Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 


Quotes of the Day:


“In keeping silent about evil, and burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousandfold in the future. When we neither punish no reproach evildoers … we are ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.” 
- Alexander Solzhenitsyn

"Nothing is more terrible than to see ignorance in action."
- Goethe

"Character cannot be developed in ease and quiet. Only through experience of trial and suffering can the soul be strengthened, ambition inspired, and success achieved."
- Helen Keller


1. Biden says U.S.-Korea alliance born out of shared beliefs

2. N. Korea vows to bolster 'military deterrence' in response to Washington Declaration

3. Possible Refueling at Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor

4. Speaking Loudly and Carrying a Small Stick: South Korea Backtracks Over the Nuclear Rubicon

5. Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center: Expansion Work Continues

6. Yoon returns home from state visit to U.S.

7. Top nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S. discuss N.K. threat in Seoul

8. Japan PM Kishida arranging S. Korea trip in early May: Japanese media

9. Yoon-Biden summit paves way for bilateral semiconductor partnership

10. ROK-US alliance 3.0 at 70

11. Netflix commits $2.5 billion to Korean film and TV projects

12. Korea as global pivotal state vs. China, Russia

13. Rival political parties diverge on Yoon-Biden summit

14. (Yonhap Feature) Cutting-edge technology backs border troops against N. Korean threats along DMZ

15.Yoon fetes new nuclear accord as allies take harder line on NK

16. The US-South Korea Alliance Is Back





1. Biden says U.S.-Korea alliance born out of shared beliefs


Some might think this is a throwaway tweet. I really think we should keep this in mind especially when critics accuse Korea of following the US in loc-step. Korea's actions are in line with its interests (security, peace and prosperity) and values: "democracy, liberty, security, and above all -- freedom." Every time someone accuses Korea of being a puppet of the US should respond that it is our shared values that drive our alliance. If you think about it, these values are the reason why the US intervened in the Korean War to come to the defense of South Korea.  


These values should also be the foundation for our information and influence campaign. Key points from the JOint Statement:


Guided by our shared commitment to defend universal human rights, freedom, and the rule of law, the United States and the ROK are constructing an Alliance that will provide future generations with a firm foundation upon which to build prosperity and security.
...
The two Presidents are committed to build a better future for all Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/leaders-joint-statement-in-commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-alliance-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-korea/


Another way to frame this is if you do not support the alliance then you do not support these values (which I think is true for selected critics).


I do not think we can emphasize these shared values enough.



Biden says U.S.-Korea alliance born out of shared beliefs | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden tweeted that the alliance between the United States and South Korea is based on shared beliefs on "democracy, liberty, security, and above all -- freedom," as President Yoon Suk Yeol headed home after a state visit to the U.S.

"The United States and Republic of Korea alliance wasn't born out of shared borders, but shared beliefs: Democracy, liberty, security, and above all -- freedom," Biden wrote on Twitter, referring to South Korea's official name.

Biden posted the comment as Yoon was on his way home from a six-day state visit to the U.S. where the two held summit talks at the White House and agreed on measures to strengthen Washington's extended deterrence commitment to South Korea.

"Today, we celebrate the ironclad alliance, shared vision of our future, and the deep friendship that unites the Republic of Korea and the United States. Over the past seven decades, our alliance has grown stronger and more capable," Biden said in a video clip attached to the post.

Yoon is set to return home in the afternoon.


President Joe Biden stresses the alliance between the United States and South Korea in a Twitter post on April 30, 2023, in this image captured from his account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023



2. N. Korea vows to bolster 'military deterrence' in response to Washington Declaration


This is the time for Kim to conduct a nuclear wrest to try to signal that he does not respect ROK/US deterrence. The response of the alliance should be this: A simple statement that says the test is no surprise and confirms the reason for our recent actions to enhance extended deterrence. This should be followed by an aggressive influence response tha tours information into the north explaining to the people that they are suffering solely because of Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions and the expenditure of scarce resources on nuclear and missile development rather than the welfare of the Korean people in the north. And then we should continue our sustained readiness training - not reacting to the specific test but continuing planned and announced exercises to sustain readiness.


Then again, Kim may not act at all and simply continue his rhetoric campaign (executed by Kim Yo Jong).



N. Korea vows to bolster 'military deterrence' in response to Washington Declaration | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will step up its "military deterrence" against South Korea and the United States, state media said Sunday, blasting this week's summit agreement between the two sides on strengthening the U.S. extended deterrence as a "product of heinous hostile policy" against Pyongyang.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) ran a commentary criticizing President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to the U.S. this week as "the most hostile, aggressive and provocative trip and a dangerous one for a nuclear war."

In Washington, Yoon held a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and announced the adoption of the Washington Declaration, under which the U.S. will share information on nuclear and strategic operations and planning and regularly deploy strategic assets to South Korea.

"The 'Washington Declaration' on raising the practicality of the 'extended deterrence' provided by the U.S. is a typical product of the heinous hostile policy towards the DPRK," the KCNA said in an English-language commentary. DPRK refers to North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Anyone can know well that they are making a nuclear war against the DPRK a fait accompli," it said.


South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and U.S. President Joe Biden hold a joint news conference after their summit at the White House in Washington, D.C., on April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)

The KCNA also took issue with Biden's warning during a joint press conference that if the North uses nuclear weapons, it will result in the "end of regime." It was the first time that Biden has talked about ending the North's regime.

"What is more serious is that Biden, the president of the U.S., dared to make frantic and reckless remarks about 'the end of regime' towards the DPRK while becoming vociferous about a 'swift, overwhelming and decisive response' at the press conference after the talks," the KCNA said.

"Under such situation, it is quite natural for the DPRK to bolster up its military deterrence corresponding to the grave security environment of the present and the future," it said.

The state media said the joint statement that pledges stronger nuclear deterrence against North Korean threats and strengthening trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea and Japan is identical with "a dangerous nuclear war plot putting up the signboard of security."

"Through this, the U.S. and the south Korean puppets have made their scheme for invasion against the DPRK more clear," the KCNA said.

"The dangerous nuclear war moves of the U.S. and the puppet group running amuck in stifling the DPRK while denying the existence of the DPRK can never be pardoned and they will have to pay dearly for their rash acts," it said.

The previous day, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, condemned the Washington Declaration as reflecting "the most hostile and aggressive will of action" by Seoul and Washington and warned the allies' plan will only result in "more serious danger."

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023



3. Possible Refueling at Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor



Imagery at the link: https://www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor/


Excerpt:


Depending on the operational parameters of the reactor, North Korea could have enough spent fuel that when reprocessed, will produce up to 5-8 kilograms of new plutonium to add to the country’s fissile material stockpile



Possible Refueling at Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor

https://www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor/


Recent commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that cooling water discharge—observed with a few short interruptions at the 5 MWe reactor over the past 23 months—ceased in early April, suggesting that the reactor has likely been shut down. If this was done for refueling purposes, the removed spent fuel could soon be sent for reprocessing. Given how long the reactor has been running, this could amount to some 5-8 kilograms of new weapons-grade plutonium, once separated, to add to the country’s fissile material stockpile.

Recent Activity



Figure 1a. Close up of 5 MWe Reactor area on imagery from March 21, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.; Figure 1b. Close up of 5 MWe Reactor area on imagery from April 20, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

The 5 MWe reactor has been operating since July 2021. While there have been brief periods in the interim with no visible discharge, those instances are likely due to maintenance activities as the stoppage only lasted a couple of days each time. Earlier irradiation campaigns lasted about two years, but North Korea may have opted for a slightly shorter period this time to produce lower burnup plutonium, which is more suitable for nuclear weapons. Lower burnup is also desirable for nuclear weapons, as reflected in discussions between North Korean operators and Dr. Siegfried Hecker.

The 5 MWe Reactor is an on-load reactor, which does not require a cease in operations to refuel. However, North Korea has historically opted to shut down the reactor during refueling campaigns to perform maintenance. The greater vehicle presence and movement around the reactor in recent weeks could indicate maintenance activities are underway.

Construction is also underway at the adjacent Spent Fuel Storage Building, although less extensive than previously reported. The nature of this work cannot be established from satellite imagery alone, but does not seem large-scale, indicating that fuel discharge and storage could take place soon.

Depending on the operational parameters of the reactor, North Korea could have enough spent fuel that when reprocessed, will produce up to 5-8 kilograms of new plutonium to add to the country’s fissile material stockpile. Cooling will take a couple of months before reprocessing can commence, making monitoring of the Radiochemical Laboratory (RCL) important in the near-term. While there are no current indicators of activity at the RCL[1], smoke coming from the stack at the Thermal (Steam) Plant, which provides necessary steam for the processes at the RCL, would be a key indicator that a new reprocessing campaign was about to begin.

  1. [1]
  2. At the Spent Fuel Receipt Building within the RCL complex, limited construction activity is visible on imagery dated April 20, 2023. If the activity is related to modifications for future ELWR fuel, doing so before a reprocessing campaign when the area is less radioactive would be beneficial.


4. Speaking Loudly and Carrying a Small Stick: South Korea Backtracks Over the Nuclear Rubicon


Some key points. I think the point of exercises is already in play. The ROK/US CFC is showing us a new normal on readiness.


I think one of the necessary actions is that the ROK and US government need to embark on a "education" process for the public and for the uniformed elites.


Hre is a tweet thread I wrote in response to comments from the Washington Post reporter Michelle Ye Hee who commented on the opposition of the the three major conservative newspapers in South Korea who criticized the Washington Declaration:


Michelle Ye Hee Lee
@myhlee
·
Apr 28
The U.S. view is that ROK will never feel it's enough when it comes to extended deterrence and credibility, but still worth noting that all three major conservative newspapers in South Korea have expressed disappointment/caution over the Washington Declaration (mini thread):

Chosun Ilbo had sharp words, saying: “There was no measure taken this time, again, to fundamentally resolve the anxiety of the Korean people.”


“We must not forget the truth that ultimately, only we can be the ones who can protect ourselves.”

Chosun: “No matter what documents or promises between ROK and United States are made, they can’t provide an answer to the question of whether the United States will protect Seoul even if there is a risk of a nuclear attack on Washington and New York.”

Joongang Ilbo cautions: “The Washington Declaration has a significant meaning, but it is too early to determine whether it is a sufficient safety valve against North Korea’s nuclear threat."

More from Joongang on Washington Declaration: "It also remains to be seen whether it will completely quell the public’s anxiety.”

And, DongA Ilbo: “If you look closely at the contents of the Washington Declaration, it’s difficult not to feel a lot of regret.”

More from DongA on Washington Declaration: “Furthermore, it repeatedly confirmed the asymmetric reality of the ROK-US alliance by specifying that ‘Korea will provide conventional support for U.S. nuclear operations in case of emergency.’”


My response to the above tweet thread:


David Maxwell
@DavidMaxwell161
Excellent thread. Do all 3 papers have the same lack of understanding of nat sec when it comes to nuclear deterrence? The only way to satisfy the “proof of commitment” demand is when Kim miscalculates and we execute a nuclear response. 1/5

Do they really think ROK possession of nuc wpns will sufficiently deter KJU? Or are they just bent on whipping up anti-Yoon and anti-American sentiment. And don’t they understand that by doing so they are supporting Kim Jong Un’s political warfare strategy …2/5

To drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. The Washington Declaration will likely turn out to be a better document for the ROK than so-called nuclear sharing (really non-sharing) with NATO. Some in Korea needs to educate not only these papers but the public as well. 3/5

The trope of trading Seoul for DC or NY is exactly what KJU wants to perpetuate. But the best way to defend the US homeland is to equally defend the ROK and US. And if we say we will not trade NY or DC for Seoul we will see conflict on the peninsula that will have 4/5

catastrophic effects for America. We must defend the ROK to defend the US. The Korean people need to know that. 5/5


Excerpts


Thus, it seems the problem with South Korean nuclear proliferation might rest on the possibility that different stakeholders want nuclear weapons for different—indeed counterposed—reasons. If, as suggested by the foregoing, US extended nuclear deterrence credibility is not the issue for the South Korean general public, but is the concern for South Korean elites, then the US is in a bind. On the one hand, Washington’s efforts to dissuade the desire of the South Korean public for nuclear weapons risk disappointing South Korean elites who fear degraded US extended deterrence credibility, thus inciting them to consider developing nuclear weapons to fill the perceived credibility gap. On the other hand, aggressive attempts to reassure South Korean elite belief in US credibility might raise popular alarm that the US is potentially inclined to use nuclear weapons on behalf of South Korea when it would be undesirable, thus incentivizing the Korean public at large to support indigenous nuclear weapons in order to ensure sovereignty of nuclear weapon use. In either case, one South Korean group could read the actions of the US as entailing a need for Seoul to build its own nuclear weapons.
This dilemma presents difficulties from a policy perspective, but there are measures to mitigate the risks. One conclusion is that message discipline is critical. The US and South Korea could do more in terms of deterrent capability development, deployment and decisionmaking, but message it less publicly—just enough to communicate resolve to North Korea, but not so much as to spook the South Korean population. The core of the Washington Declaration—the establishment of the NCG—is potentially a step in the right direction: it might enhance elite politicians’ sense of reassurance while being boring and wonky enough that it does not reach the radar of average South Korean citizens.
Combined military exercises could be expanded and scaled up to hone readiness but also regularized and normalized such that they are less subject to close media attention. This should go hand-in-hand with the Yoon and Biden administrations generally refraining from escalatory North Korea-directed rhetoric that promises devastating retaliation should North Korea execute its various and sundry menacing attacks. A more convincing overture at talks with North Korea—i.e., going beyond the US-ROK alliance boilerplate that “talks without preconditions” are available—might also balance the dissuasive effect of combined military exercises (which could continue on their present path) with the potentially attractive carrot of meaningful diplomatic exchange. In short, the US-ROK alliance should absolutely carry a big stick, but it should also speak more softly.


Speaking Loudly and Carrying a Small Stick: South Korea Backtracks Over the Nuclear Rubicon

https://www.38north.org/2023/04/speaking-loudly-and-carrying-a-small-stick-south-korea-backtracks-over-the-nuclear-rubicon/


Earlier this year, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol made a pronouncement that no leader in Seoul has ever made before. He stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This claim attracted international attention, particularly in Washington, Pyongyang, Beijing and Tokyo.

Yoon’s statement was opaque, starting with the conditional nature of the pronouncement—how much more “intense” would North Korea’s threat level have to become before triggering South Korean nuclear weapon development? Moreover, Yoon added that the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) could become a latent/threshold nuclear weapon power with an industrial and scientific capacity to produce nuclear weapons on a short time scale. How quickly that could actually be accomplished is unclear, however, given the country’s current dependence on foreign sources of nuclear material even for its civil nuclear energy program.

Given the controversial nature of these statements, Yoon’s presidential office later backtracked, offering the “clarification” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.”

Washington took notice of its worried alliance partner, starting with a clear step-up in demonstration of commitment to extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and combined US-ROK air warfare training featuring F-35s, F-22s, B-52s and B1Bs (this is in addition to regular combined military exercises, and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups). Washington also agreed to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella, going beyond the revival of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG). Additionally, the Biden administration agreed to the instituting of joint tabletop exercises that involve responses to North Korean nuclear weapons use and approached South Korea and Japan about forming a trilateral consultative mechanism on extended nuclear deterrence.

Nonetheless, elite conservative South Korean politicians have continued to argue that Seoul should consider developing nuclear weapons. In late January, Hong Joon-pyo, a veteran heavyweight in the conservative People Power Party (PPP) and current poll leader to be the conservative nominee for the next presidential election, indicated support for President Yoon’s call for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons under certain conditions. Also in January, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, a star conservative politician and another favorite for the next presidential race, argued for South Korean nuclear weapons in mid-January. Oh then doubled down on that stance in a high-profile March interview with Reuters in which he called for South Korean nuclear weapons even in the face of costs and risks from international opprobrium (sanctions, strained diplomatic ties, etc.). A national assemblyman and former chairperson of the PPP, Chung Jin-suk, broached South Korean indigenous nuclear weapons in late February. North Korean defector and current South Korean National Assemblyman Thae Yong-ho has been on the record multiple times calling for South Korean nuclear weapons. These instances demonstrate how this debate, which was long confined to fringe views and voices, has increasingly become mainstream discourse in South Korea.

All this raises the question: How serious is the risk that South Korea acquires nuclear weapons or develops a latent/threshold nuclear capacity? The short answer to this question is “not very”—at least in the current environment, the international political cost of indigenous nuclear weapons for South Korea is too high. But behind the debate in South Korea is a complex problem of nuclear deterrence and ally reassurance on the Korean Peninsula, one which will loom in the background of the US-ROK military alliance for quite some time.

Context

Impoverished, dysfunctional North Korea has nuclear weapons, no apparent intention of surrendering them, and a habit of threatening South Korea. Wealthy, high-functioning South Korea has no nuclear weapons but does have a powerful conventional military force, an alliance with the US, and the protection of US extended nuclear deterrence. From Seoul’s perspective, this arrangement has been acceptable as long as Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal was minimal in quantity, limited in quality and likely unreliable—that is, not a real risk to South Korea. That situation has changed in recent years, however, and with it, South Korea’s willingness to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence in its current form. In a nutshell, the ROK’s concerns about the US nuclear umbrella require the arrangement to evolve; failing to seriously address the situation creates a potential path to latent/threshold nuclear capability or even actual construction of indigenous nuclear weapons.

The crux of South Korea’s worry arises from the fact that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is growing quantitatively and improving qualitatively. Although North Korea has in some form possessed nuclear weapons for nearly twenty years, Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal was extremely rudimentary for most of that period. Over time, however, the North’s nuclear arsenal graduated to a minimal nuclear deterrent, including intercontinental ballistic missiles that can range the United States, and is now likely on track to achieve the status of real second-strike capability.[1] This forces South Korea to consider that North Korea might not conclude that the US president (the sole possessor of launch authority for US nuclear weapons) would be willing to sacrifice (e.g.) San Francisco for Busan, were deterrence to fail.[2] The uncertainty of this trade provokes doubt among some South Koreans regarding the credibility of the US’s extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. This problem is only set to worsen as Pyongyang develops tactical nuclear weapons that could theoretically be employed in such a way as to lead the Kim Jong Un regime to believe that it could strike South Korean targets with nuclear weapons without nuclear retaliation by the US.

North Korea’s improved and increasing nuclear capabilities have been accompanied by changes to its nuclear posture, which now seems to include possible nuclear “first-use” (presumably under conditions of existential threat to national/regime security) and a version of a nuclear “dead-hand” (“automatic” nuclear weapons launch if regime leadership and/or command-and-control is destroyed). The evolution in Pyongyang’s nuclear capability and accompanying posture creates the foundation for a far more aggressive overall coercive strategy vis-à-vis South Korea, up to and including trying to de-couple the US-ROK alliance and gain a decisive political/geopolitical/diplomatic advantage over Seoul on the Korean Peninsula.

Is an Ounce of Reassurance Worth a Pound of Deterrence?

As argued above, despite the growing North Korean nuclear menace vis-à-vis South Korea, Seoul does not intend to develop indigenous nuclear weapons in the short-/mid-term future, the trial balloons by President Yoon and other conservative elites notwithstanding. South Korean nuclear weapons acquisition would be too risky and costly: potential consequences would likely include heavy sanctions, diplomatic isolation and suspended access to civil nuclear materials in the international market (this would be a major blow to South Korea’s domestic nuclear power industry and nuclear power station exports). Why, then, have Yoon and other South Korean political elites broached the possibility of South Korea going nuclear?

The prevailing interpretation is that a combination of factors is at play. One factor is that the Yoon administration wanted to ratchet up pressure on Washington to take more seriously South Korean concerns about the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, thus accelerating (even eliciting) improved policies from the US. A second factor is that the administration wanted to signal to North Korea and China that Pyongyang’s growing nuclear arsenal could result in an unwanted (from their perspective) regional security development, absent North Korean restraint and willingness to negotiate about denuclearization. A third factor is related to domestic politics. Conservative political elites—President Yoon, Mayor Oh, party heavyweight Hong, and party leader Chung—were responding to perceived popular dissatisfaction about US extended nuclear deterrence, notably taking a cue from numerous opinion polls showing that 65-70 percent of South Koreans favor development of independent nuclear weapons.

Defense and security elites in Seoul and Washington have responded with a two-pronged approach, aiming at both augmenting deterrence of North Korea and increasing reassurance for South Korea that US extended nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea is credible. One prong is that the US has agreed to more frequent deployment and exercise of “strategic” assets to and around the Korean Peninsula. Serving as both a deterrent message to Pyongyang and a reassurance message to Seoul, these more frequent US-ROK joint military deployments and exercises have also been made more visible through assertive official messaging. Fundamentally, however, such measures are just an indicator of US nuclear capability, about which there already was no doubt in either Pyongyang or Seoul.

The second prong has been to promise greater consultation for South Korea regarding US extended nuclear deterrence. Going beyond the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group revived in 2022, the 2023 Biden-Yoon summit promulgated the Washington Declaration, which has introduced the US-ROK nuclear consultative group (NCG) dedicated to institutionalizing South Korea’s larger role in shaping extended nuclear deterrence for the Korean Peninsula. Inter alia, the US and South Korea have agreed to carry out tabletop exercises (already in February 2023, with a follow-on in May and more going forward), including scenarios involving North Korean nuclear weapon use. The idea is to improve South Korean opportunities to understand US policy, posture and logic regarding nuclear use in an extended deterrence context, and on that basis, to communicate Seoul’s position. This may (or may not) function as a first set of steps toward greater integration of South Korea into US extended nuclear deterrence planning (i.e., mutatis mutandis, a version of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group). It will, at least, likely fill in gaps of South Korean elite understanding about how the US makes and executes decisions to use nuclear weapons on behalf of allies. That said, nothing can truly dispel the underlying fear of South Korean political elites that the US president might lack the will (both personal and political) to strike North Korea with a retaliatory attack on behalf of South Korea if it meant potentially trading San Francisco for Busan.

Ironically, as a South Korean elite justification and motivation for broaching an indigenous nuclear deterrent, the concern that the US president might not push the nuclear button on behalf of South Korea is perhaps a misreading of the anxieties of South Koreans regarding the US as an alliance partner extending nuclear deterrence. Indeed, there is a conundrum in much of the polling data asking the general South Korean population about its desire for South Korean nuclear weapons: To wit, there is significant overlap between the part of the population that trusts (and approves of) the US as an alliance partner and the part that claims to want South Korean nuclear weapons. For example, a poll conducted by the Chicago Council of International Affairs/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows that for every incremental increase in the respondents’ belief that the US would defend South Korea in case of conflict with the North, there is an increase in support for independent South Korean nuclear weapons. Those with low confidence in the US defending South Korea responded 56 percent positively to the question of indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons. Those with very high confidence in the US defending South Korea responded 77 percent positively to the question of indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons. A 2020 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution reaches a similar result on the basis of surveys, as high belief in the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence correlated with higher desire for independent South Korean nuclear weapons.

The data from these studies undermine the notion that the driving force behind a general South Korean popular desire for nuclear weapons is potential US fecklessness in the face of the rising North Korean nuclear threat vis-à-vis South Korea. How can one account for this conclusion? A likely possibility is that the South Korean public actually fears undesired employment of nuclear weapons by the US in case of hot war on the Korean Peninsula.[3] For example, a 2022 article in the Journal of Conflict Resolution reported results of a scenario-based study with 2,000+ South Koreans in which only 27 percent of study participants desired US nuclear retaliation against North Korea, even if North Korea attacked Busan with a nuclear weapon. When the author presented this figure in a closed-door seminar on extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, senior US military officers were dumbfounded at the low number, routinely estimating the number to be 50-80 percent, and thus neatly encapsulating the problem of the potential mismatch between what South Koreans and the US might consider to be the best course of action against North Korea, should nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula fail.

Roosevelt Redux

Thus, it seems the problem with South Korean nuclear proliferation might rest on the possibility that different stakeholders want nuclear weapons for different—indeed counterposed—reasons. If, as suggested by the foregoing, US extended nuclear deterrence credibility is not the issue for the South Korean general public, but is the concern for South Korean elites, then the US is in a bind. On the one hand, Washington’s efforts to dissuade the desire of the South Korean public for nuclear weapons risk disappointing South Korean elites who fear degraded US extended deterrence credibility, thus inciting them to consider developing nuclear weapons to fill the perceived credibility gap. On the other hand, aggressive attempts to reassure South Korean elite belief in US credibility might raise popular alarm that the US is potentially inclined to use nuclear weapons on behalf of South Korea when it would be undesirable, thus incentivizing the Korean public at large to support indigenous nuclear weapons in order to ensure sovereignty of nuclear weapon use. In either case, one South Korean group could read the actions of the US as entailing a need for Seoul to build its own nuclear weapons.

This dilemma presents difficulties from a policy perspective, but there are measures to mitigate the risks. One conclusion is that message discipline is critical. The US and South Korea could do more in terms of deterrent capability development, deployment and decisionmaking, but message it less publicly—just enough to communicate resolve to North Korea, but not so much as to spook the South Korean population. The core of the Washington Declaration—the establishment of the NCG—is potentially a step in the right direction: it might enhance elite politicians’ sense of reassurance while being boring and wonky enough that it does not reach the radar of average South Korean citizens.

Combined military exercises could be expanded and scaled up to hone readiness but also regularized and normalized such that they are less subject to close media attention. This should go hand-in-hand with the Yoon and Biden administrations generally refraining from escalatory North Korea-directed rhetoric that promises devastating retaliation should North Korea execute its various and sundry menacing attacks. A more convincing overture at talks with North Korea—i.e., going beyond the US-ROK alliance boilerplate that “talks without preconditions” are available—might also balance the dissuasive effect of combined military exercises (which could continue on their present path) with the potentially attractive carrot of meaningful diplomatic exchange. In short, the US-ROK alliance should absolutely carry a big stick, but it should also speak more softly.

  1. [1]
  2. E.g., even if North Korea were hit with nuclear weapons by the US in retaliation for its own first strike against South Korea, North Korea would have a residual capability to strike the US in return for the retaliation.
  3. [2]
  4. One notes here that the current state of US and South Korean missile defense—both in/around the Korean Peninsula, as well as for protecting US territory—is considered insufficient to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
  5. [3]
  6. Additional, non-mutually exclusive possibilities include fears about China (notably in the context of regional great power competition with the US) and a desire for the international prestige of being a nuclear weapon state.



5. Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center: Expansion Work Continues


Imagery at the link.



Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center: Expansion Work Continues

https://www.38north.org/2023/04/yongbyon-nuclear-scientific-research-center-expansion-work-continues/


Commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that expansion and refurbishment work continues throughout the site, reinforcing the notion that Kim Jong Un’s call “to expand the production of weapon-grade materials needed for an ‘exponential’ increase in the country’s arsenal” was not an idle request.

Major activity has been observed throughout the site, especially around the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR), the 5 MWe Reactor, and within the uranium conversion area. Further, improvements to the Kuryong River causeway channel dam and other new building construction projects throughout the complex demonstrate significant investment in improving the various components of the country’s fissile material production capabilities.

Figure 1. Overview of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

ELWR

Water discharge south of the ELWR pump house, which has been noted in previous reports, continues, indicating testing or cooling operations are still underway.

Construction also continues on a building first observed on March 17 continues north of the engineering building. While the exact number of floors it will have upon completion is unclear, its foundation footprint is equal to that of the original engineering building. This is the second building to be constructed adjacent to the engineering building; work was completed on the other, a one-story structure perpendicular to the engineering building in November 2022. Additional materials, a mobile crane and possible footers have been brought in for what appears to be yet another structure.

Placed along the access road separating the engineering building from the ELWR are at least 20 probable canisters, as well some longer, cylindrical objects (these may also be additional canisters just placed end-to-end). In front of the engineering building, new materials have been placed in the parking lot. The exact purpose of these materials is unclear, although they may be related to the ongoing construction or maintenance activity at the ELWR.

Figure 2. Close up of reactor area. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

5 MWe Reactor

After an almost continuous discharge of cooling water into the Kuryong River since July 2021, this activity ceased between March 21 and April 1. On imagery from April 12, the discharge had resumed, but on imagery from April 20 it had stopped again (Figure 2). Separate analysis of the activity at Yongbyon’s 5 MWe can be found here.

Figure 3. Close up of 5 MWe Reactor area. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Uranium Conversion Area

Significant new construction work is ongoing throughout the Uranium Conversion Area, where the Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP or former Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant) and related facilities are located. Highlighted in our previous report, three new buildings are under construction in the southern part of the complex. While their purpose remains unclear, it appears two of the buildings will be at least two-story structures.

As construction continues at the UO2-UF4 buildings, evidenced by an active tower crane and materials scattered around the buildings, little change is observed to the exteriors, suggesting most of the work is occurring inside.

Since March 21, at the Yellowcake-UO2 conversion building, over 30 canisters or drums and other material have been removed from within the building, suggesting renovations are likely taking place inside. Around the UEP, similar canisters can be seen outside buildings, likely indicating that interior work may also be occurring elsewhere within the complex.

Figure 4. Construction activity continues throughout UEP Complex. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Other Activity

Construction and refurbishment of the dam, located west of the Radiochemical Laboratory (RCL) complex, is in full swing. The causeway crosses the three-channel island previously constructed to manage the flow of the Kuryong River during both the wet and dry seasons, and the dam services an adjacent pumphouse to ensure a constant source of water for the UEP and RCL. Pile post shadows are visible along the dam, indicating attempts to better stabilize it to hold its earthen fill. This activity is part of a decades long effort to manage the river flow and ensure adequate water supply for the center as a whole. The east channel has been blocked to allow for dam reconstruction, and dredging work is visible along the opposite bank. Work for the placement cisterns along the riverbank continues.

Figure 5. Close up of dam refurbishment west of RCL complex. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.


6. Yoon returns home from state visit to U.S.


The real hard work begins for President Yoon.



Yoon returns home from state visit to U.S. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · April 30, 2023

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol returned home Sunday from a state visit to the United States where the two countries agreed on measures to strengthen the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea.

The six-day visit came as the two countries mark the 70th anniversary of the bilateral alliance this year.

In Washington, Yoon held a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House and announced the adoption of the Washington Declaration, under which the U.S. will share information on nuclear and strategic operations and planning and regularly deploy strategic assets to South Korea.

Yoon also addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress and met with prominent business people, including Tesla CEO Elon Musk, to secure more investment in South Korea.

On the second leg of his trip, Yoon visited Boston to meet with digital and biotechnology experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and deliver a speech at Harvard University.

Yoon was joined on the trip by first lady Kim Keon Hee.


South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands during an official welcoming ceremony at the White House in Washington, D.C., on April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · April 30, 2023



7. Top nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S. discuss N.K. threat in Seoul


I had the honor of having a personal meeting with Ambassador Kim Gunn last week when I was in Seoul. I think our two ambassadors make an excellent team. There is no problem with our team. The problem is and always will be Kim Jong Un.



Top nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S. discuss N.K. threat in Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- The top nuclear envoys of South Korea and the United States have met in Seoul to discuss ways to cooperate on countering North Korea's evolving nuclear and military threats, the foreign ministry said Sunday.

U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim held a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Kim Gunn, on Tuesday on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum 2023 conference, a security forum hosted by a local think tank.

"The two sides shared their assessments of the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula and discussed joint responses to North Korea's nuclear threats," the ministry said in a statement.

The envoys agreed to strengthen close coordination on Pyongyang to make it cease provocations and return to denuclearization talks, based on the agreements from the South Korea-U.S. summit held in Washington last week.

It is their third consultation this month, following a bilateral session in Seoul on April 6 and phone talks on April 13.


Kim Gunn (L), South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim pose for a photo during their meeting in Seoul on April 25, 2023, in this photo released by the foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023



8. Japan PM Kishida arranging S. Korea trip in early May: Japanese media


A potential large step forward.




Japan PM Kishida arranging S. Korea trip in early May: Japanese media | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could make his first visit to South Korea since taking office in early May to hold a summit with President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japanese media reported Sunday.

The Yomiuri Shimbun cited multiple diplomatic sources saying Kishida's visit could take place on May 7 or 8 to reciprocate Yoon's visit to Tokyo in March. If realized, the trip will mark Kishida's first to South Korea since taking office

Several other newspapers also carried similar reports.

The last visit by a Japanese prime minister to South Korea was made by Shinzo Abe in February 2018.

Yoon held a summit with Kishida in Tokyo in March in the wake of his government's decision to compensate Korean victims of Japanese wartime forced labor without contributions from Japanese firms.

Yoon was the first South Korean president in 12 years to make a bilateral visit to Japan, as the two countries' relations had been strained over a series of historical disputes stemming from Tokyo's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

The two leaders agreed during their summit to resume shuttle diplomacy, or regular visits to each other's countries.


This file photo shows South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida holding talks in Tokyo on March 16, 2023. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 30, 2023


9. Yoon-Biden summit paves way for bilateral semiconductor partnership




Yoon-Biden summit paves way for bilateral semiconductor partnership | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 최경애 · April 30, 2023

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- The summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden has paved the way for the "world's best" bilateral semiconductor partnership, the finance ministry said Sunday.

President Yoon returned home Sunday from a six-day state visit to the United States, together with the chiefs of the country's four major conglomerates Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor and LG Group.

In one of the visit's major achievements, Seoul and Washington agreed to build a partnership in case of any disruptions in the global supply chains of the cutting-edge semiconductor industry, the Ministry of Economy and Finance said in a statement.

The two countries agreed to cooperate in the fields of next-generation semiconductors, cutting-edge packaging and high-end materials R&D projects to secure leadership in the semiconductor sector, the statement said.

They also agreed to minimize the uncertainties and business burdens of South Korean chipmakers in doing business in the U.S. with regards to the Chips and Science Act, it said.

The Chips act is aimed at boosting the U.S. semiconductor industry by offering ample subsidies to global chipmakers to build chip plants on its soil.


South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands during an official welcoming ceremony at the White House in Washington on April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)


(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by 최경애 · April 30, 2023


10. ROK-US alliance 3.0 at 70




Except to the critics in South Korea and Kim Jong Un apologists and sympathizers, the Biden/Yoon summit was a success. But not the work begins to move the alliance forward.


Excerpts:



The verdict on the credibility and efficacy of Alliance 3.0 will depend on how the alliance responds to these challenges from China and North Korea. The credibility of US assurances will be determined by the speed and effectiveness with which the allies respond to threats, as perceived by the South Korean public.

There is no denying that significant progress has been made through this summit. A new process has begun to redefine the future of the alliance for another 70 years. It requires close communication and coordination between Seoul and Washington to further increase the resilience and utility of the alliance. The onus is on the political leaders to deliver it not just for their respective countries, but also for the world.






ROK-US alliance 3.0 at 70

The Korea Times · April 30, 2023


By Kim Won-soo


President Yoon Suk Yeol paid a state visit to the United States last week at a doubly symbolic moment. This year South Korea and the United States celebrate 70 years of partnership in arms. But the celebration takes place under cloudy skies fraught with mounting volatility and uncertainty for the global and regional orders.


Against this backdrop, President Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden seem to have paid close attention to two primary tasks at their meeting. The first was to redefine the alliance in accordance with rapidly changing global and regional geopolitics. The second was to reassure the South Korean public that the United States was strongly committed to the defense of South Korea, including in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea.


For the first task, both leaders affirmed that the alliance had now entered a new phase, which I will call 3.0 from hereon. Over the last seven decades, the alliance went through numerous ups and downs but proved to be resilient, withstanding challenges both internal and external to the alliance. It has evolved from a one-sided and Korean Peninsula-focused arrangement (1.0) to a more balanced yet still peninsula-focused (2.0) to a balanced and globally oriented (3.0). Now the alliance has matured enough to cover a variety of issues spanning security, politics, economy, culture and technology. Many of these issues have broad implications for all spheres of human life that include not only the Korean Peninsula and beyond, but cyberspace and outer space as well. The alliance has also grown to be more value-based, moving beyond the conventional national interest calculus. Universal respect for individual freedom, basic human rights and justice for all lies at the core of the alliance.


For the second task, the Washington Declaration offers some unprecedented language on U.S. extended deterrence and goes the extra mile in three significant ways. First, Washington makes clear that any nuclear attack by North Korea will be met with a resolute allied response in kind. Second, South Korea and the United States have agreed to create a Nuclear Consultative Group which will ensure the former's greater participation in the latter's nuclear planning process. This new addition is akin to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s Nuclear Planning Group in some fundamental aspects, while distinct from it in others. Third, Washington also makes clear that all strategic assets in the American nuclear triad, in particular the Navy's ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), will be regularly and frequently deployed to South Korea. In return for these American assurances, South Korea has reaffirmed its continued compliance with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is a welcome development as it is expected to dampen the rising public support of late for South Korea pursuing its own nuclear weapons.


The Yoon-Biden summit helped lay solid groundwork for Alliance 3.0. But it does not guarantee that the road ahead will be smooth and easy. I am afraid the opposite is likely to prevail. Like almost everything else, every diplomatic deal comes with a cost. No diplomatic deal is free as it involves the other side.


An immediate scorecard for the summit seems to show largely positive ratings both in terms of the substance of the deals reached as well as diplomatic optics. But the jury is still out when it comes to the broader effects of the summit. China and North Korea must have followed the whole process closely and are expected to send out strong signals sooner or later.


The emergence of global value-based alliances inevitably means greater distancing between the two blocs, one led by the United States and its allies and the other by China and Russia. These blocs are split along the old East-West cleavages of the Cold War and tensions are growing fast between them. South Korea is likely to be sandwiched between its alliance partner (U.S.) and its largest trading partner (China) over such issues as value chains involving high-tech items and tensions in the East and South China seas including the Taiwan Strait. North Korea may react in an even more hostile manner than on previous occasions, potentially carrying out another nuclear test and/or missile launches.


The verdict on the credibility and efficacy of Alliance 3.0 will depend on how the alliance responds to these challenges from China and North Korea. The credibility of US assurances will be determined by the speed and effectiveness with which the allies respond to threats, as perceived by the South Korean public.


There is no denying that significant progress has been made through this summit. A new process has begun to redefine the future of the alliance for another 70 years. It requires close communication and coordination between Seoul and Washington to further increase the resilience and utility of the alliance. The onus is on the political leaders to deliver it not just for their respective countries, but also for the world.


Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under-secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and a chair professor at Kyung Hee University.



The Korea Times · April 30, 2023


11. Netflix commits $2.5 billion to Korean film and TV projects



I hope Netflix and its Korean content makers will include more north-SOuth content covering relationships, potential for conflict, how to mitigate conflict, unification stories, and post unification stories. Drama such as "Crash Lending on You" can be money makers and contribute to understanding between north and South and more importantly repara the way for better understanding and ultimately to pursue a free and unified Korea. Based on my discussions with north Korean escapees, "Crash Landing on You" has had a positive influence on Koreans in the north, one reason being that it portrays the Korean people in the north (to include nKPA soldiers) as human beings and not the monster that most propogandas depicts. Sustained content along these lines can have a positive influence on the Korean people by preparing them for eventual unification.


I would recommend the GEC partner with its Korean government counterpart and see if they can provide recommendations to the Netflix content providers. If South Korea could provide detailed unification policies and plans Netflix might be able to produce content that will assist in the future process to achieve a free and unified Korea.





Netflix commits $2.5 billion to Korean film and TV projects

NBC News · by Variety and Variety contributed.

The global streaming giant Netflix has publicly committed to spending $2.5 billion (about KRW3.34 trillion) on South Korean film and TV production over the next four years. The total is double the amount it has spent in Korea since 2016, the company said.

The promise was made by Ted Sarandos, co-CEO of Netflix, at a meeting in Washington with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

“We were able to make this decision because we have great confidence that the Korean creative industry will continue to tell great stories. We were also inspired by the President’s love and strong support for the Korean entertainment industry and fueling the Korean wave. I’d like to personally thank the President for his kind response letter,” Sarandos said in a statement.

“It is incredible that the love towards Korean shows has led to a wider interest in Korea, thanks to the Korean creators’ compelling stories. Their stories are now at the heart of the global cultural zeitgeist,” he continued.

Netflix has enjoyed success with drama series including “Squid Game” and “The Glory,” and increasingly with unscripted shows such as “Physical 100,” at both a local and an international level.

A roster of Korean content has anchored Netflix position as the dominant streamer within the wealthy and competitive Korean market. And at the same time, Korean shows are increasingly traveling across borders, propelling a "Korean wave" of enthusiastic audiences beyond Korean entertainment’s established markets in East Asia.

The new spending commitment by Netflix comes at a time when other global players, notably Disney+ and Apple TV+, are also trying to up their game with expanded slates of Korean shows.

Korean-based streaming operators, notably Tving (backed by CJ ENM, tech giant Naver and broadcaster-producer JTBC) and Wavve (jointly owned by the country’s three main public broadcasters KBS, MBC and SBS and private sector giant SK Telecom) are also seeking a bigger piece of the Korean wave for themselves at home and abroad.

In response to the booming demand for content, Korean production companies have also expanded their operations. CJ ENM launched a third production subsidiary, while JTBC Studios relaunched itself a year ago as Studio Lululala as part of a worldwide Korean content expansion.

At the height of the content race two years ago Netflix previously committed to spending close to $500 million on Korean production in 2021.

Analysis firm, Media Partners Asia forecast that Netflix would spend some $700 million on Korean content in 2022, but the figure was not confirmed by the streamer.

Sources close to Netflix explained subsequently that the 2021 investment promises were made due to a specific constellation of political circumstances and were unlikely to be repeated.

Around that time, a change in local regulations, Netflix had been forced to disclose its profit and loss figures in Korea. Simultaneously, a Korean internet giant was challenging Netflix to pay fees for carriage on its networks and the company was criticized by an influential committee within Korea’s National Assembly.

In a longer Korean-language version of the new production spending commitment, seen by Variety, Netflix makes several arguments for it to be regarded as a good corporate citizen and a locomotive force within the Korean entertainment community.

“The world’s interest has expanded not only to Korean content, but also to the Korean creators who produce them. Netflix’s investment goes beyond producing great works to create a ‘virtuous circle’ that grows with Korean companies involved in content production, including special effects (VFX), special makeup (SFX), post-production, production finance, and line production,” a translated version of the longer statement says.

It claims to have boosted the dubbing and sub-titling industries in Korea and name check local firms such as Dexter Studios handling digital intermediates and VFX firm Westworld, which have expanded thanks to the flow of Netflix work.

The longer statement cited a 2021 report by accounting and consultancy firm Deloitte that attributed an economic ripple effect of KRW5.6 trillion and 16,000 jobs created by the expanding Korean content industries, and a further KRW2.7 trillion of benefits to other Korean industries such as food, beauty, fashion and tourism.

It cited a recent survey by a Korean business federation “Public Perceptions of the Spread of the Korean Wave,” which found that the global presence and influence of the Korean Wave has increased more than 40 times as of 2023 compared to the early 2000s.

NBC News · by Variety and Variety contributed.



12. Korea as global pivotal state vs. China, Russia



Korean GPS. Korea is navigating a new diplomatic direction. 


Conclusion:


Korea's diplomatic transformation attempts are surprising to many, including its neighboring powers. They never thought of it happening in their wildest dreams. They are witnessing Korea's convergence into a contributing state to world affairs. It is something unheard of, and unseen to their ears and naked eyes before. Korea must also unwaveringly meet the challenges stemming from its adjustments to its transformation. Korea will prevail with its effort to fully become a global pivot state, a defender of universal values and rule-based liberal international order.


Korea as global pivotal state vs. China, Russia

The Korea Times · April 30, 2023

By Choo Jae-woo

China and Russia were not pleased after President Yoon Suk Yeol's interview with Reuters on April 20 prior to his state visit to the U.S. They were upset at his comments on the Taiwan question and the war in Ukraine. Beijing was vehement about President Yoon's opposition to changes in the status quo by force in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese foreign minister showed no restraint in his response saying anyone interfering in the issue is "playing with fire."


Moscow countered Yoon's contemplation on the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine as an intervention in the war. Russia went further to warn of heavy consequences for South Korea in the form of weapons support to North Korea. These responses coming from 'no limits' cooperative partners, as they dubbed their relationship, were taken out of context.


President Yoon's answers were reasonable enough as they met the concerns and interests of the international community. Most would not like to see the status quo in the Taiwan Strait region disrupted by force. Neither would many further like to hear about treacherous stories of the befallen innocent Ukrainian victims of Russia's merciless attacks. President Yoon's message was clear. Should there be a disruption of peace and stability by coercive means in the strait, Korea as a responsible stakeholder in the region will not remain idle. Should Russia keep massacring innocent people and violating the laws of war, Korea will be compelled to shift its standing position pertaining to supplying non-lethal weaponry to Ukraine.


President Yoon's messages were taken out of context by both China and Russia. With regard to the Taiwan Strait, he was asked about his thought on the growing tensions. The question was raised in the context of Beijing's intensification of pressure, both diplomatic and military, on Taiwan to accept Chinese sovereignty. His response was crystal clear and simple: "After all, these tensions occurred because of the attempts to change the status quo by force, and we together with the international community absolutely oppose such a change." His answer would have been the same had it been asked, perhaps by Chinese media, about the Taiwanese striving for independence that could upset the status quo situation in the strait.


With respect to the question of supporting Ukraine on the prospect of Korea's support of lethal weapons, his response was conditional. The question asked for further elaboration on the option that Korea might think it had to help Ukraine defend and rebuild itself. His response, again, was simple and clear: "If there is a situation the international community cannot condone, such as any large-scale attack on civilians, massacre or serious violation of the laws of war, it might be difficult for us to insist only on humanitarian or financial support." In other words, he was straightforward on Russia challenging the tolerance of the international community, and thereby, the possibility of a compelling effect it may engender on Korea's part as a nation that highly appreciates universal values.


President Yoon is committed to making his country a "Global Pivot State." It is a foreign policy vision that he adopted on his first day of the job as the president of South Korea. He wants his mother country to become, politically and diplomatically, a responsible state commensurate with its world economic standing profile. He foresees Korea making a more constructive contribution to the world peace and prosperity. He insists Korea should come forward to the defense of freedom, democracy, the rules-based order, the market economy and human rights. He has been persistent in his efforts to fulfill a foreign policy vision that has been welcomed worldwide.


Korea is on the same page as much of the world on these two particular global challenges. Korea wants peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Koreans want the Taiwan question to be solved by peaceful means and measures. They would be the first to oppose a coercive Chinese unification as they solemnly do with their own unification question. And be resolved with the assent of the Taiwanese people. They will be against Taiwan's unilateral pronouncement of independence should it act as a force of disruption to the equilibrium and tranquility of the Strait by provoking China's military response.


President Yoon, coupled with his deep-rooted appreciation for universal values, is apparently upset like most of his compatriots on Russia's unprovoked attacks on Ukraine and unchallenged violation of these values. By conditioning his country's possible shift in weapons supply policy on the world's condonation, he proclaimed Korea would not tolerate a large-scale civilian attack by Russia, should there be another one. He was righteous with his assertion that "I believe there won't be limitations to the extent of the support to defend and restore a country that's been illegally invaded both under international and domestic law." It is one of the long-upheld universal principles that this world has tried to respect and abide by since the end of World War II.


Korea's diplomatic transformation attempts are surprising to many, including its neighboring powers. They never thought of it happening in their wildest dreams. They are witnessing Korea's convergence into a contributing state to world affairs. It is something unheard of, and unseen to their ears and naked eyes before. Korea must also unwaveringly meet the challenges stemming from its adjustments to its transformation. Korea will prevail with its effort to fully become a global pivot state, a defender of universal values and rule-based liberal international order.


Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.



The Korea Times · April 30, 2023



13. Rival political parties diverge on Yoon-Biden summit



This is the key friction point that derives from a misunderstanding of NATO nuclear sharing and the desire of some Koreans to adopt a process to mirror NATO's. (Keeping up with the Jones). But what they do not realize is that the Washington Declaration is likely to turn out to be a much better process that is superior to NATO nuclear sharing from the strategic perspective of the Korean peninsula.


Excerpts:




He criticized the Yoon adviser’s description of the Nuclear Consultative Group aimed at addressing nuclear contingencies as a “de facto nuclear sharing” deal, which Edgard Kagan, a US National Security Council senior director, denied.
...
Speaking to The Korea Herald, the party’s Rep. Ha Tae-keung on the parliamentary foreign affairs committee said the Nuclear Consultative Group was “significant as South Korea’s first nuclear consultation with the US.”
“The Yoon administration is the first in history to do this,” he said.



Rival political parties diverge on Yoon-Biden summit

Democratic Party repeats calls for firing security advisor to president

By Kim Arin

Published : Apr 30, 2023 - 18:14      Updated : Apr 30, 2023 - 18:14

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 30, 2023

South Korean rival political parties have diverged on their assessments of the gains and losses of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s summit with US President Joe Biden. While political opponents at home have blasted Yoon for “returning from Washington empty-handed,” the ruling party has defended Yoon for upgrading the security alliance to a new level.

Park Jie-won, who headed South Korea’s National Intelligence Service during the Moon Jae-in administration, told The Korea Herald on Sunday that Yoon’s principal deputy national director Kim Tae-hyo should step down to take responsibility for the “summit failures.”

“I think the deputy national adviser (Kim) needs to go, looking at how things turned out at the South Korea-US summit,” said Park, who now sits as the major opposition Democratic Party of Korea’s standing adviser.

He criticized the Yoon adviser’s description of the Nuclear Consultative Group aimed at addressing nuclear contingencies as a “de facto nuclear sharing” deal, which Edgard Kagan, a US National Security Council senior director, denied.

Park, citing his source in the US, added that Yoon was supposed to end his rendition from “American Pie” in a duet with Biden. “This was planned ahead and the two presidents were supposed to sing the last bit together. That’s what I heard,” he said.

Rep. Youn Kun-young, who served as the state affairs monitoring director at Moon’s Cheong Wa Dae, told The Korea Herald on Sunday that Yoon was “prioritizing alliance over South Korean national interest.”

“It seems that to President Yoon, as well as those around him, alliance (with the US) seems to take precedence over national interest when it should be the other way around,” he said.

“The president has made alliance his main objective while forsaking our own interests like the economy.”

Also in a statement Sunday, Democratic Party’s chief spokesperson Rep. Kwon Chil-seung that “South Koreans are dismayed by the president not having said a word about the spying problem.”

“The president isn’t simply returning from the summit empty-handed -- it is almost like a stab in the back to the people.”

The former NIS chief Park previously said in a phone call with The Korea Herald that Yoon should issue “at least some degree of complaint” over the latest allegations that the US eavesdropped on top South Korean officials.

The Democratic Party similarly called for firing Yoon officials following the president’s summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida last month.

The ruling People Power Party says Yoon’s six-day visit to the US has been an opportunity for “commemorating the 70th anniversary of the alliance” and “sharing visions for a shared future.”

People Power Party chief spokesperson Rep. Kang Min-kuk told reporters Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yo-jong criticizing the commitments made in Washington “goes on to show how threatening North Korea finds the results of the summit.”

Speaking to The Korea Herald, the party’s Rep. Ha Tae-keung on the parliamentary foreign affairs committee said the Nuclear Consultative Group was “significant as South Korea’s first nuclear consultation with the US.”

“The Yoon administration is the first in history to do this,” he said.



By Kim Arin (arin@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 30, 2023


14. (Yonhap Feature) Cutting-edge technology backs border troops against N. Korean threats along DMZ


The technology backs boots on the ground. It complements and supports boots on the ground. It cannot replace them.


But there will always be "dead space" in the technological coverage and this is why boots on the ground are necessary to to cover those gaps.  


And it would be good to return US boots on the ground integrated with ROK frontline divisions to provide additional manpower and reinvirage the human commitment to deterrence.





(Yonhap Feature) Cutting-edge technology backs border troops against N. Korean threats along DMZ | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 30, 2023

By Chae Yun-hwan

HWACHEON, South Korea, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Less than a decade ago, ground troops used to monitor the heavily-fortified border primarily by eye and with binoculars, and through other tried-and-true methods requiring their around-the-clock presence.

But their onerous workload has eased, as the military has introduced cutting-edge equipment, such as high-resolution cameras and sensor systems, to ward off potential border breaches at a time of tensions heightened by a provocative North Korea.

Such technology-based defense operations were on full display Thursday when the defense ministry's press corps was invited to a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division tucked in the mountainous terrain in Hwacheon, 89 kilometers northeast of Seoul.

The battalion, nicknamed "North Star," is in charge of defending the central and eastern front lines lined with barbed wire fences along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) -- a 4-kilometer-wide strip that has separated the two Koreas since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.

There appeared to be no worrisome signs of North Korean activities during the press tour, but the troops remained on high alert due apparently to tensions caused by Pyongyang's recent weapons tests and its menacing rhetoric.


In this undated file photo provided by the Army, 7th Infantry Division troops patrol along barbed wire fences in the border county of Hwacheon, 89 kilometers northeast of Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

As troops patrolled along the barbed wire fences, others inside the battalion's indoor observation posts pored over surveillance screens, including those that utilize thermal observation devices, locked on targets north of the border, notably North Korean guard posts.

A single surveillance soldier is in charge of multiple cameras in operation around the clock -- so as to ease border troops' burden of monitoring enemy movements by eye.

"While outpost troops are watching North Korea, other blind spots are taken care of by our troops using surveillance systems," Lt. Col. Park Se-young told reporters.

Draped across the barbed wire fences were wired sensors programmed to trigger an instantaneous alert if they are compromised.

When the sensors are twisted or bent with just enough force, the battalion command center is immediately alerted, with surveillance cameras automatically shifting their viewing angle onto the area in question.

The unit's division rolled out advanced technologies in 2015 in earnest to make border protection more efficient and secure.


A 7th Infantry Division soldier stands guard at an outpost in the border county of Hwacheon, 89 kilometers northeast of Seoul, in this undated file photo provided by the Army. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

While technology has eased some of the troops' physical burden, it still requires constant maintenance to function properly.

Troops make weekly inspections on all of the wire sensors on top of daily spontaneous checks. In case of malfunctions, maintenance troops are on standby round-the-clock.

State-of-the-art technology has also yet to resolve problems arising from poor weather conditions.

During heavy snow, troops are left with shovels and brooms to remove piles of snow from the patrol paths.

Still, troops at the perilous border remain in high spirits despite being stationed in the isolated unit.

"While I sometimes feel burdened by the fact that I am the first one to observe the enemy on the front line, it feels worthwhile to fight off sleep at night, knowing that I am protecting my family, friends and fellow soldiers," Cpl. Lee Jun-min said.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 30, 2023



15. Yoon fetes new nuclear accord as allies take harder line on NK




Some excellent points that need to be amplified in South Korea. Recall that Wi Sung-lac was the national security advisor to President Yoon's presidential opponent. 


Excerpts:


Analysts who have supported a harder line on the isolated country, which continues to defy international sanctions over its nuclear and missile programs, hailed the accord announced at a summit held Wednesday in Washington between Yoon and US President Joe Biden.
Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s former chief nuclear envoy on North Korea, said the Yoon administration “has chosen the right path for a nonnuclear state to beef up defense against Pyongyang.”
A Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty withdrawal would not only make South Korea a rule breaker, like North Korea, but test Asia’s fourth-largest economy, with no help to enlist for bypassing potential international sanctions, according to Wi.
During a meeting Friday at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, Yoon said Seoul could develop its own nuclear weapons “within a year at the earliest,” but “political and economic considerations” were pushing the country to abide by the NPT.
“South Korea and the US shook hands on the declaration on a one-on-one basis, which tells me this is an accord more effective than the one binding NATO,” Yoon said.


Yoon fetes new nuclear accord as allies take harder line on NK

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · April 30, 2023

President Yoon Suk Yeol returned to his office Sunday after a six-day trip to the US, touting an accord to give South Korea a bigger say in a potential US nuclear response to North Korea as an upgrade to the existing Seoul-Washington mutual defense treaty.

The Washington Declaration, which gives Seoul a seat at the table on using Washington’s nuclear force in exchange for swearing off an independent nuclear buildup, is a major shift from the previous administration’s approach to Pyongyang that heavily relied on diplomacy.

Analysts who have supported a harder line on the isolated country, which continues to defy international sanctions over its nuclear and missile programs, hailed the accord announced at a summit held Wednesday in Washington between Yoon and US President Joe Biden.

Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s former chief nuclear envoy on North Korea, said the Yoon administration “has chosen the right path for a nonnuclear state to beef up defense against Pyongyang.”

A Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty withdrawal would not only make South Korea a rule breaker, like North Korea, but test Asia’s fourth-largest economy, with no help to enlist for bypassing potential international sanctions, according to Wi.

During a meeting Friday at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, Yoon said Seoul could develop its own nuclear weapons “within a year at the earliest,” but “political and economic considerations” were pushing the country to abide by the NPT.

“South Korea and the US shook hands on the declaration on a one-on-one basis, which tells me this is an accord more effective than the one binding NATO,” Yoon said.

A Nuclear Consultative Group, set up under the new accord, is Seoul’s commitment not to violate the NPT, Yoon added.

A Nuclear Consultative Group brings together senior Seoul and Washington officials to regularly discuss categorizing cases where nuclear weapons might be used. The South Korean military will learn how to support US nuclear operations, with Seoul’s fighters escorting American warplanes capable of nuclear strikes.

“We’ve clearly reinforced deterrence. The question now is how we work to make a really functioning Nuclear Consultative Group, which is by far the most advanced body we have seen when it comes to jointly responding to North Korea,” Wi told The Korea Herald on Sunday, referring to activities accompanying such regular meetings.

Tabletop exercises or simulations involving the allies’ forces will take place as the US more frequently deploys its strategic assets like nuclear ballistic missile submarines to the South, though Washington has not promised to make the deployment routine. The US says it does not intend to reverse its 1991 withdrawal and redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in the South, either.

While South Korea and the US will not exercise “joint command over actual US nuclear weapons,” Seoul can see “almost the same results from such ‘nuclear sharing’” if the two allies set up a well-coordinated NCG, with the US deeply committing itself to deploying its strategic assets, said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Shortly after Wednesday’s summit, Edgard Kagan, senior director for East Asia and Oceania on the US National Security Council, said the latest nuclear accord is not an endorsement of “de facto nuclear sharing,” dismissing a previous description of the Washington Declaration by Yoon’s office that it “essentially makes South Koreans feel like they share the weapons.”

The declaration was the highlight of the summit that marked 70 years of ties, but skeptics say it hardly alleviates growing doubts in South Korea about about America’s will to use its nuclear weapons to defend its ally. They say the accord has only refashioned “all the rhetoric about such ‘extended deterrence.’”

Those skeptics have also warned of alienating China and Russia, the two biggest supporters of North Korea, which have claimed that Seoul and Washington are setting off a new arms race in the region.

Following the summit, Beijing and Moscow issued statements warning that “any attempts to raise tension hampering stability in the region should be stopped.”

“I don’t see immediate clashes with those countries but in the long-term the Yoon administration should come up with ways to manage ties with Beijing and Moscow. We can’t risk worsening relations with them,” Park said of Yoon’s policy on those countries.

So far the Yoon administration has yet to unveil a clear blueprint on such engagement, in stark contrast with his push for closer ties with the US.

Wi Sung-lac, the former chief nuclear envoy who also later served as ambassador to Russia, stressed a “pre-coordinated response” that makes matters involving China and Russia also “integral to Yoon’s broader foreign policy."

“The way we have dealt with those countries has been largely an after-the-fact engagement. Given their potential political clout, we just can no longer treat them like that,” Wi said. “Give each of them a fair share of our attention. The US will still be our biggest ally but we can’t go all in on Washington.”



By Choi Si-young (siyoungchoi@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · April 30, 2023

16. The US-South Korea Alliance Is Back



The US-South Korea Alliance Is Back

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · April 28, 2023

South Korea President Yoon Seok-Yeol visited Washington, DC this week. He received a full state visit, complete with a dinner where he karaoke’ d the audience. The US-South Korea alliance has not had this level of comity at the top in years.

Under former US President Donald Trump and former South Korean President Moon Jae-In, relations hit a serious low. The two loathed each other, and Trump, predictably, made sure to express this publicly. Biden and Yoon conversely seem to genuinely like each other. When Yoon spoke in front of Congress, he received standing ovations.

The summit returned two major alliance shifts – one on South Korea’s growing interest in nuclear weapons; the other on South Korea’s potential involvement in a Taiwan scenario.

South Korea will Not Develop Nuclear Weapons – At Least For Now

The biggest news of the ‘Washington Declaration’ is the derailment of the newly rekindled South Korean interest in nuclear weapons. I have written on this several times here at 1945.com (here, here, here). The core argument is that North Korea can, since 2017, strike the US with a nuclear weapon. This, in turn, might lead the US to hesitate to fully fight for South Korea.

We see this in Ukraine, where Russian nuclear threats have inhibited NATO assistance to that embattled country. If Russia did not have nuclear weapons, NATO would almost certainly help Ukraine more. It is reasonable to assume that the US might have such hesitations with other allies and partners too.

The US foreign policy community adamantly opposes South Korean nuclearization however. The Biden administration probably made South Korea’s re-commitment to foregoing these weapons a prerequisite for the state visit. South Korea is a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and Yoon expressly reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to it in this trip.

In return, South Korea received yet further assurances of America’s security commitment, plus a nuclear consultative committee with the US. It is unclear how much this committee will actually permit South Korea to jointly plan US nuclear policy in East Asia – probably not much though. This has led to complaints, correct in my opinion, that South Korea did not get enough in return for its NPT re-commitment.

South Korea’s Increasingly Public Stance against a Chinese Attack on Taiwan

The other big take-away of the summit is Yoon’s increasingly vocal support for Taiwan. Yoon, like the Japanese this year as well, has signaled to China that a violent, forced unification with Taiwan is unacceptable. South Korea and Japan have traditionally avoided speaking to this topic because both have extensive trading relationships with China. Both are also proximate to China. Any major conflict with China would be more devastating to them than to the far-away US homeland.

The Ukraine War and China’s hawkish turn under current President Xi Jinping seems to have provoked a re-evaluation. Russia has sought to unilaterally alter borders in Europe by force, and China has stood by it, maintaining the Sino-Russian ‘partnership without limits.’

This has fueled understandable concerns that China might see the Ukraine War as a model or template for its own move on Taiwan. The original Russian plan was for a blitzkrieg – a lightning victory over Ukraine akin to its land-grab of Crimea in 2014. This would present the West with a fait accompli – either accept established Russian control or risk a war with Russia. China surely hopes for this in Taiwan.

Instead, the Ukraine War has turned into a major conflict, dividing the region, disrupting economic relationships, and sparking renewed competition between the West and Russia. A Chinese move on Taiwan would likely go the same way. An extended Sino-US conflict in East Asia would be disastrous and place great pressure on Japan and South Korea to support the US side. South Korea and Japan are likely signaling China not to take such a huge risk.

China’s Missed Opportunity

South Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons and increasing alignment with Taiwan are a serious failure of Chinese foreign policy. Japan was always going to line up with the US against China in a conflict. Japan is the second largest economy in the region; Chinese regional hegemony cannot be prevented without its commitment.

But South Korea had more room to move. As a smaller economy, its alignment against China is not as important, and its geographic placement so close to China long meant US officials were wary of pressuring it too much. South Korea’s progressive party is also wary, for historical reasons, of alignment with Japan.

China could have exploited these fissures and pulled South Korea toward it if it had acted as a responsible regional leader. Most obviously, it could have helped blunt the North Korean nuclear and missile program and gained credit for this in the South. China has great leverage in the North. Instead, China bullied South Korea for installing missile defense against those very North Korean rockets and did nothing to push North Korea toward better behavior. The result is that South Koreans now detest China, giving Yoon the political space to more openly align with America against it.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.


19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · April 28, 2023




De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 

De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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