Quotes of the Day:

"We grow tyrannical fighting tyranny. The most alarming spectacle today is not the spectacle of the atomic bomb in an unfederated world, it is the spectacle of the Americans beginning to accept the device of loyalty oaths and witchhunts, beginning to call anybody they don't like a Communist." 

– E. B. White

"It is wonderful what strength of purpose and boldness and energy of will are roused by the assurance that we are doing our duty." 

– Walter Scott

"There is no worse tyranny than to force a man to pay for what he does not want merely because you think it would be good for him." 

– Robert Heinlein

1. Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

2. Yes, we're divided. But new AP-NORC poll shows Americans still agree on most core American values

3. General Officer Assignments (Some Key SOF positions)

4. New Report Reveals Dirty Secret of Army Psychological Operations

5. It's not new, we're just ignorant: Our modern Maginot Line does little against political warfare by Matt Armstrong

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 3, 2024

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2024

8. Exclusive: State Department officials told House investigators they created Afghanistan withdrawal plans from scratch

9. Houthis may be running low on their weapons stocks as attacks on ships slow, US commander says

10. All the Houthi-US Navy incidents in the Middle East (that we know of)

11. Finland signs Ukraine security deal, Zelenskiy warns of Russia troop plans

12. Israel is using artificial intelligence to help pick bombing targets in Gaza, report says

13. Don’t Call it a Comeback: The Islamic State in an Age of Strategic Competition

14. How a steel ball protected Taiwan’s tallest skyscraper in an earthquake

15. The Only U.S. Lawmaker Born in Ukraine Is Now Skeptical of More Aid

16. ‘Misinformation’ Is the Censors’ Excuse

17. Explaining the diverse mission set of MARSOC's commandos

18. The Technological Pivot of History: Power in the Age of Exponential Innovation

19. Military personnel swear allegiance to the Constitution and serve the American people – not one leader or party

20. Myanmar And Irregular Warfare In A Multipolar World – Analysis

21. Israel Unleashed?

22. A double dose of hell: The Bataan Death March and what came next

1. Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

This is not a good sign.

Excerpts:

The defense policy bill for fiscal 2021 — named for Thornberry, who was retiring — created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new section of the defense budget. PDI had two goals: to push the Pentagon to spend more on the region and to make that money easier to track.

Four years later, PDI has done only one of those two things, according to experts. It has certainly made China-focused defense spending more transparent, but it hasn’t driven much new spending on the Pacific. In fact, the part of America’s defense budget created to help deter a war with China has no actual money.

Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 3, 2024

In 2020, Mac Thornberry wanted to answer two questions: How much is the U.S. spending to prevent a war with China, and is it enough?

These were difficult, even for the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. And he wasn’t the only one asking. Thornberry often traveled to Asia, where U.S. allies had the same questions. Thornberry didn’t know what to tell them.

“What do we have to offer?” he said.

For two years, Congress had asked the Pentagon for a report on how much extra money it needed for the Pacific region, but never received one. So Congress demanded one.

“The attitude was, tell us what you need and we’ll try to help,” Thornberry said during a recent interview. “Well, if they’re not going to tell us, then we’re going to tell them.”

The defense policy bill for fiscal 2021 — named for Thornberry, who was retiring — created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new section of the defense budget. PDI had two goals: to push the Pentagon to spend more on the region and to make that money easier to track.

Four years later, PDI has done only one of those two things, according to experts. It has certainly made China-focused defense spending more transparent, but it hasn’t driven much new spending on the Pacific. In fact, the part of America’s defense budget created to help deter a war with China has no actual money.

“Your priorities are always better reflected in your budget rather than in your rhetoric,” Thornberry said.

Whether those two areas match up may be the most important question in American defense policy right now. The last three administrations have decided China is America’s top threat, and a rising one at that. But it’s less clear how much money it will cost to address it and who gets to decide — Congress, the Pentagon or military leaders in the Pacific?

“I don’t think that we are somehow dangerously short of funding for the Indo-Pacific, whether it’s PDI or not,” Rep. Ed Case, D-Hawaii, who sits on the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel, told Defense News in February.

“We’re going in the right direction, but the question is: Are we going there fast enough?”

A second opinion

This was the question that led to PDI.

In 2021, the head of Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, was in Washington ahead of his planned retirement to testify before Congress. Davidson hadn’t appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in two years due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Early on, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., presented a set of charts during a short call and response. Wicker read a list projecting the number of Chinese and American weapons in the region by 2025, asking Davidson to check his numbers.

Three Chinese aircraft carriers to America’s one. Six Chinese amphibious assault ships to America’s two. Fifty-four Chinese combat ships to America’s six.

The admiral confirmed each one.

“Our conventional deterrent is actually eroding in the region,” Davidson said.

What concerned him most was not that Beijing had a more powerful military overall; it was a problem of speed and distance. Taiwan — which the Chinese government considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back by force — is about 100 miles from the mainland. It’s more than 5,000 miles from Hawaii, the headquarters of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

It would take three weeks for the U.S. to rush ships to the area from the West Coast, and around 17 days to do so from Alaska, Davidson estimated. If China launched a rapid invasion, it might overwhelm Taiwan before the U.S. had a chance to arrive.

A soldier launches an American-made TOW 2A missile during a live-fire exercise in Pingtung County, Taiwan, on July 3, 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images)

“The important factor here is time,” he said.

Davidson’s answer, and that of many committee members, was to push America’s forces closer to Taiwan — the military version of a full-court press. But the U.S. didn’t yet have the necessary infrastructure in place. It would need to construct bases, airfields, radars and other buildings along the Pacific islands that arc around Taiwan.

And this would cost money — lots of money.

PDI was, at first, meant to be the source of that money. To understand why, it’s important to understand how the Pentagon writes its budget.

The process depends mostly on the military services — in particular the Army, Navy and Air Force. These services hold about four-fifths of defense spending each year and direct where that money goes.

Their incentives are different from those of the seven geographic combatant commands, who carry out America’s military goals around the world. Given their roles, the commands often focus on shorter-term needs. Hence, the services often don’t fund everything the combatant commands want.

To lawmakers, the gap seemed especially wide in the Pacific, where China has spent the last two decades upgrading its military.

Noticing this problem, lawmakers as far back as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., in 2017 wanted to fund Indo-Pacific Command’s goals with a separate account — something Thornberry also later supported.

It didn’t come together until three years later. In May 2020, the chair and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee announced plans for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative that would reassure U.S. allies and improve its forces.

It had five goals: to improve presence, logistics, exercises, infrastructure and the strength of partners in the Pacific. The bill also added a voice to the budgeting process. Indo-Pacific Command would now give Congress an annual second opinion on America’s military needs in the region.

There was, however, a structural problem. The lawmakers that created PDI didn’t actually get any money for it. The policy bill named for Thornberry gave the Pentagon about $2 billion in authority for the effort but not permission to spend it. That would’ve required a signoff from the defense appropriations committees, who control the nation’s purse.

Those committees balk at initiatives like PDI, according to multiple congressional aides, because passing them makes it harder to write a defense budget — the same reason it’s harder to write a recipe when someone else decides your shopping list.

U.S. Army soldiers and Indonesia airborne troops conduct a joint forcible entry operation at Baturaja Training Area on Aug. 4, 2021. (Staff Sgt. Thomas Calvert/U.S. Army)

“The hope was for the following year that the appropriations and the budget would match,” said Kimberly Lehn, a former aide on the House Armed Services Committee who helped write the PDI legislation.

That didn’t happen, and by the time Davidson testified before Congress a year later, the initiative had become an accounting drill.

Think about it like a home improvement fund. If you want an upgrade — say, a nicer kitchen — then you have two options: Earn more money or spend less money elsewhere. Instead, PDI was, and still is, implemented in reverse. Each year, the Pentagon builds its budget and then reviews it to see what contributes to deterrence in the Pacific. It then labels that as PDI and highlights the total number in its budget request.

“It reflects their decisions, it doesn’t drive their decisions,” said Dustin Walker, a former Senate Armed Services Committee aide who helped write the PDI legislation and now works at the drone-maker Anduril.

‘Free chicken’

This was not the model PDI’s authors had in mind.

“It started basically as a straight copycat of [the] European Deterrence Initiative,” Walker said, referring to an effort that stemmed from Russia’s 2014 seizure and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.

The Obama administration wanted to show commitment to NATO allies rattled by war on the continent. The government did so within months using what it originally dubbed the European Reassurance Initiative.

Russian soldiers patrol outside the naval headquarters in Simferopol on March 19, 2014. Russia's Constitutional Court unanimously backed President Vladimir Putin's move to make Crimea part of Russia. (Filippo Monteforte/AFP via Getty Images)

U.S. forces in Europe had declined for decades after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s — down to about 62,000 personnel by 2016. The smaller size made sense in Europe given there were fewer needs for America’s military muscle. But Russia’s invasion showed how far readiness had fallen, said Tod Wolters, the former head of U.S. European Command.

With the European Deterrence Initiative, the administration wanted to bulk up.

“We knew that we could not go back to Cold War status, with the number of forces that were going to be in the theater. So the question became: How do we make sure that we can rapidly deploy combat power?” said Al Viana, who works in European Command’s force structure and requirements office.

This became the focus of EDI, whose name changed in 2018 when it became clear Russia’s military activities in the region weren’t coming to an end. From 2015 to 2023, the U.S. spent $35 billion on the effort to empower allies and ensure its own forces were more agile. The second goal required funding to run more exercises, rotate more troops, improve infrastructure and store important equipment on the continent.

By the end of fiscal 2014, European Command had dissolved two heavy combat brigades. However, EDI helped rebuild those forces — deferring cuts to Air Force personnel, supporting a combat aviation brigade and making sure the Army had an armored brigade combat team rotating through the theater. In FY16, the Army’s forces in Europe conducted 26 total exercises per year. By 2023, that number was around 50.

In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. surged 20,000 extra personnel to Europe. That included an armored brigade combat team — including about 4,000 personnel, 90 tanks and more than 200 other vehicles — which arrived within a week from notification. Without those stocks already stored in the theater, it would’ve taken between four and six weeks, according to U.S. Army Europe and Africa.

“EDI is the place to go and see exactly what we’re doing,” Viana said.

The two initiatives’ different fates come almost entirely down to money. EDI was paid for through an account called overseas contingency operations, more commonly referred to as OCO (pronounced like “cocoa”). That fund started for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, supplementing the annual Pentagon budget.

“EDI was easy because you weren’t fighting with a service,” a senior defense official told Defense News, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the individual was not permitted to talk to the press. “It was free chicken.”

By the start of this decade, Congress had soured on OCO, partly because the Pentagon used it to dodge some budget cuts it faced in the 2010s. Lawmakers called it a slush fund.

This meant the Pacific Deterrence Initiative didn’t get any extra funding. The European counterpart transitioned away from supplemental money in fiscal 2022, and its funding amounts since then have steadily dropped.

Amphibious armored vehicles attached to a brigade of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps make their way to a beach during maritime amphibious assault training in China's Guangdong province on Aug. 17, 2019. (Yan Jialuo and Yao Guanchen/Chinese Defense Ministry)

The result is that many items Indo-Pacific Command lists in its annual report to Congress — the things the command says it needs to maintain its strength in the region — aren’t funded. So the command just resubmits those unfunded priorities on top of additional needs in the next year’s report. Hence, each year’s dollar amount snowballs.

When Davidson testified before Congress in 2021, his report listed $4.7 billion in requirements. This year, the number was $26.5 billion — $11 billion of which is unfunded. The bulk of that $11 billion would go to construction costs — much higher in the Pacific than on the U.S. homeland — and munitions.

“Our demand signal has been consistent,” George Ka’iliwai, the director of requirements and resources at the command, said in a March interview. “It is what it is because they are our requirements.”

The Pentagon has questioned some of Indo-Pacific Command’s priorities and whether they’re possible to carry out, even with funding. Infrastructure projects, for example, sometimes require negotiations with the host government as well as expensive labor and material costs. Only about a fifth of Indo-Pacific Command’s desired construction projects appear in the FY25 budget request, Ka’iliwai said.

Since its first report, the command has said the missile defense architecture of Guam — a U.S. territory crucial to the military’s Pacific posture — is its top goal. Others, such as infrastructure on Pacific islands or a secure network to communicate with allies, have also appeared each year.

PDI “doesn’t come close to scratching the itch,” the defense source said.

‘Trade-offs’

There are a few paths forward. One of them would see Congress give Indo-Pacific Command new money each year, like the account McCain sought in 2017.

There are lawmakers, such as Hawaii’s Case, who support that. But the appropriations committees don’t, and it’s unlikely that will change in the short term, according to multiple congressional aides.

Another option is in the Pentagon’s control. At the start of the budgeting process, department leaders could reserve money for the command’s priorities and build everything else around it. That would resemble how the deputy defense secretary is funding two signature initiatives: the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, which helps accelerate prototyping; and Replicator, an effort to buy drones faster.

But these programs are loose change compared to what the command says it needs — hundreds of millions of dollars compared to more than $11 billion in unfunded priorities.

The way PDI works now is important, according to another senior defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. The official argued that a different model for the initiative would make it more difficult for the Defense Department to plan and budget.

“The department has the best ability to find the right trade-offs,” the official said.

Points of view

Three years after Davidson testified, his successor stepped into a House hearing room this March.

“The risk is still high, and it is trending in the wrong direction,” Adm. John Aquilino noted in his opening statement, later adding that the Pacific is the most dangerous he’s ever seen it.

Sitting next to him, Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, was more hopeful, citing higher spending and the administration’s “historic momentum” with allies in the region.

The higher spending is easier to see with PDI, which has charted large increases in funding over the last four years. Whether the initiative is working depends on whether you look at the Pacific through the eyes of Ratner or Aquilino. Both agree war isn’t imminent, but they’re split on whether deterrence is getting better or worse.

If it’s eroding, as Davidson argued in 2021, then PDI’s current model may not be enough. If the region is more stable, then the initiative looks better too.

The biggest misconception about PDI, according to the second defense official, is that the Pentagon doesn’t take it seriously.

“This is not a gradual slope of increase,” the official said of Pacific funding. “This is a significant and dramatic increase in investment, and we are more committed than ever.”

The PDI request for this year is $9.9 billion — more than $800 million over last year’s. But up until soon before the Pentagon released its FY25 budget request, it wasn’t, according to the first defense official and a congressional aide.

To show the Pentagon was focused on the threat from China, defense leaders tagged more items under the initiative at the last minute to raise its dollar figure, the first defense source and a congressional aide told Defense News. Among the late entries was the drone program Replicator.

At the recent March hearing, a member of Congress asked Ratner whether the $9.9 billion includes everything the Pentagon needs “for the PDI to be as effective as possible.”

“Congresswoman,” Ratner responded, “the PDI is simply an accounting mechanism.”

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

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Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 3, 2024

2. Yes, we're divided. But new AP-NORC poll shows Americans still agree on most core American values

Some good news with some bad. I hope we can rally around our core values. But the key issue is with leadership.  

Graphic and video at the link. https://apnews.com/article/ap-poll-democracy-rights-freedoms-election-b1047da72551e13554a3959487e5181a?fbclid=

Excerpts;

“If you get a bunch of normal people at random and put them in a room together and chat about issues, there’s a lot more convergence than you might imagine,” said Michael Albertus, a political science professor at the University of Chicago.

A more pessimistic assessment of the country was reflected in another finding — that only about 3 in 10 Americans believe the nation’s democracy is functioning well. About half say the U.S. is a poorly functioning democracy, while 14% say the U.S. is not a democracy.

The tension between the broad consensus on the country’s fundamental values and discontent with how well its form of government is working is not a surprise, experts say.

“Part of it is really our leaders are not reflecting the electorate, and they behave in a way that’s much more polarized than what the electorate is,” said Lilliana Mason, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University.

Yes, we're divided. But new AP-NORC poll shows Americans still agree on most core American values

AP · April 3, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — Despite the country’s deep political polarization, most Americans share many core beliefs about what it means to be an American, according to a new poll.

The poll from The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research found that about 9 in 10 U.S. adults say the right to vote, the right to equal protection under the law and the right to privacy are extremely important or very important to the United States’ identity as a nation. The survey also found that 84% feel the same way about the freedom of religion.

The results, which included perspectives on a number of different freedoms and rights, have only small variances between Republicans and Democrats except on the right to bear arms, which Republicans are more likely to see as core to the nation’s identity. The overall findings are striking because they come at a time of extreme partisanship when political agreements seem rare and concerns are heightened over the potential for violence during a volatile presidential election year.

“If you get a bunch of normal people at random and put them in a room together and chat about issues, there’s a lot more convergence than you might imagine,” said Michael Albertus, a political science professor at the University of Chicago.

A more pessimistic assessment of the country was reflected in another finding — that only about 3 in 10 Americans believe the nation’s democracy is functioning well. About half say the U.S. is a poorly functioning democracy, while 14% say the U.S. is not a democracy.

The tension between the broad consensus on the country’s fundamental values and discontent with how well its form of government is working is not a surprise, experts say.

“Part of it is really our leaders are not reflecting the electorate, and they behave in a way that’s much more polarized than what the electorate is,” said Lilliana Mason, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University.

Most Americans, she said, “are pretty moderate, but they’ve been riled up to hate people of the other party for being different from them culturally, racially and religiously.”

The AP-NORC poll also found broad agreement on the importance of some key values for the U.S.’s identity as a country. About three-quarters of U.S. adults agree that a democratically elected government is extremely or very important, and about 8 in 10 think the same about the ability of people living in the U.S. to get good jobs and achieve the American dream.

But what achieving that dream means — and which values are most fundamental to American culture — isn’t something all Americans agree on.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans — 71% to 38% — to believe that the ability to come to the U.S. from elsewhere in the world to escape violence or find economic opportunities is core to the country’s identity. A majority of Republicans, 58%, think a culture grounded in Christian values and beliefs is an essential characteristic, compared to only 18% of Democrats.

Juan Sierra, 51, a naturalized citizen whose family immigrated from the Dominican Republic after a hurricane destroyed his father’s cement business, said it is very important to him that the U.S. be seen as a place of opportunity.

The Capitol is seen as water sprinklers soak the National Mall on a hot summer morning in Washington, July 15, 2022. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)

The industrial technician in Port St. Lucie, Florida, said he believes democracy is working and will continue to do so “as long as there are good people in government.”

Sierra also said it was extremely important that people have freedom of religion, although he had concerns over the nation’s identity being tied to Christianity.

“We’re seeing what happens right now when laws are passed and decisions are made based on someone’s religion,” he said, citing the Alabama Supreme Court ruling in February that frozen embryos can be considered children and be afforded legal protections, a decision that temporarily halted IVF procedures in the state.

Susan Johnson, a 76-year-old Republican living in the Dallas suburbs, said the nation’s standing as a beacon to others who need refuge is very important, but said that could not override concerns about border security.

“We need people working,” she said. “We just need them to come the right way.”

Johnson also said she believes it’s extremely important that the nation’s identity be grounded in spirituality.

“Whether or not you’re Mormon or a Muslim or a Christian, they just have to have some higher power to reach up to,” she said. “The country is going to fall apart if we don’t believe in God.”

The poll found few divisions on democracy as a system in theory, but it identified one notable gap: younger Americans between the ages of 18 to 29 were less likely than those 60 and older to say the U.S. is a well-functioning democracy. They’re also less likely than older Americans to believe that some characteristics are essential to the U.S.’s character as a nation, including having a democratically elected government. About 6 in 10 younger adults see this as important, compared to about 9 in 10 older adults.

Palakjot Singh, a 21-year-old college student in Fresno, California, identified himself as a Republican and said he had a better quality of life when Donald Trump was president. He said the U.S. is not a well-functioning democracy in part because people are not open to debating different points of view compared to previous generations.

“There is not good communication,” he said. “Nobody is sitting together trying to get to one point.”

Howard Lavine, a political science professor at the University of Minnesota, said the generational split is understandable. Many younger people don’t remember a time when those with opposing views and from different political backgrounds could get together and “come over to your house.” Their frame of reference is the hyper partisanship of the Trump years, he said.

Joe Lagle, 55, a retired Air Force veteran in Colorado Springs who said he has not voted for either President Joe Biden or Trump, said the nation’s various rights are “all important” but believes they are being eroded by intolerance and well-meaning but shortsighted people.

Mike Maloy, 41, an engineer in Greensboro, North Carolina, said having those rights and freedoms “doesn’t necessarily mean the U.S. is a functioning democracy.”

“Everything is run by a handful of people and their corporations,” he said. “That’s not a democracy.”

A Democrat, Maloy cited as an example this year’s presidential primary in North Carolina, when Biden was the lone candidate on the ballot. He called that “frustrating” and said the result was that voters “had no choice.”

___

The poll of 1,282 adults was conducted March 21-25, 2024, using a sample drawn from NORC’s probability-based AmeriSpeak Panel, which is designed to be representative of the U.S. population. The margin of sampling error for all respondents is plus or minus 3.8 percentage points.

___

Associated Press polling writer Linley Sanders contributed to this report.

___

The Associated Press receives support from several private foundations to enhance its explanatory coverage of elections and democracy. See more about AP’s democracy initiative here. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

AP · April 3, 2024

3. General Officer Assignments (Some Key SOF positions)

I am getting old. I remember when a couple of these guys were Lieutenants and Captains,

​Excerpts:

New J-2 SOCOM

Col. (Promotable) James T. Blejski Jr., assistant chief of staff, G-3, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to director of intelligence, J-2, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

New in Qatar for the “over the horizon CT force”

Col. (Promotable) Jeremy A. Bartel, chief of staff, U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, to commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Central, Operation Enduring Sentinel, Qatar.

Inbound SOCCENT commander

Brig. Gen. Jasper Jeffers III, deputy director for Special Operations and Counter-Terrorism, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commander, Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Outbound SOCCENT headed for CJTF OIR

Maj. Gen. Kevin C. Leahy, commander, Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Inherent Resolve, Iraq.

New SOCOM Chief of Staff inbound

Brig. Gen. Guillaume N. Beaurpere, commanding general, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to chief of staff, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

New DCG USASOC

Col. (Promotable) Kirk E. Brinker, deputy commander (Support), 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to deputy commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Brig. Gen. Scott D. Wilkinson, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command; and deputy commanding general-Futures, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to chief, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.

General Officer Assignments

April 3, 2024 |   

The Chief of Staff of the Army announces the following officer assignments:

Maj. Gen. Kimberly M. Colloton, deputy commanding general for Military and International Operations, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., to deputy chief of engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army; and deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.

Maj. Gen. Lance G. Curtis, deputy chief of staff, G-4, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to commanding general, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

Maj. Gen. Christopher L. Eubank, commanding general, U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to chief of staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, deputy director for Regional Operations and Force Management, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commanding general, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Novosel, Fort Novosel, Alabama.

Maj. Gen. Gavin A. Lawrence, commanding general, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, to deputy chief of staff for Logistics and Operations, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Maj. Gen. Kevin C. Leahy, commander, Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Inherent Resolve, Iraq.

Maj. Gen. Michael C. McCurry II, commanding general, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Novosel, Fort Novosel, Alabama, to chief of staff, U.S. Army Futures Command, Austin, Texas.

Brig. Gen. Stephanie R. Ahern, director of Concepts, Futures and Concepts Center, U.S. Army Futures Command, Adelphi, Maryland, to commandant, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Brig. Gen. Sarah K. Albrycht, commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to provost marshal general, U.S. Army, and commanding general, Army Corrections Command, Washington, D.C.

Brig. Gen. Guillaume N. Beaurpere, commanding general, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to chief of staff, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Brig. Gen. Chad C. Chalfont, deputy commanding general (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, Texas, to commandant, U.S. Army Armor School, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore, Georgia.

Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Clarke, deputy commanding general (Operations), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York, to director of Concepts, Futures and Concepts Center, U.S. Army Futures Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia.

Brig. Gen. Jasper Jeffers III, deputy director for Special Operations and Counter-Terrorism, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commander, Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Brig. Gen. Shane P. Morgan, commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to deputy director for Regional Operations and Force Management, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

Brig. Gen. Jason B. Nicholson, commanding general, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Brig. Gen. Michael J. Simmering, commandant, U.S. Army Armor School, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore, Georgia, to commanding general, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brig. Gen. Brian D. Vile, commandant, U.S. Army Cyber Warfare School and Chief of Cyber, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia, to deputy director, Future Operations, J-3, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland.

Brig. Gen. Scott D. Wilkinson, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command; and deputy commanding general-Futures, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to chief, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Col. (Promotable) Jeremy A. Bartel, chief of staff, U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, to commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Central, Operation Enduring Sentinel, Qatar.

Col. (Promotable) James T. Blejski Jr., assistant chief of staff, G-3, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to director of intelligence, J-2, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Col. (Promotable) Robert G. Born, deputy commander (Support), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, Texas, to deputy commander (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, Texas.

Col. (Promotable) Kirk E. Brinker, deputy commander (Support), 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to deputy commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Col. (Promotable) Kevin S. Chaney, project manager, Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, Program Executive Office Aviation, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to deputy, Program Executive Office, Command, Control and Communication (Tactical), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Col. (Promotable) Kenneth C. Cole, deputy commander (Support), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to deputy commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Col. (Promotable) Ronald L. Franklin Jr., NATO Branch Chief, J-5, U.S. European Command, Germany, to senior defense official and defense attaché, U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Russia.

Col. (Promotable) Rogelio J. Garcia, deputy commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to commandant of cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Col. (Promotable) Peter C. Glass, deputy director/chief of staff, Futures and Concepts Center, U.S. Army Futures Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, to deputy commander (Support), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, Texas.

Col. (Promotable) Joseph C. Goetz II, commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to commander, Pacific Ocean Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

Col. (Promotable) Phillip J. Kiniery III, deputy commander (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence; and director, Future Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team, Army Futures Command, Fort Moore, Georgia.

Col. (Promotable) Paul T. Krattiger, deputy commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, to deputy commander (Operations), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas.

Col. (Promotable) Matthew J. Lennox, deputy commander, Cyber National Mission Force, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland, to deputy commander, Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber, U.S. Army Cyber Command, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia.

Col. (Promotable) Robert J. Mikesh Jr., project manager, Integrated Personnel and Pay System–Army, Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems, Arlington, Virginia, to deputy program executive officer, Enterprise Information Systems, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Col. (Promotable) Jin H. Pak, commandant, U.S. Army Quartermaster School, U.S. Army Sustainment Center of Excellence, Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia, to commander, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, Eighth Army, Republic of Korea.

Col. (Promotable) Allen J. Pepper, senior defense official and defense attaché, U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Iraq, to commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Col. (Promotable) Brendan C. Raymond, director of integration, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., to deputy commander (Support), 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.

Col. (Promotable) Adam D. Smith, deputy commander for operations, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky, to The Adjutant General of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Human Resources Command; commander, U.S. Army Physical Disability Agency; and executive director, Military Postal Service Agency, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Col. (Promotable) Kevin J. Williams, chief of staff, Joint Task Force–Red Hill, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, to deputy commander (Operations), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

4. New Report Reveals Dirty Secret of Army Psychological Operations

These explanations for why we changed the names from PSYOP to MISO and Information warfare to information operations always make me chuckle. No one can tell me how changing these names of these activities and organizations will change the negative perceptions and misunderstandings associated with the original terms. It is also as if those who demanded the changes had no understanding of psychological operations and information warfare. I would argue that it is because of such officials who wield power over PSYOP and information warfare that we are less effective than we should be. But the reporter does not have the whole story. I was an observer with a front line seat to the drug deal/horse trading that took place to change the name from PSYOP to MISO.

I would also note that the reporter doesn't seem to take into account the responses from USSOCOM and USASOC that counter some of the erroneous statements in the IG report.

Excerpts:

A December 2010 secretary of defense memorandum, issued during the Obama administration, discontinued the use of the term “psyops” and replaced it with Military information Support Operations, or MISO. The memo stated that the term “psyop” had become misleading and, “although psyop activities rely on truthful information, credibly conveyed, the term psyop tends to connote propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation, and deceit.” The memo noted that for that reason, the Pentagon would “no longer use the term psyop to describe activities (in peacetime or during combat operations) that are intended to influence foreign audiences.” Nonetheless, the Army continues to use the term “psyop” or psyops when referring to its units and to the overall career field.

(The term “information warfare” was also replaced with “information operations” during the same time period. Seeking to soften the terminology of counterterrorism, the Obama administration also sought to change the name of the Global War On Terror to Overseas Contingency Operations, a term that never stuck. The administration also introduced the euphemism “violent extremist” instead of terrorist, a term that is now applied to domestic activists with no connection to any foreign power or influence.)

New Report Reveals Dirty Secret of Army Psychological Operations

Contrary to Hollywood depictions, Army psyops are an understaffed and ineffective mess.

Daniel Boguslaw

April 2 2024, 3:41 p.m.

The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw · April 2, 2024

“If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him,” Sun Tzu wrote in the 4th century, one of those warfare aphorisms that the modern-day U.S. Army has adopted as part of its psychological operations career group. “Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant,” the Army says in a recruiting video released last year. But it is the Army that is pretending to be strong. A devastating new Defense Department inspector general report finds that its own psyops ranks are critically short at a time when Washington is obsessed with stoking influence against America’s many adversaries.

The IG report, “Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce” finds that the Army, the primary Defense Department proponent for battlefield influence and deception, has failed to staff its own psyops units at a time when the Pentagon struggles with fighting Russian, Chinese, and Iranian disinformation campaigns, particularly about U.S. military operations and bases.

A December 2010 secretary of defense memorandum, issued during the Obama administration, discontinued the use of the term “psyops” and replaced it with Military information Support Operations, or MISO. The memo stated that the term “psyop” had become misleading and, “although psyop activities rely on truthful information, credibly conveyed, the term psyop tends to connote propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation, and deceit.” The memo noted that for that reason, the Pentagon would “no longer use the term psyop to describe activities (in peacetime or during combat operations) that are intended to influence foreign audiences.” Nonetheless, the Army continues to use the term “psyop” or psyops when referring to its units and to the overall career field.

(The term “information warfare” was also replaced with “information operations” during the same time period. Seeking to soften the terminology of counterterrorism, the Obama administration also sought to change the name of the Global War On Terror to Overseas Contingency Operations, a term that never stuck. The administration also introduced the euphemism “violent extremist” instead of terrorist, a term that is now applied to domestic activists with no connection to any foreign power or influence.)

In its March report, the inspector general found that the Army’s four Psychological Operations Groups (two active duty and two in the reserves) operated with only 60 percent of their authorized strength. It also found that one third of Army Reserve psyops detachments, feeder organizations sprinkled around the country used to beef up the psyops groups during mobilization, exist only on paper, most being completely unmanned. And only a quarter of the detachments had assigned and qualified commands (captains) required to pursue their missions.

According to the report, MISO and other types of information operations are the main way the military responds to adversaries without engaging in armed combat. And yet despite this allegedly critical function, the IG found that “the Army does not have sufficient MISO-qualified military personnel in its Army Reserve and active component MISO units or serving in MISO positions on joint force command staffs to meet the increasing demand.”

The inspector general also found another problem: a comprehensive study of the entire psyops branch, with soldiers spread across the active duty component and the reserve components (Army Reserve and National Guard) has not been completed in 20 years.

Psyops is a military term that refers to efforts to influence enemy battlefield perceptions through leafleting, radio and television broadcasting and deception. Such operations, as Sun Tzu attests, are as old as organized warfare itself. In recent decades, with the growth of online news and communications, ubiquitous cellphone use, and social media, psyops has expanded. That expansion, and the nature of how information circulates, reaches far beyond the battlefield. Though there are national “influence” operations against countries such as Russia, China, and Iran that are run by the State Department and the intelligence agencies, psyops still generally refers to battlefield use.

At a time when the military says that there is “increasing demand” for psyops, it is phasing out psychological operations roles to make room for newer priorities, according to an internal Army paper. “We needed to reduce 32,000 spaces to both shrink overall structure and make room for about 7,500 new billets for emerging efforts like directed energy, the Mobile Short Range Air Defense program, and multi-domain task force teams,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George wrote in February, recommending a reduction of psyops soldiers.

Reducing the number of soldiers allocated to “special operations,” which psyops is a part of, is not without controversy. According to recent reporting, the head of Special Operations Command Gen. Bryan Fenton is fighting the Army plan, taking his complaint up the chain of command to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

Related

U.S. Special Forces Want to Use Deepfakes for Psy-Ops

In congressional testimony last month, Fenton said that MISO soldiers and units “are indispensable in 21st century warfare, which includes the development of critical information force capabilities such as civil affairs and psychological operations” adding that “MISO [the operations themselves] to counter strategic competitors have more than tripled in the past three years — comprising more than 60% of SOF’s [special operations forces] worldwide MISO activities in FY 2023.” He also pointed to the Joint MISO WebOps Center that helps coordinate combatant commands’ efforts to actively engage “foreign audiences to illuminate and counter hostile propaganda and disinformation.”

The national and regional WebOps centers maintain overt pro-U.S. websites and social media accounts that publish propaganda, but where the connection to the Pentagon is obscured or hidden in the fine print.

Despite Fenton’s push to preserve unfilled positions conducting the Army’s MISO, recent revelations about the Pentagon’s psyops call into question just how effective these programs really are.

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In 2022, an extensive report by the Washington Post revealed widespread concern inside DOD that psychological operations were being waged both recklessly and ineffectively by the armed services. The report was spurred by research from the Stanford Internet Observatory which detailed over 150 instances of Facebook and Twitter removing accounts linked to U.S. military influence campaigns.

The Pentagon also has pushed for new powers to fight adversaries in cyberspace. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act gave the Defense Department a green light to engage in offensive psyops campaigns, including clandestine operations that align with the same definition as covert, meaning that the armed forces can carry out influence operations that deny an American connection, according to an analysis by Lawfare.

As the Post detailed, after the congressional authorization, an unnamed defense official said, “Combatant commanders got really excited” and were “eager to utilize these new authorities. The defense contractors were equally eager to land lucrative classified contracts to enable clandestine influence operations.”

Related

State Department Cut Funding for Controversial “Iran Disinfo” Project — but Kept Working With Its Creators

Some of these operations involved anti-Russia narratives describing Russia’s war in Ukraine as imperialist and attempting to shift popular sentiment toward support for Ukraine. Another account apparently targeting Iranian citizens reposted content from Voice of America and Radio Free Europe in Farsi. One account spread misinformation that claimed that relatives of deceased Afghan refugees were reporting that bodies being returned from Iran had missing internal organs. The latter tweet would be in violation of CENTCOM’s psyops directives, according to the Post.

Researchers at Stanford ultimately found that despite the dozens of Defense Department obscured accounts spreading misinformation, the effect on foreign populations was far less than information conveyed overtly from self-identified U.S. sources.

“All warfare is based on deception,” Sun Tzu says. As the inspector general report demonstrates, there is a lot of deception going on to convince the American public that military psyops is a good investment. That campaign seems to have been successful.

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The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw · April 2, 2024

5. It's not new, we're just ignorant: Our modern Maginot Line does little against political warfare by Matt Armstrong

A very important essay on political warfare, information warfare, and the Freedom Academy. 

This is why Matt Armstong is one of our nation's true experts on all things related to influence and information, public diplomacy, and psychological operations.

He shows us there is nothing new under the sun.  

This short essay is very much worth the read.

Also, two videos are at the link.

It's not new, we're just ignorant

Our modern Maginot Line does little against political warfare

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/its-not-new-were-just-ignorant?utm=

MATT ARMSTRONG

APR 04, 2024

In the early 1980s, a Soviet defector gave lectures and interviews on “ideological subversion,” which, he noted, could also be called “active measures” or “psychological warfare.” I would add it could also be referred to as political warfare. In public engagements, Yuri Bezmenov described the four stages of this ideological subversion that intended to change how target audiences perceived reality. For an overview, see the interview below; for a deeper dive, see this one-hour lecture he gave in 1983.

Two weeks ago, I had the pleasure of sitting on two panels at the Connexions24 conference in Austin, Texas. For the first panel, “From Reactive to Proactive: The United States & Information Warfare,” I spoke a bit about the misunderstanding of “information warfare,” a term that tends to focus minds on a munition and thus how to “counter” that munition rather than the myriad of other salient issues related to the aggression, and the more fitting label of political warfare. I also spoke about the need to fix the pipelines to leadership – the schoolhouses, from public administration schools to political science to international relations and beyond – to expand the aperture and include the role of public opinion in foreign affairs and national security. I pointed out that political warfare is cheap asymmetric engagement that our adversaries would be stupid not to use, especially since they’ve suffered virtually no repercussions. It enables them to bypass the Maginot Line of our military deterrence, where we’ve placed virtually all of our proverbial eggs of national defense. I shared that I didn’t come up with the Maginot Line analogy myself, but rather, I began using this reference after reading a 1955 article on the gray areas and military deterrence by a guy the audience likely heard of, Henry Kissinger. I had the opportunity to discuss the propaganda of the word propaganda and its damaging effects on understanding, education, organization, and policy.

As it is my habit of emphasizing the issues of today are not new, I shared two quotes from the past as part of my eight-or-so-minute opening and in the Q&A.

Why should a leader, who was so keenly aware of the political and ideological significance of the war, have felt that the way to win it was to ignore its political and ideological aspects?

This is from 1946 as the author looked forward to the post-war world. It is a serious question that deserves an in-depth discussion, which is something for another time. It remains a fitting question today. Next.

We have lost and lost and lost in the cold war for one primary reason: we have been amateurs fighting against professionals. So long as we remain amateurs in the critical field of political warfare, the billions of dollars we annually spend on defense and foreign aid will provide us with a diminishing measure of protection.

I’ve shared this before on these pages. It’s from Senator Thomas J. Dodd arguing in support of something called the Freedom Academy (from which 

The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa is named) in 1961. The FA was to be under an independent federal agency and established to provide analysis and instruction on adversarial political warfare to educate US government and civil society leaders, and the same in allied nations, to anticipate and proactively pre-empt, or at least be better at reactively countering adversarial actions.Bezmonov came up during the Q&A of my second panel, “A World Wide Web: Countering Foreign Interference & Information Manipulation.” My friend Jeff Trimble asked for my thoughts on Bezmenov’s four stages of ideological subversion, which Jeff read out. You can hear Jeff’s question at about the 1:15 mark in the video below, followed by my response and that of my fellow panelists.

It is probably safe to say that many would view the statements from the early 1980s and the general principles they represent as revelatory. I agree, but not because of the reasons most probably think. The revelation here is the perceived reality that this was new then or is new now. Not everyone thinks that, of course. See Todd Leventhal’s 

Todd's Newsletter , Timothy Snyder’s Thinking about..., Thomas Rid’s work, and Asha’s substack, which I mentioned above, are just a few names in what might seem like a long list but is actually a relatively small cadre. I feel that I could, with relative ease, compile a longer list than what might be compiled today of authors who, in the 1940s through early 1960s, wrote extensively on this topic from informed positions, having served in – including the executive and the legislature – and near government, and raised serious alarms.Finding a report or conference discussion that thinks everything is new is not difficult. The technological evolution is relative, as similar concerns about social media today were raised about the telegraph in the 1890s, with relatable fears from the reduced cost of moving people and ideas around the world, and penetrating borders and bypassing traditional gatekeepers, with increasing speed surfacing nearly every decade thereafter. Possibly another new thing is that Russia and China, lacking any real penalty for their actions, don’t need to expend the energy to cover their tracks. On the whole, the means and objectives aren’t new. Far from it. The surprise someone might avoid the Maginot Line is evergreen. The only really new thing is the proverbial call now often comes from within our house.

Dealing with adversarial political warfare did not fit – and still does not fit – the concept of international relations as perceived by the United States today and yesterday. The threat has been ignored, minimized, dismissed, and allowed with limited repercussions, often because of fears the adversary might escalate its aggression. When addressed, it is usually through covert means. Through national security policy priorities, budgets, and organization, the US government continues to reveal its lack of interest in arming itself for the war it is now and has been in.

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So, how did I respond to Jeff’s question about the Russian concept of ideological subversion that surfaced in the 1980s? Revealing whatever shock his comment may have had was the result of a perceived reality in the US government, an indifference inculcated by foreign policy education and bureaucratic inertia that discounted the political warfare, or whatever you want to call it, waged against US interests for the past nearly eighty years. Naturally, I replied with a statement from 1964. What I recited is the bolded bit below, with more of the Congressional testimony from which it was drawn included for context.

I submit that a new agency of this type as outlined in H.R. 5368 is called for, because the conflict itself is of a new type unprecedented in the history of this Nation, a type of conflict for which we are very poorly organized. We have been conducting the cold war as if it were a traditional conflict between great-power interests. This type of conflict, with which the 19th century has made us familiar, turns on territories, boundaries, and the imponderables of a nation’s position among other nations. Its ultima ratio is a military test of strength, for which nations prepare through armaments and alliances. In this kind of conflict, one tries to protect one's interests while avoiding war as much as possible. If war breaks out, though, one fights it until a peace treaty is achieved, after which the contestants continue as nations, albeit in different political circumstances. … 

In the cold war, it not boundaries and territories, spheres of influence and relative power which are at stake, even though all these play certain role. Nor war the ultima ratio of this struggle. Nor is a peace treaty the prospective outcome if war should break out. The Communists are fighting to dissolve, decompose, disintegrate, and destroy our society, institutions, authorities, and habits of thought and heart. We are fighting to free our society from this kind of assailant. The Communists do not look on war as their chosen means to obtain their ends. In all their history, they have opted for a minimum of force when coming to power, and for a maximum of force and terror only after they had secured full control of the public means of com pulsion. They have gained access to these means mostly with the help of allies with whom they were united in coalitions and whom they destroyed as soon as they had become public officials.

Internationally, the same is true. We have armed ourselves and successfully maintained a formidable alliance. We have deterred the enemy from any large-scale military attack on us. But in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America the Communists have established new positions of strength without military attack. Our military ramparts are still strong. But the enemy has moved underneath and around them, even in our midst, creating a neutralist movement directed against the possession or use of nuclear weapons. These are not the methods of conventional great-power conflict. We are fighting an enemy who controls a nation and often looks like that na tion's representative, but has aims and motives quite different from those of a national government. We are threatened by an intent that assaults not merely our power but our way of life. And we are confronted by methods of persuasion, manipulation, and subversion the like of which no great nation has faced before.

I am saying all of this in order to establish to some extent the reason why we have done poorly in the cold war so far. I believe that this is not due to any “softness on communism” in leading circles, as has been often alleged, but simply to a confusion of the cold war with a traditional great-power conflict. And that confusion I do not think stems from sinister motives. The truth is that our Government is now organized in its external capabilities to meet the kind of threat that is involved in a traditional great-power conflict, the only kind of power conflict with which we have been familiar.

The above is one of many statements I’ve identified over the past dozen years that could easily be repackaged with minor editing as a presentation today. (I did this once… about 80% of a presentation was from 1946.) The speaker was Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, then a political science professor at Notre Dame. He previously served at the State Department, had been faculty at the National War College, and had also been faculty at Yale and Columbia Universities. I could have drawn from Niemeyer’s 1959 testimony on the same issue or from countless others, but the above provided a concise reply. I hadn’t shared Niemeyer’s quote before, so it was something fresh. And yes, he’s arguing in support of the Freedom Academy above, as he also did in 1959.

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As for the old tried and true, here are two quotes I first used publicly in a January 2017 War on the Rocks article. The first is from 1962 by Senator Karl Mundt, formerly Representative Mundt.

We train and prepare our military people for the war which we are not fighting and which we hope will never come, but we fail to train our own citizens and our representatives abroad to operate in the cold war — the only war which we are presently fighting.

The second is from 1963 by a group called the Orlando Committee. It expresses their disappointment at the expected death of the Freedom Academy concept at the hands of Senator J. William Fulbright.

Someday this nation will recognize that global non-military conflict must be pursued with the same intensity and preparation as global military conflicts.

Both remain fitting testaments to the present. Worse, there is no indication of change on the horizon, either from the executive or the legislature. The result is essentially grassroots efforts across government to adapt as they can to the historical lack of strategy, priority, integration, support, and resources from decades of decisions from the many occupants in the Oval Office through the more numerous cabinet secretaries on down.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf.
• Social media users have alleged that Lebanese Hezbollah’s representative to Iraq, Mohammad Hossein al Kawtharani, traveled to Najaf, Iraq, possibly to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s response to Israel killing IRGC Brig Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces around Gaza City.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters around Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days, suggesting that Israeli forces are advancing into the area.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that the main point of dispute in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations is over the return of displaced people to different parts of the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: The Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russian forces have deployed to a new observation post along Syria-Golan Heights border.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech emphasizing Syria’s role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
• Iran: Iranian leaders are continuing to hold Israel and the United States responsible for the April 1 airstrike targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Syria and vowing to exact revenge.
• Yemen: US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking said that the United States is trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 3, 2024

Apr 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 3, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

The Axis of Resistance is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction while others are militias over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi criticized the “land bridge,” which passes through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, in a speech on April 3.[1] Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes similarly declared on April 1 that the group is prepared to arm Iranian-backed militants in Jordan and “cut off” land routes that reach Israel.[2]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ desire to disrupt the “land bridge” is likely part of a larger Axis of Resistance effort to economically isolate Israel. These threats come as Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly called for Muslim countries to institute a blockade on Israel.[3] Iranian state media similarly has criticized countries that have allowed Israel to conduct trade through their territory.[4] Iranian state media has further argued that the “land bridge” renders Houthi attacks targeting Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea “ineffective.”[5] Israel has increasingly relied on the Israeli-UAE overland trade route to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[6] The Houthis have conducted over 40 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023.[7] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50 percent since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks.[8]

Kaabi separately discussed the West Bank, Israeli settlers, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba operations in his April 3 speech. Kaabi claimed that Israel is “confused” by the “emerging Palestinian resistance” in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.[9] Kaabi also claimed that Israeli settlers are “returning to their countries of origin” because they feel unsafe in Israel.[10] This claim is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iranian leaders seek to stoke economic, political, and security turmoil in Israel to facilitate Israeli citizens’ emigration [11] Kaabi lastly claimed that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba will “expand” its attacks if the IDF continues operating in the Gaza Strip and reiterated the militia’s commitment to removing US forces from Iraq.[12]

Social media users have alleged that Lebanese Hezbollah’s representative to Iraq, Mohammad Hossein al Kawtharani, traveled to Najaf, Iraq, possibly to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s response to Israel killing IRGC Brig Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify these rumors at this time. Iran and Hezbollah have long relied on Kawtharani to manage and unify the often-fractious Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, especially since the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in 2020. A UK-based, Middle East-focused outlet previously reported in January 2024 that Kawtharani had traveled to Baghdad to “coordinate an escalation in operations” against US forces in Iraq.[14] Kawtharani’s January 2024 visit to Baghdad marked his first trip to Iraq in two years.[15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Kawtharani in August 2013 for promoting Lebanese Hezbollah’s interests in Iraq, including providing “training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi sectarian armed groups.”[16] The US State Department announced in April 2020 that Kawtharani “facilitates the actions of groups operating outside the control of the Government of Iraq that have violently suppressed protests, attacked foreign diplomatic missions, and engaged in widespread organized criminal activity.”[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf.
• Social media users have alleged that Lebanese Hezbollah’s representative to Iraq, Mohammad Hossein al Kawtharani, traveled to Najaf, Iraq, possibly to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s response to Israel killing IRGC Brig Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces around Gaza City.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters around Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days, suggesting that Israeli forces are advancing into the area.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that the main point of dispute in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations is over the return of displaced people to different parts of the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: The Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russian forces have deployed to a new observation post along Syria-Golan Heights border.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech emphasizing Syria’s role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
• Iran: Iranian leaders are continuing to hold Israel and the United States responsible for the April 1 airstrike targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Syria and vowing to exact revenge.
• Yemen: US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking said that the United States is trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces around Gaza City on April 3. Hamas fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in Tuffah, northeast of Gaza City.[18] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, separately conducted a combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces south of Gaza City.[19]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters around Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days, suggesting that Israeli forces are advancing into the area.[20] Hamas fired a thermobaric rocket targeting Israeli forces east of Deir al Balah on April 3.[21]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis on April 3. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and IDF Givati Brigade are operating in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis. Israeli forces detained and killed Palestinian fighters.[22] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) located unspecified weapons in Khan Younis.[23] Israeli engineering forces and the IDF Air Force destroyed weapons depots and militia infrastructure in the area.[24] The IDF reported on April 3 that its 7th Brigade has been operating in Qarara in northern Khan Younis.[25] Israeli forces located and destroyed a rocket launcher in an olive grove and engaged Palestinian fighters in the area.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on April 3. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired anti-tank shells targeting Israeli forces in al Amal neighborhood.[26] The group also mortared Israeli forces in an unspecified area in western Khan Younis.[27]

This map displays engagements between Israeli and Palestinian ground forces across the Gaza Strip. The locations depicted are not exact.

Axios reported new details of a virtual meeting between senior US and Israeli officials to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[28] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met virtually with Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on April 1.[29] Unspecified sources with direct knowledge of the meeting said that the Israeli delegation presented a plan to evacuate over one million people from Rafah over at least four weeks.[30] The US side responded saying that the timeline was an unrealistic estimate and that the current humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip did not create confidence in Israel’s ability to conduct an orderly evacuation. Israel rejected a US claim that an evacuation ought to take four months. The sources said that the US message to the Israelis was that the IDF needs to operate more slowly and with lower intensity than it did in Gaza City and in Khan Younis.

The Qatari prime minister said on April 3 that the main point of dispute in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations is over the return of displaced people to different parts of the Gaza Strip.[31] Hamas has made the return of all displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip a major point in its negotiation demands, along with a comprehensive permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and adequate humanitarian relief.[32] Al Jazeera reported on April 1 that the Israeli negotiators in Cairo amended their stance on the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip to a gradual return of 60,000 people into the northern Gaza Strip.[33] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office reported on April 2 that Israel has created an “updated” ceasefire proposal for Hamas to review.[34]

Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) was responsible for mistakenly directing the airstrike that killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen (WCK) in the Gaza Strip on April 1.[35] The report noted that the Nahal Brigade has killed over two dozen Hamas fighters in the same area over the past few weeks. It also said that Hamas often tries to take control of humanitarian aid convoys. Unspecified senior IDF officials reportedly warned IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi in recent days that their coordination mechanism with international aid organizations in the Gaza Strip was not functioning properly. The IDF inaugurated a joint command between the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—and the IDF Southern Command on April 3 to improve the coordination between Israeli military headquarters and the management of humanitarian aid.[36] US President Joe Biden said following the attack that the Israeli government “has not done enough to protect aid workers.”[37]

PIJ launched rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on March 3.[38]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 2.[39] The IDF conducted a “divisional operation” in al Faraa camp, south of Tubas.[40] Hamas, PIJ, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate shooting attacks targeting Israeli forces there.[41] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also targeted Israeli forces with unspecified IEDs.[42]

Palestinian media cited local sources claiming that Palestinian fighters targeted the Qalandia checkpoint north of Jerusalem with an IED.[43]

A 26-year-old Arab Israeli conducted separate car ramming and stabbing attacks in central Israel on April 3.[44] The individual targeted four Israeli police officers at a temporary checkpoint in Kochav Yair, which borders the West Bank.[45] He then drove south to the Eliyahu crossing, where he attempted to stab security guards stationed there.[46] Israeli security forces at the Eliyahu crossing shot and killed him. Israeli police identified the attacker as a resident of Tira in central Israel.[47]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 2.[48]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on April 2 to have conducted a drone attack targeting Haifa Airport in Israel.[49] Israeli officials and media have not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claim.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on April 3 emphasizing Syria’s role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.[50] Nasrallah’s comments follow an Israeli airstrike in Syria that killed a senior Iranian military commander and some of his top subordinates on April 1.[51] The speech was for a “Quds Platform” event, which included speeches from Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi.[52] Nasrallah singled out Syria in the speech and said that Syria has not “modified or changed its position” despite the “daily aggression” that it faces.[53] Israel has been conducting an air campaign to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military material to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria throughout the current war. Nasrallah added that Syria is the “incubator and supporter of all resistance movements” in the region. Nasrallah also praised militia operations in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Yemen.[54]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking said that the United States is trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[55] Lenderking said that the Biden administration would consider—but not guarantee—revoking the Houthi’s terrorist designation if the Houthis stopped attacks into the Red Sea.[56] He also said that the Houthis could demonstrate a “show of good faith” and “intent to deescalate” by releasing the crew of the Galaxy Leader, which the Houthis hijacked in November 2023.[57]

Iranian leaders are continuing to hold Israel and the United States responsible for the April 1 airstrike targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Syria and vowing to exact revenge. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called Israel’s airstrike in Syria “desperate” and claimed that it is not enough to save Israel from failure in the Israel-Hamas war. Khamenei made these remarks during a pre-scheduled meeting for Ramadan.[58] IRGC spokesperson Brig. Gen. Ramazan Sharif announced that the funeral ceremony for the IRGC officials killed in Damascus will take place simultaneously with the World Quds Day march in Tehran on April 5.[59] Quds Day is an annual anti-Israel holiday established by Iran that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[60] Sharif further stated that the killing of IRGC officers increases the IRGC’s and Iranian people’s motivation to confront Israel. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated that the Israeli airstrike would not go unanswered.[61]

UK-based Amwaj media, citing an unspecified political source in Iran, outlined three potential Iranian responses to the April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Syria.[62] The source stated that Iran will not likely target Israel directly but may target an Israeli diplomatic target abroad. Iranian officials and state media similarly suggested on April 2 that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response.[63] The source alternatively said that Iran may respond in a way that is unclear to others but clear to Iran and Israel. This approach could include targeting a Mossad center, such as those the regime alleges are in Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan.[64] The source lastly said that Iran may avoid a quick response for the time being.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced on April 3 that Russian forces have deployed to a new observation post along Syria-Golan Heights border.[65] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the purpose of the observation post is to “maintain order and peace in Syria” and that the post was established in mutual agreement with the Syrian regime. Russian forces have previously bolstered their position in southern Syria during the Israel-Hamas War, reportedly to “monitor the ceasefire” between Israel and Syria.[66] Russian forces most recently established a joint observation post with the Syrian Arab Army on the border with the Golan Heights on March 13.[67]

The Iranian rial depreciated to a record low of 634,000 rials to the US dollar on April 3.[68] A member of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce claimed that the recent rial exchange rate fluctuations were a “temporary” response to the Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officers in Syria on April 1. The value of the rial was 32,000 rials to one US dollar when the United States and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015.[69]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian attended the 19th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) security council secretaries meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on April 2 and 3.[70] This event marked Ahmadian’s first time attending an SCO meeting since becoming SNSC secretary in May 2023 and since Iran became a full member state in July 2023.[71] The meeting participants discussed items related to the SCO’s stated mission as a collective security organization, including combating terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and confidence-building-and-security-measures.[72] Ahmadian also held separate bilateral meetings with his SCO counterparts on the sidelines of the wider meeting to discuss the implementation of bilateral economic, defense, and security cooperation agreements.[73] CTP-ISW previously assessed in July 2023 that Iran likely seeks to use its membership in the SCO to circumvent sanctions through non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries, accelerate the construction of various regional transit corridors which will confer new sources of revenue, and reap military benefits from participating in the SCO’s combined counterterrorism and naval exercises.[74]

The Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry arrested two alleged members of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—in Qom on April 2.[75] Iranian state media reported that the two suspected ISKP members were attempting to conduct an unspecified attack on the Fatima Masumeh Shrine in Qom, which is considered the second holiest site in Iran for Shias.[76] These arrests follow an uptick in Salafji-jihadi activity across several Iranian provinces in recent months and years.[77] Two ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani, killing at least 84 civilians and wounding dozens of others, on January 3.[78] ISKP similarly conducted two attacks on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, in August 2023 and October 2022.[79]

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to have increased the number and size of mechanized ground assaults on select sectors of the frontline within the past two weeks, marking a notable overall increase in Russian mechanized assaults across the theater.
• Russian forces may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to stress that the piecemeal and delayed arrival of new Western systems to Ukraine will allow Russian forces to adapt to and offset the likely operational benefits these systems would otherwise provide to Ukrainian forces.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reported Russian efforts to increase force generation this spring.
• Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov warned that Russian companies and local authorities must defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes and not rely on Russian air defenses following the April 2 Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan.
• Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov complained on April 3 that no current Russian political party adequately represents the political interests of Russian ultranationalists, highlighting a possible source of discontent between the pro-Russian ultranationalist community and the Kremlin.
• Ukraine and Finland signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on April 3.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian authorities continue to expand social benefits for Russian military personnel.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 3, 2024

Apr 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

April 3, 2024, 8pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on April 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces appear to have increased the number and size of mechanized ground assaults on select sectors of the frontline within the past two weeks, marking a notable overall increase in Russian mechanized assaults across the theater. Ukrainian officials stated on March 20 that Ukrainian forces repelled a large Russian assault in the Lyman direction and published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces damaging or destroying several Russian armored vehicles east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[1] Ukrainian forces later defeated a battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) on March 30 to which Russian forces reportedly committed at least 36 tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[2] A Ukrainian serviceman stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 Russian tanks and eight IFVs during the assault near Tonenke, and Russian forces have likely only conducted one other mechanized assault of that scale along the entire frontline since the beginning of the Russian campaign to seize Avdiivka in October 2023, which was also near Terny on January 20.[3] Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized Russian assault near Terny.[4] The April 3 footage is likely recent and is distinct from the March 20 footage of Russian assaults near Terny. Russian forces may be intensifying mechanized assaults before muddy terrain becomes more pronounced in the spring and makes mechanized maneuver warfare more difficult. Russian forces may also be intensifying mechanized assaults to take advantage of Ukrainian materiel shortages before the arrival of expected Western security assistance.[5]

Russian forces may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine. The intensification of Russian mechanized assaults has occurred generally at the same time as intensified missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities.[6] Russian forces escalated its strike campaign in Ukraine by beginning a new pattern of striking hydroelectric power plants around March 22, for example.[7] Russian forces may be intensifying strikes to further pressure the Ukrainian command to deploy air defense systems away from the front in order to more safely intensify aviation operations in support of ground operations.[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces have been gradually moving materiel and personnel to frontline positions in small increments making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to monitor Russian force accumulations, suggesting that Russian forces have been preparing for larger-scale assault operations.[9] US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stated on April 3 that the US assesses that Russia has “almost completely reconstituted militarily” over the past several months, suggesting that Russia is preparing and may already have sufficient manpower and materiel to significantly intensify ongoing offensive operations or initiate offensive efforts in new areas of the theater.[10]

Ukrainian sources continue to stress that the piecemeal and delayed arrival of new Western systems to Ukraine will allow Russian forces to adapt to and offset the likely operational benefits these systems would otherwise provide to Ukrainian forces. Politico Europe reported on April 3 that unspecified high-ranking Ukrainian military officers stated that provisions of new Western systems are arriving too late and in insufficient quantities to have maximally effective operational impacts on the battlefield.[11] The Ukrainian officers reportedly stated that Russian forces rapidly adapted to the marginal advantages that new Western-provided weapons systems provide, eliminating those advantages.[12] The Ukrainian officers reportedly pointed to the arrival of Western anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and HIMARS as systems that arrived at the right time to help Ukrainian forces protect Kyiv in the early months of the full-scale invasion and liberate Kherson City in November 2022, respectively.[13] The Ukrainian officers stated that other Western-provided weapon deliveries have not been so timely, however. The officers reportedly stated that Russian forces are likely already optimizing Russia’s air defense network to counter the arrival of F-16 fighter aircraft, which are scheduled to arrive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024. Russian forces have shown the capacity to adapt to fighting in Ukraine both through mass as well as through steady, though uneven, operational, tactical, and technological.[14] The Russian military’s demonstrated ability to adapt, even if uneven or relatively slow, means that Ukrainian forces have a limited window of opportunity to maximally effectively use new Western systems to achieve operationally significant impacts. Individual systems pose specific challenges to Russian forces, and Russian forces would likely struggle to adapt as easily or quickly as they have previously if Ukrainian forces could employ several new systems at scale simultaneously. The arrival of new Western systems in a timely manner would likely allow Ukrainian forces to significantly degrade Russian forces and prevent even marginal Russian tactical gains while also providing Ukraine with capabilities necessary for operationally significant counteroffensive operations

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reported Russian efforts to increase force generation this spring. The Russian MoD claimed on April 3 that Russian military recruitment centers have documented a significant increase in the number of people applying for military service contracts throughout Russia.[15] The Russian MoD claimed that 16,000 Russian citizens have signed military service contracts over the past 10 days and emphasized that most applicants indicated that their main motive for signing a military contract was to “avenge” the victims of the Crocus attack. The Russian MoD claimed that more than 100,000 Russians have signed military service contracts since the beginning of 2024. Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently attempted to falsely implicate Ukraine in the Crocus attack. If accurate, suggests that the Kremlin’s information operation may have been successful.[16] The fear and instability that the Islamic State’s (IS) attack created in Russian society may have spurred some Russian citizens to sign up for military service. The Russian MoD may alternatively be running a simultaneous information operation designed to portray Russians as increasingly signing military contracts for revenge to further convince others to sign contracts and justify its long-term war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 3 that Russia is preparing to “mobilize” an additional 300,000 personnel on June 1.[17] Zelensky may be referring to Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to increase contract service applications following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, but Zelensky is likely not referring to another wave of Russian partial mobilization akin to Russia’s September 2022. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 22 that high-ranking Russian officials stated that the Russian MoD plans to increased force generation starting in the spring and that Russia may intend to generate an additional 300,000 personnel within an unspecified time frame.[18] Russian authorities continue to deny Russian and Ukrainian claims about an imminent Russian partial or general mobilization order, and ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities would likely intensify crypto-mobilization efforts before deciding to conduct another unpopular wave of mobilization.[19]

Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov warned that Russian companies and local authorities must defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes and not rely on Russian air defenses following the April 2 Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan. Minnikhanov stated on April 3 that “there is no need to wait for [Russian] missile defense to work...we must decide on our own, every enterprise, every municipality, every city.”[20] Minnikhanov stated that Russians should “wake up” and realize that “no one will protect you except yourself.” Russian military sources recently told Russian state outlet Izvestia that the Russian military is forming mobile fire groups to combat Ukrainian drones, indicating that Russia may be unable to deploy conventional air defense systems to defend all of Russia’s critical facilities.[21] ISW assessed that Ukraine’s April 2 strikes on targets in Tatarstan likely represent a significant inflection in Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes far into rear Russia’s areas.[22] Minnikhanov’s statement is likely a reflection of increased Russian concern following the April 2 strikes and is a clear acknowledgment and admonition of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) failure to defend Russian cities and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes.

Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov complained on April 3 that no current Russian political party adequately represents the political interests of Russian ultranationalists, highlighting a possible source of discontent between the pro-Russian ultranationalist community and the Kremlin. Tsaryov responded to a recent claim by Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, that there is an absence of Russian nationalism in Russian politics, stating that Russian nationalism and demands for the Kremlin to implement nationalist ideals are increasing.[23] Tsaryov claimed that an official nationalist political party could provide the nationalists with a legal avenue through which to pursue policy changes without discrediting themselves and allow more radical nationalists to work with the mainstream nationalists, presumably as part of a Russian nationalist political coalition.[24] Now-imprisoned ardent nationalist Igor Girkin previously founded the Angry Patriot’s Club, his failed initiative to provide fringe Russian ultranationalists with a platform that directly opposed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and conduct of the war in Ukraine.[25] Tsaryov’s call for an official nationalist political party highlights a grievance that mainstream Russian ultranationalist milbloggers may develop over the long term as Putin aims to further increase control over the ultranationalist information space and fails to implement some of their desired political changes.[26] Putin likely aims to suppress any possible ultranationalist political movement that could oppose his regime as he did with the Angry Patriots by having Girkin arrested.[27] Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest against Ukraine is insufficiently nationalist for Tsaryov.

Ukraine and Finland signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on April 3.[28] Finland also announced a new military aid package to Ukraine worth 188 million euros (about $204 million) that includes air defense materiel and large-caliber artillery ammunition.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to have increased the number and size of mechanized ground assaults on select sectors of the frontline within the past two weeks, marking a notable overall increase in Russian mechanized assaults across the theater.
• Russian forces may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to stress that the piecemeal and delayed arrival of new Western systems to Ukraine will allow Russian forces to adapt to and offset the likely operational benefits these systems would otherwise provide to Ukrainian forces.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reported Russian efforts to increase force generation this spring.
• Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov warned that Russian companies and local authorities must defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes and not rely on Russian air defenses following the April 2 Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan.
• Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov complained on April 3 that no current Russian political party adequately represents the political interests of Russian ultranationalists, highlighting a possible source of discontent between the pro-Russian ultranationalist community and the Kremlin.
• Ukraine and Finland signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on April 3.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian authorities continue to expand social benefits for Russian military personnel.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful roughly company-sized mechanized assault west of Kreminna and resumed limited assaults immediately west of Svatove as of April 3. Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault east of Terny (west of Kreminna) with first person view (FPV) drones, artillery, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).[30] It is unclear when Russian forces conducted this assault, but it was likely recent. The recent roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Terny suggests that the Russian command is prioritizing the Lyman direction and may further intensify the tempo of their offensive operations in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 2 that Russian forces seized Ukrainian strongpoints west of Svatove, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Andriivka (west of Svatove).[31] Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Svatove near Raihorodka in the summer of 2023 but have since rarely conducted assaults in the area.[32] It remains unclear if Russian forces will continue offensive operations immediately west of Svatove. Positional fighting continued elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[33]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian logistics and command infrastructure in the Kupyansk direction. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike on a Ukrainian command post in Borova (west of Svatove) on April 2.[34] Russian milbloggers amplified footage on April 3 purporting to show Russian forces striking a bridge across the Oskil River near Kupyansk-Vuzlovy (immediately east of Kupyansk).[35] Russian forces damaged bridges across the Oskil River during a coordinated strike campaign in September and October 2023 and may be targeting crossings once again in an effort to isolate the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on April 3. Geolocated footage published on April 2 shows that Russian forces recently advanced into southwestern Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Ivanivske towards Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[38] Positional fighting also continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne and Vyimka; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanvika; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne.[39] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate east of Chasiv Yar.[40]

Russian sources discussed the struggles that Russian forces are facing in their effort to seize Chasiv Yar. A Russian milblogger complained that Russian infantry largely have to conduct dismounted infantry assaults west of Bakhmut despite heavy Ukrainian drone operations and that some Russian infantry only train for a week and a half before deploying to Bakhmut, contributing to significant Russian losses.[41] The milblogger claimed that some infantry must operate on foot for several days and that these prolonged dismounted operations also generate large losses. Other milbloggers forecasted that dense Ukrainian minefields, defense-in-depth, and prepared indirect firing positions in and near Chasiv Yar will likely present significant challenges for the Russian effort to seize the town.[42]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued fighting in the area on April 3. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers in width and depth towards the Umanske-Netaylove line (both west of Avdiivka) in recent days.[43] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from Berdychi and Semenivka (both west of Avdivka).[44] While ISW has not yet observed confirmation of this claim, ISW currently assesses that Russian forces occupy most of Berdychi. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further into the southern outskirts of Semenivka, although ISW has only observed evidence of a Russian presence in the southernmost part of the settlement.[45] Fighting also continued west of Avdiivka near Tonenke, Umanske, and Yasnobrodivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[46] Elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Tonenke despite taking heavy losses on March 30.[47]

Positional fighting continued southwest of Donetsk City on April 3. Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced near a windbreak southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Mashinostroitel community garden north of Novomykhailivka and advanced 500 meters southwest of Timiryazeva Street in southern Novomykhailivka.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to encircle Novomykhailivka from the north and south.[50] Positional fighting also continued near Mykilske (southwest of Donetsk City and southeast of Vuhledar).[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to fight west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka.[52] Elements of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 26th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (36th CAA), and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the south Donetsk direction.[53]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area amid continued positional fighting in the area on April 3. Geolocated footage published on April 2 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Pryytune (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] Positional fighting also continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) repelled a Ukrainian attack along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[56] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[57] Elements of the Russian 1152nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating near Robotyne.[58]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on April 3, including near Krynky, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[59] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces “somewhat” changed their assault tactics in the east bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting a larger number of assaults with smaller groups.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[61]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that there are two Russian force groupings operating in southern Ukraine – the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions and the Eastern Grouping of Forces operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area.[62] Mashovets reported that the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces consists of elements of the 58th, 18th, and 49th CAAs (all SMD); the 14th Army Corps (Northern Fleet); and the 7th, 76th, and 104th airborne (VDV) divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces consist of elements of the 5th, 29th, 35th, and 36th CAAs (all Eastern Military District [EMD]); the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet); and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet). Mashovets reported that the “Dnepr” and Eastern groupings of forces in total consist of 180,000 to 182,000 personnel. Mashovets stated that there are an additional 13,500 Russian military personnel in the “Crimean Defense Grouping” and at least 14,000 Rosgvardia personnel in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk warned on April 3 that Russian forces can still conduct Kalibr cruise missile strikes despite successful Ukrainian operations repelling the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) from the western part of the Black Sea.[63] Humenyk stated that Russian forces have deployed missile carriers twice in the past month before mass drone strikes against Ukraine. Humenyuk reported that the Russian BSF has nine Kalibr missile carriers, including surface ships and submarines.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched limited drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 2 to 3 and during the day on April 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian mobile fire groups destroyed all of the Shaheds over Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of April 2 to 3.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck Donetsk Oblast with three S-300 missiles on the night of April 2 to 3, and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin later stated during the day on April 3 that Russian forces struck Selydove, Donetsk Oblast, with two additional unspecified ballistic missiles.[65]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia has launched almost 1,000 missiles, 2,800 Shaheds, and almost 7,000 glide bombs against Ukraine since the beginning of 2024.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue to expand social benefits for Russian military personnel. Chairperson of the Russian state-run “Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation, Anna Tsivileva, stated during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 2 that the foundation has processed 910,000 social benefit cases and resolved 780,000 cases from Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine since the foundation opened in June 2023.[67] The “Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation provides government support to Russian servicemen and veterans and helps provide rehabilitation and social support to wounded veterans and their families.[68] Tsivileva stated that the “Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation has opened branches in all of Russia’s federal subjects, including in occupied Ukraine.[69] Putin stated during the meeting that the Russian Ministry of Defense‘s (MoD) military medical commission will provide soldiers serving in Russian private military companies (PMCs) with combat disability status.[70] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on April 3 that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers has placed a special emphasis on quickly providing benefits for Russian servicemen who fight in Ukraine and that Russian authorities will exempt servicemen from paying property taxes.[71]

Russian officials continued to praise the claimed successes of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and appear to be actively working to overcome Russia’s reliance on Western-made machine tools. Mishustin stated on April 3 that Russia’s DIB significantly increased its production of weapons and equipment in 2023.[72] Mishustin stated that Russia increased its production of machine tools by more than 60 percent by the end of 2023 (presumably compared to 2022) after not developing Russia’s machine tool production for the past 30 years.[73] Mishustin stated that Russia will allocate 300 billion rubles ($3.25 billion) from the federal budget to machine tool production over the next six years.[74] A recent report by Lithuanian intelligence indicated that Russian intelligence services likely continue to source foreign-made precision machine tools and operate them to produce Russian military equipment despite sanctions, however.[75]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on April 3 that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces have around 100 Su-35 multi-purpose fighter aircraft, over 100 Su-34 fighter bombers, and seven A-50 long range radar detection aircraft as of March 2024.[76] The GUR stated that Russia is currently repairing and modernizing two A-50 aircraft at the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast and one A-50 aircraft at the “Aviastar” aircraft construction plant in Ulyanovsk, Ulyanovsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces have reportedly downed more than 15 Su-34 and Su-35 fighters and two A-50 aircraft since the beginning of 2024, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this reporting.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue efforts to falsely implicate Ukraine and the West as sponsors of terrorism following the Kremlin’s failure to prevent the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office sent inquiries to the United States, Germany, France, and Cyprus about their possible involvement in organizing and financing a number of alleged “terrorist” attacks on Russian territory.[78] The Russian Federation Council called on the United Nations (UN) to condemn alleged Western encouragement of terrorism.[79] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed that the Ukrainian embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is recruiting mercenaries to fight in Ukraine, likely attempting to further rhetorically connect Ukraine to the Tajik attackers that conducted the Crocus City Hall attack.[80] The Washington Post reported on April 2 that the US government warned Russian officials that the Crocus City Hall concert venue was a potential target two weeks ahead of the attack, prompting Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova to deny the Washington Post‘s report as a “hoax.”[81] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov avoided responding to the Washington Post report altogether.[82] The Kremlin will likely continue alleging that Ukraine and the West are responsible for the attack as it continues efforts to capitalize on domestic fear and anger to generate perceptions about a wider Ukrainian and Western terrorist threat in hopes of increasing Russian domestic support for the war in Ukraine.[83] ISW remains confident that Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or aided the attack.[84] Russian law enforcement and intelligence responses in the North Caucasus — such as a counterterrorism raid in Dagestan on March 31 and intensified measures targeting Central Asian migrants in Russia are further evidence that Russian authorities in practice assess that the terrorist threat is emanating from Russia’s Central Asian and Muslim minority communities instead of Ukraine.[85]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov warned on April 3 that Russian actors are conducting information operations about hypothetical Russian offensive operations from Belarus and about Russian efforts to seize Kharkiv City in order to sow panic within Ukraine.[86] Yusov added that Ukrainian officials have not observed anything “strategically new” concerning the deployment of Russian forces that would indicate that there is any validity to these Russian information operations, which is consistent with ISW’s own assessment.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that the Russian military continues to use Belarusian airfields during military exercises and that Ukraine does not rule out the possibility of Russian aircraft conducting airstrikes from Belarus, given that Russian forces in Belarus conducted combat operations against Ukraine leveraging staging areas and airfields in Belarus in February 2022.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

8. Exclusive: State Department officials told House investigators they created Afghanistan withdrawal plans from scratch

When are we going to learn? So many breakdowns.

Excerpts:

The transcripts of their interviews with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, obtained exclusively by CNN, are the latest tranche of more than a dozen interviews conducted by the committee as a key part of Republican Chairman Michael McCaul’s ongoing investigation into the 2021 evacuation that involved the deaths of 13 US service members.

McCaul is planning to put out a report later this year that includes overall takeaways from the interviews, as well as State Department notes the House Foreign Affairs Committee has received from the agency’s own review of the withdrawal. Biden administration officials expect that the report will be timed with a political motive: to bring the Afghanistan withdrawal back to the fore during the heat of the presidential election.

The new details paint a picture of the chaos outside the Kabul airport and the ad-hoc nature of the evacuation, something that top US military generals suggested could have been mitigated if the State Department had called sooner for a “noncombatant evacuation operation” – known as a NEO – for remaining US citizens in Afghanistan.

Exclusive: State Department officials told House investigators they created Afghanistan withdrawal plans from scratch | CNN Politics

CNN · by Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler · April 4, 2024

U.S military aircraft takes off at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 28, 2021.

Wali Sabawoon/AP

CNN —

Hours of closed-door testimony from three top State Department officials shed new light on the “unprecedented” situation in the final days of the US presence in Afghanistan as the officials were rushed to the country with virtually no time to prepare and no established emergency evacuation plan in place when they arrived.

The three officials, John Bass, Jim DeHart and Jayne Howell, were all plucked from unrelated assignments and rushed into Afghanistan in the hours after Kabul fell to the Taliban due to their extensive experience in Afghanistan.

The transcripts of their interviews with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, obtained exclusively by CNN, are the latest tranche of more than a dozen interviews conducted by the committee as a key part of Republican Chairman Michael McCaul’s ongoing investigation into the 2021 evacuation that involved the deaths of 13 US service members.

McCaul is planning to put out a report later this year that includes overall takeaways from the interviews, as well as State Department notes the House Foreign Affairs Committee has received from the agency’s own review of the withdrawal. Biden administration officials expect that the report will be timed with a political motive: to bring the Afghanistan withdrawal back to the fore during the heat of the presidential election.

The new details paint a picture of the chaos outside the Kabul airport and the ad-hoc nature of the evacuation, something that top US military generals suggested could have been mitigated if the State Department had called sooner for a “noncombatant evacuation operation” – known as a NEO – for remaining US citizens in Afghanistan.

“It is my assessment that that decision came too late,” Gen. Mark Milley, the now-retired Joint Chiefs chairman, said at the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing last month. The State Department has continued to publicly defend its decision making around the NEO as well as the ending of the war.

Pool

Related article Top generals who oversaw US withdrawal from Afghanistan slam State Department for delaying emergency evacuation

A State Department spokesperson, asked about the interviews, said that “each of the current and former Department officials interviewed by the Committee worked alongside thousands of other personnel from the Department and the military to evacuate nearly 124,000 U.S. citizens, Afghan allies, and international partners, a massive and extremely challenging military, diplomatic, and humanitarian undertaking conducted under extraordinary circumstances.”

“It was the right decision to end the 20-year war in Afghanistan, the longest war in American history, and bring our troops home,” the State Department spokesperson told CNN Wednesday. “That decision has allowed the U.S. to better address the foreign policy challenges of the present and future, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.”

No working evacuation plan in place

All three of the officials rushed to Kabul in the days surrounding the Taliban’s seizure of the capital city, and dove into creating systems on the fly alongside the US military and with constantly-changing input on the ground and coming from DC.

Though officials who had worked at the embassy leading up to the evacuation told the committee investigators in separate interviews that planning for a NEO began in April or May, the officials who arrived in August said that no such clearly articulated plan served as their guide.

“I cannot emphasize enough to you that minute to minute, what was happening was changing,” Howell said in her July 2023 interview.

Every single US embassy around the world is required to have a NEO that can be used in the case of emergency evacuation situations, but the officials explained that the dangerous and over-crowded Kabul airport environment would have rendered any preformed plans ineffective and instead forced them to constantly adapt.

DeHart said they had to “create from scratch tactical operations that would get our priority people into the airport.” He added: “we were roughly as effective as we could be under the circumstances.”

Bass, who served as the top State Department coordinator on the evacuation efforts on the ground, echoed those sentiments.

“We were already in the midst of executing an evacuation that substantially exceeded I think the scope and scale of what had been contemplated,” explained Bass.

This image from a video released by the Department of Defense shows US Marines at Abbey Gate before a suicide bomber struck outside Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 26, 2021, in Kabul Afghanistan.

Department of Defense/AP

There was no time for them to prepare before landing in Afghanistan. Bass was serving at the Foreign Service Institute when he said he was asked to take up the role by then-Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and he departed eight to ten hours later. DeHart, who worked as Bass’ deputy, left from his posting as coordinator for arctic affairs in Washington. Howell, who served as senior consular officer on the ground, traveled to Afghanistan directly from her posting in Turkey.

The officials had virtually no briefings ahead of their arrival. Bass said in his January 2024 testimony that “given how fluid the situation was on the ground, I’m not sure that additional preparation time would have yielded a significant benefit.”

But the weighty challenge was overwhelming for the consular officers, who vetted the people seeking to leave on US flights. They faced constantly changing directions in terms of who could be evacuated, and how many people could be evacuated, which led to an air of frustration.

“On a human level, that’s quite frustrating… it was required because of the circumstances,” said DeHart as he discussed the constantly changing guidance that consular officer would receive. In some cases, the new guidance meant that someone they had just turned away could have been let in.

Taliban obstacles

The efforts to get people into the airport compound faced countless setbacks, many of which were caused by the Taliban, which maintained security perimeters throughout the city and violently stopped people from reaching the airport.

“The situation was evolving constantly,” Howell said.

“It was the Taliban. It was what will the Taliban allow? What will they let people move through and how will they do it?” she said.

Howell noted that “it was very rare that all the gates (into the airport) were open” because there was so much chaos and violence as people desperately tried to get into the airport. The military would close them when they were deemed unsafe to operate at, Howell explained.

Howell described Abbey Gate, the site of the deadly ISIS-K bombing on August 26 that killed 13 American servicemembers, as “always the one with the most violence, the most issues with the Taliban, the most issues with crowd control.”

Because of the danger and chaos around the big gates into the airport, US officials tried to find other ways to get Americans and vulnerable Afghans in. Those efforts also were met with challenges from the Taliban.

Howell spoke of one incident where she had been briefed that the Taliban agreed to “admit Americans in a controlled fashion” into a passenger terminal, only for them to do nothing “they had agreed to do, and tens of thousands of people overran the passenger terminal.”

Howell said that after having worked on Afghanistan for 19 years it was “a little bit wild to tell people that you can trust the Taliban,” but explained that it was a necessity given the circumstances.

State Department criticism from Pentagon

On the whole, accusations about who was responsible for the chaotic final weeks have fallen largely along party lines, with Republicans pointing fingers at the Biden administration and Democrats casting blame on the Trump administration for the deal that set the US withdrawal into motion.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley speaks during a hearing with the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the Rayburn House Office Building on March 19, 2024, in Washington, DC.

Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

And when focusing on the withdrawal itself, the handling of the evacuation operation has been one of the areas where the administration, and specifically the State Department, has received the most criticism, as some Americans and thousands of Afghans who had served alongside US forces were left behind.

Milley and retired Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, who were in charge of the US military during the withdrawal, blamed the State Department for not ordering a NEO sooner.

McKenzie, the former commander of US Central Command, said that “the events of mid- and late August 2021 were the direct result of delaying the initiation of the NEO (evacuation) for several months, in fact, until we were in extremis, and the Taliban had overrun the country.”

State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said in response to the testimony that “the embassy maintained an active emergency action committee planning process that convened repeatedly in 2021 to assess the situation on the ground.”

“It’s also well documented that the US did not want to publicly announce planning for or the start of a NEO so as to not weaken the position of the then-Afghan government, potentially signaling a potential lack of faith,” he said at a press briefing last month.

The State Department officials did not weigh in on whether calling a NEO sooner would have had a substantial impact, as this would have preceded their arrival in Afghanistan. They told congressional investigators they were unsure if additional planning would have mitigated the dynamic challenges they faced.

Although the State Department has faced sharp criticism from the Defense Department – most recently in a congressional hearing with retired Gens. Mark Milley and Kenneth McKenzie – the transcripts suggest there were few of those divisions at play on the ground. Instead, officials spoke to an immense level of coordination within the Kabul airport to try get as many Americans and Afghan allies out of the country before time ran out.

Coordination with the military

And on the ground, as they grappled with the frenzied and fluid situation, State Department officials and service members at Hamid Karzai International Airport were regularly coordinating.

In his January interview, Bass said that “on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis in terms of the operational coordination of aspects of the NEO, I was engaging the senior military commanders regularly.”

DeHart said that he “didn’t find the chain of command to be unclear at any time.” Instead, he found that the emergency environment stripped away the typical bureaucratic constraints and allowed personnel on the ground to respond quickly to the constantly evolving challenges.

Howell described her experience coordinating with the military as “absolute lockstep,” noting that such levels of coordination were “unprecedented in (her) career.”

CNN · by Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler · April 4, 2024

9. Houthis may be running low on their weapons stocks as attacks on ships slow, US commander says

Wishful thinking? I hope this is an accurate estimate.

Houthis may be running low on their weapons stocks as attacks on ships slow, US commander says

AP · April 3, 2024

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WASHINGTON (AP) — Houthi rebels in Yemen may be running through their supplies of drone swarms and anti-ship ballistic missiles as the pace of their attacks has slowed a bit, the top U.S. Air Force commander for the Middle East said Wednesday.

Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who heads U.S. Air Forces Central, said that the persistent American retaliatory strikes on the Iran-backed militia group have “certainly affected their behavior. Their pace of operations is not what it was.”

The Houthis have been conducting near daily attacks on commercial and military ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, launching drones and missiles from rebel-held areas of Yemen. The attacks -- which are often unsuccessful but at times have struck the ships — have disrupted a crucial shipping route.

In response, the U.S. and allies have been forced to increase their military ship presence along the waterway, and on several occasions have launched wider retaliatory strikes on ammunition, weapons and other facilities. U.S. ships and fighter jets have also been routinely bombing Houthi drones and missiles that are in place and preparing to launch.

Grynkewich said it’s difficult to know exactly how much the Houthis’ weapons supplies have been eroded by the U.S. strikes, because officials didn’t have a detailed intelligence assessment of their capabilities before the attacks began.

“The challenge for us is understanding what the denominator was at the beginning. In other words, what did they have on hand to start with? We obviously know how much we have struck and we have assessments of how successful those strikes were.” he said. “ The other complicating factor is Iranian resupply.”

He said the U.S. believes the Houthis had dozens of anti-ship ballistic missiles when they started, and they’ve launched dozens. So understanding how much Iran is able to restock the group is key.

The Houthis have defended their campaign as an effort to pressure Israel to end its war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The ships they’ve targeted, however, have largely had little or no connection to Israel, the U.S. or other nations involved in the war.

Speaking to reporters, Grynkewich said the Houthis are more independent and more difficult for Iran to control than other Tehran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. Those groups have largely paused their attacks on U.S. forces at based in Iraq and Syria since early February, when the U.S. launched a massive retaliatory assault against the groups and sites connected to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

U.S. officials have said they believe pressure from Iran was part of the reason for the pause. But Grynkewich said the Houthis are “not quite as responsive” to Iranian direction.

He said that even if Iran tried to crack down on the Houthis or cut off weapons or other supplies, it would take time for that to have an effect.

AP · April 3, 2024

10. All the Houthi-US Navy incidents in the Middle East (that we know of)

​Rather than making goal line stands and destroying Houthi incoming missiles and drones just before they strike, why don;t we rush the quarterback and conduct deep attacks to destroy large numbers of Houthi weapons and capabilities before they can be employed? Seems like this would be more cost effective and I would bet a large amount of money that military planners are advising to do this on a much larger scale that what may have already taken place. What is holding us back from conducting a more cost effective defense (that employs offensive capabilities)? What is the political rationale for restringing military operations that would better defend US interests?

All the Houthi-US Navy incidents in the Middle East (that we know of)

By Jonathan Lehrfeld, Diana Stancy and Geoff Ziezulewicz

militarytimes.com · by Jonathan Lehrfeld · 

Editor’s note: This report was updated on April 2, 2024, at 7:00 a.m. Eastern Time.

Below is a running list of every instance where a U.S. Navy ship or jet has shot down a Houthi attack, and every instance where the United States and its allies have hit back at Houthi sites in Yemen, since October.

The list is based on incidents publicly confirmed and announced by U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, as well as reporting by Military Times and The Associated Press.

Send any feedback to: jonathan.lehrfeld@militarytimes.com.

U.S. destroyers are confirmed to have participated in at least the following number of incidents, according to CENTCOM:

• USS Thomas Hudner: 2
• USS Gravely: 4
• USS Mason: 8
• USS Laboon: 10
• USS Carney: 12

April 2024

April 1, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a surface drone.

MARCH 2024

March 30, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed two aerial drones, including one over the Red Sea and another on the ground in Yemen that was prepared to launch.

March 28, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four aerial drones over the Red Sea launched by the Houthis in Yemen, which were aimed at a U.S. warship and a coalition vessel.

March 27, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four aerial drones over the Red Sea launched by the Houthis in Yemen, which were aimed at a U.S. warship.

March 23, 2024: The Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea near the M/V Huang Pu, a Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned and -operated oil tanker. CENTCOM said a fifth ballistic missile was fired toward the ship and that it suffered minimal damage. A fire was quickly extinguished and no casualties were reported.

Also, the Navy destroyer Carney and other U.S. forces engaged six aerial drones over the southern Red Sea, five of which crashed into the water and one of which flew inland to Yemen.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

March 22, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four aerial drones and struck three underground storage facilities in Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis fired four anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the Red Sea, but there were no injuries or damage reported.

March 21, 2024: A coalition aircraft destroyed a surface drone and coalition forces destroyed two anti-ship ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis from Yemen toward the Red Sea.

March 20, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed one surface drone and a coalition aircraft destroyed one aerial drone.

March 18, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three aerial drones and three weapons storage containers in Yemen.

March 16, 2024: The Houthis launched two aerial drones from Yemen toward the Red Sea, one of which U.S. forces destroyed while the other CENTCOM said presumably crashed into the water. Later, U.S. forces destroyed five surface drones and one aerial drone in Yemen.

March 15, 2024: The Houthis fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the Red Sea, but there were no injuries or damage reported.

March 14-15, 2024: The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden and another two toward the Red Sea, but there were no injuries or damage reported to U.S. or coalition ships. U.S. forces also destroyed nine anti-ship missiles and two aerial drones in Yemen.

March 13, 2024: The Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden, but it did not hit any ships and there were no injuries or damage reported. U.S. forces then destroyed four aerial drones and one surface-to-air missile in Yemen.

March 12, 2024: The Houthis fired a close-range ballistic missile from Yemen toward the Navy destroyer Laboon in the Red Sea, but it did not hit the ship and there were no injuries or damage reported. U.S. forces and a coalition vessel then destroyed two aerial drones launched from Yemen.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

March 11, 2024: The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles toward the merchant vessel Pinocchio in the Red Sea, but they did not hit the Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged ship.

Later, U.S. forces struck an underwater drone and 18 anti-ship missiles in Yemen.

March 9, 2024: U.S Navy vessels and aircraft, along with multiple coalition navy ships and aircraft, shot down 28 Houthi air attack drones launched into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

March 8, 2024: U.S. forces struck two truck-mounted anti-ship missiles in Yemen. Later, the Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden at M/V Propel Fortune, a Singapore-flagged vessel, which did not hit the ship.

March 7, 2024: CENTCOM forces took out four mobile Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a Houthi air attack drone in Yemen.

U.S. forces also shot down three air attack drones launched by the Houthis toward the Gulf of Aden.

The day’s events took place over less than two hours, according to CENTCOM.

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The Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen are believed to be the first entity to ever fire an anti-ship ballistic missile in conflict.

March 6, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen at a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden, killing three of its crew members. The incident marked the first fatal strike by the Houthis in their campaign of assaults. The attack against the M/V True Confidence, a Barbados-flagged, Liberian-owned bulk carrier also injured at least four other crew members, with three in critical condition.

Later, U.S. forces struck two aerial drones in Yemen that CENTCOM said presented an imminent threat to ships in the region.

March 5, 2024: The Navy destroyer Carney shot down one anti-ship ballistic missile and three aerial drones in the Red Sea launched at it by the Houthis in Yemen.

Later, U.S. forces destroyed three anti-ship missiles and three surface drones.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

March 4, 2024: The Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into the southern Red Sea but it hit the water and did not cause any damage or injuries. Later, the Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden at M/V MSC SKY II, a Liberian-flagged, Swiss-owned container vessel. One of the missiles hit the vessel and caused damage.

U.S. forces later struck two anti-ship cruise missiles that CENTCOM said presented a threat to ships in the region.

March 2, 2024: The M/V Rubymar, a Belize-flagged, U.K.-owned bulk carrier sank in the Red Sea after being struck by the Houthis on Feb. 18. CENTCOM said the fertilizer the vessel was carrying presents “an environmental risk” in the Red Sea and that the sunken ship presents a “subsurface impact risk” to other vessels transiting the shipping lanes of the waterway.

The Italian Defense Ministry said its destroyer Caio Duilio shot down a suspected Houthi drone in the Red Sea that appeared to be flying toward it.

March 1, 2024: U.S. forces struck one Houthi surface-to-air missile that was prepared to launch from Yemen toward the Red Sea. Later, the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into the Red Sea, but there was no impact or damage to any vessels.

FEBRUARY 2024

Feb. 29, 2024: U.S. forces shot down an aerial drone over the southern Red Sea. Later, CENTCOM said forces struck six mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch toward the Red Sea.

Feb. 27, 2024: U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea.

The German frigate Hessen engaged two hostile drones. It also mistakenly fired twice at and missed an American MQ-9 drone.

Feb. 26, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed three unmanned surface vessels and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles in Yemen that were prepared to launch toward the Red Sea. CENTCOM said they also destroyed a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle over the Red Sea.

Feb. 24, 2024: The Navy destroyer Mason shot down an anti-ship ballistic missile launched into the Gulf of Aden from Yemen by the Houthis. CENTCOM said it likely targeted the American tanker M/V Torm Thor.

U.S. forces then shot down two one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles over the southern Red Sea, while a third crashed from an assessed in-flight failure.

Later, the Houthis again tried to likely target the M/V Torm Thor with anti-ship ballistic missile in Gulf of Aden but it instead hit the water.

Shortly after, U.S. and U.K. forces — with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand — struck 18 Houthi targets in Yemen. The targets included Houthi storage facilities, one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, air defense systems, radars and a helicopter.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

Feb. 23, 2024: U.S. forces shot down three Houthi one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles near several commercial ships operating in the Red Sea.

Later, U.S. forces destroyed seven Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch toward the Red Sea.

Feb. 22, 2024: U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down six Houthi one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea, which CENTCOM said likely targeted U.S. and coalition warships. Later, the Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from southern Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. The missiles hit the M/V Islander, a Palau-flagged, U.K.-owned cargo carrier. It caused one minor injury and damage.

The French military separately said it shot down two Houthi drones in the southern part of the Red Sea.

Later, U.S. forces struck four Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch from Yemen toward the Red Sea.

Feb. 21, 2024: U.S. forces struck seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile anti-ship ballistic missile launcher that were prepared to launch toward the Red Sea. CENTCOM forces also shot down a one-way attack unmanned aircraft system.

Feb. 19-20, 2024: U.S. and coalition aircraft and warships shot down 10 one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Navy destroyer Laboon also identified one anti-ship cruise missile headed in its direction, which it subsequently shot down.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

Feb. 19, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the M/V Sea Champion, a Greek-flagged, U.S.-owned grain carrier, in the Gulf of Aden. Minor damage, but no injuries were reported. U.S. forces then destroyed a surface-to-air missile launcher in Yemen. CENTCOM also reported an anti-ship ballistic missile was launched but that it did not impact any commercial or coalition ships.

Later, a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle struck the M/V Navis Fortuna, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned bulk carrier. It caused minor damage and no injuries. U.S. forces then destroyed another aerial drone in Yemen prepared to launch at ships in the Red Sea.

Also, the Department of Defense acknowledged that on this day an American MQ-9 Reaper drone went down in the Red Sea off the coast of Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, adding that initial indications showed it was shot down by a Houthi surface-to-air missile.

Feb. 18, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the M/V Rubymar, a Belize-flagged, U.K.-owned bulk carrier. One of the missiles struck the vessel and caused damage.

Feb. 17, 2024: U.S. forces struck three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one unmanned surface vessel and one unmanned underwater vessel in Yemen, marking what CENTCOM said was the first observed Houthi employment of an underwater drone since the attacks began in October 2023.

Feb. 16-17, 2024: U.S. forces struck one mobile anti-ship cruise missile and one mobile unmanned surface vessel in Yemen. Also, the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Red Sea, three of which were assessed to be launched toward the commercial vessel M/T Pollux, a Panamanian-flagged and -registered, Denmark-owned vessel. There were no reported injuries or damage.

Feb. 15, 2024: U.S. forces struck three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles in Yemen that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea. Also, the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden toward the M/V Lycavitos, a Barbados-flagged, U.K.-owned and -operated bulk carrier. The ship reported no injuries but very minor damage in the attack and continued its voyage.

Feb. 14, 2024: U.S. forces struck seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, three mobile unmanned aerial vehicles and one explosive unmanned surface vessel in Yemen that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.

Feb. 13, 2024: U.S. forces struck one mobile anti-ship cruise missile in Yemen that was prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea. Later, one anti-ship ballistic missile was launched by the Houthis in Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. U.S. Navy ships tracked the missile but took no action because the missile was not projected to impact near any ships.

Feb. 12, 2024: Houthi militants fired two missiles from Yemen toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Both missiles launched toward the M/V Star Iris, a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged cargo vessel transiting the Red Sea with corn from Brazil. The ship, which was bound for Iran, reported being seaworthy with minor damage and no injuries to the crew.

Feb. 10, 2024: U.S. forces struck two unmanned surface vessels and three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea. CENTCOM did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

Feb. 9, 2024: U.S. forces struck two mobile unmanned surface drones, four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile land attack cruise missile that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea. CENTCOM did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

Feb. 8, 2024: U.S. forces conducted seven strikes against four Houthi unmanned surface drones and seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.

Feb. 7, 2024: CENTCOM forces conducted “self-defense” strikes against two Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles in Yemen that were set to launch. Later, CENTCOM forces conducted another strike against a Houthi mobile land attack cruise missile prepared to launch. CENTCOM did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

Feb. 6, 2024: Houthi militants fired six anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen toward the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Navy destroyer Laboon shot down one of the anti-ship ballistic missiles that was attempting to hit the M/V Star Nasia, a Marshall Islands-flagged, Greek-owned and -operated bulk carrier transiting the Gulf of Aden.

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The surface fleet has shot down scores of attack drones and missiles since October, activity without modern precedent in U.S. Navy history.

Other missiles targeted a Barbados-flagged, U.K.-owned cargo ship, M/V Morning Tide that was operating in the southern Red Sea, but they did not strike the ship.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

The Navy destroyer Laboon at work in the Red Sea in December. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Alice Husted/Navy)

Feb. 5, 2024: CENTCOM conducted a strike in self-defense against two Houthi

drones carrying explosives.

Feb. 4, 2024: CENTCOM conducted a strike against a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile in Yemen, as well as a strike against a Houthi land attack cruise missile. Later, U.S. forces struck four anti-ship cruise missiles, all of which were prepared to launch.

Feb. 3, 2024: CENTCOM conducted strikes against six Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea. Later, U.S. and allied forces conducted strikes against 36 Houthi targets at 13 locations in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.

(U.S. Central Command)

Feb. 2, 2024: The Navy destroyer Carney engaged and shot down an aerial drone over the Gulf of Aden. Later, CENTCOM conducted strikes against four Houthi attack drones in Yemen that were prepared to launch. That same day, the Navy destroyer Laboon and F/A-18 Super Hornet jets from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group engaged and shot down seven drones over the Red Sea.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney, USS Laboon and F/A-18s from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

Feb. 1, 2024: CENTCOM conducted strikes against 10 Houthi attack drones and a drone ground control station in Yemen. The same day, U.S. forces engaged and shot down another drone over the Gulf of Aden. U.S. forces also destroyed an explosive-laden Houthi surface drone in the Red Sea. Later, two anti-ship ballistic missiles were launched from Houthi areas in Yemen toward the M/V Koi in the Red Sea, a Liberian-flagged, Bermuda-owned cargo ship.

(U.S. Central Command)

JANUARY 2024

Jan. 31, 2024: The Navy destroyer Carney shot down an anti-ship ballistic missile fired from Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden. Later in the day, the Carney engaged and shot down three Iranian air drones in its vicinity.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Jan. 31, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a Houthi surface-to-air missile prepared to launch from Yemen.

Jan. 30, 2024: The Navy destroyer Gravely shot down an anti-ship cruise missile fired over the Red Sea. It got within a nautical mile of the Navy destroyer Gravely. The warship used its Phalanx Close-In Weapons System to take the missile out, a defense official later confirmed.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Gravely.

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Gravely used its Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, a cannon that can shoot 4,500 rounds a minute, to take out the Houthi missile.

Jan. 28, 2024: The U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast response cutter Clarence Sutphin Jr. seized advanced conventional weapons and other lethal aid originating in Iran and bound to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen from a vessel in the Arabian Sea.

Jan. 27, 2024: The British warship HMS Diamond shot down a Houthi drone in the Red Sea, using its Sea Viper missile system.

Jan. 27, 2024: U.S. forces struck a Houthi anti-ship missile in Yemen that was aimed at the Red Sea and prepared to launch.

Jan. 26, 2024: Houthis fired one anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen and struck the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker M/V Marlin Luanda in the Gulf of Aden. Following the missile strike, a major fire ensued in one of the cargo holds, but no injuries were reported. The Navy destroyer Carney, the French Navy frigate FS Alsace and Indian Navy frigate INS Visakhapatnam all responded and the ship remained seaworthy.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Jan. 26, 2024: Houthis launched a missile at the Navy destroyer Carney while it patrolled the Gulf of Aden, and the warship shot it down. It was believed to be the first direct attack on a U.S. Navy ship since hostilities broke out in October.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Sailors assigned to the Navy destroyer Carney in the ship’s Combat Information Center. (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Lau/Navy)

Jan. 24, 2024: Two American-flagged ships carrying cargo for the U.S. defense and state departments came under attack by the Houthis. One missile landed in the Gulf of Aden, while two others were successfully engaged and shot down by the Navy destroyer Gravely.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Gravely.

Earlier that day, U.S. forces struck two Houthi anti-ship missiles in Yemen that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch.

Jan. 22, 2024: U.S. and allied forces struck eight Houthi targets in Yemen. The U.S. and U.K. used warship- and submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles and fighter jets to take out Houthi missile storage sites and launchers.

Jan. 20, 2024: U.S. forces struck a Houthi anti-ship missile that was aimed into the Gulf of Aden and was prepared to launch.

Jan. 19, 2024: U.S. forces conducted strikes against three Houthi anti-ship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch. The strikes were carried out by F/A-18 Super Hornets off the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: F/A-18 aircraft off the Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.

(U.S. Central Command)

Jan. 18, 2024: U.S. forces struck two Houthi anti-ship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch. The strikes were carried out by F/A-18 Super Hornets. Later, Houthi militants launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at M/V Chem Ranger, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned, Greek-operated tanker ship. The crew observed the missiles impact the water near the ship and there were no reported injuries or damage to the ship.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets.

Jan. 17, 2024: A one-way attack drone was launched from Yemen and struck the M/V Genco Picardy, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned and -operated bulk carrier ship, in the Gulf of Aden. There were no injuries and some damage reported. Later, U.S. forces conducted strikes on 14 Houthi missiles that were loaded and ready to fire in Yemen.

The strikes followed the official announcement that the U.S. put the Houthis back on its list of specially designated global terrorists. The sanctions that come with the formal designation are meant to sever violent extremist groups from their sources of financing.

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Jan. 16, 2024: U.S. forces struck and destroyed four Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles prepared to launch from Yemen. Later, Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea. M/V Zografia, a Maltese-flagged bulk carrier, reported it was struck but seaworthy and continuing its transit. There were no reported injuries.

Navy Times editor Geoff Ziezulewicz explains’ the U.S. Navy’s role in the Red Sea as Houthi rebels continue their attacks.

Jan. 15, 2024: U.S. forces detected an anti-ship ballistic missile fired toward the southern Red Sea’s commercial shipping lanes. The missile failed in flight and impacted on land in Yemen. Later, Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen and struck the M/V Gibraltar Eagle, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned and -operated container ship. The ship reported no injuries or significant damage.

Jan. 14, 2024: Houthis fired an anti-ship cruise missile from Yemen toward the Navy destroyer Laboon, which was operating in the southern Red Sea. The missile was shot down off the coast of Yemen by U.S. fighter jets.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon; fighter jets.

Jan. 13, 2024: The Navy destroyer Carney struck a Houthi radar site in Yemen using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

(Navy)

Jan. 11, 2024: Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into international shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden.

Shortly after, the U.S. and British militaries bombed scores of sites used by the Houthis in Yemen, a massive retaliatory strike using warship- and submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles and fighter jets. Support came from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Bahrain. The U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command said it struck more than 60 targets at 16 sites, including “command-and-control nodes, munitions depots, launching systems, production facilities and air defense radar systems.” The strikes marked the first U.S. military response against the Houthis in Yemen for the persistent campaign of drone and missile attacks on commercial ships since the start of the war in Israel.

With air strikes and missiles launched from around the region, the U.S. and U.K. struck back at Iran-backed rebels targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Jan. 9, 2024: Houthi rebels launched a “complex attack” of drones and missiles targeting ships in the Red Sea. F/A-18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, the destroyers Gravely, Mason and Laboon and the British warship HMS Diamond downed 18 drones, two cruise missiles and an anti-ship missile.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: F/A-18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Gravely, USS Laboon and USS Mason.

Jan. 6, 2024: The Navy destroyer Laboon shot down in self-defense an air drone over the Red Sea fired by Houthis in Yemen.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

Jan. 2, 2024: Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen into the southern Red Sea.

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) conducts flight operations in response to increased Iranian-backed Houthi malign behavior in the Red Sea, Jan. 22, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kaitlin Watt)

DECEMBER 2023

Dec. 30–31, 2023: The Singapore-flagged, Denmark-owned and -operated container ship Maersk Hangzhou reported it was struck by a missile while transiting the southern Red Sea. The Navy destroyers Gravely and Laboon responded, and while responding, the Gravely shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles fired from Yemen toward the ships.

Hours later, four boats tried to attack the same ship, but U.S. forces opened fire, killing several of the armed crews. U.S. helicopters from the Eisenhower and Gravely responded. The small boats fired upon the U.S. helicopters with crew-served weapons and small arms. The Navy helicopters returned fire, sinking three of the four small boats, and killing the crews. The fourth boat fled the area.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Gravely and USS Laboon; helicopters from the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Dec. 28, 2023: The Navy destroyer Mason shot down one drone and one anti-ship ballistic missile in the southern Red Sea fired by the Houthis.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

Sailors at work aboard the Navy destroyer Mason in January in the Red Sea. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Krucke/Navy)

Dec. 26, 2023: The Navy destroyer Laboon and other U.S. forces shot down a dozen drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles and two land attack missiles in the Red Sea over a 10-hour period.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon, F/A-18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Dec. 23, 2023: The Navy destroyer Laboon shot down four attack drones that were “inbound” to the warship in the Red Sea. After shooting down the drones, the Laboon responded to distress calls after two commercial vessels came under attack.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

Dec. 18, 2023: Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the creation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a new initiative between the U.S. and a host of other nations to protect ships transiting the Red Sea that come under attack by the Houthis.

Dec. 18, 2023: A chemical/oil tanker motor vessel, the Cayman Islands-flagged Swan Atlantic, was attacked by a one-way attack drone and an anti-ship ballistic missile launched from Yemen. It reported being hit and requested assistance. The Navy destroyer Carney responded.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Dec. 16, 2023: The Navy destroyer Carney, operating in the Red Sea, took out a swarm of 14 air attack drones launched from Yemen.

• U.S. ships & assets involved: USS Carney.

Dec. 15, 2023: A drone launched from Yemen struck the Liberian-flagged Motor Vessel AL JASRAH as it was traveling south in the Red Sea, which caused a fire that was later extinguished. Later, Houthi forces launched two ballistic missiles toward the international shipping lanes in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. One of these struck the Liberian-flagged M/V PALATIUM 3, which reported that it was on fire. The Navy destroyer Mason responded and rendered assistance.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

The Navy destroyer Mason gets resupplied by the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea in January. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Krucke/Navy)

Dec. 14, 2023: A ballistic missile was fired from Yemen toward the international shipping lane north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Dec. 13, 2023: In the southern Red Sea, the Navy destroyer Mason responded to a mayday call from the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Motor Vessel Ardmore Encounter, which was under attack from Houthi forces. While responding to the distress call, the Mason shot down a drone.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

Dec. 11, 2023: The Navy destroyer Mason came to the aid of a commercial ship, the Motor Tanker Strinda, that was struck by a cruise missile in the Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

Dec. 9, 2023: The French navy announced the frigate Languedoc shot down two Houthi drones in the Red Sea that were launched from Yemen.

Dec. 6, 2023: The Navy destroyer Mason shot down an air drone that was launched from Yemen.

• U.S. ships & assets involved: USS Mason.

Dec. 3, 2023: The Navy destroyer Carney shot down multiple air drones during an hours-long drone and missile assault against commercial ships by Houthis in the Red Sea.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Flight ops aboard the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea in January. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kaitlin Watt/Navy)

NOVEMBER 2023

Nov. 29, 2023: The Navy destroyer Carney, sailing near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, shot down a drone launched from Yemen.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

Nov 26–27, 2023: The Navy destroyer Mason, with allied ships and associated aircraft from a coalition counter-piracy task force, responded to a distress call from the commercial vessel M/V Central Park that it was under attack by an unknown entity. Later, two ballistic missiles fired from Yemen were launched in the direction of the Mason and Central Park, but the missiles landed in the Gulf of Aden approximately ten nautical miles from the ships.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

Nov. 23, 2023: The Navy destroyer Thomas Hudner shot down “multiple one-way attack drones” while operating in the Red Sea.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Thomas Hudner.

Nov. 19, 2023: Houthi rebels seized a cargo ship in the Red Sea and took its 25 crew members hostage, officials said. The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of the Treasury later referenced the incident.

Nov. 15, 2023: The Navy destroyer Thomas Hudner shot down an air drone in the Red Sea.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Thomas Hudner.

A junior officer stands watch aboard the Navy destroyer Thomas Hudner on Nov. 1, 2023 in the Red Sea. (MC2 Jordan Klineizquierdo/Navy)

OCTOBER 2023

Oct. 19, 2023: The Navy destroyer Carney, in the northern Red Sea, intercepted three land attack cruise missiles and several drones that were launched by Houthi forces in Yemen. The action by the Carney is believed to signal the first shots fired by the U.S. military in the wake of the Palestinian militant group Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

• Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Jonathan is a staff writer and editor of the Early Bird Brief newsletter for Military Times. Follow him on Twitter @lehrfeld_media

Geoff is the editor of Navy Times, but he still loves writing stories. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.

11. Finland signs Ukraine security deal, Zelenskiy warns of Russia troop plans

Finland signs Ukraine security deal, Zelenskiy warns of Russia troop plans

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finland-ukraine-sign-security-agreement-2024-04-03/?utm

By Anna Voitenko

April 3, 20243:42 PM EDTUpdated 15 hours ago

Item 1 of 5 Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Finnish President Alexander Stubb shake hands as they attend a joint press conference, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, April 3, 2024. REUTERS/Alina Smutko

[1/5]Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Finnish President Alexander Stubb shake hands as they attend a joint press conference, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, April 3, 2024. REUTERS/Alina Smutko Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

KYIV, April 3 (Reuters) - Finland's president on Wednesday signed a 10-year security deal with Ukraine in Kyiv where President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said he believed Russia planned to mobilise 300,000 new troops for its war by June.

But Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, quoted by Russian news agencies, said the Ukrainian president's assertion about a new Russian mobilisation was untrue.

The pact signed by President Alexander Stubb and Zelenskiy made Finland the eighth NATO member this year to commit to long-term security cooperation and defence backing for Kyiv as it battles to hold back Russian forces.

Finland, which shares a 1,340-km (830-mile) border with Russia, joined NATO a year ago.

Stubb said Finland would also send 188 million euros ($203 million) in additional military aid, including air defences and heavy-calibre ammunition. That sum took Finland's overall defence contribution to around 2 billion euros during the war.

"We are not giving this military support only for Ukraine to defend itself, we are giving this military support for Ukraine to win this war," Stubb told a joint news conference in Kyiv.

Ukraine relies heavily on Western air defence systems and has faced a recent surge in Russian missile and drone attacks that have battered its energy system.

On the battlefield, Ukraine is on the back foot as military assistance from the United States stalls and Kyiv's troops find themselves outgunned by a larger and better armed foe. Russia has inched forward.

ZELENSKIY SAYS RUSSIA IS PREPARING

Though he provided no evidence to back up his assertion, Zelenskiy told the news conference: "I can say that Russia is preparing to mobilise 300,000 military personnel by June 1."

And later, in his nightly video address, Zelenskiy said: "We clearly understand what Russia is preparing for, what they want, what they want to assemble soldiers for in their army."

He said he had discussed plans and tactics with Ukraine's top military commander, Oleksandr Syrskyi, including "defending out positions, our pressure on Russian positions, our key plans for defensive and offensive actions in the near future".

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied in December that there was a need for Moscow to conduct another wave of mobilisation, something that would be politically sensitive.

On Wednesday, the Russian defence ministry said more than 100,000 people had signed contracts with the army since the start of the year, including about 16,000 in the past 10 days following a deadly attack on a concert hall near Moscow.

Zelenskiy's comments come as the Ukrainian parliament considers an overhaul of the rules governing how Ukrainian civilians are called up into the army.

This week, Zelenskiy signed legislation reducing the draft age to 25 from 27, expanding the number of people who can be called up to fight.

At the news conference, he said he did not think Ukraine needed to mobilise as many as 500,000 more people into the army, an idea floated late last year, but that he did not know yet how many were needed.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Louise Breusch Rasmussen in Copenhagen and Yuliia Dysa in Gdansk; Editing by Stine Jacobsen, Mark Heinrich, Nick Macfie, Sharon Singleton, Ron Popeski and Alison Williams

12. Israel is using artificial intelligence to help pick bombing targets in Gaza, report says

This will generate a lot of discussion (and controversy) especially among those who oppose the use of AI. Will this discredit AI? If the good guy nations outlaw AI in war only outlaw bad guy countries will use AI.

Israel is using artificial intelligence to help pick bombing targets in Gaza, report says | CNN

CNN · by Tara John · April 4, 2024

Smoke rises from Gaza amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, March 17, 2024.

Amir Cohen/Reuters

CNN —

The Israeli military has been using artificial intelligence to help identify bombing targets in Gaza, according to an investigation by +972 Magazine and Local Call, citing six Israeli intelligence officials involved in the alleged program – who also allege that human review of the suggested targets was cursory at best.

The officials, quoted in an extensive investigation by the online publication jointly run by Palestinians and Israelis, said that the AI-based tool was called “Lavender” and was known to have a 10% error rate.

When asked about +972 Magazine’s report, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) did not dispute the existence of the tool but denied AI was being used to identify suspected terrorists. But in a lengthy statement it emphasized that “information systems are merely tools for analysts in the target identification process,” and that Israel tries to “reduce harm to civilians to the extent feasible in the operational circumstances ruling at the time of the strike.”

The IDF said “analysts must conduct independent examinations, in which they verify that the identified targets meet the relevant definitions in accordance with international law and additional restrictions stipulated in the IDF directives.”

However, one official told +972 “that human personnel often served only as a “rubber stamp” for the machine’s decisions” and typically devoted only around 20 seconds to each target – ensuring they are male – before authorizing a bombing.

Reuters

video

Related video José Andrés says IDF strike on World Central Kitchen vehicles was no accident

The investigation comes amid intensifying international scrutiny of Israel’s military campaign, after targeted air strikes killed several foreign aid workers delivering food in the Palestinian enclave. Israel’s siege of Gaza has killed more than 32,916 people, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, and has led to a spiraling humanitarian crisis where nearly three-quarters of the population in northern Gaza are suffering from catastrophic levels of hunger, according to a United Nations-backed report.

The investigation’s author, Yuval Abraham, previously told CNN in January of his work looking into how the Israeli military has been ”heavily relying on artificial intelligence to generate targets for such assassinations with very little human supervision.”

The Israeli military “does not use an artificial intelligence system that identifies terrorist operatives or tries to predict whether a person is a terrorist,” the IDF statement on Wednesday said. But its analysts use a “database whose purpose is to cross-reference intelligence sources, in order to produce up-to-date layers of information on the military operatives of terrorist organizations.”

Human officers are then responsible for verifying “that the identified targets meet the relevant definitions in accordance with international law and additional restrictions stipulated in the IDF directives,” according to the IDF statement, a process also described by +972.

Night attacks

The magazine also reported that the Israeli army “systematically attacked” targets in their homes, usually at night when entire families were present.

“The result, as the sources testified, is that thousands of Palestinians — most of them women and children or people who were not involved in the fighting — were wiped out by Israeli airstrikes, especially during the first weeks of the war, because of the AI program’s decisions,” it wrote.

The report, citing sources, said that when alleged junior militants were targeted, “the army preferred” to use so-called dumb bombs – unguided missiles which can cause large-scale damage.

Palestinians inspect the damage to a residential building after an Israeli airstrike in the Maghazi refugee camp, central Gaza Strip, Friday, March 29, 2024. (AP Photo/Ismael Abu Dayyah)

Ismael Abu Dayyah/AP

CNN reported in December that nearly half of the 29,000 air-to-surface munitions dropped on Gaza last fall were dumb bombs, which can pose a greater threat to civilians, especially in densely populated territories like Gaza.

According to the IDF statement, it does not carry out strikes where the expected collateral damage is “excessive in relation to the military advantage” and makes efforts to “reduce harm to civilians to the extent feasible in the operational circumstances.”

It added that the “IDF reviews targets before strikes and chooses the proper munition in accordance with operational and humanitarian considerations, taking into account an assessment of the relevant structural and geographical features of the target, the target’s environment, possible effects on nearby civilians, critical infrastructure in the vicinity, and more.”

Israeli officials have long argued that heavy munitions are necessary to eliminate Hamas, whose fighters killed more than 1,200 people in Israel and took hundreds of hostages on October 7, sparking the ongoing war.

CNN’s Vasco Cotovio and Mohammed Tawfeeq contributed to this report.

CNN · by Tara John · April 4, 2024

13. Don’t Call it a Comeback: The Islamic State in an Age of Strategic Competition

A view from a student in Moscow.

Conclusion:

Although the Caliphate in its original form may have fallen, the underlying strategy that allows the Islamic State to operate as a quasi-state entity persists. The reluctance to deal with the aftermath of IS defeat, including its detained fighters and their families, its retreat to Africa as a safe haven, and the resurgence of insurgent cell attacks all provided it with the conditions to ensure its survival. The realignment of worldwide deployments away from combating distant terrorist organizations toward facing Great Powers undermines the U.S.’s counterterrorism apparatus that it invested nearly two decades in establishing—at the same time, the failure to recognize counterterrorism’s broader role in the current geopolitical competition erodes the United States’ strategic advantage in its rivalry with Great Power adversaries.

Don’t Call it a Comeback: The Islamic State in an Age of Strategic Competition - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Benjamin Kurylo · April 4, 2024

The deadly assault by four alleged ISIS-affiliated gunmen at a Moscow concert on March 22nd returned international attention to the threats of global terrorist organizations. Taking the lives of at least 137 civilians, the shooting marked Russia’s worst terrorist attack in decades. ISIS-K—the Islamic State-Khorasan—claimed responsibility. The same organization conducted the Kabul airport attack that killed thirteen U.S. servicemembers in 2021. A 2023 Office of the Director of National Intelligence report said ISIS-K “almost certainly retains the intent to conduct operations in the West and will continue efforts to attack outside Afghanistan.”

Since its declared defeat in 2019, the Islamic State, which once “consumed … the world’s attention [like few, if any, international security threats,]” is frequently downplayed as a low-level insurgency while western strategic focus shifted toward geopolitical competition. With the international spotlight shifted away, the Islamic State (IS) works resolutely to resurrect its former prominence. It retains its capability to conduct devastating strikes across multiple regions, regardless of geopolitical boundaries. As evidenced by dozens of recent attacks across multiple continents, its ideology lives on. In recent years, IS reactivated its cells, operated in detention camps in northeast Syria for recruitment and indoctrination, carried out substantial attacks and prison breakouts, and began a “particularly worrying” expansion in Africa. In 2023, for the eighth consecutive year, IS and its affiliates ranked as the deadliest terrorist group in the world by the Global Terrorism Index.

It is essential to be cognizant of IS’s strategic objectives and how they continue to manifest in the group’s current actions in light of the ongoing security concerns posed by the remnants of the Caliphate and the U.S. transitioning its primary focus away from counterterrorism. Understanding this reality and its implication for the challenges emerging in global politics is essential for the United States to effectively address the shortcomings in its shifting security strategy approach, prevent the recurrence of past threats, and ensure a safer future.

The Islamic State’s Quiet Global Resurgence

Despite the prevailing focus on near-peer threats, the extent and power of IS’s ideological influence, the organization’s resilience, and its members’ unwavering dedication to its goals demonstrate the need for Western intelligence to not lose touch with the threat of terrorism. IS shows its determination to revive its insurgencies, rebuild its forces, and, ultimately, regain territory. According to the Washington Institute, IS has been responsible for 990 attacks over the past year, resulting in over 4,000 casualties. The group maintains a constant presence on the internet and social media platforms, demonstrating sophisticated and prolific use of information and communications technologies, in-line with the strategies that gave rise to the organization in its early days.

The Islamic State remains highly active in Syria and Iraq, with an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 members operating in their former strongholds. Syria, in particular, remains a vulnerable area where the terrorist group can thrive. IS fighters held by the Syrian Democratic Forces represent the world’s largest concentration of terrorists. Additionally, tens of thousands of family members of IS fighters live in overcrowded displaced persons camps. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres described one of these camps, Al-Hol, as “the worst camp that exists in today’s world.” The camp’s population is nearly 55,000, including Syrians, Iraqis, and third-country nationals. The deplorable conditions in detention camps have benefited recruitment, allowing the Islamic State to legitimize its war and indoctrinate and recruit new members. With most of the camp’s population under 12, repatriation and rehabilitation are essential for humanitarian reasons and to prevent the emergence of a new generation of radicalized Islamist fighters. Many countries are reluctant to repatriate their nationals; since the group’s declared defeat in 2019, only 74 IS foreign fighters repatriated, the United States the only Western power to repatriate male fighters.

The United States’ Evolving Counterterrorism Approach and Resulting Challenges

Following 9/11, counterterrorism became the central focus of the United States’ defense and national security agenda and remained a top priority. However, a significant shift in policy occurred in 2018 with the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, which stressed that in light of increased global disorder, “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

History demonstrates that unchecked terrorist threats can swiftly evolve from minor concerns into significant international security issues. President Barack Obama originally characterized the Islamic State as a “junior varsity squad” compared to al-Qaeda, just six months before the group embarked on a significant territorial expansion, effectively establishing itself as a proto-state within Iraq and Syria. By prioritizing other national security issues without maintaining efforts in counterterrorism, the United States risks further complacency that will allow terrorism’s resurgence as a predominant threat. The strategic shift away from counterterrorism without its eradication allowed affiliates of the Islamic State to rebuild. Shifting the strategic focus on one issue at the expense of the other fails to grasp their global relevance and interdependence.

In 2020, the United States adopted an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism strategy. Articulated by President Biden and supported by the National Security Strategy, this strategy implies “[striking] terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground.” The U.S. has consequently aimed to reduce its military footprint in countries where terrorism is a significant concern, instead maintaining a limited number of American soldiers to provide cooperation and support. For instance, approximately 2,500 troops remain in Iraq to offer training and advisory assistance to Iraqi security forces combating IS remnants and countering Iran-backed militia groups. Similarly, in Syria, the United States retains approximately 900 troops collaborating with Kurdish fighters within the semi-autonomous region administered by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Despite the limited military presence, the U.S. forces in Syria play a pivotal role in preventing a potential resurgence of the group.

The relegation of counterterrorism in the United States national security hierarchy, in contrast to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, prompts policymakers to support the complete withdrawal from the ongoing fight against terrorism. In March 2023, a resolution was presented in the House of Representatives aiming to withdraw the United States Armed Forces from Syria. However, as emphasized by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, who took the floor against the resolution, turning away from the effort to counter the IS threat will create conditions conducive to a swift resurgence.

IS in the African Continent and the Influence of Great Powers

The Global Terrorism Index highlights sub-Saharan Africa as a new epicenter of global terrorism, accounting for 59% of total terrorism deaths worldwide. In this region plagued by instability and an alarming increase in military takeovers, the risk of IS gaining a foothold grows. Seven military coups occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa in two years alone, fostering a similar instability that allowed for the Islamic State’s rapid expansion in the Middle East in the 2010s. In June 2022, Al-Naba, the official newspaper of IS’s Central Media Office, identified Africa as the region most likely for the group to re-establish a territorial caliphate, calling it the “land of hijra (emigration) and jihad” and calling on followers to migrate to the African continent.

Diminishing Western influence in Africa amid the growing presence of China and Russia–neither of which are part of the American-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS–complicates efforts to establish a cohesive strategy involving key regional actors and African countries. The United States underscored its intention to counter the expansion of the Islamic State in Africa without directly engaging in local conflicts. Instead, it aims to complement the ongoing initiatives carried out by European and African coalition partners. However, the tensions between European nations and local governments, illustrated by the decreasing European military presence in Africa and the shifting political orientation of African countries towards China and Russia, hamper this approach.

In the ongoing fight against the growing presence of IS in Africa, the United Nations criticized the international community for failing to adequately support the joint force tasked with stabilizing the Sahel region. The end of the French Operation Barkhane in the Sahel made evident the failure to recognize and address the complexity of the region’s conflict environment. Although the operation initially achieved notable success when deployed in 2014, reclaiming significant cities and territories controlled by the Islamic State, it later evolved into a protracted conflict with no clear path to victory, allowing the group to spread freely throughout the continent without any regional strategy to counter it.

The departure of the last French troops deployed in Niger in December 2023 symbolized the end of more than ten years of French anti-jihadist operations in the Sahel and the largest Western effort to fight the Islamic State in Africa. With this departure, the region remains the most affected by terrorism, with growing and pervasive terrorist activity that subsequently led local countries to turn to Russia’s Wagner Group for military support. Wagner’s Africa Corps thus established a foothold in Mali in 2022, in Burkina Faso in January 2024, and is expected to expand to Niger. However, the Russian mercenaries’ inadequate and damaging counter-insurgency operations exacerbated terrorist threats and created the risk of spillover violence into previously untouched countries.

As Africa’s stability becomes precarious, Chinese and Russian influences gain significance and establish a substantial presence, furthering expansionist interests while Western influence continues to diminish.

Russia has strengthened its defense and security ties with Africa through arms sales, joint military training, Russian PMC activities, and signing over 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states. The Kremlin seeks to replace Western powers in the fight against terrorism amid growing anti-Western sentiments in the continent. The 2023 Russia-Africa Summit in Saint Petersburg established counterterrorism as one of the three key mechanisms for the Dialogue Partnership between Africa and Russia.

Wagner is now primarily active in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan, which all have complex relationships with Western nations stemming from colonial legacies. The changing political dynamics in Africa also led to a proliferation of Chinese private military and security companies (PMSCs) operating on the continent, operating under the legal, administrative, and political authority of the CCP. China is currently considering building overseas military bases in several African nations. China’s U.N. representative has recognized terrorism as a major threat in Africa and stressed that they aim to support counterterrorism efforts in the region.

With this ongoing predicament, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS pledged to combat terrorism in Africa and strengthen its regional approach through the Africa Focus Group. In March 2023, the Focus Group marked the first Coalition event in sub-Saharan Africa. It organized as an African-led and civilian-driven counterterrorism effort drawing on the Coalition’s experience in Iraq and Syria to address terrorist group affiliates in Africa. Nevertheless, the patterns of insurgencies of the IS’s affiliates in Africa and the continent’s political landscape provide distinct challenges from the Iraq and Syria experience, requiring a tailored strategy specific to the African setting. Despite six of the Coalition’s newest members being African nations, it currently comprises only 20 African states, failing to attract countries that face severe and active threats from IS, such as Mali and Mozambique, along with other vital African powers. Maintaining a consistent presence and commitment is essential to reassure partners and prevent them from turning to Russian or Chinese alternatives.

Counterterrorism and the Great Power Paradox

Although the Caliphate in its original form may have fallen, the underlying strategy that allows the Islamic State to operate as a quasi-state entity persists. The reluctance to deal with the aftermath of IS defeat, including its detained fighters and their families, its retreat to Africa as a safe haven, and the resurgence of insurgent cell attacks all provided it with the conditions to ensure its survival. The realignment of worldwide deployments away from combating distant terrorist organizations toward facing Great Powers undermines the U.S.’s counterterrorism apparatus that it invested nearly two decades in establishing—at the same time, the failure to recognize counterterrorism’s broader role in the current geopolitical competition erodes the United States’ strategic advantage in its rivalry with Great Power adversaries.

Benjamin Kurylo is a student at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia and is pursuing his undergraduate studies in international relations. Specializing in strategic studies, his research interests include Great Power competition, military strategy, international security issues, and irregular warfare.

Main Image: A destroyed home in Sinjar, Iraq, May 12, 2021 (Photo by Levi Meir Clancy on Unsplash)

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

14. How a steel ball protected Taiwan’s tallest skyscraper in an earthquake

I had no idea about this. Fascinating. Photo at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/04/taiwan-earthquake-taipei-101-damper/

How a steel ball protected Taiwan’s tallest skyscraper in an earthquake

The Washington Post · by Rachel Pannett · April 4, 2024

When a 7.4-magnitude earthquake rocked Taiwan on Wednesday, people inside the island’s tallest skyscraper, Taipei 101, were protected by a large yellow pendulum at the building’s center that helped absorb the shock.

Known as a “tuned mass damper” the 730-ton steel sphere is suspended between several floors at the top of the building, where it can be viewed by the public. The observatory is a popular tourist attraction in the capital city.

The sphere moves back and forth during earthquakes or typhoons that regularly lash the island, absorbing the force of any “violent swinging,” according to the Taipei 101 website. The damper’s engineers say it can curtail the building’s movement by up to 40 percent, reducing the queasiness felt by its occupants.

Closed-circuit TV footage of the Taipei skyline at the moment the earthquake hit shows the pagoda-shaped skyscraper hardly moving. The security camera, mounted on another building, is shaking violently.

Taipei 101 was the world’s tallest building when it was completed in 2004 — a title it held until 2009. As the name suggests, it is 101 stories tall, reaching a height of 1,667 feet, including its spire.

It has a number of other design features that increase its resilience to natural disasters — including 380 piles driven deep into the ground. The deepest is rammed some 30 meters, or almost 100 feet, into the bedrock, which, according to Taipei 101, “is similar to nailing the entire building onto a solid tectonic plate.” Power is supplied to the building via two substations, reducing the risk of an outage.

Taiwan, home to 23 million people, is vulnerable to earthquakes because of its location within the world’s most seismically active zone, known as the Ring of Fire. Nine people were killed and more than 900 injured in Wednesday’s earthquake, the strongest to strike the island in 25 years. A 7.6-magnitude tremor struck central Taiwan in 1999, killing more than 2,400 people.

Taipei 101 is not the only skyscraper in Taiwan and around the world to use damper systems for stability — although it is a rare case in which the engineering is on display.

A design flaw could have doomed a New York skyscraper in the 1970s — even though it had a tuned mass damper, an advanced design feature at the time. The building’s engineer had to hustle to resolve the issue — which was pointed out by a college student — as the hurricane season was approaching.

A video on Taipei 101’s website shows the sphere rocking gently during a Category 5 hurricane in 2015, ranked by scientists as one of the strongest storms in the world that year.

The Washington Post · by Rachel Pannett · April 4, 2024

15. The Only U.S. Lawmaker Born in Ukraine Is Now Skeptical of More Aid

On the one hand not a good sign for the defense of Ukraine. On the other hand she could be a model immigrant who believes in doing what she thinks is best for America because she is an American citizen and an elected American legislator. We should not assume that immigrants will always side with their home country. An immigrant is an American first.

Or has she been co-opted by certain political elements and is that driving her calculus? Does her stance give "permission" or cover for others to vote no because they will be able to say, "See, a Ukrianian-American Congresswoman is opposed to aid to her home country."

The Only U.S. Lawmaker Born in Ukraine Is Now Skeptical of More Aid

Rep. Victoria Spartz speaks of atrocities witnessed by friends and family in Ukraine—but says she won’t vote for the proposed $60 billion aid package for Kyiv

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/victoria-spartz-ukraine-aid-69ef4ed1?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Katy Stech Ferek

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Updated April 4, 2024 12:14 am ET

Rep. Victoria Spartz (R., Ind.) is among a handful of House members born in Europe and the only one from a former Soviet state. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

WASHINGTON—Rep. Victoria Spartz speaks in highly personal terms about the horrors that her friends and family in Ukraine have witnessed since Russia invaded her home country more than two years ago. Her 95-year-old grandmother died several months after a bomb blew out the windows in her apartment. “The stress was hard on her,” she said. 

But when it comes to the U.S. sending billions in more aid to the beleaguered country, Spartz is skeptical. The Indiana Republican, who is one of the House’s most colorful personalities, said she doesn’t support the Senate’s recently passed package that includes $60 billion in Ukraine-related spending along with funds for Israel and Taiwan. Additional money for Ukraine is expected to get a vote in some form in the House this spring.

Spartz’s opposition to the bipartisan bill is a stark example of the divisions among Republicans in Congress over further assistance to Kyiv amid opposition from many GOP voters. In a series of interviews, Spartz, 45 years old, said she wants a clearer strategy from President Biden on U.S. involvement in the war and a closer eye on how aid is spent. She also wants any aid sent to Ukraine to be offered as a loan, and for the administration to pay more attention to issues closer to home.

“I understand the importance of this battle and the implications if Russia is going to prevail, but I’m also not very naive. If we don’t have proper oversight, we are not going to achieve our goals,” she said. “We cannot have these never-ending wars.” 

Voters in Spartz’s suburban Indianapolis district are opposed to Ukraine aid for many of the same reasons, she said, mirroring nationwide pressures on incumbent Republicans.

Ukraine vote expected soon

The matter is expected to come to a head in coming weeks. House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.) has said he is going to put together an alternative proposal to help Ukraine soon after lawmakers return from Easter recess. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) pledged this week he would continue to push back against the “isolationist movement in my own party.”

Many Republicans have raised objections to sending more money to Ukraine, arguing that domestic issues such as border security need attention first. Johnson is expected to have to cobble together a bipartisan coalition made up mostly of Democrats to get any bill passed. 

Workers assessed damage to a building this week following a missile strike in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. PHOTO: ROMAN PILIPEY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Spartz was an early prominent voice for Ukraine. After Russia invaded in February 2022, she gave emotional speeches about neighborhoods under attack. Republican leaders gave her the microphone to criticize the Biden administration for not doing enough to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin. She joined a bipartisan push to ban oil-and-gas imports from Russia and backed a $40 billion aid package for Ukraine that May. 

But she also criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, drawing a rebuke from Kyiv.

Today, Spartz says she has largely moved on from focusing heavily on Ukraine. After months of calling for further oversight and a more clearly defined U.S. strategy, she said she decided to focus on cutting government spending and increasing transparency in the healthcare industry, efforts she said were more worth her time as the Republicans took control of the House. 

“I did what I could, but as one woman standing, I can do so much,” she said. “You can pick [only] so many hills to die on.” 

While opposing the current proposal, Spartz said she might support a package comprised of money for weapons, additional oversight and tighter U.S. border security rules. 

White House officials have briefed Spartz several times and as recently as December, where she and her Republican colleagues were able to ask top administration leaders about their concerns. They have said Biden’s support for Ukraine aid has bipartisan approval and that U.S. officials continue to monitor oversight of aid.

Democrats said they had initially hoped that Spartz could play a stronger role in trying to firm up Republican support for Ukraine aid. Military hawks see the money as a well-spent investment, compared with the money and response that would be required of the U.S. if the conflict escalated.

“There was a sense that she would be one of the Republicans really willing to go out on a limb to help Ukraine,” said Rep. Sara Jacobs (D., Calif.), who traveled to Ukraine with Spartz several weeks before Russia invaded. “Unfortunately, we haven’t seen her harness her personal knowledge of the country and its politics to effectively rally Republicans.”

Reps. Victoria Spartz, Joe Wilson and Steve Cohen visited Kyiv last May. PHOTO: LEV RADIN/ZUMA PRESS

Limited influence in the House

Spartz’s influence is also limited by her lack of close allies in Congress and her unpredictable bearing. One Republican colleague said her arguments during GOP conference meetings can be so hard to follow that it is common for people to walk out when she begins to speak. Spartz says that she speaks quickly when she is passionate about a topic. She disputes that she is a rebel and says she is strategic and determined.

Spartz was a surprise dissenter when she declined to support Rep. Kevin McCarthy last year during more than half of the 15 rounds of voting for a speaker. She broke with most Republicans by protesting plans to remove certain Democrats from their committees, saying leaders need “to stop ‘bread and circuses’ in Congress and start governing.”

Laura Merrifield Wilson, a political-science professor at the University of Indianapolis, said Spartz’s conservative stances play well with constituents, but she would have been miscast as a consensus-building proponent for Ukraine.

“I don’t think she can be that representative, even though she has the narrative, the background and the experience,” she said. 

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Spartz was a teenager when Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union. She said she grew up listening to stories about how Communist leaders made living conditions worse, including a famine in the 1930s that her grandfather survived. 

Born in Nosivka, a city northeast of Kyiv, Spartz met her husband, Jason Spartz, as he traveled through Europe in 1999. She moved to the U.S. soon after that and, after getting an accounting degree, has worked in finance, real-estate development and farming. 

Spartz was elected to Congress in 2020. She is one of eight House lawmakers born in Europe but the only one to come from a former Soviet state. She embraces “Stop Socialism” as a campaign message.

In February, she traveled to a national-security conference in Munich to tell European leaders that they needed to step up their support for Ukraine and spend more on their own defense. 

Seth Jones, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said Spartz has been one of a few lawmakers who have drawn attention to the growing relationship between China and Russia.

Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Rep. Victoria Spartz made an emotional appeal for more U.S. support for Ukraine. PHOTO: WIN MCNAMEE/GETTY IMAGES

GOP primary challenge looms

Spartz announced in February 2023 that she planned to quit Congress, saying she wanted to spend more time with her two daughters. But she reversed her decision a year later, in part because she doesn’t think any of the Republican candidates campaigning for her seat would do a good job.

She now heads into a crowded GOP primary, scheduled for May 7. Top Republican rival Chuck Goodrich, a wealthy state lawmaker who runs an Indianapolis electrical contracting company, has spent more than $1.5 million on ads, some of which attack Spartz for her past Ukraine aid vote. 

“Victoria Spartz sends $40 billion of our tax dollars to Ukraine before the border wall is finished,” the 30-second ad said. “Why does Victoria Spartz put Ukraine first?” 

Recent polling paid for by Goodrich’s campaign shows him close on Spartz’s heels. Spartz has spent about $220,000 as of Dec. 31, according to OpenSecrets.org.

“This is a good example of what happens when you have a spending advantage,” said Nathan Gonzales, editor and publisher of Inside Elections, of Goodrich’s efforts to paint Spartz as overly focused on Ukraine. “When you air more television ads, you get to control the conversation and you get to control the narrative,” he said.

Write to Katy Stech Ferek at katy.stech@wsj.com

16. ‘Misinformation’ Is the Censors’ Excuse

Excerpts:

The approach is attractive to censors because it flatters their vanity, frees them from accountability, and rigs the game against their opponents. Hubris built the Tower of Babel, and the result was semantic chaos. Today we see hubris and semantic chaos in censorship operations that claim to be combatting “misinformation.”

Knowledge can’t be flattened down to information. Once we appreciate the richness of knowledge, we see that anti-“misinformation” projects are miscarriages of civility, decency and the rule of law. We must rediscover the norms of openness, tolerance and free speech. Science, democracy, justice and everything else the censors purport to value depend on public confidence, and confidence depends on those liberal norms.

‘Misinformation’ Is the Censors’ Excuse

They kneecap free-speech advocates by portraying them as defenders of lies.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/misinformation-is-the-censors-excuse-murthy-supreme-court-covid-social-media-27ccb7c8?mod=hp_opin_pos_5#cxrecs_s

By Daniel B. Klein

April 3, 2024 5:35 pm ET

PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES/ISTOCKPHOTO

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments last month in the momentous case of Murthy v. Missouri. At issue is the constitutionality of what government authorities did to censor speech that departed from preferred narratives.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson posed a hypothetical to Louisiana Solicitor General J. Benjamin Aguiñaga: “Suppose someone started posting about a new teen challenge that involved teens jumping out of windows at increasing elevations. . . . Kids all over the country start doing this. There is an epidemic. Children are seriously injuring or even killing themselves in situations. Is it your view that government authorities could not declare those circumstances a public emergency and encourage social media platforms to take down the information that is instigating this problem?”

Mr. Aguiñaga might have countered with a question of his own: What “information”? Whether government authorities would be justified in seeking to suppress such videos is an important question. But it isn’t a question about information, misinformation or disinformation.

What would be the correct information? If we rendered the video as a statement, it would be something like: It is valiant or cool to jump out of third-floor windows. That statement is foolish, wrongheaded, false. But “misinformation”? That is a category error.

What’s “cool” is no more a factual question than whether “Citizen Kane” or “Rear Window” is the better movie. What’s cool to confused kids is a matter of interpretation and judgment, which are far beyond mere information.

In Murthy, however, the government defends its actions in terms of combatting misinformation and disinformation. The administration and other practitioners and proponents of censorship thereby pretend that they are merely protecting the public from cut-and-dried falsehoods. In doing so, they misrepresent their actions and attempt to evade responsibility for arrogating to themselves the decision of what is safe and sound for people to see and hear.

In turn, they portray free-speech advocates as supporting falsehoods, even lies. The “misinformation” stratagem kneecaps them by trapping their objections in the limited dimension of information, forcing them to epistemologize to fight off censorship. Here we are, on the opinion page, talking about how information differs from interpretation and judgment.

The approach is attractive to censors because it flatters their vanity, frees them from accountability, and rigs the game against their opponents. Hubris built the Tower of Babel, and the result was semantic chaos. Today we see hubris and semantic chaos in censorship operations that claim to be combatting “misinformation.”

Knowledge can’t be flattened down to information. Once we appreciate the richness of knowledge, we see that anti-“misinformation” projects are miscarriages of civility, decency and the rule of law. We must rediscover the norms of openness, tolerance and free speech. Science, democracy, justice and everything else the censors purport to value depend on public confidence, and confidence depends on those liberal norms.

Mr. Klein is a professor of economics at George Mason University and author of “Misinformation Is a Word We Use to Shut You Up.”

17. Explaining the diverse mission set of MARSOC's commandos

MARSOC has evolved and arrived. They can do all the major SOF missions.

Excerpts:

Foreign internal defense

Perhaps one of the most relevant mission sets in the modern world is foreign internal defense, or the training and advising of partner forces. During foreign internal defense operations, CSOs work closely with partner forces around the world to build up capabilities and enhance relationships with friends. Foreign Internal Defense focuses on training and supporting friendly forces to enable them to better face off threats.

Excellent cultural skills and proficiency in foreign languages allow CSOs to work directly with partner forces and forget important relationships that can come in handy in contingencies.

Unconventional warfare

Much like their Army Green Berets brethren, CSOs possess the expertise to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations, which involve organizing, training, and leading unconventional warfare forces. Often, these forces consist of resistance movements or indigenous personnel that aim to overthrow an existing government or resist an invader. CSOs provide both strategic guidance and tactical leadership, assisting these forces in achieving their objectives while operating in a non-permissive or denied environment.

One of the best recent examples of a successful unconventional warfare campaign was the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 after Green Berets and CIA paramilitary personnel linked up with the Northern Alliance resistance group.

Explaining the diverse mission set of MARSOC's commandos

sandboxx.us · April 3, 2024

Editor’s Note: This article was sponsored by the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and contains content developed in collaboration with their team.

In the complex theater of modern warfare, the Marine Raider Critical Skills Operators (CSOs) are the razor-sharp edge of the United States Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Forming the core of MARSOC, these elite enlisted warriors are a breed apart, conducting mission sets that go far beyond conventional military roles. Their duties extend from direct action and unconventional warfare to counterterrorism and special reconnaissance, making them versatile and formidable in today’s dynamic global security landscape.

Today we’ll look into and explain the multifaceted mission set of Marine Raider Critical Skills Operators, offering a glimpse into the specialized skills and training that allows them to safeguard U.S. interests at home and abroad.

Direct action

The staple of special operations units, direct action operations involve getting close and personal with an enemy. CSOs are highly skilled in conducting direct action missions, which involve seizing, destroying, capturing, or recovering enemy targets and personnel. The proficiency of these operators in close-quarters combat, marksmanship, and tactical operations allows them to infiltrate enemy lines, execute precise strikes, and neutralize high-value targets with precision and efficiency. This role is essential for disrupting enemy operations and reducing an enemy’s ability to threaten national security.

Special reconnaissance

A Critical Skills Operator with 2d Marine Raider Battalion, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, wait for a helicopter extract during training at Atlantic Airfield, N.C., Dec. 16, 2015. The training was part of a four-day exercise that included eight day and night missions. (Photo by Sgt. Donovan Lee/MARSOC)

Special reconnaissance is an under-discussed special operations mission set, but it’s an essential part of planning complex combat operations. During special reconnaissance missions, CSOs gather intelligence, through clandestine means, on enemy activities, composition, and capabilities. This intelligence is valuable to commanders, aiding in decision-making and influencing the overall success of a mission. To collect intelligence in hostile environments, CSOs have to integrate into local populations to develop deep and reliable sources for vital information.

Foreign internal defense

Perhaps one of the most relevant mission sets in the modern world is foreign internal defense, or the training and advising of partner forces. During foreign internal defense operations, CSOs work closely with partner forces around the world to build up capabilities and enhance relationships with friends. Foreign Internal Defense focuses on training and supporting friendly forces to enable them to better face off threats.

Excellent cultural skills and proficiency in foreign languages allow CSOs to work directly with partner forces and forget important relationships that can come in handy in contingencies.

Unconventional warfare

Operational Detachment Alpha Special Forces Soldiers and Marines with 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion conduct movement to a Landing Zone for a low altitude drop resupply at Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, Calif., Aug 5, 2018. The purpose of this training was for Army Special Forces and MARSOC to improve upon their joint training techniques. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. William Chockey)

Much like their Army Green Berets brethren, CSOs possess the expertise to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations, which involve organizing, training, and leading unconventional warfare forces. Often, these forces consist of resistance movements or indigenous personnel that aim to overthrow an existing government or resist an invader. CSOs provide both strategic guidance and tactical leadership, assisting these forces in achieving their objectives while operating in a non-permissive or denied environment.

One of the best recent examples of a successful unconventional warfare campaign was the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 after Green Berets and CIA paramilitary personnel linked up with the Northern Alliance resistance group.

Counterterrorism

CSOs are also trained in counterterrorism operations. As highly trained special operators, Marine Raiders work to prevent, disrupt, and respond to terrorist activities. This involves gathering intelligence on terrorist networks, conducting raids to capture or eliminate high-value targets, and working closely with other specialized units to combat this ongoing threat to national and international security.

Campaigns against the Islamic State (ISIS) are one example of recent counterterrorism operations in which MARSOC played an important role.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster response

Marine Raiders may be highly trained warfighters, but Critical Skills Operators are also ready to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response in times of crisis, and numerous times in the past, U.S. special operators have come to the aid of foreign countries facing natural catastrophes.

CSOs have the skills to rapidly deploy and provide support in disaster-stricken areas, offering medical aid, logistics support, and security in coordination with other agencies. Their ability to adapt to unpredictable and challenging environments makes them invaluable in providing relief and aid.

Although not a combat mission set, humanitarian assistance and disaster response goes a long way in building trust and strengthening relationships with foreign partners, which is emphasized by America’s National Security Strategy and is an essential component of defending American and allied interests abroad.

Read more from Sandboxx News

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sandboxx.us · April 3, 2024

18. The Technological Pivot of History: Power in the Age of Exponential Innovation

The Technological Pivot of History: Power in the Age of Exponential Innovation

By Mohammed Soliman

.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/04/the_technological_pivot_of_history_power_in_the_age_of_exponential_innovation_1022848.html

Bottom Line

• The Technological Pivot of History argues that global dynamics hinge on geographical control and mastery of disruptive technological innovation, which fundamentally reshapes the criteria for geopolitical influence.  
• The U.S.-China tech Cold War exemplifies how nations are engrossed in an all-out race for technological supremacy, drawing new geopolitical lines around the control of artificial intelligence and the flow of data.
• Major and regional powers, including emerging nations, are developing their technology doctrines, disrupting the global technology landscape. Rising powers are pushing boundaries and challenging established leaders, promising to reshape the world through innovation.
• The race for technological supremacy will define the new hierarchies of power, challenging nations to adapt to the transformative forces of technology. The digital divide threatens to leave certain states on the sidelines of this historical pivot.

Just as Halford Mackinder, in his seminal work The Geographical Pivot of History, argued that control over the Eurasian heartland held the key to global mastery, the world stands at the precipice of another pivotal shift—one driven not by geography, but by the relentless force of exponential technological innovation. This is the age of the Technological Pivot of History, where the balance of power hinges not only on landmasses but also on the ability to harness and wield the ever-evolving arsenal of technological advancements.

The pace of innovation today is nothing short of breathtaking. Moore’s Law, what was once a simple observation, has morphed into a self-actualizing prophecy, with processing power doubling roughly every two years. This exponential growth isn’t confined to silicon valleys—it’s reshaping every facet of human lives, from the microscopic to the macroscopic. Transistors, the building blocks of chips, are now routinely crammed into spaces smaller than the width of a human hair. This miniaturization, driven by Moore’s Law, has fueled the rise of smartphones that outperformed desktop computers just a decade ago and unleashed the potential for even more powerful AI applications like autonomous vehicles and real-time medical diagnostics. Generative AI, a subfield focused on creating new content, is already producing stunning results. Tools like DALL-E 2 can generate photorealistic images from mere text descriptions, while GPT-3 and Google Bard can write convincing human-quality prose poems and even code. As these models grow more sophisticated, their parameters, the variables that define their behavior, become increasingly complex, opening a vast universe of creative and exponential possibilities.

Robotics and automation are transforming industries, from manufacturing to agriculture. Automated assembly lines are churning out goods with unprecedented efficiency, while robots are tending crops and managing livestock with precision. These advancements are not only boosting productivity but also create new opportunities for human-robot collaboration Looking at an example that’s even more impressive, consider the revolutionary field of DNA testing. Once relegated to expensive research labs, genetic analysis is now accessible to the masses. Companies like 23andMe and AncestryDNA offer affordable kits that unlock previously unknown family history and even predict predisposition to certain diseases. This democratization of genetic information is leading to breakthroughs in personalized medicine and understanding of human health.

The impact of these technological advancements extends far beyond technical improvements, fundamentally altering the power dynamics on the global stage. Just as empires of the past rose and fell based on their mastery of geography and resources, so too will future power dynamics be determined by technological prowess. The landscape of national strength is shifting. Territorial size, resource wealth, and even military might no longer guarantee supremacy. Instead, the ability to foster innovation, attract talent, and adapt will determine who thrives in this rapidly changing landscape. In recent decades, the exponential growth of technology has redefined state sovereignty and hegemony. New geopolitical lines will continue to be drawn around technology and the flow of information, whereby historically, they were formed geopolitically and by way of traditional military superiority. Thus, technology is central to the balance of power. In recent years, it’s become clear that the United States and China are locked in a tech-fueled great power competition, with implications spanning from cyber warfare to intellectual property, from data to AI, and from undersea cables to low-orbit satellites.

The intensifying competition in the cyber and technology domain, often referred to as the “U.S.-China tech Cold War,” is prompting major and regional powers to develop their own cyber and technology doctrines. From the chokepoint of Dutch chipmaking to the ambitious AI programs of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, a new wave of rising powers is disrupting the global technology landscape. East Asian shipyards, led by Japan and Korea, now churn out the giants that traverse the world’s oceans, while India and Vietnam witness an industrial revolution. In the skies, Turkey has carved a niche as a drone superpower, with its Bayraktar TB2s becoming a sought-after commodity. These nations are not just catching up, they’re pushing boundaries, shaping the future of technology, and challenging established leaders in a race for innovation that promises to reshape the world. Their technology doctrines reflect the growing recognition that technological prowess can be a significant power multiplier in the current multipolar and volatile world.

The United States, a long-time trailblazer in technology innovation, now faces greater scrutiny from other nations observing the impact of its tech capabilities on its past geopolitical standing. Case in point: U.S. technology played a vital role in the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict, supporting Ukrainian efforts to counter the Russian invasion. Unsurprisingly, China is pouring billions into AI research and development, aiming to achieve dominance in a technology poised to revolutionize every aspect of human life. Consider the United States, its Silicon Valley churning out disruptive technologies, but grappling with internal divisions and anxieties about the pace of change. The race for technological supremacy is on, and its outcome will define the new hierarchies of power.

Unlike the zero-sum battles for geographical control, the Technological Pivot offers the potential for shared gains amidst inequalities. However, the digital divide threatens to leave entire populations behind in the exponential age. Ethical considerations loom large. Questions of privacy, security, and the very nature of humanity in the age of machines demand urgent attention. Navigating this Pivot demands a paradigm shift in thinking about international cooperation on standards and regulations to ensure responsible and ethical use of technologies, as the use of technologies poses existential questions about our place in a world increasingly shaped by machines.

The Technological Pivot of History is a transformative era where the balance of power is no longer solely dictated by geography but by the ability to harness exponential technological innovation. As the world witnesses the escalating U.S.-China tech Cold War, it becomes evident that the race for technological supremacy is shaping the future hierarchies of power. The digital divide will be widened in the exponential age and threatens to leave entire nation-states on the sidelines of this Technological Pivot of History.

Mohammed Soliman is the director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Middle East Institute and a visiting fellow with the National Security Program at Third Way. He can be found on X at @Thisissoliman.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

19. Military personnel swear allegiance to the Constitution and serve the American people – not one leader or party

A very important reminder.

Military personnel swear allegiance to the Constitution and serve the American people – not one leader or party

1. Joseph G. Amoroso
2. Assistant Professor of American Politics, United States Military Academy West Point
3. Lee Robinson
4. American Politics Program Director, United States Military Academy West Point

theconversation.com · by Joseph G. Amoroso

In general, Americans don’t trust their government institutions as much as they used to – and that includes the military.

In part, that’s because the military can be used as a tool to gain a partisan advantage rather than as a professional group that should be trusted by both parties. For instance, the day he was inaugurated as president, Donald Trump spoke at a luncheon and pointed to retired Marine four-star generals John Kelly and James Mattis, who were serving in his cabinet. “See my generals,” he said. “Those generals are going to keep us so safe.” This was the first of many times that he referred to top-ranking military officers, whether active-duty or retired, as “my generals” – rather than as military leaders who serve the nation as a whole.

The former president’s actions, while perhaps gaining the most attention, reflect a trend among recent presidential candidates, both Democrats and Republicans, who emphasize their connections to the military.

President Joe Biden has claimed he had support from numerous four-star military officers and cited his years of interactions with retired Army Gen. Lloyd Austin as justification for a congressional waiver for Austin to serve as secretary of defense.

We are active duty Army officers who teach at West Point and instruct a mandatory course for cadets on the Constitution and American politics. We are concerned about the implication that the military somehow owes allegiance to specific individuals. Military officers do take an oath upon commissioning – but not to a person. Our oath is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

The Constitution sets the foundation for civilian control of the military.

The Constitution as curriculum

The foundation of what we teach at West Point is that the military’s allegiance is to a system of government codified in the Constitution. Article I of the Constitution says that Congress declares war and funds the military. Article II of the Constitution makes clear that the military must follow the orders of the democratically elected civilian president. The Framers of the Constitution shared authority over the military among elected officials to ensure no one person has unchecked power to direct the military, and that the actions of the military are beholden to the public it serves.

The course we teach provides context and depth for cadets to understand their oath. On their first day at West Point, cadets take an oath to the Constitution. When they graduate, they take a similar oath, also to the Constitution, as they transition from cadet to military officer. Graduations, promotions, reenlistments and other major milestones are commemorated by service members reaffirming their commitment to the Constitution.

New West Point cadets take an oath to support the Constitution.

We are West Point graduates ourselves and have been taught, as we now teach, that our oath forms the basis of a nonpartisan ethic. In the U.S., unlike in many other countries, the oath implies military leaders should be trusted for their expertise and judgment, not for their loyalty to an individual or political party. We emphasize to cadets the rules and professional expectations associated with this profound responsibility.

We explain that they will likely face challenges that cannot be addressed by the text of their oath. We teach cadets that when the rules are vague or inadequate, they should live and lead without political partisanship and in ways that will maintain the trust of the elected leaders and the American public they serve.

Our assessments of students’ learning provide evidence that our lessons are working. Among the concepts taught, cadets demonstrate the largest growth in understanding the Constitution’s provisions for civilian control of the military and the expectation of nonpartisanship.

Moreover, we find that by the end of the course, their increased political awareness and understanding corresponds with less cynicism about the state of American politics.

Our course and similar efforts at the other service academies teach future officers to internalize the importance of their oath to the Constitution, especially in the current hyperpartisan political climate.

From students to stewards

We also expect that these lessons will extend well beyond the cadets in our classrooms. When they graduate, they will begin leading soldiers. As stewards of the military profession, officers shape the values and behaviors of all service members throughout their military careers.

More than 80% of the military is comprised of noncommissioned officers and enlisted service members. Most of them do not receive the same sort of instruction on the oath and the importance of a nonpartisan military.

Gen. George Washington, here wearing the light blue commander-in-chief sash, insisted on soldiers remaining citizens, and loyal to the nation as a whole, rather than to specific commanders or leaders. Charles Willson Peale/White House Historical Association via Wikimedia Commons

They also take a slightly different oath that has changed over the years as the relationship between the military and society evolved. While both officers and enlisted service members swear first to support and defend the Constitution, enlisted service members also commit to obeying the orders of the president and the officers appointed over them. This added provision could be construed as a weakness, or as a justification for soldiers to prioritize obedience to a person over principles.

We believe concerns about enlisted personnel’s oath to obey the president are overstated, for two reasons. First, in terms of both demographics and political preferences, enlisted soldiers are more representative of the wider society they serve than are the officers who lead them.

This combination of diverse backgrounds and interests among the ranks of citizen-soldiers follows the logic behind the Constitution that we teach our cadets. By encompassing a greater variety of different interests, it is less probable that any group bent on acting outside of the military’s rules and expectations could act together with such strength as to overthrow civilian authority.

Second, the military remains a hierarchical institution, in which decisions are made and resources are allocated by officers in the chain of command. No single officer or elected official can easily direct the military to take actions that violate both rules and professional expectations. This structure underscores the importance of officers’ education about the Constitution. As instructors of future officers, we know that the lessons we impart will not only influence a cohort of officers, but could also shape a generation of service members.

At the dawn of the republic, then-Gen. George Washington influenced the expectations of what it means to be a citizen-soldier. In a June 1775 letter that set the foundation for civilian control of the U.S. military, Washington emphasized that though he was serving in uniform, he was also part of the nascent nation’s democracy: “When we assumed the (role of) Soldier, we did not lay aside the (role of) Citizen.” That principle was later codified in the Constitution and in the military’s professional ethic.

In today’s contentious political environment, we believe that training and educating officers to live in accordance with Washington’s example is more important than ever. As fewer Americans know someone who is or has been involved in military service, we want the public to know that educating officers on their oath to the Constitution is and will continue to be a priority in shaping the future leaders of our military.

The views in the article are those of the authors and not the United States Military Academy, U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

theconversation.com · by Joseph G. Amoroso

20. Myanmar And Irregular Warfare In A Multipolar World – Analysis

Conclusion:

Ultimately, the insurgency in Myanmar provides a foretaste of the future political dynamics of insurgency. With the “War on Terror” rapidly passing into history and the advent of multipolar competition, insurgents and counter-insurgents will need to adapt to a different strategic zeitgeist. The extent to which they do so will determine their eventual success or failure.

Myanmar And Irregular Warfare In A Multipolar World – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · April 3, 2024

By Archishman Goswami

The civil war in Myanmar provides a vignette of what insurgency may look like in this new era. Myanmar is already a key region of concern for Indian policymakers.

Besides concerns emanating from a shared border, mutual people-to-people ties, and the security repercussions for India’s Northeast at a time when the region is developing into a fulcrum for New Delhi’s Act East policy, New Delhi’s policies are also shaped by the displacement of Pakistan by China within its strategic calculus—the latter being a more active participant within Myanmar’s security landscape, supporting a variety of belligerents including the Junta itself. Tactics and strategies employed by insurgents might, therefore, provide a glimpse into the future of insurgency amid multipolarity—the likely trends that may develop, and how they might help shape the coming global order.

What’s different?

The legacy of counterterrorism over the past two decades is deeply embedded within contemporary visualisations and praxis of insurgency and counterinsurgency and is unlikely to fade away anytime soon, as practitioners worldwide continue to draw lessons from recent examples such as the Israel-Hamas war. Yet the overarching backdrop of multipolarity will inevitably have a greater impact on the practice and politics of insurgency in the coming years.

Unlike the insurgencies occurring as part of the “War on Terror”, ‘great power insurgencies’—such as the one in Myanmar—serve to express the networked and horizontal structures of multipolarity defining modern international politics. The indictment of Yakuza boss Takeshi Ebisawa in February by US agencies on charges of nuclear proliferation from Myanmar to the Iranian government—the profits of which were to be divided between the Japanese national and an unnamed insurgent outfit in Myanmar—is demonstrative of a key feature of the international system that is likely to manifest in similar ways in future insurgencies.

First, the far-reaching ambitions that middle/regional powers such as Iran seek to exercise in pursuit of long-term strategic interests. As interconnectedness grows, and with it, the capabilities of extra-regional middle powers to derive outsized strategic dividends, insurgencies are likely to be driven by actors seeking to satisfy their demands. This would include organised criminal syndicates and disaffected militant organisations seeking to leverage their services for state support.

Regional connectivity programmes and access to/innovation in critical national infrastructure (CNI) also serve as physical manifestations of multipolar strategic competition and will come to define the trajectory that insurgencies such as the one in Myanmar may take in the future. Souring ties between India and China have increasingly come to manifest in Myanmar, where both countries vie for geopolitical influence by investing in CNI and regional connectivity projects. Evolving insurgent tactics in a world order characterised by multipolarity competition may therefore be characterised by overt proximity between militant actors and their state backers seeking to disrupt or deny adversaries’ use of such physical projections of power.

Illustrative of the interconnected character of the modern world order, insurgent attacks on supply chains and CNI in war zones may have wider implications. It can grant governments the leverage needed to gain concessions from the other side—for instance, the attacks on the India-funded Kaladan Multimodal Transport Corridor in Myanmar by the pro-China ethnic armed organisation (EAO) the Arakan Army. Through its deliberate disruption of movement along the corridor and subsequent initiation of negotiations with Indian authorities to presumably reopen it, the Arakan Army illustrates yet another insurgent strategy in the Myanmar civil war that, while common, will become a more central element of irregular warfare in the future.

Situating China

Likewise, the civil war in Myanmar provides insight into China’s potential growth as a security actor in both the land and the maritime domains. While China’s emergence as a revisionist force in international security has been marked, among other factors, by its growing maritime belligerence in the Indo-Pacific, the civil war in Myanmar and China’s role within it has provided observers with a glimpse into Beijing’s strategies towards land-based insurgencies in a multipolar world order.

China’s support for both the Junta and rebel groups conducting operations under the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) is reflective of both its strategy of mitigating losses through the establishment of relations with both sides in a conflict, but also Beijing’s immediate strategic concerns and lack of control over ongoing developments. Launched in October 2023 as a coordinated offensive by the TBA, sanctioned by China, against the Junta and organised criminal syndicates colluding with it, Operation 1027 reflected China’s success in maintaining a long-term political presence within Myanmar—establishing contingencies through close ties with the rebel groups, while parallelly continuing to cooperate with the Junta through arms sales, economic cooperation and diplomatic support. Such a strategy may be demonstrative of China’s reach, and how it seeks to leverage it for geopolitical gain. Indeed, the TBA has sought to vocalise its closeness to Beijing by amplifying concerns surrounding the entrenchment of criminal organisations within Myanmar’s political landscape as it was aware of Chinese security concerns about illicit activities by regional criminal syndicates along the border and their close ties with the military.

Strategies such as these may provide a glimpse of the means that China may employ by leveraging insurgencies to exercise political will. Supporting belligerent sides, and using one to weaken another to make strategic gains, before calibrating its political influence with either to broker agreement and hence, deepen its economic and political presence vis-à-vis ‘adversary’ states appears to be a strategy that China may use in the future insurgencies. Recent cases, such as the China-brokered ceasefire between the Junta and the TBA, seem to prove this point. A line of policy such as this also highlights the influence of multipolarity on the politics of such conflicts in the future. By intervening first and extending a strategic choice to both sides of an insurgency, China can leverage its presence to exercise greater strategic power vis-à-vis other states.

However, China’s decision to sanction Operation 1027 also reflects the limits of its power and a potential vulnerability which may continue to characterise its approach towards regional small wars in the future. The fact that the Junta only distanced itself somewhat from organised criminal syndicates after a China-backed insurgent offensive despite its supposedly close ties with Beijing—and even then, openly sanctioning anti-Chinese mass protests in its aftermath—proves that Chinese influence in local insurgencies can only go so far.

Ultimately, the insurgency in Myanmar provides a foretaste of the future political dynamics of insurgency. With the “War on Terror” rapidly passing into history and the advent of multipolar competition, insurgents and counter-insurgents will need to adapt to a different strategic zeitgeist. The extent to which they do so will determine their eventual success or failure.

• About the author: Archishman Goswami is a postgraduate student studying the MPhil International Relations programme at the University of Oxford.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation

eurasiareview.com · April 3, 2024

21. Israel Unleashed?

Excerpts:

Israel might see such risks as manageable. But an increased sense of impunity is not just a risk for Israel; it’s a dangerous posture that could directly endanger American interests and lives. After previous Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria before the Gaza war, Iran chose to retaliate against U.S. troops through its militia forces in Iraq and Syria. Starting in 2021, Iranian-backed groups launched more than 80 attacks on U.S. forces, until an informal de-escalation deal was reached between Iran and the United States in mid-2023. After the war in Gaza began, attacks on American forces resumed, and with more intensity. In January, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq carried out a drone attack that killed three U.S. military personnel in Jordan. In response, the United States launched a series of retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Syria. Since the American attack, there has been a lull in violence against U.S. troops in the region. Now with the Israeli strike in Damascus, this pause may be in jeopardy. Within hours of the Israeli strike, U.S. troops stationed in Syria shot down an attack drone flying nearby.

The Gaza war seems to be reinforcing already strong Israeli incentives for more, not less, military escalation with Iran. Israeli leaders have been working under the assumption—both before and after Gaza—that the conflict with Iran can remain contained as Israel accomplishes its goals of degrading the Iranian axis while improving ties with Arab states similarly wary of Iran. Those assumptions were flawed even before October 7. But in the midst of a sustained assault on Gaza and the killing of Palestinian civilians at a previously unimaginable scale, Israel is playing with fire. The risk is that, at some point, Israel will pay a higher price for its attacks than it anticipated. And in that scenario, it is likely that the United States will pay as well.

Israel Unleashed?

A Brazen Campaign Against Iranian Targets Could Backfire

By Dalia Dassa Kaye

April 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Dalia Dassa Kaye · April 4, 2024

On April 1, Israel launched its latest attack on Iran in the two countries’ ongoing shadow war, with an airstrike that flattened a section of Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus and reportedly killed at least 12 people. Among the dead was Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who headed Iran’s military operations in Syria and Lebanon, where he worked for decades and became a close interlocutor with Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The strike also killed Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi, Zahedi’s deputy, and at least five other officers in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Israel crossed a new line with the strike on Iran’s diplomatic compound, which Iran and many other governments see as tantamount to striking Iranian territory itself. The decision to target high-level officials at that location may reflect the Israeli government’s belief that now is its moment to act against Iranian military targets, wherever they may be, with relative impunity. From Israel’s perspective, Iran is constrained enough that it will be unlikely to respond in ways that could lead to an uncontrollable outbreak of regional war. That is, Israel may view the Gaza war as expanding rather than constraining its room to maneuver against Iran and its allies. If that is the case, it’s possible that the Israelis are underestimating the unpredictability of the current regional climate. The attack may prove to be a miscalculation that leads to dangerous outcomes, not just for Israel but also for the entire region.

OUT OF THE SHADOWS

Israel’s campaign against Iranian-linked targets in Syria did not start after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, even if Israel’s strikes appear to have intensified since the war in Gaza started. Israel has been engaged in what Israeli security experts have dubbed a “campaign between the wars” in Syria for over a decade, part of a sustained effort to degrade Iranian-linked militia groups. The scale and nature of Israeli attacks have shifted over the years from a focus on striking Iranian weapons transfers and munition sites to a more targeted campaign to kill key operational and intelligence leaders in Iran’s network, including increasingly senior Iranian military personnel.

Indeed, the latest strike follows a pattern of Israeli attacks on high-value Iranian targets in Syria and beyond in recent months. Iran accused Israel of killing a top IRGC commander in an airstrike in Damascus in December, and the following month an Israeli airstrike there killed an Iranian intelligence head and several other IRGC members. In February, Israeli air attacks in Damascus again targeted senior members of the IRGC as well as Hezbollah, which has also faced an uptick in Israeli strikes.

Since the start of the war in Gaza, Israel has killed senior Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon and at least 150 Hezbollah fighters in response to multiple Hezbollah drone and antitank missile attacks on northern Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant acknowledged in February that Israel had “stepped up” attacks on Hezbollah with heavier bombs and targets deeper into Lebanese territory. Israeli forces also killed the deputy head of Hamas, Saleh al-Arouri, in a drone strike in Beirut in early January, marking a clear escalation; previous Israeli strikes were largely contained to the border area between Israel and Lebanon. On March 29, Israeli airstrikes killed dozens of Syrian soldiers and Hezbollah militants near Aleppo.

Although Israel has been striking Iranian targets in Syria for years, its attacks since October 7 are taking place at a time when the entire region is on edge. The Iranian-backed, Yemeni-based Houthi militant group remains undeterred from attacking international shipping through the Red Sea. Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq have targeted U.S. forces. Meanwhile, continued clashes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah have displaced tens of thousands of civilians on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border. To be sure, it is not yet an all-out regional war, but military escalation continues on all fronts, and any lulls in violence are likely to be temporary as long as the bloodshed and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza continue. In this dangerous environment, there is an increasing risk that Israeli strikes on Iranian targets will lead to blowback.

A PAPER TIGER?

After Hamas’s unprecedented attacks on October 7, Israel could have scaled back its wider regional campaign against Iran as it focused on the imminent threats emanating from Gaza, particularly given that Hezbollah did not appear eager to join Hamas’s fight. Israel could have adjusted its regional campaign in light of the increased regional volatility, especially in view of the strong U.S. desire to contain the war and avoid a direct confrontation with Iran, a preference shared by Israel’s Arab neighbors.

But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his emergency war cabinet appear to be choosing a different route. Six months into the war, Israel is doubling down on its regional campaign. This is the logical extension of what Naftali Bennett, then Israel’s education minister, dubbed “the octopus doctrine” in 2018. Israel believes it needs to confront Iran directly and not just go after the proxy forces that serve as its enemy’s tentacles throughout the region. Following this strategy, Israel must hold Iran accountable for the actions of its regional militias, even if Iran has varying degrees of control over the different groups in its decentralized network. There is strong support from the Israeli public and across the Israeli political spectrum for this approach.

Some observers believe that Israel is trying to provoke Iran into war. But the opposite logic may be playing out. Israel may be making the bet that Iran is more restrained and boxed in now because it is wary of retaliatory actions that could spark a direct Israeli attack. Israel sees Iran as being in a vulnerable political and economic position, even as many analysts believe that Iran has been bolstered by the Gaza war and its increased military alignment with Russia. Policymakers and analysts have debated Iran’s ability to respond to attacks ever since the United States killed General Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, in 2020. A common narrative within Israel is that Soleimani’s assassination revealed that Iran is a paper tiger: after promising to avenge Soleimani, the Iranians ultimately did very little. The competing interpretation is that the Soleimani killing in fact fostered increased militancy and threats against both Israel and the United States. The expanded capacities of Iranian-backed militant groups in recent years suggests that Soleimani’s killing did not fundamentally deter or diminish the ability of Iranian-backed actors to cause considerable damage across the region.

Israel crossed a new line with the strike on Iran’s diplomatic compound.

But Israel is not wrong in its observation that after the onslaught of Israeli attacks in Syria and Lebanon over the past six months, Iran and Hezbollah have done little to retaliate. The Israelis may view this moment, when they still have the full backing of Washington and already believe the world is against them, as an opportunity to further weaken Iran and its regional allies. Israel may feel confident that it can push boundaries without provoking Hezbollah or Iran into a direct war. In other words, the Israelis may not be escalating their military strikes to provoke Iran to directly enter the war; they might be escalating because they think the Iranians are likely to stay out.

A similar logic may be guiding Israeli calculations regarding Washington. Israel may believe it can keep pushing the limits on military escalation because it expects the United States to stay out of its way or may even tacitly support Israeli actions against groups that also threaten U.S. interests. The Biden administration’s track record of supporting Israeli military actions since October 7 would seem to bolster such assumptions. Despite the unease the Biden administration has expressed about the Israeli campaign in Gaza, U.S. military and political support for Israel remains unchanged.

FLIRTING WITH DISASTER

By assuming that it faces few constraints as it tries to weaken Iran and its proxies, Israel is taking a significant risk. Iran may feel the need to respond at some point against Israel directly, and it appears to be facing increasing pressure at home to do so. Reports of foiled Iranian plots to attack Israeli diplomatic facilities and civilians abroad suggest that Iran’s failure to retaliate directly against Israeli interests isn’t for a lack of trying. Iraqi militia forces are already starting to attack Israel, launching a drone attack on an Israeli naval base in Eilat the night before Israel’s latest strike in Damascus. The Houthis in Yemen have aimed missiles at southern Israel as well.

Israel might see such risks as manageable. But an increased sense of impunity is not just a risk for Israel; it’s a dangerous posture that could directly endanger American interests and lives. After previous Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria before the Gaza war, Iran chose to retaliate against U.S. troops through its militia forces in Iraq and Syria. Starting in 2021, Iranian-backed groups launched more than 80 attacks on U.S. forces, until an informal de-escalation deal was reached between Iran and the United States in mid-2023. After the war in Gaza began, attacks on American forces resumed, and with more intensity. In January, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq carried out a drone attack that killed three U.S. military personnel in Jordan. In response, the United States launched a series of retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Syria. Since the American attack, there has been a lull in violence against U.S. troops in the region. Now with the Israeli strike in Damascus, this pause may be in jeopardy. Within hours of the Israeli strike, U.S. troops stationed in Syria shot down an attack drone flying nearby.

The Gaza war seems to be reinforcing already strong Israeli incentives for more, not less, military escalation with Iran. Israeli leaders have been working under the assumption—both before and after Gaza—that the conflict with Iran can remain contained as Israel accomplishes its goals of degrading the Iranian axis while improving ties with Arab states similarly wary of Iran. Those assumptions were flawed even before October 7. But in the midst of a sustained assault on Gaza and the killing of Palestinian civilians at a previously unimaginable scale, Israel is playing with fire. The risk is that, at some point, Israel will pay a higher price for its attacks than it anticipated. And in that scenario, it is likely that the United States will pay as well.

• DALIA DASSA KAYE is a Senior Fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and a Fulbright Schuman Visiting Scholar at Lund University.

Foreign Affairs · by Dalia Dassa Kaye · April 4, 2024

22. A double dose of hell: The Bataan Death March and what came next

We must not forget this tragic, horrific, but also heroic history.

A double dose of hell: The Bataan Death March and what came next

https://www.cnn.com/travel/bataan-death-march-intl-hnk-ml-dst?cid=ios_app&utm

By Brad Lendon, CNN

 10 minute read 

Published 10:06 PM EDT, Tue April 2, 2024

58 comments

A diorama outside the Bataan World War II Museum in Balanga, Philippines, depicts the surrender of US forces to Japanese commanders on April 9, 1942. Brad Lendon/CNN

Balanga, PhilippinesCNN — 

On the grounds of an elementary school in a small Philippine town, the fuse was lit on one of the worst war crimes of the 20th century while at the same time setting in motion one of the greatest survival stories in US military history.

The main feature of the Bataan World War II Museum behind Balanga Elementary School is a life-size diorama of the surrender of the US forces in the Philippines to Japanese commanders on April 9, 1942.

The museum itself is tiny, taking up less than two floors of a building that doesn’t seem much bigger than a modern American suburban house. There are some displays of the weapons of the Bataan campaign, bits of a wreckage, a few personal items, wall art with bullet points of World War II and the fighting in the Philippines. The diorama sits outside its entrance.

It hardly seems enough to remember what it represents – the largest surrender of US military forces in history.

Maj. Gen. Edward P. King (second from left) discusses preliminary terms of surrender on Bataan with Japanese officers following battles along Bataan and Corregidor. Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

Hours after that surrender, tens of thousands of Filipino and American troops began the Bataan Death March, a five-day, 65-mile trek to a prison camp to the north, during which they were denied food and water amid searing heat.

Thousands would die. Others would show unimaginable resilience.

The Battle of Bataan

As Japanese planes were bombing Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, Tokyo’s forces were also making their first attacks on other US military positions in the Pacific. And the Philippines was a key target.

Then a US commonwealth, the Philippines was home to some 20,000 US troops. About 100,000 Filipinos were also attached to the US Army by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1941 and the combined force was known as the US Army in the Far East (USAFFE).

Two weeks after its first aerial attacks on December 8, 1941, Japan’s main invasion force landed on the main Philippine island of Luzon, and in just over three months pushed the US and Filipino defenders into the Bataan Peninsula, across Manila Bay from the Philippine capital.

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Bataan Peninsula

The plan of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the US commander in the Philippines, had been for his forces to hold out on the southern part of the peninsula until the US Navy could deliver reinforcements and supplies to the besieged defenders.

But the Americans and Filipinos quickly ran out of ammunition, medicine and food, and the commander on Bataan, Gen. Edward King, went against his superior’s orders and told his troops to lay down their arms, accepting personal responsibility for the defeat.

“You men remember this. You did not surrender … you had no alternative but to obey my order,” he said.

Accounts from the time said King asked for assurances from the Japanese officer accepting the surrender, Col. Matoo Nakayama, that his troops be treated humanely.

“We are not barbarians” was the Japanese reply.

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A post-war trial would find the Japanese commander in the Battle of Bataan and the man responsible for the troops that carried out the Death March, Gen. Masaharu Homma, guilty of war crimes. He was executed in 1946.

The Death March

That surrender site in Balanga doesn’t mark the beginning of the Bataan Death March. Some of the troops came from Marileves on the peninsula’s southern tip and Bagac on the west coast. But all would pass Balanga as they moved north.

The march’s route now looks like a roadway you could see many places in the world. Trucks and cars share the pavement with the ubiquitous motorized tricycles and jeepneys that provide public transport in the Philippines.

It passes McDonald’s and Jollibee restaurants, strip malls and car dealerships, farm fields and under-construction housing developments touting the latest in luxury living at affordable prices.

But in 1942, it was hell on Earth.

The American and Filipino POWs were put in groups of 100 men each, with four Japanese guards per group, according to a US Army history. They marched four abreast in “blistering” heat.

American and Filipino prisoners of war captured by the Japanese are shown at the start of the Death March after the surrender of Bataan on April 9 near Mariveles in the Philippines in 1942 during World War II. Starting on April 10 from Mariveles, on the southern end of the Bataan Penisula, 70,000 POWs were force-marched to Camp O'Donnell, a new prison camp 65 miles away. AP

Survivor James Bollich recounted the suffering in a 2012 interview with the Air Force News Service.

“They beat us with rifle butts, sabers, clubs, anything they could get their hands on. That went on all day long. They wouldn’t let anybody have a drink of water or let us rest, and they didn’t feed us,” Bollich said.

“Once anybody collapsed, the Japanese immediately killed them,” he said. “It looked like they were really trying to kill us all.”

White markers along a highway on the Bataan Peninsula show the route from the 1942 Bataan Death March. Brad Lendon/CNN

Today the route is marked by occasional white concrete markers by the roadside, some remembering those who were on it, like one at kilometer 24, dedicated to the memories of “J.B. McBrid (sic) and Tillman R. Rutledge, two buddies who walked the Bataan Death March.”

A marker for kilometer 100, in front of the veterans cemetery on the former US Clark Air Base, just says “Death March.”

Death in boxcar

For the thousands of US and Filipino POWs, the trek from Bataan to the detention facility at the former US military Camp O’Donnell in Capas, to the north of the peninsula, was not entirely on foot.

From a railhead in San Fernando to another about five miles from the prison camp, the POWs were jammed into boxcars for about 30 miles (48 kilometers) of their journey.

The smallest of these boxcars were about 240 square feet (22 square meters) on the interior. With wooden sides, metal roofs and only a small slit for ventilation, they became ovens for the 100 or more POWs in each.

The last of their kind sits today on the Capas National Shrine, erected on the site of the former Camp O’Donnell, but a visitor could easily miss it.

A boxcar used during the infamous 1942 Bataan Death March, displayed at the Capas National Shrine in Tarlac Province, north of Manila. Kyodo News/Getty Images

It’s displayed off the parking area of the sprawling monument to the Philippines war dead. Unlike in 1942, a roof shields the boxcar. It’s almost a sanctuary from the burning sun on a March 2024 morning.

But on a nearby plaque are the accounts of those who survived a box car – maybe this very one – in 1942, and it’s spooky to be near it, to poke your head through its open door and imagine the horror it once held.

“We were herded into crowded boxcars like cattle getting ready for slaughterhouse… Men were fighting and struggling to keep a foothold and stand upright… The platform (of the boxcar) was a sea of filth from dysentery patients.”

And more.

“We were being cooked alive in a 110-degree oven; we sweated, sizzled, urinated, defecated… I saw a few who were fainting but had not an inch to fall on… I do not know how many of my comrades died in that car, there must have been at least 10.”

But for those POWs who lived, there would be unthinkable ordeals yet to come.

The Capas Concentration Camp

Standing on the grounds of the former Camp O’Donnell today, it’s impossible to imagine what it once was, a prisoner of war detention facility with conditions so bad Filipinos refer to it today as the Capas Concentration Camp.

More than 31,000 trees – each numbered in white numerals – have been planted on the 133-acre site to honor each of the fallen during the Death March. A 230-foot-high (70-meter) obelisk towers over stone walls with the names of the dead engraved on them.

It’s peaceful on this March morning, a lone visitor outnumbered by the two-person snack and souvenir stand staff.

A monolith at the Capas National Shrine to the Philippine victims of the Bataan Death March in 1942. Brad Lendon/CNN

In the late spring and early summer of 1942, more than 60,000 survivors of the death march were jammed onto the same real estate, according to a US Army history.

“There was little running water, sparse food, no medical care and only slit trenches along the sides of the camp for sanitation. The heat was intolerable, flies rose out of the latrines and covered the prisoners’ food,” the Army history says.

Around 400 POWs – Filipinos and Americans – would die each day, it says.

According to the US Navy’s History and Heritage Command, about 9,000 Americans made it to O’Donnell, and 17% of those died there.

The toll was far worse for the Filipinos. Some 26,000 died at Camp O’Donnell during its 73 days of operations, according to the US Defense Department’s POW/MIA Accounting Agency.

Off to the left of the main Filipino memorial at Capas, across the parking lot and tucked up against the site’s perimeter, is a memorial bearing names of the American victims of O’Donnell. Hundreds of them are etched in stone, now weathered by the heat and humidity of this part of Luzon island.

Like the museum back at the surrender site in Balanga, it hardly seems enough to the memories of those who had suffered so much.

Disabled Filipino World War II veteran and death march survivor Manuel Abrazado, 80, (L) and his comrade Emilio Aquino, 86, (R) look at the names of their comrades at the Capas National Shrine in northern Tarlac province on April 6, 2004 during a memorial day marking the fall of Bataan. Romeo Gacad/AFP/Getty Images

By midsummer 1942, the Japanese decided to close O’Donnell.

Over the next six months, Filipino POWs were gradually released back into the local population, after signing pledges not to take up arms against Japanese occupiers.

The Americans at O’Donnell were moved to another camp, Cabanatuan, about 50 miles (80 kilometers) to the west, where conditions were marginally better.

But by 1944, the resolve of American POWs would be tested again.

Thousands more of them would die. But a few would pull off one of the greatest but largely unheralded survival stories of World War II.

America’s worst maritime tragedy

There’s no memorial in the Philippines to the single biggest loss of life at sea in US history. But the grounds of the Capas monument are a good place to think about it because its roots run through there and back down to that surrender site in Balanga.

By 1944, Japan needed laborers to sustain its war effort in factories and mines and POWs were an easy source of manpower. And US forces island-hopping across the Pacific were closing in on the Philippines, looking to make good on Gen. MacArthur’s pledge of “I shall return.”

So the American POWs at Cabanatuan and other camps were loaded into the holds of cargo ships to be taken to Japan or its occupied territories.

The Bataan Peninsula as seen from the Mount Samat National Shrine, a monument topped with a giant memorial cross in memory of US and Philippine dead in World War II. The South China Sea is in the background. Brad Lendon/CNN

Conditions for prisoners on the ships were much like those boxcars on the death march, men packed so tightly there was no room to sit in darkened holds with no ventilation and temperatures well above 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38 degrees Celsius).

The Americans called them “hell ships.”

On October 24, 1944, one of those hell ships, the Arisan Maru, was steaming in the Bashi Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan with more than 1,700 American POWs in its holds when a US Navy submarine, mistaking the unmarked ship for a Japanese cargo or troop transport, struck it with a torpedo.

The old freighter broke apart and the POWs spilled into the South China Sea, according to accounts from some of the nine Americans who survived.

Four were picked up and taken back into custody by Japanese forces.

But five US soldiers, Lt. Robert Overbeck, Sgt. Calvin Graef, Pvt. Avery Wilber, Cpl. Donald Meyer and Pvt. Anton Cichy, would escape to freedom.

All but Meyer also survived the Bataan Death March.

According to their accounts, they were led by Overbeck, who like almost all of the POWs, was forced away from Japanese naval ships that could have rescued them.

But the lieutenant was lucky enough to find an Arisan Maru lifeboat left to float away after the Japanese crew that used it boarded a rescue ship. They’d also left a small amount of food and fresh water aboard.

Overbeck’s luck continued when the lifeboat bumped into a wooden crate that contained a sail.

A relief depicts the 1942 Bataan Death March on the Death March Memorial in Capas, Philippines. Brad Lendon/CNN

Eventually, four other POWs would join Overbeck aboard that lifeboat. And as the Army lieutenant, a civilian mining engineer in the Philippines when war broke out, had a bit of sailing experience, he was able to pilot the lifeboat about 250 miles toward the Chinese coast, on at least one occasion avoiding a Japanese warship in the South China Sea.

According to Overbeck’s account, posted online by his son Charles, they were taken aboard a local junk boat near the Chinese coast and from there were escorted inland, avoiding the Japanese occupiers.

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“For 12 days the five survivors were transported about 600 miles by foot, truck, bicycle and plane to Kunming airfield, base of the 14th Air Force and the former Flying Tigers,” according to a 2019 synopsis of the Arisan Maru sinking from the nonprofit research project Asia Policy Point.

The five survivors would fly west from Kunming aboard a US C-47 on November 28, 1944.

“We arrived in Washington, D. C. on December 1, 1944, via North Africa and the Atlantic,” Overbeck wrote.

“But it was mid-February before word was received from the Japanese through the Red Cross in Geneva that our ship had been sunk with no POW survivors. I saw the list with our names along with the rest – close friends, acquaintances, enemies and strangers.”

According to a US Naval History and Heritage Command webpage, 1,781 POWs, almost all American, were aboard Arisan Maru when it left the Philippines.

“This was the greatest US loss of life at sea,” it says.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com