tactics.

Public Opinion and the Path to an Electoral Comeback

Amid the political turmoil caused more immediately by Yoon, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party have been positioning themselves for a return to power. However, they are acutely aware that victory is not guaranteed, given the volatility of public sentiment.

By late 2024, widespread disillusionment with Yoon's administration was evident. His approval ratings plummeted to 13 percent, the lowest since his inauguration. This pervasive anti-incumbent sentiment was a significant factor in the DP’s landslide victory in the April 2024 National Assembly elections. The party secured 175 out of 300 seats, decisively retaining its parliamentary majority.

The election served as a mid-term referendum on Yoon’s performance, delivering a substantial blow to the conservatives and indicating that a significant portion of the electorate was ready to rebuke the ruling party and, perhaps, endorse – or at least tolerate – the leader of the opposition. While many voters are dissatisfied with Yoon’s leadership, negative sentiments toward Lee persist. This juxtaposition underscores the challenges Lee and the DP face in consolidating public support. As it stands, they risk being perceived as aggravating an already polarized political climate or, worse, mirroring the corruption associated with Yoon. While Lee and the DP have capitalized on the ruling party’s missteps, they must also address internal issues and public skepticism to ensure a sustainable path to governance.​

Indeed, Lee cannot rely solely on voter dissatisfaction with Yoon; he must also address significant public skepticism about his own political image. The cloud of scandals, relentless prosecutorial scrutiny, and aggressive rhetoric that have followed Lee since his narrow defeat in the 2022 presidential election have profoundly shaped his public image. Even some younger voters, who traditionally lean progressive, see Lee as a political figure burdened with ethical baggage – another typical politician rather than a genuine reformer. As one former DP youth member, who was ostracized from party involvement for being critical of Lee, pointed out, beyond the party’s loyal supporters, many young voters view Lee as corrupt. Since the last election in 2022, youth support for Lee has been mixed.

Lee’s core base, however, admires precisely his combative, resilient persona. He has consistently taken his opposition to the streets, notably leading large-scale protests against Yoon’s administration and engaging in a dramatic 24-day hunger strike in September 2023 to denounce what he called the president’s authoritarian drift and abuse of prosecutorial powers. Yet, while these tactics energize committed supporters, they risk alienating moderate voters who prioritize political stability and moderation over confrontation. Such polarizing strategies may consolidate Lee’s progressive core but simultaneously harden perceptions among centrists that his leadership could deepen political divisions rather than bridge them.

Aware of these vulnerabilities, Lee has consciously begun recalibrating his public image since late 2023 and with greater purpose lately in preparation for a presidential campaign. Recognizing that centrist, middle-class, and younger voters hold the key to victory, he has increasingly avoided partisan attacks, instead focusing on bread-and-butter and doubling down on meoksanism.

In a controversial rhetorical gambit in early 2025, Lee even described the DP as a “centrist-conservative” party – claiming the party has always balanced moderate and conservative values – in an effort to reassure voters outside the left-liberal orbit that he can represent them. Supporters called it a bold rebranding to broaden the DP’s appeal, while critics (and the PPP) derided it as a cynical ploy that “rewrites history.” The claim that the DP is “conservative” is certainly untrue, but there is a clear political logic to it.

Whether such maneuvers can overcome Lee’s polarizing reputation remains uncertain. What is clear is that Lee’s electoral strategy now involves a tightrope: He must keep his progressive base mobilized through anti-Yoon fervor and populist promises while also convincing skeptical centrists that the DP can govern responsibly despite the swirl of scandals surrounding its leader.

Striking the right balance is now the central focus of Lee’s electoral strategy. He will likely need to keep his progressive base energized – voters who want an all-out crusade against Yoon’s legacy and conservative policies – yet also reassure swing voters that a government led by him would focus on practical solutions, not revenge. The message the DP has honed in recent months reflects this tightrope act: tough on Yoon’s misrule, but not extreme; populist on economic pain points, but pledging responsible governance. So far, this calibrated approach seems to be working so that the needle on public opinion can be moved in a highly polarized environment. It carried the legislative election and has kept Lee atop presidential preference polls.

The ultimate test, however, will come if and when a presidential campaign kicks off in earnest and then, if the outcome is as polls indicate, when Lee is president.

Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for South Korea’s Democracy?

Whether Lee Jae-myung ultimately secures the presidency or not, the current political situation will dictate South Korea’s political trajectory. Lee’s rapid resurgence from electoral defeat in 2022 to frontrunner status amid scandal and an impeachment crisis underscores the volatility of South Korea’s political status quo. It also reveals deeper institutional problems, including prosecutorial authority wielded as a partisan weapon, impeachment employed as a political tactic rather than a measure of last resort, and a party system dominated by personality-driven leadership rather than coherent policy platforms. Collectively, these trends pose serious challenges to South Korean democracy’s long-term stability.

If Lee runs and wins in a snap election, South Korea would witness yet another dramatic power shift following an impeachment. This would repeat the 2017 experience and essentially complete a cycle that began with Yoon’s tenure. This could pave the way for reforms (the DP has vowed to curb prosecutorial overreach, for instance), but it might also tempt a triumphant Lee to settle scores, further entrenching the cycle of political retribution.

Alternatively, if the courts or the voters halt Lee’s rise – whether through a disqualifying verdict or an electoral upset – it would signal a different reckoning and another crisis. The conservatives would feel vindicated in portraying Lee as unfit, and the DP would face pressure to reinvent itself beyond its embattled figurehead. Or, worse, it would invite even greater political chaos and social unrest.

Regardless of the outcome, South Korea is at an inflection point. The coming weeks will reveal whether the country can steer itself toward more stable politics or if the Lee-versus-Yoon saga merely reflects a highly polarized and confrontational new normal. Politics in South Korea today suggest the latter is much more likely.

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent and overcome his legal battles without further deepening societal divisions – will likely be tested. Whether he succeeds or fails, the broader implications will extend far beyond Lee himself. The outcome will reverberate far beyond this one man’s career, shaping the health of South Korea’s democracy and society in the months and years to come.

The Authors

Steven Denney is an assistant professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at the Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University. He is also a senior editor at SinoNK.com, a senior fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna, and a non-resident fellow in the Innovation Policy Lab at the University of Toronto.

9. Yoon not to attend impeachment ruling session Friday

For all the Korean watchers in the US, as N​eil Young sings, "Tonight's the Night."​ We should hear the decision around 9pm tonight EST (10am KST on the 4th).

(2nd LD) Yoon not to attend impeachment ruling session Friday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest details in paras 4, 7)

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol has decided not to appear before the Constitutional Court for his impeachment ruling later this week, his legal team said Thursday.

The Constitutional Court has said it will deliver its ruling on Yoon's impeachment over his short-lived martial law bid at 11 a.m. Friday.

The decision was made in consideration of public order and security concerns, as congestion is expected, according to Yoon's legal team.

A presidential official said Yoon is expected to watch the ruling on TV from his residence in Seoul.

Roads near the Constitutional Court are blocked by police buses on April 3, 2025, the eve of the court's verdict on President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment. (Yonhap)

Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on charges of violating the Constitution and laws through his brief imposition of martial law on Dec. 3.

The verdict will be delivered from the court, and live broadcasts will be allowed, along with attendance by the public.

A total of 96,370 people applied online for public attendance by 5 p.m., with only 20 selected, according to the court. The competition rate stood at 4,818 to 1.

In January, Yoon was arrested and indicted on criminal rebellion charges. But he was released from prison last month after a Seoul district court cancelled his arrest and allowed him to stand trial without being physically detained.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) talks with his lawyer, Yun Gap-geun, during the 10th hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, in this file photo taken Feb. 20, 2025, over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

There have been weeks of massive rallies in Seoul and other provinces, with protesters deeply divided between calling for his ouster or reinstatement.

Acting President Han Duck-soo has urged the nation to accept the court's decision on the impeachment while strongly calling on politicians to refrain from making statements that could incite violence.

Police have ramped up security around the court in central Seoul amid growing safety concerns.

The area surrounding the court has already been turned into a restricted area, with authorities cordoning off rallies to prevent potential clashes.

Police plan to issue the highest-level alert, Gapho, on Friday, which would deploy all available forces to the situation.

Yoon has denied any wrongdoing, claiming the declaration was meant as a warning to the main opposition party for what he described as its abuse of legislative power.

Under the Constitution, the consent of at least six justices is required to uphold an impeachment motion. There are currently eight justices on the bench.

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 3, 2025

10. Chinese national under probe over allegedly bribing soldier for military secrets

​The PRC operatives are operating in South korea. Let there be no doubt. Not only conducting espionage but also subversion.

Chinese national under probe over allegedly bribing soldier for military secrets | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 3, 2025

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- A Chinese national is under investigation over allegedly bribing a South Korean soldier in an attempt to obtain military secrets, officials at the South Korean military's counterintelligence command said Thursday.

The Defense Counterintelligence Command has launched a probe after detecting allegations that a Chinese national and an active duty soldier have violated the military secret protection act, the officials said.

The Chinese national, arrested on the southern resort island of Jeju last month, is suspected of approaching South Korean soldiers in a group chat room by posing as a soldier himself.

The suspect is believed to have offered to pay the soldiers in exchange for military secrets in one-on-one conversations.

A soldier serving at a unit in Gangwon Province allegedly used an unauthorized phone to take photos of internal documents that include information on joint South Korea-U.S. military drills and handed them over to the suspect.

The counterintelligence command is reportedly looking into allegations that the suspect is a member of a larger group based in China, led by a ringleader who is possibly linked with the Chinese military.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 3, 2025

11. Seoul to devise support measures for local industries, says 'regrets' U.S. reciprocal tariff plans

​I am sure a lot of people regret the tariffs on South Korea (and Japan and other allies).

(3rd LD) Seoul to devise support measures for local industries, says 'regrets' U.S. reciprocal tariff plans | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 3, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS byline, more info in last 4 paras)

By Kim Na-young

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- The government will "swiftly" devise support measures to prevent the potential fallout on local industries from the U.S. administration's plan to slap 26 percent reciprocal tariffs on South Korea, the industry minister said Thursday, expressing "regret" over Washington's latest move.

"We regret that the U.S. tariff measures, which have a significant impact on the global trade environment, have become a reality," Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said in an emergency meeting with officials from various Korean industries, economic organizations and research institutes held to discuss a response strategy to new U.S. duties.

Ahn said the government will "swiftly" devise support measures for industries likely to suffer damage from U.S. tariffs and push for ministerial-level talks with Washington for "active" negotiations on the matter.

"The government seriously views the possible negative impact the U.S. tariffs could have on South Korea's exports to the U.S. as well as the global trade market," he added.

South Korean Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun (C) speaks at an emergency meeting on the response to the U.S. administration's announcement of reciprocal tariffs held in Seoul on April 3, 2025. (Yonhap)

Earlier in the day, U.S. President Donald Trump announced plans to impose a 10 percent "baseline" tariff on imports from all foreign countries, as well as "reciprocal" tariffs, including 25 percent duties for South Korea.

Washington later revised the country-specific rate for Korea to 26 percent.

Seoul's industry ministry explained the reciprocal tariff rate includes the baseline 10 percent duties.

The baseline and reciprocal tariffs will go into effect at 12:01 a.m. Saturday (U.S. time) and 12:01 a.m. next Wednesday, respectively.

Some goods are not subject to reciprocal tariffs, including steel, aluminum, automobiles and key auto parts -- the targets of the already announced or enforced industry-specific tariffs, according to the White House.

Under Washington's scheme, reciprocal tariffs for South Korea have been set at a lower range than China, Vietnam and Taiwan, which will face 34 percent, 46 percent and 32 percent duties, respectively, but at a higher range than the respective 24 percent, 20 percent and 10 percent for Japan, the European Union and Britain.

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks on tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington on April 2, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

After the emergency meeting, Deputy Trade Minister Park Jong-won told reporters the government will work to find a "mutually beneficial" solution for both Seoul and Washington regarding the tariff issue.

When asked if the reciprocal tariffs could lead to renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Park said it was "too early" to talk about such topics, adding the U.S. administration has not yet mentioned the renegotiation of the bilateral trade pact.

Some experts have raised skepticism over the effectiveness of the Korea-U.S. FTA, as South Korea became subject to a relatively high tariff despite its free trade deal with the U.S.

"The FTA does have meaning in that South Korea will face lower tariffs compared to Japan considering the reciprocal duties will be added to the existing duties," Heo Yoon, chairman of the National Trade Negotiation Advisory Committee, explained. Japan does not have a bilateral FTA with the U.S.

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 3, 2025

12. Acting president calls for all-out response to U.S. announcement of 25 pct tariffs

​I wonder if the South approaches this as they did the IMF crisis in 1997 in that it could have a unifying effect on the country. What if focusing on the trade war "enemy" could help overcome political division and heal the nation.

If that happens perhaps it then might be said President Trump really helped an ally with the tariffs. 

(LEAD) Acting president calls for all-out response to U.S. announcement of 25 pct tariffs | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 3, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with more remarks in last 3 paras; ADDS photo)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo instructed the government Thursday to go all-out to respond to the United States' announcement of 25 percent tariffs on imports from South Korea.

Han gave the instruction during an "emergency meeting" of the economic and security strategy task force, which brought together Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun and other senior officials from the government.

"As the situation is very grave with the approach of the reality of a global tariff war, the government must pour out all of its capabilities at its disposal to overcome this trade crisis," he said, shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump announced tariff rates for all U.S. trading partners, including 25 percent for South Korea, starting next Wednesday.

Acting President Han Duck-soo speaks as he presides over an economic security strategy task force meeting at his residence in Seoul on April 3, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Han gave instructions to Ahn to carefully analyze the details and impacts of the new tariffs together with businesses and actively engage in negotiations with the U.S. to minimize damage to the country.

He also ordered the government to swiftly draw up emergency support measures for companies and sectors affected by the tariffs, including the auto industry.

Later in the day, Han instructed Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo to promptly arrange a visit the U.S. as he presided over another task force meeting to respond to U.S. reciprocal tariffs.

"In the crisis situation, the government will make all-out efforts for negotiations with the U.S. to minimize losses to businesses," he said, noting the tariffs could become a "big burden" for South Korea's export-reliant economy.

Han also said the government will announce emergency response measures by next week in response to tariffs that took effect on the auto industry earlier in the day.

Acting President Han Duck-soo (2nd from L) presides over an emergency meeting of the economic and security strategy task force at his office in Seoul on April 3, 2025, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 3, 2025

13. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan meet in Brussels after Trump's tariff announcement

​Two against one? I wonder if they will share with the SECSTATE how they will work with China against US tariffs?

Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan meet in Brussels after Trump's tariff announcement | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 3, 2025

BRUSSELS, April 3 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan met for talks in Brussels on Thursday, a day after U.S. President Donald Trump announced sweeping global tariffs.

The talks between Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Marco Rubio and Takeshi Iwaya, respectively, took place on the margins of a foreign ministerial meeting of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its partner countries.

It marked their second trilateral meeting since Trump took office in January, following their previous talks in Munich in February.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul (L), and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Marco Rubio (C) and Takeshi Iwaya, respectively, pose for photos as they meet for trilateral talks in Brussels on April 3, 2025. (Yonhap)

During the talks, Cho and Iwaya are expected to raise concerns over the recently announced U.S. tariffs.

On Wednesday, Trump announced plans to impose a minimum 10 percent "baseline" tariff on all imports to the U.S. and "reciprocal" tariffs, including 26 percent duties for South Korea and 24 percent for Japan.

The three sides are said to be working on a joint statement, which is expected to voice concerns over military cooperation between North Korea and Russia over the war in Ukraine.

The statement is expected to include a message regarding China, given that the Trump administration considers the trilateral cooperation as a framework to not only deter North Korean threats but also counter Beijing's influence.

Later in the day, Cho is set to take part in a session of NATO members and its Indo-Pacific partners, and discuss global security challenges and the security situation in the region.

The four Indo-Pacific Partners -- South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand -- have been invited to this year's meeting for the fourth consecutive year.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 3, 2025

​14. DPRK IT Workers Expanding in Scope and Scale

​Map graphic at the link: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/dprk-it-workers-expanding-scope-scale?utm

DPRK IT Workers Expanding in Scope and Scale | Google Cloud Blog

cloud.google.com

Written by: Jamie Collier

Since our September 2024 report outlining the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) IT worker threat, the scope and scale of their operations has continued to expand. These individuals pose as legitimate remote workers to infiltrate companies and generate revenue for the regime. This places organizations that hire DPRK IT workers at risk of espionage, data theft, and disruption.

In collaboration with partners, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified an increase of active operations in Europe, confirming the threat's expansion beyond the United States. This growth is coupled with evolving tactics, such as intensified extortion campaigns and the move to conduct operations within corporate virtualized infrastructure.

On The March: IT Workers Expand Globally with a Focus on Europe

DPRK IT workers' activity across multiple countries now establishes them as a global threat. While the United States remains a key target, over the past months, DPRK IT workers have encountered challenges in seeking and maintaining employment in the country. This is likely due to increased awareness of the threat through public reporting, United States Department of Justice indictments, and right-to-work verification challenges. These factors have instigated a global expansion of IT worker operations, with a notable focus on Europe.

Figure 1: List of countries impacted by DPRK IT workers

IT Worker Activity in Europe

In late 2024, one DPRK IT worker operated at least 12 personas across Europe and the United States. The IT Worker actively sought employment with multiple organizations within Europe, particularly those within the defense industrial base and government sectors. This individual demonstrated a pattern of providing fabricated references, building a rapport with job recruiters, and using additional personas they controlled to vouch for their credibility.

Separately, additional investigations uncovered other IT worker personas seeking employment in Germany and Portugal, alongside login credentials for user accounts of European job websites and human capital management platforms.

GTIG has also observed a diverse portfolio of projects in the United Kingdom undertaken by DPRK IT workers. These projects included web development, bot development, content management system (CMS) development, and blockchain technology, indicating a broad range of technical expertise, spanning traditional web development to advanced blockchain and AI applications.

Specific projects identified include:

• Development of a Nodexa token hosting plan platform using Next.js, React, CosmosSDK, and Golang, as well as the creation of a job marketplace using Next.js, Tailwind CSS, MongoDB, and Node.js.
• Further blockchain-related projects involved Solana and Anchor/Rust smart contract development, and a blockchain job marketplace built using the MERN stack and Solana.
• Contributions to existing websites by adding pages using Next.js and Tailwind CSS,
• Development of an artificial intelligence (AI) web application leveraging Electron, Next.js, AI, and blockchain technologies.

In their efforts to secure these positions, DPRK IT workers employed deceptive tactics, falsely claiming nationalities from a diverse set of countries, including Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Ukraine, the United States, and Vietnam. The identities used were a combination of real and fabricated personas.

IT workers in Europe were recruited through various online platforms, including Upwork, Telegram, and Freelancer. Payment for their services was facilitated through cryptocurrency, the TransferWise service, and Payoneer, highlighting the use of methods that obfuscate the origin and destination of funds.

Facilitators Support European Operations

The facilitators used by IT workers to help them get jobs, defeat identity verification, and receive funds fraudulently have also been found in Europe. One incident involved a DPRK IT worker using facilitators located in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Notably, a corporate laptop, ostensibly intended for use in New York, was found to be operational in London, indicating a complex logistical chain.

An investigation into infrastructure used by a suspected facilitator also highlighted heightened interest in Europe. Resources discovered contained fabricated personas, including resumes listing degrees from Belgrade University in Serbia and residences in Slovakia, as well as instructions for navigating European job sites. Additionally, contact information for a broker specializing in false passports was discovered, indicating a coordinated effort to acquire fraudulent identification documents. One document provided specific guidance on seeking employment in Serbia, including the use of a Serbian time zone during communications.

Extortion Heating Up

Alongside global expansion, DPRK IT workers are also evolving their tactics. Based on data from multiple sources, GTIG assesses that since late October 2024, IT workers have increased the volume of extortion attempts and gone after larger organizations.

In these incidents, recently fired IT workers threatened to release their former employers’ sensitive data or to provide it to a competitor. This data included proprietary data and source code for internal projects.

The increase in extortion campaigns coincided with heightened United States law enforcement actions against DPRK IT workers, including disruptions and indictments. This suggests a potential link, where pressure on these workers may be driving them to adopt more aggressive measures to maintain their revenue stream.

Previously, workers terminated from their places of employment might attempt to provide references for their other personas so that they could be rehired by the company. It is possible that the workers suspected they were terminated due to discovery of their true identities, which would preclude attempts to be rehired.

The Virtual Workspace: BYOD Brings IT Worker Risks

To avoid distributing corporate laptops, some companies operate a bring your own device (BYOD) policy, allowing employees to access company systems through virtual machines. Unlike corporate laptops that can be monitored, personal devices operating under a BYOD policy may lack traditional security and logging tools, making it difficult to track activities and identify potential threats. This absence of conventional security measures means that typical evidence trails linked to IT workers, such as those derived from corporate laptop shipping addresses and endpoint software inventories, are unavailable. All of this increases the risk of undetected malicious activity.

GTIG believes that IT workers have identified BYOD environments as potentially ripe for their schemes, and in January 2025, IT workers are now conducting operations against their employers in these scenarios.

Conclusion

Global expansion, extortion tactics, and the use of virtualized infrastructure all highlight the adaptable strategies employed by DPRK IT workers. In response to heightened awareness of the threat within the United States, they've established a global ecosystem of fraudulent personas to enhance operational agility. Coupled with the discovery of facilitators in the UK, this suggests the rapid formation of a global infrastructure and support network that empowers their continued operations.

For detailed mitigation and detection strategies, please read our previous report on DPRK IT workers. For even more details, read our IT worker Transform post.

Posted in

• Threat Intelligence

cloud.google.com

15. Spring hunger forces N. Korean rural families to borrow grain at crushing interest rates

​Lest we forget: The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

Let's not worry about what Kim is doing or will do. Let's make him worry about what we can and will do. Let's focus on human rights, information, cyber, sanctions, military readiness, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. Let's present him with a broad front effort to bring peace, prosperity, and stability to the Korean peninsula by showing the Korean people in the north that their sacrifice and suffering is the result of Kim Jong Un's failed promises, policies, and strategy. Let's create conditions that will cause Kim to change his behavior or be faced with change from within.

Spring hunger forces N. Korean rural families to borrow grain at crushing interest rates - Daily NK English

"The poorer the family, the more they rely on credit, falling into a vicious cycle where debts grow year after year," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Eun - April 3, 2025

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 3, 2025

An October 2018 photo of North Korean porter in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province. I (Daily NK)

The number of “food-poor families” has recently grown as North Korea’s spring hunger season intensifies, worsening the already severe seasonal food shortages.

“The number of starving families in Sakju county and other agricultural districts in North Pyongan province is increasing daily,” a Daily NK source in North Pyongan province said recently. “They are barely surviving on grain borrowed at high interest.”

North Korean farming villages suffer spring lean periods every March as grain stores from the previous year’s harvest run out.

To borrow food during spring, one must repay double or triple the amount during the autumn harvest, perpetuating the vicious cycle of food shortages. Despite these harsh terms, families facing immediate starvation have no choice but to borrow grain at high interest.

In one neighborhood watch unit in Sakju county, 12 of 23 households had either barely any food or no food at all.

“Even when farmers work themselves to exhaustion for the entire year, they struggle to survive for two or three months because they’re left with very little food after delivering their rice quotas to the state and military,” the source said. “Families with many members run out of food especially quickly.”

Rice merchants who are aware that spring food shortages are worsening in agricultural communities lend food to rural residents at exorbitant interest rates.

“Urban rice merchants who understand the difficulties facing rural communities are targeting families suffering food shortages,” the source said. “They provide 1 kilogram of grain in spring on credit and collect 2 kilograms at harvest, making a substantial profit.”

Even now, urban merchants are bringing rice and corn to several rural districts and lending it on credit. Rural residents recognize this as essentially loan sharking but reluctantly borrow the grain anyway to avoid immediate starvation during the spring hunger season.

“Rural residents know perfectly well that borrowing grain is like drinking poison,” the source said. “However, they pay the high interest out of desperation to do anything just to survive from one day to the next.”

“The poorer the family, the more they rely on credit, falling into a vicious cycle where debts grow year after year,” the source added. “If they cannot repay their spring debt in autumn, their debt doubles the following year.”

This means if someone borrows 2 kilograms of rice this spring, they must pay back 4 kilograms in autumn. If they cannot pay it back in autumn, the debt grows to 8 kilograms the following year.

“To resolve the food shortages faced by rural residents, the state must reduce the amount of rice it takes,” the source said. “Food shortages will continue to worsen as the state ignores rural residents’ hardships and forcibly collects the state’s rice quota.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 3, 2025

16. Hanwha Aerospace inks 371.4 bln-won deal to export K9 howitzer to India

​Another satisfied customer ​b​y ​purchasing from ​a​ partner in the arsenal of democracy.

Hanwha Aerospace inks 371.4 bln-won deal to export K9 howitzer to India | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · April 3, 2025

SEOUL, April 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korean defense giant Hanwha Aerospace Co. said Thursday it has signed a 371.4 billion-won (US$253.6 million) deal to export homegrown K9 self-propelled howitzers to India.

Under the agreement, the company will deliver the K9 howitzers to the Indian Army by September 2030, in cooperation with Mumbai-based company Larsen & Toubro, according to Hanwha Aerospace.

The deal aligns with India's ongoing efforts to modernize its military, the company added.

This agreement follows a 2017 contract, under which Hanwha supplied 372.7 billion won worth of K9 howitzers to India by 2020.

Hanwha Aerospace said this additional contract reflects the K9's proven reliability in meeting the Indian Army's operational needs.

The company's strong performance under the first contract also helped solidify its reputation as a trusted partner in India's defense market, it added.

Hanwha Aerospace expects the latest deal to further expand sales of the K9 howitzer beyond Europe and into Asia. The K9 has already been adopted by countries such as Romania and Poland.

"We will further enhance our cooperation with countries in Asia, including India, by leveraging the K9's outstanding performance and our proven delivery record," said Hanwha Aerospace Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Son Jae-il.

Son Jae-il (R), chief executive officer (CEO) of Hanwha Aerospace Co., and Arun Ramchandani (L), executive vice president of Larsen & Toubro, pose for a photo during a signing ceremony held at the South Korean Embassy in New Delhi, India on April 3, 2025, in this photo provided by Hanwha Aerospace. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · April 3, 2025

17. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

​The 24 page report can be accessed here: https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russia-china-north-korea-relations-obstacles-to-a-trilateral-axis/

Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Elizabeth Wishnick

Introduction

This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis.

Recent Trends in Russia-North Korea-China Relations

Border closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic led to a hiatus in North Korea’s interactions with Russia and China. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Kim Jong-un emerged as an important supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine at the United Nations—a move that Vladivostok-based scholar Artyom Lukin saw as critical to the emergence of a quasi-alliance between the two countries beginning in 2022. North Korea is one of only two states (the other being Syria) to accord the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk diplomatic recognition, and it has voted in support of Russian positions on Ukraine multiple times at the UN.

In April 2024, Zhao Leji, formally the head of the National People’s Congress and the third-highest-ranking leader of the Chinese Communist Party, visited North Korea to strengthen ties and mark the 75th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The following month, Xi and Putin met in Beijing, and reportedly Chinese officials dissuaded Putin from visiting Pyongyang directly before or after Beijing.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un attend an official welcoming ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea in this image released by the Korean Central News Agency June 20, 2024. (KCNA/REUTERS)

An Axis in the Making?

What would we need to see if an axis existed? An axis would require more than a shared authoritarian playbook and anti-Western orientation. We would expect to see some formalized cooperation among the three countries. Even Russia, India, and China have regular trilateral dialogues, although their engagements fall far short of an axis due to the many tensions in Sino-Indian relations. We would anticipate a coordinated approach to assisting Russia in Ukraine. Although China has supported North Korea’s military development over the years, there is little evidence of active coordination of Chinese and North Korean military support to Russia in Ukraine. Finally, we would find evidence of widespread support among Russian and Chinese elites for such an axis. Such supporters exist, especially in Russia, but there are many detractors as well.

Many Russian and Chinese experts reject the idea of a trilateral axis with North Korea. Russian opponents of an axis point to their country’s long-standing positions opposing nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and foreign policy interests in engaging with South Korea. Chinese opposition is even more broadly based because of the fundamental challenge such an axis would pose to Xi Jinping’s signature security initiatives as well as to PRC foreign policy interests in Europe, Asia, and the Global South.

Zhao Leji (front, 2nd from R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress, is greeted by North Korean people upon his arrival in Pyongyang on April 11, 2024, for a three-day visit to attend a ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and North Korea. (Kyodo/Reuters)

Factors that Hinder an Axis

Despite their shared anti-Western orientation, four factors create obstacles to the formation of a full-fledged axis. First and foremost, the negative experience of the Korean War provides considerable disincentives, especially for China but also for North Korea. Second, China and—to a lesser extent—Russia would face reputational costs if they committed to such an axis. Third, if they opted for an axis with North Korea, both China and Russia would sacrifice important foreign policy interests in East Asia. Finally, China, Russia, and North Korea have failed thus far to implement substantial trilateral economic cooperation along their shared borders.

Historical Precedents

Reputational Costs

Russia’s deepening military partnership with North Korea raises questions about its role in abetting Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and Russia’s reputation as a member of the UN Security Council, which has sought to restrain the North Korean nuclear program via sanctions. Moreover, North Korea’s rhetoric on the “new Cold War” directly contradicts Chinese and Russian efforts to oppose this tendency, which they attribute to US and NATO policies.

Enabling North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

North Korean state media publishes photo on Saturday Nov 19, 2022 shows the launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-17. (KCNA/REUTERS)

Supporting Kim Jong-un’s “New Cold War” Rhetoric

Foreign Policy Impact

Domestic Factors

View of the Russia-North Korea railway bridge and the estuary of the Tumen River in Hunchun city, Yanbian prefecture, Jilin province, July 14, 2024. (CFOTO/Sipa USA/REUTERS)

Conclusions

Despite a shared anti-Western alignment among Russia, China, and North Korea, several factors work against the formation of a trilateral axis. The fraught history of their collaboration during the Korean War is a key restraining factor. Although a communist bloc subsequently emerged in Northeast Asia, the legacy of the underlying tensions among the three sets limits to current and future trilateral projects. China and Russia today claim that the US is responsible for creating a new Cold War—and in Asia, they point to the formation of US-centered blocs as a primary driver. North Korea, by contrast, finds advantage in a new Cold War environment, putting it at odds with China and Russia, who would incur reputational costs in the Global South by pursuing that line of thinking.

Image credits: Natalia Kopytnik/FPRI; Rogan Ward/

18. Russia, Cuba and North Korea escape worst of Trump's tariff wrath

​Kind of misleading. It is not like the US is doing any trading with north Korea and Cuba.

Remember what Billy Preston said: "Nothing from nothing means nothing."

Russia, Cuba and North Korea escape worst of Trump's tariff wrath

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20250403/russia-cuba-and-north-korea-escape-worst-of-trumps-tariff-wrath

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A photo shows the view from an observation point in the Russian port city of Vladivostok, on Sept. 13, 2023. AFP-Yonhap

By Reuters

• Published Apr 3, 2025 10:05 pm KST
• Updated Apr 3, 2025 10:07 pm KSTWhile U.S. President Donald Trump announced tariffs on allies and foes including Europe, India, Japan and China, some of the world's most heavily sanctioned countries — Russia, Belarus, Cuba and North Korea - avoided being singled out for special punitive treatment.

With the world gripped by trade war, Trump imposed a 10 percent tariff on most goods imported to the United States. China, the biggest supplier of goods to the U.S., now faces a 54 percent tariff on all exports to the world's biggest consumer.

"In the face of unrelenting economic warfare, the United States can no longer continue with a policy of unilateral economic surrender," Trump said as he presented the tariffs.

The White House released a list of comments from people praising his tariffs. They said ordinary American workers would benefit after years of what they described as abuse from trading partners such as China.

Trump said he would impose a 10% baseline tariff on all imports to the United States and higher duties on dozens of countries. Russia, Cuba and North Korea did not appear on the list of countries facing higher 'reciprocal' tariffs released by the White House.

U.S. intelligence agencies said in their annual threat assessment that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea were the biggest potential nation-state threats to the United States and Trump had threatened Moscow with new trade measures.

Asked why Russia was not on the list, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News that the United States did not trade with Russia and Belarus and that they were under sanctions.

Goods trade between Russia and the United States was $3.5 billion last year, according to U.S. figures. In 2021, the year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was $36 billion.

FUTURE UNCLEAR

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told Axios that Russia was left off because there was no meaningful trade with it, and Cuba, Belarus and North Korea were not included because existing tariffs and sanctions on them were already so high.

Russia, which is under more than 28,595 different Western sanctions, has classified trade data since the start of the war.

U.S. goods imports from Russia totaled $3.0 billion in 2024, down 34.2 percent from 2023, according to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

For Russia, though, the biggest risk is a potential slowdown in global demand from the wider tariff war - which could hit the price of oil.

The Russian central bank warned officials earlier this year that the United States and OPEC have the capacity to flood the oil market and cause a repeat of the prolonged price collapse of the 1980s — which contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.

On Sunday, Trump told NBC News he was very angry after President Vladimir Putin criticised the credibility of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, and the U.S. president suggested he could impose secondary tariffs of 25 percent-50 percent on buyers of Russian oil. (Reuters)

19. Extended Deterrence: A Tool That Has Served American Interests Since 1945

​We throw around "extended deterrence" too loosely I think. Bob Peters provides some useful historical context and analysis.

But how does this conclusion (with which i agree) square with imposing tariffs on our closest allies? Are they concerned that revoking extended deterrence might be next?

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

In the end, extended deterrence is a stabilizing force that allows Americans to focus on things that matter directly to them: security, peace, prosperity, family, and faith. It does this by increasing the freedom of action of the United States and increasing foreign direct investment into the American economy, but most importantly, it makes war (particularly, nuclear war) less likely by deterring aggression.

A world without the American nuclear umbrella is a world with more nuclear powers and more nuclear wars—one with unforeseen downsides for the United States and the American people. It is for that reason that since 1947 the United States, across Republican and Democrat administrations, has extended its nuclear umbrella over its closest allies.

Extended Deterrence: A Tool That Has Served American Interests Since 1945

https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/extended-deterrence-tool-has-served-american-interests-1945?utm

Issue Brief Defense

April 2, 2025 10 min read Download Report

Robert Peters

@realbobpeters

Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in Heritage’s Allison Center for National Security.

Summary

Extended deterrence is a stabilizing force that allows Americans to focus on things that matter directly to them: security, peace, prosperity, family, and faith. It does this by increasing the freedom of action of the United States and increasing foreign direct investment into the American economy, but, most importantly, it makes war—particularly, nuclear war—less likely by deterring aggression. A world without the American nuclear umbrella is a world with more nuclear powers and more nuclear wars, with unforeseen downsides for the United States and the American people. It is for that reason that since 1947 the United States, across Republican and Democrat administrations, has extended its nuclear umbrella over its closest allies.

Key Takeaways

America’s nuclear umbrella is a deeply stabilizing force on global security that enables Americans to enjoy family, faith, and prosperity in peace.

One of the most obvious benefits of America’s nuclear umbrella is that it gives the U.S. significant leverage over those states that are underneath said umbrella.

Additionally, the top five direct investors in the United States are all close treaty allies currently underneath the American nuclear umbrella.

Select a Section 1/0

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has extended its “nuclear umbrella” over its closest allies. This nuclear umbrella, also referred to as an “extended deterrent,” means that the U.S. guarantees the security of a close ally—including through the use of nuclear weapons. Put simply, extended deterrence means that if an adversary carries out a strategic attack on an American ally or otherwise threatens to topple said ally through conventional means, the United States reserves the right to defend that ally with all the forces at its disposal, to include its nuclear arsenal. Generally speaking, the states that are under the American nuclear umbrella are U.S. allies in NATO, Australia, Japan, and South Korea.REF

Today, the fear of a withdrawal of America’s extended-deterrent guarantee to its closest allies is triggering actors from Poland to Korea to France to consider building their own, independent nuclear arsenals to guarantee their own security or to extend their own sovereign strategic capabilities over other allies as a means of establishing their own nuclear umbrella.REF It might seem odd that the United States extends its nuclear umbrella over other nations—seemingly, this puts the U.S. at greater risk of a nuclear attack as it defends a foreign power—with little-to-no overt benefit for the United States. But the reason for extending America’s nuclear umbrella over its closest allies is not altruism, but because doing so squarely serves U.S. national interests and makes war—including nuclear war—less likely for the U.S.

Indeed, extending the nuclear umbrella provides a variety of benefits to the United States, to include giving America greater influence over the actions of its foreign allies; reducing the incentive for other states to pursue nuclear weapons (and therefore reducing the chance that the United States will become involved in a nuclear war); and incentivizing direct foreign investment into the U.S. economy and U.S. markets. Most importantly, though, America’s nuclear umbrella is a deeply stabilizing force on global security and enables Americans to enjoy family, faith, and prosperity in peace.

Extended Deterrence Gives the U.S. More Influence

One of the most obvious benefits of America’s nuclear umbrella is that it gives the United States significant leverage over those states that are underneath said umbrella. Foreign capitals, seeking to maintain their place under the American nuclear umbrella, often acquiesce to Washington’s policy preferences, be they in security issues, trade policies, or diplomacy. This soft power is shown at various international fora, where allies often side with the United States on a host of issues and co-sponsor resolutions that serve American interests.REF

Further, extended deterrence is in many ways a two-way street. Allies, in exchange for the extended-deterrent umbrella, augment American military power. As an example, South Korea, which has been under the American extended deterrent umbrella since the 1950s, has not only fought with the United States in every war since the Korean War but also has one of the strongest defense industrial bases in the free world, possesses a very large and credible army, and gives the U.S. important basing access from which it can generate combat power.REF Taken together, the alliance with South Korea gives the United States a veritable Gibraltar on the Asian mainland.

Similarly, America’s alliance with Japan—to include the nuclear component—provides the United States with an ally that has the second-largest navy in the Western Pacific and a highly competent air force that is capable of conducting strikes across the Western Pacific and East Asia, along with the military bases needed for any long-haul flights from the continental United States.

Europe, with all its problems—and they are many—similarly gives the United States important access from which the U.S. military can conduct a variety of operations that directly benefit U.S. interests. These include the forward stationing of missile defense batteries that can destroy Iranian missile threats, forward deployment of air assets that are critical to targeting and destroying terror threats, maritime bases that allow the U.S. Navy unfettered access to the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and nuclear weapons bases that allow the United States to deter strategic attack by America’s enemies.

Further, European militaries, particularly those in Poland and the Baltic and Nordic nations, are rearming.REF Even Germany has begun a significant rearmament program, long overdue though it is.REF Indeed, one of the reasons that Europe is taking security issues seriously and rearming is out of a fear of the United States withdrawing its nuclear umbrella from its NATO allies if Europe does not contribute more to the NATO alliance in the form of credible combat power.REF

While there may be some benefits to U.S. allies having an independent nuclear arsenal, the downsides of a more proliferated world probably outweigh the upsides. Indeed, the United States may already be seeing the rumblings of states who are less willing to acquiesce or accommodate American security preferences as they seek their own independent (or at least non-American) nuclear umbrellas.REF This loss of influence would track with the historical record, when Washington lost significant amounts of influence over decision-making in Paris, following France’s joining of the nuclear club in the early 1960s.REF

The Nuclear Umbrella Attracts Foreign Investment

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the more secure a state feels, the more prosperous it becomes. The more prosperous it becomes, the more willing it is to invest. This lesson from throughout history continues today.

The top five direct investors in the United States are all close treaty allies currently underneath the American nuclear umbrella.REF It should not be forgotten that extended deterrence often takes the treaty form of a “mutual security” pact, as is the case with the United States and Korea, the United States and Japan, and the broad array of networks within NATO. As demonstrated, a mutual defense treaty is not just a one-sided “the United States gives and others take” agreement. It is a pledge to come to each other’s aid.

Think of the neighborhood bully, China, shaking down other countries and threatening them. The United States teaming up with Japan and South Korea for security means that China is less likely to hurt U.S. neighbors, thereby allowing the United States to increase trade with those neighbors to everyone’s direct and mutual economic benefit. Indeed, in the late 1950s, South Korea and sub-Saharan Africa had the same per capita gross domestic product.REF

Today, South Korea is the 14th-largest economy in the worldREF and one of the most digitally integrated societies on the planetREF—in no small part because of America’s security guarantee and the extended deterrent commitment. This has not only benefited South Korea’s economy—but also the American economy, both due to trade that is mutually beneficial and because of Korea’s direct foreign investment in the U.S. economy. Similar stories unfold with most allies who enjoy America’s extended-deterrent guarantee.

In the final analysis, more security means more investment and prosperity for all, because businesses and investors like stability and certainty. Other countries feel safe investing in the United States because America is strong and its political system is stable. And Americans feel safe investing abroad (and making a tidy profit in the process) knowing that their allies are safe and their investments will be secure in the long term.

Extended Deterrence Reduces Nuclear War

If the United States withdrew its extended-deterrent guarantee from its allies in NATO and East Asia—or, if those states no longer believed in the efficacy of those guarantees—then it should be expected that some, perhaps many, of those states would acquire indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. Indeed, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and others may well have sought or desired indigenous nuclear weapons programs but have deferred such plans over the past half century in large part because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

If those countries had nuclear arms, the United States would likely see some additional deterrence benefit. Adversaries may be better deterred by the prospects of additional nuclear powers. But there are two very significant downsides to such a world. The first is that selective nuclear proliferation would almost certainly not be limited to U.S. allies. Other powers would likely respond and seek their own nuclear arsenals in response to these new nuclear powers. For each nuclear-armed Germany, Japan, Poland, or South Korea, the world could see a nuclear-armed Burma, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, or Vietnam. And there is no reason why such a proliferation cascade would stop at only a handful of countries.

The second downside is that in a world that no longer had fewer than 10 nuclear weapons states, as is the case today, but one with two or three times as many nuclear powers, the prospect for a state-on-state conflict escalating to the nuclear threshold would likely increase.REF Nuclear-armed states that had the option of escalating might be deterred from using nuclear weapons—but would all of those states make that decision? Or might a subset of them feel compelled to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict in order to achieve operational advantage or merely to stave off conventional defeat?

In such a nuclear proliferated world, the likelihood of nuclear war would increase, which could have adverse consequences for the United States—not least of which is that the United States could become embroiled in such a war. This could occur by being pulled into the conflict (either before or after first nuclear employment), or the conflict could expand to other, seemingly uninvolved powers with great rapidity and for little apparent reason. Who can forget that World War I began because a Serbian terrorist assassinated an Austrian Archduke—and dragged the British Empire, France, Imperial Germany, Italy, Czarist Russia, the Turkish Empire, the United States, and many others into the war—resulting in the collapse of four empires and upwards of 14 million dead.REF Now imagine such a war, but with half the participants having nuclear weapons as part of their arsenals.

It is tempting to say that even if medium-sized nuclear-armed powers in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East got into a conflict, the United States could remain aloof and uninvolved: That may be true for some conflicts. But it is difficult to forecast with any degree of accuracy how a nuclear war between two or even multiple nuclear-armed adversaries—some subset of which are not in the American orbit or under the U.S. nuclear umbrella—would end. The United States may get dragged into such a war, even if the United States did not want to get involved (as was the case in World War I and World War II). Indeed, history is replete with nations getting dragged into wars that they otherwise would like to ignore.

Even if the United States was able to maintain its neutrality, the consequence of a multi-sided nuclear war could well be a radical change in the world’s security environment—to include potentially a security order that is far, far less friendly than the one the United States enjoys today. Indeed, additional nuclear wars among non-U.S. partners could well have long-term consequences for the United States that one cannot yet determine—but are unlikely to be to the benefit of the American people and could well imperil that very peace that they so desperately seek and deserve.

Conclusion

In the end, extended deterrence is a stabilizing force that allows Americans to focus on things that matter directly to them: security, peace, prosperity, family, and faith. It does this by increasing the freedom of action of the United States and increasing foreign direct investment into the American economy, but most importantly, it makes war (particularly, nuclear war) less likely by deterring aggression.

A world without the American nuclear umbrella is a world with more nuclear powers and more nuclear wars—one with unforeseen downsides for the United States and the American people. It is for that reason that since 1947 the United States, across Republican and Democrat administrations, has extended its nuclear umbrella over its closest allies.

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence for Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation.

Authors

Robert Peters

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com