Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"I want our nation to be the most beautiful in the world. By this I do not mean the most powerful nation. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation, I do not want my nation to invade others. It is sufficient that our wealth makes our lives abundant; it is sufficient that our strength is able to prevent foreign invasions. The only thing that I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a noble culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others."
– Kim Gu (1876-1949)

“Sometimes there’s truth in old cliches. There can be no real peace without justice. And without resistance there will be no justice.” 
– Arundhati Roy

“When time and need require, we should resist with all our might, and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.” 
– Marcus Tullius Cicero


1. The Hollowing Out of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea

2. North Korea Will Soon Be Able to Flout Sanctions More Easily

3. Quick Take: North Korea’s “National Defence Industrial Enterprise”

4. Imagining a Future for the DPRK Panel of Experts Monitoring Regime

5. Late U.S. veteran of Korean War honored at Capitol

6. U.S. takes sanctioned Russian ship moored in China as 'incredibly seriously'

7. Only 34 pct of S. Korean elites favor nuclearization: CSIS poll

8. NIS sees possibility of N. Korean terrorist attacks involving drones, paragliders

9. Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea reaches 43 in Q1

10. S. Korea vows efforts to ensure U.N. sanctions enforcement on N.K. continues despite end to monitoring panel

11. S. Korea submits formal bid for Czech nuclear power plant project

12. NK leader openly flouts UN sanctions in recent outing

13. Gov't to open 10 trails near DMZ for visitors next month

14. Korea can bridge Global West, South: ex-UN Undersecretary-General

15. Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv

16. Reality, Democracy and the Results of South Korea’s General Election

17. Iran Says North Korean Delegation Visiting Tehran for Trade Expo

18. Ranger legend Col. Ralph Puckett honored at U.S. Capitol19. 





1. The Hollowing Out of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea


A very important and insightful essay with some very valuable analysis that few other analysts are providing. This is an important essay and anyone with any interest in understanding the current situation with north Korea will find this worth reading.


If you do not read anything else about Korea today, please read this from my friend Chung Min Lee.


The Hollowing Out of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea

CHUNG MIN LEE

APRIL 29, 2024

ARTICLE

Source: Getty

Summary: Despite North Korea’s presence on the world stage with its nuclear weapons, the Kim dynasty is slowly and irreversibly breaking down.



https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/04/29/hollowing-out-of-kim-jong-un-s-north-korea-pub-92302


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un continues to accelerate the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. At the same time, North Korea has been a key supplier of arms to Russia as the war in Ukraine progresses. Both of these actions are critical threats to South Korea, the United States, and Japan. But the outside world is missing an equally important development with immense implications for stability on the Korean Peninsula—the slow and irreversible breakdown of the Kim dynasty.

That said, regime collapse is not necessarily around the corner. When North Korea’s founding dictator Kim Il Sung died in July 1994, predictions were rampant about regime or state collapse. When his son and successor Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, many North Korea experts thought that then twenty-seven-year-old Kim Jong Un—Kim Jong Il’s youngest son—would not be able to stay in power. It has been thirteen years since Kim Jong Un succeeded his father, and he remains in firm control over North Korea, including the military and security apparatuses. The chances of a military coup are slim. But North Korea is still hollowing out and the Kim dynasty is in decline. This state of affairs will have major strategic consequences for the Korean Peninsula and the world.

THE BIGGEST THREATS TO THE KIM DYNASTY

From the outside, Kim Jong Un seems to be in full control over the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), as well as other levers of power. But Kim’s biggest threats today all come from internal forces that he and his cronies can no longer totally control. Several ingredients of the superglue that have so far sustained the world’s only communist family dynasty since 1948 are under threat or slowly coming apart. There are four main threats to the regime:

  • The deepening economic malaise in North Korea, including endemic food and energy shortages; the de facto breakdown of the state rationing system that has spurred the rise of jangmadang (small local markets, which often include illicit trade); and expenditure of some 25 to 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, including development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
  • A sharp weakening of decades of indoctrination based on intense hatred and fear of North Korea’s archenemies: South Korea, the United States, and Japan; as well as the breakdown of loyalty not just among the masses but also within the nomenklatura of the party, armed forces, security services, and the so-called donju, or moneyed elites.
  • The growing inability to sow ever-increasing dosages of fear into its citizens through concentration camps, public executions, and constant terror by the security services.
  • The uncertainties associated with a fourth dynastic succession, as Kim seems to be preparing his teenage daughter, Kim Ju Ae, to be the next Great Leader of the Kim dynasty.

ECONOMIC DECLINE

During a two-day session of the 8th Central Committee of the KWP in January 2024, Kim acknowledged the “very pitiful state” of the North Korean economy and stressed that the government is unable “to provide even basic necessities such as basic foodstuffs, groceries, and consumer goods to the local people.” In February 2024, Kim announced a major initiative to spur an “industrial revolution” in North Korea with the planned construction of factories in at least twenty remote counties into the mid-2030s to narrow the growing urban-rural economic gaps. North Korea’s state media widely publicized Kim’s remarks that “the next 10 years is truly a great revolution with enormous epochal significance.”

In reality, because North Korea spends some 25 to 30 percent of its GDP on defense and Kim is determined to accelerate his nuclear and WMD programs, the state does not have enough energy and raw materials to maintain consumer-products-related factories in remote regions, even if the state were to build them. Moreover, although North Korea was reported to have had a better harvest in 2023, a report published by Statistics Korea in December 2023 noted that “North Korea’s food production including rice and barley decreased by 4 percent to 4.51 million tons in 2022” and that food shipments from China also dropped from 500,000 tons of rice in 2021 to 130,383 tons in 2022.

Ironically, even as Kim chastised the government for North Korea’s economic malaise, “the regime has been unable to guarantee its people’s right to food” since “more than 80 percent of North Koreans do not consume enough protein.” The United Nations’s 2023 report on global food security and nutrition estimated that between 2020 and 2022, almost 12 million North Koreans, or about 45.5 percent of the population, were undernourished.

WEAKENING INDOCTRINATION AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LOYALTY

Even though the state continues to churn out propaganda on the importance of Kim Jong Un–ism, younger North Koreans go through the motions of paying homage to the Kim dynasty but otherwise pay little attention to endless indoctrination. One example of the growing indifference to intensive propaganda, political lessons, and groupthink activities praising the party and the Kim dynasty is the fact that Pyongyang is pushing indoctrination much more intensely.

Chung Min Lee

Chung Min Lee is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program. He is an expert on Korean and Northeast Asian security, defense, intelligence, and crisis management.

According to the Daily NK online newspaper, North Korean authorities stepped up indoctrination due to worsening “anti-socialist” and “non-socialist” behavior and quoted a North Korean education-related source who said that the KWP “issued a nationwide order to step up ideological indoctrination and punishment of teachers” because teachers were “often using puppet-state [South Korean] expressions in class without knowing it.” This source also stressed that “most elementary, middle, and high school teachers are young and want to follow the latest trends, so they watch a lot of South Korean TV shows and frequently listen to South Korean music.”

The Korean dialects used in the two Koreas are based on the same roots but have evolved in very different ways since the Korean War. North Korea has emphasized the importance of “language purity” and “ideological content” so that foreign-based words or phrases are forbidden, and language is a powerful tool for idolizing the Kim Dynasty, marshalling the masses for constant campaigns, and demonstrating the supposedly superior nature of a North Korean version of Korean nationalism. In sharp contrast, Korean in the South has evolved together with the country’s rapid economic growth and vast networks with the outside world. Many foreign words and phrases have seeped into daily use.

As South Korean drama and movies have penetrated North Korea, the government has cracked down on North Koreans who follow South Korean fashion, words, and phrases, and even body language. Watching South Korean dramas or movies and talking in South Korean accents will lead to arrest, imprisonment, banishment to labor camps, and, in some instances, public execution. In December 2021, for example, the New York Times reported that at least seven people were executed for watching or distributing K-pop videos because Kim Jong Un considers South Korean culture to be a “vicious cancer.” The harsh punishment against those who mimic South Korean phrases and fashion is seen as a direct threat against North Korean youth since the daily barrage of propaganda is no longer as effective as it was in previous generations.

The South Korean Ministry of Unification issued a report on the state of North Korea’s human rights in December 2023. The report was based on interviews with 6,300 North Korean defectors between 2013 and 2022, and it was the first time that the findings were released to the public. Although the Kim regime has cracked down harshly on those who watch South Korean movies and dramas, 23 percent of the respondents said they watched South Korean dramas or movies. Some 57 percent were interested to know more about the outside world. Interestingly, only 8.4 percent of North Korean defectors who came to South Korea before 2000 replied that they had watched foreign movies and dramas, including those from South Korea. Seventy-one percent said that social control and surveillance grew stronger under Kim Jong Un’s rule.

In a 2023 report released by Human Rights Watch on the closing of North Korea between 2018 and 2023, it noted that in January 2023 the North Korean government passed the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act with the intent of “completely eliminating the use of puppet language, referring to language with South Korean influence, denouncing abnormal language elements, and establishing a socialist language lifestyle throughout the entire society.”

THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF PERSISTENT FEAR AND TERROR

All North Koreans fear the country’s secret police (MSS), and the depth of fear permeates all levels of North Korean society. However, the MSS and other security apparatuses cannot jail, torture, or kill hundreds of thousands of North Koreans. According to various testimonies from the more than 30,000 defectors from the North who have settled in South Korea, even though citizens fear the MSS their level of disgust toward the regime is equally high, so fear and hatred of the regime balance each other out.

A 2021 report published by the Transitional Justice Group entitled “Mapping Killings under Kim Jong-un” noted that prisoners were treated inhumanely before they were publicly executed and that students were systematically mobilized to attend public trials. There is little doubt that Kim will continue to use the military, secret police, and security forces to prevent, quell, and crush all known and possible sources of dissent or opposition. But the paradox that Kim faces is that the only way to significantly improve the livelihood of North Koreans is by shifting resources from the defense and domestic security control budgets to the sectors of the economy that produce consumer goods and services. Obviously, he has chosen not to do so, because militarizing North Korea is at the core of his goals for ensuring regime survival. Even elites in Pyongyang who have hoarded foreign currency are not free from the security forces’ surveillance and growing crackdowns on corruption. Ironically, Kim, his family, and his closest advisers appear in public wearing very expensive watches, clothes, and handbags that are slowly becoming more available to the North Korean elite.

KIM’S SUCCESSION PROBLEM

Whether Kim Jong Un will continue to remain healthy is unknown. According to South Korean intelligence assessments that were partially revealed to the media, Kim is believed to weigh some 140 kilograms (more than 300 pounds), is a heavy drinker and smoker, and suffers from a “severe” sleep disorder as well as diabetes and heart conditions. Still, short of a sudden cardiac arrest, Kim’s personal health is well guarded. He and his family are able to receive the best possible medical treatment available in North Korea, including access to a special clinic that serves only the family.

In March 2022, Kim’s daughter Ju Ae first appeared with her father in the state media in front of a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile. She is between ten and eleven years old and apparently is being groomed as the heir to the regime. It is impossible to verify whether Kim Ju Ae is really the dictator-in-waiting, but the South Korean National Intelligence Service said that it was likely that she will be her father’s successor. The Daily Mail reported on February 23, 2024, that according to a retired South Korean intelligence official, Kim Jong Un also has a son, but the young man is “too pale and thin” to be shown to the public as the heir of the Kim dynasty.

Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, who is the deputy director of the powerful agitation and propaganda bureau in the KWP and is considered to be the second-most powerful leader in North Korea, also has been touted in the foreign press as a potential successor. But if history serves as a guide, Kim will not leave the dynasty to his sibling. Kim’s wife, Ri Sol Ju, will never agree to a succession that does not include one of her children. Even though Kim Yo Jong wields significant power, her influence stems from the wishes of her brother. If Kim Jong Un feels that she is becoming too strong or forming her own clique of supporters, Ri Sol Ju will make sure to counter her sister-in-law’s influence.

Succession struggles have taken place before in North Korean history. When Kim Il Sung was thinking about grooming his successor from the late 1960s, he initially pushed his own younger brother, Kim Yong Ju, as a potential candidate. But when Kim Il Sung’s second son, Kim Jong Il, got wind of his father’s plan, he ousted his uncle in what would be his first successful power struggle. He also made sure that his younger half-brother, Kim Pyong Il—who looked much more like Kim Il Sung and had his own group of followers within the KPA—was effectively exiled from North Korea as a diplomat in several Eastern European countries for nearly thirty years.

After Kim Jong Un rose to power in 2011 following his father’s death, he secured his own power base. To make sure that no other relatives posed a threat, he first brought trumped-up charges of counterrevolutionary activity against his uncle Jang Song Thaek, who was executed in 2013. Jang had been instrumental in bolstering Kim Jong Un’s rise as a great leader after his father suffered a stroke in August 2008. Jang also had made sure to ensure the continuing control of the Kim family over North Korea and, in particular, to prepare the young Kim Jong Un to take power when his father ultimately died in December 2011. Subsequently, in February 2017, Kim Jong Un ordered the assassination of his older half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The killing or banishing of half-brothers and uncles have been routine features of the Kim family’s power games. Given the intense paranoia that penetrates the entire class of elites, no one can trust anyone. And Kim certainly only really confides in his sister, wife, and daughter, although this may also change depending on the nature of future threats to his ironclad rule.

The legitimacy of the Kim dynasty is based on the family’s “Baekdu bloodline,” or the beginning of the dynasty by Kim Il Sung when he was fighting the Japanese during the colonial era (1910–1945) and led the struggle from Mount Baekdu—the most revered mountain on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, the official biography of Kim Jong Il says he was born in Mount Baekdu on a dark, cloudy day but that a ray of light began to shine the moment he was born. The reality is that Kim Jong Il was born in the Soviet Union and learned Russian as his first language from his Russian nanny.

Kim Jong Un’s own ties to the famed Baekdu bloodline are particularly murky and problematic. His late mother, Ko Yong Hui, was born in Japan and her parents moved to North Korea in the early 1960s. In North Korea’s stratified society, where the population is divided into three groups—known, in descending order of trust, as the core, the wavering, and hostile classes—Japanese Koreans are considered to be the lowest of the hostile class. This group also includes descendants of South Koreans, landlords, South Korean prisoners of war who were forced to stay in North Korea, and defectors. The fact that Kim Jong Un’s mother was born in Japan is something that is not public knowledge in North Korea. Considering the reverence with which the Kim family bloodline is officially regarded in state propaganda, it is nearly impossible to adulate Ko Yong Hui without revealing her connections to this most reviled of social classes.

KIM CANNOT START A WAR, REFORM NORTH KOREA, OR GIVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since the fall of 2023, Kim has been rattling his saber loudly, announcing a major U-turn in North Korea’s policy toward South Korea. In January 2024, he told the rubber-stamp Supreme People’s Assembly that the North Korean constitution will be revised to rule out any possibility of peaceful unification with South Korea. As one analyst noted, “declaring the South as a permanent adversary, not as a potential partner for reconciliation, could also be aimed at improving the credibility of Kim’s escalatory nuclear doctrine, which authorizes the military to launch preemptive nuclear attacks against adversaries if the leadership is under threat.” In the same month, Kim also proclaimed that not only was South Korea a sworn enemy, but that North Korea also had absolutely no interest in reunifying with the South peacefully. Kim stated, “We can specify in our constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annexing it as a part of the territory of our republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.”

Many North Korea observers have argued that tensions are now the highest between the two Koreas in recent memory and that prospects for conflict are growing, but the reality is that Kim’s North Korea is hollowing out economically and diplomatically. Most importantly, loyalty among the North’s masses and the elites is weakening. If Kim opts for major conflict or even war, South Korean and U.S. forces will face enormous casualties. North Korea has become a bigger threat owing to its rapidly advancing nuclear weapons programs, and it has carried out more than 200 missile tests, well over the triple the amount performed under his father and grandfather. But as explained above, Kim is ruling over a North Korea that is a failed state by almost all measures, save for its 1.1-million-strong armed forces and its nuclear weapons.

Even with the North Korean economy in dire straits—Kim admitted as much at a January 2024 KWP meeting, saying that the economic crisis was a “serious political issue” since the government was unable to “provide even basic necessities”—Kim’s most important political goal is to lay the groundwork for Kim Ju Ae or any of his other children to succeed him when the time comes. Tinkering with economic reforms that could unleash a torrent of social upheavals and power imbalances would be detrimental to making sure that a fourth dictator from the Kim family continues to rule over the North Korean mafia state.

So long as Kim is determined to continue to build up North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and other WMD—estimated between 40 and 60 nuclear warheads—in addition to maintaining a conventional force of more than a million across the country’s armed services, he does not have the money to pursue his original policy of the so-called byungjin noseon, or “parallel line,” of economic development and a strengthened military. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers” report, in 2019 North Korea’s defense spending was around $4 billion, or 26 percent of its GDP, the highest portion out of 170 countries. According to Statista, North Korea is estimated to have spent 33 percent of its GDP on defense in 2022.

North Korean men serve at least ten years in the armed forces. Women are also conscripted for three to five years and are a key source of free labor for construction, factories, and farms. If Kim pares down the military, he would have to find civilian jobs for all of these demobilized forces, which would be impossible. And given the supreme need for militarizing the state, the KPA is not just a symbol of military might: it is also the conduit for ensuring that all able North Korean citizens are perpetually on a war footing.

HOPING FOR TRUMP’S RETURN AND CEMENTING TIES WITH PUTIN

The hope that die-hard South Korean revolutionaries will heed the calls of their northern comrades and rise up to topple a succession of “puppet regimes,” including Yoon Suk-yeol’s government in the South, remains stronger in the minds of extreme leftists in South Korea than of any party leader in North Korea today. Kim’s remaining option to buy time is to enter into some type of negotiations with the United States and Japan to remove a plethora of sanctions. In his talks with former U.S. president Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019, Kim came close to a deal to freeze his nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. But Trump was unwilling to agree to these terms.

During those negotiations, Trump pressured allies and sought a diplomatic victory by reaching some type of a nuclear-freeze deal with North Korea in exchange for either drastically curtailing U.S.-South Korea military exercises, withdrawing some elements of the 28,000 members of U.S. Forces Korea currently stationed in the South, or announcing that the United States will no longer provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea. In April 2023, John Bolton, former National Security Advisor during the Trump administration stated in an interview with the Chosun Daily that “Trump lacks an understanding of the concept of ‘alliance,’ whether it’s with South Korea, Japan, or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Many works will be necessary to preempt any potential issues in the South Korea-U.S. relationship once he is re-elected.” Bolton stressed that Seoul and Tokyo should prepare for all contingencies and that it was important for South Korea to consider longer-term security interests such as working with the U.S. across party lines on buttressing U.S. and allied security in the Indo-Pacific.

On February 14, 2024, South Korea established full diplomatic ties with Cuba—one of North Korea’s oldest and closest supporters. Seoul began discussions with Havana in the mid-2000s, but the latter demurred owing to its traditional ties with Pyongyang. However, Cuba and South Korea’s tourist and commercial connections have been growing. Before the pandemic, some 14,000 South Koreans visited Cuba, and new Korean investments in the country include those of Hyundai Heavy Industries, which built a series of power stations for Cuba. Havana has realized the value of cementing these ties with Seoul. Losing Cuba in the diplomatic war will not make a serious dent in Kim’s pockets, but it will add to the growing diplomatic isolation of his impoverished nation. In December 2023, North Korea closed an additional seven embassies, leaving it with only forty-six missions. All of North Korea’s foreign embassies and missions are only given the barest of funds and the vast majority of diplomats engage in illicit trade in drugs, alcohol, and counterfeit currencies to pay rent, buy food, and cover their children’s school tuition.

In a windfall that Kim didn’t expect, the Ukrainian war pushed Russia to import crucial munitions and missiles from North Korea. According to South Korean Minister of Defense Shin Won-sik, North Korea has supplied Russia with some 6,700 containers of munitions since 2023 or about 3 million rounds of various artillery shells. In February 2024, Ukrainian sources said that Russia also fired twenty-four North Korean ballistic missiles of the KN-23/24 series, although their accuracy remains a point of contention.

By sending much needed munitions and missiles to Russia, Kim has gained Russian President Vladimir Putin’s gratitude, stronger possibility of receiving advanced fighters, space-related technologies, food, and fuel from Russia. At the same time, forging closer ties with Russia enables North Korea counterbalance, even slightly, North Korea’s overwhelming economic and political dependence on China. Like China, however, Russia is opposed to imposing additional sanctions on North Korea.

When Kim visited Putin in Vladivostok in September 2023, Putin said that Russia will be willing to help North Korea build satellites although Moscow has not yet clarified the extent to which Russian military technology or weapons systems could be transferred to North Korea. If North Korea continues to provide arms to Russia, however, South Korea may opt to export arms directly to Ukraine that would go against Russian interests. Owing to a domestic law that prohibits South Korean arms exports to conflict zones, Seoul has only sent nonlethal defense items to Ukraine. However, South Korea has supported Ukraine indirectly by shipping tanks, munitions, and small fighter jets to Poland and other NATO members who have sent significant amounts of weapons and munitions to Ukraine.

While Putin’s and Kim’s strategic interests have converged because of the Ukrainian war, once the war ends, it remains unclear whether Moscow will opt to significantly upgrade military cooperation with Pyongyang. Since North Korea doesn’t have cash to buy Russian weapons such as more modern combat aircraft or significantly upgrading existing fighters such as the MiG-29s, Russia can opt to provide them as part of a military assistance package, but given Russia’s own financial constraints and falling arms exports, Russia is unlikely to furnish North Korea with high-tech weapons for free.

CONCLUSION

Kim has failed as a leader of North Korea. At the same time, progressives in South Korea continue to attack President Yoon Suk-yeol for his “hardline” postures toward North Korea, such as his choice to stress human rights abuses in North Korea and affirm that South Korea will retaliate with massive counterstrikes if the North were to attack the South, with or without nuclear weapons. It is important to recall that Kim himself discontinued the September 18, 2018, military agreement that he signed with former South Korean president Moon Jae-in. Indeed, Moon had hailed the accord as a measure that would have prevented future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.

In the end, Kim has nothing to show for his thirteen years of stewardship other than more hardships for his people, an economy that continues to tank, and a regime set on making more nuclear weapons and missiles. Kim’s lasting legacy will be the hollowing out of North Korea and a people who are poorer than when he assumed power in 2011. Nuclear weapons will not feed North Koreans, but the money poured into their development will leave a legacy that likely will lead in the long run to the downfall of the Kim dynasty and the beginning of the end of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

While policymakers and analysts in the United States continue to search for restarting talks with North Korea and coming up with a viable road map that may lead to denuclearization, unless Kim goes back on his own words that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are never going be negotiated with the United States, the chances of a political solution to a growing North Korean nuclear threat are virtually non-existent. On April 3, 2024, North Korea announced that it has successfully tested a new solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) tipped with a hypersonic warhead. If North Korea begins to deploy the Hwasongpho-16B IRBMs, it would significantly cut back warning time for South Korean and U.S. forces. As North Korea’s nuclear and WMD capabilities continue to grow, South Korea and the United States have to substantially upgrade extended deterrence assets and strategies, but the two allies have to also prepare for domestic instability in North Korea owing to the irreversible hollowing out of North Korea.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.



2. North Korea Will Soon Be Able to Flout Sanctions More Easily


North Korea Will Soon Be Able to Flout Sanctions More Easily

After Russian opposition, the United Nations panel goes dark, removing the global monitor on Pyongyang’s rules-busting behavior

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-will-soon-be-able-to-flout-sanctions-more-easily-27595821?mod=latest_headlines

By Timothy W. MartinFollow

April 30, 2024 5:42 am ET

SEOUL—At a high-security location at the United Nations headquarters in New York, a group of investigators watched a presentation early last year with satellite imagery showing tankers picking up shipments in Chinese waters and elsewhere, and then traveling to North Korea’s oil facilities.

The Russian representative in the group posed a question: “How do you know it’s oil? Is it water in those tankers? Is it wine?” he asked, according to people familiar with the exchange. 

The suggestion that North Korea’s oil tankers had ferried barrels of wine drew laughter from around the room—including from the Russian—but it was an example of the divisions in the group that have made enforcing sanctions on the Kim regime increasingly difficult, the people said. One of the fellow investigators called the Russian’s line of questioning ridiculous, one of the people said.

The group meeting was the eight-member U.N. Panel of Experts. The cohort includes representatives from the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Japan, South Korea and an eighth country that brings maritime expertise.


A rocket launch during a tactical drill in North Korea last week. North Korea was sanctioned following its first nuclear test in 2006. PHOTO: KIM JAE-HWAN/ZUMA PRESS

The panel’s work is set to end on April 30, after Russia vetoed an extension of its mandate weeks earlier. The group’s expiration will leave a significant gap in sanctions enforcement, said diplomats and former panel members. The semiannual reports provided the only impartial, credible and transparent snapshots of North Korea’s sanctions evasion, they said.

The panel’s end also highlights how the deepening divisions among global powers are making it more difficult to rein in rogue actors such as North Korea. Russia and China, which supported international sanctions after North Korea’s nuclear tests as recently as 2017, are now pushing to ease them.

“Ultimately, the dissolution of the Panel of Experts signals further decay and dysfunction of multilateralism,” said Aaron Arnold, a U.S. representative who served on the panel from 2019 to 2021. “Furthermore, without a monitoring system in place, there’s not a lot of incentive for countries to rigorously uphold their sanctions obligations.”

That dysfunction has been playing out for years. With China and Russia often on one side, and the U.S. and allies on the other, debates raged on the panel over matters small and large—everything from the syntax of sentences to categorizing the types of missiles North Korea had tested. Ballistic missiles constituted a breach of U.N. resolutions, whereas cruise missiles didn’t.

In the official report last year, facing resistance from Russia and China, the panel could only point to dozens of countries asserting a probable North Korean breach of the annual U.N.-mandated cap of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum. But the report couldn’t specify if it agreed with those estimates. The Kim regime blocked on-site verification. Moscow and Beijing, in dissenting footnotes, questioned the evidence and accuracy of the assessment.


Guard posts on the border between North Korea and South Korea. PHOTO: AHN YOUNG-JOON/ASSOCIATED PRESS

‘Fewer Monitoring Eyes’

The Panel of Experts emerged after North Korea was sanctioned following its first nuclear test in 2006. Several rounds of strengthened penalties in the years that followed helped to lock North Korea out of the global financial system. Most of its exports were restricted. An annual cap was imposed on its oil imports. Its overseas workers, which brought in revenue to the regime, were ordered to return home.

But Russia and China, which wield veto power as permanent members at the U.N. Security Council, have withdrawn their support in recent years. In blocking the extension of the Panel of Experts, Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, said the sanctions were no longer helpful to resolving the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. He said Moscow would be willing to back an extension of the group’s work only if a time limit was placed on the sanctions.

At the U.N. on April 11, Nebenzia blasted the “odious conclusions” made in the panel’s reports and warned that indefinite “draconian restrictions” are doomed to fail. “Pyongyang is denied everything,” he said.

At the same meeting, Geng Shuang, China’s U.N. ambassador, said sanctions have harmed the livelihoods of North Koreans and that the penalties “should not be carved in stone or be indefinite.” The Korean Peninsula hasn’t come closer to denuclearization as a result of the sanctions, he added.

China ultimately abstained from a vote on the panel. The other 13 members of the U.N. Security Council backed the panel’s extension.

In recent years, North Korea has carried out dozens of weapons tests in violation of U.N. resolutions, including enhancements to its nuclear arsenal. Earlier this year, in an apparent violation of a ban on luxury imports, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave one of his head-of-state vehicles to Kim.

The end of the Panel of Experts means North Korea will more easily be able to base new operations or re-establish networks in unsuspecting countries, said Maiko Takeuchi, a former U.N. panel member from Japan who served from 2016 to 2021. Many countries lack the resources to effectively monitor potential North Korean malfeasance.

“There is room for North Korea to take advantage of these loopholes,” Takeuchi said. “If there are fewer monitoring eyes, it is easier for them to dispatch people.”

A Different Approach

The U.S., South Korea, Japan and others have discussed alternative ways to keep tabs on North Korea’s sanctions defiance. One route could be upholding the panel’s work through the U.N. General Assembly, which would require a two-thirds majority of member states present and voting. But such a resolution wouldn’t be legally binding on all members. 

Other options include leaning more on third-party researchers or creating a monitoring coalition of like-minded countries that wouldn’t include China and Russia. Those methods carry legal risk—the U.N. can’t be taken to court. The findings could also be dismissed as partisan.

“We’re not going to let it go,” Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said. She traveled to Seoul and Tokyo in April to discuss the potential options.


Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., at a meeting in South Korea on April 17. PHOTO: POOL/GETTY IMAGES

Last week, the Royal United Services Institute, a U.K. think tank, shared satellite imagery of a Russian-flagged vessel recently docked at a Chinese shipyard. The U.S.-sanctioned cargo ship, named Angara, has been previously spotted making at least 11 transits between North Korea and Russia since last August, believed to be carrying North Korean munitions, according to the institute.

Eric Penton-Voak, a U.K. expert who served as the coordinator for the U.N. panel from 2021 to 2023, lamented how political his role was, given the group’s aims to be objective investigators. It will remain a major challenge to enforce sanctions, so long as China and Russia don’t fully abide by the rules, he said.

“Frankly, if sanctions can’t be made to work because people don’t want to implement them, you lose the tool,” Penton-Voak said. “What penalty is there for states that vote for a sanction, then simply break them, as if nothing exists?”

Kate Vtorygina and Peter Landers contributed to this article.

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com



3. Quick Take: North Korea’s “National Defence Industrial Enterprise”


Quick Take: North Korea’s “National Defence Industrial Enterprise”

(Source: KCNA)

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/quick-take-north-koreas-national-defence-industrial-enterprise/

On April 26, North Korean media mentioned a “newly established national defence industrial enterprise under the Second Economy Commission” while reporting that Kim Jong Un, on the previous day, had watched “the evaluation test-fire” of a 240-mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) shell produced by this enterprise.[1] According to the report, Kim called on the enterprise to “surely carry out the munitions production plan for this year.”

This report has been mainly viewed as drawing attention to the new enterprise’s possible connection to North Korea’s weapons exports and the threat the 240-mm MRL poses to South Korea.

However, we may also consider the new defense industrial enterprise from a domestic economic angle. This new enterprise reinforces the question of whether defense industries are, in fact, playing a leading role in the North Korean economy, despite the heavy state media focus on the civilian economy.

This question is premised on a broader context that includes Kim’s reintroduction of “national defence economic work,” a rarely used term even in his father’s military-first era; his repeated calls on the munitions industry to support defense industries (as opposed to the civilian economy); and regular media commentary on the importance of national defense for stable economic growth.[2] Furthermore, North Korea has consistently used the “war preparations” formulation since early 2023—in line with its hardline US and South Korea policies—and, in recent years, has reined in market-oriented initiatives.[3] A shift to conservative economic policies in North Korea has generally reflected the state’s preference for defense industries over the civilian economy.[4]

It is premature to confirm Pyongyang’s intention of unveiling the new defense industrial enterprise. Furthermore, it is too early to know what role this enterprise will play in the North Korean economy or what it portends for—or how it reflects—Pyongyang’s longer-term economic policy. Yet, it would be remiss to assume this move is only tactical, given its alignment with the state’s broader policy shifts that have taken place since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019.

  1. [1]
  2. The Second Economic Commission oversees North Korea’s planning, production, distribution and foreign sales of military products.
  3. [2]
  4. Rachel Minyoung Lee, “To do or not to do: Pyongyang’s seventh nuclear test calculations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 2 (2024): 87–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2314434.
  5. [3]
  6. Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “North Korea Makes a Still More Conservative Turn at Party Plenum,” 38 North, January 5, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/01/north-korea-makes-a-still-more-conservative-turn-at-party-plenum/; and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “War in Ukraine: Implications for North Korea,” 38 North, February 22, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/02/war-in-ukraine-implications-for-north-korea/.
  7. [4]
  8. Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Defense Versus Civilian Spending,” 38 North, September 22, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/09/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-defense-versus-civilian-spending/.





4. Imagining a Future for the DPRK Panel of Experts Monitoring Regime


Conclusion:


Effective monitoring only really pays its way if there is a commitment to implementation and enforcement on the basis of that monitoring. With neither Russia nor China interested in either, this remains a fundamental weakness in the UN sanctions regime, wherever and whoever does the monitoring. That said, to allow the Panel to disappear at Russian demand, with China smirking in silent approval, would be a meek surrender. It is critically important to continue to cast light into dark corners. The DPRK’s WMD development—an internationally destabilizing phenomenon that even Moscow and Beijing may live to regret—is enabled by sanctions evasion, and it is still necessary to expose both it and its perpetrators, even if it cannot be stopped.


Imagining a Future for the DPRK Panel of Experts Monitoring Regime

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/imagining-a-future-for-the-dprk-panel-of-experts-monitoring-regime/


The Russian veto to end the mandate of the United Nation’s (UN) Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on April 30, 2024 has been widely commented upon in recent weeks. I was the coordinator of the Panel for two years, leaving at the end of its last annual mandate in April 2023, and I would like to add my own views.

The demise of the Panel actually underscores the importance of continued monitoring of DPRK sanctions violations while giving an opportunity to improve that function. I believe that monitoring of UN sanctions could best be conducted, paradoxically, from outside the UN system itself, as the political deadlock and bureaucratic timidity at the UN in New York makes genuinely independent and impartial sanctions monitoring impossible.

In looking forward to any successor, we should look at both how the Panel succeeded and where (and why) it fell short before considering what else might be necessary to ensure that this important monitoring mission might continue.

Lessons Learned From the Panel

The Panel was introduced by resolution in 2009 to serve the UN’s 1718 Sanctions Committee. This was to provide biannual reporting of sanctions regime breaches and recommend how UN Member States might close those loopholes. However, particularly in recent years, many of the institutional structures established to enforce the regime have largely collapsed through political sabotage and neglect.

First, the 1718 Committee has become utterly toothless. Although it does perform a useful function in efficiently approving humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions regime, the Committee has not actually taken any concrete action on any Panel recommendation relating to sanctions implementation since 2017.

This is because members of the Committee simply and always reflect their positions expressed in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Despite having voted in favor of the sanctions in place, Russia and China have demonstrated no interest in maintaining or enforcing DPRK sanctions since at least 2019, while the United States, the United Kingdom and France, by contrast, have unsuccessfully sought to tighten sanctions in response to the DPRK’s increasing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Without the consensus of all 15 of its members, the Committee can take no action. At a UN level, therefore, literally nothing has happened in response to a Panel report or Panel recommendations.

Second, the Panel itself is weakly administered by the UN Secretariat. Like the UNSC and the 1718 Committee, the Panel is bound by rules of consensus—unless all the experts agree, it cannot publish anything. But, the Panel is also supposed to operate independently and impartially. The majority of the experts do indeed rise above national interests to produce objective analysis. However, these rules effectively allow the tyranny of the minority, specifically the ability of Russian and Chinese experts to veto the publication of individual investigations and remove or undermine assessment and analysis with which Beijing and Moscow might not be content. The UN Secretariat, which employs and pays the experts as contractors, has done nothing to enforce this contractual impartiality, allowing Russia and China to have their way.

Third, the Panel has long been under-resourced and ill-equipped to perform its function. Its IT infrastructure is obsolete, preventing even the most basic analytical investigation. Furthermore, it is staffed by diplomats and other relatively senior former government officials from a set group of UN Member States rather than by trained and objective investigators whose nationality is unimportant.

Even with these problems, over the years, the Panel has produced valuable reporting that has served as a useful repository of information regarding sanctions evaders and their methodologies. I would draw attention particularly to the following:

  • Although the Panel’s reports probably did not add greatly to the understanding of developments in the DPRK for countries with a strategic interest in the Korean Peninsula, it was a regular and reliable resource for the vast majority of UN Member States, and the only means by which they could understand their detailed responsibilities and obligation under the sanctions resolutions. The Panel and its reports played an important role in improving customs and export control mechanisms in many States.
  • Unlike at the UN level (and for the most part at Member State levels), the commercial world was eager to take action on every detail contained in the reports. Information on companies, vessels and individuals involved in sanctions evasion, as well as bank accounts, contact details and the like—all carefully researched and verified by the Panel—was used by banks, insurance companies and due diligence departments, to take concrete action against sanctions evasion. Although largely unseen, these actions played an important role in imposing real-world consequences for those engaged in sanctions evasion.

Toward the Next Monitoring Regime

I would argue that this proven value of sanctions monitoring, the decay of UN systems themselves and the political stagnation that accrues from the UN’s outdated rules suggest, perversely, that UN sanctions would be best monitored from outside the UN system. Allowing those who have no interest in maintaining the sanctions regime to have a decisive say in monitoring them is a mistake. By taking the Panel’s monitoring role out of the UN system, it would be possible to improve the objective value of the monitoring effort.

So, what would a new DPRK sanctions monitoring body require?

  • The right investigators: These individuals would have the skills necessary for open-source and more sensitive investigations. They would be contractually tied to objectivity and independence (and probably some sort of internal agreement to recuse themselves from investigations involving their own countries). A multinational team would be best, but reflecting the nations on the UNSC is not an effective means of ensuring impartiality or competence. So long as they are good at what they do, the experts can come from anywhere. Additionally, they should have the right IT, imagery, databases and analytical tools, none of which come cheap.
  • Intelligence support: The Panel has relied on the provision of sanitized intelligence material as a starting point for many investigations; that material has been carefully corroborated and subjected to high evidential standards before publication in the Panel’s reports. In recent years, however, contributing States have been less and less inclined to share this valuable material with the Panel because the Panel has been prevented from using the best of this material by Russian and Chinese experts objecting to its content. The new Panel’s membership should, therefore, be trusted to handle sensitive material carefully, as well as be able to independently corroborate that material.
  • Dedicated legal support: Its status as a UN body working on a politically sensitive portfolio has largely shielded the Panel, its members and its investigations from the vexatious attention of commercial lawyers acting on behalf of sanctions evaders. In order to regularly name individuals and entities involved in sanctions evasion without wasting its own time in commercial courts, any new sanctions monitoring body operating outside the UN would require some serious—and expensive—legal help to prevent it from becoming swamped by legal hounding from sanctions breakers.
  • A flexible and responsive reporting schedule: Perhaps a quarterly annual report supplemented by “incident reports” as they happen would be a good reporting pace and method. In addition, this body should be able to draw on and republish other work by independent think tanks and journalists, with expert commentary, in order to maximize the efforts of others. There is a great deal of impartial reporting of DPRK sanctions evasion that this body could centrally assess and help

Of course, the Panel’s authority as a UN body would be lost, and there is a risk that its “impartiality” would be seen as having been lost, too. The administrative, technical and legal support the new body would require suggests to me that it might be best nested within an international organization. But it is essential, of course, that wherever it is, the “new Panel” would be independent and not subject to influence. Of course, any new body would be vulnerable to accusations of partiality—Russia’s recent veto was partly based on just such a fatuous claim about the Panel, even within the UN system. No one—State, entity or individual—would be obliged to help the new monitoring body, and some (particularly those named in its reports) would be inclined to question its independence.

The “right of reply” currently exercised by the Panel—which means that individuals, entities and States involved in sanctions evasion are offered an opportunity to defend or explain themselves prior to publication—is a good practice and should be retained. But actually, neither sanctions evaders themselves, nor the States involved in facilitating sanctions evasion, ever responded helpfully or constructively to any request for information from the Panel during my time of service. I strongly believe that the accuracy, reliability and quality of the new body’s reporting would be most important in relatively quickly building its reputation for independence.

Finally, any attempt to reconstitute the work of the Panel elsewhere, particularly if it requires considerable resources at a politically uncertain juncture, might benefit from a restatement of the aims of sanctions against the DPRK. In short, those interested in maintaining sanctions should be able to describe clearly what they are there to achieve. I would note that Russian (and Chinese) complaints about the sanctions and the Panel do, as ever, contain warped elements of truth, twisted beyond recognition to justify their egregious behavior. For example, it is true, as Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia claimed, that the Panel relied upon Western information in its reports. However, not only did the Panel corroborate that information itself, rather than simply regurgitating it, but it also repeatedly asked Russia and China for their own information and analysis—practical and constructive assistance which neither ever offered. Any ambiguity surrounding the goal of sanctions against the DPRK will only subject the sanctions regime to attack from these two countries in particular, and other States potentially sympathetic to the DPRK.

Conclusion

Effective monitoring only really pays its way if there is a commitment to implementation and enforcement on the basis of that monitoring. With neither Russia nor China interested in either, this remains a fundamental weakness in the UN sanctions regime, wherever and whoever does the monitoring. That said, to allow the Panel to disappear at Russian demand, with China smirking in silent approval, would be a meek surrender. It is critically important to continue to cast light into dark corners. The DPRK’s WMD development—an internationally destabilizing phenomenon that even Moscow and Beijing may live to regret—is enabled by sanctions evasion, and it is still necessary to expose both it and its perpetrators, even if it cannot be stopped.



5. Late U.S. veteran of Korean War honored at Capitol


A ceremony was also held at the Korean War Memorial today as well to honor Colonel Puckett.


Late U.S. veteran of Korean War honored at Capitol | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 29 (Yonhap) -- A highly decorated U.S. veteran of the 1950-53 Korean War lied in honor at the Capitol in Washington on Monday, as U.S. lawmakers, military officials and others gathered to pay tribute to the hero.

Retired Col. Ralph Puckett Jr., the last surviving Medal of Honor recipient from the war, passed away at his home in Columbus, Georgia, at the age of 97 on April 8. He is noted for his command of the Eighth Army Ranger Company in a fierce fight to secure Hill 205, a strategically crucial point, against Chinese attacks in November 1950.

His remains were placed in the rotunda of the Capitol during a ceremony where his bereaved family and other participants honored his gallantry and intrepidity shown during the Korean War, the first major armed conflict of the Cold War.

House Speaker Mike Johnson called attention to Puckett's simple yet impactful motto: "Be there" when the going gets tough.

"On that cold day in November 1950, Col. Puckett was there for his men and his country," Johnson said in his address during the ceremony.


Medal of Honor recipients salute as the late retired Army Col. Ralph Puckett lies in honor in the Rotunda at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on April 29, 2024, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

"Today, America gets to show our things to the last surviving Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean War. And we all get a chance to be there for the colonel and his family, honoring his life and sacrifice in these hallowed halls of American democracy," he added.

In 2021, Puckett belatedly received the Medal of Honor, the U.S. armed forces' highest military decoration, for his service during the Korean War. He is also a veteran of the Vietnam War.

Last April, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol awarded the Taegeuk Order of Military Merit, the country's highest military order, to Puckett and two other Korean War veterans.

Puckett's remains will reportedly be interred at the Parkhill Cemetery in Columbus.


An honor guard carries an urn containing the cremated remains of retired Army Col. Ralph Puckett Jr. during his congressional tribute in the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol in Washington on April 29, 2024, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024


6. U.S. takes sanctioned Russian ship moored in China as 'incredibly seriously'


U.S. takes sanctioned Russian ship moored in China as 'incredibly seriously' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 29 (Yonhap) -- The United States takes a sanctioned Russian vessel having used a Chinese port as "incredibly seriously," a State Department spokesperson said Monday, as the ship has been implicated in North Korea's arms transfers to Russia.

State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel made the comment as the vessel, named Angara, has been docked at a Chinese shipyard in a development that added to speculation about China's indirect support for Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.

"This is something that we take incredibly seriously. You saw the secretary ... myself speak about the closening of the relation (close relations) we're seeing between Russia and the PRC, especially as it relates to ongoing endeavors, as it relates to the Russian defense industrial base," Patel said. PRC stands for China's official name, the People's Republic of China.

"We think that that is not just risky to the region, but it is directly an affront to Ukraine. So we're going to continue to take appropriate steps to hold relevant actors accountable," he added.


State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on Aug. 14, 2023 in this captured image. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Citing Britain's Royal United Services Institute, Reuters recently reported that the ship in question has been docked at a Chinese shipyard in eastern Zhejiang province since February.

Commenting on the report, the State Department said last week that media and non-governmental organization reports implicate Angara for its direct involvement with a group of Russian cargo vessels conducting deliveries of military equipment and munitions from the DPRK to Russia

Pyongyang has shipped over 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September, as well as several dozen ballistic missiles, according to the U.S. government, as Moscow strives to replenish its weapons stockpile for use in Ukraine.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024


7. Only 34 pct of S. Korean elites favor nuclearization: CSIS poll


Please tell me what is the South Korean concept of employment of nuclear weapons? What will be the first use policy? How does the ROK plan to employ nuclear weapons across the spectrum of conflict? These are important questions that need to be answered. The argument cannot simply be that north Korea has nuclear weapons; therefore, South Korea should have them too. Or North Korea will be deterred simply by South Korea possessing nuclear weapons.


Only 34 pct of S. Korean elites favor nuclearization: CSIS poll | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 29 (Yonhap) -- Only a third of South Korean academics, experts and other elites support nuclearization of their country, a U.S. think tank poll showed Monday, a finding that contrasts with greater support shown in surveys of the general public.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report on the outcome of the poll conducted on over 1,000 "strategic elites" in South Korea from Jan. 15 to March 17. The report, titled "Breaking Bad, South Korea's Nuclear Option," was authored by Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS.

It found that only 34 percent of the elites said yes to the question of whether South Korea should have nuclear arms, while 53 percent said no with 13 percent saying that they are "not sure."

The chosen demographic of the elites, including legislators, business elites and current and former officials, is understood to better reflect both the state of national discussion and the views influential in decision-making on issues of national security, the report said.

"Thirty-four percent support represents a much lower level of elite support than that of the general public, which averages at 61 percent based on 36 public opinion polls since September 2017 -- and a substantially lower level of support than a recent public poll that puts support as high as 76.6 percent," the report said.

"Strategic elites, whose views matter most in national security decision-making, by a wide margin do not favor a nuclear South Korea," it added.

Among the respondents in support of nuclearization, 68 percent identified themselves as conservatives, 22 percent as moderates and 10 percent as progressives or moderate progressives.

Among those who said no to the nuclearization question, 36 percent were self-identified as conservatives, 36 percent as progressives or moderate progressives and 28 percent as moderates.

Of those who answered no to the question, 43 percent said it was because the country can be targeted by economic sanctions and lose prestige from violating international norms. Twenty six percent of them cited potential damage to the South Korea-U.S. alliance and possible fallout from the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

But the report showed that should former President Donald Trump return to the White House, it could affect nuclear debate in South Korea. Known for his America-first policy credo, Trump seeks reelection in the Nov. 5 presidential election where he is to face incumbent President Joe Biden.

Among the elites who are not supportive of nuclearization, 51 percent said that their support for a nuclear South Korea will increase in the event of the return of "America-first" policy that "denigrates allies and seeks retrenchment,"" according to the poll.

Ninety percent of those supportive of nuclearization said that their support for a nuclear South Korea will increase in case of America-first policy's return.

The poll came as the debate over whether South Korea should go nuclear lingers as Pyongyang has been doubling down on its push to develop nuclear weapons and diverse delivery vehicles.


Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at CSIS headquarters in Washington on Oct. 5, 2023. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 30, 2024


8. NIS sees possibility of N. Korean terrorist attacks involving drones, paragliders


What is the difference between kinetic provocation, a military attack, and a terrorist attack by north Korea against the South? Is an attack of the South involving drones and paragliders a terrorist attack or simply an attack?  


NIS sees possibility of N. Korean terrorist attacks involving drones, paragliders | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's spy agency said Tuesday it cannot rule out the possibility of North Korea staging attacks involving drones and motorized paragliders amid suspicions over Pyongyang's ties with the Hamas militant group.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) issued the warning in its annual report on global terrorism, as the North has been ramping up weapons tests and verbal threats amid allegations of its illicit arms transfers.

In January, the NIS confirmed suspicions that North Korean-made weapons are being used by the Hamas militant group in its war against Israel despite Pyongyang's repeated denial of such transactions.

"Suspicions are being raised over links between North Korea and Hamas in areas, including military training and exchange of tactics," the NIS said in the report.

"The probability of simultaneous infiltration and provocation using drones and motorized paragliders cannot be ruled out," it added.

In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly reaffirmed its stance against all forms of terrorism.

North Korea has a track record of staging terror attacks against South Korea in the past few decades, including the 1987 midair bombing of a South Korean airliner near Myanmar that killed all 115 people aboard.

The attack prompted the United States to put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist, but Washington removed Pyongyang from the list in 2008 to facilitate talks on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

In 2017, the U.S. redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.


This file photo, provided by the National Intelligence Service, South Korea's spy agency, on Jan. 8, 2024, shows an F-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher manufactured in North Korea suspected to have been used by the Hamas militant group. Korean characters are engraved inside of the fuse (in blue circle) of the grenade launcher. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024



9. Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea reaches 43 in Q1



But the draconian population and resources control measures continue to make it hard for escapees from the north.


Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea reaches 43 in Q1 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- The number of North Korean defectors coming to South Korea came to 43 in the first quarter, marking an increase from the same period last year, government data showed Tuesday.

After escaping the North, eight men and 35 women arrived in the South in the January-March period, bringing the total number of North Korean defectors to 34,121, according to the data from the unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs.

The latest figure was lower than 57 tallied in the previous quarter but was higher than 34 in the same period a year earlier.

The number of North Korean defectors coming to the South has been on a recovery after sharply dwindling in recent years due largely to Pyongyang's strict border lockdowns to curb the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2023, the number of North Korean defectors who entered the South came to 196 amid a rise in defections by North Korean diplomats and trade officials, nearly tripling from 67 in 2022.


This undated file photo shows a government resettlement facility for North Korean defectors. (Yonhap)

A ministry official said further monitoring is needed to assess overall trends as quarterly figures may vary due to numerous factors, without providing further details.

In recent years, more North Korean defectors picked aspirations for freedom as the No. 1 reason for their escape over food shortages, according to a separate survey by the Korea Hana Foundation, an agency affiliated with the ministry.

In 2023, nearly 23 percent of those surveyed said they chose to defect as they were disillusioned with the North's regime, followed by 21.4 percent citing a food crisis.

South Korea has a longstanding policy of accepting any North Korean defectors who want to live in the South and repatriating any North Koreans who stray into the South if they want to return.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024


10. S. Korea vows efforts to ensure U.N. sanctions enforcement on N.K. continues despite end to monitoring panel


S. Korea vows efforts to ensure U.N. sanctions enforcement on N.K. continues despite end to monitoring panel | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 30, 2024

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will make efforts to ensure that U.N. sanctions enforcement on North Korea will continue even though the U.N. monitoring panel is ending after Russia's veto on extending its mandate, Seoul's foreign ministry said Tuesday.

The U.N. Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions against North Korea's illicit weapons programs is set to end Tuesday (New York time), after Moscow rejected a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution meant to renew the mandate for the monitoring panel for another year.

China, one of the five permanent UNSC members with veto power, abstained from voting.

"Although the UNSC monitoring panel ends, the sanctions committee on North Korea still stands," Lim Soo-suk, foreign ministry spokesperson, said in a briefing.

"The government will step up efforts to ensure the implementation of the UNSC sanctions resolutions on North Korea, with close coordination with the international community," Lim said.

Various alternatives have been under discussion to replace the monitoring panel, Lim said, adding that Seoul will seek ways with like-minded countries to build a more effective mechanism.

During a visit to South Korea earlier this month, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the top U.S. envoy to the United Nations, said the United States will work with South Korea to explore "creative" and "out of the box" ways to find an alternative to the experts' panel, even outside of the U.N. system.


In this file photo, foreign ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk speaks during a regular press briefing at the ministry building in Seoul on April 2, 2024. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 30, 2024



11. S. Korea submits formal bid for Czech nuclear power plant project



South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power and is partner in the arsenal of democracy that support the sully based international order


S. Korea submits formal bid for Czech nuclear power plant project | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 30, 2024

By Oh Seok-min

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- The state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) said Tuesday it has submitted its formal bid for a project to construct four nuclear reactors in the Czech Republic.

The KHNP submitted the final bid to Elektrarna Dukovany II (EDUII), a subsidiary of Czech state utility company CEZ, on Monday (Czech Republic time) to take part in the project to build four 1,200-megawatt nuclear reactors in Dukovany and Temelin.

The European country will announce a preferred bidder around June and July after due evaluations and reviews by the government and relevant entities, according to KHNP officials.

"South Korea will be the optimal supplier in the world that will help the Czech Republic achieve the goal of completing the construction of new reactors by 2036," Hwang said, stressing its advanced reactor construction capacities and experiences.


Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) chief Hwang Joo-ho (3rd from L) shakes hands with Czech state utility company CEZ head Daniel Benes after submitting its bid to take part in the European country's project to build four new nuclear reactors on April 29, 2024, in this photo provided by the KHNP. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 30, 2024



12.NK leader openly flouts UN sanctions in recent outing


Excerpts:

The Ministry of Unification said Pyongyang's public display of luxury vehicles can be interpreted as an attempt to clearly show that the sanctions against North Korea are futile.
"North Korea's series of actions that violate the sanctions will further alienate its relations with a majority of countries that conform to international norms," a ministry official said.
...
"Even if the expert panel's mandate has expired, U.N. member states are still obligated to comply with sanctions against North Korea per U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. The government will seek effective measures with the international community to ensure that sanctions against North Korea are faithfully implemented," the ministry official said.
Hong said South Korea needs to explore alternatives to the expert panel monitoring the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea in cooperation with the United States and other allies.
"Establishing alternative mechanism is an inevitable option for us as the mandate of the U.N. expert panel is expiring today. South Korea, the U.S. and their allies should call for help from countries who hold anti-Western sentiment as the new mechanism can appear weaker than the U.N. sanctions," he said.

NK leader openly flouts UN sanctions in recent outing

The Korea Times · April 30, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's Aurus Senat limousine, center, is surrounded by a luxury convoy of Toyota Land Cruiser 300s as well as Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 SUVs and Lexus LX SUVs during his visit to Kim Il Sung Military University in Pyongyang, Friday. Yonhap

By Kwak Yeon-soo

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's recent public appearances with newly purchased high-end luxury vehicles, including Mercedes-Benz Maybachs, Lexus SUVs and Toyota Land Cruisers, cast doubt on the effectiveness of international sanctions against the secretive regime.

With the mandate for the United Nations expert panel that monitors sanctions on North Korea expiring Tuesday, this blatant display of showing off is feared to deepen concerns that Pyongyang could further modernize its nuclear and weapons programs by exploiting the vacuum regarding the enforcement of sanctions.

Last week, six Toyota Land Cruiser 300s were spotted in Kim's 18-vehicle motorcade during a visit to the Kim Il Sung Military University in Pyongyang, in what appears to be an obvious expression of contempt for international sanctions. The Land Cruisers are part of Toyota's J300 series, which have been produced since 2021 and have a starting price of around $80,000.

Kim was seen riding the Aurus Senat limousine, a luxury car that was given to him as a gift by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Also seen in the luxury convoy were two Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 SUVs, two Lexus LX SUVs, two Ford Transit vans, and five old Mercedes sedans, all of which cannot officially be imported to North Korea, which is under sanctions.

The Ministry of Unification said Pyongyang's public display of luxury vehicles can be interpreted as an attempt to clearly show that the sanctions against North Korea are futile.

"North Korea's series of actions that violate the sanctions will further alienate its relations with a majority of countries that conform to international norms," a ministry official said.

Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, analyzed that sanctions imposed by the United Nations on North Korea have been losing their impact.

"It seems like Pyongyang has intentionally revealed its high-end imported vehicles in an effort to show that they can evade sanctions," Hong said.

Experts played down concerns regarding the absence of the panel that monitors the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea.

"Even if the expert panel's mandate has expired, U.N. member states are still obligated to comply with sanctions against North Korea per U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. The government will seek effective measures with the international community to ensure that sanctions against North Korea are faithfully implemented," the ministry official said.

Hong said South Korea needs to explore alternatives to the expert panel monitoring the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea in cooperation with the United States and other allies.

"Establishing alternative mechanism is an inevitable option for us as the mandate of the U.N. expert panel is expiring today. South Korea, the U.S. and their allies should call for help from countries who hold anti-Western sentiment as the new mechanism can appear weaker than the U.N. sanctions," he said.

The U.N. expert panel, created in 2009, has been submitting reports biannually to the UNSC, recommending actions to enhance the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, which were first imposed in 2006 and subsequently strengthened in response to its continued weapons development.

However, Russia vetoed the annual renewal of the panel's mandate in a routine UNSC resolution vote last month, putting an end to the 15-year-old mechanism.

The Korea Times · April 30, 2024



13. Gov't to open 10 trails near DMZ for visitors next month


While the north mines approaches to the DMZ, the South opens trails. My sense is that the trails are south of the South Barrier Fence and not actually within the 4KM of the DMZ.


Gov't to open 10 trails near DMZ for visitors next month | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Ten peace-themed trails near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separating the two Koreas, will open to the public in mid-May, the government said Tuesday.

The trails are located across border towns and cities in the provinces of Gyeonggi and Gangwon, as well as the western border island of Gangwha, according to the defense and culture ministries.

The trails are set to open May 13. Visitors can sign up for trips on the government-run website (www.dmzwalk.com) and mobile app Durunubi, according to the ministries.

The DMZ, which is about 250 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide, is one of the world's most heavily fortified borders, with the rival Koreas technically in a state of conflict, as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.


This undated file photo, provided by the Korea Tourism Organization, shows visitors walking along a peace-themed trail near the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 30, 2024




14. Korea can bridge Global West, South: ex-UN Undersecretary-General



Global Pivotal State.


Korea can bridge Global West, South: ex-UN Undersecretary-General

koreaherald.com · by Sanjay Kumar · April 30, 2024

By Sanjay Kumar

Published : April 30, 2024 - 11:27

Former UN Undersecretary-General Kim Won-soo delivers a lecture on “Korea and the Changing World Issues” at Korea CQ Forum at the residence of Singapore Ambassador in Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, on Tuesday. (CICI)

South Korea could play an instrumental role in connecting the Global West and the South with its strong commitment to international cooperation and overseas assistance funds for developing countries, former UN Undersecretary-General Kim Won-soo at the CQ Forum in Seoul.

Speaking at the CQ Forum in Seoul held last week, Kim said Korea was in a position to address fragmentation, skepticism and uncertainty in the world order, referring to its leading role in hosting a series of summits on contentious issues including democracy and artificial intelligence.

"The global south is, I think, the battleground for the global east and global west," he said at the forum hosted by the Corea Image Communication Institute (CICI).

“So who will get their minds and hearts? I think we (Korea) will win that paradigm battle.”

The term "Global South" refers to countries often characterized as "developing," "less developed," or "underdeveloped." While not exclusive to the Southern Hemisphere, many of these nations are located there, predominantly in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Countries in the Global South have been advocating for a more fair, rational and representative global order for an environment of peace, stability, and sustainable development.

Discussing planetary politics and Korea, Kim cited the nuclear winter, the climate crisis and emerging technology as the perfect storm of existential threats in the present world and called for a paradigm shift from a state-centered to a planet-oriented international order to form coalitions with like-minded states from the global west and south.

Korea's engagement with the Global South is strong because the country once belonged to the Global South and moved to the Global West, said Kim when asked how strong South Korea’s engagement is with countries of the Global South.

Attendees pose for a group photo at Korea CQ Forum at the residence of Singapore Ambassador in Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, on Tuesday. (CICI)

“Korea is one of the very few countries that still commit to increasing our ODA budget,” he said, expressing Korea’s willingness to share its development experiences.

The South Korean government allocated a budget of 6.3 trillion won ($4.7 billion) for official development assistance (ODA) this year, funding 1,976 ODA projects across 47 agencies.

The country’s commitment to ODA has steadily increased since joining the Development Assistance Committee in 2010, aiding developing nations.

Kim said that the Summit for Democracy hosted by South Korea in March this year and the AI Seoul Summit to be co-hosted in May with the UK show Korea’s commitment to finding solutions and lining up with the Global South.

This summit aims to facilitate the safe development of AI technologies, building upon the cooperative framework established by the Bletchley Declaration, according to organizers.

Signed on November 3, 2023, by Australia, 27 other countries and the EU, the declaration commits signatories to proactively manage risks associated with "frontier AI" to ensure safe and responsible development and deployment of highly capable general-purpose AI models.

Meanwhile, he suggested Korea facilitate dialogue between the United States and China to fill the deficit in global public goods provision, leveraging engagement with the Global South.

“Korea can help find the US and China, find common ground,” Kim said, suggesting coalitions with like-minded states.

He also advocated for a plurilateral approach that embraces openness and inclusivity, allowing Korea to build partnerships with as many countries as possible.

Kim pointed out challenges in global governance systems, such as the breakdown of the US Security Council's privacy and the lack of strong leadership due to the US retreat and China's reluctance to fill the gap.

The leadership vacuum is evident in conflicts like those in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, including the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, according to Kim.

He said activating fortification lines between the Global East and Global West signals shifting geopolitical dynamics with potential implications.

“If the eastern part is going to be activated, then we'll see the third war,” he warned, suggesting international collaboration to prevent conflict escalation and maintain stability.

Urging proactive measures to avert unintended escalations, Kim emphasized the global impact, especially amid upcoming US elections that could either ease tensions or exacerbate them, labeling the situation as "planetary politics."

But the former UN official also cautioned against the growing risks associated with AI-driven warfare, dubbed the "singleton moment," where strategic decisions could be entrusted to artificial intelligence rather than human control.

“That's why Korea is trying to host a second AI summit in September,” he said.


koreaherald.com · by Sanjay Kumar · April 30, 2024


15. Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv





​


Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv

By Michelle Nichols

April 29, 20247:28 PM EDTUpdated 12 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/un-experts-say-north-korea-missile-landed-ukraines-kharkiv-2024-04-29/?utm


Missile debris that landed in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv on January 2 was from a North Korean ballistic missile.


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UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Kharkiv

UNITED NATIONS, April 29 (Reuters) - The debris from a missile that landed in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv on Jan. 2 was from a North Korean Hwasong-11 series ballistic missile, United Nations sanctions monitors told a Security Council committee in a report seen by Reuters on Monday.

In the 32-page report, the U.N. sanctions monitors concluded that "debris recovered from a missile that landed in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on 2 January 2024 derives from a DPRK Hwasong-11 series missile" and is in violation of the arms embargo on North Korea.

Formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs since 2006, and those measures have been strengthened over the years.

Three sanctions monitors traveled to Ukraine earlier this month to inspect the debris and found no evidence that the missile was made by Russia. They "could not independently identify from where the missile was launched, nor by whom."

"Information on the trajectory provided by Ukrainian authorities indicates it was launched within the territory of the Russian Federation," they wrote in an April 25 report to the Security Council's North Korea sanctions committee.

"Such a location, if the missile was under control of Russian forces, would probably indicate procurement by nationals of the Russian Federation," they said, adding that this would be a violation of the arms embargo imposed on North Korea in 2006.




Item 1 of 2 Experts inspect a crater next to a building heavily damaged during a Russian missile attack, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in central Kharkiv, Ukraine January 2, 2024. REUTERS/Sofiia Gatilova/File Photo

[1/2]Experts inspect a crater next to a building heavily damaged during a Russian missile attack, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in central Kharkiv, Ukraine January 2, 2024. REUTERS/Sofiia Gatilova/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab


The Russian and North Korean missions to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the report by the sanctions monitors.

The U.S. and others have accused North Korea of transferring weapons to Russia for use against Ukraine, which it invaded in February 2022. Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied the accusations, but vowed last year to deepen military relations.

At a U.N. Security Council meeting in February, the U.S. accused Russia of launching DPRK-supplied ballistic missiles against Ukraine on at least nine occasions.

The U.N. monitors said the Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles were first publicly tested by Pyongyang in 2019.

Russia last month vetoed the annual renewal of the U.N. sanctions monitors - known as a panel of experts - that has for 15 years monitored enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The mandate for the current panel of experts will expire on Tuesday.

Within days of the Jan. 2 attack, the Kharkiv region prosecutor's office showcased fragments of the missile to the media, saying it was different from Russian models and "this may be a missile which was supplied by North Korea."

Coming soon: Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Michelle Nichols at United Nations Editing by Don Durfee and Matthew Lewis






16. Reality, Democracy and the Results of South Korea’s General Election


Excerpts:


Suggestions for the Development of South Korean Democracy
Today, South Korean politics faces extreme high and low tides, with frequent and intense ebbs and flows. The political sphere has continuously steered the ship of state towards dangerous coasts, ignoring stable shores. These are the fruits of politics that are rife with easy choices dependent on anger rather than inspiration. The crucial issue for the future development of South Korean politics is which politician or political party will wisely steer the ship of state towards a peaceful and prosperous coast. This will also be the standard by which they gain the trust and votes of citizens.
Of course, this task is a difficult one. Politicians need to make steady efforts while also avoiding sweet and easy temptations. Yet, it is possible for South Korean politics to make a great leap forward. Democracy is about persuading people with words. As Aristotle argued in “Rhetoric,” in the act of persuasion with words, the speaker’s ethos is of utmost importance. For a politician's words to be powerful, they must possess authenticity, morality, dedication and trustworthiness. Persuasive words from a politician with ethos — this is the hope of citizens who long for change in South Korean politics. Politicians should reflect on how to regain the ethos they may have neglected at times in the past, especially in the wake of the 22nd General Election. Pressing systemic issues such as electoral reform, preventing the emergence of satellite parties, revising political laws, reforming party nomination systems, and improving intra-party democracy can be discussed and improved upon afterwards.



Reality, Democracy and the Results of South Korea’s General Election

Summary

South Korean voters often face difficult choices in elections and emerge with superb results. The outcome of the 22nd South Korean General Election represent an unprecedented punishment for the current administration. However, the inner workings of this situation are both complex and subtle. Political circles must properly understand and respond to the public sentiment that was expressed in the National Assembly election. The president and the ruling party, who suffered a major defeat in the mid-term election, have no choice but to pursue major changes. The Democratic Party of Korea, which has taken center stage in the political sphere, must handle the 22nd National Assembly with a sense of responsibility. As a now massive opposition party, it must simultaneously take the lead in the assembly and seek a balancing role in mediating conflicts between the People Power Party and New Building Korea. Both the ruling and opposition parties need an attitude of restraint and tolerance to expand the space for change, balance and cooperative governance. The starting point is a discussion on consensus issues centered on people’s livelihoods, not partisan strife. If they fail to reach agreements on relevant issues, the 22nd National Assembly will once again greatly disappoint the people and be evaluated negatively.

Voters wait for elections. There are not many opportunities for them to exercise their will as sovereigns and people in power apart from elections. How much anticipation and excitement did the 22nd South Korea General Election bring to voters? Judging from the high voter turnout and the unprecedented level of punishment meted out to the ruling party, it seems that voters waited for, participated in, and punished in this election more than any other general election.

Voters exercised their power to punish those in power for failing to reflect the will of the people. They sent a warning to the president and the ruling party not to show arrogance, to shift their uncommunicative attitude, and to properly care for people’s livelihoods. It is a bright spot in South Korean politics that power feels the wrath of the public through elections and has no choice but to change.

On the other hand, the recent general election was centered on punishment based in anger. The argument that the ruling party should be punished absorbed all other priorities like a black hole. Policy and personnel competition were not properly conducted. Pork-barrel pledges lacking preparation were rampant, and candidates whose qualifications were questionable were also nominated and elected. Voters found it difficult to grasp the concerns of political circles and efforts to solve livelihood problems and develop regions in the face of rampant words of hatred and ridicule toward the opposition. The darkness of South Korean politics is that political sides lie in wait for a windfall of mistakes by their opponents, which deepens emotional polarization.

Why did the People Power Party Win so Few Seats?

Results like these have never been seen in elections since the advent of democracy in South Korea. Even when the president’s approval rating was low or the economic situation was not good, there has never been a result so harsh on the ruling party as what was seen in the 22nd General Election. In the 13th General Election held immediately after democratization, the ruling Democratic Justice Party won 87 seats (38.8 percent) out of 224 in the single-member district tier.

That record was broken in the 22nd General Election. The People Power Party received a dismal result, winning only 90 seats (35.4 percent) out of 254 in the single-member district tier. Yoon Suk Yeol, the People Power Party candidate, led a regime change by narrowly winning the 20th South Korean Presidential Election held in March 2022 by a 0.7 percent margin. In the local elections held in June of the same year, the People Power Party won by a landslide. However, in the 22nd General Election, the party was forced to appeal to protect 100 seats to prevent the impeachment of the president and constitutional amendment. In the end, the People Power Party won 108 seats (36.0%) out of a total of 300. The only consolation is that their last line of defense held.

What on earth happened in the past two years that the People Power Party received such a dismal result? An accurate review is required. The following three points are clear.

First, there is the issue of the president’s management of state affairs. A general election held in the middle of a president’s term tends to act as a mid-term evaluation. The evaluation of a president’s performance on state affairs has a large influence on election results. However, President Yoon Suk Yeol’s approval rating for the management of state affairs has consistently remained in the 30 percent range. Voters rating the president negatively were consistently twice as many as those rating him positively. This structurally difficult situation made a win in the general election unlikely, considering it’s the role of the election as a mid-term evaluation.

Then why was President Yoon’s approval rating so low? There are too many reasons to count. He has failed to communicate with the public by refusing or avoiding doorstepping queries and press conferences. Even considering the legal issues surrounding Democratic Party of Korea leader Lee Jae-myung, Yoon did not formally meet with the opposition party leader even once, despite having a ruling party minority. He did not accept criticism and silenced the voices of people who opposed him. In one such situation, there was a remark by Hwang Sang-moo, the president’s senior secretary for civil society, about terrorizing journalists. Hwang said to a reporter from MBC, one who had conflicts with the administration, that in the past, a reporter who wrote articles critical of the government was stabbed in the thigh with a knife. Also, there were endless allegations surrounding First Lady Kim Gun-hee and controversies over her receiving luxury goods. For example, in September 2022, a video was released showing her receiving a Dior bag worth 3 million won as a gift. The presidential couple could not vote together. The administration failed to responsibly deal with the Itaewon disaster (an incident in which 159 people were crushed to death due to a large crowd gathering for Halloween in Itaewon in 2022) and the death of Corporal Chae Soo-geun (an incident in which a soldier who went to support the search for missing persons was swept away by a rapid current and died in 2023, with questions raised over whether the government pressured the media to downplay the incident). Rather, by appointing Lee Jong-seop, a suspect in Chae’s death, as ambassador to Australia, Yoon caused a conflict between the ruling party and the government. He also demonstrated his willingness to be swayed by public opinion when he forced Lee’s resignation after only a few weeks in the role. In a situation where citizens were facing serious inconvenience due to the intensifying conflict between the government and the Korean Medical Association over the government’s plan to increase the number of medical school students by 2,000, President Yoon delivered a special 53-minute speech that left little room for compromise. These are only a few of the reasons why the president and the Yongsan Presidential Office has been blamed for their party’s defeat in the 22nd general election.

Second, the economic situation in South Korea has not been good. For a ruling party to avoid suffering punishment in a midterm general election, the economic situation must be positive. Especially for common people, the stability of prices and interest rates is important. However, high prices and high interest rates persisted ahead of the 22nd General Election. The psychology of voters trying to hold the president and the ruling party, who are at the forefront of state affairs, responsible for this was at work.

In particular, President Yoon’s remark, made during a visit to a market, that the 875-won price for a bundle of green onions was reasonable sparked controversy and widespread media attention, because the bundle in question was on special sale, whereas the normal price in the market at the time was around 3,000 to 4,000 won. Putting aside the issue of how the Yongsan Presidential Office planned and prepared for this event, voters perceived that the president did not properly understand the difficulties of common people facing high prices. Various memes related to the 875-won green onions appeared and were used as a rallying symbol to punish the ruling party.

Third, the People Power Party was not really visible as a political party. President Yoon and the Party’s Emergency Committee Chairman Han Dong-hoon did not spend much time growing through party politics. They likely felt that they succeeded in regime change thanks to their personal power, leading the general election through a difficult time. The People Power Party fought the 22nd General Election under the leadership of two individuals who had no sense of debt to their party. The president was unpopular, and the Emergency Committee chairman had no election experience. Faced with a difficult General Election, dissonance often came out in the relationship between the party and the administration. The People Power Party failed to coordinate differences in advance between the president and the Emergency Committee chairman. It also failed to even appear to plan and prepare for the election. Neither proposals for region-specific pledges and budget input using the resources of the ruling party nor alternative frames such as the argument for local workers were put forward properly.

Understanding the Overwhelming Victory of the Democratic Party and the Performance of New Building Korea

Who is the biggest winner of the 22nd General Election? Looking only at external election results, it is obviously the Democratic Party of Korea, which won 175 seats (58.3 percent) out of a total of 300. The majority of voters demonstrated their desire to punish the Yoon Suk Yeol government and to grant the initiative in state affairs to the National Assembly and the Democratic Party.

However, when we delve into the inner workings of the election, the Democratic Party also has reasons to be wary of the outcome. First, it won 161 seats (63.4 percent) out of the 254 seats in the single-member district tier, with a 50.5 percent vote share. The People Power Party secured 90 seats (35.4 percent), with a 45.1 percent vote share. Despite the voters’ clear choice, without the winner-takes-all nature of the single-member district system, a 5.4 percent vote margin would not have resulted in such a large difference in the allocation of seats. The People Power Party's satellite party, the People's Future, won 18 of the proportional representation seats with 39.1 percent of the vote. This was not a bad outcome compared to the ruling party since the introduction of the two-ballot system in the 17th General Election. Although there was a great desire to punish the ruling party, there remained a considerable number of voters who disliked the Democratic Party. Elections have the effect of standardizing the intensity of anger through the principle of equal voting – one person, one vote.

Second, in the proportional representation tier, the People’s Future won 36.7 percent of the total vote, leading the Democratic Union’s 26.7 percent by 10 percentage points. In this tier, there was another alternative called the New Building Korea. It’s possible to evaluate the opposition’s victory based on split voting, with the Democratic Party in the single-member district tier and New Building Korea in the proportional representation tier. However, it is also difficult to completely deny that the whirlwind of New Building Korea is thanks to not only the desire for regime punishment but also dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party.

Third, it’s also notable that New Building Korea’s vote share reached 24.3 percent, not a large difference compared to the Democratic Party. Moreover, in the entire Honam region, the regional stronghold for the Democratic Party, as well as in Busan and Sejong, New Building Korea recorded a higher vote share than the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party appealed to voters to concentrate their votes for the party in the single-member district tier as well as the proportional representation tier. Despite these efforts, these discrepancies exist.

It is not easy to understand the sensation created by New Building Korea in the 22nd General Election. For this, empirical research based on future survey data is needed. However, in the current situation, we can present the following two hypotheses.

First, it is highly likely that voters who were dissatisfied with the two large parties supported New Building Korea. Many voters were dissatisfied with the deepening polarization and the politics of the camps centered on the People Power Party and the Democratic Party. There was a so-called third zone that did not support the two large parties. The Reformist New Party and the New Future Party were founded to target this political space. New Building Korea emerged as a new third-party alternative, after a union between the Reformist New Party and the New Future Party failed due to internal opposition and differences in positions. It penetrated the psychology of voters who wanted to send a warning to the ruling People Power Party and a warning to the Democratic Party, reflecting problems that appeared in the process of strengthening the party leader’s grip on power. The sensation created by New Building Korea provided a new option for voters who were dissatisfied with both of the two large parties.

Second, support for New Building Korea is closely linked to voter sentiment in Honam and Busan. Voters in Honam felt alienated and dissatisfied as traditional supporters of the Democratic Party, a side effect of witnessing the transformation of the Democratic Party around its party leader, Lee. In addition, the shared experience of being a victim of state power and the local culture of resistance to power aroused compassion for the leader of New Building Korea, Cho Kuk, and at the same time led to a demand for harsh government punishment. As Cho’s hometown, Busan voters were also likely to express their antipathy toward the conservative camp's focus on Daegu and Gyeongbuk.

How Will South Korean Politics Play Out After the 22nd General Election?

With the 22nd General Election, the Yoon Suk Yeol government is now destined to lead the state administration as the minority party for the first time. Moreover, it is a minority government in which not only the difference in seat count between the ruling and opposition parties but also the intensity of confrontation is expected to be greater than ever.

In this situation, it is difficult to expect that South Korean politics will successfully function through compromise and coexistence. Rather, it’s a reasonable prediction that there will be more severe partisan conflict than ever. The biggest political change following the election is that the central axis of state administration shifts from the president to the National Assembly and, within the National Assembly, to the Democratic Party. The power of the president and the People Power Party is likely to face various internal conflicts and to seek change, after being held accountable for the election results. The People Power Party can block attempts to impeach the president and amend the constitution. The president also has the right to veto bills passed by the National Assembly. However, there is no way to delay or block a bill led by the opposition parties. If the president does not change, he could also face a situation where eight ruling party members of the National Assembly could oppose actions such as the president’s exercise of veto power and override them.

President Yoon has no choice but to face the newly inaugurated 22nd National Assembly, which differs from the 21st National Assembly that was grandfathered in at the beginning of his term. Combining that with the new majority opposition, the political context is significantly different. The People Power Party is likely to pressure the president and the presidential office by centering around a new party leader and floor leader to seek a new party-government relationship. It is inevitable the People Power Party will face growing demands to seek significant changes and innovation to survive.

While a difficult challenge, if this process goes well, the president and the People Power Party will be able to recover the resources necessary for stable governance. Restoring horizontal party-government relations, establishing a dialogue channel between the ruling and opposition parties, and creating a political culture of compromise and cooperation are more likely to come from the urgency of the loser than from the leisure of the winner. If these changes and innovations are not properly pursued, South Korean politics will likely fall into a vortex it has never experienced before.

Democratic leader Lee and the Democratic Party of Korea won a significant victory in the elections and have gained control of the political agenda, but with this comes an increased sense of responsibility and burden. Since the voters have handed over the keys to national governance to the Democratic Party and its leader Lee rather than to President Yoon and the People Power Party, it is difficult to proceed with politics that rely solely on criticism without alternatives and political gains by default. Although there is a need to cooperate with New Building Korea, the People Power Party cannot afford to be perceived as being manipulated, losing out in the competition for clarity and distinction. If the conflict between the People Power Party and New Building Korea becomes acute, there will inevitably emerge a need for a balancer to mediate tensions. It’s not unreasonable to say that the real political experimentation and challenge faced by Lee and the Democratic Party begins after the 22nd General Election. The performance and results they produce will be central to earning the trust and votes of citizens in the future.

Suggestions for the Development of South Korean Democracy

Today, South Korean politics faces extreme high and low tides, with frequent and intense ebbs and flows. The political sphere has continuously steered the ship of state towards dangerous coasts, ignoring stable shores. These are the fruits of politics that are rife with easy choices dependent on anger rather than inspiration. The crucial issue for the future development of South Korean politics is which politician or political party will wisely steer the ship of state towards a peaceful and prosperous coast. This will also be the standard by which they gain the trust and votes of citizens.

Of course, this task is a difficult one. Politicians need to make steady efforts while also avoiding sweet and easy temptations. Yet, it is possible for South Korean politics to make a great leap forward. Democracy is about persuading people with words. As Aristotle argued in “Rhetoric,” in the act of persuasion with words, the speaker’s ethos is of utmost importance. For a politician's words to be powerful, they must possess authenticity, morality, dedication and trustworthiness. Persuasive words from a politician with ethos — this is the hope of citizens who long for change in South Korean politics. Politicians should reflect on how to regain the ethos they may have neglected at times in the past, especially in the wake of the 22nd General Election. Pressing systemic issues such as electoral reform, preventing the emergence of satellite parties, revising political laws, reforming party nomination systems, and improving intra-party democracy can be discussed and improved upon afterwards.

- - -The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation.

About the Author

Jin-man Cho(Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy at Duksung Women’s University)

Jin-man Cho obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yonsei University in 2004. He is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Duksung Women’s University. He has served as President of the Korean Association of Party Studies, Vice President of the Korean Political Science Association, a Commissioner of the National Election Survey Deliberation Commission, and Chairperson of the Political Reform Committee of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice. His major fields of study are comparative politics and Korean politics, and his primary research has been related to legislatures, elections and political parties.


17. Iran Says North Korean Delegation Visiting Tehran for Trade Expo


A long time relationship that too many overlook or are only recognizing for the first time.



Iran Says North Korean Delegation Visiting Tehran for Trade Expo

By Golnar Motevalli

April 29, 2024 at 5:51 AM EDT

An official delegation from North Korea is in Tehran to attend a trade show and have trade talks with the government and private sector, a spokesman said.

Nasser Kanaani, spokesman for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed as “biased and baseless speculation” reports that the visit had a military dimension and said it involved talks on developing bilateral trade.

Read more: North Korea, Iran Hold Talks as Concern Grows Over Military Ties






18. Ranger legend Col. Ralph Puckett honored at U.S. Capitol



Not reported in this article is that Senator Ernst offered her excellent and heartfelt remarks for COL Puckett at a ceremony at the Korean War memorial yesterday hosted by the Medal of Honor Society, the Korean War Memorial Foundation, and the Korean Defense Veterans Association. I have never been in the presence of so many Medal of Honor recipients than I saw at the Korean War Memorial ceremony.



Ranger legend Col. Ralph Puckett honored at U.S. Capitol

Sen. Joni Ernst met Puckett when she was an Army Reserve Lieutenant. "You would think he was a librarian. He was so quiet and so humble," she said.

BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED APR 29, 2024 6:55 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · April 29, 2024

Sen. Joni Ernst is one of the lead lawmakers crafting legislation that directly impacts American service members and veterans, but she found herself choking up Monday remembering how her own military service had been shaped by the mentorship and friendship with Col. Ralph Puckett.

“You would think he was a librarian. He was so quiet and so humble and he was such a good man,” Ernst told Task & Purpose Monday, as her voice occasionally caught with emotion. For decades, Ernst said, Puckett was a mentor and example to generations around the 75th Ranger Regiment, she said, including herself as a young lieutenant in the Army Reserve.

“Even into his seventies and eighties, he was still going out into the field with the rangers just to make sure their spirits were high and to ensure that they were doing okay,” she said. “Not many people continue to serve like that well beyond their time.”

On Monday, Puckett became just the second Medal of Honor recipient to lie in honor, meaning his remains were accorded a public audience in the rotunda of Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. so that lawmakers and the public could pay personal respects. Ernst was among the Senators who arranged for the honor.

Puckett, 97, is among the most revered figures in the history of the Army Ranger community. He was awarded the Medal of Honor in the Korean War and the Distinguished Service Cross in Vietnam. Both awards came for courageous leadership of units facing annihilation by an overwhelmingly larger enemy force — the 8th Army Ranger Company in Korea, a unit of the 101st Airborne Divisionin Vietnam. Puckett passed away April 8 at his home in Columbus, Georgia.

On Monday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also paid his respects to Puckett’s casket in the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol in Washington D.C.

“Col. Puckett was emblematic of the 1.7 million Americans who bravely served in the Korean War and an inspiration to those who served after him, defending peace on the Korean peninsula for the last 71 years,” a spokesperson for the Pentagon said in a statement.

Ernst said her relationship with Puckett went back more than 30 years. She first met Puckett and his family when she was living in Columbus, Georgia at then-Fort Benning, now Fort Moore, as a Ranger spouse. There, she saw the retired Colonel interact and mentor various soldiers in the Ranger regiment and students at Ranger school.


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When Ernst deployed to Iraq, she said Puckett always took the time to send her emails to check in and ask how things were doing. Ernst served in the Army Reserves as a logistics officer for over 23 years and retired as a Lt. Col. In 2003, she served as a company commander in Kuwait and led 150 Iowa Army Guardsmen during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Senator Joni Ernst at the April 29 Lying in Honor ceremony for Col. Ralph Puckett, Jr. at the U.S. Capitol.

Ernst recalled a memory during a trip to Fort Moore several years back when she was introducing Puckett to her national security adviser. They had a meeting that lasted several hours and then the group made their way back to the parking lot with Puckett walking a few steps ahead.

“Every soldier in that parking lot, they all just stopped and they watched Ralph walk across the parking lot. I mean, they were just in awe. It was like they were dumb struck. It was like some famous Hollywood actor was walking across the parking lot,” she said. “You could tell the admiration and respect from complete strangers as this elderly man just simply walked to his car. It just struck me then how well loved this man was by his community.”

The defense of Hill 205

Puckett is one of the most revered figures in Army Ranger lore. In Korea, he led the defense of a position dubbed Hill 205 against a force of Chinese soldiers several times larger than his 51-man Ranger unit during the Korean War. The Rangers faced six waves of assault. Puckett led the defense, assigning Rangers to soft spots in the lines, running ammunition between positions and encouraging his soldiers. On the final wave, two mortars landed in Puckett’s foxhole. Knowing the position was lost, he ordered his men to leave him and evacuate. Instead, they dragged him down the hill as they retreated. In May 2021, his DSC for Hill 205 was upgraded to the Medal of Honor after years of lobbying from the Ranger community.

A second award at Duc Pho

Over a decade later, he commanded 101st Airborne Division paratroopers in a similar defensive stand in Vietnam. In August 1967, then-Lt. Col. Puckett was a battalion commander near Duc Pho. The citation for his second Distinguished Service cross reads that facing a large Viet Cong force,“Puckett landed in the battle zone to coordinate defenses and to assess the battlefield situation. Disregarding his own safety, he moved across a heavily mined area to the point of the most ferocious fighting to direct and inspire his men against the hostile force.” To avoid artillery fire, Puckett scattered his leader ranks, and led from a foxhole. As he’d done in Korea, he bounced between positions, bringing ammunition and encouragement.

“When rescue helicopters came in,” the citation reads, “he repeatedly refused extraction for himself and directed that the casualties be evacuated. With bullets striking all around him, he remained in the open to rally his fatigued men through the long night by sharing every phase of the battle with them.”

After retiring in 1971, Puckett remained a Ranger icon.. The top officer in every Ranger School class receives an award named him, which Puckett would present well into his 90s. His name is also used for an annual leadership award for junior officers within the Ranger Regiment. He was also named the first honorary colonel of the 75th Ranger Regiment in 1996 — a ceremonial post in which he regularly spoke to new Rangers and represented the regiment in public.

Lying in honor

Lying in honor is a memorial service occasionally bestowed by Congress on highly distinguished Americans. It is akin to “lying in state,” though that status is reserved for former Presidents and distinguished politicians, such as former Sen. John McCain.

Puckett was the last living Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean War. The precedent of a final-living Medal of Honor recipient lying in honor was set in 2022 when lawmakers honored the last living World War II Medal of Honor recipient, Cpl. Hershel Woodrow “Woody” Williams, Ernst told Task & Purpose. Other notable figures who have had the honor of lying in honor include Rosa Parks and U.S. Capitol police officers killed during

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taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · April 29, 2024











De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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