Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time or die by suicide?”

– Abraham Lincoln, January 27, 1837 Address delivered before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois

"The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of history.

– George Orwell

"Where they have burned books, they will end in burning human beings."

– Heinrich Heine

1. Acting president likely to resign Thursday to run for president

2. Fast-tracked Lee Jae-myung verdict stirs talk of political timing

3. About 600 N. Korean soldiers killed fighting for Russia against Ukraine

4. Trump Jr. meets with Hanwha executives to discuss business partnerships: sources

5. Acting president, U.S. Navy secretary agree on need to strengthen shipbuilding cooperation

6. N. Korea conducts 1st firing test of new warship's weapons systems

7. N. Korea's military delegation heads to Russia after confirmation of troop dispatch to fight Ukraine

8. North Korea’s reveal of new warship’s weapon system hints at Russian support: expert

9. Signs detected for N. Korea, Russia launching construction of road bridge across Tumen River: Seoul

10. Prosecutors search ex-President Yoon Suk Yeol's home for evidence linked to shaman

11. Digital iron curtain: Inside N. Korea's revamped information technology law

12. Kim Yo Jong's children steal spotlight at N. Korean naval ceremony

13. 100 days in, North Korea appears further than ever from Trump’s priorities

14. N. Korean women's union members privately mock Kim's 'Our State First' ideology

15. Chinese nationals filmed Korean military bases 11 times over past year, NIS reveals

16. Strategic Implications of North Korea’s Expanding Naval Ambitions

17. China spy fears at air bases lead to string of tourist detentions

18. Awake Before the Sound of the Guns – Preparing Advisors for Conflict

1. Acting president likely to resign Thursday to run for president

This appears to be the answer to the question of will he run.

Acting president likely to resign Thursday to run for president | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 30, 2025

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo is likely to resign Thursday before announcing his bid for the June 3 presidential election the following day, according to government and political sources.

Han has been a favorite among conservatives to challenge Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the liberal Democratic Party, in the election triggered by the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

His resignation appears likely on Thursday afternoon, as he has public engagements scheduled for the morning, the sources in government and the former ruling bloc said Wednesday. A formal declaration of his presidential bid is expected to come Friday.

The declaration will reportedly be accompanied by a message to the nation, in which he will lay out his vision to achieve national unity and stop extreme confrontation between rival political camps from holding back the nation's economic and social development.

Possible measures reportedly under consideration are amending the Constitution to shorten the president's five-year term and allow the sharing of power, and forming a Cabinet with members of both sides of the political aisle.

A Han candidacy is certain to trigger merger talks with the conservative People Power Party (PPP), whose presidential candidate will be chosen Saturday.

The two final contenders -- former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon and former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo -- have both expressed an openness to merging candidacies with the acting president.

As a public official, Han faces a May 4 deadline to resign in order to run for election.

Meanwhile, the PPP has been considering various deadlines by which the merger must be finalized in order to maximize its chances in the June 3 election.

To start, May 7 is the deadline by which the National Election Commission must order printed materials for the race. May 11 is the deadline for candidate registration with the commission, while May 25 is the date that ballot printing begins.

Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo presides over a coordination meeting with related ministers to discuss key state affairs at the government complex in Seoul on April 24, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 30, 2025

2. Fast-tracked Lee Jae-myung verdict stirs talk of political timing

Is there any chance they could rule against Lee?

Fast-tracked Lee Jae-myung verdict stirs talk of political timing

koreaherald.com · by Lee Si-jin · April 30, 2025

The Supreme Court of Korea (Im Se-jun/The Korea Herald)

Legal experts say top court seen moving fast to stay above politics, ensure fair election

As the Supreme Court of Korea decided to deliver its verdict on Lee Jae-myung’s election law violation case on Thursday, just nine days after it first reviewed the case on April 22, speculation is growing over the reason for the top court’s earlier-than-expected ruling date.

While many election law violation cases that are appealed to the Supreme Court take more than three months to process, Lee’s case has garnered both public and legal analysts’ attention because the court conducted two hearings in the four days after the case was first taken up by the justices.

The hearings occurring so fast is seen as highly unusual, especially in cases referred to a full bench, which typically meets just once a month.

Though Noh Hee-bum, a former constitutional researcher and lawyer, was surprised by the Supreme Court's decision, in his view, South Korea’s Supreme Court is likely making efforts to ensure a fair election.

“I think the court decided to deliver its verdict early in order to resolve the controversy over candidate eligibility before the presidential election. This will offer people the chance to choose their president based on policies, vision and competence without prejudice and unjust slander from the opposing side,” Noh told The Korea Herald.

According to Noh, the South Korean judiciary has continued to face controversies related to Lee’s case as lower courts “wasted” more time in their rulings than is stipulated in the Public Official Election Act.

While the Public Official Election Act in principle requires the district court and high court to deliver their verdicts on election law violation cases within six months and three months, respectively, the Seoul Central District Court spent more than two years coming to its initial ruling. Then, the Seoul High Court acquitted the liberal presidential front-runner on March 26, four months after the case was assigned to the court.

Explaining that the Public Official Election Act requires the Supreme Court to rule on appeals in election law violation cases within three months of the previous verdict, Noh stressed that the expedited proceedings and ruling should be regarded as a deliberate effort not only to minimize the impact of judicial decisions on the election, but also to show the court’s efforts to issue rulings within the legally recommended time frames.

“If the Supreme Court delivers its verdict after May 11 -- the official deadline for presidential candidate registration -- after spending time reviewing the case, it might be difficult to avoid accusations that the judiciary is politicized or has political intentions,” said Lee Yun-je, a law professor at Myongji University.

“And if Lee Jae-myung wins the upcoming election, he will be protected by presidential immunity. The Supreme Court would have no choice but to suspend proceedings for five years, which would create greater confusion in society,” Lee said.

Article 84 of the Constitution stipulates that a sitting president cannot be charged with a criminal offense, except for insurrection or treason.

There are differing opinions about how to interpret this article, even in the legal community, regarding whether the judiciary needs to proceed with or suspend a case involving a president if it began before he or she was elected. In view of this question, professor Lee said the court found it necessary to rule early.

Lee’s case was initially assigned to a panel of four justices -- a conventional way for the Supreme Court to manage cases it hears on appeal. But Chief Justice Jo Hee-de decided to hear the case in a full court session after considering the high level of public interest and national concern.

A full-court review is one of two procedures by which the court exercises its jurisdiction, convening with at least two-thirds of the justices, with the chief justice presiding.

If the Supreme Court overturns the lower court’s acquittal, the case will be sent back to the lower court for a final and unchallengeable verdict.

Lee could lose both his parliamentary seat and his eligibility to run for public office for a decade. Under Article 19 of the Public Official Election Act, anyone convicted of violating election laws who receives a fine exceeding 1 million won ($700) is barred from running for office for 10 years.

But if the court dismisses the prosecution's appeal, Lee will be cleared of the charges.

The court can also directly deliver a new judgment, including sentencing, based on case records and evidence examined in the first and second trials in the lower courts.

But, legal experts consider it unlikely that a new judgment will be issued by the Supreme Court, citing the rarity of such decisions in criminal cases.

According to Supreme Court data, only 15 cases -- just 0.3 percent of all court rulings in 2023, were resolved by the top court’s issuing a new judgment.

According to the Democratic Party of Korea, Lee has decided not to attend the ruling in person as a defendant's attendance is not mandatory at the top court.

The ruling, which is set to be broadcast live on TV and the Supreme Court's YouTube channel, is due to take place at the Supreme Court in Seocho-gu, southern Seoul, on Thursday at 3 p.m.

The Supreme Court's final verdicts are reached by a majority vote.

sj_lee@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Lee Si-jin · April 30, 2025

3. About 600 N. Korean soldiers killed fighting for Russia against Ukraine

Excerpts:

North Korea has sent about 15,000 troops to Russia and there have been some 4,700 casualties, including about 600 deaths, the NIS told lawmakers, according to Reps. Lee Seong-kweun of the People Power Party and Kim Byung-kee of the Democratic Party.

North Korea has deployed its troops to Russia over two phases, and fighting has decreased since April after Moscow took back most areas of its front-line region of Kursk, the lawmakers quoted the NIS as saying.

The spy agency has yet to detect signs of another troop deployment by North Korea but did not rule out its possibility, they said.

In January, the NIS told lawmakers that at least 300 North Korean soldiers dispatched to Russia had been killed, with some 2,700 others injured.

(LEAD) About 600 N. Korean soldiers killed fighting for Russia against Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 30, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; RECASTS headline, lead para)

By Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Some 600 North Korean soldiers are believed to have been killed fighting for Russia against Ukraine, South Korea's spy agency told lawmakers Wednesday, adding that more than 4,000 North Korean soldiers have been also wounded.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) gave the assessment during a closed-door briefing for the National Assembly's intelligence committee, two days after North Korea confirmed for the first time that Pyongyang has deployed troops to Russia to support Moscow's war against Ukraine.

North Korea has sent about 15,000 troops to Russia and there have been some 4,700 casualties, including about 600 deaths, the NIS told lawmakers, according to Reps. Lee Seong-kweun of the People Power Party and Kim Byung-kee of the Democratic Party.

North Korea has deployed its troops to Russia over two phases, and fighting has decreased since April after Moscow took back most areas of its front-line region of Kursk, the lawmakers quoted the NIS as saying.

The spy agency has yet to detect signs of another troop deployment by North Korea but did not rule out its possibility, they said.

In January, the NIS told lawmakers that at least 300 North Korean soldiers dispatched to Russia had been killed, with some 2,700 others injured.

A wounded North Korean soldier, captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia's western Kursk region, is seen in this file photo posted on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's X account on Jan. 11, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

In return for troop deployment and weapons exports to Russia, the spy agency believes North Korea has received a spy satellite launchpad, drones, electronic warfare equipment and SA-22 surface-to-air missiles.

The two countries are also in talks for industrial modernization in 14 sectors, including aviation, energy and tourism, with about 15,000 North Korean laborers being dispatched to Russia, it said.

The NIS also believes that there is a high possibility that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will not attend Russia's Victory Day ceremony on May 9, citing the lack of signs of security measures if Kim were to take part.

The NIS told lawmakers that Choe Ryong-hae, chairman of the North's parliamentary standing committee, or other officials could instead attend the 80th anniversary ceremony of the Soviet Union's victory over Germany in the Second World War.

It said that efforts for Kim's visit to Russia could be reset as the two countries' relations have reached a new "turning point" after their confirmation of the North's troop deployment to Russia.

This EPA file photo shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin after signing a mutual defense treaty in June 2024 in Pyongyang. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

On Monday, North Korea confirmed for the first time that it has deployed troops to Russia after Russia's top general also made the confirmation in video talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday.

Separately, the NIS said that there have been 11 cases of Chinese nationals filming military and other state-protected facilities in South Korea without authorization since last June.

The Chinese nationals were mostly tourists or students, and they took photos of military bases, airports, ports and NIS facilities.

"(They) claim to be taking photographs to record their travel, but there appears to be plentiful intent to evade local laws by using high-performance cameras and walkie-talkies outside the perimeters of areas enforced with the military installation law," it was quoted as saying.

The NIS said it views the actions as "low-intensity" intelligence activities intended to acquire intelligence on South Korean and U.S. assets and weaken security capabilities by dispersing counterintelligence efforts.

It called for the need to revise espionage laws so that they apply not only to North Koreans but also to nationals from other countries.

This undated file photo, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 30, 2025

4. Trump Jr. meets with Hanwha executives to discuss business partnerships: sources

Will a positive outcome to Trump, Jr.'s visit have any influence over President Trump's decision making regarding Korea? I am sure South Korea is banking on it.

(LEAD) Trump Jr. meets with Hanwha executives to discuss business partnerships: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · April 30, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead to change attribution; UPDATES with more details; RESTRUCTURES; TRIMS)

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Donald Trump Jr., the eldest son of U.S. President Donald Trump, met with Hanwha Group Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan and his two younger brothers heading Hanwha affiliates Wednesday to discuss potential partnerships in the shipbuilding, defense and energy sectors, industry sources said.

Trump Jr. arrived in Seoul late Tuesday ahead of scheduled meetings with approximately 20 business leaders from major South Korean conglomerates the following day.

This two-day visit marks Trump Jr.'s first trip to South Korea since his father took office in January. The trip was arranged at the invitation of Shinsegae Group Chairman Chung Yong-jin.

Donald Trump Jr. steps off his personal plane at Gimpo International Airport in western Seoul on April 29, 2025. He arrived ahead of planned meetings with business leaders from South Korean conglomerates the following day. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Trump Jr. met with the vice chairman of Hanwha Group, Kim Dong-won, chief global officer and president of Hanwha Life Corp., and Kim Dong-seon, vice president and head of future vision at Hanwha Galleria Corp., at a hotel in southern Seoul, an industry source familiar with the matter told Yonhap News Agency.

In addition to Hanwha executives, other Korean business leaders were scheduled to meet with Trump Jr. on Wednesday afternoon.

They reportedly include CJ Group Chairman Lee Jae-hyun, Celltrion Inc. Chairman Seo Jung-jin, Naver Corp. founder Lee Hae-jin and Lotte Corp. Senior Vice President Shin Yoo-yeol.

A CJ spokesperson said, "The chairman will meet with Trump Jr. this afternoon to discuss expanding business partnerships in the U.S. market, where demand for CJ's Bibigo dumplings and other food products is rising."

Lotte's Shin Yoo-yeol was also expected to discuss expansion in the U.S., where the company operates a contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO) plant, a chemical facility and four Lotte hotels, according to a company spokesperson.

For Korean companies that export to the U.S. and seek a reliable communication channel with Washington, these meetings present a rare opportunity to engage directly with someone closely connected to President Trump.

Kim Dong-won (on the phone), chief global officer and president of Hanwha Life Corp., and Kim Dong-seon (2nd from R), vice president and head of future vision at Hanwha Galleria Corp., wait for their coffee order at a Starbucks outlet near Josun Palace hotel in Yeoksam, southern Seoul, on April 30, 2025. The two were seen following their suspected meeting with Donald Trump Jr. to discuss potential business partnerships during his two-day visit to South Korea. (Yonhap)

Industry sources said South Korea's business circles had asked the Shinsegae chairman to help facilitate Trump Jr.'s trip to Seoul well before the U.S. presidential election, held in November.

"South Korean companies had asked Chung to help facilitate Trump Jr.'s visit in hopes of establishing ties with a potential second-term Trump administration," an industry official said.

Executives from the semiconductor, automotive, energy, steel and defense sectors have expressed interest in one-on-one meetings with Trump Jr., the official added.

In December, Trump Jr. invited the Shinsegae chairman to his father's Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, which led to a meeting between Chung and then President-elect Trump.

The Trump administration began imposing "reciprocal tariffs," including 25 percent duties on South Korea, on April 9, only to announce a 90-day pause shortly afterward.

In recent high-profile trade talks, Seoul and Washington agreed to pursue a comprehensive package agreement by July 8, when the 90-day tariff pause is set to expire.

Shinsegae Group Chairman Chung Yong-jin (C) and his wife, Han Ji-hee (R), meet with Donald Trump Jr. in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 18, 2025, in this file photo provided by the group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · April 30, 2025

5. Acting president, U.S. Navy secretary agree on need to strengthen shipbuilding cooperation

A positive sign. Will a JAROKUS shipbuilding consortium be next?

Acting president, U.S. Navy secretary agree on need to strengthen shipbuilding cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 30, 2025

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo and U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan agreed Wednesday on the need to strengthen cooperation in the shipbuilding sector, an industry that has emerged as a key bargaining chip in tariff negotiations between the countries.

Phelan was in South Korea where he is set to visit the headquarters and shipyard of leading shipbuilders HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. and Hanwha Ocean Co.

During their meeting at the government complex in Seoul, Han noted the role of the 70-year-old South Korea-U.S. alliance in bringing peace and stability to the region, according to his office.

He also cast the two countries' ongoing trade talks as an example of South Korea's efforts to maintain and develop the alliance, while singling out the shipbuilding industry as a key area of "win-win" cooperation.

"(Han) said South Korea is the optimal partner to support the U.S. shipbuilding sector's reconstruction, and expressed his hope to strengthen shipbuilding cooperation based on the trust accumulated through our companies' successful maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of U.S. naval vessels," his office said.

Phelan expressed his "deep agreement" on the need to further strengthen shipbuilding cooperation between the two countries, both to improve the U.S. Navy's readiness posture and rebuild the American shipbuilding industry.

He said the allies' MRO cooperation has greatly contributed to enhancing the U.S. Navy's readiness posture and vowed to make every effort to enable active cooperation with South Korean companies in the shipbuilding field, according to Han's office.

Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (R) holds talks with U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan during their meeting at the government complex in Seoul on April 30, 2025, in this photo released by Han's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 30, 2025

6. N. Korea conducts 1st firing test of new warship's weapons systems

I know what the ROK and US Navies are calling this ship: a target.

(LEAD) N. Korea conducts 1st firing test of new warship's weapons systems | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 30, 2025

(ATTN: CHANGES lead; UPDATES with more details throughout; CHANGES photos)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, April 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has conducted its first firing tests of key weapons systems for the country's new destroyer, with leader Kim Jong-un calling for accelerating the navy's nuclear armament to enhance maritime power, state media reported Wednesday.

Under Kim's inspection, North Korea carried out the "combat application test" of weapons systems mounted on its new 5,000-ton destroyer named Choe Hyon on Monday and Tuesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The North held a launching ceremony of the new multipurpose warship Friday, armed with weapons that it said will significantly enhance its naval operations. The destroyer is equipped with supersonic strategic cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and other strike means.

North Korea conducted a test-firing of supersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and 127 millimeter ship-based automatic guns Monday, the KCNA said. A test of firing ship-to-ship tactical guided weapons, the ship's automatic guns, smoke and electronic jamming guns took place the following day.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 30, 2025, shows the North conducting its first firing tests of weapons systems of its new destroyer, named the Choe Hyon, earlier this week. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The North's leader stressed the need to "perfect" the warship's weapons systems for integrated operations in a short span of time.

"It is important to establish a proactive and offensive defensive system on the premise of powerful attack capability," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

"The time has come to make a responsible option for accelerating the nuclear armament of the navy in order to defend the state and maritime sovereignty from the existing and future threat," the North's leader said, setting forth unspecified tasks for accomplishing such a goal.

North Korea has focused on strengthening its naval power in an effort to build a platform capable of delivering nuclear attacks from the sea.

At last week's launching ceremony, Kim called for building more warships of "Choe Hyon class" and larger cruisers, as well as various types of escort ships, next year and also developing "nuclear-powered submarines" in the future.

In March, the North unveiled what appears to be a nuclear-powered submarine under construction, with its leader warning that his country's maritime defense capability will be "fully" projected "in any necessary waters without limitation."

A set of photos, carried by carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 30, 2025, shows the North conducting its first firing tests of weapons systems of its new destroyer, named the Choe Hyon, earlier this week. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 30, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (C) and his daughter, known as Ju-ae, overseeing a test-firing of weapons systems of the country's new destroyer earlier this week (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 30, 2025

7. N. Korea's military delegation heads to Russia after confirmation of troop dispatch to fight Ukraine

So they can carry home bags of cash for Kim Jong Un?

N. Korea's military delegation heads to Russia after confirmation of troop dispatch to fight Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 29, 2025

By Park Boram

SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's military delegation has left for Russia to attend an international event, the North's state media reported Tuesday, a day after Pyongyang confirmed for the first time that it has deployed troops to Russia to fight Ukraine in Kursk.

Led by Pak Young-il, deputy director of the General Political Bureau of the North's Korean People's Army, the delegation departed Pyongyang the previous day to attend an international anti-fascism event in Russia, the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

The KCNA's two-sentence dispatch did not elaborate further, but the trip comes as Russia is set to hold the 80th Victory Day celebrations on May 9.

Speculation has risen over whether North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would travel to Russia around the time of the celebrations, following an invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Pyongyang in June last year.

On Monday, North Korea officially confirmed that it had deployed troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine, while Putin issued a statement thanking Kim for the troop deployment.

Also on Monday, Putin said he would declare a 72-hour ceasefire in Ukraine to mark Victory Day.

This file photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on June 20, 2024, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin after signing a mutual defense treaty the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 29, 2025

8. North Korea’s reveal of new warship’s weapon system hints at Russian support: expert

Russian support? Perhaps the north Korean engineers took the Russian technology and designs and modified them and made them better than what the Russians could do.

An impressive photo of the ship is at the link: https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/04/30/north-korea-new-warship-russian-support/

North Korea’s reveal of new warship’s weapon system hints at Russian support: expert

The North said it conducted tests on weapons systems mounted on its new 5,000-ton destroyer named Choe Hyon.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2025.04.3

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/04/30/north-korea-new-warship-russian-support/

View of what North Korean state media Korea Central News Agency reported was a test-firing of the weapons system of the new “Choe Hyon-class” warship, in this picture released on April 30, 2025.

(KCNA via Reuters)

TAIPEI, Taiwan – North Korea’s recent test launches of key weapon systems aboard its new destroyer – including supersonic strategic cruise missiles – suggest possible assistance from Russia, according to a Seoul-based military expert.

The North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, reported that the country carried out the “combat application test” of weapons systems mounted on Choe Hyon, its new 5,000-ton destroyer.

It conducted a test firing of supersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and 127 millimeter ship-based automatic guns Monday. A test of firing ship-to-ship tactical guided weapons, the ship’s automatic guns, smoke and electronic jamming guns took place the following day.

Dubbing the new warship as North Korea’s “Aegis Combat System,” Yu Yong-weon, a military journalist-turned-lawmaker, said North Korea may have received assistance from Russia.

The supersonic strategic cruise missile unveiled by North Korean state media resembles Russia’s ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile, the Zircon, he said in an analysis published on his website.

The four-faced phased array radar mounted on the Choe Hyon is similar in layout and installation angle to the radar systems deployed on Russia’s Karakurt-class warships. Phased array radars, also found on Aegis destroyers, enable 360-degree surveillance.

Additionally, the integrated air defence system installed on the Choe Hyon – including vertical missile launchers, tracking radar, autocannons, and actuating shafts – bears a striking resemblance to Russia’s Pantsir system, suggesting it may be a replica, according to Yu.

“There is a strong possibility that North Korea received advanced military technology from Russia in exchange for its involvement in the war in Ukraine,” said Yu.

North Korea and Russia have been deepening their military and economic ties in recent months. Pyongyang reportedly supplied Moscow with large quantities of munitions and other military aid for its war in Ukraine.

North Korea on Monday acknowledged for the first time that it sent troops to Russia to support Moscow’s war against Ukraine, six months after reports of their presence first emerged.

In return, Russia has provided technological assistance and expanded cooperation in various sectors, fueling concerns over potential arms transfers and security threats.

Prosecutors search ex-President Yoon Suk Yeol's home for evidence linked to shaman

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250430/south-korean-prosecutors-search-ex-presidents-home-for-evidence-linked-to-shaman

open image gallery

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol and his wife Kim Keon Hee are seen in their vehicle as they leave the official presidential residence in Hannam-dong, Yongsan District, Seoul, April 11, to move to their private residence, following Yoon's ouster. Joint Press CorpsBy Lee Hyo-jin

Published Apr 30, 2025 9:46 am KST
Updated Apr 30, 2025 6:03 pm KST

Probe into graft allegations zeroes in on former presidential couple

Prosecutors searched the Seoul residence of former President Yoon Suk Yeol on Wednesday as part of an ongoing corruption investigation involving a spiritual adviser.

The Seoul Southern District Prosecutors’ Office sent investigators to seize evidence related to suspected lobbying and illicit financial exchanges between the former presidential couple and a shaman named Jeon Seong-bae, better known by his alias "Geonjin."

The disgraced former president and his wife, Kim Keon Hee, face multiple criminal charges, including corruption and election interference, but Wednesday’s operation marked the first time investigators searched their residence.

Jeon, 65, is under investigation on suspicion of receiving illegal political funds from candidates in the 2018 local elections. He was arrested in December 2024 on charges of violating the Political Funds Act, which governs how political parties and politicians can raise, manage and spend money for their activities.

The probe later expanded to include Yoon and Kim following revelations linking them to the case.

Jeon, who was reportedly involved in Yoon's election campaign during the 2022 presidential race, is suspected of exerting influence over personnel appointments and acting as an intermediary using his personal ties with the former first couple.

Prosecutors allege a former high-ranking Unification Church official, identified only by his surname, Yoon, delivered a diamond necklace worth 60 million won ($42,000) and an expensive handbag to Jeon shortly after Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May 2022. The items were reportedly intended as gifts for the former first lady.

Prosecutors are investigating whether the gifts were actually delivered to Kim. Jeon is said to have testified that he lost the necklace.

The investigators also suspect that the Unification Church official attempted to lobby the couple through Jeon in a bid to secure official development assistance (ODA) funding through the government for the church’s business projects in Cambodia.

At an event hosted by the religious group in May 2022, the official said that he had a private meeting with Yoon Suk Yeol, who was president-elect at the time, on March 22 of that year and discussed ODA issues.

In June 2022, the Ministry of Economy and Finance raised the ceiling for Economic Development Cooperation Fund loans to Cambodia from $700 million to $1.5 billion. A higher loan ceiling can simplify the approval process for candidate projects, making it easier for Korean businesses to secure contracts for ODA-related initiatives.

Police officers stand near the apartment complex in Seoul's Seocho District where former President Yoon Suk Yeol resides, as prosecutors search his home, Wednesday.

Yoon Suk Yeol, whom the Constitutional Court impeached on April 4, moved into his private residence in southern Seoul on April 11.

Although the residence is protected by security measures typically extended to former presidents, it is not classified as a facility requiring military or official secrecy under the Criminal Procedure Act, meaning there were no legal grounds to deny a search warrant.

The search lasted approximately six hours and 40 minutes. It also included the office of Kim’s former cultural company, Covana Contents, located near the residence, as well as the home of her aide. Kim’s personal computer and mobile phone were reportedly among the items seized.

Yoon’s lawyer said that the first lady is not a suspect but a witness in the case.

“The first lady is not a suspect. The search was conducted into a witness,” attorney Kim Gye-ri wrote on Facebook, claiming that the warrant "did not specify the date or location, nor did it state what and how it was given or under what pretext."

The liberal Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) criticized the search of Yoon’s residence by prosecutors as a “stunt” and called for a thorough investigation.

Liberal lawmakers have argued that prosecutors have been lenient toward Yoon, a former prosecutor general.

“If the prosecution is truly committed to an investigation, it must leave no sanctuary and thoroughly investigate all allegations,” DPK spokesperson Cho Seung-rae said in a statement.

Lee Hyo-jin

I cover South Korea's foreign policy, defense and security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Before that, I reported on immigration policies and human rights — topics I continue to follow closely. I strive to gain an accurate understanding of the issues I cover and am particularly interested in stories that amplify often overlooked voices. Tips and story ideas via email are always welcome.

11. Digital iron curtain: Inside N. Korea's revamped information technology law

Externally developed technology could also include malware (because of course that is what the north would do if it provided technology to others).

Digital iron curtain: Inside N. Korea's revamped information technology law - Daily NK English

"The law aims to increase self-sufficiency by developing indigenous technology," an expert told Daily NK

By Mun Dong Hui - April 30, 2025

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 30, 2025

A portion of the law obtained by Daily NK.

In a sweeping move to tighten its grip on the digital realm, North Korea has unveiled a dramatically enhanced information control system through its revised Information Technology Law, signaling the regime’s determination to maintain absolute authority over its technological development.

Daily NK has obtained the complete text of North Korea’s Information Technology Law, which was amended in 2022.

The law consists of 5 chapters and 43 articles, covering the fundamentals of information technology regulation, planning, implementation, strengthening material and technical infrastructure, and government oversight of information technology projects.

According to the law, all institutions, enterprises, and organizations must prepare and submit information technology plans for approval by state planning agencies, register with the information technology guidance agency, and provide reports on implementation status.

Additionally, these entities must implement information technology according to standardized specifications and build information infrastructure, systems, and databases in accordance with approved design documents, followed by mandatory operational inspections.

Through these measures, North Korea has established an institutional framework to control all aspects of information technology, from planning and implementation to operations.

Hwang Hyun-wook, a senior researcher at the Daily NK AND Center, explained, “The revised law aims to increase administrative and economic efficiency through information technology, creating a more scientific and convenient environment for implementing national policies and business management. It establishes a legal foundation that emphasizes standardization and strengthens the technical infrastructure for information systems.”

The revised law places particular emphasis on information security and technological self-reliance.

Article 19 stipulates that all information systems must establish security measures according to state standards and undergo mandatory review and registration. Article 24 specifies requirements for responsible management of information resources.

“The law designates information security as an essential element in implementing information technology and mandates security reviews for all systems,” Hwang said. “This can be viewed as an extension of the regime’s security policies.”

Article 27 requires that information technology equipment and software be produced according to state plans, emphasizing the development of “our style of information technology” to increase domestic production in the IT sector.

These regulations appear to be part of North Korea’s strategy to build an independent information technology ecosystem amid international sanctions, highlighting the regime’s prioritization of control over technological openness.

“The law aims to increase self-sufficiency by developing indigenous technology,” Hwang noted. “The key objective is reducing dependence on external technology and building an independent IT foundation.”

Hwang added, “While the law emphasizes investment in IT projects (Article 33) and the creation of an IT fund (Article 34), it’s uncertain whether North Korea can sustain these initiatives given its economic challenges. In the long term, these ambitious IT projects may further burden the North Korean economy.”

The revised law also includes more detailed punishment provisions for violations.

Article 42 outlines various infractions—including failure to meet IT plans, false reporting, unauthorized system operation, and security review omissions—that can result in warnings, unpaid labor for up to three months, labor education, demotion, dismissal, or removal from office.

Article 43 further stipulates that certain violations may result in criminal charges under the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law.

A full version of the law in Korean can be downloaded here.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 30, 2025

12. Kim Yo Jong's children steal spotlight at N. Korean naval ceremony

Hard to believe the most evil women in the world could have any traits of a mother.

Kim Yo Jong's children steal spotlight at N. Korean naval ceremony - Daily NK English

Party officials who were supposed to quietly observe the ceremony tried to glimpse the children, with some remarking they "look bright and intelligent"

By Jeong Seo-yeong - April 30, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 30, 2025

North Korean state media reported April 26 that the launch ceremony for the new 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer "Choi Hyun-ho" was held at Nampo Shipyard on April 25, attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. During the event, Kim's sister, Kim Yo Jong, was spotted accompanying two children believed to be her own. (KCNA screen capture)

North Korean state media reported that the launch ceremony for the new 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer “Choi Hyun-ho” was held at Nampo Shipyard on April 25, attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. During the event, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, was spotted accompanying two children believed to be her own.

The ceremony attracted significant attention as Kim Yo Jong, deputy director of the Workers’ Party, appeared with children presumed to be hers. While Kim Jong Un’s daughter, known as “Ju Ae,” was also present, a soufce reported that the two children with Kim Yo Jong drew more interest.

According to a Daily NK source in South Pyongan province, “The event was a top-priority ceremony attended by the supreme leader, conducted with thorough security measures. The children who appeared to be Kim Yo Jong’s drew explosive interest from attendees.”

The source said participants’ attention initially turned to Ju Ae but quickly shifted to the children accompanying Kim Yo Jong.

When Kim Yo Jong appeared holding the children’s hands, participants began whispering, “Aren’t those children with Kim Yo Jong her own?” Even during the ceremony, people craned their necks to get a better look at the children.

The children were dressed in luxurious yet neat attire with distinct facial features, fair skin and bright, confident expressions that suggested they were children of high-ranking officials.

Despite the somewhat tense atmosphere, the children showed no signs of intimidation as they curiously observed their surroundings.

In contrast, Ju Ae maintained a careful expression while staying close to Kim Jong Un. Since participants were already familiar with Ju Ae through media reports, they showed greater interest in the children with Kim Yo Jong.

Even party officials who were supposed to quietly observe the ceremony tried to glimpse the children, with some remarking they “look bright and intelligent.”

“The attention was so intense that security personnel had to monitor these children simultaneously,” the source said. “Even after the ceremony, some participants seemed eager to follow Kim Yo Jong’s children rather than paying attention to Ju Ae.”

Kim Yo Jong had previously appeared with a boy and girl presumed to be her children at a New Year celebration in January. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service stated they were conducting analysis on whether these children might be Kim Yo Jong’s.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 30, 2025

13. 100 days in, North Korea appears further than ever from Trump’s priorities

A love letter or two is unlikely to move President Trump. He will only tout his relationship with Kim for political purposes. During his first term he "gave it a shot" and Kim Jong Un rejected the offer. The President is unlikely to engage unless he can see some tangible benefit from doing so.

That said, Kim may not be ready to engage unless there is first a tangible concession from the US.

But it does not have to be the "status quo" or the failed denuclearization efforts. There can be a radical new strategy - a shift to a political warfare campaign in support of the Korean people:

–– The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the U.S. must rest on these two traditional efforts:

(1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and;

(2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.

––The radical new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea:

(1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasizing the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights);

(2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change;

3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK).

100 days in, North Korea appears further than ever from Trump’s priorities

With the US president focused on Ukraine and China, experts say he may be increasingly open to status quo with Pyongyang

https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/100-days-in-north-korea-appears-further-than-ever-from-trumps-priorities/?t=1746013907

Jooheon Kim | Shreyas Reddy April 30, 2025

Donald Trump with U.S. and DPRK flags in the background | Images: Gage Skidmore via Flickr (July 26, 2021) (CC BY-SA 2.0) and Dan Scavino Jr. (June 12, 2018), edited by NK News

The first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second stint in the White House has been defined by frenzied activity aimed at overhauling U.S. policies at home and abroad, but one of the biggest areas of focus from his first term has been conspicuously absent — North Korea.

In the early months of his presidency, Trump has sought to leave his stamp on how the U.S. does things with 144 executive orders — more than any other U.S. president in the same time period — as well as a host of other actions.

On the foreign policy front, much of Trump’s focus so far has been on countering China’s influence as well as resolving high-profile security challenges such as the Russia-Ukraine war and conflict in the Middle East, relegating other threats like the DPRK to allies.

At the same time, the outspoken president has taken an often confrontational approach to both friends and foes, threatening to disrupt Washington’s existing initiatives for international coordination against security risks.

But for the most part, Trump appears to be playing the waiting game when it comes to North Korea, a far cry from his first term, when Pyongyang’s nuclear development represented his “most urgent problem” from the outset.

As the Trump administration crosses the 100-day milestone, NK News takes a look at his North Korea-related agenda so far, as well as what lies ahead.

DEPRIORITIZING THE DPRK

Since day one, Trump has given glimpses of his willingness to buck the trend when it comes to North Korea, albeit infrequently as the country has slipped down Washington’s priority list.

Hours after his inauguration on Jan. 20, Trump raised eyebrows by calling the DPRK a “nuclear power,” a descriptor he previously used before November’s presidential election, and expressed an interest in North Korea’s economic potential.

The White House clarified a week later that Trump would continue the U.S. push for North Korea’s denuclearization, and the president and various senior officials subsequently reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to this objective.

Nonetheless, Trump’s occasional remarks to the contrary — as well as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s characterization of the DPRK as a “nuclear state” — highlight an implicit shift in Washington’s upper echelons regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear status.

Perhaps the biggest point of interest was whether the president would reach out to Kim Jong Un to restart their much-touted friendship, despite North Korea’s firm opposition to any engagement after announcing its “most hardline” anti-U.S. policy weeks before Trump’s inauguration.

In his first week in office, Trump confirmed his intent to engage with Kim, a desire he emphasized again earlier this month while stressing his “very good relationship” with the North Korean leader.

Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump shaking hands ahead of the first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore | Image: Dan Scavino Jr. (June 12, 2018)

However, the DPRK has largely fallen off Trump’s radar due to his focus on other global challenges, in contrast to its prime position on his agenda during a period of intensified nuclear and missile tests at the start of his first term.

With several China-focused officials in the current administration, a leaked Pentagon memo highlighted a new defense strategy prioritizing Beijing and leaving allies like South Korea and Japan to deal with other threats such as the DPRK.

Amid its focus on China, Russia and Iran, Washington has not imposed any sanctions on North Korea since Trump was elected, with its only related action being the lifting of a prior cyber designation following a court order.

Meanwhile, Trump’s extensive funding cuts have hit long-running U.S. initiatives aimed at improving North Koreans’ human rights hard, particularly efforts to shut down support for rights groups and radio services broadcasting information into the isolated state.

However, the U.S. military is still continuing its ongoing cooperation with ROK and Japanese forces against North Korean threats, despite Trump’s frequent threats to pull out troops from allied nations and his suspension of joint drills during his first term.

Overall, the Trump administration’s limited DPRK-related activity so far shows a general disinterest relative to other economic and security priorities like the Middle East, where he has failed to make much headway, according to Min Tae-eun, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

“It’s obvious that North Korea is a low priority issue for the U.S. these days,” she told NK News. “Trump’s North Korea stance is mostly about maintaining the status quo.”

AREAS OF FOCUS

While North Korea largely appears to be off Washington’s priority list for now, Trump’s enduring focus on renewing his personal relationship with Kim could offer glimpses of his policy direction.

“He’s certainly put it out there that he was anxious to meet with Kim Jong Un,” Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, told NK News.

The expert said nuclear issues would be at the top of Trump’s agenda for talks, but for the moment, Kim doesn’t appear keen to reciprocate, particularly given the “embarrassing” collapse of 2019’s Hanoi summit.

Trump’s repeated descriptions of the DPRK as a nuclear power may have been aimed at enticing Pyongyang into returning to negotiations, according to Bennett, but this has not been enough to tempt Kim.

“Kim’s position has been that he won’t have a meeting with Trump, hoping that Trump will offer him lots of concessions so that he can declare victory before there’s even a meeting,” he said.

Despite the president’s occasional pivot back to the goal of complete denuclearization, Bennett noted that Trump would be aware North Korea would reject such statements.

“We have to recognize that a huge package deal like … comprehensive denuclearization just isn’t likely to happen,” he explained. “Kim doesn’t have many successes other than his nuclear and missile programs, and that makes his regime a bit shaky.”

Kim Jong Un inspects mass-produced Hwasan-31 nuclear-capable warheads | Image: KCNA (March 28, 2023)

But any moves away from Washington’s existing policies appear unrealistic, according to Edward Howell, a lecturer in politics at Oxford University.

“The Trump administration’s actual North Korea policy remains uncertain, but is likely to continue prioritizing denuclearization over arms control, for all Trump’s claims of North Korea as a ‘nuclear power,’” he told NK News.

For now, talk of both denuclearization and arms control remain moot unless there’s a drastic shift in perception, according to Min.

“Unless they see North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a real, tangible threat — not just in rhetoric — they won’t prioritize it,” she said. “The U.S. prefers to just keep things stable for now.”

Following Russia and North Korea’s admission of military cooperation in the Ukraine war, the U.S. may still have to focus on Pyongyang in connection to other global issues, but Min believes Washington does not view the combined challenge as a direct threat to national security.

Howell warned that any Trump administration moves that leave South Korea and Japan to fend for themselves will create challenges for North Korea deterrence.

“Trump’s transactional approach toward alliances, particularly in East Asia, will likely be exploited by North Korea in order to create fissures in the U.S.’s bilateral alliance system in the region,” he said.

Howell added that the administration’s possible plans to redeploy U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) personnel to focus on other regional threats like China would also impact deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.

But Bennett noted that Trump’s redeployment threats are distant concerns for now, explaining that he has yet to make specific compensation demands of Seoul like he did in his first term.

To better reflect Washington’s current priorities, the expert said it appears inevitable that USFK will have to expand its purview to cover threats from both China and North Korea, even if it is currently ill-equipped for such a broad focus.

“They’re not really in a position where they can fully focus on China because there still is a North Korean nuclear threat and other threats that are serious,” he said. “But you also have to recognize if you’re trying to deal with China, it is really hard to find a better place to base forces than South Korea.”

WHAT COMES NEXT

Experts told NK News that they don’t see the Trump administration rolling out a new North Korea policy anytime soon.

Bennett stated that the U.S. will likely wait until South Korea elects a new president in June before he turns his focus to the Korean Peninsula.

“I think we will see a situation develop where Trump’s going to conclude likely that he’s not getting a resolution of the war in Ukraine, and he’s going to be looking for a success somewhere,” he said. “[North] Korea is a possible focus of that.”

To bring Kim back to the negotiating table, Bennett says Trump will have to rely more on “sticks” than “carrots.”

One possible step could involve a direct ultimatum: for example, threatening to deploy U.S. nuclear-capable assets and nuclear weapons to modernized facilities in the ROK if North Korea doesn’t shut down its recently revealed uranium enrichment facilities.

Kim Jong Un walks past rows of centrifuges at a uranium enrichment site. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 13, 2024)

However, Howell cautioned that Kim does not appear keen to repeat the mistakes of Hanoi when he can turn to other partners.

“North Korea’s renewed partnership with Russia has made clear how in the short-term, Pyongyang seems content to get what it wants and needs from Moscow: It does not need Washington,” he said.

If the “chaos” around U.S. tariffs and the Ukraine war subsides, Min suggested Washington may revive its interest in the DPRK.

But she said Seoul may have to step up and convince Trump to prioritize this issue.

“From the U.S. perspective, I think maintaining the status quo is the most advantageous North Korea policy right now,” she said. “If those talks go poorly or stir up tensions, they could even backfire and turn North Korea into an even more unpredictable factor.”

Edited by Bryan Betts

14. N. Korean women's union members privately mock Kim's 'Our State First' ideology

Is Kim trying to imitate America First? Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Maybe Kim will ask for a meeting so they can compare notes.

But on a serious note, the more ideological training we see the more likely it is because Kim is feeling the internal stress.

And reports like these indicate a growing resistance potential inside north Korea.

N. Korean women's union members privately mock Kim's 'Our State First' ideology - Daily NK English

At one lecture in South Pyongan province, study materials demanded loyalty to all three Kim leaders to advance the ideology

By Seon Hwa - April 30, 2025

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · April 30, 2025

A meeting of women's union members was held in April 2024, as reported by state-run media. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea’s prominent women’s organization, the Socialist Women’s Union, recently organized a political ideology study session focused on Kim Jong Un’s “Our State First” doctrine, aiming to strengthen internal unity. However, many members responded with cynicism.

According to a Daily NK source in South Pyongan province recently, the women’s union branch in Sunchon conducted a study session on “Our State First” ideology at various neighborhood branches on April 18 as part of their monthly political education activities.

The session, which lasted over an hour, covered four main topics:

The essence of the “Our State First” ideology
Its ideological and spiritual foundation
Tasks required to advance the ideology
Methods for promoting it

During the session, instructors explained that the essence of “Our State First” is to take pride in the socialist homeland that embodies the dignity of the people. They emphasized that the ideology is based on Juche thought and “Kim Jong Il Patriotism.”

The study materials noted that to advance this ideology, members must uphold and inherit Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s state-building philosophy while loyally supporting Kim Jong Un’s leadership to develop the economy, science, technology, and culture.

The session also stressed that to properly implement “Our State First,” citizens must actively maintain “national characteristics” such as high independence and patriotism while creating new national customs befitting a powerful nation.

Most women’s union members who attended expressed dissatisfaction afterward, comparing themselves unfavorably to youth league members and indicating weariness with the ideological content. Others expressed frustration that these abstract ideological sessions continue while their real-life problems remain unaddressed.

After the session, members criticized the ideology privately, questioning whether they should feel gratitude merely for day-to-day survival or pride in their current living conditions.

The source added that many North Koreans are already aware of conditions in the outside world, making the state’s claims of superiority ring hollow. While people may not express these sentiments openly, internal cynicism is reportedly spreading.

Despite the North Korean authorities continuing to promote Kim Jong Un’s governing ideologies like “Our State First” and “People-First Politics” through party-affiliated organizations, critics note that these efforts may actually be increasing public resentment rather than building support.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · April 30, 2025

15. Chinese nationals filmed Korean military bases 11 times over past year, NIS reveals

Who has the better espionage network in the ROK: China or north Korea? I daresay it is China with its some 1 million citizens living and working in the South.

Chinese nationals filmed Korean military bases 11 times over past year, NIS reveals

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/04/30/BSQ6UTF23VE6DOYORNMTJAYLQQ/

By Park Sang-ki,

Kim Seo-young

Published 2025.04.30. 18:03

In December last year, three Chinese students were charged with espionage for illegally filming the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt near the Busan Naval Operations Command using a drone. /Kim Dong-hwan

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) revealed on April 30 that there have been 11 cases of Chinese nationals taking unauthorized photographs of military bases and intelligence facilities in South Korea since June of last year.

The spy agency shared this information during a closed-door briefing with the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, according to People Power Party lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun and Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Byung-kee.

People Power Party lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun (left) and Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Byung-kee speak to reporters after a closed-door Intelligence Committee briefing at the National Assembly in Seoul on April 30. /News1

The NIS said that the incidents began in June last year, when a drone was used to film an aircraft carrier docked at the Busan Naval Operations Command. Since then, there have been 10 additional unauthorized photography cases, primarily targeting key military facilities, airports, ports, and even NIS buildings.

The intelligence agency noted that most of the individuals involved were temporary visitors to Korea, such as tourists or international students, including several minors. “While they claimed the photographs were for travel documentation, their use of high-performance cameras and radio devices from areas just outside military protection zones suggests they were trying to avoid South Korean laws,” it added.

The NIS assessed the incidents as a form of low-intensity intelligence gathering, aimed at collecting data on South Korea-U.S. strategic assets. It also warned that such activities may be designed to strain South Korea’s counterintelligence resources and undermine national security vigilance.

In response, the NIS said it is developing response protocols and facilitating intelligence-sharing among relevant agencies. It is also consulting experts to address legislative gaps, including those in the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act.

The NIS also raised the need to revise spy laws. Lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun said the agency stressed the importance of amending the espionage provision under the Criminal Act to address not only North Korean threats but also attempts by other countries to leak, detect, or obtain state secrets related to South Korea’s industrial, economic, or military security.

16. Strategic Implications of North Korea’s Expanding Naval Ambitions

Excerpts:

Ultimately, the deployment of advanced platforms like the Choe Hyon-class destroyer reflects not merely a technical upgrade, but a profound recalibration of North Korea's strategic ambitions. Pyongyang is no longer content to deter adversaries solely through the threat of land-based nuclear retaliation; it seeks to establish itself as a maritime power capable of projecting coercive influence across the Indo-Pacific. If left unaddressed, North Korea's evolving naval capabilities could significantly erode regional stability and embolden Pyongyang's broader strategic calculus. A coordinated, multidimensional response from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other regional stakeholders—encompassing deterrence, defense, diplomacy, and sustained pressure on North Korea's illicit networks—is urgently required to mitigate these emerging threats and preserve a credible deterrence posture.

Strategic Implications of North Korea’s Expanding Naval Ambitions

By Jihoon Yu

April 30, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/04/30/strategic_implications_of_north_koreas_expanding_naval_ambitions_1107120.html?mc_cid=8ae837617b

North Korea's recent unveiling of the Choe Hyon-class multipurpose destroyer signals a major transformation in its naval strategy, carrying profound and complex implications for regional and global security. The construction of this 5,000-ton warship marks a deliberate departure from Pyongyang's traditional coastal defense doctrine, historically centered around small, fast attack craft optimized for littoral engagements. Instead, the new platform reflects an ambition to project power across broader maritime domains, signaling a strategic evolution towards an expeditionary, blue-water navy.

The enhanced operational radius provided by the Choe Hyon-class destroyer enables North Korea to extend its naval presence well beyond the Korean Peninsula, threatening key maritime routes and complicating the operational calculus of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. If this platform eventually secures the ability to launch nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles, it would represent a transformative leap in Pyongyang's deterrence posture. Equipped with vertical launch system (VLS), the destroyer could then field a diverse arsenal capable of targeting both land and sea-based assets across considerable distances, significantly elevating the strategic risks in the region.

If North Korea's ongoing efforts to enhance its nuclear capabilities eventually lead to the deployment of nuclear warheads on this platform, the strategic landscape would be further destabilized. Sea-based nuclear platforms would introduce a new layer of strategic complexity. Unlike land-based missile systems, which are more readily tracked and targeted, mobile maritime platforms are inherently more elusive, complicating preemptive strike options and missile defense architectures. This mobility would grant North Korea a potent second-strike capability, eroding confidence in the stability of existing deterrence frameworks. As a result, adversaries may face greater difficulty in distinguishing between conventional and nuclear threats during a crisis, increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation.

The strategic implications would become even more acute if North Korea succeeds in complementing this surface capability with the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) capable of launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Should Pyongyang succeed in fielding a credible SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) fleet, it would possess a survivable nuclear deterrent, fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. Reports suggest that North Korea's SSN program has received clandestine assistance, possibly from Russia, accelerating its timeline and technological sophistication.

The unveiling of the Choe Hyon-class destroyer must also be seen within the broader context of North Korea's doctrinal shift toward proactive military operations. Moving away from a historically reactive defense posture, Pyongyang appears increasingly willing to embrace preemptive, offensive maritime strategies aimed at undermining U.S. and allied freedom of navigation in the region. This trajectory raises the possibility of North Korea seeking to impose a regional anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, leveraging both land- and sea-based assets to constrain allied operational flexibility in a crisis.

Such developments risk fueling a maritime arms race in Northeast Asia, prompting South Korea, Japan, and the United States to accelerate investments in naval modernization, undersea warfare capabilities, and integrated missile defenses. Yet simply matching North Korea platform-for-platform would be insufficient. Addressing the broader strategic challenge requires a comprehensive approach that enhances maritime domain awareness, strengthens alliance interoperability, and builds layered missile defenses capable of countering both conventional and nuclear threats. Enhanced investment in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, the deployment of more resilient undersea surveillance systems, the expansion of joint maritime exercises, and the establishment of rapid-reaction maritime forces will also be critical to preempt and deter potential provocations. In particular, South Korea should seriously consider pursuing its own nuclear-powered submarine program to enhance its underwater operational endurance and strategic deterrence, thereby reinforcing its ability to respond flexibly to the evolving undersea threat environment.

Ultimately, the deployment of advanced platforms like the Choe Hyon-class destroyer reflects not merely a technical upgrade, but a profound recalibration of North Korea's strategic ambitions. Pyongyang is no longer content to deter adversaries solely through the threat of land-based nuclear retaliation; it seeks to establish itself as a maritime power capable of projecting coercive influence across the Indo-Pacific. If left unaddressed, North Korea's evolving naval capabilities could significantly erode regional stability and embolden Pyongyang's broader strategic calculus. A coordinated, multidimensional response from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other regional stakeholders—encompassing deterrence, defense, diplomacy, and sustained pressure on North Korea's illicit networks—is urgently required to mitigate these emerging threats and preserve a credible deterrence posture.

Jihoon Yu is a research fellow and the director of external cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Jihoon was the member of Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project. He is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, and maritime strategy. He earned his MA in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University.

17. China spy fears at air bases lead to string of tourist detentions

A thousand grains of sand.

China spy fears at air bases lead to string of tourist detentions

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · April 29, 2025

A string of detentions of Chinese nationals caught taking unauthorized photos or filming near military bases has raised concerns over Beijing-linked spying in South Korea.

Newsweek has reached out to the Chinese embassy in South Korea with an emailed request for comment.

Why It Matters

The incidents, some of which took place near installations housing U.S. air and naval forces, recall suspected espionage cases in the Philippines and Japan, which, like South Korea, are key American security partners.

Tensions are running high as China steps up its challenge to U.S. military power across the Asia-Pacific, including efforts to assert territorial claims in the South and East China seas and around Taiwan.

What To Know

Acting on a tip from U.S. military personnel, South Korean authorities detained two Chinese nationals on April 23 for using high-end cameras to photograph planes, on suspicion of violating Seoul's Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act, according to local reports.

Police confirmed the pair had been briefly detained and warned just two days earlier for the same activity near the same facility—Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek.

The base is the center of U.S. Air Force operations in the country and home to the 51st Fighter Wing, which operates a variety of aircraft, including F-16s and A-10 Thunderbolt II "Warthog" attack planes.

An F-16 Fighting Falcon is marshaled into its spot by two 13th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron ground crew members February 23, 2025, at Suwon Air Base. An F-16 Fighting Falcon is marshaled into its spot by two 13th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron ground crew members February 23, 2025, at Suwon Air Base. U.S. Air Force

The two men were released after a review determined the photos, which were taken from public streets, did not constitute a national security threat. South Korean law does not consider photographing planes from nonrestricted areas to be a legal offense.

The incident follows a similar case involving two Chinese teenagers who were arrested for violating the same law after authorities discovered they had taken thousands of photos at Osan Air Base and several other major bases and international airports.

The students, who had arrived just three days prior on tourist visas, told authorities that plane photography was a hobby.

One of them also said his father works for China's public security bureau, raising questions about whether the students had been tasked with collecting intelligence on their government's behalf.

Under current South Korean law, a suspect can be prosecuted for espionage only if found to have acted on behalf of an "enemy state," meaning North Korea. Violators of the Military Bases and Installations Protection Act face up to three years of jail time or a maximum fine of 30 million won ($21,000).

What People Are Saying

An investigating South Korean official previously told the Chosun Daily: "Given that they began photographing strategic assets and key installations almost immediately after entering the country, their actions appear premeditated."

What Happens Next

The investigation into the Chinese tourists is ongoing.

One official told the Chosun Daily there are likely more such cases that have yet to be uncovered.

About the writer

Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan. You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · April 29, 2025

18. Awake Before the Sound of the Guns – Preparing Advisors for Conflict

There is always the option of returning to the KMAG concept in Korea versus maintaining USFK.

Awake Before the Sound of the Guns

Preparing Advisors for Conflict

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2025/Preparing-Advisors/

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army

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Maj. Harry W. Hoffman, weapons advisor for the Infantry School assigned to the Korean Military Advisory Group, watches a South Korean soldier on 9 February 1952 during target practice on a known distance rifle range in the Republic of Korea. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army via the All Hands Collection at the Naval History and Heritage Command)

On 25 June 1950, Capt. Joseph R Darrigo awakened to artillery fire in Kaesong. He was the lone American from the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) on the 38th parallel as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) initiated its assault on the Republic of Korea (ROK).1 With an armored spearhead of Soviet-provided T-34 tanks, the DPRK achieved complete surprise against the ROK Army that was not deployed for battle.2 It was the rainy season; an attack was unexpected. A third of Darrigo’s partners and most other advisors were on leave. As he hurried to assist his partners in the 12th Infantry Regiment to mount a hasty defense, he probably wished for more time: more time to organize a defense, more time for his partners and fellow advisors to mobilize for the fight, more time to advise the ROK Army, and more time to prepare them to fight an enemy ready for large-scale combat operations.

“Perhaps the most important limitation imposed upon KMAG was that of time itself,” concluded Robert Sawyer, a veteran of KMAG and author of the Army’s historical study on it.3 With more time, they might have produced an army that could have withstood the DPRK’s onslaught or even deterred them entirely. Instead, KMAG was not prepared to fight. They did not even know if they should fight or withdraw to Japan.4

KMAG was not prepared for war. In war, and preparing for war, time is the ultimate commodity. As the U.S. Army employs advisors worldwide to deter conflict and, if necessary, prevail with our partners in combat, we must ensure that we are effectively using the time that we have. We must learn from KMAG how to employ advisors for war.

It is easy to be myopic about the role of advisors, to think advisors just advise. After all, it is in the name. Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade, defines advising as “providing guidance, coaching, and counseling to a foreign counterpart to make their operations or activities more successful.”5 However, providing guidance becomes a lesser task in large-scale combat operations, particularly when paired with a peer partner force. The partner forces we would likely fight alongside in a conflict with Russia or China are highly competent with time-tested systems. There is little time for coaching them to develop new systems as T-72 tanks approach.

In conflict, advisors’ true value comes from their ability to assess, liaise, and support. With these tasks, advisors coordinate between U.S. and partner forces to smooth over the frictions in coalition operations and achieve battlefield effectiveness. Advisors need to invest in the critical resource of time to effectively assess, liaise, and support. They need to deliberately prepare for these roles with their designated partner force.

However, advisors face a problem in preparing for conflict. Too often, they are seen primarily as a force for competition below armed conflict. In competition, advising predominates over other advisor tasks. Advisors become focused on building partner capacity, creating rapport, and hopefully influencing them to stay in the United States’ orbit. Although those are worthy goals, we need to prioritize our limited number of advisors. Considering our poor record of using advisors to build capabilities and influence partners in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Niger, Mali, Chad, and elsewhere, we should recognize that advisors are not the optimal tool to politically influence a country to either reform or align with the United States.6

Advisors are often not preparing for conflict when they are employed as a competition force. In Europe, for example, the United States could deploy advisors to Albania to help advise them on capability development, but they would be useless if Russia attacked the Baltic. Advisors cannot suddenly arrive to a conflict and expect to provide value. They will just be a burden on the partner force. They need to have already invested time with the partners they will fight with so that they are not caught even more flatfooted than KMAG. Although KMAG was surprised, at least it was in the right country and already had invested time into its relationship with the ROK Army.

Assessment

To be effective, advisors need to have time with their partner force to have a deep understanding of them. T. E. Lawrence had spent years as an academic studying the Middle East, but he still was an outsider to the specific context of the revolt in the Hejaz. Even though he was supposed to be an expert, he recognized his limited understanding, explaining that “under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”7

Those “odd conditions” are not just surface-level, outward displays of culture. Advisors need a deeper understanding. Advisors need to know their partner’s strategic culture, theory of victory, economics, demography, and geography. They need to understand the military’s personnel system, doctrine, and military-industrial base. They need to understand the logic of why a partner operates. This all takes time.

Staff Sgt. Jacob DeMoss (left), Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises soldiers from Bulgaria’s 1st Mechanized Battalion, 61st Mechanized Brigade, during training on urban operations in Marino Pole, Bulgaria. (Photo by Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army)

Frequently, the United States undervalues the time it takes for such understanding. It has been overconfident in the universality of its expertise and approach to war. As an example of the U.S. Army’s historic lack of focus on understanding, it has put minimal investment in language training. In KMAG, hardly any advisors learned Korean. In a survey of 255 advisors in 1953, no respondent reported using Korean to communicate with their partner.8 These trends repeated in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Today’s advisors in security force assistance brigades (SFAB) do not undergo any language training. When working through interpreters or relying on partner forces that speak English, advisors miss nuance and cannot identify when issues are concealed.

Advisors are too valuable of an assessment tool to be missing such nuance. Advisors are the lone Americans with a hand on the pulse of a partner force. Without the ground-level understanding provided by advisors, senior decision-makers act in a void. In the latter years of the war in Afghanistan, without advisors at the local level, policymakers were ignorant of the Afghan army’s will to fight. In Korea, by 1953, the U.S. Army recognized the importance of information provided by KMAG. KMAG advisors were tasked with a dual mission “to advise” and “to function as an information gathering and reporting agency.”9

Whether due to lack of time, language, or understanding, at the war’s onset, KMAG did not provide accurate reports. Its commander, Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, claimed that “the South Koreans have the best damn army outside the United States!”10 With advisors sending such assessments, Time reported on 5 June 1950, “Most observers now rate the 100,000-man South Korean army as the best of its size in Asia ... And no one now believes that the Russian-trained North Korean army could pull off a quick, successful invasion of the South without heavy reinforcements.”11 Twenty days later, that same North Korean army smashed through the ROK Army.

Such wrong assessments were made even though the ROK Army had no tanks, medium artillery, heavy mortars, antitank weapons, and combat aircraft, and it lacked spare parts with 35 percent of its vehicles unserviceable.12 KMAG had emphasized developing internal security forces for Korea to defeat communist guerrillas.13 Even though the ROK government was concerned about an invasion from the North and pushed to develop a force to deter a conventional invasion, the United States did not support providing heavy equipment to Korea.14 KMAG influenced this decision by reporting that the Korean terrain did not lend itself to efficient tank operations.15

KMAG had not accurately assessed the threat. They had not prepared the Koreans to deal with enemy armor and “had talked endlessly about the insignificance and vulnerability of Soviet tanks.”16 Therefore, the Koreans did not have the tools to deal with armor. There was not a single antitank mine in Korea that could have blocked mountain roads.17 In a crucial opening penetration at Uijongbu, forty tanks filed through the narrow valley. A regretful U.S. military advisor recalled, “If one antitank crew had been able to pick off the lead and rear tanks, the thirty-eight others would have been sitting ducks.”18 But advisors had not assessed that they needed that capability.

The tanks foiled repeated attempts by ROK commanders to reestablish a defense. KMAG had advised their Korean counterparts on a defense plan, but it was “hasty, ill-advised, and impossible.”19 They did not base the plan on an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the newly created ROK commanders and staffs.

For a more contemporary example of shortfalls in assessments, I observed American-led training for a Ukrainian brigade that was not grounded in an accurate assessment of the brigade’s capabilities or the Russian threat. Although the training was on the military decision-making process (MDMP), the trainers did not understand the Ukrainian planning process or the staff members familiarity with MDMP. The trainers did not know how the brigade would be employed, so they reverted to a standard program of instruction for an American brigade. Even though the Ukrainian brigade would soon be thrown into the defense, its staff trained on attacking against a single enemy battalion with a three-to-one superiority in all warfighting functions. In the scenario, the Ukrainians had to breach a single two-hundred-meter minefield. The scenario was not grounded in the reality of Russian capabilities, force densities, or defenses in depth. If advisors had time to assess the brigade, they could have optimized the brigade’s training to properly prepare it to fight the Russians.

Advisors need to have accurate assessments from the tactical to strategic level. KMAG had been wrong in their assessment of the strategic situation, but ROK had been right in their appreciation of the threat from the North. The partner force’s strategic assessments will often differ. They will also have different political objectives. Advisors must understand the potential friction that can come from these differences.

At National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 24-03, I experienced a realistic scenario of friction from differing political objectives. I was partnered with a division from the fictional country of Pirtuni in a scenario that simulated a Russian invasion of Poland. Like the Polish in 1939, our partner wanted to defend forward near their borders to prevent a fait accompli. They did not want the enemy occupying their land and then digging in, as Russia has done in Ukraine. However, 1st Armored Division (1AD), the U.S. Army unit fighting alongside the Pirtunians, had expected them to withdraw toward 1AD to allow 1AD to destroy the enemy. Without advisors understanding this friction, 1AD would not have been in a position to affect the battle.

By investing time into assessing a partner, advisors will understand how a partner will fight based on political objectives, the enemy, the terrain, and preexisting war plans. For example, in Europe, advisors must understand how partner forces fit into NATO’s operational plans. They need to know specifically what that partner force will need to be asked to do and how ready it will be to fight so that they do not end up like the ROK Army unprepared to face T-34s.

Support

While KMAG might have assessed the threat wrong, the advisors played a crucial role in supporting the beleaguered ROK Army with air support. A month into the war, the U.S. Air Force conducted seven thousand close support and interdiction airstrikes that slowed the North Korean rate of advance to two miles a day. This support provided critical time to form the Pusan perimeter and prevent a total DPRK victory. Gen. Matthew Ridgeway said that except for air power, “the war would have been over in 60 days with all Korea in Communist hands.”20

In conflict, the access that advisors have to U.S. intelligence, joint fires, and logistics can make a decisive impact on the success of a partner force. In our recent counterinsurgency campaigns, advisors have sometimes had to withhold aid to force partners to build their own capabilities; in a desperate struggle of large-scale combat, winning the immediate fight takes priority over capability building. The moral hazard of doing for a partner what they need to do for themself becomes trivial.

Advisors from Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade, assess Bulgaria’s 3rd Mechanized Battalion, 61st Mechanized Brigade’s rehearsals for an urban operation in Marino Pole, Bulgaria. (Photo by Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army)

During the retreat toward Pusan, KMAG advisors often dropped their advisory roles and became operational. They were integrated members of ROK staffs, not simply offering advice but assisting in planning and bringing in U.S. assets.21

To support a partner force, advisors need to understand what is available and how to employ it. They need to have invested time to develop connections across organizations to understand what they can call upon and who to influence to get that support. Sawyer reports that KMAG advisors had to “beg, borrow, and steal” from U.S. Eighth Army units to receive support.22 With the way contemporary U.S. divisions and corps align assets in targeting cycles, it can be difficult for advisors to get support without fully understanding those units’ processes. During the NTC rotation, when the enemy was breaking through the Pirtuni defense, we had reached a trigger to request 1AD to seal the point of penetration with a scatterable minefield. It took over three hours for the request to be approved, far too slow to have an impact on the battle. If we had more time to establish a common understanding of release criteria and processes for the U.S. division to support the Pirtunis, we could have support that was responsive enough to matter.

In addition to supporting partners, advisors need to invest time into understanding how to support themselves. In Afghanistan and Iraq, advisors could easily rely on U.S. logistics networks. They will not have that luxury in a future war. While in Korea, operating isolated from American units, KMAG advisors ate Korean food and borrowed clothing, gasoline, and tentage from the ROK.23 Advisors will need to understand what partners can realistically provide and what acquisition and cross-servicing agreements are established to formalize such support. By understanding what partner forces can support, advisors will be able to tailor their equipment to endure a conflict even if it means using civilian vehicles and local purchases. Advisors need to ensure that they are a minimal burden on their partner forces.

Liaison

Advisors, through their liaison role, provide support to partner forces, share assessments, and achieve shared understanding across U.S. and partner forces. According to Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1, “Liaison is the contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces and other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.”24 To liaise, advisors need to understand the optimal placement of personnel and equipment to allow for effective communication. Providing an effective communication architecture between a partner and U.S. forces is a vital function of advisors.

On 28 June 1950, in the chaos of the retreat from Seoul, while three divisions and the KMAG headquarters were still north of the Han River, ROK Army engineers prematurely blew up the bridges across the river. KMAG had to ford the river. Abandoning their equipment in the chaotic withdrawal, the one vehicle that Col. Sterling Wright, KMAG chief of staff, was determined to save was his radio truck. They were able to procure a raft for the truck. The truck allowed KMAG to maintain communications with its scattered advisors and with U.S. forces in Japan. Critically, just after crossing the river, the truck allowed KMAG to coordinate with the U.S. Air Force as their first sortie roared overhead to strafe the pursuing DPRK forces.25

In Suwon, twenty miles south of the Han River, Brig. Gen. John H. Church, the new KMAG commander, set up his headquarters. He flew in from Japan with orders from Gen. Douglas MacArthur to serve as his liaison with ROK Army.26 Church suggested that the ROK chief of staff Gen. Chae Byong-duk move his headquarters into the same building. The combined headquarters established a common operational picture between ROK and U.S. forces and coordinated a coherent defense.27

Under their previous commander, Roberts, KMAG advisors had become accustomed to sharing workspace with their counterparts. KMAG did not have a separate headquarters building before the war.28 He believed that without such intimacy, advisors would not be effective. Unfortunately, during recent wars, often for security considerations, U.S. units became habituated to barriers with partners. These barriers inhibit shared understanding through both a lack of physical presence and the psychological walls of suspicion. Advisors, particularly when dispersed in small teams or as individuals, as KMAG often operated, need to be comfortable working in partner headquarters. Advisors cannot expect to show up in the middle of a fight and grab a desk. They need to invest time to build rapport, establish workspaces, and ensure that advisors have the appropriate communication systems to provide added value.

At a basic level, advisors need to analyze where they need to place personnel with the appropriate expertise in both partner forces and U.S. headquarters. Advisors cannot assume that partner forces command posts mimic U.S. practices. Each partner will have different approaches to command and control that will impact advisor placement. In a 2023 Military Review article on experiences at NTC Rotation 23-04, Maj. Zachary Morris recommended a task organization for covering a partner battalion; however, that concept was optimized for that unique partner force.29 Advisors need to develop standard operating procedures for their placement specific to their partner force. For example, partnering with the Bulgarian army, we learned that they employ main and alternate command posts, which have redundant functions across warfighting functions, unlike U.S. main and rear command posts that have specialized functions. We needed to balance our advisors between the command posts and cross-train them to cover all warfighting functions.

We also needed to ensure they had the correct communications equipment. SFAB teams have an impressive communications suite, but we need to tailor our capabilities to our partner and their operational environment. We need to be able to operate dispersed, at distance, and with appropriate bandwidth. However, we also need to minimize our electromagnetic signature to not reveal our partner’s positions.

In Europe, our partners have learned from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine to use stringent practices for electromagnetic concealment. To not give away positions with military-band tactical communications, they lay telephone lines for kilometers between units. They hard-wire command posts into their national network instead of relying on satellite communications. They expect to operate in the basements of nondescript buildings. Advisors need to conform to such methods.

During our NTC rotation, we initially planned to use tactical communications; however, Ghost Team coached us that the best practice for survivability was to “hide in plain sight” by using civilian bands. We used a combination of Starlink, masked connections to the cellphone network, and hardwiring to the physical network, to minimize our signature. This approach provided us with both better connectivity and far more concealment than units that used traditional military connectivity during the rotation. We integrated into our partner’s command posts in urban areas.

In addition to integrating with partner forces, advisors need to liaise with U.S. units to coordinate efforts across a coalition. Those U.S. forces may or may not have a command relationship with the partner force, but advisors need to facilitate cooperation. Advisors need to understand U.S. units’ systems and processes before being thrown into the friction of war. Tying into those systems takes time. At NTC, we worked over ten days to troubleshoot connectivity issues with 1AD. It took time, but it revealed how important it is for advisors to establish that interoperability early. It also reinforced how difficult it would be for a partner force to communicate with a U.S. force without advisors. During Austere Challenge 24, an exercise rehearsing a defense of the Baltics, advisors from 4th SFAB proved essential in establishing digital communications between the Estonian 1st Division and U.S. V Corps.

Staff Sgt. Zachary Barber (right) from Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises mortarmen from Bulgaria’s 3rd Mechanized Battalion, 61st Mechanized Brigade, during a live fire in Karlovo, Bulgaria. (Photo by Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army)

Liaison reduces friction, such as at NTC when the Pirtunian and U.S. divisions both planned to use the same locations for command posts and artillery positions. Liaisons can also prevent catastrophes in coordination. During the Korean War at Wawon, the 2nd Infantry Division instructed the newly arrived Turkish brigade to guard their flank but did not establish a liaison with them to provide shared understanding. They did not realize the Koreans in front of them were withdrawing ROK units. They engaged those ROK units and reported a victory. They assumed they had prevailed but then were in no position to fight the main strength of the pursuing Chinese forces. The Chinese overran the surprised Turkish brigade.30 Advisors coordinating between the forces of those three nations could have prevented that disaster.

Advising

Of course, advisors will still advise to assist partners in preparing for conflict. However, our likely partners will not be building a force from scratch as in Afghanistan or Iraq. They are competent militaries with tested techniques and proud traditions. To coach such militaries, advisors will need a deep understanding of how they can improve. We cannot assume our approaches are superior and just coach partners on them.

I felt strongly that I could assist the Bulgarian army on combined arms rehearsals (CAR). I had even produced a video for NTC on how to conduct CARs.31 When at a division exercise, a Bulgarian brigade commander invited me to a battalion’s rehearsal, I was excited for the opportunity to coach them. When I got to the “rehearsal,” I saw a battalion commander and his subordinate commanders in a concealed observation post, each with a map, discussing their defense while pointing out their actions on the very terrain they would fight on. It was nothing like an American CAR, but it was very productive. They synchronized their plan while conducting a recon of the terrain they would defend.

I discussed possible issues with the rehearsal. What if they could not overwatch the terrain? What if they were passing through another unit in the offense? The Bulgarians admitted that they were valid points, but why build an American-style terrain model and gather people together for a theatrical production that enemy unmanned aircraft systems might observe?

The Bulgarian rehearsal would not work in the flat, wooded terrain of the Joint Readiness Training Center or in an offense across dozens of kilometers at NTC. However, the rehearsal would work in a defense of the rolling hills in the cleared farmlands of the Black Sea Coast. It was ideal for the context that they would have to fight in. To effectively advise, advisors need time to understand such context.

Advisors Need Clarity to Prepare for Conflict

All these tasks I described take time to prepare for. Advisors can only prepare for them if they know the specific partner and context in which they will fight. KMAG struggled in the opening days of the Korean War because it did not have a specified role in conflict that it could have prepared for. KMAG did not even know if it was supposed to fight in the event of war. A few months earlier, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had left Korea out of his description of a “defensive perimeter [that] runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus.”32 The Department of the Army had not specified KMAG’s wartime mission, and the U.S. ambassador had provided no guidance.33 It also had an unclear command relationship with MacArthur’s Far East Command.34 To effectively assess, support, and liaison, let alone advise, advisors need to have a clear mission for conflict and the time to prepare for it. They need to have a defined role in operational plans and a clear command relationship with U.S. forces in their theater.

There is a trade-off here. Advisors are often prioritized to countries to serve as a competition force to establish rapport, display American commitment, and build capabilities. For advisors to prepare for their role in conflict, they will have less time to work with such partners. There is a potential middle ground, with advisors still working in countries in the competitive space but having an enduring, episodic relationship with a partner force at the front lines of a possible conflict. For example, advisors could primarily work in North Macedonia but regularly interact with an Estonian brigade, so they are ready to integrate with them if Russia builds up forces in the Baltic.

Forward-positioned advisors can allow U.S. support and coordination with partner forces in the opening hours of a conflict, but only if provided the time to understand their partner force and threat beforehand. We cannot have another lone Capt. Joseph Darrigo without the time to assist our partners in stopping our enemies.

Given sufficient time, KMAG succeeded. Before the war, advisors had little familiarity with Korea. As the war progressed, advisors were recruited from soldiers with experience fighting in Korea.35 They understood the context of the war and could effectively advise the ROK Army. By 1953, KMAG had assisted the ROK Army in growing to a six-hundred-thousand-man force that held two-thirds of the front line and took more than two-thirds of the total casualties.36 Unfortunately, the Army did not retain the lessons learned from KMAG.

Why the Army Keeps Forgetting How to Advise

America has continued to struggle in advising because it does not invest time in advisors. The U.S. Army does not allow advisors to focus on a partner and its specific context. One KMAG advisor, explaining why advisors did not learn Korean stated that there was “no point in Americans learning Korean—we’ll be in Timbuktu next year.”37 Advisors today face the same lack of incentive for a long-term commitment to understand a partner force. This shortsightedness comes from the U.S. Army’s personnel system, which does not allow the career flexibility for advisors to fully understand a partner and prepare to fight with them in conflict.38

Advisors need a long-term commitment to a partner, as Lawrence spent years in Arabia before the Arab Revolt or Field Marshal Horatio Kitchener advised the Egyptian army for over a decade before they crushed the Mahdi in the Anglo-Sudan War.39 In the U.S. Army, before the inflexible, centralized personnel system was emplaced after World War II, officers could spend years understanding a country.40 Gen. John Pershing served four years in the Philippines building ties with local leaders and speaking with the Moros without needing an interpreter.41 During the interwar period, Gen. Matthew Ridgeway spent years instructing Spanish at West Point and serving and advising in Latin America.42 Unfortunately, the personnel system in place since the 1940s does not afford advisors such time to invest in partners; rather, it has caused underperformance.

Studies on Vietnam reported that “the system of short tours destroyed continuity in the U.S. advisor effort and ensured that it was dominated by amateurs.”43 Vietnamese commanders recommended that their U.S. advisors have two-year tours to have continuity and devotion to a unit.44 A RAND survey of Vietnam advisors showed that just as in Korea, advisors did not have time to learn the language and establish true understanding. Its primary recommendation was intensive language training.45

Given limited time, advisors need a clear mission and need to prioritize their training time in understanding the partner and the context in which they will serve. Advisors currently spend too much of their time training generic tasks. Even their culminating training events are with make-believe partners like the Pirtunis. In a study of advisors, RAND reported that it was “almost impossible to find a complaint by any advisor ... who felt tactically, technically, or militarily unprepared for his duties ... however, almost to a man, advisors felt compelled to talk about the demanding challenges posed by language, cultural differences, and host-nation institutional barriers. It was in these areas—at the heart of an advisor’s effectiveness—that most felt inadequately prepared.”46 If our personnel system will not allow us to invest the time to create effective advisors, we can at least focus their limited training time on understanding their particular partner force.

Now is the time to invest in advisor’s understanding of their specific problem set. Now is the time for them to become experts on their partners and their context. Now they need to know their role—now, and not when enemy artillery is waking us up.

Notes

Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232746.pdf.
T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Macmillan, 1963), 35.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 187.
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 35.
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020), 4-25.
On how Afghanistan and Vietnam were failures of overly centralized governance, which military advising did little to address, see Robert Rose, “All Power Is Local,” Military Review 103, no. 1 (January-February 2023): 76–87, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/JF-23/Rose/rose-all-power-is-local-v1.pdf.
T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, https://www.bu.edu/mzank/Jerusalem/tx/lawrence.htm.
Alfred H. Hausrath, The KMAG Advisor: Roles and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-355 (Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, February 1957), 67, https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/The-KMAG-Advisor-Role-and-Problems-of-the-Military-Advisor-in-Developing-Indigenous-Army-for-Combat-Operations-in-Korea.pdf.
Office of the Chief, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), Advisor’s Procedure Guide (KMAG Headquarters, 3 June 1953).
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 7.
“KOREA: Progress Report, Jun. 5, 1950,” Time, 5 June 1950, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,812568,00.html.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 104.
Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 100.
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 72.
Ibid., 67.
18 “BATTLE OF KOREA: Little Man & Friends,” Time, 10 July 1950, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,805449,00.html.
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 45.
John T. Correll, “The Difference in Korea,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, 1 June 2020, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-difference-in-korea/.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 140.
Ibid., 143.
Ibid., 152.
ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade, 4-43.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 127–28.
Time, “BATTLE OF KOREA: Little Man & Friends.”
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 54.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 59.
Zachary L. Morris, “Concepts for Security Force Assistance Brigade Company Task Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Military Review 103, no. 6 (November-December 2023): 67–81, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2023/Maj-Morris/.
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 211–12.
“TAC Talks EP01: A Way To CAR,” posted 28 March 2023 by TAC Talks–Operations Group, NTC, YouTube, 25 min., 3 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BxeSq0FlDo&t=18s.
Dean Acheson, “Excerpts from Acheson’s Speech to The National Press Club,” 12 January 1950, https://web.viu.ca/davies/H102/Acheson.speech1950.htm.
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 121.
Ibid., 46.
Robert D. Ramsey III, “Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper No. 18 (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 12, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/ramsey.pdf.
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 350.
Hausrath, The KMAG Advisor, 45.
Robert Rose, “Ending the Churn: To Solve the Recruiting Crisis, the Army Should be Asking Very Different Questions,” Modern War Institute, 9 February 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ending-the-churn-to-solve-the-recruiting-crisis-the-army-should-be-asking-very-different-questions/.
Winston Churchill, The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan, vol. 1 (Longmans, Green, 1899).
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Free Press, 2017), 152.
B. H. Liddell Hart, Reputations Ten Years After (Little, Brown, 1928), 292–93.
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Free Press, 2017), 162.
A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, bk. 2, Functional Analyses (BDM Corporation, 1980), 12-24–12-25, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA096430.pdf.
Cao Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 69–70.
Gerald Hickey, The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam (RAND Corporation, 1965), 77, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2007/RM4482.pdf.
Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” 109.

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is a Lt. Gen. (R) James M. Dubik Writing Fellow. He commands Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade. He previously served as executive officer and operations officer for 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment; as the lead counterthreat finance planner for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Kabul; and as an observer coach/trainer at both the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. He deployed to Zhari, Kandahar, with 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MPhil from Cambridge University, and an MPP from Harvard University.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Why It Matters

What To Know

What People Are Saying

What Happens Next

About the writer

Awake Before the Sound of the Guns

Assessment

Support

Liaison

Advising

Advisors Need Clarity to Prepare for Conflict

Why the Army Keeps Forgetting How to Advise

Notes